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US Asia-Pacific Policy: QUAD, AUKUS and US-India Strategic partnership

Muhammad Yasir, Ahmad Aziz, Maaz Ahmad, Laiba Kiyani and Muhammad Farazdaq

Faculty of Contemporary Sciences, National Defence University Islamabad

IR-110: Introduction to International Relations

Mr. Syed Adnan Athar Bukhari

Due Date: 28th May 28, 2023

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US Asia-Pacific Policy: QUAD, AUKUS and US-India Strategic partnership

US ASIA-PACIFIC POLICY (Maaz Ahmad & Ahmad Aziz)

Congress has the ability to shape the United States’ approach to Asia, where economic,
security, and political trends are challenging U.S. leadership and interests. The Trump
Administration has promoted a strategy of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) that frames
U.S. policy in the region as a multi-faceted competition against China. China in recent years has
expanded its presence in its broad maritime periphery while pursuing an ambitious plan to
build economic corridors across the Eurasian continent. Under the FOIP strategy, the
Administration has emphasized strategic relations with countries that share its concerns about
China’s growing influence, including Japan, Australia, and India. The Administration also has
promoted several infrastructure initiatives as alternatives to Chinese funded projects, which it
has described as “predatory” and “debt traps.” Notwithstanding the FOIP policy, President
Trump’s overall foreign policy approach has deepened many Asian leaders’ questions about the
credibility of the U.S. commitment to the region. In particular, governments have expressed
concern about President Trump’s 2017 withdrawal from the proposed 12-nation Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) trade agreement; his application of unilateral tariffs against trading partners
including China, Japan, and South Korea; his comments and policy moves that may undermine
U.S. alliances; and his tendency to change policy positions. The tools Congress may use to
influence U.S. policy in Asia include oversight through hearings and investigations; the Senate
confirmation process; the authorizing and appropriations processes; other legislative directives
and restrictions; resolutions and policy statements; inspectors general; reporting requirements;
program evaluation; and informal advice and pressure.
The Asia Pacific:
Key Facts
Five U.S. treaty allies are in the Asia Pacific: Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South
Korea, and Thailand. Over 74,000 U.S. troops are deployed in the region.
In 2017, four Asian economies were among the top 10 U.S. trading partners: China (no.
1), Japan (no. 4), South Korea (no. 6), India (no. 9). China was the world’s fastest growing
economy in 2017, while India’s growth rate is expected to outpace China’s in 2018 and 2019.
Asia is home to the United States’ closest competitor in economic size and military
strength, China; the world’s most populous democracy, India; and the world’s most populous
Muslim-majority nation and third-most populous democracy, Indonesia.
Asia includes five nations with nuclear weapons arsenals: China and Russia, both
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council; India and Pakistan, which are
bitter rivals; and North Korea.
Asian nations, including U.S. allies and partners, are involved in major territorial
disputes with China and among themselves in the South China Sea and East China Sea, as well
as along the India-China and India Pakistan borders. Another potential flashpoint is Taiwan,
which Beijing claims as part of China.
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Emerging Trends
The balance of economic power in the region continues to shift. By 2030, many
economists predict that China will overtake the United States to become the world’s largest
economy in nominal terms. By the same date, some predict that India might displace Japan as
the third largest. The economic and, to a lesser extent, military rise of India exacerbates
national security fears in Pakistan and is being monitored warily in Beijing.
China is increasingly asserting influence through regional economic and financial
initiatives. It is championing its “Belt and Road initiative” (BRI), an effort to boost infrastructure
development and economic connectivity—and expand China’s influence—among more than 65
countries on three continents. The most prominent BRI project, the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor, could comprise up to $62 billion in investment. China is also promoting the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a proposed regional trade agreement that does
not include the United States. In 2015, China launched a new development bank, the Asia
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB); membership includes 14 G-20 members.
In 2016 and 2017, North Korea conducted scores of missile tests and three nuclear
weapons tests, demonstrating it may be close if not already capable of striking the continental
United States with a nuclear armed ballistic missile. After a period of hostile statements in
2017, the Trump Administration in 2018 has pursued a diplomatic solution to denuclearize
North Korea. A U.S.-North Korea summit, as well as three inter-Korean summits, have eased
tensions and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has publicly stated that he will “work toward
complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” but progress toward resolution has
remained elusive. Meanwhile, U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan face strains as U.S.
priorities diverge from Seoul’s and Tokyo’s top concerns.

Military spending in the region is rising, with China seeking greater power projection
capabilities and other nations seeking to enhance their security amid questions about the
future U.S. role in the region. In 2017, China was the world’s second-largest defense spender
after the United States, and India was number five. Several Southeast Asian nations have
increased defense budgets.
Rivalry between China and India appears to be intensifying, especially in the Indian
Ocean region, raising the possibility of greater regional instability. The world’s two most
populous states also share the world’s longest disputed land border and have divergent views
on Pakistan and Tibet.
Following the U.S. withdrawal from the proposed TPP, Asian countries have been
negotiating new regional trade agreements, including RCEP, that exclude the United States.
Many say these agreements could put U.S. companies at a competitive disadvantage. In 2018,
Japan and the European Union signed a new FTA, and Japan led the remaining 11 TPP countries
to finish a new agreement that goes into effect on December 30, 2018, for some members. In
September 2018, the United States and Japan agreed to open limited trade negotiations.
Climate change may increasingly play a role in regional security as natural disasters and
rising seas displace people and damage economies, particularly in Southeast Asia, or as the
opening of an Arctic sea lane changes trade patterns. Select Issues for Congress Questions for
Congress may include whether the Administration’s budget submission supports its FOIP
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strategy, how to weigh in on trade policy, and what role Congress should play in defining U.S.
goals in the region.
China
The Administration’s National Security Strategy describes both China and Russia as
seeking to “challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American
security and prosperity.” A summary of the U.S. National Defense Strategy released in January
2018 describes China as a “strategic competitor” that is pursuing a military modernization
program that “seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the
United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.” Congress may consider whether
China is indeed seeking to establish control over strategically and economically important seas,
as well as what U.S. policy should be toward RCEP, the AIIB, and the BRI. Is China a “revisionist”
power, as the Trump Administration asserts, and if so, what might that mean for U.S. interests
in Asia and globally? How should the United States consider Beijing’s human rights record as it
shapes policy toward China? Without U.S. leadership, what would future political, economic,
and security multilateral organizations look like, and what would be the U.S. place in them?
What would be the impact on U.S. defense strategy, plans, programs, and spending? U.S.
Alliances the Trump Administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy reaffirms the centrality
and vitality of U.S. alliances in Asia, and public statements by heads of state underscore the
strength of the bilateral agreements. However, observers point to gaps in coordination and
contentious negotiations over burden-sharing as signs of emerging divisions among the allies.
Trump’s unilateral cancellation of major U.S.-South Korean exercises has reduced U.S.-South
Korean security cooperation, and Japan has expressed anxiety that its core national interests—
including trade priorities and doubts about North Korea— are being marginalized by U.S. policy.
Congress may consider how best to secure U.S. interests and values in the region, or whether
the price to protect U.S. security interests in Asia is too high. Should the United States
encourage its allies to take a more independent approach to their defense? Congress also could
probe whether the Trump Administration is doing enough to support U.S. allies and partners in
the region. North Korea Potential issues for Congress include whether to support or impose
conditions on the Administration’s diplomacy with North Korea. Despite Kim’s statement
supporting conditional denuclearization and his cessation of nuclear and missile tests, many
analysts have expressed concern that North Korea has benefited from the diplomatic process
without providing concrete concessions in return. Congress can explore whether to limit or
expand the President’s ability to ease, waive, and/or lift sanctions previously passed by
Congress. Congress may also pressure the Administration to include North Korean human rights
abuses in denuclearization negotiations. South Asia Congress may also wish to consider how the
U.S. government should approach the India-Pakistan-China strategic triangle. Should
Washington seek to “balance” its ties with India and Pakistan? Should the United States
undertake new efforts to mediate or otherwise address the India-Pakistan dispute in Kashmir?
Should recently accelerated development of the U.S.-India “strategic partnership” perhaps
include a new level of defense cooperation and technology sharing? How will New Delhi’s
generally friendly relations with Russia and Iran affect this effort? If they are affected, how
should U.S. policy be recalibrated? With U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan drastically decreased,
should Washington rethink its post9/11 alliance with Pakistan, given considerable congressional
frustrations with Islamabad’s counterterrorism efforts?
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GOALS OF U.S POLICY IN ASIA

NATIONAL SECURITY AND DIPLOMACY
According to the 2022 Annual Threat Assessment, one major goal of U.S. policy is to
manage "opportunities to forge collective action with allies and partners against both the
renewed threat of nation-state aggression and threats to human security." Long-standing US
allies Japan and South Korea are also under attack from China and North Korea. Taiwan and the
countries of Southeast Asia are particularly at risk from China's assertiveness in the South China
Sea. With its Belt and Road Initiative, China aims to increase its economic, technological, and
military footprint abroad. China also leads the world in surveillance technologies and
censorship to monitor the populace and punish opposition.
ECONOMIC AND TRADE INTERESTS
Asia makes up about 37% of the world’s GDP and six of the U.S. top ten trade
partners are in Asia: China, 1st; Japan, 4th; South Korea, 6th; Vietnam, 7th; India, 8th; Taiwan,
9th).
China's aggressive endeavors to increase its economic clout and influence regionally and
globally are of special concern to the United States. The Belt and Road Initiative is an
outstanding instance. It is China's "ambitious plan to develop two new trade routes connecting
China with the rest of the world" in an effort "to develop a larger, more interdependent market
for China, grow China's political and economic strength, and create the right conditions for
China to build a high technology economy."
Additionally, Made in China 2025 “seeks to make China dominant in global high-tech
manufacturing” in sectors including electric vehicles, information technology and
communications, and artificial intelligence. The combination of the two endeavors, if both
successful, would make China an economic and technological powerhouse with networks it
could control across much of the world.
CURRENT CHALLENGES AND AREAS FOR REFORM
Allies
U.S. allies offer unique opportunities for cooperation as the U.S. pursues its policy
objectives in that region.
SOUTH KOREA
One of the United States' most crucial friends in the Asia Pacific is South Korea,
particularly when it comes to containing a nuclear North Korea. The alliance provides a
continental basis for American military and deters North Korean invasion. South Korea has been
included in the "nuclear umbrella," an extended deterrent strategy in which the United States
pledges to deploy its nuclear weapons to safeguard its allies. Over 28,000 American soldiers are
stationed in South Korea, and there are regular joint military drills and training sessions
between the two nations.

JAPAN
The U.S. and Japan's alliance are seen as "an anchor of the U.S. security role in Asia" and
"one of the most significant military relationships in the region." More than any other nation,
the U.S. has more than 80 military installations in Japan and more than 60,000 personnel
deployed there. Due to China's rising assertiveness, notably its nautical activity in disputed
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territory, and North Korea's missile and nuclear tests, this relationship has taken on greater
importance in recent years.
INDIA
Due to China's growth, U.S. relations with India are also becoming more significant.
India and Japan made a commitment to "intensify defense ties and push for greater
cooperation with Australia and the United States as they seek to counter growing Chinese
influence throughout Asia" beginning in 2017. Additionally, in an attempt to counter China's
expanding geopolitical and economic power through its Belt and Road Initiative, the United
States, India, and Japan have struck infrastructural agreements.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Southeast Asian nations Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and
Vietnam, all of which have maritime claim territories, are enraged by China's actions in the
South China Sea. Based on the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, the United States supports
the freedom of navigation of these claimant countries. With defense partners like Australia, the
U.S. has escalated its military and naval presence in the area, including freedom of navigation
operations.
CHALLENGES
The two greatest dangers to American interests in the Asia Pacific area as well as the
nation are North Korea and China. Despite the fact that both nations are nuclear powers, the
United States rarely interacts with them. China is one of the U.S.'s main trading partners,
although there is no diplomatic or official economic engagement between the U.S. and North
Korea.
NUCLEAR THREAT
NORTH KOREA:
In addition to possessing illicit nuclear weapons, North Korea repeatedly violated the
global Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) until leaving the pact in 2003. Despite persistent criticism
and penalties from the international world, the regime continues to develop and test nuclear
weapons.
From 2006 to 2017, the North Korean government conducted six nuclear tests, as well
as its first-ever launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile in July 2017. North Korea is still
conducting intercontinental, hypersonic, and short-range missile tests, according to the 2022
Annual Threat Assessment. Most observers believe North Korea has between 20 and 60
warheads on its arsenal.
CHINA:
ECONOMIC RELATION AND AGGRESSION
The United States' main trading partner is China, who reclaimed this position in late
2021 following trade hostilities that began in 2018. 15% of all-American overseas trade is with
China.
China continues to have the largest economy in the world, and since the 1970s, it has
transitioned from a closed, centrally planned economy to one that is more market-oriented and
plays a significant global role, although it "continues to pursue an industrial policy, state-
support of key sectors, and a restrictive investment regime," according to the CIA World
Factbook.
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The scope of China's economic objectives extends well beyond its boundaries. China's
"Belt and Road Initiative, reminiscent of the Silk Road, is a massive infrastructure project that
would stretch from East Asia to Europe." It was introduced in 2013.
The Council on Foreign Relations, or CFR, explains that aid also takes advantage of
developing countries' need for "inexpensive, high-quality technology to expand wireless phone
networks and broadband internet coverage" and "goes towards improving recipients'
telecommunications networks, artificial intelligence capabilities, cloud computing, e-commerce
and mobile payment system" in addition to infrastructure projects like hydropower dams, oil
and gas pipelines, and railway networks.

QUADRILETRAL SECURITY DIALOGUE (Laiba Kiyani)

Members
1. 1.India
2. 2.Australia
3. 3.USA
4. 4.Japan
These four countries on the world form a quadrilateral coalition. Objective of this
coalition is to safeguard the interests in Indo pacific region from Chinese expansion policy. The
idea was first proposed by Japanese president Shinzo Abi in 2007 but the idea did not move
ahead because Australia pulled out due to Chinese pressure. After 13 years in 2020 India
Australia USA and Japan turned this idea into reality gave the shape to long pending quad
coalition. This year Australia gained the Malabar exercise (2020) after the initiation from India
making it the first time that all the quad members were engaged militarily. This year due to
outbreak of the pandemic china has been heavily criticized.in June 2020 China Australia
relations started declining because of the mishandling of Covid-19 in Australia. India capitalized
this and send initiation to Australia to join QUAD. Primarily Australia did not join because the
china has been the major investor in Australia. Two-way trade between Australia and china has
been estimated as 240 billion between July 2019 to June 2020. In 2014 the Australian prime
minister and Chinese president described their countries relations as “comprehensive strategic
partnership”.
OBJECTIVES OF QUAD
There are many critical sea routes in Indo pacific region even China knows it and have
always tried to expand their influence which is a part of global expansion policy. Main objective
of this security dialogue is to keep the critical sea routes away from the Chinese influence. But
Chinese criticized it and called it as the Asian version of the NATO.
How is the alliance system useful for India?
As we all know the territorial conflict between India and China in the Himalayan region
has been going on since 1962. The Chinese have always been a threat to India. China is growing
as the world’s largest economy and exporter of goods that means they heavily depend on
trade.so the only way to control the china is through water routes because on land china can
cause many problems for India with the help of Pakistan. But with to help of Japan Australia
and USA it can truly disrupt the Chinese trade and set a clear message to China. Moreover, this
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coalition can also help India to combat the humanitarian crises like tropical cyclones, Typhoons.
This group can also work for monitoring and shipping vessels for search and rescue or anti-
piracy operations. QUAD can also provide infrastructure assistance to climatically vulnerable
states during cyclone. India is located right at the center of the Indo pacific geopolitical region.
Four countries led a foreign minister conference in japan on October 6 th 2020 followed by India
and us on October 26 and 27 2020in new delhij.as the result the Malabar exercises began on
November 3-6.it was the three-day joint naval exercise for the four countries in the Bay of
Bengal. The second phase will be held from 17 to 20 November in Arabian sea.
Quad silence on Taiwan Issue
1. United States President Joe Biden's Statement
"United States is bound to come to Taiwan's defense"
2. Quad partners have different stakes on Taiwan Issue
3. Japan has biggest risk given to its proximity to Taiwan and alliance United States
4. Many in Tokyo seemed to welcome U.S. clarity;
it remains to be seen whether Australia shares that view.
5. India would most likely avoid risking its security interests with any engagement on the
Taiwan issue.
6. China noted its displeasure about Japan's role in the Quad.
7. In a video call on May 18,
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned his counterpart, Hayashi Yoshimasa
Japan should not align itself with the United States and others in ways that could
damage Chinese "sovereignty, security and interests.
Quad meeting Day
Quad summit hosted by Japan in May 2022, the leaders of the United States, Australia,
India, and Japan reemphasized the principles of a free and open Indo-Pacific:
1. freedom
2. rule of law
3. Democratic values
4. sovereignty
5. territorial integrity
The meeting also appeared to reinforce a central purpose of the Quad-to provide the
region with public goods.
Pandemic Assistance by Quad
COVAX initiative by Quad partners and they contributed $ 5.2 billion
40% of the total government donations received by the global vaccines
• They delivered 670 million vaccine doses of which 265 countries were Indo-Pacific
Initiatives by Quad
• Quad fellowship for Stem research.
• Indo-Pacific partnership for Maritime Domain awareness by improving technology and
training which:
1. Aims to combat illegal fishing
2. To respond to humanitarian and natural disasters
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Other Quad priorities Include meeting the needs of:

1. Indo-Pacific's infrastructure
2. crafting a new Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package
3. Building cyber security capacity
However, still unknown is the timeframe for achieving these goals and who will provide
the resources required to do so.
How did the Quad address China?
The Quad leaders emphasized their shared values, including support for dispute
settlement over the use of force and opposition to any unilateral attempt to change the status
quo
• China and Russia teamed up to demonstrate their displeasure: six Chinese and Russian
strategic bombers, accompanied by surveillance aircraft, flew around Japanese territory.
• Growing military cooperation between China and Russia is putting pressure on Japan's
defenses.
Did the Quad leaders condemn Russian aggression against Ukraine?
• No. An unscheduled Quad summit was held virtually on March 3, after the Russian
invasion, but they didn't reach a consensus.
New Delhi has not been willing to condemn Moscow, either at the United Nations or
unilaterally, largely due to its long-standing military relationship with Russia.
• The other three Quad members have spoken out in various ways and have all
sanctioned Russia.
• At this meeting in Tokyo, the leaders reportedly discussed their responses to the
conflict but stopped short of condemning Russia's invasion.
What's next for the Quad?
•The meeting underscored all four members' commitment to the Quad despite
domestic political changes
• New prime ministers have taken office in Australia and Japan since the first leaders'
summit, which was held virtually in March 2021.
• Support for the Quad remains strong. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida
enthusiastically welcomed his Quad partners to Tokyo, and Australian Prime Minister Anthony
Albanese boarded a plane to attend the meeting just hours after being sworn into office
He said he looks forward to welcoming his Quad partners to Australia for next year's
summit
• In Tokyo, the Quad leaders outlined an ambitious agenda for the next year; 2023
should reveal how successful they've been in pooling their resources to meet those goals.

AUKUS (Muhammad Yasir)

An "enhanced trilateral security partnership" was announced in a joint statement by
Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, US President Joseph Biden, and British Prime Minister
Boris Johnson on September 15, 2021.
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Australian, United Kingdom, and United States. These three nations' accord calls for
consultations to start so that Australia can get nuclear-powered but non-nuclear-armed
submarines. This section of the agreement's initial scoping phase will take 18 months to
complete. The three countries would collaborate on the development of Australia's nuclear-
powered submarines with an emphasis on interoperability, shared interests, and mutual gain. A
proposal for additional cooperation to "enhance our joint capabilities and interoperability" is
also announced in the announcement. The initial emphasis of these will be on cyber
capabilities, artificial intelligence.
International Reaction
CHINA’S REACTION
AUKUS "has seriously undermined regional peace and stability," according to China.
Zhao Lijian, a spokesman for China's foreign ministry, continued by saying that the declaration
has "intensified the weapons race and weakened international "non-proliferation efforts" China
charged the three nations with having "Cold War mentalities" and applying "double standards"
to nuclear non-proliferation. The UK was encouraged by a representative of the Chinese
Embassy in London to "take concrete actions to uphold the international nuclear non-
proliferation regime and avoid any action that would increase tension in the Asia Pacific region
or compromise the peace and stability in the region."
INDIA’S REACTION
Tanvi Madan of the US-based Brookings Institution said AUKUS is likely to be seen
favorably by India in light of Delhi's relative silence over it. According to Madan, India is
extremely concerned about Chinese behavior and intentions. Additionally, AUKUS is a
reaffirmation of the partner countries' commitment to the area.
FRANCE SAYS AUKUS IS A “STAB IN THE BACK”
France's response was one of rage. Jean-Yves Le Drian, France's foreign minister, called
the AUKUS agreement a "stab in the back." The announcement, according to Mr. Le Drian,
represents "inappropriate behavior among allies and French diplomats were recalled from
Washington and Canberra in reaction. Florence Parly, France's minister of defence, also
postponed a meeting with Ben Wallace, the UK's secretary of defence. Le Drian responded that
the UK's participation in the deal was "opportunistic" and referred to it as "the fifth wheel on
the wagon" when asked why France had not summoned its ambassador to the UK. The French
state owns the bulk of Naval Group, the French firm hired to construct Australia's conventional-
powered submarines in a $36.2 billion deal. The loss of the deal, therefore, has direct financial
consequences for the French Government. Naval Group’s Chief Executive has said that they will
seek repayment from Australia of “every cost that we incurred and every cost related to the
demobilization”
Macron and Biden talk:
President Biden and President Macron spoke on the phone about the arrangement a
week after it was announced. The two leaders concurred that the situation would have
benefited from open communication, according to a readout following the call. discussions
between allies regarding issues of strategic importance to France and our European partners. In
an effort to foster confidence, they also promised to "open a process of in-depth
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consultations." Asked a few weeks after the call if he was now confident that Mr. Biden
recognized France’s importance as an ally, Mr. Macron replied “we will see”.
Europe union Reaction:
"One of our member states has been treated in a way that is not acceptable, so we want
to know what happened and why," EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen asked in an
interview of Australia. Josep Borrell Fontelles, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs,
wrote that: Reactions were not just about a deal on submarines that did not go through, but
about the wider ramifications for EU-US relations and the EU’s role in the Indo-Pacific. The lack
of consultations and communication between the close partners that we are, created real
difficulties. It provided a negative image of an uncoordinated or even divided West, where we
should show common resolve and coordination, not least as regards geostrategic challenges.
What does it mean for UK?
For the UK, AUKUS reflects the UK’s intention to tilt to the Indo-Pacific, as outlined in
the Integrated review of security, defence development and foreign policy. The tilt is necessary,
the Government says, because the region is “critical to our economy, our security and our
global ambition to support open societies.”38 Prime Minister Boris Johnson told MPs the
partnership demonstrates “Britain’s generational commitment to the security of the
IndoPacific” and how the UK can help Australia “preserve regional stability.”39 A senior White
House official described UK involvement in AUKUS as a “down payment” on their effort to
engage more deeply with the Indo-Pacific.
It ties the UK, US and Australia together in a decades long submarine programmed,
something the Prime Minister described as one of the “great prizes” of the deal. The UK
National Security Advisor, Sir Stephen Lovegrove, described it as “perhaps the most significant
capability collaboration anywhere in the world in the past six decades.”
What does it mean for Australia?
AUKUS has significant implications for Australia. One of the key outcomes is Australia's
decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, a major shift from its previous plan to
purchase conventionally powered submarines from France. This move reflects Australia's desire
to strengthen its defense capabilities and enhance its strategic posture in the Indo-Pacific
region.
The pact has also deepened Australia's security partnership with the United States and
the United Kingdom. It provides Australia with closer military ties, intelligence sharing, and
technological collaboration with two of its key allies. This cooperation is expected to bolster
Australia's deterrence capabilities and contribute to regional stability.
WHAT DOES IT MEANS FOR US?
A senior Biden Administration official said it: Reflects the Biden administration’s
determination to build stronger partnerships to sustain peace and stability across the entire
Indo Pacific region. This new architecture is really about deepening cooperation on a range of
defense capabilities for the 21st century.
President Trump focused US foreign policy on countering the threat from China. His
administration’s 2018 National Defense Strategy was clear that China was a “strategic
competitor”, that is “leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory
economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their
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advantage”. While the strategy advocated deepening partnerships in the region, critics say his
administration did little in this regard.

US-India Strategic Partnership (Muhammad Farazdaq)

Introduction
The strategic partnership between the United States and India has evolved significantly
over the years, encompassing various dimensions such as defense cooperation, economic ties,
and regional security. This research paper aims to delve into the opportunities, challenges, and
future prospects of the US-India strategic partnership, drawing upon the insights provided by
the following sources: Sameer Lalwani and Heather Byrne's "Great Expectations: Asking Too
Much of the US-India Strategic Partnership," Yogesh Joshi's "Between 'Concern' and
'Opportunity': US Pivot to Asia and Foreign Policy Debate in India," Arzan Tarapore's "A More
Focused and Resilient U.S.-India Strategic Partnership," Mahrukh Khan's "Growing India-US
Strategic Cooperation: An Analysis," and Azeem Gul, Munawar Hussain, Sumeera Imran, and
Ashfaq U. Rehman's "Assessing Various Opportunities and Challenges in India-US Strategic
Partnership."
Opportunities in the US-India Strategic Partnership
The US-India strategic partnership offers numerous opportunities for collaboration and
mutual benefit. Lalwani and Byrne highlight the potential of this partnership in enhancing
regional stability and acting as a counterbalance to common challenges, including terrorism and
China's rising influence. The authors argue that by leveraging their combined resources and
capabilities, the United States and India can effectively address these challenges.
Tarapore emphasizes the importance of a more focused approach in the strategic
partnership. He suggests that specific areas such as maritime security, defense cooperation,
and economic ties present significant opportunities for collaboration. Enhancing maritime
security in the Indo-Pacific region is of particular importance, given China's assertive actions in
the South China Sea. The United States and India can work together to ensure freedom of
navigation, maintain a rules-based order, and safeguard regional stability.
Economic cooperation between the United States and India has also witnessed
substantial growth. Khan highlights the increasing significance of economic relations, including
trade liberalization, investment facilitation, and technology transfers. The United States is one
of India's major trading partners and a significant source of foreign direct investment.
Expanding bilateral trade and investment can contribute to job creation, economic growth, and
technological advancement in both countries. Additionally, collaboration in the fields of
science, technology, and innovation can foster mutual progress and competitiveness.
Challenges in the US-India Strategic Partnership
While the US-India strategic partnership holds immense potential, it is not without its
challenges. Joshi points out that divergent perspectives on regional security challenges, such as
the US pivot to Asia, have created ambiguity in India's foreign policy. India's delicate balancing
act between the United States and China often leads to cautious and measured responses, as it
seeks to protect its own interests. This divergence can strain the partnership and limit its
effectiveness in certain areas.
In terms of defense cooperation, the United States and India have made considerable
strides, including defense technology transfers and joint military exercises. However, there are
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challenges that need to be addressed. Tarapore highlights bureaucratic obstacles and the slow
pace of defense procurement processes in India, which hinder effective collaboration.
Streamlining defense procurement, ensuring transparency, and simplifying export control
regulations are crucial steps towards strengthening defense cooperation.
Gul et al. shed light on India's historical policy of non-alignment and its commitment to
strategic autonomy. While India seeks to deepen its partnership with the United States, it is
careful to preserve its independence and maintain a balanced approach in its strategic
engagements. Balancing various strategic partnerships, including those with Russia and other
non-Western powers, is crucial for India's foreign policy. Striking the right balance between
strategic autonomy and close alignment with the United States will be crucial for the long-term
sustainability of the partnership.
Future Prospects of the US-India Strategic Partnership
Despite the challenges, the future of the US-India strategic partnership holds immense
potential for further growth and cooperation. Lalwani and Byrne suggest that both countries
should focus on realistic and achievable goals rather than pursuing overly ambitious objectives.
This pragmatic approach will help build trust and confidence between the two nations,
fostering a more resilient partnership.
Joshi argues that as the United States pivots towards Asia, India's role in regional
security becomes increasingly important. The convergence of strategic interests, particularly in
the Indo-Pacific region, opens avenues for closer cooperation and coordination between the
two nations. Addressing concerns and aligning policies on regional security challenges, such as
China's assertiveness, will be key to realizing the full potential of the partnership.
In conclusion, the US-India strategic partnership offers significant opportunities for
collaboration in various domains. By leveraging their respective strengths, the United States
and India can address common challenges, deepen economic ties, and contribute to regional
stability. However, challenges such as divergent perspectives, bureaucratic obstacles, and
India's commitment to strategic autonomy must be effectively managed. By doing so, the
partnership can evolve into a stronger and more enduring alliance, shaping regional dynamics
and contributing to global stability.
(Note: The sources mentioned above have been utilized throughout the paper to
support the analysis and arguments presented. Citations from these sources are integrated
within the body of the text.)

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Center for a New American Security (2019)

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Imran (National Defence University) Ashfaq U. Rehman (Women University Swabi)

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Yogesh Joshi Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 3 (December

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- CIA World Factbook

- CSS World
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Strategic Partnership

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