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CNS Unit-6

1. The document discusses IP security, including IP security architecture, authentication header, encapsulating security payload, and key management. 2. IP security focuses on authentication, confidentiality, and key management at the IP layer. The authentication header provides data integrity and authentication. The encapsulating security payload provides confidentiality services including encryption. 3. The IP security architecture consists of IP security documents, services, and security associations. Security associations identify traffic flows and are defined by parameters including encryption/authentication algorithms and keys.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
69 views15 pages

CNS Unit-6

1. The document discusses IP security, including IP security architecture, authentication header, encapsulating security payload, and key management. 2. IP security focuses on authentication, confidentiality, and key management at the IP layer. The authentication header provides data integrity and authentication. The encapsulating security payload provides confidentiality services including encryption. 3. The IP security architecture consists of IP security documents, services, and security associations. Security associations identify traffic flows and are defined by parameters including encryption/authentication algorithms and keys.

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pihadar269
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© © All Rights Reserved
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CRYPTOGRAPHY AND NETWORK SECURITY – UNIT VI

UNIT - VII
IP SECURITY: IP SECURITY OVERVIEW, IP SECURITY ARCHITECTURE, AUTHENTICATION HEADER,
ENCAPSULATING SECURITY PAYLOAD, COMBINING SECURITY ASSOCIATIONS AND KEY MANAGEMENT.

INTRUSION DETECTION: OVERVIEW, APPROACHES FOR IDS/IPS, SIGNATURE BASED IDS, HOST BASED
IDS/IPS (TEXT BOOK 2)

EXPLAIN ABOUT IP SECURITY.


IP-level security focuses on authentication, confidentiality, and key management. The
authentication mechanism assures that a received packet was, in fact, transmitted by the
party identified as the source in the packet header. In addition, this mechanism assures that
the packet has not been altered in transit. The confidentiality facility enables communicating
nodes to encrypt messages to prevent eavesdropping by third parties. The key management
facility is concerned with the secure exchange of keys.

IP SECURITY OVERVIEW:
The main feature of IPSec is IP level security by encrypting and/or authenticate all traffic at
the IP level.

The following figure shows is a typical scenario of IPSec usage. An organization maintains
LANs at dispersed locations. The IPSec networking device will typically encrypt and compress
all traffic going into the WAN, and decrypt and decompress traffic coming from the WAN;
these operations are transparent to workstations and servers on the LAN. Secure
transmission is also possible with individual users who dial into the WAN. Such user
workstations must implement the IPSec protocols to provide security.

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Explain about IP Security ARCHITECTURE.


The architecture of IPSec is constituted by the following components.
1. IPSec Documents
2. IPSec Services
3. Security Associations (SA)

IPSec Documents
 IPSec specifications are described in various documents. Few important documents
and specifications are described in the following table.
S. No. Documents Specifications
1. RFC 2401 An overview of a security architecture
2. RFC 2402 Description of a packet authentication extension to IPv4 and
IPv6
3. RFC 2406 Description of a packet encryption extension to IPv4 and
IPv6
4. RFC 2408 Specification of key management capabilities

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 Architecture: Covers the general concepts, security requirements, definitions, and


IPSec technology.
 Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP): Covers the packet format and general
issues related to the use of the ESP for packet encryption and, optionally,
authentication.
 Authentication Header (AH): Covers the packet format and general issues related
to the use of AH for packet authentication.
 Encryption Algorithm: A set of documents that describe how various encryption
algorithms are used for ESP.
 Authentication Algorithm: A set of documents that describe how various
authentication algorithms are used for AH and for the authentication option of ESP.
 Key Management: Documents that describe key management schemes.
 Domain of Interpretation (DOI): Contains values needed for the other
documents to relate to each other. These include identifiers for approved encryption
and authentication algorithms, as well as operational parameters such as key lifetime.

IP Sec Services
IPSec provides security services at the IP layer by selecting required security protocols,
algorithm(s) and cryptographic keys as per the services requested.
The services provided by these protocols are:
 Access control
 Connectionless integrity
 Data origin authentication
 Rejection of replayed packets (a form of partial sequence integrity)
 Confidentiality (encryption)
 Limited traffic flow confidentiality

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Security Associations (SA)


A security association is a one way relationship between sender and receiver. Security
associations are identified by the following three parameters. They are;
 Security Parameter Index
 IP Destination Address
 Security Protocol Identifier

Security Parameter Index (SPI): SPI is a string of bit assigned to this SA and has local
significance only. SPI is located in AH and ESP headers. SPI enables the receiving system
under which packet is to be processed.

IP Destination Address: It is the end point address of SA, which can be end user system
or a network system (firewall/router)

Security Protocol Identifiers: It indicates whether the association is an AH or ESP security


association.

SA Parameters
A Security Association is normally defined by the following parameters:
 Sequence Number Counter: It is a 32-bit value that indicates the Sequence
Number field in AH or ESP headers.
 Sequence Counter Overflow: Sequence Counter overflow is a flag used to indicate
whether overflow of the Sequence Number Counter should generate an auditable
event and prevent further transmission of packets on SA (required for all
implementations).
 Anti-Replay Window: Used to determine whether an inbound AH or ESP packet is
a replay.
 AH Information: Authentication algorithm, keys, key lifetimes, and related
parameters being used with AH (required for AH implementations).
 ESP Information: Encryption and authentication algorithm, keys, initialization
values, key lifetimes, and related parameters being used with ESP (required for ESP
implementations).
 IPSec Protocol Mode: Tunnel, transport, or wildcard (required for all
implementations).
 Path (MTU) Maximum Transmission Unit: Any observed path maximum
transmission unit (maximum size of a packet that can be transmitted without
fragmentation) and aging variables (required for all implementations).

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CRYPTOGRAPHY AND NETWORK SECURITY – UNIT VI

EXPLAIN ABOUT AUTHENTICATION HEADER WITH A NEAT DIAGRAM.


 It provides support for data integrity and authentication of IP packets.
 Data integrity service insures that data inside IP packets is not altered during the
transit.
 Authentication service enables an end user to authenticate the user at the other end
and decides to accept or reject packets accordingly.
 Authentication also prevents the IP address spoofing attack.
 AH is based on the Message Authentication Code (MAC), hence tow communication
parties must share a secret key.
 AH header format is shown in following figure

The Authentication Header consists of the following fields;


 Next Header (8 bits): Identifies the type of header immediately following this
header.
 Payload Length (8 bits): this field contains length of Authentication Header in 32-
bit words-2 (minus).
 Reserved (16 bits): For future use.
 Security Parameters Index (32 bits): Identifies a security association.
 Sequence Number (32 bits): Sequence Number will be given for all packets to
prevent replay attack.
 Authentication Data (variable): A variable-length field (must be an integral
number of 32-bit words) that contains the Integrity Check Value (ICV), or MAC, for
this packet.

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CRYPTOGRAPHY AND NETWORK SECURITY – UNIT VI

WHAT IS MEANT BY ENCAPSULATING SECURITY PAYLOAD? EXPLAIN ITS FORMAT IN DETAIL.


The Encapsulating Security Payload provides confidentiality services, including confidentiality
of message contents and limited traffic flow confidentiality. As an optional feature, ESP can
also provide an authentication service.

ESP Format
The following figure shows the format of an ESP packet. It contains the following fields:
 Security Parameters Index (32 bits): Identifies a security association.
 Sequence Number (32 bits): A monotonically increasing counter value; this
provides an anti-replay function, as discussed for AH.
 Payload Data (variable): This is a transport-level segment (transport mode) or IP
packet (tunnel mode) that is protected by encryption.
 Padding (0255 bytes): The purpose of this field is discussed later.
 Pad Length (8 bits): Indicates the number of pad bytes immediately preceding this
field.
 Next Header (8 bits): Identifies the type of data contained in the payload data
field by identifying the first header in that payload (for example, an extension header
in IPv6, or an upper-layer protocol such as TCP).
 Authentication Data (variable): It is variable-length field (must be an integral
number of 32-bit words) that contains the Authentication called as the Integrity
Check Value for the datagram.

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CRYPTOGRAPHY AND NETWORK SECURITY – UNIT VI

Encryption and Authentication Algorithms


The Payload Data, Padding, Pad Length, and Next Header fields are encrypted by the ESP
service. The current specification dictates that a compliant implementation must support DES
in cipher block chaining (CBC) mode.
Various algorithms used for encryption are:
 Three-key triple DES
 RC5
 IDEA
 Three-key triple IDEA
 CAST
 Blowfish

Padding
The Padding field serves several purposes:
 If an encryption algorithm requires the plaintext to be a multiple of some number of
bytes (e.g., the multiple of a single block for a block cipher), the Padding field is used
to expand the plaintext (consisting of the Payload Data, Padding, Pad Length, and
Next Header fields) to the required length.
 The ESP format requires that the Pad Length and Next Header fields be right aligned
within a 32-bit word. Equivalently, the ciphertext must be an integer multiple of 32
bits. The Padding field is used to assure this alignment.
 Additional padding may be added to provide partial traffic flow confidentiality by
concealing the actual length of the payload.

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EXPLAIN ABOUT COMBINING SECURITY ASSOCIATIONS.


Basic Combinations of Security Associations
The IPSec Architecture document lists four examples of combinations of SAs that must be
supported by compliant IPSec hosts (e.g., workstation, server) or security gateways (e.g.
firewall, router). These are illustrated in Figure 16.10. The lower part of each case in the
figure represents the physical connectivity of the elements; the upper part represents logical
connectivity via one or more nested SAs. Each SA can be either AH or ESP. For host-to-host
SAs, the mode may be either transport or tunnel; otherwise it must be tunnel mode.

In Case 1, all security is provided between end systems that implement IPSec. For any two
end systems to communicate via an SA, they must share the appropriate secret keys. Among
the possible combinations:
a. AH in transport mode
b. ESP in transport mode
c. ESP followed by AH in transport mode (an ESP SA inside an AH SA)
d. Any one of a, b, or c inside an AH or ESP in tunnel mode

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CRYPTOGRAPHY AND NETWORK SECURITY – UNIT VI

For Case 2, security is provided only between gateways (routers, firewalls, etc.) and no hosts
implement IPSec. This case illustrates simple virtual private network support. The security
architecture document specifies that only a single tunnel SA is needed for this case. The
tunnel could support AH, ESP, or ESP with the authentication option. Nested tunnels are not
required because the IPSec services apply to the entire inner packet.

For Case 3 builds on Case 2 by adding end-to-end security. The same combinations
discussed for cases 1 and 2 are allowed here. The gateway-to-gateway tunnel provides either
authentication or confidentiality or both for all traffic between end systems. When the
gateway-to-gateway tunnel is ESP, it also provides a limited form of traffic confidentiality.
Individual hosts can implement any additional IPSec services required for given applications
or given users by means of end-to-end SAs.

Case 4 provides support for a remote host that uses the Internet to reach an organization's
firewall and then to gain access to some server or workstation behind the firewall. Only
tunnel mode is required between the remote host and the firewall. As in Case 1, one or two
SAs may be used between the remote host and the local host.

EXPLAIN ABOUT KEY MANAGEMENT (INTERNET KEY EXCHANGE/ISAKMP).


The key management is the determination and distribution of secret keys. The IPsec
Architecture supports for two types of key management:

 Manual: A system administrator manually configures each system with its own keys
and with the keys of other communicating systems. This is practical for small,
relatively static environments.
 Automated: An automated system enables the on-demand creation of keys for SAs
and facilitates the use of keys in a large distributed system with an evolving
configuration.

Key management protocol for IPSec is referred to as ISAKMP/Oakley and it has the following
elements;

 Oakley Key Determination Protocol: Oakley is a key exchange protocol based on


the Diffie-Hellman algorithm but providing added security. Oakley is generic in that it
does not dictate specific formats.

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CRYPTOGRAPHY AND NETWORK SECURITY – UNIT VI

 Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP):


ISAKMP provides a framework for Internet key management and provides the specific
protocol support, including formats, for negotiation of security attributes.

ISAKMP
ISAKMP defines procedures and packet formats to establish, negotiate, modify, and delete
security associations. As part of SA establishment, ISAKMP defines payloads for exchanging
key generation and authentication data.

ISAKMP Header Format


An ISAKMP message consists of an ISAKMP header followed by one or more payloads and
must follow UDP transport layer protocol for its implementation. The header format of an
ISAKMP header is shown below:

 Initiator Code (64 bits): Cookie of entity that initiated SA establishment, SA


notification, or SA deletion.
 Responder Code (64 bits): Cookie of responding entity; null in first message from
initiator.
 Next Payload (8 bits): Indicates the type of the first payload in the message
 Major Version (4 bits): Indicates major version of ISAKMP in use.
 Minor Version (4 bits): Indicates minor version in use.
 Exchange Type (8 bits): Indicates the type of exchange. Can be informational,
aggressive, authentication only, identity protection or base exchange (S).
 Flag(8 bits): Indicates specific options set for this ISAKMP exchange. Two bits so far
defined. The Encryption bit is set if all payloads following the header are encrypted

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CRYPTOGRAPHY AND NETWORK SECURITY – UNIT VI

using the encryption algorithm for this SA. The Commit bit is used to ensure that
encrypted material is not received prior to completion of SA establishment.
 Message ID (32 bits): Unique ID for this message.
 Length (32 bits): Length of total message (header plus all payloads) in octets.

ISAKMP Payload Types


All ISAKMP payloads begin with the same generic payload header shown below.

The Next Payload field has a value of 0 if this is the last payload in the message; otherwise
its value is the type of the next payload. The Payload Length field indicates the length in
octets of this payload, including the generic payload header. There are many different
ISAKMP payload types. They are:

a. The SA payload is used to begin the establishment of an SA.


b. The Proposal payload contains information used during SA negotiation.
c. The Transform payload defines a security transform to be used to secure the
communications channel for the designated protocol.
d. The Key Exchange payload can be used for a variety of key exchange techniques,
including Oakley, Diffie-Hellman, and the RSA-based key exchange used by PGP.
e. The Identification payload is used to determine the identity of communicating
peers and may be used for determining authenticity of information.
f. The Certificate payload transfers a public-key certificate.
g. The Hash payload contains data generated by a hash function over some part of
the message and/or ISAKMP state.
h. The Signature payload contains data generated by a digital signature function over
some part of the message and/or ISAKMP state.
i. The Nonce payload contains random data used to guarantee aliveness during an
exchange and protect against replay attacks.
j. The Notification payload contains either error or status information associated
with this SA or this SA negotiation.
k. The Delete payload indicates one or more SAs that the sender has deleted from its
database and that therefore are no longer valid.

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CRYPTOGRAPHY AND NETWORK SECURITY – UNIT VI

ISAKMP Exchanges
ISAKMP provides a framework for message exchange, with the payload types serving as the
building blocks. The specification identifies five default exchange types that should be
supported.
1. Base Exchange: allows key exchange and authentication material to be transmitted
together. This minimizes the number of exchanges at the expense of not providing
identity protection.
2. Identity Protection Exchange: expands the Base Exchange to protect the users'
identities.
3. Authentication Only Exchange: used to perform mutual authentication, without a
key exchange
4. Aggressive Exchange: minimizes the number of exchanges at the expense of not
providing identity protection.
5. Informational Exchange: used for one-way transmittal of information for SA
management.

INTRUSION DETECTION: OVERVIEW, APPROACHES FOR IDS/IPS, SIGNATURE BASED IDS, HOST BASED
IDS/IPS (TEXT BOOK 2)

DEFINE INTRUDERS. WHAT ARE VARIOUS CLASSES OF INTRUDERS?


Intruder is generally referred as hacker or cracker. The intruders may cause serious threats
to computer security.
Classes of Intruders:
 Masquerader: An individual who is not authorized to use the computer but he may
gain access by exploiting a legitimate user’s account. Generally masquerader is an
outsider.
 Misfeasor: A legitimate user may access the data, programs or resources but not
authorized to such access or authorized but misuses his or her privileges. Generally
misfeasor is an insider.
 Clandestine User: An individual who seizes supervisory control of the system and
uses this control for some misuse. Generally Clandestine user is an insider or
outsider.

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EXPLAIN ABOUT INTRUSION DETECTION TECHNIQUES (INTRUSION DETECTION TECHNIQUES)


An intrusion detection/prevention system (IDS/IPS) is employed to provide deep packet
inspection at the entrance of important network. The Intrusion Detection System/Intrusion
Prevention System is positioned behind the firewall. VPN is permitted to pass firewall and
IDS/IPS since the traffic is usually encrypted and authenticated. The IDS/IPS provides deep
packet inspection for the payload, IDS is based on out-of-band detection of intrusions and
their reporting, and IPS is in-band filtering to block intrusions.

The following figure illustrates the difference between IDS and IPS. As indicated, IDS is
performed through a wire tap, and is clearly an out-of-band operation. In contrast, IPS is
performed inline. And by preventing intrusions, IPSs eliminate the need for keeping and
reading extensive intrusion-incident logs, which contributes to IDSs’ considerable CPU,
memory, and I/O overhead.

Explain about Signature based IDS/IPS.


Signature-based detection is used to detect patterns of specific known exploits and
vulnerabilities. The exploits include patterns of codes, scripts, registration-key-modification
and buffer overflow. The vulnerabilities include payload content or requests to a known
vulnerability, which is used to create vulnerability-based signatures. Content signature is
often a string of characters that appear in the payload of packets as part of the attack. Once

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a new vulnerability is disclosed, signatures are developed by researchers to counter threats.


Signature-based systems take a look at the payload and identify whether it contains a
matched signature.

While this signature-based detection usually has a lower false positive rate, it may not detect
zero-day and mutated attacks. Malware can be stealthy by embedding its communications
into protocols that are likely to be present in normal network operations or incorporate
polymorphism and metamorphism to avoid a fixed signature. A Botnet might coordinate with
its C&C at irregular intervals and at low rates to avoid generating significant anomalies. The
big challenges to signature-based IDS/IPS are the size of signature database, and the
processing time of packets against all entries in the signature database. These can make the
IDS vulnerable to DoS attacks. Some IDS evasion tools flood signature-based IDSs with too
many packets, thus making the IDS drop packets and fail detection.

Explain about Host based IDS/IPS.


Many host security products contain integrated host-based IDS/IPS systems (HIDS/HIPS),
anti-malware and a firewall. These HIDS/HIPS systems have both advantages and
weaknesses. They are capable of protecting mobile hosts from an attack when outside the
protected internal network, and they can defend local attacks, such as malware in removable
devices. They also protect against attacks from network and encrypted attacks in which the
encrypted data stream terminates at the host being protected. They have the capability of
detecting anomalies of host software execution, e.g., system call patterns. On the negative
side of the ledger, if an attacker takes over a host, the HIDS/HIPS and NAC agent software
can be compromised and disabled, and the audit logs are modified to hide the malware. In
addition, HIDS/HIPS has only a local view of the attack, and host-based anomaly detection
has a high false alarm rate. For example, OSSEC is an open source host-based intrusion
detection system. It performs log analysis, file integrity checking, policy monitoring, rootkit
detection, real-time alerting and active response. It runs on most operating systems,
including Windows, Linux, MacOS X, FreeBSD, Solaris, HP-UX and AIX. With some
modification of the host’s kernel, HIDS/HIPS can monitor all of the system calls and evaluate
system calls against either known attack signatures or anomaly rules.

The HIDS/HIPS detect and prevent attacks on host computers, including Web servers and
database servers. The inputs to HIDS/HIPS are network packets, system logs, system events
and hardware information.

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Combined signature- and anomaly-based methods detect and block abnormal activity
patterns, and generate the system alarms and event reports. The time window of an event
may be different due to its characteristics. HIDS/HIPS can update the system profiles based
on the newly observed network patterns and system calls in order to improve the false alarm
rate. HIDS/HIPS builds a dynamic database of system objects that can be monitored. Then
an analysis and comparison of a number of items is performed with respect to the database.
These items include system calls and the sequence of these calls, logs and their modification,
system binaries modifications, password files, access control lists, shell commands and
backdoor software installations. HIDS/HIPS inspects packet content after decrypting received
VPN, P2P or SSL packets, and uses anti-malware software for decrypting or emulating
malware that employs mutations. In contrast, NIDS/NIPS cannot inspect encrypted traffic and
detect mutated malware. Hence, both NIDS/NIPS and HIDS/HIPS are deployed for optimal
protection, in which the combination is greater than the sum of its individual parts. This
approach yields a more accurate result for quarantining hosts and blocking/filtering traffic as
well as providing the basis for NAC/NAP products. A trusted platform module (TPM) on the
motherboard, which is external to the CPU thus making it much harder for an intruder to
corrupt its object and checksum databases, can be used to protect the integrity of the
database used for inspection.

AMRN ::15::

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