Rafał Frączek

Technical Analysis Department ASE

+ 48 603 056 211

[email protected]

Area classification -
An explanation of the importance to correctly address the hazards and extent of
these hazards prior to design and operation of any new plant along with the
need to control and re-evaluate changes to existing plant and infrastructure.
 2/1

CONTENT

1. Introduction.
2. The formation of explosive atmospheres.
3. Complex risk assessment.
4. Hazardous areas classification in terms of the risk of explosion.
5. Preliminary ATEX audits.
 SAFETY LIFECYCLE 1. Koncepcja

2. Określenie zakresu

3. Analiza
zagrożeń i ryzyka

Each phase of the safety life cycle requires taking specific 4. Wymagania
bezpieczeństwa
9. Realizacja systemów
actions, as well as utilizing the competence and independence 5. Alokacja
bezpieczeństwa
związanych
z bezpieczeństwem
E/E/PE

of people, departments or organizations implementing them. Planowanie

9. Realizacja systemów
10. Realizacja systemów
związanych
7. 8. związanych z bezpieczeństwem
6.
walidacji instalacji z bezpieczeństwem wykonanych w innych
pracy
bezpie- i urucho- technikach
i obsługi
czeństwa mienia

12. Instalacja 11. Realizacja

i uruchomienie zewnętrznych środków
zmniejszania ryzyka

13. Walidacja
bezpieczeństwa

14. Praca, obsługa

i naprawa

LIFECYCLE OF TECHNICAL SYSTEM 15. Wyłączenie

z eksploatacji
lub likwidacja

Risk management
covers all stages of
the system life cycle

4
Modernization of an installation

3D model
Modernization of an installation
 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS DEPARTMENT:

In terms of safety, to consider means using systematic techniques for risk analysis: HAZOP,
LOPA, explosion risk evaluation, other.

Imitation includes learning from the experience of others, as described in the standards of
design, codes of practise, accident reports.

Experience, in practice, means waiting for an accident.

* Based on the Foreword to Safety Management: The Hong Kong Experience, by Lee Hung-Kwong, Lorrainelo Concept Design, Hong Kong, 1991.
RISK: Method of analysis and assessment

IEC 60300-3-9 Risk analysis in

technical systems
 BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF REGULATION ATEX 137:
COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF RISK

The employer should make comprehensive RISK ASSESSMENT associated with the
possibility of working in an explosive atmosphere, taking into account:

 the likelihood and time of occurrence of an explosive atmosphere;

 the likelihood of occurrance and activation of ignition sources, including electrostatic
discharges;
 installations operated by the employer, used substances and mixtures, processes and their
interactions;
Risk of explosion must be
 the predicted effects of an explosion. fully assessed.

Rozporządzenie Ministra Gospodarki, z dnia 8 lipca 2010r.

w sprawie minimalnych wymagań, dotyczących bezpieczeństwa i higieny pracy, związanych z możliwością
wystąpienia w miejscu pracy atmosfery wybuchowej. (Dz.U. Nr 138, poz. 931) .
 The procedure for achieving safety

Safety should be maintained in the following order:

1. Preventing the formation of an explosive atmosphere:
(the use of non-combustible materials, dilution, tightness,
eliminating sources of emissions)‫‏‬

2. Avoiding ignition of an explosive atmosphere

(sources of ignition)‫‏‬

3. Reducing the effect of explosion

(venting, explosion suppression)‫‏‬
 THE FORMATION OF EXPLOSIVE ATMOSPHERES:
flammable materials

• Flammable gases,
• Flammable liquids with a flash point
below 328.15 K (55 ° C),
• Substances which, in contact with
water, emit flammable gases,
• Materials undergoing spontaneous
decomposition or polymerization.
• Dusts.

Flammable gases, vapors and mists of flammable liquids, dusts and fibers,
combined with air or oxidizing agents (eg. Chlorine), form explosive
atmospheres.
Should such atmoshere ignite, it will cause an explosion, which may pose a
human safety and production facilities hazard.
 THE FORMATION OF EXPLOSIVE ATMOSPHERES:
gas explosive atmosphere
AIR The following three components, present in
the correct proportions, are the cause of
explosions: :

• Explosive Atmosphere (mean values) for

each combustible gas or vapor in a liquid
under ambient conditions: for pressure
1013,25hPa and temperature 20C
The amount of energy
Unit time
EXPLOSION !!!
The explosion range
FLAMMABLE GASES, IGNITION SOURCE
FLAMMABLE LIQUID
VAPOR Detonation
DGW GGW
Deflagration Deflagration
Methane 5.0% 15%
0 LEL UEL
Hydrogen 4.0% 75%
The concentration of
Acethylene 2.5% 82% combustible medium
in an atmosphere
Propane 2.1% 9.5%
RISK OF EXPLOSION: definition and parameters

Risk of explosion Consequence Probability of damage

is a and
function
of Possible damage  Frequency and duration of
Considered event
resulting from an exposure,
related to potential
event which led to  probability of a hazardous
accidents
an accident event
 PRINCIPLES OF AREA CLASSIFICATION IN TERMS OF
EXPLOSION HAZARD - taking into account the effect of
ventilation

Influence of the type  decreases the range

of ventilation zones:  reduces the residual time of an explosive atmosphere
 prevents the formation of explosive atmospheres.
 15/1

INFLUENCE OF VENTILATION
Marking the degree of emission

C – Continuous emission, which occurs continuously or whose occurrence can be expected over long periods;
P – the first stage of the emission, which under normal operating conditions can be expected to occur periodically
or occasionaly;
S – the second stage of the emission, which act in normal operating conditions can not be expected, and if it
actually occurs then only rarely and for short periods.

Determining the degree of ventilation

VH – high level at which there is a very rapid decrease in the concentration of the substance around the source of
emissions below the lower explosive limit,
VM – average level at which emissions under constant lowers the concentration of the substance below the lower
explosive limit, the occurrence of an explosive mixture does not last too long after the emission;
VL – low level at which there is no concentration control when emitting and / or there is no effective prevention of
the occurrence of an explosive mixture after emission.
 16/1

INFLUENCE OF VENTILATION

Determining the ventilation availability

Good – good availability, at which ventilation is provided and operates continuously;
Fair – quite good availability, at which ventilation is working under normal operating
conditions with only short, acceptable interruptions of the ventilation;
Poor – poor availability, at which the ventilation does not meet the criteria for good and
quite good operation, yet the downtime is not too long.

Note:
If ventilation is not even meet the conditions of poor ventilation
can not be taken into account when assessing the risk of explosion.
 Prevents the formation of an explosive
atmosphere ATEX

Means installing gas detection system

 Gas detection system is considered a „SAFETY SYSTEM", if measured directly and

implements security functions. Safety systems are designed to reduce the risk of an
explosion (disconnect the power supply, shutdown solenoid, start signaling, etc.)

 Included in the Directive ATEX 94/9 / EC Annex II, Article 1.5.

-
The control panel must be performed in accordance with the Directive as a
"SAFETY DEVICE"

 ATEX Directive 94/9 / EC, Article 1: The scope of this directive also
includes safety, controlling and regulating devices intended for using
outside hazardous areas, but which are required or contributing to the
safe functioning of equipment and protective systems against threats
explosives.
 Gas detectors have to meet requirements of the directive

 Control panel marking: II (1/2) G

 Gas detection system: hazardous areas classification

Gas Detection Systems

Safety system
associated with the gas
detection
PN-EN 60079-29-3:
new standard binding
requirements of the
basic PN-EN 61508 with
the specificity of gas PN-EN PN-EN PN-EN
detection systems 61508 61511 60079-29-3

Manufacturer System
Safety system
of gas integrator and
integrator and
detection the
a gas detection
system devices manufacturer
Specify the type of gas
detection system
 Gas detection system: hazardous areas classification

PN-EN 15233 Methodology for functional safety assessment of protective

systems for hazardous areas

In the interests of both the manufacturer and the user is to establish a

common methodology for achieving functional safety, reliability and
efficiency of protective systems. Thus, the functional safety assessment is a
tool that provides the essential link between producers and users, but this
standard contains only aspects related manufacturers.

The overall explosion safety is designed to protect against the formation of

explosive atmospheres as well as sources of ignition and reduce the effects of
an explosion.

22
 Measurement methods of gas detection

1. Catalytic

2. Electrochemical

3. Infrared absorption

4. Semiconductor
 Catalytic method

 The sensor consists of two

platinum coils coated with a layer
of aluminum oxide

 One of the fibers is impregnated

with a special catalyst for
accelerating the oxidation process
(measuring element)

 The other fibers is designed as to

avoid oxidation (reference
element)

 Everything is placed in a
flameproof enclosure cell.
 Catalytic method

 The measuring principle is based on

the use of the oxidation of the
combustible gases on the surface of
the sensing element and an increase
in the temperature of sensing element

 The purpose of the flowe of currents

through the sensing element to keep
the temp. in the area of 450 °C, which
enables the oxidation of the gas.

 The combustion of flammable gas,

that is followed by an increase in the
temperature of sensing element
causes the asymmetry of the electrical
Measurement of gas
bridge.
concentration
Catalytic method
Advantages: Limitations:

• Linear signal in the range of • Damage caused by the

the LEL exposure to H2S, silicones,
• High repeatability mixtures of metals (Pb, Hg ...),
• High stability indications chlorine (Cl, ..) etc.
• Low sensitivity to changes of • Ambiguous signal above 100%
humidity LEL
• Short response time (<15 s) • Influence of non-flammable
• Long life (depending on gases on correct
working conditions, exposure measurement (e.g. > 6% CO2)
to poisonous gases) • Detection possible only in the
• Detection most of the presence > 10 % O2
combustible gases
• Suitable for measuring gas
mixtures
• Relatively low price
 Influence of the test time to maintain a given level of SIL

PFD log
-1
10

SIL 1
-2
10

SIL 2
PFDavg
10
-3 Δ

SIL 3

czas [a]
TI 2TI 3TI 4TI
Our technologies associated with monitoring Safety Maintenance
 29/1
Identification of effective ignition sources.

1. The following potential ignition sources should be taken into account:

1. Hot surfaces – if an explosive atmosphere comes into contact with a heated surface, ignition can
occur.
2. Flames and hot gases (including hot particles) – flames are associated with combustion reactions at
temperatures of more than 1 000 °C.
3. Mechanically generated sparks
4. Electrical apparatus
5. Stray electric currents and cathodic corrosion protection
6. Static electricity – the discharge of charged, insulated conductive parts can easily lead to incendive
sparks.
7. Lightning
8. Radio frequency (RF) electromagnetic waves from 104 Hz to 3 x 1011 Hz
9. Electromagnetic waves from 3 x 1011 Hz to 3 x 1015 Hz
10. Ionizing radiation
11. Ultrasonics
12. Adiabatic compression and shock waves
13. Exothermic reactions, including self-ignition of dusts
 EXAMPLE OF CLASSIFICATION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS TANK
According to the regulation / base fuel /
Zone 1 Zone 2
R1

vapor recovery Valves.

Tank petroleum product II CLASS
(21ºC<Tingnition< 55 ºC).

The main factors affecting the type and size of the

Fire breaker. zones.
Zone 2
Zone O
Installation and process: fuel storage.
Location: outer space limited bunding or wall covering.
R2 Ventilation: outer space, the level of high, availability of
good.
Product: Tignit = 35 C, operation temperature was ambient
temperature.
Emission source: (P) the overpressure valve. Inside the tank
continuous emission (C) outside the emission of the second
Wall. stage (S). Efficiency emissions low.
Detection: -
Hazardous areas:
Nozle: Zone 1 - a sphere of radius R 1 = 1.5 m from the outlet
of the pressure relief valve and Respiratory Division 2 for a
distance of 2m from the end of Zone 1.
Reservoir: Zone 2 - R 2 = 2 m from the tank shell.
Hazardous areas:
Nozzle: Zone 1 - a sphere of radius R 1 = 1.5 m from the
outlet of the pressure relief valve and Zone 2 for a distance
of 2m from the end of Zone 1.
Tank: Zone 2 - R 2 = 2 m from the tank shell.
SAFETY ANALYSIS

TECHNICAL
CONSULTING
 AUDITS
FUND OPTIMIZATION FOR SAFETY

The preliminary
stage COHERENCE FOR THE WHOLE PLANT
Identification of
the initial state +
guidelines DETERMINATION OF RESPONSIBILITY
Preparation stage

Strategic decisions
and actions, System
competency program
implementation
Operation and
Implementation of maintenance stage
standards and
verification
Implementation and
maintenance of
Any changes made in the
standards
Audits concern project after the transition to
each stage of the next stage require
the life cycle verification that does not
safety introduce significant changes
affecting the level of safety.
• Analysis of the PHA, HAZOP, FTA, FMEA, LOPA
• SRS safety requirements specification
• Determination of SIL
• SIL verification
• ATEX audits, process safety and functional
• Process safety management
RAFAŁ FRĄCZEK
Dział Analiz Technicznych
• Certified training system with ATEX issues, Automatic Systems Engineering Sp. z o.o.
process safety and functional
[email protected]
+48 603 056 211