Murder Involuntary Manslaughter – Lacks the MR for Murder

Vickers (1957) – MR for murder is intention to kill or inflict GBH Hancock and Shankland (1985) > probability of consequence the more likely it was
Nicklinson (2014) - Consent not a defence for Crim liability, rejection of euthanasia / foreseen & if it was foreseen, the > probability it was intended.
dueling.
Gross Negligence Manslaughter
Woollin (1999)- Indirect Intent, death/GBH must be virtually certain & D must
Adomako (1994 ): Obj Test for GNM = Breach of DOC + Caused Death + Breach is
appreciate this. grossly Neg
DPP v Smith (1961) / Suanders : Serious Harm = GBH Wacker (2002) Willoughby (2004): DOC can exist in a criminal enterprise, tho not
Gibbins & Proctor: Killing can be done through omission a civil one.
Evans (2009): If person caused dangerous situation, DOC would be imposed to
Loss of Control – Reduces Murder to Voluntary Manslaughter
save life.
Ahluwalia (1992) – loss of control does not have to be immediate, also Dawes (2013)
Bawa-Garba (2016): Must show that what D did was “truly exceptionally bad”.
Duffy (1949): Devlin J defines provocation: “loss of self-control = not master of his
Rose (2016): Risk of death must be obvious & serious at time of the breach of duty
own mind”.
Constructive / Unlawful Act manslaughter
Clinton, Parker & Evans (2012) – Sexually infidelity is not a qualifying trigger Lamb (1967): Base crime must be proved in full for D to be liable (AR+MR-D).
Asmelash (2013 ) Intoxication irrelevant to determining loss of control
Holley / Wilcocks (2016): Objective test only (reasonable person), mental illness not Lowe (1973): The Unlawful act must be positive, an omission is insufficient.
used. DPP v Newbury (1977): Salmon L– Test is “Would Reasonable ppl recognize the
Act’s danger?”
Bowyer (2013): Sense of being wrong must be justified.
M(J) 2013: Type of harm need not be foreseeable, only that TRM would foresee
Diminished Responsibility – Reduces Murder to Voluntary Manslaughter some harm.
Bryne (1960): AMF means state of mind so different from ordinary, TRM calls it DJ (2007): Burden of proving D’s unlawful act led to death must be discharged
abnormal.
Blaue (1975): Thin Skull Rule.
Golds (2016): Need for AMF to substantially effect his ability to understand/control
Kennedy (2007): If V self-injects drugs, then NAI applies and D will not be liable for
himself.
death.
Brennan (2014): For the AMF to be recognized medical condition, expert evidence is
required.
Dowds (2012) & Lindo (2016): Voluntary intox is not capable of forming a defence.
Gittens (1984): AMF will occur even if coupled with intoxicants. Unless…
Kay (2017): If AMF was as a result of intoxicants, the defense will not be available.
 Assault Offence Against The Person – Governed under OAPA Act 1861
Logdon v DPP (1976): Threatening Acts/Gestures can cause the V to apprehend violence. S18 - Grievous Bodily Harm with Intent -
Constanza (1997): Words alone or Ireland (1998): silent telephone calls. Lord Steyn Coutts (2006) & Mandair (1994): s.18 charges include charges for S.20 & S.47
“Thing said is a thing done”. Morrison (1989): Test for recklessness in all OAP is subjective, need for proof of intent.
Read v Coker (1853): Conditional threats are also assaults.
Re Knights Appeal (1968): Recklessness is not enough, need to prove ulterior intent.
Lamb (1967): V must only anticipate/expect to be subjected to force. No need to feel
Taylor (2009): intent to wound insufficient, must be intent to cause GBH.
fear. S.20 - Grievous Bodily Harm-
Smith v Chief Super of Woking: Harm must be imminent/impending not necessarily Moriarty v Brooks: A wound is a break in continuity of the whole skin (top 2 layers)
instant. C v Eisenhower (1984): Internal injury/blood vessel rupture is not a wound.
R v Savage & Parmenter (1992): MR is Intention or Cunningham subjective recklessness. Ireland (1998): Severe psychiatric harm would suffice as GBH.
Battery – Bollom (2004): Characteristics of D should be taken to account i.e. harm for adult v child.
Fagan v MPC (1969): Requires a positive act, a willful omission could be sufficient AR. Dica (2004): Transmitting fatal/serious diseases qualifies as GBH i.e. AIDS, HIV+
DPP v K (1990) – Application of Force need not be directly applied & Haystead v DPP Brady (2006): D either intended or was reckless (foresaw) to cause wound/GB
(2000) DPP v Santana Bermudez (2004): recklessly failing to act when D caused danger Mowatt (1968): Enough D intended or foresaw some harm rather than wound/GBH.
is enough S.47 – Actual Bodily Harm –
Collins v Wilcock (1984): Consent is a defence to battery. “Most physical contacts are not Roberts (1971): Could the RM foresee V’s act, if not then a NAI would break the CoC.
actionable because of implied consent necessary to move around in everyday life” Goff
Williams & Davies: Refined the test, Need to consider V’s mental state & rel qualities.
LJ
DPP v Santana Bermudez (2004): Assault can be committed by a willful omission.
Faulkner v Talbot (1981): Battery need not be hostile, rude or aggressive, Only
Miller (1954) “any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with health & comfort of V, provided
unwelcome.
it is more than transient & trifling” Chan-Fook (1994) includes psychiatric harm
Dungey (1864): A kiss,
T v DPP (2003): temporary loss of senses and consciousness.
Smith (1866): Spitting,
CPS Charging Stds: extensive bruising, broken nose, minor fractures, cuts need jstitching,
Thomas (1985): Touching only clothing
broken teeth.
 Theft
Hilton (1997) & Briggs (2004): Theft requires a positive act, cannot be done by
Defences
omission.
Hasan (2005): L. Bingham - Elements of Duress: Threat of death/injury, made to D
Chan Man Sin v AG Hong Kong: does not require actual loss as it deals with or someone close, no evasive action possible, cannot be used for threats D opens
property rights. himself to
Appropriation Martin (1989): Def only available if D was acting reasonably & proportionately to
Atakpu (1994): Appropriation is a continuing act, but Theft is a finite one. save life
Morris (1983): App occurs even if D assumes 1 right of ownership as opposed to all. Re A (2000): Brooke LJ 3 conditions: 1) Act is needed to avoid irreparable evil 2) No
more should be done than is necessary 3) Evil inflicted cannot be greater than evil
Gomez (1993): D can assume rights even when act done with consent of original
avoided.
owner. Palmer v R (1971): Man attacked may defend himself but only do what is rea
Hinks (2000): Appro can occur even when rights of the property were properly necessary.
transferred. Insanity Cases: Clarke (1972), Sullivan (1984), Codere (1916), Johnson (2007).
Property Bratty vs AG N. Ireland: Denning LJ “No act is punishable if it is done involuntarily”.
Smith (2011): Property=money, things in action, intangible property & real/personal DPP v Majewski: D’s voluntary intox gives MR i.e. recklessness (basic intent crimes
items only).
belong to another Kingston (1994): Only when D’s shows lack of MR due to involuntary intox can he
Concoran v Whent: Property must belong to another at the time of appropriation. escape liability. If intox only removed inhibitions, then MR is still present & D is liable.
Davidge v Bunnett & Wain (1994): It is theft if D treats with property contrary to its Tolson (1889): Honest & reasonable mistake = absence of reasoning faculty. No MR
purpose R & G (2003): D did not foresee consequences & is thus not reckless. (Subjective
Shadrokh-Cigari (1988): When property received by mistake, subseq appro will be test)
theft.
Robinson (1997): Not dishonest if D believes he has a right to deprive the other of
it.
Ivey v Genting (2017): Test- Was what was done dishonest according to the stds of
RHM?
Burglary
Collins (1973): Edmund Davies LJ - Must be an effective and substantial entry.
Hudson (2017): What is a building is a matter of “fact and degree”. State of
completeness
Jones and Smith (1976): Entering in excess of permission is trespassing.
Durante (1972): Specific intent crime, D must intend to commit ulterior offense - A v
DPP
 Rape – Sexual Offences Act 2003
Cogan (1976) – Rape can only be committed by a man
inchoate Offences
Kaitamaki (1985) – If consent ceases during the Act, the man must withdraw or be liable.
Robinson (1915): Distinction betwn preparation & attempts - concept of
Allen- Vagina includes the Vulva, slight penetration is all that is required.
proximity. Old law
Ismail (2005) – Courts hold no distinction as to the type of penetration, all equally serious
Campbell (1991), Gullefer 1990: Acts must go beyond what is more than
AG’s Ref No.1 of 1992: No need to prove penetration, enough to show Ds acts were MTMP.
merely preparatory
Bree (2007): Where V drinks but is able to choose to have sex, it would not be rape. But Coates
(2008): (i) If V is so drunk that they don’t have capacity to agree, then it would be rape. Geddes (1996): Did the D try to start to commit the crime – more than merely
(ii) if V is asleep or unconscious, thru drink or drugs, then intercourse would be rape. preparatory
J. Assange v Swedish PA & R(F) v DPP 2013: Rape If an expressed condition of sex is violated Pearman (1984): Must prove D acted with intent to commit particular crime.
J. McNally v R (2013): Deception as to gender wrong, deception as to wealth not wrong Lol. Direct/Oblique
Tabassum: Decption as to Nature and Quality of Act will vitiate consent. Whybrow (1951): Attempted murder requires no less than intent to kill
Sharif(2004): Threat to expose woman’s sexual history to family will negate consent. Khan : If recklessness as to circumstances is enough for full offense -> enough
R v Devonald (2008): Deception as to essential cornerstone of the act will negate consent. for attempts
Jheeta (2007): Where the V doesn’t have freedom to exercise free choice or consent = Rape. AG Ref No. 3 (1992): D is guilty of attempt to commit criminal offense if he is in
RvB(2007): Not Rape if V consents to sex with D & D knew but did not disclose HIV+ status. one of the states of mind required for full offense & does his best to supply
what is missing.
White (2010): To find absence of consent, jury must find (i) D did the act, (ii) A Section 76(2)
AG ref No 1&2: conditional intent can form basis of attempt if indictment
circumstance existed and (iii) D knew that they existed.
worded properly
 Joint Enterprise Liability -
Accessorial Liability Jogee (2016): overruled Chan Win Su (1985): MR of Joint Ent is not = foresight
Jogee/Ruddock (2016): 1. Did the D assist/encourage the commission of P’s crime. Foresight is merely evidence by which intent could be evidenced.
of a crime? 2. Did the D intend to assist/encourage the P? Must do R v Mendez & Thompson: i) JE do not have to be pre planned & can be
more than foresee commission of crime. spontaneous ii) For an act to be beyond what was foreseen/intended it would
Bellman (1989): If 1 of 2 D’s commit a crime & impossible to know have to be much more dangerous
which, must acquit both Toulson K: Type of weapon does not matter, only the degree of injury it is likely
Maclin & Murphy (1838): if several ppl act together with common to cause.
intent, every act done by each of them in furtherance of intent is done Escaping JE Liability
by all. Yemoh (2009): P’s act being fundamentally different from D’s foresight is a
Stringer (2011): aiding requires actual assistance but not consensus or question of fact. Rook (1993): Failing to turn up is insufficient to escapr JE
causation. Luffman liability.
Calhaem (1985): no need for causation in counselling but P must be Mitchell & King (1998): Communication of withdrawal not necessary when
aware of D’s support violence is spontaneous but more required to show withdrawal - walking away
National Coal Board v Gamble: Motive irrelevant but must prove D or dropping weapons.
knew his acts would (or even might) assist or encourage P to commit
the offense.
R v Bryce (2004): Enough D aided + contemplated ‘real possibility’ of
commission of offense
Johnson v Youden: MR = Knowledge (foresight) + Essential
characteristics of the offense