International Journal for Quality in Health Care, 2015, 27(1), 1–9

doi: 10.1093/intqhc/mzu098
Advance Access Publication Date: 12 January 2015
Article

Article

What are incident reports telling us? A

comparative study at two Australian hospitals of
medication errors identified at audit, detected by
staff and reported to an incident system
JOHANNA I. WESTBROOK1, LING LI1, ELIN C. LEHNBOM1, MELISSA
T. BAYSARI1, JEFFREY BRAITHWAITE2, ROSEMARY BURKE3,
CHRIS CONN4, and RICHARD O. DAY5
1
Centre for Health Systems and Safety Research, Australian Institute of Health Innovation, Faculty of Medicine and
Health Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney 2109, Australia, 2Centre for Healthcare Resilience and Implementa-
tion Science, Australian Institute of Health Innovation, Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences, Macquarie Univer-
sity, Sydney 2109, Australia, 3Pharmacy Department, Concord Repatriation General Hospital, Sydney 2139, Australia,
4
Patient Safety & Quality, Clinical Governance, St Vincent's Health Network, Sydney 2010, Australia, and 5Department
of Clinical Pharmacology and Toxicology, St Vincent’s Hospital, Sydney, and UNSW Medicine, University of New
South Wales, Sydney 2052, Australia

Address reprint requests to: Johanna I. Westbrook, Centre for Health Systems and Safety Research, Australian Institute of
Health Innovation, Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences, Level 6, 75 Talavera Road, Macquarie University, Sydney 2109,
Australia. Tel: +61 2 9850 2402; Fax: +61 2 8088 6234; E-mail: [email protected]
Accepted 9 November 2014

Abstract
Objectives: To (i) compare medication errors identified at audit and observation with medication
incident reports; (ii) identify differences between two hospitals in incident report frequency and
medication error rates; (iii) identify prescribing error detection rates by staff.
Design: Audit of 3291patient records at two hospitals to identify prescribing errors and evidence of
their detection by staff. Medication administration errors were identified from a direct observational
study of 180 nurses administering 7451 medications. Severity of errors was classified. Those likely to
lead to patient harm were categorized as ‘clinically important’.
Setting: Two major academic teaching hospitals in Sydney, Australia.
Main Outcome Measures: Rates of medication errors identified from audit and from direct observa-
tion were compared with reported medication incident reports.
Results: A total of 12 567 prescribing errors were identified at audit. Of these 1.2/1000 errors (95% CI:
0.6–1.8) had incident reports. Clinically important prescribing errors (n = 539) were detected by staff
at a rate of 218.9/1000 (95% CI: 184.0–253.8), but only 13.0/1000 (95% CI: 3.4–22.5) were reported.
78.1% (n = 421) of clinically important prescribing errors were not detected. A total of 2043 drug ad-
ministrations (27.4%; 95% CI: 26.4–28.4%) contained ≥1 errors; none had an incident report. Hospital
A had a higher frequency of incident reports than Hospital B, but a lower rate of errors at audit.
Conclusions: Prescribing errors with the potential to cause harm frequently go undetected. Re-
ported incidents do not reflect the profile of medication errors which occur in hospitals or the under-
lying rates. This demonstrates the inaccuracy of using incident frequency to compare patient risk or
quality performance within or across hospitals. New approaches including data mining of electronic

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2 Westbrook et al.

clinical information systems are required to support more effective medication error detection and
mitigation.

Key words: medication error, incident reporting, safety, electronic prescribing, medication administration errors

Background outlines the steps to be followed by hospitals throughout the reporting,

severity classification and follow-up processes for individual incidents.
Incident reporting within hospitals is accepted as a key quality and
Very limited guidance is provided regarding interpretation of changes
safety mechanism [1–5], although under-reporting is a serious limita-
in incident data over time, or the strengths or limitations of aggregate
tion [6–9]. Poor understanding of the strengths and limitations of in-
incident data.
cident data can lead decision-makers astray [10–13]. Interviews with
The hospitals in this study use different electronic incident report-
administrators from 34 US hospitals revealed that many found inci-
ing systems [Riskman [30], and the NSW Health Incident Information
dent report data difficult to interpret, and raised concerns that re-
Management System (IIMS)] [29]. Hospital staff are required to report
sources may be misdirected to solve problems that are easily
all incidents they observe, or errors they themselves make, as well as
identifiable and more likely to be reported to incident systems [14].
incidents which become apparent after the event, for example when
The risk of incorrect conclusions is exacerbated by small sample
reviewing a patient record. Incidents are defined as ‘Any unplanned
sizes for specific incident types, a lack of denominators and advice
event which causes, or has the potential to cause, harm to a patient’
to monitor ‘trends’ in incident report frequency [15]. Despite attempts
[22]. Staff may report incidents anonymously. Both hospitals actively
to guard against incident report frequency as an indicator of patient
encourage reporting and previous research has shown staff within
risk, many hospital administrators and safety committees interpret
NSW have generally positive views about the reporting of incidents
increases negatively [16]. Graphing of incident data may further
[31]. Serious incidents are reviewed by the local clinical governance
reinforce perceptions of the significance of small changes in the
(quality improvement) units. Medication incidents are reported to
frequency of incident reports. Studies using incident data as an out-
the hospitals’ medication review committees where they are expected
come indicator to assess the effectiveness of safety interventions also
to be used to initiate further investigations, identify safety risks and
continue to be published [17–19].
recommend action. Medical and nursing staff are represented on the
While studies have demonstrated significant under-reporting of ad-
medication review committees. At one site, this committee prepares
verse incidents overall [3, 14, 20, 21], few have focused on medication
a monthly email to hospital staff regarding their discussions as well
incidents and whether the profile of incidents reported reflect the types
as presenting a report to the hospital’s drug and therapeutic committee
of medication errors not reported. Medication errors are one of the
as a further review mechanism. At the second site, the medication re-
most frequently reported incident types [22], and are more likely to re-
view committee also reports to a district medication safety committee.
sult in serious harm and death than other types of incidents [23, 24].
At that hospital, copies of reports summarizing incidents are provided
Levinson et al. [14] in their study of US Medicare patients found that
to the heads of medical departments and a ‘Medication Safety’ news-
of 111 medication events identified at audit, only 14 (13%) were
letter is prepared by the hospital pharmacy and distributed to staff.
reported. Importantly, 50% of all medication-related events were
These newsletters included details of de-identified incidents with a dis-
estimated to be preventable, clearly identifying the potential to
cussion of preventive actions. Actions taken as a result of incident in-
intervene to reduce such errors if they were reported and better under-
vestigations are communicated through a range of mechanisms
stood [25].
including policy changes, presentations at grand rounds and initiation
Reasons why clinicians do not report incidents include lack of
of specific quality and safety activities.
feedback and time to complete forms, along with concerns about re-
All incident data are provided to the Clinical Excellence Commis-
percussions or disciplinary actions [2, 26–28]. A frequent underlying
sion (CEC), an organization responsible for leading healthcare quality
assumption is that clinicians are aware of errors but fail to report.
and safety improvement programs across NSW, a State of 7.2 million
The extent to which this is an accurate assumption has rarely been
people. The CEC was established in 2004 to promote and support im-
investigated.
proved clinical care and safety in NSW. The organization aims to fos-
In this study, we aimed to (i) identify the extent to which medication
ter these developments within a framework of collaboration,
errors identified at record audit and observation are reported to hospital
openness, respect and empowerment. Since 2007 CEC has produced
incident reporting systems; (ii) use these data to identify differences be-
aggregated data regarding all incidents reported by hospitals across
tween two hospitals in their frequency of incident reports and their
the State and these data inform quality and safety programs.
underlying medication error rates identified and (iii) test the hypothesis
that low rates of prescribing error detection by staff may be a contrib-
uting factor to low medication incident reporting rates. Prescribing errors identified at record audit and errors
detected by staff
Data on prescribing errors occurring on six medical and surgical
Methods wards (respiratory, cardiology, renal/vascular, psychiatry and two
We enrolled two major Sydney teaching hospitals (400 and 326 beds, acute aged care wards) over two periods of time at each hospital (Hos-
respectively). All hospitals across the state of New South Wales (NSW) pital A: May–August 2006 and May–August 2008; Hospital B: No-
are required to comply with the State incident management policy [29] vember 2007–March 2008 and March 2008–February 2010) were
which requires the electronic reporting of incidents with prescribed obtained from a dataset of clinical audits of 3291 patient records con-
documentation of incident details which will allow investigation and ducted by pharmacists independent from the study hospitals [32].
development of remedial action if required. The 60-page policy During chart review, any evidence that medication errors had been
What do incident reports tell us? • Patient safety 3

detected by staff (either before or after the error reached the patient), pharmacists and nurses from both hospitals were also given subsets
such as a correction or note made by a doctor, nurse or pharmacist in of errors to classify during the study in order to verify the ratings pro-
the medication chart, progress notes or the existence of a pharmacist’s vided by the clinical pharmacists.
intervention report (e.g. indicating that the doctor had been contacted During both medication error studies, prescribing and administra-
to review the order), was recorded. Prescribing errors identified were tion, researchers were required to notify hospital staff if they identified
classified as procedural (e.g. unclear, illegal or incomplete orders) or an error which could cause serious patient harm. This occurred 15
clinical (e.g. wrong drug, dose, route). Definitions for each error times during the medication administration error study and 17 times
type have been published previously [32]. during the prescribing error study. One of these prescribing errors was
subsequently reported by staff to the hospital’s incident system.
Medication administration error data
Data on medication administration errors were obtained for six med-
ical/surgical wards (neurology, orthopaedics, respiratory, renal/vascu- Ethics approval
lar and two acute aged care wards) at the same two hospitals, derived The study was approved by the human research ethics committees of
from a second dataset [33]. That dataset contained direct observations both study hospitals.
of 180 nurses as they prepared and administered 7451 medications to
1397 patients. We had highly trained observers (nurse researchers
independent from the hospitals) who watched nurses prepare and ad- Data linkage and analyses
minister medications to patients. Inter-rater reliability was conducted Incident data were extracted relating to all prescribing and medication
on multiple occasions and kappa scores for agreement calculated. Re- administration errors from the hospitals’ incident reporting systems
searchers arrived on the study wards during peak administration times for the study wards over the same time periods as the prescribing
(7:00 am–9:30 pm) and closely shadowed individual nurses. Errors error and administration error datasets. Reported medication inci-
were classified as procedural (e.g. failure to read medication label) dents and observed errors were then linked and each possible match
or clinical (e.g. wrong drug, rate, route, timing) [33]. Observational reviewed by a research pharmacist to confirm agreement.
data of drugs administered were compared with patients’ medication Incident report data extraction occurred after both observational
charts to identify clinical administration errors. Unlike the prescribing studies had been completed, and thus auditors and observers were un-
error study, no information about whether staff had detected the medi- aware of reported incidents. If multiple errors were reported on the
cation administration error was collected. Data were collected in two same incident form, for example two drugs failed to be charted, this
periods (Hospital A: August 2006–March 2007; and October 2009– was categorized as a match for both observed errors.
June 2010; Hospital B: November 2005–March 2006; and November Frequency tables of prescribing errors are presented by hospital.
2007–March 2008). The data collected did not represent all medica- Incident reporting rates were calculated using the number of errors re-
tions administered to patients on these wards. ported over total errors observed at audit. Ninety-five percent CIs were
calculated based on the assumption of a normal distribution. Incident
reporting and detection rates by hospital were compared using z-tests
Procedures
and Fisher’s exact tests with significance set at 0.05.
The potential severity of all medication errors was rated on a 5-point
scale (Table 1). All errors rated as serious/major/moderate were
classed as ‘clinically important’ errors. Two pharmacists independently
rated the actual or potential severity of errors; disagreement was Results
settled by consensus with input from a clinical pharmacologist when
required. Severity review committees involving physicians, hospital Comparison of prescribing errors observed at audit with
those reported to the hospitals’ incident reporting
systems
Table 1 Potential severity scale [34] A total of 12 567 prescribing errors were identified at audit across the
Rating Description Categories used in two hospitals. The majority 68.9% (n = 8664) were procedural errors
analyses (e.g. missing allergy identification). Clinical errors constituted 31.1%
(n = 3903) and 539 (4.3%) were rated as clinically important errors
Insignificant Incident is likely to have little or Minor errors (Table 2).
no effect on the patient During the period covered by the record audit, 15 prescribing
Minor Incident is likely to lead to an
errors were reported to the hospitals’ incident systems. All incident
increase in level of care e.g.
reports identified prescribing errors found at audit. Thirteen (87%)
review, investigations or
referral to another clinician of the 15 incidents related to clinical prescribing errors, and two
Moderate Incident is likely to lead to Clinically important were procedural errors.
permanent reduction in errors warranting an There was a very low rate at which prescribing errors identified at
bodily functioning leading to incident report audit had a matching incident report (Table 2), with 1.2 incident re-
e.g. increase length of stay; ports per 1000 identified errors. Incident reporting rates were higher
surgical intervention for clinical errors, at 3.3 per 1000 identified clinical prescribing errors.
Major Incident is likely to lead to a The highest reporting rate was for clinically important prescribing
major permanent loss of errors at 13.0 reports per 1000.
function
Table 3 reports a sample of prescribing errors with incident
Serious Incident is likely to lead to
reports. Table A2 shows a sample of clinically important prescribing
death
errors identified at audit for which there was no incident report.
4 Westbrook et al.

Prescribing errors detected by staff and patients

Numbers of prescribing errors identified at audita in Number of prescribing errors detectedb by hospital staff (rate per Numbers of prescribing errors reportedc to the hospital incident reporting
Of the 12 567 prescribing errors identified at audit, there was evidence

Clinically important

2 (5.8: <0.1–13.9)4

5 (25.5: 3.4–47.6)3
that 1282 (10.2%) had been detected by hospital staff (n = 1277), or

7 (13.0: 3.4–22.5)
patients (n = 5) (Table 4). Of errors detected, pharmacists identified

errors reported
over two thirds (Table 4). Only 15 prescribing errors were reported
in a total of 7 incident forms, as two patients had multiple errors docu-
mented in the same report. All incident reports were made by nurses.
systems (rate per 1000 prescribing errorsd: 95% CI)

Table A1 summarizes the five errors detected by patients, which in-

cluded no clinically important errors.

11 (7.2: 3.0–11.4)2
2 (0.8:<0.1–2.0)2 Of the clinically important prescribing errors identified at audit,

13 (3.3: 1.5–5.1)
21.9% (n = 118) had been detected, of which seven had an incident
Clinical errors

form. Table 2 presents a summary of the rates at which prescribing

errors were identified at audit, detected by staff and reported to the
reported
Table 2 Prescribing errors observed at audit, those detected by staff, and the numbers and rates reported to the hospitals’ incident reporting systems

incident systems, by hospital. Figure 1a shows the distribution of pre-

scribing errors identified, detected and reported and Fig. 1b shows this
Detected errors: Prescribing errors detected by staff as evidenced by documented information which indicated that at least one staff member was aware of the error.
information for clinically important prescribing errors.
3 (0.3: <0.1–0.7)1
12 (3.0: 1.3–4.8)1
Total prescribing

15 (1.2: 0.6–1.8)
errors reported

Rates of clinically important prescribing errors identified

at audit, detected by staff and reported for each hospital
For the 3291 patient admissions reviewed, 539 had clinically import-
ant prescribing errors, a rate of 16.4/100 patient admissions. Of these,
118 were detected by staff, a rate of 3.6/100 admissions and the rate at
which these were reported via the incident reporting systems was 0.21/
Clinically important errors

100 admissions (n = 7).

118 (218.9: 184.0–253.8)
84 (244.9: 199.4–290.4)5

34 (173.5: 120.5–226.5)5

We examined each hospital’s data. At Hospital A, 8621 prescrib-

ing errors were identified at audit for 1948 patient admissions, a rate
of 4.43/100 admissions. At Hospital B, 1530 prescribing errors for
detected by staff

1343 admissions (1.14/100) were found at audit. However, the num-

ber of reported incidents for Hospital A was 0.34/1000 prescribing
errors and for Hospital B 3.04/1000 prescribing errors (Table 2).
Clinically important errors = those classified as serious, major or moderate potential severity (see Table 1).

Thus, Hospital A with the higher overall prescribing error rate had an
1000 prescribing errors: 95% CI)

P-values for comparisons between hospitals: 1P < 0.0001; 2P = 0.001; 3P = 0.052; 4P = 0.9; 5P = 0.054.

incident reporting rate significantly lower than Hospital B (P < 0.0001).

1282 (102.0: 96.7–107.3)
878 (101.8: 95.5–108.2)4

404 (102.4: 92.9–11.8)4

Comparison of medication administration errors

All prescribing errors

observed with those reported to the hospitals’ incident

detectedb by staff

Reported errors: Prescribing errors reported to the hospitals’ incident reporting systems.

systems
The direct observational study of 7451 drug administration yielded
10 955 medication administration errors. Of these, the vast majority
(79%) were procedural errors (e.g. failing to check a patient’s identi-
fication prior to drug administration). One or more clinical errors oc-
important errorse

curred in 27.4% (n = 2043; 95% CI: 26.4–28.4%) of drugs

administered. 10.2% (n = 209; 95% CI: 8.9–11.5%) of all drug ad-
Identified errors: Prescribing errors detected at record audit.

ministrations involved errors which were rated as clinically important.

Clinically

Of the 10 955 administration errors observed none had an incident

343

196
539

report. Table A3 provides examples of clinically important medication

administration errors observed. We had no information about
per 1000 prescribing errors identified at audit.

administration errors detected by staff. During the period of the obser-

Clinical

vational study, 173 medication administration errors, involving

errors

2373

1530
3903
3291 patient admissions

administrations not observed by the research staff, were reported to

the hospitals’ incident systems.
Total prescribing
errors observed

Discussion
8621

3946
12 567

Only 1.3% of clinically important prescribing errors, with the poten-

tial to cause patient harm, were reported to the hospital incident sys-
tems. Of all clinically important prescribing errors identified at record
Hospital A

Hospital B

audit, 21.9% (n = 118) had been detected by hospital staff, but only
Hospital

6% of those detected were reported. The remaining 78.1% (n = 421)

Total

d
a

appear to have failed to be detected, although it is possible that some

What do incident reports tell us? • Patient safety 5

Table 3 Examples of prescribing errors reported to the hospitals’ incident reporting systems

Severity Error description Error type Clinical error category

rating

Serious None reported – –

Major Warfarin PO 3 mg evening at 1600 h. Dose given despite INR being 5.5 at 0830 h Clinical error Medication not indicated
that day
Moderate Long-acting Risperidone IM 50 mg in the morning (should be given every 2 weeks) Clinical error Wrong frequency
Minor Esomeprazole PO 40 mg daily (not transcribed onto new chart) Clinical error Drug required but not
prescribed
Insignificant Phenytoin IV 300 mg STAT (order should have been recharted) Procedural Legal/procedural
error

PO, oral administration (per os); INR, international normalized ratio; IM, intramuscular; IV, intravenous; STAT, immediately (statim).

Table 4 Number and percentage of prescribing errors and clinically important prescribing errors detected by staff group

Hospital Number of prescribing errors detected (%) Number of clinically important prescribing errors detected (%)
Nurse Pharmacist Patient Doctors Total Nurse Pharmacist Patient Doctors Total

Hospital A 116 (13.2) 531 (60.5) 2 (0.2) 229 (26.1) 878 (100) 13 (15.5) 49 (58.3) 0 (0) 22 (26.2) 84 (100)
Hospital B 50 (12.4) 321 (79.5) 3 (0.7) 30 (7.4) 404 (100) 10 (29.4) 23 (67.6) 0 (0) 1 (2.9) 34 (100)
Total 166 (12.9) 852 (66.5) 5 (0.4) 259 (20.2) 1282 (100) 23 (19.5) 72 (61.0) 0 (0) 23 (19.5) 118 (100)

Prescribing error detection patterns by professional group were different between the two hospitals (Fisher’s exact test, χ 2 = 41.41 with df = 3, P < 0.0001).
Prescribing errors overall at Hospital A were more likely to be detected by pharmacists and doctors, while errors were more likely to be detected by pharmacists
and nurses at Hospital B. Doctors at Hospital A detected a greater proportion of errors at their hospital than their peers at Hospital B. Pharmacists at Hospital B
detected more errors than their colleagues at Hospital A.
Similar differences were observed for the detection of clinically important errors (Fisher’s exact test, χ 2 = 9.47 with df = 2, P = 0.008), except that nurses at Hospital
B detected a greater proportion of clinically important errors than their colleagues at Hospital A.

Figure 1 Distribution of (a) prescribing errors observed by researchers, and detected and reported by clinical staff; (b) clinically important prescribing errors
observed by researchers, and detected and reported by clinical staff.

of these errors were detected but no information to this effect was re- be powerful deterrents [2, 26, 27], despite survey evidence which indi-
corded in patients’ records. cates that many Australian nurses and doctors indicate they always re-
Overall, one in every 1000 prescribing errors identified at audit port drug errors [26]. Removing barriers to reporting will improve
were reported to the incident systems. For only 10% of these errors incident data, but a major problem also lies in the very low rate at
was there any evidence that staff had detected the error. Clinically im- which prescribing errors are detected by staff.
portant prescribing errors were twice as likely to be detected as other We found no relationship between the number of reported medica-
prescribing errors. Barriers to reporting, such as a lack of time, and an tion incidents by hospital and the ‘actual’ rate of prescribing errors.
absence of evidence that the data are used for good purpose, appear to The hospital with the higher number of incident reports had lower
6 Westbrook et al.

‘actual’ prescribing errors and vice versa. Thus, in this instance, the not allowed as they conflicted with the pumps’ administration rules
higher number of medication incidents reflected a lower patient risk. [41]. There is enormous potential for these new electronic data
None of the 2043 clinical medication administration errors iden- sources, and health care organizations must ensure that it is as easy
tified during direct observation were reported by staff to the inci- to retrieve information from these systems as it is to enter data [42].
dent systems. This included 209 clinically important errors These systems will not provide the detailed contextual information
observed. Flynn et al. [35] also found a very low rate at which ob- available from well-documented incident reports, but they provide a
served medication administration errors were reported, with one re- valuable new source of data that should be exploited. Quality improve-
port (0.4%) across 36 US hospitals. Husch et al. [36], investigating ment staff in hospitals should be looking to these new data sources to
errors associated with the use of intravenous pumps in a US hos- better inform medication safety and improvement policies and strat-
pital, identified 55 rate deviation and wrong medication errors dur- egies, and to reduce the reporting load on clinical staff. An important
ing 9 h of observation. They noted that in the previous 2 years only implication of our findings is the need for staff responsible for moni-
48 of these error types had been reported to the hospital’s incident toring medication safety to use multiple data sources and more sophis-
system, suggesting significant under-reporting. Unlike prescribing er- ticated approaches, which we suggest are now readily available with
rors, retrospective identification of medication administration errors electronic medication management systems.
is often not possible. For example an IV pump set at the wrong rate, A strength of our study was the availability of robust audit and ob-
or an incorrect dose administered, are largely undetectable once the servational data from previous studies. A limitation was that we relied
event has passed, greatly hindering learning from such incidents. upon documented evidence of error detection and thus our detection
Our results clearly indicate that the incident data hospitals generate rates may be an under-estimation. However, for clinically important
have significant limitations in reflecting both the frequency and nature prescribing errors, which had the potential to cause permanent
of medication errors occurring. Hospital committees and management harm to patients, some form of documentation would be expected if
boards charged with the responsibility for monitoring medication they had been detected. While poor documentation in medical records
incident reports require clear guidance regarding the strengths and is widely recognized in terms of reflecting all care provided, it seems
limitations of these data, including guidance on how to interpret less likely that health professionals who detected potentially serious
changes in the frequency of incident data. This guidance should in- medication errors would not document any information about correc-
clude that: an increase in incident reports should be encouraged and tions made or steps taken to remediate errors or their effects. Studies
viewed as an indicator of an open and safe reporting culture; the have attempted to estimate the extent to which medical records under-
value of incidents lie in their ability to identify hazards on which to report care provided and have estimated that record reviews may lead
focus quality improvement activities [28]; attention should focus on to under-estimations in the order of 10% [43]. Even if our results
groups within the hospital who are not reporting incidents, but this regarding error detection represent only 50% of those errors ‘truly
must be accompanied by direct feedback regarding the actions taken detected’, our findings still demonstrate a significant problem in rela-
when incidents are reported; presentation of incident data with histo- tion to the extent to which existing processes effectively support the
gram and line graphs should be discouraged (other than to monitor the detection of serious medication errors by clinical staff on hospital
‘reporting culture’) without the availability of a meaningful denomin- wards. Unfortunately, we had no information about the detection of
ator; and alternative approaches such as the use of control charts and medication administration errors by staff as these data were not col-
specific measures better suited to rare event data should be applied. lected in that study.
Finally, health care organizations need to take advantage of new In conclusion, our findings demonstrate that for individual health
opportunities to obtain more reliable and comprehensive medication care organizations medication incident report data provide an inaccur-
incident data. The increasing introduction of electronic clinical infor- ate reflection of the types or severity of medication errors occurring to
mation systems presents an opportunity to revolutionize the quality patients. As such, incident data may provide only limited insights into
and timeliness of medication-related data available for monitoring patient risk. Steps should be taken to ensure that incident data are used
medication safety and the quality use of medicines. Electronic prescrib- appropriately to investigate specific types of hazards, but the fre-
ing and medication administration record systems capture details of all quency of reported incidents should not be used to monitor changes
drugs prescribed and administered. They are highly effective at redu- over time, compare hospitals or as a source of outcome measurement
cing prescribing errors, particularly with well-designed decision sup- in relation to the effectiveness of specific interventions.
port [32, 37], and when linked with bar-coding of medications they Many clinically important prescribing errors fail to be detected and
are also effective at reducing administration errors [38]. The potential this is a significant barrier to reporting. Given the recognized limitations
of these technologies to deliver up-to-date data about the quality and of incident reporting systems, greater attention should be placed on
safety of medication practices has been under-explored. Automatically more effective ways to monitor medication safety in hospitals. Electronic
mining data derived from these electronic systems, can provide infor- medication management technologies are not only highly effective error
mation about both medication errors and near-miss situations. For prevention interventions; they also present a powerful tool by which to
example an automated report from an electronic prescribing system generate up-to-date and comprehensive data regarding medication prac-
database could identify dangerous drug combinations prescribed tices and potential and actual errors. Such data should be used to moni-
and ceased within a defined time period. A clear advantage is the abil- tor medication safety, identify new strategies to reduce risk (e.g.
ity to search across all patients and thus generate a denominator to cal- introduction of specific electronic decision-support rules) and to provide
culate incident rates. Novel approaches to examine the rates at which feedback to clinicians regarding their medication practices.
decision-support alerts are fired, when and by whom, as well as actions
taken subsequently, can provide insights into approaches to effectively
mitigate prescribing errors. Such analyses may allow identification of Funding
doctors at higher risk of making serious prescribing errors [39]. Data Funding to pay the Open Access publication charges for this article was
on missed doses can be automatically identified [40]. Data logs of provided by a National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) Pro-
smart pumps can be used to identify orders entered, abandoned or gram grant APP1054146.
What do incident reports tell us? • Patient safety 7

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8 Westbrook et al.

Appendix

Table A1 Examples of clinically important prescribing errors identified by research pharmacists at audit for which there was no evidence the
error had been detected by clinical staff and no incident report was completed

Error description Error type Error category

No designated allergy recorded in system yet patient is allergic to penicillin (anaphylaxis), cefotaxime Documentation Legal/procedural
(rash) and sulphur (anaphylaxis) as per previous charts.
Potassium chloride (Slow K) 16 mmol PO BD after food (order still active despite potassium levels of Clinical Drug not indicated
6.1 mmol/l)
Warfarin 3 mg PO evening at 4 pm (given despite INR of 5.5) Clinical Drug not indicated
Prescriber withheld ‘warfarin target range’ (instead of ‘warfarin order’, dose given) Clinical Drug not indicated
Fentanyl patches 75 µg 3 daily (instead of every 3 days; patient had three patches applied afresh each Documentation Unclear order (which resulted
day) in a wrong dose)
Fludrocortisone 0.1 mg PO TDS ( previous dose was 0.1 mg BD but BD was charted unclearly and Clinical Wrong rate/frequency
patient received TDS dosing for 6 days)
Vancomycin 1 g IV BD. Trough levels of up to 32.6 mg/l (TDM recommend trough levels 10–20 mg/l) Clinical Inadequate monitoring
Patient admitted from nursing home on meloxicam 7.5 mg PO nocte + perindopril 4 mg PO Clinical Drug–drug interaction
nocte + furosemide 40 mg PO mane and 20 mg PO midi (NSAID + ACEI + diuretic = triple
whammy)
Simvastatin 40 mg PO nocte (eGFR 9 ml/min, recommended dose as per renal handbook GFR Clinical Wrong drug
<10 ml/min is 10 mg daily). The patient was admitted for acute renal failure. Taking statin during
severe inter-current illness, increases the risk of myopathy, rhabdomyolysis and renal failure.
Meloxicam 15 mg PO mane prescribed to patient with history of CVA and seizures (black box Clinical Wrong drug
warning in Micromedex that meloxicam may be fatal in patient with history of cardiovascular
disorder; MI and stroke risk increased).
Trimethoprim 300 mg PO nocte ( peak potassium levels of 7.0 mmol/l with ECG changes but patient Clinical Wrong dose/volume
remained asymptomatic)
Potassium chloride (Slow K) 2 tablets PO BD ( potassium level increased from 4.0 to 6.0 mmol/l over 5 Clinical Inadequate monitoring
days)
Concurrent orders of naproxen SR 750 mg PO nocte + irbesartan 150 mg PO mane + furosemide Clinical Drug–drug interaction
20 mg PO mane (NSAID + ARB + diuretic = triple whammy)
No designated allergy recorded in system yet—previously documented to react to amiodarone Documentation Legal/procedural
(collapse requiring adrenaline), metoprolol (collapse) and morphine (itch)
Ciprofloxacin 150 mg PO BD and tramadol 50 mg PO TDS ordered (increased risk of serotonin Clinical Drug–drug interaction
syndrome)
Furosemide 120 mg IV TDS was recharted without ceasing old order Clinical Duplicate drug
Digoxin 625 µg PO mane (instead of 62.5 µg PO mane) Clinical Wrong dose/volume

PO, by mouth; BD, twice a day; TDS, three times a day; IV, intravenous; TDM, therapeutic drug monitoring; to measure peak or trough concentrations of a
medication in the blood; S/C, subcutaneous; nocte, at night; mane, in the morning); midi, at mid-day; NSAID, non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug; ACEI,
angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitor; triple whammy, a combination of diuretics; NSAIDs, ACEI/ARB that may impair renal function; ARB, angiotensin
receptor blocker; eGFR, estimated glomerular filtration rate; CVA, cardio vascular accident; MI, myocardial infarction; ECG, electrocardiogram; SR, slow release.

Table A2 Medication incidents detected by patients

Error description Error category Potential outcome

severity

Glyceryl trinitrate 5 mg/24 h patch was prescribed for ‘on’ at 0800 h and ‘off’ at 2200 h. Patient reported using Wrong timing Minor
the patch overnight (on at 2200 h and off at 0800 h) at home.
Atorvastatin 40 mg oral in the morning at 0800 h. Patient refused morning medication as usually takes the Wrong timing Insignificant
tablet at night.
Hydrocortisone 20 mg oral twice daily at 0800 h and 2200 h. Patient reported taking the second dose at 1400 h Wrong timing Minor
as per endocrinologist.
Montelukast 10 mg oral daily was ordered. A dose was given to the patient in the morning (but should have been Wrong timing Minor
administered at night). Patient took morning dose and then was given a second evening dose. Record
indicated that patient identified that they had been given two doses (one in error).
Carmellose (Refresh Tears) 0.5% was ordered to be given orally instead of in the patient’s eyes. Patient refused Legal/ Insignificant
administration orally as they reported using the eye drops in their eyes. The order was changed, but not procedural
recharted (as is legally required), to carmellose 0.5% eye 1 drop both sides TDS.

TDS, three times a day.

What do incident reports tell us? • Patient safety 9

Table A3 Clinically important medication administration errors identified at observation but with no incident report

Drug name Drug Error type/s Comment

form

Heparin Injection Wrong drug Heparin 5000 units/0.2 ml subcutaneously was ordered but enoxaparin was
Wrong dose administered.
Wrong strength
Metoprolol Tablet Wrong dose Metoprolol 12.5 mg was ordered, nurse signed for metoprolol 25 mg but
administered metoprolol 50 mg.
Tramadol Capsule Wrong dose Tramadol 100 mg SR was ordered but tramadol 50 mg was administered.
Wrong formulation
Gentamicin Injection Wrong route Gentamicin 80 mg/2 ml administered as an IV bolus injection. Gentamicin is not
Wrong IV rate recommended to be given as a bolus injection.
Irbesartan/hydrochlorothiazide Tablet Wrong strength Irbesartan/hydrochlorothiazide 125 mg/12.5 mg 2 tablets were ordered but
Wrong dose 300 mg/12.5 mg 2 tablets were administered.
Clopidogrel Tablet Extra dose Ordered to be given Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. Was in addition
administered, but not signed for, on a Thursday.
Ampicillin Injection Wrong IV rate Recommended administration rate according to MIMS is 3–5 min. It was
administered over 0.31 min.

SR, slow release; IV, intravenous; MIMS, Monthly index of medical specialties, an independent medicine information source for health care professional.