Philippine Rabbit vs.

People and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still
G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004 intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest
PANGANIBAN, J.: therein.

Facts: Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare
reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted
and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to against their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they have an
pay damages. The court further ruled that in the event of the insolvency of interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary
accused, petitioner shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the
Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory. latter’s lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently
on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The CA ruled
that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Under
action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for
against the accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary civil liability as set the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s
forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and insolvency. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need
enforceable. not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. In the
absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended
Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily
of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction liable. In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses
independently of the accused. mere civil liability.

Held: No. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would
may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
the accused jumps bail. This rule is based on the rationale that appellants competent court. By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final
lose their standing in court when they abscond. criminal conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent would also
result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment. The
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive
instituted in a criminal prosecution. When a criminal action is instituted, the upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated
shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party from that of the employee.
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action. The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the
pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the
deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable.
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is
institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced
by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the
employee.

What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability

arising from the crime or delict per se, but not those liabilities arising from
quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed
separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains,
BANAL VS. TADEO Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental
This is a petition for certiorari to review and set aside the orders of the postulate of our law that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable" (Art.
respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City dated - (1) 8 100, The Revised Penal Code).Underlying this legal principle is the
January 1987 which rejected the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as traditional theory that when a person commits a crime he offends two entities
private prosecutor in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-40909 to Q-40913 where namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the
respondent Rosario Claudio is the accused for violation of State whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; and (2) 31 March 1987 which denied the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order dated 8 January 1987; and directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or
for mandamus to allow Atty. Bustos to enter his appearance as private omission.However, this rather broad and general provision is among the
prosecutor in the aforestated criminal cases. most complex and controversial topics in criminal procedure.It can be
It appears that fifteen (15) separate informations for violation of misleading in its implications especially where the same act or omission may
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks law, docketed as Criminal be treated as a crime in one instance and as a tort in another or where the
Cases Nos. 40909 - 40913, were filed against respondent Claudio before the law allows a separate civil action to proceed independently of the course of
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and originally assigned to Branch 84. the criminal prosecution with which it is intimately intertwined.Many legal
The presiding judge of Branch 84 inhibited himself when respondent Claudio, scholars treat as a misconception or fallacy the generally accepted notion
through counsel, filed a petition for recuse dated May 19, 1986. that the civil liability actually arises from the crime when, in the ultimate
The cases were re-raffled and consequently assigned on June 25, 1986 to analysis, it does not.While an act or omission is felonious because it is
Branch 105 which was then presided over by Judge Johnico G. Serquina. punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a
During these proceedings, respondent Claudio was finally arraigned on crime but because it caused damage to another.Viewing things
November 20, 1986 where she pleaded not guilty to the charges.Pre-trial pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is
was then set on January 8, 1987. really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole
the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done
In the meantime, Judge Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr. replaced Judge Serquina as intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law.In
presiding judge of Branch 105. On January 8, 1987, the respondent court other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same
issued an order rejecting the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the
prosecutor on the ground that the charge is for the violation of direct and Proximate Cause thereof.Damage or injury to another is evidently
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which does not provide for any civil liability or the foundation of the civil action.Such is not the case in criminal actions for,
indemnity and hence, "it is not a crime against property but public order." The to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained of is
petitioner, through counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of the order punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to
dated 8 January 1987 on March 10, 1987. Respondent Claudio filed her another.(See Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 1978, Revised
opposition to the motion for reconsideration on March 25, 1987. In an order Edition, pp. 246-247).
dated 31 March 1987, the respondent court denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition questioning the orders of the respondent Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Court. The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent Court acted "Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage
with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in rejecting the to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same."
appearance of a private prosecutor. The respondents make capital of the fact Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides,
that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punishes the act of knowingly issuing worthless indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the damage,
checks as an offense against public order.As such, it is argued that it is the loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of
State and the public that are the principal complainants and, therefore, no another.The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral
civil indemnity is provided for by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for which a private part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime (Quemel v.
party or prosecutor may intervene. On the other hand, the petitioner, relying Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil.
on the legal axiom that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable," 692).Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment
contends that indemnity may be recovered from the offender regardless of of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair
whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 so provides. A careful study of the of the damage, and indemnification for the losses (United States v. Bernardo,
concept of civil liability allows a solution to the issues in the case at bar. 19 Phil. 265).
Indeed one cannot disregard the private party in the case at bar who suffered Maniago v. CA (G.R. No. 104392)
the offenses committed against her.Not only the State but the petitioner too is Facts:
entitled to relief as a member of the public which the law seeks to One of the shuttle buses owned by petitioner Ruben Maniago, and driven by
protect.She was assured that the checks were good when she parted with Herminio Andaya, figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney
money, property or services.She suffered with the State when the checks owned by respondent Boado along Loakan Road, Baguio City. A criminal
bounced. case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple
physical injuries was filed against petitioner’s driver. A month later,
In Lozano v. Hon. Martinez (G.R. No. 63419, December 18, 1986) and the respondent Boado filed a civil case for damages against petitioner Maniago
cases consolidated therewith, we held that "The effects of a worthless check himself. Petitioner moved that the civil case be suspended citing that a
transcend the private interests of the parties directly involved in the criminal case was already pending. The trial court denied the motion on the
transaction and touch the interests of the community at large." Yet, we too ground that the civil action could proceed independently of the criminal
recognized the wrong done to the private party defrauded when we stated action. On appeal to CA, petitioner reiterated his contention adding that the
therein that "The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or the civil action could not proceed because no reservation to bring it separately
holder, but also an injury to the public." was made in the criminal case. CA affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied.The payee of
the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless Issue:
check was issued.Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to Whether or not the civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
recompense. action when no reservation of right to bring it separately was made.

Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Ruling: NO.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and *We have reached the conclusion that the right to bring an action for
empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule III, §1,
the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file otherwise it should be dismissed.
a separate civil suit.To do so, may leave the offended party unable to recover To begin with, §1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to
even the face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise
errant drawer at the expense of the payee.The protection which the law they will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. Such civil
seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught. actions are not limited to those which arise “from the offense charged,” as
The petitioner's intervention in the prosecution of Criminal Cases 40909 to originally provided in Rule III before the amendment of the Rules of Court in
40913 is justified not only for the protection of her interests but also in the 1988. In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the
interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice mandated by recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from
the Constitution (Section 16, Article III, Bill of Rights, Constitution of 1987).A quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise
separate civil action for the purpose would only prove to be costly, they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action.
burdensome, and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final
disposition of the case.This multiplicity of suits must be avoided.Where *NOTA BENE: This case is decided under the old rules on criminal
petitioner's rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial procedure. Now, there is no more need for a reservation of the right to file
court, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
unwarranted. of the Philippines. The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.The respondent court is civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense
ordered to permit the intervention of a private prosecutor in behalf of charged (Case on Point: DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative v. Velez,
petitioner Charmina B. Banal, in the prosecution of the civil aspect of G.R. No. 129282, November 29, 2001)
Criminal Cases Nos. 40909 to 40913.The temporary restraining order issued
by this court on July 15, 1987 is lifted and the case is remanded to the court
a quo for further proceedings.This decision is immediately executory.
G.R. No. L-38352 August 19, 1982 in the criminal action has been rendered. Petitioner relies on Section 3, pars.
ADELA J. CAÑOS, petitioner, [a] and [b], Rule III of the Rules of Court, which we quote: 1äwphï1.ñët
vs. [a] Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense
HON. E.L. PERALTA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has
del Sur and ROLANDO APAS, respondents. been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until
final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action;
The facts pertinent to this case are as follows: On December 23, 1971, [b] After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil
petitioner Adela C. Caños was charged in the Court of First Instance of action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and
Davao del Sur with violation of Section 3[a] of Rep. Act No. 602, as the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be
amended, otherwise known as the Minimum Wage Law, for alleged non- found, until final judgment in the criminal proceedings has
payment of the minimum wage to her employee, respondent Rolando Apas. been rendered;
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 326. The argument, fails to consider the provisions of Article 31 of the Civil Code.
On August 4, 1972, respondent Apas instituted an action against petitioner Civil Case No. 558 is a separate and distinct action from Criminal Case No.
for collection of differential, overtime and termination pay, plus damages, 326. The former is based upon a contract of services entered into by the
docketed as Civil Case No. 558 of the same court. The complaint averred parties, not upon the civil liability arising from the offense charged in Criminal
that respondent Apas had been employed by petitioner as cashier in her Case No. 326, i.e., non-payment of the minimum wage, punishable under
gasoline station since August 1965 up until he was illegally dismissed on Section 3 (a) of Rep. Act 602, as amended, in relation to Section 15 (a) of the
January 15, 1971; that during his employment, he was not paid the minimum same Act. 2 Being essentially an action for enforcement of an obligation ex-
wage or the overtime pay prescribed by law, neither was he given contractu the civil case can proceed independently of the latter, in
termination pay after his dismissal. Respondent, however, did not pray for accordance with Article 31 of the Civil Code: 1äwphï1.ñët
reinstatement. Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not
After joinder of issues, the provincial fiscal of Davao del Sur and respondent arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,
Apas filed a "motion for consolidated trial" of the criminal and civil cases, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
alleging in support thereof – 1äwphï1.ñët proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
That the defendant in. each of the two cases is one and the But did respondent judge abuse his discretion in ordering the consolidation
same person; that the complaining witness in the criminal and joint trial of the criminal and civil cases? A court may order several
case is also the plaintiff in the civil case; that the nature of actions pending before it to be tried together where they arise from the same
the issues, at least, the factual issues, in both cases are act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely
almost Identical; and that the evidence in both cases would or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction
virtually be the same, so that a conso-lidated trial of both over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party
cases would be conducive to the early termination of the two an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the
cases and would greatly enhance the convenience of the parties. 3 Consolidation of actions is expressly authorized under Section 1,
parties and the speedy administration of justice. 1 Rule 31 of the Rules of Court: 1äwphï1.ñët
Acting on the motion, respondent judge issued the challenged order, Section 1. Consolidation. — When actions involving a
directing the joint trial of the two cases, in this wise: 1äwphï1.ñët common question of law or fact are pending before the court,
Since Rolando Apas, complainant, is not insisting on the trial it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in
of this case ahead of his civil case against the accused, for issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated;
practical purpose, that is, to save time and effort of the and it may make such orders concerning proceedings
parties and the court, the court is of the view that this case therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
and the civil case be jointly tried. We shall be shooting two The obvious purpose of the above rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, to
birds with a single shot. guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order, but the same was denied. dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short the attainment of
Hence, this petition. justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties litigants. 4
Petitioner contends that after the institution of Criminal Case No. 326, the Consolidation of actions is addressed to the sound discretion of the court,
proceedings in Civil Case No. 558 should be suspended until final judgment and its action in consolidating will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest
abuse of discretion. In the instant case, respondent judge did not abuse his
discretion in ordering the joint trial of the two cases. There is no showing that filed an omnibus Motion thru counsel to reconsider the promulgated decision
such joint trial would prejudice any substantial right of petitioner. Neither Be reconsidered and set aside. Judge Soluren, new Judge gave due course
does the latter question the court's jurisdiction to try and decide the two on the Motion filed by the accused
cases. Granting the said Motion and reinstated his bail. Gonzales was acquitted
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed with costs against petitioner. from all the charges against him.
The lower court is directed to proceed with the joint trial of the two cases A petition for certiorari was filed by Carmen Macatiag against
without unnecessary delay. Judge Soluren to the Court of Appeals. Court of appeals dismissed the said
Petition.
Loida M. Javier Vs. Pepito Gonzales G.R. No. 193150 January 23, 2017
ISSUES:
A criminal case was filed against PEPITO GONZALES and was charged Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred Affirming the Decision of
of Murder with Frustrated Murder and Multiple Attempted Murder. The case Judge Soluren setting aside the first decision of the Trial Court and in
was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Baler, Aurora. dismissing the petition filed by heir of the offended party.
That on December 25, 1997, at around 11:30 in the evening, PEPITO Whether or not the first promulgation of judgment was valid and
Gonzales with intent to kill with treachery and evident premeditation throw a whether a special civil action is the proper remedy to question the acquittal of
grenade inside the house of Leonardo Hermenigildo which resulted to the the private respondent
death of Rufino Concepcion. Hermenigildo sustained fatal wounds which the
latter also died. As a consequence of the explosives, three more persons, RULING:
Julius Toledo, Ariel Cabusal and Jesus Macatiag sustained not necessary The Supreme Court ruled that the Petition for certiorari filed by
mortal wounds. Macatiag was with merit considering that she has sufficient interest and
Accused filed a Motion for bail. An opposition to the Motion for Bail personality to file said Petition, under Rule 1 and 2, Rule, Rule 65 of the
was filed by Carmen Macatiag, sister of the victim Rufino Concepcion. Rules of Court. Judge Soluren as an officer acted without or in excess its or
Gonzales filed a comment on the said Motion and a reply was likewise filed. his jurisdiction.
Gonzales granted to post bail and a Motion for Reconsideration on the grant The promulgation of the decision rendered by Judge Buted was
of bail was filed by Macatiag and was denied. Macatiag filed again an Urgent ruled to be valid. The accused and the offended parties were properly
Motion for transfer venue. Motion to Suspend hearing was filed by Macatiag notified of the scheduled promulgation. Under Sec. 6, par 5, Rule 120 , Rules
pending the resolution of the Urgent Motion to transfer venue. The Motion to on criminal procedure, Judgment is for conviction and he failure of the
transfer venue was granted and the case was re assigned to RTC, accused to appear was without a justifiable cause shall lose the remedies
Palayunan City. available in these rules against the judgment and the Court shall order for his
Trial on the merits proceeded and the Court admitted the arrest..
prosecution's evidences. The accused filed a Motion for Leave of Court for
Demurrer to Evidence and the Demurrer was attached to the Motion and Pilapil vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 101978. April 7, 1993
subsequently was denied.
The promulgation of decision was set on December 15,2005 and The Investigating Ombudsman issued an order requiring Pilapil to submit his
notice was received by the sister of the accused Gonzales but refused to counter-affidavit, affidavits of his witnesses and other controverting evidence.
sign the Return. This order was captioned as Case No. OMB-1-89-0168 for "Malversation of
On the day of promulgation, the accused failed to appear but his counsel Public Property under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code." Pilapil
filed a Withdrawal as counsel with the conformity of the accused. The submitted his counter-affidavit. After the preliminary investigation, a
promulgation was reset to December 22, 2005. The decision was resolution was issued finding no crime of malversation but a prima facie case
promulgated in absentia when the accused again failed to appear and for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
counsel de officio was appointed to assist him. The accused was convicted known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. An Information for
of the charges against him and was sentenced to a death penalty. Issuance violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 was thus filed with the
for the arrest was ordered for his non appearance and forfeiture of his bail Sandiganbayan.
bond was ordered. The decision was entered in the docket book of the Court
Judge Buted ordered the immediate transmittal of the records to the Pilapil filed a motion to quash on the ground that respondent Sandiganbayan
Court of Appeals for automatic review. In less than a month, the accused has no jurisdiction over his person because the information was filed without
probable cause since there is absolutely no proof adduced in the preliminary petitioner could not validly raise violation of his right to due process because
investigation of any of the elements of the crime defined in Section 3(e) of the bases for the information filed by the Ombudsman were all reflected in
Republic Act No. 3019. The Court denied the motion. the complaint and the evidence supporting it. In Cinco vs. Sandiganbayan,
Pilapil went to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari. He harped on the this Court held that preliminary investigation is nothing more than the
lack of preliminary investigation on the specific charge of violation of Sec. submission of the parties' respective affidavits, counter-affidavits and
3(e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, filed before the Sandiganbayan. evidence to buttress their separate allegations.
He alleged that the preliminary investigation was conducted for the charge of Petitioner attaches significance to the fact that the preliminary investigation
malversation. conducted by the Ombudsman against him was under the title of
"malversation." According to him, this is not sufficient to justify the filing of the
Issues: charge of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law.
1. Is absence of a preliminary investigation a ground to quash a complaint or
information? Petitioner loses sight of the fact that preliminary investigation is merely
2. Does absence of preliminary investigation affect the court's jurisdiction inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering whether a person
over the case? may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare
3. Is absence of preliminary investigation waivable? his complaint or information. The preliminary designation of the offense in the
4. Was there no preliminary investigation conducted in the case necessitating directive to file a counter-affidavit and affidavits of one's witnesses is not
the suspension of the proceedings in the case until after the outcome of such conclusive. Such designation is only a conclusion of law of Deputy
preliminary investigation? Ombudsman Domingo. The Ombudsman is not bound by the said
Held: qualification of the crime. Rather, he is guided by the evidence presented in
1. The absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash a the course of a preliminary investigation and on the basis of which, he may
complaint or information under Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. formulate and designate the offense and direct the filing of the corresponding
The proper procedure in case of lack of preliminary investigation is to hold in information. In fact, even, the designation of the offense by the prosecutor in
abeyance the proceedings upon such information and the case remanded to the information itself has been held inconclusive, to wit:
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal or the Ombudsman, for that matter, for him ". . . the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption
or the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation. or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the
2. The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's actual recital of facts in the complaint or information . . . it is not the technical
jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or name given by the Fiscal appearing in the title of the information that
otherwise render it defective, but, if there were no preliminary investigations determines the character of the crime but the facts alleged in the body of the
and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court Information."
to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the Information, should
conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case Petitioner's argument that he could not have asked for a new preliminary
to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted investigation in the Office of the Ombudsman since he came to know about
the charge only after the information was filed in the Sandiganbayan, is not
3. The right to a preliminary investigation is not a fundamental right and may tenable. Under the last paragraph of Section 7, Rule 112 of 1985 Rules on
be waived expressly or by silence. Failure of accused to invoke his right to a Criminal Procedure, the right to ask for preliminary investigation is
preliminary investigation constituted a waiver of such right and any recognized even after the case has already been filed, to wit:
irregularity that attended it. The right may be forfeited by inaction and can no "If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary Investigation having
longer be invoked for the first time at the appellate level. been first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he
learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with
4. The facts on record show that in an order dated October 3, 1990, Deputy the same right to adduce evidence to his favor in the manner prescribed in
Ombudsman Domingo required petitioner to answer the charges against him this Rule."
as stated in the affidavits-complaints and supporting documents thereto.
Petitioner fully complied with said order and filed his and his witnesses'
affidavits. In other words, petitioner was properly apprised of the act
complained of and given ample opportunity to rebut the same. Thus,
Leviste v. Alameda, et. al., G.R. No. 182677, Aug. 3, 2010
Crim Pro - Rule 110 What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend
Facts: himself from the charge of murder after the claimed circumstances were
On January 16, 2007, an Information was filed against Jose Antonio made known to him as early as the first motion. Petitioner did not, however,
Leviste charging him with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on make much of the opportunity to present countervailing evidence on the
January 12, 2007 before the RTC of Makati. The private complainants-heirs proposed amended charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to
of de las Alas filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the deferment of merely observe the proceedings and declined to actively participate, even
the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on with extreme caution, in the reinvestigation.
record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The
RTC thereafter issued the Order granting the motion by the complainants, CASE DIGEST: SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, Petitioner, vs. HON. EPHREM
thus, allowing the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation. Later, the trial S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
court issued the other order that admitted the Amended Information for Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18, CESAR M. MERIN, in. his capacity
murder and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner as Approving Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge, ROSULO U. VIVERO, in
questioned these two orders before the appellate court. his capacity as Investigating Prosecutor, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice, Respondents.
Upon arraignment, the petitioner refused to plead. The trial court
entered the plea of "not guilty" for him. Prior to this, the petitioner filed an FACTS: On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of
Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela, which the trial the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco,
court granted on the ground that the evidence of guilt of the crime of murder Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.1The mass grave contained skeletal
is not strong. The trial court went on to try the petitioner under the Amended remains of 67 individuals believed to be victims of "Operation Venereal
Information. Then, the trial court found the petitioner guilty of homicide. From Disease" (Operation VD) launched by members of the Communist Party of
the trial court's decision, the petitioner filed an appeal to the CA. The the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic Front of the
appellate court confirmed the decision of the trial court. The petitioner's Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military
motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition to the SC. informers.

Issue: Whether or not the amendment of the Information from homicide to P C/Insp. Almaden of the (PNP) Regional Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate
murder is considered a substantial amendment, which would make it not just Captain Allan Tiu (Army Captain Tiu) of the 8th Infantry Division of the
a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary investigation. Philippine Army sent 12 undated letters to the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte
through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo U. Vivero (Prosecutor
Held: Yes. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts Vivero).The letters requested appropriate legal action on 12 complaint-
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the affidavits attached therewith accusing 71 named members of the Communist
court. All other matters are merely of form. The test as to whether a Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army/National Democratic Front of the
defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including petitioners herein along
information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is with several other unnamed members.
made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally
applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of Zacarias Piedad,Leonardo
C. Tanaid, Floro M. Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel, Glecerio Roluna and
An amendment to an information which does not change the nature Veronica P. Tabara. They narrated that they were former members of the
of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or CPP/NPA/NDFP.According to them, Operation VD was ordered in 1985 by
cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee.Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C.
averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. here is Ocampo (Ocampo),Randall B. Echanis (Echanis),Rafael G. Baylosis
no substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a (Baylosis),and Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad)were then members of the Central
reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the Committee.
same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied,
respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. tortured and executed by members of the CPP/NPA/NDF pursuant to
Operation VD. While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested by
virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Abando. On 1 February 2008,
On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for Judicial Reinvestigation/
issued a subpoena requiring, among others, petitioners to submit their Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright
counter-affidavits and those of their witnesses.Petitioner Ocampo submitted and Alternative Prayer to Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant.
his counter-affidavit.Petitioners Echanisand Baylosis did not file counter-
affidavits because they were allegedly not served the copy of the complaint Judge Abando issued an Order denying the motion.Petitioners Echanis and
and the attached documents or evidence. Counsel of petitioner Ladlad made Baylosis filed a Motion for Reconsideration but before being able to rule
a formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006 during the preliminary thereon, Judge Abando issued an Order transmitting the records of Criminal
investigation. However, petitioner Ladlad did not file a counter-affidavit Case to the Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC Manila.
because he was allegedly not served a subpoena.
Petitioner Ladlad and Baylosis filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail and a
In a Resolution, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of an Information Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail respectively.The OSG interposed no
for 15 counts of multiple murder against 54 named members of the objection to the grant of aP100,000 cash bail to them. The Court granted the
CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners herein motions of petitioners Ladlad and Baylosis and fixed their bail in the amount
ofP100,000, subject to the condition that their temporary release shall be
Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias Piedad, Leonardo limited to the period of their actual participation in the peace negotiations
Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel and Glecerio Roluna be dropped as
respondents and utilized as state witnesses, as their testimonies were vital to ISSUE: [1] Were petitioners denied due process during preliminary
the success of the prosecution. investigation and in the issuance of the warrant of arrest?

The Information was filed before the (RTC) of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18 [2] Should the murder charges against petitioners be dismissed under
(RTC Hilongos, Leyte) presided by Judge Ephrem S. Abando (Judge the political offense doctrine?
Abando).
HELD: "The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard
On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause "in and submit evidence in support of one's defense." What is proscribed is lack
the commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged." He ordered of opportunity to be heard. Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to
the issuance of warrants of arrest against them with no recommended bail for present ones own side of the story cannot claim denial of due process.
their temporary liberty.
Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because
On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed a special civil action for certiorari they could no longer be found in their last known address, per return of the
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of subpoenas. On the other hand, Saturnino Ocampo @ Satur, Fides Lim,
the 6 March 2007 Order of Judge Abando and the Resolution of Prosecutor Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad submitted their Counter-Affidavits.
Vivero.The petition prayed for the unconditional release of petitioner Ocampo However, Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem failed to submit the required
from PNP custody, as well as the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ Counter Affidavits in spite entry of appearance by their respective counsels.
writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the conduct of further proceedings
during the pendency of the petition. Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to
resolve the complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent
Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were
(including petitioners Echanis and Baylosisand Ladlad) was then pending made, and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence,
before the RTC Makati, Branch 150 (RTC Makati).Putting forward the the preliminary investigation remains valid.
political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that common crimes,
such as murder in this case, are already absorbed by the crime of rebellion In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve
when committed as a necessary means, in connection with and in subpoenas on the named respondents at their last known addresses. This is
furtherance of rebellion. sufficient for due process. It was only because a majority of them could no
longer be found at their last known addresses that they were not served
copies of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence. The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as
Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure the trial judge.
copies of the complaint after his counsels formal entry of appearance and,
thereafter, to participate fully in the preliminary investigation. Instead, he Under the political offense doctrine, "common crimes, perpetrated in
refused to participate. furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as "common"
offenses and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they
Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampos contention that he was denied the are mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished separately
right to be heard. For him to claim that he was denied due process by not from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the
being furnished a copy of the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad imposition of a graver penalty." People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515
would imply that the entire case of the prosecution rested on the
Supplemental Affidavit. The OSG has asserted that the indictment of Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime
petitioner Ocampo was based on the collective affidavits of several other of rebellion.Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the
witnesses attesting to the allegation that he was a member of the killing is not homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political
CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee, which had ordered the launch of complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and
Operation VD. punished as rebellion alone.

Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "no search warrant or But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined court, it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the act of killing
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce." act to be conclusively demonstrated.

Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the ***
requirements of the Constitution in finding the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners. Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA, 401 Phil
905 if during trial, petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as indeed committed in furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the
"such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and Rules of Court provides the remedy of Amendment or substitution.
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested." Allado v. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, May 5, Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have
1994.Although the Constitution provides that probable cause shall be been simple rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon
determined by the judge after an examination under oath or an affirmation of the filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners would
the complainant and the witnesses, we have ruled that a hearing is not not be placed in double jeopardy.
necessary for the determination thereof. In fact, the judges personal
examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and evidence. Being situated on a higher level than the pumpboat, the life of
indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest. accused- appellants cannot be said to have been in immediate peril. As
such, their judgment of firing at an "escaping" pumpboat was highly
unjustifiable. The mere fact that their verbal warning or warning shots were
It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutors report and not heeded was no justification to spray bullets on those persons on board.
supporting documents showing the existence of probable cause for the Accused-appellants should have known, as they ought to have known, that
indictment and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the there were unarmed waitresses on board the pumpboat. The Court,
basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable cause, to disregard the however, modified accused-appellants' conviction for the injuries
prosecutor's resolution and require the submission of additional affidavits of sustained by Cerilles and Villaflor to slight physical injuries and less serious
witnesses to aid him in determining its existence. Delos Santos-Reyes v. physical injuries because of insufficient allegation in the information to
Montesa, Jr. 317 Phil. 101 warrant conviction for the crime of attempted murder. The five wounds
sustained by Cerilles on the different parts of her body were non-fatal and
may heal in seven to eight days while the abrasions sustained by Villaflor observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though
may heal in 2 to 3 weeks' time. The Court likewise modified the award the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a
of damages. . Joey M. Pestilos, Dwight Macapanas, Miguel Gaces, Jerry warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances
Fernandez and Ronald Muñoz v. People of the Philippines,, Elements of at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable
valid warrantless arrest, hot pursuit. G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014 cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
The petitioners were indicted for attempted murder. Petitioners filed an However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or
Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground that there circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the
no valid warrantless arrest took place. The RTC denied the motion and the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy. In other words, the
CA affirmed the denial. clincher in the element of ”personal knowledge of facts or circumstances” is
the required element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances
Records show that an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. should be gathered.
Moreno Generoso. The latter called the Central Police District to report the With the facts and circumstances of the case at bar that the police officers
incident and acting on this report, SPO1 Monsalve dispatched SPO2 Javier gathered and which they have personally observed less than one hour from
to go to the scene of the crime and render assistance. SPO2, together with the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime, it is reasonable to
augmentation personnel arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of the facts and
after the alleged altercation and saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten. circumstances justifying the petitioners’ warrantless arrests.
Atty. Generoso then pointed the petitioners as those who mauled him which Hence, the petitioners were validly arrested and the subsequent inquest
prompted the police officers to “invite” the petitioners to go to the police proceeding was likewise appropriate
station for investigation. At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor found
that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon who TAN VS PEOPLE
fortunately survived the attack Summary:
Petitioners aver that they were not validly arrested without a warrant. Fidel Tan was convicted and imprisoned in provincial jail of Samar. When he
was supposed to be transfered to the National penetentiary, the jal warden
SSUE: retained him nad subesequently relesead him under GCTA. The provincial
Are the petitioners validly arrested without a warrant when the police officers fiscal moved for the re-arrest of Tan but was denied by the lower court. The
did not witness the crime and arrived only less than an hour after the alleged case was raised to the Supreme Court and the decision of the lower court
altercation? was therein denied.
Doctrine:
HELD: 1. The prisoner's re-arrests would not place him twice in jeopardy because
YES, the petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant. Section 5(b), his re-incarceration is merely a continuation of the penalty that he had not
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that: completely served due to the erroneous act of the warden, it is not a new or
subsequent conviction. Neither would his re-arrest deprive him of liberty
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to without due process of law, because he was not yet entitled to liberty at the
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the time he was released.
person to be arrested has committed it 2. Service of penalties and allowance for good conduct are specifically, even
The elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal elaborately, governed by the Penal Code and do not depend upon the good
Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the faith of the warden and of the prisoner.
arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge 3. The court's jurisdiction was not terminated by the commitment of the
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. convict to the jail authorities — the commitment was but the start in carrying
The Court’s appreciation of the elements that “the offense has just been out of the court's decision. It is the prerogative of the court meting out the
committed” and ”personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the punishment to see to it that the punishment be served until, by act of lawfully
person to be arrested committed it” depended on the particular authorized administrative agencies of the state the convict is pardoned or
circumstances of the case. The element of ”personal knowledge of facts or paroled or, on lawful grounds, set at liberty sooner than the expiration of the
circumstances”, however, under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules sentence imposed.
of Criminal Procedure requires clarification. Circumstances may pertain to
events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or
Facts:
Fidel Tan was convicted by the Court of First instance of Samar and was People vs Mojello
jailed therein for TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS, as minimum, to The victim was last seen with the appellant Bebot Mojello. On December
FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS, as maximum. Tan was committed 16,200 the body of Lenlen Rayco was found lifeless, naked and bruised on
to the Director of prisons, but the warden chose to retain Tan in Samar the seashore. The medico-legal report positively indicated that the victim was
Provincial Jail for health reasons. Subsequently, Tan was released under raped.
GCTA by the provincial jail warden.
Issues Ratio: When apprehended by the police officers and was subjected to an
1. WON the Provincial warden committed breach of duty in deciding to retain investigation on 17 December 1996, the appellant admitted to the crime.
Tan in Samar Provincial Jail.
2. WON the court loses jurisdiction when the accused-appellee commenced Six days after, on 23 December 1996, during custodial investigation, the
serving his sentence and was committed to the warden. appellant, assisted by his counsel, executed an extrajudicial confession to
3. WON the jail warden has the authority to release Tan under GCTA. the crime.
4. WON the re-arrest of Tan constitutes Double Jeopardy and deprive him of
his liberty wothout due process of law. The appellant was charged of the crime of Rape with Homicide defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
I. YES, the Provincial warden committed breach of duty. The excuses Republic Act No. 7659.The accused was arraigned and entered a not guilty
tendered by the provincial warden are clearly inacceptable. The alleged fear plea. The lower court found him guilty. Hence, an automatic review of the
that the convict Tan might be involved in occasional riots in the Insular case was submitted to the Supreme Court.
Penitentiary is but a flimsy pretext for evading the warden's plain duty of Issues
remitting the prisoner to his proper place of confinement. Having been WON the extrajudicial confession of the appellant was admissible
sentenced to more than one year of imprisonment, the convict was not a WON the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
provincial Prisoner but an insular prisoner (Adm. Code, section 1740), and
there being no showing that his life would be endangered by the trip to Ruling
Muntinlupa penitentiary, the warden's failure to send him thither was a
breach of duty for which said officer should be held accountable. It needs no The decision of the lower court was affirmed and was modified. The accused
stressing that to allow provincial wardens to retain insular prisoners without was found guilty of the crime of statutory rape.
proper authorization would open the way to all sorts of discrimination in the
treatment of prisoners and constitute a standing invitation for the commission Ratio Decidendi
of abuses and anomalies for personal or political motives.
II. No. The court's jurisdiction was not terminated by the commitment of the The appellant avers that his extrajudicial confession, and admissions therein,
convict to the jail authorities — the commitment was but the start in carrying should be considered a fruit of a poisonous tree and being such, should be
out of the court's decision. It is the prerogative of the court meting out the inadmissible as evidence against him. The Court disagrees. The Court finds
punishment to see to it that the punishment be served until, by act of lawfully the extrajudicial confession in compliance with the strict constitutional
authorized administrative agencies of the state the convict is pardoned or requirements of the right to counsel as enshrined in Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of
paroled or, on lawful grounds, set at liberty sooner than the expiration of the the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2. The Court observed
sentence imposed. that the confession itself expressly states that the investigating officers
III. No. The warden usurps the authority of the Director of Prisons in crediting informed him of such rights
the prisoner with good conduct time allowance. Article 99 of the Revised Further, the appellant claimed that his confession was induced by a threat
Penal Code vests such authority exclusively in the Director and no one else. against his life. The Court took cognizance, however, of his failure to present
IV. No. The prisoner's re-arrests would not place him twice in jeopardy evidence to prove such threat and neither did he file any case against the
because his re-incarceration is merely a continuation of the penalty that he person who threatened him nor did he report such incident to his counsel. He
had not completely served due to the erroneous act of the warden, it is not a also claimed that he did not understand the contents of the confession which
new or subsequent conviction. Neither would his re-arrest deprive him of was read in the Visayan dialect, yet he admits that he uses the Visayan
liberty without due process of law, because he was not yet entitled to liberty dialect in his daily discourse.
at the time he was released.
The Court also noted that even if improper interrogation methods were used Rule:The "acid-washed maong" pants were admissible in evidence, They
at the start, it does not bar the possibility of having a valid confession by were taken fromAccused-appellant as an incident of his arrest. It may be that
properly interrogating the subject. the police officers were not armedwith a warrant when they apprehended
With regards to the second query, appellant alleges that the lower court erred Accused-Appellant. The warrantless arrest, however,was justified under
in convicting him of the crime of rape with homicide sentencing him of the Section 5(b), Rule 133 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure providingthat
death penalty despite of the insufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove a peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person "when an offense
his guilt. has in fact just beencommitted, and he has personal knowledge of facts
The Court sustained the appellant’s conviction on the crime of rape based on indicating that the person to be arrested hascommitted it." In this case, Pat.
his admission to the said crime, the medico-legal report and the witness’ Leguarda, in effecting the arrest of Accused-appellant, hadknowledge of
testimony proving the corpus delicti but held that there was no sufficient facts gathered by him personally in the course of his investigation indicating
evidence to prove that the appellant killed the victim or that the rape thatAccused-appellant was one of the perpetrators. "
committed caused the death of the victim. Therefore, he cannot be convicted
of the said special complex crime as that would raise a reasonable doubt to "FACTS: - PO3 Renato de Leon was riding on his motorcycle when he saw
his guilt. appellant NazarenoVillareal from an 8 to 10 meter-distance- Villareal was
The Court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime only that then inspecting a plastic sachet containing shabu- De Leon approached
of statutory rape, the victim being 11 years old, and was sentenced to suffer Villanueva whom he recognized as someone he had previouslyarrested for
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. illegal drug possession but the latter tried to escape- He was apprehended
with the help of a tricycle driver and was brought to the policestation- In his
"People vs Tonog, Jr.G.R. No. 94533February 4, 1992 defense, Villanueva was walking when a man who was riding a
motorcyclecalled him from behind- He was approached, instructed not to
Facts:Dumaguete City Police Station received a report that a lifeless body run, then was frisked, and took his wallet- Appellant was brought to the
was found who waslater identified as Efren Flores. Based from the police station where he was detained and mauled- He was also asked
investigation, a motorcab stopped near the placewhere the deceased was questions with a gun right beside his ear each time he failed toanswer about
found. It was also revealed that Ignacio Tonog, Jr. was the one who a stolen cellphone- The trial court convicted appellant of illegal possession
wasresponsible for his death and that prior to the incident, there were of dangerous drugs and suchwas established properly through an in
grudges between the two.Without warrant, police officers went to Bacong, flagrante delicto warrantless arrest- The appellate court sustained
Negros Oriental, and upon being invited forquestioning, voluntarily went with conviction finding a clear case of in flagrante delictowarrantless arrest
the law enforcers unaccompanied by a counsel. While theywere on their way "Issue: Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest based on the
to the police station, it was noticed that there were blood stains the police officers personalknowledge of the criminal record of the appellant.
theaccused’s pants and when asked about it, he said that it was from a pig. Held:No, there was no valid warrantless arrest.
He was then requestedto take off his pants for examination.At the station, he A lawful warrantless arrest exists when eitherof the following circumstances
confessed his guilt but was not recorded. After a month, the pants andthe are present: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrestedhas
knife found were brought to the Cebu crime lab and found that the blood was committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit an offense, (b)
the same asthe victim’s.One of the witnesses, Liberato Solamillo, testified when anoffense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
that while drinking with the accusedand a certain Allan. The accused left with believe based on personalknowledge of facts or circumstances that he
certain Biyok. At around 11pm, Liberato and Allanrode a motorcab to look for person to be arrested has committed it, and (c)when the person to be
the accused. They then saw the victim and requested to convey himto arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment orplace
Dumaguete. Allan left and when it fauled to return, Liberato decided to ride a where he is service final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pedicab. Onhis way, he saw the motorcab, and when he proceeded to the pending, orhas escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
motorcab, he saw Tonog withinside and noticed the blood stains on his another.
pants.All the facts were denied by the accused and that he only confessed Based on the distanceand the amount of the powdery substance it is
because he was toldto do so. Charged with three others, Ignacio Tonog was insufficient to conclude, even with clear visionthat such substance constitutes
convicted of murder. as shabu. The act of the appellant of examining the substanceis not
Issue:Whether the trial court faulted in admitting the pants and knife as tantamount to arouse suspicion of a commission or possible commission of a
evidence since theywere taken during a warrantless arrest? crime evenif he has previous criminal history on the same offense.
Personal knowledge is not defined as knowledge of a person’s criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
record, but personal knowledge as to the actual commission of the crime. the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of
The act of running away fromauthority also does not automatically imply guilt Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to
on the accused. There are various reasons torun away from authority, and furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting
commission of a crime is just one of the possible reasons.Because there is affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit
an absence of overt act there is no justification for the appellant’ s is issued to the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the
warrantlessarrest. Hence, it cannot be presented as evidence in court as it is Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter
a fruit of the poisonous tree. " such affidavits [of the complainant and his witnesses] have been secured,
the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the
Estrada vs ombudsman GR 212140-41 jan 21, 2015 affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to
FACTS: submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x."
At this point, there is still no counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent.
Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his
Sen. Estrada two (2) criminal complaints for plunder, among others. Eighteen witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-
(18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the
counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014. complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the
Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen.
On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Estrada’s Request.
Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New
Witnesses and Other Filings” (the “Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary
made “[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence investigation is only for the determination of probable cause, and “probable
submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’ cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a
(Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is
evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights,
Office of the Ombudsman).” such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his
The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are
the present certiorari case. limited to those granted by procedural law.

ISSUE: WON petitioner Estrada was denied due process of law A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the
purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
HELD: NO. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been
due process. committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary
First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a investigation is such evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief”
respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s probable
guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
The SC cited in its decision Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such
of Criminal Procedure, as well as Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7, Rules evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, for ready reference. been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. We are in
accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists
Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits prima facie evidence of petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the
of his co-respondents violates his constitutional right to due process. Sen. crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and the facts
Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a obtaining therein.
compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the
Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co- Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has
respondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by
its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, fails in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
we find no compelling justification for a strict application of the evidentiary Ombudsman.
rules.
The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as
Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to amplified in GSIS, are not applicable to preliminary investigations which are
those in administrative proceedings as laid down in the landmark doctrine of creations of statutory law giving rise to mere statutory rights. A law can
Ang Tibay. The quantum of evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in abolish preliminary investigations without running afoul of the constitutional
GSIS, is greater than the evidence needed in a preliminary investigation to requirements of due process as prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in
establish probable cause, or to establish the existence of a prima facie case GSIS. The present procedures for preliminary investigations do not comply
that would warrant the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial and were never intended to comply, with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS.
evidence,” while the establishment of probable cause needs “only more than Preliminary investigations do not adjudicate with finality rights and obligations
‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction’.” In of parties, while administrative investigations governed by Ang Tibay, as
the United States, from where we borrowed the concept of probable cause, amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate. Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires
the prevailing definition of probable cause is this: substantial evidence for a decision against the respondent in the
administrative case.In preliminary investigations, only likelihood or probability
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal of guilt is required. To apply Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to preliminary
with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical investigations will change the quantum of evidence required to establish
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not probable cause. The respondent in an administrative case governed by Ang
legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, has the right to an actual hearing and to cross-
must be proved. examine the witnesses against him. In preliminary investigations, the
respondent has no such rights.
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as
there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS,
admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation the hearing officer must be impartial and cannot be the fact-finder,
because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally investigator, and hearing officer at the same time. In preliminary
adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in administrative cases, investigations, the same public officer may be the investigator and hearing
where rights and obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is officer at the same time, or the fact-finder, investigator and hearing officer
“substantial evidence” which cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay may be under the control and supervision of the same public officer, like the
evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence because Ombudsman or Secretary of Justice. This explains why Ang Tibay, as
substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can amplified in GSIS, does not apply to preliminary investigations. To now
include hearsay evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as declare that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are
amplified in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change the quantum of fundamental and essential requirements in preliminary investigations will
evidence required in determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood render all past and present preliminary investigations invalid for violation of
or probability of guilt to substantial evidence of guilt. constitutional due process. This will mean remanding for reinvestigation all
criminal cases now pending in all courts throughout the country. No
Actually, the Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even furnished Sen. preliminary investigation can proceed until a new law designates a public
Estrada with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents whom he officer, outside of the prosecution service, to determine probable cause.
specifically named, as well as the counter-affidavits of some of other co- Moreover, those serving sentences by final judgment would have to be
respondents. In the 4 June 2014 Joint Order, the Ombudsman even held in released from prison because their conviction violated constitutional due
abeyance the disposition of the motions for reconsideration because the process.
Ombudsman granted Sen. Estrada five days from receipt of the 7 May 2014
Joint Order to formally respond to the claims made by his co-respondents. Thus, petition dismissed for being premature and it constitutes forum
The Ombudsman faithfully complied with the existing Rules on preliminary shopping
investigation and even accommodated Sen. Estrada beyond what the Rules
required. Thus, the Ombudsman could not be faulted with grave abuse of
discretion. Since this is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, the Petition
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,-versus – Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in
ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO, Respondent. the morning of 2 January destroyed several houses x x x.
G.R. No. 186228, SECOND DIVISION, March 15, 2010, PEREZ, J. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights
FACTS: guaranteed by x x x [the] Constitution should have already been observed or
Antonio Lauga was accused of qualified rape committed against his 13-year applied to her. Accused-appellant’s confession to
old daughter. One of the witnesses for the prosecution was Moises Boy Barangay Chairman x x x was made in response to the ‘interrogation’ made
Banting, a bantay bayan in the barangay. Banting testified that after his by the latter – admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant
assistance was sought, he proceeded to Lauga's house and found the latter of her rights under the Constitution or done in
wearing only his underwear. He invited Lauga to the police station, to which the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-
Lauga obliged. At the police outpost, Lauga admitted to him that he raped his appellant, given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as the lighter found x x
daughter AAA because he was unable to control himself. Lauga contested x in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her x x x.
the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with Banting.m He
argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a “bantay [But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he
bayan,” the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to
assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement. those not elicited through questioning by the police or their
agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits
ISSUE: x x x as x x x in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession made with a "bantay bayan" Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors x x x [of the
admissible in evidence. private complainant].

RULING: NO. Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to
Extrajudicial confession before a bantay bayan taken without counsel is ascertain whether or not a
inadmissible in evidence. This Court is convinced that barangay-based "bantay bayan" may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the
volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, this Court had the occasion to
unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at mention the nature of a "bantay bayan," that is, "a group of male residents
the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the living in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping
legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP."
duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the
authority to conduct a custodial Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive
investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function Order No. 309 issued on
and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each
rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of barangay shall be organized"to serve as implementing arm of the
the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. We, City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay level."
therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong
without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence. Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3)
a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a
The case of People v. Malngan is the authority on the scope of the Miranda Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members of existing Barangay-
doctrine provided for under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government
Constitution. In Malngan, appellant questioned the Organization Representative well-known in his
admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman community.
and a neighbor of the private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus:

Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this

particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes
of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the