4th Cpuh National Moot Court Competition, 2023 (Respondent Side)

T.C.
– CPUH11/23
T.C. – CPUH11/23
IVTH CAREER POINT UNVERSITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION,

IVTH CAREER POINT UNVERSITY NATIONAL
2023 MOOT COURT COMPETITION,
2023
BEFORE THE HON’BLE

BEFORE THE HON’BLE
SUPREME COURT OF KAHLER
SUPREME COURT OF KAHLER
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. _____OF 2002

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. _____OF 2002
UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KAHLER
UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KAHLER
HERSELF
HERSELF
…………. PETITIONER
…………. PETITIONER
V.
V.
STATE OF UTTAR RAYAN & ORS.
STATE OF UTTAR RAYAN & ORS.
…………RESPONDENTS
…………RESPONDENTS
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
4TH CAREER POINT UNIVERSITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2023
TABLE OF CONTENTS
➢ LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS…………………………………………………………4
➢ INDEX OF AUTHORITIES………………………………………………………….5
➢ STAETEMENT OF JURISDICTION………………………………………………..7
➢ STATEMENT OF FACTS…………………………………………………………….8
➢ STATEMENT OF ISSUES……………………………………………………………11
➢ SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS……………………………………………………...12
➢ ARGUMENTS ADVANCED………………………….……………………………...14
[ ISSUE NO. 1] WHTHER THE EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICE WHICH IS BASED
UPON A BILOGICAL FACTOR EXCLUSIVE TO THE FEAMLE GENDER
AMOUNTS TO ‘‘DISCRIMINATION’’ AND THEREBY VIOLATES THE VERY
CORE OF ARTICLES 14, 15 AND 17 AND ARE NOT PROTECTED BY
‘‘MORALITY’’ AS USED IN ARTICLES 25 AND 26 OF THE
CONSTITUTION?...........................................................................................................14
[1.1] THE SAID RESTRICTION IMPOSED ON WOMEN BETWEEN THE AGE OF
10 AND 50 YEARS IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF INDIA.
[1.2] THE SAID RESTRICTION IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ANY FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 15
[1.3] THE SAID RESTRICTION IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 17 OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
[ ISSUE NO. 2] WHETHER THE CUSTOM OF EXCLUDING SUCH WOMEN

CONSTITUTES AN ‘‘ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE’’ UNDER ARTICLE
25 AND WHETHER A RELIGIOUS INSTITUION CAN ASSERT A CLAIM IN
THAT REGARD UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF RIGHT TO MANAGE ITS OWN
AFFARIS IN THE MATTERS OF RELIGION?.......................................................20
[2.1] WHAT CONSTITUTES AS ‘‘ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICES’’ IS THE
MATTER TO BE DECIDED BY THE RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION ONLY
[2.2] A RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION HAS THE RIGHT TO MANAGE ITS AFFAIRS IN
THE MATTERS OF RELIGION
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 2 of 31

[ ISSUE – 3] WHTHER RULE 3 OF THE UTTAR RAYAN HINDU PLACES OF

WORSHIP (AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY) RULES PERMITS ‘‘RELIGIOUS
DENOMINATION’’ TO BAN ENTRY OF WOMEN BETWEEN THE AGE OF 10
TO 50 YEARS? AND IF SO, WOULD IT NOT PLAY FOUL OF ARTICLE 14 AND
15(3) OF THE CONSTITUTION BY RESTRICTING ENTRY OF WOMEN ON THE
GROUND OF SEX?.......................................................................................................24
[3.1] THE TEMPLE BOARD IS A ‘STATE’ UNDER ARTICLE 12
[3.2] THE DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IMPOSED BY THE IMPUGNED RULE 3(b)

DOES NOT VIOLATE RIGHT TO EQUALITY
[3.3] THE IMPUGNED RULE 3(B) IS A SPECIFIC PROVISION PROTECTED UNDER

ART. 15(3).
ISSUE – IV WHETHER RULE 3(B) OF UTTAR RAYAN HINDU PLACES OF

WORSHIP (AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY) RULES, 1965 IS ULTRA VIRES THE
UTTAR RAYAN HINDU PLACES OF WORSHIP (AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY)
ACT, 1965 AND, IF TREATED TO BE INTRA VIRES, WHETHER IT WILL BE
VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE PART-III OF THE
CONSTITUTION?..........................................................................................................28
[4.1] RULE 3(B) IS NOT ULTRA VIRES THE ACT.
[4.2] RULE 3(B) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE PROVISIONS OF PART - III OF
THE CONSTITUTION.
➢ PRAYER……………………………………………………………………………….31

LIST OF ABREVIATIONS
& and
AIR All India Reporter
Art. Article
Anr. Another
Ed. Edition
Const. Constitution
Govt. Government
Hon’ble Honourable
International Covenant on Civil and Political

ICCPR
Rights
Ors. Others
PIL Public Interest Litigation
Pub. Public
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SC Supreme Court
Vol. Volume
V. Versus

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
LIST OF CASES
• State of Gujarat V. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Jamat, (2005) 8 S.C.C. 534

• R.K. Garg V. Union of India, (1981) 4 S.C.C. 675
• Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, 1958 AIR 255, 1958 SCR 895
• State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale, AIR 1993 S.C. 1126
• Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, (1987) A.I.R. 748
• D.R.R. Varu V. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1970 S.C.181
• Ravipuram Bhajana Sangham v. Cochin Devaswom Board, A.I.R. (2001)
• Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India, 1950 SCR 869: AIR 1951 SC 41; Dhirendra v. Legal
Remembrancer, (1955) 1SCR 224: AIR 1954 SC424
• 27 St. Stephens College v. University of Delhi, AIR 1992 SC 1630
• State of Kerela v. N.M. Thomas (1976) 2 SCC 310: AIR 1976 C 490
• Deepak Sibbal v. Punjab University, A.I.R. 1989 SC 903
• Dharam Das v. Union of India, (2004) 1 SCC 712: AIR 2004 SC 1295
• Kedar Nath v. State of West Bengal, 1954 SCR 30: AIR 1953 SC 404
• Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union Of India, AIR 1992 (Supp) 1 SCC 594
• M. Nagraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212: AIR 2007 SC 71
• 32 Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay & H. Laljee, AIR 1954 SC 321: (1954) 1 SCR
930: (1954) 56 BOM LR1179
• Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay & H. Laljee, AIR 1954 SC 321: (1954) 1 SCR930
• 34 State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75
• State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318: (1951) 2 SCR 68
STATUTES
• The Constitution of India, 1950
• Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955
• Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship Act, 1965

BOOKS
• M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, 6th Edition 2010, LexisNexis Butterworth Wadhwa
Nagpur
• Narender Kumar, Constitutional Law of India, 9th Edition 2015, Allahabad Law Agency
• J.N. Pandey Dr., The Constitutional Law of India, 48th Edition 2011, Central Law Agency
• D.D. Basu Dr., Introduction to the Constitution of India, 21stt Edition 2013, LexisNexis
• G.P. Tripathi Dr., Constitutional Law New Challenges,2nd edition 2018, Central Law
Publication
LEGAL DATABASES
• Manupatra
• SCC Online

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Respondent, hereby submits this Memorandum before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
Kahler, invoking the writ jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution.
Article 32-
“Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part-
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the
enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by this Part.
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (1) and
(2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits
of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under
clause (2) (4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as
otherwise provided for by this Constitution.”

STATEMENT OF FACTS
HISTORY OF THE TEMPLE

The deity in Lord Devan temple is in the form of a Yogi or a Brahmachari according to the
Thanthri (Priest) of the temple. The temple was built in 1912 by a priest family of the Uttar
Rayan. After independence the temple was shifted under a trust board - Uttar Rayan Lord
Devan Board, a statutory body under the Uttar Rayan Hindu Places of Public Worship
(Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 which looks into the administrationon of the temple. A new
building was made and deity was shifted to new temple in 20 March, 1960. The Uttar Rayan
Lord Devan Board restricted the entry of women between the ages of 10 to 50 years as a custom
and practice integral to the sanctity of the Temple. This practice of restricting the entry of
women is admied to have been prevalent since the past several centuries and considered as
essential practice.
THE UTTAR RAYAN HINDU PLACES OF PUBLIC WORSHIP ACT, 1965

These practices are protected by the proviso to Secon 3 of the 1965 Act which is given effect
to by Rule 3(b) of the Uttar Rayan Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry)
Rules, 1965. Secon 3(b) of the 1965 Act provides that every place of public worship which is
open to Hindus generally, or to any section or class thereof, shall be open to all sections and
classes of Hindus; and no Hindu of whatsoever secon or class shall, in any manner be
prevented, obstructed or discouraged from entering such place of public worship or from
worshipping or from offering prayers there or performing any religious service therein, in the
like manner and to the like extent as any other Hindu of whatsoever secon or class may enter,
worship, pray or perform. The proviso to Secon 3 of the 1965 Act carves out an exception in
the case of public worship in a temple founded for the benefit of any religious denomination or
section thereof. The provisions of the main section would be subject to the right of a religious
denomination or section to manage its own affairs in the matters of religion. The proviso to Sec
on 3 makes an exception in cases of religious denominations, or sects thereof to
manage their affairs in matters of religion.
PROHIBITION OF WOMEN'S ENTRY IN LORD DEVAN TEMPLE OF UTTAR RAYAN

People of Uttar Rayan have blind faith in Lord Devan and there is a belief that all the
adversaries of people are vanished by visiting the temple. However, the women from the age
group of 10-50 years were barred from entering the premises of core temple on the basis of
custom and ritual followed since 1912. The prohibition is placed on the ground of maintaining

the purity and sanctity of the premises. This custom has been followed without any opposition
till 2001 in the State.
‘HERSELF’ NGO RAISES ISSUE OF WOMEN'S ENTRY IN LORD DEVAN TEMPLE
In 2002 an NGO named HERSELF, working for women rights raised the issue of prohibiting
women entry in the Lord Devan temple before the temple trust. The trust denied any change
or modification in customs as it would be an interference with the faith of people. According
to trust, since the establishment of temple, no woman has ever raised such kind of issue before
the trust, showing the affirmation by women to the prevailing custom.
PUBLIC DIVIDED ON WOMEN'S ENTRY IN LORD DEVAN TEMPLE
The issue was also raised in public with the help of mass media. The public was divided into
two sections, one progressive who wanted to break the stereotype prevailing in society on the
grounds of equality and secularism. The other being conservative, wanting to continue with
old customs and practices. However, the most interesting part is that even the view of women
is not unanimous on this.
LORD DEVAN TEMPLES IN KAHLER WITHOUT ENTRY RESTRICTIONS FOR

WOMEN
There are two more temples of Lord Devan in Kahler- one has been situated in Amrit Hara state
and another in North Stone State. Lord Devan temple of Amrit Hara was built in around 17th
century whereas Lord Devan temple of North Sone was built in late 18th century. Both the
temple does not follow any such custom of prohibiting the entry of women in the
temple premise.
WRIT PETITION FILED FOR WOMEN'S ENTRY IN LORD DEVAN TEMPLE
The instant writ petition preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution by HERSELF, a non-
government organization seeking the issuance of directions against the Government of Uttar
Rayan, Trust Board and Chief Thanthri of Devan Temple to ensure entry of female devotees
between the age group of 10 to 50 years to the Lord Devan Temple at Uttar Rayan which has
been denied to them on the basis of certain custom and usage; to declare Rule 3(b) of the
Uttar Rayan Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 (for short,
"the 1965 Rules") framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 4 of the Uttar Rayan
Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 (for brevity, "the 1965

Act") as unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14, 15, 25 and 51A(e) of the Constitution
of Kahler and further to pass directions for the safety of women pilgrims.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE
ISSUE 1
WHTHER THE EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICE WHICH IS BASED UPON A

BIOLOGICAL FACTOR EXCLUSIVE TO THE FEMALE GENDER AMOUNTS TO
‘‘DISCRIMINATION’’ AND THEREBY VIOLATES THE VERY CORE OF ARTICLES 14,
15 AND 17 AND ARE NOT PROTECTED BY ‘‘MORALITY’’ AS USED IN ARTICLES 25
AND 26 OF THE CONSTITUTION?
ISSUE 2
WHETHER THE CUSTOM OF EXCLUDING SUCH WOMEN CONSTITUTES AN
‘‘ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE’’ UNDER ARTICLE 25 AND WHETHER A
RELIGIOUS INSTITUION CAN ASSERT A CLAIM IN THAT REGARD UNDER THE
UMBRELLA OF RIGHT TO MANAGE ITS OWN AFFARIS IN THE MATTERS OF
RELIGION?
ISSUE 3
WHTHER RULE 3 OF THE UTTAR RAYAN HINDU PLACES OF WORSHIP
(AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY) RULES PERMITS ‘‘RELIGIOUS DENOMINARION’’
TO BAN ENTRY OF WOMEN BETWEEN THE AGE OF 10 TO 50 YEARS? AND IF SO,
WOULD IT NOT PLAY FOUL OF ARTICLE 14 AND 15(3) OF THE CONSTITUTION BY
RESTRICTING ENTRY OF WOMEN ON THE GROUND OF SEX?
ISSUE 4
WHETHER RULE 3(B) OF UTTAR RAYAN HINDU PLACES OF WORSHIP

(AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY) RULES, 1965 IS ULTRA VIRES THE UTTAR RAYAN
HINDU PLACES OF WORSHIP (AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY) ACT, 1965 AND, IF
TREATED TO BE INTRA VIRES, WHETHER IT WILL BE VIOLATIVE OF THE
PROVISIONS OF THE PART-III OF THE CONSTITUTION?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. WHTHER THE EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICE WHICH IS BASED UPON A

BIOLOGICAL FACTOR EXCLUSIVE TO THE FEMALE GENDER AMOUNTS
TO ‘‘DISCRIMINATION’’ AND THEREBY VIOLATES THE VERY CORE OF
ARTICLES 14, 15 AND 17 AND ARE NOT PROTECTED BY ‘‘MORALITY’’ AS
USED IN ARTICLES 25 AND 26 OF THE CONSTITUTION?
The counsel for the respondents humbly submits that the exclusionary practice which is
based upon a biological factor exclusive to the female gender does not amount to
discrimination and that there has been no violation of article 14, 15(3) & 17 of the
Constitution of India, 1950, in light of Rule 3(b) of the Uttar Rayan Hindu Places of Public
Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules & Rule 3(b) of the Uttar Rayan Hindu Places of
Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules is constitutional.
2. WHETHER THE CUSTOM OF EXCLUDING SUCH WOMEN CONSTITUTES AN

‘‘ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE’’ UNDER ARTICLE 25 AND WHETHER
A RELIGIOUS INSTITUION CAN ASSERT A CLAIM IN THAT REGARD UNDER
THE UMBRELLA OF RIGHT TO MANAGE ITS OWN AFFARIS IN THE
MATTERS OF RELIGION?
The counsel for the respondents humbly submits that the practice of excluding women
between 10-50 years of age into the temple does constitutes an “essential religious practice”
and will conclusively assert such claim. The Lord Devan temple can assert, in that regard,
protection of being under the umbrella of right to manage its own affairs in matters of
religion.
3. WHTHER RULE 3 OF THE UTTAR RAYAN HINDU PLACES OF WORSHIP

(AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY) RULES PERMITS ‘‘RELIGIOUS
DENOMINARION’’ TO BAN ENTRY OF WOMEN BETWEEN THE AGE OF 10
TO 50 YEARS? AND IF SO, WOULD IT NOT PLAY FOUL OF ARTICLE 14 AND
15(3) OF THE CONSTITUTION BY RESTRICTING ENTRY OF WOMEN ON THE
GROUND OF SEX?
The counsel for the respondents humbly submits that the rule 3 of the Uttar Rayan Hindu
Places of Public Worship (authorization of entry) Rules permits ‘‘religious denomination’’

to ban entry of women between the age of 10 to 50 years also it would not play foul of
article 14 and 15(3) of the constitution by restricting entry of women on the ground of sex.
4. WHETHER RULE 3(B) OF UTTAR RAYAN HINDU PLACES OF WORSHIP

(AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY) RULES, 1965 IS ULTRA VIRES THE UTTAR
RAYAN HINDU PLACES OF WORSHIP (AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY) ACT,
1965 AND, IF TREATED TO BE INTRA VIRES, WHETHER IT WILL BE
VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE PART-III OF THE
CONSTITUTION?
The counsel for the respondents humbly submits that rule 3(b) of Uttar Rayan Hindu Places
of worship (authorization of entry) rules, 1965 is ultra vires the Uttar Rayan Hindu places
of worship (authorization of entry) act, 1965 and also it is not violative of the provisions of
the Part-III of the Constitution.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
[ ISSUE NO. 1] WHTHER THE EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICE WHICH IS BASED

UPON A BIOLOGICAL FACTOR EXCLUSIVE TO THE FEAMLE GENDER
AMOUNTS TO ‘‘DISCRIMINATION’’ AND THEREBY VIOLATES THE VERY
CORE OF ARTICLES 14, 15 AND 17 AND ARE NOT PROTECTED BY ‘‘MORALITY’’
AS USED IN ARTICLES 25 AND 26 OF THE CONSTITUTION?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the essential elements of a valid
custom are that it must be followed from time immemorial, it must be reasonable, certain and
continuous. The customs and usages, religious beliefs and practices as mentioned above are
peculiar to the Lord Devan Temple and have admittedly been followed from a very long time.
The limited restriction on the entry of women from 10 to 50 years, in Lord Devan Temple is a
matter of ‘religion’ and ‘religious faith and practice’. The classification of women between the
ages of 10 to 50 years, has a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved, which is
to preserve the identity and manifestation of the Lord as a Brahmachari.
Primary reason behind restricting the females of age 10 to 50 years from entering the temple is
the fact that performing or attending religious ceremonies and rituals, or entering temples
during menstruation over a long period of time may have an adverse effect on the health of the
menstruating woman. The energy present at a properly consecrated temple, or the energy
generated in a properly performed religious ritual, will facilitate spiritual upliftment and
calmness of the mind in those who participate, by causing the Apana vayu to move upwards.
This upward movement will interfere with the downward movement of Apana vayu that is
facilitating menstruation. This interference will result in imbalance of the Prakriti Doshas,
which in-turn will affect the health of the menstruating woman over a long duration.
Thus, menstruating women have been advised not to take part in any religious activity,
including visiting temples, so as to fulfil the dual purpose of: facilitating maintenance of the
spiritual atmosphere at the temples and during the religious ceremonies, without any
disturbance to its energy and spiritual environment; and protecting the menstruating woman
from any adverse effects on her health due to interference with her physiological functioning
of Doshas.

[1.1] THE SAID RESTRICTION IMPOSED ON WOMEN BETWEEN THE AGE OF

10 AND 50 YEARS IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF INDIA.
Article 14 of the Constitution reads as: “Equality before law—The State shall not deny to any
person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India”.1
In matters of religion and religious practices, Article 14 can be invoked only by persons who
are similarly situated, that is, persons belonging to the same faith, creed, or sect. The petitioners
do not state that they are devotees of Lord Devan, who are aggrieved by the practices followed
in the Lord Devan Temple. The right to equality under Article 14 in matters of religion and
religious beliefs has to be viewed differently. It has to be adjudged amongst the worshippers of
a particular religion or shrine, who are aggrieved by certain practices which are found to be
oppressive or pernicious.
Here, neither the practices followed are pernicious and oppressive nor have the petitioners
claimed to be devotees of Lord Devan.
Religious customs and practices cannot be solely tested on the touchstone of Article 14 and the
principles of rationality embedded therein. Article 25 specifically provides the equal
entitlement of every individual to freely practice their religion. Equal treatment under Article
25 is conditioned by the essential beliefs and practices of any religion. Equality in matters of
religion must be viewed in the context of the worshippers of the same faith.
The twin-test for determining the validity of a classification under Article 14 is:
• The classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia; and
• It must have a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the impugned law 2.
The principle was given by the Supreme Court in the case of R. K. Garg v. Union of India.3
The exclusion of women is not based on gender and satisfies the test of intelligible differentia
and nexus to the object sought to be achieved. The exclusion of women in this Temple is not
absolute or universal. It is limited to a particular age group in one particular temple, with the
view to preserve the character of the deity. Women outside the age group of 10 to 50 years are.
1
The Constitution of India, Art.14
2
State of Gujarat V. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Jamat, (2005) 8 S.C.C. 534
3
R.K. Garg V. Union of India, (1981) 4 S.C.C. 675

It was further submitted that there are several temples dedicated to the worship of Lord Devan,
where the deity is not in the form of a ‘Brahmachari’. In those temples, the mode and manner
entitled to worship at the Lord Devan Temple. The usage and practice is primary to preserve
the sacred form and character of the deity of worship differs from the Lord Devan Temple,
since the deity has manifested himself in a different form. There is no similar restriction on the
entry of women in the other temples of Lord Devan, where women of all ages can worship the
deity. This is evident from the moot proposition.
The menstruation taboo is not the sole reason for restricting women’s entry into the temple.
The unique characteristic of Lord Devan, the deity of the temple, is one of the primary reasons
for the prohibition of women inside the temple premises. He is considered to be a Brahmachari
or a celibate. It is believed that he will remain a celibate until the day his devotees stop
visiting the temple.5 This is a unique feature of this deity and for years the prohibition of
women has been practiced fervently.
Religious practices can’t solely be tested on the basis of the right to equality. It’s up to the
worshippers, not the court to decide what constitutes religion’s essential practice.
In the case of Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore4, the Supreme Court held that the
exclusion of women from entering the inner sanctum of a temple did not violate the
fundamental right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution.
[1.2] THE SAID RESTRICTION IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ANY FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 15.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the said restriction is not violative of
Article 15 of the Constitution. No discrimination, whatsoever, is practiced in the Lord Devan
Temple that defeats the purpose of Article 15, specifically article 15(3).
This case before the Hon’ble Court needs consideration of clauses 1, 2 and 3 of Article 15 of
the Constitution. The relevant clauses read as:
“(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste,
sex, place of birth or any of them.
4
1958 AIR 255, 1958 SCR 895
5
Moot Proposition

(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them,
be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to—
(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained wholly
or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public.
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women
and children.”6
It is respectfully submitted that clause (1) of the above article prohibits discrimination solely
on the basis of religion, race, caste, sex and place of birth. The petitioners have claimed that
the Lord Devan Temple administration has been discriminating against women on the basis
sex.7 This contention is completely unfounded and is not in accordance with the facts and
circumstances of the present case. It is humbly submitted that if there had been any restriction
on the basis of sex, women as a whole would have been restricted from entering the temple but
there is no such practice in place. Women below 10 years and above 50 years of age are not
restricted from entering the temple thus there has been no discrimination on the basis of sex.
In as far as discrimination on the basis of class is concerned, which is prohibited under clause
(1) of Article 15, there is no such practice. There is no restriction between one section and
another section or between one class and another class among the Hindus in the matter of entry
to a temple whereas the prohibition is only in respect of women of a particular age group and
not women as a class.
Temples were consciously deleted from draft Art. 9 (Art.15 of Indian Constitution) since the
Constituent Assembly did not consider it fit to include temples along with places of public
resort where no citizens are subject to discrimination on the basis of the prohibited grounds.8
Furthermore, the fact that the expression ‘and public place of public resort’ is added to a specific
enumeration of ‘wells, tanks, bathing Ghats, roads’9 indicates that the expression is to be
6
The Constitution of India, Art.15
7
Moot Proposition
8
Vol. No. VII, Constituent Assembly Debates, Amendment No. 301 p. 650-664
9
KHWAJA.A.MUNTAQIM, EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN & GENDER JUSTICE IN INDIA 415 (3rd ed.,
Law Publishers 2011)

interpreted by the rule of ejusdem generis.10 Hence, for the same reason religious institutions
and places of public worship appear to be excluded from the purview of Art.15 (2) and that is
why separate provision in Articles 25 (2) (b) at 26 (b) were needed.11 Thus petitioners cannot
claim the right under 15(2) in case of religious institutions and places of public worship, and
hence they cannot plead a violation of the right guaranteed under Art.15.
[1.3] THE SAID RESTRICTION IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 17 OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Kahler that the said restriction on
women between ages 10 and 50 years is not violative of the fundamental rights enshrined in
the Constitution including Article 17.
Article 17 of the constitution reads: “Untouchability is abolished and its practice in any form
is forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of Untouchability shall be an offence
punishable in accordance with law”.12
It is contended that all forms of exclusion “would not equivalent to untouchability”. Article 17
of the Constitution pertains to caste prejudice and untouchability was never understood to apply
women as a class. Moreover, there is also no absolute restriction but only on a women of certain
age group for a certain period of time which is because of the nature of deity, not social
exclusion.
The plea of the petitioners with reference to Article 17 is wholly misconceived. The object and
core of Article 17 was to prohibit untouchability based on ‘caste’ in the Hindu religion. No such
caste-based or religion-based untouchability is practiced at the Lord Devan Temple. The
practiced by the devotees at the Lord Devan Temple do not flow from any practice associated
with untouchability under Article 17. The custom is not based on any alleged impurity or
disability. Hence, the contention is liable to be rejected.
The restriction on the entry of women during the notified age group in this temple is based on
the unique characteristic of the deity, and not founded on any social exclusion. The analogy
sought to be drawn by comparing the rights of Dalits with reference to entry to temples and
women is wholly misconceived and unsustainable.
10
State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale, AIR 1993 S.C. 1126
11
D.D. BASU’S COMMENTARY ON THE ‘CONSTITUTION OF INDIA’ ,2735 (8TH ed., Lexis Nexus 2009)
12
Indian Constitution Art. 17

The right to exclude women of a particular age group from the temple flows from the religious
rights of the devotees under Article 25 of the Constitution and the character of the deity as a
Brahmachari.
Article 11 of the Draft Constitution corresponds to Article 17 of our present Constitution13. A

perusal of the Constituent Assembly debates on Article 11 of the Draft Constitution would
reflect that “untouchability” refers to caste-based discrimination faced by Harijans, and not
women as contended by the petitioners. During the debates, Mr. V. I. Muniswamy Pillai had
stated: “Sir, under the device of caste distinction, a certain section of people has been brought
under the rope of untouchability, who have been suffering for ages under tyranny of so-called
caste Hindus, and all those people who style themselves as landlords and zamindars, and were
thus not allowed the ordinary rudimentary facilities required for a human being… I am sure,
Sir, by adoption of this clause, many a Hindu who is a Harijan, who is a scheduled class man
will feel that he has been elevated in society and has now got a place in society.14 Mr. Seervai,
in his seminal commentary, states that “Untouchability” must not be interpreted in its literal or
grammatical sense, but refers to the practice as it developed historically in India amongst
Hindus. He further states that Article 17 must be read with the Untouchability (Offences) Act,
1955, which punishes offences committed in relation to a member of a Scheduled Caste15.
Professor M.P. Jain also interprets Article 17 in a similar manner. He states: “Therefore, treating
of persons as untouchables either temporarily or otherwise for various reasons, e.g., suffering
from an epidemic or a contagious disease, or social observances associated with birth or death,
or social boycott resulting from caste or other disputes do not come within the purview of Art.
17. Article 17 is concerned with those regarded untouchables in the course of historic
developments16.
It is clear that Article 17 refers to the practise of untouchability as committed in the Hindu
community against Harijans or people from depressed classes, and not women, as contended
by the Petitioner.
13
Draft Constitution of India, Drafting Committee of the Constituent Assembly of India (1948)
14
7th Constituent Assembly Debates (Nov. 29,1948) (Statement of Shri V.I. Muniswamy Pillai)
15
1 H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India: A Critical Commentary 691 (4 th ed. 1999)
16
M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law 1067 (6th ed. 2010)

[ ISSUE NO. 2] WHETHER THE CUSTOM OF EXCLUDING SUCH WOMEN

CONSTITUTES AN ‘‘ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE’’ UNDER ARTICLE 25
AND WHETHER A RELIGIOUS INSTITUION CAN ASSERT A CLAIM IN THAT
REGARD UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF RIGHT TO MANAGE ITS OWN AFFARIS
IN THE MATTERS OF RELIGION?
The respondent humbly submits before the Hon’ble Court that the practice of selective
exclusion of women constitutes an “essential religious practice” under Article 25 of the
Constitution. Moreover, devotees of Lord Devan can be said to constitute a separate religious
denomination under the Article 26 and have a right to manage their own affairs. and a religious
institution can assert a claim in that regard under Article 26(a).
[2.1] WHAT CONSTITUTES AS ‘‘ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICES’’ IS THE

MATTER TO BE DECIDED BY THE RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION ONLY.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that what are the essential religious practices
and what comes within the ambit of integral parts of religion should be best left to men of
religion since Article 25 of Constitution confers this as their fundamental rights, not to be
tampered with by anyone.
Article 25 of the Constitution reads as:
25. Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion46. —
(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all
persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise
and propagate religion.
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State
from making any law—
(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which
may be associated with religious practice;
(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions
of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.17
The provisions of Article 25(1) stipulate that, subject to public order, morality, health, and other
relevant provisions, all individuals are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right
to freely profess, practice, and propagate their religion. However, Article 25(2) clarifies that
17
The Constitution of India, Art. 25

this does not impede the State's ability to make laws that regulate or restrict economic,
financial, political, or other secular activities associated with religious practices or promote
social welfare, reform, and open Hindu religious institutions to all members of the
Hindu community.
Regarding Article 25(1), it is respectfully submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the
worshippers of Lord Devan are entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to profess,
practice, and propagate their religion. The right to profess their faith by worshipping at the
Lord Devan Temple can be guaranteed only if the character of the deity as a ‘Brahmachari’ is
preserved. Allowing women between the age group of 10 to 50 years to enter the temple would
alter the deity's nature, which would infringe the devotees' right to practice their religion as
secured by Article 25(1) of the Constitution.
It is contended that the devotees' rights under Article 25(1) cannot be made subject to the
Petitioners' claim to enter the temple under Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution, as they do
not assert faith in the temple's deity. Additionally, Article 25(2)(b) should not be interpreted to
mean that customs and practices that are integral to the religion should be overridden. The
provision was designed to eliminate caste-based prejudices and injustices in society, and it does
not apply in this scenario where there is only a limited restriction during the notified period,
based on faith, custom, and belief, which has been in place for time immemorial.
In Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala,18 it was observed that the question is not whether a
particular religious belief or practice appeals to our reason or sentiment, but whether the belief
is genuinely and conscientiously held as part of the profession or practice of religion. Personal
views and reactions are irrelevant. If the belief is genuinely and conscientiously held, it attracts
the protection of Art. 25. 19
A denomination within Article 26 and persons who are members of that denomination are under
Article 25 entitled to ensure the continuity of the denomination and such continuity is possible
only by maintaining the bond of religious discipline which would secure the adherence of its
members to certain essentials like faith, doctrine, tenets and practices.
While interpreting Article 26(b) of the Constitution the Supreme Court in the case of D. R. R.
Varu v. State of Andhra Pradesh20 held that a religious denomination or organization enjoys
18
Bijoe Emmanuel
19
P.M. BAKSHI, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (14TH Ed., Universal Law Publishing 2017)

complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential
according to the tenets of the religion. No outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere
with its decision in such matters.
It was further laid down that a law which takes away the right of administration from the hands
of a religious denomination altogether and vests in any other authority would amount to a
violation of the right guaranteed under Clause (d) of Article 26.
‘‘Under Article 26(b), therefore, a religious denomination or organization enjoys complete

autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential according to
the tenets of the religion they hold and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere
with their decision in such matters.’’21
[2.2] A RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION HAS THE RIGHT TO MANAGE ITS AFFAIRS IN

THE MATTERS OF RELIGION
Article 26 of the Constitution guarantees the right to manage religious affairs to religious
denominations. This right includes the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious
and charitable purposes, the right to manage their own affairs in matters of religion, the right
to own and acquire property, and the right to administer such property in accordance with law.
The right to manage religious affairs has been interpreted by the Indian judiciary as a
fundamental right of religious denominations. The Supreme Court of India, in the case of Sri
Shirur Mutt v. Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments,22 held that the right to manage
religious affairs is an essential part of the right to practice religion, which is guaranteed under
Article 25 of the Indian Constitution. The court further held that the State cannot interfere in
matters of religion unless there is a compelling reason to do so.
The Supreme Court has also held that the right to manage religious affairs includes the right to
regulate the entry of devotees into places of worship. In the case of Sardar Syedna Taher
Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay,23 the court held that the right to manage religious affairs
includes the right to decide who can enter the mosque and who cannot.
20
D.R.R. Varu V. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1970 S.C.181
21
Commissioner of H.R.E. V. L.T. Swamiar, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 282
22
A.I.R. 1954. S.C. 282
23
A.I.R. 1958, 253

The right to manage religious affairs is also protected under international law. Article 18 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees the right to freedom of thought, conscience,
and religion, and includes the right to manifest one's religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice, and teaching. This right is also protected under Article 18 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

[ ISSUE NO. 3] WHTHER RULE 3 OF THE UTTAR RAYAN HINDU PLACES OF

WORSHIP (AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY) RULES PERMITS ‘‘RELIGIOUS
DENOMINATION’’ TO BAN ENTRY OF WOMEN BETWEEN THE AGE OF 10 TO
50 YEARS? AND IF SO, WOULD IT NOT PLAY FOUL OF ARTICLE 14 AND 15(3) OF
THE CONSTITUTION BY RESTRICTING ENTRY OF WOMEN ON THE GROUND
OF SEX?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the entry of women devotees into the
Lord Devan temple, despite of the prevailing immemorial religious customs followed thereby,
will hurt the religious sentiments and beliefs of the temple board and millions of devotees
visiting the temple.
Rule 3(b) rightly excludes the entry of women pertaining to the deity’s celibacy. The said rule
in pursuance of their ancient religious practice cannot be held violative of the fundamental
rights of the women devotees under article 14 and 15 (3) of the Constitution.
[3.1] THE TEMPLE BOARD IS A ‘STATE’ UNDER ARTICLE 12
Article 12 of the Constitution states that,
“In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, the State includes the Government and
Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local
or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of
India.”
In the matter of Ravipuram Bhajana Sangham v. Cochin Devaswom Board,24 a temple managed
and administered by Devaswom Board was held to be a state under Art. 12. Therefore, it is
submitted that the Lord Devan Temple managed by the Uttar Rayan Lord Devan Board is a
‘state’ under Art. 12.
Thus, it is evident that being a State the temple administration is legitimate in its actions in
framing rules for the protection of antiquated tradition being profoundly followed in the culture
of State of Uttar Rayan.
24
A.I.R. (2001)

[3.2] THE DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IMPOSED BY THE IMPUGNED RULE

3(b) DOES NOT VIOLATE RIGHT TO EQUALITY
Article 14 reads as follows:
“The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the
laws within the territory of India.”25
The principle of Equality does not mean that every law must have universal application for all
persons who are not by nature, attainment or circumstances, in the same position, as the varying
needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment.26 Moreover right to
equality under Art. 14 is not an absolute right, there can certain exceptions for the betterment
of the citizens and in favour of the public interest.
Treatment to unequal persons differently according to their inequality is not only permitted but
also required.27 One of the primary reasons of restricting women’s entry to the temple of Lord
Devan is because of the unique characteristic of Lord Devan, the deity of the temple. He is
considered to be a Brahmachari or a celibate. It is believed that he will remain a celibate until
the day his devotees stop visiting the temple. This is a unique feature of this deity and for years
the prohibition of women has been practiced fervently.
Religious practices can’t solely be tested on the basis of the right to equality. Therefore,
respecting the unique identity and nature of the deity, the devotees have voluntarily agreed to
this reasonable classification imposed by the temple authorities.
As held in State of Kerela v. N.M. Thomas28, it is a mistake to assume priori that there can be
no classification within a class. If there is intelligible differentia which separates a group within
that class from the rest and that differentia has a nexus with the object of the classification,
there is no objection to a further classification within the class.
The rationale behind such distinction or classification lies in the fact that women bear different
biological characteristic from that of men, pertaining to the celibacy attained by the deity, it is
highly valid of prohibiting women from entering into the premises of the temple.
25
The Constitution of India, Art. 14
26
Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India, 1950 SCR 869: AIR 1951 SC 41; Dhirendra v. Legal Remembrancer, (1955) 1
SCR 224: AIR 1954 SC424
27
St. Stephens College v. University of Delhi, AIR 1992 SC 1630
28
(1976) 2 SCC 310: AIR 1976 C 490; State of M.P v. Gopal D. Thirthani, AIR 2003 SC 2952 : (2003) 7 SCC 83

The classification need not be made with mathematical precision29 or need not be scientifically
perfect or logically complete.30 The concept of equality allows differential treatment but it
prevents distinctions that are not properly justified. The justification depends upon case to
case.31 To consider a classification as reasonable, the Court has pointed out that it is necessary
to take into account the objective for such classification.
[3.3] THE IMPUGNED RULE 3(B) IS A SPECIFIC PROVISION PROTECTED

UNDER ART. 15(3)
For the convenience of this Hon’ble Court, Article 15 clause (3) is quoted as under:
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women
and children.
The said Article is an exception to the general principle of non-discrimination. The article
validates the classification based on sex, a sound classification. There can be no discrimination
in general on that ground, but the Constitution of India itself provides for special provisions in
the case of women and children, irrespective of them being beneficial in nature.32
Article 15 itself classified men and women in two classes having regard to the position of
women in Indian Society. Thus, Art.15 (3) expressly permits and certifies the discrimination of
women. A constitutional Classification cannot be held invalid.33
Mukherjee J. noted the grounds for permissibility of discrimination and quoted that ‘Art.14
does not take away from the state the power of classifying persons for legitimate purposes.
Every classification is in some degree likely to produce some inequality and mere production
of inequality is not enough.’34
29
Deepak Sibbal v. Punjab University, A.I.R. 1989 SC 903
30
Dharam Das v. Union of India, (2004) 1 SCC 712: AIR 2004 SC 1295; Kedar Nath v. State of West Bengal,
1954 SCR 30: AIR 1953 SC 404; Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union Of India, AIR 1992 (Supp) 1 SCC 594
31
M. Nagraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212: AIR 2007 SC 71
32
Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay & H. Laljee, AIR 1954 SC 321: (1954) 1 SCR 930 : (1954) 56 BOM LR
1179
33
Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay & H. Laljee, AIR 1954 SC 321: (1954) 1 SCR 930
34
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, AIR 1952 SC 75; State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC
318: (1951) 2 SCR 682

When a Statute provides for consultation but procedure for holding such consultation, the
competent authority can evolve its own procedure and such a provision cannot be held
to be arbitrary.35
35
Chairman & MD BPL Ltd. V. S.P. Gururaja, (2003) 8 SCC 567: AIR 2003 SC 4536

[ ISSUE NO. 4] WHETHER RULE 3(B) OF UTTAR RAYAN HINDU PLACES OF

WORSHIP (AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY) RULES, 1965 IS ULTRA VIRES THE
UTTAR RAYAN HINDU PLACES OF WORSHIP (AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY)
ACT, 1965 AND, IF TREATED TO BE INTRA VIRES, WHETHER IT WILL BE
VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE PART-III OF THE CONSTITUTION?
The Counsel for the respondent humbly submits before the Hon’ble Court that the rule 3(b) is
intra vires of the Act and is not violative of the provisions of the Part – III of the Constitution.
The counsel makes this submission for the following reasons.
[4.1] RULE 3(B) IS NOT ULTRA VIRES THE ACT
The Rule 3(b) of the Rules states that "women shall not be entitled to offer worship in any place
of public worship during menstruation". The question that arises is whether this rule is ultra
vires the Act. Section 3 of the Act provides that "every religious denomination or any section
thereof shall have the right to manage its own affairs in matters of religion." This provision
clearly recognizes the autonomy of religious denominations and their right to manage their own
religious affairs.
The restriction imposed by Rule 3(b) is not inconsistent with the Act as it is made in furtherance
of the objective of the Act, which is to provide for the regulation of entry of persons into places
of public worship in the state of Uttar Rayan. It is pertinent to note that the Act was enacted to
regulate the entry of all persons into places of public worship and not just women. Thus, the
Act does not confer an absolute right to all persons to enter a place of public worship.
Further, the Supreme Court in the case of Sri Venkataramana Devaru and Others v. State of
Mysore and Others has held that the right to manage religious affairs includes the right to
regulate the entry of persons into a place of public worship. The Court has observed that "it is
implicit in the right to manage religious affairs that a denomination or section thereof would
have the power to decide as to who should or should not be allowed to enter the temple." Thus,
the restriction imposed by Rule 3(b) is well within the scope of the power granted to the
religious denomination to manage its own affairs in matters of religion under
Section 3 of the Act.
The restriction imposed by Rule 3(b) is a reasonable one, made with the objective of
maintaining the dignity and decorum of the place of public worship, and ensuring the safety
36
A.I.R. 1958. SCC 255

and security of women. This rule is, therefore, intra vires the Act.
[4.2] RULE 3(B) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE PROVISIONS OF PART - III OF
THE CONSTITUTION
The Constitution of India guarantees the fundamental right to equality before the law and equal
protection of the laws to all persons. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees that the State
shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within
the territory of India.
It is argued that Rule 3(b) is discriminatory and violates the right to equality under Article 14
of the Constitution. However, it is well established that not all classifications are
discriminatory. A classification will not be discriminatory if it is based on intelligible differentia
and has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved.
The restriction imposed by Rule 3(b) is based on the biological difference between men and
women, and it seeks to ensure hygiene, cleanliness and sanctity in places of public worship.
Further, it is important to note that the restriction is not absolute, and it applies only during the
menstruation period. Therefore, it is submitted that the classification is based on intelligible
differentia and has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved, and thus does not
violate Article 14 of the Constitution.
Moreover, it is submitted that the fundamental right to freedom of religion guaranteed under
Article 25 of the Constitution includes the right to manage religious affairs, and this right has
been recognized by the Supreme Court in a number of judgements. The right to freedom of
religion guaranteed under Article 25 of the Constitution is subject to public order, morality, and
health. The prohibition on the entry of women between the ages of 10 and 50 years into the
Lord Devan temple is based on the belief that the deity in the temple is a celibate and that the
presence of women of menstruating age would violate the celibacy of the deity.37 This belief is
an essential aspect of the Hindu religion and is based on a long-standing tradition.
It is well-settled law that courts should not interfere with the religious beliefs and practices of
a particular religion unless they are repugnant to morality, public order, or health. The
prohibition on the entry of women of menstruating age into the Uttar Rayan temple is not
repugnant to morality, public order, or health, and therefore, the prohibition cannot be said to
be a violation of the fundamental right to freedom of religion.
37
Moot Proposition

Furthermore, Article 26 of the Constitution guarantees the right to manage religious affairs.
The management of the Lord Devan temple is vested with the Uttar Rayan Lord Devan Board,
which is a statutory body constituted under the Uttar Rayan Hindu Places of Public Worship
(Authorization of entry) Act, 1965. The Board has the right to manage the affairs of the temple
in accordance with the religious beliefs and practices of the Hindu religion. The prohibition on
the entry of women of menstruating age into the temple is a practice that has been followed for
several decades and is based on the religious beliefs and practices of the Hindu religion. If the
practice of restriction to the entry of women is made for women as a class, then it would be
violative of the above - mentioned articles of the Constitution. Therefore, the management of
the Lord Devan temple has the right to regulate the entry of women into the temple.

PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of the facts of the case, issues raised, arguments advanced and
authorities cited, it is most humbly and respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be
pleased to adjudge and declare that:
1. The exclusionary practice pertaining to the entry of women does not violate the
Fundamental right to equality and thus ordered to be continued.
2. The practise followed in the Lord Devan Temple is an “essential religious practise” and is
protected by the “right to manage religious affairs
3. Rule 3(b) excluding the entry of women in menstruating age does not violate the
fundamental rights enshrined under Article 14 and 15(3) of the Constitution, thus, valid and
constitutional.
4. 3(b) of Uttar Rayan Hindu places of worship (authorization of entry) Rules, 1965 is intra
vires the Uttar Rayan Hindu places of worship (authorization of entry) Act, 1965 and is not
violative of any provisions of the Part-III of the Constitution.
The Court may also be pleased to pass any other order, which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit
in the interest of justice, equity and good conscience.
All of which has been respectfully submitted,

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS

4th Cpuh National Moot Court Competition, 2023 (Respondent Side)

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T.C.

IVTH CAREER POINT UNVERSITY NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION,

BEFORE THE HON’BLE

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. _____OF 2002

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

[1.3] THE SAID RESTRICTION IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 17 OF THE

[ ISSUE NO. 2] WHETHER THE CUSTOM OF EXCLUDING SUCH WOMEN

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 2 of 31

[ ISSUE – 3] WHTHER RULE 3 OF THE UTTAR RAYAN HINDU PLACES OF

[3.1] THE TEMPLE BOARD IS A ‘STATE’ UNDER ARTICLE 12

[3.2] THE DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IMPOSED BY THE IMPUGNED RULE 3(b)

[3.3] THE IMPUGNED RULE 3(B) IS A SPECIFIC PROVISION PROTECTED UNDER

ISSUE – IV WHETHER RULE 3(B) OF UTTAR RAYAN HINDU PLACES OF

[4.1] RULE 3(B) IS NOT ULTRA VIRES THE ACT.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 3 of 31

AIR All India Reporter

International Covenant on Civil and Political

PIL Public Interest Litigation

SCC Supreme Court Cases

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 4 of 31

• State of Gujarat V. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Jamat, (2005) 8 S.C.C. 534

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 5 of 31

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 6 of 31

“Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part-

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 7 of 31

HISTORY OF THE TEMPLE

THE UTTAR RAYAN HINDU PLACES OF PUBLIC WORSHIP ACT, 1965

PROHIBITION OF WOMEN'S ENTRY IN LORD DEVAN TEMPLE OF UTTAR RAYAN

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 8 of 31

‘HERSELF’ NGO RAISES ISSUE OF WOMEN'S ENTRY IN LORD DEVAN TEMPLE

PUBLIC DIVIDED ON WOMEN'S ENTRY IN LORD DEVAN TEMPLE

LORD DEVAN TEMPLES IN KAHLER WITHOUT ENTRY RESTRICTIONS FOR

WRIT PETITION FILED FOR WOMEN'S ENTRY IN LORD DEVAN TEMPLE

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 9 of 31

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 10 of 31

WHTHER THE EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICE WHICH IS BASED UPON A

WHETHER RULE 3(B) OF UTTAR RAYAN HINDU PLACES OF WORSHIP

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 11 of 31

1. WHTHER THE EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICE WHICH IS BASED UPON A

2. WHETHER THE CUSTOM OF EXCLUDING SUCH WOMEN CONSTITUTES AN

3. WHTHER RULE 3 OF THE UTTAR RAYAN HINDU PLACES OF WORSHIP

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 12 of 31

4. WHETHER RULE 3(B) OF UTTAR RAYAN HINDU PLACES OF WORSHIP

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 13 of 31

[ ISSUE NO. 1] WHTHER THE EXCLUSIONARY PRACTICE WHICH IS BASED

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 14 of 31

[1.1] THE SAID RESTRICTION IMPOSED ON WOMEN BETWEEN THE AGE OF

• The classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia; and

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 15 of 31

[1.2] THE SAID RESTRICTION IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ANY FUNDAMENTAL

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 16 of 31

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 17 of 31

[1.3] THE SAID RESTRICTION IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 17 OF THE

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 18 of 31

Article 11 of the Draft Constitution corresponds to Article 17 of our present Constitution13. A

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS Page 19 of 31

[ ISSUE NO. 2] WHETHER THE CUSTOM OF EXCLUDING SUCH WOMEN

[2.1] WHAT CONSTITUTES AS ‘‘ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICES’’ IS THE