INTELLECT AND INTELLIGIBLES IN AQUINAS

SANDRIE JUDE O. COROCOTO

I. INTRODUCTION

One of the main concerns that modern Aquinas readers have is His handling of what is

referred to as the "thought-world" has intrigued philosophers of mind. Gap the ontological

"distance" between the mind "in here" and the objects "out" How does the intellect relate to the

extramental or "outside" world? Can it possibly? instantly join with the treeness that resides in

that tree on the Mississippi River's banks? Or alternatively, does it only see an instrumental

"likeness" of the treeness, like an image scrolling across a display "inside" the Cartesian theater

of the mind? (The same queries might be asked.) whether it comes to the senses or imagination,

however the emphasis of this study will be on the intellect (Cory, 2017) .

It is commonly known that Aquinas examined how the intellect interacts with

extramental objects. Is dependent upon what Aquinas refers to as the "intelligent species." Trees

give rise to "phantasms" in my mind that resemble certain trees. The agent intellect creates or

abstracts an understandable species a likeness of the real thing from these phantasms. essence

"tree" that guides my potential intellect and allows me to carry out the act of recognizing the

treeness. The "tree" of the informing species appears to give the intellect access Without serving

as a secondary object of cognition, extramental treeness directly, considering that Aquinas

aware (Cory,2017). Most people believe that both formulae close the mind-world gap, hence

both describe the relationship between the intellect and treeness as it exists in this tree outside of

the mind. But One of these two formulas mentions identity or unity, but the other does not.

mentions similarity. Scholars have noticed Aquinas's frequent assertions in their attempts to

reconcile them asserts that an immaterial mind and a material brain cannot be numerically

identified. extramental items, which has been interpreted as approving a less strict reading of the

Formula for Identity. Therefore, the scholarly trend has been to use the Likeness Formula as

Deflating the Identity Formula and providing a normative definition of the intellect's relationship

to objects match.

However, I contend that these attempts to combine the two formulas have been Aquinas

never meant for the Identity Formula to be a claim about how the mind-world divide is crossed,

nor is it discussed how the intellect relates to things other than itself. (For instance, the

extramental existence of treeness). He is instead explaining the metaphysical condition of an

active intellect. To put it another way, whenever the Likeness Formula states a psychological or

philosophical assertion regarding the relationship between our intellect and the extramental the

Identity Formula provides a metaphysical assertion on what an engaged intellect is in the world.

in itself, or the nature of an intellect while it is actively pondering the existence of trees.

II. OVERVIEW

The claim made by Thomas Aquinas that "intellect in act is the intelligibility in act" does

not, as is typically assumed, convey his viewpoint on In response to the alleged "mind-world
gap," the intellect has access to extramental realities. Rather, it is a claim concerning the

metaphysics of intellection, according to whereby what may be called the perfection necessary

for carrying out the act of understanding In reinterpreting Aquinas's Identity Formula, I

investigate what Aquinas meant by "intellectual-intelligible being." it refers to the state of being

"in act" as a mind or intellect (intelligibile actu, intellectus actu), his enigmatic remarks on a

"order" or "genus" of intelligibles, as well as the relationship between both comprehension and

being understood (Cory,2017).

III. POSITIVE

Aquinas thought the In the Identity Formula, "intelligible in act" cannot be an

extramental essence like the Considering his repeated claims that the intelligible in act cannot be

a tree, the treeness of that tree a physical body or even anything external to a particular brain.

Let's think about some examples for each assertion. Aquinas first explains that immateriality is

essential for being in a number of places. comprehensible in action Real intelligence cannot exist

in any form that is instantiated in matter: "The thing that The act of intellection has no effect on

anything that exists outside the soul because the intellect's It is neither a transitive or productive

act because it does not enter outer matter to transform it. Consequently, the object outside of the

soul in this instance is Consequently, the item beyond the soul in this case, a material thing is

outside the genus of intelligible.

IV. NEGATIVE

It would seem that by abstracting from the phantasms, our cognition is unable to

comprehend corporeal and material things. If the intellect interprets a thing differently than
 how it actually is, it is untrue. Now that the specific things represented by the phantasms

have been separated from, the forms of material things no longer exist. Therefore, there will

be an intellectual error if we try to grasp material things by abstracting the species from the

phantasm.

V. JUDGEMENT

It must be acknowledged that the intelligible species is connected to the intellect as the

means by which it comprehends, as demonstrated by this. There are two types of action (metaph.

Ix, did. Viii), each of which proceeds by virtue of a different form. Examples of actions that

remain within the agent include seeing and understanding, while others move into an external

object include heating and cutting. The form from which an action aiming to something external

proceeds is the resemblance of the action's object, just as heat in a heater is a likeness of the thing

heated, so too is the form from which an action tending to something internal proceeds.

As a result, what the eye sees is a likeness of what is visible, and what the intellect

understands is a likeness of what is understood, or the intelligible species. However, because the

intellect is self-reflective, it can comprehend both its own act of intelligence and the species

through which it understands. Thus, the species that is understandable is that which is understood

secondary; yet, the object, of which the species is a resemblance, is that which is understood in

its entirety. This is also supported by the ancient philosophers' belief that "like is known by like,"

who said that the soul learns about the outer world by learning about the inside world, and so on.

Aristotle suggests that if we substitute the species of the earth for the world (De Anima iii,). who
claims "that a stone is not in the soul, but merely the likeness of the stone" this implies that the

soul has an intelligent species and therefore understands the world.

VI. CONCLUSION

According to the Philosopher, words represent intellectual notions (Peri Herm. i). However,

the composition and division of words can be seen in both affirmative and negative assertions.

As a result, the mind functions by division and composition.

I conclude that the human intellect must by definition comprehend through composition and

division. The human intellect does not acquire perfect knowledge by the first act of apprehension

rather, it first apprehends something about its object, such as its quiddity, and this is its first and

proper object, after which it understands the properties, accidents, and the various relations of its

object. This is because the intellect moves from potentiality to act, and generated things do not

attain perfection all at once but acquire it by degrees. As a result, it must compare one object to

another by composition or division, moving on to another composition or division as part of the

reasoning process.