Racine 2007

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The American Journal of Bioethics

Identifying Challenges and Conditions


for the Use of Neuroscience
in Bioethics
Eric Racine, Institut de recherches cliniques de Montréal

In “Personhood and Neuroscience: Naturalizing or Nihi- CNS as a complex information-processing system. Neuro-
lating”, Farah and Heberlein (2007) provide an insightful science can therefore inform our thinking on moral behavior
perspective on the naturalization of the personhood con- and cognition without implying neurological determinism.
cept. Their contribution clearly shows the interest of case
studies in the neuroscience of ethics including their poten- NATURALISTIC FALLACY
tial broader theoretical and practical impact on bioethics. Hume’s identification of the naturalistic fallacy, the unin-
My commentary will be based on the identification and dis- vited slide from an “is” to an “ought” remains a common
cussion of five (briefly formulated) challenges for the neuro- reference in bioethics scholarship. Much of the interest of
science of ethics: 1) neurological determinism; 2) naturalistic the distinction lies in preventing hasty reasoning that slides
fallacy; 3) semantic dualism; 4) biological reductionism; and from matters of fact to what we should pursue as individu-
5) threats to ethics (Racine 2005). These arguments are of- als and societies.
ten used to oppose any input of neuroscience in bioethics Generally speaking the identification and critique of nat-
but in many ways Farah and Heberlein succeed in avoiding uralistic fallacies remains a rampart against crude forms
these pitfalls. Closer analysis reveals nonetheless that the of biology-based moral-political ideologies. However, any
conditions for the interpretation and use of neuroscience in meaningful discussion of the neuroscience of ethics needs
biomedical ethics must be further defined and articulated. to acknowledge that radical forms of is/ought distinctions
In this commentary, I will focus on the authors’ claims rel- have serious problems such as precluding the existence of
ative to the nature of the concept of person and not on its any concrete sources of the “ought” (Callahan 1996). In con-
role (foundational or not in bioethics) essentially because I trast to any radical is/ought divide, empirical research in
believe that respect for persons is a principle that only partly bioethics is now a lively and respectable area of scholar-
expresses and operationalizes the goals of bioethics. ship (Sugarman et al. 2001) and contributes to the evolu-
tion of bioethics as a form of practice distinct from nor-
NEUROLOGICAL DETERMINISM mative disciplines such as theology and philosophy that
At first glance, the use of neuroscience research in bioethics nourish bioethics (Andre 2002). What Farah and Heberlein’s
appears to jeopardize our belief in freewill and brings sup- (2007) paper shows is that neuroscience is not so different
port to forms of determinism. Using neuroscience evidence from other disciplines that are feeding empirical evidence
could jeopardize our belief in the “uncaused causer” and to bioethics. For example, similar to the way in which qual-
the power of human will. itative research has informed us about what happens in
Acknowledging extensive brain-environment interac- the end-of-life decision-making process; neuroscience and
tions, Farah and Heberlein (2007) do not argue for any moral psychology could help us further understand what
form of determinism. Further, their review of current neu- moral reasoning and behavior are and how they are en-
roscience research on person and personhood shows that gaged in bioethics situations. What we need is more bridg-
deterministic interpretations of behavior and cognition are ing of naturally occurring real-world bioethics problems
foreign to higher-order level cognitive neuroscience. As with neuroscience research conducted in controlled envi-
Mayr (1988) argued, the biological sciences do not entirely ronment to test emerging neuroscience-informed models of
comply with deterministic philosophies of science given moral reasoning and behavior. To maximize its relevance
the interaction of biological systems with their internal and impact, the contribution of neuroscience to our empir-
(physiological) and external environments. In particular, ical understanding of moral psychology will also need to
determinism is unlikely to be the overarching biophiloso- interact with relevant non-biology-based research. In sum,
phy that accurately describes the structure and function of far from corroborating any conservative reasoning that self-
the central nervous system (CNS). Indeed neuronal plastic- advantageously deduces a preferred view on the “ought”
ity and constant interactions between the CNS and its en- from a specific take on the “is”, neuroscience can shake our
vironments contribute to the evolutionary relevance of the implicit and explicit beliefs about how moral cognition and

Address correspondence to Eric Racine, Neuroethics Research Unit, Institut de recherches cliniques de Montréal, 110 Avenue de Pins
Quest, Montreal, Quebec, H7L 5L2, Canada. E-mail: [email protected]

74 ajob January, Volume 7, Number 1, 2007


Personhood and Neuroscience: Naturalizing or Nihilating?

behavior work such as in the case of the concept of person. defined domain of normative behavior. In other words, what
The contribution of neuroscience is in this respect a welcome the empirical bioethics researcher considers to be relevant to
addition to the evolving pool of empirical bioethics research. study (e.g., respect of patient preferences in end-of-life care)
is in part informed by a combination of implicit and ex-
SEMANTIC DUALISM plicit commitments to what is considered by the researcher
The French philosopher Paul Ricoeur systematically ar- to be constitutive of the moral domain (e.g., normative
gued in his dialogue with neuroscientist Jean-Pierre justification for the importance of respect for autonomy).
Changeux that brain-properties are different from mind- As the neuroscience of ethics moves forward, the issue of
properties (Changeux and Ricoeur 2000). According to this inter-theoric reduction must be further addressed to respect
phenomenology-inspired argument, use of neuroscience to the normative dimensions of bioethics and to ensure that
explore the biological bases of the self or to further define the neuroscience fits in multi-level interdisciplinary research
nature of morality can confuse brain-properties with mind- approaches.
properties (e.g., the brain thinks instead of I think).
It is true that neuroscience explanations of the concept of
person may not capture the essence of an ethical concept on THREATS TO ETHICS
which there are multiple perspectives. For example, it is un- One of the most important challenges voiced against any
clear from Farah and Heberlein’s (2007) review that the con- interest in the integration of neuroscience to bioethics is
cept of person (and even more so the concept of personhood) that, neuroscience, with its scientific methods and concepts,
is what neuroscientists are in fact directly and unanimously risks trumping other forms of bioethics discourse and schol-
researching. However, Farah and Heberlein’s contribution arship. Although this may seem like a practical issue with
does identify some interesting challenges in clarifying the poor theoretical grounding, it is in my view probably one the
boundaries of ambiguous but frequently used concepts such most significant issues to tackle proactively. Frontier neuro-
as person and personhood. Their article shows that contrary science research results are often reported without attention
to semantic dualism certain mind-properties can be revised to the limitations inherent to study designs, limited number
based on neuroscience evidence (Bickle 1992). Folk psychol- of participants and other factors influencing external valid-
ogy or so called propositional attitude psychology can be ity and therefore real-world meaning and use (Racine et al.
seen as a tool that we pragmatically use (Dennett 1981), and 2005). In addition, emerging popular interpretations of neu-
that can be refined to reflect our evolving scientific under- roscience take the form of neuroessentialist and neurorealist
standing of morality. If we better understand how our con- beliefs that prepare the public psyche for hasty social use of
cept of person works, perhaps we can be more attentive to results (i.e., neuropolicy). How will the neuroethics commu-
how we apply it and increase our insight into the genesis of nity prevent early conclusions that neuroscience evidence is
ethical problems associated with its use. In addition, current inherently more informative than research yielded by social
neuroscience evidence can bring bioethicists to consider as- science approaches? How will we avoid—while keeping in
pects of moral concepts and moral reasoning that may be mind the interest of neuroscience research—disseminating
left unattended (e.g., the existence of separate person and forms of scientism and technological fix that reduce our take
non-person recognition systems) even though this may have on the individual and society? These are some of the very
important practical implications (e.g., defining the status of challenges that bioethics tackles in the delivery of health-
persons in beginning-of-life contexts). care.
The conditions for the interpretation and use of neu-
BIOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM roscience in biomedical ethics need to be further defined
Some have voiced the fear that neuroscience will reduce and articulated. Hopefully such a work-in-progress prole-
ethical concepts to the point of examining only their trivial gomenon to the neuroscience of ethics will be stimulated by
components that are theoretically and practically irrelevant additional case studies and open-minded interdisciplinary
(Macintyre 1998). scholarship.
It is true that in comparison to qualitative research,
neuroscience is perhaps less well equipped to approach
the meaning of moral concepts and behaviors. However, REFERENCES
Farah and Heberlein’s (2007) contribution shows that the Andre, J. 2002. Bioethics as a practice. Chapel Hill, NC: The University
progressive integration of neuroscience in bioethics does of North Carolina Press.
not necessarily do injustice to the nature of moral con- Bickle, J. 1992. Revisionary physicalism. Biology and Philosophy 7:
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Bunge, M. 1977. Levels and reduction. American Journal of Physiology
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of multi-level scientific approach, we can benefit from the
progressive study of interacting levels of biological and so- Callahan, D. 1996. Can nature serve as a moral guide? Hastings
cial systems (Bunge 1977). In fact, more broadly speaking, Center Report 26(6): 21–22.
any empirical examination of moral concepts and moral Changeux, J.-P., and P. Ricoeur. 2000. Ce qui nous fait penser: La nature
behavior faces the challenge of relying on a reduced pre- et la règle. Paris, FR: Odile Jacob.

January, Volume 7, Number 1, 2007 ajob 75


The American Journal of Bioethics

Dennett, D. 1981. Brainstorms: Philosophical essays on mind and psy- Racine, E. 2005. Pourquoi et comment doit-on tenir compte
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