Texas Constitutional Challenges

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO
STATE STATUTES AND RULES
©MARY A. KEENEY
SUSAN G. CONWAY
401 Congress Avenue, Suite 2200
(512) 480-5682 Telephone
(512) 480-5882 Facsimile
State Bar of Texas

TH
17 ANNUAL ADVANCED ADMINISTRATIVE LAW COURSE
September 22-23, 2005
Austin
CHAPTER 16
MARY A. KEENEY
Graves, Dougherty, Hearon & Moody, P.C.
A Professional Corporation
401 Congress Ave., Suite 2200
Austin, TX 78701
phone: (512) 480-5682

[email protected]
Mary Keeney is a shareholder in the Austin law firm of Graves, Dougherty, Hearon & Moody. Her law practice focuses
on appellate law, administrative litigation, and general litigation involving a wide range of substantive law areas, including
state electric and telecommunications utility regulation, state lands, insurance, and products liability. After spending 10
years in the Attorney General’s office defending state agencies, she has spent the last 5 and a half years both suing and
representing them in a variety of matters. She is Board Certified in Civil Appellate Law.
Education
Vanderbilt University (B.A., magna cum laude, 1975)

University of Texas (J.D., with honors, 1977)
Experience
Briefing Attorney to Chief Justice Joe R. Greenhill, Supreme Court of Texas, 1978-1979
Daugherty, Kuperman, Golden & Morehead, P.C., 1979-1987
Johnson & Gibbs, P.C., 1987-1989
Assistant Attorney General in Tax, Energy, and Natural Resources Divisions, 1990-2000
Graves, Dougherty, Hearon & Moody, February 2000 to present
SUSAN G. CONWAY
Graves, Dougherty, Hearon & Moody, P.C.
A Professional Corporation
515 Congress Ave., Suite 2300
Austin, TX 78701
phone: (512) 480-5768

[email protected]
Susan Conway is a shareholder in the Austin law firm of Graves, Dougherty, Hearon & Moody. Her law practice
focuses on state regulation of insurance, health care, managed care, marketing and advertising practices, and various
other government-regulated professional and business activities. Susan has handled regulatory investigations, enforcement
actions, contested administrative cases; professional licensing and standards matters, open records disputes, ratemaking
proceedings, and rulemaking proceedings involving numerous governmental agencies and officials, including the Texas
Department of Insurance, Attorney General of Texas, Texas Health and Human Services Commission, Texas
Department of Licensing and Regulation, and State Board of Pharmacy.
Education
Rice University (B.A. 1971)

The University of Texas at Austin (M.A. 1979)
The University of Texas School of Law (J.D. with honors 1982)
Experience
Graves, Dougherty, Hearon & Moody - Since April 2004

Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P. - 1982 - 2004
Chambers USA: America's Leading Business Lawyers 2003-2004, 2004, in insurance law
President, Board of Directors, Lady Bird Johnson Wildflower Center
Constitutional Challenges to State Statutes and Rules Chapter 16
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. Threshold Issues: Standing, Justiciability, Ripeness and Joinder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
III. Nuts and Bolts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

A. Procedural Vehicles to Challenge the Constitutionality of a Texas Statute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
B. Procedural Vehicles to Challenge the Constitutionality of an Agency Rule. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
C. Recovering the costs of litigating: availability of attorneys’ fees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
IV. "Facial" versus "As Applied" Constitutional Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
V. Challenges Based on the Texas Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

A. Prohibition Against Retroactive Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
B. Right to Trial by Jury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
C. Violation of the Open Courts Provision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
D. Unconstitutional Takings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
E. Restrictions on Abortions and the Texas Constitution’s Equal Rights
Amendment, Equal Protection Clause and Right to Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
F. Unlawful Delegation of Legislative Authority to State Agencies and Private Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Unlawful delegation to other governmental entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2. Unlawful delegation to private entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
G. Unlawful Delegation of Powers Vested in the Judicial Branch to State Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
H. Constitutional Prohibition Against Gratuitous Payment of
Public Money to Individuals, Associations or Corporations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
I. Constitutional Prohibition Against “Local” or “Special” Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
VI. Challenges Based on the U.S. Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

A. Challenges Under the Dormant Commerce Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B. Preemption When a State Agency Misapplies the Federal Law It Implements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. The federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2. The federal Medicaid laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3. Restrictions on Abortion Funding and Clinics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
C. Comprehensive and Express Preemption (or Not) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1. The Broadest Preemption There Is– ERISA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2. Importance of the Scope of the Federal Regulation – a FIFRA case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3. A Narrow Construction of Scope and Plain Language – a CERCLA Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
i
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES County Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925

S.W.2d 618, 626-27 (Tex. 1996).
TO STATE STATUTES AND RULES
A person to whom a statute may constitutionally be
I. Introduction1 applied may not challenge the statute on grounds that it
could be applied unconstitutionally to others. Garcia, 893
"The right to judicial review of acts of legislative and
S.W.2d at 518. However, an association may sue on
administrative bodies affecting constitutional or property
behalf of its members if the members would have
rights is axiomatic." City of Houston v. Blackbird, 394
standing to sue in their own right, and protection of the
S.W.2d 159, 162 (Tex. 1965). Although curbed by many
member interests at issue is germane to the organization's
qualifications and circumscribed by many conditions, the
purpose. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 518 (association has
right of a person whose constitutionally protected rights
standing to challenge Workers Compensation Act on
are affected by a state statute or an agency rule to
behalf of members "a large majority of" which are
judicially challenge that statute or rule is firmly
covered under the workers' compensation system and
established and is an important fundamental check on
may be assumed to have suffered a compensable injury
governmental power.
under the Act); Tex. Ass'n of Business, 852 S.W.2d at
447 (business association alleging some of its members
II. Threshold Issues: Standing, Justiciability, subjected to administrative penalties assessed under
Ripeness and Joinder challenged statute and others at substantial risk of penalty
held to have standing).
To challenge the constitutionality of a statute, a plaintiff
must have standing, a necessary component of the A statute may be challenged even though a state
court's subject matter jurisdiction. Standing requires a
agency has not yet imposed a penalty or sanction under
real controversy between the parties that will be actually
the statute. A plaintiff may present justiciable
determined by the judicial declaration sought. Texas
controversies addressable by the courts upon a showing
Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d
that an injury “is likely to occur.” Texas Dep’t of
440, 446 (Tex. 1993) (quoting Board of Water Engrs v.
Banking v. Mount Olivet Cemetery Ass’n, 27 S.W.3d
City of San Antonio, 155 Tex. 111, 114, 283 S.W.2d
276, 282 (Tex. App.–Austin 2000, pet denied).
722, 724 (1955).
(Emphasis added.) If action has previously been taken
or threatened, unless the agency officials make a “binding
Thus, to challenge a statute, a plaintiff must first
admission or [take] extrajudicial action that would
suffer some actual or threatened restriction
prevent a recurrence of the challenged action,” a
under that statute. Second, the plaintiff must
declaratory judgment action remains justiciable. Texas
contend that the statute unconstitutionally
Health Care Info. Council v. Seton Health Plan, Inc.,
restricts the plaintiff's rights, not somebody
94 S.W.3d 841, 849 (Tex. App.–Austin 2002, pet.
else's.
denied).
Texas Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d Statutory challenges, however, must still meet
504, 517-18 (1995) (citing Texas Ass'n of Business v.
traditional standards of ripeness. “A court cannot pass
Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d at 445 (emphasis in
on the constitutionality of a statute unless the facts have
original). To show actual or threatened restriction under
matured, forming the concrete basis against which the
a statute, it is typically sufficient for plaintiffs to show
statute may be applied.” Atmos Energy Corp. v.
that they are subject to the statute in question and in
Abbott, 127 S.W.3d 852, 857 (Tex. App.–Austin 2004,
circumstances in which the statute is likely to be
no pet.). In Atmos, natural gas sellers sued the Attorney
enforc ed against them in a way that will affect rights or
General, asserting that a state ceiling-price statute
privileges they enjoy. See e.g., Barshop v. Medina
purporting to set the price of natural gas sold to
agricultural users did not apply to them or, if it did, the
statute violated due process and was void and
unenforceable. The Attorney General filed a plea to the
1
Special thanks to summer associates Mary Wommack Barton jurisdiction, asserting that he was not currently enforcing
and Abby Wells for their research and writing assistance on
the statute against the plaintiff and had no plans to do so.
this paper and to our legal assistant Pat Jeans, for her excellent
The Attorney General also argued that it was not proper
work.
1
to permit litigation against the Attorney General regarding Justiciability of challenges to penal statutes are
the validity and applicability of the statute when Atmos governed by the standards set out in State v. Morales,
was litigating the application of the statute in two 869 S.W.2d 941, 942 (Tex. 1994), in which the Supreme
separate private-party lawsuits in West Texas. The Court held that the constitutionality of the state’s sodomy
court did not reach the latter ground, but agreed that the statute could not be decided because (1) the state
suit should be dismissed on ripeness grounds. The court attorney general had represented that the statute had not
evaluated the ripeness issue on the basis of two and probably would not be enforced against consenting
considerations: “(1) the fitness of the issues for judicial adults acting in private and (2) no vested property rights
decision; and (2) the hardship occasioned to a party by were alleged to be affected by any enforcement of the
the court’s denying judicial review.” Id. at 858. The statute. The basic standards for jurisdiction are set out in
court found that the applicability of the statute to the Robinson v. Jefferson County, 37 S.W.3d 503, 507-508
plaintiff was a fact-intensive inquiry and that there was (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2001, no pet.):
no hardship to the plaintiff because a violation of the
statute carried with it no state sanction or penalty. Because Texas has a bifurcated system of civil
and criminal jurisdiction, the authority of a civil
The Austin Court of Appeals reached the opposite court to declare a criminal statute
result on justiciability in Juliff Gardens, L.L.C. v. Texas unconstitutional and enjoin its enforcement is
Commission on Environmental Quality, 131 S.W.3d limited to situations where there is evidence
271 (Tex. App.–Austin 2004, no pet.). In that case, an that (1) the statute at issue is unconstitutionally
applicant for a permit to build and operate a landfill applied by a rule, policy, or other noncriminal
brought a declaratory judgment action against TCEQ, means subject to a civil court’s equity
asserting that legislation passed while his application was jurisdiction, and irreparable injury to property or
pending and mandating denial of his application personal rights is threatened; or (2) the
constituted an unconstitutional loc al or special law. At enforcement of an unconstitutional statute
the agency, the applicant also filed a request to amend its threatens irreparable injury to property rights.
permit to move the location of the landfill and avoid State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 942 (Tex.
application of the statute. While the court ultimately 1994).
upheld the statute against the constitutional challenge, it
rejected the trial court’s determination that the issue was Robinson involved an action by the owner of a sexually
not justiciable. Applying the same two considerations as oriented business to obtain a declaratory judgment and
were applied in Atmos, the court reasoned that a injunction against the enforcement of a county regulation
determination that the statute was constitutional “is that criminalized possession or consumption of alcoholic
unquestionably an issue fit for judicial review” because beverages on the premises of sexually oriented
the agency had no authority to determine the businesses. The court held that these standards of State
constitutionality of the statute. Id. at 278. The court v. Morales were met but nevertheless dismissed the
further found that refusing to decide the issue imposed a case for lack of jurisdiction because of the failure to join
hardship on the plaintiff because it would be forced to an indispensable party, the criminal district attorney
expend resources defending its permit application against authorized to enforce the regulations. Id. at 511.
a statute that might ultimately be held unconstitutional.
Id. The absence of a state agency responsible for
enforcement of a civil statute may also result in dismissal
The court also rejected the agency’s argument that of a lawsuit. In Motor Vehicle Board v. El Paso
it had exclusive or primary jurisdiction to determine Independent Automobile Dealers Association, Inc., 37
whether to issue the permit and that the courts should not S.W.3d 538, 541 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2001, pet. denied),
address the constitutionality issue until the agency had the court dismissed a constitutional challenge to the
ruled on the permit. The court reasoned that the state’s “blue law” prohibiting sales of motor vehicles on
Commission had no statutory authority to determine the consecutive Saturdays and Sundays because of failure
constitutionality of the statute, and the declaratory relief on the part of plaintiffs to sue the Motor Vehicle Board,
requested regarding the validity of the statute “does not the state agency with authority to enforce the law.
infringe on the Commission’s permitting power.” Id. at Plaintiffs had sued local officials who also had authority
279. to enforce the statute, particularly its criminal penalties.
The court reasoned that joinder of these officials was not
2
sufficient to confer jurisdiction, particularly in light of the Continental Cas. Ins. Co. v. Functional Restoration
fact that the local officials had not attempted to enforce Assocs., 19 S.W.3d 393, 397 (Tex. 2000). See T EX . CIV.
the statute and did not defend its constitutionality in the PRAC. & REM . CODE §37.006(b).
courts. See id.
If a challenge to the constitutionality of a state
III. Nuts and Bolts statute is initiated in federal court, the suit should
ordinarily be brought against state officials rather than the
A. Procedural Vehicles to Challenge the s tate or its agencies, as the Eleventh Amendment
Constitutionality of a Texas Statute generally bars a direct action against the state. See
McCarthy ex rel. Travis v. Hawkins, 381 F.3d 407. 412
The most common procedural vehicle for (5th Cir. 2004) (“The Eleventh Amendment has been
challenging a Texas statute is the Declaratory Judgments interpreted by the Supreme Court to bar suits by
Act, codified in chapter 37 of the Texas Civil Practice individuals against nonconsenting states.”). Even when
and Remedies Code. The Texas Supreme Court has the Eleventh Amendment bars an action directly against
construed the Texas DJA to constitute not only a waiver the state, the Ex parte Young doctrine permits federal
of sovereign immunity for suits regarding the construction courts to enjoin state officials to conform their future
or validity of statutes, but also to authorize recovery of conduct to the requirements of federal law. Id. T he
attorneys’ fees incurred in seeking that declaratory relief. officials should be sued in their official capacity; such a
Texas Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 446 suit “is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit
(Tex. 1994); Texas Dep’t of Banking v. Mount Olivet against the officials’ office” and the “real party in interest
Cemetery Ass’n, 27 S.W.3d at 281. The court’s general is the [governmental] entity.” Id. at 414.
jurisdictional authority under Article V, § 8 of the Texas
Constitution and Tex. Gov’t Code § 24.011 is properly Federal court jurisdiction of a suit that asserts a state
invoked by the filing of a declaratory judgment action statute violates the U.S. Constitution rests on the
challenging the constitutionality of a statute. Supremacy Clause and the federal question jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. §1331. While most federal court suits
If an agency is attempting to apply an challenging state officials’ application of unconstitutional
unconstitutional statute to a party, the agency or its state statutes are brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983, they
officials may be sued. In state court, a direct suit against need not be. The Fifth Circuit, along with a number of
the agency is generally permitted, regardless of whether other circuits, has “recognized an implied cause of action
a statutory right of appeal from an agency order is to bring preemption claims seeking injunctive and
available. See, e.g., EnRe Corp. v. Railroad Comm’n, declaratory relief even absent an explicit statutory
852 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. App.–Aus tin 1993, no writ) claim.” Planned Parenthood of Houston and
(holding that party need not preserve constitutional Southeast Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 333 (5th Cir.
challenge to statute in motion for hearing filed at the 2005). Thus, when §1983 is not available to challenge a
agency because agency is not empowered to determine statute because the party affected by the statute is not a
constitutionality of a statute).2 The right directly to party intended to be protected by the federal
challenge a state agency that is enforcing an constitutional provision at issue, 3 federal court jurisdiction
unconstitutional statute exists because the agency action nevertheless exists and the plaintiff may simply assert an
“adversely affects a vested property right or otherwise implied right of action based on the Supremacy Clause.
violates a constitutional right.” Texas Dep’t of
Protective and Regulatory Servs. v. Mega Child Care, If suit is brought against the state or state agency in
Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170, 172 (Tex. 2004), citing state court and the government removes the case to
federal court, it waives its Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Meyers ex rel. Benzing v. Texas, 410 F.3d
2
The Supreme Court, however, has recently expanded the 236, 242 (5th Cir. 2005). This decision reflects a recent
grant of judicial review of agency orders, holding that Tex.
Gov’t Code § 2001.171 of the APA provides an independent
3
right to judicial review of contested case decisions when an See, e.g., Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. v. Hood,
agency enabling statute neither specifically authorizes nor 235 F.3d 908, 924-25 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a health care
prohibits judicial review, abrogating numerous prior decisions provider could not sue under § 1983 because the federal
to the contrary. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. Medicaid law that the provider contended the state official was
v. Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170, 173 (Tex. 2004). violating was not intended to benefit the provider).
3
change in the law by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision opinion from the same panel, the court has subsequently
in Lapides v. Board of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 122 S.Ct. stated the opposite. See Local Neon Co. v. Strayhorn,
1640 (2002), which holds that a state waives its Eleventh No. 03-04-00261-CV, 2005 WL 1412171 at *6 (Tex.
Amendment immunity when it voluntarily invokes the App.–Austin June 16, 2005, no pet.) (mem. opinion)
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Removal, however, will (stating that § 2001.038 “is the exclusive remedy for
not necessarily waive a state’s immunity from liability. testing the validity of an administrative rule”). What the
In Meyers, the Fifth Circuit recognized that “state court apparently meant in Hospitals is that a party may
sovereign immunity consis ts of two separate and challenge the rule in a proceeding before the agency,
different kinds of immunity, immunity from suit and including a pending contested case proceeding, and,
immunity from liability.” 410 F.3d at 254. In other therefore, is not restricted to filing a declaratory judgment
words, “the Constitution guarantees a state’s prerogative, action.
by its own law, to treat its immunity from liability as
separate from its immunity from suit for purposes of These apparently conflic ting statements can be
waiver or relinquishment.” Id. at 255. Whether a state reconciled by concluding that, absent an initial challenge
waives immunity from liability for damages, then, will turn commenced at the agency itself in either a contested
not on the forum waiver created by removal to federal case proceeding or some other proceeding, a challenge
court but on the state’s substantive law. Id. may be lodged in the courts only pursuant to §2001.038.
This analysis is consistent with those cases recognizing
B. Procedural Vehicles to Challenge the that parties may include challenges to agency rules in the
Constitutionality of an Agency Rule. context of contested case proceedings. It is also
consistent with Lopez v. Public Utility Commission,
The most common procedural vehicle for 816 S.W.2d 776, 782 (Tex. App.–Austin 1991, writ
challenging the constitutionality of an agency rule is Tex. denied), which holds that a party may not utilize §
Gov’t Code § 2001.038, which authorizes the filing of a 2001.038 to challenge the validity of an agency rule
declaratory judgment action in a district court in Travis applied in a contested case if the party fails to perfect an
County to determine the validity or applicability of any appeal of the agency’s final order in the contested case. 4
rule adopted by an administrative agency. Challenges to Because an agency would have the authority to
the validity of a rule encompass challenges to their determine the constitutionality of its own rules, the
constitutionality. Eldercare Props., Inc. v. Department doctrine in EnRe Corp. v. Railroad Comm’n, 852
of Human Servs., 63 S.W.3d 551, 558 (Tex.App.-Austin S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. App. – Austin 1993, no writ),
2001, pet. denied). Jurisdiction exists under § 2001.038 which permits a party to challenge the constitutionality of
“if it is alleged that the rule or its threatened application a statute even though the issue of constitutionality was
interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with not presented to the agency in the contested case
or impair, a legal right or privilege of the plaintiff.” This proceeding, would presumably not apply.
requirement is met upon a showing that implementation
of the rule is likely to “‘affect’” the party challenging it. If a challenge is made in federal court to the
State Bd. of Ins. v. Deffebach, 631 S.W.2d 794, 797 constitutionality of a state statute and the State or one of
(Tex. App.–Austin 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (applying its agencies is not joined as a party, the Texas Attorney
predecessor statute). Challenges to a rule’s validity are General should be notified. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2403, in
not restricted to parties against whom the agency seeks any such action “wherein the constitutionality of any
to apply the rule. Cf. Eldercare Props., Inc. v. Texas statute of that State affecting the public interest is drawn
Dep’t of Human Servs., 63 S.W.3d at 558 (adjudicating in question, the court shall certify such fact to the
merits of challenge to the validity of rule being applied to attorney general of the State, and shall permit the State
competitor of the plaintiff). to intervene for presentation of evidence, if evidence is
In Hospitals v. Continental Casualty Co., 109

S.W.3d 96, 100 n.9 (Tex. App.–Austin 2003, pet. 4
The court reasoned: “Rule 21.62(g) purport s to be effective
denied), the Austin Court of Appeals stated that § only within the context of an appeal to the Commission under
2001.038 was not the exclusive vehicle to challenge the PURA § 26(c), and the controversy within that appeal is now
validity or applicability of a rule, reasoning that the statute at an end because the plaintiffs did not file the motion for
rehearing necessary to sue for judicial review of the
merely states that such a challenge “may” be determined
Commission’s final order, and therefore did not take the only
in an action for declaratory judgment. In an unpublished step that could have vacated the final order.” Id. at 782.
4
otherwise admissible in the case, and for argument on the attorney fees, the Declaratory Judgment Act necessarily
question of constitutionality.” It will stand you in good waives governmental immunity for such awards.”);
stead with the Court if you have already provided this Texas Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Texas Builders Ins.
notification to the AG. Co., 994 S.W.2d 902, 909 (Tex. App. – Austin 1999, pet.
denied)(affirming fees under T EX . CIV. PRAC. & REM .
C. Recovering the costs of litigating: CODE §37.009 against the Commission); Texas Dep’t of
availability of attorneys’ fees. Pub. Safety v. Moore, 985 S.W.2d 149, 157-58 (Tex.
App.–Austin 1998, no pet.) (affirming fees under
Shifting the costs of litigation to the State is often a §37.009 against the Department).
critical factor in challenging a state statute or rule. It is
also often a hot-button issue for agencies. Many private Pursuant to Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code
entities make the political decision not to seek recovery § 37.009 of the Texas UDJA, a court in any such
of fees from an agency that will continue to regulate proceeding may award “costs and reasonable and
them under other statutes and rules. necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.”
This provision is unique to Texas. The model state
When 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is available because a state Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act contains no
statute or rule violates federal laws designed to protect provisions expressly authorizing awards of attorneys’
the plaintiff, a plaintiff who invokes 42 U.S.C. §1988 and fees but, instead, merely provides only that “[i]n any
prevails is generally entitled to recovery of reasonable proceeding under this act the court may make such
attorneys’ fees. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. City award of costs as may seem equitable and just.”
of El Paso, 346 F.3d 541, 551 (5th Cir. 1993). In fact, Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act §10 (1922). See
attorney’s fees may be awarded under § 1988 even if the also 12A Uniform Laws Annotated, UDJA, §10 at 414
§ 1983 claim is not decided, “provided that 1) the § 1983 (1996). Award of fees under this statute, however, is
claim of constitutional deprivation was substantial; and 2) discretionary with the Court and may, in unusual
the successful pendant claims arose out of a ‘common circumstances, even be awarded to a non-prevailing
nucleus of operative facts.’” Id. To qualify as a party. See Brazoria County v. Texas Comm’n on
prevailing party under § 1988, the plaintiff must Envtl. Quality, 128 S.W.3d 728, 744 (Tex. App. – Austin
“(1) obtain actual relief, such as an enforceable judgment 2004, no pet.); J.C. Penny Life Ins. Co. v. Heinrich, 32
or a consent decree; (2) that materially alters the legal S.W.3d. 280, 290 (Tex. App. – Austin 2000, pet. denied).
relationship between the parties; and (3) modifies the
defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the Recovery of attorneys’ fees in a case that merely
plaintiff at the time of the judgment or settlement.” Id. challenges the constitutional validity of a rule under
The Texas Supreme Court has held that “by Texas Gov’t Code § 2001.038 is not permitted. Texas
authorizing declaratory judgment actions to construe the State Bd. Of Plumbing Exam’rs v. Associated
legislative enactments of governmental entities and Plumbing-Heating-Cooling Contractors of Tex., Inc.,
authorizing awards of attorney fees, the DJA necessarily 31 S.W.3d 750, 753 (Tex. App.–Austin 2000, pet. dism’d
waives governmental immunity for such awards.” Texas by agr.) (holding that when a party "files a proceeding
Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d at 446. Since that only challenges the validity of an administrative rule,
Leeper, courts have routinely held that attorneys’ fees the parties are bound by the APA and may not seek
may be recovered under the Texas UDJA when the relief under the UDJA because such relief would be
validity or construction of a statute is at issue. Rylander redundant"). (Emphasis added.)
v. Bandag Licensing Corp., 18 S.W.3d 296, 305 (Tex.
App. –Austin 2000, pet. denied) (affirming fee award When, however, a rule challenge also includes
against Texas Comptroller and holding that legislative requests for construction of a statute, recovery of
authorizations of declaratory judgment and fees are attorneys’ fees under the Texas UDJA may be
“mutually dependent and together make up the legislative permitted. See, e.g., Howell v. Texas Workers’ Comp.
intent”); City of San Antonio v. TPLP Office Park Comm’n, 143 S.W.3d 416, 442-43 (Tex. App.– Austin
Props., Ltd., 155 S.W.3d 365, 378-79 (Tex. App. – San 2004, pet. denied) (holding that parties were entitled to
Antonio 2004, pet. filed)(“Like the supreme court in seek attorney’s fees under the Texas UDJA because, in
Leeper, we conclude that by authorizing declaratory addition to rule challenge, they “sought a declaration
judgment actions to construe the legislative enactments concerning the exhaustion of administrative remedies in
of governmental entities and authorizing awards of medical payment disputes”); Texas Dep’t. of Pub.
5
Safety v. Moore, 985 S.W.2d at 157-58) (“Since we face, "arguing that the act will, under all circumstances,
have held that the trial court had jurisdiction to construe deprive them of their property rights in underground
section 411.007(b) and that the trial court’s construction water." Id. at 628. The Court held that the plaintiffs
of that statute favors Moore, Moore has achieved a failed to sustain their burden of establishing that "the
declaration of rights entitling him to seek the additional statute, by its terms, always operates unconstitutionally,"
relief of attorney’s fees.”); Texas State Bd. of Plumbing id., and, specifically, that the plaintiffs failed "to establish
Exam’rs v. Associated Plumbing-Heating-Cooling that the Act will always operate to deprive them of their
Contractors of Tex., Inc., 31 S.W.3d at 754 (“Because property without due course of law," id. at 633. The
the proceeding was not solely a challenge to the Board’s case did not present the question of whether the act was
revision of its rules, we hold that the district court did not "unconstitutional when applied to a particular landowner,"
abuse its discretion in ordering the Board to pay [the id. at 623, and the Court, rejecting the facial challenge to
plaintiff’s] attorney’s fees.”). See also Texas Mun. the act, concluded that it was not required to reach the
Power Agency v. Public Util. Comm’n, 100 S.W.3d question of "the point at which water regulation
510, 516 n.5 (Tex. App.–Austin 2003, pet. denied). unconstitutionally invades the property rights of
landowners," id. at 626.
In a case filed in state court and successfully
removed by the defendant to federal court, consideration In Texas Association of Business v. Texas Air Control
should be given to adding a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim to the Board, 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993), the Court held
suit, including a request for attorney’s fees under § 1988, plaintiffs did meet their burden of proving the challenged
if it is not already pled. Some Fifth Circuit precedent statutes to be facially unconstitutional. The statutes
holds that the Texas UDJA’s provision authorizing an authorized administrative agencies to levy fines for
award of attorneys’ fees is “procedural” and cannot environmental law violations, and imposed forfeiture of
provide a basis for recovering attorneys’ fees once the any right to judicial review unless bond or a deposit in the
case is removed to the federal court. See Olander v. full amount of the penalty assessed was paid in 30 days.
Compass Bank , 363 F.3d 560, 567-68 (5th Cir. 2004). The Texas Supreme Court held that those statutes, as
For those who have not included or are unable to proceed written, placed an unreasonable restriction on access to
under § 1983, the great weight of authority is contrary to the courts, in violation of the open courts provision of the
this decision. See Cates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 928 Texas Constitution, Article. I, Section 13. Id. at 448-450.
F.2d 679, 687 (5th Cir. 1991); 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& M. KANE, F EDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § In an "as applied" challenge, the plaintiff argues t h a t a
2669 at 256-57 (1998). statute, which may be constitutional on its face (that is,
capable of being applied constitutionally in general or at
IV. "Facial" versus "As Applied" Constitutional least in some cases), operates unconstitutionally as to the
Challenges plaintiff, in particular existing circumstances. See Texas
Workers' Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504
A litigant may challenge a statute or rule as (Tex. 1995) (in an "as applied" challenge, "the plaintiff
unconstitutional either on its face or as applied. A facial argues that a statute, even though generally constitutional,
challenge is a claim that the statute is unconstitutional by operates unconstitutionally as to him or her because of
its terms, as written, not only when applied to a particular the plaintiff's particular circumstances.") . Thus, in an
person or in specific circumstances. A party making a as-applied constitutional challenge, the court "must
facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute has evaluate the statute as it operates in practice against the
the heavy burden of demonstrating that the statute, by its particular plaintiff.” Texas Mun. League
terms, operates unconstitutionally in all its Intergovernmental Risk Pool v. Texas Workers' Comp.
applications-that is, that there is no set of circumstances Comm’n, 74 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. 2002). For example, in
under which the statute would be constitutional. See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 922 (Tex. 1984), the
Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water court held that a two-year statute of limitations on
Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d at 626. medical malpractice actions was unconstitutional under
the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution, as
In Barshop, landowners challenged the statute applied to a plaintiff who could not have discovered the
authorizing the Edwards Aquifer Authority to regulate the injury that was the subject of her malpractice claim
use of underground water, in a suit brought before the act during the two-year period. The Court distinguished its
was implemented. Plaintiffs challenged the act on its holding from other "as applied" challenges in which the
6
constitutionality of statutes of limitations was upheld: DNA database was an impermissible retroactive law
"The statutes of limitation were not unconstitutional as because the crime for which he was incarcerated
applied to the parties in Sax and Robinson; hence, there occurred prior to the passage of the DNA statute. The
was no reason to strike down the statutes merely court rejected the argument that application of the statute
because they might operate in an unconstitutional manner to Mr. Johnson was retroactive, reasoning that the statute
in another case." 678 S.W.2d at 923. “does not retroactively criminalize acts performed by
Johnson before its enactment,” even though the statute
V. Challenges Based on the Texas Constitution authorized prison officials to deny Mr. Johnson parole
eligibility for his crime if he refused to submit to the DNA
There are numerous grounds for challenging statutes sampling. Id. This case addresses and rejects numerous
and rules as violative of the Texas Constitution. This other constitutional challenges as well, holding that the
paper provides a sampling of some of the provisions in following constitutional rights and provisions are not
prevalent use today. infringed by the statute: right against unreasonable search
and seizure, prohibition against self-incrimination, right of
A. Prohibition Against Retroactive Laws privacy, doctrine requiring separation of powers of the
three branches of government, and prohibition against
The Texas Constitution prohibits the passage of Bills of Attainder. *3-*6.
retroactive laws. TEX. CONST . art. I, § 16 (“No . . .
retroactive law . . . shall be made.”).5 Like other B. Right to Trial by Jury
provisions that, read literally, would invalidate a host of
statutes, this provision has been substantially limited. The Article I, § 15 of the Texas Constitution provides
courts have held that it applies only to “vested rights” and that the “right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.”
have been careful to limit the rights recognized as Courts have interpreted the right to trial by jury to exist
“vested.” Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid only “for those actions, or analogous actions, tried by jury
Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 219 (Tex. 2002). Rejecting when the Constitution was adopted in 1876.” Texas
the argument that the rights affec ted by a statute were Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at
“vested,” two recent decisions have rejected challenges 526. In addition, Article V, § 10 of the Texas
that statutes were impermissibly retroactive. In Williams Constitution – which is part of the Judiciary Article –
v. Houston Firemen’s Relief & Retirement Fund, 121 provides that “[i]n the trial of all causes in the Distric t
S.W.3d 415, 431 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no Courts, the plaintiff or defendant shall, upon application
pet.), the court held that the Fund was entitled, pursuant made in open court, have the right of trial by jury.” Not
to statute, to reduce pension benefits by denying prior all adversary proceedings, however, are “causes” within
service credit as a result of employment with other fire the meaning of the Judiciary Article. In particular, an
departments. The court reasoned: “A participant in a appeal from an administrative decision is not. 893
statutory pension plan does not have a vested right to S.W.2d at 527.
receive currently unvested benefits; he has merely an
expectancy based on the anticipated continuance of In TWCC v. Garcia, the Court held that the right to
existing law; and this expectancy is subordinate to the trial by jury was not impaired under the workers’
right of the Legislature to abolish the pension system or compensation scheme because of the modified de novo
to diminish the benefits of pensioners thereunder.” Id. review scheme, which permits jury trials on the issues
that were the substitutes for the common law causes of
The Houston 14th Court of Appeals handed down a action for negligence. Id. The Court reasoned:
similar rejection of a retroactivity claim in Johnson v. “Although legislation altering or restricting a cause of
Davis, No. 14-04-00206-CV, 2005 WL 1772075 at *5 action is subject to scrutiny under the open courts
(Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] July 26, 2005, no pet.). doctrine, this substantive change does not implicate the
In Johnson, the plaintiff, a prison inmate, argued that a right to jury trial, as long as the relevant issues under the
statute permitting collection of a blood sample from him modified cause of action are decided by a jury.” Id.
for purposes of DNA testing and inclusion in the state’s
In contrast, the Austin Court of Appeals recently
reversed an order of the Department of Agriculture
5 Produce Recovery Fund Board on the ground that the
The U.S. Constitution has a similar prohibition. Carmell v.
agency, by awarding contract damages, had violated a
Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 552, 120 S.Ct. 1620, 1643 (2000).
7
produce buyer’s right to a jury trial on the grower’s reasoned that “[a]ppeals from administrative decisions
breach of contract action. McManus-Wyatt Produce . . . are not ‘causes’” within the meaning of the Texas
Co. v. Texas Dep’t of Agriculture Produce Recovery Constitution. Id. Yet the Court also acknowledged that
Fund Bd., 140 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. App.–Austin 2004, pet. adjudications of property rights were matters for the
denied). In McManus, a carrot grower filed a breach of judicial branch and permitted the initial agency
contract complaint against a carrot buyer, who was adjudication only because judicial review was available.
licensed by the Board. The carrot buyer filed an action Id. at 635. The question arises as to how a cause that
for breach of contract in the district court in Hildago would, prior to the passage of the Edwards Aquifer Act,
County, and the grower counterclaimed and requested a have been adjudicated only in the courts can lose the
jury trial, thereby triggering both parties’ right to a jury. right to jury trial simply because the Legislature decided
The Board awarded the grower $35,000 to be paid from to impose an intervening administrative proceeding. The
the Produce Recovery Fund and further ordered the Court reasoned that “there was no governmental scheme
buyer to pay the grower an additional $103,439.74. The in 1876 to regulate natural resources such as the
buyer appealed, asserting that the Board’s order violated Edwards Aquifer.” Id. But common law property rights
its right to a jury trial. The relevant statutory provisions in water did exist in 1876, making the Court’s reasoning
authorized the Board to award the $35,000 from the fund somewhat perplexing, since the landowners’ argument
and to adjudicate the total damage claim. Id. at 829. If was that their property rights were being
the buyer refused to pay the amount awarded, the Board unconstitutionally impacted.
is to issue an order cancelling the buyer’s license to
purchase produce. The statutory scheme did not permit One way to distinguish the two cases is that
the buyer to bring his own cause of action for breach of McManus involved an action for damages for breach of
contract before the Board: “[t]he only capacity in which contract, which has long been recognized as a common
a license holder may appear is as a defendant.” Id. at law cause of action for which there is a right to a jury
830. If the license holder loses, his only remedy is trial. Barshop, on the other hand, is more akin to a
substantial evidence review. regulatory taking for which there may be no constitutional
right to jury trial. See City of Houston v. Blackbird,
The buyer argued that the Board violated its own 394 S.W.2d 159, 162-63 (Tex. 1965) (holding property
rule – 4 Tex. Admin. Code § 14.10(a)(2), which prohibits owners had no right to a jury trial in appeal of City’s
the Board from considering “claims for which a assessments for street improvements).
complainant has filed suit in a court of competent
jurisdiction.” Id at 828. C. Violation of the Open Courts Provision.
The court did not expressly rule on the validity or The open courts provision of the Texas Constitution,
applicability of the agency rule or the constitutionality of part of Texas's Bill of Rights, provides that “[a]ll courts
the statute. Instead, it focused solely on the Board’s shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in
order, which it held violated the buyer’s right to a jury his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy
trial under the Texas Constitution. Id. at 833. The court by due course of law.” T EX. CONST . art. I, § 13. The
distinguished the McManus case on the ground that, provision ensures that Texas courts will remain operating
unlike in Garcia, the right to jury trial was completely and available and that the Texas Legislature will not
abrogated under the state administrative scheme at issue: restrict access to the courts by creating unreasonable
only the Board could adjudicate the contract dispute, and financial barriers. 12A T EX. J UR. 3D Constitutional
judicial review was not de novo but, instead, was a trial Law § 219 (2004). It also guarantees that no party
to the court under the substantial evidence rule. Id. at seeking redress under a common law claim will be denied
832-33. access to court unreasonably or arbitrarily. Shah v.
Moss, 67 S.W.3d 836, 841 (Tex. 2001). The Texas
This decision, which the Supreme Court declined to Legislature may not abrogate the right to assert a
review, is somewhat difficult to square with the Supreme traditional common law cause of action unless the
Court’s decision in Barshop, 925 S.W.2d at 636. In that reasons for doing so outweigh the constitutional right of
case, the Court held that the Edwards Aquifer Act, redress. Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid
which adjudicated property rights subject to judicial Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d at 227. To establish that a
review under the substantial evidence rule, did not violate statute violates the open courts guarantee, a party must
the constitutional right to trial by jury. The Court there demonstrate (1) that it has a well established common
8
law cause of action that has been restricted by the Improvement Act. 6 In a previous case, the court found
statute and (2) the restriction is unreasonable or arbitrary that this statute of limitations does not violate a plaintiff's
when balanced against the purpose of the statute. open courts rights if the plaintiff "has had a reasonable
Owens Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d 560, 573 (Tex. opportunity to discover the alleged wrong and bring suit
1999). There is a strong presumption that any valid before the limitations period expired." Earle, 998 S.W.2d
legislative enactment is constitutional, so a party at 889 (citing Jennings v. Burgess, 917 S.W.2d 790, 794
challenging a statute bears the burden of demonstrating (Tex. 1996)). If a plaintiff has reasonable opportunity to
that the statute violates its constitutional rights. Enron file suit within the designated time period, the restriction
Corp. v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 922 S.W.2d 931, 934 on his common law cause of action is not unreasonable
(Tex. 1996). In some cases, a statute can be facially or arbitrary; therefore, the claim fails to satisfy the
constitutional yet still violate the open courts provision "as second prong of the open courts test. Shah, 67 S.W.3d
applied to a particular category of people" if the at 842. In the two most recent cases to address this
restriction of that group's access to the courts is issue, Earle and Shah, the court conducted this very fact
unreasonable or arbitrary. In re Hinterlong, 109 S.W.3d specific inquiry and determined that the plaintiffs had
611, 631 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, orig. proceeding ample time to file suit. Shah, 67 S.W.3d at 847; Earle,
[mand. denied]) (emphasis in original). 998 S.W.2d at 890. Therefore, their constitutional rights
had not been violated. Id.
A key case on the Open Courts provision is the
Supreme Court decision upholding the Legislature’s In Earle, the plaintiff, Ratliff, alleged that the statute
overhaul of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act in of limitations violated his open courts rights because
1989. Texas Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 limitations ran long before he learned that his health
S.W.2d at 521. In that case the Court weighed the problems could be a result of medical malpractice.
reduced benefits available under the statutory scheme Earle, 998 S.W.2d at 889. Earle performed back
against the benefits gained by workers in not having to surgeries on Ratliff in November of 1991 and November
prove negligence or address, with limited exceptions, of 1993, after which Ratliff's health deteriorated. Id. at
employer’s potential defenses. “We believe this quid pro 884. Ratliff filed a lawsuit against Earle in February of
quo, which produces a more limited but more certain 1994 after watching a television program about the risks
recovery, renders the Act an adequate substitute for associated with the instrument that Earle surgic ally
purposes of the open courts guarantee.” Id. The Court implanted in his back during the first surgery. Id. The
took a deferential approach to the Legislature’s solution, court held that "[t]he record [established] that Ratliff had
which involved compromises for many different interests: an opportunity to learn of any negligence by Earle in
“Our duty to enforce the open courts guarantee does not performing the 1991 surgery" much earlier than the day
allow us to rewrite legislation merely to try to craft a in 1994 when he watched the television program because
remedy that we might believe to be more inclusive or Ratliff visited Earle's office many times, consistently
equitable.” Id. at 523. experienced neck and back pain, and showed few signs
of improvement. Id. at 890.
The Open Courts provision has been successfully
used to strike down a requirement that taxes be paid The Texas Supreme Court followed the same line of
before they can be challenged. Central Appraisal Dist. reasoning when addressing a similar statutory challenge
v. Lall, 924 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1996). It has also been in Shah. Shah treated Moss for persisting visual
used to invalidate a requirement that a party seeking to problems that eventually left Moss blind in his right eye.
appeal a penalty either pay the penalty or post a bond to Shah, 67 S.W.3d at 839. He saw Moss in his office on
cover it. EnRe Corp. v. Railroad Comm’n, 852 S.W.2d many occasions and, among other things, performed two
at 663-64. Recent statutory challenges under the Open retinal surgeries on his patient. Id. Moss filed medical
Courts provision, however, have been largely
unsuccessful.
6
Shah, 67 S.W.3d 836; Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882 (Tex.
In two recent cases, the Texas Supreme Court 1999); the statute at issue in both of these cases was Tex. Rev.
addressed the constitutionality of the statute of limitations Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1999), which
set forth in the Medical Liability and Insurance has been replaced by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 74.251(a) (Vernon 2005). The revised statute contains the
same pertinent statutory language as the statute at issue in
these cases.
9
malpractice claims against Shah after the two-year Motor Vehicle Board exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the
statute of limitations passed. Id. at 839, 845. The Court sale, distribution, and leasing of motor vehicles.8 The
held that Moss had to demonstrate that he did not have a plaintiff in Subaru v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc.
reasonable opportunity to discover the alleged wrong (“McDavid”), sued Subaru of America, Inc. for refusing
before the limitations period expired and that he used due to allow the dealer to relocate its Subaru dealership after
diligence to sue within a reasonable time after verbally consenting to the move. Subaru, 84 S.W.3d at
discovering the alleged wrong. Id. at 846-47. Because 217. McDavid claimed the statute unconstitutionally
Moss knew of the injury at least seventeen months restricted its access to the Texas court system because
before filing suit and could not explain why he waited so it required the dealership to exhaust all of its
long to file his case, as a matter of law, he did not file his administrative remedies through the Texas Motor Vehicle
suit within a reasonable time after discovering the injury. Board before pursuing common law and statutory causes
Id. Therefore, the statute of limitations set forth in the of action in court. Id. at 227. The court declared that
Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act did not “the [Motor Vehicle Code] sections providing that a
unconstitutionally restrict Moss's access to the courts. dealer must obtain a license to operate a franchise at a
Id. certain location confer statutory rights on motor vehicle
dealers that do not exist at common law.” Id. Because
In another recent case, the Supreme Court declared the right to operate a car dealership is a statutory right,
that the Open Courts provision does not pertain to or McDavid’s claims constituted statutory, not common law
protect plaintiffs who bring survival actions, because a rights, and, thus, were not protected by the open courts
survival action is statutory in nature. Horizon/CMS provision. Id. In other words, McDavid failed to
Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 903 (Tex. establish the first prong of the open courts test because
2000). Hary, a nursing home resident, filed a suit alleging it could not demonstrate that it had a common law cause
that the nursing home was negligent and grossly negligent of action that had been restricted by a statute. Id.
in failing to provide her with appropriate medical Therefore, McDavid's constitutional challenge failed. Id.
treatment. Id. at 890-91. Upon Hary's death, Auld, the
administratix of Hary's estate, continued the case as a In 1999, the Texas Supreme Court rejected a claim
survival action and was awarded a substantial jury that the Texas "borrowing statute" violated the open
verdict. Id. at 891. The court applied a cap to the courts provision.9 The borrowing statute provides that an
damages in accordance with a statutory provision in the out of state plaintiff whose personal injury claim arises in
Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act.7 In a state with a limitations period shorter than the Texas
1988, the court found that this statutory cap violated the period must file suit within the time limitation provided by
open courts provision as it applied to common law claims the other state's law. Owens Corning, 997 S.W.2d at
for personal injuries resulting from medical negligence. 566 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §
Id. at 902 (citing Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 71.031(a)(3)). In Owens Corning, out of state plaintiffs
687 (Tex. 1988)). Despite the fact that Auld's case was whose asbestos claims arose in Alabama and most likely
based on Hary's claims for negligence and gross would have been timely if governed by Texas law
negligence, two common law causes of action, the brought personal injury claims in Texas after the
statutory cap did not violate the Open Courts provision applicable Alabama statute of limitations expired. Id. at
because Auld's survival claim was statutory. Id. The 572. They challenged the constitutionality of the
Court emphasized that statutes violate the open courts borrowing statute, claiming that Alabama's statute of
provision only if they restrict access to court for a limitations for such cases did not provide a reasonable
common law cause of action. Id. at 903. opportunity for asbestos victims to discover their injuries
In 2002, the Texas Supreme Court addressed an

open courts challenge to the provision of the Texas 8
Id. The statute in question was Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
Motor Vehicle Commission Code that grants the Texas 4590i, § 11.02(a), which has been replaced by Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code Ann. § 74.301 (Vernon 2005). However, this
statutory change is not pertinent for the purposes of this
Id. The statute in question was Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. article.
4590i, § 11.02(a), which has been replaced by Tex. Civ. Prac. &
9
Rem. Code Ann. § 74.301 (Vernon 2005). However, this Owens Corning, 997 S.W.2d 560. The "borrowing statute"
statutory change is not pertinent for the purposes of this challenged in this case was Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
article. § 71.031(a)(3) (Vernon 2004).
10
and file suit, arguing that the open courts provision should Id. However, in the setting of public schools with zero
give them additional time to file their claims. Id. at 574. tolerance programs, the court found that protecting the
The Court found the borrowing statute to be a valid identity of tipsters encourages illegitimate tips and setup
exercise of the state's police power in that it prevents out situations. Id. at 632. To resolve the constitutional
of state plaintiffs from gaining more rights in Texas violation the court adopted an in camera review
courts than they would have in the state where the cause procedure in which the trial court would review the
of action arose. Id. As such, the statute represses protected information and provide as much information to
forum shopping and conserves Texas' judicial resources. Hinterlong as necessary for him to establish his claims.
Id. Therefore, the Court held that the Texas Legislature Id. at 634.
took reasonable action to alleviate a problem in the Texas
court system when it enacted this statute and did not In recent years, the Texas Supreme Court has not
abrogate the plaintiffs' access to Texas courts in violation found any statute unconstitutional under the open courts
of the open courts provision. Id. provision. Challenges to the constitutionality of the
medical liability statute of limitations in Earle and Shah
In Hinterlong, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals failed because plaintiffs had reasonable opportunity to
found a provision of the “crime stoppers” statute discover the alleged wrongs and file suit within the
unconstitutional as it applied to a very limited set of limitations period. In Horizon/CMS Healthcare and
circumstances.10 Hinterlong was a senior at Arlington Subaru, constitutional challenges failed because the
Martin High School (“AMHS”) when a crime stoppers challengers’ causes of action had statutory, not common
"tipster" called a teacher to report that Hinterlong was law roots. The challenge to Texas's borrowing statute in
hoarding alcohol in his car. 109 S.W.3d at 616. When a Owens Corning failed because the legislative purpose
school official searched his trunk, she found a water behind the statute was reasonable when balanced against
bottle with a very small amount of what appeared to be the restriction it imposed on the plaintiffs. Finally, the
alcohol inside. Id. at 617. Because of the school's zero challenge to the Texas crime stoppers statute was
tolerance policy for alcohol, AHMS expelled Hinterlong successful in the Texas Court of Appeals in Fort Worth
and placed him in an alternative school. Id. at 619. because it unreasonably restricted the plaintiff's common
Hinterlong was eventually acquitted for his minor in law cause of action. These cases shed light on the
possession charge. Id. Hinterlong claimed the tipster prospects for future open courts challenges. Based on
had called in the crime stoppers tip maliciously and had these recent opinions, it appears as though Texas courts,
planted or had someone else plant the water bottle in his especially the Texas Supreme Court, have been
car. Id. He sought to assert the common law claims of reluctant to strike state statutes for violating the open
defamation, malicious prosecution, and negligence against courts provision.
a school official, the tipster, and the person or persons
who allegedly planted the water bottle in his car. Id. D. Unconstitutional Takings
However, the crime stoppers statute protected the
identity of the tipster. Id. at 623. The court applied the The police power includes the authority of the
two prong open courts test and determined that the government to regulate, restrict, control, or prohibit the
statute violated the open courts provision in these conduct of any business that affects the health, safety,
circumstances. Id. at 633. It restricted Hinterlong's morals, comfort, or general welfare of the public. The
common law cause of action because he could not right to engage in any lawful business, occupation, or
successfully file suit for his common law claims without profession is therefore not absolute, but is subject to
knowing the identity of the tipster. Id. at 630. whatever reasonable restrictions and regulations the
Furthermore, the restriction proved arbitrary and protection of the public may require. To the extent that
unreasonable when balanced against the legislative such restrictions and regulations effect an
purpose of the statute under these circumstances. Id. at uncompensated transfer or destruction of vested property
631. The protection of the identity of crime stoppers rights, however, they are subject to challenge as an
tipsters is meant to encourage legitimate tips concerning unconstitutional governmental taking or destruction of
criminal activities, which is clearly a valid state interest. private property without compensation or due process.
Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution

10 provides, “No person's property shall be taken, damaged
Hinterlong, 109 S.W.3d at 632-633; the challenged statute in
or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate
the case was Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 414.008 (Vernon 2004).
11
compensation being made. . . .” TEX. CONST . art. I, § S.W.2d 559, 572 (Tex. 1956); Federal Power Comm'n
17. This provision has been construed as the equivalent v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603, 64 S. Ct.
of the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 281 (1944); Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co.
Constitution, which provides that "private property [shall v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 692-93, 43 S.Ct.
not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." 675, 676, 679 (1923). While acknowledging the
U.S. CONST . amend. V. constitutional limitations on government price controls, the
courts define a "broad zone of reasonableness" within
Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution which a government-set rate is constitutionally
provides, “No citizen of this State shall be deprived of permissible, and, in testing the rate for validity, balance
life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any the constitutionally protected property interests of public
manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the utility investors with the legitimate public purpose of
law of the land.” TEX . CONST . art. I, § 19. The Texas protecting consumers from exploitative rates. Permian
Constitution’s “due course of law” provision parallels the Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 769-770, 88 S.Ct.
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 1344, 1361 (1968).
U.S. Constitution, which provides that, "No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the The constitutionality of a government-set rate is
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; most likely to arise in the appeal of an order issued in a
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or contested case conducted under a rate ordinance or
property, without due process of law . . . ." U.S. CONST . statute the constitutionality of which is not contested.
amend. XIV, § 1. Like the federal due process clause, See, e.g., City of Corpus Christi v. PUC, 51 S.W.3d
the Texas due course of law provision contains both a 231 (involving both evidentiary-based and constitutional
procedural component and a substantive component. challenges to rates). However, ratesetting is essentially
Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water a legislative function, and a statute or regulation that, on
Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1996). its face or as applied, results in confiscatory rates is
subject to challenge by an affected party. One such
The takings clauses apply most obviously in the challenge is currently pending before the Third Court of
context of governmental takings of real property by Appeals. Montemayor v. State Farm Lloyds, No.
eminent domain. This is a topic of great current interest 03-05-0057-CV (Tex. App.-Austin, filed Feb. 9, 2005)
and vast discussion possibilities, but one that will not be (district court struck down as confiscatory, on its f a c e
treated here. The takings and due process clauses have and as applied, an insurance rate statute that by its terms
also been invoked as the basis for constitutional allowed commissioner to affirm an agency-set rate with
challenges to statutes and rules that affect other property no provision for profit, absent proof by insurer that rate
rights and interests, including the right to engage in lawful would cause insolvency). See also Guaranty Nat'l Ins.
activities and occupations that are subject to state Co. v. Gates, 916 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1990) (Nevada
regulation. statute mandating across-the-board auto insurance rate
rollback, with no mechanism for relief from resulting
For example, the constitutionality of government-set confiscatory rates, declared unconstitutional on its face);
rates and governmental price controls on regulated Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247 (1989)
services and commodities is subject to challenge if the (provision in California statute permitting relief from
rates are “confiscatory” – that is, if they “result i n a statutorily rolled-back, frozen rates only if insurer
‘deprivation of property without due process of law or “substantially threatened with insolvency” struck down as
the taking of private property for public use without just facially unconstitutional).
compensation.’” City of Corpus Christi v. Public Util.
Comm'n, 51 S.W.3d 231, 241 n.34 (Tex. 2001) (quoting E. Restrictions on Abortions and the Texas
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. Constitution’s Equal Rights Amendment,
38, 51, 56 S.Ct. 720 (1936)). Constitutional due process Equal Protection Clause and Right to
requires that a government-set rate allow a regulated Privacy
entity to "operate successfully;" that is, to earn a
reasonable return on its investment, a profit sufficient to In Bell v. Low Income Women of Texas, 95 S.W.3d
assure confidence in the ongoing financial integrity of the 253 (Tex. 2002), the Supreme Court addressed Texas
enterprise and attract capital. See Railroad Comm'n v. constitutional challenges of abortion funding restrictions.
Houston Natural Gas Corp., 155 Tex. 502, 523, 289 The federal Medicaid program provides matching funds
12
to states that provide health services to the indigent. The F. Unlawful Delegation of Legislative
Hyde Amendment to that federal legislation limits the use Authority to State Agencies and Private
of federal matching funds for abortions. The Texas Entities
Legislature created a mechanism to utilize the federal
Medicaid funding through the Texas Medical Assistance Over the last several years, numerous constitutional
Act (TMAP). TMAP prohibits the provisioning of any challenges have been made to statutes on the ground that
service under the state program unless federal matching the statute unlawfully delegates the authority of the
funds are available. Thus, TMAP incorporates the Hyde Legislature to a state agency or a private entity. Two
Amendment with respect to the use of state funds. In Texas constitutional provisions are relevant: Article II,
Bell, physicians and clinics sought a declaratory judgment Section 1 and Article III, Section 1. Article II, Section 1
that TMAP violated the Texas Constitution’s equal rights is a “direct prohibition of the blending of the legislative,
amendment, equal protection clause, and rights of executive, and judicial departments” – i.e., a separation
privacy. Id. at 255. of powers provision. Proctor v. Andrews, 972 S.W.2d
729, 733 (Tex. 1998). Article III, Section 1 addresses
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court where the legislative power lies, vesting it in the Senate
rejected all challenges. While the Court agreed that the and House of Representatives. “Article II and Article III
legislation denied equality to women because virtually all both apply when the constitutionality of the Legislature’s
medically necessary services were provided to indigent delegation of power to another branch of state
men, the Court concluded that the classification was not government, such as an administrative agency, is
impermissibly sex based. The Court relied, in part, on challenged. Article II is not relevant, however, to a
federal court standards in disparate impact cases for legislative delegation of authority to an entity that is not
reaching this conclusion but also recognized that the a part of state government.” Proctor v. Andrews, 972
Texas equal rights amendment has no federal counterpart S.W.2d at 733. Thus, the provision at issue with respect
and “was intended to enlarge upon the federal equal to delegations of legislative authority to private entities is
protection guarantees” by “elevating sex to a suspect Article III, Section 1. Id.
class and subjecting sex-based classifications to
heightened strict-s crutiny review.” Id. at 262. The 1. Unlawful delegation to other
Court determined, however, that the strict scrutiny test governmental entities
was inapplicable because “we do not believe the
discouragement of abortion through funding restric tions Under these constitutional provisions, the Legislature
can, by itself, be considered purposeful discrimination may delegate its powers to agencies and other
against women as a class.” Id. at 263. The legislation governmental bodies to carry out its legislative purposes
easily passed the rational-basis standard of review. Id. “as long as it establishes ‘reasonable standards to guide
at 264. The Court also relied heavily on federal the entity to which the powers are delegated.’”
precedent in rejecting the right of privacy issue, Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717,
distinguishing between governmental action prohibiting 740 (Tex. 1995) (citations omitted). Because of the
abortion and “the government’s decision to encourage practical necessity of permitting delegation of authority to
childbirth as a policy matter.” Id. at 265. Finally, the governmental bodies to implement state statutes, courts
Court followed the federal rational-basis standard in are reluctant to strike statutes on the ground of unlawful
reviewing the legislation under the equal protection delegation to a public entity. Thus, while there have been
clause. recent challenges to the delegation of authority to public
entities, they have been generally unsuccessful.
While the case had a predictable outcome, it is
instructive in the extent to which the Supreme Court is In Texas Advocates Supporting Kids with
willing to rely on federal authority for evaluating Disabilities v. Texas Education Agency, 112 S.W.3d
constitutional issues. 234, 240 (Tex.App.-Austin 2003, no pet.), an advocacy
group for disabled children and their parents challenged
a TEA rule establishing a one-year limitations period for
administrative hearings to challenge a disabled child’s
individualized education plan and an additional rule
imposing a 90-day time limit to appeal a TEA decision
regarding such a plan. This case reflects an unusual use
13
of the separation of powers provisions in Article II, regulate sexually oriented businesses. Id. at 609. The
Section 1. Texas Advocates argued that, because TEA Dallas Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the
exceeded its authority in promulgating the rules, the statutes unlawfully delegated legislative authority to
agency had violated this constitutional provision. While municipalities, finding that the statutes contained
the court noted that it was “not necessarily incorrect” to sufficient reasonable guidelines. Those guidelines were
rely on the separation of powers doctrine, “the normal fairly minimal, basically authorizing cities only to adopt
practice is to challenge agency action as being in excess regulations that are necessary to promote the public
of its statutory authority without making explicit health, safety, or welfare and limiting each city’s
reference to separation of powers.” Id. at 237 n.1. authority to its corporate limits. Finding these general
guidelines sufficient, the court reasoned that “[t]he
Texas Advocates also made the more traditional standards for regulation may be broad where conditions
separation of powers argument that the delegation of must be considered that cannot be conveniently
power to TEA to promulgate a limitations period was investigated by the legislature.” Id. at 611. There is
void for lack of reasonable standards to guide TEA. Id. some question as to whether municipalities already have
at 240. Texas Advocates did not challenge the the authority to regulate these businesses and, therefore,
sufficiency of the legislative standards for the statewide the ordinance does not need the state statute in order to
design to educate disabled children consistent with a be upheld. It may be that the court will affirm the
federal law addressing these matters. Instead, it argued decision on that basis.
that the Legislature was required to give detailed
guidelines for establishing a limitations period for In Texas Building Owners and Managers Ass’n,
administrative hearings challenging a plan. Id. The court Inc. v. Public Utility Commission, 110 S.W.3d 524, 530-
rejected this argument, reasoning that establishing the 31 (Tex.App–Austin 2003, pet. denied), the Austin Court
limitations period was an integral part of the design and of Appeals rejected an unlawful delegation challenge to
the legislature had prescribed sufficient standards to authority given the Public Utility Commission to settle
guide TEA’s discretion. Id. In other words, no disputes between private parties and telecommunications
particular guidelines for establishing a limitations period utilities regarding access to or across private property to
were constitutionally required. provide service. These disputes typically arise in
buildings with multiple tenants who choose providers
The court, however, upheld the trial court’s different from those preferred by the landlords. Several
determination that TEA exceeded its statutory authority landowners challenged the statute claiming that (1) the
in imposing a 90-day limitations period for filing suit for statute was an unconstitutional taking, (2) the PUC did
judicial review on federal preemption grounds. The not have delegated power to determine compensation for
federal law that TEA was required to implement, and access, and (3) if the Legislature did delegate the power
that authorized, judicial review of TEA decisions did not to determine compensation, the delegation was
impose a limitations period for judicial review. The unconstitutional. “According to the Building Owners, the
federal courts had determined that the appropriate precise mode and method for determining compensation
limitations period for judicial review under the federal law must be written into the Statutes.” Id. at 536.
was Texas’ two-year limitations period for tort actions.
Id. at 241. The court of appeals further indicated that The court held that the statute gave the PUC the
there was nothing in the state statute indicating any intent power to determine compensation and rejected the
to confer authority on the agency to develop procedures argument that there were insufficient statutory standards
for judicial review of its own decisions. Id. for determining compensation. The court reasoned that
the express authority given to the PUC to enforce the
Ex parte Smalley, 156 S.W.3d 608, 610 (Tex.App.- statute and its general authority to engage in rulemaking
Dallas 2004, pet. granted), is a case to watch, as the were sufficient to meet the requirement of reasonable
Court of Criminal Appeals has granted review. Pursuant guidelines. “Here, the government–acting through the
to Chapter 243 of the Local Government Code, Commission–has relied on an express enforcement
municipalities have been delegated authority to regulate provision in the Statutes to adopt detailed rules that
certain sexually oriented businesses to promote the public provide a process for obtaining compensation. Thus, on
health, safety or welfare. In Smalley, a cabaret dancer, their face, the Statutes provide for the existence of a
fined for touching a customer while exposing a portion of reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining
her breast, challenged the authority of a city ordinance to compensation.” Id. at 537 (citation omitted).
14
The court’s reasoning suggests that the only 1. Are the private delegate’s actions subject to
constitutionally required standard was the basic standard meaningful review by a state agency or other
that the agency “enforce” the statute, with the statute branch of state government?
itself requiring reasonable compensation. It is difficult to
imagine how any statute could fail this delegation test. 2. Are the persons affected by the private
But the court’s decision reasonably reflects the delegate’s actions adequately represented in the
practicalities of legislation. It is easy enough for the decisionmaking process?
courts to protect property owners’ rights by limiting
judicial review to ascertaining whether the agency 3. Is the private delegate’s power limited to
actually implements the constitutional requirement of just making rules, or does the delegate also apply the
compensation. Here, because the challenge was a facial law to particular individuals?
one, the court did not reach the issue of whether any
individual property owner had been denied its rights either 4. Does the private delegate have a pecuniary
procedurally or substantively. “Because a lack of or other personal interest that may conflict with his
adequate procedures to establish compensation is a or her public function?
necessary element to establish a claim under the takings
doctrine, the Building Owners cannot have a takings 5. Is the private delegate empowered to define
claim until they have availed themselves of the criminal acts or impose criminal sanctions?
Commission’s procedures and have been denied just
compensation.” Id. a 537-38. 6. Is the delegation narrow in duration, extent,
and subject matter?
2. Unlawful delegation to private entities
7. Does the private delegate possess special
The key case for evaluating the constitutionality of qualifications or training for the task delegated to it?
statutes delegating powers to private entities is Texas
Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation, Inc. v. Lewellen, 8. Has the Legislature provided sufficient
952 S.W.2d 454, 465 (Tex.1997). In B oll Weevil, the standards to guide the private delegate in its work?
Supreme Court held that the delegation of authority to a
private foundation to operate a boll weevil eradication Id. at 472.
program and assess growers for the cost of the program
was unconstitutional. The statute at issue required the The Court emphasized that a private delegation need
Commissioner of Agriculture to establish and select a not satisfy all eight of the factors. The foundation in Boll
Foundation board and promulgate some of the Weevil failed factors 1, 3, 4, 7 and 8. Id. at 473-75. The
Foundation’s rules. Id. However, once established, the Court concluded that “the Act as a whole represents an
Foundation was not subject to review or dismissal by the overly broad delegation of legislative authority to a
Commissioner of Agriculture. Id. private entity, violating a majority of the eight factors we
have set forth. Therefore, the Act cannot stand.” Id. at
As the Court noted in Boll Weevil, private 475.
delegations raise “more troubling constitutional issues
than their public counterparts.” Id. at 469. A private The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of
delegate “may have a personal or pecuniary interest delegation to private entities several times since Boll
which is inconsistent with or repugnant to the public Weevil, applying the 8-factor test. In Proctor v.
interest to be served. More fundamentally, the basic Andrews, 972 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1998), Lubbock police
concept of democratic rule under a republican form of officers who were suspended because of violation of civil
government is compromised when public powers are service rules elected to appeal their suspensions pursuant
abandoned to those who are neither elected by the to a statute providing for arbitration services. The City
people, appointed by a public official or entity, nor refused to comply on the ground that the statute was an
employed by the government.” Id. Determining that unconstitutional delegation of authority to a private entity.
private delegations require a “more searching scrutiny,” Finding that the first factor was not satisfied because the
the Court developed eight factors to consider in selection of the arbitrators was not subject to any
determining whether a private delegation is constitutional. meaningful governmental review, the Court nevertheless
The eight factors are:
15
upheld the statute bec ause it satisfied all of the seven G. Unlawful Delegation of Powers Vested in
other factors. Id. at 737-38. the Judicial Branch to State Agencies
In FM Properties Operating Co. v. City of Austin, The separation of powers doctrine established in
22 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2000), the Court struck a provision Article II, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution als o
in the Water Code permitting certain private landowners prohibits the Legislature from interfering with the powers
to create “water quality protection zones” in certain vested in the judicial branch. In Barshop v. Medina
cities’ extraterritorial jurisdictions. The Court found that Underground Water Conservation District, 925
the statute failed factors 1, 2, 4, and 6 and that factors 7 S.W.2d at 635,11 landowners challenged the Edwards
and 8 weighed neither for nor against the delegation. Aquifer Act as violative of the separation of powers
The Court indicated that it placed particular weight on doctrine on the ground that the statute allowed the
factors 1 – the existence of meaningful governmental Authority to determine the nature and extent of
review of the delegates’ actions – and 4 – the existence landowners’ property rights to water beneath their land.
of a conflicting private or pecuniary interest by the While the Court acknowledged that “the power to
delegate. Id. at 875. The Court concluded that “the determine controverted rights to property by means of
delegation here presents the very concerns this Court binding judgment is vested in the judicial branch,” the
identified in Boll Weevil.” Id. at 877. The Court Court nevertheless rejected the challenge. Id. The
expressed particular concern that the statute gave the Court reasoned that “[t]his principle does not bar
landowners the authority to exempt themselves from administrative agencies of the executive branch of
municipal regulations, the landowners were not elected government from working in tandem with the judicial
by the people or appointed by the government, and had a branch to administer justice under appropriate
pecuniary interest that could be inconsistent with the circumstances.” Id. The Court relied heavily on the fact
public interest. Id. that the Authority’s determinations were subject to
judicial review under the APA. Id.
These successful uses of the unlawful delegation
doctrine apparently spawned an unsuccessful attempt to H. Constitutional Prohibition Against
characterize an agency rule requiring participation by the Gratuitous Payment of Public Money to
private entities regulated as a delegation of the agency’s Individuals, Associations or Corporations
authority to those entities. In Texas Workers’
Compensation Commission v. Patient Advocates of The Texas Constitution has two provisions
Texas, 136 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. 2004), a patient prohibiting gratuitous payments of public monies.
organization and provider of health care to injured Article III, section 51 of the Texas Constitution provides:
workers (“PAT”) challenged the validity of health care
reimbursement rules promulgated by the Commission. The Legislature shall have no power to make
PAT argued that the Dispute and Audit Rules, which any grant or authorize the making of any grant
granted insurance carriers the right to gather additional of public moneys to any individual, association
information from health care providers for purposes of of individuals, municipal or other corporations
paying or denying a medical claim, unlawfully delegated whatsoever; provided that the provisions of this
authority to the carriers. Id. at 655. The Court found Section shall not be construed so as to prevent
that this authorization did not delegate any legislative the grant of aid in cases of public calamity.
authority: the carriers had no power to set public policy
or to perform the Commission’s audit reviews and no Article III, section 52(a) of the Texas Constitution
authority to determine the controlling law. Id. The Court provides:
also rejected PAT’s argument that the rules delegated
the Commission’s fee-setting authority to the carriers [T]he Legislature shall have no power to
because it permitted the carrier to develop a methodology authorize any county, city, town or other
to determine reimbursement amounts. Id. The Court political corporation or subdivision of the State
concluded there was no delegation of fee-setting
authority at all: the Commission made the decision on the
proper payment, subject to judicial review, and the 11
Barshop involved numerous constitutional challenges. A
carriers were required to follow agency rules in
review of it for possible grounds for challenging a statute is
establishing their methodologies. Id. at 656-57. recommended.
16
to lend its credit or to grant public money or carriers to pay unclaimed death benefits into the
thing of value in aid of, or to any individual, Subsequent Injury Fund violated Section 52(a) with
association or corporation whatsoever. respect to application to the risk pool, which was a joint
insurance fund consisting of 1600-member cities that
The first prohibition is a prohibition against the elected to self-insure for purposes of workers’
Legislature making these prohibited payments itself. The compensation liability. The Court first held that the
second prohibition prevents the Legislature from requiring constitutional provision was not even applicable because
its political subdivisions to make such payments. The the Fund was neither an individual, association or
Texas Supreme Court has interpreted these provisions to corporation under Section 52(a) but was, instead, an
permit payments that serve a public purpose with a “clear account in the State treasury. Recognizing that the Fund,
public benefit received in return.” Edgewood Indep. however, ultimately disbursed the contributed monies to
Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Tex. 1995). individuals, the Court concluded that payments to
In other words, the prohibition is only against “gratuitous” individuals were not unconstitutional here because the
payments. See Texas Mun. League Intergovernmental cities received some consideration in exchange for the
Risk Pool v. Texas Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 74 required payment. Id. at 384. “Specifically, the
S.W.3d at 383. A payment is not “gratuitous” if the TWCC’s statutory obligation to pay lifetime benefits from
government receives consideration in return for the the Fund to any Risk Pool member city’s employee who
payment. Id. suffers a subsequent injury and qualifies for these
benefits is consideration.” Id. at 385. Finally, the Court
The Supreme Court has articulated a three-part test concluded that payment of these unclaimed death
to determine whether a statute has a public purpose: benefits to the Fund “accomplishes a legitimate public
purpose.” Id.
[T]he Legislature must: (1) ensure that the
statute’s predominant purpose is to accomplish I. Constitutional Prohibition Against “Local”
a public purpose, not to benefit private parties; or “Special” Laws .
(2) retain public control over the funds to
ensure that the public purpose is accomplished Article III, Section 56 of the Texas Constitution
and to protect the public’s investment; and prohibits the Legislature from enacting local or special
(3) ensure that the political subdivision receives laws regarding a variety of matters, ranging from interest
a return benefit. rates and liens to cemeteries and divorces. While the
provision appears at first glance to constitute a viable
Id. mechanism to challenge a variety of statutes, its recent
use has been largely unsuccessful. See, e.g., Zaragoas
The Court has been generally disinclined to strike v. Chemetron Invs., Inc. , 122 S.W.3d 341, 347 (Tex.
legislation as violative of either of these provisions. In App.–Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (unsuccessful challenge
City of Corpus Christi v. Public Utility Commission, 51 to 15-year statute of repose for products liability suits
S.W.3d at 254, the Court held that the provisions were against manufacturers and sellers of equipment); Thomas
inapplicable to charges that the Legislature had v. Bush, 23 S.W.3d 215, 219 (Tex. App.–Beaumont
authorized the PUC to order paid by ratepayers to utilities 2000, pet. denied) (failed challenge to statute prohibiting
for their investment in generation plant and equipment inmates from filing pro se suits unless they filed affidavit
that would become uneconomic or “stranded” after the identifying prior suits). A “local law is one limited to a
State transitioned to a competitive electric market. The specific geographic region of the state, while a special
Court side-stepped the public purpose distinction law is limited to a particular class of persons distinguished
altogether, reasoning that the required payments were by some characteristic other than geography.” Juliff
nothing more than a continuation of PUC ratemaking and Gardens, 131 S.W.3d at 281. Laws targeting specific
did not involve the use of state or public funds to pay the geographic regions or class of people, however, are not
charges. Id. per se unconstitutional. “The primary and ultimate test
of whether a law is general or special [so as to be
In Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental unconstitutional] is whether there is a reasonable basis
Risk Pool v. Texas Workers’ Compensation for the classification made by the law, and whether the
Commission, 74 S.W.3d 377 at 384, the Court rejected a law operates equally on all within the class.” Maple Run
challenge that a state statute requiring compensation
17
at Austin Mun. Util. Dist. v. Monaghan, 931 S.W.2d objective of Congress.’” 530 U.S. at 372-73, 120 S.Ct. at
941, 945 (Tex. 1996). 2294. These categories are helpful in an analysis of
preemption issues, but it should be kept in mind that they
In Juliff Gardens, an applic ant for a landfill permit are not “rigidly distinct” and a statute may fall into more
challenged a state law requiring denial of his application than one category. English v. General Elec. Co., 496
as an unconstitutional local or special law. The plaintiff U.S. at 79 n.5, 110 S.Ct. at 2275 n.5.
argued that the legislative history of the statutory
amendment at issue, passed while his landfill application A. Challenges Under the Dormant
was pending, established that the amendment specifically Commerce Clause
targeted his application and, as such, was
unconstitutional. 131 S.W.3d at 283. The Austin Court A couple of recent decisions have involved
of Appeals rejected the argument, reasoning that the challenges to the constitutionality of state statutes under
constitutional analysis focused on “the reasonableness of the dormant Commerce Clause. The “dormant” or
the statute’s classifications” rather than “the precipitating “negative” Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution
forces that led to its enactment.” Id. The court upheld “prohibits states from engaging in economic
the statute “because the classifications within the section protectionism.” International Truck & Engine Corp.
are reasonable, and because the law operates equally on v. Bray, 372 F.3d 717, 725 (5th Cir. 2004).
all within the class.” Id. at 285.
In International Truck, a truck manufacturer
VI. Challenges Based on the U.S. Constitution challenged as violative of the dormant Commerce Clause
the Texas Occupations Code section that bars a truck
Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. manufacturer from operating as a dealer of used truc ks.
Constitution, State statutes and agency rules are always Id. at 724. As a prohibition against acting as a dealer,
subordinate to either federal statutes or constitutional the statute effectively prohibits manufacturers from
provisions with which they conflict. U.S. CONST . art. VI, selling used vehicles because, in making the sale, the
cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause provides that federal law manufacturer would be “acting as a dealer.” Id. at 719.
“shall be the supreme Law of the Land” and that “the The manufacturer argued that such a prohibition was
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.” Id. The discriminatory and impermissibly burdened the out-of-
Clause has been interpreted to require state laws to yield state economic interests of manufacturers and benefited
to federal law when they “interfere with, or are contrary the local interests of in-state car and truck dealers. The
to the laws of Congress.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S . court rejected the argument, finding that the statute did
(9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824). not discriminate between similarly situated in-state and
out-of-state interests at all. Id. at 726. The court
There are three basic types of federal preemption: reasoned that there was nothing in the legislative history
express, field, and conflict preemption. English v. of the statute “to suggest that the Texas Legislature
General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, intended to discriminate between similarly situated
2275 (1990). Express preemption occurs when Congress interests” and that the statute did not discriminate
explicitly defines the extent to which its enactment because it applied to “motor vehicle manufacturers,
preempts state law. Id. at 78, 110 S.Ct. at 2275. While whether Texas-based or not.” Id. The court also found
express preemption may sound like the easiest, clearest no discrimination against dealers based on out-of-state
form of preemption, cases turning on express preemption status because “any non-manufacturer, whether Texas-
are often split decisions, suggesting that it is not always based or not, could receive a dealer license.” Id.
altogether clear just what Congress has “expressed.”
See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 In Home Interiors & Gifts, Inc. v. Strayhorn, No.
U.S. 374, 112 S.Ct. 2031 (1992). Field preemption 03-04-00600-CV, 2005 WL 178480 (Tex. App.–Austin
occurs when “Congress intends federal law to ‘occupy 2005, July 28, 2005, no pet.), a taxpayer challenged the
the field.’” Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, constitutionality of the Texas corporate franchise tax
530 U.S. 363, 372, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 2293 (2000). Conflict under the dormant Commerce Clause. To survive a
preemption occurs when “it is impossible for a private challenge under the Commerce Clause, a state tax must
party to comply with both state and federal law” and be fairly apportioned so as to ensure that no state taxes
when the state law “‘stands as an obstacle to the more than its fair share of an interstate transaction. Id.
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and at *5. The tax must be “internally consistent” – i.e., the
18
tax must result in fair apportionment under a hypothetical restricted the State’s authority to create a universal
scenario in which every state imposes a tax identical to service fund to actions that were not inconsistent with the
the one at issue. Id. at *6. The court held that the federal scheme. Id. at 647. Since the FCC’s fund
franchise tax flunked this test because an interstate assessed fees on the basis of interstate revenues, the
corporation would be liable for franchise taxes on its net state was precluded from doing so.
taxable capital in all states in which it did business, while
a corporation doing business only in Texas would not. Id. 2. The federal Medicaid laws
at *8. This rendered the Texas tax internally inconsistent
because the interstate corporation would be taxed on its Another area with the potential for conflicts
net taxable earned surplus in Texas and would pay between state and federal law is the states’
franchise tax on its net taxable capital in all other states. implementation of federal Medicaid benefits. In
Id. The majority expressed reluctance to reach this Comacho v. Texas Workforce Commission, 408 F.3d
result because the risk of such a nationwide tax scheme 229 (5th Cir. 2005), the Fifth Circuit invalidated a TWC
was purely theoretical but concluded that the U.S. rule that required termination of Medicaid benefits if
Supreme Court precedent compelled the result. Id. at recipients failed to ensure their children’s immunizations,
*10. wellness check-ups, school attendance, or failed to avoid
substance abuse. Federal law establishes various
B. Preemption When a State Agency standards for both the federal-state Temporary
Misapplies the Federal Law It Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF”) and the
Implements federal Medicaid Act. States are given relatively broad
authority with respect to the operation of the TANF
Congress often passes federal laws and standards program, including authority to terminate TANF
in a regulated area but leaves to the states the assistance for a variety of social and policy reasons such
implementation of much of the federal program. as the TANF recipients’ refusing to work, failing to keep
Preemption issues often arise when the state attempts to their children in school or failing to avoid substance
interpret the federal law. abuse. Much less discretion is given the states with
respect to terminating Medicaid benefits, and a federal
1. The federal Telecommunications Act statute expressly limits termination of Medicaid benefits
of 1996 to TANF recipients who are having their TANF benefits
“because of refusing to work.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-
In 1996, Congress passed legislation that was 1(b)(3).
designed to bring competition to the local telephone
market. State commissions implement much of the The Fifth Circuit rejected TWC’s argument that the
applicable laws, but the FCC also regulates in the area beneficial activities such as keeping children in school
and conflicts often arise with respect to state regulation and avoiding substance abuse could be characterized as
that impacts telecommunications providers who operate work under the federally defined work activity of “job
on an interstate basis. In AT&T Corp. v. Public Utility search and job readiness.” The court held that both the
Commission, 373 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 2004), the Fifth plain language of the Medicaid Act and the rest of the
Circuit struck down a state regulation that required all Act rendered TWC’s interpretation impermissible. Id. at
carriers providing intrastate service to pay a percentage 235. Concluding that TWC’s definition of work fell
of their total telecommunications revenue originating in outside the “range of permissible choices” granted to the
the state into a state universal service fund. The FCC State, the court also rejected TWC’s argument that its
had a similar fund for interstate services, and the state interpretation should be accepted because the Medicaid
funding system would have required payment on the Act is “designed to advance cooperative federalism.” Id.
basis of interstate calls that originated in Texas. The at 236 (quotations and citations omitted). The court did
Court agreed with the district court’s ruling that the not address the issue of whether TWC’s interpretation of
state’s “assessment of revenues derived from both federal law should be given any deference, concluding
interstate and intrastate calls was inequitable and that deference of any sort was inapplicable because
discriminatory because it burdened multijurisdictional where “the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of
carriers more harshly than their pure interstate the matter.” Id. at 237.
competitors.” Id. at 645. The Court concluded that the
state scheme conflicted with the federal law that
19
3. Restrictions on Abortion Funding and which preemption was based be intended to confer
Clinics individual rights on the plaintiff. The court further
declined to reach the issue of whether Planned
Like other states, Texas voluntarily participates in Parenthood could sue under § 1983. Id. at 335.
several federal programs that provide funds for family
planning services. The Public Health Service Act, which Neither affirming nor reversing the district court’s
provides federal grants to public and private agencies, injunction, the Fifth Circuit remanded, reasoning that the
and the Social Security Act, which provides states with statute was ambiguous and could be interpreted to permit
block grants for social services, both prohibit use of distribution of funds to Planned Parenthood as long as it
federal funds to finance abortions. Planned Parenthood created separate affiliates to perform the abortion
entities in Texas (collectively “Planned Parenthood”) servic es. The court stated, “The mere fact that a state
have long been a recipient of these funds for use in its program imposes an additional ‘modest impediment’ to
family planning services. It has never used the funds for eligibility for federal funds does not provide a sufficient
abortion services but has, instead, relied on private basis for preemption.” Id. at 336-37. The court directed
donations for that part of its services. In 2003, the Texas that the district court dissolve the injunction unless
Legislature elected to take restrictions on abortion Planned Parenthood “can show that the burden of
services a step further than the federal prohibition and forming affiliates in forthcoming years would in practical
passed legislation that no funds for family planning could terms frustrate their ability to receive federal funds.” Id.
be distributed to individuals or entities that perform at 342.
elective abortion procedures. The Texas Department of
Health (“TDH”) interpreted the statute to prohibit Planned Parenthood is important in at least two
payments to entities like Planned Parenthood. TDH sent respects. First, it recognizes an implied right of action
letters to Planned Parenthood, requiring it to sign and under the Supremacy Clause to challenge a state statute
return an affidavit that pledged that it would not perform as preempted by federal Spending Clause legislation.
elective abortion procedures and would not contract with Second, it indicates that the state can impose some
or provide funds to individuals or entities that did. additional burdens and restrictions on a federal program,
provided those burdens do not unduly frustrate the
In Planned Parenthood of Houston and federal goals.
Southeast Texas v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324 (5th Cir.
2005), Planned Parenthood sued the Commissioner of C. Comprehensive and Express Preemption
Health to enjoin TDH from implementing the statute on (or Not)
the ground that it imposed an unconstitutional condition on
Planned Parenthood’s eligibility for the funds. It argued 1. The Broadest Preemption There Is–
that the state statute imposed an additional condition on ERISA
eligibility for funds that was inconsistent with the federal
requirements and, therefore, was in violation of federal Preemption issues arising out of the federal
Spending Clause legislation, and further argued that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”),
state legislation imposed an unconstitutional burden on a which governs employee pension and benefit plans, have
woman’s right to obtain an abortion. Id. at 328. The been a major source of preemption litigation since
district court granted preliminary injunctive relief, which passage of ERISA in 1974. ERISA is an example of
the Commissioner appealed. broad federal preemption as a result of comprehensive
federal legislation. The most recent, significant case
TDH argued that the federal courts could not impacting Texas law is Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542
consider Planned Parenthood’s suit because it was not U.S. 200, 124 S.Ct. 2488 (2004). In Aetna, two
seeking to vindicate any right or to enforce any duty individuals sued their respective health maintenance
running to it, the right to abortion resting with the female organizations (HMOs) for alleged failure to exercise
patients. Id. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, ordinary care in handling coverage decisions, in violation
holding that the entity had stated a claim for Spending of a duty imposed by the Texas Health Care Liability Act
Clause preemption. Id. at 332-34. The court rejected (“THCLA”). The Texas Legislature passed THCLA in
TDH’s argument that Planned Parenthood was required response to public outcry over difficulties in obtaining
to establish a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which treatment and coverage of claims by HMOs. The
had the additional requirement that the federal law on
20
Supreme Court held that the state legislation was tort claims based on defective design and manufacture,
preempted by ERISA. negligent testing, and breach of express warranty were
not preempted because state laws in these areas were
The Court rejected the argument that THCLA fell similarly not requirements for labeling or packing. Finally,
within the purview of a provision in ERISA excepting the Court held that state-law labeling requirements would
from ERISA preemption state statutes that regulate not be preempted by FIFRA to the extent they were
insurance, an area traditionally the province of the states. equivalent to and fully consistent with FIFRA’s
The Court reasoned that “[a]llowing respondents to misbranding provisions.
proceed with their state-law suits would ‘pose an
obstacle to the purposes and objectives of Congress.’” The Supreme Court ruling reversed a Fifth Circuit
124 S.Ct. at 2500. decision and overruled several Circuit Court decisions.
The Court based its decision on a narrow reading of the
In a concurring opinion, Justice Ginsberg noted and express preemption provision in the statute, finding that
joined “‘the rising judicial chorus urging that Congress the statute preempted only requirements for labeling or
and [this] Court revisit what is an unjust and increasingly packaging that were in addition to or different from those
tangled ERISA regime.’” Id. at 2503. She further required under the federal law. Id. at 1798. The key
noted, “Because the Court has coupled an encompassing focus was on the “scope of that pre-emption” and the
interpretation of ERISA’s preemptive force with a Court concluded that rules about labeling and packaging
cramped construction of the ‘equitable relief’ allowable do not encompass within their scope rules governing the
under” the federal statute, a “regulatory vacuum” exists design of a product. Id. Therefore, product liability
in which state law remedies are preempted but few standards regarding negligent or defective design are
federal substitutes are given. Id. outside the scope of FIFRA.
2. Importance of the Scope of the Successfully characterizing a state statute or rule as

Federal Regulation – a FIFRA case addressing matters outside the “scope” of what a federal
statutory scheme either expressly or comprehensively
In contrast to the broad preemption rulings with regulates appears to be the means to avoid federal
respect to ERISA, the Supreme Court recently held that preemption.
various common law claims as well as claims under the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act against an 3. A Narrow Construction of Scope and
herbicide manufacturer for crop damages caused by its Plain Language – a CERCLA
herbicide were not preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Decision
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences LLC, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 1788 A recent Fifth Circuit decision takes the concept of
(2005). FIFRA is a comprehensive regulatory statute scope of preemption to a new level. This past summer,
that governs the use, as well as the sale and labeling, of the Fifth Circuit held that the Texas statute of repose for
pesticides and herbicides. A manufacturer seeking to products liability claims was not preempted by a provision
register a pesticide must submit a proposed label to the of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
EPA to ensure that its label complies with the federal Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) that
statute’s prohibition against misbranding. A pesticide is engrafted a discovery rule onto state statutes of
misbranded if its label has false or misleading statements limitations. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Poole
or if its label does not contain adequate instructions for Chem. Co, 419 F.3d 355, 364 (5th Cir. 2005). Burlington,
use or omits necessary warnings or cautionary a railroad that conducted emergency clean-up and
statements. Id. at 1795. In approving proposed labels, restoration of its right-of-way after the rupture of above-
the EPA essentially determines that there is no ground chemical storage tanks, sued the seller of the
misbranding in the label. tanks and others on the ground that the tanks were
defective. Defendants moved for summary judgment,
The Court held that DTPA, breach of warranty, and relying on a Texas statute of repose, which bars products
fraud claims based on oral misrepresentations by sales liability claims against manufacturers from suits based on
agents were not preempted by FIFRA because oral products sold more than 15 years prior to the filing of
representations are not a requirement for labeling or suit. The date of sale here occurred in 1988; suit was
packaging under FIFRA. Similarly, the Court held that filed in 2004.
21
Burlington unsuccessfully raised state-law regarding the primacy of plain language. Under the
retroactivity and open courts arguments with respect to reasoning in this case, if Congress expressly addresses a
the Texas statute, which was passed in 2003. The particular type of state statute being preempted and fails
company also argued that Section 9658 of CERCLA, to mention other state statutes with similar purposes, the
which preempts state statutes of limitations in state law latter will survive a preemption challenge regardless of
causes of action for personal injury or property damage any undermining of the general purposes of the federal
arising from exposure to any hazardous substance legislation.
released into the environment, also preempted Texas’
statutes of repose. Section 9658 engrafts onto all state
statutes of limitations a deferral of accrual of a cause of
action “until the plaintiff knew or, exercising reasonable
diligence, should have known of the facts giving rise to
the cause of action.” Id. at 362 (quoting statute).
Statutes of repose, like statutes of limitations, impose

a time bar for suits. Statutes of limitations are often
subjected to court-formulated discovery rules; statutes of
repose are not. As the Fifth Circuit noted, statutes of
repose are much broader than statutes of limitation:
A statute of limitations extinguishes the right to

prosecute an accrued cause of action after a
period of time. It cuts off the remedy . . . . A
statute of repose limits the time during which a
cause of action can arise and usually runs from
an act of a defendant. It abolishes the cause
of action after the passage of time even though
the cause of action may not have yet accrued.
Id. at 363.
The Court observed that Congress, in passing

Section 9658, had expressly addressed only state statutes
of limitations and made “no mention of peremptory
statutes or statutes of repose.” Id. at 362. The court
therefore concluded that it was bound “by that plain
language, absent express congressional intent to the
contrary,” reasoning that its “interpretation comports with
a fundamental principle of statutory
construction–common sense.” Id. at 364. The court
further reasoned that Section 9658 was passed in
response to concerns about long-latency diseases, not
hazardous leaks from storage facilities. Id.
The court did not address traditional preemption

analysis regarding the purposes of the federal legislation
and whether the state statute would thwart those
purposes. It is difficult to conceive how a statute of
repose, which is even harsher than a statute of limitation,
would not thwart a federal statute intended to permit suits
timely filed after the plaintiff did or should have
discovered the claim. This case is a significant one
22

Texas Constitutional Challenges

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CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO

STATE STATUTES AND RULES

State Bar of Texas

phone: (512) 480-5682

Vanderbilt University (B.A., magna cum laude, 1975)

phone: (512) 480-5768

Rice University (B.A. 1971)

Graves, Dougherty, Hearon & Moody - Since April 2004

II. Threshold Issues: Standing, Justiciability, Ripeness and Joinder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

III. Nuts and Bolts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

IV. "Facial" versus "As Applied" Constitutional Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

V. Challenges Based on the Texas Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

VI. Challenges Based on the U.S. Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES County Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925

In Hospitals v. Continental Casualty Co., 109

In 2002, the Texas Supreme Court addressed an

Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution

2. Importance of the Scope of the Successfully characterizing a state statute or rule as

Statutes of repose, like statutes of limitations, impose

A statute of limitations extinguishes the right to

The Court observed that Congress, in passing

The court did not address traditional preemption

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