Neuropsychoanalysis

An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences

ISSN: 1529-4145 (Print) 2044-3978 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rnpa20

Of brains and Borromean knots: A Lacanian meta-

neuropsychology

John Dall’Aglio

To cite this article: John Dall’Aglio (2019) Of brains and Borromean knots: A Lacanian meta-
neuropsychology, Neuropsychoanalysis, 21:1, 23-38, DOI: 10.1080/15294145.2019.1619091

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2019.1619091

Published online: 22 May 2019.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 99

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rnpa20
NEUROPSYCHOANALYSIS
2019, VOL. 21, NO. 1, 23–38
https://doi.org/10.1080/15294145.2019.1619091

Of brains and Borromean knots: A Lacanian meta-neuropsychology

a,b
John Dall’Aglio
a
Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, Providence, RI, USA; bDevelopmental Psychosomatics
Laboratory, New York State Psychiatric Institute/Columbia University Medical Center, New York, NY, USA

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

Meta-psychological bridges between neuroscience and psychoanalysis have focused on Freud’s Received 26 January 2018
structural model [Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2002. Clinical studies in neuro-psychoanalysis: Accepted 8 December 2018
Introduction to a depth neuropsychology (2nd ed.). London: Karnac Books; Solms, 2013. The
KEYWORDS
conscious id. Neuropsychoanalysis, 15(1), 5–19]. While other psychoanalytic schools have been in Lacan; metapsychology;
dialog on specific concepts, alternative full-scale meta-psychologies have received less attention. affective consciousness; real;
This paper maps the brain through the Lacanian triad of the real, imaginary, and symbolic. imaginary; symbolic;
Dynamic localization of these concepts avoids neuro-structural reduction. Right and left cortical neuropsychoanalysis;
hemispheres appear necessary (but not sufficient) for imaginary and symbolic functions psychoanalysis
respectively, with the frontal lobes underlying social and self-reflective functions. The real is
supported by subcortical affective and motivational structures, particularly the automatization of
non-representational systems prior to hippocampal development. This project highlights the
structural disjuncture (impossibility) which is constitutive of human subjectivity and brain function.

Can there be a Lacanian within nature itself (Lacan, 1975–1976). Rather than redu-
neuropsychoanalysis? cing Lacanian theory to neurobiology, this Lacanian neu-
ropsychoanalysis aims to elevate neuroscience beyond
To many, a “Lacanian neuropsychoanalysis” is an oxy-
biology.
moron. Lacan’s theory, with its philosophical bend and
Moreover, Lacan himself interfaces with neurobiology.
emphasis on structural linguistics, tends to oppose an
In his discussions of the mirror stage and the ego (Lacan,
organic conception of the psyche. Contemporary Lacan-
1953, 1977, 1988), he refers to the cerebral cortex as an
ians often endorse this view, emphasizing the immaterial
intra-organic mirror. Furthermore, highlighting Freud’s
subject beyond the understanding of the brain
(1895) concept of infantile helplessness, Lacan points
(Redmond, 2015). The neuropsychoanalytic project is
to the infant’s physical body as a state of original
seen as a bio-reductionist cul de sac (Laurent, 2014).
organic discord, a “body-in-pieces” (Johnston, 2013a).
However, this reading of Lacan simplifies his criticism
Lacan does indeed conceive of the physical sphere of
of the life sciences. In my reading, Lacan opposes the
the psyche – for him, the brain is premature and frag-
project of a material whole, an understanding of nature
mented, lacking adaptation.
which guarantees total knowledge. As will be discussed,
This paper presents a preliminary outline of a meta-
Lacan argued that this is to fall for the lure of an imagin-
neuropsychology of Lacan’s registers of the real, the ima-
ary-symbolic reality, ignoring the real dimension of
ginary, and the symbolic. Prior Lacanian neuropsychoa-
experience. Lacan opposes Nature with a capital N (John-
nalytic models (Ansermet & Magistretti, 2007; Johnston,
ston, 2013b; Lacan, 1975–1976). A theory of the brain
2013a) will be discussed. But first, Lacan’s register
which promises to fully explain the subject of psychoana-
theory will be reviewed.
lysis is indeed, in Lacan’s view and mine, a cul de sac
which ignores the primacy of the unconscious.
However, a neuropsychoanalysis which accounts for
Real, imaginary, symbolic: Lacan’s
this lack of totalized knowledge or understanding – and
metapsychology
conceives of nature itself as inherently lacking and non-
totalized – would be compatible with Lacan (Johnston, It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss Lacan’s
2012). This would recognize the “beyond the brain” triad extensively. Certain aspects will be omitted, and
which is within the brain, akin to the more-than-nature not all related concepts (such as jouissance) will be

CONTACT John Dall’Aglio [email protected] Brown University, Providence, RI, United States of America Developmental Psychosomatics Lab-
oratory, New York State Psychiatric Institute/Columbia University Medical Center, New York, NY, USA
© 2019 International Neuropsychoanalysis Society
24 J. DALL’AGLIO

discussed.1 This reflects an attempt to establish a The real: negativity and excess
bedrock, upon which other concepts can be built.
The real refers to this “negative excess,” that which is
lacking (i.e. absence, negativity) with respect to the sym-
Lost in reality: the mirror stage, the imaginary, bolic and imaginary registers but nevertheless makes
and the symbolic itself felt as excess. Indeed, Lacan (1978) abandoned
his mirror stage because it obscured the importance of
For Lacan, the human infant is not born adapted to the
that which is beyond the imaginary and symbolic (Van-
world. Rather, the infant is premature and uncoordinated,
heule, 2011). Thus, Lacan’s later teaching focuses on
ravaged by auto-erotic partial drives (Freud, 1905). From
the real.
this primal experience of intra-organic chaos, the infant
For Lacan, the proper object of psychoanalytic study is
turns to the Other2 (Verhaeghe, 2004). Lacan (1977,
the unconscious. The analysand is referred to as a
1988) formally depicts this process in the mirror stage,
“subject” and is considered split. This split is not con-
where the infant sees itself in a mirror. The infant perceives
sidered a flaw which must be repaired by the ego.
a whole, gestalt image, which it (mis)recognizes as itself.
Rather, this split is constitutive of the subject (Lacan,
This unified image forms the ego, an ideal gestalt upon
2000). In Lacan’s reading of the unconscious, the
which all later imagos are built in a cycle of identifications
subject emerges in the gap (lack) in logical conscious
and imitations (Muller, 1985). The wholeness of the body
experience. Bungled actions, slips of the tongue,
and of external reality rests upon this imaginary ego
dreams, and symptoms all reveal this lack in logical con-
identification (Lacan, 1988). Lacan’s term “imaginary”
tinuity (Verhaeghe, 2004).
does not suggest that the ego is unimportant, something
At the core of the subject, the real is the nucleus of the
simply “made up” or “fake.” The imaginary is rooted in
unconscious.3 As a negative entity, the real is not a mere
images. However, Lacan’s choice of this term reflects the
nullity – it is the presence of a fault without represen-
crucial point that the imaginal world of perception is illu-
tation. In speech, it is the unsayable – not because it is
sory insofar as it obscures the real (see below).
prohibited, but because it is impossible. It is the constitu-
Similarly, while the ego brings (a degree of) mastery
tive impasse of speech and representation. As such, the
over the body, Lacan argues that it is fundamentally illu-
real does not exist (in representable reality). It insists,
sory since it contrasts with the subject’s internal frag-
demanding repetition and disrupting the subject’s
mentation. Thus, captivation with the ideal alienates
organization in the other registers. The real is part of
the subject from its own internal experience (Lacan,
the subject and excessive to it – the subject is not a
1977; Muller, 1985). Consequently, the ego’s defense
whole, but a subject with something beyond it. The
mechanisms involve misrecognition, of itself and of
real4 goes beyond what the subject can speak and
others. Alienation is the effect of imaginary identification
imagine about itself (Copjec, 2012; Lacan, 2000).
(Verhaeghe, 2004).
Lacan (1997) traces this concept back to Freud’s
In addition, the image in the mirror is named by the
(1895) Project for a Scientific Psychology. Freud writes
Other, adding symbolic identification through the
on the development of speech:
signifier. The relationship between name and image is
arbitrary – any word can suffice. Signifier and image do Speech innervation is originally a path of discharge … it
not bear a one-to-one relationship (Lacan, 1988; Thi- is a portion of the path to internal change, which rep-
bierge & Morin, 2010). However, the Other (language) resents the only discharge till the specific action has
been found. This path acquires a secondary function
structures the way the imaginary image is perceived,
from the fact that it draws the attention of the helpful
orienting the subject’s reality. person (usually the wished-for object itself) to the
The symbolic is rooted in language, where signifiers child’s longing and distressful state; and thereafter it
only bear differential relationships to other signifiers. serves for communication and is thus drawn into the
Any relationship to a signified meaning or image is arbi- specific action. At the start of the function of judgement,
when the perceptions, on account of their possible con-
trary. With infinite potential significations, language fails
nection with the wished-for object, are arousing interest
to produce a precise meaning without ambiguity (Lacan, … their complexes are dissected into an unassimilable
1988; Miller & Roberts, 1996). Furthermore, the symbolic component (the Thing [das Ding]) and one known to
extends to social rules and laws governing relations the ego from its own experience (attribute, activity) –
among subjects – the Oedipal prohibition of the subject’s what we call understanding. (Freud, 1895, p. 366,
enjoyment (Verhaeghe, 2004) being the most exemplary. emphases in the original)
However, desire remains inexact (Miller & Roberts, 1996), The emergence of representation (understanding)
for the articulation of desire betrays the lack beyond the occurs simultaneously with the emergence of an
symbolic (Fink, 1999).
 NEUROPSYCHOANALYSIS 25

“unassimilable component,” which is subtracted from drive – it does not exist (as representation). This is one
representation itself. This subtraction is objectively regis- way to understand Freud’s claim: “the finding of an
tered as such (das Ding). object is the refinding of an object” (Freud, 1905, p.
Freud describes a similar scenario in the Three Essays: 222). The subject continually seeks this lost objet which
escaped it from the beginning. The drive5 does not
At a time at which the first beginnings of sexual satisfac-
tion are still linked with the taking of nourishment, the admit of satisfaction because satisfaction follows a
sexual instinct has a sexual object outside the infant’s logic of filling a lack (reduction of tension, meeting
own body in the shape of his mother’s breast. It is only needs). Thus, in Lacan’s formulation, the drive insists,
later that the instinct loses that object, just at the time, seeking excitation, not discharge, resulting in the rep-
perhaps, when the child is able to form a total idea of etition compulsion (Johnston, 2013a).
the person to whom the organ that is giving him satisfac-
Lacan links the real to the body, the original state of
tion belongs. As a rule the sexual instinct [drive] then
becomes auto-erotic. (Freud, 1905, p. 222) organic chaos and infantile helplessness (Lacan, 1977).
Johnston (2013a) describes this as a “barred corporo-
Again, the genesis of the representation (“a total idea of real,” emphasizing the not-whole (barred) nature of the
the person”) is simultaneous with the loss of the object of corporeal body. Furthermore, Lacan (1978) gives objet a
the drive. For Lacan, this loss is inseparable from – certain bodily coordinates: the breast, the faeces, the
indeed, constitutive of – representation. gaze, and the voice. One should read these coordinates
The real (das Ding, the primordial loss) is an internal, of objet a as the points of the body where the subject
alien presence – something that is simultaneously within lacks (is not-whole) in relation to the other (Laurent,
the subject, yet other to the subject. It is an intimate exter- 2014). They highlight lost objets which only exist as nega-
iority; hence, Lacan’s neologism: “extimate” (Laurent, tivities since they did not exist as positive represen-
2014). This is how Lacan understands primal repression, tations in symbolic-imaginary totality (Zupančič, 2017).
which is not recognized in reality and then (secondarily) To avoid excessive complexity, this paper will mainly
repressed into the unconscious. Rather, it never existed consider the concept of objet a as a subtraction (negative
– in Freudian terms, it never received a cathexis in the excess) and will not detail these bodily coordinates.
first place (Freud, 1915b, 1915c). Freud (1900) alludes to To sum up, the real refers to the primordial loss,
this unassimilable component of the psyche in the navel without (indeed, beyond) representation or signification.
of the dream which resists a final interpretation. The At birth, there is primordial organic discord (the barred
unconscious is that which is both internal to subject, but corporo-real) of the internal bodily fragmentation. The
also foreign to it (Lacan, 1997). infant’s turn to the imaginary register introduces the
Lacan’s (1978) objet a is a derivative of Freud’s das gestalt ego. Perceptual and motor mastery in relation-
Ding. The real insists in not being spoken. Therefore, ship to the external world alienates the subject from its
language and symbolic-imaginary reality entail loss (of internal experience. Language is ambiguous, and sign-
that which is impossible to articulate), since the real ifiers introduce enigmatic meaning and desire. Further-
forever remains out of the grasp of language and rep- more, the symbolic structures social relationships
resentation. Thus, objet a is the first (non)object, the among subjects and tames the drive. Together, the sym-
lost object, something in the register of the real, a sub- bolic and imaginary constitute the external world.
traction which remains outside of the symbolic and ima- Neither captures the real, since neither language nor
ginary. This loss is the loss of something which the image can represent the not-whole (Johnston, 2019; Ver-
subject never possessed in the first place. It is a remain- haeghe, 2004). Indeed, the real insists as negative excess,
der, a residual which emerges as loss with the entrance the impasse of symbolic-imaginary reality.
into the symbolic and imaginary (Morin, Pradat-Diehl, In his integration of mathematics and knot theory, Lacan
Robain, Bensalah, & Perrigot, 2003; Thibierge & Morin, (1975–1976) describes the three registers as “knotted”
2010). Neither language nor image can represent the together in the Borromean knot. Without going into
subject because the subject is not-whole (split), produ- further detail on this aspect of Lacan’s thought, it suffices
cing negative excess (loss) in representation. to say that, in his view, no register will be encountered in
The drive belongs to the real insofar as drive is unteth- isolation – they intersect. This paper asserts that the brain
ered to actual (representable) objects. For Freud (1915a), is a critical locus of this knotting.
the aim and the object are the most variable parts of the
drive, in contrast to the source and pressure (Johnston,
Mind and brain: dynamic localization
2013a). For Lacan, the object of the drive is fantasmatic.
It never existed as something which the subject pos- Dual-aspect monism is the philosophical basis for neu-
sessed. Lacan (1978) terms objet a the object of the ropsychoanalysis. In this view, the mind and the brain
26 J. DALL’AGLIO

are two perspectives of the same mental apparatus, the all three registers, not one in isolation. However,
same thing in nature (Solms, 2015). Freud (1900, 1915c, dynamic localization can identify neural areas which
1923) developed different models of the mental appar- are necessary (but not sufficient) for the proper function-
atus as understood from the perspective of psychoanaly- ing of a given register.
sis. Within the view of dual-aspect monism, neuroscience
takes an alternative route of investigating models of the
Prior approaches to Lacanian
same mental apparatus. As two different ways of experi-
neuropsychoanalysis
encing the same thing, psychoanalysis and neuroscience
each contribute a unique perspective. Neuropsychoana- It is beyond the scope of this paper to review prior
lysis investigates how these two perspectives overlap. models of Lacanian neuropsychoanalysis, namely the
Concepts from each discipline can be correlated with, work of Ansermet and Magistretti (2007) and Johnston
but not reduced to, concepts from the other. For (2013a, 2013b). It will suffice to highlight the differences
example, the psychological effects of brain lesions between the present model and Ansermet and Magis-
cannot be understood without knowledge of the tretti’s approach, as well as how Johnston’s model lays
patient’s subjective history. The psychic sphere remains groundwork which I build upon.
essential to psychological understanding. In this view,
the brain does not cause the mind. Mind and brain are
Neuroplastic traces
two (incomplete) lenses of the same thing in nature –
changes to this thing can be investigated from both per- Ansermet and Magistretti (2007) emphasize the neuro-
spectives independently. Neither perspective gives a plasticity of traces – modifications of the synaptic con-
complete understanding, but consideration of both nections among neurons. Experience leaves a trace,
paints a more thorough picture (Solms, 2015). whether from the external world as a sensory impression
Neuropsychoanalysis frames this overlap through or from the internal body as a somatic marker (Damasio,
dynamic localization (Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2002). 2005). However, these traces are not static. Via neuro-
Psychic phenomena are not localized in neural struc- plasticity, traces are constantly re-associated, strength-
tures. Instead, out of inter-activation of several neural ened, or weakened according to the principles of
centers, mental functions emerge between neural struc- synaptic memory (Milner, Squire, & Kandel, 1998).
tures. A neural structure has its own function, but also Simply put, neurons that fire together wire together
contributes to the organization of others. Mental func- (Hebb, 1949). The network of traces changes based on
tions – and neural structures – are interdependent, experience.
such that one cannot be damaged without dynamic However, traces are not faithful to experience.
changes to the rest of the organization. Because of neuroplasticity, the neural system of traces
Thus, following a brain lesion, psychic functions are continues to modify itself in relation to other stimuli
not destroyed – as in cognitive neuropsychological (internal and external) which may or may not be
models (e.g. Caramazza & Coltheart, 2006). Rather, related to the original experience. Indeed, the laying
several mental functions are distorted in dynamic ways. down of traces is affected by the already-present internal
Through psychoanalytic investigation of lesion patients, organization of traces. Thus, the internal (neural) trace of
one can identify the mechanism impaired in each experience does not bear a one-to-one relationship with
psychic system – the damaged neural area would be the (external) experience (Laurent, 2014).
necessary for that common underlying function. This Ansermet and Magistretti’s (2007) Lacanian reading of
methodology (called clinico-anatomical correlation) traces concludes that traces function like signifiers. Like
allows a psychoanalytic mapping of the brain (Kaplan- the signifier’s non-relation to the signified, traces have
Solms & Solms, 2002). no clear relation to experience (due to neuroplasticity).
In this view, psychoanalytic concepts, like Lacan’s reg- Each brain’s unique system of traces constitutes the sub-
isters, are not equated to neuroanatomy in a one-to-one ject’s internal unconscious reality. This is how the authors
correspondence. Instead, they are dynamically localized, interpret Lacan’s (1978) claim that the unconscious is
reflecting a particular organization between constella- structured like a language.
tions of neural activity. Inter-relations between structures To some extent, the neuroplasticity of traces reflects
prevent the reduction of a concept to a single neural primary process operations. Ansermet and Magistretti
explanation. Thus, I suggest that, as we look towards discuss the reorganization of traces under the associative
making some preliminary linkages between brain func- logic of displacement and condensation (and the Laca-
tion and Lacan’s registers, we will find that given nian reframing of metonymy and metaphor). I argue
neural areas are likely to participate to some extent in that the basic organization of neural traces obeys this
 NEUROPSYCHOANALYSIS 27

primary process logic, particularly in the infantile brain. not in totalizing harmony with itself; rather, there is an
However, as neocortical areas mature and impose top- inherent antagonism, impasse, or disjunction. The real
down regulation over lower systems (see below), the of the drive stands for this antagonism within nature.
organization of traces might become more structued Johnston (2013a) localizes this “rotten” nature to the
(at least in some areas), reflecting the secondary pro- structural disjunctures of the brain itself. Damasio
cesses. In certain areas, primary process functions will (2010) and LeDoux (2002) comment on the evolutionary
persist; other areas may be more “bound” by secondary hodgpodge of systems in the brain. Drawing on Linden’s
processes.6 It is important to distinguish between the (2008) view of the brain as a “kludge,” Johnston empha-
function of traces in different areas of the brain. sizes that the brain did not evolve as a totality. Rather
While I agree with Ansermet and Magistretti’s model than a unified, harmonious system, the brain is a series
of traces, I believe their argument misses the Lacanian of systems which evolved on top of each other and
distinction between the three registers. Each register whose functions can conflict. Ancient emotional
would have its own traces in neural structures. Ansertmet systems shared across mammals (Panksepp, 1998) sit
and Magistretti’s model does not discern the differences together in an uncomfortable “kludge” with evolutiona-
between traces at these registers (e.g. the difference rily-recent neocortical structures relatively unique to
between the traces of the image in the mirror and humans (Damasio, 2010). These structural failings open
those of the name given to that image). Moreover, a neurobiological basis for a brain divided by the
their reading of the unconscious as internal reality barred corporo-real – an original, antagonistic split.
aligns more with Lacan’s formations of the unconscious Johnston (2013a) argues that the real (drive iteration)
(through the symbolic) and fantasy, rather than the corresponds to non-representational emotional-motiva-
non-representational navel of the unconscious as the tional subcortical systems, whereas the symbolic and
real. imaginary (drive alteration) correspond to neocortical
representational systems. These registers intersect, for
“the cerebral cortex, via the thalamus, is the conduit for
The “rotten” brain
the phenomena and structures of Imaginary-Symbolic
In his discussion of the drive, Johnston (2013a) highlights reality to affect and mediate the bodily Real, embodied
two “axes”: alteration and iteration. Alteration refers to first and foremost in the brain stem” (Johnston, 2015,
the shifting aims and objects of the drive, which are p. 62).
not inherent. This involves the symbolic and imaginary From Johnston’s Lacanian neuropsychoanalysis, I draw
(dis)junctions with the real. Iteration refers to the upon his understanding of the brain as “rotten,” with an
source and pressure of the drive as a repeating non-rep- internal antagonism inherent to its “natural” structure. I
resentational demand upon the mind. also highlight his emphasis on the temporal split in the
Therefore, Johnston (2013a) describes drive itself as drive. Since the two axes of the drive involve participation
being split between alteration (symbolic-imaginary of all three registers, this temporal split also rifts the sym-
aims and objects) and iteration (barred coporo-real bolic-imaginary and the real. Furthermore, against Lacan’s
source and pressure). It is self-defeating, since non-rep- anti-evolutionary stance, Johnston (2012) calls for a phylo-
resentational iteration demands the eternal return of genetic account of the emergence of this neural disjunc-
the same, something impossible for the aim and ture which characterizes humans. One might place
object. In his words: “the very attempt at represen- Johnston’s call for a neuropsychoanalysis that reckons
tational repetition made by the axis of alteration at the with the temporal tension of the drive at both the onto-
behest of its corresponding axis of iteration itself gener- genetic and phylogenetic levels.
ates repetition-defying differences.” Thus, “the split The present Lacanian meta-neuropsychology maps
within the very structure of [drive] is temporal,” where Johnston’s localization of the three registers in greater
iteration and alteration are characterized by a temporal detail, particularly through dialog with Mark Solms’ Freu-
tension (p. 61). dian meta-neuropsychology (Kaplan-Solms & Solms,
In other words, there is a temporal disjunction 2002; Solms, 2013, 2017b). Furthermore, it introduces a
between the barred corporo-real and the symbolic- developmental perspective to dynamically and tem-
imgainary registers. The real is an a priori “rotten porally localize the disjuncture between the real and
nature.” Insofar as Lacan situates drive in the real, the symbolic-imaginary. Mapping at the level of neural
drive’s inherent structure is a failure (Johnston, 2012). It centers (as opposed to Ansermet and Magistretti’s
is a failure of total satisfaction, of filling in the lack – synaptic traces) allows a better localization of Lacan’s
because the real does not obey the logic of a lack registers for a more nuanced meta-neuropsychology of
which can be filled. It is “rotten” insofar as its nature is the subject.
28 J. DALL’AGLIO

Tying the brain in a Borromean knot beginning. Das Ding emerges simultaneously with
understanding yet is outside of it (Freud, 1895). Reason
As a prelude to this meta-neuropsychology, recall that
(or cognition, understood as a symbolic-imaginary func-
Freud (1923) posited two “surfaces” for the mental appar-
tion) cannot represent, and thereby cannot comprehend,
atus. On one hand, the ego is turned towards the exter-
the real. In this way, the limit of reason is within reason
nal world via the perceptual modalities. On the other, the
(Copjec, 2012; Laplanche, 2011).
id is turned towards the internal milieu and receives
Therefore, neural areas corresponding to the real
stimuli from the body (i.e. the drives). This division
should be constitutive of, but not identical with, cogni-
maps easily onto the brain. Perceptual cortical structures
tive functions. As non-representational, they should
receive external information via the sensory modalities
insist their presence through affect and the compulsive
whereas upper brainstem structures receive input from
repetition of the drive. At the core of the subject, the
the internal body (Solms, 2013).
real is also at the core of cognition, while simultaneously
A Lacanian reading of Freud’s division between ego
the limit of that cognition.
and id highlights the internal otherness of the subject,
The drive (iteration, source/pressure) refers to the real
the “s” of “subject” being a homophone with “Es,” the
(Johnston, 2013a). Freud (1915a) defined drive as:
German word for “it,” translated in the Standard Edition
as “id.” (Lacan, 1977). Building on Johnston (2013a), I a concept on the frontier between the mental and the
suggest that the upper brainstem representations of somatic, as the psychical representative of stimuli orig-
inating from within the organism and reaching the
the internal body refer to an “extimate,” internal other-
mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the
ness, the alien real (Lacan, 1997). These subcortical struc- mind for work in consequence of its connection with
tures are present from birth, whereas the more the body. (Freud, 1915a, pp. 121–122)
experience-dependent neocortex is developmentally
delayed (Solms & Turnbull, 2002). I believe this develop- Drive, thereby, refers to the demand upon the mind con-
mental time lag contributes to the temporal split and the cerning bodily needs. In the brain, the brainstem and
insistance of the real from infancy. Areas corresponding diencephalon contain “need-detectors.” Each has a
to the real (which, as will be discussed, are largely homeostatic set-point – for example, the ideal amount
affective and non-representational) lay down memories of salt to have in the blood. The hypothalamus and
prior to the subject’s capacity for (imaginary) episodic related systems closely monitor and modulate the
representations or its ability to speak. internal body (see, for example, Waterson & Horvath,
Therefore, I argue that the evidence suggests that the 2015; Williams, Harrold, & Cutler, 2000; Woods, Seeley,
division between the upper brainstem id (the real) and Porte, & Schwartz, 1998). These areas can be dynamically
the cortical ego (symbolic-imaginary) is multi-fold: phylo- localized as important points of proximity between the
genetically structural (evolutionarily ancient brainstem body and the mind, and the locus of the pressure of
versus recent neocortex), qualitative (non-represen- the drive (Solms, 2013).
tational, emotional dynamics versus imaginal, linguistic These diencephalic and upper brainstem systems are
representations), and ontogenetically temporal (innate fundamentally affective (Panksepp, 1998; Solms, 2013).
and active from infancy versus developmentally delayed). Deviations from set-points produce unpleasure,
In this meta-neuropsychology, one must keep in mind whereas moving towards the set-point generates plea-
the principle of dynamic localization. It is incorrect to say sure. One major structure is the periaqueductal gray
that any of Lacan’s registers are located in or equal to (PAG), which receives projections from these brainstem
brain structures. Psychic functions emerge between areas. Stimulation of the ventral columns of the PAG
neural structures. This is especially relevant for the corti- induces feelings of extreme pleasure, whereas stimu-
cal localizations of the symbolic and imaginary. Elements lation of the dorsal columns corresponds to feelings of
of all three registers will be found at every level of the excruciating pain. Here, one finds the pleasure principle
brain. However, this does not prevent a dynamic localiz- as a key dynamic in the process of maintaining homeo-
ation of which areas appear essential to the “typical” stasis (Solms & Turnbull, 2002).
functioning of each of these registers. It is to this Importantly, this affective system is fundamental to
dynamic localization that I turn now. consciousness, the feeling state of being. Disturbances
to upper areas of the brain disrupt cognitive and
emotional functions, but the subject retains affective
Affective consciousness and the real
being (Penfield & Jasper, 1954). For example, hydranen-
Recall the concept of the real as a negativity (non-rep- cephalic patients are born with little-to-no cortex but
resentational insistence) which is present from the intact subcortical affective circuits (Merker, 2007;
 NEUROPSYCHOANALYSIS 29

Shewmon, Holmes, & Byrne, 1999). These patients are circuits are more specialized. For example, RAGE charac-
still conscious in the affective sense and respond to the terizes the aggressive impulse to destroy that which frus-
environment through these circuits. Summarizing these trates the subject’s goals. PANIC activates in response to
various lines of evidence, Solms (2013) argues that con- separation from a loved object, connoting separation-
sciousness can exist without cortex. anxiety. Generally speaking, all seven systems generate
However, damage to these affective circuits signifi- a distinct response to an experience of the external
cantly impairs consciousness (along with cognition). In world.
fact, a lesion to the PAG completely wipes out conscious- Furthermore, these experiences also concern socio-
ness, extinguishing affective being. This supports the emotional needs, such as attachment needs in the
critical role of the upper brainstem in the generation of PANIC system (Solms, 2012b). These limbic circuits quali-
consciousness (Moruzzi & Magoun, 1949), which leads tatively elaborate upper brainstem affective conscious-
Solms (2013) to conclude that affective consciousness ness through distinct socio-emotional needs. These
is the bedrock of consciousness. Later cognitive func- affective instincts prepare the organism to interact with
tions of the cortex depend upon and are shaped by the the world and meet its needs, albeit in a rough-and-
affective circuits which function prior to them (Panksepp, ready way (Solms & Turnbull, 2002).
1998; Solms & Turnbull, 2002). Insofar as these affective instincts are prepared for
With its (extimate) relationship with the internal body certain types of experiences, I would suggest that they
via homeostasis and drives, the upper brainstem and are not the real proper and are better localized at the
associated structures correspond functionally to Freud’s intersection of the real and the imaginary. Nevertheless,
id. In contrast, the cortical focus on exteroception corre- they also have built in “holes” – the potential to acquire
sponds to Freud’s ego. Since the upper brainstem is new objects. For example, the FEAR system has certain
intrinsically conscious (i.e. its activity generates the built-in objects (such as a fear of falling). However, it
affective bedrock of consciousness) and the cortex is also has the potential to learn new objects, such as elec-
dependent on the brainstem for consciousness, Solms trical outlets. This potential is never exhausted, for these
(2013) argues that the id is fundamentally conscious. areas are subject to neuroplasticity (Ansermet & Magis-
Rather than the nucleus of the unconscious, the id is tretti, 2007; Solms & Turnbull, 2002). I suggest that
the font of consciousness. these seven affective instincts might be considered
More specifically, the id (upper brainstem and associ- “highways” from the real to the symbolic-imaginary.
ated structures) is affectively conscious. It generates being Similarly, Verhaeghe (2004) highlights Panksepp’s
as a feeling state without representation. Through a Laca- (1998) instincts as potential neurobiological underpin-
nian lens, this affective consciousness corresponds to the nings in the child’s turn to the Other (symbolic-imaginary
insistence of the real. It is non-representational, a primary registers) to answer the pressure of the drive (the real).
affect (Lacan, 1997). It is beyond (indeed, prior to) cogni- These instincts contrast with the upper brainstem
tion – constituting a limit, an impasse. Furthermore, as homeostatic drives. Each instinct represents a socio-
the bedrock of consciousness, it is constitutive of cogni- emotional need. In the perspective of drive as represen-
tion. This fits well within Lacan’s conception of the real tative of bodily need (i.e. located in brainstem and dien-
and the drive (Johnston, 2013a). cephalon “need-detectors”), there is not much flexibility
in terms of what objects might satisfy the drive. Only
water can satisfy the demand made upon the mind
Affective instincts
when dehydrated, for example. However, affective
Additionally, affective consciousness extends into the instincts are more flexible – emotional needs may find
limbic system. Panksepp (1998) identifies seven any number of objects.
affective systems: SEEKING, RAGE, PANIC, PLAY, CARE, Therefore, the flexibility attributed to the psychoana-
LUST, and FEAR.7 Across mammals, they exhibit the lytic drive (i.e. alteration, the aim and object) corresponds
same circuitry, neurotransmitters, and stereotyped with the plasticity and potentiality of these affective
motor functions (see Panksepp, 1998 for neuroanatomi- instincts. In contrast, the brainstem, corresponds to the
cal details). A combination of lesion, pharmacological, real of the drive (i.e. iteration, the source and pressure).
and deep brain stimulation studies supports the Indeed, drive itself is split – here, neuro-structurally and
dynamic localization of their functions. evolutionarily, for the affective instincts are more evolu-
SEEKING closely resembles the Freudian libidinal drive tionarily recent than the upper brainstem (Solms & Turn-
(Solms, 2012a). It is an objectless, volitional system that bull, 2002). For Lacan, the tension of the drive is never
carries its own subjective quality of excitatory pleasure eliminated. SEEKING corresponds best to this notion of
(as opposed to a reduction of tension). The rest of the excitatory pleasure in the drive, for it is innately objectless
30 J. DALL’AGLIO

(Solms, 2012a). However, this inexhaustibility may be automatized, non-representational infantile memories
attributed to all seven affective instincts. are foundational for (constitutive of) and inaccessible
to (the limit of) later cognition (Solms & Turnbull,
2002). As such, they belong to the real.
The temporal split
Such dynamics apply to all experiences coded in this
Furthermore, these affective instincts are active from non-representational manner, which can occur after
birth, before the capacity to lay down episodic memories infancy. In PTSD, for example, heightened cortisol
(declarative memories which the subject can recall, levels can shut down hippocampal function and
imagine, and verbalize). In addition, procedural enhance amygdala function – the latter involved in
memory systems, including the basal ganglia,8 mature FEAR and RAGE. Sole amygdala encoding of the event
very early in life (Richmond & Nelson, 2007), and there lays the memory down in a non-representational but
is evidence for procedural memory (e.g. simple con- still felt form (Ansermet & Magistretti, 2007; McGaugh,
ditioning) in newborn infants (DeCasper & Fifer, 1980). 2000). Research indicating the bodily (non-verbalized)
In contrast, the hippocampus, a limbic structure necess- encoding of the trauma (van der Kolk, 2014) supports
ary for episodic (representational) memories does not the real dimension of these traces and their connection
mature until around the age of three (Solms & Turnbull, to the body(-in-pieces). This corresponds with Lacan’s
2002). Because of this temporal difference between notion that the real is traumatic, without language
declarative memory (belated hippocampal and neocorti- (Lacan, 1978).
cal development) and non-declarative memory (affective Moreover, this neuropsychoanalytic model nuances
instincts and basal ganglia), memories during the first the affective angle of the real. Since each instinct runs
few years are laid down which can never be explicitly through the PAG, each has its own homeostatic system
remembered – they were not laid down as represen- of pleasure-unpleasure. Rather than a single pleasure-
tations (in declarative memory). There are no declarative unpleasure series, there are multiple circuits of pleasure
representations of these early infantile experiences. and unpleasure. What is pleasurable for one instinct
The capacity for learning in these procedural and can be unpleasurable for another, creating potential for
emotional systems suggests that these early infantile conflict (Solms & Turnbull, 2002). Furthermore, what
experiences are encoded in the brain and play a signifi- was once pleasurable may not have the same result in
cant role in subsequent development. Since a great the future (cf. the temporal split; see also Bazan &
deal of non-declarative learning occurs in infancy, auto- Detandt, 2013).
matization will cause such memories to persist through- Thus, I suggest a different relationship between the
out life (Solms, 2017a, 2017b). After the development of repetition compulsion and the pleasure principle. With
hippocampal memory systems, one may recall specific multiple instincts, there are multiple series of pleasure-
experiences (although, early childhood memories unpleasure. Because they are automatized in non-
would likely be murky). However, the prior, infantile declarative memory, each instinct functions under its
experiences – solely encoded in non-representational own compulsion to repeat, particularly with respect to
procedural and emotional memory – continue to exert early infantile memories. Although the environment
pressure and generate affect if needs are unmet may change, these automatized instinctual responses
(Solms, 2017a). may repeat, even if they cause unpleasure in the
Therefore, I suggest that the brainstem and subcorti- present (Solms, 2017b). When the compulsively repeated
cal affective circuits are necessary structures underpin- instinctual function was first encoded, it had initially
ning the Lacanian real. They are not sufficient, since served homeostasis.
other areas, such as the insula (Magistretti & Ansermet, Therefore, unpleasurable repetition is not “beyond”
2012), may also play critical roles. These systems refer the pleasure principle as a completely distinct system
to the unspeakable aspect of being. Experiences laid or drive. Rather, it is the repetition (insistence) of a
down in infancy cannot be remembered or represented prior function of the pleasure principle – a solution
to the subject, but they continue to be affectively felt. which was previously automatized (obeying the pleasure
Lacan (1993) highlights Freud’s emphasis that primary principle) but whose repetition in the present no longer
repression (the real) refers to the era of infantile relations brings pleasure (violating the pleasure principle).9
for which speech is impossible. This is the insistence of Homeostatic repetition of these circuits assists the survi-
the real which cannot be represented but is nevertheless val of the subject (thereby felt as pleasure). This might be
present as negativity. Furthermore, this insistence occurs considered “healthy” repression because the automa-
through compulsive repetition (automatization) of these tized emotional response meets the subject’s needs
systems. Like the upper brainstem drives, these (Solms, 2017b). Unpleasurable repetition may be
 NEUROPSYCHOANALYSIS 31

thought of as arising from an automatized response that (Guariglia, Palermo, Piccardi, Iaria, & Incoccia, 2013). Bilat-
was once in the service of homeostasis for the subject eral parietal damage may result in Bálint’s syndrome
but is now no longer adaptive. From a Lacanian stand- (Ptak & Fellrath, 2014). These patients are impaired in
point, Bazan and Detandt (2013, 2017) make a similar visually-guided reaching, have uncoordinated eye move-
argument for the SEEKING system, linking its automa- ments, and cannot attend to more than one object at a
tized repetitions to the drive as (potentially) maladaptive time. Altogether, these syndromes suggest deficits in
excess. The model proposed in this paper extends this the subject’s motor and perceptual relation to the exter-
logic to all procedural-emotional systems. nal world – a relationship which Lacan (1988) identifies
While the real can be dynamically localized from the with the imaginary register.
perspective of the brain (cf. dual-aspect monism), the Neuropsychoanalytic investigations (Feinberg, 2010;
mind can never localize (represent) its own affective con- Fotopoulou, 2015; Fotopoulou, Pernigo, Maeda, Rudd, &
sciousness. Indeed, neuroimaging would reveal nothing Kopelman, 2010; Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2002; Salas &
about the specific experience of these circuits and their Coetzer, 2015) have elaborated the subjective, emotional
memories. In the physical world, one may localize the features of right hemisphere (often in the perisylvian
real while maintaining that it is a non-place in the psychi- area) damage. Anosognosia for hemiplegia is the denial
cal sphere. of paralysis. When confronted with clear evidence of
In dialog with Lacan, affective consciousness, the core paralysis, patients might say that the arm is not theirs or
of consciousness, is simultaneously alien to conscious- that it belongs to the doctor. Variations include anosodia-
ness. It is an internal, “extimate” presence of affect at phoria, where patients do not deny the deficit but remain
the base of the mind’s relationship to the body, represen- (manifestly) emotionally indifferent, and misoplegia, an
tative of something foreign to the subject. Such an obsessional hatred of the paralyzed limb (Solms, 2015).
internal exteriority stands at a disjuncture with respect Reconciling these extreme emotional presentations
to the symbolic and imaginary structures of the cortex. (unawareness, indifference, and hatred) following
damage to similar areas of the cortex, Kaplan-Solms
and Solms (2002) suggest a regression to narcissistic
Cracking the cortical mirror
defenses and a breakdown of whole-object relations.
At several points, Lacan claims that the cerebral cortex The ambivalent nature of the subject’s relationship to
functions as an “intra-organic mirror” (Lacan, 1977; objects is unraveled, resulting in splitting11 into good
Lacan, 1988, p. 80). Certain parts of the cortex participate and bad part-objects along with drive defusion.
in this imaginary function. Recall that the imaginary con- This paradigm aligns the splitting of object relations
stitutes the basis of a cohesive self-representation (the with the breakdown of the perception of the external
ego) derived from perception of the external world. world. The parietal lobes integrate different sensory
This contains the partial drives, creating an illusory systems for a holistic representation of the external
cover over the gap of the real. Therefore, damage to world (Matheson & McMullen, 2010; Milner & Goodale,
areas which are fundamental to this function would 2008). As this processs breaks down, the ego is simul-
predict a fragmentation of the ego. Such damage taneously fragmented – parts of the body are treated
would unravel the partial drives and increase the intru- as other. As the internalized representations of the
sion of the real. whole-object world collapse following right hemisphere
Neuropsychological research suggests that the right damage, whole-object relations break down into part-
hemisphere is essential to ego-centric body constitution object relations, a splitting of the ego (Kaplan-Solms &
(Morin et al., 2003). Right hemisphere damage can lead Solms, 2002).
to symptoms breaking down the subject’s perceptual From a Lacanian lens, Morin (2018) comes to a similar
and motor relationship to the external world, as well as conclusion, where there is a breakdown in the relation-
fragmentations of the self (Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2002). ship between the objet and the ego. When asked to
Damage to the parietal lobes, predominantly in the draw self-portraits, right hemisphere patients depict a
left but also in the right,10 may cause apraxia, an impair- fragmented body-image that reflects subjective
ment in motor function and imitation without a primary changes in the relationship to the body. One patient
deficit in motor control (Goldenberg, 2009). Hemi- commented: “I have members, but I have no body
neglect is also associated with right parietal damage – which obeys me” (Morin et al., 2003, p. 26). Many of
patients systematically neglect the left side of space, these patients’ self-portraits did not accurately depict
without any primary deficit in perception. This neglect the state of the body and the subject’s life, signifying a
extends beyond concrete perception of the external breakdown in the ego where the foreigness of the
world to internal representations and mental images body emerges.
32 J. DALL’AGLIO

Whereas Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2002) use a Klei- Vanheule, 2015). Since Lacan extends the symbolic
nian reading of whole- and part-objects, Morin (2018) from language to law, these neural areas will also rep-
interprets bodily delusions as the intrusion of the Laca- resent and implement abstract social rules.
nian objet a. Rather than excessive secondary repression Neuropsychological and cognitive neuroscience
(Solms’ denial of paralysis), Morin interprets a lifting of research inscribes signifiers in a left hemisphere
primary repression of objet a. I will return to this differ- network, largely temporo-parietal (Binder & Desai,
ence between Morin and Solms towards the end of 2011; McGilchrist, 2009; Price, Moore, Humphreys, &
this paper. For now, recall that the imaginary typically Wise, 1997; Rapcsak et al., 2009). Left hemisphere
covers the real by obfuscating the fragmented partial damage often results in aphasias, disorders of language.
drives. It follows that impairments to the imaginary Damage to the left inferior frontal gyrus (Broca’s area)
involve the intrusion of the real. This does not prevent results in Broca’s aphasia. Broca’s aphasics cannot articu-
the neurological patient from utilizing remaining late words, and speech becomes non-fluent. However,
defenses, such as denial. psychoanalytic investigations suggest that the structural
Therefore, I suggest that damage to the right hemi- integrity of the psyche remains intact (Kaplan-Solms &
sphere12 “cracks” the cortical mirror. Its functions do Solms, 2002). There are no dramatic changes in person-
not disappear – there are still relations to the external ality or significant cognitive deficits, beyond errors in
world. The regression from whole- to part-object complex syntax comprehension. In other words, the
relations accords with Lacan’s hypothesis that the corti- motor output of language (the articulation of a certain
cal mirror binds partial drives (Vanheule, 2011). Also, signification) is damaged without impairment to internal
Kaplan-Solms’ and Solms’ (2002) focus on changes in symbolic organization. These patients can therefore
Kleinian object relations following right hemisphere understand spoken and written language (Kaplan-
damage supports Lacan’s (1988) argument that object Solms & Solms, 2002).
relations belong to the imaginary register. In contrast, damage to superior posterior temporal
Moreover, the symptoms of hemi-neglect and apraxia cortex results in Wernicke’s aphasia, an impaired com-
show how right hemisphere damage simultaneously prehension of language. Kaplan-Solms and Solms
impairs the subject’s representation of external reality (2002) argue that damage here impairs the association
(of space and of others). That distortions of both external between words and things. Hearing is intact, but
space and the ego coincide in right hemisphere damage meaning cannot be attached to words. Speech remains
supports Lacan’s (1988) connection between the imagin- fluid but lacks any coherent meaning.
ary internalization of the ego and the constitution of However, these patients also retain executive control
external perceptual reality. Importantly, primary percep- and remain more-or-less oriented to reality. Impaired
tual processes (i.e. vision, audition, somatosenation, audio-verbal reflexive consciousness (i.e. the rupture
olfaction, and gustation) are still intact following right between words and things) results in some lapses of per-
hemisphere damage – it is the the integration (whole- sonal continuity,13 but these do not dominate experi-
ness) of these senses which is impaired. ence.14 Therefore, the connection between signifiers
Therefore, right hemisphere damage distorts the tota- and semantics contributes to subjective structure, but
lizing function of the imaginary. Since imaginary func- it is not the essential organizing principle. Behavioral
tions remain (albeit in a distorted fashion), the right and executive control (ego functions) endure. These
hemisphere is thereby necessary but not sufficient for patients (and Broca’s aphasics) can undergo the normal
“typical” imaginary functions, particularly the gestalt process of mourning, reflecting intact psychic organiz-
ego. This supports the principle of dynamic localiation ation (Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2002).
against a bio-reduction of the imaginary to this This contrasts with more extensive left parietal
hemisphere. damage leading to transcortical aphasia, which signifi-
cantly impairs the patient’s ability to think. Kaplan-
Solms and Solms (2002) argue that the convergence of
Inscribing signifiers
sensory tracts in left parietal cortex is a re-representation
Recall Lacan’s emphasis on the symbolic (language) in of sensory data in an abstract, symbolic form. Associative
structuring the subject through enigmatic signifiers. links are formed between symbolic concepts in the left
This suggests a linguistic organization of signifiers in parietal lobe.
the brain independent from, but still connected to, In Lacanian terms, one might understand damage to
semantic meaning. Symbolic brain areas would thereby this area as a significant blow to the signifying (associat-
underlie meaning, structuring the subject’s external ive) chain. Damage to abstract levels of symbolic associ-
(imaginary) experience of reality (Ribolsi, Feyaerts, & ations impairs the constitution of meaning. Words with
 NEUROPSYCHOANALYSIS 33

rudimentary associative links (e.g. “trigonometry,” “geo- are mediated), the PFC exerts organizational control over
metry”) come to mind without being linked to the rest of the brain. For example, aging populations with
meaning (Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2002). Greater symbolic diminished prefrontal functions show more errors in
abstractions are destroyed. Without abstract associative remembering the order of items and make more mis-
links, subjective experience loses the structure given to takes when asked when and where something was
it by language – signifiers passively occur to the learned (Roediger & Geraci, 2007). Damage to PFC can
subject without any sense of meaning. This meets the produce similar effects, sometimes called frontal
prediction that damage to the signifying chain itself amnesia (Baddeley & Barbara, 1988; Schachter, 1987).
will undermine the sense of meaning. Frontal amnesia is not a deficit in memory contents per
In sum, evidence suggests that left hemisphere dis- se, but rather in the organization of memory. The PFC
ruptions of speech production (Broca’s aphasia) or com- also underlies the subject’s ability to mentalize action
prehension (Wernicke’s aphasia) do not undermine the and bring representations to (self-reflective) conscious-
structural integrity of the psyche, whereas damage to ness through working memory (Baddeley, 2003). In
the abstract links between symbolic concepts signifi- other words, prefrontal functions structure mental con-
cantly impairs thinking and meaning-making. This sup- tents and experience.
ports Lacan’s emphasis on the signifying chain for Thereby, the PFC fundamentally mediates symbolic
structuring the subject. I argue that the linguistic materi- executive organization. Through rule systems, the pre-
ality of the symbolic (the signifiers of language) is largely frontal lobes control behavior and speech. For instance,
inscribed in the left temporo-parietal cortex. However, executive control of phonological short-term memory
the symbolic is more than simply speaking and compre- supports sentence comprehension and structure (Willis
hending words, or even abstract concepts. Via the sym- & Gathercole, 2001). PFC receives and organizes input
bolic, the subject takes a position in language – that is, to serve the current social goal or rule (Baddeley, 2003;
a position with respect to the Other and with respect Badre et al., 2010). This introduces the social dimension
to negativity (Lacan, 2007; Verhaeghe, 2004; Zupančič, of the symbolic.
2017). In Lacanian neuropsychoanalytic terms, the sym- Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2002) argue that the ventro-
bolic entails social regulation among subjects and the medial PFC performs the ego’s function of binding
modulation of affective consciousness. cathectic energy, enabling Freudian secondary pro-
cesses. Damage here results in the emergence of time-
lessness, mutual contradiction, and an emphasis on
Rules and regulations: the cortical law
psychic reality. Such damage reveals the dominance of
Symbolic functioning effects a degree of organization, of unconscious functions (i.e. the system unconscious;
structure. Psychological research suggests that mind’s Freud, 1915c) in patients with ventromedial prefrontal
linguistic framework of sounds (phonetics) and mean- damage. They act impulsively, without regard for social
ings (semantics) has an associational structure (Collins convention (Solms & Turnbull, 2002). Kaplan-Solms and
& Loftus, 1988; Kahan, Sellinger, & Broman-Fulks, 2006). Solms (2002) describe this as an unraveling of the
When a word is activated (e.g. in speech), other words fabric of the ego (Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2002).
similar in sound and meaning are also activated. This Where they use the term “ego,” I believe Lacan would
can be seen in priming effects (i.e. rapid presentation use “subject,” since Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2002) are
of a stimulus – in this case, a word) which decrease not referring the concrete, ideal image of the self (the
response times for associatively related target words. ideal ego), but rather to the structure of the psyche
Bazan (2011) discusses the necessary inhibition of irrele- with respect to others and the unconscious. In Lacanian
vant associative links to make sense of speech. For terms, these patients reveal major deficits in the sym-
example, if one meaning of a word is disambiguated bolic, in relation to the common cultural Other (disregard
(e.g. “match” in the context of lighting fire), then compre- for social rules) and the real (dysregulation of drives). In
hension of the word with a different meaning is delayed support of this interpretation, ventromedial PFC receives
(e.g. “match” as in a game). The left prefrontal cortex input from limbic circuits (affective systems) and “binds”
(PFC) performs this inhibition in the service of articulat- this energy, organizing it based on the subject’s social
ing a particular meaning (McGilchrist, 2009). milieu and history (Solms & Turnbull, 2002). In infancy,
The PFC executes an internalized abstract rule system, parental figures organize and socialize the child’s experi-
selecting proper actions (and inhibiting undesired ones) ence. PFC internalizes actions and speech – especially of
based on the current social rules (Badre, Kayser, & the parents – in order to organize experience and control
D’Esposito, 2010). With input from association cortex behavior (Kaplan-Solms & Solms, 2002) This fits with
(such as parietal lobes where the imaginary and signifiers Lacan’s placing the parents in the position of the Other
34 J. DALL’AGLIO

who exerts symbolic law to regulate libidinal desires of registers as subcortical real, left hemisphere symbolic,
the subject (Verhaeghe, 2004). and right hemisphere imaginary. The neuropsychological
The ventromedial areas communicate socially evidence discussed above supports the argument that
modified affective information to the dorsolateral PFC, these areas are necessary but not sufficient for the
which determines the best course of action based on typical functioning of these registers.
the abstract (social) rule system in play. I suggest that, For example, Morin (2018) analyzes her right hemi-
given this correlation, it is reasonable to propose that sphere patients through the concept of the body
expressed desire (i.e. desire filtered through the Other, schema. This refers to the imaginary gestalt ego, its func-
internalized in PFC) involves a split between subcortical tion to cover the real, and its symbolic coordinates with
drive pressures and cortical, socio-linguistic rules and respect to the Other. She makes use of all three registers
words which originate in the Other. Self-conscious rep- in analyzing the right hemisphere (e.g. self-portraits,
resentational thinking (working memory), a feature of pronoun use, delusional intrusions of objet a). However,
the imaginary ego, depends on the prefrontal binding her conclusion of right hemisphere disorders as body
of subcortical drive pressures (Kaplan-Solms & Solms, schema disorders highlights the essential imaginary
2002). This follows Lacan’s (1993) assertion of the imagin- impairment. While the other registers are also affected,
ary’s dependence on the symbolic for structure. the critical blow is to the integrity of the body schema
Therefore, I propose that the PFC is a major locus of (i.e. the imaginary ego) as a unity. Subsequent effects,
the convergence of the signifying chain of language, such as the intrusion of objet a and altered speech,
affective needs, and the imaginary external world. reflect the dynamic localization of the system and
Social rules (symbolic) and self-reflection (imaginary) effects predictable following damage to circuits mediat-
regulate the pressure of the real. While underlying signifi- ing the imaginary.
cant symbolic structure, this region constitutes an inter- Furthermore, Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2002) demon-
section of all three registers. strate how psychoanalytic interpretations could tempor-
arily undo anosognosia due to right hemisphere
damage. In a Lacanian framework, these interventions
The Borromean brain
(via the signifier) may have reoriented the subject to its
To summarize, based on the very preliminary correlations reality via the intact signifying chain, despite “cracks” in
between brain function and Lacanian ideas laid out in the imaginary. That these patients regressed to their pre-
this paper, I believe that we can make a first pass at loca- vious state after some time suggests that the imaginary
lizing Lacan’s registers as follows. The real, correspond- is necessary to maintain this orientation. Additional
ing to the barred-corporeality of the subject, emerges research (Yeates, Henwood, Gracey, & Evans, 2006) has
first and foremost in the upper brainstem representatives shown that social and interpersonal relations affect the
of bodily needs. This non-representative pressure motiv- extent of disability awareness following brain damage,
ates subcortical limbic and basal ganglia systems at the pointing to the dynamically localized knotting of the
interface of the real with the symbolic-imaginary regis- registers.
ters. Prior to hippocampal (episodic, representational) In particular, the left and right cortical hemispheres
memory, these emotional memories are encoded in a seem to involve extensive dynamic inter-activity for the
real fashion, insofar as they insist a non-representable, symbolic and imaginary. McGilchrist (2009) argues that
affective pressure upon the subject. the left hemisphere mediates abstract, determinate
The right hemisphere appears to be a key locus of brain knowledge. It expresses a particular meaning. In contrast,
circuits underlying the constitution of the ego as a gestalt, the right hemisphere underlies non-articulate knowl-
thereby serving as the foundation for the imaginary regis- edge that extends beyond what is certain. Hence, the
ter. Partial drives are (not fully) unified through the right capacity for ambiguity and metaphor are considered pri-
hemisphere to enable whole-object relationships. In the marily right hemisphere functions (Ribolsi et al., 2015).
left temporo-parietal cortices, the abstract signifying Therefore, the ambiguity of the signifier, with infinite
chain is constituted, providing structure for the subject. potential meanings, seems to be a right hemisphere
The PFC extends the symbolic through the internalized function. Similarly, the sonorous, phonetic aspect of the
Other (parents) which sets rules which organize speech signifier, as opposed to semantic meaning (to use the
and actions. Imaginary experience of motor mastery and Lacanian term, lalangue; Cottes, 2003; Johnston,
active representational memory (i.e. working memory) 2013b), corresponds to the rhythm of language, a right
are also supported by the PFC. hemisphere function. Indeed, non-meaningful words
However, in keeping with the principle of dynamic are prior to meaningful speech, just as the right hemi-
localization, there is no clean division between the sphere develops earlier than the left (McGilchrist, 2009).
 NEUROPSYCHOANALYSIS 35

On the other hand, a particular meaning (at the intersec- syndromes. As we expand our neuropsychoanalytic cor-
tion of the symbolic and imaginary) seems to be a left relations, these kinds of debates can be clarified, and
hemisphere function. Thus, neither register can be concepts enriched. Viewing the brain through different
cleanly reduced to one hemisphere. Rather, there is a psychoanalytic lenses can thus open new avenues for
dynamic localization (between hemispheres) of these dialog.
functions. A Lacanian neuropsychoanalysis emphasizes the dis-
In a similar vein, Panksepp’s (1998) affective instincts juncture between the symbolic-imaginary cortices and
differ structurally in humans compared to lower the subcortical real. Pre-hippocampal, infantile dynamics
mammals (e.g. rats) (Johnston, 2018). For example, the heavily influenced by drive pressures contrast with struc-
human SEEKING system projects up the limbic system tured, neocortical processing, which originates from the
through PFC and further into other neocortical struc- Other. This is a failed relation. Johnston (2013a) para-
tures. Higher cognitive functions inter-weave with the phrases Lacan: “there is no intracerebral relationship,” a
SEEKING system in a more complex (and, perhaps, play on Lacan’s “there is no sexual relationship” (p. 59,
kludgey) fashion compared to lower mammals. Thus, translated by author). Something emerges as loss (objet
the pressure of the drive as non-representational a) in neocortical representation and interaction with
primary affect (at least prior to hippocampal develop- the subcortical drive pressures.
ment) is not reducible to subcortical areas. The This Lacanian emphasis on the extimate real compli-
SEEKING system cuts across evolutionarily ancient and cates affective consciousness. Affect is foreign and may
recent layers of the brain, which might be further evi- thereby be subject to misrecognition or “misfeeling”
dence for the drive itself as being split (Johnston, 2013a). (Johnston, 2013b) by self-reflecting consciousness (Pank-
Moreover, the cortical (cognitive) and subcortical sepp & Solms, 2012). A Lacanian neuropsychoanalysis
(affective) dichotomy is a false oversimplification. emphasizes that affective consciousness is not self-
Rather, subcortical structures are necessary but not evident, even to the feeling subject. Such an intracereb-
sufficient for human affective functions. The neuropsy- ral impasse may be a productive way to understand
chological evidence demonstrates that damage to Lacanian anxiety as the (negative) presence of objet a.
these areas significantly impairs affective processes On the other hand, the neuropsychoanalysis of
(Solms, 2013), but not that human affect is reducible to affective instincts allows some mapping of the real
them. Likewise, the real depends on these subcortical with precision impossible from the subjective viewpoint
processes, but still exists (or, insists) in symbolic-imagin- of psychoanalysis. Neuropsychoanalysis is indeed a bi-
ary cortical structures which affect the nature of emotion directional dialog (Solms, 2015).
(Panksepp & Solms, 2012). Similarly, in his later teachings, This preliminary meta-neuropsychology is sketched in
Lacan (2000) focuses not on the split between the broad brushstrokes. Lacanian studies of neurological
signifier and affect, which would be akin to the division patients (e.g. Morin, 2018) can enrich this model. As
between cognition and affect. Rather, he emphasizes always, this integration with neuroscientific research
the split within the signifier (Zupančič, 2017), akin to should be tested against clinical practice. Clinical conse-
the extimacy of the real within the symbolic and the quences of this model, such as the potential for “misfeel-
insistence of affective consciousness within self-reflec- ing” and the foreign nature of affective consciousness,
tive cognition. can nuance (neuro)psychoanalytic practice. The analyst’s
I hope that these preliminary formulations of a Laca- counter-transference may not accurately reflect the
nian meta-neuropsychology demonstrate the possibili- patient’s affect if affect is alien (Laurent, 2014).
ties for a neural convergence (but not necessarily an Furthermore, this Lacanian meta-neuropsychology
agreement) of different psychoanalytic schools. This carries massive implications for neuroscience. The
follows Solms and Turnbull’s (2002) call for the brain to emphasis on the real and affective consciousness –
function as a “useful set of anchor points from which echoing Solms (2013) – places affect at both the core
to reevaluate psychoanalytic concepts” (p. 42–43). As and the limit of cognition. Conceiving how affective con-
other psychoanalytic models are mapped, the brain sciousness stands at a disjuncture with the neocortex
can provide a common ground to debate different theor- (the impasse of non-representational infantile history,
etical constructs. For example, in contrast to Kaplan- the body-in-pieces) is a challenge for neuroscience.
Solms’ and Solms’ (2002) conclusion that anosognosia Indeed, this structural negativity (impossibility) is
is due to excessive (secondary) defenses, Morin (2018) central to the human being. As Johnston (2013a)
argues that anosognosia is an undoing of primary repres- suggests, the neural non-relation – “there is no intracer-
sion (hence the intrusion of objet a). No doubt similar ebral relationship” – may constitute the precisely human
debates can emerge across other neurological nature of our subjectivity and brain function.
36 J. DALL’AGLIO

Notes 13. This supports dynamic localization, where imaginary

components (self-reflective consciousness) are distorted
1. For more comprehensive discussions of Lacanian con- alongside symbolic disturbances.
cepts, see Fink (1999) and Verhaeghe (2004). 14. As Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2002) point out, this sup-
2. “Other” refers to the symbolic Other. It is the dimension ports Freud’s argument that consciousness is not essen-
of language (difference) and the pool of signifiers where tial to the ego’s function. Likewise, Lacan emphasizes the
meaning is articulated. The Other extends to social insti- structuring role of the symbolic for the subject, rather
tutions and the law. In contrast, “other” refers to the ima- than the conscious dimension of the imaginary ego.
ginary dimension of reflexivity and sameness. This is
because the ego forms by identifications with others.
Otherness proper, for Lacan, is accessible through Acknowledgements
language (the Other). It is important to note that the
ego is distinct from the subject; see below (Johnston, An earlier version of this paper was written for a seminar taught
2013b; Verhaeghe, 2004). by Joan Copjec. I would like to thank Joan Copjec and Brian
3. This is not to equate the unconscious with the real. Hayden for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
Rather, the real is the nucleus of the unconscious paper. I would also like to thank the reviewers for their com-
proper (without representation). Formations of the ments, which significantly improved this paper. Geolocation
unconscious (e.g., dreams, parapraxes) involve partici- Information This paper was written while in New York City,
pation of the other registers (Johnston, 2013b). This New York and Providence, Rhode Island in the United States.
does not contradict Lacan’s statement that the uncon-
scious is structured like a language, for the real is internal
to language itself, an internal otherness (Lacan, 2007; Disclosure statement
Laurent, 2014).
4. Admittedly, this characterization of the real leaves out the No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
essential dimension of sexuality and jouissance. These
topics are beyond the scope of this paper and will be
addressed in subsequent work. For work on the neuro- ORCID
physiology of jouissance, see Bazan and Detandt (2013). John Dall’Aglio http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4620-743X
5. In the sense of the auto-erotic drive discussed in the pre-
vious block quotation.
6. For an excellent discussion of primary processes and
References
binding in relation to the brain, see Carhart-Harris and
Friston (2010). Ansermet, F., & Magistretti, P. (2007). Biology of freedom: Neural
7. The use of capital letters follows Jaak Panksepp’s usage plasticity, experience, and the unconscious. (S. Fairfield, Trans.).
in distinguishing the circuits from the words while also New York: Other Press.
qualifying their functions. Baddeley, A. (2003). Working memory: Looking back and
8. Solms (2017a) localizes the unconscious (as without rep- looking forward. Nature, 4, 829–883.
resentation) to the automatized action plans and mem- Baddeley, A., & Barbara, W. (1988). Frontal amnesia and the dys-
ories of the basal ganglia. The present paper nuances executive syndrome. Brain and Cognition, 7(2), 212–230.
this argument by extending the unconscious (through Badre, D., Kayser, A., & D’Esposito, M. (2010). Frontal cortex and
the Lacanian real) to the insistence of the real at the the discovery of abstract action rules. Neuron, 66(2), 315–326.
level of affective instincts. Affective instincts, in their Bazan, A. (2011). Phantoms in the voice: A neuropsychoanalytic
activity prior to hippocampal development, also function hypothesis on the structure of the unconscious.
without representation. In this way, the unconscious is Neuropsychoanalysis, 13(2), 161–176.
felt emotionally (is affectively conscious) without being Bazan, A., & Detandt, S. (2013). On the physiology of jouissance:
cognitively (representationally, declaratively) conscious. Interpreting the mesolimbic dopaminergic reward functions
This reflects Solms’ (2013) argument that the id is con- from a psychoanalytic perspective. Frontiers in Human
scious, in the sense that it is felt. Neuroscience, 7, Article 709. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00709
9. Indeed, for Lacan, the death drive is the foundation of Bazan, A., & Detandt, S. (2017). The grand challenge for psycho-
the pleasure principle – a negative foundation (Zupančič, analysis and neuropsychoanalysis: A science of the subject.
2017). Frontiers in Psychology, 8, Article 1259. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.
10. This points to the distributed, dynamic localization of the 2017.01259
imaginary, which is not wholly lateralized to the right Binder, J., & Desai, R. (2011). The neurobiology of semantic
hemisphere. Apraxia impairs symbolic action, thus memory. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(11), 527–536.
reflecting the intersection of these registers. The same Caramazza, A., & Coltheart, M. (2006). Cognitive neuropsychol-
applies for Bálint’s syndrome. ogy twenty years on. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 23(1), 3–12.
11. In the Kleinian sense (Klein, 1946), not the Lacanian sense Carhart-Harris, R., & Friston, K. (2010). The default-mode, ego-
of the split-subject. functions and free-energy: A neurobiological account of
12. Not all cases of right hemisphere damage result in these Freudian ideas. Brain, 133(4), 1265–1283.
psychological effects (Morin, 2018). This reflects both the Collins, A., & Loftus, E. (1988). A spreading-activation theory of
dynamic localization of the system as well as the broad semantic processing. In A. Collins, & E. Smith (Eds.),
localization made in the present model. Readings in cognitive science: A perspective from psychology
 NEUROPSYCHOANALYSIS 37

and artificial intelligence (pp. 126–136). San Mateo, CA: Johnston, A. (2015). Confession of a weak reductionist:
Morgan Kaufmann. Responses to some recent criticisms of my materialism. In
Copjec, J. (2012). The sexual compact. Angelaki, 17(2), 31–48. J. De Vos, & E. Pluth (Eds.), Neuroscience and critique:
Cottes, J.-F. (2003). Psychosis and the child in the teachings of Exploring the limits of the neurological turn (pp. 141–170).
Jacques Lacan: Consequences for an institution. Courtil Papers. New York: Routledge.
Damasio, A. (2005). Decartes’ error: Emotion, reason, and the Johnston, A. (2018). The late innate: Jean Laplanche, Jaak
human brain. New York: Penguin Books. Panksepp, and the distinction between sexual drives and
Damasio, A. (2010). Self comes to mind: Constructing the con- instincts. In J. Goldbach & J. Godley (Eds.), Inheritance in psy-
scious brain. New York: Pantheon. choanalysis (pp. 57–84). Albany: State University of New York
DeCasper, A., & Fifer, W. (1980). Of human bonding: Newbrons Press.
prefer their mothers’ voices. Science, 208, 1174–1176. Johnston, A. (2019). Fear of science: Transcendental materialism
Feinberg, T. (2010). Neuropathologies of the self: A general and its discontents. In R. Sbriglia, & S. Žižek (Eds.), Subject les-
theory. Neuropsychoanalysis, 12(2), 133–158. sions: Hegel, Lacan, and the future of materialism (p.
Fink, B. (1999). A clinical introduction to Lacanian psychoanalysis: Forthcoming). New York: Columbia University Press.
Theory and technique. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Kahan, T., Sellinger, J., & Broman-Fulks, J. (2006). Associative and
Fotopoulou, A. (2015). The virtual bodily self: Mentalisation of phonological priming effects after letter search on the prime.
the body as revealed in anosognosia for hemiplegia. The American Journal of Psychology, 119(2), 239–254.
Consciousness and Cognition, 33, 500–510. Kaplan-Solms, K., & Solms, M. (2002). Clinical studies in neuro-
Fotopoulou, A., Pernigo, S., Maeda, R., Rudd, A., & Kopelman, M. psychoanalysis: Introduction to a depth neuropsychology
(2010). Implicit awareness in anosognosia for hemiplegia: (2nd ed.). London: Karnac Books.
Unconscious interference without conscious re-represen- Klein, M. (1946). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. The
tation. Brain, 133, 3564–3577. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 27, 99–110.
Freud, S. (1895). Project for a scientific psychology. In The stan- Lacan, J. (1953). Some reflections on the ego. International
dard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 34(1), 11–17.
Freud (J. Strachey, Trans., Vol. I, pp. 281–391). Lacan, J. (1975–1976). The seminar of Jacques Lacan XXIII: Le
Freud, S. (1900). The interpretation of dreams (J. Strachey, Ed., & sinthome. (J.-A. Miller, Ed., & L. Thurston, Trans.) Ornicar?
J. Strachey, Trans.) New York: Basic Books. Lacan, J. (1977). Écrits: A selection. (A. Sheridan, Trans). New York:
Freud, S. (1905). Three essays on the theory of sexuality. In The W.W. Norton & Company.
standard edition of the complete psychological works of Lacan, J. (1978). The seminar of Jacques Lacan: The four funda-
Sigmund Freud (J. Strachey, Trans., Vol. VII, pp. 123–246). mental concepts of psychoanalysis. (J.-A. Miller, Ed., & A.
London: Hogarth Press. Sheridan, Trans.) New York: Norton.
Freud, S. (1915a). Instincts and their vicissitudes. In The standard Lacan, J. (1988). The seminar of Jacques Lacan: Freud’s papers on
edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud technique. (J.-A. Miller, Ed., & J. Forrester, Trans.). New York:
(J. Strachey, Trans., Vol. XIV, pp. 109–140). London: Hogarth Norton.
Press. Lacan, J. (1993). The seminar of Jacques Lacan: The psychoses. (J.-
Freud, S. (1915b). Repression. In The standard edition of the com- A. Miller, Ed., & R. Grigg, Trans.). New York: Norton.
plete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (J. Strachey, Lacan, J. (1997). The seminar of Jacques Lacan: The ethics of psy-
Trans., Vol. XIV, pp. 141–158). London: Hogarth Press. choanalysis. (J.-A. Miller, Ed., & D. Porter, Trans.) New York:
Freud, S. (1915c). The unconscious. In The standard edition of the Norton.
complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (J. Strachey, Lacan, J. (2000). The seminar of Jacques Lacan: On feminine sexu-
Trans., Vol. XIV, pp. 159–215). London: Hogarth Press. ality, the limits of love and knowledge. (J.-A. Miller, Ed., & B.
Freud, S. (1923). The ego and the id. In The standard edition of Fink, Trans.) New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (J. Lacan, J. (2007). The seminar of Jacques Lacan: The other side of
Strachey, Trans., Vol. XIX, pp. 1–66). London: Hogarth Press. psychoanalysis. (J.-A. Miller, Ed., & R. Grigg, Trans.) New York:
Goldenberg, G. (2009). Apraxia and the parietal lobes. W. W. Norton & Company.
Neuropsychologia, 47, 1449–1459. Laplanche, J. (2011). Freud and the sexual (1st ed.). The
Guariglia, C., Palermo, L., Piccardi, L., Iaria, G., & Incoccia, C. Unconscious in Translation.
(2013). Neglecting the left side of a city square but not the Laurent, E. (2014). Lost in cognition: Psychoanalysis and the cog-
left side of its clock: Prevalence and characteristics of rep- nitive sciences. (A. Price, Trans.). London: Karnac Books.
resentational neglect. PLoS ONE, 8(7), e67390. LeDoux, J. (2002). Synaptic self: How our brains become who we
Hebb, D. (1949). The organization of behavior. New York: Wiley & are. New York: Penguin Books.
Sons. Linden, D. (2008). The accidental mind: How brain evolution has
Johnston, A. (2012). Reflections of a rotten nature: Hegel, Lacan, given us love, memory, dreams, and God. Cambridge: Harvard
and material negativity. Filozofski Vestnik, XXXIII(2), 23–52. University Press.
Johnston, A. (2013a). Drive between brain and subject: An imma- Magistretti, P., & Ansermet, F. (2012). The island of the drive.
nent critique of Lacanian neuropsychoanalysis. The Southern Swiss Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, 163(8), 281–285.
Journal of Philosophy, 51(Spindel Supplement), 48–84. Matheson, H., & McMullen, P. (2010). Neuropsychological dis-
Johnston, A. (2013b). Misfelt feelings: Unconscious affect sociations between motion and form perception suggest
between psychoanalysis, neuroscience, and philosophy. In functional organization in extrastriate cortical regions in
A. Johnston, & C. Malabou (Eds.), Self and emotional life: the human brain. Brain and Cognition, 74, 160–168.
Philosophy, psychoanalysis, and neuroscience (pp. 73–210). McGaugh, J. (2000). Memory: A century of consolidation.
New York: Columbia University Press. Science, 287(5451), 248–251.
38 J. DALL’AGLIO

McGilchrist, I. (2009). The master and his emissary: The divided and mourning difficulties after traumatic brain injury?
brain and the making of the Western world. New Haven: Neuropsychoanalysis, 17(1), 3–18.
Yale University Press. Schachter, D. (1987). Memory, amnesia, and frontal lobe dys-
Merker, B. (2007). Consciousness without a cerebral cortex: A function. Psychobiology, 15(1), 21–36.
challenge for neuroscience and medicine. Behavioral and Shewmon, D., Holmes, G., & Byrne, P. (1999). Consciousness in
Brain Sciences, 30(1), 63–81. congenitally decorticate children: Developmental vegetative
Miller, J.-A., & Roberts, M. D. (1996). The monologue of l’appar- state as self-fulfilling prophecy. Developmental Medicine &
ole. Qui Parle, 9(2), 160–182. Child Neurology, 41, 364–374.
Milner, A., & Goodale, M. (2008). Two visual systems re-viewed. Solms, M. (2012a). Are Freud’s “erogenous zones” sources or
Neuropsychologia, 46, 774–785. objects of libidinal drive? Neuropsychoanalysis, 14, 53–56.
Milner, B., Squire, L., & Kandel, E. (1998). Cognitive neuroscience Solms, M. (2012b). Depression: A neuropsychoanalytic perspec-
and the study of memory. Neuron, 20, 445–468. tive. International Forum of Pscyhoanalysis, 21, 207–213.
Morin, C. (2018). Stroke, body image, and self-representation: Solms, M. (2013). The conscious id. Neuropsychoanalysis, 15(1),
Psychoanalytic and neurological perspectives. (K. 5–19.
Valendinova & C. Morin, Trans.). New York: Routledge. Solms, M. (2015). The feeling brain: Selected papers on neuropsy-
Morin, C., Pradat-Diehl, P., Robain, G., Bensalah, Y., & Perrigot, M. choanalysis. London: Karnac Books.
(2003). Stroke hemiplegia and specular image: Lessons from Solms, M. (2017a). “The unconscious” in psychoanalysis and
self-portraits. The International Journal of Aging and Human neuroscience: An integrated approach to the cognitive
Development, 56(1), 1–41. unconscious. In M. Leuzinger-Bohleber, S. Arnold, & M.
Moruzzi, G., & Magoun, H. (1949). Brain stem reticular formation Solms (Eds.), The unconscious: A bridge between psychoanalysis
and activation of the EEG. Electrocephalography and Clinical and cognitive neuroscience (pp. 16–35). London: Routledge.
Neurophysiology, 1, 455–473. Solms, M. (2017b). What is “the unconscious,” and where is
Muller, J. (1985). Lacan’s mirror stage. Psychoanalytic Inquiry, 5 it located in the brain? A neuropsychoanalytic perspec-
(2), 233–252. tive. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1406
Panksepp, J. (1998). Affective neuroscience: The foundations of (1), 90–97.
human and animal emotions. New York: Oxford University Solms, M., & Turnbull, O. (2002). The brain and the inner world:
Press. An introduction to the neuroscience of subjective experience.
Panksepp, J., & Solms, M. (2012). What is neuropsychoanalysis? New York: Other Press.
Clinically relevant studies of the minded brain. Trends in Thibierge, S., & Morin, C. (2010). The self and the subject: A psy-
Cognitive Sciences, 16(1), 6–8. choanalytic Lacanian perspective. Neuropsychoanalysis, 12
Penfield, W., & Jasper, H. (1954). Epilepsy and the functional (2), 171–184.
anatomy of the human brain. Oxford: Little & Brown. van der Kolk, B. (2014). The body keeps the score: Brain, mind, and
Price, C., Moore, C., Humphreys, G., & Wise, R. (1997). body in the healing of trauma. New York: Penguin Books.
Segregating semantic from phonological processes during Vanheule, S. (2011). Lacan’s construction and deconstruction of
reading. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 9(6), 727–733. the double-mirror device. Frontiers in Psychology, 2, Article
Ptak, R., & Fellrath, J. (2014). Exploring the world with bálint syn- 209. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00209.
drome: Biased bottom-up guidance of gaze by local saliency Verhaeghe, P. (2004). On being normal and other disorders: A
differences. Experimental Brain Research, 232(4), 1233–1240. manual for clinical psychodiagnostics. (S. Jottkandt, Trans.).
Rapcsak, S., Beeson, P., Henry, M., Leyden, A., Kim, E., Rising, K., New York: Other Press.
… Cho, H. (2009). Phonological dyslexia and dysgraphia: Waterson, M., & Horvath, T. (2015). Neuronal regulation of
Cognitive mechanisms and neural substractes. Cortex, 45 energy homeostasis: Beyond the hypothalamus and
(5), 575–591. feeding. Cell Metabolism, 22, 962–970.
Redmond, J. (2015). Debating the subject: Is there a Lacanian Williams, G., Harrold, J., & Cutler, D. (2000). The hypothalamus
neuropsychoanalysis? Psychoanalysis Lacan, 1. Retrieved and the regulation of energy homeostasis: Lifting the lid
from http://psychoanalysislacan.com/issue-1/ on a black box. Proceedings of the Nutrition Society, 59,
Ribolsi, M., Feyaerts, J., & Vanheule, S. (2015). Metaphor in psy- 385–396.
chosis: On the possible convergence of Lacanian theory and Willis, C., & Gathercole, S. (2001). Phonological short-term
neuro-scientific research. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, Article memory contributions to sentence processing in young chil-
664. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00664 dren. Memory, 9, 349–363.
Richmond, J., & Nelson, C. (2007). Accounting for change in Woods, S., Seeley, R., Porte, D., & Schwartz, M. (1998). Signals
declarative memory: A cognitive neuroscience perspective. that regulate food intake and energy homeostasis. Science,
Developmental Review, 27(3), 349–373. 280(5368), 1378–1383.
Roediger, H., & Geraci, L. (2007). Aging and the misinformation Yeates, G., Henwood, K., Gracey, F., & Evans, J. (2006). Awareness
effect: A neuropsychological analysis. Journal of Experimental of disability after acquired brain injury: Subjectivity
Psychology, 33(2), 321–334. within the psychosocial context. Neuro-Psychoanalysis, 8(2),
Salas, C., & Coetzer, R. (2015). Is concreteness the invisible link 175–189.
between altered emotional processing, impaired awareness Zupančič, A. (2017). What IS sex? Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.