Case Digest: Kho v. Republic (G.R. No.

187462, June 1, 2016)

Facts: Petitioner Raquel G. Kho filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to the late
Arsenio Kho on the ground of void ab initio due to the absence of a marriage license. The petitioner
presented a certification from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, stating that no
record of marriage license was issued to her and the late Arsenio Kho. Despite this certification, the
Court of Appeals (CA) ruled that the marriage was valid. The petitioner filed a petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court (SC).

Issue: Whether the marriage of the petitioner and the late Arsenio Kho is void ab initio due to the
absence of a marriage license.

Ruling: The SC ruled that the marriage of the petitioner and the late Arsenio Kho is void ab initio. The SC
held that the certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance
of the marriage license. The SC further held that the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is
undoubtedly void ab initio since it was solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being
one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement.

Case Digest: Republic of the Philippines v. Cipriano Obrecido III (G.R. No. 154380, September 21, 2005)

Facts: Cipriano Obrecido, a Filipino citizen, married a Filipina citizen in the Philippines in 1982. In 1989,
Obrecido's wife acquired American citizenship. In 1991, while still married to Obrecido, his wife obtained
a divorce decree from a California court on the ground of irreconcilable differences. In 1992, Obrecido's
wife remarried an American citizen in California. Obrecido sought to remarry in the Philippines, but the
Local Civil Registrar refused to issue him a marriage license on the ground that his previous marriage was
still subsisting and that he was not capacitated to remarry under Article 26, Paragraph 2 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.

Issue: Whether Cipriano Obrecido is capacitated to remarry under Article 26, Paragraph 2 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.

Ruling: The Supreme Court of the Philippines (SC) ruled that Cipriano Obrecido is capacitated to remarry
under Article 26, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The SC held that the twin requisites
for the application of Article 26, Paragraph 2 are both present in this case: (1) the marriage was between
two Filipino citizens; and (2) one of the spouses later acquired foreign citizenship and obtained a divorce
decree abroad capacitating him or her to remarry. The SC further held that Obrecido's wife's act of
remarrying an American citizen in California did not revive her Philippine marriage to Obrecido.
Case Digest: Van Dorn vs. Ronillo, Jr. et al., 139 SCRA 139 (1985)

Facts: Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipina citizen, married Richard Upton, a United States citizen, in Hong
Kong in 1972. They established their residence in the Philippines and had two children. In 1982, the
couple obtained a divorce decree in Nevada, United States. Alice subsequently married Theodore Van
Dorn, also a United States citizen. Richard Upton filed a lawsuit in the Philippines, claiming that
the Galleon Shop, a business in Ermita, Manila, was conjugal property and that Alice should render an
accounting of the business. Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the Nevada divorce
decree extinguished the conjugal partnership and that the Philippine courts lacked jurisdiction over the
case.

Issue: Whether the Nevada divorce decree extinguished the conjugal partnership and whether the
Philippine courts had jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling: The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the Nevada divorce decree extinguished the conjugal
partnership and that the Philippine courts lacked jurisdiction over the case. The SC held that the
nationality principle applies to the question of whether a divorce decree obtained abroad is valid in the
Philippines. Under the nationality principle, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces. The SC further held that the Galleon Shop was not conjugal property because it
was acquired after the divorce decree was obtained. The SC also held that the Philippine courts lacked
jurisdiction over the case because the Nevada divorce decree was valid in the Philippines and
extinguished the conjugal partnership.

Case Digest: Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013

Facts: Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese national, filed a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign judgment
(decree of absolute nullity of marriage) obtained in Japan. The foreign judgment declared his marriage to
Maria Paz Galela Marinay, a Filipina citizen, void ab initio due to the lack of a marriage license.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the petition on the grounds of improper venue and lack of
personality of the petitioner to file the petition. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision.

Issue: Whether the RTC and the CA correctly dismissed the petition for judicial recognition of a foreign
judgment.

Ruling: The Supreme Court (SC) reversed the decisions of the RTC and the CA and granted the petition
for judicial recognition of the foreign judgment. The SC held that the RTC and the CA erred in dismissing
the petition on the grounds of improper venue and lack of personality of the petitioner.

The SC held that the proper venue for the petition was the RTC where the petitioner resided, which was
Quezon City. The SC further held that the petitioner had the personality to file the petition even if he was
not a party to the Japanese proceeding. The SC explained that the petitioner had a legal interest in the
foreign judgment as it affected his marital status.
Case Digest: Republic of the Philippines vs. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018)

Facts: Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo), a Filipina citizen, married Jun Manalo, a Japanese national, in
Japan in 2001. The couple had one child. In 2008, the Japanese court granted Manalo a divorce decree,
dissolving their marriage. In 2012, Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in
the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of the Japanese divorce decree. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City granted the petition. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals (CA).

Issue: Whether a Filipino spouse can file a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the Civil
Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a foreign divorce decree obtained by the alien spouse.

Ruling: The CA reversed the RTC decision and granted Manalo's petition. The CA held that Article 26,
Paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) applies to this case. The CA further held
that Manalo is capacitated to file the petition even if she was not the one who obtained the divorce
decree.

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court
(SC).

Ruling: The SC affirmed the CA decision and granted Manalo's petition. The SC held that Article 26,
Paragraph 2 of the Family Code applies to this case. The SC explained that the purpose of the provision is
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a
foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. The SC further held that Manalo is capacitated to file the petition even if she was not the
one who obtained the divorce decree. The SC explained that Manalo has a legal interest in the foreign
divorce decree as it affects her civil status.

Case Digest: Republic v. Molina (G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997)

Facts: The case involved a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by the Republic of the
Philippines against respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina. The petitioner alleged that the marriage
between the respondent and her husband, Renato Molina, was void ab initio due to the psychological
incapacity of the latter. The trial court granted the petition, but the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the
decision, holding that the evidence presented by the petitioner was insufficient to prove Renato's
psychological incapacity.

Issue: Whether the marriage between Roridel Olaviano Molina and Renato Molina is null and void ab
initio due to the psychological incapacity of the latter.

Ruling: The Supreme Court (SC) affirmed the CA's decision and dismissed the petition. The SC held that
the petitioner failed to prove Renato's psychological incapacity by preponderance of evidence. The SC
explained that the psychological incapacity must be: (1) clinically identified, meaning that it can be
diagnosed by a qualified psychologist or psychiatrist; (2) gravely serious and incurable; and (3) must
already exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Case Digest: Castillo v. Republic (G.R. No. 214064, February 6, 2017)

Facts: Mirasol Castillo (Mirasol) filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Felipe Impas
(Felipe) on the ground of psychological incapacity. Mirasol alleged that Felipe suffered from
schizophrenia, which rendered him incapable of performing his marital obligations. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City granted Mirasol's petition, holding that Felipe was psychologically
incapacitated. The Court of Appeals (CA), however, reversed the RTC's decision and held that Mirasol
failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that Felipe was psychologically incapacitated.

Issue: Whether the marriage between Mirasol Castillo and Felipe Impas is null and void ab initio due to
the psychological incapacity of the latter.

Ruling: The Supreme Court (SC) affirmed the CA's decision and dismissed Mirasol's petition. The SC held
that Mirasol failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that Felipe was psychologically incapacitated.
The SC explained that psychological incapacity must be grave and serious enough to undermine the
marital bond. The SC further held that Mirasol's evidence, consisting mainly of her own testimony and
the testimony of her witnesses, was not sufficient to establish that Felipe's alleged schizophrenia was a
grave and serious condition that rendered him incapable of performing his marital obligations.

Domingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993

Facts: Petitioner Roberto Domingo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation
of property against his wife, respondent Maria Luisa R. Domingo. The petition was based on the ground
that their marriage was void ab initio because respondent was still legally married to her first husband at
the time of their marriage.

Issue: Whether the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purpose of entering
into a subsequent marriage on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity.

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be
invoked for the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such nullity. This is in accordance with Article 41 of the Family Code, which provides that "For
the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only
be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity."

The Court reasoned that the declaration of nullity of marriage is a judicial function, and that only a court
of competent jurisdiction may make such a declaration. A mere allegation of nullity of marriage is not
sufficient to support the entry into a subsequent marriage.

The Court also held that the requirement of a final judgment of nullity is a manifestation of the State's
interest in protecting the sanctity of marriage. The State has a legitimate interest in ensuring that
marriages are entered into freely and voluntarily, and that marriages that are not valid are not
recognized.

Republic of the Philippines v. Ludyson C. Catubag, G.R. No. 210580, April 18, 2018

Facts: Petitioner Ludyson C. Catubag filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of his wife,
Shanaviv G. Alvarez-Catubag. The petition was based on the ground that Shanaviv had been absent for
four years and was presumed dead.

Issue: Whether Ludyson C. Catubag can be allowed to contract a subsequent marriage without
securing a declaration of nullity of his previous marriage.

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court held that Ludyson C. Catubag can be allowed to contract a subsequent
marriage without securing a declaration of nullity of his previous marriage. This is in accordance with
Article 41 of the Family Code, which provides that:

"A person who has been absent for four years, or whose whereabouts has been unknown for the same
period of time, may be declared presumptively dead by the court."

The Court reasoned that the purpose of Article 41 is to protect the rights of the spouse and children of
the absent person. If the absent person is presumed dead, then the spouse may remarry and the
children may inherit from the absent person.

The Court also held that the requirement of a declaration of presumptive death is a safeguard against
the entry into bigamous marriages. If the absent person is presumed dead, then there is no risk that the
person will enter into another marriage while still legally married to the first spouse.

Aurora A. Anaya v. Fernando O. Palaroan, GR. No. L-27930, November 26, 1970

Facts: Petitioner Aurora A. Anaya filed a complaint for annulment of her marriage to respondent
Fernando O. Palaroan on the ground that her consent to the marriage was obtained through fraud. The
petitioner alleged that the respondent had a pre-marital relationship with another woman and failed to
disclose this relationship to her before they were married.

Issue: Whether the non-disclosure of a pre-marital relationship constitutes fraud that warrants the
annulment of a marriage.

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the non-disclosure of a pre-marital relationship can constitute
fraud that warrants the annulment of a marriage. This is in accordance with Article 85 of the Civil Code,
which provides that a marriage may be annulled on the ground that the consent of either party was
obtained through fraud.

The Court reasoned that marriage is a consensual contract, and that both parties must enter into the
marriage freely and voluntarily. If one party is induced to enter into the marriage through fraud, then the
consent is vitiated and the marriage is voidable.
The Court also held that the non-disclosure of a pre-marital relationship can be considered fraud if it is a
material fact that would have influenced the other party's decision to enter into the marriage. In the
present case, the Court found that the respondent's non-disclosure of his pre-marital relationship was a
material fact that would have influenced the petitioner's decision to marry him.

Susan Lim-Lua v. Danilo Y. Lua, G.R. Nos. 175279-80, June 5, 2013

Facts: Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua (Wife) filed a petition for legal separation against her husband,
respondent Danilo Y. Lua (Husband), on the ground of psychological abuse under Article 15 of the Family
Code. The Wife alleged that the Husband had subjected her to years of verbal abuse, threats, and
intimidation, which had caused her severe emotional distress.

Issue: Whether the Husband's conduct constituted psychological abuse under Article 15 of the Family
Code.

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Husband's conduct constituted psychological abuse under
Article 15 of the Family Code. The Court reasoned that the Family Code's definition of psychological
abuse is broad and encompasses any conduct that is "physically or mentally hurtful" to the spouse or
child. In this case, the Wife's testimony, corroborated by witnesses, established that the Husband had
subjected her to years of verbal abuse, threats, and intimidation, which had caused her severe emotional
distress. The Court held that this conduct constituted psychological abuse under the Family Code.