o

)
ATSS-BAR-STU (351) 11 May 1994
MEMORANDUM FOR Commandant, united States Army Sergeants Major
Academy, Fort Bliss, TX 79981-8002
SUBJECT: The Battles of Bloody and Heartbreak Ridge
1. Thesis Statement. The tactics employed at the battles of
Bloody and Heartbreak Ridge .. __..Qf.... I .
... ve L-_and.. offenUye battles were politically
motivated to force a truce and to thlS end were successful.
2. Discussion. After the North Korean aggressors came across the
38th parallel)the united Nations began its political battle. The
united and controlled all operations for the
united Nations. The united Nations, however, commanded the war
from this point forward with political motivations. The united
Nations Forces pulled back to near the 38th parallel, the original
truce line. Here the united Nations decided to pressure the North
Koreans to sign a truce by military pressure. The battles of
Bloody and Heartbreak Ridge forced the North Koreans to the
\ I.
J. ' .
bargaining table.
I l.,JA
.jJ .l
3. Conclusion. The forces committed to the battles of Bloody and t I'> ,v- \'
l
oI\l r
Heartbreak Ridge did not possess the force necessary to achieve a ref .'1'
decisive victory. The united Nations did not want a military .\
It sought a political through the use of J ,\ I,' ", \
mllltary pressure to force bargalnlng at the truce table. 17 l\ .../ \
Politically the battles proved beneficial and These
battles prove ... .. \\ _
21' fens i ve mc::J k . k-iJJ "7
4. Haines Award. I Gao nc.t) request that the Haines Award '..r
Selection Board this paper for the General Haines Award
for Excellence in research. Writing Research Papers, Sixth
Edition by James D. Lester, is the guide used in the preparation
of this research paper.
STEVEN ISRA Encl
SGM, USA
Faculty Advisor
MSG Steven Bouvia
Chairperson
MSG Roberto Diaz
MSG Lonny Goecke
MSG Ronnie Mosteller
MSG Bruce Vanleuven
The Battles of Bloody and Heartbreak Ridge
by
MSG Steven Bouvia
MSG Roberto Diaz
MSG Lonny Goecks
MSG Ronnie Mosteller
MSG Bruce Vanleuven
SGM steven Israel
Group 31
11 May 1994
ii
Outline
Thesis: The tactics employed at the battles of Bloody and
Heartbreak Ridge lacked essential economy of force,
SoC'" ............
objective, and operational purpose. The battles were
politically motivated and to this end were successful.
I. Background
A. History
B. Events prior to Korean conflict
C. united Nations declarations
D. First united Nations forces committed
E. Concept of operations prior to August 1951
II. Battle of Bloody Ridge
A. Concept of operations from 1 Aug 51 thru 12 Sep 51
1. 36th Regiment
2. 72d Tank Battalion
3. 1st Battalion 9th Regiment
4. 2d Battalion 9th Regiment
5. 2d Division Artillery fire support
III. Battle of Heartbreak Ridge
A. Concept of operations from 13 Sep 51 thru 27 Sep 51
1. 23d Infantry Division
2. 9th Infantry Division
3. 72d Tank Battalion
iii
4. Operation Touchdown
a. Concept of operations from 28 Sep 51 thru
I
31 Oct 51 -?1
b. 23d Infantry Division
c. 9th Infantry Division
d. 38th Artillery Support
e. Task Force Sturman
5. Execution of Operation Touchdown
a. 23d Infantry Division
b. 9th Infantry Division
c. 38th Artillery Support
d. Task Force Sturman
e. 2d Engineer Battalion
f. 72d Tank Battalion
IV. Political Battle
A. united Nations directional control of conflict
B. America's discontent with the conflict
c. Politics controlled the direction of combat
D. Truce .talks
1
The Battles of Ridge
On July 10, 1951, the f1rst arm1st1ce meet1ng between the
North Koreans and the united Nations opened in Kaesong. However,
the only proposal was from the united Nations side. The North
Koreans did not come to the table with any proposal for peace or
desire to end hostilities. This then began the stalemate of \. ( j
forces. One side wanted peace, the other side wanted full and
L-S
unconditional control of Korea. to encourage the North Koreans
to negotiatejthe United Nations decided to use the troops as pawns (
for political gain. The direction from Washington to Ridgway gave
.-------------- ----------J.-::;;;7L.) Ino
little by way of clear objectives. The message stated, "Fight on, \
but don't fight too hard. Don't lose; but don't win, either.
Hold the line, while the diplomats muddle through" (Fehrenbach
501). In other words, get soldiers killed while we play games at
the table. The field commanders disliked these actions but had no

choice but to follow through
The Battles of Bloody and Heartbreak Ridge happened during
this very confusing period of stalemate. The battles had only one
objective, to get the North Koreans back to the negotiation table.
The ridges did not have any apparent military value, only
political. In late October General Ridgway issued a new directive
stating, "Fight the war, but don't get anyone killed" (528).
The battles of Bloody and Heartbreak Ridge did not conform to
the standards of military essential offensive operations. The
ridge lines had very little to do with a military end to the war.
The battles did, however, provide the necessary pressure on the
2
North Koreans to resume a negotiated peace. Otherwise, the North
Koreans would have continued to receive reinforcements from China
and become an overwhelming force. The cost of lives to the united
Nations forces was much too high for the political end achieved.
On June 25, 1950, North
Korean troops invaded South
Korea, justifying (, the
intervention by United States
and forces.' Ancestors
of the Korean people lived in
Q
whati\ is now Korea, at least
30,000 years ago. Since
ancient times other nations
]I"
have often had strong
influence on the peninsula.
China controlled I part of
Korea from 108 B.C. until the
early 300s A.D. (World Book
Encyclopedia Vol. 11, 367).
The Japanese gained
control of Korea in 1895 and
made it part of Japan in /n"10
1910. The defeated Japan in World War II, 1939 through
1945. The United States and Soviet Forces moved into Korea after
the war. Soviet troops occupied Korea north of the 38th parallel)
7>
of north latitude, an imaginary line that cuts the country
in half. American troops occupied Korea south of the 38th
OF
JA PA N
MAN C H URI A
l'ELLO W
LEGEND
lIII.lftroad _
Had,,* 4 _
"" __ I.,
__
Towft
? r-:;J 'II '?
1
3
parallel. In 1947, the united Nations General Assembly supported
general elections throughout Korea to choose one government for
the entire country. The Soviet Union opposed this idea and would
not permit elections in North Korea. On May 10, 1948, the people
of South Korea elected a national assembly. The assembly set up
the government of the Republic of Korea. On September 9, 1948,
North Korean communists established the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea. Both North and South Korea claimed the entire
country, and their troops clashed near the border several times
from 1948 to 1950.
The united States removed its last troops from Korea in 1949.
Early in 1950 the United States indicated that Korea lay outside
its main defense line in Asia (379).
The Korean War, 1950 to 1953, was a conflict between forces of
the united Nations and forces of North Korea and communist China.
The war began after the North Koreans attempted to topple the
government of the south by indirect means. North Korea launched a
surprise invasion of South Korea to gain control of the whole
peninsula. General Douglas MacArthur commanded the united Nations
forces sent to assist South Korea (The National Encyclopedia Vol.
9, 3118)()
The Communists believed the time was right for military
action. When North Korea invaded South Korea, the North Korean
Army had about 135,000 soldiers. Many of the soldiers had fought
for China and the Soviet Union during World War II. North Korea
had airplanes, artillery, and tanks. The South Korean Army had
about 95,000 soldiers, few planes or heavy guns, and no tanks.
4
The Korean War was the first war in which a world organization,
the united Nations, played a military role. The Korean War was a
major challenge for the United Nations that had come into
existence only five years earlier.
When troops from communist ruled North Korea invaded South
Korea, the united Nations called the invasion a violation of
international peace. They demanded that the Communists withdraw
from South Korea immediately. After the Communists kept fighting,
the united Nations asked its member nations to give military aid
to South united Nations countries sent troops to
help the South Koreans. Forty-one other united Nations countries
sent military equipment or food and other supplies. The United
States sent more than 90 per cent of the troops, military
equipment, and supplies. China and the Soviet Union provided
North Korea with personnel and military equipment (World Book
Encyclopedia Vol. 11, 379).
At their greatest strength the South Korean and united Nations
forces consisted of almost 1,110,000 soldiers. The North Korean
Army grew to more than 260,000 troops during the war. China sent
another 780,000 soldiers to help the North Koreans. On the day
the war began, the united Nations Security Council issued a
resolution. The resolution demanded that the Communists stop
fighting and retreat to the 38th parallel. The Soviet Union,
/
member of the eleven nation council, could have vetoed the
resolution. However, the Soviet Union was boycotting council
meetings to protest nationalist China's membership on the council.
5
Therefore, the Soviet delegate did not cast his vote with the rest
of the council that unanimously voted to intervene.
North Korea ignored the united Nations' demand. The North
Korean troops reached the outskirts of Seoul, the South Korean
capital, on June 27, 1950. That same day both President Harry S.
Truman and the united Nations took action to halt the Communist
advance. Truman ordered united States air and naval forces to
South Korea}and the united Nations asked its members to aid South
Korea. Truman ordered American ground forces into action on June
30, 1950. Congress supported Truman's actions and the United
Nations policy, but did not formally declare war against North
Korea (380).
On July 1, 1950, part of the united States Army 24th Infantry
Division flew from Japan to Pusan at the southern tip of Korea.
The next day, these troops began to move into battle positions
near Taejon, about 75 miles south of Seoul. Troops from other
nations began arriving in Korea shortly after the Americans.
united States troops first fought the North Koreans on July 5,
1950, at Osan, 30 miles south of Seoul.
The Communists had already captured Seoul. On July 8, 1950,
/ c
with the approval of the United Nations Security Council, /
named General Douglas MacArthur Commander in Chief of the
Nations Command. The command had authority over all the United), 00
States troops, South Korean troops, and the troops from other
J
united Nations countries, MacArthur directed allied operations/I
from his headquarters in Tokyo, Japan. On July 13, 1950,
Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, head of the 8th United States L5
6
Army, became Field Commander of the combined forces in Korea.
units of the united States Army 1st Calvary Division and 25th
Infantry Division landed in Korea to aid the outnumbered soldiers
of the 24th Division (381).
Several significant events happened in Korea before the
Battles of Bloody and Heartbreak Ridge. General Walker lost his
life in a jeep accident and Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway
took command on December 27, 1950. The Communists began to attack
Seoul on New Eve, 1951, and they occupied the city on
January 4, 1951. The allies dug in about twenty-five miles south
on January 10, 1951, and their retreat ended. General Ridgway
quickly restored the confidence of the allied troops and they soon
inflicted heavy loses on the enemy.
The began to move again on January 16, 1951. In
fifteen days they were able to fire on Seoul. General Ridgway
ordered slower advances that would wipe out all enemy forces
instead of bypassing some. The allies reoccupied Seoul on March
14, 1951, without a fight (382). By order of President Truman)
General Ridgway replaced General MacArthur as Supreme Commander of
f'

f:
forces. General Van Fleet took over as Field Commander of
allied forces. They advanced a short distance into North Korea by\\0{\ '5
June 10, 1951, by then the war had changed. The two sides dug in
and began fighting along a battle line north of the 38th parallel.
Truce talks began on July 10, 1951, but fighting continued for two
more years. Neither side made important advances, but they fought
V cJ1-.-' 1\ C-,
many bitter battles for apparently strategic positions.
7
period the united Nations concentrated on battles for hills,
including Bloody and Heartbreak Ridge (382).
During the truce talks the united Nations Command didn't seek
military victory anymore. They didn't want to spend lives for
just wanted to come to an agreement about a
settlement in the vicinity of the 38th parallel. There wasn't any
significant progress at the truce talks: the Communists were
stalling. Stalling allowed them to rebuild their force to
continue the fighting. As summer ended, the hopes for peace
slowly vanished in the green, muddy, and bloody hills of Korea.
On August 17, 1951, the war began a new and terrible phase
(Fehrenbach 499).
For all practical purposes the Korean War ended June 30, 1951.
This is when united Nations Supreme Commander General Ridgway
expressed a willingness to discuss truce terms with Communist
forces. united Nations Command became convinced that the enemy
was stalling. Therefore, applying a little judiciously placed
pressure along enemy fronts could have a wholesome effect. These
new attacks, although limited in zone and objectives, would erase
the few bulges in defense lines (502).
"In no terms was it to open the door to a new major offensive.
The war would settle down to a static war, where the troops would
fight and die battles where they would create poetic names for
their battle fields, Bloody Ridge, Heartbreak Ridge " (Hoyt
441). However, the offensive at Bloody Ridge looked like a full
scale attack on the enemy. The attack would serve no other
purpose except to pressure the enemy into sincerity at the peace
102'
__,pr' Elevations in meters
....t3
THE BLOODY RIDGES
AUII.-Gct., 18.1

the Punchbowl (Matray 33).
8
tables. It would also help to keep the 8th united States Army
combat ready. It was not an ambitious program, nor an
unreasonable one. As it turned out)the only thing it lacked was
,
the number of casualties the battle would produce.
The ridge had little value to anyone, except as a vantage
point for superior observation over the defensive line. The
battle of Bloody Ridge provided the Republic of Korea Army an
opportunity to show the world its revitalized army. On August 17,
1951, orders arrived at the Republic of Korea's 36th Regiment, 7th
Division to take the ridge. Bloody Ridge consisted of three
hills, numbers 983, 940, and 773)with connecting ridges in a
region known as
The 72d Tank
Battalion) along with the
American Air Force and
the 2d Division
provided fire support.
After heavy fighting the
36th Regiment took the
ridge on August 25, 1951.
However, ,\ to
withdraw due to the North
Korean .1 pressure I and
counter-attacks. This
two-mile wide and three-mile deep mountain mass would soon gain
the name Bloody Ridge.
9
The preliminary assault on hill 983 was a day long
concentration of artillery fire. The artillery fire gradually
eliminated practically every trace of vegetation upon the ridge
line. The Republic of Korea soldiers attacked frontally up the
fingers leading to the peak (Alexander 440). The heavy artillery
bombardments and air strikes eliminated trees and underbrush. They
could not destroy the well built Communist bunkers or all the
thick mine fields protecting the emplacements. The bunkers,
\
constructed of heavy timbers covered with deep layers of rock and4
earth, were so massive that only a direct hit from the heaviest //)
caliber of weapon could destroy them (440). As a result, the
North K o r e a n ~ struck the Republic of Korea troops with automatic
fire and clouds of hand grenades. This style of combat tactics
generated a large number of casualties. The Republic of Korea
soldiers were brave and tried hard. In ten days the 36th Republic
of Korea Regiment reported a thousand killed and wounded.
Massive counter-attacks from the North Korean forces caused
the Republic of Korea's 36th Regiment to withdraw. This caused
the commitment of the 2d Division, 9th Infantry. The 2d Division
went forward with confidence that somehow the Republic of Korea
had managed to mess up another battle. On August 27, 1951, going
into a maze of trenches and hidden bunkers, they were stopped
cold. On August 30, 1951, 1/9 and 2/9 attacked the ridges
frontally, determined to overwhelm the resistance quickly (512).
They employed four organic battalions of the 2d Division
Artillery, supported by three additional battalions, and two
mortar companies. A regimental tank company stood in reserve for
10
support. In all, the artillery support fired 451,979 rounds in a
very short period of time (513). However, even the massive
bombardment could not eliminate the enemy reinforced bunkers.
North Koreans died by the thousands but conventional weapons
would not dislodge the enemy from deliberately prepared positions.
The only way to reduce the long ridge was bunker by bunker, at
close range with rifle and grenade. Pushing against Bloody Ridge,
the men of 1/9 and 2/9 sustained heavy losses and casualties.
Other events before the attack contributed to the high
casualty rate. First, the rotation schedule for many seasoned
veterans sent the battleline experience home. The replacements
did not have any combat experience or extensive combat training.
Only in Korea could the soldiers learn the lessons they needed to
fight and survive this war. With the rotation, the complexion of
the Army changed. The second reason for the dramatic loss of life
and the high casualty rate is the lack of essential equipment.
The neutralization of bunker emplacements required the use of
flamethrowers and hand to hand combat. The 8th united States Army
lacked both the flamethrowers and the experience to use them.
Training and experience takes time)and with that the casualty and
death statistics continued to rise.
On September 5, 1951, having lost an estimated 15,363 men,
four thousand of them dead, the North Korean Army voluntarily
relinquished Bloody Ridge. The battle cost the Republic of
Korea's Army more than one thousand men. The 2d Division lost
almost three thousand to secure the insignificant ridge (515).
After a summer of hard fighting, the united States c,
---------
11
Division moved to new positions. They saw before them a dark mass
of rock and rubble soon to be known as Heartbreak Ridge. The main
ridge ran north to south for about seven miles. It included three
principal peaks. Hill 894 at the southern terminus commanded the
approach from Bloody Ridge, three miles to the south. Thirteen
hundred yards to the north of Hill 894 rose the highest peak of
the three, Hill 931. Twenty-one hundred yards to the north of
Hill 931 stood a needle-like projection, Hill 851. These
distances were well within the range of infantry weapons. Thus,
the North Korean defenders could lay down supporting fires from
one hill to the other. Extending from Hills 894, 931, and 851
were many spurs that ran down into the Sataeri and Mundungni
valleys (Hinshaw 7-10).
?
A New Coach, a NeuJ p/Qy
HEARTBREAK RIDGE AND
SURROUNDING HILLS
SHOWING THE DISTANCES
BETWE EN STRATEGIC PEAKS
""...-otIC not to scale
Map 6
The bastions (hills) surrounding Heartbreak Ridge
12
The enemy had built elaborate fortifications on Heartbreak
.,.-,C,
Ridge. Mostly on the reverse or western slope facing
Valley. They had dug deep bunkers covered over with timber, then
hardened on top by dirt and rocks. So strong were they that one
of these bunkers could resist a direct hit by a 105mm howitzer
shell. Anything less than a direct hit by a 250 pound bomb could
y'\/
not destroy the bunkers. They were also well camouflaged. The
North Korean 6th Division, commanded by General Hong Nim, manned
the fortifications on Heartbreak and covered the approaches from
'(\)
Sataeri Valley. The 6th was up by its sister division the
12th Division. The North Korean 12th Division, entrenched on the
hills west of Shipchon River, covered the Mundungni Valley. Both
6th and 12th Divisions were in the North Korean V Corps, as
designated in official United States Army histories. Major Le
Mire, Deputy Commander French Battalion, described the enemy's
tenacity on the defensive as extr{-,rdinary. "The North Koreans
only give up terrain foot by foot" (10-11).
The order went out on September 8, 1951, from Van Fleet to
Major General Clevis E. Byers, the new X Corps commander. Take
the high ground north of Bloody Ridge. Indianhead Division was
the choice of X Corps to carry out this difficult mission. No one
envisioned just how difficult the task would be. Indianhead, the
2d united States Infantry Division, was a typical triangular
division having three infantry regiments, the 9th, the 23d and the
38th. The 37th Field Artillery under Colonel Linton S. "Buster"
Boatright was in direct support of the 23d. They positioned their
13
105mm howitzers three miles southeast of the principal ridge. The
38th Field Artillery positioned its 105mm howitzers with the 503d
Field Artillery Battalion's 155mm howitzers, southeast of the
ridge. Also, in general support was the 96th Field Artillery's
I
155mm howitzers located about seven miles south of the main ridge.
Battery C of the 780th Field Artillery fired its eight-inch
howitzers, with 200-pound projectiles, from positions near
Yack'on-Ni, about eleven miles to the south. Colonel John M.
Lynch's 9th Infantry would give fire support to the 23d.
Afterward they made an attack on Hill 728 lying 2,000 yards to the
9
west and a little south
A New Coach, a New Play
of Hill 894. The predawn
hours of
September
the first
hill mass
rightfully earn its
Heartbreak
Ridge. The : ~
23d, 2d, and
Battalions shared the
HEARTBREAK RIDGE AND
SURROUNDING HILLS
Attack ~
dubious honor of this: ... 9Ul Inf Objectives
.... 23dlnf 0
first attack. From Hill
.. 38thlnf
schematic - not to scale
702 the column descended Map 7
Objectives assigned by Operation Touchdown
through the gray fog
hanging over Sataeri Valley to a point near Samtaedong. This' was
their designated line of departure (24-26).
Before crossing the line of departure, Major Craven, 3d
14
Battalion Commander, called for planned artillery fires to soften
up the enemy. Thousands of shells from the artillery's 105mm,
155mm, and eight-inch howitzers rumbled throughout the early
morning air. This continued for forty-five minutes for the
attacking troops and their commander. When daylight broke on
September 14, 1951, heavy enemy mortar and artillery
concentrations on the attacking units of 23d Regiment continued
throughout the morning. This inflicted heavy casualties on the
regiment. In midafternoon)L I Company following,
attacked up the finger leading to the ridge connecting Hills 931
and 851. After two days of fighting, 23d Infantry Regiment with
its attached French Battalion sustained seventy-five battle
casualties (26-31).
The 23d Regiment made repeated unsuccessful assaults against
Hills 931 and 851. Colonel Lynch's 9th Infantry Regiment,
positioned southeastward of the main hill mass, 851,931, and 894,
was near Piari. The 9th's mission was to move onto Hill 728,
located about 1,800 meters southwest of Hill 894. Brigadier
General de Shazo's initial plan was for the 9th to move on Hill
728 after the 23d had secured its assigned objective. This would
conclude the 2d Division's hold of the whole rocky range. Colonel
Lynch moved his 2d Battalion, less F Company, against Hill 728.
They had fire support from the 4.2 inch mortars and the attached
tanks from B Company, 72d Tank Battalion. Moving forward under
moderate long-range fire from the enemy on Hill 894, the battalion
reached the southeast slope of 894 about 1,300 meters southwest of
15
Samtaedong. Battle casualties that day in the 23d Regiment were
as follows: 1st Battalion, 29; 2d Battalion, 13; 3d Battalion,
23; and the French Battalion, 3 (33-43).
On September 19, 1951, the 2d Infantry Division's new
Commander, General Robert Young, arrived at the division command
post. General Young began making an assessment of the current
situation on Heartbreak Ridge. He knew the battle for Heartbreak
Ridge had already cost the division too many casualties (Hinshaw
82).
After nearly two weeks of trying to take Heartbreak Ridge, the
command decided to try a new plan. The new plan,
Touchdown, would broaden the offensive to include assaults on key
adjacent hills. Thereby, forcing North Korea to spread its
\
and leave few reserves to reinforce Heartbreak (Matray 135).
/
General Young rehearsed his battalion commanders constantly.
Every battalion submitted fire plans showing how it intended to
employ tanks, automatic weapons, small arms, and mortars in
Touchdown. Sand table models of Heartbreak Ridge sector allowed
the division to see how the fire plans would look in action. The
division could then adjust the plans as necessary (Craven 134).
Target day for Operation Touchdown was October 5, 1951. All
three regiments of the 2d Division would launch concentrated and
coordinated attacks. Two powerful armored thrusts would
supplement the advance of the regiments. One attack up the3 r-
Sataere Valley. The second armored thrust was a tank and infantry
drive up the Mundungni Valley (Aiken 45). The 23d Infantry had
the task of securing hill 931. On order, the 23d Infantry would
16
attack hill 728 or help the 38th Infantry capture it. The 23d
Infantry also would take hill 520, west of Heartbreak Ridge (92).
The 9th Infantry would advance on the western side of
Mundungni Valley and seize hills 867, 1005, 980, and 1040. The
9th Infantry moved on the left flank of the Division, tied in with
the 7th Infantry, Republic of Korea forces (92-94).
The 38th Infantry would move up the Mundungni Valley and
secure hill 485, southwest of Heartbreak Ridge, but east of
Mundungni valley. They also would provide infantry support for
the 72d Tank Battalion.
The 3d Battalion of the 38th Infantry was the Division
reserve. General Young, Division Commander, was the only one
authorized to commit this battalion into the battle (93). The
38th Infantry had a battalion of infantry from the Netherlands
attached to it. This gave the 38th Infantry Regiment three
battalions.
To protect the division right flank in the Sataere Valley a r e a ~ ~ ..
and to distract the enemy was Task Force sturman. Task Force
Sturman consisted of the 23d Tank Company, 2d Reconnaissance
Company, a French Engineer Platoon, and one infantry company from
the divisional security forces. Task Force Sturman had
additional missions to destroy enemy bunkers on the east side of
Heartbreak Ridge. Also to act as a decoy to draw enemy fire awayj F ( ~
from the 23d Infantry soldiers on Heartbreak Ridge.
Mission support came from the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion.
The road along the Mundungni Valley was rough track, unsuitable
for Sherman tanks. Craters clotted the ground and the North
17
Koreans had planted mines along the way. The engineers blasted
the neighboring cliff walls for the rock to provide fill for the
craters. The engineers also removed all the mines in the roadway.
They placed chain blocks of tetranol at fifty foot intervals on
both sides of trail and then set them off. At times stream beds
became roads or trails because of intense mines and craters. Bit
by bit, they advanced the road northward up the valley (92-93).
While the engineers prepared the trail, the 2d Division
Regiments received replacements to bring them up to full strength.
:. (yr d
They also resupply food, equipment, and ammunition for the
upcoming operation. The division established supply points
'J--.f\-
forward of line Kansas. This insured the division's weapons
employment in the most effective locations (92).
Execution of Operation Touchdown started on October 4, 1951.
Forty-nine fighter bombers worked over the division sector. Task
Force Sturman force raided the Sataeri Valley. The other units of
the 2d Division underwent final rehearsals for the attack
scheduled for 2100 the next night. Fire support teams, usually
consisting of a combination of mortars, machine guns, rifles, and
(
automatic weapons, The infantry directed the
use, movements, and opeations of the teams as the battle
progressed (Alexander 445).
Late on October 5, 1951, the artillery preparation opened on
the enemy positions, the 9th and 38th Regiments stood by in the
Mundungni Valley for orders to move forward. Air strikes by
Marine Corsairs sent napalm, rockets, and machine gun bullets into
the North Korean lines before the main attack that night (445).
18
From the west, 9th Infantry pressed on toward Hill 867 in the
Mundungni Valley area. By October 7, 1951, they secured the hill
with only light resistance. They swung northwest toward hill 960
and hill 666 and after a bayonet assault took possession on
October 10, 1951. The following day the Republic of Korea forces,
8th Division, took possession of the Kim II Sung range west of the
9th Infantry (446).
The 38th Regiment made good progress especially when they
discovered that the enemy had abandoned Hill 485. On October 6,
1951, they advanced on Hill 485 and 728 against light resistance.
Another element from the 38th deployed up the Mundungni Valley and
attacked Hill 636, which fell on October 7, 1951. Possession of
these three hills furnished cover for the 2d Engineers, who could
now finished the road. On October 7, 1951, the 38th Regiment
gained essential firepower with the attachment of the 72d Tank
Battalion. The 38th Regiment also received three new objectives.
"
Their objectives, all the high ground west of Mundungni Valley
Kim II Sung range (Hermes 94).
The 23d the cover of night and
distractions provided by the rest of the division,
' ... _._----/
Enemy fire came in quick on the 2d Battalion, but the North
Koreans could not concentrate upon the assault. To preserve the
element of surprise, there was no artillery preparation. The 37th
Artillery Battalion bombarded all known enemy mortar positions as F:r I
------'
__9uring the assault. The countermortar fire was very
-----... _-----
effective. The 23d Infantry closed ln on the North Koreans with
only light losses. By 0300 the 2d and 3d Battalions had control
19
of the southern half of Hill 931. The united Nations troops
repelled the expected enemy counterattack with ease. By noon Hill
931 belonged to the 23d Infantry (Alexander 446).
The 3d Battalion of 23d Infantry pushed on to join the 1st
t
Battalion in its assault. This was the last objective on
Heartbreak Ridge, Hill 851. In the Sataeri valley) Sturman's tanks
sustained their daylight raids. They continued to blast away at
the bunkers on the eastern side of
Hill 851 (Hermes 95).
In the west, in the Mundungni
Valley, the 72d Tank Battalion waited
for the go ahead signal from the
engineers. On October 10, 1951, the
engineers finished the road. The 72d
Shermans and a company from the 38th
infantry, began to rumble north up
the valley (95). The North Koreans
were in the middle of relieving their
elements in the Heartbreak sector.
The tank thrust, with the general
forward movement of the rest of
division, caught the Chinese enroute
to new positions. The 72d Tank
Battalion raced to the town of
Mundungni and beyond, inflicting
. \
r---F"
\ ,.
heavy losses upon the Chinese soldiers. This action also cut the
20
supply and replacement routes up the western side of Heartbreak
Ridge (95).
During the next two days, the 23d Infantry and the French
Battalions inched north toward the objective, bunker by bunker.
The united Nations soldiers took very few prisoners in the bitter
fighting. The enemy would not surrender and fought bravely to the
death. On October 13, 1951, the French troops stormed the last
peak. After thirty long days of intensive fightirig, Heartbreak
Ridge was in the possession of the 23d Infantry (96).
The casualty rate for this limited war was very high. The
North Korean forces did not give up any territory easily. They
fought to the very last man and then came back again harder and
stronger (Rees 461). It is important to note that over half of
the killed, wounded, captured, or missing in action occurred after
/ i
the truce talks began. Even "'7'(4 'fJ '
't"
Battle cnsunlties of the Korean War
though the truce talks continued ROK
. According to an UN release of '13 October '953, ROK casualtic
Korean totalled ',3'3,836, including about a
during the last two years of the CIVIlians. No defimtlve bre:1kdown of the ROK military caau:lItie
h:1s e\'er reached. but the following figures are approximatel:
COfrect: KJiled, 47,000; wounded, ,83,000; Missing and POW, ;0.00.;.

war the fighting continued to be

Total: 300,000.
United N a/ions
Apart from the US losses. the battle c:1Sualties of the other UN
intense.
contingents of the UNC are calculated to have been as follows:
The loss of life already was
Dead: 3,'94
Wounded: 11.297
Missing and POW: '1.709
Total: '7,'160
["IIi/cd States
(Source: UN release, 23 October 1953,)
---.-_.- .. -. - ._- --
Of this total the Commonwealth casualties killed, wounded and
missing were 7,'168:
l>e_:1_th_s ' 33.0'19' '17.704 458 I 4.'167 ;-;;;;
1_;o_t:1_1c_3_su_a_lti_es :-;42.0C)--;-, '1.087 i '18.'105
in Action i '1.3.300: '9.3.3'; '179 i .3.308 .379

\\'ounded in Action ,: '05.785 79.5'16 '.599 '14. 28, 379
Died 2.5'. '.93
0
23 537 "
Other i IOp8,,! 7705rfi '.5i6 23.744 368
\Iissing in Action I 5.866 'W; --;;.-----SS;
Died 5.'2i i 3.7i
8
'52 39' 806
Returned I 7'5 ' 66.; '3 I 38
C_,uf_fe_n_t ! '1'; __9_1___, __'5_
c.'ptured or interned II ;.'4 6.6;6 3S 2'15 '1'14
Died '1,7' '1.66: 4 3' 4
Returned I 4.4,8 3,gj.3 3' '94 '120
Refused rep:1triation I '1' '11 0 0 0
(Source: Barclay. The Firs' Corn_l'h DivUiorI. 1,0]6 prftoaen wac
Killed Wounded MissiftflPOIV Tou"
Australia '161 1,034
37
1,332

1543
4
10'1
I
4.'186
p68
Canada
'194 ',20'1
47
India
4
New Zealand 22
79 I
South Africa
I
UK 686
'1.498 1,102
Totals
1.'163 4,81 7 ",88
repatriated by the Communilu.)
(Source: Office of Ihe Secretary of Defence.)

r
i
, I I
--'
1
l I,
tt j.) , 't"
I
21
more than the united States could justify for a police action.
The public pressure on Washington showed during the presidential
election when Truman lost. General MacArthur said all along that
if politics directs a war then it's a war we can't win, and he was
right (528).
The only positive to come from these battles is the
cooperation of military branches to achieve a goal. The infantry,
artillery, armor, and engineer team did succeed in controlling the
ridges (Craven 24). However, the indecisiveness, misdirection,
and unclear objectives cost the lives of many of America's young
men needlessly. The United Nations did achieve a political peace,
but at a very high cost in lives. The united Nations and United
-
states did not prepare the battle plans effectively or efficiently
to achieve the political end. Only during Operation Touchdown did
all the firepower, personnel, and support become concentrated to
successfully gain the objective. Still, because of the Communist? (\
\"
enemy, at a very high cost in personnel and equipment.
No matter how just the cause or how m o r a l ~ the conflict,
political motivations can not win a war. To playa political game
of chess with the lives of our soldiers will not win popular
public support. In The Korean War, and these two battles in
particular, popular support did not appear. Therefore, the
battles proved costly to American soldiers and did not achieve a
military advantage. There is not honor - only irony - to being
the last man killed in any war fought for any reason (Fehrenbach
501). Neither side gained territory, yet neither side lost face.
The world was now a far more dangerous place. The signing of the
22
armistice on July 27,
(Chevprime 127).
U
lJ'
l,
!
i
;.---(
I
',.)
1953, meant peace would prevail again
I
.//,r
\ \ ~
,
r..' !
./ft, ~ t ( ' ;
,
I
23

Aiken, Scott D. "The 72d Tank Bat:tal:Wn in Operation TOUCHDOWN."
Armor Sep-Oct 1992: 44-48
Alexander, Bevin R. The Korean War, The War We Lost. New York:
Hippocrene Books Inc., 1986
/Chevprime Limited. History of the united States Army. London:
Chevprime Limited, 1988.
Craven, Virgil E. LTC. "Operation Touchdown Won Heartbreak
Ridge." U.S. Army Combat Forces Journal Dec. 1953: 24-29.
II Fehrenbach, T. R. This Kind of War. New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1963.
Walter G. Truce Tent and Fighting Front. US Government
Printing Office: 1966
" Hinshaw, Arned L. Heartbreak Ridge. New York: Preager
Publishers, 1989
Hoyt, Edwin P. American Wars and Military Excursions. New York:
McGraw Hill, 1989
_ Hoyt, Edwin P. The Bloody Road to Panmunjom. New York: Stein
and Day Inc., 1985
_"Korean War." The National Encyclopedia. 1986 ed.
_-"Korean War." World Book Encyclopedia. 1988 ed.
--Matray, James J. Historical Dictionary of the Korean War.
Connecticut: Drummond Publishing Co., 1988: 33-34
Miller, John Jr., MAJ Owen J. Carroll, and Margaret E. Tackley.
Korea 1951-53. Waashington: Office of the Chief of Military
History, 1956.
24
Rees, David. Korea the Limited War. New York: St Martin's
Press., 1964
Summers, Harry G. Jr. Korean War Almanac.