Answer Key CPC
Answer Key CPC
1. d. Section 24 –
2. b. Section 35A-
3. c. Section 55
4. b. Order 16 Rule 1
5. d. Order 18 Rule 3A
6. b. Order 9 Rule 8 –
7. c. Order 9 Rule 13 Explanation –
8. c. Order 32 Rule 14 –
9. d. Order 39 Rule 3A –
10. c
11. a. Order 9 Rule 5 –
12. b. Order 22 Rule 6 –
13. b. Order 33 Rule 10 –
14. d. Order 40 Rule 1 –
15. d. -
16. a. Order 13 Rule 1 –
17. d. -
18. b. Order 21 Rule 85 –
19. b. Section 34(2)-
20. d. Order 8 Rule 6 –
21. d. Order 34 Rule 1 –
22. b. Order 26 Rule 10 –
23. d. Order 33 Rule 15A –
24. b Order 30 –
25. d. Order 29 Rule 2 –
26. d. Order 30 –
27. d. Order 31 Rule 1 –
31. d Order 21 R 11
32. c Order 21 R 51
33. c Order 21 R 82
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34. c Order 41 R 27
35. c Order 46 R 2
36. c Order 47 R 6
38.a
39.a .Order 33 R 13
40.b Order 36
41. Ans b
42. Ans d
43. Ans b
44. Ans a
46. (d) The amendments made in 1976 were not found sufficient. With a view to
dispose of civil cases expeditiously, Justice Malimath Committee was appointed by
the Government. In pursuance of recommendations of the Committee, the Code was
amended by the Amendment Acts of 19996 and 2002.7 Important amendments made
by Acts of 1999 and 2002 may be summarised thus: (i) In several matters, such as
issuing of summons, filing of written statement, amendment of pleadings, production
of documents, examination of witnesses, pronouncement of judgments, preparation of
decree, etc., a timelimit is prescribed; (ii) A new provision for settlement of disputes
outside the court has been introduced; (iii) Number of adjournments have been
restricted; (iv) A provision for recording of evidence by the Court Commissioner has
been made;
47. (d) Some of the important changes made by the Amendment Act, 1976 are as
under: (i) The doctrine of res judicata is being made more effective. (ii) Power to
transfer proceedings from one High Court to another is given to the Supreme Court.
(iii) Freedom from attachment of a portion of salary to all salaried employees, is
granted. (iv) Provision of giving notice under Section 80 before the institution of a suit
against the Government or a public officer is made less stringent. (v) Restrictions are
imposed on the right of appeal and revision. (vi) Provisions are being made to ensure
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that written statements and documents were filed without delay. (vii) New Order 32-A
has been inserted to provide a special procedure in litigation concerning the affairs of
a family. (viii) The practice to pass preliminary and final decree in certain suits is
abolished. (ix) Scope of Summary Trials is substantially widened. (x) Important
changes have been made to provide relief to poorer sections of the community.
48 (d). The following decisions, on the other hand, are held not to be decrees: (i)
Dismissal of appeal for default; (ii) Appointment of Commissioner to take accounts;
(iii) Order of remand; (iv) Order granting or refusing interim relief; (v) Return of
plaint for presentation to proper court; (vi) Dismissal of suit under Order 23 Rule 1;
(vii) Rejection of application for condonation of delay; (viii) Order holding an
application to be maintainable; (ix) Order refusing to set aside sale; (x) Order
directing assessment of mesne profits. (f) Classes of decrees
49. (a) It is well-settled that consent cannot confer nor take away jurisdiction of a
court. In the leading case of A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak8, Mukharji, J. (as he then
was) stated, "This Court, by its directions, could not confer jurisdiction on the High
Court of Bombay to try any case for which it did not possess...." It was further stated:
"The power to create or enlarge jurisdiction is legislative in character, so also the
power to confer a right of appeal or to take away right of appeal. Parliament alone can
do it by law and no court, whether superior or inferior or both combined, can enlarge
the jurisdiction of a court or divest a person of his rights of revision and appeal.
50. (b) In the case of Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan13, the Supreme Court observed:
"It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a court without
jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever
it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in
collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction ... strikes at the very authority of the
Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of
parties."
51 (d) The following are suits of a civil nature: (i) Suits relating to rights to property;
(ii) Suits relating to rights of worship; (iii) Suits relating to taking out of religious
processions; (iv) Suits relating to right to shares in offerings; (v) Suits for damages for
civil wrongs; (vi) Suits for specific performance of contracts or for damages for
breach of contracts; (vii) Suits for specific reliefs; (viii) Suits for restitution of
conjugal rights; (ix) Suits for dissolution of marriages; (x) Suits for rents; (xi) Suits
for or on accounts; (xii) Suits for rights of franchise; (xiii) Suits for rights to
hereditary offices; (xiv) Suits for rights to Yajmanvritis; (xv) Suits against wrongful
dismissals from service and for salaries, etc. (vi) Suits not of civil nature:
Illustrations—The following are not suits of a civil nature: (i) Suits involving
principally caste questions; (ii) Suits involving purely religious rites or ceremonies;
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52. (a) A sues B for possession of certain properties, on the basis of a sale deed in his
favour. B impugns the deed as fictitious. The plea is upheld and the suit is dismissed.
A subsequent suit for some other properties on the basis of the same sale deed is
barred as the issue about the fictitious nature of the sale deed was actually in issue in
the former suit directly and substantially.
53. (a) A sues B, C and D and in order to decide the claim of A, the court has to
interpret a will. The decision regarding the construction of the will on rival claims of
the defendants will operate as res judicata in any subsequent suit by any of the
defendants against the rest.
54. (b) A, a partnership firm, filed a suit against B to recover Rs 50,000. The suit was
dismissed on the ground that it was not maintainable since the partnership was not
registered as required by the provisions of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. The firm
was thereafter registered and a fresh suit was filed against B on the same cause of
action. The suit is not barred by res judicata.
55. (d) (i) Whereas res judicata results from a decision of the court, estoppel flows
from the act of parties. (ii) The rule of res judicata is based on public policy, viz., that
there should be an end to litigation. Estoppel, on the other hand, proceeds upon the
doctrine of equity, that he who, by his conduct, has induced another to alter his
position to his disadvantage, cannot turn round and take advantage of such alteration
of the other's position. In other words, while res judicata bars multiplicity of suits,
estoppel prevents multiplicity of representations. (iii) Res judicata ousts the
jurisdiction of a court to try a case and precludes an enquiry in limine (at the
threshold); estoppel is only a rule of evidence and shuts the mouth of a party.
56. (d) A sues B to recover damages for a breach of contract and obtains a decree in
his favour. B cannot afterwards sue A for recession of contract on the ground that it
did not fully represent the agreement between the parties, since that ground ought to
have been taken by him in the previous suit as a ground of defence. 5. A sues B for
possession of certain property alleging that it has come to his share on partition of
joint family property. B's contention that the partition has not taken place is upheld by
the court and the suit is dismissed. A subsequent suit by A against B for partition of
joint family property is not barred. 6. As a mortgagor A sues B for redemption of
certain property alleging that he has mortgaged it with possession to B. The mortgage
is not proved and the suit is dismissed. A files another suit against B for possession of
the same property claiming to be the owner thereof. The suit is not barred. 7. A sues B
to recover certain property alleging that B was holding the property under a lease,
which had expired. The lease is not proved and the suit is dismissed. A subsequent
suit by A against B on the basis of general title is not barred.
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57. (a) A sues B for the rent due. B pleads abatement of rent on the ground that the
actual area of the land is less than that mentioned in the lease deed. The court,
however, finds the area greater than that shown in the lease deed. The finding as to the
excess area, being ancillary and incidentally to the direct and substantial issue, is not
res judicata.
58. (a) In other words, the principle underlying Section 11, expressed in the maxim
"interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium" (it is in the interest of the State that there
should be an end to litigation) is founded on sound public policy and is of universal
application, otherwise great injustice might be done under colour and pretence of
law.176 The rule of res judicata is dictated by a wisdom which is for all times.
59.(a) In M.S.M. Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna190, for the first time, the Supreme
Court held that the general principle of res judicata applies even to writ petitions filed
under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. Thus, if once the petition filed under
Article 32 of the Constitution is dismissed by the court, subsequent petition is barred.
Similarly, if a writ petition filed by a party under Article 226 is considered on merits
as a contested matter and is dismissed, the decision thus pronounced would continue
to bind the parties unless it is otherwise modified or reversed in appeal or in other
appropriate proceedings permissible under the Constitution. It would not be open to a
party to ignore the said judgment and again move the High Court under Article 226 or
the Supreme Court under Article 32 on the same facts and for obtaining the same or
similar orders or writs.
60. (d) General principles.—In the leading case of Daryao v. State of U.P.214, the
Supreme Court has exhaustively dealt with the question of applicability of the
principle of res judicata in writ proceedings and laid down certain principles which
may be summarised thus: 1 If a petition under Article 226 is considered on the merits
as a contested matter and is dismissed, the decision would continue to bind the parties
unless it is otherwise modified or reversed by appeal or other appropriate proceedings
permissible under the Constitution. 2 It would not be open to a party to ignore the said
judgment and move the Supreme Court under Article 32 by an original petition made
on the same facts and for obtaining the same or similar orders or writs. 3 If the petition
under Article 226 in a High Court is dismissed not on the merits but because of laches
of the party applying for the writ or because it is held that the party had an alternative
remedy available to it, the dismissal of the writ petition would not constitute a bar to a
subsequent petition under Article 32. 4 Such a dismissal may, however, constitute a
bar to a subsequent application under Article 32 where and if the facts thus found by
the High Court be themselves relevant even under Article 32. 5 If the writ petition is
dismissed in limine and an order is pronounced in that behalf, whether or not the
dismissal would constitute a bar would depend on the nature of the order. If the order
is on the merits, it would be a bar.
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61. (d) Where a plaintiff is precluded by rules from instituting a further suit in respect
of any particular cause of action, he shall not be entitled to institute a suit in respect of
such cause of action in any court to which this Code applies.243 The Code of Civil
Procedure precludes a plaintiff from instituting a suit in the following cases: (1)
Section 11 — Where a suit is barred by res judicata. (2) Section 21-A — Where a
decree is sought to be challenged on objection as to territorial (and/or pecuniary)
jurisdiction of a Court. (3) Section 47(1) — Where questions relate to execution,
discharge or satisfaction of decree. (4) Section 95(2) — Where an order is made
determining an application for compensation for arrest, attachment or temporary
injunction. (5) Section 144(2)— Where restitution can be claimed. (6) Order 2 Rule
2— Where there is omission to sue in respect of part of claim by a plaintiff. (7) Order
9 Rule 9— Where a decree is passed against a plaintiff by default. (8) Order 11 Rule
21(2) — Where a suit is dismissed for non-compliance with an order of discovery. (9)
Order 22 Rule 9 — Where a suit has abated. (10) Order 23 Rule 1(1) — Where a suit
or part of a claim has been abandoned by a plaintiff. (11) Order 23 Rule 1(3) —
Where a suit or part of a claim has been withdrawn by a plaintiff without the leave of
the court. (12) Order 23 Rule 3-A — Where a compromise decree is sought to be
challenged on the ground that the compromise was not lawful.
62. (d) Section 13 embodies the principle of res judicata in foreign judgments. This
provision embodies the principle of private international law that a judgment delivered
by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction can be enforced in India. The section is
not confined in its application to plaintiffs. A defendant is equally entitled to non-suit
the plaintiff on the basis of a foreign judgment.
63. (d) In the following six cases, a foreign judgment shall not be conclusive: (1)
Foreign judgment not by a competent court; (2) Foreign judgment not on merits; (3)
Foreign judgment against International or Indian Law; (4) Foreign judgment opposed
to natural justice; (5) Foreign judgment obtained by fraud; and (6) Foreign judgment
founded on a breach of Indian Law. (1) Foreign judgment not by a competent court
65 a. -
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66. (d) A files a suit against B to recover possession of a house. He values his claim in
the plaint at Rs 8000. The suit is filed in court C, which has jurisdiction to try suits of
a value up to Rs 10,000. The market value of the house is Rs 12,000, but B does not
object to the jurisdiction of the court. The decree is passed in favour of A. In appellate
court, B cannot take the objection about the pecuniary jurisdiction of court C. Thus, in
Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, negativing the contention of the appellant that a mere
change of forum can be said to have caused prejudice to him, the Supreme Court
rightly observed: "If the fact of an appeal being heard by a Subordinate Court or
District Court where the appeal would have laid to the High Court if the correct
valuation had been given, is itself a matter of prejudice, then the decree passed by the
Subordinate Court must, without more, be liable to set aside, and the words 'unless the
overvaluation or undervaluation thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal of the
suit or appeal on its merits' would become wholly useless.
67. (c) A enters into an agreement jointly with B and C to sell 100 tins of oil. A
thereafter refuses to deliver the goods. Here both, B and C, have each of them a right
to recover damages from A. The said right arises out of the same transaction, namely,
the breach of agreement; and common questions of law and fact would also arise. B
and C, therefore, may file a suit jointly as plaintiffs against A for damages.
An altercation takes place between A on the one hand and B and C on the other. A
assaults B and C simultaneously. B and C may join as plaintiffs in one suit for
damages against A for that tortious act since both the above conditions are fulfilled. 3.
A agrees to sell and deliver 100 tins of oil to B at a particular rate on 1st January 1991.
He also agrees to sell and deliver a like quantity of oil on the same day at the same
price to C. B and C cannot join as plaintiffs in one suit against A as the transactions
are different.
68. (a) There is a collision between a bus and a car. The bus belongs to B and the car
belongs to C. As a result of the collision, A, a passer-by is injured. A may join B and
C as defendants in one suit for damages for injuries caused to him by negligence on
the part of both of them or any one of them, since the case involves common questions
of fact arising out of the same act, namely, collision of two vehicles.
69. (b) Rule 10(1) of Order 1 deals with striking out, addition and substitution of
parties. (i) Adding or substituting plaintiffs If after the filing of the suit, the plaintiff
discovers that he cannot get the relief he seeks without joining some other person also
as a plaintiff or where it is found that some other person and not the original plaintiff
is entitled to the relief, as prayed for, an application for addition or substitution of the
plaintiff can be made. The object underlying this provision is to save honest plaintiffs,
believing bona fide in the maintainability of their claims being non-suite
A sues B for possession of a house. B contends that since A has transferred the house
to C, he has no title to sue and the suit is, therefore, not maintainable. A maintains his
right contending that no transfer was made, but the contention is found to be false.
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Thereupon, A applies for adding Casa co-plaintiff. The application requires to be
rejected since the mistake was not found to be bona fide.
70. (a) Residential buildings were allotted by the Housing Board to the applicants who
belonged to the low-income group. After settlement of price, excess demand was
made by the Board. The allottees challenged the demand by filing a suit in a
representative capacity. It was contended that such a suit in a representative capacity
was not maintainable as separate demand notices were issued against each of the
allottees, giving rise to separate causes of action. Negativing the contention the
Supreme Court held that all of them had the same interest and, therefore, the suit was
maintainable.
71. (d) (2) A advances loan of Rs 2200 to B. To bring the suit within the jurisdiction
of court X, A sues B for Rs 2000 only. A cannot afterwards sue for Rs 200. (3) A sues
B for Rs 200. Against this claim, B claims set-off for Rs 200 being part of Rs 1200
due to B by A but omits to counterclaim the balance of Rs 1000. B cannot afterwards
sue A for Rs 1000. (4) A sues B for possession alleging that B is tenant in arrears. The
suit is dismissed on the ground that B is mortgagee in possession. A subsequent suit
by A against B for redemption is not barred.
72.(d) .133 (g) Exemption from appearance in person: No party shall be ordered to
appear in person: (a) unless he resides (a) within the local limits of the court's ordinary
original jurisdiction; or (b) outside such limits, but at a place less than (i) 50 miles; or
(ii) 200 miles (where public conveyance is available) from the courthouse;or (b) who
is a woman not appearing in public; or (c) who is entitled to exemption under the
Code.
73. (d) Such counterclaim has the effect of a cross-suit and the court can pronounce a
final judgment both on the original claim and the counterclaim. The counterclaim of
the defendant will be treated as a plaint and the plaintiff has a right to file a written
statement in answer to the counterclaim of the defendant. The effect of the
counterclaim is that even if the suit of the plaintiff is stayed, discontinued, dismissed
or withdrawn, the counterclaim will be decided on merits, and the defendant will have
a right to get a decree for a counterclaim as claimed in the written statement.
74. (d) The defendant, against whom an ex parte decree has been passed, has the
following remedies available to him: (1) to apply to the court by which such decree is
passed to set it aside: Order 9 Rule 13; or (2) to prefer an appeal against such decree:
Section 96(2) (or to file a revision under Section 115 where no appeal lies); (3) to
apply for review: Order 47 Rule 1; or (4) to file a suit on the ground of fraud.
75. (a) A, B and C are coparceners of joint Hindu family. They jointly execute a
mortgage in favour of X. X files a suit against all of them. Summons is served to C
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but not to A and B. None of them appears and an ex parte decree is passed against all.
A and B apply to set aside the ex parte decree. Here the decree being one and
indivisible, it ought to be set aside against C also.
A files a suit against B, C and D on a mortgage bond and gets an ex parte decree
against all of them. B alone applies to set it aside. Neither in the mortgage bond nor in
the plaint nor in the decree there is any specification of shares and liabilities of the
respective defendants. The decree must be set aside as a whole
A sues B and C on a promissory note. B is the principal debtor and C is the surety. An
ex parte decree is passed against both. B alone applies to set aside the decree and
shows sufficient cause for his absence. The decree must be set aside against C also
inasmuch as the liability of both is based on a common ground.
77. (c) The effect of setting aside an ex parte decree is that the suit is restored, and the
court should proceed to decide the suit as it stood before the decree. The trial should
commence de novo and the evidence that had been recorded in the ex parte
proceedings should not be taken into account.
78. (d) By the Amendment Act of 1976, Rules 10-A to 10-C have been inserted to
provide for issue of commissions for scientific investigation, sale of movable property
or performance of a ministerial act.
79. (a) The provisions of Order 21 (execution proceedings) will also apply to
attachment before judgment
Rules 5-13 of Order 38 deal with attachment before judgment.
The sole object behind the order levying attachment before judgment is to give an
assurance to the plaintiff that his decree if made would be satisfied.
80. (c) An order passed under Order 38 Rule 5 is appealable.107 (14) Revision An
order granting or refusing attachment before judgment is a case decided within the
meaning of Section 115 of the Code and is revisable by the High Court.
81. (c) An order passed on an application for appointment of receiver by allowing the
application or rejecting such application is a "case decided" within the meaning of
Section 115 of the Code. Hence, where no appeal lies, a revision is competent and
maintainable.
82. (a) The Plaintiff institutes the suit for recovery of Rs. 3 lacs by way of damages
for breach of contract against the defendant. It is the case of the plaintiff that the
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defendant had vide a lease deed dated 1st January, 2008 prepared on a stamp paper of
Rs. 50/-let out his property in Delhi to the plaintiff at a rent of Rs. 5,000/- and for a
period of ten years; that the defendant however without any reason and in breach of
the said lease terminated the said lease on 1st January 2010 only and also instituted a
suit for ejectment of the plaintiff. The plaintiff thus claimed damages of Rs. 3 lacs for
breach of contract. The defendant files an application for rejection of the plaint on the
ground that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action.
Further, from the facts of the case, it is apparent that there has been a breach of
contract by the defendant in as much as the plaintiff acted upon the lease and before
the expiry of term contemplated in the lease deed, the defendant terminated the lease
and also instituted a suit for ejectment of plaintiff. There is a valid cause of action
arising in favour plaintiff and against the defendant in the suit. Thus, the objection of
the defendant is not tenable and the suit filed by the plaintiff is maintainable.
83. (d) A applies for execution of a decree for possession against B. During the
pendency of the said execution, B dies on 10th March, 2008. A applies on 10th
September, 2008 for substitution of legal representatives of B in the execution. Is the
said application within time? Give reasons also. (10 marks)
Ans. The issue in the present case is with respect to the limitation for filing an
application for substitution of legal representatives of defendants in execution
proceedings.
There is no provision specifying the period of time within which an application for
substitution of legal representatives in an execution proceeding is to be filed.
However, in other cases, the limitation for filing application for substitution of legal
representatives is governed by Order 22.
Hence, the application of A filed on 10th September 2008 for substitution of legal
representatives of B in the execution is within time.
84. (b) The petitioner in a probate case examined an attesting witness to the Will who
was cross examined by the objector. The evidence of the objector has begun. The
objector wants to examine, as his own witness, the attesting witness to the Will whom
he had cross examined earlier. It is his case that the said attesting witness had on an
earlier occasion deposed under pressure from the petitioner and now wants to give the
correct statement. Whether the objector can be permitted to examine as his own
witness, the witness whom he had cross examined earlier? (10 marks)
Ans. The issue in the present case is whether the objector can be permitted to
examine as his own witness, the witness whom he had cross examined earlier on
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the ground that the said attesting witness has on an earlier occasion deposed
under pressure from the petitioner and now wants to give the correct statement.
Order 18 Rule 17 provides for recall and examination of witness. It states that the
court may at any stage recall any witness who has been examined and may put such
questions to him as the Court thinks fit. The provision is not applicable to the present
situation wherein the objector wants to recall witness to cross examine him on the plea
that the witness had earlier deposed under pressure from the petitioner and now wants
to give correct statement. Litigant cannot invoke Order 18, Rule 17 CPC or inherent
powers of the Court to recall witness who had earlier deposed against that litigant to
now depose in favour. If it is allowed then it would be a dilatory tactic in the hands of
the defendants.
85. (c) The plaintiff instituted a suit pleading that one A was the producer of certain
films, negatives whereof had been kept by him in the custody of defendant no. 3
laboratory for preservation; A died leaving the defendants No. 1 and 2 as his only
legal heirs; that upon the demise of A, defendants No. 1 and 2 had become the owners
of the films, negatives whereof were kept in the custody of the defendant no. 3; that
the defendants no. 1 and 2 had sold their rights in the said films/negatives in favour of
the plaintiff. The plaintiff thus sued for mandatory injunction for direction to
defendant no. 3 to deliver the negatives of the films to the plaintiff. The defendant No.
1 and 2 did not contest the suit. The defendant No. 3 files a written statement pleading
that A had kept the negatives with it for safe custody on payment of charges; that a
sum of Rs. 6 lacs was due to towards the said charges. One of the issues framed in the
suit was as to whether the defendant no. 3 was entitled to the sum of Rs. 6 lacs
towards charges for safe custody of the negatives. The defendant no. 3 did not lead
any evidence in the suit. Resultantly, the issue as to its entitlement to Rs. 6 lacs was
decided against it. The decree for mandatory injunction was passed directing the
defendant No. 3 to hand over the negatives to the plaintiff subject to payment of
appropriate charges. The plaintiff filed an application for execution. The defendant no.
3 again said that besides the sum of Rs. 6 lacs earlier stated, to be due, further amounts
had accrued towards charges for safe custody of the negatives. How would you
proceed with the execution?
Ans. The issue for consideration in the present application for execution is
whether the claim of Rs. 6 lacs & further charges of defendant no. 3 for sale
custody of negatives be decided in execution.
Section 47 of CPC provides that all questions arising between the parties to the suit in
which the decree was passed or their representatives and relating to the execution,
discharge or satisfaction of the decree shall be determined by the Court executing the
decree and not by separate suit.
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In the present case, the question of claim of defendant no. 3 is a question arising
between the parties relating to execution of decree which was passed in favour of
plaintiffs directing the defendant no. 3 to hand over the negatives to the plaintiff
subject to payment of appropriate charges. Hence, the claim of defendant no. 3 is Rs.
6 lacs & further amounts accrued towards charges for safe custody of the negatives
shall be decided by the executing Court in the execution proceeding itself & not by
separate Court.
86. (a) The application of the plaintiff under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC was
dismissed by the Trial Court. The plaintiff preferred an appeal against the said order.
However, after some arguments the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. The plaintiff
thereafter applied to the Trial Court for review of the order of dismissal of the
application. The defendant took a preliminary objection that an appeal having been
preferred and withdrawn, the plaintiff was not entitled to apply for review. Decide the
said preliminary objection to the maintainability of the review.
Ans. The issue in the present case is with respect to maintainability of review.
Order 47 provides for review. Rule 1 of Order 47 provides for grounds on which an
application for review can be allowed. An aggrieved person may apply for a review of
judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order –
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal
has been preferred;
In Rakesh Bhatia vs. Pramod Sharma, 162 (2009) DLT 452, wherein Delhi High
Court observed that an appeal would be preferred, the moment it is instituted and mere
institution of appeal would bar the review.
In the present case, an appeal was preferred by the plaintiff which was withdrawn
subsequently. Plaintiff thereafter cannot apply for review of order of dismissal of the
application.
87. (a) The court makes efforts for amicable settlement in a suit. Amicable settlement
is arrived at between the parties, the broad terms whereof are recorded by the court in
its order. The matter is adjourned for filing of an application under Order 23 Rule 3 of
the CPC by the parties. However, the defendant does not join in the said application.
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The plaintiff applies for decreeing the suit in terms of the compromise recorded in the
earlier order of the court. The defendant opposes. Decide. (10 marks)
Ans. The issue for consideration in the present case is whether the compromise
recorded in the earlier suit pending application under O 23 R. 3 is valid and
binding or not.
O 23 Rule 3 provides that the Court shall pass a decree in accordance with the
satisfaction, agreement or compromise so recorded. The said satisfaction, agreement
or compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties.
In the present case, an amicable settlement was arrived at between the parties by the
Court and the terms thereof were recorded by the Court in it’s order.
The said terms of settlement was neither made in writing nor signed by the parties. It
was a decision of the Court. Further, an application under Order 23 Rule 3 of CPC
was filed by the parties which was pending in Court with respect to the earlier
compromise. Since the defendant did not join the said application, no compromise
decree could have come into existence. In view of the same, the plaintiff cannot apply
for decree in terms of the earlier order of the Court since it was not a compromise in
terms of Order 23 Rule 3 on having failed to fulfill all requirements of the provision.
88. (b) B is a tenant of A in a premises governed by the Rent Control Act where under
notwithstanding a contract to the contrary B can be evicted from the premises only on
a ground provided under the Rent Act. A in or about January, 2008 institutes a petition
for eviction against B on the ground of misuse of the tenancy premises by A. A
thereafter in or about August 2008, while the earlier petition for eviction is still
pending, institutes another petition for eviction against B on the ground of B having
sub-let a portion of the tenancy premises in 2006 to C. B in defence to the second
petition states that the same is barred by Order 2, Rule 2 and/or the proceedings
therein are liable to be stayed under section 10 of CPC. Decide the said plea of B.
Ans. The issue for consideration in the present suit is whether the subsequent
petition for eviction against B on the ground of B having sub-let a portion of the
tenancy premises in 2006 to C is barred by Order 2 Rule 2 and/or the
proceedings therein are liable to be stayed under section 10 of CPC.
Order 2 Rule 2 lays down the bar to further suit. It states that every suit must include
the whole of the claim to which the plaintiff is entitled in respect of the cause of action
and where the plaintiff omits to sue for or intentionally relinquishes any portion of his
13
claim, he shall nor afterwards be allowed to sue in respect of the portion so omitted or
relinquished.
(i) The second suit must be in respect of same cause of action as that on which the
previous suit was based;
(ii) the cause of action on which subsequent claim is founded had already arisen at the
time of first suit or claim.
Section 10 provides that no Court should proceed with the trial of any suit in which
the matter in issue is directly & substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit
between the same parties and the Court before which the previously instituted suit is
pending is competent to grant the relief sought.
The rule applies to trial of a suit and not the institution thereof. The object of the rule
contained in Section 10 is to prevent Courts of concurrent jurisdiction simultaneously
entertaining and adjudicating upon two parallel litigations in respect of the same cause
of action, the same subject matter & the same relief. The provisions contained in
Section 10 are mandatory.
(1) There must be two suits, one previously instituted and the other subsequently
instituted.
(2) The matter in issue in the subsequent suit must be directly and substantially in
issue in the previous suit.
(3) Both the suits must be between the same parties or their representatives.
(4) The previously instituted suit must be pending in the same Court in which the
subsequent suit is brought.
(5) The Court in which the previous suit is instituted must have jurisdiction to
grant the relief claimed in the subsequent suit.
(6) Such parties must be litigating under the same title in both the suits.
In the present case, the first petition filed by A for eviction against B is on the ground
of misuse of premises while the second petition filed by A against B is on the ground
of subletting of premises to C as permitted by the Rent Control Act. The Rent Control
Act provides for relief of eviction on separate grounds and each ground gives an
14
independent cause of action. Since the cause of action on which the petition is filed is
different in both the cases, the bar of O.2 R 2 will not apply.
With respect to the stay of suit under section 10 of CPC, it is submitted that A filed a
subsequent petition for eviction against B while the earlier petition was still pending.
However, the grounds and the cause of action of the petitions being different, section
10 will not be attracted in the present case even though the parties are the same.
89. (b)
92. d Order 8 R 2
93. C Order 10 R 4
94. d Order 10 R 2
95. d Order 11 R 1
96. d Order 11 R 2
97. a Order 12 R 2
101. c
102. b.Order 33 R 9
103. (b) Bank filed a suit for money decree against the partnership firm, A and its
four partners, B, C,D and E. Trial Court passed a decree against the firm A and two of
its partners, B and C and dismissed the suit against remaining partners. Only Bank
went in appeal challenging the decision of the trial court so far as it dismissed the
claim as against partners, D and E but did not implead firm A, partners B and C, as
parties to the appeal. The question is whether A, B and C were necessary parties and
in their absence the appeal is not maintainable? Give decision and reason for it.
15
Ans. The issue for consideration in the present case is whether A, B and C were
necessary parties and in their absence the appeal is not maintainable.
A necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively by the Court.
Parties which ought to have been brought in the suit are necessary parties. They are
parties which ought to have been joined within Order 1 Rule 10.
Order 1 Rule 9 provides that the Court shall not dismiss any suit on the ground of mis
joinder or non joinder of parties. However, non joinder of necessary party will be fatal
to the suit and the suit shall be dismissed by the Court.
In the present case, a suit was filed by the Bank for money decree against the firm A
and four of it’s partners B, C, D and E. The trial Court passed a decree in favour of the
bank and against the two partners B and C and dismissed the suit against remaining
partners. The same having not been challenged by way of appeal, the decision of the
trial court against the two partners B and C are conclusive and final. In the appeal the
bank has sought a decree against D and E against whom no order was passed by the
trial Court. Therefore, A, B and C cannot be said to be necessary parties in the appeal
and the appeal is not bad for non-joinder of A, B and C as respondents.
104. (a) The plaintiff sued in forma pauperis. The defendant applied for appointment
of a Commissioner for examination of his witnesses at Bombay and Meerut. The
plaintiff says he has no means to go with his counsel and cross examine witnesses at
Bombay and Meerut unless the defendant is asked to defray his expenses. The
defendant contended that under Order 26 Rule 15 C.P.C. he can be directed to pay a
reasonable sum for “the expenses of the commission” which expression does not
include the expenses of the other party. Should the plaintiff get his expenses? Give
reason for allowing or disallowing his request.
Ans. Order 26 Rule 15 provides for expenses for issuance of commission to be paid
into Court by the party at whose instance or for whose benefit the commission is
issued. The provision is silent on the point that the expression “the expenses of the
commission” does not include the expenses of the other party. It can, however, be
construed that the expression “the expenses of the commission” includes the expenses
of the other party. In the present case, the commission was issued at the instance of the
defendant and hence the defendant is entitled to bear the expenses of the Commission.
Further, the plaintiff being a pauper has no means to go with his counsel and cross
examine witnesses at Bombay and Meerut. He is entitled to get expenses so that he
can appear before the Commission in the interest of justice and the Court may
accordingly interpret Order 26 Rule 15 and pass an order directing the defendant to
pay for the expenses of the plaintiff in the interest of justice.
16
105. (a) In an eviction proceeding, 27-5-1989 was fixed for the evidence of the
landlord and 2.6.1989 for the evidence of the tenant. On 27.5.1989 neither the tenant
nor his counsel appeared at hearing. The Court recorded evidence of the landlord and
passed ex-parte eviction order. Same day tenant applied for setting aside the ex-parte
order alleging that he was ill and his counsel had forgotten mentioning the case in his
diary. He filed his own affidavit but did not file medical certificate and diary and
affidavit of counsel. The landlord rebutted his allegation on affidavit. Decide the
application.
Ans. The issue for consideration in the present case is whether the ex parte order
is liable to be set aside in view of Order 9 Rule 7
Order 9 Rule 6 provides that where the plaintiff appears and it is established that the
defendant as been duly served, but still defendant does not appear, Court may make an
order that the suit will be heard ex-parte. Order 9 Rule 7 further provides that upon
showing of good cause for non appearance by defendant, the Court may on such terms
as to costs or otherwise, direct to be heard, as if, he had appeared on the date fixed for
his appearance.
In the present case, in an eviction proceeding, 27-5-1989 was fixed for the evidence of
the landlord and 2.6.1989 for the evidence of the tenant. On 27.5.1989 neither the
tenant nor his counsel appeared at hearing. The Court recorded evidence of the
landlord and passed ex-parte eviction order. If the application for setting aside of ex-
parte order was filed by the tenant on the same day on the ground that he was ill and
his counsel had forgotten mentioning the case in his diary, then it would be sufficient
cause as used in Order 9 Rule 7 or Rule 13 of the Code as it must be construed
liberally.
However, on 27.5.1989 neither the tenant nor his counsel appeared at hearing and the
matter was fixed for the evidence of the tenant on 2.6.1989 in absence of the parties.
The Rent Controller could have adjourned the date fixed for evidence of the tenant
because the tenant had shown sufficient cause for his non-appearance and the absence
of the tenant at the previous hearing did not mean that he was not willing to attend the
hearing. In light of the same, the ex parte order is liable to be set aside.
106. (d) A filed a suit for the recovery of the rent against B, on the ground that B was
his tenant and has not paid rent for the past 2 years. In the written statement filed, B
admitted that he was the tenant of A, but he pleaded that he has paid the rent without a
receipt having been issued. During the trial B filed an application seeking permission
to amend the written statement and instead pleaded that he was not a tenant of A.
Decide and give reasons.
17
Ans. The issue for consideration in the present case is whether the application for
amendment of written statement filed by B be allowed under Order VI Rule 17
Order VI Rule 17 provides for the amendment of pleadings. Under Order VI Rule 17,
the Court may at any stage allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings. But such
amendment may be allowed if it is necessary for determining the real questions in
controversy between the parties.
(2) whether it is necessary for the determination of the real questions in controversy
between the parties
No application for amendment shall be allowed after the trail has commenced unless
the court comes to the conclusion that inspite of due diligence, the party could not
have raised the matter before the commencement of trial.
(a) when the amendment is not necessary for the determination of the real questions in
controversy between the parties
(b)where the plaintiff’s suit must be wholly displaced by the proposed amendment
(c) when the amendment takes away a legal right accrued by lapse of time
(d) when the amendment introduces a totally different, new and inconsistent case
In the present case, in the suit filed by A for the recovery of the rent against B, B
admitted in his written statement that he was the tenant of A but now by application
for amendment is seeking to amend written statement to plead that he was not the
tenant of A. By doing so, B is trying to remove the fact from the pleading which has
been admitted by himself. Such an amendment if allowed would prejudice the other
side and deprive the other side from any right which reasonably accrued in his favour.
Proposed amendment would amount to taking away the ‘admission’ of B and thus,
cannot be permitted. In view of the Order 6 Rule 17, the application for amendment of
written statement filed by B is not allowed.
107. (a) B was in occupation of a house belonging to A. In March 1981, A filed a suit
for possession alleging that B was a trespasser in the house. The suit was contested by
18
B, who pleaded that he had become the owner of the house, by adverse possession.
The suit was fixed for hearing on 15th July 1981, on which date A was unable to
attend the Court, but B appeared in Court. The suit was dismissed in default. On 10 th
December 1981, B died leaving behind a widow C. In January, 1982 A brought a suit
against C alleging that she is in illegal possession of the house and praying that a
decree for possession be passed against her. Advice C if the suit is barred. Give
reasons. (1982)
Ans. The issue in the present case is whether the subsequent suit of A against C is
hit by the provisions of Order 9 Rule 9
Order 9 Rule 9 precludes a second suit in respect of “the same cause of action” where
the first suit is dismissed for default of appearance of the plaintiff. In considering
whether the cause of action in the subsequent suit is the same or not, as the cause of
action in the previous suit, the test to be applied is “are the causes of action in the two
suits in substance and not technically identical.” Thus, the term “cause of action” is to
be construed with reference to the substance than to the form.
In the present case, A had earlier filed a suit against B for possession claiming himself
to be the owner though the said suit was dismissed. Till then, B was in possession of
premises in question. Thereafter, after the death of B, his widow C was in possession.
Further, A did not apply for restoration of the suit filed against B. In view of the
same, the suit for possession filed against C will be considered to be on the same
cause of action against B because A was claiming ownership and was alleging the
defendant (B and C) as trespassers. Since C being the widow of B is claiming under B
and does not have any independent right, title or interest to the estate, the subsequent
suit of A against C is hit by the provisions of Order 9 Rule 9.
108. (a)
109. (d) Section 16. of the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial
Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 - (1) The provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall, in their application to any suit in respect of a
commercial dispute of a Specified Value, stand amended in the manner as specified in
the Schedule. (2) The Commercial Division and Commercial Court shall follow the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), as amended by this Act,
in the trial of a suit in respect of a commercial dispute of a Specified Value. (3) Where
any provision of any Rule of the jurisdictional High Court or any amendment to the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), by the State Government is in conflict
with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as amended by this Act, the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by this Act shall prevail.
110. (a) The Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate
Division of High Courts Act, 2015 introduces a system of “Summary Judgment”
19
through a new Order XIII-A in the CPC. Summary judgment is given by the court
without recording oral evidence in the following scenarios:
111. (a) The date for hearing a summary judgment of a commercial dispute must be
fixed, after giving a notice period of thirty days to the respondent. The respondent has
to file his reply within thirty days of the receipt of notice of application of summary
judgment or notice of hearing, whichever is earlier.
112. (b) Order VI of CPC deals with pleadings. The form of pleadings in commercial
dispute will be as per High Court Rules or Practice Directions provided for such
disputes. A new Rule 15A has been inserted, which pertains to verification of
pleadings in a commercial dispute, in a prescribed manner (Statement of Truth). In the
absence of verification, the pleadings cannot be relied as evidence. Every pleading has
to be verified by an affidavit signed by the party, or one of the parties to the
proceedings or any person who is acquainted with the facts of the case and authorized
by such parties. If the pleading is amended, the same has to be verified.
113.(b) The maximum period within which the written statement could be filed is 90
days under CPC. The Act has increased the time period to 120 days. Accordingly the
Act has amended Order V of CPC dealing with issue of summons and Order VIII of
CPC pertaining to filing of written statement by the defendant.
As per the provisions of CPC, if a party fails to present written statement, the court
shall pronounce judgment or make an order in relation to the suit.
115.(c) New Order inserted into the CPC- Order XV-A. This allows the Court to
make a time line, and fix dates for the proceedings of the matter.
The first Case Management Hearing has to be held by the court within four weeks
from the date of filing of affidavit of admission or denial of documents by all parties
to the suit. Arguments have to be closed within six months of the first Case
Management Hearing.
116. (c) ORDER XIII-A Rule 3. Grounds for summary judgment. —The Court may
give a summary judgment against a plaintiff or defendant on a claim if it considers
that–– (a) the plaintiff has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or the
defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim, as the case may
be; and (b) there is no other compelling reason why the claim should not be disposed
of before recording of oral evidence.
20
117. (d) ORDER XIII-A Summary Judgment Rule 1. Scope of and classes of suits to
which this Order applies. —
(2) For the purposes of this Order, the word “claim” shall include—
(a) part of a claim; (b) any particular question on which the claim (whether in whole
or in part) depends; or (c) a counter-claim, as the case may be.
118. (d) ORDER XIII-A Rule 6. Orders that may be made by Court. —(1) On an
application made under this Order, the Court may make such orders that it may deem
fit in its discretion including the following:— (a) judgment on the claim; (b)
conditional order in accordance with Rule 7 mentioned hereunder; (c) dismissing the
application; (d) dismissing part of the claim and a judgment on part of the claim that is
not dismissed; (e) striking out the pleadings (whether in whole or in part); or (f)
further directions to proceed for case management under Order XV-A. (2) Where the
Court makes any of the orders as set forth in sub-rule (1) (a) to (f), the Court shall
record its reasons for making such order.
119. (d) Order XVA Rule 6 Powers of the Court in a Case Management Hearing.—(1)
In any Case Management Hearing held under this Order, the Court shall have the
power to— (a) prior to the framing of issues, hear and decide any pending application
filed by the parties under Order XIII-A; (b) direct parties to file compilations of
documents or pleadings relevant and necessary for framing issues; (c) extend or
shorten the time for compliance with any practice, direction or Court order if it finds
sufficient reason to do so; (d) adjourn or bring forward a hearing if it finds sufficient
reason to do so; (e) direct a party to attend the Court for the purposes of examination
under Rule 2 of Order X; (f) consolidate proceedings; (g) strike off the name of any
witness or evidence that it deems irrelevant to the issues framed; (h) direct a separate
trial of any issue; (i) decide the order in which issues are to be tried; (j) exclude an
issue from consideration; (k) dismiss or give judgment on a claim after a decision on a
preliminary issue; (l) direct that evidence be recorded by a Commission where
necessary in accordance with Order XXVI; (m)
Rule 7. Certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 not to apply. — For
avoidance of doubt, it is hereby clarified that Order XIII Rule 1, Order VII Rule 14
and Order VIII Rule 1A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) shall not
apply to suits or applications before the Commercial Divisions of High Court or
Commercial Courts.]
21
Explanation – Section 79 provides that in a suit by or against the Government, the
authority to be named as plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be, shall be—
(a) in the case of a suit by or against the Central Government, the Union of India, and
(b) in the case of a suit by or against a State Government, the State.
(a) in the case of a suit by or against the Central Government, the Union of India, and
(b) in the case of a suit by or against a State Government, the State.
Clause (3) provides that the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply in
relation to an order or award as they apply in relation to a decree, if the order or
award—
(a) is passed or made against [the Union of India] or a State or a public officer in
respect of any such act as aforesaid, whether by a Court or by any other authority; and
(b) is capable of being executed under the provisions of this Code or of any other law
for the time being in force as if it were a decree.
Thus, provisions of Section 80 of C.P.C. are binding on all the Courts mentioned
hereinabove.
22
Explanation – Section 82 Clause (2) provides that execution shall not be issued on
any decree passed against the Union of India or a State for the act done in the official
capacity of the officer concerned unless it remains unsatisfied for the period of three
months computed from the date of such decree.
Explanation – Section 86 provides that no foreign State may be sued in any Court
otherwise competent to try the suit except with the consent of the Central Government
certified in writing by a Secretary to that Government.
Explanation – Section 83 provides that Alien enemies residing in India with the
permission of the Central Government, and alien friends, may sue in any Court
otherwise competent to try the suit, as if they were citizens of India, but alien enemies
residing in India without such permission, or residing in a foreign country, shall not
sue in any such Court.
Explanation – Order XXXV Rule 5 provides that nothing in the Order shall be
deemed to enable agents to sue their principals, or tenants to sue their landlords, for
the purpose of compelling them to interplead with any persons other than persons
making claim through such principals or landlords.
The question is based on the Illustration (a) which is as follows: A deposits a box of
jewels with B as his agent. C alleges that the jewels were wrongfully obtained from
him by A, and claims them from B. B cannot institute an interpleader-suit against A
and C.
Explanation – Section 90 provides for power to state case for opinion of Court. It
states that where any persons agree in writing to state a case for the opinion of the
Court, then the Court shall try and determine the same in the manner prescribed.
ORDER XXXVI Rule 1 provides for Power to state case for Court’s opinion.
23
Explanation – Clause (1) of Section 91 provides in the case of a public nuisance or
other wrongful act affecting, or likely to affect, the public, a suit for a declaration and
injunction or for such other relief as may be appropriate in the circumstances of the
case, may be instituted,—
(b) with the leave of the Court, by two or more persons, even though no special
damage has been
caused to such persons by reason of such public nuisance or other wrongful act.
(b) with the leave of the Court, by two or more persons, even though no special
damage has been caused to such persons by reason of such public nuisance or other
wrongful act.
(b) with the leave of the Court, by two or more persons, even though no special
damage has been
caused to such persons by reason of such public nuisance or other wrongful act.
Clause (2) provides that nothing in this section shall be deemed to limit or otherwise
affect any right of suit which may exist independently of its provisions.
24
(a) He is liable to criminal prosecution under I.P.C
(b) Suit may be filed against him under Section 91 of Civil Procedure Code
against him
(b) with the leave of the Court, by two or more persons, even though no special
damage has been caused to such persons by reason of such public nuisance or other
wrongful act.
Explanation – Section 94 states that in order to prevent the ends of justice from being
defeated the Court may, if it is so prescribed, —
(a) issue a warrant to arrest the defendant and bring him before the Court to show
cause why he should not give security for his appearance, and if he fails to comply
with any order for security commit him to the civil prison;
(b) direct the defendant to furnish security to produce any property belonging to him
and to place the same at the disposal of the Court or order the attachment of any
property;
(c) grant a temporary injunction and in case of disobedience commit the person guilty
thereof to the civil prison and order that his property be attached and sold;
(d) appoint a receiver of any property and enforce the performance of his duties by
attaching and selling his property;
25
(e) make such other interlocutory orders as may appear to the Court to be just and
convenient.
Explanation – Section 94 states that in order to prevent the ends of justice from being
defeated the Court may, if it is so prescribed, —
(a) issue a warrant to arrest the defendant and bring him before the Court to show
cause why he should not give security for his appearance, and if he fails to comply
with any order for security commit him to the civil prison;
(b) direct the defendant to furnish security to produce any property belonging to him
and to place the same at the disposal of the Court or order the attachment of any
property;
(c) grant a temporary injunction and in case of disobedience commit the person guilty
thereof to
the civil prison and order that his property be attached and sold;
(d) appoint a receiver of any property and enforce the performance of his duties by
attaching and
(e) make such other interlocutory orders as may appear to the Court to be just and
convenient.
Explanation –Clause (4) of Section 96 provides that no appeal shall lie, except on a
question of law, from a decree in any suit of the nature cognisable by Courts of Small
Causes, when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not
exceed ten thousand rupees
Explanation –Clause (4) of Section 96 provides that no appeal shall lie, except on a
question of law, from a decree in any suit of the nature cognisable by Courts of Small
Causes, when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not
exceed ten thousand rupees
26
Explanation –Section 96 provides that an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by
any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorized to hear appeals from
the decisions of such Court.
Clause (2) provides that an appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex parte.
Further, according to Clause (3) no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court
with the consent of parties.
Clause (4) provides that no appeal shall lie, except on a question of law, from a decree
in any suit of the nature cognisable by Courts of Small Causes, when the amount or
value of the subject-matter of the original suit does not exceed ten thousand rupees
Explanation – Section 96 provides that an appeal shall lie from every decree passed
by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorized to hear appeals
from the decisions of such Court, save where otherwise expressly provided in the body
of the Code of Civil Procedure or by any other law for the time being in force.
Explanation – Section 96 provides that an appeal shall lie from every decree passed
by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorized to hear appeals
from the decisions of such Court.
Clause (2) provides that an appeal may lie from an original decree passed ex parte.
Explanation – A Second Appeal can be filed under Section 100 which provides that an
appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any Court
subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a
substantial question of law.
Explanation –Section 102 provides that no second appeal shall lie from any decree,
when the subject matter of the original suit is for recovery of money not exceeding
twenty-five thousand rupees.
Explanation – Section 100A provides that where any appeal from an original or
appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no
further appeal shall lie from the judgment and decree of such Single Judge
27
146. Ans. (d)
Explanation – Clause (1) of Section 104 provides that an appeal shall lie from the
following orders, and save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or
by any law for the time being in force, from no other orders:—
(ffa) an order under section 91 or section 92 refusing leave to institute a suit of the
nature referred to in section 91 or section 92, as the case may be;
(h) an order under any of the provisions of this Code imposing a fine or directing the
arrest or detention in the civil prison of any person except where such arrest or
detention is in execution of a decree;
(i) any order made under rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by rules:
[Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order specified in clause (ff) save on the
ground that no order, or an order for the payment of a less amount, ought to have been
made.
(2) No appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this section.
Explanation – Section 107 provides that an Appellate Court shall have power—
(2) Subject as aforesaid, the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall
perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code
on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein.
Explanation – Section 104 provides that an appeal shall lie from the following orders,
and save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any law for
the time being in force, from no other orders:—
28
(ffa) an order under section 91 or section 92 refusing leave to institute a suit of the
nature referred to in section 91 or section 92, as the case may be;
(h) an order under any of the provisions of this Code imposing a fine or directing the
arrest or detention in the civil prison of any person except where such arrest or
detention is in execution of a decree;
(i) any order made under rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by rules:
[Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order specified in clause (ff) save on the
ground that no order, or an order for the payment of a less amount, ought to have been
made.]
(2) No appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this section.
Explanation –Section 113 provides that any Court may state a case and refer the same
for the opinion of the High Court, and the High Court may make such order thereon as
it thinks fit.
Explanation – Section 113 provides that any Court may state a case and refer the same
for the opinion of the High Court, and the High Court may make such order thereon as
it thinks fit.
29