Giambattista Vico

Giambattista Vico
Imagination and Historical Knowledge
Cecilia Miller
Assistant Professor of European Intellectual History
Wesleyan University, Connecticut
150th YEAR
M
St. Martin's Press
©CeciliaMillerl993
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of

this publication may be made without written permission.
No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or
transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with
the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988,
or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying
issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court
Road,LondonWlP9HE.
Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this
publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil
claims for damages.
First published in Great Britain 1993 by

T H E M A C M I L L A N PRESS L T D
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS
and London
Companies and representatives
throughout the worid
First published in the United States of America 1993 by
Scholarly and Reference Division,
ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC.,
175 Fifth Avenue,
New York, N.Y. 10010
ISBN0-312^9719^
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Miller, Cecilia.
Giambattista Vico : imagination and historical knowledge / Cecilia
Miller.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN0-312^9719^
1. History—^Philosophy. 2. Vico, Giambattista, 1668-1744.
3. Imagination. I. Title.
D16.8.M673 1993
901^c20 93-10200
CIP
For Gordon DesBrisay
ί
Contents
Acknowledgements ix
Note on the Texts x
Select List of Vico 's Writings and List ofAbbreviations xi
Introduction 1
1 VICO'S mXELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT 9

1. Vico's Orations (1699, 1700, 1701, 1704, 1705, 1707)
and His Supposed Epistemological Break (1710) 9
2. Verum ipsumfactum 25
3. Categories of Historical Knowledge 28
4. A Critique of Collingwood 29
5. ffistoricalCycles 32
6. Historical Sense 34
7. History as a Science 38
2 VICO'S EARLY WRITWGS, 1709-1728 41

1. Introduction 41
2. De nostri temporis studiorum ratione (1709) 41
3. De antiquissima italorum sapientia (1710) 47
4. // diritto universale (1720-22) 53
5. La scienza nuova prima (1725) 58
6. Vita di Giambattista Vico scritta da si medesimo
(1725, 1728) 65
3 LA SCIENZA NUOVA, 1725,1730,1744 72

1. The Three Editions 72
2. Vico's Vocabulary 74
3. UniformityofIdeas 75
4. Sapienza volgare 79
5. Religion and Society 83
6. Free Will 85
7. Formation of Society: The Taming of Primitive Man 86
8. Setti di tempi 89
vii
viii Contents
9. New Critical Art 93
4 LANGUAGE, fflSTORICAL RECONSTRUCTION

AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCffiTY 97
1. Introduction 97
2. Vico and Early Language 99
3. Language as an Instrument of Human Thought 104
4. The History which Vico Sought 106
5. Myths 109
6. Social Institutions 112
7. OrderinMyths 115
8. bnagination and Historical Reconstruction 117
5 EVlAGINATION AND fflSTORICAL KNOWLEDGE 120

1. Introduction 120
2. Fantasia as the Poetic, Recreative Instinct 121
3. Fantasia as the Expression of the Spirit of a Particular Age 124
4. Fantasia as la scienza nuova 125
5. History 127
6. Historical Knowledge 132
7. Fantasia V 135
8. OtherInterpretations j 138
9. ACritiqueofBerlin У 139
Conclusion 143
Notes 147
Bibliography ΥΠ
Index 202
Acknowledgements
I begin by thanking Isaiah Berlin, who supervised my Oxford D.Phil,

thesis on Vico, for his enthusiasm and support throughout my research.
Conversations with Donald Verene, Leon Pompa, Laurence Brockliss, John
Robertson and Joseph Mali spurred me on in my studies. I am indebted to
Giorgio Tagliacozzo for putting me in touch with many Vico scholars in
Italy and Britain.
Quentin Skinner and Patrick Gardiner examined my thesis and I thank
them for their cOmments. Donald Kelley, Perez Zagorin, Dan Terkla and
Giuseppe Mazzotta gave me detailed criticism of the manuscript.
I am grateful for the funds I received during my time in Oxford from the
Overseas Research Scheme, the Oxford University Scholarship and Balliol
College.
The Centro di Studi Vichiani made me very welcome in Naples and
provided me with much needed materials. Lessico Intellettuale Europeo in
Rome furnished me with draft versions of its forthcoming concordances to
several ofVico's writings.
Librarians at the Taylorian Library and the Bodleian Library (Oxford),
the British Library, the London Library, the Biblioteca Nazionale «Vittorio
Emanuele ΠΙ» di NapoU, the Butler Library (Columbia), the Beinecke
Library (Yale), the Widener Library, the Houghton Library and the Law
Library (Harvard) and the Library of Congress assisted me.
Eleanor Wood, Jerri-Lyn Scofield and Julia Perkins gave me excellent
help with the manuscript. James 0'Hara and Christopher Parslow corrected
my Latin cheerfully. Neil Parekh helped with the index.
The Society of Fellows at Columbia University provided me with a
very congenial venue for work on this project as a Mellon Postdoctoral
Research Fellow. Thank you to my colleagues at Wesleyan University for
their comments on my book.
I appreciate the help I received &om my editors, Giovanna Davitti and
Anthony Grahame, at Macmillan.
My parents, J. Melvin and Wanda (Howard), and my siblings, Kyle
and Celesta, read the manuscript. I thank them for their unfailing support
throughout my research and for giving me a love of books and of debating
ideas.
Thank you to William Fike.
ix
Note on the Texts
Unless otherwise indicated the Latin and Italian references are to the Nicolini
edition of Vico's writings. There are three exceptions. A new edition of the
orations has been produced by the Centro di Studi Vichiani, Institutiones
oratoriae has been translated into Italian by Giuliano Crifo. The 1730 edition
of La scienz/z nuova was not reprinted in its entirety by Nicolini; in this case,
references are made either to the extracts by Nicolini or to the page numbers
in the 1730 edition itself References to La scienza nuova (1725, 1730 and
1744) are made either by Nicolini's paragraph divisions or by Vico's own
divisions. The autobiography is referred to by page number in the Nicolini
edition. All other divisions are Vico's own.
There are several excellent English translations of Vico - by Bergin and
Fisch (the 1744 edition and the autobiography), Pompa (extracts from the
1725 edition and De antiquissima italorum sapientia as well as others),
and Gianturco {De nostri temporis studiorum ratione). The translations of
the Orations by Giorgio A. Pinton will be published shortly by Cornell
University Press. Translations quoted from these works are by the scholars
Usted above. All other translations are my own. Mainly due to Vico's
idiosyncratic spelUng, the original spelling and punctuation have been
retained in quotations.
x
Select List of Vico's Writings
Affetti di un disperato 1693

Inaugural Orations 1699,1700,1701,
1704,1705,1707
De nostri temporis studiorum ratione 1709
De antiquissima italorum sapientia 1710
De rebus gestis Antonj Caraphaei 1716
// diritto universale 1720-22
La scienza nuova prima 1725
Vita di Giambattista Vico scritta da se medesimo 1725, 1728
La scienza nuova 1730
'La pratica" 1731
De mente heroica 1732
Institutiones oratoriae 1741
La scienza nuova 1744
Lust of Abbreviations
Inaugural Orations (1699-1707) Orations
Vita di Giambattista Vico scritta da si medesimo
(1725, 1728) Autobiography
La scienza nuova (1725) 1725
Section of La scienza nuova, unpublished in Vico's
lifetime, entitled *La pratica della scienza nuova' 'La pratica'
xi
Introduction
Vico*s fundamental importance in the history of European ideas lies in his

strong anti-Cartesian, anti-French and anti-Enlightenment views. In an age
in which intellectuals congratulated themselves on their modem (which was
to say, rational) approach to life, Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) stressed
the nonrational elements in man - in particular, imagination - as well as
social and civic relationships, none of them easily reducible to the scientinc
theories so popular in his time. It is well known that the chief reason Vico
gave for his anti-Cartesian stance was that man could not fully know the
natural world (science) as it was made by God, but that human history was
largely, if not entirely, comprehensible precisely because it was man-made.
Yet it is important to note that although Vico tumed his back on Cartesian
rationalism, he nevertheless applied rational methods to the subject Rend
Descartes (1596-1650) despised - history.
Vico's main effort was an attempt to discern, if not a pattern, at least some
otherwise unobtainable glimpses into the past. His most important means
were language, mythology and rites of religion, all of which were to be used
as tools in this exploration into the unrecorded periods ofhuman history. As
alternatives to written records, they gave access to the past civiUsations that
left no historical documents. Vico's unique contribution was to view myths
not as false statements about reality or fanciful versions of past events, but
rather as embodiments of early outiooks and beliefs; similarly, he was not
as concerned with cycles in history, per se, but in their use as an instrument
to investigate the development of cultures.
Vico's notion of the development of the human mind and the correspond
ing development of social institutions has not been analysed sufficientiy.
Vico saw the anomalies and idiosyncrasies of manHnd as natural parts of
the creative spirit, which could not be forced into any kind of methodological
straitjacket. It was Vico's beUef in the nonrational aspect of human nature
which separated his work from that of his contemporaries.
Vico's ideas were indeed out of step with the intellectual climate, not only
in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century Naples, but in Europe as a
whole; certidnly, they did not fit neatly into the Enlightenment. Yet it was
precisely these ideas which constituted his unique contribution to the history
of ideas and which laid the groundwork for subsequent inquiries into the
philosophy of history. Vico's concern not only with patterns of history, but,
more importantiy, with the issue of changes in human nature and in society
1
2 Introduction
is, i f anything, of more pertinent interest today than at the time they were
written.
This book attempts to provide a reinterpretation of several of the theo
retical foundations of Vico studies. It endeavours to counter the belief in
Vico's epistemological break (1710), at which point he supposedly became
suddenly and violentiy anti-Cartesian. The anti-Cartesian tone of his later
works is not in doubt, but there are (in this writer's view) elements of his
most original ideas concerning imagination and historical knowledge in his
pre-1710 writings.
One reason the accepted view has remained unchallenged for so long is
that many previous studies have resti-icted themselves to an analysis of the
third and final version of Vico's best-known work, La scienza nuova (The
New Science, 1744). Little effort has been made to trace the development
of his ideas, not only in the critical first (1725) and almost unknown second
(1730) editions of La scienza nuova, but also throughout his autobiography
and earlier theoretical writings. The first six orations and the 1725 and 1730
editions of La scienza nuova deserve particular attention here, since these
works remain relatively untouched by Vico scholars, who have generally
ignored the sti"ong statements that these works contain concerning imagi
nation in regard to social and historical development. At the heart of this
research, then, is the attempt not only to analyse Vico's theories of history
as reflected not only by his well-known cyclical view of history, but also to
give a systematic analysis, based on all his theoretical works, which it is
hoped will establish the crucial position of his profound insights regarding
imagination and human creativity in relation to historical knowledge.
* * *
In order to comprehend Vico's profound statements regarding language,
imagination and historical knowledge, it is crucial to have an understand
ing of his own particular, rather idiosyncratic, vocabulary. This requires
an analysis not only of all three versions of La scienza nuova (1725,
1730, 1744) and his autobiography (1725, 1728), but also of II diritto
universale (Universal Law, 1720-22) and all of his earlier theoretical
writings (1699-1710, 1719). There are several themes to which he returned
time after time in his writings: uniformity of ideas, discussed both in terms
of human nature and common sense (sensus communis [Latin] and senso
comune [Italian]), primitive wisdom (sapienza volgare), the idea of society,
social structures and his new critical art. These concepts commanded Vico's
interest precisely because he was persuaded that they could inform him
concerning past societies. The history which Vico sought to explore had
litde to do with chronologies of rulers or particular events, except as
Introduction 3
they could be used as evidence of an individual society's philosophy

of life.
Vico's work is indeed distinguished from that of most of his
contemporaries by his strong, anti-Cartesian stance. It has been previously
accepted that in 1710 Vico experienced a dramatic epistemological break
in this regard. That Vico's writings were profoundly anti-Cartesian after
this date is not at all in doubt. However even in his earliest writings, the
1699-1707 orations, elements of his most inventive notions of imagination
(phantasia [Latin] and fantasia [Italian]) and historical knowledge are
to be found, although they admittedly appear side-by-side with more
traditional Cartesian notions, particularly those regarding the importance
of mathematics and physics. Nevertheless an intellectual history of Vico's
thought cannot ignore these early attempts to grasp the importance of these
two essential concepts simply because they are not yet presented in a purified
form.
According to Vico there were seven main aspects to his work. It was the
elucidation of these principles, shared by all societies, which he believed
to be his particular task. The first was 'a rational civil theology of divine
providence' {'una teologia civile ragionata della provvedenza'). Arguments
still continue regarding the exact relationship of Vico's 'divine providence'
to Adam Smith's (1723-90) 'invisible hand' and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel's (1770-1831) 'cunning of reason'. But it can be stated with some
assurance that Vico's divine providence had little to do with any rational
pattern or the increase or development of reason. Divine providence was
for Vico the providential path which shapes the unforeseen consequences of
life for the benefit of those involved.
Secondly, Vico wrote of a 'philosophy of authority' ('una filosofia
dell'autorita'), which was always discussed in relation to the Law of
the Twelve Tables. This insight is one of Vico's most profound. He
argued that the Law of the Twelve Tables - he used the same type of
argument regarding the authorship of the Iliad and the Odyssey - was
not gleaned from Greek law but was the result of the collective wisdom
of the ancient Italian peoples. Here was an early case of exposure of an
obvious anachronism, a fanciful juxtaposition of elements in culture which
belong to quite different stages of development - the ancient Italians not
only did not derive their law code fi-om Solon (638?-?559 B.c.); they
could not have. The implications of this statement went far beyond the
identification of the origins of even such an important law code (or of
epic poetry). Vico was convinced that the 'order of ideas must follow the
order of institutions' CL'ordine dell'idee dee procedere secondo l'ordine
delle cose.'). Thus law and literature were prime examples of a particular
4 Introduction
social group's creativity, which was not dependent on timeless, Platonic

patterns.
A 'history ofhuman ideas' (*мла storia d'umane idee') was the third main
idea on Vico's list. He considered primitive poetry, and equally primitive
religion and law, to be created by the same faculty and that all expressed
the way of thinking and feeling of a specific society. These ideas determined
the character of a society, and were the object of Vico's method of historical
reconstruction.
Vico's fourth point was 'a philosophical criticism' ('una critica filosofica')
which developed from the history of ideas. He maintained it was possible to
enter by means of the imagination into ancient, even pre-literate societies, by
means of a critical examination of social usage, thereby reconstructing certain
forms of social behaviour. His historical method was not all-forgiving; rather
it offered a means to examine critically cultures quite diverse from one's own.
Vico did not moralise; instead his was an attempt to gain isolated glimpses
of these past societies. His warnings regardinganachronisms were the basis
on which such an investigation could be carried out.
Next was Vico's concept of an 'ideal, eternal history traversed in time
by the histories of all nations' ('ипа storia ideal eterna sopra la quale
corrano in tempo le storie di tutte le ruizionV), which he declared to be
an eternal truth. Here we must note Vico's tripartite historical cycles which
have traditionally received more attention than any other aspect of his work.
The cycleswere not an unimportant part of his thought, but they certainly
were not the most original.
Sixth, according to Vico, was natural law {4l diritto natural delle gentV),
which was composed of all the concrete, as opposed to transcendental,
aspects of human society such as the origins of religions, languages,
customs, governments and other social creations. For Vico the study of
these institutions was the correct means to gain insight concerning a past
society. Vico regarded natural law, divine providence and his *ideal, eternal
history' as the principles upon which human history was worked out. Yet
his main focus was not on these abstract concepts as much as on social
institutions, the study of which he assumed was the only sure means to
apprehend human history.
Vico's crucial, final point had to do with the principles of universal
history ('i principi della storia universale'). Since later men were unable
to enter into the imaginations of the first men, Vico offered fantasia as the
method, the means, to overcome this barrier and to reconstruct the thinking
of these early peoples. The tennfantasia was also used by Vico to describe
the creative efforts of these same peoples (in the form of poetry, religion,
law, or any other social institution) and at the same time the resultant culture
Introduction 5
ofthät particular social group. Vico's emphasis was always on the historical
and social dimensions. Fantasia was the means, the scienza nuova, which
allowed historical reconstruction and thus provided the historical knowledge
which Vico sought.
Vico's primary concern was with the ways of thinking and feeling,
the mentalities of distant, often all but forgotten societies. Most of his
discussions focused on the first stages of a primitive social group. Myths
and early poetry were seen by Vico as virtually identical for the purposes
of later historical analysis with the outlook, the Weltanschauung, of these
particular social groups. It wasfantasia which Vico identified as the peculiar,
involuntary force which created early poetry. And it was fantasia which
comprised the culture, the particular contributions of any given society. It
was alsofantasia which one must make use of in order to enter into the world
view of these peoples so far removed from oneself, both chronologically and
culturally.
Nevertheless it must be clearly stated that Vico showed little interest in
using his historical method,/aniay/a, himself. Most of his references were to
ancient Rome, an exceptionally well-documented society. He made passing
references to North American Indians and the ancient Chinese, for example,
but his only sustained discussion of an early society was of the Greeks. This
observation will hardly come as a surprise to the reader of Vico, nor does it
downgrade the importance of fantasia and historical knowledge. Vico was
always much more interested in the theoretical underpinnings of any concept
than its practical application.
* * *
Vico studies have gone through several definite phases. Vico was gener
ally ignored outside of Naples in his lifetime. There were only a few
exceptions. De antiquissima italorum sapientia (On the Wisdom of the
Ancient Italians) was reviewed unfavourably in the Giomale de' letterati
d'Italia (Journal ofthe Scholars ofItaly, 1711). Jean Le Clerc (1657-1736)
wrote a review which was more of a summary, although without an
understanding of the quite radical implications of II diritto universale
(1720-22) in the 1722 volume of the last edition of his Bibliothdque
ancienne et moderne (Ancient and Modem Library, 1714-22). Vico wrote
his autobiography for publication, at the request of a Venetian nobleman,
to serve as a model for future intellectual autobiographies. And La scienza
nuova prima (The First New Science, 1725) was reviewed in Leipzig in
1729. But these isolated contacts brought Vico no lasting connection with
the wider intellectual world. He was further restricted by his inability to
read any modem European language except Italian, which was unusual
6 Introduction
for Neapolitan academics of his generation. His only other language was
Latin.
In the generations following Vico, Antonio Genovesi (1713-69), Gaetano
Filangieri (1752-88) and other economic thinkers of the Kingdom ofNaples
often referred to him as the source of their inspiration. The actual connection
between Vico and these later econonüc theorists was quite slight, but
their desire to identify themselves with him was in itself significant.
Vincenzo Cuoco (1770-1823) was the best known of those who had to
flee Naples at the time of the Neapohtan Revolution of 1799 and who
subsequently introduced Vico's works to France and northern Italy. Over
the past two-and-a-half centuries Catholics, Romantics, Italian nationalists,
German historicists, communists and fascists - to name just a few groups -
have all claimed Vico as their spiritual father or son. Isolated references to
Vico, by Karl Marx (1818-1883), for example, or the integration ofVico into
later fictional works, with James Joyce (1882-1941) as the prime example,
have coloured our perception of hiswork much more than would have been
possible with a better-known thinker. But even though these groups and
thinkers were generally not addressing the Vico to be read in the texts,
their fascination with Vichian topics is itself compelling. An intellectual
history of the tradition of Vico studies and the diverse inteφretations and
misinterpretations of his thought remains to be written.
Jules Michelet (1798-1874) was the first of Vico's great interpreters.
His Romantic interpretation of Vico idealised men in the state of nature,
and stressed the notion of humanity strugghng to raise itself above the
pressure of external forces. Although interesting on its own terms, Michelet's
interpretation of Vico no longer adds much that is new to an understanding of
Vico. Vico was analysed by Idealist thinkers Giovanni Gentile (1875-1944)
and Benedetto Croce (1866-1952). Croce's powerful and extremely per
suasive pronouncements regarding Vico, which referred constantiy to the
transcendental aspects ofhistory, are still a force to be reckoned with in Vico
studies, both in the Italian-speaking world and beyond. R. G. CoUingwood's
(1889-1943) translations of Croce made these views accessible to the
EngUsh-speaking world as early as 1913. For this reason, and because of the
major impact of CoUingwood's own brief writings on Vico, it is necessary
for the modern scholar to take great care that assumptions regarding Vico
can be traced back to Vico himself and did not originate with Croce or
Collingwood. At present it is Isaiah BerUn's interpretation, in which he deals
with Vico's stress on the non-rational elements in man and Vico's original
methods of examining history, which dominates the field both inside and
outside Italy. Michelet, Croce and Collingwood, and Berlin represent three
extremes in Vico studies - the Romantic, the Idealist and the Liberal.
Introduction 7
Much important work has been done relatively recently in Vico studies
by Adams, Badaloni, Battistini, Donzelli, Fasso, Fisch, Fubini, Giarrizzo,
Gianturco, Haddock, Momigliano, Mooney, Piovani, Pompa, Rossi, Said,
Verene and Zagorin to name just a few. The tricentenary of Vico's birth in
1968 gave rise to a profusion of conferences, special collections and volumes
dedicated to the Neapolitan thinker. Two institutes have been founded -
the Institute for Vico Studies in New York and Atlanta and the Centro di
Studi Vichiani in Naples. Such an upsurge of interest in Vico is not to be
disparaged, for it must be assumed that it represents a very real curiosity
regarding Vico's own concepts. Nevertheless much work on Vico remains
to be done. The lack of an English translation of his complete works is
perhaps the most serious issue. In addition, there is a need for a collection of
essential articles on Vico, which remain scattered in often obscure journals.
There is also a need to view Vico's thought in an interdisciplinary manner.
His eighteenth-century views do notfitneatly into the modern understanding
of history, philosophy, politics, language and literature.
* * *
This book, then, is an effort to explicate and analyse what I believe to be
the two central themes ofVico's thought - imagination and historical knowl
edge. For the most part, this study has been based on a textual approach to
vico's theoretical works. His work sustains detailed scrutiny very well. For
this reason it is maintained that one need not necessarily study his writings in
conjunction with those of a better known thinker or intellectual movement,
although such studies, for example those by Badaloni, most certainly have
their own advantages. Thus little attempt has been made here to discuss at
length either Vico's sources or his extremely disparate followers.
Perhaps surprisingly, there follows no lengthy discussion of Croce's
inteφretation of Vico at any length. Croce's views are so pervasive that
an analysis of Vico senza Croce (Vico without Croce) seemed to be in
order. However far we have moved from Croce's Idealism, his discussion
of Vico and mythology still maintains its relevance today. The works of
Fausto Nicolini (1879-1965), the great editor of Vico, form the backbone
of any Vichian study. As this book follows most closely in the tradition of
Collingwood and Berlin, its points of departure from their interpretations are
spelled out explicitly throughout.
This work is distinguished from that of Leon Pompa by its stress on
imagination, which, it will be argued, is by no means a marginal aspect of
Vico's thought. I argue that Vico cannot be placed neatly into the tradition of
Western philosophy. To do so creates a danger that Vico might appear to be
a second-rate philosopher, and the diversity and richness of his thought and
8 Introduction
the originality of both his subjects and his views might be ignored. Bruce
Haddock and Giovanni Giarrizzo maintain, in their own ways, that Vico
was a political thinker. This book will argue that Vico was uninterested
in political theory and political structures; that which one might wish to
regard as a philosophy of politics was for Vico an investigation into the
social relations of particular cultures. This work also takes a different route
from that ofDonald Verene on knowledge (although there is no disagreement
on the primacy of imagination) as this study analyses the relationship of
fantasia, in the various senses it was used by Vico - to culture, society,
language and history.
It is the purpose here to establish two main points. The first is to show
that an analysis of all the versions of La scienza nuova, as well as Vico's
earlier theoretical texts, can provide a means to gain a more fully-rounded
appreciation of his thought. Special emphasis has been placed on the
second version of La scienzp. nuova (1730) and the first six biaugural
Orations (1699-1707), precisely because of the information they contain
concerning imagination. This -textual study has led to the contention that
Vico's epistemological break was neither so sudden nor unaccountable
as has been previously assumed. Secondly and most significantly is the
argument that the concepts of fantasia and historical knowledge were the
central themes in Vico's thought, and that they require an appraisal not only
of early language but of the development of the very idea of society. The
aim is to demonstrate that it was these notions of imagination, language and
historical consciousness which constituted Vico's unique contribution to the
history of ideas and which laid the groundwork for subsequent inquiries into
the philosophy of history.
1 Vico's Intellectual
Development
1. Vico's Orations (1699,1700,1701,1704,1705,1707) and His
Supposed Epistemological Break (1710)
Virtually all recent work on Vico is based on the premise that there was
an epistemological break in his thought in 1710, at which point he became
suddenly and dramatically anti-Cartesian.^ One reason for this is that most
previous studies have restricted themselves to an analysis of the third and
final version of Vico's best known work, La scienza nuova (1744). Little
effort has been made to trace the development of his ideas not only in
the important first (1725) and almost unknown second (1730) editions
of La scienza nuova, but also throughout his autobiographical and earüer
theoretical writings. The exception to this practice is the attention given to
De antiquissima italorum sapientia, the publication of which in 1710 is held
to mark his supposed intellectual conversion. Quite to the contrary, however,
it can be argued that no such major shift in his thought occurred at any point.
Yet this is not to deny Vico's anti-Cartesian stance. The year 1710 was not
a dramatic turning point in Vico's intellectual development; rather, it was
the year that he wrote the first of his works which was to receive significant
attention.
Without a doubt Vico was violently anti-Cartesian by the time he published
De antiquissima italorum sapientia (1710) and certainly his autobiography
(1725, 1728).2 But elements of his most original views, those regarding the
importance of imagination and historical knowledge, are to be found in the
first six orations as well, admittedly side-by-side with praise for Descartes.
The ambivalence of Vico's views in these orations should be viewed in its
historical and intellectual contexts: praise of mathematics and physics would
not have been surprising to Vico's readers. The point at which Vico dropped
his Cartesian references altogether and began to actively criticise the French
philosopher in his later works is well known.
However we should not ignore his first six orations simply because in
them he praised Descartes and adopted the mathematical method. It must
be remembered that Vico praised the mathematical method in 1720-22. As
late as 1744 he again examined the merits and demerits of various scientific
approaches, long after his alleged epistemological break. Vico became
9
10 Giambattista Vico: Imagination and Historical Knowledge
anti-Cartesian, but never anti-scientific, even though his own interests

veered towards the human and social sciences. More intriguing than his
comments on science or Descartes are his first discussions of imagination
and historical knowledge. This argument is not only about texts, but about
ideas, ideas which should not be dismissed because they are mixed with
unoriginal material. Indeed all of Vico's works contain very well-known
issues, most particularly the 1744 edition of La scienza nuova, to which
most Vico scholars confine themselves.
Vico's opposition to Descartes had at least as much to do with the
scientific approach, which developed for the most part after the French
philosopher's death and which bore his name, as with Descartes himself.
This distinction is critical since it helps somewhat to explain the ambivalence
in Vico's writings from 1699-1710, in which he both praised Descartes and
stressed the importance of imagination and history. Vico's incorporation of
Cartesian themes into his earliest theoretical works was not unusual for the
time, and thus it isno excuse for ignoring the peculiar ideas of his own
which were present there as well. It can be argued further that Descartes
deserves to rank, even if in opposition, along with Vico's four acknowledged
awion-Plato (4277-347 B.c.), Tacitus (557-after 11? A . D . ) , Francis Bacon
(1561-1626) and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645).3
There is no denying that the epistemological break retains its fascination
on many levels. It makes Vico an honorary Modem by detaching him from
his own cultural and intellectual background. It gives Vico an experience that
ranks with Descartes's famous night in the winter of 1619 in a 'stove-heated'
room in Bavaria.4 It seemingly explains Vico's switch from a discussion of
the nature of man in the first three orations (Ι-ΠΙ) to that of the development
of civil societies in the next three (rV-VI), although even this shift occurred
as early as 1704.^ Further, the scientific references retumed in full force in
his later works; thus there was not the complete tum from scientific matters
that one would expect from such an about-face.
Hence there was no radical shift in 1710, since Vico's discussions in the
first years of the eighteenth century on human nature and society demonstrate
a continuum of the very themes which he was to make so famous. If there
was a break, it was with the discussion of his method, his new science, his
critical art, in II diritto universale written in the years 1720-22; but even this
approach was firmly embedded in the early works.^ The radical break in
Vico's thought that many commentators have for so long accepted simply is
not to be found in his writings. The reality which commanded Vico's interest
throughout all of his writings was social relations. Cartesian thought was
shed in a natural and gradual process, as he turned his attention to language
and societies. In particular, scientific Cartesian thought was dropped as
Vico's Intellectual Development 11
Vico iumed his attention more and more towards the relationships among
social groups. There is a parallel here with Vico's own discussion of the
development of societies, in which transitions from one stage to the next
were natural and gradual, not dramatic and abrupt.
As Vico's anti-Cartesian views are not in doubt, when reading Descartes
one is struck more forcefully by the parallels with Vico than with the
confrasts. Repeatedly the same issues were addressed (imagination, memory,
will, good or common sense) even though the conclusions are contradictory.^
Even less well known are the topics upon which Vico and Descartes agreed.
Each felt that it was necessary to begin intellectual endeavour afresh. Both
believed they had found a new method which would explain and unify all
subjects, and they shared (along with Bacon) an unnutigated contempt for
Scholasticism.8 Vico was not, however, at all gratefiil to Descartes for
helping to loosen the grip of Scholasticism on academic life.
Both Vico and Descartes prized common sense, and a childlike awareness
of the world over the scientific (or any other) theories taught from books;
even from their diametrically opposed standpoints on the relative importance
of the arts and sciences, they each designed new systems, new approaches to
human knowledge.9 Descartes wrote that it was more effective to re-do the
whole scheme of human knowledge, rather than to revise isolated aspects,
giving the example of town planning (that it is easier to plan a new city
than to renovate an existing one), but without much discussion of the
inherent problems of implementing such a scheme.i^ Descartes's desire
was to reform human learning by showing that all disciplines were parts of
asingle science.^^ Both Vico and Descartes wanted to unify and to provide
a method for the explanation and study of human knowledge.
Nevertheless it is not difficult to find Descartes's famous denunciation of
the arts - Part I , paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Discours de la methode - and
the accessibility of this passage is no doubt one reason that the surprising
parallels between the two thinkers have been almost entirely ignored.^^ It is
not, however, the intention here simply to catalogue littie known points in
common between the two thinkers in order to claim a direct link between
them. Rather it is instructive to realize that the goals and outlook of the two
were quite similar. This view is most important in terms of Vico's supposed
epistemological break. Although Descartes and Vico developed conflicting
systems, they started with many of the same goals and dealt with similar
issues. This helps to explain Vico's early admiration for Descartes and how
he was able to mix Cartesian concepts with his own for so many years before
he dropped the Cartesian aspects altogether.
Vico's views were in many cases the mirror image of those of Descartes
- the analogy could be made of a child who rebels against his parents by
adopting diametrically opposed political and social views. This idea goes a
long way towards explaining Vico's rather rabid anti-Cartesian statements
in the Autobiography and his eagerness to disassociate even his youthful self
from the Cartesian spirit so prevalent in eighteenth-century Naples, where
in the academies - if not at the university - it was considered a mark of
distinction to say that one understood Descartes.^^
There is no doubt that at the time Vico wrote his autobiography he had
become violently anti-Cartesian.^* As Yvon Belavel's summary ofVico's
views indicates:
[Descartes] . . . has slipped somefictionsinto his Discours . . . ; he does

not acknowledge his readings . . . ; in his "greed for glory" he has
planned, in opposition to the Metaphysics of Aristotle, to establish "his
empire in the cathedral schools" . . . ; . . . he has become the leader of
a sect. . . ; his method is sterile; some of his followers are quacks . . . ;
the final result of his philosophy is fatalism, and so on.^^
Vico not only made personal attacks on Descartes's character, calling him
overly ambitious for glory, for example, but more importantly he could not
forgive Descartes for the scom the French philosopher had poured on the
study of language, orators, historians and poets - the very elements which
together comprised the essence of Vico's approach.i^ In any case Vico's
anti-Cartesian stance was a means by which to demonstrate his break
with his contemporaries and identify himself with the Ancients. Hence
his much-vaunted epistemological break of 1710 was a break not only
from science (or even from law) to history, but was also a split from the
current scientific trends in Naples and Europe. One might argue that Vico's
major attack was as much on scientific Cartesianism as on Descartes himself,
which would have pleased Descartes, for he pleaded that his readers beUeve
only him, via the texts, not what was said about him.^^
According to the French philosopher, important subjects must be analysed
in an unbroken manner, beginning with the simplest and most evident truths;
in this manner Descartes dealt with transitions in nature and in history.i^
He maintained that the whole of human knowledge consists of a distinct
perception of the way in which these simple ideas combine to build up other
objects. Thus he, like Vico, dealt with transitions in history as a gradual
process.i^ And it was Descartes, not Vico, who wrote that one must not go
beyond what one understands intuitively.ô Belavel wrote:
No longer is imagination - for Vico any more than Descartes - a simple

auxiliary of the intellect, which the union of soul and body renders useful.
We should, instead, envisage it as the primal, positive power of seizing

analogies and similarities; without that power, chance would never result
in creation . . . 21
This is not to say that Vico and Descartes were closely aligned even
on non-scientific imagination. According to Descartes intuition was 'an
unclouded conception of an attentive mind and springs from the light of
reason alone' {'mentis purae & attentae non dubiam conceptum, qui ά
fola rationis luce nafcitur').^^ Descartes contended that imagination is most
intense when the brain is disturbed, when the true is linked with the real and
the false with the fantastic.^3 In addition he contended that ideas did not
come via the senses.^* Although Vico and Descartes both desired to reorder
the division and examination of intellectual endeavours and addressed many
of the same subjects - imagination, memory, will and common sense - their
approaches were shaφly divergent.
For his part Vico was not at all concerned with imagination or ideas
in the Cartesian sense.^s There is no discussion in Vico of when ideas
may be present, the difference between perception and ideas, or even
a clear differentiation between memory and imagination, much less any
concern regarding the distinction between the nünd and the body. For Vico
imagination was not irrational but nonrational.
The utility of doubt so important to Descartes was completely missing in
Vico. Descartes desired to find just one thing that was certain, indubitable,
whereas Vico was completely unconcerned with this issue. For Vico clear
and distinct ideas were only abstractions of the human mind. He asserted:
. . . ac proinde nostra clara ac Accordingly, our clear and distinct

distincta mentis idea, nedum idea of the mind cannot be a
ceterum veroram, sed mentis criterion of the mnd itself, still
ipsius criterium esse non less of other truths. For while the
possit: quia, dum se mens mind perceives itself it does not
cognoscit, no facit, et quia make itself, and because it does not
non facit, nescit genus seu know the genus or mode by which
modum, quo se cognoscit. it perceives itself.^^
In the same work, De antiquissima italorum sapientia, Vico made his famous
declaration that only by making something can we hope to understand it. In
the same manner we can only hope to understand events in the past, accord
ing to Vico, if we re-make them by means of our own imagination.^^
Descartes was troubled by the paradox that we cannot doubt our existence
without existing while we doubt. Vico called this 'Descartes's deceitful
demon' ('geniofalkici CarthesiV); for Vico the famous Cartesian tag would
be an affirmation: I think, therefore we, as a society, mankind, are.^s
According to Vico his scienza nuova was possible if we could recover the
principles fi-om the modifications of our same human mind.29
The concept of God was used by Descartes as a means to discuss limitless
will and intelligence. Descartes appealed to God's veracity to bridge the
epistemological gap between belief and certain knowledge.ô Yet one of
his more famous critics, Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694), was one of the first
of many to attack the circularity of this argument. According to Arnauld,
Descartes used clear and distinct ideas to prove the existence of God, while
at the same time appealing to the veracity of God to guarantee clear and
distinct ideas - this is not dissimilar to Vico's treatment of natural law and
sacred religion.î For both Descartes and Vico the truths they sought to
identify and order were distinct from God, and theologyonly entered into
their writings as it furnished a basis of certainty. Descartes believed one
could only understand the world through reason, whereas Vico considered
reason to offer only a partial solution, and Vico argued that imagination was
a much more profound method.
For Vico the only creations worthy of sustained consideration were social
institutions; he was not at all concerned (following Oration V I ) with the
physical world or even the composition of human nature in the manner
of Plato, Thomas Aquinas (12257-1274), Bacon or Descartes, although
Vico continued his discussion of human nature in his later works in
a very different form as senso comune.^^ His earlier works (the Ora
tions, De nostri temporis studiorum ratione, De antiquissima italorum
sapientia and the autobiography), listed ways to feed the imagination:
start children in school late, where they should read both epic poetry
and national histories and study the quantitative sciences, in particular,
geometry, since he considered geometry to be a tool in the formation of
an inventive mind.^3 But if De nostri temporis studiorum rationev/iih
its attack on the Modern, French approach was a leap ahead, then De
antiquissima italorumsapientia (with the exception of the first chapter
of the first book on verum and factum) was, in some respects, a step
backwards, for in it Vico discussed at length mathematics, physics, motion
and extension. Thus in 1709 in De nostri temporis studiorum ratione
(and as late as 1744) he espoused the virtues of the sciences.^* But
this was possible, according to Vico, because one could recognise the
usefulness of mathematics and physics without being Cartesian. Hence
Vico professed a limited approval of the geometrical (and hence Cartesian)
method because it developed a taste for order and, most importantly, because
it developed the imagination. Vico sought to counter what he viewed as the
extremes of Cartesianism by re-establishing the dignity of the science of

man.35
Indeed Vico was very much out ofhis depth as a reviewer of Cartesianism.
Even as a student he never demonstrated any aptitude for the sciences; his
background was in the classics and law. There is even some doubt as to
to Vico's familiarity with Descartes, especially with the Discours de la
mithode, since it was written not in Latin but in French, which Vico could
not read. Nevertheless Vichian criticism of Descartes, if not of the highest
standard, is of interest, if only because it indicates some of Vico's weak
points as well as his own intellectual priorities.^^
The importance to Vico of the belief that he developed in an intellectual
vacuum, and of his related feelings concerning Descartes, Isaac Newton
(1642-1727) and John Locke (1632-1704), no doubt had much more to do
with his feelings of exclusion (both real and imagined) from the intellectual,
academic and social hierarchies of Naples, let alone Europe. Vico was not
so much in rebellion against his European intellectual heritage as he was
in reaction to the university in Naples and the decline of its fortunes, his
own lowly position there, and what he perceived to be the generally poor
intellectual standard at the beginning of the eighteenth century.37 It is very
probable that ifVico had been more successful professionally, he would have
felt that the historical methods available were all that were necessary, and
would never have developed his own views on imagination and historical
knowledge.
If Vico had accepted that he would not be famous in his own time then this
is another reason that he would have written on generalised topics which he
would have hoped to be of interest to future readers.^s Whereas Vico turned
to the Ancients for inspiration, Descartes looked to the past masters to see
what was left for investigation.^^ Vico lashed out against the Moderns and
their scientific approach because he felt that they would not allow a study
of cultures and other topics (now termed social sciences) which cannot be
discussed in scientific terms. For all these reasons Vico considered himself
an Ancient, yet his views are often of more interest to us than to his Modern
(or even Ancient) contemporaries.
Thus Vico had always been anti-Cartesian in outlook, even if he himself
did not fully recognize it until later in his life. A recognition that there was
no dramatic epistemological break in Vico's thought is important not only in
terms of the surprising unity of Vico's work, it also establishes the critical
position of his early works. A short survey of Vico's first six orations clearly
demonstrates not only the presence of what we now consider to be Vichian
themes, but also lengthy discussions of the same. It is accepted that in Vico's
first three orations (1699, 1700, and 1701), he dealt with human nature and
the development of the mind, and in the next three (1704, 1705, and 1707),
he discussed the usefulness and, indeed, the necessity for society to foster
both a love of literature and a well-rounded educational system, embracing
both the arts and the sciences.*" gut beyond these common topics of the
time, the orations were the first expression of Vico's own ideas regarding
society and history.
As early as the first oration, Suam ipsius cognitionem ad omnem
doctrinarum orbem brevi absolverulum maximo cuique esse incitamento
{Knowledge of oneself is for everyone the greatest incentive to acquire
the universe of learning in the shortest possible time) delivered on 18
October 1699, Vico outlined many of the most important themes which
would play major roles in his work over the next four decades: phantasia
(Latin for imagination), the faculty which conceived images; Greek and
Roman gods as early expressions of phantasia; the uselessness of music
or the performing and creative arts in developing the nünd; the central
role of memory; philology as an historical method (his concern with the
history of words - philology and etymology - was due to his obsession with
the history of culture); ingenium (promptness, acuity, dedication, capacity,
inventiveness and inmiediacy) as the guide in all creative enteφrises; and
knowledge, which he considered to be closely related to the will. It was here
that he first made the critical point that it was by means of phantasia that
one could reclaim both the great and sublime aspects of the past.*i As early
as Oration I (1699) we find his initial statement concerning imagination,
phantasia, as the creative faculty.
Vis vero illa reram imagines con- Truly, the power that fashions
formandi, quae dicitur «phantasia», the images of things, which is
dum novas formas gignit et procreai, called phantasy, at the same time
divinitatem profecto originis asserit that it originates and produces
et confirmat. Haecfinxitmaiorum new forms, reveals and confirms
minorumque gentium deos, haec finxit its own divine origin. It was this
heroas, haec reram formas modo that imagined the gods of,all the
vertit, modo componit, modo secemit; major and minor nations; it was
haec res maxime remotissimas ob this that imagined the heroes; it
oculos ponit, dissitas complectitur, is this that now differentiates the
inaccessas superat, abstrasas aperit, the forms of things, sometimes
per invias viam munit. At quanta et separating them, at other times
quam incredibiU velocitate! mixing them together. It is
phantasy that makes present to our
eyes lands that are very far away,
that unites those things that are
* separated, that overcomes the

inaccessible,thatdiscloseswhat
is hidden and builds a road
through trackless places. And it
does all this with unbelievable
swiftness!*2
In the first oration (after some very slightly veiled criticism of the Rector
of the University of Naples for asking him so late to give this speech) Vico
asserted that all men have the desire for self-knowledge, but only educated
people have the ability and opportunity to recognise and then act on this
compulsion. For this reason he considered students to be naturally attracted
to learning. Professors, he argued, have an obligation to teach without bias,
in order to satisfy their students's needs. (He always wrote as if it were
possible to teach or write without any bias, neglecting to notice that his
own views formed a particular outlook, or prejudice, of their own.) This
notion of an innate desire for knowledge was an early parallel of Vico's
own tenet that societies naturally preserve records of their past and seek
ways to decode such artefacts. Vico's use of self-knowledge (*suam ipsius
cognitionem'Y^ had no modem psychoanalytical overtones; nor did it mean
an acceptance of one's own mental and physical limitations. Rather it was
recognition of an inherent desire to learn. For Vico the possibility of
becoming wise depended essentially on our will, our detemdnation. It was
cultural knowledge, knowledge of the past of one's own society and of the
the natural world, which he sought.
The desire to comprehend the past was for Vico a basic human need. Here
as elsewhere in his work, the discussion of the developmentof laws and
human institutions was curiously amoral. Vico did not (as John Stuart Mill,
1806-1873, was to argue in the following century) regard laws as the product
of intellect and virtue, nor of modern cormption grafted upon barbarism.**
Instead Vico viewed the development of these specific human institutions
and the subsequent artefacts - laws in codified form - as a natural, and
always gradual, process. Laws, according to Vico, always reflected the spirit
of the entire society concerned, not just its elite.
The second oration was entitled Hostem hosti infensiorem infestioremque
quam stultum sibi esse neminem (There is no enemy more dangerous and
treacherous to its adversary than thefool against himself, 18 October 1700).
His discussion of etemal models and etemal order in this work referred to
his faith in the Christian religion, not an acceptance of Platonic universals.
He stated that ferocity, bestiality and war should be avoided or discouraged,
and in their place he offered the students the satisfaction which comes from
intense study and the freedom generated by wisdom. In general this oration is
less original and offered his listeners such platitudes as the need to reproduce
in oneself the order seen in nature.*^
However the tension between reason and passion within man, a critical
issue for students, according to Vico in this oration, is of more than passing
interest. For Vico unrestrained passions were the weapons of fools {stultorum
arma sunt ejfraenes animi ajfectusY^ and thus reason should be supreme
over the passions. Yet he did not state that it should have the dominant role
over phantasia. For phantasia was not identical with the passions for Vico.
It could be instinctive and it certainly was non-rational, but phantasia was
assigned to the category of the spirit (not the emotions), which included also
sensus communis.
In the third oration, A litteraria societate omnem malam fraudem abesse
oportere, si nos vera non simulata, solida non vana eruditione omatos esse
studeamus (If we would study to manifest true, not feigned, arui solid, not
empty, erudition, the republic of letters must be rid of every deceit, 18
October 1701).*^ He argued that free will, a 'magnificent gift from God',
was also responsible for much violence. Free will is abused when actions
are taken which are not good for society as a whole or for the environment,
nature. For Vico the possibility of society was built on reciprocal trust (for,
he mentioned, even criminals obey the laws of their nefarious organizations)
and the proper use of human reason. The distinction he later drew between
the will and reason is in this work rather muddled. One explanation might
be that in early societies he would not have considered the difference to
be very great between them. In this work he also praised Aristotle for his
philosophy of customs; this was exactly what Vico himself was to create in
later years.
This oration is essential as it stresses the bonds which tie men together
in society. He spoke of an innate desire in man to associate with others -
demonstrating his confidence in the natural sociability of man. In an age
donunated by the Hobbesian view of warring primitives in the state of nature,
the Lockean notion of early men being unable to use their natural reason in
the earliest stagesof society, and later Jean-Jacques Rousseau's (1712-78)
noble savages forced into society by families and farming (albeit, Rousseau's
work was yet to be written), Vico insisted not on man's natural good nature
but on his innate desire to associate with others. Vico obviously followed
Aristotle (348-322 B.c.) on this point, but he differed from Aristotle in
viewing this inclination not as a desire for political control and economic
security but as an inner drive without which (and thus without language,
law and all social creations) man could not be fully human.
In the fourth oration. Si quis ex literarum studiis maximas utilitates
easque semper cum honestate coniunctas percipere velit, is rei publicae seu
communi civium bono erudiatur (If one wishes to gain the greatest benefit
from the study of the liberal arts, and these always conjoined with honor,
let him be educated for the good of the republic which is the common good
ofthe citizenry, 18 October 1704), he reiterated the definition of phantasia
as the faculty of forming images of things and he again mentioned ingenium,
which he described as exuberant.*^ in this he stated for the first time his
oft repeated belief that imagination was strongest in the young, be they
individuals, communities or whole cultures*9 He praised students, who,
after long nights of study, wouldcome through pouring rain to attend the
lectures at the university. He desired to encourage this drive and curiosity in
the young. Yet a warning note was sounded regarding phantasia, which he
equated with youthful enthusiasm. While it should be nurtured in the young,
Vico declared, it should not dominate in intellectual endeavours. Indeed at
this stage not only phantasia but the senses and even reason are all dismissed
as insufficient for the young ever fully to grasp the arts and sciences. Vico's
emphasis on history is more comprehensible in this respect, for he felt it was
the one subject of which we could gain the most complete knowledge.
Proper conduct in both education and society was of particular interest to
him in this oration.In terms of early society he argued that political positions
were created because of the need to help the conmiunity. At every stage of a
civilization, he maintained citizenship to be useful, because it breeds feelings
of piety and respect, presumably in general, notjust for the country involved.
For Vico a university liberal arts education was necessary not only for the
individual, but also for the state, since graduates could then be employed
to work for the government. This was an old Neapolitan tradition - the
university in Naples was founded in 1224 by the Hohenstaufen Frederick
П for the explicit purpose of training civil servants. For this reason there
was a general sentiment in Naples that education paid for by the state
was worthwhile. The purpose of this speech was certainly to encourage
the students, but his reasons were not entirely altruistic, because, as Vico
himself stated, society cares for the young so that later they will care for
society.
The fifth oration, Res publicas tum maxime belli gloria inclytas et rerum
imperio potentas, quum maxime Uterisfloruerunt(Nations have been nwst
celebrated in gloryfor battles and have obtained the greatest political power
when they excelled in letters, 18 October 1705) is of the least lasting value.
It discusses war and honour, with specific examples given of each.^" vico's
answer to the debate regarding the relative merits of military and literary
glory, was that they complement each other. Vico taught that literary glory
would follow military glory and that the same people would not do both. He
believed scholars to be as productive as soldiers in their work for the state.

Leadership qualities are stressed in this oration as well as in the previous one.
His preference for a strong state which would foster study in the humanities
is absolutely clear here. Although of far less merit than the other orations (as
indicated by his classical references, a sure sign that he is not dealing with
a topic in an original manner) it does indicate his interest in the militaiy, in
the concept of heroism, and in the symbolism with which it is invested.
The final oration, Corruptae hominum naturae cognito ad universum
ingenuarum artium scientiarumque orbem absolverulum invitat, ac rectum,
facilem ac perpetuum in iis addisceruiis ordinem exponit (The knowledge of
the corrupt nature ofman invites us to study the entire universe ofliberal
arts and sciences and setsfor the correct method by which to leam them, 18
October 1707), is the most exciting of the orations. He began it by discussing
wisdom and the will.î The role of wisdom he saw as threefold:
Tria ipsissima sapientiae officia: Three are the very duties of

eloquentia stultorum ferociam wisdom - with eloquence to tame
cicurare, prudentia eos ab errore the impetuousness of the fools,
deducere, virtute de iis bene mereri, with prudence to lead them out
atque eo pacto pro se quemque sedulo of error, with virtue toward
humanam adiuvare societatem. them to earn their good will,
and in these ways, each
according to his ability, to
foster with zeal the society
of man.52
Vico declared that the benefits of learning always accrued to society. This
theme was to be taken up enthusiastically in his later works, when he
discussed the formation of society. In this work he stated that languages
were the most powerful means for setting up human societies; for language
would have been essential to form the type of associations he discussed in
Oration Ш. But the motivating force was a self-centered love, a desire for
advancement, usually associated with the notions of Bernard Mandeville
(16707-1733) and Smith.
Also in this oration, far from deprecating mathematics, Vico cited it as a
means to develop the imagination, and he observed that this sort of study
should be required for the young, when their imaginations were strongest.
He went so far as to state that imagination should be sculpted into young
minds at a very tender age so that it could not then be erased.s3 He recognised
the immense power of phantasia and sought to harness it, so that later in
life it would overwhehn reason. This potential conflict between reason and
Vico'sIntellectual Development 21
phantasia should not be viewed as a denouncement of phantasia by Vico,

as much as an indication of the importance he placed on a proper balance
between the two.
One last theme in this workmust be mentioned: his belief that the foolish
do not have the ability to distinguish the truth - a view that was to receive
pride of place in La scienza nuova.^* This theme had earlier been discussed
by Descartes:
En quoy il n'eft pas It is unUkely that this is an

vrayfemblable que tous fe error on their part; it seems
trompent; mais plutoft cela rather to be evidence in support of
tefmoigne que Ia puiffance se the view that the power of forming
bien iuger, & distinguer le a good judgement and of
vray d'avec le faux, qui eft distinguishing the true from the
proprement ce qu'on nomme le false, which is properly speaWng
bons fens ou la raison, eft what is called Good Sense or
natarellement efgale en tous Reason, is by nature equal in aU
les hommes; . . . men.55
Les plus grandes ames font The greatest minds are capable of
capables des plus grans vices, the greatest vices as well as of
auffy bien que des plus grandes the greatest virtues.'^
vertus; . . .
This final point, unfortunately, was never addressed by Vico, nor is there
any discussion of restraints on the ruler in Vico.
One of the reasons that these early works have been ignored is due to the
claim that there was no method in them. Issues of civil society and cultural
development were discussed, but it has generally been assumed that Vico
gave no hints as to how to approach them. The reason may be because
phantasia has not been previously recognised as his means of obtaining
historical knowledge, and thus it has been assumed that it was only when
Vico used the terms scienza nuova and arte critica that he had a system in
mind.
It is indeed amazing that parallels could exist between Vico and Descartes,
the latter believing that the 'gracefulness of fables make one imagine many
events as possible which in reality are not so' {'Outre queles font imaginer
plufieurs eunemens comme poffibles qui ne lefont poinf)P Descartes tried
to purge himself of aU beliefs without a rational basis, writing that 'we must
be particularly careful not to let our reason go on holiday while we are exam
ining the truth of any matter' (*vi illis confifa ratio, etiamfi quodammodo
ferietur ab ipfius iUationis evidenti & attenda confideratione*).^^ Vico was

more interested in man*s emotions than his rational development, for the
limitations on the subjects which could be pursued by rational means were
all too clear to Vico. Although there is in his writings a combination of
scientific with mythical, poetic truth, particularly in De nostri temporis
studiorum ratione, it is not a sophisticated admixture.59 In Vico the poetic
passages soar, while the scientific ones seem Ieaden.Vico's brilliance was
in recognising that poetry could be used in a sophisticated way in order
to find out about the past, by means of the historical imagination. Hence
these universali fantastici (imaginative universals) embedded in sapienza
volgare (common wisdom, in the form of the myths) are revealed by means
of conscious reflection upon them.^ Myths and fables were used by Vico
as the basis for re-constructing a world view of primitive peoples. According
to Vico analyses of these early myths and fables must be done as much as
possiblefiromthe vantage points of these same peoples. Vico warned against
the dangers of an overly sophisticated or nationalistic approach, but once
he had issued these warnings he was quite willing to use any technique or
approach to revive these lost mentalities.
Although Vico listed Plato as the first ofhis quattro autori, it has for some
time been recognised that the most profound influence came in the form of
neo-Platonism, not from reading Plato. Vico's introduction to the concept
of imagination as well as law in the neo-Platonic writers he read at Vatolla
has not been previously recognised.*si Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola's
(1463-94) treatise De imaginatione (published posthumously in 1501) is for
the most part a condemnation of the evils of imagination.^^ Yet it now seems
clear that it was from Pico that Vico gained his incurable fascination with
the topic of imagination. No doubt Vico's grounding in heo-Platonic thought
helped shield him from the pursuit of scientific, Cartesian ideas. This was
due to the contradictory implication of neo-Platonism which placed rational
knowledge infinitely above the reach of the human mind.^^ vico's adoption
ofPlatonism rather than Cartesianism (for, as has been established, imagina
tion was an essential faculty to Descartes, but for him it never threatened the
supremacy of reason) in tum overcame the neo-Platonic problem that human
knowledge appears as a feeble vestige of divine knowledge, by means of
Vico's elimination of any attempt to deal with nature or the sciences.^*
Nevertheless man's inability ever to recover the totality of human history
would be an issue in this regard - human knowledge of history would be
but a feeble vestige of divine knowledge. Still Vico considered his critical
art, his new science, enabled historical reconstmction to be a fraitful (if not
altogether complete) and necessary endeavour.
No ideal society was ever presented in Vico's writings as either a model
ог a goal because he was not concerned with social change for the future
but with an analysis ofthe taming of primitive man.^^ goth Descartes and
Vico recognized that the people were the source of power for a state and
a society but neither was particularly interested in methods of governing
the people. Vico offered no new ideas regarding the civic virtues that
children should absorb, but a modern variation of the republican virtues,
the philosophy of man expounded by Petrarch (1304-74), Lorenzo Valla
(c. 1400-57), Marsilio Ficino (1433-99), Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525)
and especially Pico can be assumed to have been Vico's model.^ Yet these
civic virtues receive only one mention in Vico, whereas the benefits of
education are almost omnipresent in his work, especially in the orations
and his autobiography.^^ In this way Vico's scienza nuova may be viewed
as an educational programme. His critical art had to be mastered and then
applied, in order not only to understand the past properly but also to maintain
the present order.
Vico was scathing about cultures which did not maintain their dominance
and were overtaken by other societies on the rise. He never explained
just why growth was natural, but not decline. For a thinker who so
often discussed world history and the great civilisations of the past, it
seems rather inconsistent that he attached a moral value and adopted a
judgemental stance concerning societies which had lost their vigour and
were either gently or rapidly declining. The explanation for this anomaly
seems at first to be straightforward - that Vico began to take a personal
interest in the maintenance of advanced societies, as this study had a personal
relevance for him and his own time. However it seems more plausible that
the reason that Vico genuinely feared the decline of society had nothing to
do with his own situation, or with issues of right or wrong. For a thinker
so occupied with the concepts of imagination and human creativity (both
necessary for the maintenance of society), the death of a fiilly functioning
civilisation meant the end of invention, and for Vico, without man's social
creation, there was nothing left worthy of investigation.
Much later thinkers were concerned with a time when, again according
to Mill, *the law came to be like the costume of a full-grown man who had
never put off the clothes made for him when he first went to school'-^^ por
Vico, this sort of society would truly befinished.Law was all-important
to him in its role as an indicator of a society's structural growth. But
Vico never placed law above history; he contended that law could only
be understood in relation to a specific historical context. At one point Vico
maintained that all universal science was summed up in the legal sciences.
In II diritto universale, which more than any other of his works dealt with
specific groups and events, Vico's philosophy of law was already based
on the science of human cultures, which could be exanüned by means of

De principiis humanitatis (The Principles ofHumanity; an early, working
title for La scienza nuova).^^ Vico did not view law as radically different
from literature or writtenhistories. Previously he wouldhave noted this
approach in some of the neo-Platonic writers he read at Vatolla who
discussed imagination, literature and the law in the same sections of a
single treatise.
At the heart of Vico's message was his beHef that history itself was a
human artefact and thus comprehensible by means of a careful exanünation
of human institutions such as laws, religion and customs. Unlike most
thinkers of his time, Vico saw the comprehension of history as an end
in itself, not, in the words of Laurence Brockliss, as *a means to criticise
existing legal systems (which had departed from the unwritten law common
to all men) or as a way ofjustifying raison d'itat (in which present necessity
meant that written law was different from the universal law of man)'.ô
Historical knowledge had precedence over all other types ofknowledge for
Vico, especially over scientific thought - theological knowledge was always
exempted from his discussions. It was nature that wecannot know, forVico,
science and mathematics are what we do know. According to Vico historical
knowledge was sadly neglected for the simple reason that there was not a
widespread belief in its usefulness. Vico's aim was to provide a method
which would enable one to re-make these cultures of antiquity, in spite
of the intervening years. Even though Vico devised his own chronologies,
his major effort was to break down the chronologies of ancient narratives
and to discover and order their common themes, in order to understand the
universality of myths, thus providing a basis for the study of individual
cultures.
There is no evidence that Vico was personally concerned about
reconstructing past societies; rather it was the theoretical underpinnings
of such an attempt which entranced him. This was not necessarily the
case because he considered the abstract aspects of a subject (for example,
preliterate societies) to be inherently more interesting than a study of
well-known ancient texts, but because these past cultures were completely
unsolved puzzles, and thus, among other reasons, much more of a challenge
to him. Once revealed they could illunfinate the texts which he so revered.
Vico did notconstruct a 'tree of knowledge' - along the lines of Bacon
or Denis Diderot (1713-84) and Jean d'Alembert (1717-83) - because his
aim was not to divide but to unify what he considered to be the legitimate
fields of human knowledge.^^ Vico paid virtually no attention to Bacon's last
category of reason, which included the faculties of the mind and government
as well as the sciences and medicine, although for Bacon and certainly for
Descartes reason was always the superior faculty to imagination. Ultimately

Vico left both his favourite quattro autori - Plato, Tacitus, Bacon and Hugo
Grotius - as well as his critique of Descartes, instead stressing the categories
of collective memory and imagination, and he limited his definition and
analysis of knowledge to what was humanly knowable.
Far from a dramatic epistemological break there was a slow shift in
Vico's thought, and, arguably, an ambivalence throughout the whole of his
writings regarding the sciences and the study of пшп. For Vico gave qualified
approval to some Cartesian theories, while at the same time advocating a
balanced approach in the university curriculum which would include the
sciences as well as the arts. Despite Vico's later anti-Cartesian statements,
and examples of these attitudes can be found in his work as early as 1699
and as late as 1744 - the belief in Vico's sudden epistemological break in
1709-10 is too extreme.
2. Verum ipsum factum
The above discussion does not detract from the importance of verum
ipsum factum (that the true is what is made) (De antiquissima italorum
sapientia, I,1). Far fiOm a dead-end approach to Vico's thought, «verum»
et «factum» reciprocantur ('verum [the true] and factum [what is made]
are interchangeable or, in the language of the Schools, convertible terms')
was the basis on wWch Vico proclaimed that it was human history and not
the sciences of which we could hope to have complete comprehension.^
Verum (truth), factum (aU human artefacts - law, marriage and society,
for example, but not religion, according to Vico), and certum (certainty;
knowledge which comes only fiOm creating something) were the three key
terms in this argument. That verum was convertible with/acium indicated
that human creations could be accepted as both truthfiil and legitimate. No
such guarantee or relationship could ever be hoped for in the study of nature,
which God created and thus only He comprehended fuUy. According to Vico
'because man is neither nothing nor everything, he perceives neither nothing
nor the infinite' ('Homo quia neque nihil est, neque omnia, nec nihilpercipit,
nec infinitum').^
In 1711-12 Vico wrote in response to an attack on De antiquissima
itaU>rum sapientia in the Giomale dei letterati d'Italia (Venice):
- Fa' del proposto teorema una Create the truth that you
dimostrazione - , che tanto h a dire wish to [analyse]; and I, in
quanto: - Fa' vero ciö che tu vuoi [analysing] the truth that
conoscere - ; ed io, in conoscere il you have proposed to me, will
vero che nü avete proposto il farö, [make] it in such a way that
talchd non mi resta in conto alcuno there will be no possibility
da dubbitame, perch6 io stesso l'ho of my doubting it, since I am
fatto. the very one who has produced
Vico seldom used the terms verum and factum (or, indeed, the Italian
equivalents, il vero and il fatto) in La Scienza Nuova. More often he
discussed knowing (scire) and making (fare):
Lo che, a chiunque virifletta,dee Whoever reflects on this

recar maraviglia come tutti i filosoii cannot but marvel that the
seriosamente si studiarono di philosophers should have bent
conseguire la scienza di questo aU their energies to the
mondo naturale, del quale, perchd study of the world of nature,
Iddio egli il fece, esso solo ne ha which, since God made it. He
la scienza; e traccurarono di alone knows; and that they should
meditare su questo mondo delle have neglected the study of the
nazioni, 0 sia mondo civile, del nations, or civil world, which,
quale, perchd, l'avevano fatto gU since men had made it, men could
uomini, ne potevano conseguire la come to know.*
la scienza gU uomini.
Vico's conviction that God created man is not inconsistent with his view Üiat
history is the one area which offers complete comprehension because it was
man-made,^ciwOT. Vico's argument has nothing to do with the creation or
reproduction of mankind. It was the social institutions created by man, the
'world of nations', which was his concern. For in this sense, man made
the *world of nations' (il nwndo delle ru2zi0ni): society and government.^
Vico's concept of the 'world of nations' is part of a long debate concerning
jus gentium (law of the nations) and jus naturale (natural law). In the
seventeenth century, thinkers argued the Maker's Knowledge Tradition, as
it is called by Antonio Pdrez-Ramos.^ For Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)
it was the state which is man-made and thus comprehensible, for Robert
Boyle (1627-91) and John Locke the emphasis was on knowledge of the
physical world. In terms of political philosophy, Vico is more Hobbesian
than Lockean (although Vico repudiated the social contract in any form),
for he considered society and government began together. For Vico, society
was the creation of generations of slow development, whereas for Thomas
H'obbes (1588-1679) society and government began together at the time of

the social contract, and for John Locke society began in the state of nature,
but government at the time of the social contract.
According to Vico it was necessary to isolate the principles of this scienza
nuova that are in the human mind and at the same time initiate human
society. The prime ingredient was the desire for expression, which was
not a privilege or a hobby in early societies, but a requirement. This
need for answers, tius curiosity, was responsible for the creation of social
institutions. Ultimately both the creation of il mondo delle nazioni - civil
governments and societies - and historical consciousness were aspects of
the creative faculty of man -fantasia. The truth (verum) which Vico sought
was knowledge concerning past, man-made societies.
There is a strong connection between Vico's theory of verum etfactum
and Hobbes on the connection between knowing and making.^ Hobbes wrote
that politics is a science and that its truths are demonstrable because men
make the commonwealth themselves.^ Hobbes declared he had founded civil
philosophy, the science of poUtical bodies (De cive, 1642). In Üüs sense
Hobbes considered politics to be analogous to other man-made forms of
knowledge. Locke in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690)
stressed the critical importance of the relationship between making and
knowing.^ But neither Hobbes nor Locke appUed the theory of making
and knowing to history, primarily because they did not have Vico's fully
rounded conception of human knowledge. Hobbes regarded history as an
inferior form of knowledge founded on sense, memory and testimony with
aU their fallibUity. Both Hobbes and Locke assumed that for history to be of
human making it would have to be comprised of names and definitions given
to it by man.ô In contrast Vico's view of history was not at aU dependent on
language; rather language was for Vico another human creation. Although
his claim is open to debate regarding politics, according to Vico, history was
not constructed in the same way as geometry or even politics (deUberately
fashioned, in the same manner as making a building); rather he argued
history was made slowly and unself-consciously by mankind, as composed
of particular social groups. It is at this essential point that Vico's view of
history (the civU world, itself factum) diverges sharply from Hobbesian
conunonwealth and Lockean morality."
Vico's concept of verum mdfactum had a number of dramatic implica
tions. (1) It called for a radical break between the study of and thus the
perception of what exactly were the arts and sciences. This statement in
tandem with his later historical principles allowed an attack on scientific
and metaphysical Cartesianism.^^ (2) It was because ofhis theory of verum
and factum that Vico announced that history was the area over which we
could gain complete comprehension. (3) Verum ipsum factum recognised

that human artefacts had characteristics in common in whatever society they
appeared, varying similarly age by age, and also that these human creations
were the means by which these same societies demonstrated their individual
character - by means of their myths, laws and social institutions. (4) This
strong statement also implied that these same human institutions could be
trusted as true representations of the societies by which they were created,
because they were not designed to deceive or magnify (as standard national,
political histories inevitably are), but were produced to fulfil actual needs
- as explanations of their place in nature (myths) or as a means to live in
relative social harmony (for example, accepted marriage patterns and social
mores which later became codified laws). Verum and factum demonstrated
Vico's commitment to man-made language and society and the subservience
of ideas to institutions: for Vico ideas were generated by early society
rather than by rationality (even in a Lockean sense) or by Platonic forms
slowly grasped by developing social groups. He did not accept a dualistic
epistemology - one for the sciences and the other for the social sciences and
history - but rather argued for a single epistemology, which was most fiiUy
expressed in the study of past societies.^^
3. Categories of Historical Knowledge
Isaiah Berlin identified four categories of knowledge discussed by Vico.^

(1) It was scienza (knowledge) which yielded verum (truth a priori), as
created by God. *Verum presides over what men make - rules, norms,
standards, including those which shape the facts themselves; products are
known before they are made by the creator' (Berlin).^ (2) Vico discussed
coscienza (knowledge of matters of fact, consciousness) as the certum that
one has of the external world.^ Berlin's defence ofVico's nanüng ofhis best
known work is not entirely convincing. Berlin argued that the reason why
Vico chose the term scienza rather than coscienza *lies in the inteφlay of
what Vico symbolized as the "Platonic" and the "Tacitean" - the general and
the particular, the eternal and the temporal, the necessary and the contingent,
the ideal and the actual'.* The foregoing is no doubt true, but it was not a
priori truths which Vico sought to discover in history or in his method. It was
exactly those specific incidents - human artefacts, past ways of thinking and
feeling - that he sought to elucidate. For this reason a much more appropriate
name for Vico's last work would have been La coscienza nuova, the new
historical consciousness of the evolving of social institutions and creations.
It should also be kept in mind that a much better English trirrs1ation of the
title of this work would be The New Consciousness rather than The New
Science.
(3) This is not to deny the Platonic patterns, the eternal truths and prin
ciples in his writings, notably 'Za storia ideale etema' (ideal, etemal history;
a priori knowledge, a pattern to predict and re-predict), which was presented
by Vico as an eternal tmth. According to Leon Pompa historical laws can
be established only if they can be shown to be part of the constitution of
historical facts themselves.^ Since Vico's 'ideal etemal history' was indeed
demonstrated by historical knowledge of identifiable pattems in past society,
it thus seems unnecessary for it to have been an etemal truth as well.^ Vico
broke with the Platonic tradition, thereby leaving no permanent values or
standards. It seems he felt it not simply necessary but stimulating to make
his own historical approach an etemal trath itself: doing so was his discovery,
his moment of illumination. Now this declaration seems rather pointless, but
not surprising in the context of his intellectual background.
(4) The final category ofknowledge was 'inner' or 'historical' knowledge,
which Vico discussed as knowledge per caussas (of causes - Vico's
spelling); it was to be attained by attending to the 'modifications of our
same human mind' {*modificazioni della nostra medesima mente umarui').^
Knowledge per caussas was for Vico the identification of previous events
in regular conjunction, of which the causes were generative. It was that
which pushed human creation into existence, the dynamic, metaphysical
principle, which was connected with very particular views about religion,
especially divine providence, that which gives a pattern to history, as well as
history itself. Yet it is Vico's method ofhistorical reconstraction, which was
neither Stoic nor Epicurean, and the identification of historical sense which
we prize today, fronically the societies he mentioned at most length, par
ticularly classical Rome, tended to be fijUy flourishing with well-developed
civil institutions, especially law, and left particularly rich written records.
However it is this final category of knowledge - historical knowledge (very
often discussed in connection with the work of Collingwood) - which was
Vico's greatest contribution.
4. A Critique of Collingwood
In the English-speaking world it is critical to begin any study of Vico with

an analysis of how our view of Vico is coloured by the writings of R.
G. Collingwood, philosopher of history, friend and translator of Croce.
Vico studies in this century might have developed much sooner (and very
differently) outside of Italy if Collingwood had translated Vico himself
rather than Croce's monograph on La filosofia del Giambattista Vico (The

Philosophy ofGiambattista Vico) in 1913.' Unfortunately many ofVico's
greatest insights were attributed by Collingwood to Johann Gottfried Herder
(1744-1803). The fundamental error was that Collingwood believed Vico
accepted human nature as unchanging in aU societies at aU times, and it was
thus to Herder that Collingwood ascribed the concept that each culture must
be analysed separately because human naturewas constantly changing.^
Hence Collingwood proclaimed Herder as the father of social anthropology.
The most important issue is not which thinker is the accepted head of a
particular modern academic discipline, but rather a correct understanding of
the concepts involved.
CoUingwood was correct in discussing sensus communis. However even
sensus communis itself was not static (as not only CoUingwood, but also aU
other commentators have accepted), and has been adapted slightly in every
culture.3 According to Vico human nature was not unchanging, thus each
society needs to be examined individually; but because of common - not
preordained - pattems of development, and sensus communis (the shared
attitudes of aU men at aU times), which Vico discussed as // dizionario di
voci mentali (dictionary of mental words), it was possible not only to analyse
effectively, but also to make judgements about past societies.
At least three of CoUingwood's comments on Vico stiH require further
attention. Arguably the three could be viewed as developments of Vico's
thought by CoUingwood (and Croce), rather than Vico's own views, but the
difference between the two has not been generally apparent to most readers.
The first is the 'inside-outside' metaphor. According to CoUingwood Üie
outside of an event should be looked through, not at:
To the scientist, nature is always and merely a 'phenomenon*, not in the

sense of being defective in reality, but in the sense of being a spectacle
presented to his intelligent observation; whereas the events of history
are never mere phenomena, never mere spectacles for contemplation,
but things which the historian looks, not at, but through, to discem the
thought within them.*
Vague as this statement is, it is essential to realize that CoUingwood

considered that what happened in the past was not as important as why
it happened, because if we can reconstract why events happened, we can
much more easily reconstract tiie events themselves. CoUingwood has been
accused of ascribing 'to historians the role of a psychoanalyst - the capacity
to discover in the record of what a man did, various thoughts of which
the man himself was unaware'.^ Patrick Gardiner warned that this approach
attributed to historians *a power of self-certifying insight' (paraphrase by

Dray of Gardiner).6 On these grounds Collingwood - but not Vico - stands
accused. Yet, accepting these modern conmients as necessary correctives,
it is not at aU clear why Vico's role of fantasia (which was by no
means as extreme as that of Collingwood) in the work of historians
should be disparaged and not encouraged. In addition it must be noted
that Collingwood was more committed to recreating past events than was
Vico, who wished to discover the ways of thinking and feeling, the mentality
of a particular age or culture.
Second, according to Collingwood, once the historian knows what hap
pened, he already knows why it happened, unlike the natural scientist.^
For Collingwood events were not events, but an expression of people's
characters, what they knew and how they reacted. This Hegelian or Crocean
Idealism of CoUingwood was actually a good deal more hopefiil than Vico's
idea ofreconstructing the spirit of past ages from past events. (Nonetheless
it must be restated in CoUingwood's defence that he thought it was possible
to think through the 'outside' of an event to the reasons that caused it).^
More plausibly, Vico stressed the importance of language and mythology
as examined by philology and etymology as the most faithfril means by
which to reconstruct past societies. On this point Vico appears much more
convincing than Collingwood, not only because knowledge of these past
events has been lost in most cases, but also becausethere is no magic key in
Vico (or elsewhere) which unlocks the mind of a people from its succession
of rulers, batties or other decisive events, even if they are known.
Finally there is CoUingwood's most contentious view: in order to under
stand a human action, the historian must not only discover the thought that
expressed it, but must re-think or re-enact the thought in his own mind. This
view was expressed most forcefully in the section of Idea ofHistory entitied
'History as Re-enactment of Past Experience' Empathy was the key - if one
knows what men were (what it was for them to feel, eat, walk, pray or hate)
one will know what they knew. Somehow Collingwood discussed this power
of entering into the spirit of another age without relating it iofantasia itself.
This view is taken directiy from Vico, who exhorted his readers entrare
(to enter) and descendere (to descend) into the minds of these grossi
bestioniXgTOSs beasts) if they ever hoped to have any understanding of
these primitive peoples.'" The crucial difference between CoUingwood and
Vico on this point was that Collingwood regarded this imaginative method
to be infallible. Vico accepted the very real chance that the results might
very well be wrong. Vico stressed (and Collingwood ignored) the essential
point that having made use of imaginative reconstruction, the historian
must then check the results as much as possible by empirical means. This
particular view of history being a vicarious experience has been violently

attacked in the last half century as a wholly inadequate and subjective
means of approaching the past. Although as Louis Mink (1921-83) in his
well-known defense of CoUingwood's account ofhistorical knowledge wrote
' . . . CoUingwood's theory of history is so often accepted in principle but
disparaged in detail, especially by historians.''' What CoUingwood's (and
thus to some extent Vico's) critics have failed to produce was any alternative
method. It is true that philological and etymological research could be done
on mythological and linguistic evidence left from past societies without
more personal involvement by the researcher. This would be similar to the
type of historical reconstruction which ColUngwood himself disparagingly
described as the 'scissors and paste' approach. If past societies are to be truly
resurrected and the spirit of their times identified, it can only be, according to
Vico, through the use offantasia, byttieimagination and the rational skiHs of
the modern scholar, as applied to a particular period of the past.
5. Historical Cycles
Although Vico used tobe hailed primarily as one of the great speculative
philosophers of history, along with Hegel, Karl Marx, Oswald Spengler
(1880-1936) and Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975), for his three stages of a
civilisation, he is generally much more of interest now as an analytical
philosopher of history, for his insights regarding historical reconstruction
and historical knowledge.' Nevertheless the cycles were not an unimportant
part of Vico's ideas about history. Only since Marx have some considered
it essential to be an economic determinist in order to recognize a pattern
of development and decline in societies. It is in this manner that his
cycles are so often interpreted.^ Vico's cycles have often been used by
his commentators as a barrier between man and his creations, which both
comprise and include history. Vico is perhaps best known for his cyclical
philosophy of history, and he is very often connected at the beginning of
the chain of thinkers whose best-known exponentis Marx. The HegeUan
interpretation dominated Vichian scholarship until after World War П.
Although this connection brought Vico some little prominence - notably
in nineteenth-century Germany - it had a stultifying effect on any critical
analysis of him on his own merits as distinct from a study of him as a
harbinger of Hegelian thought. PietroPiovani's article 'Vico senza HegeV
('Vico without Hegel', 1968) was an important turning point in this respect.^
Vico's cycles are now viewed as a means to examine history tiuOugh an
analysis of the birth and development of human societies and institutions.
Vico's Intellectual Devehpment 33
The concept of historical cycles was not original with Vico, for cycles
can be found in the writings of Plato, Polybius (2057-7125 B . C . ) , Niccolö
Machiavelli (1469-1527) and others.* It is not suφrising that Vico used
this Platonic pattern, when one considers that Plato was the first of his
acknowledged quattro autori. Vico used the historical cycles, this Platonic
pattern, as the foundation for his storia ideale etema, which in turn he
considered to be the foundation of his scienza nuova.
He maintained that the cycles were a means to exanüne societies, par
ticularly pre-literate ones. This was due to the special, general character
that each of these three periods possessed. For Vico these cycles were not
cyclical but spiral-like, and they were also open-ended. He was convinced of
the individual character of particular societies, which was not blurred by the
features it had in сопмпоп with any other society at the same stage. This is
the corsi e ricorsi (course and recourse) of the nations to which he referred.
These epochs, which he named the ages of gods, heroes and men, tended to
recur in the same order in any and every society until the decline into a new
*barbarism of reflection' (*to barbarie della riflessione'), at which point the
people are 'rotting in that ultimate civil disease' (*se i popoli marciscano in
queU'ultimo civil malore'). Only then did he regard it as clear that thought
in that particular society had exhausted its creative power.^
First, the guiding principle of histor/ is brute strength; then valiantor

heroic justice; then brilliant originality; then constructive reflection; and
lastly a kind of spendthrift and wasteful opulence which destroys what
has been constructed.^
This was CoUingwood's elegant description of the Vichian pattern. Although

modern Vico scholarship accepts the cycles as a model of historical change
in society, not as preordained, many inteφreters see the barbarism of reflec
tion inevitably programmed into the final stages of every society, although
this pattern does not logically follow from their view of the cycles.
Vico's view of the barbarism of reflection was unusual. His fear of the
doubtful, sceptical, cynical outlook was based on the belief that criticism
destroys something essential in society. He argued that the existence and
development of society was based on the organic links between human
needs, based on common beliefs which are taken for granted. The relation
of barbarism of reflection to the restof Vico's thought has not been fiilly
appreciated by scholars, who have tended to neglect the issue of senso
comune, shared values. Yet a sustained analysis of his work leads to the
conclusion that barbarism of reflection occurs when peoplelose contact with
and, indeed, begin to question senso comune itself. Whether this catastrophic
effect of intellectual development was inevitable for a society, it is clear that

Vico believed that intellectual sophistication did to some extent carry with it
the seeds of its own destruction, because the creative instinct in that society
would have died out by that point.
6. Historical Sense
Vico was not precise about how men make their own history. Very often a
parallel is drawn with Marx, who stated that 'man makes his own history,
but he does not make it out of the whole cloth'.' A more modern translation
of Marx renders this passage as the following:
Die Menschen niachen ihre eigene Men make their own history, but
Geschichte, aber sie machen sie they do not make it just as they
nicht aus freien Stücken, nicht please; they do not make it under
unter selbstgewählten, sondern circumstances chosen by themselves,
unter unmittelbar vorgefundenen, but under given circumstances
gegebenen und überlieferten directly encountered and inherited
Umständen. from the past.^
It could be argued that these same sentiments were implicit in Vico, but to
some extent to do so is to make excuses for Vico's neglect of physical,
biological and mental factors, to give only a few examples.^ It would be
more correct to admit that Vico was completely uninterested in almost all
these additional elements. History for Vico meant the pattern of development
in past cultures and the idea of society. Accordingly, any aspect of the past
was historical (in his sense of the word) only if it involved social relations
and creations. He designed theories of historical reconstruction in order to
make contact with the mentalities of past cultures. The historical knowledge
he sought had to do both with ways of approaching these past ages and
knowledge of their means of expression and personality.
Berlin has asked what it was that first planted in Vico's mind the aware
ness of the diversity of cultures. One possible answer may be the biography
(virtually a hagiography) of Antonio Caraffa, a Neapolitan general, which
Vico wrote for pay. Vico was commissioned by a former student of his,
the nephew of Caraffa, Hadrian Caraffa, Duke of Traetto, to write this
biographical account. In return Vico received sufficient funds to pay the
dowry of his daughter, Luisa, the next year; in addition he gained the
fiiendship of Gian Vincenzo Gravina (1664-1718), a Calabrese writer, at
the time much more famous than Vico, who greatly admired the study of
Caraffa. De rebus gestis Antonj Caraphaei {The Life ofAntonio Caraffa)

was published in 1716, but Vico had earlier written a canzone (lyric poem)
for a Caraffa family celebration in 1693 - six years before he delivered
Oration I . * Such set pieces were quite common at this time in Italy; a family
would commission a local writer to compile a raccolte (little collection
of poems) on the occasion of a marriage, ftmeral or taking of the veil.^
One guess might be hazarded that these quasi-historical pieces which Vico
wrote for much-needed commissions might perhaps have contributed to his
disgust with contemporary writing and helped lead him into more theoretical
speculation.
This was Vico's one experience of using primary sources, Caraffa's own
papers, and it was not a happy one. A general in the Austrian service during
the Hungarian wars, Antonio Caraffa's name is still remembered with horror
in Hungary. However, not surprisingly, Vico's laudatory account ignored
the butchery and stressed instead the decadence of the Ottoman empire.^
The Hungarian revolt was the unifying theme of the work and Caraffa served
as a somewhat minor figure in his own biography. (For example, Nicolini
translated fourteen pages of extracts firom this biography into Italian, only
one sentence of which dealt with Caraffa.) Vico, recognizing his need to
put these conflicts into an international context, turned to Hugo Grotius, who
was to become his fourth autoreP For some time Vico considered editing
an annotated version of Grotius's collected works, but later rejected this as
an inappropriate study for a Catholic because of Grotius's deism. Even so
his study of Grotius on natural law was to prove more important to his
developing theories ofhistory than the Tacitean model he so admired, which
had to do with poUtical decision-making in a specific historical context.*
The convoluted approach, which is the rule rather than the exception
throughout Vico's writings, is readily apparent in De rebus gestis Antonj
Caraphaei. But happily, after long pages of Vico's digressions, there
appears, as so often happens in his work, an exceUent and fairly concise
section, dealing with the customs of nations, the decline of empires, and
divine providence, aU three important Vichian themes.^
Greatness and decline in the Ottoman Empire fascinated Vico, but there
is little of the liberal tone he was to use in his theoretical discussions of the
development of different cultures. The Koran was called a lying code which
promoted servility and the fatalistic attitude that nothing could change the
predestined moment of death. Bribery, trickery and luxury were the recurring
themes in Vico's portrait of Ottoman society. He made little mention of
women - except for a pedestrian remark that women were manifestly
incompetent in civil matters and that in private they dressed well - or
polygamy. One would have expected that polygamy in advanced societies
would have greatly intrigued Vico, representing as it did a deviation from

his set concepts of marriage and family, so fundamental to his theory of
the development and decline of nations. Vico's horror of the punishments
dispensed in the Ottoman Empire, such as the example of entire families
being put to death with the prisoner, could well be termed proto-Beccarian.
It was notjust the Sultan andGrand Vizer's lack of concern for the human
rights of their subjects which amazed Vico, but also the very foreignness
of their outlook. This observation was very much in line with Vico's
view: that past societies were probably much more dissimilar to one's
own society than would be expected. There was in this account some of
the ambivalence towards such a diverse culture, although none of the same
elegance or originality, that one finds in Montesquieu's (1689-1755) Les
lettres persanes (The Persian Letters, 1721). Nevertheless this (in most
respectsjustly maligned) historical work by Vico reaffirms what is so evident
from his theoretical writings, and may well provide at least a partial answer
to the question of where he gained the idea of the diversity of cultures.
Indeed in the final edition of La scienza nuova there were few references to
specific prinütive societies (North American Indians, for example) - unlike
Montesquieu, Rousseau and Voltaire (1694-1778), in whose works there
appeared virtually countless references to contemporary, historical and often
fictional primitive societies.'" Vico was undoubtedly much more concerned
with the idea of primitive societies than with any particular examples. For
Vico history had to do with past cultures and society and with a sense of
historical awareness - he was much less interested in the way we write
history.
Vico's concept of history was based on two Renaissance ideas: that
historical reconstruction was more than a catalogue of past events and
that even the advanced civilisations of the past were a good deal less like
our own than the natural law theorists had argued." Vico's view of culture
was undoubtedly pluraUstic, yet he seldom discussed the modem definition
of pluralism as various social groups with different native languages,
customs, religions or political beliefs living together in relative harmony.
The pluralism Vico addressed had to do with a collection of distinct cultures
and was based on the belief that there was no ideal state or superior pattem of
development by which aU other societies should bejudged. His discussion of
cultures was certainly contemporary as weU as historical and he saw no break
between the two. Thus each culture had the right to develop as it wished, and
it was only as it exercised this prerogative that its true abilities or genius
could be manifested.
Vico's 'first indubitable truth' was that 'the world of nations must
therefore be found' (ritruovare, retrieved, recovered, discovered) in the
modifications of our same human mind' (1744, §349).'2 Perez 2^gorin,

who has written one of the very best of the recent articles on Vico,
argues that 'there is no common mind available, and that there are far
too many variations'.'^ Zagorin is quite right not to accept aU of Vico's
theories uncriticaUy. Nevertheless, this 'common mind', 'nostra medesima
mente umana' ('our same human mind'), is an essential if problematic
part of Vico's thought. Following from Zagorin's assertion that there is
no common mind, 'urm certa mente umana delle nazioni', Zagorin states
that the historian does not know the past in his genericcharacter, but solely
as the particular man he is.'* But if we were to do away with mente, shared
consciousness, there would then be no means of making judgements or of
analysing past or contemporary lifestyles different from our own. Certainly
*if the past is entirely alien, then it is a past that we wUl never know or
comment upon in any way'.'^ Various definitions for Vico's mens, mente
have been suggested: universal mind, Hegelian Geist, Jungian 'coUective
unconsciousness', or sensus communis.^^ It is not at aU clear that mente
was for Vico, as has been argued, the creative principle of the world - this
role was explicitly reserved by Vico iorfantasia - nor that ultimately mente
was the same as the concept of culture (again, this is fantasia, as the spirit
of particular society, not the totality of the individual society itself).'^ At the
very least it can be said that Vico's mente was intimately related to sensus
communis and his dizionario di voci mentale and thus its importance cannot
be doubted. Mente has to do with what is common to and alive in society,
such as social relationships. It is that which generates culture (altiiough not
culture itself), an active faculty, not thought but a non-Jungian, collective
human consciousness which develops and perhaps even understands itself.
Although Vico based his historical theories on verum ipsum factum it was
not his intention to discover the truth in history. He desired to reclaim human
artefacts, social institutions. Vico considered myths to be true in the sense
that they were representative of the time in which they were created. He
beUeved myths were not false statements about reality. Atthe same time
they were not true in any abstract, metaphysical manner. Neither did Vico
seek to reclaim particular facts or events. Chronological reversal - reading
history backwards - was one of Vico's approaches to history, but it was not
the chronologies themselves which were important to him.'* Beriin wrote, in
a particularly Vichian manner, that 'facts are not hard pellets of experience,
independent of concepts and categories by which they are discriminated,
classified, perceived, interpreted, and indeed shaped'.'9 AU history for Vico
was a history of ideas; hewas much more concerned with explanation than
truth or facts in history. Since a reconstruction of past ideas and ways of
thinking can never be complete, in the same way 'there can be no complete
or iinished or definitive history . . . only partial, incomplete, even tentative'

(Preston King).2o
Vico never seems to have agonized over how one can know the past. A
modern concern - the desire not to blur the contrast between 'then' and
'now' - was articulated by Vico to the extent that he stressed that people
of the past were probably less like us than would generally be thought, but
he did not see any inconsistency regarding thinking in the present about the
past.î He was weU aware that any thought we are now thinking is a present
thought, and he stiêssed the need for imaginative reconstruction. That the
present contains the past within it was a constant theme in his work, in
which he explains why he considered language to be perhaps the best link
with the past because it is shaped by the past, is a product of some process
of the past and carries with it the marks of the past.22 Language has to do
with both past and present things, then and now. Vico propounded the view
that language can only be fuUy understood in reference to the experiences of
the past; modern speech evokes a dim awareness of the origins of the words
used, often for an entirely different puφose. Vico stated that if his warnings
regarding historical anachronisms were heeded, effective analysis of the past
could be done by historians with no personal connection to the time they
were studying. The role of historians was thus to identify and examine these
past cultures, making use of both their reason and their fantasia.
7. History as a Science
One of Vico's most useful insights was the identification of the lack of a
proper historical awareness, an historical sense. Vico was deeply indebted
to neo-Platonic writers, notably Lorenzo Valla, for this approach. The
relationship between legal humanism and the study of classical texts and
the development of modem historical studies is identified by Donald Kelley
in his book. The Foundations ofModem Historical Scholarship.^
Vico isolated five major problems in this regard, which are very often
viewed as a parallel to Bacon's idols of the mind, as 'fallacies that
systematically distort thinking' (Zagorin).^ First, he discussed exaggerated
opinions about antiquity, particularly concerning the national history of each
society.3 Scholarship, battles, establishment of kingdoms and the behaviour
of the young, for example, are often spoken of as having been so much
better in the past. This longing for happier days of the past is stiU very
much present today and tiie desire to embeUish and aggrandise past events
and achievements was seen by Vico as a barrier to any possible realistic
understanding and analysis of the past. Second, he discussed 'the conceit
Vico 's Intellectual Development 39
of nations' ('/α boria delle nazioni').^ The feeUng that the development of
one's own country is of the utmost concern to aU countries, the beUef that
the splendour or dominance of one's country must have been apparent at
every stage of its development, and the assumption that one's country is
splendid, dominant and best, at least in the areas one considers important
- military endeavour, culture, or lifestyle - aU of these were attitudes which
Vico considered must be acknowledged, at least by historians, even if they
could not be eradicated.
Third, Vico discussed the 'conceit of scholars' (Ία boria de' dottV).^ This
was a favourite topic of his. According to Vico, scholars tended to think
of people in the past as people like themselves, of an academic, reflective
outlook.6 He blamed scholars repeatedly for stifling the imagination of the
young. Vico seems to have taken particular pleasure in stating that the most
effective men in history were not academics. He called for a new Augustus
'to arise and establish himself as a monarch and, by force of arms, take in
hand aU the institutions and aU the laws, which, though sprung from liberty,
no longer avail to regulate and hold it within bounds' ('£, come Augusto, vi
surge e vi si stabilisca monarca, il quale, poichi tutti gli ordini e tutte le
leggiritruovateper Ш liberta punto non piu valsero aregoUirki e tenerlavi
dentro infreno')P
Fourth, he discussed what CoUingwood termed the fallacy of sources.*
It was generally considered that societies must share sources in order
to have the same characteristics. Thus one society would have to have
borrowed a concept from another or both from a third, if an identical
pattern could be identified. Vico made no attempt to deal with cultural
sharing. He declared that every society went through a similar pattem of
growth, and its stage of development could be identified by comparing it
to other societies. The fortunes of Vico's own theories exemplify his view
that ideas are not diffused, but created by each society when needed. For
example, his exact idea, the identity of Homer, is often cited as a discovery
of nineteenth-century Germany.^
Finally Vico considered it necessary to remind his readers that societies
in antiquity were most probably not better informed than we ourselves about
societies that lay closer to them. This statement usually is lost in any study
of Vico, However it is a powerful reminder that Vico was setting out not
only ways of approaching the past - methods of historical reconstruction -
but also delineating the proper way of thinking about the past.
Vico's historical method was constructive as weU as critical; one reads
Vico not only for the problems he identified but also for the solutions he
presented. Vico declared that linguistic, etymological and philological study
could shed light on history because it was language which created minds.
and not minds language. Vico argued that the poets did not merely create
artificial worlds but that mythologies expressed the social structure at the
time of their creation.'" This theory was of particular use to Vico since he
maintained that other minds at the same stage of development tend to create
the same products. He wrote:
Le tradizioni volgari devon avere Vulgar traditions must have had

avuto pubblici motivi di vero, onde pubUc grounds of truth, by virtue
nacquero e si conservarono da intieri of which they came into being and
popoli per lunghi spazi di tempi. were preserved by entire peoples
over long periods of time."
. . . vi si vagUa dal falso il vero Truth is sifted from falsehood in

in tutto ciö che per lungo tratto di everything that has been preserved
secoli ce ne hanno custodito le for us through long centuries by
volgari tradizioni, le quali, those vulgar traditions which,
perocchd sonosi per sf lunga etä e since they have been preserved for
da intieri popoli custodite, per so long a time and by entire
una degnitä sopraposta debbon peoples, must have had a public
avere avuto un pubblico ground of truth.'2
fondamento di vero. ^
It was this *public ground of truth' ('ми pubblicofondamento di vero^) which

Vico desired to obtain. His was an altogether new manner of thinking about
tradition. Although not literally true, these alternative sources were also not
false statements about reality. These myths, laws and other social institutions
were the primary source materials needed to reconstruct past societies -
they provided the most pertinent type of historical information that one
could wish. One does not sense that Vico regrets the lack of written
records for pre-hterate or other societies, rather he positively delighted
in this non-literate means of discovering and examining the cultures and
mentalities of the past.
>
2 Vico's Early Writings,

1709-28
1. Introduction
Most writers on Vico have concentrated their efforts on his important

final work, La scienza nuova, to the exclusion of his earlier writings;
yet, within these works - which include an autobiography, orations, an
unfinished book on the wisdom of the ancient Italians, a book on law,
and the first two editions of La scienza nuova itself - Vico addressed
the fundamental issues of imagination and history. Many crucial insights
regarding these and other issues raised there do not reappearin his later
works. Consequently a fully-rounded understanding of Vico's thought is
not possible without consulting the 1699-1730 works. The autobiography
gives the most detailed description we have of Vico's life and intellectual
development. De nostri studiorum ratione and De antiquissima sapientia
italorum are much undervalued as sources ofVico's growing preoccupation
with imagination in particular, and it is in II diritto universale and the first
two editions of La scienza nuova that Vico expressed his ideas on social
groups and human history in the most sophisticated form. Thus this chapter
is designed to introduce these important works, which will form an integral
part of the analysis of Vico's thought in later chapters.
2. De nostri temporis studiorum ratione (1709)
As with his earlier orations of 1699-1707, Vico clearly felt no compunction

to linüt this essentially pedagogical piece simply to the standard debate
regarding the relative merits of the Ancients and Moderns - although he
was far firom indifferent on this point.' As in his other orations, he began and
ended this one with issues and platitudes of the time, but in between he gave
his (no doubt uncomprehending and bewildered) audience a distillation ofhis
own ideas. He discussed standard themes of the time in order to put across
his own ideas. He began De nostri temporis studiorum ratione (On the Study
Methods ofOur Time) by stating that every study method was composed of
three things: instruments, of which the philosophical method was the most
41
common in his time, complementary aids, such as literature, fine arts and
printing, and the aim envisaged.^ This tedious opening notwithstanding and
although Vico's stated aim in this work was to compare the ancient and
modem study methods, what he wrote was a startlingly clear denunciation
of any dogmatic application of Cartesian principles. Twenty-three years
later in his final oration, De mente heroica (On the Heroic Mind, 1732)
Vico retumed to the issue of the Ancients versus the Moderns and reiterated
his call for a balanced approach to study in the university,^ Unfortunately
the final oration had little new to add to his views on imagination and
the historical method. The normal university lectures Vico delivered to
his students as part of his duties as a professor of rhetoric, now entitied
Institutiones oratoriae (University Lectures) sti-essed invention, testimony
and metaphor.* One can find a clear link between his university orations
and his own personal writings, the sharp divide between the two, so often
stressed by Vico scholars, robs one of additional Vichian texts.
This emphasis on the proper approach to academic study was first stated in
De Nostri temporis studiorum ratione and, not incidentally, he combined this
with a forceful statement concerning the need for a new historical method:
Ac haec addas librariorum menda, We must guard against scribal

librorum plagia et imposturas, garblings, plagiarisms, forgeries,
alienae manus irreptiones, quibus interpoloations of alien hands
legitimos authorum partus vix through which it is difficult for
agnoscimus, vix germanos sensus us to recognise the originals, and
assequimur. Ita ut, cum, to grasp the author's true
quod nos scire oportet, tot meanings. What we need to know is
libris contineatur, quorum contained in so many books in
Unguae intermortuae, respublicae languages that are extinct,
deletae, mores ignorati, codices composed by authors belonging to
corrupti, una quaevis ars nations long since vanished. These
scientiaque adeo difficiUs books contain allusions to custom
facta est, ut vix singuli ad often urJcnown, in corrupted
singulas profitendas codices; therefore the attainment
sufficiant. Itaque studioruom of any science or art has become so
universates nobis institutae difficult for us, that at the
sunt, et omni disciplinarum present time no person can master
genere instructae, in quibis even a single subject. This has
alii aUas doctrinas, suae made the establishment of
quisque scientissimus, tradunt. universities necessary.^
As was his way, Vico used this occasion primarily as a platform for
Vico's Early Writings, 1709-28 43
discussion of many of the themes which playedsuch a vitalrole in all

his theoretical works - including sensus communis, phantasia, ingenium
and, to a lesser extent, memory, imitation and poetry. Vico's writings in
general represent a shift in emphasis to the issues of society, culture and
history, away from the usual stress on politics and government. This work
is no exception.
On 15 November 1708 when Vico gave this oration as the annual
inaugural address at the University of Naples, he once again drew the
analogy of the young as strong in phantasia, the old in reason. He stressed
common sense and memory, because it was the faculty closest to imagination
in the later stages of a society. He urged that phantasia should be cultivated
in the young.ö For this reason, he argued, subjects such as geometry, which
demanded both memory and imagination, were to be strongly supported.
Vico assigned to memory, as weU as imagination, very much more than a
passive function.
Vico mixed his discussion of oratory and other subjects at the university
with his own views concerning the study of culture and society. For example
in the midst of a discussion on medicine and the natural sciences, he made
perhaps his only remark on ethics.^ Never a great interest of his, perhaps
as it had as much to do with individuals as social groups, ethics received
relatively little attention in this period, because of the increased interest
in the natural sciences. Vico's mention of ethics here is explained when
it is realised that it was a mixture of demography and sociology to which
he was referring, rather than a set of standards which individuals or even
groups should strive to achieve. He feared that the increasing dominance
of the sciences would lead to the neglect of ethics, politics and 'human
character, dispositions, passions and the [correct] manner of adjusting these
factors to public life and eloquence' {'quae de humani animi ingenio eiusque
passionibus ad vitam civilem et ad eloquentiamaccomodate').^
He expressed a desire for a broadening of the university curriculum, so
as to allow for more study of other past cultures. It was not his intention
to promote narrow specialisation, but rather to encourage a morebalanced
approach in which students would be taught both arts and sciences, and
thus more about society and history, particularly concerning the ways in
which previous generations and cultures lived their Uves. Vico stated that
universities failed to enquire into human life and that consequently the
students were not prepared for the actual life they would lead after their
education was completed.
Throughout this work Vico stressed the importance of the practical
aspect - sometimes as sensus communis, more often as practical judgement
[prudentia].
Nam prudentia in hunnanis actionibus Practical judgement in human

vestigat verum uti est, etiam ab affairs seeks out the truth as
iprudentia, ignorantia, libidine, it is, although truth may be
necessitate, fortune: poesis tantum deeply hidden under
ad id verum spectat, uti natura et imprudence, whim, fatality, or
consilio esse debet. chance; whereas poetry focuses
her gaze on truth as it ought
be by nature and reason.^
As vague as this statement is, the implication is clear enough that Vico felt
that modem, more sophisticated modes of analysis overlooked the simple
and the obvious.'" One of his greatest fears, in regard to philosophical
criticism, was that it would swamp the sensus communis of the young.
Hence he considered it necessary for students to spend some part of their
youth uncontaminated by the sophistry of both modern and ancient thought,
during which time their intuitive wisdom, shared with aU members of their
society, their sensus communis, would develop sufficientiy to withstand the
onslaught of their further academic training."
Vico feared that subjects which depended on sensus communis would
in time be systematised into inactivity. He complimented geometry by
stating that it encouraged ingeniousness.'2 This was particularly important
to Vico and he often stated that only ingenious minds could produce new
inventions. He noted with pleasure the usefulness of printing, which allowed
new, untried authors to be published much more easily - a great personal
interest of his - and discussed in some detail the disciplines which depended
on sound or practical judgement: oratory, poetics and the art of writing
history.'3
In the midst of a brief discussion concerning the problems of blending the
Cartesian geometric method and Aristotelian physics, Vico offered one ofhis
innumerable Usts of three: abandon the new method altogether, incorporate
it within the old method or retain the older method used at present but
account for any new phenomenon as a corollary to this modern type of
physics.'* In spite of these half-hearted attempts to mixthe old with the
new, Vico could not be reconciled to the widely held belief that Cartesian
geometric physics was theauthentic voice of nature. This popular view was
diametrically opposed to that which he was to express most explicitiy in
his next work, De antiquissima sapientia italorum. Vico asserted that any
archetypal forms, ideal pattems of reality, existed in God alone and could
never be fuUy comprehended by man (7n игю enim Deo Opt. Max. sunt
verae rerumformae, quibus earumdem est conformata natura').^^ Thus the
pursuit of science was for him less compeUing, simply because it could never
Vico'sEarly Writings, 1709-28 45
be grasped fully by man, whereas the study of history and of society offered
the best opportunity for rigorous and complete study.
One might have expected Vico, who had borrowed so liberally from
Bacon in so many other areas, also to have embraced the experimental
method, which had been the focal point of the scientific academy, /
lnvestiganti (The Investigators), which dominated Neapolitan intellectual
life in the previous generation. The experimental method would seem to
be particularly relevant in the nüdst of this particular oration, in which
he repeatedly stressed the importance of practical knowledge. But, as
is abundantly clear from his later works, Vico was always inclined to
the theoretical rather than the pragmatic approach; on those occasions
when he did discuss the practical aspects of an issue he was almost
invariably dealing with early stages of development, not sophisticated
technical advances. Most notably, Vico was concerned at this point to
develop a new concept of wisdom. He considered absfract knowledge to be
the highest form of truth, sensus communis the lowest.'^ The important point
is not the ranking of sensus communis as the lowest form; rather the issue is
that Vico considered it to be a form of knowledge at all - indeed for Vico it
waS the basis of aU knowledge. Even in the advanced stages of a civiUzation,
Vico maintained that abstract knowledge alone was not sufficient, for sensus
communis was necessary if such advanced notions were to be communicated
toa larger audience in order to save developed societies from falUng into the
traps of luxury and laziness. Vico maintained it was 'impossible to assess
human affairs by the inflexible standard of the abstract right' Cnon ex ista
recta mentis reguL·, quae rigida est, hominumfacta aestimari possunf)P^
There are are modem parallels of Vico's sensus communis in the work of
the philosopher Donald Davidson on the possibiUty of translation and of
comprehending other cultures.'*
Chance and choice played the dominant roles in human affairs, according
to Vico. Thus any educational system and particularly any study of history
should reflect the variety of human actions and intentions, the ambivalences
of life andfluctuationsin fortune of aU sorts. Vico noted that even the art
of writing history varied directly with time and place. This view clearly
reflects Vico's notions of the changeability ofhuman nature and the freedom
of man's will. An example of practical wisdom was for him a view of an
event which would accord the greatest number of causes to it.
Vico considered sensus communis to be not only the criterion of practical
judgement but also the guiding standard of eloquence. Contrary to tiie
prevailing Cartesian view, eloquence, according to Vico, was not to be
downgraded. Indeed this art of speaking the truth in pubUc was to be actively
encouraged. It can safely be assumed that Vico regarded the art of eloquence
as one of the principal means by which the young should be taught. He wrote
in 'La pratica\ the final section of La scienza nuova seconda unpublished in
his lifetime, that if this civic training was executed properly, the cataclysm
of his third and final stage of a society could be averted, or at least postponed
indefinitely.
The theme of imitation tantalizes the reader of this work, for there is in
De nostri temporis studiorum ratione the well-known phrase that 'without
Homer there would have been no Vergil, and without Vergil no Tasso'
{*Neque-enim, inquiunt, esset Virgilius, nisi ante fuisset Homerus: neque
apud nostros Torquatus, nisi ante Virgilius')A^ Thus Vico impHed the
continuity of the great themes, butfiromthe 1744 work it can be seen that he
also argued very strongly against the traditional belief that there had been a
single person who had written all the works attributed to a man called Homer.
The thesis of 'Della discoverta del vero Omero' ('On the Discovery of the
True Homer* (Book Ш of the second and third versions of La scienza nuova)
was that the Homeric epics were the distillation of the ancient wisdom of the
Greek people, handed down gaieration by generation and eventually written
down. On the one hand, Vico did not despise imitation, rather he thought it
to be the natural way in which a society passed on its own history. In the
same vein he stated that one's reading should be governed by thejudgement
of the ages. Vico's ideas were drawn from Renaissance concepts of origin
and originality. According to David Quint the tension between tradition and
modernity in Renaissance literature was due both to the desire to identify
classical sources for modern ideas in a society becoming increasingly aware
of itself historically and to the new appreciation of contemporary literature
and art.2o On the other hand, Vico clearly stated in De nostri temporis
studiorum ratione that a genius does not model his work on established
masterpieces, for it is not possible to produce anything of lasting merit if
it is simply copied fiôm what has gone before; he even went so far as to
write that tiie most outstanding masteφieces hinder rather than help students
in the field. In order to produce something original a break must be made
eventually firom the old masters and the inspiration must come from nature,
by which he meant in this case both the social and physical environments.
The richest passages in De nostri temporis studiorum ratione were those
in which he contrasted the concepts of phantasia and reason, poetry and
metaphysics, and the poetic and logical faculties. Through these comparisons
the clearest insight can be gained regarding his use of the individual terms.
Poetry, for example, was mentioned only occasionally in this work, once
described as a gift from heaven; at another point, he stated that there was
no instrument, no artificial means, by which poetry could be attained, but he
did not refine these ideas beyond this point.î With regard to the concepts of
language and poetry, De nostri temporis studiorum ratione offers little new
to anyone weU versed in La scienza nuova, but in terms of phantasia and
sensus communis in particular, the key elements in Vico's ideas regarding
history and society, this oration is fundamental.
Without a doubt, the single most important statement Vico made in De
nostri temporis studiorum ratione was to condemn the French language as
unsuitable for either stately prose or for verse. At the same time he lashed
out at the French intellectuals for praising the юnd of eloquence which
characterised their language.22 This outburst did not simply reflect Vico's
linguistic xenophobia, but went much farther, for it was meant as a direct
criticism of the Cartesian approach, which by this time had a strong hold
not only in northern Europe, but in Naples as weU. Unknowingly, Vico was
much more in agreement with British than French thought of his time. There
was an eighteenth-century move away from rationalityamong many British
writers, including Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury (1621-83),
David Hume (1711-76), Smith and Edmund Burke (1729-97).23
Vico objected to study methods, and even languages, which by their
very construction defined which subjects should receive attention and even
how such restricted areas should be pursued. Vico desired to throw open
the fields of enquiry, and he viewed Scholasticism and Cartesianism as
sfrange bedfellows in the ruling acadenüc establishment, equally determined
tothwart his new approach. Thus as early as 1708, thirty-six years before the
final version of La scienza nuova was published, Vico had already drawn up
the lines of his attack on the rationalist emphasis of his time.
3. De antiquissima italorum sapientia (1710)
Vico's readers might have expected this work to include a famiUar discussion
of Aristotle and the scholastic tradition, the Ionians, the Etruscans and
ancient ItaUan thought. They were not to be disappointed. Just over fifty
pages long, much of De antiquissima italorum sapientia (On the Wisdom
of the Ancient Italians), as with De nostri studiorum ratione, would be
of more interest to historians examining the institutional history of the
university - for example, a study of the curricula - than those interested
solely in the development of Vico's thought. The title was most probably
borrowed from Bacon's De sapientia veterum (On the Wisdom of the
Ancients, 1609).' Vico's book was to have been in three parts: metaphysics,
physics and morals, but in the end he wrote only the first part on metaphysics.
Nevertheless it was in De antiquissima italorum sapientia that Vico made
his clearest and most forthright statements regarding verum &ndfactum: that
man could never fiilly know the natural world, and hence master the sciences,
because the natural world was made by God, but that human history was
largely i f not entirely comprehensible precisely because it was man-made.^
For this reason De antiquissima italorum sapientia has long been taken to
mark a major epistemological break in Vico's thought. Despite that, as was
discussed above, these themes were present in the orations and De nostri
temporis studiorum ratione as well.
Vico made constant references throughout this work to a host of ancient
Italian thinkers. Sometimes it was only to raise the question as to whether
they agreed with Aristotle, the Roman legal writers or some other well-
known authority. But the title of the book is a sham, because nowhere in the
work does he actually discuss whether there was a distinct school of thought
which could properly be termed the ancient wisdom of the Italians, nor did
he specify to which (if any) of the ancient Italic and post-Roman peoples he
was referring. There is no discussion of any indigenous developments, only
these passing references to outside influences. There is indeed no evidence
whatsoever that such ancient Italian thinkers ever existed; these flctional
characters seem to have been invented by Vico to lend authority to his own
original ideas regarding verum andfactum, for which he had no classical or
modem sources.^ Indeed even a reviewer of the book at the time stated that
there was no proof at aU conceming these ancient wise Italians. (Otherwise
the review was quite positive, even though, or possibly because, the reviewer
did not grasp the originality of Vico's argument. Perhaps for this reason
Vico took offence at some rather trivial points and wrote two responses,
which were also published in 1711 in the Gi0rru2le de'letterati d'Italia.)
Nevertheless Vico's references to ancient Italian peoples were later taken
up by Italian nationalists eager to flnd a discussion of pre-Roman, Italic
peoples.* Yet there are no traces of proto-nationalism in Vico's writings, in
the vein of the final chapter of Machiavelli's II principe (The Prince, 1513)
and certainly no condemnation of classical Rome.
The established Latin writers to whom Vico referred so frequently argued
that everything produced by the mind was entirely the result of sense
perception. For Vico this was clearly an example of pagan metaphysics,
because Christian metaphysics taught just the opposite. He did speculate as
to whether the ancient fictional Italian philosophers accepted, with Aristotle,
fliat the human mind perceived nothing but by the senses, but he seemed not
to have been particularly interested in the answer.^
Of much greater interest than his discussion in De antiquissima italorum
sapientia of the five physical senses and their relationship to the mind was
Vico's emphasis, once again, on sensus communis.^ Vico scholars have
overlooked the issue that he did not believe that every group of people
Vico's Early Writings, 1709^28 49
shared the same type of sensus communis, as to have done so would have
presupposed an identical pattem of development. Rather he maintained
that i l l peoples have their own version of sensus communis. In this way
his approach was more complex tfian has previously been recognised. For
sensus communis was a faculty shared by aU social groups, but which was
manifested in a multitude of forms. When Vico examined in De antiquissima
italorum sapientia what common sense is ('Quid sitsensus communis'),^ his
answer was 'the likeness of customs among peoples gives birth to common
sense' {'Similitudo autem morum in nationibus sensum communem gignif).
This issue was addressed in the properly rhetorical sense, not that it was so
obvious that it need not be asked, but rather that it was a teaching device to
illustrate a point he considered to be most important to stress. This use of
rhetoric was to be found in many of Vico's authors, Bacon being the best
modemexample.
One of the major themes of this book was the relationship between
memoria and phantasia which Vico considered to have been almost sym
biotic, but he made the issue less straightforward by also stating that *men
can remember nothing not given in nature' CHominifingerenihil praeter
ruituram datuf).^ It was not at aU clear whether he meant in this case
nature as the environmental conditioning of a child by the physical and
social world into which it was bom, or if it represented the native abilities
of each child. Either inteφretation diminished the importance of imagination
for the individual, once again stressing his emphasis on social groups, not
individuals, as the important factor in the development of the human nünd.
Likewise memory was not that of a particular person, of events glimpsed,
and attitudes sensed or even nüsunderstood during youth; rather, it was the
common memory shared by aU people of a particular social group, hence
memory and imagination formed in effect a collective phantasia.
Phantasia was not at a l l a subsidiary attribute for Vico, nor was it
to be considered simply as a creditable gift or talent of a people. For
Vico imagination wasan essential, tme faculty because 'we are creating
images of things' {'Phantasia certissima facultas est, quia dum ea utimur
rerum imaginesfingimus*)and this idea led to the well-known statement
that 'it is when we understand something that we make it trae' {'Ad
haec exempla intellectus verus facultas est, quo, cum quid intelligimus, id
verum facimus').^ Images played a pivotal role in Vico*s design, for his
whole orientation was towards the discemment and interpretation of past
attitudes rather than of specificevents. Thus in Vichian terminology images
(perceptions and memories) were trae - not because they were necessarily
accurate historicaUy, but because they were in and of themselves autiientic
representations of the essence of former times. Thus Vico's own work on
Caraffa was true, in the sense that it was a piece of primary evidence of
an account written by a younger contemporary at the time of the general's
death, even though it was wildly inaccurate historically.
Vico himself advised caution when meditating on truth. For, he wrote,
the line between passions and prejudice was very often difficult to recog
nise, even when it was consciously sought. This statement has a deeper
significance in the context of his analyses of attitudes towards the past.
If prejudices and biases, which are both natural parts of past outlooks,
are not acknowledged, if only by the onlooker of himself, then the result
can simply be another piece of primary evidence - for example, how
an eighteenth-century Neapolitan academic viewed previous civilisations
- rather than an attempt at theoretical historical analysis, which would,
of course, be an example of secondary evidence. Needless to say, Vico
somehow considered that he could write about bias without exhibiting it.
Elsewhere in the book Vico defined human knowledge as the dissection
of the works of nature, thus inferring that all knowledge was simply the
gradual comprehension of nature itself, insofar as that was possible, the
most important aspect being the increase of the mental abilities of human
beings.'" Yet the physical world, which at other points he described as
nature, was, as is weU known, excluded from his method of historical
understanding. Arithmetic, geometry and mechanics, he wrote, lie within
human faculties, but physics he regarded as within the faculty of God.
Nevertheless it wasfiômnature that he drew many of his analogies, as when
he also compared human knowledge to chemistry, by which one assumes he
meant that there was a systematic body of knowledge that was necessary for
a proper understanding of the human mind, just as there was in a science
such as chenüstry, based on the acquisition of a standard body of work.
Hence although De antiquissima italorum sapientia is quite rightly regarded
as anti-Cartesian, it is not anti-scientific. Vico happily used examples from
mathematics and the natural sciences to back up his arguments regarding the
development of human history. Most importantly, he equated mathematics
with contemplation, thereby establishing it as one of the first major steps
towards true knowledge.
Nature imagery, such as fish swimming upstream, was used throughout
this book. Such imagery, colourful and readUy understandable, would
have been expected by his audience and supposedly was easy for them
to remember. An example of a different type of imagery which he sometimes
employed was his notion that the Latins placed prudence in the heart." Vico
employed this and many otherfigurativeexpressions primarily as examples
of the ways in which people with a limited vocabulary could express
intangible concepts, but these phrases were also intended to demonstrate in
a graphic manner various essential qualities, such as prudence and morality,

which Vico deemed necessary for tiie proper functioning and survival - not
only of early cultures - but of aU human societies at each stage of their
development.
Vico wrote that perception, judgement and reasoning were faculties pecu-
Uar to the human ntind and that their regulation was by topics, criticism and
method, areas of much less general interest to us now than to Vico, who was
Uving in the final throes of scholastic tradition.'^ One might have expected
him to have developed the discussion of these three faculties much further:
he would have then been in line with his interest in the development of the
human mind. Even in the first stages of mental development, always his
prime concern, he recognised that these three faculties were all-important.
Nevertheless he did differentiate emotional reactions andsimple recognition
from systematic forms of cognitive activity. He next proceeded to his
distinction between knowledge, which was systematic and learned, and
consciousness, which was intuitive.'^ This fundamental point was made first
in De antiquissima italorum sapientia and was then maintained throughout
the rest of Vico's writings. The distinction was significant for two reasons: it
demonstrated that he considered there to be a difference between knowledge
(scientia, which was systematic and learned) and consciousness (conscientia,
which was intuitive); and it underlined his own emphasis on the intuitive and
communal aspect of mental activity.'*
Throughout De antiquissima italorum sapientia Vico discussed phantasia
and sensus communis as the twin pillars upon which true intellect rested. His
frequent references to mathematics, geometry and mechanics were used as
concrete exariiples of the development of human mental faculties. In each
of these fields the ability and desire to go beyond established Umits was
essential for further developments, particularly in mechanics, where the prac
tical means to implement a workable project was as vital as the appropriate
theoretical concept. This passing mention of the experimental method can be
traced back to Bacon and / lnvestiganti. Vico identified ingenuity as an inte
gral part of man's nature, the faculty proper to knowledge,'^ this being the
case from childhood on and thus for societies throughout the development of
a civiUzation. He discussedmgenmw as gifts, talents, a type of mental power
or activity. Ingenium was described as synonymous with nature, peculiar to
man as a power which connects disparate things and as a faculty which devel
ops with age as imaginationdiminishes with age.'^ He wrote that 'imagina
tion was the eye of ingenuity butjudgementtiie eye of inteUect' ('Phantasia
ingenii oculus, ut iudicium est oculus intellectus').^^ Creativity alone, then,
was not true intellect, so much as it was the ability to recognize true worth,
so-called consti:uctive criticism, which was fundamental to intellectproper.'*
Vico accepted that man did not have complete mastery over nature, even
though he was a rational animal: 'God is the comprehension of aU causes'
COmnium comprehensio caussarum est Deus') but, more originally he
argued *because man is neither nothing nor everything, he perceives neither
nothing nor the infinite' {'Homo quia neque nihil est, neque omnia, nec nihil
percipit, nec infinitum')P^ This latter statement is a key declaration for Vico,
for contrary to the generally accepted version of Enlightenment thought,
he did not argue that man's potential for development was unlimited, but
that it was restricted by lack of proper training, education and inclination.
He asserted - and here there is a clear parallel with Hegel's and Marx's
attitudes towards their own phUosophies of history - that this realization
was his first; but now, because of him, it belongs to aU groups, not only to
isolated individuals such as himself, and further that it was the responsibiUty
of these recently enlightened societies to act in accordance with his historical
insights.
Vico most certainly did not hold that man's mind was the apex of mental
and rational development and that there was no need for the concept of a
god. The desire in man to order his place in his relevant physical, social,
mental and spiritual hierarchies was central to Vich|an thought. However
nowhere in his discussion of the limitations of the human nünd did he state
that social groups consciously recognised their abilities were restricted. This
was his inteφretation, not one he concluded came naturally from a study of
the behaviour of societies.ô
According to Vico metaphysics {metaphysicus, a theoretical basis) estab
lished the proper scope for each of the other branches of knowledge.^' (He
considered theology to be the most certain of aU subjects.) Although a
second-order discipline, as its role was to delineate other fields, metaphysics
was in no way to be despised, for without it the other subjects could not
function correctly. He Ukened the clarity of metaphysical light to that of
sunlight,22 and further used this analogy to state that physical objects exist
in the dark.23 vico assigned to metaphysicsroughlythe same role in relation
to aU other academic subjects that modem interpreters have accorded his
own contribution towards the provision of a means to approach the study of
history - this being his critical (ratiier than speculative) approach to history.
Vico was certainly not proposing a broad, all-inclusive interpretation of each
of these various subjects - he wrote that to speak in universals was the
practice of children and barbarians.^* His main criticism of AristoteUan
physics was that it was based on universals. He regarded the particular as
always superior to the universal. Not only were ideas simpler to comprehend
in an abbreviated form (examples and exceptions to set mles and standards,
as already noted, were not unimportant to Vico as a teaching method), but
for Vico universals do not give what is new, wonderful and unexpected. In
a slightly different approach than in De nostri studiorum ratione, Vico stated
in De antiquissima italorum Sapientia that the best imitative artists are those
who improve details, which once again one may interpret as a need to master
universals before one can go beyond them, for only then can anything truly
original be achieved. Vico's preoccupation with the idiosyncratic aspects of
human life, manifested in De antiquissima italorum sapientia and throughout
the entire corpus of his theoretical writings, lends considerable weight to
interpretations of his thought which maintain that the goal of his study was
the history of society, with all of its petty triumphs and manifest foibles.
r -
4. // diritto universale (1720-22)
II diritto universale (Universal Law) is a substantial work by Vico, but

to date it has been ignored by most Vico scholars. The first volume, De
universi iuris uno principio et fino uno (Universal Law, One Principle
and One End), published in 1720, is admittedly not generally of profound
theoretical interest, grounded as it is in discussion and examples of Roman
law. Nevertheless mixed in with his arguments conceming classical cases, he
also mentioned key themes, often in the titles of his subsections: 'principles
of all humanity' (*Principium Omnis Humanitatis'), 'true laws and certain
laws' ('Verum Legum Et Certum LegMw'),'customs and laws as expressions
of law' ('Mores Et Leges Iuris Naturae Interpretamenta'), 'the natural order
is the mind of civil society, the laws are the stories' ('Ordo rmturalis estmens
reipublicae. leges sunt lingua'), and the 'history of obscure times' ('historia
temporis obscurV).^ He wrote that governments must be preserved in the
proper form in order to preserve the laws and that corruption of the laws
always results when the natural order is forgotten. This book demonstrates
how Vico would be attracted to a certain idea and term - for example, ricorsi
(recourse) - and would use it many times before he clarified its definition in
his own particular sense.
Nineteenth-century commentators, most notably Giuseppe Ferrari (1811¬
76), stressed the importance of Roman history on the development of Vico's
thought..More precisely it should be noted that Vico's emphasis was almost
exclusively focused on Roman law. It was the history of Roman law, in the
history of Rome, in the history of all nations, which was his aim. Likewise
his autobiography was written as an individual demonstration of his general
principles ofworld history. Achronological reading ofhis theoretical works
allows one to examine the full formation of Vico's own ideas, to a much
greater extent than with most writers.
The second book of // diritto universale is entitled De corvstantia

iurisprudentis (On the Constancy ofJurisprudence, 1722). It was followed
by a book of notes (1722) and a final section of dissertations. Together they
are now taken to comprise // diritto universale. De constantia iurisprudentis
is itself divided by Vico into two sections, thefirst of which dealt with the
constancy of philosophy and the second, which begins with the chapter
*Nova scientia tentatur' ('New Science Attempted'), with the constancy of
philology. Etymology and philology were often discussed by Vico as being
synonymous with historical reconstruction itself. He considered philology to
be have two parts - the history of words and the history of human institutions
C<<Philologia» quid? Eius paries duae: historia verborum et historia rerum').
This explains his allegiance to etymology (the study of words) and mythology
(the study of happenings of tfie past). The seven and a half pages of 'Nova
scientia tentatuf are generally regarded - although seldom mentioned except
in passing - as the rough draft for La scienza nuova, but the remainder of
De constantia philologiae is itself an extremely useftil and much neglected
source of Vico's historical thought. It contains many ideas which changed
üttle between 1721 and 1744, the publication dates of this second volume
of II diritto universale and that of the final version of La scienza nuova.
Vico's fascination with what he termed the 'magnificence of imaginings'
('Imaginum granditas') is one ofthe major Öiemes running throughout this
book.2 He viewed imagination as the result of the poetic faculty of man,
which disappears in the later phases of a society as the sciences gain in
strength. Sinularly he considered that where philosophy was robust, poetry
diminished - for poetry originated through necessity and was the language
of the first peoples.3 He stressed over and over that original fables were
produced by the least educated social groups. This was for him the 'poetic
metamorphosis' ('i7 Principio di tutte le metamorfosi, o sieno poetiche
trasformazionidi corpV).^
Giants are mentioned many times in his discussion of primitive man. Vico
cited the development of a fanüly structure and the fear of false reUgion, by
which he meant the awe, the fear of the supernatural, inspired by any religion
other than Christianity, as the two main reasons for their disappearance.^ The
obscure times of the giants were divided into smaller sub-sections by Vico,
divisions easily recognisable fi:om the various versions of La scienza nuova.
In the earliest phase, that of divine authority, a theocratic society was the
norm. Groups then progressed into a system in which authority was vested
in families in the more general sense - extended families and kin groups.
Then came the heroic, which Vico, rather confusingly, also called poetic,
times. Changes occurred in these kingdoms with the diffiision of laws, in
particular laws which protected therightsof the less powerful.^
According to Vico the first laws were bom of the people and were not
written down. Customs and ritual always preceded the development of laws
and served as models for them; later the laws themselves were to fiinction as
the standard of proper behaviour. It was only the actual codification of the
laws that distinguished them firom customs.^ Vico wrote that the first wise
men were the poets who knew the laws, which were kept from the people.*
He claimed, rather oddly, that even in Rome the jurisconsults served as the
oracles for the people and poets of the city.9
Vico, then, discusspd law in many different respects. Most importantly, he
presented it as one of the best means of gaining historical insight into a past
civilization. He especially prized ancient law, for it contained the purest form
of a given language, thereby providing the necessary basis for a philological
study of the even older form of the language from which it developed.'" The
vemacular used in classical Rome, for example, would not shed as much
light on the origins of Latin as would the written form of the language.
Hence the law also fulfilled an important role in his scheme as literature, as
an expression of the creative spirit of a people. According to Vico 'poetic
language is properly of religion and law' {'Lingua poetica est religionis et
legunC), thus he included both spoken language and customs."
Mathematics was once again stressed by Vico as an instmment of the
application of practical knowledge, on this point in line with other thinkers
of this period. He discussed geometry many times in this regard both in De
nostri temporis studiorum ratione and in De antiquissima italorum sapientia.
In the latter, for example, he cited the Egyptians' application of their
mathematically-based astronomy to practical problems on earth.'2 Several
parallels are drawn between mathematics and writing - he described the
alphabet as the first geometry, and mathematics itself as the first writing.'^
It was of little concern to him whether the written word or mathematics
developed first; he accepted them both as natural products of the developing
human mind.
Rather unusually, at one point Vico veered away from his preoccupation
with imagination and directiy addressed tiie topic of human will. He argued
that there were two origins of aU knowledge, the intellect (intellectus) and
the will (voluntas). He maintained tiiat man was shaped by intellect and
will in the same manner - that the consciousness of each is derived from
either one, and that there cannot be one without the other.'* Whatever Vico
meant by this, he certainly did not hold tiiat knowledge could be obtained
in a passive manner. He occasionally dealt with knowledge as a capacity
of a given individual - although this was always discussed in abstract terms
- but more commonly as a stage acquired by a society; in .this manner he
defined knowledge as the necessity of reason, the arbiter of authority.'^
For example, he wrote that at the beginning of knowledge, in the early

stages of a society, the religious leader and civil leader were one and the
same.iö Hence it naturally follows that Vico also contended, predating Max
Weber (1864-1920), that no society was founded on religious lines alone.'^
Vico praised the patriarchal society of the Jews in this book more for its
effectiveness than for any particular spiritual virtues; in the same manner he
stressed that the first mythology was a civil mythology.'*
One of the most intriguing themes in this book - but one never directly
addressed by Vico, only alluded to - is that of the development of the human
mind. According to Vico when people are not vigorous in reason, the senses
must be depended upon to a greater extent, just as nature has given animals
very acute senses, and he continued (here in accord with Rousseau in Emile,
1762) that it followed that women were more sensible than men.'5 There is
a very clear patterning of his objects of inquiry - he traced the development
of human mental capacities through the senses, the growth of imagination
and the fascination with magic and divination, as expressed by language
and mythology. Set stages of mental development were at points spelled
out (though they are more often suggested), but his often muddled examples
demonstrate that he was not attempting to put forward a linear progression
of human knowledge.
Nevertheless the discussion of language and poetry in II diritto universale
was firmly linked to Vico's growing realization of the need for some sort
of historical method. Poetry and language were for him the natural starting
points in his attempt to devise a method of reconstructing the histories
of non-literate societies. He maintained that poetic language comprised
primitive religion and laws, and that it was the late development of writing
(relative to tiiat of mytiiology) which kept most people unaware of their own
history. Vico dealt for some pages here with the origin of language and the
first human words - specifically with the order of appearance of the parts
of speech - in a section not unlike the corresponding discussion in the final
version of La scienza nuova (1730,1744, Book П).
Poets were the first founders of literature, and it was the origins of heroic
language or p0eti7 which most intrigued Vico. He propounded two main
causes for the ignorance surrounding the origin of poetry.20 The first was
the belief that the language of poetry was peculiar to the poets and hence
different from that of the people. Perhaps no other single statement was so
fundamental to Vico's interwoven fabric of language and history, here he
was not at all concerned with the ruling elites of these primitive societies
but witii the structure and perceptions of the entire community. The second
point concerned his conviction that the poets founded the false religions.^'
Vico does not dwell long on this issue, but certainly his intention was to
reinforce the role of the poet simply as a medium, a human reservoir of the
desires and fears of the people, not so much of his own generation but of
those preceding him. Having estabUshed, at least to his own satisfaction,
the inadequacy of previous approaches to the origins of language and poetry,
Vico then proceeded to set out his list of dignitate ([Latin], degnita, [Italian]
- axioms, a philosophical term, attributed in modem Italian dictionaries
to Vico in particular) as the new basis for such an enquiry.22 At this
point Vico provided perhaps his most forthright statements conceming
language and history: first, that language was inextricably linked with the
expression of human creativity and second, that 'language gave a route to
the mind, in regard to both civil and domestic customs, whether natural or
moral, or domestic or civil' ('wam linguae mentes solertes faciunt, cum ad
quanquerem, sive naturalem, sive moralem, sive domesticam, sive civilem'),
and third that it was by means of language, and thus customs, that the nature
of the past could be discerned.^^
In response to the question 'what is history?' CHistoria quid?'), he
answered conventionally: 'history is the witness of the times' {'Historia
autem est temporum testis').^ The two-page chronology he presented at
the beginning of Nova scientia tentatur was given as a background for his
principles of universal history. The chronology itself varies Uttle from the
versions given in the various editions of La scienza nuova. He stated much
more pronouncedly here than in any of his later and better known works
that there is a double history - one of human institutions (historia rerum)
and one of words (historia verbum).^^ Etymology and philology, he cited
once again, were the appropriate means to investigate not only the history of
words but thetimes in which they were in conunon usage.26 He maintained
that Öie origins and developments of past histories could be discovered
through сагеАд] philological studies. Even more originally, he proposed that
mythology could be used to penetrate the histories of what he often referred
to as the 'fabulous times' (temporisfabulosi).
He considered secular histories to be of primary hnportance, since they
were the means of entry into past successions of events. Many pages of
this book are devoted to sacred history - the creation of the world, the
Flood, the call of Abraham by God and the laws given to Moses on Mount
Sinai. These were, according to Vico, the first four epochs of sacred history
during the times in which secular history was for the most part obscure. Yet
he remained preoccupied with the obscufe and fabulous times, considering
sacred history to be of interest primarily as a deviation from Gentile history.
The overlapping of sacred and profane history held a peculiar fascination
for him. As in some of his other works, notably La scienza nuova prima,
Vico's enthusiasm for his topic takes him so far that he deemed it politic to
retreat every few pages from the frontier between pagan and sacred history
and to reiterate that antiquity demonstrated the peφetuity and truthof sacred
history.2*7
There is no indication that when Vico spoke ofhistory he was particularly
keen to discover, verify or bring to Ufe ancient civilisations, in the manner
attempted by political and social historians of later centuries. There is no
doubt that history, as the development of culture, was his primary concern.
There is no evidence to suggest that he considered it possible to reconstruct,
by means of his historical method, actual events of the past or the conditions
in which these peoples lived. More importantly for an enquiry of this sort,
Vico asserted that the perceptions and reactions of past peoples, not only
to each other, but also to their social and physical environment, could be
ascertained by means of philology (language) and mythology. It was without
a doubt a history of ideas which Vico was attempting to construct.
For Vico the ultimate goal of such a study was a history of ideas. For
aU his discussions of Rome, he was not concerned with the production of a
complete national history or even a unified history of ancient Rome or any
particular social group. He was much more strongly motivated to bring to
light commonideals shared by aU people (which is discussed as il dizionario
di voci mentale in La scienza nuova prima), and he speculated that this was
a great deal easier to discern among prinütive than modern peoples.
His interest in the development of human mental capacities demonstrated a
strong desire to comprehend theworkings and levels of the human mind in its
more advanced state. He considered his proposed type of historical enquiry
to be one way, if not the only way, to penetrate the gradual development
of the human mind. Not only are ideas often aU we have to examine of
the past but at the mostfiindamentallevel it was ideas which motivated
the actions and events of previous ages, regardless of whether these arose
out of any conscious impulses. For this reason Vico's writings have an
immediate relevance today. They not only point the way to what was in the
eighteenth century a new method ofapproaching the past through language
and mytiiology, but also they offer the very first elucidation of a new manner
of viewing the past via the history of ideas, of mentalitäs. This second path,
illuminated by Vico, is one which has only begun to be explored in recent
times.
5. La scienza nuova prima (1725)
Vico*s well-known failure to gain the Chair of Law at the University of

Naples in 1723, which he had for so long desired, is generally accepted
as signalling a major intellectual turning point for the philosopher. But this
view does not take into account the unity of Vico's writings from 1699
onwards. Without a doubt Vico felt that his writing was most important,
indeed it was all he had after this professional setback. By 1723 // diritto
universale, including 'Nova scientia tentatuf (1720-22) had ahtady been
written, but the year after his defeat Vico turned to the writing of La scienza
nuova in forma negativa, {The New Science in Negative Form; now lost).
Max Fisch considers La scienm nuova informa negativa to be parallel in its
development to the first section of the autobiography. Fisch views La scienza
nuova prima as aUgned with the second section of the autobiography.i
In 1728 Giannartico di Porcfa (who had organized the volume in which
the autobiography appeared), and Antonio Conti (1677-1749), the patron of
the same project, encouraged Vico to produce a new edition of La scienza
nuova, but complaints from die Venetian printer regarding the repetitions
and general unwieldiness of the revised work led Vico to publish the 1733
edition in Naples as he had the first. One cannot help but wish die Venetian
pubUsher had had some influence on Vico.^ In any case, the variations which
make |ip this edition are now referred to as Correzioni, miglioramenti, e
aggiuê (Corrections, Improvements, and Supplements) (1730)3 jhe third
edition, generally known, rather confusingly, as La scienza nuova seconda
(Jhe Second New Science), designates the 1744 edition plus passages from
the edition of 1733, the corrections of 1730 mentioned above (but not the
ones done in 1733), as weU as the remaining sections of the 1733 edition.
There is no sn-aightforward answer as to why Vico revised La scienza
nuova. Encouragement from admirers of the book, his desire for a larger
audience, plus the very probable genuine desire in his own mind to perfect
these most important principles - aU these were no doubt important factors.
The reader familiar with die 1744 edition is forcibly struck by major
differences when inspecting the first and second editions. The narrative
style of La scienza nuova prima is a welcome suφrise, entirely at odds
with the list of degnita of II diritto universale, of Institutiones oratoriae
and the later, more popular versions of this work. Furthermore the 1725
edition is both more subtle and complete in its presentation of the major
themes than the 1744 work. Perhaps there was an implicit assumption by
Vico that most of the readers of his later edition would have read the earlier
one - thus justifying his outline siyle in 1744 - or that readers new to his
work would require his theories to be expressed more simply.
Why has the 1725 edition been so little used by Vico scholars? The 1744
edition is many times aU that is cited in worfa on Vico - the two notable
exceptions in the older scholarship of the EngUsh-speaking world being
Adams and Berry.* Often the assumption is made that the final version
contained the most complete and mature representation of his life's work
simply because it was the last. This notion rests on the assumption of the
internal coherence of a single writer's work, which derives in turn from
the concept of progress. To be sure, questions regarding Vico's intellectual
development from 1725 to the end of his life in 1744 are tantalizing. The
academies and confraternities he frequented during this period, for example,
would havegiven him at the very least a place to go and to talk, even if (as
he repeatedly claimed) he did not have anyone with whom he could properly
discuss his ideas.
The first book of La scienza nuova prima discussed the necessity of such
a new science and the means whereby it could be discovered. But it is the
second book on the principles of this science drawn fi-om ideas, and the
third, which discussed these principles as drawn from language, that are
richest in Vico's highly stimulating notions regarding mankind, // genere
umano (mankind). The fourth book, concerning the grounds of the proofs
which establish this science, and the fifth and final one, on the philosophy
of humanity and the universal history of the nations, are useful primarily as
complements to the second and third book.
By way of contrast, the merits of the 1730 and 1744 editions are much
more evenly spread. An explanation of the frontispiece, 4dea dell'opera*
('Idea of the Work'), begins the book, followed by Books I and П on the
establishment of the principles and poetic wisdom. The small sub-section
of seventeen lines on the Elements (7725, 208) was expanded to a rather
large section of forty-three pages in the first book of the 1744 edition (1744,
119-329); it is this section which Fisch recommended as a starting point to
readers new to Vico. Book ΠΙ, 'DelUi discoverta del vero Omero' (On the
Discovery of the True Homer'), is an addition to the later editions. It is very
likely that the reason there is a more extended discussion of language in the
first edition than in the others was that Vico had shifted his emphasis to the
Homeric example; he viewed these epic poems as the classic example and
supreme triumph of collective national wisdom, not pf individual genius.
Book IV, 'Del corso chefanno le nazionV ('The Course the Nations Run'),
expanded a section of the earlier work (1725, 400-1) and, in general, much
more attention was given in the later editions to society and tradition.
Although there is more discussion of Rome in La scienza nuova prima,
in particular to Roman law, thefe is much less regarding the course of
civilizations in general. The fifth and final book had the highly suggestive
title of 'Del ricorso delle cose umano nel risurgere che fanno le nazionV
('The Recourse ofHuman Institutions which the Nations take when they Rise
Again'). The short work, 'La pratica' ('Practic ofthe New Science'), is now
considered to be part of the so-called secpnd La scienza nuova. La pratica
offered a possible escape route from the return to barbarism which is implicit
throughout La scienza nuova - that is, if the young are educated properly, in
a society not already in decline, a people capable of maintaining public virtue
will be created.^ It has been sunnised that this section was not published
in his lifetime,because it implied that there was something external to his
science that was needed to save nations from ultimate decUne.
The complete title of La scienza nuova prima includesthe concept, which
was all-important to Vico, of the 'natural law of the peoples': 'Principi
di una scienza nuova dintomo alla ruüura delle nazioni, per la quale
si ritruovano principi di altro sistema del diritto naturale delle gentV
{'Principles ofa new science according to the nature ofnations, in order
to retrieve the principles ofanother system ofnatural ktw ofthe peoples').
His definition of natural law was indeed broad, including as it did the origins
of religions, language, customs, positive laws, societies, government, types
of ownership, occupations, orders, authorities, judiciaries, penalties, wars,
peace, surrender, slavery and alUances.^ He viewed this natural law of
the people as a 'jurisprudence of mankind',^ believing one of its greatest
strengths to be that it offered a method by which to analyse the barbaric
stages of past civilisations. It offered a metaphysical explanation of the
certa mente comune (certain conmion mind).* In addition Vico maintained
that this natural law demonstrated the truth of the Christian religion. Hence
natural law, according to Vico, was composed of virtually all elements of
society, and yet it also proved (much less successfully) the validity of what
may be viewed as the most controversial of its elements, that is, a particular
religion and not religion in the abstract. Vico attacks Grotius, John Selden
(1584-1654) and Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-94) for three reasons: they
failed to note that natural law developed with the customs, they did not give
us a way to find out the history of barbarous times and they do not discuss
individual nations and cases, only common traits of all nations. Vico began
this work by declaring that natural law developed with the customs, but
within a few pages he used the terms synonymously. Vico had no patience
for the universal approaches of the three thinkers mentioned above who dealt
with politics, war and foreign relations to the exclusion of society, culture
and history. He demanded knowledge of what was unique concerning each
society, and had no time for universal theories, which provided no means of
examining the particular.
At the very beginning of La scienza nuova prima, Vico condemned
curiosity about the future as irreligious, but elsewhere in his writings he
used the same term, curiositä, only in a positive, constructive sense. Vico
wrote that it was curiosity that led early man to explore his environment and,
understandably, to judge the unknown by the known.9 This issue ofcuriosity
is central to Vico's ideas about language, the development of the human

mind and history itself. He was persuaded that only when the desire to push
back established boundaries of knowledge and learning was present could
additional knowledge or insight be gained. Vico would not have argued that
this desire had to be fuUy articulated or even conscious, simply that the
demand for additional information was in itself Üie vehicle by which the
human mind progressed.
Both editions make repeated references to the dictionary of mental words,
un dizionario di voci mentale comune a tutte le nazioni (a dictionary of
mental words common to aU the nations), a marvelous phrase which Vico
concocted for this rich and diverse group of innate ideas. Unfortunately he
did not list them in the last edition in as specific a form as in the 1725
edition, which proves rather confiising for one who has read the more
popular version.'o The first edition expressly listed the twelve somewhat
disjointed concepts - not single words as the following sununary indicates
- which aU societies shared: imagined deities, children begotten under divine
auspices, beings of heroic origins, divination, sacrifice, complete power over
fanülies, the strength to kill wild animals and to cultivate and defend the
land, magnaninüty towards the poor, the fame brought by ability to crush
enemies, sovereign donüiüon over the fields, the power of arms and the
power of law." These twelve concepts or categories were viewed by Vico
as the nfinimum requirements, thefimdamentalpractices of aU societies;
he went so far as to consider them necessary ingredients of aU early
cultures. Only the point regarding magnanimity towards vagabonds did not
fit naturally into his Ust - it seems to havebeen a rather gratuitous addition,
perhaps made to stress the civilising aspects of a developing society.
This concept of a dizionario mentale wasfimdamentalto Vico's views
regarding history. His storia ideale etema and natural law could only work
if aU people shared some common goals, regardless of the time, place or
circumstances of birth. This concept led naturally to his assertion that
two civilisations could develop in a similar pattem and share common
beliefs without any direct contact occurring between the two. The notion
of originality here seems to have been tumed on its head by Vico. It is
commonly assumed that whoever was first to devise an idea or approach
is to be credited with this breakthrough and that aU subsequent work in this
area will go on from this point, even if only as revision. But Vico seemed to
have considered it neither meritorious nor even possible to conceive a new
idea, because there was for him - at least in the abstract - no such thing.
For Vico it was the application of these ideas which was the most decisive
issue.
One finds in La scienza nuova prima in five-point form perhaps the
clearest statement in any of Vico's writings regarding his methods of

history. The first is the use of evidence synchronous (sincrono) with the
times in which the Gentile nations were bom.'2 Unfortunately for us, Vico
did not develop this point, but one can safely assume tradition to have been
a major aspect. The word sincrono would allow for a broad range of Vichian
subjects. For example, the development of language, legends regarding the
deities and speculations regarding the creation and workings of the natural
world formed a natural part of this approach.
In his second point, Vico cited the use of documents belonging to the
first peoples, and stated time and time again that men naturally preserve
records of their past history.'^ His primary example, and one stiU studied
today, is that of independent verifications of Üie Flood in the records of
past civilisations which were not in direct contact with one another. The
use of documents was not an issue which Vico stressed, surely because
its importance was so obvious. Yet it was in regard to the examination of
such documents that Vico gave his well-known warning that one should
not suppose people in the past to have been better informed than ourselves
about times that lay closer to them and he mentioned forgeries in this
connection.'^
The third point concerned what Vico chose to call physical demonstrations
(fisiche dimostrazioni)A^ Giants and monsters were for Vico physical proof
of the bestial stage of Gentile man left over from a Hobbesian state of
nature.'^ Scattered references to these bestioni are to be found particularly
in De constantia philologiae and in the last edition of La scienza nuova. It
is not clear why Vico felt giants be a necessary part of his scheme, for he
does not discuss the physical development ofhuman beings. Understandably,
this has been interpreted as a proto-evolutionary view on Vico's part. Yet
nothing would have horrified him more, and it could weU be argued that it
is indeed superfluous to Vico's main argument regarding the development
of Üie human mind.
The fourth means Vico listed concerned the rational proofs contained in
fables. He did not, however, consider this method by any means simple or
guaranteed to work. He gave the examples of contemporary idiots and feral
children, citing the difficulty in establishing any sort of inteUectual contact
with them, despite their having had some access to modern civilization.'^
At one point Vico wrote that fables were fictional expressions of tangible
objects; but elsewhere he expanded this definition to include substantives,
since emotions and ideas were often personified in mythical form.'» First
speech, he wrote, was an outburst of such passion - interjections.'^ He
spent a great deal of time discussing the origin of the poetic character
which constituted the vocabulary of Gentile nations and the meanings of true
poetic allegories. For Vico language went hand-in-hand with fables, myths
and poetry, and together they were a testimony of the ancient peoples.ô
Vico was most explicit in his discussion of myths and fables in 1725.
Myths must be a credible impossibility, they must inspire awe and fear, and
they must contain a worthy message.^' In the 1744 edition this three-fold
aim was sUghtly changed to encompass the invention of sublime tales,
the inspiration of awe and fear (exactly as in 7725), and the teaching
of the vulgar to act piously.22 The final point, important in regard to the
implications of 'La pratica\ was mentioned in the 1725 edition but had not
been ranked as one of the goals.
In Üie fifth and final point Vico contended metaphysical proofs (theoretical
arguments) to be necessary when the other four means proved inapplicable
or inadequate.23 Vico asserted that he had discovered the origins of idolatry
and divination in this manner.^* To some extent, Vico's entire schema -
including its more tangible aspects such as language - could be grouped
under this metaphysical heading. He did not speculate merely about the
decline following the development of a nation, but also about areas now
considered analytical in the philosophy of history; and it is not unreasonable
to sumüse that it is his achievements in the latter area which will be of
lasting interest. Vico did indeed draw up a framework of past civilisations
- the most tangible example being La tavoJa cronologica (the chronological
table), which appeared in all three editions.
The bulk of each edition is devoted to a quite different issue - how
entrare and descendere into the minds of these grossi bestioni, and how
then to inteφret this information conceming the past, bnagination, human
creativity, is the theme which runs throughout thisbook. Vico avowed that
he had formulated both a history and a philosophy of the law of mankind.
His principles of mythology and etymology were to be used to retrieve the
vocabularies, and hence the mentalities, of early societies:
Finalmente il niuno 0 poco uso del Finally an absence or scarcity of

raziocinio port robustezza de'sensi. reasoning brings with it a strength
La robustezza de'sensi porta vivezza of the senses which, in tum, leads
di fantasia. La vivida fantasia Ь to a vividness of imagination,
andl'ottima dipintrice delle and a vivid imagination is the best
immagini, che imprimono gli painter of the images which objects
oggetti ne'sensi. impress on the senses.^s
Vico has been credited with so many original insights that it is important
to distinguish those which are traly his fiOm those which have been falsely
attributed to him, many of which are not only unrelated but are diametrically
opposed to his principles. Falling into this last category is the notion of
freedom, either in the abstract or as a specific goal for individuals or
societies.26 This would seem to be not unrelated to the issue that Vico was
not particularly interested in the roleof the individual. Although very much
concerned with the creative faculties of man, his interest lay in the results
of collective incUnations, not in individual achievements. Thus, anti-social
behaviour, which one might have expected to intrigue Vico as a break
from his ideal, etemal pattem, is ignored inhis writings as insignificant;
or perhaps he simply deemed it a natural part of any, and thus all, societies.
His mention of Julius Caesar or of the need for an Augustus notwithstanding,
Vico's views most closely approximate those ofHegel on 'World Historical
Individuals' ('die weltgeschichtlichen Individuen') on this point.^7
Although a strictly detemünistic application of Vico's rise and fall of
civilizations robs his work of much of itsflavourand diversity, it must be
acknowledged that he never denied thefimdamentalrole of this pattern for
his outlook on human history. Yet as Vico himself often repeated, it was not
those etemal truths that transcended any one particular society which most
tantalized and inspired him, but the process of investigating these past social
groups by means of language, mythology and imagination. These were the
factors which constituted the major components ofVico's highly original -
and stiU much nüsunderstood - approach to the past.
6. Vita di Giambattista Vico scritta da se medesimo (1725,1728)
The original impetus for Vico's autobiography came from Gottfried Wilhelm
von Leibniz (1646-1716). Count Giannartico di Porcia, a Venetian noble
man, learned of the German philosopher's proposal for an anthology of
contemporary inteUectual autobiographies. Thus inspired, Porcia asked Vico,
along with eight other Neapolitan thinkers - including Paolo Mattia Doria
(1661-1746), Vico's fiiend, and Pietro Giannone, (1676-1748) his rival
- to write thek autobiographies, which were to be published together in
a single volume.' In the event, Porcia persuaded only Vico to contrib
ute, no doubt because he never completely gave up hope of achieving
the sort of wider recognition which was to elude him in his Ufetime.^
Porcia proposed to pubUsh Vico's work by itself as a model for future
autobiographies, but Vico was quite rightiy afraid that he would be mocked
for writing such an intensely personal piece and only very reluctantly gave
his permission for its publication two years later. Indeed Giannone, the
famous anti-clerical writer of Naples, called the autobiography, when he
read it in Vienna in 1729, 'la cosa piu sciapita e trasonica insieme che si
potesse mai leggere', ('the most insipid and dreamy thing that one could
ever read').3
Written in Italian, the original section of the autobiography is over fifty
pages in length. Four other sections are now considered to be part of the
autobiography as well.^ In 1730 Vico was elected to the Academy of the
Assorditi of Urbino, through the efforts of the well-known Neapolitan
historian, Ludovico Muratori (1672-1750), on his behalf. The Academy
asked for a biographical piece, and, not wanting to renew the conflicts
surrounding the publication of his autobiography, Vico simply revised it as
Aggiunta fatta dal Vico alla sua autobiografia (Supplement made by Vico
to his Autobiography, 1731). The first part (1725) of the original section
of the autobiography was completed just after La scienza nuova in forma
negativa, and the second section (1725, 1728) after he completed the first
edition of La scienza nuova. Further, the second La scienza nuova displays
a number of parallels with the 1731 addition to the autobiography.^ Just as
Vico added the numerous classical examples (especially regarding Homer)
to the later edition of his book, he expanded the second section of the
autobiography with numerous quotations fi-om letters sent to him by people
who had received (usually unsolicited) copies of his book.
The Marquis ofVillarosa found a copy of Aggiunta fatta dal Vico alla sua
autobiografia iunong the papers ofVico's son, Gennaro, in 1806.^ Villarosa
himself wrote Gli ultimi anni del Vico (Vico's Final Years, 1818) based
loosely on oral tradition, it is now considered to be the third part of the
autobiography. Villarosa's study of Vico's last years is tragically concise:
his unhappy fanüly life; small salary; frustrated academic career; a wife
with whom he had very littie in common; one son a criminal; senility which
struck him at least fourteen months before his death; and the physical fight
over his coφse between the members of the Confraternity of Santa Sofia and
the professors of the university. Vülarosa considered this to be literally the
final insult to Vico. Happier entries might have included the general high
regard in which he was held in the various academies he frequented; his
relationship with his daughter, Luisa, who became a poetess of note in the |
city; and the professional success of his son, Gennaro, who succeeded him
in his Chair of Rhetoric. Although Gennaro was perhaps too helpftil to his
increasingly senile father during his final years, and might be responsible for \
encouraging the generally prosaic changes made between the 1730 and 1744
editions of La scienza nuova.
The fourth andfinalpart of the autobiography. Due appendici (Two Appen
dices), contains the Cataloghi delle opere del Vico compilati dall'autore
(Catalogue of Vico's work compiled by the author, 1728, 1735) and Le
recensioni di Giovanni Leclerc tradotte e annotate dal Vico. Notizie sparse
е documenti per la vita del Vico (A few notices and documents rekiting to
the life of Vico) is the final section of the autobiography. Villarosa, then,
was responsible for three of the five sections, having written the third and
collected the materials which comprised the final two.
It is generally accepted that Vico used Descartes's Discours de Ui
mithode as the model for his autobiography. There is some sense to
this view, since the Discours de la mithode was largely autobiographical
in approach; nevertheless, it is somewhat ironic that by 1725 when Vico
wote his autobiography he was undoubtedly anti-Cartesian. The use of
the third person singular by Vico is seen by Max Fisch as a response to
Descartes's 'ubiquitous ' T " . ' But other considerations should perhaps be
taken into account: die now familiar first person autobiographical style, for
example, had not been established at this time, and it must also be noted that
the voice of a supposedly impersonal narrator allowed Vico toflatterhis own
accompUshments and justify his failings. Seemingly endless quotations are
given of people praising Vico, particularly in the second section, so many
that sadly one wonders if every compUment he ever received is recorded
here. In Vico's defence it must be stated that by 1725 he may have realized,
quite rightly as it transpired, that if he did not take the opportunity to record
his own biographical details and to present his work to a wider audience, it
would never be done. Indeed later biographical sketches of Vico (including
this one) are almost entirely dependent on the autobiography since there are
few other sources to consult. There is no self-criticism of his Ufe or work
in the autobiography, only justifications for obvious failures. Clearly there
is a need to apply gracious Vichian modes of criticism to Vico himself, if
we are to avoid too severe a judgement.
From the autobiography one gains the sense that Vico was less than
proud of his family background. His father, Antonio di Vico, had a small
bookstore in Naples. His motiier, Candida MasuUo, was the daughter of a
carriage maker, and is generally believed to have been Uliterate, as was
his wife. Porcia had asked that the connibutors to his proposed anthology
discuss their 'tempo delUi nascita' (time of birth), the 'nome de' U>ro Padri
e della loro Patria' (name of their fathers and of their countries), and 'tutte
quelle aventure della loro vita, che render ki ponno piu ammirable e pia
curiosa' (aU of the adventures of their Uves, which are most admirable or
most curious).8 However Vico omitted the names ofhis parents and claimed
to have been born in 1670 rather ihan 1668. It is not altogether clear why
Vico felt compelled to make himself two years younger, as he was the sixth
of eight children born to his father's second wife and so was presumably free
of any taint of illegitimacy. Nicolini was perhaps correct in speculating that
it had to do with Vico's embarrassment over the long interruption to his
schooling caused by a fall on his head as a child.^ Vico was a precocious

child and was treated warily by his teachers at both school and university.
His true ability was never recognized at any stage of his life.
It is from the autobiography that the best known facts regarding Vico's
life are to be found: this fall on his head as a child, his failure to gain the
prestigious chair of the head morning lecturer of law in 1723, and the sale
of his ring to pay for the printing of a shortened version of his work. La
scienza nuova informa positiva (The New Science in Positive Form, 1725).
Vico stressed the critical importance of the nine years he was away from
Naples in preserving him from the corruption of Cartesian thought which
he claimed gained prominence in Naples during this period.'o The years in
question (1686-95) were spent as a tutor to the son ofDon Domenico Rocca
at the family estate in Vatolla, approximately one hundred kilomefres south
ofNaples: many years later the son participated in the 1701 conspiracy of the
nobles, of which Vico was to write an account. Vico's own poetry, written
at the age of twenty-four, perhaps for the daughter of the house, Affetti di
un disperato (Emotions ofa Desperate Man, 1692) offers no clues to his
theoretical works on language and poetry, although it is of interest when
studying his intellectual development because of the Lucretian overtones.''
These were the only years Vico spent away from Naples, and thus they are
of some particular interest when studying his intellectual development. StiU
there is little doubt that Vico overestimated the importance of this period
in terms of his escaping the snare of Cartesianism, particularly because the
Cartesian spirit was already very much alive in Naples among the generation
preceding Vico - Leonardo di Capua (1617-95) is one exponent of this.
There is also evidence to suggest that the entire Rocca family spent several
months of every year in the city of Naples, hence Vico in his capacity as
the son's tutor would have been back in the city at regular intervals
and thus would have been exposed to the prevaiUng intellectual currents
himself. Nevertheless his claim must be taken seriously, for Vico used it
- consciously or not - as a means of separating himself from contemporary
inteUectual trends, from Naples and aU that it represented.
Although later writers are most concerned with Vico's philosophical
differences with Cartesian thought, this went along with his horror regarding
the diminished status of the sixteenth-century Italian neo-Platonic writers
(many of whom he had avidly read while at Vatolla), due in large degree to
the vast and stUl-growing influence of Cartesian thought. Ironically Vico's
insights into the inteφretation of poetry are now considered to be the apex
of the early eighteenth-century Italian school of literary criticism which he
himselfloathed.'2
There is no doubt that Vico was to a great extent removed from the
mainstream of intellectual life in Naples. Not only did he not achieve the
kind of professional success which he so keenly desired, but he had little in
common with the two mostdynamic groups in Naples which overlapped the
opposite ends of his lifetime, the scientifically-minded / lnvestiganti and the
economic and political writers of Genovesi's circle. Vico's strange inability
to read either French or English, or indeed any modem lanaguage except
Italian, which was not at all typical of other Neapolitan intellectuals of his
generation, cut him off from much of the more exciting work produced at
the turn of the eighteenth century. These circumstances further tied him to
the seventeenth century: when Vico boasted that he never read a new book
after 1709 - at the age of forty-one, thirty-five years before his death - one is
not inclined (along with Nicolini) to believe him. Certainly Vico >yas familiar
with the work of Jakob Bracker (1696-1770) on philosophical eclecticism.'^
Nevertheless, the date when Vico supposedly stopped reading new books,
1709, takes on a greater significance when it is realized that that was the year
that Vico published De nostri temporis studiorum ratione. Although Vico
never mastered another living language, in an academic and abstract manner
he was greatly interested in tiie development of language and philology, and
language played a fundamental role in his theoretical works regarding the
growth of human creativity and imagination.
Much of the recent work on Vico, especially that done on his theory of
knowledge, considers him to have secretly harboured heretical views, and
that his purpose in using allegory was to attack Biblical authority. Homer,
according to this view, was used as a synonym for Moses in 'Delki
discoverta del vero Omero' in much the same manner that the central
character in Voltaire's Mohammet (Mohammed, 1741) was popularly inter
preted as Christ. This position is supported by existence of the Inquisition
in Naples during Vico's lifetime and Vico had personal acquaintancescalled
before it.
Yet many Neapolitan historians, of which Croce is the best known, have
stressed the Neapolitan loathing for the Inquisition and its subsequent inef-
ficacy. Giannone's sharp attack on the power of the papacy in Dell'istoria
civile del Regno di Napoli (On the Civil History ofthe Kingdom ofNaples),
which was quickly placed on the Index after its publication in 1723, was
not out of line with the anti-clerical mood of many influential Neapolitans
of their generation.'* Throughout this period the Kingdom of Naples was
engaged in offlcial disputes with Rome over papal claims to Naples dating
back to 1053 and 1059, and in the third quarter of the eighteenth century
Bemardo Tanucci (1698-1783) and Ferdinando Galiani (1728-87) formed
a successful alliance to drive the Jesuits out of the Kingdom of Naples
altogether.'^ Nonetheless th6re is no evidence in Vico's autobiography
or elsewhere to suggest that he personally found the Catholic Church

to be a stumbling block; quite to the contrary, he recounted with great
pleasure a number of conversations he had had both as a student and as
an adult with intellectual priests, several of whom he counted as friends.
In this century Catholic writers prefer to speak of Vico's 'sweet, Christian
manner'; the late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century anti-Vico controversy
among Catholic scholars, exemplified byFinetti, has not been revived.'^
Yet precisely because many of his ideas were so startlingly modem, there
remains a tendency for subsequent generations of readers, who assume that
Vico's work was aU of a piece, to regard his opinions as being in fuU accord
with their own (often, in reality, quitecontrary) views. When, in reality, it
mightweU be argued that Vico was unaware, and indeed would have been
horrified, by many of the later conclusions drawn from his own ideas.
Vico's formal education was not unusual for his time, but here againhe
stressed his own individuality (somewhat ironically, as he had no theoretical
interest in individuals, only in social groups) by blessing his great good
fortune in not having become the prot^gd of any one of the town's more
forceful inteUectuals, thereby leaving him untroubled by the fighting among
the various academic factions.'^
Talch6 per tutte queste cose il Vico So for aU thesereasons Vico

benedisse non aver lui avuto maestto blessed his good fortune in having
nelle cui parole avesse egU giurato, no teacher whose words he had
eringraziöquelle selve fralle quali swom by, and he felt most
dal suo buon genio guidato aveva grateful for those woods in which
fatto il maggior corso dei suoi guided by his good genius, he had
studi senza niun affetto di setta, e foUowed the main course of his
non nella cittä nella quale, come studies untroubled by sectarian
moda di vesti, si cangiava ogni prejudice; for in the city taste
due 0 tre anni gusto di lettere. in letters changed every two or
three years like styles in
dress.i8
It was his prodigious private reading which first distinguished Vico from
his peers. He claimed to have read classic works without the use of any
commentaries three times: once for an understanding of the composition as
a whole, next to note thetransitions, and finally totrace the development of
the ideas.l^
Although he discussed his quattro autori in some detail in the
autobiography, these four writers had both a symbolic and a tangible
effect on his own writings - they are sometimes viewed as an *allegory

regarding his own intellectual development, a sort of private myth', as Peter
Burke expresses it well.20 In any case, Vico was influenced much more by
neo-Platonic writers than by Plato. He relied on Tacitus and Grotius in his
work on Caraffa. Tacitus's Germania (98 A.D.) was crucial in shaping Vico's
own concept of primitive society, and Vico shared Bacon's fascination with
myth. There is certainly a parallel between Bacon's stress on reproducing
nature in a laboratory setting and Vico's idea that one can only know
completely what one has made; although Vico used this argument to state
that one can never fully understand nature.
Vico discussed each of his own main works and their various editions
in chronological order in the autobiography, but little new Ught is shed on
these pieces other than the circumstances under which they were written.
His presentation of his own writings led up to La scienza nuova in a
straightforward chronological manner, but, significantly, he did not treat La
scienza nuova as his only work of importance. A great many questions are
left unanswered by the autobiography. There is, for example, unfortunately
no explicit statement regarding his increasing preoccupation with history and
cultural development. Yet certain ideas and terms recur throughout this work
- lingua, memoria andfantasia,and ingenio (ingenious), a term he often
used to describe himself. In the autobiography, as in II diritto universale,
he used his favourite terms over and over, whether in an original form
or not. His obsession with particular ideas is evident. The continuity of
the development of his ideas is clear from the autobiography, and this
development is equally clear from his writings.
The real importance of the autobiography, then, has little to do with the
sometimes muddled facts which Vico recounted regarding his life. Its true
significance lies in the fact that it was one of the first examples of an original
writer's examination of the sources and origins of his own ideas. There was
a direct parallel, for example, between his autobiography and his view of
myths, not as false statements about reality or fanciful versions of past events
but as evidence of early outlooks and beliefs. Hence Vico's autobiography
was written not only as a model for future intellectual autobiographies but
also as a practical lesson in the application of his own view of history.
3 La scienza nuova, 1725,
1730, 1744
1. The Three Editions
Vico wrote three versions of his last work, La scienza nuova, all of which
were published in Naples in 1725, in 1730 and in 1744, the year of his
death.' With very few exceptions, it has been the final version which has
been considered the definitive edition, to the exclusion not only of the two
previous editions but also of aU of Vico's other writings. Only inthis century
has this overemphasis been somewhat rectified in theItalian-speaking world
by research on Vico's early works, especially in their specific NeapoUtan
or Italian cultural c0ntexts,2 and in addition, more recently, by thel981
publication by Lessico InteUettuale Europeo of a concordance of the 1725
e d i t i o n 3 (with concordances of the rest of his works to follow shortly) and
the release in 1987 by the Centro di Studi Vichiani of the orations as the first
volume of the long-awaited scholarly edition of Vico.*
The difficulty has not only been the lack of modern, scholarly editions
of Vico's works, nor that the 1744 edition is generally the work first to be
ti-anslated;^ the stumbling-block has been the assumption by generations of
readers that the edition tiiey were reading was the best because it was the
final one and thus Vico must have considered it the best. It istiruethat Vico
wrote in 1731,
A' quali per far loro verdere che gli To show them that he knew
conosceva quali essi eraano, fece them for what they were, Vico
intendere che di tutte le deboU opere gave them to understand that
del suo affannato ingtegno arebbe of aU the poor works of his
voluto che sola fusse restata exhausted genius he wished
al mondo la Scienza Nuova,. . . only the New Science to remain
to the world; . . . ^
The edition he was referring to was the 1730, and the only exception he
made in this regard was for the essential section in the 1725 edition on i voci
mentale. At tiiis point he had not yet written the work, tiie 1744 edition of
La scienza nuova, which most interpreters claim is the quintessential Vico.
72
La scienza nuova, 7725, 77iO, 1744 73
Contrary to what some modem interpreters claim, Vico did not write that
he considered the 1744 edition the definitive one (as it had not been written
at this point), but that the 1730 edition plus this one important section fi-om
the 1725 edition were to be his lasting memorial.
There is another reason for the dominance of the final edition, which is that
the interpretations of Vico championed by Michelet, Croce, Collingwood
and Berlin have been so strong, and the interest in Vico generally so slight,
that many established tenets of Vico studies have never been questioned.
Such an attitude would never be tolerated in studies of better-known thinkers
of the time, such as Descartes or Voltaire.
This complaisance is nowhere more obvious than with regard to the issue
of the various editions of La scienza nuova. In the previous chapter the 1725
edition was discussed in the context of Vico's most significant early works.
The issue of the dizionario mentale never again received such fuU treatment
as in the first edition.^ Yet Vico*s concepts, not only of imagination but also
of history, received only passing mention in La scienza nova prima, hence
the 1725 work could never be considered the definitive edition.
One of the many problems with the final edition concerns the long
passages in which Vico supposedly applied or demonstrated his theories
by references to classical history or classical and popular mythology,
which he supposedly hoped would increase his readership. WhUe it is
no longer possible to judge the exact reaction of Vico's contemporaries
to his literary style, it is weU known that such references were derigueurin
eighteenth-century theoretical works. One must imagine that it was not these
classical allusions, which the modem reader finds so tiresome, but Vico's
own unconventional ideas which were responsible for the poor sales of his
works in the eighteenth century.
Long, tortuous passages on Roman law and heroicfigures,not to mention
his many nüsquotations and spurious allusions (faithfiiUy rectified by Ferrari,
Pomodoro, Nicolini and later editors)* form the bulk of the final version.
These additions were written in 1730, 1731 and 1733 and were entitied by
Vico Correzioni, miglioramenti, e aggiunte.^ Sadly the 161 folio pages of
closely written corrections written in Vico's own hand add very littie to our
understanding of his thought, for they are almost entirely concemed with the
Roman and mythological examples to be found in tiie 1744 edition.
This is not to say that La scienza nuova was unimportant to Vico's
thought, but that we have not been readifig the correct edition. It is neitiier the
1725 nor the 1744 edition to whichweshould turn our attention, but to tiie
1730 edition - particularly in regard to imagination. This all-but-forgotten
edition, which even Nicolini abridged, has never been repubUshed in its
entirety. The sections of Vico's work that are of least interest to modem
readers - classical mythology in Books IV and V of the 1725,'" and the

classical and mythological references of the 1744 - form only a small
portion of the 1730 edition. Certainly the discriminating reader is capable
of skimnüng or passing over less interesting passages. But the issue is
more fiindamental than this. In the 1730 edition Vico devoted most of
his energies to the topics in which he was to provide the most interesting
and original insights: language, imagination and history." One of the only
previous supporters of this view was Croce:
His system is recapitulated and brought to perfection in the Principi di

una scienza nuova intomo alla commune natura delle rmzioni (1725) and
especially in the second Cirûe libri de' principtdi una scienza nuova
(1730, new ed. 1744).'2
Virtually aU of the 1730 edition is repeated in the 1744 (some of the few
exceptions are cited at various points throughout this book). Nevertheless,
if one must choose a definitive edition of La scienza nuova, based on its own
intrinsic merits rather than on the grounds of availability (which, granted, is
no small consideration for those not able to consult oneof the very few extant
copies - the manuscript has not survived), then the 1744 edition clearly is
inferior to that of 1730. This view is by the two modern Italian scholars who
have spent the most time studying the Vico manuscripts and first editions
- Manuela Sanna, who compiled the Catalogo vichiano napoletano^^ in
1986 and Paolo CristofoUni, who edited the excellent Sansoni editions of
Vico's Operefilosofichein 1971 and Opere giuridiche in 1974'* and who
is editing a complete, scholarly edition of the 1730 edition, expected to be
published in the near fiiture. The 1730 edition reads like afirst-classprecis
of the often incomprehensiblefinishedproduct of 1744. It is to be hoped that
after more than 250 years of near total neglect, the 1730 edition will at last
receive the attention it so clearly deserves. This streamlined version would
be more likely to attract modern readers than the other two editions. In the
fiiture Vico studies should concentrate on the 1725 and 1730 editions of La
scienza nuova, in conjunction with his earlier writings, in order to gain the
most complete representations of his ideas.
2. Vico's Vocabulary
As we have seen, most previous studies have restricted themselves to an

analysis of the third and final version of Vico's best known work. La scienza
La scienza nuova, 1725, 1730, 1744 75
nuova (1744). Little effort has been made to trace the development of his
ideas in the important first (1725) and almost unknown second (1730)
editions of La scienza nuova. It is in the second edition, never reprinted
in its entirety, that he devoted most of his energies to the topics in which
he was to provide the most interesting and original insights - language,
imagination and historical knowledge. (Most of these ideas were repeated
in the final edition but theemphasis there is on Roman history, classical
mythology and historical cycles.) Yet a study of these three crucial topics
in Vico, each of which will be dealt with in greater depth in later chapters,
must be firmly grounded in a study of the many diverse terms and phrases
which comprised Vico's own very idiosyncratic vocabulary.
According to Vico, the best method to search out early human institutions
was to study the mental vocabularies of these times.' It was the poetic
characters, the gods, whom he believed comprised the vocabulary of the
Gentile nations.^ Although he claimed to be weU aware of the difficulties
in such an historical reconstruction,^ he argued that it was impossible for
these peoples to have created false ideas, because there was no tradition
which did not have some basis in truth - the ideas could not have been
completely manufactured.* Just as Vico asserted it was necessary to break
the poetic codes of early, preliterate societies in order to discover the
mentality of those times, in tiie same way we must break the code of
Vico's own vocabulary. There are seven main concepts which must be
addressed: The notion of the uniformity of ideas in aU societies at the same
stage of development, sapienza volgare (vulgar, common, sometimes called
poetic wisdom), religion and society of these early groups, the relationship
between fi-ee will and the development of society in Vico's thought and,
finally, Vico's division of human history into setti di tempi (periods of time)
which can be exanüned only by means of his new critical art.
3. Uniformity of Ideas
The third book of the 1744 edition, entitled 'Della discoverta del vero
Omero'^ was based on an earlier two-and-a-half-page draft written in
1728-29, entitied by Nicolini, 'Della discoverta del vero Dante' (On
the Discovery of the True Dante').^ The shorter piece listed the three
primary reasons for reading the La commedia divina (The Divine Comedy,
13077-1321), which show astriking similarity to Vico's later arguments
for studying early poetry and mytiiology, and hence history. The first
reason was that La commedia divina itself was a history of the barbarous
times in Italy. This is a clear statement of Vico's conviction that it was
from oral history, and later codiüed versions of the same, diat one could
gain historical knowledge of the past. Sixteen years later he wrote in his
best-known work:
Ma sopra tutto, per tal discoverta, But above all, in virtue of our
gU si aggiugne una sfolgorantissima discovery we may ascribe to Homer
lode: d'esser Omero stato il primo an additional and most dazzling
storico, il quale ci sia giunto di glory: that of having been the
tutta la gentilitd; onde dovranno first historian of the entire
quindi appresso, i di lui poemi Gentile world who has come down
salire nell'alto credito d'essere to us. Wherefore his poems should
due grandi tesori de'costumi dell' henceforth be highly prized as
antichissima Grecia. being two great treasure stores of
the customs of early Greece.^
Thus for Vico the primary importance of poetry was the evidence it
contained of past cultures, in this manner he believed Roman law to be
a *serious poem** *DelUi discoverta del veroDante' is further evidence
that, long before 1744, Vico considered early poetry to be crucial not
only as literature but also as philology and history. He postulated that
Dante's (1265-1321) masterpiece was created by shared Italian wisdom.
Vico himself attempted, unsuccessfully, to emulate this 'puro e largofonte
di bellissimifavellari toscanV ^ ('pure and large fount of the beautifiil Tuscan
language') by modelling his own writing style onthe Cruscan model.^ But
more importantly, he prized the pure form of any language for its invaluable
role in philological studies. Although attention is now quite rightly placed on
Vico's interpretations of mythology, rather than on the academic methods
by which such a reconstitution could be accomplished and which he
never discussed in a specific manner, Vico himself repeatedly stressed
that philology and etymology were virtually synonymous with historical
studies.
Vico declared La commedia divina to be an example of sublime, lofty and
majestic poetry. Yet it seems clear that one of the main reasons Vico shifted
his example from Dante to Homer was that he wanted to discuss mythology
rather than the work of one тш1, however exceptional. Book Ш of the 1744
edition made clear that Vico regarded the works of Homer to be the result
of the collective wisdom of the Greek people.
In cotal guisa si dimostra l'Omero In this fashion we show that the

autor deir Iliade avere di molt'etä Homer who was the author of the
preceduto l'Omero autore dell' lÜad preceded by many centuries
La scienza nuova, 1725, 1730, 1744 77
Odissea. the Homer whowas the author of

the OdysseyP
Not onIy the discussion of Homer, as with that of Dante in the earlier
'DelUj. discoverta del vero Dante\ but also in La scienza nuova prima
(three years previously) there was a strong argument tiiat many of his
conclusions were leading in the same direction as his discussion of Moses
in 1725.* If Vico himself was aware of this possible inteφretation - that
is, that Moses was not an historical person, but the personificationof the
wisdom of the ancient Jewish people - it would no doubt account for
his twice changing his principal exatnple, from Moses to Dante and then
firom Dante to Homer. This argument need not depend on any supposedly
heretical views which Vico wanted to hide, since the issue could have
been simply that he did not want his ideas to be inteφreted in such
a way. For, as already mentioned, Vico did not even exhibit the usual
anti-clerical attitudes rife among Neapolitans of his time, attitudes which
culminated after his death in the expulsion of the Jesuits from the Kingdom
of Naples.^
Vico's shift from Moses to Dante to Homer is most intriguing today as
an example of his concept of the unifonnity of ideas. As quoted above,
Vico declared that Homer was the Greek people, and that the two poems
were the treasure trove of Greek law. This, then, was the reason for Homer's
matchless faculty for heroic poetry - it was literallythe culmination of
the entire Greek wisdom, mythology, religion and history. In effect, Vico
claimed that Homer himself was an imaginative universal, just as the Greeks
themselves had (unknowingly) used their gods as symbols of their own lives
and fears.
Vico was curious about the natural order of ideas which transcended
cultural boundaries and in the identicalfashion in which the stages of
all cultures progress, not in the development or preservation of particular
nations.io He wrote in no uncertain terms that,
. . . ogni parola volgare dovette . . . each vulgar word certainly

incominciare certamente da alcuno must begin in every nation . . . "
d'una nazione . . .
Vico's argument regarding the uniformity of ideasbetween all peoples was

not strengthened by his refusal to admit any degree of cultural sharing,
either through cooperation or coercion, even among subgroups of the same
civilization.'2
According to Vico language and early poetry must be rigorously and
ruthlessly explored'^ in order to discover the early histories, the mental

development and the way of thinking of these previous societies. He did not
consider it a disappointment, but a confirmation of his approach that human
ideas, laws and rightsfirstdevelopedfi-omsuperstition, which he viewed as
early attempts to pacify the natural world. These inborn ideas shared by all
peoples at aU times formed the basis of Vico's interpretation of il diritto
naturale delle nazioni (natural law of the nations). These innermost ideas
implied that man was not restricted to an instinctive or limited life.'* Vico
argued that a pattern of development was programmed into every human
being before birth, but that it was done in such away that man's will, as
expressed by his creativity, was the very instrument ofhis individual cultural
development. The idea of a dizionario di voci mentale which was common
to aU nations was closely tied to natural law. According to La scienza nuova
prima:
E qui si ponefinea questo libro We conclude our book on language

delle lingue con questa idea di un with the idea of a dictionary of,
dizionario di voci, per cosf dire, so to speak, mental words, which is
mentali comune a tutte le nazioni, common to aU nations. By
che, spiegandone l'idee uniformi expressing the uiuform ideas of
circa le sostanze, che, dalle substance through which, by means
diverse modiiicazioni che le of the various modifications, the
nazioni ebbero di pensare intomo nations thought about the same
alle stesse umane necessitä human necessities or utilities
0 utilitä comuni a tutte, common to aU, but looюng at them
riguardandole per diverse propietä, through different properties
secondo la diversitä de'loro siti, according to their diversities of
cieli e quindi nature e costumi, ne place, climate and, hence, nature
narri l'origini delle diverse and custom, this dictionary must
lingue vocali, che tutte narrate the origins of the
convengano in una lingua ideale different vocal languages, aU of
comune. which share a common ideal
language.i5
Vico's natural law concerning the common nature of aU nations and

idea of the parallel development of human customs were coupled with his
discussion of the development of man's mind and will in its various stages
of development. Vico asserted that natural law, which he viewed as virtually
identical to human customs, was bom from tradition and that its roots were
the eternal desires which aU men shared. This was for Vico the foundation
of the umana menteA^
Lascienza nuova, 1725, 1730, 1744 79
4. Sapienza volgare
Sapienza volgare, also referred to as poetic wisdom, is fundamental to an

understanding of Vico's thought.' He criticized the Epicureans and Stoics
for, among other issues, having abandoned sapienza volgare. This warning
against the dangers of an overly sophisticated approach is a recurrent theme
in his work. Vico clearly stated that the first wisdom was not rational and
absti-act, but feltand imagined.^ He stiûck another blow at the smugness and
self-centi-edness of scholars since Plato, who believed that the first authors
of language were themselves intellectuals. Vico emphatically denied that
language was consciously created and that originally aU words had been
assigned meanings; on the contrary, he theorised that language had devel
oped spontaneously, based on natural rather than prescribed significances for
each word.3 At the sametimehe regarded the development of language to be
largely responsible for the development of the human mind, for it taught the
mind to become more dextrous and swift in its workings.*
In the 1725 edition (Book П, 2) sapienza volgare was identified as the
senso comune shared by aU peoples and nations of the world. Senso comune
was, therefore innate and had an educational aspect. Thus sapienza vulgare
could be viewed as a refinement of the senso comune of a people. It follows
that a concordance of national senso comune would be a record of the
wisdom of aU mankind. Book I of the 1725 edition demonstrated that
the natural law of the nations arose along with their common customs.
Vico delineated a progressive relationship among senso comune, sapienza
volgare, the wisdom of aU mankind and the natural law of the nations. What
he described as the three senso comune of mankind - divine providence,
an orderly family life based on civU religion and the burial of the dead
- reinforced his three main precepts of religion, marriage and once again
burial. In addition it reaffirmed his concept of tiie uniformity of ideas as
demonsti-ated in sapienza volgare.^
Vico maintained that every group possessed its own version of senso
comune, molded and fashioned by its own particular geographic, climatic
and social characteristics.^ As mentioned in Chapter 2, tiiis second point hias
previously gone untold; even those who do mention senso comune in practice
tend to equate it with the modern notion of divine providence, which is to say
that it had perhaps only oneor, more likely, no function at all.^ At the same
time most commentators would willingly acknowledge that the dizionario
di voci mentale, although not senso comune, would certainly mainifest itself
(as Vico clearly stated) in a multitude of forms. Further evidence in support
of this new argument can be found again in Book I of the first edition, in
which Vico wrote that common sense is the proof that men havefi-eewill -
thus the inference was clear that senso comune would vary radically culture
by culture and age by age.*
Vico positively rejoiced in the poverty of articulate languages among the
first nations:
Perch6 la povertä de' parlari fa For a poverty of words naturally

naturalmente gli uomini subUmi makes men sublime in expression,
neU'espressione, gravi nel serious in conception, and acute in
concepire, acuti nel understanding much in brevity,
comprendere molto in brieve: which are the supreme virtues of
le quali sono le piu belle language.
virtu delle Ungue.
Queste sono le tre virtu piu The three most important virtuesof
rilevanti deUa faveUa poetic Umguage are: that it should
poetica: che imalzi e heighten and expand [our powers of]
ingrandisca le fantasie; sia in imagination; that it should give
brieve avvertita all'ultime brief expression to the ultimate
circostanze che diffiniscono le circumstances by which things are
cose; e trasporti le menti in defined; and that it should
cose lontaiussime e con diletto transport the nünd to the most
le faccia come in un nastro vedere remote things and present them in
Ugate con acconcezza. a captivating manner, as though
decked out in ribbons.^
This direct statement demonstrates that Vico held there to be a constructive

and contemporary application ofhis scienze nuove (new sciences).'"
There is a fragment of Vico's writing - unpublished in his lifetime and
unincorporated into any of his major works - entitled (again by Nicolini)
'Idea d'urw. grammaticafiU>sofica*(*Idea of a PhUosophical Grammar')."
Throughout his writings Vico used linguistic terms - etymologicon, dic
tionary, granmiar, mental language and mental words'^ - and used them
as symbols relating to shared qualities of all peoples at all times. Indeed
tiie idea di un dizionario di voci mentali, comune a tutte le nazioni (idea of
a dictionary of mental words, common to all nations), the twelve concepts,
most important as shared ideas, is particularly noteworthy in this respect as
weU, since Vico referred to them as voci, thus confirming his emphasis on
philology and etymology as the means to comprehending past times.'^
Vico saw old legends, fables, chronicles, laws and customs as having
prinütive history 'embalmed witiiin', as Charles Vaughan (1854-1922)
phrased it.'* The recognition that p0eti7 and myths were forms of cognition
La scienza nuova, 1725, 1730. 1744 81
was the basis of Vico's assertion that the mind of past civilizations could be
penetrated by means of imagination.'^ He distinguished between myths, the
original stories passed on through oral tradition and fables as later editions of
Üie same.'6 A fable must be a credible impossibility, inspire awe and possess
an elementof the supernatural.'^ At one point Vico declared that myths were
true narration but that fables were false narration; he later realized that fables
- if less useful in a study of the beginnings of a culture - were themselves
true, faithful, contemporary reactions to past events.'* Hence the origins of
poetic characters were fundamental to Vico. They constituted the essence
of fables;'9 for the fables themselves, which Vico called imaginative class
concepts, generi or universali fantastici were the key to the mind of past
civilizations.20
Breaking the code of the poetic characters was essential to Vico in order
to discover the human necessities which Üiey represented.^' Although not
inspiring reading, the clearest example of this principle is in Book V of the
1725 edition, in which he discussed in great detail the significance of the
twelve major Greek and Roman gods. For example, he used Achilles as a
paradigm, as the personification of virtue, Jove for idolatry and divination,
Venus for civil beauty, Minerva for civil order and Mercury for conunerce.
Although these associations were not original to him, they were especially
pertinent to his interest, for the gods were held to represent early human
priorities, thoughts and emotions.^ The modem study of pagan theology
was essential,23 according to Vico, to unlock these most fundamental human
reactions to the world. Vico would not have been concemed if his divine and
heroic characters and ages had never existed, the key point being for him
that they existed in human memory as imaginative universals for human
emotions, relationships and dramas. This theme is so dominant in his work
that it seems almost redundant when Vico finally stated that poetic wisdom
contained historical significance and that the first writers of both ancient and
modem nations were poets.
It is now generally maintained that it is not possible to discuss the
origins of language and mythology separately. Vico, as is well known,
discussed them particularly in connection with the first and second stages
of a civilisation. He considered original myths in the age of the gods to
be narrationsof real events or emotions, which were later misunderstood
and altered to suit the times. Unfortunately, he gave no indication of how
to distinguish the later, false myths from the original ones. But he did
make several assumptions in regard to myth-making.^* First, he wrote
that primitive man had strong feelings and that they were dominated by
their passions and bodily functions. Second, he argued that the thoughts
of those early men were expressed in animistic forms - hence the myths
themselves. Third, Vico presupposed a shared set of reactions for aU

men, which he sometimes discussed as senso comune, other times as a
l'ordine naturale d'idee (natural order of ideas), and elsewhere as human
necessities or utilities; Vico maintained that wildly divergent cultural groups
experienced similar patterns of development in regard to the growth of their
societies. Finally, he assumed, based on his other premises, that primitive
myths must have a rough unity in terms of their subject matter.^s
Vico gave credence to mythology in an era when it was generally
dismissed as the product of superstitious minds and thus of no value to
advanced societies, but the genuine appeal of mythology to Vico was that
it was the product of primitive minds. The early modern and particularly
eighteenth-century fascination with travellers*s tales of supposedly primitive
peoples was usually treated as light diversion, whereas Vico recognized that
by sifting myths one could come to a better understanding of the science
of history itself and thus one's own contemporary society.^^ For Vico the
distinction between mythology and history was not useful. He realized, and it
is now considered commonplace, that philology and comparative mythology
couldfiUthe gaps of philosophical speculation. He was not unaware of the
sinülarity of linguistic and mythical concepts and their shared opposition to
rational thought. Vico argued that language was man's prime instrument of
thought, but he deemed that this initially reflected man's myth-making rather
than his rational tendencies. Thus symbols were necessary for representa
tions of any mental process. Hence we can better understand the importance
Vico placed on the long passages at the end of La scienza nuova prima in
which he discussed the various human emotions connected with particular
classical gods and goddesses: for example, Hercules for heroism and Hermes
for inventive intelligence.^^
When Vico discussed the development of the human mind, it was
imagination which separated the strong from the weak, the wise from
the foolish,28 the daring from the pedestrian. That the human mind takes
a delight in uniformity, that early man judged the unknown by the known and
that these same men created social institutions according to their own ideas,
are aU vital to an understanding of Vico's theory of the development of the
human mind as aUied to the development of culture.2^ Social change was not
at aU an aUen aspect to Vico in the development of a society but was rather
part of the social fabric.^" The imagination was most acute when reasoning
was absent: this was the primary reason Vico considered early societies to
be rich in creative power. It was a great concern of his, in the 1730 edition,
that later men were unable to understand early imagination.^' Vico wrote that
it was curiosity which led early man to explore his environment and that,
understandably, they judged the unknown by the known.^2 He hypoÜiesized
La scienza nuova, 1725, 1730, 1744 83
that the first stage of poetry was divine because 'early man imagined the
causes of the things they felt and wondered at to begods' ('t quali tutte le
cose che superano Ui loro piccioki capacita dicono esser diV)}^ He neatly
contrasted this to the modern mentality, so civilised and detached 'that we
can scarcely understand, still less imagine, how those first men thought who
founded gentile humanity' Cqffatto immaginarno sipud, come pensassero i
primi uomini, che foruiarono l'umanita gentilesca').^^ The modern penchant
for trivialities was for Vico not unrelated to the issue that 'the human mind
takes delight in uniformity' (Lamente umana έ naturalmente portataa
dilettarsi dell' uniforme).^^ For Vico, order and regularity were natural
desires, but this was not necessarily meant complimentarily, for elsewhere
he wrote that 'the weak desire laws, the powerful withhold them' (/ deboli
vogliano le leggi, i potenti le ricuscano'); further, and this would have
been an insult coming from Vico, the weak interpret laws literally ('Gli
uomini di corte ideestimano diritto quanto si ispiegato con le parole.')?^
He discussed enthusiastically the capacity of the human mind:
* La curiositä, propietä connaturale Curiosity - that inbom property of

dell'uomo,figliuolodell* man, daughter of ignorance and
ignoranza, che partorisce la scienza, mother of knowledge - when wonder
all'aprireche fa della nostra mente wakens our n^nds, has the habit,
la maraviglia, porta questo costume: wherever it sees some extraordinary
straordinario effetto in natura, phenomenon of nature, a comet, for
come cometa, parelio o stella in example, a sundog, or a midday
mezzodi, subito domanda che tal star, of asking strdghtawway what
cosa vogUa dire o significare. it means.37
This is one of the few later mentions of curiosity by Vico, imagination having
clearly replaced this faculty for him.
5. ReUgion and Society
It was not in Vico's discussions of sacred human history' that the close
relationship between the Gentile religions and society, particularly the
growth of societies, was established. Rather, it was in his analysis of
social customs and religious rites. Religion, marriage and burial - the three
human customs (umani costumi) which Vico asserted all civilisations shared,
sometimes discussed as stages of utility, are mentioned time after time in all
three versions of La scienza nuovaP- Although religion seems an obvious
way to examine the past in a Vichian manner (this approach is put forward by
Berlinas rites of reHgion),^ it is the one means (the other two being language
and mythology), which Vico himself paid the least attention and which is the
most difficult to use for the purposes of historical reconstruction. This is true
in practical terms because the more advanced religious practices generally
have, if anything, even less to do with earlier ones than epic poetry has to
do with early fables and myths.
Rather than the Christian religion, Vico was concerned primarily with
the mystical side of pagan religion - ritual and ceremonies. The religion
Vico discussed at length was 'a "civil" phenomenon, profane and historical'
(Karl Löwith, 1879-1973).* Vico would have agreed with Rousseau that the
political religions of antiquity were false but useful, and that Christianity was
true but socially useless, to the extent that Vico did not argue that religion,
marriage or burials had afiindamentalrole in the shaping of societies in the
later stages. By this point in the development of a society, he considered his
three human customs to be rituals rather than spontaneous acts.^
It is now known that totemism, incest taboos, divination, as weU as
sacrifice, visions and ecstasy were natural parts of the religious Ufe of many
of the primitive peoples described in his first two stages - although only the
third, divination, was cited by Vico. According to him, the authority structure
of these early societies was reflected very clearly in their established rites
of religion, and it was in weddings and burials that the overlapping of
the customs of society and religion was seen most clearly. Marriage was
essentially a socio-economic arrangement in Vico's scheme, but he asserted
that its confirmation through a religious ceremony was necessary for the
development of the correct civic spirit.^ He believed marriage made men
more dependent on reUgion, less warlike, more apt to be content with
a monogamous relationship and also more industrious - aU of which he
considered essential for the proper development of an advancing society.
Vico noted that mourningritualswere very often strictly delineated in early
cultures, and throughout his writings there is the implicit warning that such
rituals should be protected so that the world does not once again return to
its former bestial state.^
With the issue of property Vico blended together the topics of pagan
religion and society most smoothly, yet unfortunately without any critique
of Locke, although Locke was mentioned in other contexts by Vico.*
One of the reasons Vico cited for the need for proper burials was that
it was necessary to establish correct boundaries for family owned property.9
Likewise, Vico argued human society could not begin without marriage,
which would have had a simUar significance in terms of property. The
two acts which he did delineate as being of key importance to property,
La scienza nuova, 7725, 7750, 1744 85
in addition to buriaI,were the invention of writing and names for family

relationships.'"
At the base of Vico's model was social organization, mixed witii what
we would now term politics. Law, authority and succession were all viewed
as part of the hierarchical structure. Vico dealt with age only in regard to
hierarchy, not in relation to kinship. Nevertheless familial ties were the
basis of his hrst stage of society. Vico stated this again and again, but
never attempted to analyse or codify these various relationships. Kinship
and social custom are now recognized as the key to any social stiiicture;
Vico saw the former as implicit, the latter as fundamental." He mentioned
the related areas: invention; subsistence; economic organization; social life
beyond marriage and burial; fraternities; government in terms of laws, but
not the development of government; art was mentioned rarely, if at aU.
However art is now recognised along with language, mythology and rites
of religion as the fourth means of inteφreting tiie past history of previous
civilizations. Music was discussed occasionally along with early poetry.
Vico never dealt directiy with the complexity of primitive societies,
although most certainly he did see a given culture as much more than
the sum of its traits. His references to social institutions were provided as
a backdrop for these social issues, which in tum were to answer the issues
of exactiy what was human nature (prinütive and modern) and thus history.
He rarely commented on ethical issues; instead, the two areas he was deeply
committed to were communication - signals, language, mythology, poetry
and music - and rites of religion - prayer, magic and ritual. His credence
in the unique quality of social institutions was underscored throughout La
scienza nuova, but without reference to the complexity of social values.
6. FreeWffl
Vico declared that free wiU {libero arbitrio) was the 'artificer [creator]
of tiie world'.' In Vici vindiciae, the 1729 response Vico wrote to an
attack on La scienza nuova prima, published in Leipzig, Vico reinforced
this revolutionary statement by affirming that philology, which elsewhere
in his work is argued to be identical with history, depended on the free
choice of man, language, customs, peace and war in history and proper
philosophy.2 In the 1725 edition Vico's second great principle, following
divine providence and preceding the human wiU as the artificer of the world
of nations, was vulgar or popular wisdom as the senso comune possessed
by each people or nation. Thus the individual has libero arbitrio, in a
social, never a theological sense, according to Vico. He compared it to
senso comune, which demonstrated itself in wildly divergent manners for

different societies.^
Vico's definition of the history of ideas was very closely linked to his
ideas on custom;* he asserted, rather arrogantly, that his scienza nuova
provided both a philosophy and a history of human customs^ which could
explain the varying customsand languages which came about because of
differing geography, climate and culture.^ According to Vico individual
groups devised customs which were best suited to their own particular
situation, thus he implied that there is some degree of free wiU. Yet this
free wiU was always for groups, never individuals, and was not limitless
even for societies, since social groups were bound by their environments -
both natural and created.
It is the mental vocabulary of Uiese social institutions which Vico sodes-
perately wanted to translate.^ The institution which he was most concerned
withwas not marriage, burial or rites of religion but the law. He discussed
at some length* the importance of guarding the social institutions and, in
particular, law. As Vico's primary aim was to study the social institutions
created by man, it is hardly suφrising that he clearly identified the power
relationship, however variable, among decision-making, determination and
the human mind. In the final edition little time is spent on libero arbitrio;
rather, there is a shift to imagination.9 Nonetheless it is necessary to note
Vico's early discussion of free wUl, both in La scienza nuova prima and in
II diritto universale, in order to be able fuUy to comprehend his definition
of imagination.io
7. Formation of Society: The Taming of Primitive Man
In 1744 Vico stated boldly that the role of philosophy was to raise and
direct man, the puφose of poetry to tame the ferocity of the vulgar, the
purpose of legislation to tum man to good use in society and the purpose
of religion to subdue the savages.' These forces were aU designed to build
efficient societies in which the individual would gain satisfaction firom
fulfilling his particular place in society. Vico's scheme of social engineering
included the taming of man, domestic education, the end of roaming and the
nomadic Ufestyle, the consequent development ofhome and homelife and the
eventual development offamilial authority into civic authority. AU of these
were underlying themes of Vico's theoretical work on societies,^ including
even the human tendency which Vico's work completely depended upon,
that 'men are naturally impelled to preserve the memories of the laws and
institutions that bind them to society' ('GZi uomini sono naturalmente poriati
La scienza nuova, J725, 1730, 1744 87
a conservar le memorie delle leggi e degli ordini che gli tengono dentro le
loro societd')? This was itself a recognition tiiat there are forces within man
that are not of his own making.
But the key to this taming of prinütive manlay not in Vico's lengthy
discussions of human needs and utilities but in the concept of shame,
modesty (pudore), the prime motivating and civilizing force, moving men
closer to the traditions of monogamy, a sense of family and beliefs regarding
gods and religion* Pudore was also critical for Vico as it implied that the
sense of conscience was an innate quality. Hence it was for Vico not
a positive but a negative force - shame - which was the basic power,
propelling man out of his original bestial state.
In the midst of this discussion of the taming of primitive man Vico
maintained that poetry, as well as philosophy, played an educative role,
teaching the vulgar to act piously.^ As has been mentioned, he sinülarly
maintained that marriage made man more amenable to group pressure,
more peaceful, monogamous and industrious.^ Thus Vico was not merely
concerned with the creative aspects of poetry, or with marriage as a religious
rite. He was also determined to discover the link between imagination and
the creation of a social group, the tanüng of primitive man into a fully
functioning member of society. The reason that fables were intended to
frighten and excite the people was precisely so they would enter into and
manipulate the minds of their listeners. These fables had to be suited to
popular understanding, otherwise they wouldnot achieve their purpose. But
there is a problem here. Elsewhere he discussed the importance of free will in
history - it is one of the contentions of this work that Vico did not believe the
cycles to be predetermined - nevertheless, Vico assigned to poetiy an almost
determinist role in early society which is closely aligned totiieti-aditional
Catholic inteφretation of Vico's divine providence.
Although there is no uncertainty that Vico was most concerned with the
early stages of early society, he never adopted a wistful attitude towards
this period. Nor is there any trace in his work of the bon savage (noble
savage) mourned and all but venerated by Rousseau. Of greater worth than
the dissection of Vico's stages of a civilisation is an examination of his
usage and interpretation of the past, which was not pre-Romantic; rather
Vico freely criticised the same peoples and societies which he acknowledged
left the richest cultural heritages.
Very often Vico conti-asted tiie evils of the beginnings of a social group
with the mirror image failings of the final stages of a society - the primitive
man witii tiie overly refined one.As already mentioned in the section on De
nostri temporis studiorum ratione,^ Vico struck out against conventional
scholars* as he argued that the imagination of the young was dulled rather
than encouraged by contemporary educational practices, Vico had little time

for civilised nünds with their abstractions and refinements,^ but neither did
he delight wholeheartedly in primitive attempts at comprehending the world.
Yet the imagination of these early stages is certainly for Vico the tool
which created these social institutions as well as the code-breaker of past
civilisations. One peripheral reason for this is that Vico did not expect
imagination to manifest itself in the form of epic poetry in the very first
years of an incipient social group, although imagination was demonstrably
at work in his first age, that of gods.
Some of the same tension in Vico is also present in the work of Hobbes,
whom Vico much abused. In Hobbes one is never sure how primitive man
ever evolved out of his feral state. In Vico there is a similar ambivalence
towards prindtive man, indeed it was men not so far removedfi"omthe same
*primi uomini, stupidi, insensati ed orribili bestionV ('first men, stupid,
insensate, horrible beasts')'" who had the robustissimafantasia (*extremely
robust imagination') which so fascinated him. Yet Vico provided transitions
and progress by means of his discussion of the gradual development of a
culture. But it must be noted that he wasted little time on even stating how
the shift occurred from one stage or level to the next. Hence the problem for
those who would like to apply Vico's principles of 'la storia ideale etema
comune a tutte le nazionV is that they are given no instructions and set no
boundaries regarding how exactly to do so.
Vico listed numerous groupings of three - for example, three ages of poets
before Homer, not to mention three kinds of natures, customs, natural law,
govemments,languages, characters, jurisprudence, authority, reason, and
judgements. Vico's groupings of three were done for the sake of convenience
(and out of personal preference) but he never forgot that they encompassed
innumerable changes and developments." The most interesting group of
three was not original to Vico - that is the development of the human mind
from senses to imagination and finally to rational thought, which clearly
echoes the division of mental abilities and society in Plato's Republic.
Authority - a key term in Vico's vocabulary - was certainly not a later
development of a society. According to Vico:
. . . che tra'l debole e'l forte . . . there is no equality of right

non vi έ uguaHtä di ragione; between the weak and the strong,
perch^ non mai gU huomini for men have never made pacts with
patteggiarono co'leoni; ηέ le lions nor have lambs and wolves
agnelle e i lupi ebbero mai ever shared any uniformity of
uniformitä di voleri: . . . desires.'^
La scienza nuova, 1725, 1730, 1744 89
The concept of basicrightsfor all was a later recognition,'^ for Vico believed
that it took a developed and cultured mind to recognise and enforce common
privileges for aU classes.'* Many diverse and unusual types of authority
figures were referred to by Vico - reUgion and poetry had pride of place
as the twin authorities of his science, but he also gave specific examples
such as fathers, kings, phUosophers, lawgivers and scholars, to name just
a few. In his discussion of natural law, Vico's civic hierarchy is clearly
delineated: (1) the natural law of nations has only to do with civil authorities,
(2) these civil authorities should be revered as sacred persons who recognize
no superior other than God, (3) these rulers have right of Ufe or death over
subjects.'s Although Vico recognized that there was a multitude of varieties
of societies and governments, this in no way indicated that he approved of
a flexible approach within any single society. Vico then blended the two
diverse topics together by claiming *authority as the fi:ee use of will'.'^
Natural law was of supreme interest to Vico, since it was for him identical
with custom. The authority structure and community life fashioned human
nature, and not vice versa. According to Vico, people are directly affected
by their social and physical worlds and heritage. Free wiU of the community
detemünes the social and religious mores of that society. Therefore his more
unusual discussion of natural law '^ traced the authority of human nature to
the authority of natural law, which was for Vico human customs and thus
culture.'*
8. Setti di tempi
Vico employed the terms modus (nrade, measure), forma, (form) and genus
(class, kind), interchangeably in De antiquissima italorum sapientia to refer
to the manner or style of a particular society at a particular time.' This
was at the very heart of Vico's search to identify the manner in which
previous societies lived and died. This again supports the view that the
senso comune of each group is manifested in a somewhat different form,
although composed of the same basic elements.
Although it is Vico's concept of urui storia ideal etema that is most often
cited by those making passing reference to his work, this term is very often
nüsleading, particularly when discussed with regard to the cycles presented
in tiie final edition. The notion of an ideal, eternal history only nmkes sense
in tiie context of senso comune, and it can only be investigated by means
of imagination.2 In tiie first edition of Vico's magnum opus he did not
discuss the three ages at alU It is in Book V of tiie final edition that one
finds his weU-known Ust of threes - characters, jurisprudence, autorita,
reason, judgements and setti di tempi (divisions of time), to name a few

- these stages of development do not vary significandy among the diverse
topics, rather they are similar in pattem to the growth of a language which
corresponded to the appropriate stage of a civilisation.^
Without a doubt, Vico was entranced by the uniformity in the development
and decline of nations - he named these stages the divine, heroic,* and
human ages.^ He desired to discover the mentality of these early peoples
via their particular customs. There was a clear link between the origins
of language and his principle of the development of nations. Vico stated
without qualification that 'the world of human nations has certainly been
made by man' Cche questo mondo civile egli certamente έ statofatto dagli
uominV),^ and forVico man made society.
A common interpretation of the 1744 edition presents these periods,
these divisions of time,as of more importance than the cultures which
flourished within them and which of course overlapped these arbitrary
boundaries. Quite the contrary, in his attempt to penetrate the nature of
nations, Vico always leads us back to the common mind possessed by
all peoples.^ He cautioned against the hope that language, for example,
would answer all questions about preliterate mentalities, for if we cannot
make contact with feral children (a common preoccupation, even before the
еш-ly nineteenth-century Kaspar Hauser cause calibre) how do we ever hope
to understand those who lived so many centuries before, in such a diverse
manner? Thus Vico employed language not because he considered it capable
of answering aU of our questions regarding early societies, but rather because
it offered a possible avenue to the past. It was because the mind of the nations
diminished - in terms ofcoUective imagination, Vico's main preoccupation
- with the development of literacy* that he was drawn to early societies.
UfM cronologia ragionata ('a rational chronology'), un gran mostro di
cronologia' ('a great monster of chronology'; a play on words by Vico,
mostro as opposed to mostra, demonstration),^ was essential to Vico's
new study of history.'o Clearly the cycles are an essential part of his
historical critique, but aU too often tfds has been given undue importance
by commentators. Almost always he focused on the first stage of a society to
the exclusion of later developments; yet, by reiterating that there were at least
three principal phases, Vico regularly renunded his readers that he was not
unaware of the importance of later developments. Vico was less engaging,
certainly less original on the decline of a society. It was his aim to seek out
the roots, the origins of later, more sophisticated developments."
In the 1725 edition Vico discussed at length another example of la boria
de' dotti - of assuming some sort of understanding of societies of the past
which were not separated by a long time period.'^ For Vico an anachronism
La scienza nuova, 1725, 1730, 1744 91
was best defined as 'perverted time'.'^ Не criticized traditional historians

for assuming that there were no events of importance in the earliest times.
These common errors of chronology received scathing comments from him,
particularly because he believed that from his time forward his science of
imagination could circumvent them. Vico's stress on the notionof an
anachronism owed much to his reading of Renaissance writerson philology
and history, notably Valla and Bodin.'*
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Vico's 1725 definition of natural law was
very broad indeed including as it did Öie origins of religions, languages,
customs, positive laws, societies, government, types of ownership, occu
pations, orders, authorities, judiciaries, penalties, wars, peace, surrender,
slavery and alliances.'^ According to Vico, natural law was composed of
all the tangible aspects of human society, and study of these institutions
was the correct means to gain insight conceming apast society. In addition
to the issue that Vico believed that this il diritto natural delle genti (natural
law of the nations) was composed of virtually aU elements of society, he
also argued in a circuitous fashion that it proved the validity of what
may be viewed as the most controversial of aU the elements, that is, the
Christian religion'^ - a point which would have made rather more sense
if it had referred to thefimdamentalrole of early pagan religions in the
development of a society. Even though Vico reiterated numerous times that
his interpretation of natural law was Christian and worked out by divine
providence, nevertheless there is noÜüng of the sacred or religious in his
discussion of natural law. Vico's natural law dealt only with the workings
of Gentile, non-Judeo-Christian history, which was the only history he ever
discussed in äny detail. Vico beUeved that natural law, divine providence
and his ideal, etemal history were the principles on which human history
was worked out, but his main focus was not on these abstract concepts as
muchas on human institutions, the study of which was the only way to
penetrate human history and consequentiy to comprehend natural law.
In tiie 1744 edition natural law was listed simply as the sixtii of seven
aspects of his new science. It foUowed divine providence, a philosophy of
authority, a history of human ideas, a method of philosophical criticism
(based on the history of human ideas); an ideal eternal history preceded
the principles of universal history.'^ For Vico (unlike Plato) the order of
knowing was tiie same as the order of human institutions, by which he
meant that one could only traly comprehend that which one has made;
thus he stressed once again the notion of natural and gradual growth and
development. He expressed natural law in slightiy different terms:
II diritto natural delle genti The natural law of the gentes is

Ь uscito coi costumi delle coeval with the customs of the

nazioni, tra loro conformi in nations, conforming one with
un senso comune umano, senza another in virtue of a common
alcunariflessionesenza prender human sense, without any reflection
esemplo l'una daU'altra. and without one nation following
the example of another.'*
Again Vico stressed the ability of separate nations to develop in a parallel

fashion without any contact having taken place between them.'9
In Vici vindiciae Vico claimed natural law as central to his science,
believing that the social side of man's nature was inextricably linked with,
if not identical to, natural law.20 By means of this connection of nature
and custom, Vico then spoke of natural customs (/ naturalicostumi) thus
destroying the long opposition between nature (j>hysis) and custom (nomos).
Hence 'reasonable customs' (consuetudine ragionevale) were natural as they
arose from man's own nature, and following them was both natural and
pleasant.2' For Vico these 'natural customs' were very similar to his
own 'principles of humanity', often discussed as 'these universal and
eternal principles . . . on which all nations are founded and stiU preserve
themselves' ('i princ(pi unviersale ed etemi, quali devon essere d'ogni
scienza, sopra i quali tutte [le nazioniI sursero e tutte vi si conservano
in nazionV) and 'those institutions which aU men agree and have always
agreed' {'quali cose hanno con perpetuitd convenuto tutti gli uominV)?^
Vico asserted that he had solved the long argument between customary
and natural law by blurring the distinction itself. For Vico the question 'is
man naturally sociable?' would have carried the same implications as 'does
natural law exist?'. Thus, he concluded, society was itself natural because
of law, which was based on some customs, which were themselves derived
from man's needs and utiUties, which were basic to human nature.
Vico's definition of natural law may be viewed most appropriately as
an elaboration of his ideas regarding the development of the human mind
and of nations. According to Vico, every person, every social group, shared
certain common ideas regarding their position in the natural world, and these
ideas were arrived at through сопшюп sense. Human needs and utilities
were the two sources {fonti) of natural law. Common sense functioned as
the foundation, since it provided the means of defining what was certain (and
thus necessary and useful) in natural law.^3 But this is not to say that Vico
adopted a utilitarian approach to natural law: because ofhis religious beliefs,
he adhered to an etemal order of ideas, which could not have arisenftômthe
natural body alone. Vico refuted the utilitarian theories of the development of
law; he was repelled by the materiaUsm and relativism of an approach which
La scienza nuova, 1725, 1730, 1744 93
stressed either the demands of the weak or the dominance of the strong - by
means of his conception of the law as an eternal truth inherent in the nature
of man.
By means of his definition of natural law Vico maintained that the popular
notion of law could be analysed and the social and civil experiences of past
societies could bericonosciuto(known again, recognised). Vico viewed the
natural law as a 'jurisprudence of mankind' {'una giurisprudenza del genere
ипиггю')?^ He deemed one of its greatest strengths to be that it offered a
method, 'a new art of criticism' by which to anidyse the barbaric stages
of past civilisations. It provided the philosophical groundwork needed to
explain the certa mente comune,^^ which was quite distinctfiromany form
of antiquarianism. Without a doubt, Vico incorporated his interpretation of
natural law, which dealt with customs, shared cultural characteristics and
senso comune, into his historical and philosophical scheme, as it offered him
another avenue by which to analyse early civilizations.
9. New Critical Art
Vico felt compelled to discover and devise a new critical art, his new
science,' in which even physical abnormalities, such as giants^ were of
iniportance exactly because they demonstrated the truth - by which he
signified the fundamental role, usefulness, veracity on their own terms,
and dependability - of the fables. He considered it necessary to elucidate
rules which would enable one to discem tiie truth of aU Gentile history,
and in this manner facts, laws and nature would aU be interpreted in light
of one another.3 'Vulgar traditions given in verse must be trae' Vico wrote
in 1744, 'because this form is so old' {'Onde di tal spezie di verso bisogna
che sieno vere quelle volgari tradizioni').^ By 'trae' he did not mean correct
in aU particulars, but rather that, far from detracting from the usefulness of
these myths, the inaccuracies themselves reflected the attitudes and mores
of subsequent eras.^ Thus every stage or layer was a trae representation of
a particular culture. Vico's method was not an aU-forgiving look at the past,
rather it was intended as constractive criticism.
In the first edition Vico clearly stated the two practical aims of his scienza
nuova: the first was a new art of criticism 'by which to discem what is trae
in obscure and fabulous history' {'una nuova Arte Critica, che ne serva di
Fiaccola da diftinguere il vero nella Storia Ofcura, e Favolofa') and the
second an 'art of diagnosis, recognition of the indubitable signs of the state of
the nation' {Oltre quefta l'altra Pratica έ un' Arte come Diagnoftica . . . di
conoscere ifegni indubitati dello Stato delle Nazioni').^ He maintained that
his rules of interpretation were applicable even to new laws and fact7 It was
truly a new means of discovering the past.* In 1725 he stated that his new
art of criticism revealed the whole of Gentile theology, which included new
ways of thinking about pagan reUgions as a means to discover tiie culture of
the relevant societies.^ When in 1730 Vico discussed the two branches of
his study, poetica metafisica (metaphysical poetry) and scienze specolative
(speculative sciences)'" his goal was to combine the two to form a scienze
poetiche (poetic sciences)."
The term degnita (axiom), used in // diritto universale, does not appear
in the first edition of La scienza nuova; only in 1730'^ and tiien in 1744
did he use this already archaic term.'3 it was in the second edition, and
in his first degnitä, that he exhorted the reader to use his own imagination
to comprehend early man. The use of this term is crucial, for it indicated
the conüng together of Vico's thought on the critical method. In this same
edition he asserted that 'with our intellects we can amend the errors of our
memories' ('pruove le quali soddisfacciano i nostri intelletti, sono ammende
che sifanno agli errori delle nostre memorie')A^ This was in effect a clarion
call to apply tiie critical metiiod to fables, customs, religious rites, laws and
all other such remnants of previous cultures.
Vico maintained that the reason that such a science was lacking was that
no one had previously addressed the history and the philosophy of humanity
together.'^ In 'La pratica' he wrote boldly that his was a science of
contemplationfi-omwhich could be derived a study of the development and
decUne of nations.'^ Philosophers and philologians (which for Vico included
poets, historians, orators and grammarians) '^ should together examine the
wisdom of ancient Gentiles by means of a study of aU the diverse records left
by primitive man.'* Vico's goal was nothing less than a history of human
ideas.'9 He weU understood that this could not be accomplished easily;
on the contrary, he considered the best way to understand such a history
was to investigate the 'natural order of ideas . . . religions, laws, languages,
marriages, names, arms and governments proper to them' ('Ordine ruiturale
d'idee dintomo al diritto delle nazioniper le loro propie religioni, religioni,
leggi, lingue, nozze, nomi, armi, e govemi')P-^
Book П of the 1730 and 1744 editions once again elucidated the common
principles, in this case of articulate language, which Vico believed was his
particular task. He postulated tiiat one could use any language (in his case,
Latin) to discover the true roots not only of that particular language but of
any tongue. Language, which he called 'a mighty witness of tiie ancient
customs of the peoples', was for him the natural key to understanding
past civilisations, and he believed the origin of language was to be found
in early poetry and mythology. Vico maintained that the genius for poetry
La scienza nuova, 1725, 1730, 1744 95
was a gift from heaven; at the same time he also considered primitive
man, with his lively imagination, to be particularly well suited for this
form of self-expression. Vico defined fables as a way of Üiinking for an
entire group. He was concerned not only with the actual poetic universals
formed by primitive groups as a recreation of their own hves and histories,
but in addition he considered at least as important the instinct which led to
the preservation of these laws and institutions.^'
The uniformity of ideas among aU nations at any stage of development
was often discussed as the certa mente umane or certa mente comune?^ It
is hardly surprising that Vico considered the immediate need to be a method
to discover this common mind possessed by all peoples at aUtimes.The
term sapienza (wisdom, learning and knowledge) was very closely related
to Vico's statement of the need for a scientific, critical,ti*ainedand skiUed
grasp of the customs of tiie nations, by which he meant the blending of early
wisdom as demonstiâted by social conventions and customary, practical
theology and morality. It is this recondite, hidden, obscure, abstruse and
above aU profound wisdom which was his goal.
Vico clearly recognised the difficulties inherent in devising a means to
decipher the ancient, primitive languages and especially their developing
vocabularies, which, he was persuaded, represented the development of
their own ideas. Much the same is his later admission regarding the
dilemma of historical reconstruction.23 In 1725 he wrote of the difficulty
of reconstructing the world of ancient Rome, for the information an historian
possesses of a past culture is so fragmentary.^* For this reason he asserted
that it was essential to have a philosophy of history in order to reconstruct
past societies and mentalities.
Vico described an ideal, eternal pattem of history which supposedly
dictated the development and decline of nations. He examined the human
condition in terms of a cycUcal theory of history in which civiUsations
progressed through three stages - from the age of gods, to heroes, and
finally men. The key role is played by classical and popular mythology in his
attempt to unravel the pattern of history within this speculative framework.
Vico regarded the science of myth to be his greatest achievement. Arguably
the single most exciting passage from the final edition is the following:
. . . vi si vagUa dal falso il vero Truth is sifted from falsehood in

in tutto ciö che per lungo tratto di everything that has been preserved
secoU ce ne hanno custodito le for us through long centuries by
volgari tradizioni, le quali, those vulgartraditions which,
perocch6 sonosi per sf lunga etä e since they have been preserved for
da intieri popoli custodite, per so long a time and by entire
una degnitä sopraposta debbon peopIes, must have had a pubUc

avere avuto un pubblico ground of truth.
fondamento di vero.
. . . i grandi frantunü deU'antichitä, The great fragments of antiquity,

inutiU iinor alIa scienza perchä hitherto useless to science because
erano giaciuti squallidi, tronchi e they lay begrimed, broken, and
slogati, arrecano de' grandi lunu, scattered, shed great light when
tersi, composti ed allogati ne' cleaned, pieced together, and
luoghi loro. restored.
. . . sopra tutte queste cose, come To aU these institutions, as to

loro necessarie cagioni, vi their necessary causes, are traced
reggono tutti gli effetti i quaU aU the effects narrated by certain
ci narra la storia certa. history.25
Vico was convinced that he.had found in history what he had earlier
searched for in jurisprudence, and although he believed he had isolated
etemal truths (for example, 'ki storia ideale etema'), he recognised that
his greatest achievement was the creation of a method which transcended
the mere acquisition of facts.
4 Language, Historical
Reconstruction and the
Development of Society
1. bitroduction
Vico was not concerned with poetry as either art or literature; rather it wa
man's innate desire to create representations of the past whichwas hi
primary consideration. Neither did poetry in Vico's thought have anythin|
to do with the products of sensitive, perceptive or refined imaginations, no
was it the work of individuals.' Vico showed no interest in the great ariisti(
traditions which often accompany extravagant and decadent civilizations
His emphasis was always on the spontaneous creations of social group
rather than well-planned individual works of great genius. He did no
discuss Ui questione della lingua (the question of language), which run
throughout the history of Italian culture and concerns the variety of languag
most appropriate for literary use.^ For Vico early poetry was produced b;
necessity, not for pleasure. Croce was absolutely correct; it is necessary t<
understand Vico's idea of poetry if one wishes to comprehend La scienzt
nuova?
Even in his theoretical discussions, imagination was for Vico the crea
tive ability of a social group, the spirit of their time, and the ability o
later groups to reconstruct these lost worlds. Vico showed no particula
interest in the role of the individual or in the nature of man, as di(
Bacon or Hume. His recognition that language was a representation of j
society never led him to the study of dialects or the varieties of languag(
within a culture - although it would have been a natural extrapolatioi
from his own ideas. Vico's mind was set on the abstract concepts o
language, society and history, and he spared no time on the subgroup
which nüght in many cases have led him much more quickly to hii
ultimate goal.
ThetiM:eemost general means of examining language have to do with it
origins, its sti^cture and the relation between language and reality.* In Vico
for the first time, one finds reference to aU three. Donald Kelley Unks Vic<
with his sources:
97
. . . the grand tradition of the ars poetica going back to Boccacio, [on]
which Vico draws: poets as first philosophers, poetry as the highest
wisdom, origins of language, and other highly conventional themes
- on which, of course, Vico performs his characteristically virtuoso
variations.5
The trend towards formality in both speech and writing in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, and the increasing dominance of the Tuscan language
led to a growing awareness in the Italian states of language as an active force
in society.6 Neither Descartes nor the Port Royal Grammarians had shown
any interest in the origins of language, yet this peculiarly eighteenth-century
fascination was one of the cornerstones of Vico's thought, even in his first
writings at the end of the seventeenth century, no doubt because of his
grounding in Renaissance thought.
Vico always tumed to the earliest stages of a language for information
regarding the development of societies. Although he devoted some lines in
each of the three editions of his last work to the development of the parts
of speech (interjections, followed by pronouns, particles, then nouns and
finally verbs, according to Vico), tius discussion is not critical to his most
profound comments on language.^ It is his arguments regarding language and
the progression of cultures which are of the most lasting value, for history
functioned as the vehicle by which further knowledge regarding the human
condition and societies could be obtained.
Vico's views on language predated those of James Burnett, Lord
Monboddo (1714-99), Origin and Progress ofLanguage (1773-92), yet
Vico's views on the subject are often interpreted in the light of Monboddo's
later, better-known theories: that language was a human invention and that
it was the natural product of the biological evolution of the species.* Vico's
basic view of language was that it was a product of incipient social units
and that among the first peoples the urge to express tiieir feelings was
innate. Hence, according to Vico, language was neither dependent on a
fully functioning social group, nor did it have to be taught in a formal
sense. Monboddo, in contrast, was to assert that the Greek language was
the invention of a literate people. In addition Monboddo dismissed the
examples of primitive peoples witii advanced forms of a language as the
result of language mixture and corraption, a possibility that Vico violently
opposed.9
Vico would have been happier with Rousseau's view tiiat the creation
of a human society presupposed the existence of a language.'" But, more
precisely, for Vico the development of language and society were aspects of
a single process, of interacting human faculties. Monboddo wrote *Monkeys
Language, Historical Reconstruction arui Society 99
are in aU ways human except they lack the ability to speak . . , ' and * . . . if
there were nothing else to convince me that the Ourang Outang belongs
to our species, his using sticks as a weapon would be alone sufficient'."
Vico never subscribed to this later view that the linguistic development and
abilities of human beings could in any way be described simply as a higher
form of animal communication.
It must be stressed that when Vico spoke of language, he did not
mean simply the articulate versions of the same, but aU forms of human
communication: gesture, exclamations, aU the stages of the development of
a language and even heraldry. In this sense Vico's view of what constituted
language is much closer to that now ascribed to Monboddo than Vico might
have cared to admit (had he been given the opportunity). Certainly the
late eighteenth-century debate of theferini (beasts) versus the anti-ferini,
in which the supporters of Vico were labeUed the ferini, recognised this
tendency in his work.'^
2. Vico and Early Language
Few authors when commenting on Vico neglect to mention his fascination

with language, mythology and rites of reUgion - if only in connection with
the bestial stages of his sp-called cycles of history. Yet often these three
topics are mentioned in such a way as to reinforce the accepted view of
Vico as an eighteenth-century polymath. Indeed Vico's collected works fiU
eight volumes' ranging from jurisprudence to poetry, treatises on language
(Latin in particular) and education, eulogies, orations, speeches written for
pronünent civic leaders to read at festivals and other occasions, inscriptions
and dedications - as weU as the theoretical works already discussed. It is
always a somewhat dangerous enterprise to force eighteenth-century writings
into twentietii-century categories; yet even judging by the standards of his
time, Vico's works transcended the normal boundaries, not only in terms
of subject matter but in their conclusions. Indeed, one would expect nothing
less from the man who is considered the first modern philosopher of history,
the father of the social sciences and the precursor of Hegel - to name but
a few of tiie labels which have been attached to Vico. Without wishing to
belittie the extensive range of subjects with which Vico dealt, but in order to
have a better understanding of Vico's contribution to them, it is particularly
significant to examine exactly what intrigued Vico about the pivotal topic
of language and how it formed the basis of his new method of historical
investigation.
Since Vico wanted to discover the first roots of society, he was forced to
surrender the implicit assumption that it is only European classics we must

study.2 His research was thus centred on subjects excluded, for whatever
reason, from the texts. Vico was intrigued by areas which would now be clas
sified as ancient history or anthropology rather than history in the fraditional
sense. His theoretical studies dealt primarily with non-literate societies even
though, as has been noted, his most numerous specific examples were drawn
from a civihsation which was exceptionally well documented. Throughout
La scienza nuova there are scattered references to North American Indians,
Chinese, ancient Egyptians and Greeks, to name a few, but the bulk of
his examples were drawn from classical Rome.3 However Vico generally
gave short shrift to the historical periods for which he nught have gained
documentation. There is no indication that he sought out what would now
be termed archives or even the private libraries of Naples in his search for
knowledge of the past.** This practice was certainly not unusual for the time.
But Vico was so advanced in many of his conceptual methods that one would
not have been surprised if he had anticipated this type of primary research.
Yet as his own rather unexceptional historical writings reveal, Vico was
never at his best when it came to the practical application of his theories.
Without a doubt, language was for Vico the natural key to understanding
past civilisations and he considered that the origin of language to be found
in early poetry and mythology.^ He wrote that the 'genius for poetry was
a gift from heaven' ('poeticus instinctus Dei. Opt. Max. donum esf),^
but he also believed that primitive man, with his lively imagination, was
particularly weU suited for this form of self-expression. Croce expressed it
in this manner:
. . . perch6 I'ucmo rozzo e di Since uncivilized man is of

debole cervallo, non potendo low brain power and cannot
soddisfare il bisogno che prova satisfy the thirst he feels
del generale e dell'universale, for the general and the
foggia a sostituzione i generi universal, hefillstheir
fantastici, gli uiüversale ο place by inventing imaginative
caratteri poetici, . . . genera, poetical universals or
characters.7
Vico viewed historical reconstruction through philology as the most straight

forward means of analysing the past, and, as he constantly reiterated, Latin
was particularly weU suited for this type of study. In *Nova scientia tentatuf
Vico attempted to reduce phUology to scientific principles, and he claimed
La scienza nuova to be the first union of philosophy and philology.*
Vico's emphasis was on the origin oflanguage rather than the distinction
Language, Historical Reconstruction and Society 101
between languages. Geography and climate answered for him the question
as to why there are so many languages.^ The independent origin of similar
grammatical processes would not have suφrised Vico in the least, because he
presumed that there were cycles in the development of language.'" The issue
of the scope for originality within a predetermined cycle of development
of language in the Vichian scheme is thus just as relevant as that within a
predictable pattem of development for societies. He wrote that as primitive
man moved towards life in a village and then a city, his vocabulary, syntax
and general command of his language developed accordingly.
But although Vico was engaged with language in all its aspects -
philology, hieroglyphics and demotic language, to mention just a few,"
his attention was on early language, both in spoken and written forms.
Mythology was for him a way to regain early speech. Vico himself slipped
relatively easily from one idiom (for example, scholastic, neo-Platonic
and literary) to another in his writings.'^ In the same way he recognised
that people have always used different codes on different occasions and
in different languages, depending on audience, setting and topic.'^ The
necessity of historians to study the oral form of the language through
the written and investigate social groups via the records of other social
groups was discussed innumerable times by Vico.'* This type of study
was of necessity complicated by the changes in form of the vernacular,
which were accompanied by changes in the form of the language as a
whole because of the need or desire for a standard, correct form of the
vernacular.'5 Vico prized codified versions of early law as remnants of
the early societies in which they developed.'^ Yet the standardisation of
the language also marked the end of his poetic era, and after this point the
language was less compelling for Vico in terms of its potential concerning
the cultural study of societies' earliest phases.
One of Vico's greatest insights was that myths and legends carried
significant subtexts. They were forms - even if corrupted ones - of the
past history of a society. Yet hand-in-hand with this theory goes one of his
work's shortcomings: Vico closed his eyes to the literal meanings of at least
some of the classical legends he cited.'^ His discussion of myths and legends
expressed a certain ambivalence, for he equated theriseof idolatry and divi
nation with the establishment of the birth of the fables. Vico made no effort
to hide his contempt for the pagan religions of which the fables were the
focus, even though he considered the classical gods to be primary sources of
human emotions, be they fear, jealousy, love or any of tiie passions.'* Vico
was greatiy concemed with the very pagan religions he despised - for he
maintained that their funeralrites,marriages and other religious ceremonies
were inextricably linked to the beliefs and values of those societies.
Vico seemingly found no negative aspects of language at any stage, while

at the same time he was often scathing in his criticism of the early men
who spoke these first languages. Language had for Vico a curiously amoral
quality. For him language could only reflect the stage of development of the
society in which it was present, thus not affecting early societies directly;
its role in any social conditioning was thus muted. For this reason he never
regarded language as a social force for good or evil, discounting any sort of
moral bias or basis for it whatsoever. This is also the reason that he discussed
language at such length, because he regarded it as another way, perhaps the
best way, to gain access to past societies.
Vico used the term language (lingua in both Italian and Latin) to denote
aU forms of human communication - notjust articulate forms of speech and
writings. In addition he used the word in four other major senses: firstiy,
as an instrument of thought; secondly, as synonymous with early fables,
myths and poetry; thirdly, as parallel in its growth to that of the relevant
society, while at the same time as an educational tool and social force in
its own right; and finally, as perhaps the most important tool in historical
reconstruction and thus ameans, as well as a source, ofhistorical knowledge.
The term *philology' (philologia [Latm],filologia [Italian]) was often used
by Vico as a synonym for history, which for him comprised the history of
civilisations, cultural development and social development. Language was
for Vico the key to identifying these essential stages of a society.
Thus the single word lingua was used by Vico to convey a multiplicity
of ideas, both commonplace and original. There was some discussion of the
structural development of language. He accepted tiiat language had formal
characteristics (such as an inflexible pattern of development of the parts
of speech within any given language). At the same time he also viewed
language as man's most fundamental attribute, mainly because he maintained
that language was the means of discovering human creations, particularly
social institutions. He regarded language as a human invention because in his
opinion language only developed in social groups, not spontaneously within
each individual as a natural part of his particular physical development.
Vico's blatant lack of interest in later, more developed stages of a society
is nowhere more apparent than in his discussion of language. Early societies
were the root, not tiiefruit, of Vico's thought. He was entirely focused on
development in antiquity, on beginnings. There is no evidence in his work
of any appreciation of the creative arts or even the poetry of his own
time. According to Vico modern man had lost the protective covering of
accepted myth structures. This loss of myth-consciousness was to him both
essential to the development of a society and marked the end of imaginative
creation, Vico's most compelling interest.'^ When Vico discussed language,
Language, Historical Reconstruction arui Society 103
it was almost always the language of primitive peoples, never of partially

developed societies or those of his own time. His concern was concentrated
almost exclusively on the early phases of a civilisation, not even on the
transitions from it, much less on the apex or decline of a state. Philosophy
was the antithesis of poetry, according to Vico, and once philosophy gained
dominance in a society, poetry as a living art form withered away.20 This
early poetry had to do with basic human needs and the religion and laws of
the first peoples.21 Although poetic activity enjoyed maximum autonomy in
his final, non-poetic period, this phase was of little concern to Vico, because
the poetic forms which preoccupied him had nothing to do with the free and
creative urges of gifted individuals. Much more importantly, Vico saw early
poetry as a source of cultural, ethnological information.22 Vico's concern
with societies is central. His approach arose initially through an examination
of jurisprudence. Vico maintained that the authority of poetry resided in
common humanity, in its development and historical conditions and that it
was not the result of change or the abstract consideration of principles.
As man's poetic qualities - cruelty, violent passions, blind self-interest
- would by themselves tear society apart, Vico argued that it was divine
providence which saw to their utilisation and historical efficacy.^3 This
abstract, but for Vico very real, force within his philosophy of history
was not unlike the secular versions presented later by Hegel as the 'cunning
of reason'and by Adam Smitii as 'the invisible hand'. The real history in
Vico's writings was presented and discussed in the form of unintended
consequences. Antiquity demonstrated for Vico the peφetuity of sacred
history; because of the critical role of divine providence, the most important
histories for him were secular as they were the points of entry into the
changes and successions of the past. It was the elements of pagan history
which concerned him - most particularly, law, which he believed shed light
on both human institutions and words.
As discussed in Chapter 2, Vico wisely pinpointed two causes of the
ignorance surrounding the origin of poetry - thinWng that the language of
poetry was peculiar to poets not the people at large, and the belief that it
was the poets who founded the first reUgions (De constantia iurisprudentis,
XII). Just as Vico considered myths to be the product of the mind of an entire
social group, he also maintained that religion developed in the same way and
that it (always excepting the Christian religion forVico) was the product of
a social group. The early, basic mentality of these first groups took myths
literally. Yet, at the same time, with mythical imagination there is always
for Vico an implied act of belief.
In opposition to the common assumptions that the poets developed
language and reUgion, Vico argued that new reasons must be estabUshed
for the origins of poetry - and his degnita were to be the basis of this
new approach to mythology and language. The presence of terms such as
voci mentale and dizionario mentale was a clue concerning the shift in his
discussion from actual or presumed language of the past and its development
to the use of language as a means of historical reconstruction and to the
Unkage of ideas and language in his thought.
3. Language as an Instrument of Human Thought
All of Vico's interpretations of language depended on his view that it was

not simply a means of communication but also an instrument of thought.
Inasmuch as he argued that all languages evolved along the same lines,
according to a rather inflexible pattern, it was environmental factors like
climate which he used to account for the different stages of development
in societies of roughly the same age.' Montesquieu was to write at much
greater length in L'Esprit des lois (The Spirit ofthe Laws, 1748) about the
importance of climate and geography in shaping individual societies and
is generally credited with this t h e 0 r y , 2 Hume, in his essay O f National
Characters' also published in 1748, trivialised the importance of climate
and geography on cultural and national development. Its origins are to be
found in Book VB of Aristotle's Politics?
In his autobiography, after having nodded in the direction of Arab math
ematics and philosophy (Averroes, 1126-98),* Vico stiU considered himself
able to state that it was because he was born in Naples and not Morocco that
he was a scholar. This most bizarre, not to mention inaccurate statement,
though hardly unusual for its time, does not save Vico from relativism as
much as it points out his own prejudices. In any case, it is of great importance
in showing that Vico was not afraid to make judgements regarding past
societies - far from it. He postulated that for the first time his scienza
nuova allowed for critical analyses of the past. Developing social groups,
with their codified myths, laws, were dealt with more or less impartially,
but he did not attempt to avoid value judgements regarding more advanced
societies. Vico recognised that the abiUty and confidence to nmke statements
of fact regarding other societies led tojudgements which inevitably involved
some system of values.^ Hence it is clear that, although Vico maintained
that aU societies foUowed the samebasic pattern of growth and decUne, he
did not believe that aU Ufestyles, social arrangements and political systems
were equal. He argued that his arie critica (critical art) established a basis
for effective judgements of societies. In no way, therefore, can Vico be
considered a relativist.^
The creation of early poetry was for him the first operation of the human
mind. Thus the imaginative faculty of man was autonomous. Vico traced the
development of primitive mentality from the knowledge of particulars to the
grouping together by the imagination of these particulars. This then led to
the creation of general types; next the other senses and faculties developed;
and finally there was a division between imagination and reason.^ Vico
considered the human mind to be the same everywhere, having the same
capacities, but not everywhere developed to the same levels. The issue was
the degree of progress made.
However although early poetry was the focal point of Vico's attention,
he nonetheless regarded poetry as an immature phase in the development
of the human mind. (The scattered references to the development of the
human mind are not discussed because of Vico's stress on early societies;
the development of the mind is yet another intriguing topic sacrificed to
his relentless pursuit of the theme of the evolution of cultures.) Vico
gave primitive man no credit for disinterested thinking, beyond that of his
primitive needs. The p0eti7 of primitive man consisted in a vision of tiie
world as a reality made and imagined similar to his own experience. Vico
did not feel it was necessary to distinguish between early and theological
language. Language, for him, was always poetic, never abstiâct, cynical or
sarcastic. At the same time poetry provided the internal logic ofVico's work,
the essential link among imagination, language and history. These elements
togetiier comprised his mondo poetico (poetic world).
According to Vico metaphors in early society were pervasive not only
in language, but also in thought and in action.* The essence of metaphor
was understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another.
Far from believing that words have set definitions, he exanüned linguistic
expressions as flexible containers for meaning. Metaphors were to him the
conduit between experience and expression.^ This view of the metaphor was
in direct opposition to the seventeenth-century attitude which suspected the
metaphor because it was connected with 'the false world of ancient super
stition, dreams, myths, terrors with which the lurid, barbarous imaginations
peopled the world, causing error and irrationalism and persecution' (para
phrase ofM. H. Abrams by Berlin).'" Yet as Berlin responded 'such ways of
speech . . . only later became artificial or decorative because men have by
then forgotten how they came into being and for which they were originally
used'." Vico was concerned with the primitive operation of metaphor in the
evolution of speech. He declared that tiie poverty of words caused tiie origin
ofboth metaphors and metonymy.'^ Vico's insight regarding metaphors, that
they contained kernels of past experiences and emotions, has been noted
numerous times. But the danger in such an emphasis is that the metaphor
itself is seen as Vico's method, rather than simply one, albeit a highly useful,
means to the past.
Ultimately metaphors - whether thunder or pagan gods - were insufficient
to Vico. It was the stories, the myths, that he needed for analysis, and the
metaphors were thus a part rather than the whole answer. The metaphor has
very often been declared to be the key to Vico's thought. But it is more useful
to see the myths, the stories themselves as the medium which transmitted the
cultural information that he desired.
Vico assumed that language developed to deal with theproblem of com
munication. He never discussed forms of conununication between different
societies, just as he never discussed culture-sharing of any sort.'^ It did
not discomfort him that one word - god, for example - could have so
many different meanings. Instead he wanted to analyse the combination
of everyday assumptions and creative thinking which together fashioned
living myths. For Vico language was never the 'mere clothing of a thought
which otherwise possesses itself in full clarity', as Maurice Merleau-Ponty
(1908-61) laterwrote.i4
Language was a human creation for Vico, and he thus believed the
meaning of words to be a function, not a property, of terms. It was this
aspect of language, that of conceiving and naming objects - which most
concerned Vico; communication was secondary. Primitive forms oflanguage
were for Vico prinütive forms of cognition. He discussed the concepts of
ideas and language as almost interchangeable;'^ he stated that language was
at the start of any ingenuity.'^ Language was, therefore, very much more
than simply a means of communication for Vico; it was a form of thought.
Further the intellect was that capacity of nünd which enables it to conceive
universal symbols and the meaning of ideas.
4. Theffistorywhich Vico Sought
Following the tradition of Renaissance studies, the history which Vico

sought to discover was closely bound up with philology and etymology.
Philology was declared by Vico to be synonymous with both the history
of speech and the history of human institutions. It was when he discussed
his historical method of reconstructing isolated aspects of past cultures
that he named philology as the particular means by which the origins
and development of a society can be uncovered.' His new principles of
mythology and etymology were to be used to examine the vocabulary of
the first nations, which has been left in the form of fables.^ Thus his idea of
the new art of criticism was to be found infables, and with his new approach
- which included etymology, philology and, most originally, mythology -

the truth in pagan fables could be discerned.^ Through much of his writings
the terms language, poetry and philology were used interchangeably with the
notion of history itself. Once again this practice demonstrated that Vico had
a few central ideas which he discussed over and over in a myriad of ways.
Vico's account of the fundamental role of etymology, which he sometimes
defined as philosophy and elsewhere as history, was the first systematic
attack on Plato's dismissal of etymology as wholly useless.* In 'Nova
scientia tentatur' Vico delineated the need for the study of discourse and
of variety in word usage.^ Nonetiieless he did not leave his readers any
suggestions as to how such a study should be pursued, although in his
defence it must be stressed that he was less concemed with the techniques
of etymology or philology than with their results. Philology, Vico wrote in
'Nova scientia tentatur', had to do with the history of speech and the history
of human institutions. This statement is the first and one of the clearest of all
ofVico's writings regarding the intimate relationship between language and
history; the statement was also the basis ofhis concept of the 'common mind
of the nations' ('mente comune delle nazione').^
In addition language was important to Vico in terms of his chronology.
The study of language made possible the correction of the chronological
table, which was the inunediate puφose of the scienza nuovaP It is now
difficult to appreciate the importance that Vico himself placed on his
chronology, for he ti:^ly believed that it would demonstiâte tiie validity
of his new science. To what extent Vico meant this method to be applied
to more recent historical artefacts is not completely clear. He maintained
that articulate language, followed by philosophy, brought about the dentise
of imaginative symbolism. He abhorred the sophistry of contemporary intel
lectuals and would not have considered their deliberately hidden meanings
to have been in any way as useful as early metaphors and myths, since such
clever phrasing was tiie preserve of only a small segment of the population.*
No doubt his desire for a larger reading audience was one of the reasons for
his shift from Latin to Italian in mid-life, although he remained dependent
on the educated classes to read, accept and teach his scienza nuova if it was
ever to have any appreciable impact on society.
Vico cannot be considered an elitist on the basis of his theoretical works,
his fascination with the aristocracy notwithstanding, for he was concemed
with the the life and the way of thinking of entire social groups. On
the conti-ary, Vico can be faulted on this point for not subdividing his
societies even more, for his macro-approach with its all-inclusive scope
came dangerously close to corrupting lhe unique, individual images of tiiese
past societies. In unsympathetic hands his method, even with the sympathetic
1п1ефге1аиоп and usage of his notion of imagination, could well blur the
subtie and not-so-subtie social and economic distinctions which are present
in every society.
Vico never gave any indication that he believed there was a correct inter
pretation of the past. The cycles, the chronology and all his new concepts
(scienza nuova, arte critica, chiave maestra [master key]) notwithstanding,
he never attempted (with the exception of tiie demonstration of the truth of
sacred history) to demonsti:'ate an optimum approach to the past or a single
tiieme in history. His was a remarkably tolerant and flexible system - almost
certainly more so than he intended. Far from being single-minded, Vico
could well be accused of tiMOwing his energies in too many diverse directions
and, once again, of not leaving any specific advice on how to proceed with
any of his theories in an orderly and coherent manner. He propounded the
use of language and its complements, such as epigraphy, numismatics, and
chronology (by which he meant his own scheme that listed by years aU the
great world civUisations), as weU as philology, etymology and a great many
other approaches to begin the task of comprehending past societies.^ Even
if it is ever true of other tiieoretical works, Vico's writings most definitely
cannot be treated as a vade-mecum, a virtually infallible manual for historical
studies. Just why Vico considered it necessary to comprehend history at aU
is not entirely clear. Historical awareness was not the essential element in
saving societies from decUne, according to Vico, nor would an awareness
of history necessarily aid us in leading more fulfilled lives. However it is
essential if we are ever to understand the creative abilities of any given time.
What Vico did provide, however, was a new approach, a new way of thinking
about history and historical studies. Research was no longer limited to topics
that could be studied in ofßcial written records. Vico's work opened the way
to alternatives to the poUtical history which retains its dominance to this day.
These alternatives clearly included cultural history, but by extension also
inteUectual, social and economic history.
Vico's work was revolutionary, not just in terms of content but also in
its techniques. Anthropologists and sociologists have long since superseded
Vico's suggestions regarding the means of exploring pre-literate societies.'"
But within the discipline of history, as weU as for many other of the social
sciences, it is the breadth of Vico's vision and his willingness to advocate
almost any means - academic or otherwise - to achieve his ends, which are
most inspiring.
The history that Vico sought to identify and that he discussed at great
length throughout his writings was not the straightforward determination
and study of past events, nor was it simply a system of pre-detennined
cycles. History to him was also much more than divisions or epochs; it
was the testimony of those times." The knowledge of the past which Vico
desired was not to recreate specific events, primitive forms of government
or hierarchy, but to recover the shared mentalitis of the time, which aU of
the above examples could help to identify.Vico's historical method was a
means offinding out about peoples in their social and physical environments,
and in their particular place in time. His was a study of how people in earlier
civiUsations perceivedthemselves, their roles in society and their place in
regard to both their ancestors and to following generations. Vico wrote that
his approach was not just about particular early societies, it was to furnish
aU we wUl ever know about the birth of first societies. This was the sapienza
riposta (hidden knowledge) that he sought.'^
The ultimate goal for Vico of such a linguistic enterprise was not the
production of a complete national history, or of a unified history of any
given social group, much less that of a world history. Vico's history was
a history of ideas. The rewards of such a historical reconstruction were
neither concrete nor directly applicable but were much more personal.Vico
set out the means of answering questions asked by many people at many
different places and times. Vico maintained that it was possible to identify
the particular categories of mythical thinking: these common notions, these
wordless, unconscious attitudes dictated by social usage, that were at the
heart of Vico's research.'^ His plan was to find the common ideals shared by
aU peoples, as set out in his dizionario mentale. Most importantly, such an
analysis was the means by which historical knowledge of past cultures could
be obtained and exanuned. Such a study was an investigation not only into
past cultures but into the mind of the researcher. An investigation of history
in this sense was a way of finding out about oneself and one's own culture;
it was a way - and for Vico the only way - to comprehend the workings
and development of the human mind.
5. Myths
La scienza nuova prima offered a radical shift in the study of language in

European culture, for it was the first response to the issue of when and
how figurative speech is born.' But Vico was to receive little credit at
the time either for this insight or for his theory that Homer was not an
actual historical person, but rather the culmination of the ancient Greek
people, the concept which dominated the third book of the final edition of
La scienza nuova. Vico did not intend his logica poetica (poetic logic) to
be interpreted in a theoretical and abstract manner. On the contrary, one of
Vico's greatest insights was that he recognised that poetry contained isolated
images of previous cultures. Early poetry was for Vico one of the means
to what we now refer to as cultural anthropology. For Vico metaphorical
imagination {l'immaginazione metaforica) was the most useful instrument
by which early man expressed his feeUngs and fears in analogical form, for
example, 'the blood boils in my heart'.^ His genius lay in his realisation that
it was necessary to break the codes of these poetic characters and metaphors
in order to make use of them in a cultural study of that time. These included,
for example, therepresentations of virtue, strength and love by classical
gods and goddesses and the description of anger and an awareness of the
insignificance of man in comparison to nature by comparisons to everyday
occurrences. StiU, today it is often stated that only writing preserves the older
form of a language, a generalisation which ignores the long centuries when
language and culture were preserved in fables, myths and oral poetry.
Vico interpreted myths as a form of thought for a society. He considered
it necessary to penetrate the mythical consciousness of a society in order to
comprehend the way those social groups thought. The construction of the
theory of myth was the chiave maestra to his entire system. He declared
the mythmaker's mind to be the prototype, and the mind of the poet to
be mythopoeic. Inthis manner he viewed myths as a form of intuition,
both on the part of the societies and of the poets involved, as weU as
for the modern researcher trying to come to grips with these ancient
fables. It was the genuine culture, the characteristic mould of a particular
civiUsation which concerned him. There was the emergence of a concept
of personality of cultures - for example, ancient Rome as war-like - in
his writings. In the words of Susanne Langer (1895-1985) 'every society
meets a new idea with its own concepts, its own tacit,fimdamentalway of
seeing things; that is to say with its own questions, its peculiar curiosity.'^
Although Vico was concerned with the dynamics of myth preservation and
change, it was actually the nature, content and form of the earliest versions
of these myths that he sought.* Yet it must be noted that Vico's work was
limited somewhat by his belief in pure language. He had relatively Uttle
interest in the development of language; rather he wanted to strip away aU
the intervening layers.^
Myths tend not to be logical in their arrangement, nor internally consistent.
This issue was not important to Vico, for it was the content of the myths
which was the essential element to him, the attempt to deal with the origin,
shape, function and destiny of the world. The same themes recurred in
many parts of the world. The relationships between gods and men, men and
spirits, men and men were discussed in rich detail. Many myths described
a primitive, glorious and happy state in which men and gods once lived
together in perfect harmony until something tragic happened. The myths
were an attempt to deal with personal problems such as illness, as weU

as cosmic events and natural phenomena such as earthquakes, lightning,
thunder, rain, frost, eclipses and other catastrophes.^ Vico was not at all
concerned with the ideathat myth does not give man any power over nature,
only with the illusion that he understands it.^
Myths served an explanatory function in society, answering fundamental
questions about death and the meaning of life. These central topics recurred
over and over in primitive myths and in early poetry from every part of
the world. This tenet of Vichian thought is constantiy reaffirmed by the
research of modern social anthropologists. Echoes of Vico's views can be
also be found in the writing of modern linguistics. For example: the prinütive
mind was coarser tiian our own and completely determined by basic needs
(Bronislaw Malinowski, 1884-1942) and differences between modem and
primitive thought were inevitable because the latter was entirely determined
by emotion and mystic conception (Lucien Levy-Bmhl, 1857-1939).*
The categories which Vico devised for the analysis of myths have not lost
their relevance even in our age of specialisation. For example, one canfindin
Vico aU four of Joseph Campbell's (1879-1944) later functions of traditional
mythologies.^ The first was the reconciUation of the consciousness of a
society with the preconditions of its own existence. Campbell wrote that
a society attempted through myths to redeem human consciousness from
its sense of guilt in life; Vico wrote of shame (pudore) as the motivating
factor which civilised primitive man and led him to express these feelings
in fables. This mystic^ function of mytii was foUowed by a cosmological
function: myths were aU important to a primitive society in formulating and
rendering an image of the universe. Vico discussed at length the explanations
of early peoples for tiieir physical surroundings. Just as important was
the sociological function, which was responsible for the validation and
maintenance of the individual social order. In this way, Vico attributed
the taming of primitive man to early poetry.'" The final fimction was the
psychological - shaping individuals to the aims and ideals of their various
social groups, bearing them through the course of human Ufe. Thus to Vico
myths were responsible for the social cohesion of early societies. They gave
a group of heretofore disparate peoples a way of thinking about their roles
in regard to the supernatural, in nature, in society and as individuals."
These stories had a fundamental fimction in society itself. A myth was a
conceptual statement about man, his society and his universe and generally
was the story of acts involving the supernatural. The myth itself was
considered by that society to be true and sacred, and was related to a
creation, how something came into existence, or how a pattem ofbehaviour,
an institution or a manner of working was established. Myths dealt with the
origin, behaviour and destiny of man; they were an attempt to account for
the origin of the world (and the local tribe) even in pre-literate societies.
Thus Vico viewed myths as paradigms for aU significant human acts. The
mythopoeic need for myths in these early societies was based on the belief
that by knowing the origin of things, one could control them at wiU. It was
believed that by recounting the myth it lived again and the events which it
recounted could be re-enacted.'^
6. Social Institutions
It could be argued that language was not Vico's best developed theme and
that he tried to discuss too many diverse topics under this heading - the
development of language, early folk tales, myths and codified laws. A
cursory reading ofVico could lead one to believe that he was more interested
in language than in society. But time after time Vico himself leads us back
to his main theme of history, and there the complementary role of language
is made clear. The phrases sapienza volgare and logica poetica were used
almost interchangeably. Vico glorified the wisdom of early man not because
he considered that he had reached any higher inteUectual heights - perhaps
because he had greater awareness of his physical and social environment -
but primarily because early fables and myths, now preserved in a much more
polished form, were aU that was left of a forgottentime. A prolonged reading
ofVico leaves one with the feeling that there must be another reason as weU:
that something is lost at every stage of development and that to gain a more
complete comprehension of the ebb and flow of historical development, if
not also for a more personal reason as pursued by the Romantics, it is
necessary to try to retrieve these lost attitudes and mentalities. Something
happened at each stage of development ofa society without which the most
valued contributions of that society could not have been made.' For example,
Vico claimed that only the cruel society of the ancient Greeks could have
produced the Iliad. Thus he teased his readers by reminding them that (in his
opinion) the most brilliant literary and philosophical works were produced in
societies which one cannot always reproduce or approve.
It was the principle of civility (ratio civilis) which offered the clue to
unravelling the myths. Vico stated that the study of language is called
humanitas ([Latin], umanita [Italian] - culture, humanity), because it is
affection that induces men to help each other - particularly those who speak
the same language.^ Humanity, and hence human nature itself, were thus
inextricably bound by language. This is, according to Vico, another reason
for the study of language - that one is thus analysing particular social
groupings formed along linguistic lines. The issue that language groups
were often synonymous with nations, or at least that the desire for this to be
so was present, was not lost on Vico. For him language was inseparable from
humanity: it was language and not a nünd capable of rational thought that
makes us human rather than bestial. Yet his view could weU be countered by
the argument that language is just one of the great many functions of which
the human mind is capable; that it is a part rather than the whole. In this way
he used the term lingua to describe aU human and humane qualities.
Vico wrote that humanitas was composed of shame {pudor) and liberty
(freedom, a way of thinking befitting a freeman, libertas), which together
were the roots of liberaUty (generosity, a way of thinking befitting a freeman,
libertas - (II diritto universale, De constantia iurisprudentis, ВоокП). This
was one of the most sophisticated mixtures of Vico's concepts. Shame, the
negative force which civilised primitive man, and liberty, a concept not
discussed in a theoretical manner elsewhere in his work, together helped
(we are not told the other elements) to comprise liberality, which he used
to denote the attitude of those whofreelyaided others similar to themselves.
Such an attitude of cooperation was mandatory for the transition of family
units into villages, cities and then to nation-states. Vico considered growth
to be natural and, thus, gradual. He also discussed language in society as an
educational tool, an active force in the tanUng of primitive man, because
poetry, in his view, taught the vulgar to live piously. Hence he defined
a social role for language in which the latter was intimately involved
in the tanüng of prinütive man. Myths and stories passed orally from
generation to generation, instilled in listeners a sense of reUgion and of
respect for superiors, and fostered the development of creative imagination
as manifested by the capacity for constructive and mythological thinking.
AU these factors were essential to the process of turning wandering peoples
into monogamous cultivators of the land. In his own time Vico accepted
that not only mathematics, but - more significantiy in the scheme of his
own work - rhetoric formed a basis for education. Rhetoric combined
many of the skills he considered most pertinent for the civil education of
the young: memory, linguistic abiUty and assertiveness. Thus language had
an educational fimction not only in the early stages (via the elegance of early
poetry), but, unlike many of Vico's other favourite topics, throughout the
development of a society. For Vico the benefits of a language, by which he
meant its civilising force, were shared by aU people. Yet there was nothing
of the missionary in Vico. His desire was not to spread his interpretation
of languageto primitive groups of his time, such as tiie North American
Indians, Chinese and Japanese, whom he discussed at various points. Quite to
the confrary, he saw language as a means of analysing these societies as they
were; he had no desire to disrupt the balance of their social development.

Nor did he foresee practical benefits deriving from his work, no philological
or etymological theories which would help in the study of specific ancient or
otherwise unknown languages.
Instead Vico desired to find the order in myths for the рифозе of
determining the social structure of early cultures. This view was expressed
in this century by Claude L^vi-Strauss: 'Qui dit homme, dit langage, et
qui dit langage, dit societi' ('He who says man, says language, and he
who says language, says society').^ Myths were responsible for integrating
the universe, natural and supernatural, into a form understandable by each
fully-functioning member of the community.* Vico wrote:
. . . che suUe cose le quali si Our mythologies agree with the

meditano vi convengono le nostre institutions under considera
nutologie, non isforzate e contorte, tion, not by force and distor
ma diritte, faciU e naturali, che si tion, but directly, easily,
vedranno essere istorie civili de' and naturally. They wiU be
primi popoli, i quali si truovano seen to be civil histories of
dappertutto essere stati thefirstpeoples, who were
naturalmente poeti. everywhere naturaUy poets.^
Myths were involved in renewal on many different levels. They re-enacted

creative events of the past; many of the stories had to do with the renewal of
health or even life. Perhaps most importantly, myths helped men transcend
their limitations by lifting their spirits and explaining their place in the
universe. Myths were the means of evaluating, classifying and relating
aU of life's experiences. Thus the making of myths, this universal human
trait, was essential for the preservation and transmission of the beliefs and
attitudes of individual societies.^
Myths validated social behaviour - rules of behaviour, mores, taboos and
attitudes were aU confirmed by mythology. Mythicinjunctions served as
a basis for parental or community demands. In this way myths validated
beliefs, and beliefs were in turn reinforced by everyday events. Myths also
served as a model for ritual. Conscious repetition was necessary to keep the
details of the stories fixed in the nünd. Changes were made in the stories,
sometimes based on group consensus, or by reinteφreting old elements of
thestories in terms of new information. Eventually these modifications led
to the restructuring of the myths themselves.^
Myths were used by Vico as a way to go beyond texts and apprehend
the history of cultures directly. There is no doubt about the fundamental
importance of culture to Vico, for he viewed thought and culture as
synonymous. He was also most aware of the interdependence in society

between culture and the framework of the state.* Nonetheless Vico was
not attempting to develop a history of comparative cultures but of human
social institutions. Indeed he cared less about what was created than that it
was created. For Vico history was man's creation, and he desired to identify
as many aspects of human creativity exhibited in developing societies as
possible. However in his rush to define and delineate the concept of culture
and individual societies, he did not fall into the trap of ethnocentrism. La
boria delki ruizioni (the conceit of nations) was strongly condemned by Vico.
This sort of easy generalisation based on cultural conditioning was for him
neitherjustifiable nor useful.
7. Order in Myths
Three main approaches to myth analysis have developed since Vico's time!
The historical school regarded myths as half-forgotten historical events,
imaginatively embellished tales in which deities were merely magnified
men.i In this manner myths represented at the very least non-historical
reality. Although this was not Vico's approach, there is a parallel here with
his view of human language as a copy of divine language.^ And one can
find in Vico strong echoes of the classical theory of myth as an allegory of
philosophical truths which inspired Bacon's De sapientia veterum? Yet he
was if anything in closer accord with the modern psychoanalytical approach
in which myths are viewed as externalised wishfiil thinking. The material
of these early myths was sinülar to the symbolism of dreams - image and
fantasy. According to Vico myths were public dreams, representing the
hopes and fears of a community, but he never pursued this line of thought
to conclude in the manner attributed to Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) that
dreams were private myths.* Still Vico would have been in accord with
Freud on the point that childhood, the period of our lives which affects us
most as adults, is paradoxically the one we can remember least well. Vico's
aim was, clearly, to reconstruct these half-forgotten first years and stages of
a society.
bi the third, psychoanalytical, approach, myths are viewed as the founda
tion for understanding inteφersonal relationships and most importantly as
the means to gain understanding of individual and group behaviour. This
type of access was considered possible because language had developed
to solve practical problems. More important than the individual motifs
(symbols or metaphors, for example), which were very often the same in
any society at the same stage, was their overall arrangement. This structurie
of beliefs gave crucial information regarding the world view of these early
societies.^
Vico maintained that there was an inherent order in mythological stories,
and he denied that he was forcing his own theoretical structure onto them. He
saw no essential difference between mythological thinking and that involved
in the writing of history, in that they both attempted to portray the spirit of
a given culture at a given time. Thus it appeared entirely natural to him that
the telling of a myth was done in innumerable and diverse ways, which
very often transformed the original story. He viewed epic stories as broken
fragments of an on-going saga. He did not consider the disorganized state
of the myth to be the initial form.^
Vico asserted that there was no exact point where mythology ended and
history started. The gaps between myths and history should be bridged by
histories which are conceived not as separate from, but as continuations of,
mythology. Yet myths, as histories, were extremely repetitive. Thus it was
by the sifting of myths that one comes to a better understanding ofhistorical
sciences.^ By this point history had replaced mythology, since it fulfilled the
same functions. For example, historical accounts in the eighteenth century
were almost entirely based on written documents.*
Vico recognised that these cultures could never be regained exactly as
if they had not been lost. Yet he stressed that there must be an awareness
of their existence and importance. Vico wanted to find the order behind
the disorder in history, by identifying the common rituals and patterns in
the development of societies. He stressed the similarities rather than the
differences in the development of cultures. He saw that a study of myths of
very different cultures can close some of these divisions, explaining apparent
discrepancies.^
His discussion of language and mythology was an attack on the objec
tive approach to thinking and society. Vico strongly disagreed with the
long-standing belief that words have fixed meanings, and departed from
the supposedly enlightened attitude that language should be as direct as
possible, and that poetic, fancifiil, rhetorical andfigurativelanguage should
be avoided. At the same time he asserted that one experiences the world by
acquaintance with objects in it, one understands these objects in terms of
concepts and categories, there is a reality which is not subjective, and one
can say things that are absolutely, impartially and unconditionally tiîe and
false about it. This final point was stiêngthened by the stiêss he put on senso
comune, the shared values of any and all social groups. He believed that
senso comune could be illustrated in either a slightiy or very distinct manner
in each society, but that because of these shared values that aU societies at
aU times have in common there was some basis for comparison.'"
Vico's approach to life and language was not completely subjective.

Although he recognised that in most of our everyday activities we rely on
our senses and develop intuitions we can trust, Vico did not consider themost
important factor in one's Ufe to be one's feelings, or that poetry transcended
rationality." Nevertheless he declared that the language of imagination was
necessary in order to express the unique aspects ofour experience.
Vico's originality lay in his view oflanguage as a way of thinking, as both
the expression itself and as part of the actual, creative process. The critical
importance of language to Vico was not only that it was ahuman creation,
but that it was the means of discovering other human creations. Language
was the identifying mark of a people, and, as with customs, it would develop
in its own particular way in each society.
Vico had five main aims in his examination of language and culture,
of speech and society. First, he desired to find out the mentality of
early cultures. This led naturaUy to the second point, which involved an
analysis of developing social structure. Third, he recognised religion as
part of the social fabric, permeating aU aspects of early society, as can be
demonstrated from myths. Fourth, Vico maintained it was his dizionario
mentale which allowed exploration of the past. Fifth, it was fantasia
which worked through language and myths, and which made possible the
expression of individual cultural characteristics and interests. The crucial
relationship between imagination and language has long been neglected, in
part because language was viewed as the only creative force. Vico's plea for
the recognition of imagination in human society was echoed in this century
by Michel Foucault (1926-84) who argued that the insane and irrational
elements have always been excluded by European culture.'^
8. Imagination and Historical Reconstruction
Vico's overwhelming emphasis on language rather than rites of religion,

as the best means to study societies of the past, is vindicated when his
dependence on language as the proper tool for the application of his critical
art is recognised. It was by means of the discovery of the true nature of poetry
that he demonstrated the key to La scienza nuova, that is, imagination.'
According to Vico, myths were faithful records of trae narration {vero
narratio), since they had to do with both the imagination and the wiU of
the community.2 He would not have been distressed by records which were
writtendeliberately to deceive, forhe would have considered them to have
been true to their basic purposes. Unfortunately he gave no clues as to how
we can detect deliberate falsifications in historical documents.
There is an essential point here: Vico himself sensibly realised that it was
necessary to grasp not only the imagination but also the wiU of a society
before a true understanding of that culture could be gained. Hence his was
an attempt to recreate not only the transient feelings of a people, but also
an effort to understand what types of people they were. Ultimately Vico's
distinction between the wiU and the spirit of a people differed very little,
no doubt accounting for why the concept of the wiU does not appear in his
later writings.3 But the differentiation of the two in II diritto universale, De
constantia iurisprudentis gives us an important insight into his definition of
imagination, helping us to understand better his own personal vocabulary.
Collingwood put forth the interpretation that Vico literally meant that
we should use our own imaginations entrare and desceruiere into the
conditions of those people in the past we should like to know.* There is a
parallel here between Freud's belief regarding reason and Vico's imaginative
historical reconstruction. According to Freud reason cannot save us, nothing
can, but reason can mitigate the cruelty of living. A simUar analogy
would apply to Vico and the historical knowledge acquired by means
of imagination.5 However unfashionable this Vichian view, introduced to
the EngUsh-speaking world by ColUngwood, might be today, many history
teachers at all levels still urge their students to do just this. But using the
knowledge we have gained through a linguistic study of a society, based
on the codified versions of their myÜis and laws, how does one begin to
incarnate the skeleton of a lost civilisation? Vico, and to a greater extent
CoUingwood, was at fault for not sufficiently stressing how difficult and
Umited such an historical reconstruction based only on oral records would
be. For the results might be utterly inaccurate and there is no way to verify
them. But the difficulties in such an approach, the impossibility of shedding
the conscious and unconscious prejudices of our own culture, should not be
sufficient to deter us from trying, particularly as this is very often the only
means possible to recapture lost times. This is the third usage of imagination
in Vico: we avail ourselves of our own creative powers and intellects in this
attempt at historical reconstruction.
As has been demonstrated, language in Vico was much more than a
means of communication or an instrument of thought; it also actively shaped
social development from the earliest to the most advanced stages. Language
developed according to particular physical environments, but it itself (in the
form of myths, legends and poetry) shaped and was shaped by the social
world and the visions of life and nature of particular groups. Language for
Vico had profound implications in terms of historical reconstruction and
techniques.
Although Vico called poetry a gift from God, bora of curiosity, he
discussed it as an innate instinct, fashioned by environment and ultimately a

human creation.^ These seenungly contradictory characteristics demonstrate
the crossroads at which Vico was standing. His statement that poetry was
a gift from God added nothing original to his work, although this is not to
say that Vico did not believe in both concepts himself. The birth of poetry
by means of curiosity confirmed the place of imagination, while at the same
time the nomination of ignorance as the mother of poetry reinforced the
fundamental role of poetry in the earliest phases of a culture.^ Both of
these metaphoric relationships stressed the origins of language in response
to environmental conditions. Language as an innate instinct in Vico had
more to do with // dizioruirio delle voci mentale than with poetry as a
divine gift. Throughout Vico's writings it is his preoccupation with a rich
mythological universe, and most particularly with language and society as
human creations, which is most evident and inventive.
5 Imagination and Historical
Knowledge
1. bitroduction
One can hardly fail to notice in Vico's writings the quite amazing jumble
of ideas and terms. The danger when one is presented with such an
inchoate nüxture of the startlingly new and the prosaic is to read into it
an interpretation which is not dissinülar to that held before reading Vico.
But even if Vico's lack of precise terminology is to be greatly regretted, the
continuation of such an approach would be intolerable. There is no doubt
this has hindered a proper understanding of the Vichian view offantasia,
for much of the confusion regarding Vico's views on this pivotal issue is
because it has beenrelegated to a subordinate position, as simply the means
of creating mythology and early poetry. Thus tiie only hope of understanding
the profound implications of Vico's discussion of fantasia is to begin by
dividing into categories the three main ways in which he used this not
uncommon term.
Thefirst'v&fantasiaas the attempt by prinutive peoples to make sense of
their physical and social environments.' Virtually every writer on Vico in
the last thirty years has mentioned this important point, but without exploring
how it is related to Vico's views on historical knowledge in more than the
most general terms. With only two or three exceptions, this has been the
only aspect of Vico's discussion of fantasia which has been recognized by
scholars in the field.2 However Vico usedfantasia in two additional senses,
the second being the spirit of a particular age.^ It was not only the component
parts, these attempts to explain human existence through poetry and myth,
but more excitingly, it was also the composite mentality of the people of a
particular civiUsation at a particulartimewhich was Vico's major concern.
Vico had no desire (nor did his metiiod attempt to provide ä means) to
reconstruct past events, much less to describe an ideal state or to provide a
political system which he desired to see implemented in the years to come.
Rather he sought to gain historical knowledge by comprehending the ways
of thinking and feeling in these early civiUsations. The third usage of the
term describes the fimction we must ourselves employ to unlock the minds,
the consciousnesses, of these past civilisations to reconstruct pattems of past
cultures - this is truly Vico's chiave maestra.^ Littie attention has been paid
120
Imagination and Historical Knowledge 121
to this critical, final point except by Verene and those, like Dray and van
der Dussen, writing on CoUingwood.^
Vico's approach to imagination was characteristically broad in scope.
Nowhere in his writings do we find a close examination of the exact
relationship between imagination and the development of the primitive
human mind. Yet in virtually aU of his theoretical works, and as early
as the orations of 1699-1707, this connection is among his most dominant
themes, one which he usually demonstrated by means of his discussion of
the development of a civiUsation. But Vico's intention was never to examine
the contents of the human nünd in the manner of Locke; instead he was
concerned with the manifestations of this mental development as shown by
the gradual growth of a society. It was imagination as the creative human
and social faculty which occupied his complete attention.
2. Fantasia as the Poetic, Recreative Instinct
The traditional interpretation ofVico and his views onfantasia was reflected
by Giulio Lepschy in a fourteen-page article in Lettere italiane (1987)
entitled 'Fantasia e immaginazione\ which devoted only seven Unes to
Vico, and referred to him simply as the precursor of Romanticism, Idealism
and Croce.' Sadly, among ItaUan scholars both outside and inside Italy, as
in the English-speaking world, the emphasis is stiU on relating Vico to wider
European trends. Thus Vico's more original insights regarding imagination
have been ignored for the last two and a half centuries, primarUy because
they have no obvious paraUel with those of a better known thinker.
Yet as early as his orations of 1699-1707 and again in the following
year when he presented De nostri temporis studiorum ratione as the
grandest and most ambitious of his inaugural addresses at the University
of Naples, Vico spoke of the fundamental importance of imagination.^ In
De antiquissima italorum sapientia he discussed the division of imagination
into two component parts: ingenium (the power of connecting separate and
diverse elements) and phantasia? Recognition of this relationship is crucial
for a proper understanding of imagination in Vico's philosophical works;
because in this way ingenium and phantasiav/ere not distinct abilities
competing with each other, but instead were constituents of imagination.
Vico averred that ingenium was to be applied in practical spheres such
as mathematics, astronomy and mechanics. He used the terms in such a
similar way that it would be pointiess to speculate whether ingenium could
be applied to tiie arts and phantasia to the natural and physical sciences.
In De nostri temporis studiorum ratione he stressed the importance of
imagination and memory in a pedagogical sense* while in De antiquissima

italorum sapientia he listed several examples of the fruits of ingenium:
mathematics, design and the most colourful one - the pyramids.^ He wrote
in this oration that imagination is a true faculty because of the creation
of images {'Phantasia certissima facultas est, quia dum ea utimur rerum
imaginesfingimus'),^leading to his even better known discussion of verum
andfactum. The second half of II diritto universale, which begins with 'Nova
scientia tentatur',finishedin 1721, stressed over and over Vico's fascination
with what he termed as the 'magnificence of imaginings' (4maginum
granditas').^ In the same work he argued that imagination was the result of
man's poetic faculty, which disappeared in the later phases of a society as the
sciences developed in strength, though he was not at all specific about when
or even at which stage it disappeared. According to Vico imagination, in the
first sense of the poetic instinct of man, withers away completely in a society
which has gone on to the study of philosophy and mathematics. Once again,
the only concrete - but very eccentric - exception he ever gave, in which
some remnant of the primitive form of imagination would remain in a later
stage of a civilisation, was the consuls in Rome and their role as preservers
of the law and thus of the earliest version extant of their language.*
Vico did not always clearly distinguish between his discussions of
imagination and tiiose of memory. In De antiquissima italorum sapientia
he wrote, 'Men can remember nothing not given in nature' ('Hominifingere
nihil praeter ruituram datur').^ The implications of this quotation are pro
found, for consciously or not Vico has denied any supernatural element in
the development and functioning of human thought. Memory is thereby
separated fromfantasia, which allows for invention and fiction. In 1744 he
wrote that 'Resemblance is the mother of all discovery' {'Similitudo mater
omnis inventionis') and that menjudge the unknown by the known {'ch'ove
gli uomini delle cose lontane e non conosciute non possonofare niurui idea,
le stimano dalle cose loro conosciute e presenti').^^
As discussed in Chapter 2 in the sections on De nostri temporis studiorum
ratione and La scienza nuova prima, Vico generally did not make value
judgements regarding imitation, which he discussed in terms of the creative
arts {De nOstri temporis studiorum ratione), laws (Л diritto universale) and
fables (La scienza nuova prima).^^ He viewed the process of recognition
and differentiation as central to the development of the human mind and
of societies. In the 1730 edition of La scienza nuova Vico discussed the
critical role of the rational faculties as a complement to his favourite topics
of imagination and memory:
Ma tutte queste, anzichd pruove le But aU these, rather than

quali soddisfacciano i nostri proving to the satisfaction of

intelletti, sono ammende che si our intellects, amend the
fanno agli errori delle nostre errors made by our memories
memorie ed alle sconcezze delle and the disorderUness of our
nostre fantasi, . . . imaginations . . .
For all the stress Vico laid on imagination he did not trust it entirely as
the sole means of historical construction. His reluctance to rely wholly on
imagination is in line with his conviction that the facts one obtained from
myths might be completely inaccurate, but the attitudes could never be
falsified - for example a direct confradiction of the facts (if indeed this could
be proved) would itself reveal a crucial emphasis on a particular issue.
Far too oftenfantasia is simply equated with mythology in Vico's work,
butfantasia is best viewed as a faculty or an ability rather than an art or a
learned method, much less as a product of such an art of which myths would
be the prime example. Vico argued in II diritto universale that the poets were
simply conduits of the knowledge of a society, usually that of the generations
preceding them.'^ Thus it was certainly not the wisdom or the fantasia of
the poets but of the people which was passed on. It is essential to note that
Vico never appears to have used the termfantasia in a negative sense. Even
if inaccurate, he always saw it as constructive and absolutely fundamental to
the progress of a society. He never viewed it as a characteristic of stagnation,
due to its repetitious quality: parent to child and poet to the people. In De
nostri temporis studiorum ratione Vico advised teachers in no uncertain
terms to develop memory in their students in a systematic manner, because it
was almost identical with imagination.'* From the first orations, Vico argued
that imagination had not died out in his time, and that the modern variant of
imagination was memory. Or, more exactly, he assserted that imagination
had completely diniinished in his age of science and philosophy and that
memory was the closest one could come to imagination in this later stage
of his own society. Either way, the preservation and cultivation of such
knowledge by means of memory was of the greatest importance to him.'^
Vico wrote that it was curiosity which led early man to explore his
environment,'^ and this issue was central to his ideas about language, the
development of the human mind and history itself.'^ For Vico language
was natural, the spontaneous expression of human thoughts and feelings.'*
Language was not invented by the philosophers.'^ Although he maintained
that rational thought was the apex toward which all mental development was
aimed, he was nevertheless emphatic that the more sophisticated modes of
human cognition were not necessarily superior in all ways to the prinütive
attempts at understanding their physical and social worlds. Vico held that
only when the desire to push back established boundaries of knowledge

and learning was present could further additional knowledge or insight be
gained. He did not contend that this desire had to be fuUy articulated or even
conscious, but simply that the demand for additional information was in itself
the vehicle by which the human mind progressed.
Vico called the fables of primitive peoples sapienza (wisdom).^" Yet
he certainly recognised that these people did not have the educational
background or technical expertise to explain natural phenomena even to the
level of sophistication practised in his own time. This was of no concern to
him, since he viewed myths not as an inferior version of modern wisdom, but
as constructive attempts to resolve problems of human existence and social
organization. Unlike Croce, Vico himself had no real interest in studying or
collecting local fables and foUc songs.^' Vico's great interest in mythology
was theoretical and functional in that it was provided a means, and he was
persuaded the only means, to discover the ways of thinking and feeling of
past civilizations.
3. Fantasia as the Expression of the Spirit of a Particular Age
The second major use Vico made of the notion of fantasia was as the
description of the spirit of a particular age.' It was the same faculty which
produced poetry (or religion or any other social institution) and the culture
of a society. Berlin was exactly right Uiat it is at this point we see *the
emergence of the concept of the uniqueness and individuality of an age,
an outlook, a civilization'.^ This aspect of Vico's work is generally ignored
altogether, unless it is Unked to a discussion of Vico as a precursor of the
Romantics or Hegel. Writers on Italian literature are often the only ones to
recognise the importance Vico put on this aspect of fantasia. An isolated
example of this was J. G. Robertson's chapter on Vico in his 1923 book
entitled Studies in the Genesis ofRomantic Theory in the Eighteenth Century,
which is better than anything written on this connection since.^ This second
role which Vico assigned iofantasia is not at aU subsidiary-on the contrary,
this was exactly the type of historical knowledge which Vico craved.
Vico's importance is primarily that he recognised the value of the early
stages of any society and that he had faith that it was possible to tap the
early wisdom of that time even in the later stages of different societies.
Vico suggested that Üie human mind was active long before it reached
rational thought, although he never denied that the earlier was a lower stage
of conception.* Without glamourizing these early men or their achievements,
Vico recognised that something is lost at each stage as a society develops
and that only by comprehending these very early phases can one gain proper
historical knowledge of a particular age's way of thinking. Vico's writings
could perhaps be best described as a philosophy of the history of culture.
According to Vico imagination in the first and second senses discussed above
could only be manifested by a culture, the aggregate of individual attempts at
self-expression. There is no indication that he considered there to be any limit
to the number of forms by which imagination could be expressed. He clearly
expected it to vary dramatically culture by culture and age to age and that
these disparities comprisedthe identifying marks of a particular period.
Vico showed no great interest in planned social action, yet its creative
counteφart, collective imagination, was the focal point of aU his theoretical
works. Social change most certainly occurred within the Vichian framework,
but gradually, not as the resuk of single actions. Perhaps for this reason
there is no discussion of social and political responsibiUty except interms
of education. For Vico the outcome of a civUisation primarily had to do
with decisions made by that social group. Again this supports the view
that there is no evidence that cataclysmic decline was programmed into his
system, but rather that he recognised its repeated presence. Nor is there any
evidence that Vico considered his theory of history to be either mechanistic
or static. His historical cycles undoubtedly affirm that he accepted any given
society to be part of a continuum. Yet in no way would he have beUeved
that this excluded the possibUity of novelty.^ This was seen in 'La pratica\
in which he intimated that proper moral and civic education of the young
could avert the third stage, the final downfall of society - thus destroying
the inteφretation that Vico accepted the character and health of cultures to
be predetermined. Indeed the whole tone of his theoretical works stressed
the vitality, spontaneity and originality of the early stages of each society.
It was, without a doubt, by means of a study of imagination, and thus of the
creative instincts as manifested within particular societies, that Vico asserted
that one could obtain the proper historical consciousness.
4. Fantasia as la scienza nuova
Vico's concept of historical consciousness encompassed a group's growing

awareness of itself as a separate, legitimate social unit and a paraUel
transition of mental processes from imagination to rational thought.' Vico
maintained that the development of the human mind was progressive, even
though this clearly clashed with the Christian view, and he also contended
that the essential nature of man was itself changeable.2 He asserted tiiat the
history of past civiUsations could only be inteφreted if one could understand
the human nature of that time. In an era when Neapolitan intellectuals tended
to align themselves with the scientific approach, Vico constantly reaffirmed
the complexity of human nature. In the words of Elio Gianturco, for Vico
hiunan nature was composed not only of 'sheer rationality, nor merely
of intellect, but also of fantasy, passion and emotion and his insistence
on the historical and social dimensions'.^ Indeed Vico's emphases were
always on the historical and social dimensions. There can be no doubt
that Vico would have argued that the development of the human mind
through imagination could not have been separated fi:om the development
of human society. He regarded historical consciousness as developmental,
and the potentid for greater awareness of the past as increasing with the
progress of a society. He put forward a case for a higher level of historical
consciousness than any ofhis contemporaries and maintained that his readers
could benefit directly from his insights by making use of his method.*
Vico held that analysis of the development of human consciousness
(шпагш mente) was the single most important part of his work.^ Perhaps
the second best known aspect of his writings (after corsi e ricorsi) was
that he argued it was possible to comprehend histoty because it was made
by men. This statement can only be true if there is some means of at least
penetrating the primitive psyche of man and if the primitive consciousness
held the same basic notions of humanitas that were considered innate in his
time. Without this latter point in common, one might as weU study a different
species.^ Clearly it is here that his dizionario di voci mentale delineated in
La scienza nuova prima played its most crucial role.^
In the final version of La scienza nuova, fantasia is used in two distinct
senses: there is the fantasia which is the means of the creation of poetic
wisdom, and there is the fantasia which functions as the medium through
which understanding of past societies can be gained. Vico was not unaware
of the very different uses he made of the concept of imagination. At the end
of Book I of the 1744 edition in the section on method he wrote:
Finalmente, quanto gran principio Finally (to realise) what a

dell'umanitä sieno le seppolture, great principle of humanity
s'immagini uno stato ferino nel burial is, imagine a feral
quale restino inseppolti i state in which human bodies
cadaveri umani sopra la remain unburied on the surface
terra ad esser 6sca de'corvi of the earth as food for crows
a cani . . . and dogs.8
In this example Vico challenged his reader to make use of his own faculty
of imagination in order to comprehend this early society, which for once
was not described in heroic terms as being strong in imagination, but rather
was presented as an example of the anarchic quality of mankind without the
civilising force of a coherent society. It should never be forgotten that the
complete title of this work is Principj di Scienza Nuova di Giambattista Vico
d'intorno alla comune natura delle nazioni (Principles of the New Science
ofGiambattista Vico according to the Соттюп Nature ofthe Nations).^ His
new method oifantasia was not simply to be applied to individual aspects
of human nature, such as shame. More correctly, it was the dynamic aspect,
the tension, among the diverse components of a society which Vico viewed
as new and interesting.'"
Vico's aggressive attacks on the conceits of both scholars and nations are
more comprehensible in the midst of his study of ancient societies if viewed
as a threat, in his eyes, to the proper use of imagination." As discussed
above, as early as 1707 Vico wrote that the young should spend some of their
school years uncontaminated by the sophistry of established curricula so as
to preserve their child-like imagination.'^ This is one ofVico's most explicit
attacks on established pedagogical and historical practices of his day. Boria,
which implies arrogance and complacency as well as the usual translation
of conceit, was confronted by Vico in a place of prominence (Book I ,
125-128) in the 1744 work.'3 National conceit, la boria delle nazioni, was
contemptuously dismissed by Vico, for it undermined the whole purpose and
proper function ofhistorical studies.'* Scholarly conceit, la boria de'dotti,
the assumption that aU the people in the past were themselves scholars, with
the background and orientation which that entails, also received scathing
treatment from Vico for its one-dimensional approach to other cultures and
times.'5
Imagination was for Vico the basis of human historical reality. Far from
devaluing the importance of verum and factum, imagination complements
this much better known aspect of his work. There is no confradiction in
his thought between the two concepts; indeed his belief that one could only
truly know what one had made, '«verum» et «factum» reciprocantur. . .
convertuntur', was fulfilled by means of imagination, the creative instincts
of man. This is one of the strongest links regarding the intimate relationship
between imagination and historical knowledge in Vico's thought.
5. History
One of the reasons that Vico used early societies as his model was because
he maintained that they were more likely to recur in a relatively similar
form in various cultures.' He considered them to be the basic form of
society, uncontaminated by education and training. This is not to suggest

that Vico viewed the first, primitive cultures as unchanging. Vico was
fascinated by the permanence of change in human societies. He recognized
the extremely close relationship between local and national history and it
was the unconscious elements in society which he sought. Vico insisted
that the interplay between the conscious and the unconscious elements of
history provided the means to discover the 'course the nations n1n'.2 The
role of unconscious elements in history, particularly in psychohistory, is
stiU contentious today. But Vico contested the opposite viewpoint. At the
time he wrote, only divine providence was granted arole in history which
was impossible to identify in any precise fashion, albeit its presence was
considered to be both obvious and fundamental.^ But Vico considered it
necessary to recognise not only divine providence, but also to identify the
ways of thinking and feeling of communities, since he believed only then
would it be possible to understand the events and pattems of the past.*
According to Vico in De antiquissima italorum sapientia,
Historici utiles, no qui facta . . . useful historians are not

crassiuset genericas caussas narrant, those who offer imprecise
sed qui ultimas factorum accounts of the facts and
circumstantias persequuntur, et generic causes, but those who
caussarum peculiares search for the ultimate
reserant. circumstances of facts and
and search for particular
causes.5
Vico was engrossed in what is now termed the cultural unconscious and in
its transmission.^ It was the development of belief systems and other social
forces which Vico most wanted to trace. In particular he was extremely
concerned with culture-bound elements, for these were the very factors
which distinguished a particular age or each successive culture.
Vico considered language to be intimately related to the general concep
tion of a cultural system. He asserted that in its first stages language was
essentially amoral (in terms of relations between individuals) for it reflected
the sentiments and prejudices of a single social group. Yet as that same
society developed, its language moulded later generations in their ways
of thinking about themselves, their society, their environment and their
prospects.^ Vico would have denied that language had a neutral effect on
society. He realised that both primitive and modern languages carry their
own particular liabilities in terms of foreshortening ethical perspective, but
he maintained that this did not necessarily have to occur in either case.*
For Vico the sum of all the varieties of human control (unconscious
more than conscious) is dominant over language. Hence language was
not deterministic in his scheme; nevertheless, he would have agreed that
whoever or whatever controlled language controlled society. This is why
he discussed language at such great length. It was another way toget to
societies, since language involved the ways in which societies looked at their
lives and positions both in the world and .in time.^ It was precisely these
culturally-biased assumptions which Vico felt best identified a particular
society. It was because of this that he constantly argued that more attention
should be paid to the social situation, both general and particular, if any true
knowledge of a society were to be gained. For tiiis reason he held that tiie
relationship between philology and history was ahnost symbiotic because
of a shared social structure.'" AU the while Vico desired to catch something
lost, something as volatile as words."
Vico was certainly more interested in the cultural nature of language than
in ways in which it is distinguished from culture. He was intensely concerned
with man's ability to invent symbols, much more than in the complexity 6f
patterns in linguistic structure.'^ Vico declared that language was not merely
one aspect of culture; it was at the very least the factor that makes possible
the development, elaboration and transmission, in both oral and written form,
of the accumulation of the culture as a whole.'^ Vico did not give exact
answers regarding the relation of experience to language, for he believed
attitudes and beliefs shaped language to a greater extent than did specific
events or conditions. Therefore the relationship between the vocabulary of
a society and its cultural characteristics was very close indeed.'* He averred
that philosophies and ways of Ufe characteristic of individual cultures, even
if not brought to the level of conscious formation, are reflected in their
languages. For Vico the loss of the ancient form of a language would have
been equivalent to the loss of the early culture of that society.
The question of the scope for originality within Vico's pre-set parameters
is an issue in botii languages and societies. Seemingly a discussion of the
origins of language would be pointless if aU the origins were the same. But,
according to Vico, the absorbing aspect of tiie development of language or
of societies was not a study of the component parts - granmiar or reUgion, for
example - but the way in which these common elements were shared to form
a distinct social unit. Vico recognised the tendency to reduce a multiplicity
of viewpoints to a single perspective, in order to make complicated issues
simple, and he did not disapprove of it. He was convinced that these cultural
universals were ideologically sound.'^ He asserted that tiiere must be a
method, a metiiodological justification, for historical studies. He postulated
that it was necessary to discover specific analogies as a means of finding
130 Giambattista Vico: Imagination and Hisforical Knowledge
something else, for example in metaphor and metonymy. Vico's discussion

of figurative speech was also important in that it recognised the importance
of both the commonplace and of that which has been discarded either by
the same or later societies. According to Vico, metaphorical imagination not
only played a role in societies and history, but it also dealt with basic human
fears and often mundane feelings.'^ Vico was not uninterested in the human
ability to think or to reason. Nevertheless reason is not tiie new or interesting
aspect of his work. The essential reality which commanded Vico's interest
was social relations.
bnagination enabled Vico to examine the mondo civile (civil world).
Although Vico examined the early stages of a civilisation at perhaps
unnecessary length, the focus of his arguments was always to find the roots
of an advanced society. There is no doubt that Vico was concerned with
the first stages of a society exactiy because they contained vital information
regarding the social life of a fuUy functioning society.'^
Rituals confirmed social facts, according to Vico. He viewed parallels
in early society (such as primitive marriage, funeral rites and religious
practices) as more than just chance. These common customs could be
examined in terms of a theoretical structure, even if the historical context
was not known. Marriages, burials and religious practices were not of vital
interest to him simply because they were so widespread or repeated so often,
so much as because they represented universally shared ways of thinking and
of reacting to family life, death and the supernatural elements of the world.
According to Vico, social history was a form of group remembering. He
was determined to use social memory in order to reconstincttiieseparticular
social worlds. A natural development of his thought would have been an
interest in what might be called social amnesia, where instances could be
identified using other sources. This line of development would encompass
aU kinds of suppression of social memory, for suppression indicated the
presence of inconvenient memories. He realised that history was written
and then forgotten by the victors of the past, and he recognised that both
official and unofficial memories were historical forces in their own right.'*
Vico viewed the culture of a society as indistinguishable from its collective
memory. Thus myths were important for aU stages of a society, because they
kept the mental retrieval system of a society in good order. Myths served as
the charter of the later, highly codified foundations (for example, laws) of
advanced social institutions.'^
His degnita were put forward without apology as the answer to the
problem of reconstructing these past societies.^" He presented his famous
threes ~ stages of a society, social rites, customs, natural law, governments,
languages, characters, jurisprudence, authority, reason - aU as necessary
sequences.2i There is no evidence in Vico's writings tiiat even he considered

this model to be a preordained, predetermined pattem, much less a perfect
one. The essential point in regard to Vico's cycles is that he presented them
as a means to examine every aspect of society - growth, development,
change, decadence, decline and dissolution. The concept of a storia ideale
eterna encompassed every phase of the histories of aU nations.^2 As a means
of comparison and examination, the concepts of corsi and ricorsi were
exti-emely important to Vico - especially as he argued that tiiey occurred
by means of divine providence, not by human intervention, and further that
they had nothing to do with scholars.^3 It was not a theory of progress but
of progression that he sought.
Vico did not force his methodology upon every civilisation. Rather he
used these categories as a means of examination and analysis. Historical
anachronisms and 'the conceit of thescholars' were, according to Vico,
due to a lack of a proper historical method, which he believed had handi
capped previous historians, no matter how competent.^* These anachronisms
resulted from the failure on the part of scholars to recognise the many,
intertwined layers of each society's consciousness.^^ Vico's conception of
philology was intertwined with his il mondo delle ruzzioni (world of nations)
for philology included not only political history and the history of thought
but also every other aspect of human expression. Vico was concemed with
nature (from ruitura [Latin] and nascimento [Italian] meaning birth), not
as the natural world but as the make-up, or essence, of nations. Thus an
examination of the nature conunon to aU nations was fundamental to his
study of the historical development of cultures.ê His science was composed
of language, myth, Uterature, reUgion, law and economics - which together
formed the basis of his new art of criticism.^? He asserted that the truth
inherent in myths had not been recognised by earlier scholars, because they
possessed neither the desire nor the method necessary to discover the beliefs
and assumptions (both false as weU as trae) which coloured aU that men
thought and did.^* Scholars lacked not just the historical method but also
an historical sense, an awareness of how history moved, of how tiie past
seemed to the past.
Vico maintained that it was possible to obtain historical knowledge both
of past societies and of their shared ways of thinking and feeling precisely
because of these shared attitudes and prejudices. He argued that it was
possible to do so because the aggregate of any social group had its own
special unity which could be recreated. This was not a transcendental guiding
spirit (Vico reserved that role for divine providence in aU societies, and one
must never forget that there is no convincing evidence that Vico was not a
devout CathoUc, pace Badaloni), rather it was tiie spirit, tone or personality
of each particular culture which he sought. He stressed that if one is to

understand man, one must think of him as a social being. This assertion
alone suffices to explain Vico's strong disagreement with the Hobbesian
belief in man's anti-social behaviour. For Vico, unlike Hobbes, Baruch
Spinoza (1632-77) and Locke, the break between the sciences and the arts
was so radical that he never considered it possible to be equally interested in
both the natural elements of human development and in the social element,
although he did not consider the sciences to be useless.2^
There existed a point of genuine concurrence between Vico's views and
the those of the natural law and social contract theorists; they all accepted
that man needed not just a social context but a legally structured one and
attempted to explain the issue of exactly how society was formed. Indeed
Vico agreed with (although in his writing he only attacked) the social
contract theorists in respect to his view that the initial social contact between
primitive peoples was made out of fear - fear of the state of nature for
Vico, fear of other men for Hobbes - and that consequently the weak were
then free from the arbitrary decisions of the strong. On this point Vico and
Hobbes diverge shaφly. Leon Pompa sums up Vico's view very weU: Vico
refuted the basic tenet of the social contract theorists, for in his view society
could not rest upon a contract or agreement because contacts and agreements
rest upon a promise, which was dependent upon an understanding of what
a promise is, which in tum only comes about via social upbringing.^"
The natural law theorists asserted that man had certain rights which
were his inalienable etemal possessions, among them the power of reason.
Although a paraUel might be drawn here between Vico's belief in senso
comune, which was shared by all peoples at aU time, he denied that man
had natural, inalienable rights at any time, much less the power of reason at
all times. For Vico man never had inalienablerightsnor did man always have
the faculty of reason, enabling him to tell right from wrong. Vico rejected
both ideas because they failed to take into account notjust the issue that man
is socially conditioned but that he is historically conditioned.î
6. Historical Knowledge
Vico insisted on the uniqueness of historical knowledge and the special

role of imaginative insight.' Imaginative knowledge, produced by the
faculties of memoria, fantasia arui ingegno, was for Vico the fundamental
form of human knowledge. The universali fantastici functioned not only
as a conception of primitive thought, but also as a principle of human
knowledge itself.2 Historical knowledge had precedence for him over aU
other types of knowledge, especially scientific; theological knowledge was

always exempted fi-om his discussions. It was, and to some extent stiU is,
accepted that historical knowledge was not studied more because there was
not a widespread belief in its usefulness. Vico never stated that societies
learn from the past, thus it is not at aU clear how the loss of knowledge
regarding the past would affect a society. He had no new ideas regarding
the civic virtues that children should absorb, but a modem variation of the
repubUcan virtues, the philosophy of man, expounded by Petrarch, Valla,
Ficino, Pomponazzi and especially Pico can be assumed to have been Vico's
model.3 Vico's decision to omit 'La pratica' (1731) from the last edition
was perhaps because it encouraged the idea that practical application was
something extemal to his science.* No ideal society was ever presented in
Vico's writings either as a model or a goal because he simply was not
concerned with the shaping of society in the future, but ratiier with analysing
the social engineering of the past.^
Vico's entire theoretical structure was based on a belief in senso comune
and in a dizionario di voci mentale, which, although elegantiy simple
concepts, were at the same time infinitely more sophisticated than the
first words of prinütive peoples. This dependence in Vico's system on
some sort of instinctive inner knowledge can also be blamed for serious
problems: that the human mind measures things by itself, that men ignorant
of the past would judge it by the present, and the conceitedness of nations
and scholars.^
Yet for aU of the dangers inherent in reUance on inner knowledge and
because of tiie need to avoid them, Vico maintained that the histories of
obscure times could only be known if we comprehend the human nature
of that time. Vico was attracted by the notion that every culture believed
its views to be rational, correct and just, and perhaps what he wanted most
of aU was to know what caused such a belief to arise. Vico viewed human
nature, language and society as gradually evolving entities, and held that
only with a proper understanding ofhuman nature, language or society could
the temper, attitudes, prejudices and preferences of a particular period of the
past be reconstiOcted.
Vico never regarded poetry as distinctftômhistory. His view that poetry
was an.immature phase in the development of the human nünd was not
entirely meant as criticism of this phase. He considered the poetic mentality
in a far fi-om positive light.^ Vico was extremely critical of early law and
religion for their cradeness, falsity and failure to satisfy the demands and
longings for reUgion, but at the same time he extolled the benefits of
imagination in almost every area of early human activity.* This contradiction
is at the very heart of his work, and if an attempt is made to explain away
these differences, something intrinsic in Vico's work is lost.^ His contempt

for early societies was reserved for the so-called savage people and religions;
for early poetry itself Vico had nothing but respect, almost awe.'"
According to Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) and Verene, sensation was a
form of primitive thought for early man because only for beasts does each
new sensation cancel the last." But for Vico it was the attempt to reconcile
the human conditionto its social and physical environments through the
creation of myths which was the first stage of human mental development
- that the comparison of the unknown to the known, the stories, and the
questioning were necessary elements even at this initial stage. There is,
then, a distinction here between the view of primitive thought propounded
by Cassirer and Verene, which classified instinctive reactions along with
mental capacities, and that of Vico (not in spite of, but because of, his
interest in imagination), who was concerned with the first manner in
which human creativity was transmitted.'^ Although one could argue that
in primitive societies perhaps the earliest insights were lost in the senses,
now the problem is that everything is reduced to closely defined concepts
and categories. For example, it is now sadly the case that far too often
historical evidence is examined in isolation from thefindingsin other fields.
Disciplinary boundaries today oppose the discovery of new knowledge, and
tiie term interdisciplinary is often taken to imply undisciplined or vague,
(fronically, these are charges often made regarding Vico's writings, when
an attempt is made to fit his ideas into an existing theoretical system.)
Vico made no such distinctions in his work. Factum comprised all the
historical artefacts - society, law, marriage, reUgion and burials - of which
he desired to make use.'^ It is at this point that one sees the profound
significance of his belief that only by making something can we hope to
understand it, and thus we can only hope to understand events in the past
if we re-make them by means of our own imagination. Law was a prime
example of the collective mentaUty, and the legal system, not surprisingly,
was considered by Vico to be the crowning achievement of his age, because
it was an example of human creativity uncopied from any Platonic abstract
original.
Vico was intensely concerned with the construction and fashioning of
the mondo civile. This civil world, he stated, issued fi-om a mind often
diverse, at times quite contrary, and always superior to that of the particular
individuals concerned.'* Vico considered it possible to grasp the thinking
of these early societies precisely because 'the world of civil society has
certainly been made by men, and that its principles [can, because they
must, be rediscovered] are therefore to be found in the modifications of
our same human mind' ('che questo mondo civile egli certamente έ stato
fatto dagli uomini, onde se ne possono, perche se ne debbono, ritruovare

iprincipi dentro le modificazioni delki nostra medesima mente umaruL')P^
This is the reverse of the eighteenth-century belief in preformation, a view
that aU physical variations of human kind were present in the first people
- a type of Russian dolls effect. Vico's argument was exactly the opposite,
that we hold in our subconscious minds the whole of the development of
the human race, including even the most savage forms of thought and
action, and that it is not only possible but mandatory that we attempt
to unlock this knowledge using aU methods possible - most specifically
an analysis of the potentialities of 'our same human mind'. According to
Berlin, these modifications were 'stages of the growth, or of the range or
direction, of human thought, imagination, wiU, and feeUng, into which
any man equipped with sufficient/awiajra (as weU as rational methods)
can "enter'".'^ According to Vico, such an activity could only lead to the
acquisition, not the loss, ofjudgement.'^
7. Fantasia
Imagination had tiie central role in tiie constitution of experience and phi
losophy in Vico's thought. He wanted to discover the connections between
forming an imaginative universal with the making of a story or myth and its
physical connection (for example, fear and thunder). According to Vico it
was the universalifantastici, which were defined by him as fables in brief,
caused by fear and shame, which enabled early man to fix his attention on
an object botii powerful and significant.' These imaginative universals were
indistinguishable for Vico from primitive ti10ught,2 and because oftiushe
maintained tiiat there were as many distinct cultural worlds as there were
varied conditions regarding their birth and development.^
Vico would have disUked the term 'rigorous' used as the opposite of
'imaginative', even though he himself stated that imagination was strongest
in the most fluid, least regimented stages of development in a society. He
would not have accepted the impUcation that to be rigorous was to be rational
and that this was thus the only stage worthy of interest. When Vico wrote that
imagination decreased as reason increased, he referred to poetic creation, not
to the spirit of a social group or to the recoUective faculty. According to
Vico, we have now lost the imaginative foundation on which understanding
of the world rests.* This does not contradict his belief in the particular logic
of each age, which was necessary for the formation of a fuUy functioning
society. Vico's emphasis on imagination did not endanger the uniqueness of
the intervening stages.^
Vico did not desire to return to the barbarism of early societies, but he
argued that it was possible for us to examine these first social groups
with our own training and prejudices and to discover admirable traits and
achievements which we wiU never be able to duplicate. History was for
Vico an ever deepening type of apprehension of the historical world.^ Each
culture has some feature not found in any other, and we cannot eUminate any
of these stages of development, for each phase of a society is as essential as
any other.7
Vico was occupied with the basic structures of the imagination. He
asserted this was the way to get away fi-om the disembodied history based
on stereotypes from literary evidence which dominated in his time. Vico
maintained that ideas captured through reading were generally not typical of
popular culture. This was, certainly, much more true in his time than today.*
To him the greatest advantage of non-literarysources was that, since they
were not designed to inform, they were not designed to inform selectively.
Modern scholars extrapolate from this premise to use buildings, monuments
and the lay-out of cities as historical sources.^
Vico rarely discussed ancient, mediaeval or early modern views of
imagination.'" He did not discuss the standard topics, ancient or modern,
of imagination - sensation, forms, fantasms or reality. Nor was he proto-
Romantic in his inteφretation. Imagination was for Vico best defined as
creativity, not simply as images. Vico took the raw concept of imagination,
without any philosophical niceties, and applied it to early societies. This is
surprising, given Vico's inteUectual development; it would have been more
natural for him to have discussed imagination in a more technical sense.
For in his time imagination was being added to the inteUectual agenda, as
demonstrated by many thinkers of the time (Descartes and Shaftesbury, to
give two very diverse examples) who felt it necessary at least to dismiss the
role of imagination.
As was discussed in Chapter 1, there was not a radical epistemological
break in Vico's thought. Cartesian thought was shed in a natural and gradual
process as Vico tumed his attention more and more to language and societies.
At no point did he become wholly anti-scientific. Nevertheless his tum
toward social and historical issues was encouraged by the neo-Platonic
writers that Vico absorbed during his years at VatoUa. Pico spent most of
his treatise, De imaginatione, condemning the evils of imagination." Yet,
as was discussed above, it now seems clear that it was from Pico that Vico
gained his fascination with the topic. That Vico had benefited greatly from
earlier writers, notably Pico, Bacon and Descartes, in no way diminishes
his own achievement. It was the unique synthesis of the concepts of history,
society and imagination which made his work so vital.
Imagination was for Vico a true faculty in the production of images.'^

Myths and fables were used by him as the basis for the construction of
prinütive peoples's world view. Myths were indistinguishable to Vico from
the way of thinking, the mentality, the world view of their creators. For this
reason he argued that analysis of early myths and fables must be done as
much as possible from the vantage points of these same peoples. He was
willing to use any technique or approach to revive these lost mentalities.
For example, he did not view law as radically different from literature
or written histories, as has already been mentioned. This approach Vico
would have seen in the neo-Platonic writers he read at Vatolla, who
discussed imagination, literature and the law in tiie same sections of a
single treatise.i3
These themes recur throughout his writings. His earlier works listed ways
in which to feed the imagination: start children in school late, where they
should then read histories and study geometry, which he viewed as a
necessary tool in the formation of an inventive mind.'* Vico's discussion
of the propereducational system for the children of his time becomes
more theoretical when it is remembered that he compared the early Greek
mentality to that of a child. Later he asserted that this was the same for
aU early societies.'^ Thus by discussing education, Vico was also arguing
by analogy for the correct means of analysing, if not encouraging, proper
development in early societies.
It should be noted that Vico occasionally discussed creative topics,
in the traditional sense. In De antiquissima italorum sapientia in the
section entitied 'De certa facultate sciendV ('On the Faculty Peculiar to
Knowledge') Vico asserted that topics - the art of determining arguments
and finding subject matter in rhetoric - should be considered simultaneously
inventive and critical. His sfress on imagination became even more marked
in the later works.
The concept of memory is presented by Vico as not quite identical to or
tiie mirror image of, imagination. In the 1744 work he wrote tiiat memory
has three aspects: memory when it remembers things, imagination when it
alters or imitatesthem and invention when it gives them a new turn or puts
them into proper arrangement and relationship.'^ In this brief passage he
tied together the three concepts of menwria,fantasia and ingegno. AU three
stages - recollection, inütation and invention - were necessary in order for
a society to pass on their cultural heritage, with the addition of their own
particular contribution. Vico did not clearly distinguish between memory
and imagination, because he considered tiiat the differentiation between
man's primary faculties - memory, imagination and invention - was not
at aU relevant to his discussion.'^ Thus although Vico identified myth as tiie
master key to his science, it is the concept of imagination, with its recreative
and recoUective functions, which provides the content and explanation ofhis
thought.
8. Other biterpretations
Vico was certainly an historicist to the extent that he considered the history of
anything is a sufficient explanation of it.' He wrote that 'doctrines must take
their beginnings from that of the matters of which they treat' ('Le dottrine
debbono cominciare da quando cominciano le materie che trattano')? This
does not imply that Vico accepted the complete history of a particular culture
as simply the sum of its episodic parts. The essential difference is that Vico
asserted the creative elements in society had the capacity to produce wildly
divergent social groups from the same elements. Societies, doctrines or any
social creation are moulded by their initial make-up. It is the manner in which
these elements are combined that determines the final outcome.
Thefimdamentalproblem faced by some of Vico's modem interpreters
is that they wish to fit Vico into the established.tradition of Western
philosophy.3 The traditional philosophical approach has misinterpreted Vico
in two ways. First, it does not accept that Vico considered imagination to
be the prime i f not the sole capacity involved in the construction of tiie
human world of the past. Yet Vico clearly demonstrated that imagination
was the prime capacity but not the only one. The role of rational thought in
historical reconstruction was acknowledged manytimesby Vico, but he did
not dweU long on it, because it was hardly an exciting discovery.* Second,
it does not accept that there are areas in which it is the imagination rather
than reason which is required if we are to gain such understanding of lost
stages of civiUsation as to recognise them as our own history.^ Vico's stress
on imagination did not imply that he meant that philosophers in the age of
men must fall back on the cognitive apparatus of the previous ages. Quite
the contrary, he claimed that poetic mentality was lost to scholars in the final
stage of a civiUsation and that imagination was the only way of retrieving
this period. According to Vico, the discovery of poetic origins in some
way affects our understanding of what it is to be human now.^ A study
of prinütive miui brings us face to face with our own ignorance and the
limitations of our reason. But, unlike primitive man, we can deal with this
ignorance more effectively with rational thought and our own creativity.^
Periiaps the main reason that Vico's concept of imagination has been so
often misunderstood is that it has been taken to encompass only the faculty of
producing images, of myth-making, rather than the whole range of creativity
of a social group, which in turn becomes the identifying mark or badge of

that people. Vico never denied the importance of the development of the
human mind. He himself recognised that it was because of our advanced
mental capacities that we should be able to prevent ourselves from returning
to barbarism. Philosophers criticise Vico on imagination for not employing
categories. But three obvious usages of imagination are clear from a carefiil
reading of his work - imagination as the poetic faculty of early man, as the
spirit of a particular social group and, finally, as the mental process we must
employ in order to reconstruct these lost phases of human history.
It must be acknowledged that if one accepts Vico as a traditional
philosopher in the rational tradition, the key to Vico's thought cannot
be imagination. Certainly imagination has never played such a sustained
role in the thinking of any other major philosopher, with the exception
of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-80), whose work was another deviation from
mainline philosophy. Aristotle thought the seat of the imagination was the
heart, Galen (fl. 2nd century A.D.) thought it to be the brain and Averroes
took a moderate view that imagination was bom in the heart and then
moved to the head; imagination was nonetheless not central to pre-Vichian
diought.8
Vico was decidedly not a conventional philosopher; his work was a
radical break from traditional European thought which at most merely
acknowledged the work done by earlier thinkers on imagination. Vico's
thought was based on a fundamental break with the Platonic tradition, despite
his enormous admiration for Plato, as well as from the much more modern
scientific tradition. He strongly opposed the Enlightenment approach, which
he called French, to human nature by means of an examination of the
physical nature of man and his environment.^ Vico's work was distinct
from that of the philosophes, and it must be remembered that much of it was
written in his Ufetime, which sought to establish the role of the sciences and
undernüne the absolute authority of the church and the state.io Vico's theory
of knowledge not only derives from but also continually rehes on fantasia,
this nonrational quality so derided by the Moderns of his time. It was this
so frequendy ignored or misinterpreted concept of imagination which was
the key to both his thought and his new science.
9. ACritiqueofBerUn
Michelet's Vico was exciting but bears little resemblance to the NeapoUtan
uunker one reads in the original texts.i Croce was very good on myth but
otherwise his work on Vico now seems tedious - there is far too much of
Croce's socio-political approach to life and far too little of Vic0.2 Berlin
was correct to insist on the primacy of culture in Vico and to see history as
a kaleidoscope of cultures. But Berlin misses several crucial topics in Vico.
As his interpretation of Vico is so donunant at the moment, these omissions
represent gaps in Vico studies today which must be addressed.
First, in Berlin's exultation over Vico's presentation of a theory of culture,
he ignored his stress on the basic structures of society.^ Although culture and
society are very closely related concepts, the terms are not synonymous.
Culture for Vico comprised the diversity of social groups; society was the
shared characteristics and structure of development. One of the important
reasons Vico studied early societies was that they provided a model, a basis
for comparison, for more advanced social groups regarding the essential
components of a society.^ Vico desperately wanted to know exactly which
elements were necessary for the composition of a society. What aU three
of these interpreters have failed to come to grips with is that Vico's work
was concerned the idea of society, most especially the development of
society. Michelet's Romanticism, Croce's modified Idealism and Berlin's
Liberalism have taken them down very different paths, but they have
somehow aU missed, or considered too obvious for a prolonged examination,
the notion of society. The more recent inteφreters of Vico, who see Vico
fiindamentally as a political thinker, have a valid point in their insistence on
Vico's commitment to the issue of the development of a society.5 For Vico
did indeed care passionately about the origins, make-up, composition, the
very essence of societies, which are composed of human social institutions
such as famUies, reUgion, law and poetry.
It was imagination which brought aU these human artefacts into being,
and it was imagination which distinguished one society or culture from
another, differentiated by exactly how its people married, prayed and died.
Vico's historical psychology of history is the dynamic element of cultural
development.^ The problem which was never solved by Vico or any of his
interpreters arises when one tries to draw conclusions regarding what sort
of general scheme can be concocted from a collection of mentalities.
The reason Vico desired historical knowledge and devised his plan of his
torical reconstruction was because he wanted to obtain specific information
regarding actual societies of the past; he would then be able to compile a
list of similar components of aU societies. Thus his cycles, for example, are a
means to these social groups, and hence to the concept of society itself. Vico
cared more about the abstract concept of society than about reconstructing
various past civilisations. Although presently we may be more concerned
about gaining isolated glimpses of the past, every indication supports the
view that Vico himself cared more about the general concept. Indeed
every term in his highly idiosyncratic vocabulary leads one back to the
notion of society, without which the rest of his intellectual framework has
no meaning.
Second, Berlin's insistence that Vico's work was a radical break both
with the Platonic tradition and with the modem scientific tradition, thus
leaving no permanent values or standards, is highly useful as far as it goes.
Nonetheless Beriin does not retum to this point, except in passing, to discuss
senso comune or the dizionario di voci mentale, the shared beliefs which do
transcend all cultures, the bond between societies, without which there would
be no way ofcomparing, much less comprehending, such disparate societies.
Vico's concern with the countless configurations of uiüversal human nature,
first mentioned in the early orations, was continued in the later works in his
discussions of senso comuneP According to Vico, the best means we have of
ever understanding collective actions and events of the past is by examining
the elements of senso comune. These shared attitudes are the only method
left to us to discover not only the ways pre-literate societies thought and felt,
but also the only means of explaining their actions, although this is much
less effective. Without senso comune or the dizionario di voci mentale it
would not be possible within Vico's system to make judgements regarding
past societies. For some reason Berlin did not recognise this, although he
very accurately pinpointed this tension in Montesquieu's work: "There is a
kind of continuous dialectic in aU Montesquieu's writings between absolute
values which seem to correspond to the permanent interests of men as such,
and those which depend upon time and place in a concrete situation."*
Exactly the same could be said for the work of Vico, in which absolute
values were called senso comune - slightiy modified by each culture, but
stiU distinct and clearly recognisable - and the dizionario di voci mentale.^
Third, although Berlin discusses/ontoiia, it is listed as only one ofVico's
seven insights, not as the essential and singular means by which historical
reconstmction of the past can proceed and historical knowledge can actually
be gained.'^ The other six Vichian insights were (1) the nature of man is not
static, (2) verum-factum, (3) the distinctive quality ofhistorical knowledge as
opposed to scientific knowledge, (4) a concept of culture and the beginiung
of comparative cultural anthropology, (5) creations of man are forms of
self-expression and (6) as there exist no timeless Platonic principles or
Forms, each human institution must be evaluated in terms of that society
alone." The need to examine senso comune and il dizionario di voci mentale
- missing from Berlin's final point - in relation to cultural values and as
the basis for critical judgements of other societies was discussed above.
Therefore, it is sufficient to note here tiiat each of these six notions is
dependent on the role of fantasia.
Imagination as poetry was an unconscious drive in early man as the

characteristic temper of a society, imagination is unavoidable. Nevertheless
imagination as the means to reclaim past times, lost societies, is a deUberate
effort, requiring rational thought. Vico believed it was possible by means
of fantasia to identify individual strands of change and development in
the midst of la storia ideale eterrui which encompassed the history of all
cultures.'2 It is true that one of Vico's aims was to reconstruct the histories
of some of the major ancient histories known to him (in this way Vico
believed he was providing both a history and a philosophy of humanity); but
this was Umited to references to ancient Rome. It was the method, fantasia
- which he called philosophy - which was ultimately much more important
than the examples - which he called history.'^ Vico's sophisticated usage
offantasia as both an unconscious and a conscious participant in historical
reconstruction was not fuUy articulated by Berlin nor fuUy appreciated as the
fundamental tenet of Vico's thought. Yet it was this so frequently ignored
or misinteφreted concept of imagination which was the key to both Vico's
thought and his new science.
Conclusion
There is at present a great deal of interest in the work of Giambattista Vico.
Historians and philosophers, however, have tended to focus their attention
on Vico's speculative philosophy - an ideal, eternal pattem which dictated
both the development and decline of nations, to Üie relative neglect of his,
admittedly sometimes flawed, efforts to apply his ideas regarding historical
knowledge. Vico's contribution to Westem thought does not depend solely
upon the historical cycles or on any other rather simplistic means of reading
the past backwards.'
Without disparaging the role of reason, Vico felt it necessary to go beyond
it; he argued that only imagination could set our minds free to be able to
investigate the past. Yet his stronganti-French and anti-Enlightenment views
generally would have appeared reactionary to his contemporaries - i f they
had read him - rather than as a revision, albeit a somewhat unconscious one,
of EnUghtenment principles and values. It was Vico's stress on non-rational
factors which separated his work from that of his contemporaries.
Desire for knowledge of the past was a given in Vico's writings. He
assumed that there was a general thirst for knowledge, that knowledge
of the extemal, natural world could never be fully obtained or mastered
because it was ultimately God-made, but that historical knowledge, since
it was man-made, could be grasped. Vico's philosophy of history rested on
several main points.
Senso comune, 'judgement without reflection, shared by an entire class,
an entire people, an entire nation, or the whole of the human race' ('Л
senso comune έ un giudizio senz'alcunoriflessione,comunemente sentito
da tutto un ordine, da tutto un popoh, da tutta una nazione o da tutto
il gener umano') was the vehicle by which he discussed human nature.2
The malleability of human nature was also discussed by means of his
dizionario di voci mentale. This was the foundation of his discussion of
culture, which enabled comparison and criticism of societies very different
from one's own.
Language was, according to Vico, the means by which knowledge of past
culture could be obtained. Vico asserted repeatedly that language forms
minds, and not minds language. He was acutely aware that language moulded
the nünds of later generations of a society, subconsciously teaching them the
attitudes of their forefathers. It was precisely these early beliefs, attitudes,
and fears - still encapsulated in later forms of a language as myths and
143
144 Conclusion
metaphors - which contained the historical information that Vico craved.

Both classical and popular mythology played a large role in Vico's attempt
to unravel the patterns of history, and to Vico mythology went hand-in-hand
with ritual and religion.
Vico asserted that he had found in history what he had earlier searched
for in jurisprudence: eternal truths regarding historical development and
historical knowledge, which transcended the mere acquisition of facts.
Vico's discussion of history always had to do with distinct cultures and
the idea of society. He was a social theorist in the sense that he wished to
exanüne social groups (not those within a society, but separate cultures) and
how they developed, in a similar, yet an independent and individual fashion.
It is curious that, apart from a few references to pre-Homeric Greece, Vico
did not put his own ideas concerning historical reconstraction into practice.
Nevertheless tiiere is much to be learned from Vico not only conceming
historical knowledge but also regarding the practice of history. Within the
tangled web of his ideas one finds his caveats regarding scholarly and
national conceit, anachronistic tendencies and various other presumptions
conunon when regarding the past - these were aU based on Vico's belief in
the creative power of the human mind.
Vico's originaUty lies in his historical study of cultures and society. His
scienza nuova was la scienza dell'uomo (the science, study and knowledge
of man). Imagination, in aU its various usages, preoccupied Vico. Indeed
without imagination his theoretical stracture of history would be a very
rough and incomplete notion. It was imagination, in the form of early poetry,
which was the instrament, tiie means, of his study of early societies. It was
imagination which embodied the spirit of a particular age of an individual
culture. The faculty of imagination which produced early myths, laws or any
other social institution, was identical with the faculty which created culture
as a whole. Vico also had a third, distinct usage of the term: imagination
which enables us entrare and descendere into the nünds of these grossi
bestioni. Gross, disgusting brates may be the way in which he described the
first men, while not dinünishing his desire to comprehend their prinütive,
pagan and peculiar (in Vico's estimation) ways of thinking and feeling. This
information was essential if any trae apprehension of their society and the
history of that time was ever to be gained.
Vico's writings reveal a thinker who spent his youth, once he left formal
schooling and university, reading neo-Platonic writers and thus Renaissance
concepts of history and imagination. As he grew increasingly disillusioned
with his own personal and professional life, he abandoned even the few
references in his own writings to the fashionable topics of histime- physics
and mathematics, in particular. Rather than a sharp epistemological break.
Conclusion 145
there was a gradual development and narrowing of his interests, to the

point that by the 1730 edition of La scienza nuova his central themes of
imagination and historical knowledge are unmistakably clear. A parallel can
be drawn between Vico's own intellectual development and his discussion
of the development of a society in which transitions are both natural and
gradual, producing a theoty of change much more sophisticated than that
of Hobbes. To those familiar with his earUest works, Vico's stress on the
importance of imagination and history comes as no surprise, since their
outline was clear as early as in the first six orations. II diritto universale is
arguably more powerfiil (although adnüttedly even more obscure) than any
of the versions of La scienza nuova. The critical point here is not an argument
about texts, but a better understanding of these Vichian concepts; this can
be achieved only by a familiarity with the fuU range of Vico's theoretical
writings.
This contention ihatfantasia was Vico's central theme is one which wiU
hopefully be of interest to those who approach Vico from the philological,
literary, legal and philosophical traditions and even to those with diverse
readings of Vico. One of the best arguments in support of this interpretation
is that it can be effectively defended from almost any or aU of his theoretical
writings, including the most famous work. Not only does this view enlighten
us regarding Vico's inteUectual development, but it unifies to some extent
the whole of his thought, by means of a common, far too often ignored,
element. Nevertheless until modern editions and translations are made of
the first six orations, // diritto universale and the 1725 and 1730 editions
of La scienza nuova (in particular), it is unlikely that scholars wiU begin to
include these works in their discussions, and thus many important tenets of
Vico studies, such as the validity of the epistemological break, wiU not be
properly addressed or debated.
For Vico an historical consciousness demanded an awareness that any
society under discussion was part of an ancient continuum of one society
slowly becoming another, distinct and yet fanüüar. Thus a Vichian study of
the past, particularly of one's own culture, would lead to self-awareness on
the part of the historian of her own smaU role in the history of her society.
Although Vico wrote of a changing human nature, certain elements such
as senso comune allow investigation into these intriguing, seemingly lost
cultures of the past. The corresponding development of the human nünd and
of society was central to his own thought, and indeed was responsible for
much of the hostiUty towards the reception of his work in the late eighteenth
century.
Vico offered a way of thinking about history, as weU as the means to
discover, or recover, aspects of the past. He did not proffer his theories as
146 Conclusion
an infallible method, though he was not averse to calling his identification of

the storia ideale eterna an eternal truth. Rather he made a call for caution:
Che dense notti di tenebre, che What dense nights of darkness must
abisso di confusione non dee our minds encounter, in what abyss
ingombrare e disperdere le nostre of confusion must they not be lost,
menti messe in ricerca di qual as they search for the nature, the
natura, di quai costumi, di qual customs and the kind of government ,
sorta di goverao dovette essere which ancient Rome must havehad,
Roma antica, della quale non unable to draw upon any likeness,
possiamo dalle nostre nature, no matter how remote, with our own
costunu e governi fare nessuna, nature, customs and governments?
quantunque lontanissima, Let even our most ingenious
simigUanza! Impegnino pur i [scholars] employ aU their
nostri ingegni tutta la loro acuteness, or rather shaφ-
acutezza o piu tosto arguzia wittedness, to support the
per poter mantenere la reliability of our recollections,
riputazione alla nostra which are indeed of great
. . . memoria, giäinvecchiata age.3
in cio . . .
Vico was aware much more than some of his foUowers (it may not be
altogether fair, but one sometimes receives the impression that the imagi
native method, without empirical verification, was aU that was necessary to
Collingwood) of the dangers of relying only on his imaginative method, and
of the importance of verifying its results furnished by every rational means
available. That Vico's concept offantasia has its limitations is an important
realisation, for only then can one make proper use of it to obtain the historical
knowledge which is sought.
> •·--
Notes
CHAPTER 1: VICO'S DSiTELLECTUALDEVELOPMENT
1. Vico's Orations (1699,1700,1701,1704,1705,1707) and His

Supposed Epistemological Break (1710)
1. On the widespread belief in Vico's epistemological break, see, for exam

ple, the volumes of articles compiled by the Institute for Vico Studies
(New York): G. TagHacozzo and H. White (eds), Giambattista Vico:
An International Symposium (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1969). G. Tagliacozzo, D. P. Verene (eds), Giambattista Vico's
Science ofHumanity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).
G. TagUacozzo, M. Mooney and D. P. Verene (eds), Vico: Past arui
Present (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1981). G.
Tagliacozzo, M. Mooney, and D. P. Verene (eds), Vico and Contem
porary Thought (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press,
1979, φt. London: Macmillan, 1980) reprinted from Social Research,
43, Nos. 3-4 (1976).
2. Useful studies on Vico's intellectual development include N. Caraffa,
Gli studi giovanili e I'insegruimento accademico di G. B. Vico (Urbino:
Melchiorre Arduni, 1912); and N. Badaloni, Vico prima della Scienm
Nuova (Rome: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1969).
3. Autobiography, pp. 3-54.
4. Anthony Kenny, Descartes: A Study of his Philosophy (New York:
Random House, 1968) pp. 3-13. On the Cartesian influence in Italy see
the following extremely useful work: B. de Besauc61e, Les Cartesians de
ritalie (Paris: Auguste Picard: 1920); also E. Garin, 'Cartesio e l'ItaUa',
Giomale Critico della Filosofia Italiarui 3rd series, Year 29, 4 (1950)
385-405; and F. Bouillier, Histoire de laphilosophie cartesienne, 2 vols
(Paris: Durand, 1854, 3rd edn (Paris: Delagrave, 1868).
5. Giambattista Vico, Le Orazioni Inaugurali, II De Italorum Sapientia e
le Polemiche, G. Gentile and F. Nicolini (eds) (Bari: Laterza, 1914)
pp. 3-67. The preferred version of the Orations is now: Giambattista
Vico, Le Orazioni InauguraliI-VI (Bologna: П Mulino, 1982), the first
completed volume of the new edition of Vico's collected works by the
Centro di Studi Vichiani. Hereafter as the Orations. See: Salvatore Monti,
Sulla tradizione e sul testo delle orazioni inaugurali di Vico (Naples:
Guida, 1977); and Maria Donzelli, Natura e humanitas nel giovane Vico
(Naples:Istituto itaUano per gU studi storici, 1970) pp. 30-68.
4 6. Giambattista Vico, II Diritto Universale, F. NicoUni (ed.) (Bari: Laterza,
1936) 1 vol. bound in 3.
147
148 Notes
7. Descartes: Corresporuiance, C, Adam and G. MiUiaud (eds), 8 vols,

(Paris: F61ix Alcan, Presses Universitaires de France, 1936-63). R.
Descartes, The Essential Descartes, M. Wilson (ed.) (New York: Men
tor, 1969, rpt. Scarborough, Ontario: Meridian, 1983). R. Descartes,
Oeuvres de Descartes, C. Adam and P. Tannery (eds), 12 vols and sup
plement (Paris: Leopold Cerf, 1897-1913). R. Descartes, Philosophical
WorL· ofDescartes, E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (trs), 2 vols
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967). On sensus communis,
see Descartes, Discours de Ui mithode; ReguUie ad directionem ingenii,
ХП; and Vico, 1744, §142, 145.
8. Descartes, Discours de la methode. Vico, Autobiography.
9. Vaia., Regulae addirectionem ingenii, ХП. Vico, 1744, §1406.
10. ftid., Discours de la mithode, П. Kenny, p. 4. 1744, §330. 1725, П, 7,
Corollary, on the problems of implementing such a scheme.
11. K>id. Autobiography.
12. n>id., Discours de lamithode, I. See the very useful article by Yvon
Belavel, 'Vico and Anti<ârtesianism', G. Tagliacozzo and H. White
(eds), Giambattista Vico: An Internatioruil Symposium, pp. 77-91.
13. Vaid., p. 77. Autobiography, pp. 21-22.
14. De antiquissima italorum sapientia. Autobiography (Part A, 1725).
15. Belavel, p. 77.
16. Autobiography. Descartes, Discours de la mithode, I .
17. Autobiography. Descartes, Discours de la mithode, VI.
18. Descartes, Regulae ad directionem ingenii, Vn, Vffl, ХП.
19. ftid.
20. ftid.
21. Belavel, p. 80.
22. Descartes, Regukie ad directionem ingenii, Ш.
23. See: Objections V and RepUes', in Haldane and Ross (trs), The Philo
sophical WorL· ofDescartes, pp. 135-203.
24. n>id.
25. 1744, §34, 204-210, 400-403.
26. De antiquissima italorum sapientia, I.2,1.1,1.3.
27. 1744, §349-360.
28. De antiquissima italorum sapientia I, П, ΠΙ. C. Ciranna, Sintesi di
storia della filosofia (Rome: Ciranna, 1986) vol. 2., pp. 138^146,
esp. 139.
29. 1744, §331.
30. Descartes, 'Objections YW, and Replies', in Haldane and Ross (trs), The
Philosophical WorL· ofDescartes, pp. 79-122.
31. ftid.i725,I,l.
32. Descartes, ReguUie ad directionem ingenii (I). 1744, §142, 1406.
33. Autobiography, pp. 30-31. De nostri temporis studiorum ratione, V.
34. n>id. 1744, §159.
35. On 4a scienm gU uominV ('on the science of man'), 1744, §331.
Autobiography, p. 22. See: Belavel, p. 79.
Notes 149
36. IWd. Autobiography, p. 22.

37. Ibid., pp. 3-54.
38. De rwstri temporis studiorum ratione, УШ.
40. Donzelli. Fausto NicoUni, La giovinezza di Giambattista Vico
(1668-1700) (Bari: Laterza, 1932).
41. Vico, Oration I, pp. 72-95.
42. Ibid., p. 82.
43. ft)id., pp. 72-95.
44. J. S. Mill, 'Bentham', in Jeremy Bentham: Ten Critical Essays, Bhikhu
Parekh (ed.) (London: Frank Cass, 1974) p. 3. Rpt. from J. S. MiU,
Dissertations arui Discussions, 2 vols in 4 (London: John W. Parker
and Son, 1859-1875) vol. 1, 1859, p. 333.
45. Oration П, pp. 96-145.
46. Ibid., p. 106.
47. Oration ///, pp. 122-145.
48. Oration IV, pp. 146-165.
49. K)id., p. 148. On the University ofNaples, see Alan Ryder, The Kingdom
of Naples under Alfonso the Magnanimous: The Making of a Modem
State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976) pp. 6-9.
50. Oration V, pp. 166-187.
51. Oration VI, pp. 188-209.
52. U)id., p. 196.
53. U)id.
54. 1744, §283, 319.
55. Descartes, Discours de la methode, I .
56. Ujid., Regulae ad directionem ingenii, X.
57. n>id., Discours de la methode, I .
58. Descartes, Regulae ad directionem ingenii, X.
59. See 1744, §34, 204-210, 400-403.
61. G. F. Pico della Mirandola, On the Imagiruition, H. Caplan (tr) (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1930).
62. See Autobiography, pp. 3-22.
63. U)id.
64. I . Berlin, 'Vico and the Ideal of the Enlightenment', Against the Current:
Essays in the History of Ideas (London: The Hogarth Press, 1979)
pp. 120-129.
65. Vico, /744 {'La pratica'), § 1406-1407.
66. See especially De nostri temporis studiorum ratione.
67. 1744 {'La pratica'), §1406-1407.
68. Mill, p. 24 (Parekh, ed.) and p. 369 (1859 ed.). And see: R. Lef6vre,
L'Humanisme de Descartes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1957) pp. 137-143 on Descartes and cultural development.
69. II diritto universale, De constantia iurisprudentis, ch. 1.1744, § 118,123,
163, 338,
150 Notes
70. Laurence Brcx:kHss article to be pubüshed in the forthcoming History of

European Universities, vol. 2, by Cambridge University Press.
71. See Robert Damton, The Great Cat Massacre arui Other Episodes in
French Cultural History (New York: Basic Books, 1984; 2nd edn, New
York, Random House, 1985), ch. 5, entitled 'Philosophers Trim the
Tree of Knowledge: The Epistemological Strategy of the Encyclopedie',
pp. 191-213.
2. Verum ipsum factum
1. Donald Kunze, 'Giambattista Vico as a Philosopher of Place: Comments

on a Recent Article by Mills', Transactions ofthe Institute ofBritish
Geographers, N.S. 8 (1983) 239.
2. De antiquissima italorum sapientia, I I .
3. Vico in his reply to Article 10 of Vol. 8 of the Giomale dei letterati
d'Italia (Venice, 1711), E. Gianturco (tr, ed.) On the Study Methods
of Our Times (bidianapoUs: Bobbs-MerriU, Library of Liberal Stud
ies, 1965) p. xxxi. Paolo CristofoUni (ed.) Vico: Opere Filosofiche
(Florence: Sansoni, 1971) p. 156.
4. 1744, §331.
5. ftid.
6. Antonio Pdrez-Ramos, Francis Bacon 's Idea ofScierwe and the Maker's
Knowledge Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
7. De antiquissima italorum sapientia, П, 1. 1744, §331, 349, 376. Less
controversial than his other writings on Vico but very useful is the
article by James Morrison, 'Vico's Principle of Vemm isFactum and
the Problem of Historicism', Journal of the History of Ideas, 39,
No. 4 (1978) 579-595. Also R. Mondotfo, II 'verum-factum' prima
di Vico (Naples: Guida, 1969). A. Child, Making arul Knowing in
Hobbes, Vico and Dewey University of California Publications in
Philosophy, 16, No. 13 (1953). Fare e conoscere in Hobbes, Vico
e Dewey, M. DonzeUi, tr (Naples: Guida, 1970). K. Löwith, Vicos
Gruruisatz: verum et factum convertuntur (Heidelberg: Carl Winter,
1968).
8. T. Hobbes, De cive (Paris, 1642) [Bodleian - Seld 4 H.14 Art] and
Leviathan (London, 1651), [Bodleian - A.1 17 Art Seld]Also Perez
Zagorin's exceUent article 'Vico's Theory of Knowledge: A Critique',
The Philosophical Quarterly, 34, No. 134 (1984) 15-30, esp. 2-24.
9. Locke, An Essay Concerning Humane [sic] Uruierstanding (London:
EUz. HoU for Thomas Basset, 1690). [Bodleian - LL 24 Art Seld].
Zagorin, pp. 20-24.
10. Zagorin, pp. 20-24. James Morrison, 'Vico's Principle of Verum is
Factum and the Problem of Historicism', pp. 579-595.
11. Zagorin,pp.20-24.
12. R. G. CoUingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1946, New York: Galaxy, 1956, 6th rpt.) pp. 63-66.
Notes 151
13. My thanks to Perez Zagorin for encouraging me to be more explicit on

this point.
3. Categories of Historical Knowledge
1. lsaiah Berlin, Vico and Herder (London: The Hogarth Press, 1976, rpt.
London: Chatto & Windus, 1980) pp. 105-114. Hereafter as Berlin.
2. n>id., p. 108.
3. Certum (certainty) was often identified with authority by Vico, but this
was definitely not inductive knowledge (in the Baconian sense) as Vico
himself wrongly identified it. Berlin, pp. 105-106.
4. n>id.,p.lll.
5. Leon Pompa, Vico: A Study of the 'New Science' (Cambridge: Cam
bridge University Press, 1975) pp. 128-141, ch. 14, entitled 'Philosophy
and Historical Confirmation'.
6. On 4a storia ideale eterna', see, for example, 1744, §348-349.
7. On 'knowledge per caussas', see 1725,1, 12. 1730, §1291. 1744, §345,
358, 630. On Stoic thought, 1744, §130, 227, 335, 342, 345, 387, 585,
706. On Epicurean thought, 1744, §5, 130,135, 335, 338, 345,499,630,
696, 1109.
4. A Critique of Collingwood
1. Benedetto Croce, Lafilosofia di Giambattista Vico (Bari: Laterza, 1911).

The Philosophy ofGiambattista Vico, R. G. CoUingwood (tr) (London:
HowaidLatimer, 1913).
2. R. G. Collingwood, The Historical lmagiruition: An Inaugural Lecture
1935 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935).
3. R. G. Collingwood, The Idea ofHistory, on Herder, pp. 88-93, on Vico,
pp. 63-71. Hereafter as ColUngwood.
4. U)id., pp. 214. See: E. Weinryb, 'Re-enactment in Retrospect', The
Monist 11, No. 4 (1989) 568-580.
5. CoUingwood, pp. 205-234, esp. 214. W. H. Walsh, An Introduction to
Philosophy ofHistory (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1951,
3rd edn, 1967) pp. 48-71. W. Dray, Philosophy ofHistory (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964) pp. 10-15.
6. Patrick Gardiner, The Nature of Historical ExpUmation (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1952, rpt. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968)
p. 30. Paraphrased and discussed by W. Dray, Perspectives on History
(Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980) pp. 13, 21.
7. Dray, Perspectives on History, p. 16. Collingwood, pp. 205-234.
8. Collingwood, pp. 282-302. Walsh, p. 54.
9. Collingwood, pp. 282-302.
10. On entrare e descendere, see 1725, I I , Corollary and ΠΙ, 22, 25 and
1744, 338.
152 Notes
11, Louis Mink, Mind, History and Dialectic: The Philosophy of R. G.

Collingwood (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969) p. 158.
5. Historical Cycles
1. The standard view can be found as early as R. Flint, Vico (Edinburgh:

Blackwood, 1884). More extreme views can be found in the collection,
G. TagUacozzo (ed.), Vico and Marx: Affinities and Contrasts (Atiantic
Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1983; London: Macmillan Press,
1983).
2. See: Pietro Piovani, *Vico senza HegeV, in A. Corsano (ed.), Omaggio a
Vico (Naples: Morano, 1968) pp. 551-586.
3. n>id.
4. Berlin, p. 64.
5. ;744,§1105-1106.
6. ColUngwood, p. 67.
6. Historical Sense
1. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire ofLouis Bonaparte (New York:

bitemational PubUshing Company, 1898) p. 5.
2. U)id., The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, tr n.g. (Peking:
Foreign Languages Press, 1978) p. 9. Der achtzehnte Brumaire des
Louis Bonaparte âmburg, 1885) p. 1.
3. BerUn, 'Discussions on Vico', Philosophical Quarterly, 35, No. 140
(1985) 289. This is a response to Zagorin's article above.
4. Fausto Nicolini, Scritti storici: Giambattista Vico (Bari: Laterza, 1939)
pp. 5-300. In 1693 Vico had written Canzone in morte di Antonio
Caraffa and in 1719 he edited a selection of poems on the occasion
of Adriano Caraffa's wedding to Tesera Borghese. See: Fausto NicoUni,
Scritti vari: Giambattista Vico, pp. 242-243, 248-251.
5. Bruno MigHorini, Storia delUi lingua italiana (Florence: Sansoni, 1960)
p. 548. Revised by T. G. Griffith as The Italian Language (London:
Faber, 1984, 2nd EngUsh edn), ch. 10.
6. H. P. Adams, The Ufe and Writings of Giambattista Vico (London:
George AUen & Unwin, 1935) p. 20.
7. Fausto NicoUni, Giambattista Vico: Opere (MUan, Naples: Riccardo
Ricciardi, 1953) pp. 973-986.
8. Peter Burke, Vico (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) pp. 32-34.
9. NicoUni, Scritti storici, Book 1, ch. 9.
10. C. E. Vaughan, Studies in the History ofPolitical Thought Before and
AfterRousseau (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1925) vol. 1
(of2),pp. 237.
11. BerUn,pp.l37-139.
12. 1744, §349. See G. Vico, 'De mente heroica\ in Scritti vari e pagine
Notes 153
sparse, F. Nicolini (ed.) (Bari: Laterza, 1940) vol. 7 of G. B. Vico:

Opere, pp. 3-22.
13. Zagorin, pp. 24-27.
14. K>id., 28-29. According to Zagorin Vico never clarified who is the
knowing subject of history of the manner to which man's mind made
the history it recounts (p. 28).
15. Preston Ring, 'Thinking Past a Problem', The History ofIdeas, Preston
föng (ed.) (London: Croom Helm, 1983) p. 44.
16. BerUn, 'Discussions on Vico', p. 285.
17. n>id., 290.
18. King, p. 55.
19. Beriin, pp. 108-109
20. King, 53.
21. ftid., p. 22.
22. B)id., pp. 46-49. // diritto universale, De constantia iurisprudentis, I .
7. History as a Science
1. Donald R. Kelley, The Foundations ofModem Historical Scholarship
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), chs. 1-2.
2. F. Bacon, Novum organum (1620), |Bodleian Library, Oxford - Seld 4
H 14 Art]. Zagorin, p. 27.
3. Collingwood, pp. 68-69. CoUingwood's list is here expanded and
modified.
4. On 'Ш boria delle nazionV, see 1744, §125-126.
5. On Ία boria de' dotti', see 1744, §127-128.
6. ColUngwood, pp. 68-69.
7. 1744,Ш04.
8. On the. 'fallacy of sources', see 7725, П on the Twelve Tables.
Collingwood, p. 69.
9. Collingwood. F. A. Wolff (1759-1824) is credited with the insight that
Homer was not an actual historical person, and that the Iliad and the
Odyssey were the result of the coUective Greek mentality. See also K.
Simonsuuri, Homer's Origirud Genius: Eighteenth-Century Notions of
the Early Greek Epic (1688-1798) (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1979).
10. BerUn, 'Discussions on Vico', p. 284.
11. 1744,Û9.
12. Ibid., §356.
CHAPTER TWO: VlCO'S EARLY WIOTDSiGS, 1709-28

2. De nostri temporis studiorum ratione (1709)
1. De nostri temporis studiomm ratione (1709) in Le Orazioni Iruiugurali,

II De Italorum Sapientia e le Polemiche, G. Gentile and F. NicoUni
154 Notes
(eds) (Bari: Laterza, 1914), I . See also G. Vico, On the Study Methods
of Our Time, Elio Gianturco (tr, ed.) (Indianapolis: Library of of
the Liberal Arts, 1965) esp. the excellent introduction. See: Paolo
Rossi, Francesco Васопе: Dalla magica alh scienza (Bari: Laterza,
1957) and Le sterminate antichitä: Studi Vichiana (Pisa: Nistri-Lischi,
1969).
2. n>id., I , X, XI.
3. G. Vico, De mente heroica, in F. Nicolini (ed.), Scritti Vari e Pagine
Sparse (Bari: Laterza, 1940).
4. n>id., Institutiones oratoriae, G. Crifö (ed.) (Naples: Istituto Suor Orsola
Benincasa, 1989) #9, 11, 37, 38, 40, 41.
5. De nostri temporis studiorum ratione, XIV.
6. n>id., Ш.
7. ftid., Vn.
8. n>id.
9. n>id., Vn, Vffl.
10. ftid., Vni, ΠΙ.
11. Ibid.,m.
12. n>id., П.
13. ftid., Х-ХП.
14. n>id., Ι-ΠΙ.
15. n>id., IV.
16. n>id., Vn.
17. n>id.
18. Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', Proceed
ings of the American Philosophical Association, XLVH (1973-1974)
5-20.
19. De nostri temporis studiorum ratione, ХП.
20. David Quint, Origin arui Originality in Reruiissance Literature: Versions
ofthe Source (New Haven: Yale, 1983) p. x, see the preface and ch. 1
on Erasmus (14667-1536).
21. De ru>stri temporis studiorum ratione, VIII.
22. ftid., Vn.
23. Terry Eagleton, The Ideology ofthe Aesthetic (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1990), ch. 2 entitled 'The Law ofthe Heart: Shaftesbury, Hume, Burke',
pp. 31-69.
3. De antiquissima itahrum sapientia (1710)
1. Francis Bacon, De sapientia veterum (1609) in The Works ofFrancis

Bacon, J. Spedding, R. L. Ellis and D. D. Heath (eds) (London:
Longman, 1857-1874) vol. VI, pp. 617-764.
2. G. Vico, De antiquissima italorum sapientia (1710) in Le orazioni
iruzugurali, II de italorum sapientia, e le polemiche, G. Gentile and F.
Nicolini (eds) (Bari: Laterza, 1914), in G. B. Vico: Opere, I , 1.
3. Nicolini supports this view in a footnote to the Due risposte in his edition
Notes 155
of Giambattista Vico, Opere (Milan, Naples: Riccardo Ricciardi, 1953)

p. 310.
4. E. P. Noether, Seeds of Italian Nationalism, 1700-1815 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1951) pp. 48-62, esp. pp. 58-59.
5. Giambattista Vico, Opere, F. Nicolini (ed.) (1953) p. 310.
6. De antiquissima italorum sapientia, ch. Vü, 5.
7. n>id.
8. Voiu., Vn.3; Ш.
9. n>id., Vn.l.
10. n>id., I.2, 3.
11. bid.,V.3.
12. fl)id., Vn.5.
13. lbid., I.3.
14. ftid., Vn.4.
15. ftid.
16. ftid., Vn,5.
17. n>id.
18. n>id., 1,4; Π,Ι.
19. ftid., I, П.
20. Ша., I,3.
21. ftid., Ш.
22. lbid.
23. Ша., Π.
24. n>id.
4. Π diritto universale (1720-22)
1. II diritto universale. De Uno Universi Iuris Prirwipio Et Fine Uno

in Vico': Opere Giuridiche (Florence: Sansoni, 1974), chs. ХХХШ,
LXXXn, CXLW, CUn, CLXX.
2. G. Vico, De constantia philologiae in II diritto universale, Parte 11,
ХП.25.
3. B)id., ХП.ЗЗ.
4. 1725, §272. Comma is in the original edition.
5. // diritto universale, K , XDC, XXDC-XXX, ХХХП.
6. fl)id., x v m - x K .
7. n>id., XV.
8. n>id., ХШ.
9. n>id.
10. Ibid.
11. ftid.
12. ftid., XiW.
13. n>id., XW, XV.
14. n>id., I, at the very beginning of De constantia philologiae.
15. n>id. See the section in Chapter 3 on free wiU.
16. ftid., XV.
156 Notes
17. n>id., ΧνΠ.

18. n>id., XI . . .
19. №id., ХП.9.
20. bid., ХП.
21. njid.
22. Ша., ХП.З.
23. ftid.,Xn.ll.
24. Ibid., 1.5
25. Ша., I.1, VII, XVin.
26. ftid.,I.l.
27. ftid., X I .
5. La scienza nuova prima (1725)
1. Bergin and Fisch, p. 12. La scienza nuova in forma negativa would be

useful if only as a guide to Vico's sources.
2. Ша., p. 16. See also Costa, 45-54.
3. G. B. Vico, La scienza nuova, F. Nicolini (ed.) (Bari: Laterza, 1928),
2 vols, 1113-1487, 1493-1498. See Michael Mooney, Vico in the
Tradition of Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985)
pp. 265-275 on 'Vico's Writings'.
4. H. P. Adams, The Life arui Writings of Giambattista Vico (London:
George AUen & Unwin, 1935) and T. M. Berry, The Historical Theory of
Giambattista Vico (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America
Press, 1949).
5. 1744, §1405-11, especially 1406. See: 1744, Book V on the retum to
barbarism.
6. G. B. Vico, La scierâ nuova prima (1725), F. NicoUni (ed.) (Bari:
Laterza, 1931), 19. Hereafter as 1725.
7. U)id.,41.
8. Ша., §28.
9. Ша., §111 and 1744, §122, 180, 184, 198, 266.
10. Ша., §144- 6, 161-2, 240, 294, 542.
11. 7725,§387-388
12. U)id., §94, 96.
13. 7744,§811,201.
14. See 1725,1.9, 10 and 1744, §330 on the uselessness of texts in such a
study.
15. 7725, §100.
16. 1744, §369-73, 37.
17. 7725, §43.
18. 1744, §255.
19. U)id.
20. U)id., §151.
21. 7725, §210. 1744, §376.
22. 1744, §379.
Notes 157
23. 1725, §108.

24. Π)ία.,§109-111.
25. 7725,§252.
26. // diritto universale, De constantia iurisprudentis, П, TV.
27. 7744, §1104, but see also 1108.
6. Vfto </( Giambattista Vico scritiu da se medesimo (1725,1728)
1. G. Costa, 'An Enduring Venetian Accomplishment: The Autobiography

of G. B. Vico', Italian Quarterly, 21, No. 79 (1980) 46-47. See A.
Battistini, La Degnita della Retorica: Studi su G.B. Vico (Pisa: Pacini,
1975) for an analysis of this work in terms of rhetoric.
2. G. Vico, 'Vita di Giambattista Vico scritta da se medesimo% Raccolta
d'opuscoli scientifici efilologici (Venice: 1728) pp. 145-256.
3. B. Croce and F. Nicolini, Bibliografia Vichiana (Naples: Riccardo
Ricciardi, 1947-1948) 1, p. 194.
4. G. Vico, L'Autobiografia, il carteggio e le poesie varie, B. Croce (ed.)
(Bari: Laterza, 1911) pp. 3-128.
5. G. Vico, The Autobiography ofGiambattista Vico, M. H. Fisch and T. G.
Bergin (trs) (Ithaca and London: Comell UniversityPress, 1944, 1983)
pp. 8-19; die introduction by Fisch is first rate.
6. Gennaro Vico, Carte vichiane donate del Marchese Villarosa per
la massima parte di Gennaro Vico e a lui dirette (BibUoteca
Nazionale . . . di Napoli, XIX B43).
7. n>id., pp. 18-19.
8. G. di Porcfa, 'Progetto ai letterati d'Italia scrivere le loro vite del Signor
Co(nte) Giovannartico di Porc(a', Raccolta, I , 128.
9. See F. Nicolini,La giovinezza di Giambattista Vico (1668-1700).
11. G. Vico, Affeti di un disperato (Naples: Philobiblon, 1948, facs. of
1693). See the introduction by Croce.
12. H. Quigley, Italy arui the Rise of a New School of Criticism in the
Eighteeenth Century (Perth: Munro & Scott, 1921), ch. 1.
13. See Giovanni Santinello, Storia delle storie generali della filosofia
(Brescia: La Scuola, 1979) vol. П, Dell'eta Cartesiana a Brucker,
pp. 520-635, esp. 564-632.
14. P. Giannone, Dell'Istoria civile del Regno di Napoli (Naples; Niccolö
Naso, 1723). See also L. Marini, Pietro Giannone e il giannonismo
aNapoli nel settecento (Bari: Laterza, 1950). G. L. C. Bedani, 'A
Neglected Problem in Contemporary Vico Studies: Intellectual Freedom
and Religious Constraints in Vico's Naples', New Vico Studies, 4 (1986)
57-72.
15. H. Acton, The Bourbons of Naples 1734-1825 (London: Metheun,
1956), ch. 7. See also: S. Woolf, A History ofItaly (London: Methuen,
1979) - the best book in EngHsh on the Kingdom of Naples in the
eighteenth century.
1S8 Notes
16. P. C. Perrotta, 'Giambattista Vico, Philosopher-Historian', Catholic His

torical Review, 20 (1934-1935) 384-410. See M. Rosa, Cattolicesismo
e lumi nel settecento italiano (Rome: Herder 1981) chs. 1-4.
18. n>id.
19. n>id.,pp.lO-ll.
20. Peter Burke, Vico (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) p. 25.
CHAPTER THREE: LA SCIENZA NUOVA, 1725, 1730, 1744
1. The Three Editions
1. See Chapter 2 on La scienza nuova prima.

2. For works on seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Naples see especially
the historical works of NicoUni and N. Badaloni, Introduzione a G. B.
Vico (Milan: FeltrineUi, 1961); and also R. Ajello (ed.), Pietro Giannone
e il suo tempo (Naples: Jovene, 1980).
3. A. Duro (ed.) Concordanze e indici di frequenza dei Principi di игш
Scienza Nuova 1725 di G. Vico (Rome: Ateneo, 1981).
4. G. Vico, Le orazioni inaugurali I-VI, G. G. Visconti (ed.).
5. Granted, the Bergin and Fisch EngUsh translation was pubUshed four
years before the translation of the 1744 edition (1944, 1948).
6. Autobiography, p. 70.
7. On the il dizionario di voci mentale, see: 1744, §144- 6, 161-2, 240,
294, 542, 387, 388.
8. See Nicoliiü edition (8 vols in 11) and Bergin and Fisch translation. The
NewScience ofGiambattista Vico.
9. See the discussion of the Correzioni, miglioramenti e aggiunte in B.
Croce and F. Nicolini, Bibliografia Vichiana (Naples: Laterza, 1948,
2nd ed., vol. 1 (of 2) pp. 49-53.
10. 1725: Books 4 and 5 form less than one-fifth of the total work.
11. 1730: pp. 1-221 of 480 pages disscuss imagination in some detail.
12. Benedetto Croce, entry on Vico in the Encyclopaedia of the Social
Sciences (New York: MacnüUan, 1935) vol. 15, pp. 249-250, esp.
p. 250.
13. M. Sanna, Catalogo vichiano napoletano (Naples: BibliopoUs, 1986).
14. P. CristofoUni, Opere filosofiche (Florence: Sansoni, 1971); Opere
giurdiche (Florence: Sansoni, 1974).
2. Vico'sVocabulary
1. On the development of human institutions: 1744, §239-40, 249. On

mental vocabularies: Ibid., §352.1725, Ш, 43.
2. 1725, Ш.4-5.
Notes 159
3. n>id., II.7 (Part 2, Corollary).

4. B)id., Ш.6.
3. Uniformity of Ideas
1. 1744,m.
2. 'Della discoverta del vero Dante', in Giambattista Vico, Opere, F.
Nicolini (ed.) (1953) pp. 950-4.
3. 1744, §902-4
4. ftid., §1037.
5. 'Della discoverta del vero Dante', p. 950.
6. See Migliorini.
7. 7744, §880.
8. 7725,n.35-36;in.42.
9. Autobiography.
10. 7725,1.5.
11. 7750,§1231.
12. 7725, П. C. E. Vaughan, Studies in the History ofPolitical Philosophy
before and after Rousseau, vol. 1 (of 2) pp. 204-254.
13. ftid., II.4.
14. On innate ideas, 7725,1.1; П.6-7.
15. 7725, П.43.
16. On итагш mente: 1725,1.1.
4. Sapienza volgare
1. 7725,n.2.
2. 7744, §375.
3. Vico's response to the theory that language was artificial: 7725, I.13;
П.7. Further on language: 7725,1.43.
4. 7725,1.13.
5. Ibid., II.2.7. On religion, marriage and burials: 7744, §333.
6. On senso comune: 1725,1; and 7744, §142.
7. But see G. Modica, Lafilosofia del «senso comune» in Giambattista Vico,
(Caltanissetta-Rome: Sciascia, 1983; and his article 'SulRuolo del «senso
comune» nel giovane Vico', Rivista difilosofia neo-scoUistica, 75, No. 2
(1983) 243-262. Also J. D. Schaeffer, *Vico's Rhetorical Model oftiie
Mind: Sensus communis in the De nostri temporis studiorum ratione*,
PhilosophyandRhetoric 14 (1981) 152-67.
8. On language: 7725,1.13; П.7 and ΠΙ.40-43.
9. UDid.,in.l.
10. n>id.
11. G. Vico, 4dea d'urui grammatica filosofica', F. Nicolini (ed.)
Giambattista Vico: Opere (1953) pp. 944-945..
12. On tiie etymologicon: 7725, III.40-43. On the mental words, language
and dictionary: 7744: §144-6, 161-2, 240, 542, 387-388.
160 Notes
13. 7725, Ш.43. See Berlin, Vico and Herder, pp. 129-30, 136.
14. C. E. Vaughan, Studies in the History ofPolitical Philosophy before arui
after Rousseau, vol. 1 (of 2) pp. 204-254.
15. On the recognition of myths and, to a lesser degree, fables and myths
as forms ofcognition see: 1725, II.7, 13; Ш.1. 1744, §220-1, 375. See
issue on 'Myth and Myth-Making', Daedalus 2 (1959).
16. 7725, П.7, Corollary.
17. 1744, §376. Fables as a way of thinking for an entire social group: 1744,
§816.
18. Myths as true narration: 7725, П.
19. Poetic characters as the essence of fables: 7725, II.5-7; 1744, §209,
211-2, 424, 932-2, 935.
20. On generi or universalifantastici: 1744, 34, 204-10.
21. On human utilities: 7725, V; and 1744, §141.
22. On Achilles: 7725, П,4.
23. Vulgar, natural or poetic theology (theogony): 7725, П.7. On i poeti
teologi (theological poets): 1730, §1296.
24. On assumptions regarding mythmaking, see David Bidney, 'Vico's New
Scierwe ofMytW, in Giambattista Vico: An Interruitional Symposium, G.
TagUacozzo and H. White (eds) (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1969) pp. 259-277, esp. 272-274.
25. Nevertheless Vico would have agreed readily with Cassirer that the
reduction of aU myths to a single subject would not bring one closer
to a real, that is to say, an ultimate answer. See Emst Cassirer, Language
andMyth, S. K. Langer (tr) (New York: Harper and Row, 1946).
26. Claude L6vi-Sti:auss, Myth arui Meaning (London: Routiedge & Kegan
Paul, 1978), ch. 4, 'When Mytii becomes History'.
27. n>id. On mytiiology: 7725, П.6-7, 13.
28. 1744, §283, 319, 323.
29. ftid.,' §122,' 18o', 184, 204, 319, 323, 376, 378-9. See also: 7725, Ш,
1.4 . . . ; 7750: §1181-4.
30. 7750, §399.
31. On curiosita: 1725,1.1; П.14. 1744, §189. Negative aspect of curiositä
according to Vico: 7725,1.1. 7750, П, Ш.
32. 7725, §111 andl744, §122, 180, 184.
33. 1744, §375.
34. ftid., §378.
35. ftid., §204.
36. U)id., §283, 319.
37. n>id., §189.
5. Religion and Society
1. References to sacred human history, for example: 7725,1.1, 3; Ш.7; V.3.

7750, §1148, 1184.
2. 7725, I.1. 7750, I ; 1744, 333. Religion, in Vico's writings, is always
Notes 161
separated from Christianity. The modem notion of the evolutionary

development of religion in Vico's writings removes his distinction
between the Gentile and Christian traditions - Jewish history was
seldom mentioned by Vico, for the same reasons that he ignored
Christian history. See especially James Morrison, 'Vico and Spinoza',
Journal ofthe History ofIdeas, 41, No. 1 (1980) 49-68. On this point
Vico agreed with Descartes that there was a зЬаф distinction between
philosophical and mathematical truth, on the one hand, and theological
truth, on the other; for both of them this was the difference between
demonstrable logical truth and revealed theological truth. Vico then, of
course, went one step further to form a third category - history - which
was not rational, but nonetheless comprehensible to man.
3. Berlin believes language, mythology andritesof religion to be the three
most important historical artefacts. See Beriin. Also the conclusion of
Donald Kelley, The Beginning of Ideology, Consciousness arui Society
in the French Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981).
4. Karl Löwith, Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the
Philosophy of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949)
p. 130.
5. ftid.
6. On the social benefits of reUgion and marriage: 1744, §177, 503
(reUgion) and 516 (marriage).
7. Waming against the return to the bestial state: 1744, §333. See 1725, FV,
para. 5.
8. Vico on Locke, for example: 1725, П.1; and 1730, §1122, 1215.
9. On property: 1725, П.15; 1744, §531.
10. On writing, family relationships and age as issues in regard to property:
7725. 1744, §428, 439, 526.
11. Vico attributed the inequality of social classes to imperfect forms of
reUgion, not to technological progress. Nevertheless this discussion has
encouraged countless readers to see Vico as the prototype of Hegel and
Marx. The parallels are obvious (historical cycles, social classes and
some discussion of luxury by Vico), but Vico's reason for discussing
these topics was to identify particular societies and thus detemüne the
make-up of society itself. There were no transcendental or practical
aspects to his work, as later ascribed to him by Croce, Gentile and
CoUingwood. See Giovanni Gentile, Studi vichiani (Florence: Felice Le
Monnier, 1927, 2nd ed.).
6. FreeWiU
1. Human wiU, 'artificer of the world' and onfreewiU: 7725, П, Ш.

2. Vici vindiciae, X.2.
3. 1744, §344; and also 445.
4. 1730, §1191.
162 Notes
5. 1725, Π.
6. 1744, §445.
7. n>id., §352.
8. K)id., §985-999, approx.
9. On libero arbitrio: 1725, I , 1. On ruiturali obbligazioni: 1730, §1269.
On the shift to imagination: 1744, §34, 204-10.
10. See Chapter 2 on the imagination and the wiU.
7. Formation of Sodety: The Taming of Primitive Man
1. 7744.§129,782,1132.
2. On famiHal and civic authority: Ibid., §532, 524.
3. 1744, §201.
4. 7725,1.1. On the taming of primitive man: 1744, §523.
5. Poetry in an educative role: 1744, §379, 502.
6. On marriage: 1744, §505 and especially 516.
7. De rwstri temporis studiorum ratione, VlII.
8. Scholars: 1730, §1140, 1161-2: 1744, §125, most importantly 127, and
492-8 on the logic of the leamed. See De nostri temporis studiorum
ratione, Ш.
9. 1744, §378, and see 399.
10. On the *primi uomini. stupidi, insensati ed orribili', 1744, §374.
11. See 7 744, IV, on the various groupings of three.
12. 7725, П.4.
13. n>id.
14. ftid., П.4. 1744, §1086. See 7725, П, §1345 on the state of the first
cities.
15. 7725. Г/. See also: 7725, Ш.43.
16. 1744,389-90.
17. ftid.
18. ftid., §1073-4.
8. Setti di tempi
1. See Vico: SelectedWritings, L. Pompa (tr, ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1982) p. 88, footnote 14.
2. See 7725,1.1, 7; II.8. Also 7750. §1384.
3. 7725. Ш.43. 1744, §443.
4. On heroes and heroic qualities: 7725. П.17; V.8-9; 7750, §1113. 1744,
§352. 634-61, 832, 958.
5. 1744, V.10, and 1744, V.
6. 1744, §331.
7. n>id.
8. 7750, §1301.
9. n>id., §1151.
10. 7725, П.8-9.
Notes 163
11. ftid.,II.59.
12. Ibid., П.7.
13. Ibid., 11.60.
14. See Donald R. Kelley, The Foundations ofModem Historical Scholar
ship (New York: Columbia, 1970), ch. 1 on Lorenzo Valla.
15. /725,1.5.
16. Ibid., I .
17. Ibid,, 1744, §394.
18. fl)id., §311.
19. See: 7725,1.
20. Vici Vindiciae, Vm, ΧνίΠ.
21. James C. Morrison, 'Vico's Doctrine of the Natural Law of the Gentes',
Journal ofthe History ofPhilosophy, 16 (1978) 47- 60, esp. 52-53.1744,
308-309,311.
22. Ibid., §145, 332-333. 77J0, §1163.
23. 1744, §141.
24. Ibid., §142.
25. n>id., §143; and 7725,1.12.
9. New Critical Art
1. 7725, П.9.
2. 1744, §377 on giants and 670 on the bestial education of giants.
According to Vico giants {i giganti, this term and also i bestioni were
used by Vico to describe the most primitive and savage forms of man)
disappeared because of the development of family structure, which was
related to the fear inspired by the pagan reUgions. {Il diritto universale,
De constantia iurisprudentis, ХШ.)
3. 7725, П.9.
4. 1744, §469.
5. Void.
6. 7725, IV.
7. n>id., I.8.
8. U)id., I.12.
9. n>id.,n.l.
10. 1730, §1204.
11. ftid., §1217.
12. Vbid., §1160.
13. 1744,1.
14. 7750,§1186.
15. 7725,1.6.
16. 1744, i'La pratica') §1405-11, most particularly 1407.
17. 7725, L10.
18. 1744, §374.
19. ftid., §499-501.
20. 7725, П.7.
21. 1744, §201.
164 Notes
22. 7725,1.1.
23. 1744, §378.
24. 7725, П.7, Corollary.
25. Contrast with 7725, IV; this is from 1744,1, §356-8.
CHAPTER FOUR: LANGUAGE, HISTORICAL RECONSTRUCTON AND

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIETY
I . Introduction
1. The standard work is Andrea Sorrentino, La retorica e la poetica di

G. B. Vico (Turin: Bocca, 1927). See also G. Bedani, The Poetic as
an Aesthetic Category in Vico's Scienza Nuova\ Italian Studies, 31
(1976) 22-36. And G. Bianca, II concetto di poesia in Giambattista
Vico (Messina-Florence: G. D'Anno, 1967).
2. G. Lepschy, 'Linguistics', in Developing Contemporary Marxism, Z. G.
Baranski and J. R. Short (eds) (London: Macmillan, 1985) 215. And see
Migliorini.
3. Croce, ch. 5.
4. S. K. Land, 'The Account of Language in Vico's Scienza Nuova: A
Critical Analysis', Philological Quarterly 55 (1976) 354-373.
5. Letter from Donald Kelley, 1 September 1990.
6. P. Burke, 'Language and anti-languages in early modem Italy', History
Worbhop Journal, 11 (1981) 24-32, esp. 31.
7. 1744, §449-454.
8. James Bumett, Of the Origin and Progress of Language, 6 vols
(Edinburgh and London: A. Kincaid and T. Cadell, 1773-92).
9. Dictioruiry ofthe History ofIdeas (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1973) vol. П, p. 669.
10. J. J. Rousseau, Discours sur l'origine e lesfondamens de l'inegalite
parmi les hommes in Collection complete des oeuvres de J. J. Rousseau,
33 vols (Geneva, 1782-89), vol. 1, pp. 50-183, Notes, pp. 184-243. Du
Contrat Social, vol. 2, pp. 1-252. Essai sur 1 'origine des langues, vol. 16,
pp. 217-325. Rousseau addressed the problem that while language
presupposes society, the creation of human society presupposes the
existence of language, but Vico believed the development of the two
could not be separated. On Rousseau, see the Dictionary ofthe History
ofIdeas, vol. 2, p. 669.
II. Bumett, 1773, vol. 1, pp. 174, 272.
12, On the ferini versus the anti-ferini debate see: B. Labanca, G. Vico
e i suoi critici cattolici (Naples: Piero, 1898); G. F. Finetti, Difesa
dell'autorita della sacra Scrittura contro G. Vico, B. Croce(ed.) (Bari:
Laterza, 1936, facs. of 1768); and Apologia del genere итагю acpusato
di essere stato игш volta bestia: Parte I (Venice: Radici, 1768).
Notes 165
2. Vko and Early Language
1. The standard edition of Vico's collected works is F. Nicolini, ed., with

G. Gentile (vol. 1) and B. Croce (vol. 5), G. B. Vico Opere, Scrittori
d'Italia series, 8 vols in 11 (Bari: Laterza, 1911-41).
2. This is now a contention of modem language studies. See: the introduc
tion of E. W. Said, The World, The Text and The Critic (Cambridge,
Mass., Harvard University Press, 1983). See also E. W. Said, Beginnings
(New York: Basic Books, 1975) pp. 347- 372 on Vico as the philosopher
of beginnings.
3. This disparity is particularly obvious in the 1744 edition.
4. Nevertheless Vico was chosen to appraise Valletta's famous library
indicating that Vico was recognized to have been very familiar witii
the libraries of Naples. See the comment by Fisch in the introduction
to his translation of the Autobiography, p. 33.
5. There is a good statement of this in 1744, §779. See also Bedani.
6. De nostri temporis studiorum ratione, Vffl.
7. Croce (Collingwood tr.) p. 54. Laterza rpt. of Italian edition (1980),
pp. 56-57.
8. Samuel Beckett began his essay entitied 'Dante . . . Bruno.Vico
. . Joyce,' 'mOurExagmiruitionRoundhisFactificationforIncamiruition
of Work in Progress, in S. Beckett et al. (Paris: Shakespeare and
Company, 1929), with a criticism of this alUance, which unfortunately
was not argued more fuUy in the essay itself:
The danger is in tiie neatness of identifications. The conception of
Philosophy and Philology as a pair of nigger nünstrels out of the
Teatro dei Piccoli is soothing, like the contemplation of a carefiUly
folded ham-sandwich. Giambattista Vico himself could not resist
the attractiveness of such coincidence of gesture. He insisted on
complete identification between the philosophical abstraction and
the empirical iUustration, thereby annuUing tiie absolutism of each
conception - hoisting the real unjustifiably clear of its dimensional
limits, temporalising that which is extratemporal. (p. 3)
9. 1744, §445.
10. U)id., §449-454. See also: L. Formigiari, 'Language and Society in the
Late Eighteenth Century', Journal of the History of Ideas 35 (1974)
274-292.
11. NicoUni, La giovinezza di Giambattista Vico, p. 133. Vico wrote
'stabiUmmo finalmente da ben venti anni fa, di non leggere piu
libri . . . ' ('I decided a good twenty years ago not to read any more
books...')inl729-30.
12. Croce and Nicolini, Bibliografia vichiana, pp. 91-95.
13. See, especially: the Autobiography. R. Damton, The Great Cat Massa
cre, p. 204.
14. Burke, p. 24.
15. bid., pp. 25-28.
166 Notes
16. Ша., pp. 29-30.

17. See Max Fisch, 'Vico on Roman Law', in Essays in Political Theory
Presented to G. E. Sabine, M. R. Konvitz and A. E. МифЬу (eds)
(Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1948) pp. 62-82.
18. The Vichian approach to mythology (dthough not acknowledged as
such) of symbolic appHcations and hidden meanings has been so much
in vogue in this century that Franz Boas's waming was necessary:
As we may underestimate the poetic value of such trifling songs,
we may easily overestimate the actual poetic value of stereotyped
symbohc poetry that appeals to us on account of its strange imagery,
but that may have to the native no other than the emotional appeal of
the ritual.
See: F. Boas, General Anthropology (ed.) (Boston: Heath, 1938)
pp. 594-595. See also R. Benedict, Pattems of Culture (London:
Routledge, 1961, 5th rpt.).
21. 7725, ΠΙ.
22. S. R. Hopper, 'Myth, Dream, and Imagination' in J. Campbell, Myths,
Dreams, and ReUgion (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1970) pp. 111-137,
esp. p. 113.
23. II diritto universale, De constantia iurisprudentia, ХП, XIX. 1744, §443.
Autobiography, pp. 48-54. Bedani.
3. Language as an Instrument of Human Thought
1. 1744, §445.
2. Montesquieu, L'esprit des loix, 2 vols (Geneva: Barrillot & Fils, 1748)
vol. 1, bks. 14-17, pp. 360-443.
3. Aristotle's Politics, B. Jowett (tr) (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1938, 8th ed.) Book УШ, pp. 300-317. David Hume, 'Of National
Characters' The Philosophical Works, T. H. Green and T. H. Grose
(eds) (Darmstadt: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1964, φ t of 1882 ed.) Ш,
pp. 244-245.
4. Autobiography, pp. 11, 25. And see 1744, §446.
5. I . Beriin, 'On the Pursuit of the Ideal', New York Review ofBooks, 35,
No. 4 (March 17, 1988), 11-18.
6. This argument reinforces BerHn's view of Vico against that of
Momigliano presented in his searching critique of Vico and Herder,
in which he accused both Berlin and Vico of being relativists. See A.
MomigUano, 'On the Pioneer Trail', New York Review ofBooks, 23,
No. 36 (November 11. 1976) 33-38.
7. C. Ottaviano, Metafisica dell'essereparziale (Naples: Rondinella, 1954)
pp. 585-589. Quoted in Bianca, pp. 17-18.
8. On the metaphor, see 1744, §404-405.
9. G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1980).
10. Paraphrase of M. H. Abrams by BerUn. M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and
Notes 167
the Lamp (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953) p. 285. Berlin,
p. 104.
11. Berlin,p.l05.
12. // diritto universale, De constantia iurisprudentia, ХП.11-12.
13. Likewise issues of trade and economic relations are neglected in his
theoretical works, nor is his discussion of family or socio-economic
relations in the villages very sophisticated. Yet Vico wrote four works
which can be termed with some accuracy as historical in nature -
his autobiography, the biography of a Neapohtan general {De rebus
gestis Antonj Caraphaei, 1716), an account of the 1701 revolt of the
Neapolitan nobles (Principum neapolitanorum coniurationis Historia,
1703) and a recital of the War of the Spanish Succession (in In morte
di Апгш Aspermont contessa di Althann, 1724); the second and third
are to be found in Scritti storici and the latter in Scritti vari (1940).
Without wishing to put these four historical works on the same level
as the theoretical works, it must be asserted that they are important, not
only for a fuller understanding of the theoretical works but also, contrary
to die accepted view, because they themselves illustrate aspects of his
methods and interests which do not appear anywhere else in his writings
- in particular practical economic matters.
14. M. Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World, J. O'Neill (tr) (Evanston,
I11.: Northwestern University Press, 1973) p. xiii, from 'An UnpubUshed
Text', pp. 8-9, quoted in the Editor's Preface. La Prose du Monde,
(Mayenne: GalUmard, 1969) pp. 7-14, 'Le fant6me d'un langage pur'.
15. 7725, П.
16. II diritto universale, De constantia iurisprudentia, ХП.10.
4. The History which Vico Sought

1. II diritto universale. De constantia iurisprudentia, XII.
2. 7725, Ш.249
3. II diritto universale. De constantia iurisprudentia, DC.91.
4. Plato: The Collected Dialogues, E. Hamilton and H. Caims (eds)
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982, 11th pr.), Cratylus 414.
5. II diritto universale, De constantia iurisprudentia, I.
6. ftid., I.8. 1744, §331. See 7725, 1.1 on 'natura comune degli uomini'
('the common nature of men').
7. 11 diritto universale, De constantia iurisprudentia, XII. 1744, §34.
8. 1744, §127-128.
10. II diritto universale, De constantia iurisprudentia, I.
11. On art and music as primitive creative expressions, see Boas, ch. 6 on
art (R. Benedict) and ch. 7 on literature, music and dance (F. Boas). II
diritto universale. De constantia iurisprudentia, I.
12. // diritto universale, De constantia iurisprudentia, I.
13. E. Cassirer, An Essay On Man: An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Human Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944) p. 94.
168 Notes
5. Myths
1. R. Caponigri, 'Philosophy and Philology: The "New Art of Criticism"
of Giambattista Vico', Modem Schoolman, 59, No. 2 (1982), 81-116.
2. 1744, §460.
3. Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1942, 2nd edn, 15tii rpt. New York: Mentor, 1951)
p. 17. And see E. Sapir, Culture, Language and Personality (Berkeley:
University of Califomia Press, 1956).
4. W. Smalley, Readings in Missionary Anthropology II (South Pasadena,
Ca.: William Carey Library, 1978) pp. 290-293. My thanks to Walther
Olsen for bringing this book to my attention.
5. Merleau-Ponty, pp. 7-14.
6. 1744,352.
7. Smalley, pp. 292-299.
8. n>id. L6vi-Strauss, pp. 15-16.
9. J. Campbell, 'Mythological Themes in Creative Art and Literature', in
Campbell, Myths, DreamsandReligions, pp. 138-175, esp. pp. 138-144.
See also: J. Campbell, Myths We Live By (New York: The Viking Press,
1972).
10. See Chapter 3.
11. Campbell, Myths, Dreams and Religions, pp. 138-144.
12. C. Ldvi-Strauss, Myth and Meaning, p. 17. Hereafter as L6vi-Strauss.
6. Social Institutions
1. There is a danger here that the people who make the effort to read Vico
(with Michelet as the classic example) often tend to beUeve that there
is something missing in their own lives, societies or academic studies,
and that these people tend thus to distort their interpretations of Vico
so that he seems more out of step with his own time and the European
inteUectual tradition than was indeed the case.
2. 11 diritto universale, De constantia iurisprudentia, П.
3. C. Ldvi-Strauss, Tristes tropiques (Paris: Plon, 1955) p. 421.
4. Smalley, pp. 300-303. See M. EUade, Myth and Reality (New York:
Harper and Row, 1963; London: George AUen & Unwin, 1964)
pp. 141-143. B. Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion and Other
Essays (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1948).
5. 1744, §352.
6. Smalley,pp.303-306.
7. Bjid.
8. See the introduction of Said, The World, The Text and The Critic.
7. Order in Myths
1. This approach is caUed euhemerism, a system which explains mythology
as growing out of real history. See G. Cantelli, 'Myth and Language in
Notes 169
Vico', Giambattista Vico's Science ofHumanity, G. Tagliacozzo and D.

P. Verene (eds)(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1976) pp. 47-63. See also C. L6vi-Strauss, La pensie sauvage (Paris:
Plon, 1962).
2. 1744, §401-929.
3. Croce, p. 62. Croce is exceUent on myth, see his ch. 5.
4. P. Rieff, The Mind ofthe Moralist (London: Victor GoUancz, I960).
5. Smalley,pp.310-317.
6. L6vi-Strauss, pp. 34-43.
7. U)id.
8. Voia., pp. 5-6. The separation between science and mythical thought
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was based on the works of
Bacon, Newton and Descartes, forfromthe Renaissance to the seventeen
century mythology had slipped to the background of Westem thought.
9. U)id., pp. 34-43.
10. On sertso comune, see: 1725,1.1 and 1744, §142.
11. Lakoff and Johnson, pp. 185-194.
12. Michel Foucault, Histoire de Ui folie (Paris: Librarie Plon, 1961);
Madness arul Civilization (New York: Random House, 1965). See the
introduction of Said, The World. The Text and The Critic.
8. Imagination and Historical Reconstruction
1. 11 diritto universale, De constantia iurisprudentia, I . 1744, §34. 'To

conceive his new science Vico beUeved it would be weU to retum to a
state of ignorance, as if no philosophers, phUoIogists nor books had ever
existed' (Vico paraphrased by Croce and translated by ColUngwood.
Croce, p. 26).
2. II diritto universale, De constantia iurisprudentia, I .
3. Ша.
4. See W. Dray, Perspectives in History, ch. 1 on CoUingwood.
5. Rieff, p. xii.
6. 7744,§189andBookn.
7. 1744, §189, 184. See also G. Villa, Lafilosofiadel mito secondo G. B.
Vico (Milan: FratelU Bocca, 1949).
CI^VPTER nVE: ΜΑΟΟίΑΉΟΝ AND HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE
1. faitroduction
1. Fantasia as expressed by poetry: 7750, П. 1744, §367, 375, 379, 381.

2. A notable exception was D. P. Verene's article, 'Vico's Philosophy of
Imagination', Isaiah BerUn's 'Comment on Professor Verene's Paper'
and Verene's 'Response by the Author', in G. TagUacozzo, D. P.
Verene (eds), Giambattista Vico's Science of Humanity (Baltimore:
170 Notes
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) pp. 20-36, 36-39, 39-43, In

the initial article Verene drew a valuable distinction between imagination
as poetry and 'imaginative recollection' - a term devised by Verene
(pp. 25-27). See also his book: Vico's Science ofImagination (Ithaca:
Comell University Press, 1981). The various reviews of his book have
served as a foram for discussion of this essential topic. See the following:
A. Alberti, The Journal of Modern History, 55 (1983) 151-152. L.
Armour, Library Journal, 106 (1981) 887. V. M. Bevilacqua, Quarterly
Journal of Speech, 69 (1983) 444-447. Bibliographical Bulletinof
Philosophy, 29 (1982) 112. A. Blasi, Journal ofthe Behavioral Sci
ences, 19 (1983) 265-266. S. Cain, Religious Studies Review, 8 (1982)
162. A. R. Caponigri, The Modern Schoolman, 60 (1983) 221-224.
Choice, 19 (1981) 226. R. Dupree, The Review of Metaphysics, 35
(1982) 916-917. C. Evangeliou, Philosophia, 12 (1982) 445-447.
B. A. Haddock, Religious Studies 19 (1983) 549-552. D. LoveWn,
Philosophy and Rhetoric, 16 (1983) 55-60. J. Milbank, History of
European Ideas, 4 (1983), 337-342. A. Munk, Journal ofPhilosophy
and Social Science (1984) 356-357. L. Pompa, IntemationalStudies
in Philosophy, 17, No. 1 (1985) 101-103. Psychological Medicine, 12
(1982). R. S. Steven, Ethics, 92 (1982) 792. E. F. Strong, Journal o/the
History ofPhilosophy, 21 (1983) Т1Ъ-П5. Times Literary Supplement,
(Nov. 6, 1981) 1309. W. H. Walsh, British JoUrnal ofAesthetics, 22
(1982)378-380.
3. Fantasia as the spirit of a particular age: 1744, §361- 384 on poetry and
the earliest stages.
4. Fantasia as a means of restracturing, reclaiming the past: 1744, §349,
352-359.
5. William Dray, Perspectives on History, pp. 9-26. W. J. van der Dussen,
History as a Science: The Philosophy ofR. G. Collingwood (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1981).
2. Fantasia as the Poetic, Recreative Instinct
1 G. Lepschy, 'Fantasia e irrunagiruzzione', Lettere Italiane, 39, No, 1

(1987) 20- 34. And see: Luigi Ambrosi, La Psicologia dell'imaginazione
nella storia della filosofia (Rome: Dante Aligheri, 1898, rpt. Padua:
CEDAM, 1959).
2. De rwstri temporis studiorum ratione, ΠΙ.
3. De antiquissima italorum sapientia, V, 3; VH, 4.
4. De nostri temporis studiorum ratione, III, On geometry: De antiquissima
italorum sapientia, I.2; П.1; Ш; TV.2; VIL
5. II diritto universale, De constantia iurisprudentia, XIV-XV. De
antiquissima italorum sapientia, I.2, II.1, Ш, IV.2, Vn.
6. n>id., Vn.l, L
7. // diritto universale, De constantia iurisprudentia, XII.25, ХШ.
8. ftid.
Notes 171
9, Be antiquissima italorum sapientia, Ш.

10. n>id., Vn.5. 1744, §122.
11. See Chapter 2 on De nostri temporis studiorum ratione and La scienza
nuova prima.
12. 1730, §1186.
13. // diritto universale, De constantia iurisprudentia, ΧΏ..2.
14. De rwstri temporis studiorum ratione, П.
15. ftid., Ш. 7725, П.9, 16.1744, §699.
16. 1744, §122, 180, 189.
17. D)id., §189.
18. n>id., §461-462.
19. Vico attacked various authorities on language in Book П of the 1744
edition entitled 'Della sapienza poetica'.
20. Tbid.
21. Cecil Sprigge, Benedetto Croce: Man arui Thinker (Cambridge: Bowes
and Bowes, 1952) ch. 2.
3. Fantasia as the Expression of the Spirit of a Particular Age
1. 1744, §361-384.
2. Berlin, p. 138.
3. J. C. Robertson, Studies in the Genesis of the Romantic Theory in the
Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923)
pp. 179-194, ch. Vm.
4. De antiquissima italorum sapientia, VH. 7750, 1744 П.
5. van der Dussen, 2.5,
4. Fantasia as L· scienza nuova
1. De antiquissima italorum sapientia, Vn. 7750 and 1744, П.

2. Beriin, pp. xvi on human nature. On senso comune, see: De nostri
temporis studiorum ratione, Ш. De antiquissima italorum sapientia,
Vn.5.1744, §142.
3. On the Study Methods ofOur Time, E. Gianturco (tr, ed.) p. xvi.
4. 1744,1.
5. On umana mente, see 7725,1.1 and 1744, §331.
6. 1744,1, section 4, §338- 360.
7. On the dictionary of mental words: 7725, Ш.43. 1744, §144-146,
161-162, 240, 294, 542.
8. 1744, §337.
9. The titles of all three versions of La scienza nuova are as follows:
Principi di una scienza nuova intorno alla natura delle rmzioni per la
quale si ritruovano i principi di altro sistema del diritto naturale delle
genti (1725). агщие libri di G. В. Vico de' Principi di una Scienza
Nuova d'intorrw alla comune ruüura delle Nazioni, in questa seconda
impression con piu propia maniera corulotti, e di molto accresciuti
172 Notes
(1730). Principj di scienza nuova di Giambattista Vico d'intorrw alla

comune rmtura delle nazioni (1744).
10. On pudore, 1725,1.1.
11. 7744,§125-128.
12. De nostri temporis studiorum ratione, ΠΙ.
13. 1744, §125-128.
14. ß)id.,§125-126.
15. Md., §127-128.
5. History
1. Vico very often dealt with the gradual but creative force of imagination;
for example, 1744, §147: 'The nature of institutions is nothing but their
coming into being ruiscimento) at certain times and in certain guises,
whenever the time and guise are thus and so, such and not otherwise are
the institutions that come into being'. See 1744, §148-149. History was
for Vico 'the testimony of the times' (// diritto universale, De constantia
iurisprudentia П.5.
2. This is the title of Book V of 1730 and 1744.
3. De antiquissima italorum sapientia, Vn. 4. Pompa, Vico: A Study of the
'NewScience',pp.77-78.
4. On the cultural unconscious, see Carlo Ginzburg, The Cheese and the
Worms: The Cosmos ofa Sixteenth-Century Miller, John and Anne
Tedeschi (trs) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987, φt.).
5. De antiquissima italorum sapientia, П.
6. Carlo Ginzburg and Peter Burke's discussion, Institute of Contemporary
Arts, London, 15 October 1987.
7. 1730widl744,IL.
8. Milbank review of Verene, p. 339.
9. 1730bsxdl744,Jl.
10. II diritto universale, De constantia iurisprudentia, I.1, VII on philology
and history. Milbank's review of Verene, p. 339.
11. Ginzburg(15 0ctoberl987).
12. Interruitional Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York:
Macmillan, 1968), vol. 9, p. 19.
13. n>id., p. 20.
14. Ginzburg (15 October 1987).
15. 1730 and 1744, П. Bianca, ch. 3.
16. 1744, §349.
17. 1744, §354-358.
18. Peter Burke, 'History as social memory', paper delivered at Wolfson
College, Oxford, 16 February 1988, in the College Lecture series on
Memory.
19. Thomas Butler, 'Memory: a mixed blessing', paper deUvered at Wolfson
College, Oxford, 19 January 1988, in the College Lectureseries on
Memory.
Notes 173
20. As early as II diritto universale, De constantia iurisprudentia, рШ.З) in

1721, Vico claimed his degnita as the necessary basis of any discussion
of (the causes of the ignorance surrounding) the origin of poetry.
21. 1744,W.
22. Vico went so far as to state in the 1730 edition that the humanity of the
nations, Uke eveiything else that is mortal, must run andfinishits course.
Caponigri article. T. Berry, The Historical Theory ofGiambattista Vico
(Washington, D.C.: Cathohc University ofAmerica, 1949).
23. A. R. Caponigri, Time arui Idea: The Theory ofHistory in Giambattista
Vico (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953) pp. 133, 136.
24. Bruce Haddock, 'Vico and the Methodology of the History of Ideas',
G. TagHacozzo, D. P. Verene (eds), Vico: Past and Present (Atlantic
Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1981) 227-239,
esp. 238.
25. n>id., pp. 230-231.
26. On 4a natura comune delle ruizionV: 1744, §412.
27. E. Auerbach, Literary Language and Its Public in Late Latin Antiquity
arui in the Middle Ages (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965)
pp. 5-24.
28. fl5id., p. 231.
29. L. Pompa, 'Vico's Theory of the Causes of Historical Change', (Tun-
bridge Wells, Kent: Institute for Cultural Research, 1971,1979) pp. 6-7.
30. n>id.,pp.6-8.Hobbes,LevwiAan.
31. n>id. H. Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres, F. W. Kelsey (tr),
2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925). Aquinas, Selected Political
Writings, A. P. d'Entr6ves (ed.) and J. G. Dawson (tr) (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1948).
6. Hustorical Knowledge
1. James Morrison, 'Three Inteφretations of Vico', Journal ofthe History

ofIdeas, 39, No. 3 (1978) 515.
2. 1744, §34, 204, 210, 400-403. See tiie review of Verene by A. Alberti,
The Journal ofModern History, 55 (1983), 151-152, esp. 151.
3. De rwstri temporis studiorum ratione, 'La Pratica'. J. Habermas, Theory
arui Practice, J. Viertel (tr) (London: Heinemann, 1974) pp. 45-46,
79. Habermas viewed La scienza nuova as the transition from civic
humanism to modem social philosophy. See the Milbank review of
Verene.
4. 1744, §428,452. Jeffrey Bamouw's review of Vico 's Science of Human
ity, Eighteenth Century Studies, 10 (1977) 388.
5. See Chapter 3.
6. 1744, §120-121,125-128.
7. Pompa was exactly right that 'while he (Vico) praises the imaginative
products of early man for their incomparable beauty and immediacy, he
is equally critical of early law and early reUgion for their crudeness,
174 Notes
falsity, and failure to satisfy the demands of religion'. Review of Verene

by Leon Pompa in International Studies in Philosophy, 17, No. 1 (1985)
101-103, esp. 102. But Pompa was not correct (in my view) to then
diminish the importance of imagination in Vico's thought because ofthis
ambivalence of Vico's towards early societies.
8. On imagination, see 1730,1744, П.
9. Gardiner's review of Berlin, History and Theory, 16, No. 1 (1977),
45-51, esp. 45.
10. Bianca. Milbank's review of Verene, pp. 337-342.
11. Strong's review of Verene, pp. 273-275.
12. This idea was stated again and again by Vico: for example, 1744,
§360.
13. There are 70 specific references to the Law of the Twelve Tables in
the 1744 edition alone (there were much longer passages in the 1725
edition). Vico postulated that the Twelve Tables represented the early
wisdom of the ancient Italian peoples eventually put in a codified
version. He used this same argument in 'La Discoverta del vero Omero*
(1730,1744, ΠΙ).
14. 7744,§1108.
15. 1744, §331, Bergin and Fisch translation. Pompa translation in brackets:
Selected Writings, L. Pompa (tr, ed.) pp. 2016. On preformation, see the
Dictionary ofthe History ofIdeas, vol. 1, p. 231; vol. 2., p. 178, 284;
vol.4,pp.309-310.
16 1744, §349. Berlin, p. 27.
17. E. Auerbach, Literary Language arui Its Public in LateLatin Antiquity
arul in the Middle Ages, p. 19.
7. Fantasia
1. 1744, §403.
2. 1744, §495- 8.
3. 7725,n.9.
4. Joseph Campbell, Myths to live by, pp. 10-20.
5. Excellent review of Verene by W. H. Walsh, British Jounud ofAesthet
ics, 22 (1982) 378-380.
6. BerUn.
7. Berlin, 'On die Pursuit of the Ideal'.
8. 1744, §384, 330.
9. Robert Damton, The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French
Cultural History, pp. 107-143, on thelay-out of cities as historical
sources.
10. 1744, §699, 819. G. S. Brett, A History ofPsychology, 3 vols (London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1912, 1921). W. Bundy, The Theory of
Imagiruition in Classical and Medieval Thought, University of Ilhnois
Studies in Language and Literature, 12, Nos. 2-3 (1927) 1-289.
11. Pico della Mirandola, On the Imagination, H. Caplan, tr.
Notes 175
12. Deantiquissimaitalorumsapientia,Vll.l.
14. 1744, §496.
15. Milbank's review of Verene, p. 338.
16 1744, §819.
17. See J. M. Shorter, 'Imagination', Mind, N.S. 61 (1952) 528-542.
8. Other biterpretations
1. D. E. Lee and R. N. Beck, *The Meaning of "Historicism'", American

HistoricalReview, 59, No. 3 (1959) 568-577, esp. 568. And D. D. Runes
(ed), The Dictionary ofPhilosophy (London: George Routledge & Sons,
1944) p. 127.
2. 1744, §314.
3. Pompa, Vico: A Study ofthe 'New Science' and his review of Verene.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. 1744, §378-380.
7. Milbank's review of Verene, p. 340.
8. Pico,pp.34-37.
9. See: On the Study Methods of Our Times, Gianturco (tr, ed.),
pp. ix-xxxiii of the introduction.
10. For two of the best-known works on the EnUghtenment see P. Gay,
The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, 2 vols (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1966); and P. Hazard, La Crise de la conscience europeenne,
1680-1715 (Paris: Boivin, 1935). The European Mind, J. L. May (tr)
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973, 3rd edn).
9. A Critique of Berlin
1. J. B. Vico, Principes de la philosophie de l'histoire, J. Michelet, (tr, ed.)

(Paris: Jules Renouard, 1827, rpt. 1859). J. B. Vico, Oeuvres choisies de
Vico, J. Michelet (tr, ed.) (Paris: Emest Flammarion, 1895 [?]).
2. Croce.
3. Berlin, pp. xvi-xix, 109-110.
4. 1744, §152, 247, 662.
5. G. Giarrizzo, Vico: La politica e la storia (Naples: Guida, 1981). B. A.
Haddock, Vico's Political Thought (Swansea: Mortlake Press, 1986). F.
Vaughan, The Political Philosophy of Giambattista Vico (The Hague:
6. 1744, §384.
7. On senso commune, De antiquissima italorum sapientia, 5. 1725,1, 1.
See J. Morrison 'Three Interpretations of Vico', p. 514.
8. Beriin, article on 'Montesquieu' in Against the Current, pp. 130-161,
157.
9. See: Momigliano's attack on Beriin and Vico, accusing them both of
176 Notes
of relativism, and Berlin's response, 'Note on Alleged Relativism in

Eighteenth Century Thought' in Substance and Form in History, Leon
Pompa and W. Dray (eds) (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Pre;ss,
1981) pp. 1-14.
10. Berlin, pp. xvi-xx.
11. n>id.
12. 1744, §393 and the last section of Book V.
13. 1744, §346,148. Morrison, 'Three Inteφretations ofVico', pp, 511-518.
On a perfect society, see G. Huppert, The Idea of Perfect History
(Urbana: University ofIlhnois Press, 1970).
CONCLUSION
1. King, p. 55.
2. 1744, §142.
3. /725, П.7, Corollary.
Bibüography
1. Manuscripts and First Editions
The first two sections of this Ust follow the model of M. Sanna, Catalogo
vichiano napoletano (Naples: BibliopoUs, 1986).
Titles, descriptions and shelfinarks are, if not indicated otherwise, those used
in the Manuscript and Rare Books Room of the Biblioteca Nazionale «Vittorio
Emanuele III» di Napoli.
a. Manuscripts
Seifascicoli di carie vichiane varie nonrilegate(XDC 42)
Versi iscrizioni del Vico e al Vico
Frammenti di scritti vari del Vico
Lettere del Vico e al Vico o riguardanti Vico
Carie varie della scuola del Vico
Un'opera per commissione; Ragionamento primo e secondo
Carte varie relative alla vita e albfortuna del Vico
Scienza nuova ed altri scritti autografi (ХШ-D 79- 80)

Scienza nuova
Correzioni, miglioramenti e aggiunte terze poste insieme con le prime delUi
Scienza Nuova Seconda
Vici Viruiiciae
Oratio «Si umquam Divina Providentia . . . .»
Autografo cartaceo (in miscellanea) QW H 50)
Codice cartaceo (ХШ B 55)

Sommario autografo
Autografo dell Orazione irumgurali
Autografo delle Emendatiorws alle Orazioni
Codice cartaceo (XVÜ B 30)

Autografo di Correzioni, miglioramenti ed aggiunte Terze poste insieme
con le Prime e Seconde e tutte coordinate per incorporarsi nella Terza
impressione deUa Scienza Nuova
Un'orazione latine autografaper le nozze di Carlo di Borbone «Si umquam
Divirui Providentia . .»
Iscrizione per Jacope Stuart
177
178 Bibliography
Apografo di игш lettera a D. Francesco.
Ms. cartaceo (ХШ B73)

Delle cene sontuose de' romani
Cartaceo apografo (transcriptions) (XVIH 38)

De chriss
Collectio phrasium elocutionum ac rerum notabilium selectae . . .
In artem poeticam Q. Horatii Flacci
Le sei commedie di Terenzio tradotte da G. B. Vico (1735)
G(ennaro) Vico, Carte vichiane donate dal Marchese di Villarosa per la

massima parte di Gennaro Vico e a lui dirette (XIX B 43)
b. First editions
De antiquissinm italorum sapientia ex linguae latirme originibus eruenda
(Naples: Felice Mosca, 1710). [Houghton Library, Harvard - *IC7.
V6643.710d].
De nostri temporis studiorum ratione (Naples: Felice Mosca, 1709). |[BodIeian

Library, Oxford - 8 St. Amand 74]. [Houghton Library, Harvard - *IC7.
V6643.709d].
Cinque libri di G. B. Vico de' Principi di una Scienza Nuova d'intorno alla
comune nature delle Nazioni, in questa seconda impressione con piu propia
maniera condotti, e di nwlto accresciuti (Naples: Felice Mosca, 1730).
(XVffl 39)
Fogli volanti (XrV G 20 [1])

Vico, G. Spese matrimoniali, in Raccolta (grande) di cose varie ecc.
Libri a stampa con note autografe (ХШ B 62)

De Universi Juris uno principio, etfine Urw (Naples: Felice Mosca, 1720).
[Law Library, Special Collections, Harvard].
De constantia jurisprudentis (Naples: Felice Mosca, 1721).
NotaeinduoslibrosalterumDeuno . . . alterumDeconstanti. . . (Naples:
Felice Mosca, 1722).
Sinopsi del Diritto universale (Naples: Felice Mosca 1720).
Mendorum ab typis literarris emendationes.
Priru:ipi di una scienza nuova (Naples: Felice Mosca, 1725). [Houghton

Library, Harvard - *C7. V6643.725p, with corrections in Vico's hand].
Prirwipii d'urm scienza nuova (Naples: Felice Mosca, 1730). (ХШ H 58 and
ХШ H 59, 2 copies)
Bibliography 179
Principi di una scienza nuova (Naples: Felice Mosca, 1744). [Taylor

Institute Library, Oxford - Moore 4 f.3]. [Houghton Library, Harvard
- *IC7.V6643.725pc].
De Rebus Gesti Antonj Caraphaei (Naples: Felice Mosca, 1716). [Houghton

Library, Harvard - Typ 725. 16.869]
2. Other Editions of Vico's Writings
Latinae Orationes (Naples: Josephus Raymundus, 1766). [Houghton Library,

Harvard - *IC7.V6643.7661]
Principes de la philosophie de l'histoire, J. Michelet (ed., tr) (Paris: Jules
Renouard, 1826, rpt. 1859).
Opere di Giambattista Vico, G. Ferrari (ed.), 2nd edn, 6 vols (Milan: Societä
tipograficade' classiciitaUani, 1852-1854).
Opere di Giambattista Vico, F. Pomodoro (ed.), 8 vols (Naples: Morano,
previously Tipografia de' classici latini, 1858-1869, rpt. 8 vols in 4, Leipzig:
Zentralantiquariat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1970).
Oeuvres choisies de Vico, J. Michelet (ed., tr) (Paris: Emest Flammarion,
1895[?]).
Opere di G. B. Vico, F. Nicolini (ed.) witii G. Gentile (vol. 1) and B. Croce
(vol. 5), (eds), 8 vols in 11 (Bari: Laterza, 1911-1941).
La Scienza nuova e opere scelte di G. B. Vico, N. Abbagnano (ed.) (Turin:
Unione tipografico-editrice torinese, 1952).
Opere di Giambattista Vico, F. Nicolini (ed.) (Milan and Naples: Ricciardi,
1953).
Tutte le opere di Giambattista Vico, F. Flora (ed.) (Milan: Mondadori, 1957-)
1 vol. to date.
Opere di Giambattista Vico, P. Rossi (ed.) (Milan: RizzoU, 1959).
Giambattista Vico: Operefilosofiche,P. Cristofolini (ed.) (Florence: Sansoni,
1971).
Giambattista Vico: Opere giuridiche, P. Cristofolini (ed.) (Florence: Sansoni,
1974).
Le Orazioni Inaugurali I-VI, G. G. Visconti (ed.) (Bolgona: II MuUno, 1982)
vol. 1 of the new edition of Vico by the Centro di Studi Vichiani.
a. A select list ofkUer editions ofsingle or several works by Vico

La conguira dei principi napoletani del 1701, Е. De Falco (ed.) (Naples: Istituto
Editoriale del Mezzogiomo, 1971).
Institutiones Oratoriae, G. Crifö (ed.) (Naples: Istituto Suro Orsola Benincasa,
1989).
De rwstri temporis studiorum ratione, P. Massimi (ed.) (Rome: Armando
Armando, 1974).
Opere, R. Parenti (ed.), 2 vols (Naples: Fulvio Rossi, 1972).
Principj di una scienza nuova intorno alla natura delle nazioni, T. Gregory
180 Bibliography
(ed.) (Rome: Ateno, 1979, facs. of 1725 edn) vol. 1. Concordanze e indici di
frequenza dei Principi di una Scienza Nuova 1725 di G. Vico (Rome: Ateno,
1981), vol. 2.
Principes d'une science nouvelle relative a la nature commune des nations
(Paris: Nagel, 1953).
La scienza nuova, Paolo Rossi (ed.) (Milan: Rizzoli, 1977).
b. EngUsh transUitions ofVico's works

The Autobiography of Giambattista Vico, M. H. Fisch and T. G. Bergin (trs,
eds) (lthaca: Comell University Press, 1944, 1983).
The New Science ofGiambattista Vico, M. H. Fisch and T. G. Bergin (trs, eds)
(Ithaca: Comell University Press, 1948, 1968).
On the Study Methods ofOur Time, E. Gianturco (tr, ed.) (Indianapolis, Indiana:
Bobbs-Merrill, Library ofthe Liberal Arts, 1965).
On the Heroic Mind', E. Sewell and A. C. Sirignano (trs), Social Research, 43
(1976): 886-903. Rpt. Vico and Contemporary Thought, G. Tagliacozzo, M.
Mooney, D. P. Verene (eds) (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities
Press, 1979) 228-245!
Vico: Selected Writings, L. Pompa (tr, ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982).
3. Other Prunary Sources
Bacon, F., Novum Organum (1620). [Bodleian - Pyw. C 1. 24].

Bumett, J., Of the Origin and Progress of Language, 6 vols (Edinburgh,
London: A. Kincaid and T. Cadell, 1773-92). [Bodleian Library, Oxford
- 8Q 25- 30Linc].
Doria, P. M., La vita civile con un trattato della educaziorw del Principe
(Naples, 1710). [Bodleian - Vet. D4 d.60].
Giannone, P., Dell'istoria civile del Regno di Napoli (Naples: Niccolö Naso,
1723). CBodleian Library, Oxford - Vet. F4 d. 7-10] The Civil History of
the Kingdom ofNaples, James Ogilvie (tr) (London, 1729). |Bodleian - Vet
A4c231,232].
Hobbes, T., De cive (Paris, 1642). Podleian Library, Oxford - Seld 4 H.14
Art].
Hobbes, T., Leviathan (London, 1651). [Bodleian Library, Oxford - A.1 17 Art
Seld].
Le Clerc, J., Bibliotheque ancienne et moderne, 20 vols bound in 11 (Amster
dam: Fr6res Wetstein, 1714-23). [Taylor Institution Library, Oxford - K
43-45].
Locke, J., An Essay Coru:erning Humane [sic] Understanding (London: EUz.
Holt for Thomas Basset, 1690). pBodleian Library, Oxford - LL 24 Art
Seld].
Michelet, Introduction a l'Histoire Universelle (Paris: Hachette, 1843, 3rd
edn). [Taylor Institution Library, Oxford - Vet Fr. Ш B 445].
Bibliography 181
Montesquieu, L'Esprit des loix [sicJ, 2 vols (Geneva: Barillot & Fils, 1748).
[Bodleian Library, Oxford - EE 133, 134 Art].
Muratori, L., Dellaforza dellafantasia umana (Venice: G. PasquaH, 1745, φ Ι
Venice: Alvisopoli, 1825). PibliotecaNazionale . . . di Napoli].
Rousseau, J. J., Collection complete des oeuvres de J. J. Rousseau, 33 vols
(Geneva, 1782-89). [TaylorInstitutionLibrary, Oxford-VR.l 1782-89].
4. Secondary Works
Articles from the Bolletino del Centro di Studi Vichiani, New Vico Studies,
the volumes produced by the Institute for Vico Studies (New York) and
for the tricentenary of Vico's birth (1968) are not hsted separately in the
bibliography.
Abbagnano, N., 'Vico e I'lUuminismo: risposta a F. Nicolini', Rivista di

Filosofia 14, No. 3 (1953) 338-342.
Abrams, M. H., The Mirror and the Lamp (New York: Oxford University Press,
1953).
Acton, H., The Bourbons ofNaples /7i4-7825(London: Metheun, 1956).
Adams, H. P., The Ufe and Writings of Giambattista Vico (London: George
AUen & Unwin, 1935, φt. New York: Russell & RusseU, 1970).
Agrimi, M., 'Vico Oggi', itinerai, Nos. 1-2 (1981).
Ajello, R., Pietro Giannone e il suo tempo, 2 vols (Naples: Jovene, 1980).
Alatri, P., 'Un Convegno su Illuministi e Giacobini a Napoli', Studi Storici, 23,
No. 2 (1982) 439-448.
Alberti, A., 'Primitive Language and Feudal Ideology: A Discovery of Vico',
European Institute Colloquium Papers (28-30 September 1983).
Alston, W. P., Philosophy of Language (Englewood CUffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, 1964).
Amerio, F., Introduzione allo studio di G. B. Vico (Torino: Societä Editrice
Intemazionale, 1947).
Ambrosi, L., La Psicologia dell'imaginazione nella storia della filosofia
(Rome: Dante Aligheri, 1898, φt. Padua: CEDAM, 1959).
Anderson, M. S., Historians arui Eighteenth Century Europe 1715-89 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1979).
Aristotie, De Anima (On the Soul), H. Lawson-Tancred (tr) (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1986).
Aristotle's Politics, B. Jowett (ed., tr)(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1938,
8tii edn).
Art and Ideas in Eighteenth Century Italy (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e
Letteratura, 1960).
Aquinas, Selected Political Writings, A. P. d'Entr6ves (ed.) and J. G. Dawson
(tr) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948).
Auerbach, E., Uterary Language arul Its Public in Late Latin Antiquity and in
the Middle Ages (London: Routiedge & Kegan Paul, 1965).
182 Bibliography
Auerbach, E., 'Vico and Aesthetic Historicism', The Journal ofAesthetics and
Art Criticism, 8 (1949), 110-118, rpt. in Scenesfrom the Drama ofEuropean
Literature, New York: Meridian, 1969).
Bacon, F., The Advancement ofLearning and New Atlantis, A. Johnston (ed.)
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974).
Bacon, F., The WorL· of Francis Bacon, J. Spedding, R. L. Ems and D. D.
Heath (eds) (London: Longman, 1857-1874).
Badaloni, N., Antonio Conti: Un abate libero pensatore tra Newton e Voltaire
(Milan: FeltrineUi, 1968).
Badaloni, N., Introduzione a G. B. Vico (Milan: FeltrineUi, 1961).
Badaloni, N., Vico prima della Scienza Nuova (Rome: Accademia Nazioruile
dei Lincei, 1969).
Baker, J. V., The Sacred River: Coleridge's Theory ofthe Imagiruition (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957).
Barariski, Z. G. and J. R. Short (eds), Developing Contemporary Marxism
(London: Macmillan, 1985).
Barbagallo, C., 'The Conditions and Tendencies in Historical Writing in Italy
Today', Journal ofModern History, 1, No. 2 (1929) 236-244.
Barber, W. H. et al, (eds), The Age ofEnlightenment: Studies Presented to
Theodore Besterman (Edinburgh: OUver and Boyd, 1967).
Bamouw, J., 'Vico and the Continuity of Science: The Relation of His
Epistemology to Bacon and Hobbes', Isis, 71, No. 259 (1980) 609-620.
Battistini, A., La degnita delki retorica: Studi su G. B. Vico (Pisa: Pacini,
1975).
Battistini, A. (ed.) Nuovo Contributo alla Bibliografia Vichiana, 1971-1980
(Naples: Guida, 1983).
Battistini, A. (ed.) Vico Oggi (Rome: Armando Armando, 1979).
Bazzoli, B., 'Giambattista Almici e la diffusione di Pufendord nel settecento
italiano', Critica Storica, Year 16 (1979) 3-100.
Becker, C., The Heavenly City ofthe Eighteenth Century Philosophers (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1932),
Beckett, S. etaL, OurExagminationRourulhisFactifactionforIncamiruition
of Work in Progress (Paris: Shakespeare and Co., 1929).
Bedani, G., Vico Revisited: Orihodoxy, Naturalism arui Science in the
Scienza Nuova (Oxford: Berg, 1989).
Bedani, G. L. C., 'The Poetic as an Aesthetic Category in Vico's Scienza
Nuova', Italian Studies, 31 (1976) 22-36.
Bellamy, R., 'Liberalism and Historicism - History and Politics in the
Thought of Benedetto Croce' (unpubUshed Ph.D. thesis. University of
Cambridge, 1983).
Bellofiore, L., La dottrina dellaprovvidenza in G. B. Vico (Padua: CEDAM,
1962).
Bellofiore, L., Morale e storia in G. B. Vico (Padua: CEDAM, 1972).
Bibliography 183
Benedict, R,, Patterns ofCulture (London: Routledge & KeganPaul, 1935,

5thrpt, 1971).
Berlin, I., Against the Current: Essays in the History ofIdeas (London: The
Hogarth Press, 1979).
Berlin, I . , TheAge ofEnlightenment (New York: Mentor, Houghton Mifflin,
1956, rpt.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
Berlin, I . , Vico and Herder (London: The Hogarth Press, 1976, φ t London:
Chatto & Windus, 1980).
REVIEWS:
p. Gardiner, History and Theory, 16, No. 1 (1977) 45-51;
A. Momigliano, On the Pioneer Trail', New York Review ofBooks, 23,
No. 36 (Nov. 11, 1976) 33-38;
J. Morrison, 'Three Inteφretations of Vico', Journal of the History of
Ideas, 39, No. 3 (1978) 511-518.
Beriin, I . , 'On the Pursuit of the Ideal', New York Review ofBooL·, 35, No.
4(March 17, 1988) 11-18.
Berry, T. M., The Historical Theory of Giambattista Vico (Washington,
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1949).
Besaucele, B., de, Les Cari4sians de l'Italie (Paris: Auguste Picard, 1920).
Bianca, G., II concetto di poesia in Giambattista Vico (Messina-Florence:
G. D'Anna, 1967).
Blackwell, T., An Enquiry into the Life and Writings of Homer (London:
n.p., 1735).
Blamires, C., 'Three Critiques of the French Revolution: Maistre, Bonald,
and Saint-Simon' (unpublished D.Phil, thesis, University of Oxford,
1986).
Bloch, M., Apologie pour l'histoire ou mitier d'historien, Cahiers des
Annales, 3 (1949). The Historians Craft, P. Putnam (tr) (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1954).
Boas, G., Essays on Primitivism arui Related Ideas in the Middle Ages
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1948).
Boas, F., General Anthropology (Boston: Heath, 1938).
Bolletino del Centro di Studi Vichiani 1-16 (1971-1986).
BoUinger,B. L., Aspects ofLanguage (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World,
1968).
Boorstin, D. J., The Discoverers (New York: Random House, 1983, φ t
1985).
Borsa, G., Introduzione allastoria (Florence: Felice Le Monnier, 1980).
Botton, C. A., Church Reform in Eighteenth Century Italy (The Hague:
Bouillier, F., Histoire de la philosophie cari4sienne, 2 vols (Paris: Durand,
184 Bibliography
1854; 3rd edn, Paris: Delagrave, 1868).

Bouwsma, W. J., Three Types ofHistoriography in Post-Renaissance Italy',
History arul Theory, 4, No. 1 (1965) 303-314.
Braudel, F., La Mediterranäe et le nwruie miditeran4en ά l'epoque de
Philippe II (Paris: Armand Colin, 1949), The Mediterranean and the
Mediterranean WorUl in the Age of Phillip II, S. Reynolds (tr) 2 vols
(Bungay, Suffolk: Fontana, 1972, 2nd revised tr).
Brett, G. S., A History of Psychology, 3 vols (London: George AUen &
Unwin, 1912, 1921).
Brown, N. 0., Closing Time (New York: Random House, 1973).
Bundy, M . W., The Theory of Imagiruition in Classical arui Medieval
Thought, University of IUinois Studies in Language and Literature, 12,
Nos. 2-3 (1927) 1-289.
Burke, P., 'Languages and Anti-Languages in Early Modem Italy', History
Workshop Journal, 11 <1981), 24- 32.
Burke, P., ТЪе Renaissance Sense of the Past (London: Edward Arnold,
1969).
Burke, P., Vico (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).
Candela, P. S., L'ünitä e la religiosita del pensiero di Giambattista Vico
(Naples: Edizioni «Ceruicolo Serafico», 1969).
Campbell, J., The Mythic Image (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1974).
Campbell, J., Myths, Dreams and Religion (New York: Dutton, 1970).
Campbell, J., Myths to Live By (New York: Viking Press, 1972,rpt. London
Souvenh- Press, 1973).
Cantelli, G., Mente Corpo Linguaggio: Saggio sull'interpretazione vichiarui
del mito (Florence: Sansoni, 1986).
Caponigri, A. R., History arui Liberty: The Historical Writings ofBenedetto
Croce (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955).
Caponigri, A. R., 'PhUosophy and Philology: The "New Art of Criticism"
ofGiambattista Vico', Modem Schoolman, 59, No. 2 (1982) 81-116.
Caponigri, A. R., Time arui Idea: The Theory of History in Giambattista
Vico (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953).
REVIEW:
Fisch, M., Journal ofPhilosophy, 54 (1957) 648-652.
Cappello, C., La visione della storia in G. B. Vico (Torino: Societa Editrice
Intemazionale, 1948).
Caraffa, N., Gli studi giovanili e l'insegrumento accademico di G, B. Vico
(Urbino: Melchiorre Arduni, 1912).
Caφanetto, D., and G. Ricuperati, Italy in the Age ofReason I685-I789
(London: Longman, 1987).
Bibliography 185
Cassirer, E., An Essay on Man: An Introduction to the Philosophy ofHuman

Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944).
Cassirer, E., Language arui Myth, S. K. Langer (tr) (New York: Harper &
Row, 1946).
Cassirer, E., The Philosophy ofthe Enlightenment, F. C. A. Koelln and J. P.
Pettegrove (trs) (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
Cassirer, E., P. 0. Kristeller, andJ. H. Randall, Jr. (eds), The Renaissance
Philosophy ofMan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948).
Caverni, R., Storia del metodo sperimentale in Italia (Florence: G. Civelli,
1891).
Chaix-Ruy, J., Laformation de la pensie philosophique de J.-B. Vico (Gap:
Louis Jean, 1943),
Chaix-Ruy, J., J.-B. Vico etL'IlluminismeAthie (Paris: Mondiale, 1968).
Chaix-Ruy, J., Vie de J.-B. Vico (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1943).
Chambliss, J. J., Imagination and Reason in PkUo, Aristotle, Vico, Rousseau,
and Keats (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).
Child, A., Making and Knowing in Hobbes, Vico and Dewey, University
of Califomia Publications in Philosophy, 16, No. 13 (1953). Fare e
conoscere in Hobbes, Vico e Dewey, M. Donzelli (tr) (Naples: Guida,
1970).
Chorley, P., Oil, Silk, and the Enlightenment: Economic Problems in
XVIIIth Century Naples (Naples: btituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici,
1965).
Ciardo, M., Le quattro epoche dello storicismo: Vico-Kant-Hegel-Croce
(Bari: Lateiza, 1947).
CipoUa, C. M. (ed) Storia dell'economia italiarm (Turin: Boringhieri, 1959),
vol. 1, Secoli settimo-diciassettesimo.
Ckanna, C., Sintesi di storia dellafilosofia (Rome: Ciranna, 1986), vol. 2.
Clark, D. S. T., 'Francis Bacon: The Study of History and the Science of
Man' (unpublished Ph.D. thesis. University of Cambridge, 1971).
Cochrane, E., The Late Italian Renaissance 1525-1630 (London: Macmillan,
1970).
Cochrane, E., Tradition arui Enlightenment in the Tuscan Academies,
1690-1800 (Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1961).
Cohen, E., *Law, Folklore and Animal Lore', Past and Present, 110 (1986)
6-37,
CoHe, R. L., 'Johan Huizinga and the Task of Cultural History', American
Historical Review, 69, No. 3 (1964) 607-630.
Collingwood, R, G., An Autobiography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939, 3rd
rpt, 1982).
186 Bibliography
Collingwood, R. G., The Historical Imagination: An Inaugural Lecture 1935

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935).
Collingwood, R. G., The Idea ofHistory (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1946, New York: Galaxy, 1956, 6th rpt).
Cortese, N., Cultura e politica a Napoli dal Cinquecento al Settecento
(Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1965).
Corsano, A. et al. (eds), Omaggio a Vico (Naples: Morano, 1968).
Corsano, A., Umanesisnw e religione in G. B. Vico (Bari: Laterza, 1935).
Costa, G., 'An Enduring Venetian Accomplishment: The Autobiography of
G. B. Vico', Italian Quarterly, 21, No. 79 (1980) 45-54.
Cotungo, R., La sorte di G. B. Vico (Bari: Laterza, 1914).
Cranston, M., Jean-Jacques: The Early Life and Work of Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, 1712-54 (London: AUen Lane, 1983, φt. Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1987).
Crease, R. (ed.), Vico in English (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Human
ities Press, 1978).
Croce, B., An Autobiography, R. G. Collingwood (tr) (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1927).
Croce, B., and F. Nicolini, Bibliografia Vichiana (Naples: Riccardo
Ricciardi, 1947-1948).
Croce, B., 'Eternita e storicita della filosofia', Quaderni critici, 21 (1930).
Croce. B., La filosofia di Giambattista Vico (Bari: Laterza, 1911). The
Philosophy of Giambattista Vico, R. G. Collingwood (tr) (London:
Howard Latimer, 1913).
Croce, B., Storia del Regno di Napoli (Bari: Laterza, 1924, 1st edn, 1944,
3rd edn). History of the Kingdom of Naples (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1970).
Croce, B., Storia della eta barocca in Italia (Bari: Laterza, 1929), vol. 23
of Scritti di storia letteraria e politica.
Croce, B., 'Vico', Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York:
Macmillan, 1935) vol. 15, pp. 249-250.
Curtius, E. R., European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, W. R. Trask
(tr) (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953, 2nd edn, 1979).
Daedalus, 2 (1959), issue entitled 'Myth and Myth-making'.
D'Arcais, G. F., Latinita dello storicismo vichiano (Padua: CEDAM, 1940).
Darnton, R., The Great Cat Massacre arui Other Episodes in French
Cultural History (New York: Basic Books, 1984; 2nd edn, New York:
Random House, 1985).
Davidson, D., 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', Proceed
ings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, XLVH
(1973-1974) 5-20.
Bibliography 187
DeFalco, Е. (ed.), L'ideale educativo secondo le "Orationes" il "De

Nostri", "l'Autobiografia" e il "Carieggio" (Naples: De Vito, 1954).
De Maio, R., 'Muratori e il Regno di Napoli: Amicizie, Fortuna, e
Polemiche', Rivista Storica Italiana, 85, No. 3 (1973) 756-777.
De Mas, E., Bacone e Vico (Torino: Edizioni di Filosofia, 1959).
De Mas, E., 'La dottrina dell'anima umana e delle sue facoltä nel sistema
di Francesco Bacone\ Filosofia, 13 (1962) 371-408.
De Mas, E., 'On the New Method of a New Science: A Study of G. Vico',
Journal ofthe History ofIdeas, 32, No. 1 (1971) 85-94.
de Michelis, C., and G. Pizzamiglio (eds), Vico e Venezia (Florence: Leo S.
Olschki, 1982).
De Rosa, G., *Religione e societa nell'Italia del settecento. I problemi
della ricerca', Ricerche di storie sociale e religiose, 19, No. 27 (1985)
233-246.
De Rosa, L., 'Property Rights, Institutional Change and Economic Growth in
Southern Italy in the XVfflth and XDCth Centuries', Journal ofEuropean
Economic History, 8, No. 3 (1979) 531-552.
Descartes: Correspondance, C. Adam and G. Milhaud (eds), 8 vols (Paris:
Fdlix Alcan, Presses Universitaires de France, 1936-1963).
Descartes, R., The Essential Descartes, M. D. Wilson (ed.) (New York:
Mentor, 1969, rpt. Scarborough, Ontario: Meridian, 1983).
Descartes, R., Oeuvres de Descartes, C. Adam and P. Tannery (eds) 12 vols
and supplement (Paris: Leopold Cerf, 1897-1913).
Descartes, R., Philosophical Works ofDescartes, E. S. Haldane and G. R.
T. Ross, (trs), 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967).
Donzelli, M., Natura e humanitas nel giovane Vico (Naples: Istituto Italiano
per gli studi storici, 1970).
de Ruggiero, G., Myths andIdeals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946).
De Seta, C., Storia delki citta di Napoli (Rome, Bari: Laterza, 1973).
Diaz, F., 'L'Italie des Princes Eclaires',Anna/ej Historiques de la R4volution
Frangaise, 51, No. 4 (1979) 581-593.
Dictionary ofthe History ofIdeas, 5 vols (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1973).
Diez-Canedo, A., Un Estudio sobre Uxs dos versiones de la "Ciencia Nueva"
de Juan Bautista Vico (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autonomade
Mexico, 1981).
Donati, B., Nuovi studi sullafilosofiacivile di G. B. Vico (Florence: Le
Monnier, 1936).
Doney, W. (ed.), Descartes: A Collection ofCriticalEssays (Garden City,
New York: Doubleday [Anchor Book], 1967; φt. London: Macmillan,
1967; rpt. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1968).
188 Bibliography
Donoghue, D., Imagiruition (Glasgow: Glasgow University Press, 1974).

Donzelli, M. (ed.), Contributo alla Bibliografia Vichiana (1948-1970)
Donzelli, M., Natura e humanitas nel giovane Vico (Naples: Istituto italiano
per gli studi storici, 1970).
ХУглу, W., Perspectives on History (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1980).
Dray, W. (ed.), Philosophical Aruzlysis and History (New York: Harper &
Row, 1966).
Dray, W., Philosophy ofHistory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1964).
Dussen, W. J. van der, History as a Science: The Philosophy of R. G.
Collingwood (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981).
Eagleton, Terry, The Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1990.
Eliade, M., Myth arui Reality (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1964).
Engell, J., The Creative Imagination: Enlightenment to Romanticism (Cam
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).
Fasso, G., La lingua del Vico (Florence: «La Nuova Italia» Editrice, 1963).
Fasso, G., / «quattro autore» del Vico: Saggio sulki genesi della «Scienza
Nuova» (Milan: A. Giuffre, 1949).
Fasso, G., Vico e Grozio (Naples: Guida, 1971).
Feldman, B. and R. D. Richardson, The RiseofModem Mythology,
1680-1860 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972).
Ferrari, G., La mente di G. B. Vico (Milan: Societa tipografica de' classici
italiani, 1837).
Ferrari, J. (G.), Vico etL'Italie (Paris: Eveillard, 1939).
Ferrone, V., Scienza, natura, religione: Mondo newtoniano e cultura italiana
nel primo Settecento (Naples: Jovene, 1982).
Finetti, B., Apologia del genere umano accusato di essere stato игю volta
bestia: Parte I (Venice: Radici, 1768).
Finetti, B., Difesa dell autorita della scrittura contro Giambattista Vico
(Bari: Laterza, 1936, facs. of 1768).
Fisch, M., 'Vico on Roman Law', in Essays in Political Theory Presented
to G. E. Sabine, M. R. Konvitz and A. E. МифЬу (eds) (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1948), pp. 62-88.
Flint, R., Vico (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1884).
Foreign Quarterly Review, 2 (1828), 621-661, 'Italian Literature of the
Eighteenth Century'.
Foreign Review and Continental Miscelkmy, 5 (1830) 380-391. 'Vico -
"New Science" and "Ancient Wisdom of the Italians'".
Bibliography 189
Forum Italicum, 2, No. 4 (1968), 'Special Issue: A Homage to G. B. Vico

in the Tercentenary of His Birth*.
Formigari, L., 'Language and Society in the Late Eighteenth Century',
Journal ofthe History ofIdeas, 35 (1974) 275-292.
France, P., Rhetoric and Truth in France (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1972).
Friedrich, C. J., The Philosophy ofLaw in Historical Perspective (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1958).
Fubini, M. (ed.), La cultura illuministica in Italia (Torino: Edizione Rai
Radiotelevisione Italiana, 1964).
Fubini, M., 'Letteratura scolastica', La Cultura (Rome: Leo S. Olschki,
n.d.).
Fubini, M., Stile e umanita di G. Vico (Bari: Laterza, 1946).
Funkenstein, A., Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle
Ages to the Seventeenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1986).
Gadol, E. T., 'The Idealist Foundations of Cultural Anthropology', Journal
ofthe History ofPhilosophy, 12, No. 2 (1974) 207-225.
Gallie, W. B., Philosophy and the Historical Uruierstanding (New York:
Schocken, 1964).
Gardiner, P., The Nature of Historical Explanation (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1952).
Gardiner, P., The Philosophy ofHistory (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1974, rpt, 1982).
Gardiner, P., Theories ofHistory (New York: The Free Press, 1959).
Garin, E., 'Cartesio e l'Italia', Giomale Critico della Filosofia Italiarui, 3rd
series. Year 29, 4 (1950) 385-405.
Garin, E., G. Pico della Mirandola (Parma: Comitato per le celebrazioni
centenarie in onore di Giovanni Pico, 1963).
Garin, E., Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: Vita e Dottrina, Universitä degli
studi di Firenze, Facolta di Lettere e Filosofia, 3rd series, 5.
Garin, E., Italian Humanism: Philosophy and Civic Life in the Reruiissance
(Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1965).
Gay, P., The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, 2 vols (London: Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, 1966).
Gentile, G., Studi Vichiani (Florence: Felice Le Monnier, 1927, 2nd edn).
Gentile, M. T., lmmagine e parola nelUi formazione dell'uomo (Rome:
Armando Armando, 1965).
Gianturco, E., 'Character, Essence, Origin and Content of the Jus Gentium
According to Vico and Suarez', Revue de Uttirature comparie, 16 (1936)
167-172.
190 Bibliography
Giarrizzo, G., Edward Gibbon e ki cultura europea Settecento (Naples:

Istituto italiano per gli studi storici, 1954).
Ginzburg, C., The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-
Century Miller, John and Anne Tedeschi (trs) (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1987, φt.).
Giarrizzo, G., Vico: La politica e la storia (Naples: Guida, 1981).
Giordano, P., Vico: Filosofo del suo tempo (Padua, CEDAM, 1974).
Goethe, J. W., Italian Journey, W. H. Auden and E. Mayer (trs)
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982, 2nd Penguin rpt).
Golding, W., The Inheritors (London: Faber & Faber, 1955).
Gombrich, E. H., Ideals and Idols: Essays on Values in History and Art
(Oxford: Phaidon Press, 1979, rpt. E. P. Dutton, 1979).
Gorman, J. L., The Expression of Historical Knowledge (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1982).
Grassi, Ernesto, Vico and Humanism: Essays on Vico, Heiddegger, and
Rhetoric (New York: Peter Lang, 1990).
Grimaldi, A. A., The Universal Humanity ofGiambattista Vico (New York:
S. F. Vannik, 1958).
Grotius, H., De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres, F. W. Kelsey (tr) 2 vols
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925).
Habermas, J., Theory and Practice, J. Viertel (tr) (London: Heinemann,
1974).
Haddock, B. A., An Introduction to Historical Thought (London: Edward
Arnold, 1980).
Haddock, B. A., 'Vico and IdeaUsm' (unpublished D.Phil, thesis. University
ofOxford, 1977).
Haddock, B. A., Vico's Political Thought (Swansea: Mortlake Press, 1986).
Hampshire, S., 'Vico and His "New Science'", The Listener, 44 (1949)
569-571.
Hampshire, S., 'Vico and Language', New York Review of Books, (23
February 1969) 19-22.
Hathaway, B., The Age ofCriticism: The Late Reruiissance in Italy (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1962).
Hazard, P., La Crise de la conscience europienne, 1680-1715 (Paris:
Boivin, 1935). The European Mind, J. L. May (tr) (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1973, 3rd edn).
Hegel, G. W. T.,The Philosophy ofHistory, J. Sibree (tr) (New York: Dover,
1956).
Hill, C., Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1965, 2nd φt, 1980).
Hughes, H. S., Consciousness and Society (Trowbridge and Esher: The
Bibliography 191
Harvester Press, 1979).

Humphreys, R. S., 'The Historian, His Documents, and the Elementary
Modes of Historical Thought', History and Theory, 19, No. 4 (1980)
1-20.
Hunter, J. F. M., Essays after Wittgenstein (London: George AUen & Unwin,
1973).
Huppert, G., The Idea ofPerfect History (Urbana: University of IUinois
Press, 1970).
lntematioruxl Encyclopedia ofthe Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan,
1968) 'Language', vol. 9, pp. 1-22.
Jacobitti, E., Revolutionary Humanism and Historicism in Modem Italy
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).
Jacobs, M. C., The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and
Republicans (London: George AUen & Unwin, 1981).
Jemolo, A. C., II giansenismo in Italia (Bari: Laterza, 1928).
Kearns, E. J., Ideas in Seventeenth Century France (Manchester: Manches
ter University Press, 1979).
Kelley, D. R., The Beginning ofIdeology: Consciousness and Society in the
French Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
Kelley, D. R., The Foundations of Modem Historical Scholarship: Lan
guage, Law and History in the French Renaissance (New York: Columbia
KeUey, D. R., 'The Prehistory of Sociology: Montesquieu, Vico and the
Legal Tradition', Journal ofthe History ofthe Behavioral Sciences 16,
No. 2 (1980) 133-144.
Kenny, A., Descartes: A Study of His Philosophy (New York: Random
House, 1968).
King, P. (ed.), The History ofIdeas (Totawa, New Jersey: Barnes and Noble
Books, 1983).
Koenigsberger, D., Renaissance Man and Creative Thinking: A History
of Concepts in Harmony 1400-1700 (Hassocks: The Harvester Press,
1979).
Koenigsberger, H. G., 'Decadence or Swift Changes in the CiviUzation of
Italy and Europe in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries?' Transac-
tions.ofthe Royal Historical Society, 5th Series, 10 (1960) 1-18.
Krieger, L., Kings and Philosophers 1689-1789 (London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 1970).
Kristeller, P., Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1964).
Labanca, B., G. Vico e i suoi critici cattolici (Naples: Pierro, 1898).
LaCapra, D., Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language
192 Bibliography
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

Lakoff, G., and M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University
ofChicagoPress, 1980).
Land, S. K., *The Account ofLanguage in Vico's Scienza Nuova: A Critical
Analysis', Philological Quarterly, 55 (1976) 354-373.
Lanza, F., Saggi dipoetica vichiana (Varese: Magenta, 1961).
Langer, S. K., Philosophy in a New Key (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1942, 2nd edn, 15th rpt. New York: Mentor, 1951).
Lee, D. E., and R. N. Beck, *The Meaning of "Historicism'", American
Historical Review, 59, No. 3 (1959) 568-577.
Lefbvre, R., L'Humanisme de Descartes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1957).
Lepschy, G., 'Fantasia e immaginazione', Lettere Italiane, 39, No. 1 (1987)
20-34.
Levi-Strauss, C., Myth and Meaning (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1978).
Levi-Strauss, C., La pensie sauvage (Paris: Plon, 1962),
Levi-Strauss, C., The Scope of Anthropology (London: Jonathan Cape,
1967).
Levi-Strauss, C., Tristes tropiques (Paris: Plon, 1955).
Lilla, Mark, 'A Preface to Vico: Skepticism, Politics, Theodicy' (unpubUshed
Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1990).
Lion, A., The Idealist Conception ofReligion: Vico, Hegel, Gentile (Oxford,
Longo, M., Giambattista Vico (Turin: Bocca, 1921).
Löwith, K., Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the
Philosophy ofHistory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949).
Löwith, K., Vicos Gruruisatz: verum et factum convertuntur (Heidelberg:
Carl Winter Universitätsveriag, 1968).
Malinowski, B., Magic, Science, arid Religion arui Other Essays (Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1948).
Manno, A, G., Lo storicismo di G. B. Vico (Naples: ktituto Editoriale del
Mezzogiomo, 1965).
Manson, R., The Theory of Knowledge of Giambattista Vico (Hamden,
Connecticut: Archon Book, 1969).
Manuel, F,, The Eighteenth Century Confronts the Gods (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1959).
Marini, L., // Mezzogiomo d'Italia difronte a Vienna e a Roma (Bologna:
Patron, 1970).
Marini, L., Pietro Giannone e il Gianrwnismo a Napoli nel Settecento (Bari:
Laterza, 1950).
Bibliography 193
Martin-Trigona, Η. V., Logical Proof and Imaginative Reason in Selected

Speeches ofFrancis Bacon (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Illinois, 1967).
Marx, K., The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York:
International Publishing Company, 1898). The Eighteenth Brumaire
of Louis Bonaparte (tr n.g.) (Peking: Foreign Languages Press,
1978). Der achtzehnte Brumaire des Louis Bonaparte (Hamburg:
1885).
Mastellone, S., Pensieropolitico e vita culturale a Napoli nelki seconda
meta del seicento (Messina-Florence: G. D'Ana, 1965).
Maugain, G., ttude sur V4volution intellectuelle de l'Italie de 1657al750
environ (Paris: Librarie Hachette, 1909).
Mazlish, B., The Riddle of History: The Great Speculators from Vico to
Freud (New York: Нафег and Row, 1966).
Mazzeo, J., Renaissance arui Seventeenth Century Studies (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1964).
Megill, A., 'Aesthetic Theory and Historical Consciousness in Öie Eight
eenth Century', History and Theory, 17, No. 1 (1978) 29-62.
Meek, R. L., Social Science and the Ignoble Savage (Cambridge: Cambridge
Merleau-Ponty, M., La Prose du moruk (Mayenne: Gallimard, 1969). The
Prose of the World, J. O'Neill (tr) (Evanston, niinois: Northwestern
Migliorini, B., La lingua italiana (Florence: Sansoni, 1960). Revised by T.
G. Griffith as The Italian Language (London: Faber, 1984, 2nd English
edn).
Mill, J. S., Dissertations arui Discussions, 2 vols in 4 (London: John W.
Parker and Son, 1859-1875).
Mills, W. J., *Positivism Reversed: The Relevance of Giambattista Vico',
Transactions ofthe Institute ofBritish Geographers, N.S. 7, Nos. 1-14
(1982) 1-14.
RESPONSE:
D. Kunze, 'Giambattista Vico: As a Philosopher of Place, Comments
on the Recent Article by Mills', Transactions ofthe Institute ofBritish
Georgraphers, N.S. 8 (1983) 237-248.
Mink, L. 0., Mirui, fhistory and Dialectic: The Philosophy of R. G.
Collingwood (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969).
Modica, G., Lafilosofiadel «senso comune» in G. Vico (Caltanissetta-Rome:
Sciascia, 1983).
Modica, G., 'Sul ruolo del «senso comune» nel giovane Vico', Rivista
Fihsofia Neo-Scohstica, 75 (1983), 243-262.
194 Bibliography
Momigliano, Α., 'Gibbon from an Italian Point of View', Daedalus, 105,

No. 3 (1976) 125-135.
Monugliano, A., 'The One True History', Times Literary Supplement, (5
September 1975) 982-983.
Monügliano, A., Studies in Historiography (New York: Harper and Row,
1966).
Momigliano, A., 'Vico's Scienza Nuova: Roman "Bestioni" and Roman
"Eroi", History and Theory, 5, No. 1 (1966) 3-23.
Moncallero, G. L., Teorica d'Arcadia (Florence: Olschki, 1953), vol. 1 of
L'Arcadia.
Mondolfo, R., II 'verum-factum' prima di Vico (Naples: Guida, 1969).
Montano, R., 'Vico's Opposition to the Enlightenment', Italian Quarterly,
17,No. 68 (1974)3-34.
Monti, S., Sulla tradizione e sul testo delle orazioni inaugurali di Vico
Mooney, M., Vico in the Tradition ofRhetoric (Princeton: Princeton Uni
versity Press, 1985).
Moravia, S., La scienza dell'uomo nel Settecento (Bari: Laterza, 1970).
Morrison, J., 'Vico and Spinoza', Jourruü ofthe Histpry ofIdeas 41, No. 1
(1980) 49-68.
Morrison, J., 'Vico's Doctrine of the Natural Law of the Gentes', Journal
ofthe History ofPhilosophy, 16 (1978) 47-60.
Morrison, J. 'Vico's Principle of Verum is Factum and and the Problem
of Historicism', Journal of the History of Ideas, 39, No. 4 (1978)
579-595.
New Vico Studies, 1-7 (1983-1989).
Nicolini, F., Commento storico alla seconda Scienza Nuova, 2 vols (Rome:
Edizioni di «Storia Letteratura», 1949).
Nicolini, F., La giovinezza di Giambattista Vico (1668-1700) (Bari: Laterza,
1932).
Nicolini, F., 'Jean-Baptiste Vico dans l'histoire dela pens6e', Cahiers
d'histoire mondiale 1, No. 2 (1963) 299-319.
Nicolini, F., Giambattista Vico, Opere (Milan, Naples: Riccardo Ricciardi,
1953).
Nicolini, F., La religiosita di Giambattista Vico (Bari: Laterza, 1949).
Nicolini, F., Sugli studi omerici di Giambattista Vico (Rome: Accademia
Nazionale dei Lincei, 1954).
Nicolini, F., Vico Storico (Naples: Morano, 1967).
Noether, E. P., Seeds of Italian Nationalism, 1700-1815 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1951).
Nuzzo, E., Vico (Florence: Vallecchi, 1974).
Bibliography 195
O'Brien, G. D., Hegel on Reason and History (Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1975).
Opinioni e Giudizi di Alcuni Illustri Italiani e Stranieri sulle Opere di
Giambattista Vico (Naples: Iovene, 1863) [Library of Congress, Law
Library - L A W , Italy, 7, OPiN]
Ottavanio, C., Metafisica dell'essere parziale (Naples: Rondinella, 1954).
Otto, S., Materialien zur Theorie der Geistesgeschichte (Munich: Wilhelm
Fink Veriag, 1979).
Paci, E., Ingens silva (Milan: Mondadori, 1949).
Pandolfi, C., 'Appunti di filologia vichiana', Giomale Italiano di Filologia,
N.S. 8 (29),No. 2(1977) 181-194.
Papini, M., Arbor humanae linguae (Bologna: Capelli, 1984).
Parekh, B. (ed.), Jeremy Bentham: Ten Critical Essays (London: Frank Cass,
1974).
Perez-Ramos, Antonio, Francis Bacon's Idea ofScience and the Maker's
Knowledge Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
Perrotta, P. C., 'GiambattistaVico, Philosopher-Historian', CatholicHistori-
cal Review, 20 (1934-5) 384-410.
Pico della Mirandola, G. F., On the Imagination, H. Caplan (tr) (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1930).
Piovani, P., 'Philosophie et histoire des idês', Revue europienne des
sciences sociales, 10, No. 28 (1972) 5-245.
РШо: The CollectedDialogues, E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (eds) (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1982, 11th pr.).
Pomeau, R., L'Europe des lumiäres (Pomeau: Stock, 1966).
Pompa, L., A Study ofthe 'New Science' (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1975, 2nd edn, 1990).
Pompa, L., and W. Dray (eds), Substance and Form in History (Edinburgh:
University ofEdinburgh Press, 1981).
Pompa, L., 'Vico's Science', History and Theory, 10 (1971) 49-83.
Pompa, L., 'Vico's Theory of the Causes of Historical Change' (Tunbridge
Wells, Kent: Institutefor Cultural Research, 1971, φt. 1979).
Pons, A., 'Nature et histoire chez G. B. Vico', Les ätudes philosophiques,
No. 216 (1961) 39-53.
Popper, K. R., The Poverty ofHistoricism (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1957).
Porter, R., and M . Teich, The Enlightenment in National Context (Cam
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
Prezzolini, G., The Legacy ofItaly (New York: Vanni, 1948).
Procacci, G., History of the Italian People (London: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1968).
196 Bibliography
Quigley, H., Italy and the Rise ofa New School ofCriticism in the Eighteenth
Century (Perth: Munro & Scott, 1921).
Quint, David, Origin arui Origiruility in Reruiissance Literature: Versions of
the Source (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).
Rak, M., Letture vichiane (Naples: Liguori, 1971).
Renaldo, J. J., 'Bacon's Empiricism, Boyle's Science, and the Jesuit
Response in Italy', Journal ofthe History ofIdeas, 37, No. 4 (1976)
689-695.
Ricoeur, P., Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language,
Action, arui Interpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981).
Ricoeur, P., Interpretation Theory (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University
Press, 1976),
Ricoeur, P., The Reality of the Historical Past (Milwaukee: Marquette
lüeff. P., The Mind ofthe Moralist (London: Victor GoUancz, 1960).
Rigault, M. H., Histoire de ki querelle des anciens et des modems (Paris:
Hachette, 1856).
Robertson, J. C., Studies in the Genesis of the Romantic Theory in the
Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923).
Rorty, R., J. B. Schneewind and Q. Skinner (eds), Philosophy in History
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, 2nd rpt).
Rosa, M., Cattolicesismo e lumi nel settecento italiano (Rome: Herder,
1981).
Rosa, M., Dispotismo e libertä nel Settecento: interpretazioni «repubblic-
ane» di Machiavelli (Bari: Dedalo Litostampa, 1964).
Rossi, P. Francesco Bacone: DalUi magica allscienza (Bari: Laterza, 1957).
Rossi, P., *Gli studi vichiani' Immagini del Settecento in Italia, (Bari:
Laterza, 1980) 98-107.
Rossi, P., Isegni del tempo: Storia della terra e storia delle ruizioni da Hooke
a Vico (MUan: FeltrineUi, 1979).
Rossi, P., Le sterminate antichitä: Studi vichiani (Pisa: Nistri-Lischi, 1969).
Rossi, P., 'Lineamenti di storia della critica vichiana', inW, Binni (ed.), /
classici italiani nelle storia della critica (Florence: La nuova Italia, 1961)
vol. П.
Roy, J. H., L'imagiruition selon Descartes (Paris: Gallimard, 1944).
Runes, D. D. (ed.), The Dictionary of Philosophy (London: George
Routledge & Sons, 1944).
Rudnick, S. D., 'From Created to Creator: Conceptions of Nature and
Authority in Sixteenth Century England' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Brandeis University, 1963).
Bibliography 197
Rudnick Luft, S. D., Ά Genetic Interpretation of Divine Providence in

Vico's New Science% Journal ofthe History ofPhiU)sophy, 20 (1982),
151-169.
Russell, B., The Analysis of Mind (London: George Allen & Unwin,
1921).
Ryder, A., The Kingdom ofNaples under Alfonso the Magnanimous: The
Making ofa Modern State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976).
Ryle, G., The Concept ofMirul (London: Hutchinson University Library,
Senior Series, 1949).
Ryle, G., Philosophical Arguments: An Iruiugural Lecture 1945 (Oxford:
Saccenti, M., Lucrezio in Toscana (Florence: Olschki, 1966).
Saggi e Ricerche sul Settecento (Naples: Istituto Italiano per gliStudi Storici,
1968).
Said, E., Beginnings: Intention and Method (New York: Basic Books,
1975).
Said, E., The World, The Text and the Critic (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Sanna, M., Catalogo Vichiano Napoletano (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1986).
Santinello, G., Storia delle storie generali della filosofia (Brescia: La
Scuola, 1979), vol. П, Dell'ita Cartesiana a Brucker.
Sapir, E., Culture, Language and Personality (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1956).
Sartre, J.-P. L'imaginaire (Paris: Gallimard, 1940). Imagination: A Psycho
logical Critique (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972).
Schaeffer, J. D., 'Vico's Rhetorical Model of the Mind: Sensus Communis
in the De nostri temporis studiorum ratione', Philosophy arui Rhetoric,
14 (1981) 152-167.
Schenk, H. G., The Mind ofthe European Romantics: An Essay in Cultural
History (London: Constable, 1966; Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1979, 2nd edn).
Schmitt, C. and Skinner, Q. (eds), The Cambridge History ofReruiissance
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
Shorter, J. M., 'Imagination', Mind, N.S. 61 (1952) 528-542.
Siedentop, L., 'The Limits ofEnlightenment: A Study of Conservative Social
and Political Thought in Early Nineteenth France, with reference to Maine
de Biran and Joseph de Maistre' (unpublished D. Phil, thesis, Oxford,
1966).
Simioni, A., Le Origini del Risorgimento Politico delVltalia Meridioruzle, 2
vols (Messina-Rome: Giuseppee Principato, 1925).
Simonsuuri, K., Homer's Original Genius: Eighteenth-Century Notions of
198 Bibliography
the Early Greek Epic (1688-1798) (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1979).
Skinner, Q., The Foundations ofModern Political Thought, 2 vols (Cam
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, 2nd rpt. 1980).
Smalley, W. A., Readings in Missionary Anthropology II (South Pasadena,
CaUfornia: William Carey Library, 1978).
Sorrentino, A., La retorica e Uipoetica di G. B. Vico (Turin: Bocca, 1927).
Spaventa, B., Lafilosofiaitaliana (Bari: Laterza, 1908).
Sprigge, C., Benedetto Croce: Man and Thinker (Cambridge: Bowes and
Bowes), 1952.
Steiner, G., After Babel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).
Steinberg, M., The Twelve Tables and their Origin: An Eighteenth Century
Debate', Journal ofthe History ofIdeas, 43, No. 3 (1982) 379-396.
Stem, F., The Varieties ofHistory from Voltaire to the Present (London:
Meridian Books, Thames and Hudson, 1957).
Stewart, K., 'Ancient Poetry as History in the Eighteenth Century', Journal
ofthe History ofIdeas, 3 (1958) 335-347.
Stoye, J. W., English Travellers Abroad, 1604-1667 (London: Jonathan
Cape, 1952).
Stromberg, R. N., 'History in the Eighteenth Century', Journal ofthe History
ofIdeas, 12, No. 3 (1951) 295-304.
Tagliacozzo, G., D. P. Verene, V. Rumble (eds), A Bibliography ofVico in
English 1884-1984 (Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation
Center, 1986).
Tagliacozzo, G. and H. White (eds), Giambattista Vico: An Intematiorud
Symposium, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969).
TagUacozzo, G., and D. P. Verene (eds), Giambattista Vico's Scieru:e of
Humanity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).
REVIEW:
J. Baraouw, Eighteenth Century Studies, 10 (1977) 384-388.
TagUacozzo, G., M. Mooney and D. P. Verene (eds), Vico: Past and Present
(Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1981). .
TagUacozzo, G., M. Mooney, and D. P. Verene (eds), Vico and Contempo
rary Thought (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979,
rpt London: MacnüUan, 1980), φt. from Social Research, 43, Nos. 3-4
(1976).
Tagliacozzo, G. (ed.), Vico and Marx: Affinities arui Contrasts (Atlantic
Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1983; London: Macmillan
Press, 1983).
Tessitore, F. (ed.), Giambattista Vico nel terzo centeruirio delUi ruiscita
(Salemo: Istituto Universitario di Salerno, 1968).
Bibliography 199
Titone, V., La storiografia dell'illuminismo in Italia (Milan: Mursia, 1969,

first edition 1952).
Todd, J. and J. Cono, 'Vico and Collingwood on "The Conceit of the
Scholars'", History ofEuropean Ideas, 6, No. 1 (1983) 59-69.
Torrini, M., 'L'AccademiadegliInvestiganti,Napoli, 1663-1670', Quademi
Storici, 48 (1981)845-883.
Torrini, M., ' I I problema del rapporto scienza-filosofia nel pensiero del
primo Vico', Physis, 20, Nos. 1-4 (1978) 103-121.
Ursini-Scuderi, S., G. B. Vico come fondatore della sociologia modema,
(Palermo: Giuseppe Pedone Lauriel, 1888).
Vasoli, C., L'enciclopedismo del Seicento (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1978).
Vaughan, C. E., Giambattista Vico: An Eighteenth Century Pioneer, The
Bulletin ofthe John Rylands Library, 6, No. 3 (July 1921). Reprinted for
private circulation: Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1921).
Vaughan, C. E., Studies in the History ofPolitical Thought Before and and
AfterRousseau, 2 vols (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1925).
Vaughan, F., The Political Philosophy ofGiambattista Vico (The Hague:
Venturi, F., 'Alle origini dell'IUununismo Napoletano: Dal carteggio di
Bartolomeo Intieri', Rivista Storica Italiana, 71 (1959) 416-456.
Venturi, F., Italy and the Enlightenment, S. Corsi (tr) (London: Longman,
1972).
Verene, D. P., Vico's Science ofImagination (Ithaca: Comell University
Press, 1981).
REVIEWS:
Alberti, A., The Journal ofModem History, 55 (1983) 151-152.
Armour, L., Library Journal 106 (1981) 887.
Bevilacqua, V. M., Quarierly JoumalofSpeech, 69 (1983) 444-447.
Bibliographical Bulletin ofPhilosophy, 29 (1982) 112.
Blasi, A., Journal ofthe Behavioral Sciences, 19 (1983) 265-266.
Cain, S., Religious Studies Review, 8 (1982) 162.
Caponigri, A. R., The Modem Schoolman, 60 (1983) 221-224.
Choice, 19 (1981) 226.
Dupree, D., The Review ofMetaphysics, 35 (1982) 916-917.
Evangeliou. C., Philosophia, 12 (1982) 445-447.
Haddock, B. A., Religious Studies, 19 (1983) 549-552.
Jung, H. Y., 'Vico's Rhetoric: A Note on Verene's Vico's Science of
Imagination', PhilosophyandRhetoric, 15, No. 3 (1982) 187-202.
Lovekin, D., Philosophy and Rhetoric, 16 (1983) 55-60.
Milbank, 3., History ofEuropean Ideas, 4 (1983) 337-342.
Munk, A., Joumal ofPhilosophy and Social Science, (1984) 356-357.
200 Bibliography
Pompa, L., InternationalStudies inPhilosophy, 17, No. 1 (1985) 101-103.

Psychological Medicine, 12 (1982).
Steven, R. S., Ethics, 92 (1982) 792.
Strong, E. F., Journal ofthe History ofPhilosophy, 21 (1983) 273-275.
TimesLiterary Supplement, (Nov. 6, 1981), 1309.
Walsh, W. H., British Joumal ofAesthetics, 22 (1982) 378-380.
Verri, A., G. B. Vico nella cultura contemporanea (Lece: Milella, 1979).
Villari, R., 'La Spagna, L'Italia, e L'Assolutismo', Studi Storici, 18, No. 4
(1977) 5-22.
Villa, G., Lafilosofiadel mito (Milan: Bocca, 1949).
Vitale, M., 'Norma linguisitica cruscante in scrittori atomisti e libertini del
secondo seicento napoletano', Societa nazioruile di scienze, lettere e arti
in Napoli, n.d.
Vittorini, D., 'Giambattista Vico and Reality: an Evaluation of the "De nostri
temporis studiorum ratione" (1708)', Modem Language Quarterly, 13
(1952) 90-98.
von Otto, S., 'Imagination und Geometrie: Die Idee kreativer Synthesis',
ArchivfUrgeschichte derphilosphie, 63, No. 3 (1981).
Wainwright, E. H., 'The Historical Thought of Giambattista Vico', Kleio,
9, Nos. 1-2 (1977) 1-21.
Wallace, K. R., Francis Bacon on the Nature ofMan (Urbana: University
ofniinoisPress, 1967).
Walsh, W. H., An Introduction to Philosophy of History (London:
Hutchinson University Library, 1951, 3rd edn, 1967).
Waraock, M., Imagiruition (London: Faber and Faber, 1976).
Wasserman, E. R. (ed.), Aspects ofthe Eighteenth Century (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1965).
Weinberg, B., A History ofLiterary Criticism in the Italian Reruiissance, 2
vols (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961).
Weinryb, E., 'Re-enactment in Retrospect', The Monist, 72, No. 4 (1989)
568-580.
Whitman, C. H., Homer and the Heroic Tradition (Cambridge, Mass.:
Whittaker, T., 'Vico's New Science ofHumanity', Mind, 35 (1926) 59-71,
204-221, 319-336, rpt. in Reason: A Philosophical Essay, with Histori-
calIllustrations-Comte, Mill, Schopenhauer, Vico, Spinoza (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1934).
Wohlfart, G., Denken der Sprache: Sprache und Kunst bei Vico, Hamann,
Humboldt und Hegel (FreiburgAlunich: Veriag Karl Alber, 1984).
Wolf, E. R., Europe and the People Without History (Berkeley: University
ofCaliforniaPress, 1982).
Bibliography 201
Woolf, S., A History ofItaly (London: Methuen, 1979, rpt. 1986).

Yates, F., The Art ofMemory (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966, φ t
1984),
Zagorin, P., 'Vico's Theory of Knowledge*, The Philosophical Quarterly,
34,No. 134 (1984) 15-30.
RESPONSE:
Beriin, I., 'Discussions on Vico', Philosophical Quarterly 35, No. 140
(1985) 281-290,
Zagorin, P., 'Berlin on Vico', Phihsophical Quarterly, 35, No. 140 (1985)
290-296.
ZoUa, E., The Uses ofImagination arui the Decline ofthe West (Ipswich:
Golgonooza Press, 1978; φt. from Sophia Perennis, 1, No. 1).
Index
Abrams, Μ. H., 105 Descartes, Ren6, 1, 9-25, 42, 44-45, 50,

Abraham, 57 67-68, 73, 98, 136-137
Adams, Henry Packwood, 7, 59 Diderot, Denis, 24
Alembert, Jean Le Rond d', 24 Donzelli, Maria, 7
Aquinas, Thomas, 14 Doria, Paolo Matta, 65
Aristotle, 18, 44,47-48, 52, 104,139 Dray, William, 30-31
Arnauld, Antoine, 14 Dussen, W. J. van der, 121
Augustus, 39, 65
Averroes, 104 Fassö, Guido, 7
Ferrari, Giuseppe, 53, 73
Bacon, Francis, 10-11, 14, 25, 38, 47, Ficino, Marsilio, 23, 133
49,51,71,97, 115, 136 Filangieri, Gaetano, 6
Battistini, Andrea, 7 Finetti, B., 70
Beccaria, Cesare, 36 Fisch, Max, 7, 59-60,67
Badalonii, Nicola, 7, 131 Foucault,Michel,U7
Belavel, Yvon, 12-13 Frederick II, 19
Berlin, Isaiah, 6-7, 28-29, 34, 73, Freud, Sigmund, 115, 118
83-84, 105, 124, 135, 139-142 Fubini, Mario, 7
Berry, Thomas, 59
Bodin, Jean, 91 Galen, 139
Boyle, Robert, 26 Galiani, Ferdinando, 69
Brockliss, Laurence, 24 Gardiner, Patrick, 30-31
Brucker, Jakob, 69 Genovesi, Antonio, 6
Burke, Edmund, 47 Gentile, Giovanni, 6
Burke, Peter, 71 Giannone, Pietro, 65, 69
Burnett, James, Lord Monboddo, 98-99 Gianturco, Elio, 7, 126
Giarrizzo, Giuseppe, 7- 8
Campbell, Joseph, 111 Gravina, Gian Vincenzo, 34
Capua, Leonardo di, 68 Grotius, Hugo, 10, 25, 35, 61, 71
Caraffa, Antonio, 34-36
Caraffa, Hadrian, 34 Haddock, Bruce, 7-8
Cassirer, Ernst, 134 Hauser, Kaspar, 90
Coffingwood, R. G., 6-7, 29-34, 39, 73, Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 3,
118, 121, 146 31-32, 52, 65, 99, 103
Conti, Antonio, 59 Herder, Johann Gottfried, 30
Cristofolini, Paolo, 74 Hobbes, Thomas, 18, 26-27, 63, 88, 132
Croce, Benedetto, 6-7, 29-31, 69, Homer. 39, 46, 60, 76-77, 109
73-74,97, 100, 121,140 Hume, David, 47, 97, 104
Cuoco, Vincenzo, 6
Joyce, James, 6
Dante, Alighieri, 75-77 Julius Caesar, 65
Davidson, Donald, 45 Jung, Karl Gustav, 37
202
Index 203
Kelley, Donald, 38,97 Pomponazzi, Pieti"o, 23, 133

King, Preston, 37-38 Porcia, Giannartico di, 59, 65, 67
Pufendorf, Samuel von, 61
Langer, Susanne, 110
Le Clerc, Jean, 5, 66 Quint, David, 46
Leibniz, Gottfried WiUielm von, 65
Lepschy, Giulio, 121 Robertson, J. G., 124
L^vi-Strauss, Claude, 114 Rocca, Eton Domenico, 68
Ldvy-Bruhl, Lucien, 111 Rossi, Paolo, 7
Locke, John, 15,18, 26-27,121,132 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 18, 36,
Löwith, Kark, 84 56,87,98
Machiavelli, Niccolö, 33, 48 Said, Edward, 7

MaUnowski, Bronislaw, 111 Sanna, Manuela, 74
Mandeville, Bernard, 20 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 139
Marx, Karl, 6, 32, 34, 52 Selden, John, 61
MasuUo, Candida, 67 Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper,
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 106 Earlof.47, 136
Michelet, Jules, 6, 73, 140 Smith, Adam, 3, 20, 47
Mill, John Stuart, 17, 23 Solon, 3
Mink, Louis, 32 Spengler, Oswald, 32
Momigliano, Arnaldo, 7 Spinoza, Baruch, 132
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat,
Baron de, 36, 104, 141 Tacitus, 10, 25, 71
Mooney, Michael, 7 Tanucci, Bernardo, 69
Moses, 69, 77 Tasso, Torquato, 46
Muratori, Ludovico, 66 Toynbee, Arnold, 32
Newton, Isaac, 15 Valla,Lorenzo, 23, 38, 91, 133

Nicolini, Fausto, 7, 35, 67, 69, 73, 75, 80 Vaughan, Charles, 80
Verene, Donald, 7-8, 121, 134
Perez-Ramos, Antonio, 26 Vergil, 46
РеижсЬ, 23, 133 Vico, Antonio di, 67
Pico della Mirandola, Gianfrancesco, 22, Vico, Gennaro, 66
133,136 Vico, Luisa, 34, 66
Piovani, Pietro, 7, 32 Villarosa, Marquis of, 66
Plato, 10, 14, 22, 25, 28-29, 33, 79, 88, Voltaire (Franôis-Marie Arouet),
91, 134, 137, 139, 141,144 36, 69, 73
Polybius, 33
Pomodoro, F., 73 Weber, Max. 56
Pompa, Leon, 7-8, 29, 132
Zagorin, Perez, 7, 36-38

Giambattista Vico - Imagination and Historical Knowledge

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Giambattista Vico - Imagination and Historical Knowledge

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Giambattista Vico - Imagination and Historical Knowledge

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Imagination and Historical Knowledge

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of

First published in Great Britain 1993 by

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

1 VICO'S mXELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT 9

2 VICO'S EARLY WRITWGS, 1709-1728 41

3 LA SCIENZA NUOVA, 1725,1730,1744 72

9. New Critical Art 93

4 LANGUAGE, fflSTORICAL RECONSTRUCTION

5 EVlAGINATION AND fflSTORICAL KNOWLEDGE 120

I begin by thanking Isaiah Berlin, who supervised my Oxford D.Phil,

Affetti di un disperato 1693

Vico*s fundamental importance in the history of European ideas lies in his

they could be used as evidence of an individual society's philosophy

social group's creativity, which was not dependent on timeless, Platonic

anti-Cartesian, but never anti-scientific, even though his own interests

[Descartes] . . . has slipped somefictionsinto his Discours . . . ; he does

No longer is imagination - for Vico any more than Descartes - a simple

We should, instead, envisage it as the primal, positive power of seizing

. . . ac proinde nostra clara ac Accordingly, our clear and distinct

extremes of Cartesianism by re-establishing the dignity of the science of

* separated, that overcomes the

believed scholars to be as productive as soldiers in their work for the state.

Tria ipsissima sapientiae officia: Three are the very duties of

phantasia should not be viewed as a denouncement of phantasia by Vico,

En quoy il n'eft pas It is unUkely that this is an

ferietur ab ipfius iUationis evidenti & attenda confideratione*).^^ Vico was

on the science of human cultures, which could be exanüned by means of

Descartes reason was always the superior faculty to imagination. Ultimately

2. Verum ipsum factum

Lo che, a chiunque virifletta,dee Whoever reflects on this

H'obbes (1588-1679) society and government began together at the time of

could gain complete comprehension. (3) Verum ipsum factum recognised

3. Categories of Historical Knowledge

Isaiah Berlin identified four categories of knowledge discussed by Vico.^

In the English-speaking world it is critical to begin any study of Vico with

rather than Croce's monograph on La filosofia del Giambattista Vico (The

To the scientist, nature is always and merely a 'phenomenon*, not in the

Vague as this statement is, it is essential to realize that CoUingwood

attributed to historians *a power of self-certifying insight' (paraphrase by

particular view of history being a vicarious experience has been violently

First, the guiding principle of histor/ is brute strength; then valiantor

This was CoUingwood's elegant description of the Vichian pattern. Although

effect of intellectual development was inevitable for a society, it is clear that

Caraffa. De rebus gestis Antonj Caraphaei {The Life ofAntonio Caraffa)

would have greatly intrigued Vico, representing as it did a deviation from

modifications of our same human mind' (1744, §349).'2 Perez 2^gorin,

or iinished or definitive history . . . only partial, incomplete, even tentative'

Le tradizioni volgari devon avere Vulgar traditions must have had

. . . vi si vagUa dal falso il vero Truth is sifted from falsehood in

It was this *public ground of truth' ('ми pubblicofondamento di vero^) which

2 Vico's Early Writings,

Most writers on Vico have concentrated their efforts on his important

2. De nostri temporis studiorum ratione (1709)

As with his earlier orations of 1699-1707, Vico clearly felt no compunction

Ac haec addas librariorum menda, We must guard against scribal

discussion of many of the themes which playedsuch a vitalrole in all

Nam prudentia in hunnanis actionibus Practical judgement in human

Vico viewed historical reconstruction through philology as the most straight