G.R. No.

183711 June 22, 2010

EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P.
TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL.
MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 183712
EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P.
TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and LT. COL. NOEL
CLEMENT, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 183713
EDITA T. BURGOS, Petitioner,
vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR.;
Commanding General of the Philippine Army, LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO; and Chief of the Philippine
National Police, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR., Respondents.

FACTS:

 Jonas Joseph T. Burgos – a farmer advocate and a member of Kilusang Magbubukid sa Bulacan – was
forcibly taken and abducted by a group of four (4) men and a woman from a restaurant at Quezon City.

 a security guard tried to intervene but backed off-- then noted the plate number and reported the incident to
his superiors as well as to the police on duty in the said mall.

 the petitioner held a press conference and announced that her son Jonas was missing.

 Upon subsequent police investigation and LTO verification, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194
was registered to a 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle owned by a certain Mauro B. Mudlong.

 DENR later confirmed that Mudlong was arrested and his car seized by the 56th Infantry Battalion of the
Philippine Army in 2006

 the vehicle was impounded in the 56th IB headquarters whose commanding officer at that time was
respondent Lt. Col. Noel Clement.

 At the time Jonas was abducted on April 28, 2007, respondent Lt. Col. Feliciano was the 56th IB's
commanding officer

 after Jonas’ abduction was made public, it was discovered that plate number TAB 194 of this 1991 Isuzu
XLT vehicle was missing, and the engine and other spare parts were "cannibalized."

 Petitioner Edita Burgos, Jonas’ mother, filed separate petitions for writ of habeas corpus, for contempt and
writ of amparo.

 Burgos testified before the CA that the police was able to generate cartographic sketches of two (one male
and one female) of the abductors of Jonas based on its interview of eyewitnesses. However she said that
nothing came out of this information given by State Prosecutor Velasco because he was "pulled out
from the investigation by the DOJ Secretary," and that the police, particularly P/Supt. Jonnel
C.Estomo, failed to investigate and act upon these leads

 PNP-CIDG proposed the theory that the NPA perpetrated the abduction of Jonas. They presented as
witnesses Ka Tibo / Ka Cris, Ka Carlo, and Ka Lisa / Ramil. They said that Jonas was a member of the NPA
and was known as Ka Ramon.

 Allegedly, Ka Baste (leader of the Bulacan Party Committee doing intelligence work) and Jonas aka Ka
Ramon had an argument. Ka Baste then instructed Ka Tibo / Ka Cris to put Jonas under
surveillance AS THEY SUSPECTED HIM OF PILFERING FUNDS FROM THE PARTY AND OF ACTING
AS A MILITARY AGENT. They then abducted him from the restaurant upon the instruction of Ka Baste.

The CA Findings

the CA noted - based on the Certification issued by the Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, DOJ dated March 5, 2008
- that no case has been referred by the PNP to the DOJ for preliminary investigation in relation to the abduction and
disappearance of Jonas. This is contrary to PNP’s manifest representation that it had already forwarded all pertinent
and relevant documents to the DOJ for the filing of appropriate charges against the suspects (i.e., @KA DANTE and
@KA ENSO).
The CA also held that the petitions for habeas corpus and contempt as against President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
must be dropped since she enjoys the privilege of immunity from suit. The CA ruled that the President’s immunity
from suit is a settled doctrine citing David v. Arroyo.23

ISSUE: WoN the Petition for Contempt was correctly dismissed

RULING: YES. The dismissal of the petitions for Contempt and for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is hereby AFFIRMED.

We agree with the CA that indirect contempt is the appropriate characterization of the charge filed by the petitioner
against the respondents and that the charge is criminal in nature. Evidently, the charge of filing a false return
constitutes improper conduct that serves no other purpose but to mislead, impede and obstruct the administration of
justice by the Court. In People v. Godoy, [19] which the CA cited, we specifically held that under paragraph (d) of
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice constitutes criminal contempt.

A criminal contempt proceeding has been characterized as sui generis as it partakes some of the elements of both
a civil and criminal proceeding, without completely falling under either proceeding. Its identification with a criminal
proceeding is in the use of the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, to the extent that criminal procedure
is consistent with the summary nature of a contempt proceeding. We have consistently held and established that
the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt; that the accused is
afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases; and that proceedings under statutes governing
them are to be strictly construed. [20]

Contempt, too, is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and
the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt . [21] The presumption of
innocence can be overcome only by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which means proof to the satisfaction
of the court and keeping in mind the presumption of innocence that precludes every reasonable hypothesis except
that for which it is given. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact
charged is more likely true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable certainty and
moral certainty - a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon
it. [22]

For the petitioner to succeed in her petition to declare the respondents in contempt for filing false returns in
the habeas corpus proceedings before the CA, she has the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the
respondents had custody of Jonas. As the CA did, we find that the pieces of evidence on record as of the time
of the CA proceedings were merely circumstantial and did not provide a direct link between the
respondents and the abduction of Jonas; the evidence did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
respondents had a hand in the abduction of Jonas, and consequently, had custody of him at the time they
filed their returns to the Writ of habeas corpus denying custody of Jonas.

However, the subsequent developments in this case, specifically, the investigative findings presented to us by the
CHR pointing to Lt. Baliaga as one of the abductors of Jonas, have given a twist to our otherwise clear conclusion.
Investigations will continue, consistent with the nature of Amparo proceedings to be alive until a definitive result is
achieved, and these investigations may yet yield additional evidence affecting the conclusion the CA made. For this
reason, we can only conclude that the CA's dismissal of the contempt charge should be provisional , i.e.,
without prejudice to the re-filing of the charge in the future should the petitioner find this step warranted by the
evidence in the proceedings related to Jonas's disappearance, including the criminal prosecutions that may
transpire.
C. Petition for Contempt

[17]
In dismissing the petition, the CA held:

Undoubtedly, the accusation against respondents is criminal in nature. In view thereof, the rules in criminal
prosecution and corollary recognition of respondents' constitutional rights inevitably come into play. As
held in People v. Godoy:

In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is on the
prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt.

Hence, assuming that there is circumstantial evidence to support petitioner's allegations, said
circumstantial evidence falls short of the quantum of evidence that is required to establish the guilt of an
accused in a criminal proceeding, which is proof beyond reasonable doubt.

The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court on contempt, in relation to a Habeas Corpus proceeding, is
Section 16, Rule 102, which provides:

Sec. 16. Penalty for refusing to issue writ, or for disobeying the same. - A clerk of a court who refuses to
issue the writ after allowance thereof and demand therefor, or a person to whom a writ is
directed, who neglects or refuses to obey or make return of the same according to the command thereof,
or makes false return thereof, or who, upon demand made by or on behalf of the prisoner, refuses to deliver
to the person demanding, within six (6) hours after the demand therefor, a true copy of the warrant or order
of commitment, shall forfeit to the party aggrieved the sum of one thousand pesos, to be recovered in a
proper action, and may also be punished by the court or judge as for contempt. [emphasis supplied]

[18]
In Montenegro v. Montenegro, we explained the types and nature of contempt, as follows:

Contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an
affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. It is defined as "disobedience to the
court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity." 7The power to punish contempt is inherent
in all courts, because it is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the courts; and, consequently, to the due administration
of justice.

xxx

Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be civil or criminal depending on the nature and effect of the
contemptuous act. Criminal contempt is "conduct directed against the authority and dignity of the court or a
judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court
into disrepute or disrespect." On the other hand, civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be
done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is therefore, an offense against
the party in whose behalf the violated order was made.If the purpose is to punish, then it is criminal in
nature; but if to compensate, then it is civil. [emphasis supplied]