Anonymity
Anonymity
. General Position
Introduction to Anonymity
2. Social media platforms not only allow users to operate anonymously but also
to sign up and use their platform without providing verified identification. When
signing up to their platform, Twitter and Facebook only require an email address or a
telephone number for the user wishing to join. It would drastically reduce the no. of
sign ups, and use and earning potential of these platforms.
The general proposition that bloggers have a specific right to anonymity was considered by
the English High Court in The Author Of A Blog v Times Newspapers Limited [2009]
EWHC 1358 (QB).The court was faced with an application by the plaintiff – a police officer –
who wished to prevent the defendant newspaper from unmasking his identity. The Plaintiff
submitted the general proposition that ‘there is a public interest in preserving the anonymity
of bloggers.’ This was rejected by the court, which said: “...It is in my judgement a
significantly further step to argue, if others are able to deduce their identity, that they should
be restrained by law from revealing it.”
In K.U. V Finland (App no. 2872/02, 2 December 2008), the ECtHR considered an
application from a 12-year-old Finnish boy whose identity had been used on an internet
dating site. Finnish law allowed intermediaries to refuse to disclose the identity of their users
"to protect their right to anonymous expression." The Court held that the boy's right to
privacy had been breached, and that the guarantee of internet users contained in articles 8
and 10 ECHR “could not be absolute and should yield on occasion to other legitimate
imperatives, such as the prevention ... of crime or the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others”
In The AB v Bragg Communications Inc [2012] 2 SCR 567, the Canadian Supreme
Court allowed the victim of cyberbullying to bring her proceedings anonymously, citing
the importance of both her age (she was 15) and the need to encourage victims to
bring proceedings without "the risk of further harm from public disclosure"
In the Australian case of X v Twitter Inc [2017] NSWSC 1300, the Supreme Court of
New South Wales granted anonymity to a company about whom fake twitter accounts had
been set up in an attempt to damage their reputation. The Court held that "If that were not
so, the protection that the plaintiff seeks in relation to its private and confidential
information right be undone."
• The Civil Procedure Rules in the UK allow the court a general discretion to conceal
the identity of any party, or witness, ‘if it considers non-disclosure necessary in order to
protect the interests of that party or witness."
• The courts in Australia and New Zealand have likewise shown themselves more willing
to allow victims to bring proceedings anonymously - X v Twitter Inc [2017] NSWSC
1300.
• Situation in this jurisdiction, however, is very different...
3. Anonymity in Ireland
Right to anonymity for a plaintiff in Ireland? No
• Irish courts have traditionally been reluctant to allow for someone to institute proceedings
anonymously. This is based on the constitutional right to have justice administered in public
under Article 34.1.
• Aside from the requirement to hold certain proceedings in camera, the Courts have
interpreted this constitutional provision as requiring the identification of parties.
In refusing the application, Laffoy J held that "the public disclosure of the true identities of
parties to civil litigation is essential if justice is to be administered in public."????????? Are
they the same thing? Would the principles have been lost if she would have been
anonymous? Would we have gotten less from the case?
• It was submitted on his behalf that retaining his anonymity was the only way for the Plaintiff
to be granted an effective remedy, as the publication of his name in the media would perform
the very mischief he was attempting to prevent. The Court rejected the application, stating
that “the right to have justice administered in public far exceeds any right to privacy,
confidentiality or a good name.”
Summary:
• The benefits of anonymity, in terms of fostering positive discussion, enabling
whistleblowing and facilitating freedom of expression, are self-evident.
First step:
• Ask the internet intermediary being used (ie Facebook, Twitter etc) to identify the
anonymous user.
• Platforms are traditionally very protective about the right of their users to operate
anonymously. Twitter recently stated that: “Pseudonymity has been a vital tool for speaking
out in oppressive regimes, it is no less critical in democratic societies.
“Pseudonymity may be used to explore your identity, to find support as
victims of crimes, or to highlight issues faced by vulnerable communities.”
• General position is that they will refuse to release any information about their users without
a court order, citing issues concerning data protection and confidentiality.
• Other positions of such platforms when requested to identify users relates to whether or not
they are sure the material is actually unlawful. In Muwema v Facebook Ireland Ltd [2017]
IEHC 69, for example, Facebook said that they are 'not in a position' to arbitrate as to
whether the material a user has uploaded is unlawful.
Background:
• Decision in Fairfax v Voller [2021] HCA 27 (Fairfax held responsible for comments made
by 3rd party users).
• In November 2021, prime minister Scott Morrison articulated the frustration of many victims
of anonymous online trolling when he declared that social media has become a “coward’s
palace … ... where (anonymous) people can say the most foul and offensive things to people
and do so with impunity.” – platform is the root cause.
• The draft Social Media (Anti-Trolling) Bill 2021, which followed almost immediately, is an
attempt to codify some of the Prime Minister’s suggestions.
▪ The Bill proposes to make social media platforms liable for comments posted by users of
social media, as well as comments posted by third parties on that user’s page, by
considering the platforms to be the publishers of such comments. It further proposes to
remove the defence of innocent dissemination which had previously been available to them.
b) If the author of the comment consents, the comment will be removed by the social
media service;
c) If the author of the comment does not consent to it being removed, the social
media service must provide the complainant with the author’s name, address and email
address, subject to the author consenting to such information being disclosed;
d) If the author does not consent to their name and address being disclosed, the
complainant can apply to the court for an “End-user information disclosure order”, obliging
the social media service to give the complainant contact details for the author of the
defamatory comment. (this appears to mirror the Norwich Pharmacal procedure utilised in
this jurisdiction.)
An action whose aim is purely to obtain information in respect of a proposed defendant is not
provided for either by legislation or the Court Rules – instead, it is provided for by the
inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. The relief was established in Norwich Pharmacal v
Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133, a decision which has given the
application its name, in which Lord Reid gave the definitive statement of the principle:
‘…if through no fault of his own a person gets mixed up in the tortious acts of
others so as to facilitate their wrong-doing he may incur no personal liability but he
comes under a duty to assist the person who has been wronged by giving him full
information and disclosing the identity of the wrongdoers.’
The granting of a Norwich Pharmacal order is an entirely discretionary relief and the courts
have formulated a test that must be met before such an order will be granted. The test is as
follows:
4) The order is necessary in the interests of justice on the facts of the case.
In the majority of cases, the internet intermediary does not oppose the application, and the
order will be granted.
• It is only provided for in the High Court, so is expensive. Original draft of Harassment,
Harmful Communications and Related Offences Bill had a provision to bring such an
application to the Circuit Court, but this was dropped before the enactment. This is again
being recommended in the reform of the Defamation Act 2009, which is currently undergoing
consultation.
Background:
Boys set up a Whatsapp group and shared teacher info (some student info) in the form of
banter/memes. Someone complained. School wanted to “discipline” the boys. Members of
the group were operating anonymously. Application to discover identity. Court considered
wider issues at play (1. school children’s identity, 2. only entitled to anonymous identity in
order to prosecute them for unlawful conduct, 3. general right to freedom of expression and
privacy). School didn’t intend to sue
The High Court proposed to refer three questions to the Court of Justice in respect of such
applications:
1) Do the rights conferred under Article 7, Article 8 and Article 11 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union imply a right, in principle, to post material
anonymously on the internet (subject always to any countervailing objective of public
interest)?
– First time anyone asked CJ if there is a right to anonymity.
2) What is the threshold to be met under the General Data Protection Regulation
and/or the Charter before the provider of a social media platform can be compelled to
disclose, to a third party, information which would identify an otherwise anonymous account
user?
3) Is there any necessity for a national court to attempt to put the affected party on
notice of an application which seeks to identify the operators of an otherwise anonymous
user account?
– No provision for this in Norwich Pharmacal orders.
• The information obtained may not even reveal the identity of the anonymous user. In
Parcel Connect v Twitter [2020] IEHC 279 for example, Twitter stated that it "has nothing to
say as to what the information should be and does not warrant that such information as it
has will be sufficient to allow the plaintiffs to establish the true identity of the owner and
operator of the account...”
• There is a lack of clarity as to who pays for the costs of the application.
5. General Right to Privacy
Origin of the right to Privacy:
- The right to privacy does not come from Statute. In Ireland, it is an unenumerated right
under Article 40.3.1 of the Constitution:
"The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to
defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen."
It is not an unqualified right, with Hamilton P. stressing that it was subject to the
constitutional rights of others and the preservation of public order, morality and the common
good.
- It is also a Constitutional right but is specifically provided for under Article 40.6.1:
"The State guarantees liberty for the exercise of the following rights, subject to public
order and morality: The Right of the citizens to express freely their convictions and opinions"
It is not an unqualified right, with the same Article providing the restriction:
Both rights are protected by the EU Fundamental Charter of Human Rights and the
European Convention of Human Rights:
The Charter:
• Article 7 provides for "respect for private and family life"
• Article 11 provides that "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.
The Convention:
• Article 8 provides protection for "private and family life, his home and his correspondence"
• Article 10 provides that "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.
See also:
– John v Associated Newspapers [2006] EMLR 27
– Hickey v Sunday Newspapers Ltd [2011] 1 IR 228
2) Privacy at work
This engages with two main issues:
▪ The employee created and operated a Yahoo! messenger account on behalf of his
employer. The company circulated an information notice to its staff, which stipulated that
staff must not use company time for personal internet use. When accused of using the
Yahoo! service for personal reasons, the claimant denied doing so. He was then shown a
45-page transcript of the monitored communications from the company account, as well as a
number of messages that were sent on his personal Yahoo Messenger account and was
dismissed.
▪ Mr Bărbulescu alleged that his Article 8 rights to privacy had been infringed. In the lower
Chamber, it held that the monitoring had been reasonable. On appeal, the Grand Chamber
overturned the decision, finding that the domestic Romanian court had failed to consider:
- whether Mr Bărbulescu was on notice that his online usage might be monitored, or
- whether the scope of such monitoring would include the content of his
communications, rather than simply recording the flow.*
• Central to the Grand Chamber's decision was its finding that a total ban on private
correspondence in the workplace was impermissible, that "an employer’s instructions cannot
reduce private social life in the workplace to zero."
• The Grand Chamber stressed that monitoring of employees by the employer was not
illegal, holding that the latter retained ‘...a right to engage in monitoring, including the
corresponding disciplinary powers, in order to ensure the smooth running of the company’.
▪ The complainant had been part of a picket outside the respondent's store, and was
penalised, inter alia, for her participation in the private Facebook page set up by 43 fellow
strikers. The respondents became aware of comments amongst the group which were in
breach of the company’s social media policy and used this as a reason for dismissing the
complainant. The complainant insisted that these were private communications between
union members, and not the business of the respondent.
▪ The Adjudicating Officer rejected the submission that this group could be considered
private with the following observations:
‘... [a]s a group with 43 members posting to a Facebook page, there is no prospect
that the information could be contained in the group. While the members may have aspired
to privacy, in reality the information was posted on the world-wide web ... It seems to me
naïve to think that any postings on Facebook are private.’ (only takes 1 person to break the
chain and make the info public)
• English employment case in which the complainant had been dismissed for comments he
published by third parties, and comments he made himself, on his personal FB page about
the quality of Apple's products. He claimed that those comments were private and could only
be viewed by his FB friends. The Tribunal disagreed:
"The nature of Facebook, and the internet generally, is that comments by one person
can very easily be forwarded on to others. The claimant had no control over how his
comments might be copied and passed on."
The issue of privacy settings on social media and the degree to which they can prevent
content hidden behind those settings being used in court has not been considered by a court
in this jurisdiction…
Martin & Ors v Gabriele Giambrone P/A Giambrone & Law [2013] NIQB 48.
• Northern Ireland case concerning application for a Mareva injunction. Defendant objected
to evidence obtained from his Facebook account which suggested that he would "leave them
with nothing". Court refused to disallow the evidence, which appears to have been a private
conversation:
"I should say that anyone who uses Facebook does so at his or her peril. There is no
guarantee that any comments posted to be viewed by friends will only be seen by those
friends. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how information can remain confidential if a
Facebook user shares it with all his friends and yet no control is placed on the further
dissemination of that information by those friends."
• Evidence, particularly from Facebook that contradicts a plaintiff's case in personal injuries
proceedings, is regularly introduced in the Irish courts, without any consideration of how it
was obtained, or whether it was hidden behind privacy settings.
• The question arises as to whether you can compel a plaintiff to produce relevant
information from behind these settings via a discovery application. No consideration in this
jurisdiction, but Canadian courts have considered both sides of the argument...
Granted. Court held that: ‘To permit a party claiming very substantial damages for loss of
enjoyment of life to hide behind self-set privacy controls on a website … risks depriving the
opposite party of access to material that may be relevant to ensuring a fair trial’