G.R. No.

173034 October 9, 2007

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III; HEALTH UNDER SECRETARIES DR.
ETHELYN P. NIETO, DR. MARGARITA M. GALON, ATTY. ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, & DR.
JADE F. DEL MUNDO; and ASSISTANT SECRETARIES DR. MARIO C. VILLAVERDE, DR.
DAVID J. LOZADA, AND DR. NEMESIO T. GAKO, respondents.

FACTS:
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify Administrative
Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0012 entitled, Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Executive Order No. 51, Otherwise Known as The "Milk Code," Relevant International
Agreements, Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes (RIRR). Petitioner
posits that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go
beyond the law it is supposed to implement and The Petitioner also alleged that the RIRR is
invalid because it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond the law it is
supposed to implement. Specifically, the RIRR prohibits advertising, promotion,
sponsorships, or marketing breastmilk substitutes for infants and young children. Through
the RIRR, the Respondents Department of Health officials amended and expanded the Milk
Code.

In its defense, the Respondents countered that the RIRR implements not only the Milk Code,
but also various international agreements and instruments regarding infant and young child
nutrition, specifically Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICMBS) adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA). For them, these
international agreements are deemed part of the law of the land under the Doctrine of
Incorporation as provided by the Constitution, and therefore must be implemented through
the RIRR.

ISSUE: Whether or not the international agreements as mentioned by the Respondents are
part of the law of the land and may be implemented through the RIRR.

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court held that international law could become part of the law of the land
either by transformation or incorporation. In the transformation method, an international law
can be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as
legislation. An enabling law is required in order for international law to become effective. In
the incorporation method, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Thus, under the Constitution, treaties or international agreements shall become valid and
effective upon concurrence of two-thirds of all members of the Senate. Further, the Court
held that under the Incorporation Clause, generally accepted principles of international law
are those customary rules accepted as binding and established in different jurisdictions.
They are not recommendatory but are part of the general and consistent practice of states
from a sense of obligation. If they are recommendatory, these international laws are called
soft law or non-binding norms, principals, and practices that influence state behavior, as
opposed to hard law which are binding rules of international law.
G.R. No. 167919 February 14, 2007

PLARIDEL M. ABAYA, COMMODORE PLARIDEL C. GARCIA (retired) and PMA ’59

FOUNDATION, INC., rep. by its President, COMMODORE CARLOS L. AGUSTIN
(retired), Petitioners,
vs.
HON. SECRETARY HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS and HIGHWAYS, HON. SECRETARY EMILIA T.
BONCODIN, in her capacity as Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and
MANAGEMENT, HON. SECRETARY CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of
the DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, HON. TREASURER NORMA L. LASALA, in her capacity
as Treasurer of the Bureau of Treasury, and CHINA ROAD and BRIDGE
CORPORATION, Respondents.

FACTS:
On May 7, 2004 Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) issued a Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012. It was approved by DPWH
Acting Secretary Florante Soriquez. This resolution recommended the award to China Road
& Bridge Corporation of the contract for the implementation of civil works for Contract
Package No. I (CP I), which consists of the improvement/rehabilitation of the San Andres-
Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga road, with the lengt of 79.818 kilometers, in the island province of
Catanduanes. This Loan Agreement No. PH-204 was executed by and between the JBIC
and the Philippine Government pursuant to the exchange of Notes executed by and between
Mr. Yoshihisa Ara, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the
Philippines, and then Foreign Affairs Secretary Siazon, in behalf of their respective
governments.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Loan Agreement No. PH-204 between the JBIC and the
Philippine Government is a kind of a treaty.
HELD:
The Loan Agreement No. PH-204 taken in conjunction with the Exchange of Notes dated
December 27, 1999 between the Japanese Government and the Philippine Government is
an executive agreement. An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine agreement that has
many similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of
two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the
representative of the other. …treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols,
declarations, memoranda of understanding, modus vivendi and exchange of notes all are
refer to international instruments binding at international law.
G.R. No. 106064 October 13, 2005

Spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino and their minor children
Renato Redentor, Anna Marika Lissa, Nina Elissa, and Anna Karmina, Freedom From Debt
Coalition, and Filomeno Sta. Ana III, Petitioners,
vs.
Hon. Jose B. Cuisia, in his capacity as Governor of the Central Bank, Hon. Ramon del
Rosario, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, Hon. Emmanuel V. Pelaez, in his capacity
as Philippine Debt Negotiating Chairman, and the NATIONAL TREASURER, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus of the Philippine Comprehensive Program
for 1992. Petitioners are members of the non-government organization, Freedom from Debt
Coalition, which advocates a “pro-people and just Philippine debt policy.” They question the
Financing Program started by then President Corazon Aquino, characterized as a “multi-
option financing package”, wherein the President entered into three restructuring
agreements with foreign creditor governments. Petitioners stress that unlike other powers
which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is
expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President.

ISSUE:
1. WON the President can borrow to meet publice expenditures in the form of bond.
2. WON the President can delegate the power to incur foreign debts to other executive
agencies.

RULING:

Obligations; It may not be amiss to recognize that there are many advocates of the position
that the Republic should renege on obligations that are considered as “illegitimate.”—It may
not be amiss to recognize that there are many advocates of the position that the Republic
should renege on obligations that are considered as “illegitimate.” However, should the
executive branch unilaterally, and possibly even without prior court determination of the
validity or invalidity of these contracts, repudiate or otherwise declare to the international
community its resolve not to recognize a certain set of “illegitimate” loans, adverse
repercussions would come into play.
Province of North Cotabato vs. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), 568 SCRA 402, G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008

FACTS:
On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), represented by the GRP
Peace Panel and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP), and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral
Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia. The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation that creates the Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity (BJE), to which the GRP grants the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral
domain and ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro—defined as the present geographic area of the
ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City, as
well as the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001
plebiscite. The BJE is then granted the power to build, develop, and maintain its own institutions.
The MOA-AD also described the relationship of the GRP and the BJE as “associative,” characterized
by shared authority and responsibility. It further provides that its provisions requiring “amendments
to the existing legal framework” shall take effect upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact. Before
the signing, however, the Province of North Cotabato sought to compel the respondents to disclose
and furnish it with complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, as well as to hold a public
consultation thereon, invoking its right to information on matters of public concern. A subsequent
petition sought to have the City of Zamboanga excluded from the BJE. The Court then issued a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 4 August 2008, directing the public respondents and their
agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD

ISSUE: Whether or not a peace settlement signed by representatives of states and

international organizations will mean that the agreement is internationalized so as to create
obligations in international law.

RULING:

The mere fact that in addition to the parties to the conflict, the peace settlement is signed by
representatives of states and international organizations does not mean that the agreement is
internationalized so as to create obligations in international law.—Assessing the MOA-AD in light of
the above criteria, it would not have amounted to a unilateral declaration on the part of the
Philippine State to the international community. The Philippine panel did not draft the same with the
clear intention of being bound thereby to the international community as a whole or to any State,
but only to the MILF. While there were States and international organizations involved, one way or
another, in the negotiation and projected signing of the MOA-AD, they participated merely as
witnesses or, in the case of Malaysia, as facilitator. As held in the Lomé Accord case, the mere fact
that in addition to the parties to the conflict, the peace settlement is signed by representatives of
states and international organizations does not mean that the agreement is internationalized so as
to create obligations in international law.
CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP.(GROUP), Petitioner, vs. HON.
CESAR D. SANTAMARIA, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 145,
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, et al., Respondents
FACTS:

CHINA NATIONAL
MACHINERY &
EQUIPMENT CORP.
(GROUP), Petitioner,
vs.
HON. CESAR D.
SANTAMARIA, in his
official capacity as
Presiding Judge
of Branch 145, Regional
Trial Court of Makati
City, et al., Respondents
Facts
On 14 September 2002,
petitioner China
National Machinery &
Equipment
Corp. (Group)
(CNMEG), represented
by its chairperson, Ren
Hongbin, entered
into a Memorandum
of Understanding with
the North Luzon
Railways
Corporation (Northrail),
represented by its
president, Jose L. Cortes,
Jr. for the
conduct of a feasibility
study on a possible
railway line from Manila
to San
Fernando, La Union (the
Northrail Project).
On 30 August 2003, the
Export Import Bank of
China (EXIM Bank) and
the
Department of Finance of
the Philippines (DOF)
entered into a
Memorandum of
Understanding (Aug 30
MOU), wherein China
agreed to extend
Preferential
Buyer’s Credit to the
Philippine government to
finance the Northrail
Project.
The Chinese
government designated
EXIM Bank as the
lender, while the
Philippine government
named the DOF as the
borrower. Under the
Aug 30
MOU, EXIM Bank
agreed to extend an
amount not exceeding
USD
400,000,000 in favor of
the DOF, payable in 20
years, with a 5-year
grace
period, and at the rate of
3% per annum.
On 1 October 2003, the
Chinese Ambassador to
the Philippines, Wang
Chungui
(Amb. Wang), wrote
a letter to DOF
Secretary Jose Isidro
Camacho (Sec.
Camacho) informing him
of CNMEG’s designation
as the Prime Contractor
for
the Northrail Project.
On 30 December 2003,
Northrail and CNMEG
executed a Contract
Agreement
for the construction of
Section I, Phase I of the
North Luzon Railway
System
from Caloocan to
Malolos on a turnkey
basis (the Contract
Agreement). The
contract price for the
Northrail Project was
pegged at USD
421,050,000.
On 26 February 2004, the
Philippine government
and EXIM Bank entered
into a
counterpart financial
agreement – Buyer
Credit Loan Agreement
No. BLA
04055 (the Loan
Agreement). In the Loan
Agreement, EXIM Bank
agreed to
extend Preferential
Buyer’s Credit in the
amount of USD
400,000,000 in favor
of the Philippine
government in order to
finance the construction
of Phase I of
the Northrail Project.
On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp.
(Group) (CNMEG), represented by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding with the North Luzon Railways Corporation (North
rail), represented by its president, Jose L. Cortes, Jr. for the conduct of a feasibility study on
a possible railway line from Manila to San Fernando, La Union (the North rail Project).On 30
August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the Department of Finance
of the Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (Aug 30 MOU),
wherein China agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit to the Philippine government to
finance the North rail Project. The Chinese government designated EXIM Bank as
the lender, while the Philippine government named the DOF as the borrower.
Under the Aug 30MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to extend an amount not exceeding
USD400,000,000 in favor of the DOF, payable in 20 years, with a 5-year grace period,
and at the rate of 3% per annum. On 1 October 2003, the Chinese Ambassador to the
Philippines, Wang Chungui (Amb. Wang), wrote a letter to DOF Secretary Jose
Isidro Camacho (Sec. Camacho) informing him of CNMEG’s designation as the Prime
Contractor for the North rail Project. On 30 December 2003, North rail and CNMEG
executed a Contract Agreement for the construction of Section I, Phase I of the North Luzon
Railway System from Caloocan to Malolos on a turnkey basis (the Contract Agreement). The
contract price for the North rail Project was pegged at USD 421,050,000.On 26 February
2004, the Philippine government and EXIM Bank entered into a counter part financial
agreement – Buyer Credit Loan Agreement No. BLA04055 (the Loan Agreement). In
the Loan Agreement, EXIM Bank agreed to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit in the amount
of USD 400,000,000 in favor of the Philippine government in order to finance the
construction of Phase I of the North rail Project. On 13 February 2006, respondents filed a
Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Injunction with Urgent Motion for Summary
Hearing to Determine the Existence of Facts and Circumstances Justifying the
Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction and/or
TRO against CNMEG, the Office of the Executive Secretary, the DOF, the Department of
Budget and Management, the National Economic Development Authority andNorthrail.11
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 06-203 before the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Makati City, Branch 145(RTC Br. 145). In the
Complaint, respondents alleged that the Contract Agreement and the Loan Agreement were
void for being contrary to (a) the Constitution; (b) Republic Act No. 9184 (R.A. No.
9184), otherwise known as the Government Procurement Reform Act; (c) Presidential
Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code; and (d) Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code.

ISSUE: Whether the Contract Agreement is an executive agreement

RULING:
NO.
Article 2(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) defines a
treaty as follows: An international agreement concluded between States in written form
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in
two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation. In Bayan Muna
v. Romulo, this Court held that an executive agreement is similar to a treaty, except that the
former (a) does not require legislative concurrence; (b) is usually less formal; and (c) deals
with a narrower range of subject matters.50Despite these differences, to be
considered an executive agreement, the following three requisites provided under
the Vienna Convention must nevertheless concur: (a) the agreement must be
between states; (b) it must be written; and (c) it must governed by international
law. The first and the third requisites do not obtain in the case at bar
NICOLAS VS ROMULO GR NO. 175888, FEB 11, 2009 SUZETTE NICOLAS y
SOMBILON vs. ALBERTO ROMULO
Facts:
Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the United States Armed
Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, sometime on
November 1, 2005. Subsequently, he was convicted of the crime of rape under Article 266-
A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua by the Regional Trial Court of Makati on December 4, 2006. Pursuant to Article V,
paragraph No. 10, of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) entered into by the Philippines
and the United States, Smith shall serve his sentence in the facilities that shall be agreed
upon by appropriate Philippine and United States authorities. On December 19 and 22,
2006, after Smith’s conviction, an agreement relative to the detention of Smith was entered
into between then Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo and former United States
Ambassador Kristie Kenney – which was known as Romulo-Kenney Agreement – that allows
L/Cpl. Smith to be returned to US military custody at the US Embassy in Manila and be
detained in the Rowe (JUSMAG) Building, US Embassy Compound. Thus, by virtue
of the Romulo-Kenney Agreement, Smith was taken out of the Makati jail and brought to a
facility for detention under the control of the United States government. The Romulo-Kenney
Agreement’s validity was questioned by several petitioners contending that the Philippines
should have custody of Smith on the premise that the VFA is not valid and binding, as the
Senate of the United States did not ratify the same.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the visiting forces agreement is valid and binding considering that it was
not ratified by the senate of the united states.
2. Whether or not the Romulo-Kenney agreement is valid.
Held:
1. Yes, the VFA is valid. The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of
the United States Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international
agreement or treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal United
States law. Likewise, the earlier RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty of August 30, 1951 was
signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the United
States Senate. Hence, the VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to provide for the joint
RP-US military exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US Military
Defense Treaty. Accordingly, as an implementing agreement of the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty, it was not necessary to submit the VFA to the US Senate for advice and consent, but
merely to the US Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act within 60 days of its ratification

2. No, the Romulo-Kenny agreement is void. It is clear that the parties to the VFA
recognized the difference between custody during the trial and detention after
conviction, because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover detention.
And this specific arrangement clearly states not only that the detention shall be
carried out in facilities agreed on by authorities of both parties, but also that the
detention shall be "by Philippine
authorities." Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22,
2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States
Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not "by
Philippine authorities."
 WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA v. EDGARDO ANGARA, GR No. 118295, 1997-05-02

Facts:
To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War, plans for
the establishment of three multilateral institutions -- inspired by that grand political body, the
United Nations -- were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods. The first was the
World Bank (WB) which was to address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-ravaged and
later developing countries; the second, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to deal
with currency problems; and the third, the International Trade Organization (ITO), which... was
to foster order and predictability in world trade and to minimize unilateral protectionist policies
that invite challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However, for a variety of reasons,
including its non-ratification by the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and
WB, never took off. What remained was only GATT -- the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. GATT was a collection of treaties governing access to the economies of treaty adherents
with no institutionalized body administering the agreements or dependable system of dispute...
settlement.
Philippines joined WTO as a founding member
Issues:
does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization?
Does it prescribe Philippine integration into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and
privatized?

RULING:

Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events. They should be
interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances.
petitioners claim that said WTO proviso derogates from the power to tax, which is lodged in the
Congress.
Sovereignty Limited by International Law and Treaties... it is however subject to restrictions
and... limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of
the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of
the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, the Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and
amity, with all nations."
One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda --...
international agreements must be performed in good faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere
moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such... modifications
as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken."
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their
voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater
benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact.
The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain
restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of... membership in
the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.
Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it
consented to restrict its sovereign rights under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation."
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international pacts -- both
bilateral and multilateral -- that involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty.
The underlying consideration in this partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal
commitment of the other... contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the
Philippines, its officials and its citizens.
 Mijares v Ranada GR No: 139325;
Apr 12, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioners were victims of human rights violations during the Marcos era. A final
judgement was held in their favor abasing the estate of the late President Ferdinand Marcos.
The US court awarded $1.9 billion as compensation for the torte it had during the said era.
The said judgement was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals. For the enforcement,
petitioners filed a complaint in RTC Makati and paid filing fees of Php 410 since the value of
the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The heirs of Marcos filed a motion to
dismiss because of the said filing fees paid by the petitioners. The Makati RTC dismissed
the case because the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation since it involved a
judgement from a foreign court. Thus, it can be ascertained because it is a payment of
definite sum even if it is in a foreign currency. The proper filing fee should be Php
472 Million to enforce a judgement awarded to them by the foreign court.
ISSUE: Can a foreign judgement be recognized in the Philippines?
RULING:
YES. There is no obligatory rule regarding treaties entered into by the Philippines to
recognize foreign judgements or enforcement thereof. Exception to the rule is when it is
a generally accepted principle of international law, where the Philippines adhere
through the incorporation clause provided in the constitution even if there are
no treaty obligations. A generally accepted principle of international law must
comply with the following requisites: established, widespread and consistent
practice on part of the states and a psychological element known as opinio
juris side necessitates or belief that the practice is considered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law.
 MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011

FACTS:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines
as an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State
parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting
some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984.
The requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of
some basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our
sovereignty and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those
territories.

ISSUE: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

RULING:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm
that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out
basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices
the international community of the scope of our maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating
routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the
absence of such, international law norms operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place
them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary
international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in
fact, it increased the Phils.’total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’
continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the
general configuration of the archipelago’.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules:
that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.
 Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan
GR. NO. 148571 Sept. 24 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS:

Petition is a sequel to the case “Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion”. The Secretary was ordered
to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant
the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. But, on
motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr.
Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process. On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the
issuance of an order for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent
the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an
“Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion” praying for his application for an arrest warrant be set for
hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum.
Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post
bail in the amount of P100,000. The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and
fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and
posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.

Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set
aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty
at P1M in cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local
jurisprudence to guide lower court.

ISSUES:
i. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a
potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069
ii. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail

iii. Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process

HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court of
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.

i. YES
By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. From the knowledge and the material then available to
it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression or a prima facie finding sufficient to
make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused. The
prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest
warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after
having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. The
silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no
intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings. It also bears
emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary in nature. Sending to
persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at
some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape which
neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended.
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study
them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether
a) they are sufficient in form and substance
b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law
c) the person sought is extraditable

At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may
personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and
examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of
the judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the
magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same
time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to
the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the
pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the
proceedings.

ii. Yes.

The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested
and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the
presumption of innocence is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the “right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended”
finds application “only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion.” iii. NO.

Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. The
doctrine of right to due process and fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior
opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. He will be given full
opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for
Extradition. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full
chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary
nature of extradition.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country. He already had that opportunity in the
requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

Other Doctrines: Five Postulates of Extradition

1) Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime

In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to
cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own
country.
FACTS:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States. On the same day petitioner designate and
authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending
evaluation of the afore stated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a
letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S
Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have
received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the
consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine
Government must present the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of
a request for extradition.

ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold

a citizen’s basic due process
rights or the governments
ironclad duties
under a treaty.
RULING: Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person,
whether citizen or alien , and the
rights of the accused guaranteed
in our
Constitution should take
precedence over treaty rights
claimed by a contracting state.
The duties of the
government to the individual
deserve preferential consideration
when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of
another state. This is so although
we recognize treaties as a source
of
binding obligations under
generally accepted principles of
international law incorporated in
our
Constitution as part of the law of
the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is
applied whenever municipal
tribunals are confronted with
situation in
which there appears to be a
conflict between a rule of
international law and the
provision of the
constitution or statute of the local
state.
ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold
a citizen’s basic due process
rights or the governments
ironclad duties
under a treaty.
RULING: Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person,
whether citizen or alien , and the
rights of the accused guaranteed
in our
Constitution should take
precedence over treaty rights
claimed by a contracting state.
The duties of the
government to the individual
deserve preferential consideration
when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of
another state. This is so although
we recognize treaties as a source
of
binding obligations under
generally accepted principles of
international law incorporated in
our
Constitution as part of the law of
the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is
applied whenever municipal
tribunals are confronted with
situation in
which there appears to be a
conflict between a rule of
international law and the
provision of the
constitution or statute of the local
state.
ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the governments
ironclad duties under a treaty.

RULING:
Petition dismissed. The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of
the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights
claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve
preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of
another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations
under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as
part of the law of the land. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal
tribunals are confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule
of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period
within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. “Under the Doctrine of
Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further
legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. “The
doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. “Efforts should first be exerted to
harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law
was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision. “In a
situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between
a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law
should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of
municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances. “The fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the
primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The
doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law
are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a
statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the highest law
of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be
invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.
SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner,

vs.

Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel

MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO TABUENA,
Major FEDERICO ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT PORT, respondents.

83 PHIL. 171

March 26, 1949

FACTS:

Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and

Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during a period
covering 1943 and 1944, who is now charged before a Military Commission with having
unlawfully disregarded and failed “to discharge his duties as such commander to control the
operations of members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other
high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces, in
violation of the laws and customs of war” — comes before this Court seeking to establish the
illegality of EO No. 68, which established a National War Crimes Offices and provides that
persons accused as war criminals shall be tried by military commission; and to permanently
prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioner.

Kuroda argues that EO No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provisions of
our constitutional law but also our local laws, to say nothing of the fact (that) the Philippines is not
a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land
Warfare and, therefore, petitioner is charged of `crimes’ not based on law, national and
international. Hence, petitioner argues — “That in view of the fact that this commission has been
empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional law and an illegal order, this commission is without
jurisdiction to try herein petitioner.”

ISSUE:

WON the Philippines can adopt the rules and regulations laid down on The Hague and Geneva
Conventions notwithstanding that it is not a signatory thereto and whether it can create a Military
Commission to try violations of the Hague Convention?

HELD:

Yes. Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules
and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of the
Philippines on the 29th day of July, 1947. This Court holds that this order is valid and
constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that

“The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.”

In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of the present day,
including the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of
international jurisprudence established by the United Nations, all those persons, military or
civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the
commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of the laws
and customs of war, of humanity and civilization, are held accountable therefor. Consequently, in
the promulgation and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, the President of the Philippines
has acted in conformity with the generally accepted principles and policies of international law
which are part of our Constitution.

The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his powers as
Commander in Chief of all our armed forces, as upheld by this Court in the case of Yamashita vs.
Styer L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 654) 1 when we said

“War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities,
incidents of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time of war. `An
important incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measures by the military command not
only to repel and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those
enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of war.’
(Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.) Indeed, the power to create a military commission
for the trial and punishment of war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And, in the language of
a writer, a military commission `has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues. This
includes the period of an armistice, or military occupation, up to the effective date of a treaty of
peace, and may extend beyond, by treaty agreement.’ (Cowls, Trial of War Criminals by Military
Tribunals, American Bar Association Journal, June, 1944.)”

Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this

unfinished aspect of war, namely, the trial and punishment of war criminals, through the issuance
and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts
committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the
Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied
that the rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly
based on the generally accepted principles of international law. In fact, these rules and principles
were accepted by the two belligerent nations, the United States and Japan, who were signatories
to the two Conventions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of the law of our nation
even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our
Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the
recognition of rules and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our
government may have been or shall be a signatory.

Furthermore, when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed, the
Philippines was under the sovereignty of the United States, and thus we were equally bound
together with the United States and with Japan, to the rights and obligations contained in the
treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligations were not erased by our
assumption of full sovereignty. If at all, our emergence as a free state entitles us to enforce the
right, on our own, of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against our people.
 Yamashita vs. Styer
G.R. L-129 December 19, 1945
Ponente: Moran, C.J.

Facts:
1. Yamashita was the Commanding General of the Japanese army in the Philippines during
World War 2. He was charged before the American military commission for war crimes.

2. He filed a petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Gen. Styer to reinstate his status
as prisoner of war from being accused as a war criminal. Petitioner also questioned the
jurisdiction of the military tribunal.

Issue: Whether or not the military tribunal has jurisdiction

Held:

YES.
1. The military commission was lawfully created in conformity with an act of Congress
sanctioning the creation of such tribunals.

2. The laws of war imposes upon a commander the duty to take any appropriate measures within
his powers to control the troops under his command to prevent acts which constitute violation of
the laws of war. Hence, petitioner could be legitimately charged with personal responsibility
arising from his failure to take such measure. In this regard the SC invoked Art. 1 of the Hague
Convention No. IV of 1907, as well as Art. 19 of Hague Convention No. X, Art. 26 of 1929
Geneva Convention among others.

3. Habeas corpus is untenable since the petitioner merely sought for restoration to his former
status as prisoner of war and not a discharge from confinement. This is a matter of military
measure and not within the jurisdiction of the courts.

4. The petition for prohibition against the respondent will also not life since the military
commission is not made a party respondent in the case. As such, no order may be issued
requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.
EREMES KOOKOORITCHKIN v. SOLICITOR GENERAL, GR No. L-1812, 1948-08-27
Facts:
appellee filed with the lover court a petition for naturalization,... he petition was finally set for
hearing on
December 18, 1941, but it was not held on that date because the province was invaded by
the Japanese forces... he case remained pending until the records were destroyed during
the military operations for liberation
The case was declared... reconstituted on May 10, 1947) and the evidence was presented
on August 28 and September 30, 1947. On the same day resolution was issued granting the
petition.
Although appellant was represented at the hearing and cross-examined the witnesses for
the petitioner, he did not file an opposition or presented any evidence.
Eremes Kookooritchkin applies for Philippine citizenship by naturalization under the
provisions of Commonwealth Act 473
The record shows that in August, 1941, he filed his petition for naturalization supported by
the affidavits of ex-Judge Jaime M. Reyes and Dr. Salvador Mariano, both residents of
Camarines Sur. In the preceding year, in July, 1940 to be precise, he filed his declaration
of... intention to become a citizen of this country. Notice of the hearing was published as
required by law.
"It was established at the hearing that the petitioner is a native-born Russian, having first
seen the light of day on November 4, 1897 in the old City of St. Petersburg, Russia. He grew
up as a citizen of the defunct Imperial Russian Government under the Czars. World War I...
found him in the military service of this Government.
The applicant is married to a Filipina by the name of Concepcion Segovia, with whom he has
one son named Ronald Kookooritchkin. He is at present studying in Saint Agnes Academy,
at Legaspi, Albay, a school duly recognized by the Government.
Although a Russian by birth he is not a citizen of Soviet Russia. He disclaims allegiance to
the present Communist Government of Russia. He is, therefore, a stateless refugee in this
country, belonging to no State, much less to the present Government of the land of his
birth... to which he is uncompromisingly opposed
Issues:
Appellant contends that the lower court erred in finding pppellee stateless and not a Russian
citizen and in not finding that he has failed to establish that he is not disqualified for
Philippine citizenship under section (h) of the Revised Naturalization Law.
Ruling:
We do not believe that the lower court erred in pronouncing appellee stateless. Appellee's
testimony, besides being uncontradicted, is supported by the well-known fact that the
ruthlessness of modern dictatorships has scattered throughought the world a large number
of... stateless refugees or displaced persons, without country and without flag.
Knowing, as all cultured persons all over the world ought to know, the history, nature and
character of the Soviet dictatorship, presently the greatest menace to humanity and
civilization, it would be technically fastidious to require further evidence of petitioner's claim...
that he is stateless than his testimony that he owes no allegiance to the Russian Communist
government and, because he has been at war with it, he fled from Russia to permanently
reside in the Philippines.
 Salonga vs. Executive Secretary (2009)

Facts:
1. Daniel Smith
a. Member of the US Armed Forces
b. Charged with the crime of rape against a Filipina (Suzette Nicolas, 22-year
old unmarried woman)
2. Trial of the accused
a. Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Philippines and
the US, the US was granted custody of defendant Smith pending the
proceedings
b. Trial was transferred from RTC Zambales to RTC Makati for security
purposes
c. During trial, the US Government faithfully complied to their obligation of
bringing Smith to the trial court every time his presence was required
3. RTC Makati decision – Smith is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
a. Pursuant to Article V, par. 10, of the VFA – Smith shall serve his sentence in
a facility that shall be agreed upon by the Philippine and US authorities.
b. Pending this agreement, Smith is ordered to be temporarily committed to the
Makati city jail
4. Romulo-Kenney Agreement
a. This is the agreement pursuant to Art. V, par. 10, of the VFA
b. It has been agreed upon by Kristie Kenney (representative of US) and Alberto
Romulo (representative of the Philippines) that Smith shall be detained at the
1st floor, Rowe (JUSMAG) Building, US Embassy Compound in a room of
approximately 10x12 square feet
i. The Philippine police & jail authorities shall have access to the place
of detention in order to ensure the compliance of the US with the
terms of the VFA
c. Dec. 29, 2006 – Smith was taken out of the Makati jail by Philippine law
enforcement agents (acting upon the orders of DILG) and brought to the US
Embassy
5. The matter was brought to the CA, which dismissed the petition for having become
moot. Hence, the present action.

Procedure:
1. RTC Makati - Smith was convicted of the crime rape
2. CA – to question the Romulo-Kenney agreement; petition dismissed
3. SC – petitions for certiorari, as special civil actions and/or for review of the CA
decision

Issue/s:
1. WON the VFA is void and unconstitutional – No
2. WON the VFA provision on cases of offenses committed by the members of the US
Armed Forces in the Philippines violates Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) (“...providing for the
exclusive power of this Court to adopt rules of procedure for all courts in the
Philippines”)- No
 3. WON the Romulo-Kenney Agreement is in accord of the VFA – No
4. WON the VFA is affected by the US SC decision on Medellin vs. Texas - No

Held/Ratio:
1. The VFA is constitutional.
a. The petitioners contend that the issue is of primordial importance involving
the sovereignty of the Republic, as well as the mandate of the Constitution
b. The SC upheld the constitutionality of the VFA for the following reasons:
i. The SC, in Bayan vs. Zamora, has already resolved in favour of the
constitutionality of the VFA.
1. The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine senate and
has been recognized as a treaty by the US. Thus, it follows the
Constitutional mandate that an agreement concerning Military
Bases shall only be allowed “under a treaty duly concurred in
by the Senate ... and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting state” (Art. XVIII, Sec. 25)
2. Though the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of
the US Senate, it is still a binding international agreement or
treaty recognized by the US
a. Only policymaking agreements are submitted to the US
Senate
b. Those that carry out or further implement policymaking
agreements are submitted to Congress under the
provisions of Case-Zablocki Act. Submission of this
kind of agreement to the US Senate is not necessary.
c. The RP-US Military Defense Treaty is the policymaking
agreement, while the VFA is its implementing
agreement. The RP-US Military Defense Treaty has
been ratified & concurred by both Philippine & US
senates.
2. Art. VIII, Sec 5 (5) is not violated
a. Equal protection clause is not violated due to the presence of substantial
basis for a different treatment of a member of foreign military allowed to enter
the Philippine territory
b. Rule on international law – a foreign military allowed to enter one’s territory is
immune from local jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon
i. The issue does not involve the adoption of rules of procedure. Rather,
it is the question of extraterritorial immunity based on what has been
agreed upon by the contracting States. Nothing in the Constitution
prohibits such.
3. The Romulo-Kenney is not in accord with the VFA
a. The VFA provides for a different treatment between detention and custody
i. Detention – in a facility agreed by both States BUT shall be “by
Philippine authorities”
b. Romulo-Kenney agreement is in violation of the VFA because the detention
agreed upon is not “by Philippine authorities”
4. The VFA is different from the subject matter of the Medellin vs. Texas case
 a. In Medellin vs. Texas, the US SC held that “treaties entered into by the US
are not automatically part of their domestic law unless these treaties are self-
executing or there is an implementing legislation to make them enforceable”.
b. VFA vs Vienna Convention on Consular Relations & the Avena decision of
the International Court of Justice (subject matter of the Medellin decision)
i. VFA – (1) self- executing agreement because the parties intend its
provisions to be enforceable and (2) it is covered by implementing
legislation which is the Case-Zablocki Act
1. These two characteristics are absent in the subject matter of
the Medellin decision

authorities." Therefore, the

Romulo-Kenney Agreements of
December 19 and 22, 2006,
which are agreements on the
detention of the accused in the
United States Embassy, are
not in accord with the VFA itself
because such detention is not "by
Philippine authorities."
Although these instruments differ
from each other by title, they all
have common features and
international law has applied
basically the same rules to all
these instruments. These rules are
the result
of long practice among the States,
which have accepted them as
binding norms in their mutual
relations.
Therefore, they are regarded as
international cu