Lightning Direct

Effects Handbook

Revision Letter Date Released Report Number Author Additional Notes

original 3/1/2002 AGATE-WP3.1- Ed Rupke Work Package Title:
031027-043-Design Lightning Technologies Inc. WBS3.0 Integrated
Guideline 10 Downing Parkway Design and Mfg
Pittsfield, MA 01201

A 01/20/2017 ENV-RP-2016-004 Michelle Cronkleton NIAR KART R51135

Environmental Test Lab Direct Effects Project
WSU – NIAR
3800 S. Oliver, Bldg 13L
Wichita, KS 67210
REVISIONS

Rev Date Prepared By: Checked By: Approved By:

- 03/01/2002 Ed Rupke Ed Rupke Ed Rupke

Section Description
All Initial Release

Rev Date Prepared By: Checked By: Approved By:

A 1/20/2017 Michelle Cronkleton Yulia Kostogorova-Beller Billy Martin

Section Description

All Changed the page numbers to represent the entire document instead
of by Section
All Changed Figure numbers to Section level instead of paragraph level.
All Changed Table numbers to Section level instead of paragraph level.
Title page Added Revision Box
page i Added Revisions descriptions table
T of C, pii Added a second layer of headings
Figures, piv Added a list of Figures
Tables, pvi Added a list of Tables
Table 6.1, Modified Table 6.1 to add more columns to reorganize the data.
p53
Table 6.2, Modified Table 6.2 to add columns for panel #, core material, core
p57 thickness, paint thickness, current level, and current components.
Changed “Protection Ply Loss Region” to “repair area outer”.
Increased “repair area” measurement for panel 6 from 4.5” to 8” based
off picture. Changed “Delamination Region on Laminate” to “delam
inner”.
Table 6.3, Modified Table 6.3 to add columns for panel #, core material, core
p59 thickness, paint thickness, current level, current components, and
repair area outer. Changed “Delamination” to “delam outer”. Added
the three panels that were described in the text – Figures 6-6 through
6-8.
Table 6.4, Modified Table 6.4 to add columns for panel #, panel thickness, core
p61 material, core thickness, and paint thickness. Changed “Waveshape”
to “current components”. Added separate columns for the test results.
Table 6.5, Modified Table 6.5 to add columns for panel #, core material, core
p65 thickness, paint thickness, current level, and current components.

i
 Changed “Protection Ply Loss Region” to “repair area outer”. Changed
“Delamination Region on Laminate” to “delam inner”.
6.4, p69 Added Section 6.4 “Damage Codes”

ii
 Table of Contents

1.0 INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................. 1
2.0 THE LIGHTNING ENVIRONMENT ..................................................................................................... 3
2.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 3
2.2 ORIGINS............................................................................................................................................. 3
2.3 CLOUD-TO-GROUND FLASHES ............................................................................................................ 4
2.4 INTER AND INTRA-CLOUD FLASHES ..................................................................................................... 6
2.5 NATURAL LIGHTNING PARAMETERS ..................................................................................................... 7
2.6 PROTECTION DESIGN AND VERIFICATION ENVIRONMENT ...................................................................... 9
3.0 AIRCRAFT - LIGHTNING INTERACTION ......................................................................................... 10
3.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 10
3.2 AIRCRAFT LIGHTNING ATTACHMENT POINTS ...................................................................................... 11
3.3 AIRCRAFT LIGHTNING EXPERIENCE ................................................................................................... 11
3.4 AIRCRAFT LIGHTNING STRIKE MECHANISMS....................................................................................... 15
3.5 SWEPT FLASH PHENOMENA .............................................................................................................. 18
3.6 DIRECT EFFECTS ON SKIN STRUCTURES ........................................................................................... 19
4.0 THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS ..................................................................................................... 27
4.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 27
4.2 FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATIONS FOR LIGHTNING DIRECT EFFECTS .................................................. 27
4.3 STEPS IN PROTECTION DESIGN AND CERTIFICATION .......................................................................... 30
4.4 CERTIFICATION PLANS ...................................................................................................................... 35
4.5 TEST PLANS..................................................................................................................................... 36
5.0 PROTECTION METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................................... 37
5.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 37
5.2 SKIN AND SURFACE PROTECTION OF COMPOSITES............................................................................. 37
5.3 PROTECTION OF RADOMES AND ANTENNA FAIRINGS ........................................................................... 39
5.4 PROTECTION OF OTHER COMPOSITE SKINS ....................................................................................... 40
5.5 W EIGHTS OF PROTECTION MATERIALS .............................................................................................. 46
6.0 AIRCRAFT SKIN PROTECTION EFFECTIVENESS ........................................................................ 47
6.1 ALUMINUM SKINS ............................................................................................................................. 48
6.2 CARBON FIBER COMPOSITE (CFC) ................................................................................................... 54
6.3 NON-CONDUCTIVE COMPOSITES ....................................................................................................... 65
6.4 DAMAGE CODES............................................................................................................................... 69
7.0 WINDSHIELDS AND SIMILAR ASSEMBLIES ................................................................................. 79
8.0 CONTROL SURFACES ..................................................................................................................... 84
8.1 DESIGN GUIDANCE AND CONSIDERATIONS......................................................................................... 84
8.2 CONTROL SURFACE TEST RESULTS .................................................................................................. 85
9.0 CONTROL SURFACE HINGES AND BEARINGS ........................................................................... 89
9.1 PIANO HINGE INSTALLATION.............................................................................................................. 89
9.2 W ING TO FLAP HINGE INTERFACE ..................................................................................................... 91
9.3 CANOPY HINGE ................................................................................................................................ 93
10.0 COMPOSITE FUEL CELLS ............................................................................................................... 95
10.1 TANK STRUCTURES DESIGN.............................................................................................................. 95

iii
 10.2 FUEL TANK JOINTS: SPECIAL PROBLEMS ......................................................................................... 105
10.3 CONNECTORS AND INTERFACES IN PIPES AND COUPLINGS ............................................................... 108
10.4 ELECTRICAL W IRING IN FUEL TANKS ............................................................................................... 110
10.5 FUEL TANK ACCESS DOOR EXAMPLE .............................................................................................. 112
11.0 EXTERNALLY MOUNTED HARDWARE ........................................................................................ 114
11.1 DESIGN GUIDELINES ....................................................................................................................... 114
11.2 AIR DATA PROBES (PITOT TUBE) ................................................................................................... 115
11.3 ANTENNAS (SIMULATED L-BAND INSTALLATION)............................................................................... 117
12.0 RADOMES ....................................................................................................................................... 120
12.1 RADOME DESIGN............................................................................................................................ 120
12.2 VERIFICATION OF DESIGN ............................................................................................................... 122
12.3 TYPICAL NOSE RADOME TEST ........................................................................................................ 124
13.0 PROPULSION SYSTEMS ............................................................................................................... 125
13.1 PROPELLERS ................................................................................................................................. 125
13.2 ROTOR BLADES.............................................................................................................................. 126
13.3 GEAR BOXES ................................................................................................................................. 126
13.4 TURBOJET ENGINES ....................................................................................................................... 126
13.5 TEST OF A PROPULSION SYSTEM .................................................................................................... 126

iv
 Figures

Figure 2-1: Generalized diagram showing distribution of electrical charge ..................................... 3

Figure 2-2: Model of a severe negative lightning flash waveform ................................................... 5
Figure 2-3: Typical Positive Flash .................................................................................................. 6
Figure 2-4: Standardized Aircraft Lightning Environment ............................................................... 9

Figure 3-1: Aircraft lightning strikes vs. Altitude ........................................................................... 12

Figure 3-2: Aircraft location with respect to clouds ....................................................................... 14
Figure 3-3: Turbulence when Lightning Strikes have Occurred .................................................... 14
Figure 3-4: Precipitation at time of aircraft lightning strikes .......................................................... 14
Figure 3-5: Outside Air Temperature during lightning strikes ....................................................... 14
Figure 3-6: Stepped leader approaching an aircraft ..................................................................... 16
Figure 3-7: Compression of electric field around an aircraft ......................................................... 16
Figure 3-8: Return stroke paths ................................................................................................... 18
Figure 3-9: Typical path of swept flash attachment points ............................................................ 19

Figure 4-1: Typical General Aviation Aircraft Zone Drawing ......................................................... 33

Figure 5-1: Mechanism of puncture of a radome.......................................................................... 38

Figure 6-1: Time to melt-through on aluminum skins ................................................................... 48

Figure 6-2: Methods for protecting against melt-through .............................................................. 50
Figure 6-3: Aluminum Panel (0.032" thick) ................................................................................... 51
Figure 6-4: 0.040” painted aluminum panel with aluminum tape .................................................. 52
Figure 6-5: 0.040" painted aluminum panel.................................................................................. 52
Figure 6-6: Unprotected and unpainted CFC panel ...................................................................... 54
Figure 6-7: Zone 1A strike to a painted exterior surface............................................................... 55
Figure 6-8: Zone 2A strike to exterior surface .............................................................................. 56
Figure 6-9: Ni CFC Panel Zone 2A .............................................................................................. 58
Figure 6-10: EAF/CFC Panel Zone 1B ......................................................................................... 58
Figure 6-11: Cu CFC Panel Zone 1A ........................................................................................... 58
Figure 6-12: Ni CFC Panel Zone 1A ............................................................................................ 58
Figure 6-13: Al CFC Panel Zone 1A ............................................................................................ 58
Figure 6-14: Cu CFC Panel Zone 2A ........................................................................................... 58
Figure 6-15: Cu CFC Panel Zone 1A ........................................................................................... 60
Figure 6-16: IAW CFC Panel Zone 1A ......................................................................................... 60
Figure 6-17: WS CFC Panel, no core .......................................................................................... 60
Figure 6-18: Cu CFC Panel Zone 2A ........................................................................................... 60
Figure 6-19: IAW CFC Panel Zone 2A ......................................................................................... 60
Figure 6-20: AF 1 mil, Test No. 019 ............................................................................................. 62
Figure 6-21: AF 3 mil, Test No. 021 ............................................................................................. 62
Figure 6-22: AF 3 mil, Test No 023 .............................................................................................. 62
Figure 6-23: AF 6 mil, Test No. 044 ............................................................................................. 63
Figure 6-24: Cu Paint, Test No. 61 .............................................................................................. 63
Figure 6-25: Al Plasma Spray ...................................................................................................... 63
Figure 6-26: Thorstrand protected Fiberglass Panel .................................................................... 66
Figure 6-27: 120 x 120 Woven Wire Mesh ................................................................................... 66

v
Figure 6-28: LDS 50-120 Aluminum Foil ...................................................................................... 67
Figure 6-29: EAF protected Fiberglass Panel .............................................................................. 67
Figure 6-30: 0.029 ECF protected Panel, Zone 1A ...................................................................... 68
Figure 6-31: 0.029 ECF protected Panel, Zone 2A ...................................................................... 68
Figure 6-32: AGATE Data Graph with Damage Codes ................................................................ 75
Figure 6-33: AGATE Data Graph by Paint Thickness .................................................................. 76
Figure 6-34: AGATE Data Graph by Lightning Strike Protection .................................................. 77
Figure 6-35: AGATE Data Graph by Panel Material ..................................................................... 78

Figure 7-1: Electrically Heated Windshields ................................................................................. 79

Figure 7-2: Lightning Damage to Heated Windshield ................................................................... 80
Figure 7-3: High Voltage Attachment Testing to Windshield and Canopy .................................... 82
Figure 7-4: Photograph of Mannequin During Testing.................................................................. 82
Figure 7-5: High Voltage to Canopy Component Test .................................................................. 83

Figure 8-1: Flap Trailing Edge, Zone 2 attachment, Glasair IIILP ................................................. 85
Figure 8-2: Elevator Post-Test Condition ..................................................................................... 86
Figure 8-3: Post-test Photograph of Rudder Test Article .............................................................. 87
Figure 8-4: Closeup Photograph of Trailing Edge Attachment ..................................................... 87
Figure 8-5: Post-test Photograph of the attachment to the Trim Tab ............................................ 88

Figure 9-1: Sketch of Piano Hinge Test Article............................................................................. 90

Figure 9-2: Post-view of localized damage to expanded foil around rivets ................................... 90
Figure 9-3: View of lower side of hinge after test ......................................................................... 91
Figure 9-4: Sketch of Flap Test Specimen ................................................................................... 91
Figure 9-5: Flap Hinge Post-test Photographs ............................................................................. 92
Figure 9-6: Sketch of Flap to Wing Hinge Interface ...................................................................... 93
Figure 9-7: Photograph of Canopy Hinge Test Article after the test ............................................. 94
Figure 9-8: Closeup Photograph of Canopy Hinge after the test .................................................. 94

Figure 10-1: Spar-Skin Interface Design to Reduce Ignition Hazards .......................................... 96

Figure 10-2: Wing Stiffener Design to Eliminate Ignition Sources ................................................ 96
Figure 10-3: Fuel cell closeout rib-skin interface .......................................................................... 97
Figure 10-4: Fasteners Penetrate Tank ....................................................................................... 98
Figure 10-5: Advanced Manufacturing used to Eliminate Fasteners ............................................ 98
Figure 10-6: Non-conducting ribs ................................................................................................. 99
Figure 10-7: Non-conducting shear clips...................................................................................... 99
Figure 10-8: Non-conducting ply or laminate ............................................................................... 99
Figure 10-9: Arcing at Fastener Interfaces ................................................................................. 101
Figure 10-10: Fastener Sealing Concepts.................................................................................. 101
Figure 10-11: Guidelines for Overcoating Fasteners .................................................................. 102
Figure 10-12: Recommended Sealant Application Notes ........................................................... 103
Figure 10-13: Bonding through Mechanical Fasteners ............................................................... 106
Figure 10-14: Potential Arc Sources at Structural Interfaces ...................................................... 106
Figure 10-15: Hypothetical Wing Box......................................................................................... 108
Figure 10-16: Bonding Across Couplers .................................................................................... 109
Figure 10-17: Typical Fuel Probe Wiring .................................................................................... 111
Figure 10-18: Background photo of Access Door....................................................................... 113

vi
Figure 10-19: Photographic Evidence of Sparking ..................................................................... 113

Figure 11-1: Description of the Test Article ................................................................................ 116

Figure 11-2: Pitot Probe Before Strike ....................................................................................... 116
Figure 11-3: Pitot Probe Before Strike ....................................................................................... 116
Figure 11-4: Exterior view of Pitot Probe, Post-Test................................................................... 117
Figure 11-5: Installation details, simulated antenna ................................................................... 118
Figure 11-6: Antenna Following Test ......................................................................................... 119

Figure 12-1: Typical Lightning Damage to a Radome ................................................................ 121

Figure 12-2: Closeup Showing Attachment to Intermal Hardware .............................................. 121
Figure 12-3: Typical High Voltage Test ...................................................................................... 122
Figure 12-4: Typical High Current Setup .................................................................................... 123
Figure 12-5: Radome under High Current Test .......................................................................... 123
Figure 12-6: Lear Fan Model 2100, simulated lightning strike .................................................... 124

Tables

Table 2-1: Parameters for Positive Lightning Flashes Measured at Ground ................................... 7
Table 2-2: Parameters for Negative Lightning Flashes Measured at Ground ................................. 8

Table 3-1: Number of Lightning Strikes by Flight Hours ............................................................... 14

Table 5-1: Current Carrying Capabilities of Foils.......................................................................... 43

Table 5-2: Weights of Protective Coating Systems ...................................................................... 46

Table 6-1: Typical Aluminum Skin Test Data ............................................................................... 53

Table 6-2: Carbon Fiber Composites: with foam core .................................................................. 57
Table 6-3: Carbon Fiber Composites: no core ............................................................................. 59
Table 6-4: AFML Test Data for CFC (no core) ............................................................................. 61
Table 6-5: Non-Conductive Composite with Fiberglass and Core ................................................ 65
Table 6-6: Damage Code Levels ................................................................................................. 69
Table 6-7: Damage Code Numerical Assignments ...................................................................... 71
Table 6-8: Damage Codes for AGATE Data - Metal..................................................................... 72
Table 6-9: Damage Codes for AGATE Data - CFC foam core ..................................................... 72
Table 6-10: Damage Codes for AGATE Data - CFC no core ....................................................... 73
Table 6-11: Damage Codes for AGATE Data - AFML CFC no core ............................................. 73
Table 6-12: Damage Codes for AGATE Data - Fiberglass foam core .......................................... 73
Table 6-13: Damage Codes for AGATE Data - All ....................................................................... 74

vii
1.0 INTRODUCTION

This handbook is intended to assist aircraft design and certification engineers

in protecting small personal aircraft against the direct effects of lightning strikes. It is
also intended to assist Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certifying engineers in
assessing the adequacy of proposed lightning protection designs. Emphasis has
been given to successful test results (which have largely been condensed) in an
effort to assist protection design of new aircraft through similarity to previous
successful designs. This compilation of data should also allow a designer to make
early decisions and minimize development testing. The design engineer will also
find this handbook a means of avoiding either ineffective protection methods or the
testing of previously proven techniques.

This handbook addresses the direct effects of lightning strikes. Its intent is to
provide guidance and educate engineering personnel responsible for lightning
protection of primary aircraft structure. The recommendations included in this
document are specific to the design of small personal aircraft and may not be as
applicable to large composite aircraft designs. It is intended to assist engineers with
limited experience in the design of aircraft lightning strike protection. Information is
included on the natural lightning environment, the interaction between aircraft and
lightning, and the mechanism of the lightning strike effects on the aircraft.

Protection design guidelines in this handbook are applicable to composite

airframes, (including primary and secondary structures), control surfaces, exterior
skins and fuel tanks. Composite materials to be included are fiberglass, aramid fiber
and carbon fiber reinforced epoxies. Boron structures are addressed only briefly, as
this material is not in wide use. This handbook also includes a discussion of
verification procedures for determining the adequacy of protection designs.

Included herein is design and test data accumulated from a variety of

references. These include airframe manufacturers and U.S. government research and
development agencies. Specific sources are referenced throughout the handbook.

This handbook will not address the protection of: a) electrical systems and
components and avionics, b) fuel system and fuel system components other than
tanks, c) flight control systems other than control surfaces and d) protection of
personnel from electrical shock. These items usually are exposed to lightning indirect
effects and require case-by-case treatment. The protection of metal skins and
structures is treated only briefly since other sources of lightning protection design
information for metal airframes are readily available.

Periodic updates of this handbook are anticipated as additional test data

and new protection materials and techniques are developed.

1
 The user of this handbook new to lightning protection is urged to study the
introductory sections on lightning interaction and effects before utilizing the protection
design sections of this handbook. Treatment of these topics begins on an elementary
level and is aided by illustrations which should enable the non-specialist to proceed to
an adequate understanding of important aspects. Should this discussion be
inadequate to the user’s needs, a more comprehensive treatment is found in,
Lightning Protection of Aircraft, Fisher and Plumer et al., published by Lightning
Technologies Inc., 10 Downing Parkway, Pittsfield, MA 01201, or the identical volume,
under the title Aircraft Lightning Protection Handbook, 1989, DOT Report No. DOT/
FAA/CT-89/22.

The designs included in this handbook represent typical methodologies or

approaches to protecting composite materials from the direct effects of lightning. The
advantage of using previously tested and proven protection methods is afforded by the
ability to verify adequacy of protection designs through similarity to these previously
proven methods. This should reduce program costs.

2
2.0 The Lightning Environment

2.1 Introduction

In order to accurately assess the interaction of lightning with an aircraft, one must
have some knowledge as to the physics of the lightning phenomena. This helps one to
understand the conditions under which aircraft are struck by lightning.

This section will discuss the following topics:

 Origins (Where and how lightning originates)

 Cloud-to-ground flashes
- The negative flash to ground
- The positive flash to ground
- Inter and Intra-cloud flashes
 Flash Parameters

2.2 Origins

Lightning flashes usually originate from charge centers in a cloud, particularly the
cumulonimbus cloud, although they can occur in other atmospheric conditions. The
charges in clouds are produced by complex processes of freezing and melting and by
movements of raindrops and ice particles involving collisions and splintering. Typically,
most positive charges accumulate at the top of the cumulonimbus clouds, leaving the
lower regions negative, although there may be a small positive region near the base. The
result is the typical structure of Figure 2-1.

Figure 2-1: Generalized diagram showing distribution of electrical charge

in a typical cumulonimbus cloud

3
 The electric charges within clouds produce electric fields which, if sufficiently intense,
may ionize the air and produce electrical sparks which can develop into lightning flashes.
These lightning flashes may be of three types, namely:

a) Flashes between regions of opposite polarity within a cloud (intra-cloud discharges)

b) Flashes between regions of opposite polarity in different clouds (inter-cloud charges)

c) Flashes between clouds and ground. These may originate from the cloud and
propagate to ground, or originate from tall objects on the ground and propagate to a cloud.

It is believed that over 50% of all flashes are intra-cloud flashes.

2.3 Cloud-to-Ground Flashes

The process that culminates in a lightning flash begins with the formation of an
ionized column called a leader which travels out from a region where the electric field is
sufficiently high that it initiates progressive ionization. This occurs when the field is about
500kV/m. The leader advances in zigzag steps each about 50m long and separated by
pauses of 40-100ms (hence the name stepped leader).

The diameter of the stepped leader is between 1m and 10m although the current,
which is low (about 100A), is concentrated in a small highly ionized core, about 1 cm
diameter. The average velocity of propagation is 1.5 x 105m/s. The leader may form
branches on its downward path to the ground. When a branch is near to the ground, it
causes electrical fields to intensify at projections such as trees and buildings. These fields
may ionize the air and initiate junction leaders, one or more of which will make contact with
the tip of the downward propagating leader. This has the effect of closing a switch and the
location where the leaders connect is known as the switching point. When this occurs,
charge in the leader may be conducted into the earth and the condition propagates rapidly
up the leader. This is known as a return stroke, and the process discharges the leader at a
velocity of about 5 x 107m/s. This initial return stroke is characterized by a current pulse of
high amplitude accompanied by a bright flash.

A positive flash is one that lowers positive charge to earth while a negative flash
lowers negative charge. It is common for a negative flash to discharge several charge
centers in succession, with the result that the flash contains several distinct pulses of
current, and these are usually referred to as subsequent strokes.

Return stroke modeling indicates that there is a decrease of the value of the return
stroke current versus altitude. This is typical of a negative flash to open ground, but over
mountains and tall buildings, the leader may be of the upward moving type, originating from
a high point such as a mountain peak. When such a leader reaches the charge pocket in
the cloud, a return stroke is also initiated and subsequent events follow the same pattern as
for initiation by a downward moving leader. Thus the “switching” point is near the ground for
downward leaders but near the charge pocket in the cloud for upward leaders. This can
make a significant difference to the waveform and amplitude of the current experienced by
an airborne vehicle which may be intercepted by a flash.

4
 There is evidence that cloud-to-ground flashes produce more intense currents
than intra-cloud lightning.

The negative flash to ground: An example of the return stroke current in a severe
negative flash is sketched in Figure 2-2. The number of strokes in a negative flash is
usually between 1 and 24, with the mean value being 3; very few flashes contain more
than 24 strokes. The total duration of the flash is between about 20ms and 1s, with a
mean value of 0.2s. The time interval between the strokes is typically about 60ms.
There is some correlation among these parameters, the flashes with the most strokes
tend to have the longest duration. The rise time of the first stroke is about 6µs, with a
decay time (to half the peak amplitude) of about 70µs. Subsequent strokes in the flash
tend to have higher rates-of-rise although lower peak amplitudes than the initial stroke
and they can therefore be significant for inducing voltages in aircraft wiring, where the
inductively coupled voltages are proportional to the rate of change of the lightning current.

Figure 2-2: Model of a severe negative lightning flash waveform

Near the end of some of the strokes in a negative flash, there is often a lower
level current of a few kA persisting for several milliseconds, known as an ‘intermediate
Figure 2-2 flows with a duration of 100-800ms, so that there is substantial charge
transfer in this phase. It is particularly common for there to be a continuing current
after the last stroke.

It is generally thought that before a restrike can occur, the continuing

current must cease, as illustrated after stroke 5 in Figure 2-2.

5
The positive flash to ground: Positive flashes to ground generally occur less frequently
than negative flashes, however in certain geographic locations there may be more
positive flashes to ground. Present standards have assumed an average of 10% of
flashes to ground are of positive polarity. Positive flashes are usually initiated by upward
moving leaders and more commonly occur over mountains than over flat terrain.
Normally they consist of one stroke only followed by continuing current. Positive strokes
have slower rise times than negative strokes, with higher peak currents and charge
transfers. The stroke duration is longer than most negative strokes.

An example of the current in a positive flash is shown in Figure 2-3; it is a

moderately severe example although not the “super flash” which occurs occasionally.
Typically the rise time of a positive flash is 20µs and the total duration 0.1s. Although
positive flashes are less frequent than negative, they have been considered in formulating
the lightning environment for design and certification purposes.

Figure 2-3: Typical Positive Flash

2.4 Inter and Intra-Cloud Flashes

The preceding discussion relates to flashes of either polarity to ground since most
available knowledge relates to flashes of that type. Instrumented aircraft have been
employed in U.S.A. and France to record the characteristics of cloud flashes. Generally
speaking, the conclusion is that intra-cloud flashes are less severe than flashes to the
ground, certainly with respect to peak current, charge transfer and action integral.
However, the airborne measurements show some evidence that over a portion of some
pulse wavefronts, the rate-of- rise for a short time (less than 0.4µs) may be higher than
the cloud to ground flashes. Short pulses of low amplitude but high rate-of-rise have
been observed during intra-cloud flashes. Similar pulses due to charge redistribution in a
cloud have been observed between return strokes in flashes to ground.

For intra-cloud discharges up to 60kA peak currents have been recorded, but are
more typically 20-30kA. The pulses occurring during the initial lightning attachment
phase occasionally occur in negative cloud to ground flashes.

6
 For the designer of aircraft, the difference between cloud to ground and cloud to
cloud lightning may be academic. Aircraft may, after all, be expected to encounter all
types of flashes. Whether the high current striking an aircraft is associated with the
upper end of a cloud-to-ground flash or with an intra-cloud flash makes no difference.
Protection designs and test data presented here are expected to account for each of
these lightning environments.

Additional data on the natural lightning environment and descriptions of the

standard lightning environment for design and certification purposes may be found in
“Aircraft Lightning Environment and Related Test Waveforms Standard,” SAE AE4L,
Committee Report AE4L-97-4, July 1997.

2.5 Natural Lightning Parameters

Most of the available statistical data are from cloud to ground and ground to
cloud lightning flashes. The relevant data for positive flashes is presented in Table 2-1.
The relevant data for negative flashes is presented in Table 2-2. The tables include
statistical data for the lightning currents and all related parameters of interest for the
definition of the lightning environment. For a given flash or stroke parameter, the tables
show that as the magnitude increases, the percentage of occurrence decreases. The
extreme parameters do not occur together in one flash.

Table 2-1: Parameters for Positive Lightning Flashes Measured at Ground

7
 Table 2-2: Parameters for Negative Lightning Flashes Measured at Ground
Parameters Unit Lightning Parameters
Negative Flashes 95% 50% 5%

Number of strokes 1-2 3-4 12

Time intervals between strokes ms 8 35 140
Flash duration s 0.03-0.04 0.2 1
Charge in flash C 1.3 7.5 40

Negative first stroke

Peak current kA 14 30 80
Peak rate-of-rise A/s 5.5 x 109 1.2 x 1010 3.2 x 1010
Time to peak µs 1.8 5.5 18
Time to half value µs 30 75 200
Impulse charge C 1.1 5.2 24
Action integral A2s 6 x 103 5.5 x 104 5.5 x 105

Negative subsequent strokes

Peak Current kA 4.6 12 30

Peak rate-of-rise A/s 1.2 x 1010 4 x 1010 1.2 x 1011
Time to peak µs 0.22 1.1 4.5
Time to half value µs 6.5 32 140
Impulse charge C 0.2 1.4 11
Action integral A2s 5.5 x 102 6 x 103 5.2 x 104

Continuing current 98% 50% 2%

Amplitude A 33 140 520

Duration s 0.058 0.16 0.40
Charge C 7 26 110

Note 1: The above lightning parameters do not necessarily occur together in one flash.
Note 2: The percentage figures represent percentiles, that is, the percentage of events
having a greater amplitude than those given.

8
 The available data indicate that the cloud to ground flashes represent the most severe
lightning threat to the aircraft as regards with physical damage to composite structures. The
high rate of rise pulse currents measured during the initial and the final attachment phases to
instrumented aircraft may constitute a severe indirect effects threat. Similar pulses with fast
rates of change have also been reported in cloud-to-earth flashes which convey negative
charge to the earth.

In addition to the lightning currents, electric fields exist before and during a lightning
strike event. Initially, these fields result in breakdown of the air to form the attachment and
may also cause breakdown of dielectric materials on an aircraft. The magnitudes of these
fields are dependent upon air breakdown thresholds and range between 400 and 3000 kV/m,
with rates of rise of up to 1000kV/m/µs.

2.6 Protection Design and Verification Environment

The lightning environment for aircraft protection design and certification testing has
been synthesized from negative and positive natural lightning flash characteristics and
includes components designated A, B, C and D. These components are illustrated in Error!
eference source not found. and are from the document “Aircraft Lightning Environment
and Related Test Waveforms Standard,” Committee Report: AE4L-97-4,” July 1997.

Figure 2-4: Standardized Aircraft Lightning Environment

9
3.0 AIRCRAFT - LIGHTNING INTERACTION

3.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses the circumstances under which aircraft are struck by lightning.
It also describes the potential effects of lightning on the aircraft.

A considerable amount of research into the mechanisms whereby aircraft are struck by
lightning have been accomplished. Much of this research has been aimed at defining the
atmospheric conditions under which an aircraft may be struck by lightning, and answering the
question of whether or not an aircraft can produce a lightning strike that originates at the
aircraft, or if it can trigger an impending flash originating at a cloud charge region. Results of
these studies are summarized in the following paragraphs.

Strike occurrence data, principally for transport airplanes, has been collected for many
years and is usually summarized according to the following categories:

1. Altitude

2. Flight path; that is, climbing, level flight, or descent

3. Meteorological conditions

4. Outside air temperature

5. Lightning strike effects on the aircraft

The following specific topics are discussed:

 Definitions of Lightning attachment points

 Circumstances under which aircraft are struck
 Altitude and flight path
 Meteorological Conditions
 Immediate Environment at time of strike
 Frequency of Occurrence
 Aircraft-lightning strike mechanisms
 Electrical field effects
 The charge stored on the aircraft
 Triggered lightning (“Can an aircraft trigger lightning?”)
 Swept flash phenomena
 Direct effects on aircraft skins
 Pitting and melt-through
 Magnetic forces
 Pitting at structural interfaces
 Resistive heating
 Shock waves and overpressure
 Direct effects on non-metallic structures
 Direct effects on fuel systems
 Direct effects on electrical systems
 Direct effects on propulsion systems

10
3.2 Aircraft Lightning Attachment Points

A lightning flash initially attaches to, or enters, an aircraft at one spot and exits from
another. Usually these are extremities of the aircraft such as the nose or a wing tip. For
convenience, these are called initial entry and initial exit points.

At any one time, current is flowing into one point and out of another. The "entry" point
may be either an anode or a cathode; that is, a spot where electrons are either entering or
exiting the aircraft. The visual evidence after the strike does not allow one to resolve the issue
and usually no attempt is made. Instead, by convention, attachment spots at forward or upper
locations have usually been called entry spots and those at aft or lower locations on the aircraft
have been termed exit points.

Since the aircraft flies more than its own length within the lifetime of most flashes, the
entry point will change as the flash reattaches to other spots aft of the initial entry point. The
exit point may do the same if the initial exit spot is at a forward portion of the aircraft. Thus, for
any one flash, there may be many "entry" or "exit" spots and the following definitions are used:

lightning attachment point: The place where the lightning flash touches (attaches to) the
aircraft.

initial entry point: The place where the lightning flash channel first "enters" the aircraft
(usually an extremity).

final entry point: The place where the lightning flash channel last "enters" the aircraft
(typically a trailing edge).

initial exit point: The place where the lightning flash channel first "exits" from the aircraft
(usually an extremity).

final exit point: The last place where the lightning flash "exits" from the aircraft (usually a
trailing edge).

swept "flash"(or "stroke") points: Spots where the flash channel reattaches between the
initial and final points, usually associated with the entry part of the flash channel.

3.3 Aircraft Lightning Experience

The following paragraphs summarize the important findings from the transport aircraft
data gathering projects noted previously and describe the flight and weather conditions under
which lightning strikes are most common. Knowledge of these conditions may help pilots to
minimize future lightning strike incidents. Small airplanes can be expected to experience
lightning strikes during the same flight and weather conditions that have existed when larger
transport airplanes have been struck, although there have been no data gathering projects
involving small airplanes to quantify these conditions.

Altitude and Flight Path: Figure 3-1 shows the altitudes at which the reporting projects
discussed above show aircraft are being struck. This data indicates that there are more
lightning strikes begin experienced at intermediate altitudes than at cruise altitudes for
transport airplanes. This fact indicates (1) that there are more lightning flashes to be
11
intercepted below about 20,000 ft than above this altitude, and (2) that jet aircraft are being
struck at lower than cruise altitudes: that is, during climb, descent, or hold operations.

Figure 3-1: Aircraft lightning strikes vs. Altitude

It is generally thought that strikes which occur above about 10,000 ft. result from
intracloud flashes between positive and negative charge centers in the cloud (or between
adjacent clouds), whereas strikes below this level are more likely to result from cloud-to-ground
flashes. Strike incidents occurring above 20,000 ft. occur less frequently because aircraft at
these altitudes can more easily divert around areas of precipitation than can aircraft at lower
altitudes and most pilots make an effort to avoid regions of convective activity where cumulus
tops are greater than 20,000 or 25,000 thousand feet.

Synoptic Meteorological Conditions: Data discussed thus far might imply that an aircraft
must be within or beneath a cloud to receive a strike and, since electrical charge separation is
accompanied by precipitation, that most strikes would occur when the aircraft is within a cloud,
or in or near regions of precipitation. Strike incident reports show that these conditions often
do exist, but other lightning strikes occur to aircraft in a cloud when there is no evidence of
precipitation nearby, and even to aircraft flying in clear air at a supposedly safe distance from a
thundercloud. FAA and airline advisory procedures instruct pilots to circumvent thunderclouds
or regions of precipitation evident either visibly or on radar, but strikes to aircraft flying 25 miles
from the nearest radar returns or precipitation have been reported. Occasionally a report is
received of a "bolt from the blue," with no clouds anywhere in sight. It is not certain that these
reports are correct because it does not seem possible for electric charge separation of the
magnitude necessary to form a lightning flash to occur in clear air. In most well documented
incidents, a cloud is present somewhere, within 25 miles when the incident occurs.

12
 Perhaps of most interest to aircraft operators are the area weather conditions which
prevailed at the time of reported strikes. There is no universal data bank for this type of data,
but several surveys have been conducted from time to time, including those of [3.1] through
[3.7]. A survey involving a more limited number of strikes, but containing more weather
information than the broad based surveys referenced above, is that of H.T. Harrison [3.8] of
the synoptic meteorological conditions prevailing for 99 United Airlines lightning-strike
incidents occurring between July 1963 and June 1964.

Harrison has drawn the conclusion that any condition which will cause precipitation may
also be expected to cause lightning, although he adds that no strikes were reported in the
middle of warm front winter storms. Data from the Airlines Lightning Strike Reporting Project
reported by Rasch et al [3.7], show that lightning strikes to aircraft in the United States and
Europe occur most often during the spring and summer months, when thunderstorms are most
prevalent.

It is also important to note that many strike incidents have been reported where
no bona fide thunderstorms have been visually observed or reported.

Immediate Environment at Time of Strike: Figure 3-2 through Figure 3-4 show the
immediate environment of the aircraft at the times of the 881 strikes reported in [3.7]. In over
80% of the strikes reported, each aircraft was within a cloud and was experiencing precipitation
and some turbulence.

The incident reports above also show that most aircraft strikes have occurred when an
aircraft is near the freezing level. Figure 3-5 [3.7] shows the distribution of lightning strikes to
aircraft as a function of outside air temperature. Freezing temperatures (and below) are
thought to be required for the electrical charge separation process to function. Of course,
strikes to aircraft at temperatures higher than 50ºF have occurred when the aircraft was close
to (or on) the ground, where the ambient air temperature may be as high as about 77ºF.

Frequency of Occurrence (Commercial aircraft): An example of the number of lightning

strikes which actually occur, as related to flight hours for piston, turboprop, and pure jet
aircraft, is tabulated in Table 3-1 based on the data of Newman [3.1] and Perry [3.5]. From this
data it follows that an average of one strike can be expected for each 3000 hours of flight for
most commercial transport aircraft. This amounts to approximately one strike per year per
airplane. Strike frequency data is not available for small general aviation, although on an
annual basis these airplanes are probably experiencing fewer strikes since they do not usually
fly as many hours per year.

Several factors may influence the apparent lower strike rate of small general aviation aircraft.

1. General aviation aircraft need not adhere to strict flight schedules or congested traffic
patterns around metropolitan airports.

2. General aviation aircraft are a much smaller “target” for lightning than a large transport
aircraft, probably because the electric field is not perturbed as much by the smaller
aircraft, resulting in less likelihood of an aircraft initiated strike (See Section 3.4 for
discussion of strike mechanisms).

13
Figure 3-2: Aircraft location with respect to
clouds
Figure 3-4: Precipitation at time of aircraft
lightning strikes

Figure 3-3: Turbulence when Lightning Figure 3-5: Outside Air Temperature during
Strikes have Occurred lightning strikes

Table 3-1: Number of Lightning Strikes by Flight Hours

14
 3. Most transport aircraft data has been obtained via voluntary reporting of lightning strikes
by pilots. The general aviation aircraft operators typically do not have a similar system
in place. These operators report strike incidents to the FAA only if a major lightning
related incident or accident occurs. Possibly the best source of data would be the
insurance companies that usually pay for repairs when damage occurs.

Other statistics that are available, which apply to a broad category of aircraft and
include data from a variety of different operators in varying geographic locations, may be
misleading. For example, data shows that there is an average of 99,000 flying hours between
reported lightning strikes to U.S. Air Force fighter-type aircraft. The strike experience in
Europe is known to be more frequent than strike experience in the U.S. and most other parts
of the world. Weinstock and Shaeffer [3.9] report 10.5 strikes per 10,000 hours for U.S.
Military aircraft flying in Europe, which rate is about 5 times greater than the world-wide
exposure rate for similar aircraft. The same situation pertains to commercial aircraft operating
in Europe, as indicated by Perry's summary of United Kingdom and European strike data [3.6],
for example. This unusually high lightning-strike exposure rates seem to result both from the
high level of lightning activity in Europe compared with that in many other regions, together
with traffic congestion.

Trends affecting strike rate: There are several trends in small aircraft operations which may
cause greater exposure of aircraft everywhere to lightning strikes in the future:

1. Longer range capabilities of small airplanes

2. Increases in the number of small aircraft and rotorcraft equipped for instrument flight
rules (IFR) flight.

3. Increasing use of radar and direct route navigation aids in general aviation aircraft,
permitting IFR flight under adverse weather conditions.

These factors warrant continued diligence in the design and operation of aircraft with
respect to the possible hazards lightning may present.

3.4 Aircraft Lightning Strike Mechanisms

The electrical conditions which produce lightning, together with the mechanisms of
lightning strike attachment to an aircraft are discussed in the following paragraphs. While it is
not impossible to anticipate or avoid these conditions all of the time, it is important to
understand the strike attachment process in order to properly assess the ways in which
lightning effects aircraft.

Electric Field Effects: At the beginning of lightning flash formation, when a stepped-leader
propagates outward from a cloud charge center, the ultimate destination of the leader, at an
opposite charge center in the cloud or on the ground, has not yet been determined. The
difference of potential which exists between the stepped leader and the opposite charge(s)
establishes an electrostatic field between them, represented by imaginary equipotential
surfaces, which are shown as lines in the two dimensional drawing of Figure 3-6. The field
intensity, commonly expressed in kilovolts per meter, is greatest where equipotential surfaces
are closest together. It is this field that is available to ionize air and form the conductive spark
which is the leader. Because the direction of electrostatic force is normal to the equipotentials,
and strongest where they are closest together, the leader is most likely to progress toward the
most intense field regions.
15
 Figure 3-6: Stepped leader approaching an aircraft

An aircraft will always assume the electrical potential of its location. Since the aircraft is
typically a large conductor, whose surfaces are all at this same potential, it will divert and
compress adjacent equipotentials, thus increasing the electric field intensity at its extremities,
and especially between it and other charge sources, such as the advancing leader. If the
aircraft is far away from the leader, its effect on the field near the leader is negligible; however,
if the aircraft is within several tens or hundreds of meters from the leader, the increased field
intensity in between may be sufficient to attract subsequent leader propagation toward the
aircraft. As this happens, the intervening field will become even more intense, and the leader
will advance more directly toward the aircraft.

Figure 3-7: Compression of electric field around an aircraft

16
 The highest electric fields about the aircraft will occur around extremities, where the
equipotential lines are compressed closest together, as shown in Figure 3-7. Typically, these
are the nose, wing and empennage tips, and also smaller protrusions, such as antennas or air
data probes. When the leader advances to the point where the field adjacent to an aircraft
extremity is increased to about 30 kV/cm (at sea level pressure), the air will ionize and
electrical sparks will form at the aircraft extremities, extending in the direction of the oncoming
leader. Several of these sparks, called streamers, usually occur nearly simultaneously from
several extremities of the aircraft. These streamers will continue to propagate outward as long
as the field remains above about 5 to 7 kV/cm. One of these streamers, called the junction
leader, will meet the nearest branch of the advancing leader and form a continuous spark from
the cloud charge center to the aircraft. Thus, when the aircraft is close enough to influence the
direction of the leader propagation, it will very likely become attached to a branch of the leader
system.

Charge Stored on Aircraft: Streamers may propagate onward from two or more extremities
of the aircraft at the same time. If so, the oncoming leader will have split, and the two (or
more) branches will continue from the aircraft independently of each other until one or both of
them reach their destination. This process of attachment and propagation onward from an
aircraft is shown in Figure 3-8.

When the leader has reached its destination and a continuous ionized channel between
charge centers has been formed, recombination of electrons and positive ions occurs back up
the leader channel, and this forms the high-amplitude return stroke current. This stroke current
and any subsequent stroke or continuing current components must flow through the aircraft,
which has now become part of the conducting path between charge centers.

If another branch of the original leader reaches the ground before the branch which has
involved the aircraft, the return stroke will follow the former, and all other branches will die out.
No substantial currents will flow through the aircraft in such a case, and any damage to the
aircraft will be slight.

Aircraft Initiated Lightning Strikes: A question often asked is "If an aircraft cannot produce a
lightning flash from its own stored charge, can it trigger a natural one?" Stated another way
the question might be "Would the lightning flash have occurred if the aircraft were not
present?" A second question would be "Even if aircraft do trigger lightning, would there be an
impact on the criteria to which aircraft must be designed?" Some preliminary discussion of the
mechanism by which aircraft triggers lightning is necessary.

There is clear evidence that lightning flashes can be triggered by research aircraft that
are intentionally flown into clouds to observe lightning phenomena, but it is not clear how often
aircraft in normal service trigger lightning.

17
 Figure 3-8: Return stroke paths

3.5 Swept Flash Phenomena

After the aircraft has become part of a completed flash channel, the ensuing stroke and
continuing currents which flow through the channel may persist for up to a second or more.
Essentially, the channel remains in its original location, but the aircraft will move forward a
significant distance during the life of the flash.

Thus, whereas the initial entry and exit points are determined by the mechanisms
previously described, there may be other lightning attachment points on the airframe that are
determined by the motion of the aircraft through the relatively stationary flash channel. In the
case of an aircraft, for example, when a forward extremity such as the nose becomes an initial
attachment point, its surface moves through the lightning channel, and thus the channel
appears to sweep back over the surface, as illustrated in Figure 3-9. This occurrence is known
as the swept flash phenomenon. As the sweeping action occurs, the type of surface can
cause the lightning channel to attach and dwell at various surface locations for different periods
of time.

18
 Figure 3-9: Typical path of swept flash attachment points

The aircraft does not usually fly out of, or away from, the channel. This is because the
potential difference between charge centers (cloud and earth or another cloud) is sufficient to
maintain a very long channel until the charges have neutralized each other and the flash dies.

3.6 Direct Effects on Skin Structures

The effects of lightning on skins, both metallic and composite include:

1. Melting or burning at lightning attachment points.

2. Resistive temperature rise.

3. Magnetic force effects.

4. Acoustic shock effects.

5. Arcing and sparking at bonds, hinges and joints.

6. Ignition of vapors within fuel tanks.

As is no doubt apparent, not all materials will suffer from these effects equally.
Obviously, aluminum skins will suffer most from melting at lightning attachment points. While
they will be subject, like composites, to acoustic shock damage, their greater ductility and
malleability will likely enable them to survive. Composites will suffer the most from acoustic
shock waves. It should be emphasized, however, that, carbon composites are conductors,
albeit resistive conductors. They are therefore subject to the same influences as metal
structures, although in different degree. They are, for example, subject to magnetic forces, as
well as arcing and sparking at bonds and resistive heating.

Non-conductive composites, such as fiberglass and aramid fiber reinforced plastics will
be subject to dielectric breakdown and puncture

19
 Aircraft structures include the outer skins of the aircraft, together with internal
framework, such as spars, ribs, frames, and bulkheads. Lightning currents must flow between
lightning entry and exit points on an aircraft and tend to spread out as they flow between
attachment points, using the entire airframe as a conductor. Any conductive material, metal or
conductive composite with which most of these structures are fabricated becomes part of the
conductive path for lightning currents.

In metal structures, the current density at any single point in the airframe is sometimes
sufficient to cause physical damage between lightning entry and exit points. Only if there is a
poor electrical bond (contact) between structural elements in the current flow path is there likely
to be physical damage, and this may be of little consequence unless this arcing occurs in a fuel
tank. On the other hand, where the currents converge to the immediate vicinity of an entry or
exit point, there may be a sufficient concentration of magnetic force and resistive heating to
cause damage. Discussion of individual effects follows.

3.6.1 Pitting and Melt-through

If a lightning channel touches a metal surface, melting will occur at the point of
attachment. Common evidence of this is the successive pit marks often seen along a
fuselage, or the holes melted in the trailing edges of wing or empennage tips. Most holes are
melted in skins of no more than 0.040" (1 mm) thick, except at trailing edges, where the
lightning channel may hang on for a longer time and enable holes to be burned through much
thicker surfaces. Since a finite amount of time is needed for melting to occur, the continuing
currents are the lightning flash components most conducive to pitting and melt-through. Melt-
through of skins is usually not a safety-of-flight problem unless this occurs in an integral fuel
tank skin.

3.6.2 Magnetic Force

It is well known that parallel conductors with current traveling in the same direction are
mutually attracted to each other. If the structure near a lightning attachment point is viewed
electrically as being made up of a large number of parallel conductors converging to a lightning
entry (exit) point, then as lightning current converges to the point, forces occur which try to draw
these conductors closer together. If a structure is not sufficiently rigid, pinching or crimping
may occur. The amount of damage created is proportional to the square of the lightning stroke
current amplitudes and is also proportional to the length of time during which this stroke current
flows. Thus the high amplitudes of stroke currents are the lightning flash components most
responsible for magnetic force damage.

Besides airframe extremities, other parts which may be damaged by magnetic forces
include bonding or diverter straps, or any other object which may conduct concentrated
lightning stroke currents. Magnetic force damage is usually not evident during a flight, and
may not be detected until the aircraft is later examined after landing. However, since
overstress or severe bending of metals is involved, parts damaged by this effect may need
repair or replacement.

3.6.3 Pitting at Structural Interfaces

Wherever poor electrical contact exists between two mating surfaces, such as a control
surface hinge or bearing across which lightning currents may flow, melting and pitting of these
surfaces may occur. In one incident, for example, the jackscrew of an inboard trailing edge flap
of a jet transport was so damaged by a lightning flash that the flap could not be extended past
15 degrees.
20
 The jackscrew in this instance was not an initial attachment point and it became an
attachment point only by being in the path of a swept flash. This incident illustrates the fact
that lightning channels may reach seemingly improbable locations on the surface of an
aircraft, and that protection designers must look beyond obvious lightning attachment points
to find potential hazards.

A second example illustrates pitting caused by arcing in a structural interface. The

arcing caused damage to the chemical conversion coating in the interface, resulting in
accelerated corrosion within that region.

3.6.4 Resistive Heating

Another direct effect is the resistive heating of conductors exposed to lightning currents.
When the resistivity of a conductor is too high or its cross--sectional area too low for adequate
current conductance, lightning currents in it may deposit appreciable energy in the conductor
and cause an excessive temperature rise. Since the resistivity of most metals increases with
temperature rise, a given current in a heated conductor will deposit more energy than it would
in an unheated, less resistant conductor; this process in turn increases the conductor
temperature still further. Most metal structural elements can tolerate lightning current without
overheating, and aluminum or copper conductors of greater than 0.5 cm2 cross-sectional area
can conduct severe lightning currents without overheating. Methods for determining
temperature rises in conductors of specific material or cross-sectional size are available [3.10]

Wire explosion: Resistive energy deposition is proportional to the action integral of the
lightning current and for any conductor there is an action integral value at which the metal will
melt and vaporize. Small diameter wires, such as AWG 22 to 16, which are of the sizes
commonly used to interconnect avionic equipment, or distribute AC power to small loads, will
often melt or vaporize when subjected to full amplitude lightning currents.

The damage produced by explosive vaporization of conductors is usually most severe

when the exploding conductor is within an enclosure, such as composite wing tips, because
then the explosion energy is contained until the pressure has built up to a level sufficient to
rupture the container. Partly, the damage results because the mechanical energy of
combustion that the wire releases as it burns, and this adds to the energy deposited by the
lightning current.

In most cases, such wiring is installed within conducting airframes and so is not
exposed to major amounts of the lightning current. Some exceptions occur, however, such as
a wiring harness feeding a wingtip navigation light installed on a non-conductive, fiberglass
wing tip that is not protected with metallized coating or other paths (diverters) for lightning
current. In such cases, lightning strikes to the navigation light vaporize and explode the wire
harness, thus allowing the lightning current path to exist in plasma form within the wing tip.
The accompanying shock wave can do extensive damage to the enclosing and adjacent
structures.

Exploding wire harnesses are one of the most common and damaging lightning effects.
They have, as far as is known, not had catastrophic consequences because these harnesses
are usually found in secondary structures that are not flight critical. If these situations are
allowed to exist within unprotected fiberglass primary structures, such as a wing, the effects
could be catastrophic. There is no reason, however, to allow these situations to exist because
protection is easily applied. Such protection can also minimize the possibility of conducting
lightning current surges into power distribution or avionic systems.

21
3.6.5 Shock Wave and Overpressure

When a lightning stroke current flows in an ionized leader channel, as when the first
return stroke occurs, a large amount of energy is delivered to the channel in 5 to 10
microseconds, causing the channel to expand with supersonic speed. Its temperature has
been measured by spectroscope techniques to be 30,000o K and the channel pressure (before
expansion) about 10 atmospheres. When the supersonic expansion is complete, the channel
diameter is several centimeters and the channel pressure is in equilibrium with the surrounding
air. Later, the channel continues to expand more slowly to the equilibrium situation of a stable
arc. The cylindrical shockwave propagates radially outward from the center of the channel,
and, if a hard surface is intercepted, the kinetic energy in the shock wave is transformed into a
pressure rise over and above that in the shock wave itself. This results in a total overpressure
of several times that in the free shock wave at the surface.

Depending on the distance of the channel from the aircraft surface, overpressures can
range up to several hundred atmospheres at the surface, resulting in implosion damage. The
lightning channel does not have to contact the damaged surface, but may simply be swept
alongside it. Air pressure is the direct agent of damage.

Other examples of shock wave implosion damage include cracked or shattered

windshields and navigation light globes. Modern windshields, especially those aboard
transport aircraft, are of laminated construction and evidently of sufficient strength to have
avoided being completely broken by shockwaves and overpressures. Broken windshields
resulting from a lightning strike, however, are considered a possible cause of the crash of at
least one propeller driven aircraft.

Little test data exists because manufacturers have shown a reluctance to test
windshields. While windshields sometimes fail in laboratory conditions, this does not seem to
duplicate in-flight experience. This may be because laboratory conditions do not successfully
imitate actual lightning strike conditions, or there may be some other reason not yet
understood. Additional discussion about windshields are included in Section 14.

3.6.6 Direct Effects on Nonmetallic Structures

Non-metallic materials used in aircraft include fiber reinforced composites and other
plastics such as polycarbonate resins. The composites are of greatest interest since these may
comprise much of an airframe. Polycarbonates are employed only in windows and some
fairings. Fiberglass reenforced composites are non-electrically conductive and respond to
lightning in a different way than the carbon fiber composites, which are electrically conductive.

Fiberglass composites: Some of these materials have begun to replace aluminum in

secondary structures, such as nose, wing and empennage tips, tail cones, wing-body fairings
and control surfaces, and on several occasions the entire aircraft has been fabricated of glass
reinforced composites.

Often the nonmetallic material is used to cover a metallic object, such as a radar
antenna. If this covering material is nonconducting, such as is the case with fiberglass or
Kevlar, electric fields may penetrate it and initiate streamers from metallic objects inside.
These streamers may puncture the nonmetallic material as they propagate outward to meet an
oncoming lightning leader. This puncture begins as a pinhole, but, as soon as stroke currents
and accompanying blast and shock waves follow, a much larger hole may result.

22
 Examples of punctured fiberglass honeycomb radomes are shown in section 12.
Streamers propagate from the radar antenna or other conductive object inside the radome,
puncturing the fiberglass--honeycomb wall and rubber erosion protection boot on its way to
meet an oncoming lightning leader. Most of the visible damage is done by the stroke current.

Carbon Fiber Composites: As stated, composites reinforced with carbon or boron fibers
have some electrical conductivity, because of this, their behavior with respect to lightning
differs not merely from nonconductive materials, but from that of aluminum (which is much
more conductive). Carbon fiber composites (CFC) are employed extensively in primary
structures.

In carbon and other conductive composites, resistive heating has an entirely different
effect. As temperatures rise, the resin bonding the carbon fibers begin to break down, typically
as a result of burning or pyrolysis. If the gases which the burning resins give off are trapped in
a substrate, explosive release may occur with attendant damage to the structure. The damage
may be great enough to result in a puncture. The principal risk is structural damage, although
this is normally local to the puncture, especially if the punctured skin is comprised of cloth plies.
Unidirectional (tape) ply laminates may allow damage to propagate further, at least on the
surface ply. Many factors influence damage, and these are evaluated in the test data in this
handbook. Unlike most aluminum alloys, which are ductile and will deform, but not break, CFC
materials are stiff and may shatter. This damage is usually limited to the vicinity of the lightning
attachment point.

Other plastics: Transparent acrylics or polycarbonate resins are often utilized for canopies
and windshields. These materials are usually found in locations where lightning flashes may
attach or sweep by. Most of the polycarbonates are very good insulators, however, and so will
successfully resist punctures by lightning or streamers. The electric field will penetrate the
canopy and induce streamers from conducting objects inside, however if the canopy dielectric
is high enough these streamers will be unable to puncture the canopy.

Pilots of small planes beneath polycarbonate canopies have often reported electric
shocks indicative of streamering off their earphones or helmets, but the current levels involved
have not been harmful because the streamers have not come in contact with the lightning
flash. Leaders approaching the outside of a canopy travel along its surface to reach a metallic
skin, or those initially attached to a forward metal frame may be swept aft over a canopy until
they reattach to an aft metallic point. Sometimes this occurrence will leave a scorched path
across the canopy.

3.6.7 Direct Effects on Fuel Systems

Lightning presents a potential hazard to aircraft fuel systems. An electric arc or spark
conducting only one ampere of current is sufficient to ignite flammable fuel vapor, yet lightning
flashes may inject thousands of amperes of current into an aircraft.

There are several dozen civil and military aircraft accidents which have been attributed
to lightning ignition of fuel and there have been fires and explosions within small aircraft fuel
tanks. Although the exact source of ignition in some cases remains obscure, the most likely
possibility is that electrical arcing or sparking occurred at some structural joint or plumbing
device not designed to conduct electric currents. Some accidents have been attributed to
lightning ignition of fuel vapors exiting from vent outlets, but this has never been positively
established. Lightning strikes have also melted holes in integral fuel tank skins, igniting vapors
within. Streamers induced from conducting objects within tanks made of non-conducting
materials such as fiberglass are believed to have ignited fuel vapors.
23
 In addition to the direct effects described above, there are several instances in which
indirect effects have evidently accounted for ignition of fuel. Lightning induced voltages in
aircraft electrical wiring are believed to have resulted in sparks across, for example, a
capacitance type fuel probe or some other electrical object inside fuel tanks of several aircraft,
resulting in loss of external tanks in some cases and the entire aircraft in others. Capacitance
type fuel probes are designed to preclude such occurrences, but some of the float-type fuel
level sender units employed in small airplanes have not been designed nor tested to withstand
lightning-induced currents without arcing or sparking.

The accidents and incidents noted above have prompted extensive research into the
lightning effects on and protection of aircraft fuel systems. Improved tank design, lightning
protected filler caps and access doors, active and passive vent flame suppression devices,
and safer (i.e., less volatile) fuels are examples of developments which have resulted from
this research. In addition, FAA airworthiness requirements now focus attention on lightning
protection for fuel systems of both small and large aircraft. As a result, lightning strikes have
presented fewer hazards to the fuel systems aboard modern aircraft than to those of older
aircraft. Continued changes in airframe designs and materials, however, make it necessary
to consider lightning protection in small airplane fuel tank designs.

3.6.8 Direct Effects on Electrical Systems

If an externally mounted electrical apparatus, such as a navigation lamp or antenna,

happens to be a lightning attachment point, protective globes or fairings may shatter and
permit some of the lightning current to directly enter associated electrical wiring.

In the case of a wing tip navigation light, for example, lightning may shatter the
protective globe and light bulb. This may in turn allow the lightning channel to contact the bulb
filament so that lightning currents may flow into the electrical wires running from the bulb to the
power distribution bus. Even if only a fraction of the total lightning current enters the wire
harness, it may be too small to conduct the lightning currents involved and thus will be melted
or vaporized, as described in section 3.6.4.

The accompanying voltage surge may cause breakdown of insulation or damage to

other electrical equipment powered from the same source. The externally mounted
component affected is disabled, and, at worst, enough other electrical apparatus is disabled
along with it to impair flight safety. There are many examples of this effect, involving all types
of aircraft. Susceptible components generally include navigation lights, antennas, air data
probe heaters and occasionally propeller blade or windshield heaters. The latter were quite
susceptible to lightning strikes, and, since these wires were too thin to conduct the lightning
currents, they were usually burned away. The high frequency radio sets feeding antennas
were also frequently damaged, and cockpit fires were common.

3.6.9 Direct Effects on Propulsion Systems

With the exception of a few incidents of momentary interruption, there have been no
reports of adverse lightning effects on the performance of reciprocating engines. Metal
propellers and spinners have been struck frequently, of course, but effects have been limited to
pitting of blades or burning of small holes in spinners. Lightning currents must flow through
propeller blade and engine shaft bearings, and bearings may become pitted as a result,
necessitating tear down and inspection in accordance with engine manufacturer’s instructions.
Wooden propellers, especially ones without metal leading edges, could probably experience
more damage, but there is no published data.

24
Turbine stalls: Reported lightning effects on turbojet engines show that these effects also are
limited to temporary interference with engine operation. Flameouts, compressor stalls, and
roll-backs (reduction in turbine speed) have been reported after lightning strikes to aircraft with
turbo-prop and turbo-jet mounted engines. This type includes military aircraft with internally
mounted engines and fuselage air intakes, and business-jet aircraft with engines mounted on
the fuselage.

There have been no attempts to duplicate engine flameouts or turbine stalls with
simulated lightning in a ground test, or have there been other qualitative analyses of the
interference mechanisms. It is generally believed that these events result from disruption of
the inlet air by the shock wave associated with the lightning channel sweeping aft along a
fuselage. This channel may pass close in front of an engine intake, and if a stroke current
occurs, the accompanying shock wave is considered sufficient to disrupt engine operation.
The steep temperature gradient may be important. These effects have been reported as
occurring more often on smaller military or business jet aircraft than on larger transport
aircraft. Thus, smaller engines seem more susceptible to disrupted inlet air than are larger
engines.

Operational aspects: In some cases a complete flameout of the engine results, while in
others there is only a stall or roll-back. In most instances a successful restart or recovery of
the engine to full power has been made. Operators of aircraft with turbine engines (especially
small engines) with inlets close to the fuselage should anticipate possible loss of power in the
event of a lightning strike and be prepared to take quick corrective action.

There have been only a few reports of lightning affecting wing mounted turbojet
engines. Since these are usually large engines the shock wave from a lightning flash is
probably inadequate to noticeably disrupt inlet air flow, and there have been no reports of
stalls or rollbacks of wing-mounted turbojet engines.

25
 Chapter 3 References

[3.1] M. M. Newman and J. D. Robb, "Aircraft Protection from Atmospheric Electrical

Hazards," ASD Technical Report 61-493, or L and T Report 374, Lightning and
Transients Research Institute, Minneapolis, Minnesota, December 1961.

[3.2] "Lightning Strike Survey Report for the Period of January 1965 through December of
1966," Federal Aviation Agency Report of the Conference on Fire Safety Measures for
Aircraft Fuel Systems. Appendix II, Department of Transportation, Washington D.C.,
December 1967.

[3.3] B. I. Hourihan, "Data from the Airlines Lightning Strike Reporting Project," June 1971 to
November 1974, Summary Report GPR-75-004, High Voltage Laboratory,
Electromagnetic Unit, Corporate Research and Development, General Electric
Company, Pittsfield, Massachusetts, March 1975.

[3.4] R. B. Anderson and H. Kroninger, "Lightning Phenomena in the Aerospace

Environment: Part II, Lightning Strikes to Aircraft," Proceedings of the 1975
Conference on Lightning and Static Electricity, December 1975.

[3.5] J. A. Plumer and B. L. Perry, "An Analysis of Lightning Strikes in Airline Operation in
the USA and Europe,'' Proceedings of the 1975 Conference of Lightning and Static
Electricity, December 1975.

[3.6] O. K. Trunov, "Conditions of Lightning Strikes in Air Transports and Certain General
Lightning Protection Requirements," Proceedings of the 1975 Conference on Lightning
and Static Electricity, December 1975.

[3.7] N. O. Rasch, M. S. Glynn and J. A. Plumer, "Lightning Interaction With Commercial Air
Carrier Type Aircraft," International Aerospace and Ground Conference on Lightning
and Static Electricity, Orlando, Florida, 26--28 June, 1984, paper 21.

[3.8] H. T. Harrison, "UAL Turbojet Experience with Electrical Discharges", UAL

Meteorological Circular No. 57, United Air Lines, Chicago, Illinois, January 1, 1965.

[3.9] J. F. Shaeffer and G. L. Weinstock, "Aircraft Related Lightning Mechanisms",

Technical Report AFAL-TR-72-386, prepared by the US Air Force Avionics Laboratory,
Air Force systems Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, January 1973.

26
4.0 THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the aircraft lightning protection requirements included in the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR’s) and the steps that
can be taken by applicants for certification to comply with these regulations. Where
applicable, the role of the FAA certifying engineer or his designated engineering representative
(DER) is discussed in addition to the activities of the aircraft design engineers and certification
managers.

Related FAA advisory material and test standards are also described in this section.
This section does not include design data or methodology. Those responsible for design and
certification should be familiar with the material in this chapter before proceeding with a
lightning protection design program.

Aircraft lightning protection requirements and related standards have improved

substantially, to where they now address nearly all of the potential lightning hazards and
incorporate the known aspects of the lightning environment. Before this, the aircraft protection
requirements focused on a limited number of hazards, such as fuel tanks, access panels,
antennas and other “points of entry.” Regulations ignored problems such as internal arc and
spark sources as well as indirect effects on electrical and avionic systems.

4.2 Federal Aviation Regulations for Lightning Direct Effects

Since lightning represents a possible safety hazard whose consequences may extend
to loss of the aircraft and the lives of those aboard, the fundamental goal of aircraft lightning
protection is to prevent catastrophic accidents, and to enable the aircraft to continue flying
safely and be able to land at a suitable airport.

FAR's and AC's: Lightning protection requirements have therefore been included in the
collection of Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR's) and Advisory Circulars (AC's) aimed at
ensuring that the above goal is met for all except experimental and certain acrobatic aircraft.
These regulations deal with the aircraft as a whole, and more specifically with the fuel system
and other systems performing flight critical and essential functions. Specific regulations for
each category of aircraft are reproduced in the following pages. As with most FAR’s, they
state a performance requirement, but do not include guidelines for compliance or specific
technical design requirements. In this manner the FAR's allow the designer a maximum
amount of flexibility. Emphasis is placed by the FAA on verification and compliance with the
FAR's, in this case by demonstrating, often by test, that the designs do in fact provide the
necessary protection.

Lightning protection requirements are included in the FAR's for Transport Category
Aircraft (Part 25), Normal, Utility and Acrobatic Aircraft (Part 23), which are hereinafter referred
to as "General Aviation" aircraft, and for both categories of rotorcraft (Parts 27 and 29), though
some differences in applicable paragraph numbering and wording exist. It will be noted that
the lightning protection regulations are functional requirements which are comparatively brief.
The intensity of the lightning environment, the frequency of lightning strike occurrences and
locations where strikes enter or exit the aircraft are not provided in the protection regulations.

27
 The lightning environment for design and certification purposes is presented in FAA
Advisory Circulars [4.1, 4.2], along with definitions of lightning strike zones and guidance for
locating them on specific aircraft.

4.2.1 US Federal Aviation Regulations

The basic lightning protection regulation for airframes is the same for all vehicle
categories, and appears in the FAR's for general aviation aircraft as FAR 23.867. Identical
regulations are applicable to the other categories for aircraft:

Part 23.867 - Lightning Protection of Structure, This is the basic airframe lightning
protection regulation, which requires that the aircraft be able to sustain a lightning strike
without experiencing catastrophic damage. It reads:

23.867 Lightning protection of structure.

(a) the airplane must be protected against catastrophic effects from lightning.

(b) For Metallic components, compliance with paragraph (a) of this section may be
shown by -
(1) Bonding the components properly to the airframe; or
(2) Designing the components so that a strike will not endanger the
airplane

(c) For nonmetallic components, compliance with paragraph (a) of this section may be
shown by -
(1) Designing the components to minimize the effect of a strike; or
(2) Incorporating acceptable means of diverting the resulting electrical
current so as not to endanger the airplane.

[Amdt. 23 -7, 34 FR 13092, Aug. 13, 1969]

Other regulations address specific systems, as follows:

Part 23.954 - Fuel System Lightning Protection

This regulation requires that fuel tanks and systems be free of ignition sources such as
electrical arcs and sparks due to direct or swept lightning strikes at externally mounted fuel
system components. The regulation reads:

23.954 Fuel system lightning protection.

The fuel system must be designed and arranged to prevent the ignition of fuel vapor
within the system by -

(a) Direct lightning strikes to areas having a high probability of stroke attachment;
(b) Swept lightning strokes on areas where swept strokes are highly probable; and
(c) Corona or streamering at fuel vent outlets.

[Amdt. 23 -7, 34 FR 13093, Aug. 13, 1969]

28
4.2.2 Protection Design Objectives

The primary focus of the design guidelines presented in this handbook is to minimize
lightning effects caused by severe lightning attachment to the aircraft and enable compliance
with the lightning direct effects protection regulations described in Section 4.2.1. Following are
the objectives of the lightning protection design direct effects:

1. Prevent catastrophic structural damage.

2. Prevent hazardous electrical shocks to occupants.

3. Prevent loss of aircraft flight control capability.

4. Prevent ignition of fuel vapors.

The regulations state that compliance can be shown by either bonding components to
the airframe or by designing components so that a strike will not endanger the airframe. In
this context the term “bonding” refers to electrical connections among components sufficient
to withstand lightning currents.

At the time this basic regulation was formulated it was widely believed that hazardous
lightning effects were limited to the external structure or to components directly exposed to
lightning strikes and that protection from these effects could be achieved by ensuring that they
were adequately bonded to the main airframe. Examples were flight control surfaces, air data
probes, wing and empennage tips and other components located at extremities of the aircraft
where lightning strikes most frequently occur. Adequate bonding would prevent damage to the
hinges, fasteners and other means of attaching these components to the airframe.

Bonding resistance: Unfortunately, this emphasis on bonding has led some designers to
conclude that bonding, by itself, will provide adequate lightning protection for an aircraft and
that little else need be done. To them, a lightning protected aircraft has meant a "bonded"
aircraft. Verification of this "bonded" status has, in turn, been signified by attainment of a
specified electrical resistance among the "bonded" components. The industry has adapted
various bonding resistance limits for this purpose, among them the US military specification
MIL-B-5087B , which requires that components subject to lightning currents be interconnected
with a "bonding" resistance not exceeding 2.5 milliohms. This is achieved by allowing
metal-to-metal contact among parts and verified by a dc resistance measurement.

Criteria like the 2.5 milliohm bonding specification have taken on an importance all of
their own, to the neglect of the real purpose of design. Whereas electrical continuity among
metal parts of an aircraft is important, there are many other features of a successful protection
design that are of equal or greater importance.

Effects within the aircraft: The focus of FAR 23.867 on the bonding and externally mounted
components has perhaps led designers to give much less attention to lightning effects
occurring within the airframe, either directly from current flow among internal structural
members or indirectly, from changing magnetic and electric fields interacting with electrical
systems. These indirect effects have been the cause of several catastrophic accidents,
brought about by electrical arcing among fuel tank components and by burnout of flight
essential electronic components. More detailed discussions of these effects and related
protection methods are found in the succeeding chapters.

29
 The emphasis of FAR 23.867 on the external and bonding aspects of lightning
protection does not, of course, excuse the designer from actively identifying and addressing all
potentially hazardous direct and indirect lightning effects.

4.3 Steps in Protection Design and Certification

Experience has shown that the most successful lightning protection design and
certification programs have occurred when the work is conducted in a logical series of steps.
In this case, success means achievement of a satisfactory protection design and compliance
with the regulations, all with a minimum impact on weight and cost. The specific steps and
order of occurrence may vary somewhat from one program to another, but most programs
include the following basic steps:

4.3.1 Step a - Establish the Lightning Zone Locations

Lightning zoning is a functional step in demonstrating that the aircraft is adequately protected
from both direct and indirect effects of lightning. The purpose of lightning zoning is to
determine the surfaces of the aircraft which are likely to experience lightning channel
attachment and the structures which may experience lightning current conduction between
pairs of entry/exit points.

Zoning should be used with the aircraft hazard assessment to determine the appropriate
protection for a given aircraft part or location. To determine the appropriate protection for parts
and structure in a particular lightning zone, the criticality of the systems or structure in the zone
should be considered.

ZONE DEFINITIONS: The surface of an aircraft can be divided into a set of regions called
lightning strike zones. These zones represent the areas likely to experience the various types
of lightning currents and consequently, the various components of the lightning environment.
There are three major divisions representing:

1. Regions likely to experience initial lightning attachment and first return strokes,

2. Regions which are unlikely to experience first return strokes but which are likely
to experience subsequent return strokes. This will happen where the aircraft is
in motion relative to a lightning channel causing sweeping of the channel
backwards from a forward initial attachment point.

3. Regions which are unlikely to experience any arc attachment but which will have
to conduct lightning current between attachment points.

Regions 1 and 2 are subdivided into specific lightning attachment zones as follows:

Zones 1A and 2A, where long hang-on of a lightning channel is unlikely because the
motion of the aircraft with respect to the channel causes the arc root to move across the
surface of the aircraft in the opposite direction from the direction of motion.

Zones 1B and 2B, where the lightning channel is unlikely to move during the remainder
of the flash because the location is a trailing edge or a large promontory from which the
relative motion of the aircraft and channel cannot sweep the attachment point further.

30
 Finally, an additional zone, 1C, is defined in which, by virtue of the change in current
parameters along a lightning channel and the time taken for sweeping of the attachment point
across the surface of the aircraft, the threat to the aircraft is reduced.

Specific zone definitions are as follows:

Zone 1A - First return stroke zone

All the areas of the aircraft surfaces where a first return stroke is anticipated during
lightning channel attachment with a low likelihood of flash hang on.

Zone 1B - First return stroke zone with long hang on

All the areas of the aircraft surfaces where a first return stroke is anticipated during
lightning channel attachment with a high likelihood of flash hang on.

Zone 1C - Transition zone for first return stroke

All the areas of the aircraft surfaces where a first return stroke of reduced amplitude is
anticipated during lightning channel attachment with a low likelihood of flash hang on.

Zone 2A - Swept stroke zone

All the areas of the aircraft surfaces where subsequent return stroke is anticipated to be
swept with a low likelihood of flash hang on.

Zone 2B - Swept stroke zone with long hang on

All the areas of the aircraft surfaces into which a lightning channel carrying a
subsequent return stroke is likely to be swept with a high expectation of flash hang on.

Zone 3 - Those surfaces not in Zone 1A, 1B, 2A or 2B and where any attachment of
the lightning channel is unlikely, and those portions of the aircraft that lie beneath or
between the other zones and conduct substantial amount of electrical current between
direct or swept stroke attachment points.

The location of these zones on any particular aircraft should be agreed upon between
the airframe manufacturer and the appropriate certification authority.

ZONE LOCATION PROCESS: The locations of the lightning strike zones on any aircraft are
dependent on the geometry of the aircraft and operational factors, and often vary from one
aircraft to another. The eight steps described below should be followed in locating the
lightning strike zones on a particular aircraft.

Step 1: Determination of Initial Lightning Leader Attachment Locations: The first step in
locating the lightning strike zones is to determine the locations where lightning leaders may
initially attach to an aircraft. Analytical methods such as rolling sphere or electrical field
analysis and test methods such as model lightning strike attachment tests can be used for this
purpose. If initial lightning attachment data is available for an aircraft of similar geometry, this
may be used in lieu of analysis or test for establishing initial leader attachment locations. Initial

31
attachment locations typically include extremities such as the nose, wing and empennage tips,
propellers and rotor blades, some engine nacelles, and other significant projections.

Step 2: Location of Zones 1A and 1B: The second step in locating the lightning strike zones is
to identify the surfaces that may experience possible first return stroke arrival. These locations
will include Zones 1A and 1C. In most cases the aircraft will be moving forward when initially
struck and the leader will have swept aft from its original attachment point by the time the
leader reaches the earth (or other charge center) and initiates the first return stroke. The
distance, d1, flown by the aircraft during this period determines the aft extension of Zone 1A
surfaces, and is dependent upon aircraft velocity, aircraft altitude above the earth (for a cloud-
to-ground strike), and leader velocity. Experience indicates that most severe strike
encounters, which include current Component A, involve cloud-to-ground flashes that strike the
aircraft at altitudes of 5,000 ft. (1500m) or less, so Zone 1A extensions can be based on this
altitude.

Step 3: Location of Zone 1C: Zone 1C is applicable to surfaces aft of Zone 1A which can be
reached by swept leaders at flight altitudes between 5,000 and 15,000 ft. Between 5,000 ft.
and 10,000 ft., a first return stroke of lower amplitude then Component A, called current
Component Ah, is applicable. The leader sweep distance associated with this altitude is
designated d2. The aircraft surfaces lying between d1 and d2 are within Zone 1C. Since all
aircraft fly at altitudes below 10,000 ft., the minimum rearward extensions of Zones 1A and 1C
on a particular aircraft should be based on the highest velocities at which the aircraft operates
for an appreciable time within these altitudes. If the aircraft never reaches one or the other of
these altitudes, then its normal cruise altitudes and the highest velocities at which the aircraft
operates for any appreciable time should be used. The leader velocity should be taken as 1.5
x 105 m/s.

Step 4: Further Zone 1A and 1C Extensions: In rare cases, first return strokes may occur
further aft of initial leader attachment locations than is predicted by distances d1 and d2 as
determined above. This possibility should be considered if the probability of a flight safety
hazard due to a Zone 1A and/or 1C to a susceptible component is high.

Step 5: Location of Zones 2A and 2B: Since most aircraft can travel more than their entire
length in the one or two second duration of a lightning flash, the remainder of the surfaces aft
of Zone 1C should be considered within Zone 2A. Trailing edge surfaces should be
considered in Zones 1B and 2B, depending on whether they can be reached by an initial strike
(Zone 1B) or a swept stroke only (Zone 2B), in accordance with the zone definitions.

Step 6: Location of Lateral Extensions of Zones 1 and 2: Surfaces 0.5m (18in) to either side
(i.e. outboard or inboard) of Zones 1 and 2 determined by Steps 10.1 through 10.4 should also
be considered within these same zones to account for small lateral movements of the lightning
channel.

Step 7: Location of Zone 3: Those surfaces not in Zones 1 or 2 and where there is a low
expectation of any attachment of the lightning channel are considered to be in Zone 3. Zone 3
includes those portions of the aircraft that lie beneath or between the other zones and which
conduct lightning current between areas of direct or swept-flash attachment.

In some cases a subsequent return stroke may occur in a region described as Zone 3.
This possibility should be considered if the probability of a flight safety hazard due to a Zone
2A strike to a susceptible component is high.

32
Step 8: Overlapping Zones: Surfaces within Zones 1A and 1C are also in Zone 2A, as in some
cases the first return stroke may occur near the initial leader attachment point, as at a nose or
engine inlet cowl, with subsequent strokes occurring within the rest of the Zone 1A areas.
Protection designs should be based on the worst case zones. Once the lightning strike zones
have been established, they should be documented on a drawing of the aircraft, with
boundaries identified by appropriate station numbers or other notations.

Examples of Zone Locations: Lightning strike zones located in accordance with the above
guidelines are illustrated in Figure 4-1 for a general aviation airplane.

Figure 4-1: Typical General Aviation Aircraft Zone Drawing

33
4.3.2 Step c - Identify Systems and Components that are Performing Flight Critical or
Essential Functions

Identify the aircraft systems and/or components that may be susceptible to direct and
indirect effects of lightning, and whose function is critical or essential to the safe flight of the
aircraft.

Determine if any of these structures and systems could be damaged or upset by direct
or indirect lightning effects.

4.3.3 Step d - Establish Protection Criteria

In this step, the specific criteria for each of the structures and systems in need of
protection should be decided upon. For direct effects, this will include definition of the degree
of physical damage that can be tolerated by flight critical/essential structures, and
establishment of ignition free criteria for the fuel tanks.

4.3.4 Step e - Design Protection

In this step, specific design additions, changes or modifications are made to the flight
critical/essential structures, systems and components to enable them to meet the protection
criteria established in Step d. For direct effects, this will involve a number of design
techniques, ranging from selection of structural materials and manufacturing techniques to the
addition of treatments or devices to improve electrical conductivity, arc or spark suppression,
and shielding of electrical/electronic systems from lightning indirect effects.

4.3.5 Step f - Verify Protection Adequacy

Verification of protection can be accomplished by analysis, similarity to previously

proven designs, or by test. Any of the three methods, or a combination of them, can be used,
but similarity and analysis are normally considered first. If verification tests are needed, they
cannot be performed until hardware has been designed, built and made available for testing.
Frequently, development testing is advisable during the design process, and some of this test
data may be useable for verification purposes.

Analysis: Typical analysis used for verification of direct effects protection methods include
calculation of conductor temperature rises due to current, based on conductor material,
cross-sectional area and action integral of the lightning current, or calculation of magnetic
forces effects which are dependent upon current amplitude and geometrical factors. These
analyzes are based on fundamental physical laws which can be described in mathematical
terms.

Other analyzes include comparison of present designs with earlier designs for which an
empirical data base exists. In this case, extensions or extrapolations are utilized to relate the
existing empirical data bases to the designs of interest.

34
 Analysis can rarely be utilized to determine the behavior of lightning currents in
complex structures or components with multiple interfaces and current paths, especially when
these interfaces have not been designed to conduct electric currents. Therefore, testing must
frequently be used to evaluate lightning direct effects and verify protection design of
structures.

Similarity: Verification of direct effects protection by similarity means that current-carrying

structures and joints must be shown to have equal or greater cross-sectional areas and
interface surface areas than the designs to which they are similar, and that other design
features are also sufficiently similar so as not to respond differently to other lightning effects
such as shock waves and magnetic forces.

Demonstration of similarity includes comparisons of detailed design drawings, parts

lists and installation details, combined with such analyzes as are necessary to show that
dissimilarities do not result in unforeseen hazards.

Examples of designs that may be verified by similarity are:

- Skins and structures

- Hinges and bearings
- Landing gear
- Flight control surfaces
- Windshields
- Joints, interfaces and couplings

Test: Many subsystems or components will be verified by test. The environment will be
determined by the test specimen’s physical location on or within the aircraft and the lightning
strike zones that are applicable. More than one zone may apply; that is, components must
conduct the lightning current away from the attachment point in addition to withstanding the
thermal, blast and magnetic force effects of lightning attachment. Thus, all subsystems or
components must usually withstand the Zone 3 environment in addition to the surface zone
environments.

Lightning direct effects are usually limited to the near vicinity of an attachment point. In
most structures, the current will diffuse radially away from an attachment point and as the
current density decreases, the physical damage also decreases. This indicates that the
specimen size for test can be small compared to the size of the total structure or component.

4.4 Certification plans

Experience has shown, particularly on aircraft employing major amounts of composites

or avionics that perform critical or essential functions, that preparation and submittal of a
certification plan to the FAA early in the program is desirable. FAA concurrence with this
certification plan should also be obtained. This plan is beneficial to both the applicant and the
FAA because it identifies protection criteria and verification methods early in the certification
process. As the process proceeds, analysis or test results may warrant modifications in
protection design and/or verification methods. As necessary, when significant changes occur,
the plan should be updated. The plan should include the following items:

35
Description of the airframe and systems to be addressed. This should include materials,
installation configurations, any unusual or unique features, the operational aspects being
addressed, applicable zone locations, lightning environment, and protection design level(s) (for
avionics).

Description of the protection: There should be a brief description of the protection

approaches. Frequently, this is subdivided to describe protection features for airframe and
structures, propulsion and fuel, and electrical and avionics systems.

Acceptance Criteria: The acceptance criteria (also known as pass/fail criteria) should be
identified and will apply to all parts of the lightning protection design.

4.5 Test Plans

When tests are to be a part of the verification process, plans for each test should be
prepared which describe or include the following: purpose of the test; test article description
and configuration (including appropriate drawing references); test setup to simulate the
electrical aspects of the production installation; applicable lightning zone(s); lightning test
method; test voltage or current waveforms to be applied; diagnostic methods; acceptance
criteria; and the appropriate schedule(s) and location(s) of proposed test(s).

Some procedural steps that should be taken are:

A. Obtain FAA concurrence with test plans.

B. Obtain FAA concurrence on details of part conformity of the test article and installation
conformity of the test setup.

Part conformity and installation conformity should be judged from the viewpoint of
similarity to the production parts and installation. Development parts and simulated
installations are acceptable provided they can be shown to adequately represent the
electrical and mechanical features of the production parts and installation for the
specific lightning tests. Adequacy should be justified by the applicant and receive
concurrence from the FAA.

C. Schedule FAA witnessing of the test(s).

D. Conduct testing.

E. Submit a final test report describing all results.

F. Obtain FAA approval of the report.

36
5.0 Protection Methodology

5.1 Introduction

This chapter describes generic protection methods. The effectiveness of these

methods on specific airplane skin and structural materials, determined by lightning tests, is
described in subsequent chapters.

Topics discussed in this section are:

 Skin and surface protection

 Composites, mechanism of damage
 Protection of composites requiring radar transparency
- Solid bar diverters
- Segmented diverters
 Protection of composites with conductive applications
- Thermal sprayed metals
- Woven wire fabrics
- Solid metal foils
- Expanded metal foils
- Aluminized fiberglass
- Conductive paints
- Metalized fabrics
- Interwoven wires
 Comparative weights of protection systems.

5.2 Skin and Surface Protection of composites

Composite materials are employed extensively in small aircraft design. For the
purposes of lightning protection, composites may be divided into the categories of electrically
conductive and non-conductive composites. The most common conductive composite is
carbon-fiber reinforced composites (CFC), sometimes referred to as graphite epoxy (GR/E).
The non-conductive composites generally include fiberglass and aramid fiber reinforced
plastics.

Non-conductive composites are electrical insulators and cannot conduct lightning

currents. Anti-static paints applied to some frontal surfaces, such as radomes, also have
insignificant conductivity for lightning currents. Lightning electric fields will penetrate these
materials without attenuation.

Conductive composites, such as CFC have adequate conductivity to prevent electric

field penetration and prevent internal streamers. Non-conductive composites with conductive
coating will also prevent electric field penetration when coatings approach 100% coverage.

37
5.2.1 Non-Conductive Composites

The non-conducting materials include aramid fiber and fiberglass. Non-filled resins,
such as polycarbonates and acrylics are sometimes included in this classification. Glass
employed in windshields, is also non-conductive.

Non-conductive composites are employed in many secondary structures such as

radomes, wing and empennage tips, fairings and fins. These composites are also employed
where skins must be transparent to radio and radar waves. Polycarbonates, acrylics and glass
are used for canopies and windshields and view ports where optical transparency is desired.

5.2.2 Damage Mechanisms

Non-conductive composites are prone to punctures by lightning initiated streamers

since electric fields are able to penetrate these skin materials and induce streamers from
conductive objects within. Therefore, when employed as an exterior skin, they may be
punctured by a lightning flash that contacts a conductive object beneath the skin. The high
amplitude return stroke currents can then result in significant damage to these materials.
Unprotected airframe skins fabricated of fiberglass or other non-conductive composites are
subject to such puncture and damage.

Punctures of these composites can be prevented by providing external conductors

called diverters to intercept the lightning flashes and divert them to the surrounding metallic
structure. Design of such conductors requires some understanding of the mechanism of
puncture and this is reviewed in the following.

Lightning produces damage to a non-conducting skin by puncturing these skins.

Intense overpressures associated with stroke currents through the puncture may cause
extensive damage to the composites.

Electric fields: Electric fields result in the formation of corona and streamers which propagate
outward from enclosed conductors such as antenna elements. Figure 5-1 shows
a sketch of the process. Whether the streamers
from the aircraft are induced by the electric field of
an approaching lightning leader or whether they
occur due to presence of the aircraft in a pre-
existing response to an electric field, resulting in an
aircraft initiated strike is rather academic; the point
is that the streamers may puncture non-conducting
composites.

In this process, the streamers will originate from the

internal metallic objects and contact the internal
surface of the skin, depositing electric charge there.
The streamers spread electric charge in much the
same way that a water hose would spread water
around on the internal surface.

Figure 5-1: Mechanism of puncture of a radome

38
 Puncture is more likely to occur with a composite material than a homogeneous plastic
such as polycarbonates because composites have microscopic holes (porosity) and material
interfaces through or along which an electric discharge can propagate. The field required to
puncture a given thickness of fiberglass or aramid fiber composite is, in fact, only slightly
greater than that required to ionize a similar thickness of air. A measure of the ability of a
non-conductive material to resist puncture is its dielectric strength. Homogeneous materials,
such as acrylic and polycarbonate sheets, have very high dielectric strengths and are more
resistant to puncture.

Unprotected radomes are most often punctured, partly because of the low dielectric
strength of non-conductive composites and partly because the radar antenna must, of
necessity, extend beyond any adjacent metal structure. This, in turn, means that the electric
field is concentrated around the metal structure of the radar and that electrical streamers can
most easily form there.

There are two basic ways of providing protection for non-conductive composites. One
employs diverter strips or bars on the exterior surface to serve as preferred streamer initiation
points and intercept lightning flashes, while allowing the skin to be transparent to
electromagnetic waves. This is the approach used for protection of radomes and some antenna
fairings. The other method is to apply an electrically conductive material over the exterior of the
structure. This latter method provides the most effective lightning protection and should be
employed whenever possible. It also provides improved protection of enclosed systems against
lightning indirect effects. Both of these approaches are discussed in the following paragraphs.

5.3 Protection of radomes and antenna fairings

These structures must remain electromagnetically transparent to permit radio and radar
operation and are known as radio frequency (RF) transparencies. Therefore, in most cases,
only diverter strips may be utilized for lightning protection if the transparent region is otherwise
large enough to allow puncture by the lightning channel.

There are two types of diverter strips: solid and segmented. If properly applied, either
type significantly reduces the number of lightning related punctures (of a radome for example),
but they are not 100% effective. Occasional punctures of protected radomes occur.
Application of diverters will be discussed with particular emphasis on radomes, because that is
where they are most commonly used, but the discussion is equally applicable to any RF
transparency, such as an antenna fairings.

Solid diverters: Solid diverters are continuous metal bars fastened to the outside of a skin to
intercept a lightning flash and conduct the current to an adjacent metallic structure. Solid bars
also provide some electrostatic shielding from the external electric field for objects under the
skin. Thus they tend to inhibit the growth of streamers from internal objects.

Solid diverters should be designed to conduct the lightning current of the zone in which
the part is located, typically 200 kA, for diverters on a nose radome in Zone 1A, and are usually
made of aluminum, with a rectangular cross section sufficient to permit conduction of the
current without excessive temperature rise or mechanical distortion. For

mechanical reasons, and to prevent fastener holes from unduly reducing the cross-sectional
area, most diverters have cross-sectional areas of about 0.5 cm. sq., (0.08 in. sq.) though

39
some are larger. A common design is 0.125-in. thick by 0.50-in. wide. The diverters are
usually attached to the composite skin with screws spaced approximately 6 in. apart. It is
important that the diverters be securely fastened to the radome or fairing to prevent their loss
due to rain erosion and lightning magnetic force effects, and possible injection into engine
inlets.

Some manufacturers of radomes install metal diverters that are not designed to
conduct a severe lightning stroke and may be vaporized when exposed to a severe stroke
current. These diverters are sometimes considered sacrificial, and are effective for only the
first strike and may not provide protection for a subsequent lightning attachment to the same
area. This is often a tradeoff of weight and costs versus the probability of a severe strike to a
smaller aircraft.

Segmented diverters: Solid diverter bars tend to degrade RF transmission efficiency of

radomes and fairings. To minimize this, segmented diverters, also called "button strips," may
be utilized. These consist of a series of thin, conductive segments, interconnected by a
resistive material, and fastened to a thin fiberglass strip which can then be adhesive bonded to
the surface to be protected.

Segmented diverters provide many small airgaps that ionize when a lightning electric
field is applied. Since the small gaps are close together, the resulting ionization quickly
becomes continuous to guide the lightning flash across the protected surface.

Spacing between diverters: The maximum spacing between segmented diverters, and the
minimum permissible spacing to underlying conductors, is dependent upon the amount of
voltage required to ionize the segmented strips, the thickness of the radome skin, and the
proximity of conducting elements behind the skin. Spacings typically range between 6 and 18
inches. Thin skins and/or close proximities require closer diverter spacings.

The length of a segmented diverter must also be factored into the protection design. It
takes a certain amount of voltage per linear inch to break down the diverter. As the diverter
gets longer and longer the voltage breakdown level becomes higher and higher. The diverter
may get so long and take such a high voltage breakdown that it becomes ineffective.

Often to overcome this inherent problem of length, a combination of solid and

segmented diverters have been used on larger structures.

5.4 Protection of Other Composite Skins

Where RF transparency is not required, or conductive structural materials are utilized, a

conductive coating can be applied to the exterior surfaces of composites to prevent electric
field penetration, and puncture, and to conduct lightning currents. Protective materials include
arc or flame sprayed metals, woven wire fabrics, expanded metal foils, aluminized fiberglass,
nickel plated aramid fiber and metal loaded paints. Some of these systems can also be used to
protect CFC materials, as described. All of these approaches must be applied to the exterior
surface of a composite skin, and there should be only one layer of protective material.

40
5.4.1 Arc or flame sprayed metals

Solid metal coatings applied by spraying molten metal onto the surface to be protected,
or into the mold of a manufactured part can provide effective lightning protection. The
protected skin material may be fiberglass or Kevlar-epoxy composites. The most common
sprayed metal is aluminum.

Sprayed metal thicknesses range from 0.004 - 0.008 in. The metal solidifies on the
exterior surface of the composite, resulting in a hard, stiff, conductive layer capable of
conducting Zone 1A or 2A currents with very little damage. The sprayed metal can be coated
with paint, but paint thicknesses should be minimized, as thick primers and/or paints will
intensify damage at lightning strike attachment points. Coatings sprayed on manufactured
parts may have a somewhat rough finish and may require smoothing. This can be avoided by
spraying the metal into a mold, after which the composite plies are laid in and cured. In this
case the exterior metal finish will be smooth.

The advantages of arc or flame-sprayed metal are:

• Excellent protection for all strike zones

• The ability to cover complex shapes that might be difficult to cover with wire
meshes or expanded foils.

Disadvantages are:

• Cost of process
• Weight
• Difficulty of mold separation

Some users have also reported cracking of the metal spray surface, probably due to
differences in coefficients of thermal expansion between metal and composite or flexing of the
composite skin under flight loads.

5.4.2 Woven wire fabrics

Metallic fabrics woven from small diameter wires of aluminum or copper can provide
effective protection for non-conductive surfaces. The metal fabrics most commonly applied
are woven of aluminum wires spaced 60 to 200 wires per inch. Wire diameters range from
0.002 - 0.004 in. These fabrics are identical to filter screens commonly used in the chemical
and water processing industries.

Woven wire fabrics do not drape well over surfaces with compound curves and this is
especially true of tightly woven fabrics. They must be cut and lapped to fit. Woven fabrics can
readily be co-cured with a composite laminate since the resin can flow around the individual
wire strands. They can also be cemented onto a previously manufactured surface, though care
should be taken not to let a film of adhesive build up over the wires.

The lightning protection effectiveness of woven wire fabrics comes from the improved
electrical conductivity of the metal wires as compared with the composite, and the period
“holes” and “ridges” in the weave which intensifies local electric fields that enable dielectric
breakdown of primers and paints at a multiplicity of points in the vicinity of the lightning
attachment. This divides the lightning arc into many conductive filaments of low intensity,
thereby dispersing the lightning energy over a wider area and reducing damage.

41
 Advantages of wire fabrics include:

• Ability to co-cure with the composite laminate

• Effective protection for all strike zones
• Flexibility
• Light weight

Disadvantage is:

• Difficulty in draping over compound curves. This may require the fabrics to be
cut into gores and lapped to fit.

An analysis of comparative weights of protection methods will be found at the end of

this chapter.

5.4.3 Solid Metal Foils

Early use of foils as a protection method was limited to the use of unperforated, solid
foils, much like that used in a household kitchen.

Metal foil can be adhesive bonded to non-conducting surfaces to provide a conducting

layer. Metal foils of 0.001 in. or greater provide protection for the composite that is about the
same as that provided by wire meshes, however, a substantial amount of foil will be melted
away at the point of lightning attachment.

Manufacturing concerns have limited the application of solid metal foils. These foils do
not drape smoothly over a compound curve. Solid foils must be cut and spliced to prevent
wrinkles and this results in seams which might arc and delaminate when conducting lightning
currents. Solid foils also have smooth, impervious surfaces, which makes them difficult to
bond to the composite surface. Unbonded areas may allow the foil to become delaminated and
to confine moisture, which can corrode the foils. Because of these difficulties solid metal foils
are less commonly employed as compared with other protection options.

5.4.4 Expanded metal foils: Expanded foils are fabricated by a milling process that
perforates and stretches a solid metal foil. The expanded foils have the superficial
appearance of a woven wire mesh, yet are fabricated of one piece of metal, and thus have
somewhat better electrical conductivity than metal fabrics which depend on contact between
wires. Protection is effective for all lightning strike zones and is about the same as for woven
wire meshes and sprayed metals.

The physical description of expanded foils is often given in weight, rather than
thickness. The number cited is in pounds per square foot; a foil referred to as 0.016
is, therefore, not 0.016 inches, but 0.016 pounds per one square foot of application.
The weight cited is for the foil alone and does not include adhesive. Comparative
weights of protection methods are given at the end of this chapter.

Expanded foils are better than wire fabrics at draping over compound curves since they
can be stretched somewhat. They can be bonded to composite laminates as well as wire
fabrics and, like fabrics, tend to promote arc root dispersion. Thus, much less expanded foil will
be burned away at a strike attachment point than would be the case for an equal thickness of
solid foil. Thermal and shock wave damage will also be less.
42
 The primary difference between types and thickness of expanded metal foils is in their
ability to carry highly concentrated lightning currents, such as along cabin door and window
frames or other narrow paths. The lightest commercially available expanded foils will usually
provide adequate protection for nearly all composite skin configurations when applied over wide
surface areas, (i.e. over 12 inches wide) but however weight foils mus usually be employed
along narrower current paths. Table 5.4.4-1 shows current carrying capabilities of typical foils.
The selection criteria for any region of the aircraft should include current density in order to
prevent vaporization of protective foils and loss of electrical continuity from one to another.

Advantages of expanded metal foils include:

• Ability to co-cease with the composite laminate

• Effective protection for all strike zones
• Excellent conductivity, especially at overlap region when co-cured
• Ease of application (including adhesion and cocuring) and draping
• Flexibility
• Light weight
• Ability to drape over compound curvatures

Disadvantages may be:

• Cost

Note: Expanded foils are a popular form of lightning protection for fiberglass and CFC
composites.

Table 5-1 provides information pertaining to the current carrying capability of

commercially available expanded metal foils.

Table 5-1: Current Carrying Capabilities of Foils

Material
Current Density
Capability
Weight or Solid or
Style (kA / inch)
Thickness Expanded

Aluminum 0.016 lb/ft2 Expanded 8 - 12

Aluminum 0.028 lb/ft2 Expanded 18
Copper 0.029 lb/ft2 Expanded 7
Aluminum 0.001" Solid 8
Aluminum 0.002" Solid 14
Aluminum 0.003" Solid 20
Aluminum 0.006" Solid 35

5.4.5 Aluminized fiberglass

Glass fibers can be coated with aluminum and woven into fabrics with significant
electrical conductivity. An individual coated filament has a nominal resistance of 2 ohms/cm.
Preimpregnated fabrics (“prepregs”) made from aluminized fibers are available commercially.

43
 A virtue of the material is that the outer ply of a fiberglass laminate can be replaced by a ply
made from the coated fibers. Individual fibers can carry significant amounts of electric current
because of the excellent thermal coupling between the aluminum and the glass. The glass
provides a heat sink, enabling the aluminum coating to carry twice the current that could be
normally carried by this much aluminum by itself.

At the point of lightning strike attachment, some volume of aluminum will be explosively
vaporized, the area affected depending on the intensity of the current and the amount of
aluminum on the prepreg. If the coated fiberglass material is covered by fillers or paints, the
expanding gasses will be mechanically contained and more of the explosive force will be
directed into the composite material, the added amount of damage being related to the mass of
covering material. Paint and primer, thicknesses of less than 0.007 in are usually not sufficient
to cause any significant damage, but larger thicknesses can result in damage to several plies of
fiberglass below the aluminum coated ply.

The increased damage caused by confinement of arc products is associated with any
protective material. Confinement by surface finishes does, however, seem to promote more
extensive damage to laminates protected with aluminized fiberglass than to those protected
with woven wire fabrics or expanded metal foils.

5.4.6 Conductive paints

Adding conductive particles, such as carbon, copper or aluminum, to a paint results in a

surface that has a certain amount of conductivity and some ability to provide lightning
protection. This protection is marginal, however, since the conductive particles make only
random contact with each other. As a result, the coating has a much lower conductivity than
the metal meshes, foils or sprays.

No practical thickness of paint is sufficient to provide conduction of concentrated

lightning currents. Instead, when current density exceeds the paints’ ability to conduct, the
paint acts to guide a flashover across the coated surface and the lightning current is then
carried more in the resulting arc than in the conductive paint.

Conducting paint films are least effective if there is some conducting object beneath the
surface of the insulating surface being protected. In such a case, the arc voltage might be high
enough to cause a puncture through the insulating surface to that object. Damage will also be
found to be greater if as in CFC materials, the composite itself has some conductivity.

Conducting paint does have the virtue that it can be applied to an existing surface, even
one of complex shape. Copper paints have been the most widely used. One of the most
successful applications of copper loaded paints has been in the protection of helicopter rotor
blades fabricated of non-conductive composites. A coating of conductive paint approximately
0.003 - 0.005 in. applied under the finish coat of paint has been shown to prevent punctures of
the blade skin. Paints have been less successful on blades with metal spars or embedded
heater wires because sufficient voltage builds up along the conducting paint to puncture to the
internal conductors. Resulting damage in these situations may be sufficiently extensive to
represent a safety of flight hazard.

Conductive paints are the least desirable of lightning protection methods, partly
because of this voltage buildup problem and also because they are subject to erosion from
intense rain or hail. Also, such points would have to be present throughout the life of the
aircraft.

44
5.4.7 Metalized carbon

Metalized carbon fibers have recently been made available by the industry. Available
in both nickel coated and copper coated fiber, only the nickel coated variety has been tested.
Protection for thin laminates has generally been disappointing, but protection for CFC
laminates on the order of 10 plies (0.080" thick) has been promising.

This material is sometimes been used for electromagnetic shielding purposes, rather
than lightning protection, especially on internal composite panels within cockpits and
equipment bays.

5.4.8 Interwoven Wire

This method protects CFC laminates by the addition of fine metal wires woven into the
outer ply of a CFC laminate. The wires do not degrade the mechanical properties of the CFC.
They are typically woven bi-directionally among the outer layer of graphite fibers. Wire
diameters have been in the range of 0.0005 in. To 0.02 in., although mostly in the range of
0.001 in. to0.010 in. Wires are positioned within the ply in such a way that there is often one
wire per tow, resulting in 8 to 12 wires per inch. Although a number of metal wires have been
tested, the most successful has been aluminum, possibly because of the lower melting point
as compared with other metals. The wires installed must be incorporated in the outer
structural ply. Additional layers of interwoven wire plies have a tendency to increase the
degree of damage.

Tests show that interwoven wires provide a significant reduction in damage incurred by
lightning strikes. Compared with an unprotected panel, which suffered a 6 to 8 inch puncture
(Zone 1A) throughout all plies, a similar panel with interwoven wire suffered damage to the
exterior ply (containing the wires) only.

Advantages of interwoven wires include:

• Ease of manufacture, maintenance and repair

• Negligible weight penalty

disadvantages may be:

• Potential for corrosion of the wires when exposed to moisture. Aluminum wires
are most susceptible to this.

The protection effectiveness of interwoven wires is due to the arc root dispersion
provided by the wires which appear periodically at the surface of the laminate, and promote
primer/paint breakdown and multiple lightning attachment points. Additional attachments occur
as wires vaporize when they attempt to conduct lightning current away from the lightning
attachment areas. The vaporization products burst through the surface finish, creating
additional arc roots.

45
5.5 Weights of Protection Materials

There is always some weight penalty associated with lightning protection materials. The
interwoven wires in CFC have the least impact, while weights of other materials are dependent
on thicknesses, and adhesion methods. Wire fabric alone weighs about 2 lbs/100 sq. ft. and
when cocured, the total weight is about 3 lbs/100 sq. ft. Secondary bonding with additional
adhesive can increase weight to 5 lbs/100 sq. ft. Table 5-2 provides a summary of typical
weight penalties that may be expected:

Table 5-2: Weights of Protective Coating Systems

Coating Material Weight (lbs per 100 sq. Ft.)

Interwoven Wire (aluminum) .024

Expanded Aluminum Foil 1.6 to 6 (2.9 typical)
Woven Wire Mesh 2.4 to 5
Wire Fabric 3-5
Thermal Spray (aluminum) 5.75 to 8
Conductive Paint (silver) 8
Aluminum Foil (solid) 8.5

46
6.0 Aircraft Skin Protection Effectiveness

The designer will find the following compilation of data useful for selection of
candidates for lightning protection of the aircraft skins. This chapter provides further
discussion of protection effectiveness based on previous test data. This chapter primarily
addresses composite materials, since most aluminum skins are inherently self protecting;
however, protection of aluminum integral fuel tank skins from melt-through is also
addressed. This section includes discussions pertaining to the following topics:

 Aluminum Skin Melt-through

 CFC Skin Protection
 Non-Conductive Skins Protection

Protection Methods Examined: Several protection effectiveness data for methods of

protection for aircraft skins are presented in this chapter. The most common method
for protection of composite skins involves the application of a “protection ply”
comprised of a metallized coating on the outer surface of the composite laminate. This
process is referred to as “metalizing.” These coatings provide varied amounts of
protection, and direct comparisons can, and should be made by lightning tests of skin
specimens of similar construction and different protection systems. Many of the skin
protection methods discussed in Chapter 5 of this handbook have been included.

The effectiveness of composite skin protection methods discussed in this

chapter have been evaluated on various laminates including conductive carbon layups,
non-conductive fiberglass and aramid fiber laminates. The success of the protection
material may be influenced by the total thickness of the laminate and any core
materials. Other conditions such as the thickness of paint and surface finishes, can
also influence protection effectiveness. Comparisons of relative damage for the
different variables are shown in Figure 6-32 through Figure 6-35.

The most effective way to successfully protect an aircraft from direct effects is to
apply one or more of the protective layers described in Chapter 5 to the exterior
surfaces of the aircraft. By so doing, the majority of the lightning currents will flow
on the outside of the aircraft. Keeping the lightning currents on the outside of the
aircraft will significantly minimize effects to systems and personnel.

Dielectric coatings cannot protect the entire aircraft from a lightning attachment.
On the contrary, the dielectric may actually increase damage at locations where
the attachment occurs. Dielectrics should only be used to provide protection for
small regions or components of the aircraft.

47
6.1 Aluminum Skins

Aluminum skins provide a high degree of conductivity, but may experience

melt- through and physical deformation. Melt-through is predominately a concern for
integral fuel tank design, but other, light-weight metal components such as control
surfaces may experience deformation.

This section provides test data which will help to define the type of damage that
may be expected when lightning attaches to painted aluminum skins of various
thicknesses. The data will evaluate several thicknesses of skins and illustrate the
effects of the various current components of lightning.

Melt-through: Studies have shown that the volume of metal melted away at a lightning
attachment point is closely related to the charge carried into the point by the lightning
arc, at specific current amplitudes. A nearly linear relationship exists between the
amount of charge delivered to an arc attachment spot and the amount of metal melted
from it. In determining the minimum amount of charge and current required to melt
aluminum skins, the effects depend on current amplitude as well as charge, as shown
in Figure 6-1.

Figure 6-1: Time to melt-through on aluminum skins

Figure 6-1 provides guidance on the amount of coulombs and time required to
melt through an aluminum skin, which may be considered to be the time at which fuel
vapor ignition may occur as the hot lightning arc may then be presumed to be in contact
with fuel vapor.
The data also explores the average current amplitude versus time. It has been shown
that over 22 C, when delivered by a current of 200 A was enough to melt completely
through a skin of
0.080 inch thickness. As little as 2 C, when delivered by about 130 A, melted a hole
completely through a skin sample of 0.040 inch thick aluminum.

48
 The 100,000 A stroke current do not typically melt-though aluminum skins as their
time duration and charge transfers are too low. Intermediate (component B) and continuing
currents (component C) remain attached to a spot long enough to melt-through.

Whether melt-through occurs or not depends on the time that a lightning arc remains
attached to a single spot. This is called the “dwell time”. Dwell times on painted skins have
been determined to be less than 20 milliseconds, whereas dwell times on unpainted
aluminum skins are less than 5 milliseconds. Skins in zones 1A or 2A must tolerate current
Component B and, if the dwell time exceeds 5 milliseconds, also a portion of continuing
currents, Component C. Component B by itself delivers 10 coulombs of charge, but
Component B (5 milliseconds) plus Component C for a additional 15 milliseconds delivers 6
additional coulombs (at a rate of 400 A) for a total of 16 coulombs. Error! Reference source
ot found. shows that 10 coulombs melts through 0.040 in. of aluminum in 5 ms, but 16
coulombs melts through 0.080 in. thick skins. Flight experience has shown that 0.080 in. thick
skins have resisted in melt-through, whereas thinner skins have been melted through;
corroborating the data of Figure 6-1.

Few small airplanes can tolerate the weight of 0.080 in. skins on integral fuel tanks,
nor require skins this thick for structural purposes. Therefore, other approaches need to be
considered for lightning protection of small airplane skins.

Unpainted aluminum skins 0.040 in. survived and greater have resisted melt-through
under the Zone 1A or 2A lightning environment. The unpainted surface allows the lightning
channel to attach to a subsequent point sooner than when a dielectric paint covers the
aluminum, keeping dwell times less than 5 ms. This shorter “dwell time” results in less
coulomb transfer, therefore less chance of skin melt-through.

Protection from Melt-Through for Metal Skins: The protection of thin aluminum skins
(0.020-0.060) have utilized a variety of methods for improving resistance to melt-through.
Typically four methods have been implemented in designs;

a. Increased metal skin thickness: This method is the least desirable because of the
additional weight that may not be needed for structural reasons and is only there for
melt-through protection. Whereas an aluminum unpainted skin of 0.060" may be
adequate to prevent melt-through, a painted skin may need to be greater the 0.080"
thick as shown in Figure 6-2(a).

b. Add a dielectric barrier to the inner surface: In regions of a limited area, adhesives or
polysulfide-type fuel tank sealants have been added to create a barrier between the
metal skin which may melt the fuel cell vapors. This method does necessitate
controlling the thickness of the sealant over protected areas. Other approaches that
provide similar results for fuel cells are bladder installations and internal thin-walled
plastic fuel tank enclosures that are becoming increasingly popular with small aircraft
designs.

c. Addition of conductive particles within the exterior surface paint: The function of these
particles is to reduce arc dwell time and improve the arc root dispersion, which allows
multiple conduction paths through the painted surface. The technical reasoning behind
this concept is sound, however verification testing is difficult unless the facility has the
ability to test in a moving air stream or with the test article moving to verify decreased
dwell times. Figure 6-2(b) illustrates the concept of improved arc root dispersion.

49
d. Laminated aluminum skins: The key to the success of this technique is to insure that a
thermal barrier exists between the aluminum skin and the inner layer. Adhesive films
have provided a sufficient barrier to prevent arc attachment to the inner aluminum skin.
The arc remains attached to the edges of the hole melted in the exterior layer instead.
A condition of an 0.020 in. (external) and a 030 in. (internal) aluminum ply, of total
aluminum thickness 0.050 in. has successfully withstood the painted surface (i.e. 16
coulombs) zone 1A or 2A lightning environment. Figure 6-2(c) illustrates this
protection concept.

Figure 6-2: Methods for protecting against melt-through

a) Increasing skin thickness
b) Arc root dispersion / Decreasing dwell time
c) Laminated skins

50
Aluminum Skin Test Data: Lightning testing of aluminum skin panels has demonstrated the
shock wave effects of stroke currents and the relationship of Component B and C charge
transfer and melt-through. Panel thicknesses of 0.032, 0.040 and 0.080 were evaluated for
lightning melt-through tolerance.

Table 6-1 lists typical test results. A Zone 2A strike of 5 ms dwell time (Components D
and B only) will generally melt through a panel less than 0.080 inches thick. Even the 0.080
panels may show resolidified metal on the interior surface. Figure 6-3 through Figure 6-5
show typical damage to aluminum skins caused by Zone 1A and 1B test currents.

Figure 6-3: Aluminum Panel (0.032" thick)

darkened area is a 2" in diameter dent to a depth of 1", no melt-through.

51
 Figure 6-4: 0.040” painted aluminum panel with aluminum tape
melted hole 0.2" through panel, foil loss 1" dia. minor indentation

Figure 6-5: 0.040" painted aluminum panel

dent, small hole aluminum panel with Zone 1A Strike

52
 Table 6-1: Typical Aluminum Skin Test Data

Panel Panel Comp. A Comp. B Comp. C

Coating Zone hole dent repair notes Figure
No. Thickness (kA) (C) (C)
1 0.032” none 213 10 none 1A none 2” 3” pitting >2” Figure 6-3
primer burned, surface melting,
2 0.040” primer 215 3.5 none 1 none none 1”
metal splatter, no hole
3 0.040” paint 209 10 none 1A 0.1” 0.5” 1” pitting Figure 6-5
paint & Tape evaporated, scorching and
4 0.040” 211 none none (a) 0.2” 1” 2” Figure 6-4
Al tape pitting beneath, small dent
17 0.040” Al tape none 3.80 none (a) 0.1” none 1” 0.25” pitting and burn
slight cosmetic damage, no melt-
18 0.080” none none 10.2 none (a) none none 1”
through
slight cosmetic damage, no melt-
19 0.080” none none 10.0 26 (a) none none 1”
through
slight cosmetic damage, no melt-
20 0.080” paint none 10.2 none (a) none none 1”
through

(a) No zone definition is possible, current components were applied as specified in the table for evaluation purposes.

53
6.2 Carbon Fiber Composite (CFC)

The designer must decide what composite structures will require additional protection,
since lightning damage to some aircraft surfaces may be safety tolerated surfaces and these
may not require additional protection. The test data in this section illustrates damage that can
be expected of both unprotected and protected, CFC laminates typical of small aircraft skin
applications.

6.2.1 Unprotected CFC

The three examples selected for this section were fabricated of a 0.040 in. thick CFC
laminate comprised of four, 0.010 in. fabric plies with no core or lightning strike protection on
the exterior surface. The panels were tested to Zone 1A and 2A lightning environments.

Zone 1A - Unpainted: Figure 6-6 shows that the 0.040 in. thick unpainted CFC panel has very
good tolerance to a lightning strike when surface treatments, such as paint, are eliminated.
The laminate was undamaged except for minor, cosmetic loss of surface resin. There was no
delamination and no puncture.

Figure 6-6: Unprotected and unpainted CFC panel

subjected to a Zone 1A strike

54
The unpainted panel in Figure 6-6 illustrates the effects of non-conductive surface treatments
on the CFC laminate. This is a typical illustration of the importance of allowing the arc root of
the lightning channel an opportunity to spread out over a larger region. Although an unpainted
carbon structure is not realistic, the importance of keeping surface treatments to a minimum
thickness, even on protected composites, are important in minimizing damage.

Zone 1A - Painted: Figure 6-7 shows the results of a Zone 1A lightning strike to a 0.040 in.
thick painted CFC panel. The laminate was damaged over a regions of 30 to 40 square
inches of the laminate. The laminate was also punctured on the back side of the panel.

Figure 6-7: Zone 1A strike to a painted exterior surface

unprotected 4 ply 0.052 in. CFC laminate of woven cloth plies.

55
Zone 2A - Painted: Figure 6-8 shows the results of a Zone 2A lightning attachment to an
unprotected 0.040" thick painted CFC panel. The laminate was damaged over a regions of 3
square inches. The inner ply laminate was also fractured over the approximate same area as
the exterior surface, although the resin was not pyrolized on this ply.

Figure 6-8: Zone 2A strike to exterior surface

unprotected 4 ply 0.052 in. thick laminate of woven cloth plies.

6.2.2 Protected CFC Panels

Table 6-2 and Table 6-3 provide additional data of protected CFC panels test data.
The tables are accompanied by photographs of the post-test condition of the panel.

56
 Table 6-2: Carbon Fiber Composites: with foam core

Panel repair
Panel I delam hole
Thickness Core Thick LSP Paint Zone I (kA) area Figure/Ref
No. Comps
inner outer inner inner outer outer
21 0.008” 0.016” foam 3/8” NCC 5 mils 2A 100 D,B 4” 1” 3” 3.5” Figure 6-9/b

5 0.008” 0.016” foam 3/8” NCC 5 mils 1A 200 A,B 6” 3” 6” 7” Figure 6-12/b
6 0.016” 0.032” foam ½” EAF 5 mils 1B 200 A,B 2” none 3” 8” Figure 6-10/a
7 0.016” 0.032” foam ½” EAF 5 mils 1A 200 A,B 1” none none 3.5” Figure 6-13/a

8 0.008” 0.016” foam 3/8” ECF 5 mils 1A 200 A,B 6” none none 9” Figure 6-11/b
22 0.008” 0.016” foam 3/8” ECF 5 mils 2A 100 D,B 1” none none 6” Figure 6-14/b
Abbreviations: NCC = Nickel Coated Carbon Fiber, EAF = Expanded Aluminum Foil, ECF = Expanded Copper Foil

References:
a) Lightning Technologies, Glasair III Lightning Protection System Development Report, LT-92-782, 1992.
b) Lightning Technologies, Lightning Tests on the Model LC40 Aircraft Components, LT-97-1398, 1997.
c) Lightning Technologies, Lightning Strike Tests on Cycom MCG Fiber Protected Panels, LT-83-145, 1983.

Analysis: Expanded copper foil demonstrated the best protection for both zones, being marginally better than expanded
aluminum foil. Nickel coated carbon fiber permitted puncture in both zones.

57
 Figure 6-9: Ni CFC Panel Zone 2A Figure 6-12: Ni CFC Panel Zone 1A
Reference b, Test No. 4 Reference b, Test No. 12

Figure 6-10: EAF/CFC Panel Zone 1B Figure 6-13: Al CFC Panel Zone 1A
Reference a, Test No. 5 Reference a, Test No. 40

Figure 6-11: Cu CFC Panel Zone 1A Figure 6-14: Cu CFC Panel Zone 2A
Test No. 10 Test No. 7

58
 Table 6-3: Carbon Fiber Composites: no core

Panel
Panel I hole delam repair
Thickness Core Thick LSP Paint Zone I (kA) Figure/Ref
No. Comps area
inner outer inner outer outer
9 N/A 0.040” none N/A none none 1A 200 A,B none none none 5” Figure 6-6/

10 N/A 0.040” none N/A none 5 mils 1A 200 A,B 3” 3” 7”x9” 7”x9” Figure 6-7/

23 N/A 0.040” none N/A none 5 mils 2A 100 D,B 1.5”x3” 1.5”x3” 3”x4” 4”x5” Figure 6-8/

11 N/A 0.024” none N/A ECF 5 mils 1A 200 A,B,C* none none none 9” Figure 6-15/b
24 N/A 0.024” none N/A ECF 5 mils 2A 100 D,B,C* none none none 5” Figure 6-18/b
12 N/A 0.032 none N/A IAW 5 mils 1A 200 A,B none none 3” 8” Figure 6-16/d

25 N/A 0.032 none N/A IAW 5 mils 2A 100 D,B none none 2” 6” Figure 6-19/d

26 N/A 0.032 none N/A WWM 5 mils 2A 100 D,B none none 1” 3” Figure 6-17/d
Abbreviations: ECF = Expanded Copper Foil 0.029, IAW = Interwoven Aluminum Wires 1 ply,
WWM = Woven Wire Mesh 200x200

References:
b) Lightning Technologies, Inc. Report: Lightning Tests on the Model LC40 Aircraft Components, LT-97-1398, 1997.

d) Lightning Technologies, Inc. Report: Learfan Development Tests, no released report

Analysis: ECF exhibited best protection both zones. Interwoven aluminum wire in the outer ply of carbon resulted in
a localized region of delamination of the outer ply.

59
Figure 6-15: Cu CFC Panel Zone 1A Figure 6-18: Cu CFC Panel Zone 2A
no core, Test No. 9 no core, Test No. 6

Figure 6-16: IAW CFC Panel Zone 1A Figure 6-19: IAW CFC Panel Zone 2A
no core no core

Figure 6-17: WS CFC Panel, no core

60
 6.2.3. Carbon Fiber Composite (graphite) Panels

The following test panels were done for the US Air Force (Quinlivan, J. T., Kuo, C. J., Brick, R. O., Coatings for Lighting (sic)
Protection of Structural Reinforced Plastics, AFML-TR-70-303 Pt.1, 1971). The tests were a Zone 2 strike, however due to the old
nature of the test procedures the action integral is not known. The language used to describe the damage is that of the original
document. Dimensions are 6" by 12", and foils are unperforated and unexpanded.

Table 6-4: AFML Test Data for CFC (no core)

Panel
Panel I hole delam repair Figure/
Thickness Core Thick LSP Paint Zone I (kA)
No. Comps area Test No
inner outer inner outer outer
27 N/A 0.040” none N/A AF 1mil 5 mils 2 94 D,B none none none 6” Figure 6-20/019

28 N/A 0.040” none N/A AF 3mil 5 mils 2 94 D,B none none 1.5” 2” Figure 6-21/021

29 N/A 0.040” none N/A AF 3mil 5 mils 2 94 D,B none none 1.5” 2” Figure 6-22/023

30 N/A 0.040” none N/A AF 6mil 5 mils 2 95 D,B none none 0.75” 1” Figure 6-23/044

31 N/A 0.040” none N/A Cu paint 5 mils 2 110 D,B 0.5” 1” 1” 4” Figure 6-24/61
Al
32 N/A 0.040” none N/A 5 mils 2 94 D,B none none 2” 6” Figure 6-25/68
plasma
Abbreviations: AF = Solid Aluminum Foil

61
Figure 6-20: AF 1 mil, Test No. 019 Figure 6-21: AF 3 mil, Test No. 021 Figure 6-22: AF 3 mil, Test No 023

62
Figure 6-23: AF 6 mil, Test No. 044 Figure 6-24: Cu Paint, Test No. 61 Figure 6-25: Al Plasma Spray
Test No. 68

63
Analysis of CFC panel test data:

1) Conductive paints do little to protect against a severe strike with a conductive

composite beneath.

2) Unperforated (solid) foils work well in aluminum, copper or the more resistive nickel.
Application and maintenance problems persist however. Most designers will prefer the
perforated and expanded variety.

3) Typically, protection from less conductive materials (such as nickel or stainless steel)
will not perform as well as more conductive materials. There is likely to be little
difference in maintenance, apart from galvanic concerns. There is also likely to be little
difference in application.

4) A layer of significant dielectric strength placed over a conductive layer (such as

carbon-based composites like graphite) will typically increase damage to the
conductive layer when attachment occurs.

64
6.3 Non-Conductive Composites

The following examples show typical protection methods for non-conductive composites and define the magnitude of
damage that can be expected for Zone 1 and 2 lightning attachments.

Table 6-5: Non-Conductive Composite with Fiberglass and Core

Panel repair
Panel I delam hole
Thickness Core Thick LSP Paint Zone I (kA) area Figure/Ref
No. Comps
inner outer inner inner outer outer
13 0.016” 0.016” foam ½” Thor 5 mils 1A 200 A,B 7” none none 8” Figure 6-26/a

14 0.024” 0.024” foam ½” LDS 5 mils 1A 200 A,B 4” none none 8” Figure 6-28/a
15 0.024” 0.024” foam ½” EAF 5 mils 1A 200 A,B 1” none none 5” Figure 6-29/a

16 0.016” 0.016” foam 3/8” ECF 5 mils 1A 200 A,B 1” none none 10” Figure 6-30/b

33 0.024” 0.024” foam ½” WWM 5 mils 2A 100 D,B 1.5” none 1” 2” Figure 6-27/a

34 0.016” 0.016” foam 3/8” ECF 5 mils 2A 100 D,B none none none 4” Figure 6-31/b
Abbreviations: Thor = Thorstrand Aluminized Fiberglass, LDS = LDS 50-212 Aluminum Foil Perforated,
EAF = Expanded Aluminum Foil 0.028, ECF = Expanded Copper Foil 0.029, WWM = Woven Wire Mesh 120x120

References:
a) Lightning Technologies, Glasair III Lightning Protection System Development Report, LT-92-782, 1992.
b) Lightning Technologies, Lightning Tests on the Model LC40 Aircraft Components, LT-97-1398, 1997.

Analysis: None of the fiberglass non-conductive panels showed puncture when protected by expanded foils of either copper or
aluminum.

65
Figure 6-26: Thorstrand protected Fiberglass Panel

Figure 6-27: 120 x 120 Woven Wire Mesh

protected Fiberglass Panel

66
 Figure 6-28: LDS 50-120 Aluminum Foil
protected Fiberglass Panel

Figure 6-29: EAF protected Fiberglass Panel

67
Figure 6-30: 0.029 ECF protected Panel, Zone 1A

Figure 6-31: 0.029 ECF protected Panel, Zone 2A

68
6.4 Damage Codes

Pass/Fail assessment is currently used to determine the success of lightning strike test
lay-ups. This is fine for certification of a specific lay-up but is very limiting for future design and
for comparisons. Assigning an objective and consistent numerical measurement of the lightning
damage is a way to determine the influential variables and to quantify their effects. A numerical
measurement of lightning damage is also a way to use relative damage to compare panel results.

6.4.1 Damage Code Measurements

It was determined by comparing many test panels that four individual damage measurements
need to be combined to represent the overall damage to the test panel. The four individual
damage measurements to be incorporated into the overall damage code include:

1. The size of the hole on the inside of the panel (next to the equipment),
2. The size and type of the damage on the inside of the panel,
3. The size of the hole on the outside of the panel (painted side), and
4. The size of the damage on the outside of the panel.

The individual damage codes are combined in a specific order to give more importance to
certain of the individual codes. A hole on the inside of a test panel is the most important
measurement. It is the definitive measure of failure because it means a possible attachment to
the equipment underneath the panel. Damage on the inside of a panel is next in importance
followed by a hole on the outside and then damage on the outside.

6.4.2 Damage Code Levels

Table 6-6 lists the definitions that were used to assign the levels for each of the damage
measurements. This definition is crucial to the amount of distinction between the damage levels
of the panels. More distinction was desired for the damage on the inside of the panels so there
are more levels with smaller windows for Codes 3 and 4.

Table 6-6: Damage Code Levels

Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 Code 4
(outer damage) (outer hole) (inner damage) (inner hole)
L = ≤ 4” delamination L = < 1” hole L1 = ≤4” delamination N = no hole
M = > 4”-8” delamination M = 1”-2” hole L2 = > 4”-8” delamination L = < ½” hole
H = > 8” delamination H = > 2” hole L3 = > 8” delamination M = ½”- < 1” hole
M1 = < 1” damage H = 1”- < 1½” hole
M2 = 1”-2” damage V = ≥ 1½” hole
H = > 2”-5” damage
V = > 5” damage

69
6.4.3 Damage Code Combination Numerical Assignments

After a damage code is determined for each of the four damage measurements, the
codes are combined. Table 6-7 lists every combination for all the levels of the four damage
codes.

Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 Code 4

315 combinations = 3 levels x 3 levels x 7 levels x 5 levels

The damage code combinations are listed in order from least damage to most damage so
numbers are assigned sequentially. To use Table 6-7, find a particular four code combination
and use the numerical value to the left of it.

There are five sections to Table 6-7 because there are five levels to Code 4 (N, L, M, H,
V). Code 4 is the most important damage measurement and determines the Pass/Fail status of
the panel. Only the codes in the first section have no inside holes (N). These panels correspond
to the numerical values of 1 through 63. Anything above 63 is considered a Fail.

Each of the damage code combinations is weighted equally in Table 6-7 but the
combinations are not truly weighted equally because of the way that the levels are set up in Table
6-6. The information is skewed towards more information on the failed panels.

70
 Table 6-7: Damage Code Numerical Assignments
outer delam outer hole inner dmg inner hole outer delam outer hole inner dmg inner hole outer delam outer hole inner dmg inner hole outer delam outer hole inner dmg inner hole outer delamouter hole inner dmg inner hole
Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 Code 4 Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 Code 4 Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 Code 4 Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 Code 4 Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 Code 4
1 L L L1 N 64 L L L1 L 127 L L L1 M 190 L L L1 H 253 L L L1 V
2 M L L1 N 65 M L L1 L 128 M L L1 M 191 M L L1 H 254 M L L1 V
3 H L L1 N 66 H L L1 L 129 H L L1 M 192 H L L1 H 255 H L L1 V
4 L M L1 N 67 L M L1 L 130 L M L1 M 193 L M L1 H 256 L M L1 V
5 M M L1 N 68 M M L1 L 131 M M L1 M 194 M M L1 H 257 M M L1 V
6 H M L1 N 69 H M L1 L 132 H M L1 M 195 H M L1 H 258 H M L1 V
7 L H L1 N 70 L H L1 L 133 L H L1 M 196 L H L1 H 259 L H L1 V
8 M H L1 N 71 M H L1 L 134 M H L1 M 197 M H L1 H 260 M H L1 V
9 H H L1 N 72 H H L1 L 135 H H L1 M 198 H H L1 H 261 H H L1 V
10 L L L2 N 73 L L L2 L 136 L L L2 M 199 L L L2 H 262 L L L2 V
11 M L L2 N 74 M L L2 L 137 M L L2 M 200 M L L2 H 263 M L L2 V
12 H L L2 N 75 H L L2 L 138 H L L2 M 201 H L L2 H 264 H L L2 V
13 L M L2 N 76 L M L2 L 139 L M L2 M 202 L M L2 H 265 L M L2 V
14 M M L2 N 77 M M L2 L 140 M M L2 M 203 M M L2 H 266 M M L2 V
15 H M L2 N 78 H M L2 L 141 H M L2 M 204 H M L2 H 267 H M L2 V
16 L H L2 N 79 L H L2 L 142 L H L2 M 205 L H L2 H 268 L H L2 V
17 M H L2 N 80 M H L2 L 143 M H L2 M 206 M H L2 H 269 M H L2 V
18 H H L2 N 81 H H L2 L 144 H H L2 M 207 H H L2 H 270 H H L2 V
19 L L L3 N 82 L L L3 L 145 L L L3 M 208 L L L3 H 271 L L L3 V
20 M L L3 N 83 M L L3 L 146 M L L3 M 209 M L L3 H 272 M L L3 V
21 H L L3 N 84 H L L3 L 147 H L L3 M 210 H L L3 H 273 H L L3 V
22 L M L3 N 85 L M L3 L 148 L M L3 M 211 L M L3 H 274 L M L3 V
23 M M L3 N 86 M M L3 L 149 M M L3 M 212 M M L3 H 275 M M L3 V
24 H M L3 N 87 H M L3 L 150 H M L3 M 213 H M L3 H 276 H M L3 V
25 L H L3 N 88 L H L3 L 151 L H L3 M 214 L H L3 H 277 L H L3 V
26 M H L3 N 89 M H L3 L 152 M H L3 M 215 M H L3 H 278 M H L3 V
27 H H L3 N 90 H H L3 L 153 H H L3 M 216 H H L3 H 279 H H L3 V
28 L L M1 N 91 L L M1 L 154 L L M1 M 217 L L M1 H 280 L L M1 V
29 M L M1 N 92 M L M1 L 155 M L M1 M 218 M L M1 H 281 M L M1 V
30 H L M1 N 93 H L M1 L 156 H L M1 M 219 H L M1 H 282 H L M1 V
31 L M M1 N 94 L M M1 L 157 L M M1 M 220 L M M1 H 283 L M M1 V
32 M M M1 N 95 M M M1 L 158 M M M1 M 221 M M M1 H 284 M M M1 V
33 H M M1 N 96 H M M1 L 159 H M M1 M 222 H M M1 H 285 H M M1 V
34 L H M1 N 97 L H M1 L 160 L H M1 M 223 L H M1 H 286 L H M1 V
35 M H M1 N 98 M H M1 L 161 M H M1 M 224 M H M1 H 287 M H M1 V
36 H H M1 N 99 H H M1 L 162 H H M1 M 225 H H M1 H 288 H H M1 V
37 L L M2 N 100 L L M2 L 163 L L M2 M 226 L L M2 H 289 L L M2 V
38 M L M2 N 101 M L M2 L 164 M L M2 M 227 M L M2 H 290 M L M2 V
39 H L M2 N 102 H L M2 L 165 H L M2 M 228 H L M2 H 291 H L M2 V
40 L M M2 N 103 L M M2 L 166 L M M2 M 229 L M M2 H 292 L M M2 V
41 M M M2 N 104 M M M2 L 167 M M M2 M 230 M M M2 H 293 M M M2 V
42 H M M2 N 105 H M M2 L 168 H M M2 M 231 H M M2 H 294 H M M2 V
43 L H M2 N 106 L H M2 L 169 L H M2 M 232 L H M2 H 295 L H M2 V
44 M H M2 N 107 M H M2 L 170 M H M2 M 233 M H M2 H 296 M H M2 V
45 H H M2 N 108 H H M2 L 171 H H M2 M 234 H H M2 H 297 H H M2 V
46 L L H N 109 L L H L 172 L L H M 235 L L H H 298 L L H V
47 M L H N 110 M L H L 173 M L H M 236 M L H H 299 M L H V
48 H L H N 111 H L H L 174 H L H M 237 H L H H 300 H L H V
49 L M H N 112 L M H L 175 L M H M 238 L M H H 301 L M H V
50 M M H N 113 M M H L 176 M M H M 239 M M H H 302 M M H V
51 H M H N 114 H M H L 177 H M H M 240 H M H H 303 H M H V
52 L H H N 115 L H H L 178 L H H M 241 L H H H 304 L H H V
53 M H H N 116 M H H L 179 M H H M 242 M H H H 305 M H H V
54 H H H N 117 H H H L 180 H H H M 243 H H H H 306 H H H V
55 L L V N 118 L L V L 181 L L V M 244 L L V H 307 L L V V
56 M L V N 119 M L V L 182 M L V M 245 M L V H 308 M L V V
57 H L V N 120 H L V L 183 H L V M 246 H L V H 309 H L V V
58 L M V N 121 L M V L 184 L M V M 247 L M V H 310 L M V V
59 M M V N 122 M M V L 185 M M V M 248 M M V H 311 M M V V
60 H M V N 123 H M V L 186 H M V M 249 H M V H 312 H M V V
61 L H V N 124 L H V L 187 L H V M 250 L H V H 313 L H V V
62 M H V N 125 M H V L 188 M H V M 251 M H V H 314 M H V V
63 H H V N 126 H H V L 189 H H V M 252 H H V H 315 H H V V

71
 6.4.4 Damage Codes for AGATE Data

There are 8 metal examples and 26 composite examples in the AGATE handbook for a
total of 34 pieces of data. A damage code was assigned to each of the test panels from the
AGATE handbook using the process described in Section 6.4. The results are shown in
Table 6-8 through Table 6-13.

Table 6-8: Damage Codes for AGATE Data - Metal

Panel Panel repair
Coating Zone hole dent Damage Code Figure
No. Thickness area
1 0.032” none 1A none 2” 3” 37 Figure 6-3
2 0.040” primer 1 none none 1” 1

3 0.040” paint 1A 0.1” 0.5” 1” 64 Figure 6-5

paint &
4 0.040” (a) 0.2” 1” 2” 100 Figure 6-4
Al tape
17 0.040” Al tape (a) 0.1” none 1” 64
18 0.080” none (a) none none 1” 1

19 0.080” none (a) none none 1” 1

20 0.080” paint (a) none none 1” 1

Table 6-9: Damage Codes for AGATE Data - CFC foam core
Panel repair
Panel delam hole
Thickness Core Thick LSP Paint Zone area Damage Figure
No. Code
inner outer inner inner outer outer
21 0.008” 0.016” foam 3/8” NCC 5 mils 2A 4” 1” 3” 3.5” 196 Figure 6-9

5 0.008” 0.016” foam 3/8” NCC 5 mils 1A 6” 3” 6” 7” 269 Figure 6-12

6 0.016” 0.032” foam ½” EAF 5 mils 1B 2” none 3” 8” 8 Figure 6-10

7 0.016” 0.032” foam ½” EAF 5 mils 1A 1” none none 3.5” 1 Figure 6-13

8 0.008” 0.016” foam 3/8” ECF 5 mils 1A 6” none none 9” 12 Figure 6-11

22 0.008” 0.016” foam 3/8” ECF 5 mils 2A 1” none none 6” 2 Figure 6-14

72
 Table 6-10: Damage Codes for AGATE Data - CFC no core
Panel repair
Panel hole delam
Thickness LSP Paint Zone area Damage Figure
No. Code
inner outer inner outer outer outer
9 N/A 0.040” none none 1A none none none 5” 2 Figure 6-6

10 N/A 0.040” none 5 mils 1A 3” 3” 7”x9” 7”x9” 306 Figure 6-7

23 N/A 0.040” none 5 mils 2A 1.5”x3” 1.5”x3” 3”x4” 4”x5” 296 Figure 6-8

11 N/A 0.024” ECF 5 mils 1A none none none 9” 3 Figure 6-15

24 N/A 0.024” ECF 5 mils 2A none none none 5” 2 Figure 6-18

12 N/A 0.032” IAW 5 mils 1A none none 3” 8” 2 Figure 6-16

25 N/A 0.032” IAW 5 mils 2A none none 2” 6” 2 Figure 6-19

26 N/A 0.032” WWM 5 mils 2A none none 1” 3” 1 Figure 6-17

Table 6-11: Damage Codes for AGATE Data - AFML CFC no core
Panel
Panel hole delam repair Damage Figure
Thickness LSP Paint Zone
No. area Code
inner outer inner outer outer
27 N/A 0.040” AF 1mil 5 mils 2 none none none 6” 2 Figure 6-20
28 N/A 0.040” AF 3mil 5 mils 2 none none 1.5” 2” 1 Figure 6-21

29 N/A 0.040” AF 3mil 5 mils 2 none none 1.5” 2” 1 Figure 6-22

30 N/A 0.040” AF 6mil 5 mils 2 none none 0.75” 1” 1 Figure 6-23

31 N/A 0.040” Cu paint 5 mils 2 0.5” 1” 1” 4” 166 Figure 6-24

Al
32 N/A 0.040” 5 mils 2 none none 2” 6” 2 Figure 6-25
plasma

Table 6-12: Damage Codes for AGATE Data - Fiberglass foam core
Panel repair
Panel delam hole
Thickness Core Thick LSP Paint Zone area Damage Figure
No. Code
inner outer inner inner outer outer
13 0.016” 0.016” foam ½” Thor 5 mils 1A 7” none none 8” 11 Figure 6-26

14 0.024” 0.024” foam ½” LDS 5 mils 1A 4” none none 8” 2 Figure 6-28

15 0.024” 0.024” foam ½” EAF 5 mils 1A 1” none none 5” 2 Figure 6-29

16 0.016” 0.016” foam 3/8” ECF 5 mils 1A 1” none none 10” 3 Figure 6-30
33 0.024” 0.024” foam ½” WWM 5 mils 2A 1.5” none 1” 2” 4 Figure 6-27

34 0.016” 0.016” foam 3/8” ECF 5 mils 2A none none none 4” 1 Figure 6-31

73
 Table 6-13: Damage Codes for AGATE Data - All
Panel
Test Article ID Damage code
No.
1 M-.032,no paint 37
2 M-.04,primer 1
3 M-.04,paint 64
4 M-.04,paint,tape 100
5 C-core,NCC 269
6 C-core,EAF,1B 8
7 C-core,EAF,1A 1
8 C-core,ECF 12
9 C-.04,no paint 2
10 C-.04,paint 306
11 C-.024,ECF 3
12 C-.032,IAW 2
13 F-core,Thor 11
14 F-core,LDS 2
15 F-core,EAF 2
16 F-core,ECF 3
17 M-.04,tape,paint,B 64
18 M-.08,no paint,B 1
19 M-.08,no paint,BC 1
20 M-.08,paint,B 1
21 C-core,NCC 196
22 C-core,ECF 2
23 C-.04,paint 296
24 C-.024,ECF 2
25 C-.032,IAW 2
26 C-.032,200WM 1
27 C-.04,AF-1 2
28 C-.04,AF-3 1
29 C-.04,AF-3 1
30 C-.04,AF-6 1
31 C-.04,Cu paint 166
32 C-.04,Al plasma 2
33 F-core,120WM 4
34 F-core,ECF 1

Zone 1A
Zone 2A

M = Metal
C = Carbon Fiber
F = Fiberglass

NCC = Nickel Coated Carbon Fiber, outer ply only

EAF = Expanded Aluminum Foil – perforated and stretched solid metal foil
ECF = Expanded Copper Foil – perforated and stretched solid metal foil
IAW = Interwoven Aluminum Wires, 8-10 wires per inch
WWM = Woven Wire Mesh – Aluminum wires at 0.0004” diameter
AF = Solid Aluminum Foil

74
6.4.5 AGATE Data Damage Code Graphs

Shown below in Figure 6-32 is all the data from the AGATE Handbook plotted using the damage
codes assigned from the method described in Section 6.4 Damage Codes.

Figure 6-32: AGATE Data Graph with Damage Codes

Partial data will be shown in the following graphs to emphasize the effect of different variables
(i.e. - adding paint, lightning strike protection, and panel material).

No conclusions could be made about the effectiveness of various laminate thicknesses or

whether using a core versus using a solid laminate was better because there was not enough
data.

75
 Figure 6-33: AGATE Data Graph by Paint Thickness

Analysis: adding paint is a huge detriment.

 0.04” thick carbon fiber panel with no paint passes but with paint fails definitively in both
zones.
 The results for primer on the zone 1A metal panels were very different than the results for
paint. The 0.04” metal panel with primer had very little damage but the 0.04” panels with
paint and/or tape failed.
 Even though the 0.032” metal panel has no paint, it still sustains more damage than the
0.04” metal panel with primer because it is thinner.
 For the no zone metal panels, the 0.08” thick panels are basically not affected.
 The no zone metal panel that is 0.04” thick fails with a hole even with just Component B
(10 coulombs of charge transfer, 2 kA amplitude, and ≤5 milliseconds of time duration).

76
 Figure 6-34: AGATE Data Graph by Lightning Strike Protection

Analysis: The Nickel Coated carbon fiber and the copper paint failed as effective lightning strike
protection materials. All the other lightning strike protection materials appear to be equally good
because they all passed at almost the same levels. The expanded copper foil may have an
advantage because it passed on a much thinner panel (0.024”).

 The panels with Nickel Coated carbon fiber as the lightning protection failed in both
zones.
 The copper paint failed on 0.04” thick carbon fiber in zone 2A but the aluminum plasma
and three thicknesses of aluminum foil passed on 0.04” thick carbon fiber.

77
 Figure 6-35: AGATE Data Graph by Panel Material

Analysis: Metal panels with paint withstand lightning strike much better than carbon fiber panels
with paint.

 A 0.04” thick metal panel with paint just failed but a 0.04” thick carbon fiber panel with
paint failed much worse in both zones.
 The 0.032” metal panel with no paint and the 0.04” carbon fiber panel with no paint had
much more similar outcomes than the test panels with paint.

78
7.0 Windshields and Similar Assemblies
Windshields, canopies, and side windows are often located in direct and/or swept
stroke attachment regions, Zones 1A or 2A. Lightning damage to windshields has not been
frequent, but at least one accident in the 1930s has been attributed to such damage. There
are several aspects of windshield and canopy designs which could make them susceptible
to damage and designers should verify that these conditions do not result in safety or flight
hazards.

Windows and windshields are usually fabricated from glass, acrylic, polycarbonate, or
combinations of these materials. These materials generally have high dielectric strengths
especially when compared to air or even many fiberglass or aramid fiber type non-conductive
composites. Generally, if conductive objects are not be positioned close to the inside
surface of windshields, there will be little tendency for a lightning flash to puncture the
windows. However, the likelihood of lightning punctures increase when conductive films or
wires are embedded in the windshield laminate.

Electrically heated windshields: Electrical heating elements embedded within laminated

windshields are used to clear icing and fogging. Typical configurations are shown in Figure 7-1.
Heating elements are either fine metal wires or metal films, powered by the aircraft electrical
power systems.

Figure 7-1: Electrically Heated Windshields

(a) Fine wires in glass/acrylic sandwich
(b) Metal film in acrylic or polycarbonate sandwich

79
 Since the wires are of small diameter and arranged in zig-zag patterns, an electric field
directed through the glass is concentrated at those wires which may result in a puncture of the
outer glass ply and conduction of lightning currents directly into the heating elements and the
power circuits. Electric fields can be produced either by an approaching lightning leader or by
electrical charge that collects on the outside of the window as the aircraft flies through
precipitation. It is generally thought that punctures of the outer glass may be less likely with
metal film heating elements because the uniform conductive film helps to prevent e-field
concentration at localized spots of the windshield.

The over-pressures created by the expanding lightning channel may present a similar
hazard by cracking the outer laminate, which then allows direct attachment of the lightning
channel to the heating element. The subsequent vaporizing of the thin wires or metal film of
the heating element results in an explosive over-pressure and damage to inner and outer
laminates of the windshield as illustrated in Figure 7-2. The loss of integrity of the windshield
may result in sudden loss of cabin pressure and the chance of glass being ejected into the
face of the pilots or passengers.

A secondary hazard of the lightning

attachment to the heating element is the
direct injection of very high surge currents
into the aircraft's electric power distribution
system, often resulting in damage to
electrical loads powered from the same
distribution bus.

Protection methods: One method of

eliminating these problems is to de-ice the
windshield with hot air instead of electrical
heating elements. Removing the heating
elements eliminates the possibility of
windshield puncture.

The following design approaches can be

followed to minimize the lightning related
hazards if electrical heating elements are
present:

a) Utilize a tough center ply of urethane

or polycarbonate. These materials
are usually and tolerant of shock
wave or impact damage. Some
specifications require that windshield
structures be able to survive the Figure 7-2: Lightning Damage to Heated Windshield
impact of a 2 kg (4 lb) bird at 200 a) Shock wave damage to laminate
knots. Such windshields have b) Surge current into power system
sometimes been capable of tolerating
the effects of Zone 1A punctures through the outer ply. Since failures can also result
from tearing at the interface between the laminate and the frame, as well as by
puncture of the laminate itself, this part of the design must also be considered.
Approaches that successfully tolerate bird strike requirements may also be likely to
meet lightning requirements.

80
b) Utilize a metal film heating elements instead of fine embedded wires. The films may be
less conducive to puncture by the lightning channel.

c) Since windshields, canopies and other windows are usually flight critical items,
candidate designs should be tested. This is especially true of the newer, lighter-weight
windshields. Databases relating to these newer, high strength, light weight laminate
designs do not exist.

The foregoing protection methods are applicable to bubble-type canopies and side
windows, as well as to frontal windshields, though windshields represent the most likely
lightning related problem.

Canopies rarely employ de-icing elements and are fabricated most often of
polycarbonate resins which have very high dielectric strengths. This is also true of side
windows. Sometimes metal films are deposited on the interior of bubble type canopies to
shield the pilot from strong electric fields that would otherwise cause electric shocks. These
films typically have not promoted punctures to canopies fabricated of polycarbonate resins.

Anti-static coatings: Electrical charges that accumulate on frontal windshields and canopies
can be bled away by electrically conducting surfaces. To remain optically transparent, these
films must be very thin resulting in conductivity values that are inadequate to conduct lightning
currents.

The most common coating in present use is indium tin oxide (ITO) and it is preferred for
its comparative durability against erosion.

Flash blindness: If a lightning strike occurs at night in front of a windshield the bright flash
might temporarily blind the pilot, making it difficult or impossible to read instruments.

The flash blindness may last for a minute or two and several accidents have resulted when the
aircraft was on final approach to an airport or in IFR conditions.

No windshield treatment has been found to prevent this effect without impairing normal
visibility. When there are two pilots, one of them should focus on the instruments and avoid
looking out the windshield during conditions that might lead to a lightning strike. Cockpit
instrument lights and display intensities should also be kept at maximum brightness.

Failure and Test Implications: While windshields usually fail when tested under laboratory
conditions, it is rare for such structures to fail under real life conditions. It has traditionally
been assumed that laboratory conditions fail to duplicate some aspect of real life conditions.
There have been a variety of explanations, none entirely satisfactory. It seems likely,
however, that the lightning often attaches to the adjacent airframe structure, rather than the
windshield itself.

For such reasons such as these, manufacturers have often been reluctant to either test
windshields or release the results of such testing. Therefore little data has accumulated.
Before testing any windshield or windshield-structure, manufacturers are urged to contact
experienced test personnel for suggestions and test method recommendations.

Experimental Test Example: The following data was developed from a series of tests
conducted for Stoddard Hamilton ( Lightning Technologies, Glasair III Lightning Protection
System Development Report, LT-92-782, 1992). The tests evaluated the acrylic windshield
81
and canopy side windows. A mannequin was placed in the front seat of the aircraft to simulate
a passenger or pilot. Cameras were placed behind the mannequin to witness streamers or
arcing to the head region. Figure 7-3 shows a typical high voltage discharge to the windshield
and canopy region. In all cases the lightning channel attached to adjacent airframe structure
with no evidence of dielectric breakdown or punctures of the windshield or canopy. Figure 7-4
shows a photograph of the mannequin’s head during a high voltage test.

Figure 7-3: High Voltage Attachment Testing to Windshield and Canopy

Figure 7-4: Photograph of Mannequin During Testing

82
 The tests shown above were performed on a complete aircraft. Test conditions can be
set up to simulate a canopy or windshield and tests performed on a specimen basis as shown
in Figure 7-5, shown below. In the example shown below the canopy window, comprised of
acrylic was able to withstand the high voltage thread even with a conductive object in close
proximity to the inside surface.

Figure 7-5: High Voltage to Canopy Component Test

83
8.0 Control Surfaces

This section provides design guidance for composite control surfaces. It also includes
the results of lightning verification testing to several composite control surfaces.

8.1 Design Guidance and Considerations

Control surfaces will usually be located in Zones 1B or 2B. The designer will need to
remember that current densities in these areas are likely to be high, not merely because of the
type of attachment, but because control surface cross sectional areas are likely to be small.
Control surfaces, whether composite or metal, are typically fabricated from thin and light
weight materials. As with any hinge installation, care must be taken to insure that the hinge to
structure connection must remain structurally sound.

The small aircraft designer will find the lightning protection requirements for control
surfaces to be a challenge in a number of areas. Among these are: control surface skins,
trailing edges, internal structural members (including ribs, spars and their interfaces), and
hinge interfaces.

The protection of external skin surfaces have been dealt with at length in Chapters 5
and 6 of this document, but there are additional design guidelines for control surfaces.

a) The best way to protect control surfaces is typically to metalize all surfaces. That is,
insure maximum conductivity with some form of metal protection, be it foil, metalized
fibers or other technique. In so doing, the designer will help to ensure that a majority of
the current remains on the outside of the control surface.

b) The designer may alternatively make the entire control surface, as well as internal
support structures of a non-conductive material such as fiberglass. Although, the
control surface is fabricated of non-conductive materials, streamers could form internal
to the control surface and result in lightning channel formation internal to the control
surface. In these cases, exterior surface protection may still be required and some
verification testing may be required.

c) Control surface interfaces at ribs, spars, and hinges can often be damaged due to
arcing at adhesive bondlines that result in disbond. The designer is wise to provide
redundancy, probably in the form of mechanical fasteners, in addition to adhesives.
Testing will often be required to verify the adequacy of the design.

d) Control surfaces will more often than not require some form of protection, particularly at
the trailing edge, where composite surfaces are usually secondarily bonded, and the
composite structure is thin. This secondarily bonded trailing edge interface are likely
to disbond during a lightning attachment the trailing edge. Several options can be
considered, such as a secondarily bonded wrap-around of foil or screen, a sheet metal
wrap-around or a metal inserts. Metal fasteners often are required to provide
mechanical support in the event the adhesive bondline fails.

e) In carbon fiber composite control surfaces, the assembly may be cocured, that is,
constructed as a single unit, thus maximizing conductivity. The technique is sometimes
referred to as resin transfer or unitized construction.

84
f) Ribs and spars may be composed of a non-conductive composite, providing the
lightning with no current path. Since the lightning currents are not transferred through
those adhesive bondlines of the ribs and spars, the likelihood of damage is minimized.

Hinges: Hinge brackets to control surface structural interfaces must be carefully reviewed. In
considering these interfaces, note that adhesive bondlines often fail, for the same reason other
non-conductive adhesive bonds fail. The current density may cause mechanical fasteners to
loosen. Lightning protection is, therefore, likely to be a design challenge at these locations.
Testing is often necessary in these instances.

In addition to these difficulties, the designer will need to remember that multiple hinges
are not sufficient to insure adequate conductivity. The current will choose the shortest path,
typically delivering a majority of the current to one hinge. This phenomenon will be most likely
to occur with conductive composites and to a lesser amount on control surfaces with aluminum
skins. In a three hinge installation, it is not uncommon for one hinge to carry seventy percent
of the lightning current. Even higher currents are possible, depending on where the strike
attaches and electrical qualities of the control surface. Even when the control surface is
neither an attachment nor an exit point, hinges and control surface will serve as a parallel
conductive pathway. Additional data on the effect of lightning on hinges or bearings will be
found in Section 9.

8.2 Control Surface Test Results

The following paragraphs provide some examples of tests performed on several control
surface designs.

8.2.1 Fiberglass Flap

A flap assembly fabricated of fiberglass was subjected to a Zone 2 lightning attachment.

The flap received only cosmetic damage to the expanded foil protection ply along a 4 inch area
of the trailing edge and localized foil loss near the hinge locations. The fiberglass structure
remained intact with no apparent disbonds or damage that would endanger continued sage
flight to landing. Figure 8-1 shows the area of damage to the flap trailing edge.

Figure 8-1: Flap Trailing Edge, Zone 2 attachment, Glasair IIILP

85
8.2.2 Fiberglass Elevator Installation

This example shows the results of a Zone 1B attachment to a fiberglass elevator that
was protected with expanded aluminum foil. The elevator assembly was connected to a
horizontal stabilizer which provided a realistic current distribution to the hinge interfaces. The
test resulted in loss of expanded foil at the attachment point and at hinge locations where
current density was high. The fiberglass structure of the elevator was not damaged by the test
series. Figure 8-2 provides a photograph of the elevator post-test condition.

Figure 8-2: Elevator Post-Test Condition

8.2.3 Carbon Fiber Rudder

The testing to the carbon fiber rudder assembly evaluated the ability of the rudder to
sustain a Zone 2 lighting strike. The rudder skins and spars were assembled utilizing a co-
cured laminate process which eliminates the necessity of assembly with secondarily bonded
joints. The rudder trim tab was fabricated from fiberglass composites and attached to the
rudder with a piano hinge.

The rudder hinge brackets were attached to the rudder with bolts. The rudder carbon
fiber skins were sandwiched between load bearing metal doublers. The rudder had three
hinges attached similar to the aircraft installation.

The test currents were injected on the trailing edge of the rudder and removed by hard-
wire connections to the rudder hinge brackets. The first test evaluated a Zone 2 strike to the
rudder trailing edge and the second test evaluated a strike to the fiberglass trim tab.

Figure 8-3 shows the post-test photograph of the rudder.

86
 Figure 8-3: Post-test Photograph of Rudder Test Article

Figure 8-4 shows a closeup photograph of the Zone 2 attachment to the trailing edge.

Figure 8-4: Closeup Photograph of Trailing Edge Attachment

Damage to the trailing edge was limited to localized loss of expanded foil protection ply
and minor loss of the resin at the area of the attachment. This loss of resin was localized in a
region of less than 2 inches along the trailing edge. Damage to the trailing edge was minimal
and would not affect flight safety.

Figure 8-5 shows the post-test photograph of the attachment to the trim tab.

87
 Figure 8-5: Post-test Photograph of the attachment to the Trim Tab

The rudder data was derived from tests conducted for Pacific Aviation ( Lightning
Technologies, Inc., Report Entitled, “Lightning Tests on the Model LC40 Aircraft Components”,
Report No. LT-97-1398, 1997).

88
9.0 Control Surface Hinges and Bearings

If hinges and bearings are located where lightning currents might pass through
them, such as control surfaces in Zones 1B or 2B, they must be able to safely conduct
currents without impairment of their function. Otherwise suitable means should be
provided to carry the lightning currents around the rotating hinge points. Tests and
experience are often the only real guides as to whether the hinge might be excessively
damaged.

Slowly rotating joints often experience pitting and welding damage to the
bearing surfaces. During laboratory testing, welding of bearings can occur, but the
welding is seldom so severe that the joint cannot be broken apart by pilot induced
forces on the control system. The welding induced by laboratory test techniques may
represent somewhat of an overly severe condition, especially considering that control
surfaces in flight may often be vibrating or moving during the lightning strike, which can
help to minimize the welding effects and may prevent the formation of a stationary
weld. Hinges with multiple points of contact, such as piano hinges, generally are
capable of safely conducting lightning currents without endangering safe flight to
landing. In most cases, all hinges and bearing should be checked in a timely manner
after a lightning event to determine the necessity of replacement or repairs.

The hinges and bearing of most aircraft control surfaces have been able to
tolerate the conduction of lightning currents without special protection techniques. The
lightning currents can conceivably weld movable parts together, but generally the weld
point would be small enough that the force of the actuator could free the joint.

If tests were to indicate that excessive damage might occur, additional

conductivity should be provided. The most effective way of providing this
additional conductivity is to provide additional areas of contact in the hinge itself, or
else by additional hinges.

Bonding jumpers on hinges: Flexible bonding straps or jumpers are often installed
across hinges. In many cases, however, the jumpers do not really reduce the hinge
current. The reason for this is that the lightning tends to follow the path of least
inductance, rather than the path of least resistance and the jumpers almost always
involve longer and more inductive paths than do the paths through the hinges.

Bond straps are sometimes required to prevent the electromagnetic

interference that arises when precipitation static charges must be conducted through
hinges with loose or resistive contact.

The following paragraphs provide a summary of various tests that have

been performed on hinges and bearings that are typically used on small aircraft
installations.

9.1 Piano Hinge Installation

This example represents a typical piano hinge installation. The airframe structure
was fabricated of fiberglass reinforced composite with a 0.016 lb/ft2 expanded aluminum
foil protection ply providing conductivity. The hinge length was 12 inches and had rivets
installed every inch. Figure 9-1 shows a sketch of the test article.

89
 Figure 9-1: Sketch of Piano Hinge Test Article

The test was performed to evaluate the conducted Zone 1A lightning currents
across a typical piano hinge installation. The test current applied was approximately
133 kA of Component A and 10 coulombs of Component B

Test Results: The hinge remained functional with only the loss of expanded foil around
fasteners of the hinge installation. The fiberglass structure was not damaged by the
currents and the hinge remained rigidly attached. A small amount of additional
frictional forces were observed during movement of the hinge. Figure 9-2 and Figure
9-3 show photographs of the test article after the application of the test currents.

Figure 9-2: Post-view of localized damage to expanded foil around rivets

90
 Figure 9-3: View of lower side of hinge after test

9.2 Wing to Flap Hinge Interface

The test specimen simulated the flap to wing interface for the Glasair III-LP.
The fiberglass wing and flap structure utilized expanded aluminum foil to provide a
conductive path. Figure 9-4 provides a sketch of the test specimen. The test specimen
was subjected to a Zone 2B lightning currents during the tests. The tests resulted in
some loss of the expanded foil in the region near the hinge locations due to localized
high current densities. A second ply of expanded foil, or a thicker expanded foil would
have reduced the loss of foil near the hinge attachment points. Photographs of the
post-test condition of the test specimen are provided in Figure 9-5.

Figure 9-4: Sketch of Flap Test Specimen

91
a) flap hinge specimen

b) close-up of hinge damage area

Figure 9-5: Flap Hinge Post-test Photographs

92
9.3 Canopy Hinge

This test specimen evaluated a lightning strike to a typical canopy door hinge.
Zone 1A lightning currents were conducted through the door hinge assembly. On the
aircraft, two hinges share the lightning currents, therefore the test configuration
anticipated a worst case currents of 133 kA which considers a maximum of 2/3 of the
total current will pass through any single hinge assembly.

The canopy and adjacent fuselage structure was fabricated of fiberglass

composites with expanded aluminum foil on the exterior surface. Figure 9-6 provides a
sketch of the test specimen.

Figure 9-6: Sketch of Flap to Wing Hinge Interface

The tests were performed with no apparent damage to the fiberglass structure.
Evidence of arcing at the hinge was observed, however the hinge continued to function
normally. Figure 9-7 and Figure 9-8 provide photographs of the canopy specimen after
application of the lightning currents.

93
Figure 9-7: Photograph of Canopy Hinge Test Article after the test

Figure 9-8: Closeup Photograph of Canopy Hinge after the test

94
 10.0 Composite Fuel Cells

As we have seen, the principal challenge of designing fuel cells for air vehicles lies in
protecting the fuel system from ignition by lightning. We will discuss in this chapter appropriate
methods of protecting composite fuel cells from ignition by lightning strikes.

Protection of fuel systems will involve one or more of the approaches:

1) Containment: Designing the structure to be capable of containing the resulting over-

pressure without rupture.

2) Inerting: Controlling the atmosphere in the fuel system to ensure that it cannot
support combustion.

3) Foaming: Filling the fuel systems with a material that prevents a flame from
propagating.

These approaches involve selection of basic structural materials, modifications in the

airframe structural design and perhaps methods to prevent contact between any remaining
ignition sources and fuel vapors. Successful implementation of these measures will require the
designer to work closely with airframe and structures designers and manufacturing technologists
from a very early point in the design process. Structural design modifications to minimize lightning
protection problems can result in substantial savings in weight and cost, but these benefits will not
be obtained unless such concerns are incorporated early in the design cycle. Structure design
must satisfy many requirements and some lightning protection features may not be compatible
with other requirements.

The following design approaches should be utilized to the extent practical to minimize
potential ignition sources within aircraft fuel tanks.

1) Design the fuel tank structure to minimize the number of joints, fasteners and other
potential arc and spark sources in fuel vapor areas.

2) Provide adequate electrical conductivity between adjacent parts of structures.

3) Provide a barrier to separate remaining arc or spark products from the fuel vapor.

4) Design fuel system components to interrupt potential current.

10.1 Tank Structures Design

As illustrated in the foregoing sections, most ignition sources are associated with structural
joints and fasteners of various kinds. As much as possible, joints and fasteners should be
eliminated in fuel vapor areas. If they cannot be eliminated, they should be designed so that they
do not spark. If sparks cannot be completely eliminated, the fastener must be sealed so that the
sparks do not contact the vapor. Several design approaches are possible.

Eliminating penetrating fasteners: Figure 10-1 through Figure 10-3, show how wing spars and
ribs can be rearranged to eliminate penetrations of fasteners into the fuel tank. This approach
may eliminate possible fuel leaks at the fasteners as well as eliminating ignition sources, though
the possibility of leaks due to bowing of the closeout rib would have to be considered.

95
Figure 10-1: Spar-Skin Interface Design to Reduce Ignition Hazards
a) Conventional - fasteners in fuel area
b) Improved - fasteners outside fuel area

Figure 10-2: Wing Stiffener Design to Eliminate Ignition Sources

a) Conventional - penetrating fasteners
b) Improved - integral stiffeners

96
 Care must be given to ensuring
that the edges of spars and the rib-to-
skin interfaces do not present arc or
spark sources themselves. This is
usually done by use of electrically
insulating, corrosion resistant finishes,
as well as sealant materials between
parts. Also, polysulfide type sealant is
sometimes necessary at fillets and
fasteners.

The approaches illustrated in

Figure 10-1 through Figure 10-3 are
applicable to CFC as well as to metal
structures. Lightning currents in
fasteners in CFC structures may be
higher than those in aluminum structures
because diffusion times in CFC are much
shorter than in aluminum and more
current will seek to flow in interior
structural elements such as ribs and
Figure 10-3: Fuel cell closeout rib-skin interface spars. Also, it is usually more difficult to
a) Conventional make arc free electrical contact between
b) Improved CFC parts. These design approaches
may be more necessary in CFC
airframes than for aluminum airframes.

Likewise, the lightning current densities in airframes of small size, general aviation
aircraft and small rotorcraft, will be proportionally higher than the current densities in larger
transport category vehicles exposed to the same total amount of lightning current. Design
approaches can be followed to eliminate potential ignition sources in small integral tank
structures.

Co-curing of CFC tanks: The most radical way of eliminating fasteners and their associated
problems is to build the tank as a single monolithic structure which is electrically conductive
throughout. While this is not done at present, it is a technique that could be used to build CFC
tanks.

In Figure 10-4 fasteners penetrate the tank. In Figure 10-5 filament winding is used to
achieve an entirely co-cured structure. Practical limitations may prevent this method from being
utilized to build complete wings of large aircraft, but similar approaches may be useful for
construction of various substructures.

Co-cured joints in CFC structures will eliminate potential arc and spark sources and
provide the best possible electrical conductivity among structural sections. In these joints, the
pre-impregnated resin is used to bond yarns and plies together without the need for additional
adhesives. Practical difficulties arise in co-curing large structures, but great improvements in
lightning protection of CFC structures can be achieved by co-curing of simple interfaces, such
as between stiffeners and skins.

97
 Figure 10-4: Fasteners Penetrate Tank

Figure 10-5: Advanced Manufacturing used to Eliminate Fasteners

Non-conductive ribs: Another method, shown in Figure 10-6 illustrates the use of fiberglass or
aramid fiber reinforced composites to fabricate ribs within a wing fuel tank. In this case,
lightning currents tend not to flow into fasteners because these bear against non-conducting
interior surfaces and do not constitute current paths. Mechanical strength considerations may
preclude use of other than CFC material for spars and ribs. If so, several other approaches can
be used to interrupt current through fasteners.
98
 Figure 10-6: Non-conducting ribs

Figure 10-8: Non-conducting ply or laminate

Figure 10-7: Non-conducting shear clips

99
Non-conductive shear ties: Figure 10-7 illustrates the use of a non-conductive shear tie,
sometimes called a clip or shear clip, to interrupt electric current paths between skin and
interior structures which are conductive. This allows these elements to remain conductive, yet
ensures that lightning currents remain in the tank skin and eliminates potential arc sources at
fasteners.

Prevention of fastener sparks: If it is not possible to use a non-conducting shear tie, Figure
10-8 illustrates a method of controlling internal sparking at the fastener. A non-conductive ply
or multi-ply laminate is bonded to the interior surface of the clip. This prevents current from
arcing from the fastener to the back of the shear tie at the surface.

The designs illustrated in Figure 10-1Error! Reference source not found. through
REF _Ref471808721 \h Figure 10-8 are examples of the kinds of approaches that can be
followed to eliminate the source of potential fuel vapor ignition. These concepts avoid the
method of extensive sealant overcoat that impose cost and weight penalties and concerns
regarding the durability of such coatings. Designers are encouraged to develop other
approaches to solving these problems.

Since success is dependent on many factors such as dimensions, clearances and fit,
the performance of any given design cannot readily be predicted. Any new design must be
evaluated through testing.

When employing electrically insulating structural materials to interrupt lightning current,

it must be remembered that current paths must be provided between extremities, such as
nose, tail, wing and empennage tips and control surfaces. Thus, non-conductive elements
may be utilized within a CFC tank, but the tank skins, and often the main spars, must be
fabricated of conductive materials capable of conducting lightning currents.

10.1.1 Provision of Adequate Electrical Contact

A primary means of current transfer between fuel tank structural elements is often
through fasteners. When current is conducted through them, arc products may be produced.
These consist of plasmas of ionized air, vaporized and melted metals, and/or composite fiber-
epoxy materials. Any of these arc products can be hot enough to ignite fuel vapors.

The basic mechanism is shown in Figure 10-9. The lightning current is conducted from
one part to another through the fastener, threaded nut, and washer. With lightning densities of
hundreds or thousands of amperes per fastener, arcing will occur at the points of contact
between fastener and fastened parts. If the fastener could bear directly against bare metal, the
arc threshold (amperes per fastener) could be increased. However, bare uncoated parts are
almost never tolerated within aircraft structures due to the possibility of corrosion.

Keeping current densities low: One method to minimize arcing at a fastener is to keep the
current density in the fastener low. This may be accomplished by using fasteners as large as
possible to maximize the contact area between the fastener and the joined surfaces.

The intensity of arcs may also be reduced by allowing or encouraging the current to be
shared among several fasteners. With a large number of fasteners in a current path, the
current in any one fastener will be lower. Lightning currents do not divide evenly among all
fasteners in most designs, since overall current densities diminish with distance away from
lightning entry and exit points. Reliable analysis methods are not readily available to calculate
the current distribution among fasteners. Gross estimates can be made by intuition, sufficient

100
to design test specimens and establish appropriate current levels.

101
Figure 10-9: Arcing at Fastener Interfaces Figure 10-10: Fastener Sealing Concepts

Arc Containment: As noted earlier, certain design methods can be employed to reduce the
intensity of arcs at conductive interfaces. These methods may prevent ignitions at low to
moderate current levels, but at higher levels the arc pressure buildup may be sufficient to blow
arc products into the fuel vapor space. For this reason, it is generally necessary to employ a
barrier between arc sources and fuel vapor areas.

Containment with tank sealant: The most common method of containment is the addition of
a fuel tank sealant coating over the surface of the fasteners. The basic principle is shown in
Figure 10-10. It must be emphasized that sealant does not eliminate the arcs which occur, but
merely contains the resulting products so that they do not contact the flammable vapor space.

Protection increases as the thickness of the applied sealant is increased, though there is a
practical limit to the amount of sealant which may be applied because of the weight which it
adds to the aircraft and the cost of labor and material. The effectiveness of overcoating
depends upon the skill of the operator. The fastener must be thoroughly coated and there
must be no voids or thinly coated areas.

Examples of acceptable and unacceptable sealant coverage for fasteners are shown inFigure
10-11. Figure 10-11(a) shows sealant applied at the sides of the fastener, but not of sufficient
quantity to prevent arc pressure blowby through the sealant or at the interfaces between the
sealant and the fastener. This is remedied, as shown in Figure 10-11(b), by applying a coating
thick enough to prevent arc product breakthrough. In addition, the sealant has been extended
over the fastener head, thus eliminating the possibility of arc product blowby through the
sealant at this location.

102
 The advantages of sealant are:

1) Sealants may already be applied to

prevent leaks. Containment of arcs and
sparks may only require that the sealant
be applied more thickly, or over a wider
area.

2) They are easily applied.

3) They can be applied to existing designs;

they can be retro-fitted to problem areas.

Disadvantages of sealant are:

1) Application is operator dependent.

Figure 10-11: Guidelines for Overcoating 2) Sealant exacts a weight and cost
Fasteners penalty.

3) Protection may deteriorate with age and

flexing of the airframe.

Containment with fasteners: Although arcing can take place at any point of contact between
the fastener and the CFC structure, the most significant arcing takes place between the shaft
of the fastener and the hole surface. Pressure will then build up in this area and can vent
under the fastener nut or washer into the fuel tank vapor space.

A method of containing these products is to use fasteners which provide a mechanical seal.
These fasteners are fabricated with a gasket to contain the arc products which result from
contact between the fastener and the structure. Arcing may occur between surfaces in close
proximity, such as between the fastener housing and the skin surface as shown in the
sketches, but electrically non-conductive primers or finishes on the skin surface may help
prevent this problem. Typical installations should be tested for certainty.

Arcing threshold levels of self-sealing rivetless nutplates are generally higher than similar
nutplate fasteners with rivets. This is due to the combination of the rubber seal, which
prevents blowby of arc products into the fuel vapor space, and the elimination of rivets which
are generally the source of arcing when currents of any appreciable amplitude are conducted
through the nutplate fastener. While arcing threshold levels of typical fasteners have been
shown to be approximately 5 kA, the levels achieved by rivetless nutplate fasteners have
been three to four times this level.

Structural interfaces: Sealant coatings must also be applied to structural interfaces, at least
in exterior skins where current densities are highest. In tanks fabricated of aluminum, coatings
of electrically non-conductive corrosion finishes on interfacing parts can result in arcing
between the parts due to the poor electrical contact. For CFC tanks, arcing can be caused by
the non-conductive resins and adhesives used in the fabrication of structures. Arcing may
occur due to insufficient electrical contact between elements and sparking may occur due to
voltage potential differences between elements.

Recommended fillet sealing dimensions for sealants are provided in Figure 10-12.

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 Figure 10-12: Recommended Sealant Application Notes

Spark and arc thresholds: The arc and spark threshold level of a particular aircraft
design depends on several factors which include the following:

1. Type of skin material.

2. Skin thickness.

3. Thickness of primer and surface finishes.

4. Arc entry vs. conducted current entry.

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 5. Current amplitude.

6. Current division among structural elements.

7. Thoroughness of fuel tank sealant coverage.

The threshold levels at which arcs and sparks occur in a new aircraft design
may be estimated by similarity with other designs for which a data base exists.
However, the fuel tank designer should be careful when assuming that a new design is
similar to a previous one. Any differences in materials, thicknesses, coatings, or
number of fasteners will change the impedances and current paths within the tank,
which can alter the threshold levels.

The current density in a particular set of fasteners can be estimated by

mathematical techniques, but determination of structural current is impossible due to
the complexity of current paths and the difficulty of describing them in electrical
terms. Since there is uncertainty about the reliability of these calculations, it is best
that designs be based on similarity or upon analysis supported by test data.

10.1.2 Filler Caps

Filler caps present a special series of problems when lightning protection is

concerned. In an effort to maintain a liquid-secure fitting, the cap must be fitted with
gaskets or seals between the cap and its tank adapter. If lightning contacts the filler
cap (typically composed of an attractive conductor) the potential exists for sparking
across or through the seals.

In addition, a filler cap lanyard has traditionally been used to retain the filler
cap against loss. Usually made of light gauge chain or ball and wire chain, the
lanyard produced an attractive environment for sparking in the case of lightning
attachment.

There are a variety of design modifications which can be employed to

remediate such difficulties.

A lightning protected filler cap most often uses a plastic insert so that there are
no metallic faying surfaces across which sparking can occur. If a lanyard is required to
retain filler cap to plane, it must be made of plastic.

In the case of the cap itself, a lightning protected cap can be installed in
conjunction with mating adapters. Electrically non-conductive O-ring adapters
provide a seal between plastic insert and mating adapter to prevent fuel leakage. If
a strike occurs to the cap, the resulting currents arc from cap to the adjacent
adapter, since the O-ring seal prevents direct electrical contact between the two
parts.

Alternatively, an all-plastic cap can be installed, preventing any arc attachment.

Lightning protected caps must be used if there is any possibility that the cap can
receive a lightning strike. This is the case if the cap is located in Zones 1A, 1B, 2A or 2B.

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10.1.3 Access Doors

Like filler caps, access doors present a conflicting set need for the aircraft designer.
Access doors must be found in all, or nearly all, aircraft designs to permit installation and
maintenance of fuel system hardware. Such doors are normally located in exterior skins in
areas subject to direct or swept stroke lightning strikes. Without protection, such access
doors are likely to spark across the gap between door and jamb. Given the potential for
ignition of fuel or fuel vapor, it is essential that access doors be given protection.

The following modifications have been used:

1) Metal to metal contact should be avoided in areas that may be exposed to fuel
vapors.

2) Provision of adequate current conduction paths between door and adapter and
between adapter and surrounding skin, away from fuel vapors. This usually occurs
via the fasteners, which are separated from vapor areas by O-rings, gaskets or
sealants.

3) Application of sealant to other potential arc or spark sources so as to prevent

contact with fuel vapors. The advantages and disadvantages of sealants have
been discussed.

Design guideline for access doors: The following guidelines are intended to assist in
designing access doors.

1) Provide as much electrical contact via screws or fasteners as possible while

making the current paths through these fasteners as short as possible.

2) Fasteners should be isolated from vapors areas with non-conductive gaskets or O-

ring seals.

3) All fasteners should be coated with tank sealant.

Verification

The nearly infinite number of variables involved in access door design mandates
that lightning tests should be performed on all such installations.

A typical door should be fabricated into a panel specimen and tested by high current
arc attachment to determine if arcing or sparking occurs on the interior of the door. Arc
entry tests should be applied to the center of the door as well as to door fasteners. This is
intended to show the adequacy of the access door-to adapter gasket seal, as well as the
seals of the door fasteners/dome nuts. The door/frame samples can be tested in a
flammable gas chamber environment, but if ignition occurs, it will be difficult to locate the
source.

10.2 Fuel Tank Joints: Special Problems

High-density patterns of rivets or fasteners, as commonly used to join fuel tank skins
to stiffeners, ribs, and spars, should be capable of conducting 200 kA stroke currents even
when nonconductive primers and sealants are present between the surfaces, as in Figure
10-13.
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 Figure 10-13: Bonding through Mechanical Fasteners

There is no hard-and-fast rule for the number of fasteners per joint which are
necessary to avoid arcing, but a rough guideline of 2-5 kA per fastener, as discussed
below, can give some indication of the number of fasteners which may be required to
transfer lightning currents among structural elements without arcing. In general, it has
been found that structural fastener configurations inside tanks and not exposed to direct
strikes can tolerate (Zone 3) current densities without visible arcing and the need for
overcoating with sealant. Fasteners exposed to exterior surfaces in (Zones 1 or 2),
however, must usually be protected and verified by testing.

Figure 10-14: Potential Arc Sources at Structural Interfaces

At areas of high current density, arcing usually occurs at the interfaces between
the fastener and surrounding structure, as shown in Figure 10-14 and the occurrence of
such arcing depends on other physical characteristics, such as skin material, skin
thickness, surface coatings, and fastener tightness. Tests in which simulated lightning
currents are conducted through the joint should always be made on samples of joints
involving new materials or designs to confirm protection adequacy.

107
 Arc thresholds of fasteners in Zone 3 areas: Under a program sponsored by
NASA (NASA Contractor Report 3762, pp. 33-35, January 1984) tests were performed to
determine the spark threshold level of typical fasteners used in aircraft installations. For
those tests, aluminum lap joint specimens were bonded with electrically non-conductive
fuel tank sealant and were also fastened with a single rivet which had been "wet" installed
with the same sealant. Currents were conducted directly into one end of the specimen
and removed from the other end. All current was forced through the single fastener since
the non-conductive sealant eliminated any direct electrical contact between the mating
surfaces. No coatings of any kind were applied to the head of the fastener.

The tests indicated that the spark threshold current level of the fasteners was 5
kA. Thus, a door containing 40 fasteners could conduct nearly 200 kA without sparking if
the current were distributed evenly among the fasteners. In most cases, however, the
current will not divide uniformly, but will be concentrated in those fasteners closest to the
point of attachment or exit.

Direct attachments: The preceding discussion relates to joints located in Zone 3 which
must conduct only a portion of the lightning current. Joints located in other zones can
be struck directly by the lightning arc. It is possible for the lightning arc to remain
attached to a single fastener or rivet. If that happens, the arc can melt or otherwise
damage the rivet and surrounding skin. If ignitable fuel vapors exist beneath such a joint,
the joint may have to be larger than would be otherwise required.

Guidelines for joints: Some other guidelines which should be noted in designing integral
tank joints are as follows:

1. Provide electrically conducting paths among the structural elements so that lightning
currents can be conducted among elements without excessive arcing, and without
having to spark across non-conducting adhesives or sealants. Often this will be via
rivets or removable fasteners, which make metal to metal contact with joined parts.
There must be sufficient areas of contact among all of the fasteners in the current
path to avoid excessive arcing, damage to the fasteners or surrounding structural
material.

2. Put no insulating materials in places that would divert lightning current from direct
paths between entry and exit points on the aircraft. Voltages which may cause
sparking will build up wherever diversions in these paths exist. The diversions
through the fasteners and stringer of Figure 10-13 are acceptable. More
extended paths may not be.

3. Account for aging and mechanical stress which may cause reduced electrical
conductivity. Continued flexing of structures under flight load conditions may
eventually loosen a joint to the point where arcing could occur. To evaluate this
possibility, perform simulated lightning tests on joint samples which have been
previously subjected to fatigue or environmental tests.

4. Coat all joints thoroughly with fuel tank sealant to contain any arcs or sparks
which may occur.

5. Do not depend on resistance measurements to confirm the adequacy of

lightning current conductivity in a joint. The inductance of the path plays an
equally important part. Resistance measurements (ac or dc) may be useful as
a production quality control tool, but they are not useful for establishing the
adequacy of the lightning current path through the joint.
108
10.3 Connectors and Interfaces in Pipes and Couplings

Electrical plumbing lines within a fuel tank will usually conduct some of the aircraft
lightning currents since they provide conducting paths in contact with conducting
structures. The amount of current in plumbing depends on the resistance and
inductance of current paths in plumbing as compared with surrounding structural
paths. Currents in plumbing within metal aircraft may be small, a few tens or
hundreds of amperes, but current in metal pipes inside non-conducting or CFC
structures may be very high.

Problems: The current in these lines may cause sparking at pipe couplings where
there is intermittent or poor electrical contact. Some pipe couplings, for example, are
designed to permit relative motion between the mating ends of a pipe to relieve
mechanical stresses caused by wing flexure and vibration and this precludes the tight
metal to metal contact needed to carry current. Also, electrically insulating coatings
such as anodized finishes are often applied to the pipe ends and couplings to control
corrosion. Relative motion and vibration may wear this insulation away, providing
unintentional and intermittent conductive paths, situations that lead to sparking.
Therefore, particular attention should be given to the design of fuel system plumbing.

Lightning currents in plumbing: The high amplitude return stroke currents will not
spread very deeply into interior structural elements or other interior conductors
because they are of short duration, but will instead tend to remain in the metal skins.
Still, there will be some current. During a NASA sponsored program currents in the
fuel lines within a fuel tank with adhesively bonded aluminum structural elements
were measured. With a current of 88 kA injected into the wing, the current in a small
diameter fuel line within the tank was 160 amperes.

The analytical procedures for determining how rapidly changing currents

distribute, are complex, but intermediate and continuing currents persist for times long
enough for the distribution to be calculated on the basis of the dc resistances involved.

Figure 10-15: Hypothetical Wing Box

Assume that the leading and trailing edge sections of a wing are nonconductive
or sufficiently isolated as to be unavailable for conduction and that the remaining wing
box is comprised of skins and spars having the dimensions as shown in Figure 10-15.
The cross sectional area of the spars and skins forming this box is 135 cm2. The tank
also contains an aluminum vent pipe electrically bonded to the structure at each end of
the tank. This tube has an outside diameter of 10 cm, a wall thickness of 0.5 mm, and
a cross sectional area of 1.56 cm2.

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 Assume an intermediate strike with an average amplitude of 2000 A for 5 ms, in
accordance with Component B of AC-20-53A. The current in the pipe can be calculated
as follows:

1.56𝑐𝑚2
I pipe ≈ [ ] 𝑥 2000𝐴 = 21.3𝐴
135𝑐𝑚2

Currents of this order of magnitude have produced arcs at movable, poorly

conducting, interfaces in some couplings. More common examples of electric arc
sources include motor commutators.

Bond straps: Electrical bond straps or jumpers are sometimes installed across
poorly conducting pipe couplings, as shown in Figure 10-16. These bond straps
should not be relied upon to prevent sparking from lightning currents. Current is apt
to divide in proportion to resistance which may be the result of a small contact area
in the coupling. Some current in the coupling could lead to sparking even with the
bond strap in place.

Figure 10-16: Bonding Across Couplers

Conduction through couplings and interfaces: The extensive use of anodized

coatings to provide noncorrosive mating surfaces in pipe couplings would seem to
preclude arcing across the pipe interface, but relative motion between these surfaces
can wear through the anodized coating, forming a conductive path. If there happens to
be a large, bare metal-to-metal contact within the coupling, this could provide a spark
free path. However, a slight change in the relative position of the mating surfaces, or
introduction of dirt or residue might drastically change the electrical capability of a
coupling. It is probable that the electrical capability of a typical pipe coupling changes
many times during a flight as a result of relative motion caused by structural vibrations
and flexing.

Some of the commercially available couplings and bulkhead fittings have been
designed to conduct impulse currents up to 2500 amperes without sparking. These
couplings should be adequate for use in most metal tanks where currents are of the
order of a few hundred amperes or less.

110
 Fuel tanks fabricated of CFC materials, however, are more highly resistive than
aluminum. Currents on the exterior skin surface of such tanks will diffuse more rapidly
to internal conductive plumbing and currents might greatly exceed 2500 amperes.

Guidelines for protection: In the absence of definitive data on the electrical conductivity
of pipe couplings under in-service conditions, it is advisable to take the following
approach:

1. Determine, by analysis or test, the fraction of lightning current expected in a

particular pipe.

2. Inject this current into a sample of the coupling under simulated in-flight
vibration and contamination conditions.

3. Perform this test in a darkened enclosure and observe whether any arcs or sparks
occur. Repeat the test until reliable and satisfactory results are obtained.

Non-conducting interfaces: One solution to the problem of arcs and sparks at

couplings and plumbing interfaces with aircraft structure is to insert electrically non-
conductive isolation links into these lines to eliminate them as current carrying paths.
This solution, of course, requires additional couplings, which may add additional weight
compared to the traditional all aluminum plumbing.

Another solution is to make the pipes of a non-conductive material. Various solid

polymers or fiber reinforced resins may be used for this purpose. Some electrical
conducting material must be provided in the interior linings of pipes transferring fuel
however, to prevent frictional charge accumulation. The resistivity of these materials
should be on the order of 106 to 108 ohm-cm. This is sufficiently high to prevent lightning
currents, but still adequate to dissipate static charges. Lower values would make the
lines too conductive. One such system presently under development is a reformable
duct system of electrically non-conductive thermoplastic fluoropolymer, reinforced with
aramid fibers.

10.4 Electrical Wiring in Fuel Tanks

Problems: Lightning current in an aircraft may induce voltages in electrical wiring. If this
wiring enters a fuel tank, the induced voltages may be high enough to cause a spark.

Electrical wires found inside fuel tanks are typically those used for
capacitance-type fuel quantity probes or electric motors used to operate pumps or
valves. If these wires are totally enclosed by metal skins and ribs or spars, the
internal magnetic fields and induced voltages will be relatively low. Electrical
devices, such as fuel quantity probes, and their installation hardware, have been
intentionally designed to withstand comparatively high voltages without sparking.
The fuel system designer, however, must be continually alert for changes in material
or structural design that might permit excessive induced voltages to appear in fuel
tank electrical circuits.

Guidelines for design: In practice, design of small airgaps should incorporate a margin
of 100% over anticipated actual voltage levels, to account for mechanical installation
tolerances, the effects of contaminants, and the statistical variations in small gap
sparkover voltages themselves. Thus, a particular gap should be sized to withstand, at
altitude, twice the anticipated actual voltage.

111
 In some cases, particularly installations within CFC tanks, this will require
unacceptably large clearances between objects such as fuel quantity probes and
adjacent structure. In such cases other means, such as coating adjacent surfaces with
dielectric films, may be explored to enable smaller gaps to withstand twice the anticipated
voltage. Designs like this must be given voltage withstand tests, as handbook type data
does not exist to support specific designs.

It is particularly important that sufficient insulation be provided between the

active elements and the airframe because the highest induced voltages usually
appear between the wires and the airframe. These voltages may be IR voltages
related to lightning currents in the structural resistance of the wing or they may
magnetically induced voltages as illustrated in Figure 10-17. Structural IR voltages
may be only a few volts for a metal wing, but they may be several thousand volts in a
composite wing.

Figure 10-17: Typical Fuel Probe Wiring

Contaminants that accumulate with time on the probe surfaces may

act to reduce the sparkover voltage; therefore, it is wise to
incorporate a factor of two when designing clearances necessary to
tolerate the anticipated induced voltages expected in fuel tank wiring
harnesses.

Figure 10-17 illustrates that the proximity of the probe to the airframe structure
on which it is mounted is very important in determining breakdown voltages to the
airframe. Because of this, design of adequate insulation between the active elements
of the probe and the airframe may not be entirely within the probe designer's control.

Shielding of fuel probe wires: The fuel probe wires are most closely referenced to the
airframe at the electronics end, which is usually in the fuselage. If one or more of the
wires are shielded, there can be a conflict between the grounding practices that are
best for control of lightning induced voltages and those considered best for control of
steady state electromagnetic interference, EMI.

112
 Usually, because of EMI considerations and concern for "ground loops", only
one end of the shield is grounded; most commonly at the end remote from the fuel
sensor. Grounding the shield at both ends permits stray ac fields to induce circulating
currents in the shield, and such currents may interfere with the operation of the fuel
quantity electronics.

The conflict arises because a shield grounded at only one end does not act to
reduce magnetically induced voltage between conductors and ground, though it may
reduce voltages between conductors in the shield. The gist of the matter is that a
shield can reduce voltages between conductors and ground only if it is grounded at
both ends and allowed to carry current. If a shield is ungrounded at one end,
magnetically induced voltages can develop at that end between the conductors and
ground. Thus, most shields found on fuel quantity probe wiring harnesses offer little or
no protection from lightning induced effects.

Routing of wires: The routing of the fuel probe wires can have a lot to do with how
much induced voltage appears at apparatus inside fuel tanks. Good practice
dictates that wires should be routed in regions which are shielded from intense
magnetic and electric fields.

10.5 Fuel Tank Access Door Example

An ignition source test was performed on a fuel tank access door as part of a
series of tests (Lightning Technologies, LF 2100 Lightning Results - Wing, R43222,
1985) designed to certify an outboard access panel on a carbon fiber wing structure.
The access door was a fabricated from kevlar, however potential sparking around the
fasteners had to be evaluated.

A 35 mm camera was positioned within the fuel tank area through the access
door. Prior to the test, the tank interior was lit and a background photo recorded by the
camera (Figure 10-18). These photos were used as an aid in pinpointing the position
of any arcing or sparks which might occur during testing. After initial background
photos were taken, the cameras were set to f 2.8 and shutters set for bulb exposure.
The fuel tank was then made light tight. Exposures were made and developed to
equivalent of ASA 3200 at f4.7.

Following the initial test, it was found that door sealant was too stiff to permit
adequate contact between access door and the doubler. Figure 10-19 shows
evidence of arcing at various locations around the door.

Prior to a second test on the door, the sealant was removed and
replaced with a different grade. The second test showed that arc blowby was
eliminated and the door installation passed with evidence of no light at the
access door interfaces.

Analysis: Arcing between door fasteners and the mounting interface was solved
with the application of a PROSEAL sealant, P/N PR703. The sealant provided an
adequate barrier and prevented the arc products from entering the wet region of the
fuel cell.

113
 Figure 10-18: Background photo of Access Door
provided for reference during the actual test

Figure 10-19: Photographic Evidence of Sparking

of Access Door Installation

Note: Successful test should result in no visible light in the photograph.

114
11.0 Externally Mounted Hardware

11.1 Design Guidelines

Externally mounted hardware includes antenna and air data probes such as pitot
probes, angle of attack sensors, temperature sensors, stall detectors, and any other device
mounted on the external surface of the aircraft. Most of these devices protrude somewhat into
the airstream and so may be a preferential attachment point for lightning strikes, especially if
they are located in Zones 1 or 2. Experience shows that many off-the-shelf hardware design
will remain functional following a lightning strike to aircraft as long as the lightning does not
contact the external hardware. However, those with sensitive electronics and movable parts
may especially be susceptible when the lightning channel attaches directly to the device.

Hardware such as angle of attack probes which have movable parts and antennas with
dielectric covers may be damaged, especially when lightning is allowed to attach directly to the
device or hardware. The likelihood of damage is often increased when external hardware is
installed or mounted to non-conductive or poorly-conducting (i.e. CFC) airframe materials.
When the hardware is installed on aluminum surfaces and the wire harnesses and other
supporting systems are installed within an aluminum airframe (i.e. fuselage), additional
lightning protection measures may not be necessary.

When external components are mounted on composite skins, the following protection
guidelines should be followed.

a) Protect the surface on which the external component is mounted with metallic
coatings. Materials such as foils or meshes are excellent candidates for these
coatings. The coating should be capable of conducting the lightning currents away
from the component in cases when lightning attaches.

b) Attach the external component to the protected surface with a minimum of four (4)
metal fasteners. Rivets, or preferable removable fasteners, of the largest size practical
should be utilized. If necessary ply buildups in the fastener area is recommended to
facilitate a secure attachment. It is best to allow metal-to-metal contact between the
component body and the metalized surface treatment. A preferred method of
accomplishing this is to co-cure a 0.016 in. (or thicker) aluminum plate to the metallized
skin treatment. This process produces a smooth, hard metal surface that will allow a
more consistent electrical bond than is usually available between the component and
metallized composite skin.

c) Enclose the electrical component electrical wire harness in braided tinned copper
shields, minimum shield cross-section should be equivalent to AWG No. 8. This should
be securely attached to the device housing and the interfacing equipment case, or
adjoining conductive structure such as an equipment rack, instrument panel, or metal
airframe.

The shields are necessary, even though exterior surface protection is present, since the
metalized coating on composite skins does not provide as much conductivity as does a
solid aluminum fuselage. The shield helps to prevent excessive currents from being

115
 conducted on wiring, which may include critical circuits or distribution buses. (Note that
the application of wire harness shields should be coordinated with the overall lightning
indirect effects and EME protection design, which is outside the scope of this handbook.

d) Utilize non-electrically conductive air tubes for the transfer of air data. This eliminates
the possibility of lightning currents flowing in these tubes and damaging them or
associated instruments.

e) Sensors which provide essential or critical data should be installed in a manner that
should remain functional after a lightning strike, otherwise the sensor may provide
erroneous data.

Examples of the external components and their installation which have successfully
tolerated the zone 1A and 2A lightning environments are described in the following
paragraphs. When installing sensors and antennas on a CFC skin, care must be exercised to
assure that lightning currents flowing from the component into the composite skins do not
cause excessive damage, including heating, arcing, delamination and vaporization of the resin
in the adjacent area to fasteners. The possibility of debris entering fuselage-mounted engine
inlets must also be considered. In a pressurized fuselage, explosive decompression is of
concern.

The following paragraphs discuss several different external component installations on

composite structures. The following examples are provided:

 Pitot Static installation on CFC laminate

 Antenna installation on protected fiberglass laminate

11.2 Air Data Probes (Pitot Tube)

The pitot probe installation is very similar to other air data probes (i.e. ice detection,
static ports, etc.) located at various locations on an aircraft. Data described in this section is
easily transferrable to other types of probes.

Test Article Description: The pitot tube probe was mounted on a CFC composite panel. The
Nomex honeycomb core was removed locally which allowed for the inner and outer plies of
carbon cloth to be closed out at the local area where the pitot probe was installed (See Figure
11-1). The probe was mounted to an aluminum plate and the aluminum plate was then riveted
to the closed out carbon fiber laminate. Figure 11-2 and Figure 11-3 show the pretest
condition of the test specimen.

Test Description: The probe was subjected to a Zone 1A lightning strike, which forced the
lightning current to be conducted from the pitot mast to the carbon fiber panel. The primary
current path from the pitot to the CFC was via the 16 rivets because the aluminum plate was
isolated from the carbon fiber laminate by a non-conductive liquid shim barrier. The high
current density at fasteners caused overheating of the carbon fibers adjacent to the fasteners,
resulting in localized damage around the fasteners. The pitot installation remained solid and
probably functional, however if less fasteners had been used, loosening of the probe may
have been a higher probability. Figure 11-4 provides a photograph of the post-test condition of
the test specimen.

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 Figure 11-1: Description of the Test Article

Figure 11-2: Pitot Probe Before Strike Figure 11-3: Pitot Probe Before Strike
Exterior view view of interior mount

Design Guidance: The following design recommendations will help to minimize the effects of a
lightning strike to external air data probes;

a) Rivets of the largest size practical should be used to install the probe

b) Additional plies of carbon cloth helps to minimize the damage around the fasteners.

c) If liquid shim material is used, a conductive, carbon-filled material will help to reduce
current in the fasteners.

d) Ideally the aluminum mounting plates should make direct contact with the CFC laminate
to help provide additional conductivity.

117
e) The mounting plate should be fabricated from a material that resists corrosion or has a
semi-conductive finish, such as an Alodine 1200 coating.

f) The lightning threat can be minimized to probes by installing them in Zone 2 or

3 regions of the aircraft.

Figure 11-4: Exterior view of Pitot Probe, Post-Test

showing current concentration at the fasteners

11.3 Antennas (Simulated L-Band Installation)

Most antennas are fastened to the exterior surface of an aircraft. Generally, removable
fasteners secure the antenna to the surface. The base of the antenna which interfaces with
the skin, along with any fasteners, provides the primary path for conduction of lightning
currents onto the airframe structure. The current densities can be very high in local areas,
especially when the antenna is small. High amplitude lightning currents conducted into a very
small region of composite structure can result in significant damage to a localized area of the
structure. The examples discussed in this section illustrate effective designs which minimize
the potential for damage.

11.3.1 L-Band Antenna Installation of FRC

The L-Band style of antennas have a relatively small footprint which can carry lightning
currents into the airframe structure. Typically only four fasteners are installed and the antenna
may only be about 4 in. long and 1 or 2 inches wide. Usually these antennas are installed in a
Zone 1A or 2A region of the aircraft and may still result in current densities exceeding 50 kA per
square inch. In the case of FRC, the lightning strike surface protection and the interfacing coax
are the only conductive medium which can carry away the lightning currents.

Test Article Description: The antenna was simulated by a 0.25 in. thick aluminum plate that
was approximately 2 in. wide and 4 in. long. The simulated antenna was fastened to the skin
sample with 4 (ea.) No. 10 fasteners. The FRP test specimen was protected with a 0.016
118
lb/ft2 expanded aluminum foil (EAF) co-cured on the outer surface of the skin specimen. A
0.020” thick aluminum plate was also co-cured on the outer surface of the expanded foil in
the region where the antenna was installed. Figure 11-5 shows a sketch of the test
specimen.

Figure 11-5: Installation details, simulated antenna

Test Description: The simulated antenna was subjected to a Zone 1A lightning strike. The
FRC skin panel showed very little degradation to the laminate. The only apparent damage
was the loss (vaporization) of expanded foil for a region of about 20 in. in circumference
around the antenna. Figure 11-6 provides a photograph of test specimen after the test. The
loss of EAF adjacent to the antenna has the potential to cause antenna performance
degradation due to the loss of electrical conductivity to the surrounding EAF. It is also
probable that antennas that have not been qualified to lightning test procedures similar to
RTCA DO-160C, Section 23, may in themselves fail due to the lightning attachment.

Generally a second antenna with physical separation is installed on the aircraft to

decrease the risk of total loss of reception or transmitting capabilities.

119
 Figure 11-6: Antenna Following Test

Design Guidance: The following guidelines provide methods that can minimize lightning
effects or provide alternate means of meeting certification compliance.

a) Efforts should be taken to provide good conductivity between antenna and aircraft skin

b) Redundancy or multiple antenna installations can be considered a valid means of

providing continued system operation if multiple radios or isolated antenna inputs are
provided so that one interface can fail while the other remains operable. This concept
is only acceptable if antennas are placed in a manner that minimizes the chance of a
lightning flash attaching to both antennas.

c) In cases where antennas are allowed to be damaged by lightning, they should be

installed in regions that prevent antenna debris from striking the propellers or entering
engine intakes.

d) Spark-gap surge arresters can be installed between certain types of antennas and
radio equipment to minimize transients that might normally damage the radio interface.

e) When non-conductive gaskets or sealants are used between the antenna base and
airframe, adequate conductivity may need to be maintained by other means such as
multiple rivets or bolts.

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12.0 Radomes

These structures must remain electromagnetically transparent to permit radio and radar
operation and are known as radio frequency (RF) transparencies. Therefore, in most cases,
only diverter strips may be utilized for lightning protection if the transparent region is large
enough to allow puncture by the lightning channel. Figure 12-1 and Figure 12-2 show typical
damage that might be expected from a radome puncture by lightning.

The methods of protecting radomes are included in Section 5.3, “Protection

Methodology”.

12.1 Radome Design

Radomes present a number of unique problems in terms of designing lightning

protection. The radome by nature must be transparent to radar. What this means for the
designer is that many of the standard protection methods are unworkable. In addition, radomes
are usually constructed of non-conductive composites or dielectric resins. The most common
means of protecting radomes is diverter strips which is discussed in Section 5.2 of this
document.

The majority of radomes used by multi-engine aircraft will be located in the nose of the
aircraft, an area usually considered to be Zone 1. Single engine aircraft may have small
radomes located on the leading edges of wings or in the wingtip fairings. Often the radomes
are utilized for weather radar. Recently however, composite aircraft have integrated radomes
within the fuselage structure for other applications like GPS and emergency locator systems.
Typically many of these locations place the radome in regions that have a high probability to be
struck.

Most experience for general aviation and transport category aircraft has been with
radomes located on the nose of the aircraft. Smaller single engine aircraft may have radomes
located in different locations, but the protection methodologies will be similar. The designer will
probably have to choose one of the following options when considering lightning interaction with
his radome design:

a) Install diverters, either segmented or solid.

b) Increase the dielectric of the radome by the addition of various films or sheet
plastics. Plastics, such as acrylics, polycarbonates, or urethanes, have been
used to increase the dielectric of the radome.
c) Position the radome in a Zone 3 region where a lightning attachment is unlikely.
d) Minimize the radome regions to the extent that the surrounding structure is likely
to intercept the lightning strike. This can often be done for small GPS antennas,
where the RF window can be small and located on a fuselage Zone 2A region.

The verification process for radomes generally requires some experimental testing.

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 Figure 12-1: Typical Lightning Damage to a Radome

Figure 12-2: Closeup Showing Attachment to Intermal Hardware

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12.2 Verification of Design

The adequacy of a design is often proven by a series of tests. These tests are usually
broken down into a high voltage attachment test and then followed by a high current test. This
two step process in the laboratory is required because of the limitations of test generators. In
the test laboratory, this process of high voltage evaluation is separate from the high current
evaluation.

Procedures for high voltage and high current testing can be found in several industry
documents. The most prevalent document used by commercial companies is the SAE
document, “Lightning Protection of Aerospace Vehicles and Hardware”, Report of SAE
Committee AE-4, Special Task F, 5 May 1976.

Step 1 - High Voltage Testing

Generally the high voltage

test may produce up to several
million volts of potential to
simulate the high voltage
attachment phenomena of
lightning. However, these
generators only produce several
thousand amperes and do not
simulate the damage mechanism
of the high current components of
lightning

Figure 12-3 provides a

photograph of a typical high
voltage test of a radome in the
Laboratory. This photograph
shows the verification of a
segmented diverter system to
prevent punctures to a nose
radome. This test setup requires
that conductive objects within the Figure 12-3: Typical High Voltage Test
radome must be installed or
simulated.

The high voltage test procedures have limitations that must be understood prior to
testing.

a) High voltage testing can be used to determine the following;

 diverter spacing
 dielectric qualities of radome materials
 determine probable high voltage puncture locations

b) High voltage testing will not evaluate;

 damage
 inductive or magnetic effects
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Step 2 - High Current Testing

The high current tests produce

upwards of 200,000 amperes to simulate
the high current damage capabilities of
lightning. However, these generators
typically only produce 50 - 100 thousand
volts of electrical potential which limits
their capability to produce long arcs that
exceed several inches. This limits their
ability to assess dielectric breakdown.

Figure 12-4 provides a

photograph of a typical high current test
of a radome in the Laboratory. This Figure 12-4: Typical High Current Setup
photograph shows the verification of a
segmented diverter system to prevent
punctures to a nose radome. This test
setup requires that conductive objects
within the radome must be installed or
simulated.

Step 2 - High Current Testing

a) High current testing will determine

the following;
- physical damage to
radome
- diverter termination
- evaluate arc overpressure
effects

b) High current testing will not

determine the following;
- Evaluate dielectric
breakdown
- Cannot produce long arc Figure 12-5: Radome under High Current Test
tests without incorporation
of special techniques

Similarity: Similarity is sometimes used to qualify one radome with another style. For similarity
to be acceptable a number of factors must be met such as;

a) layup design,
b) core type
c) geometry
d) location of internal metallic objects

Experience has shown that the difference between pass or fail may be caused by as
little as a one-inch difference in gap between the inner radome wall and a radar dish, as might
be the case with an updated radar installation in a previously certified installation.
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12.3 Typical Nose Radome Test

Purpose: A full scale radome assembly was tested for lightning protection of the Lear Fan
2100 Program (1985). The radome was composed of six plies of Kevlar. The interfacing aft
fuselage skin was fabricated of plies of graphite with an outer ply of interwoven aluminum wire.
Four diverter strips were fastened to the forward radome skin. A glide slope antenna was
installed within the radome, as was a mock-up of a radar antenna.

The first series of tests evaluated the high voltage attachment phenomena. The high
voltage electrode was positioned 1 meter from the radome at various locations and discharged
into the radome. In the first test, two strikes were applied between diverter strips. In the
second test another two strikes were applied at another spot between a different pair of
diverters. In the third test, the strike was positioned adjacent to the outboard end of two
diverters. In the fourth test, negative polarity was applied to simulate differences between
characteristics of positive and negative streamers. The internal simulated radar dish was
positioned so the antenna was at its closest position to the inner radome skin, nearest to the
attachment point. The segmented diverters intercepted the simulated lightning leader and
conducted it without puncturing the radome to the diverter termination points.

The second series of tests used the high current generator, capable of producing a
200,000 ampere strike. The electrode was place along the length of the diverter to evaluate the
ability of the design to transfer the high amplitude lightning currents from the diverter to the
primary carbon fiber aircraft structure. The photograph in Figure 12-6 shows the transition from
the non-conductive radome to the carbon fiber fuselage skins. The current density was
sufficient to cause vaporization of the small interwoven wires that provide lightning protection for
the carbon fiber fuselage skins, however the fastening hardware and structural integrity of the
installation remained within acceptable design parameters.

Figure 12-6: Lear Fan Model 2100, simulated lightning strike

minor scorching of paint, no structural damage

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13.0 Propulsion Systems

Propellers, engines, and nacelles will require protection if located in a lightning strike
zone, as most are. The aircraft propulsion system may contain some electrical instruments or
electronic controls which can be damaged by lightning direct effects if lightning is allowed to
contact them. Therefore, nacelles should be provided with sufficient protection to prevent
lightning strikes from contacting potentially vulnerable components. These and other indirect
effects are not addressed in this handbook. The effects discussed here are those related to
propellers and rotors, gear boxes, and stalls of turbofan engines.

Bond straps, typically flat, wired copper, maximum 1 inch wide and equivalent to AWG
No. 4 wire cross-section should be installed across non-conductive shock mounts in engine
trusses.

The same methods are describe for other airframe surfaces are available for protection
of engine nacelles. Lightning currents will directly enter propeller drive shafts and transfer
across bearings and gears to engine frames, and from these via mounting hardware to
conducting airframe. There may be some damage to bearings and gears following a strike,
though this has not been catastrophic. Engine manufacturers’ requirements regarding engine
teardown and inspection should be followed after a lightning strike. Replacements of some
parts may be necessary. There is no way to direct lightning currents around these interfaces,
or prevent this damage.

13.1 Propellers

Aircraft propellers are frequent targets for lightning strikes. The general location of
propellers, front for traction or rear or pusher, probably accounts for their susceptibility to
lightning strike attachment. Tractor blades are usually in a Zone 1A, while pushers will be in
Zone 1B. The stroke current component of lightning, due to its short duration, will affect only
one blade. The intermediate current is also of a short enough duration that it too will also
involve only one of the blades. However, the propeller does spin fast enough that the long
duration continuing current will divide among all the blades, if they are in Zone 1B.

A lightning flash to a metal propeller does little damage. It may produce minor pitting
and erosion of metal at trailing edges, but not enough damage to require special protection
features.

Propellers of composites are potentially more vulnerable to lightning damage, if the

protection techniques are the same as for other composite skins. Sometimes a metal leading
edge rain erosion strip can be part of the protection design.

Verification is mandatory due to the critical function of the blade. If protection is

required, methods discussed in sections can be applied. The effectiveness of such
protection must always be verified by tests, since small variations in designs can have a
significant effect on protection effectiveness.

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13.2 Rotor Blades

Helicopter rotor blades are also susceptible to lightning strikes. The same protection
methods as are available for composite propeller blades are also applicable to composite
helicopter rotor blades. Most helicopter rotor blades are in Zone 1A, and, if protection against
strikes to helicopters on the ground is desired, the rotor blade should be protected against the
Zone 1B environment.

13.3 Gear Boxes

Lightning currents entering propellers or rotor blades will conduct to the aircraft through
the gears and bearings supporting the propeller or rotor shaft. The conduction of these
currents through the bearings, which are supported on insulating lubricant films, will result in
some pitting of the bearing surfaces. This does not appear to be a major problem since there
do not appear to be any records of any catastrophic failures of bearings associated with
lightning strikes. Engine manufacturers, however, have always recommended that gear boxes
and bearings be disassembled and inspected after a strike. This usually results in replacement
of the bearing since arc pitting of critical parts may shorten their life expectancy wear. There
does not appear to be any way of avoiding such pitting since lightning current will always travel
through the bearing.

There is currently no practical way of diverting current away from the bearings.

13.4 Turbojet Engines

Small turbojet engines, especially those mounted on or within the fuselage, may
experience turbine stall or roll-back during a lightning strike to the aircraft, especially one that
attaches to the nose. Present theory holds that this effect is caused by the lightning channel
interrupting air flow at the engine air inlet. Numerous cases of temporary engine power loss
have been reported and in one particular instance both engines flamed out. Physical damage
to the engine or nacelle is seldom observed. There apparently is no protective way to prevent
this. Therefore, pilots should be made aware of this possibility and provided with instruction in
in-flight restart procedures.

13.5 Test of a Propulsion System

An entire turboshaft propulsion system was tested for lightning protection adequacy.
The system (Lightning Technologies, Inc. LF 2100 Lightning Results - Propulsion System,
R43225,) was designed for the Lear Fan 2100. The tests described here were performed in
1985.

The system consisted of a twining gearbox designed to combine the power of two Pratt
and Whitney turboshaft engines to drive a single propeller. The propeller was located in Zone
1B, and therefore, the gearshaft was in Zone 3.

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Purpose: Two kinds of tests were used to demonstrate the ability of the unit to withstand a
Zone 1B and Zone 3 strike. First dynamic test was performed, with the drive shafts and
gearbox to rotating at cruise speeds. The second test was conducted with drive shafts and
gearbox in a stationary, non-rotating condition. After dynamic test, the gearbox was replaced
to avoid lightning damage accumulation.

During each of these tests, the test setup was arranged in such a manner that the test
currents entered the gearbox through the propeller shaft and exited from the gearbox via the
gearbox/fuselage mounts and the engine drive shafts in a manner representative of the aircraft
installation.

Result: Neither test showed any significant damage to the gearboxes, but some pitting
occurred around mounting holes on the gearboxes and on the drive shaft attachment flanges.
Following the second static test, the propeller shaft showed a temporary freeze, indicating
some welding at roller bearings and associated races.

The minor pitting which occurred is consistent with similar tests and with the analysis of
strikes which have occurred in flight. It is sometimes difficult to determine if the wear or pitting
on bearings is due to a lightning strike or to ordinary wear.

These tests indicated that conventional turbomachinery can withstand the effects of
Zones 1A/1B/3 lightning currents without an immediate hazard to continued safe flight and
landing, although the engine is often disassembled and inspected following a lightning strike.

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