Lecture Book 2 Pre Bar Review 2018 For Distribution
Lecture Book 2 Pre Bar Review 2018 For Distribution
Lecture Book 2 Pre Bar Review 2018 For Distribution
The crimes under national security have extra-territorial application. Even if the criminal act or
acts are committed outside the Philippine territorial jurisdiction, the offenders can be charged
and prosecuted before the Philippine Courts.
Note: The prosecution can proceed only if the offender is within the Philippine territory or
brought to the Philippines pursuant to an extradition treaty.
In the case of crimes against the law of nations, the offender can be prosecuted whenever he may
be found because the crimes are regarded as committed against humanity in general. These
crimes are considered crimes against humanity or crimes against mankind.
Almost all of these are crimes committed in times of war, except the following, which can be
committed in times of peace:
(1) Espionage
(2) Inciting to War or Giving Motives for Reprisals under Article 118
Article 114. Treason. Treason. — Any person who, owing allegiance to (the United States or)
the Government of the Philippine Islands, not being a foreigner, levies war against them or
adheres to their enemies, giving them aid or comfort within the Philippine Islands or
elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed
Four million pesos (₱4,000,000) pesos.
No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses at least to the
same overt act or on confession of the accused in open court.
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Likewise, an alien, residing in the Philippine Islands, who commits acts of treason as defined
in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be punished by prision mayor to death and shall pay a fine
not to exceed Four Million pesos. (As amended by Republic Act 10951).
Elements of treason:
When one lives in the Philippines, either as a citizen or as a resident alien, said individual is
presumed to owe allegiance to the Philippine Government. The individual is under obligation to
remain faithful and loyal to the Government of the Philippines.
Originally, treason is committed only by a Filipino citizen which is apparent under the first
paragraph of Article 114. The original concept is to the effect that only Filipino citizens owe their
country allegiance. But in the course of time, history has taught mankind and in particular the
Filipinos that such theory is impractical and has no pragmatic value. And so on May 31, 1945,
Executive Order No, 14 was promulgated introducing an amendment to Article 114, declaring
that resident aliens shall henceforth be liable for the crime of treason.
Because of the amendment, allegiance has earned a secondary meaning. It used to be that
there is only permanent allegiance. Now allegiance can be temporary. And while permanent
allegiance is demanded of a Filipino citizen, such is not required of an alien who is legally
expected to owe permanent allegiance to his mother country. But for staying or residing in the
Philippines, he should owe temporary allegiance to the Philippine Government in exchange for
the protection extended to him.
By its very nature, treason cannot be committed in time of peace. It is not an all time
offense. It is seasonal as it can be committed only during war time wherein the Philippines must
necessarily be involved. As treason is basically a war crime, it is made punishable by the State as
a measure of self-defense and self-preservation.
SC: In Laurel vs. Misa, 77 Phil. 865, “the law of treason is an emergency measure. It
remains dormant until the emergency arises. But as soon as war starts, it is relent lessly put into
effect. While in a state of hibernation during peacetime, it asserts its authority as a self-preserving
measure when actual hostilities begin.”
Why is treason punishable? --- It is made punishable by the State as a measure of self-defense
and self-preservation.
b) The second is by adhering to the enemies of the Philippines, giving them aid or comfort.
The term "levies war" means overt acts which translate into action the emotional or intellectual
sympathies of the offender towards the enemy country. It is manifested by the actual assemblying
of men who will engage the forces of Government. The war effort of the offenders must be to
overthrow the Government. It matters not how vain and futile the attempt may be. Success is not
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important. What matters is the actual assembly of men and the execution of treasonable design by
force.
In the end, the purpose of levying war is to deliver the country in whole or in part to a foreign
country.
By adherence and giving aid or comfort to the enemy. The two must go together. This is the
most common.
If first type is committed by multitude, the 2nd type can be committed by an individual.
Adherence must be understood to mean "intent to betray." It is a preparatory act and is not
therefore punishable by itself. When this adherence or sympathies are converted into aid and
comfort, only then do they take material form. This material form is now what is made
punishable.
NOTE: Adherence alone without giving aid or comfort is not treason. Both adherence and
giving aid or comfort must go hand in hand.
Principle: No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses
at least to the same overt act or on confession of the accused in open court.
Q: Why so restrictive?
A: The law theoretically assumes that treason is committed during abnormal times and in order to
avoid a miscarriage of justice, the two-witness rule was adopted. The purpose is to prevent mortal
enemies from resorting to unscrupulous means to get even with enemies taking advantage of an
extremely abnormal time (People vs. Escleto, 84 Phil. 121).
Q: Suppose 1 witness testified that Kaloy committed this act on November 9, 2 nd witness testified
that Kaloy committed another act in November 10. Will Kaloy be convicted of treason?
A: NO. Because although there are 2 witnesses but each one testify to 2 different acts, not on the
same act of treason. What happens here? – the 2-witness rule is not present – the accused must be
acquitted.
The two-witness rule must be observed for each and every external act performed by the offender.
Q: Can treason be complexed with common crimes? Example: Can there be Treason with
Homicide or Treason with Arson?
A: Treason cannot be complexed with common crimes. Treason is an umbrella crime or a
component crime under which common crimes committed on the occasion or in furtherance
thereof are deemed absorbed.
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By its very nature, treason can only be committed as a felony by means of dolo. It is inherently an
intentional crime and must be committed with malice and with deliberate intent. It cannot be
committed by means of culpa or through reckless imprudence or simple negligence.
The manner in which both crimes are committed is the same. There is levying of war against the
forces of government. In treason however, the purpose of the offender is to deliver the
government to the enemy country or to a foreign power. In rebellion, the purpose of the rebels is
to substitute the government with their own form of government. No foreign power is involved.
In treason, the offender repudiates his allegiance to the government by means of force or
intimidation. He does not recognize the supreme authority of the State. He violates his allegiance
by fighting the forces of the duly constituted authorities.
In sedition, the offender disagrees with certain policies of the State and seeks to disturb public
peace by raising a commotion or public uprising.
2) No matter how many acts of treason are committed by the offender, he will be liable for
only one crime of treason. The series of acts performed by the offender are considered
indispensable elements of the crime, hence, they are absorbed.
4) In the imposition of the penalty for the crime of treason, the court may disregard the
presence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. It may consider only the number,
nature and gravity of the acts established during the trial. The imposition of the penalty
rests largely on the exercise of judicial discretion.
5) Treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength are absorbed in the crime
of treason.
Article 115. Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Treason. -Penalty. — The conspiracy and
proposal to commit the crime of treason shall be punished respectively, by prision mayor
and a fine not exceeding Two Million pesos, and by prision correccional and a fine not
exceeding One Million pesos. (As amended by Republic Act 10951)
General Rule: Under Article 8, conspiracy and proposal to commit a felony or to violate a special
law is not a crime.
Exception: Article 115, the mere conspiracy or proposal to commit treason is a felony.
Note: It is worthy to note at this juncture that while treason as a crime should be established by
the two-witness rule, the same is not observed when the crime committed is conspiracy to commit
treason or when it is only a proposal to commit treason. In the example cited above, even if only
one witness is presented to prove the meeting between General Ricarte and Francisco Bautista,
such testimony will be sufficient to prove the overt act of the actual meeting.
Note that what is being discussed and articulated is a conspiracy to commit treason. Supposing
therefore that the conspiracy was carried out, meaning, that overt acts were performed,
translating into action the emotional and intellectual sympathies of the offender, the crime
committed will no longer be called conspiracy to commit treason. Instead, the crime of treason is
already constituted. What will happen to the conspiracy to commit treason ? It will only be
considered as a means to commit the crime of treason. It is not regarded as a separate offense.
Although theoretically two crimes are committed, one for conspiracy to commit treason and the
other for treason, the conspiracy will only be considered as an element of treason. And because
conspiracy connotes a meeting of minds, then it follows that the act of one should be the act of
all.
This is what we call “conspiracy as a crime by itself”. When the acts of treason are carried out,
the conspiracy becomes a means to commit treason and shall be absorbed in the crime of treason.
Art. 116. Misprision of treason. — Every person owing allegiance to (the United States) the
Government of the Philippine Islands, without being a foreigner, and having knowledge of
any conspiracy against them, conceals or does not disclose and make known the same, as
soon as possible to the governor or fiscal of the province, or the mayor or fiscal of the city in
which he resides, as the case may be, shall be punished as an accessory to the crime of
treason.
Elements
3. He conceals or does not disclose and make known the same as soon as possible to the
governor or fiscal of the province in which he resides, or the mayor or fiscal of the city in
which he resides.
Misprision of treason is a felony committed by omission. This is an exception to the general rule
that mere silence of one knowing the commission of a felony does not a commit a crime under
the RPC. --- the offender is liable for failure to do an act.
Note that even aliens can commit the crime of treason because of the amendment to the article,
but no such amendment was made in misprision of treason. Misprision of treason is a crime that
may be committed only by citizens of the Philippines. --- “every person owing allegiance to the
government without being a foreigner”.
Note: The criminal liability arises if the treasonous activity was still at the conspiratorial stage.
Because if the treason already erupted into an overt act, the implication is that the government is
already aware of it. There is no need to report the same. This is a felony by omission although
committed with dolo, not with culpa.
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Take Note: you must not be in conspiracy with the other. The situation here is a stranger who has
knowledge of any conspiracy failed to report the matter.
Example: Suppose A has knowledge that X is giving aid or comfort to the enemy but A did not
report this matter to the proper authorities. Is A I liable for misprision of treason?
Ans: NO. There is no conspiracy to commit treason here because treason has already been
committed. Here, knowledge of the crime of treason and not knowledge of the conspiracy.
Whether the conspirators are parents or children, and the ones who learn the conspiracy is a
parent or child, they are required to report the same. The reason is that although blood is thicker
than water so to speak, when it comes to security of the state, blood relationship is always
subservient to national security. Article 20 does not apply here because the persons found liable
for this crime are not considered accessories; they are treated as principals.
Article 117. Espionage — The penalty of prision correccional shall be inflicted upon any
person who:
(a) Without authority therefore, enters a warship, fort, or naval or military establishment
or reservation to obtain any information, plans, photographs, or other data of a confidential
nature relative to the defense of the Philippine Archipelago; or
(b) Being in possession, by reason of the public office he holds, of the articles, data, or
information referred to in the preceding paragraph, discloses their contents to a repre-
sentative of a foreign nation.
The penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed if the offender be a public officer or
employee.
Elements
2. By disclosing to the representative of a foreign nation the contents of the articles, data or
information referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 117, which he had in his possession by
reason of the public office he holds.
Elements
Under the first mode of committing espionage, the offender must have the intention to obtain
information relative to the defense of the Philippines. It is not necessary that the offender has
obtained the information. It is sufficient that he entered the prohibited premises. Here, the
offender is any private individual, whether an alien or a citizen of the Philippines, or a public
officer.
Under the second mode, the offender must be a public officer who has in his possession the
articles, data or information by reason of the office he holds. Taking advantage of his official
position, he reveals or discloses the information which are confidential and relevant to the
defense of the Philippines.
If the offender is not the custodian of the said documents, he is not liable for Espionage but for
Violation of Commonwealth Act No. 616 if he discloses information relative to the defense of the
Philippines.
If the information disclosed to a representative of a foreign nation does not relate to the defense
of the Philippines and the offender is the custodian thereof, he is liable for Infidelity in the Custody
of Public Records.
Commonwealth Act No. 616 – An Act to Punish Espionage and Other Offenses against National
Security.
Acts punished
Elements
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This crime is committed in time of peace. What is important here is on the effect of what you
did.
Q: Why prohibited?
A: It disturbs the friendly relation that our country may have with another country.
Article 119. Violation of Neutrality. — The penalty of prision correccional shall be inflicted
upon anyone who, on the occasion of a war in which the Government is not involved,
violates any regulation issued by competent authority for the purpose of enforcing
neutrality.
There must be a war going on between nations, but the Philippines is not a party to the war. To
maintain its neutrality, the Philippine Government promulgates rules to protect its interest. The
offender violates any of the rules promulgated. The violation can be done either by means of dolo
or by means of culpa. So violation of neutrality can be committed through reckless imprudence.
Example: Japan and China are at war. China invaded Japan. The Philippine government did not
want to embroil itself in the war. The President of the Philippines upon due consultation with the
House of Senate and House of Representatives adopted a policy of neutrality and disseminated
the regulations for its enforcement. A, a Filipino businessman, violated the regulations enforcing
neutrality by giving financial and material aid to China. X is liable for Violation of Neutrality.
Article 120. Correspondence with hostile country. — Any person who, in time of war, shall
have correspondence with an enemy country or territory occupied by enemy troops shall be
punished:
Elements
Article 121. Flight to Enemy's Country The penalty of arresto mayor shall be inflicted
upon any person who, owing allegiance to the Government, attempts to flee or go to an
enemy country when prohibited by competent authority.
Elements
Example: Singapore declared war against the Philippines. War raged on. X, a Filipino citizen,
boarded a plane bound for Singapore. Before the plane could take off, X was arrested by the
authorities. Is X liable for Flight to enemy's country?
Answer: Yes, X is liable for Flight to Enemy's Country. He attempted to flee or go to the enemy
country. This crime is consummated by mere attempt.
Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas or in Philippine waters, shall attack
or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the
whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its
complement or passengers.
The same penalty shall be inflicted in case of mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine
waters. (As amended by RA 7659)
Definition of piracy.
It is the robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas without lawful authority and done with
animo lucrandi and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility (People vs. Lol-lo, et al., 43
Phil. 19).
Robbery is the taking of a personal property belonging to another with intent to gain by:
Piracy is considered as a crime against the whole world. It is a crime against mankind. Along this
line, pirates can be prosecuted wherever they may go and wherever they are arrested. The pirates
violate not the law of a particular country but the law of nations.
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2. Offenders are neither members of its complement nor passengers of the vessel;
3. Offenders either –
b. seize in the vessel while on the high seas or in Philippine waters the whole or part
of its cargo, its equipment or personal belongings of its complement or
passengers;
If a person is lawfully admitted to the vessel other than a crew or a complement of the vessel,
then he is a passenger. If he gets a personal property belonging to another passenger while the
vessel is in the high or open seas by means of force or intimidation, he is liable for ROBBERY
and not PIRACY. (Bar question 2008)
But if he boards the vessel without being lawfully admitted thereto, and divests a passenger of his
personal property by means of violence or intimidation or force upon things, he is liable for PI-
RACY on the high or open seas. He is still considered as outsider not being a passenger in the
contemplation of law.
Notes: Originally, piracy and mutiny can only be committed on the high seas (outside of Philippine
waters).
In 1974, PD 532 (The Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974) was enacted punishing
Piracy committed in internal waters or Philippine waters, but not Mutiny.
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1. Piracy under the Revised Penal Code committed on the high seas;
2. Piracy in Philippine waters or internal waters.
PD 532 was superseded by RA 7659, The Anti-Heinous Crime Law. RA 7659 (The Anti-Heinous
Crime Law) pro tanto superseded PD 532 by punishing Piracy as well as Mutiny, whether committed
on the high seas or in Philippine waters and the penalty was increased from reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua.
Thus, Piracy can now be committed on the high or open seas or in Philippine waters. And Mutiny
can now be committed on the high or open seas and also in Philippine waters.
Q: While X was on board his boat at the Agno River, Y attacked him and with the use of a gun
seized his personal belongings. What crime did Y commit? Why?
A: Y committed Piracy. Under PD 532 as amended, Piracy can now be committed in Philippine
waters by outsiders to the vessel or who are not passengers or members of the crew. Pirates are
outsiders of the vessel.
ABETTING PIRACY (PD 532) — is the crime committed by any person who:
1. Gives pirates information about the movement of peace officers of the government;
2. Acquires or receives property taken by the pirates or devices any benefit from it;
3. Directly or indirectly abets the commission thereof.
Q: What is mutiny?
A: it is the unlawful resistance to a superior officer, or the raising of commotions & disturbance
on board a ship against the authority of its commander. The last par of Art. 122 provides that the
same penalty prescribed for piracy shall be inflicted in the case of mutiny on the high seas or in
Philippine waters.
Elements of mutiny
3. Offenders either –
b. seize the whole or part of the cargo, its equipment, or personal belongings of the
crew or passengers.
(1) As to offenders
Piracy is committed by persons who are not members of the complement or the
passengers of the vessel.
Example of Mutiny in the High or Open Seas: MV Panama is owned and registered under the
laws of Panama. While the vessel was in the Pacific Ocean, the members of the crew rebelled
against internal management of the vessel. They defied the ship captain and controlled the vessel.
The members of the crew are liable for Mutiny on the High or Open Seas.
Example of Mutiny within Philippine Waters: MV PRINCESS OF THE STARS, a merchant ship
registered in Holland docked at Pier 14 Manila Bay. The members of the crew or passengers
attacked the ship captain and seized control of the vessel. What crime was committed? Ans: They
committed the crime of Mutiny within Philippine waters. Under RA 7659, Mutiny can now be
committed in Philippine waters.
Art. 123. Qualified piracy. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed
upon those who commit any of the crimes referred to in the preceding article, under any of
the following circumstances:
1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon the same;
2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without means of saving
themselves; or
Elements
2. Offenders may or may not be members of its complement, or passengers of the vessel;
3. Offenders either –
b. seize the whole or part of the cargo, its equipment., or personal belongings of the
crew or passengers;
a. whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon the same;
b. whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without means of saving
themselves; or
Example: A passenger of an interisland vessel robbed and killed another passenger by stabbing
him at the back for several times. The Prosecutor's Office filed a complex crime of Piracy with
Murder. Is the charge correct? Why?
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Ans: The charge is not correct. Murder, rape, homicide, or physical injuries are mere
circumstances qualifying piracy. Any of these crimes cannot be complexed with piracy. A special
law cannot be complexed with a felony under the Revised Penal Code. Only felonies can be
complexed with one another.
When any of the crimes of murder, homicide, rape, physical injuries accompany piracy is
committed, there is no complex crime. Instead, there is only one crime committed — qualified
piracy. Murder, rape, homicide, physical injuries are mere circumstances qualifying piracy and
cannot be punished as separate crimes, nor can they be complexed with piracy.
Rule: There is no complex crime of Piracy with Murder, Piracy with Homicide, Piracy with
Rape, etc.
Qualified Mutiny
Article 123 merely refers to qualified piracy. There is now a crime of qualified mutiny.
(1) When the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves;
(2) When the mutiny is accompanied by rape, murder, homicide, or physical injuries.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6235 (The Anti-Hijacking Law) – this is known as aircraft piracy.
(2) usurping or seizing control of an aircraft of foreign registry while within Philippine
territory, compelling the pilots thereof to land in any part of Philippine territory;
(3) carrying or loading on board an aircraft operating as a public utility passenger aircraft in
the Philippines, any flammable, corrosive, explosive, or poisonous substance; and
(4) loading, shipping, or transporting on board a cargo aircraft operating as a public utility in
the Philippines, any flammable, corrosive, explosive, or poisonous substance if this was
done not in accordance with the rules and regulations set and promulgated by the Air
Transportation Office on this matter.
1. Whenever he has fired upon the pilot, member of the crew or passenger of the aircraft;
2. Whenever he has exploded or attempted to explode any bomb or explosive to destroy
the aircraft; or
3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, serious physical injuries or
rape.
Between numbers 1 and 2, the point of distinction is whether the aircraft is of Philippine registry
or foreign registry.
The important thing is that before the anti hi-jacking law can apply, the aircraft must be in flight.
If not in flight, whatever crimes committed shall be governed by the Revised Penal Code.
The law makes a distinction between aircraft of a foreign registry and of Philippine registry. If
the aircraft subject of the hi-jack is of Philippine registry, it should be in flight at the time of the
hi-jacking. Otherwise, the anti hi-jacking law will not apply and the crime is still punished under
the Revised Penal Code. The correlative crime may be one of grave coercion or grave threat. If
somebody is killed, the crime is homicide or murder, as the case may be. If there are some
explosives carried there, the crime is destructive arson. Explosives are by nature pyro-
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techniques. Destruction of property with the use of pyro-technique is destructive arson. If there
is illegally possessed or carried firearm, other special laws will apply.
On the other hand, if the aircraft is of foreign registry, the law does not require that it be in flight
before the anti hi-jacking law can apply. This is because aircrafts of foreign registry are
considered in transit while they are in foreign countries. Although they may have been in a
foreign country, technically they are still in flight, because they have to move out of that foreign
country.
So even if any of the acts mentioned were committed while the exterior doors of the foreign
aircraft were still open, the anti hi-jacking law will already govern.
Note that under this law, an aircraft is considered in flight from the moment all exterior doors are
closed following embarkation until such time when the same doors are again opened for
disembarkation. This means that there are passengers that boarded. So if the doors are closed to
bring the aircraft to the hangar, the aircraft is not considered as in flight. The aircraft shall be
deemed to be already in flight even if its engine has not yet been started.
Note: There is no hi-jacking in the attempted stage. This is a special law where the attempted
stage is not punishable.
Q: A Philippine Air Lines aircraft is bound for Davao. While the pilot and co-pilot are taking
their snacks at the airport lounge, some of the armed men were also there. The pilots were
followed by these men on their way to the aircraft. As soon as the pilots entered the cockpit, they
pulled out their firearms and gave instructions where to fly the aircraft. Does the anti hi-jacking
law apply?
Ans: No. The passengers have yet to board the aircraft. If at that time, the offenders are
apprehended, the law will not apply because the aircraft is not yet in flight. Note that the aircraft
is of Philippine registry.
Q: While the stewardess of a Philippine Air Lines plane bound for Cebu was waiting for the
passenger manifest, two of its passengers seated near the pilot surreptitiously entered the pilot
cockpit. At gunpoint, they directed the pilot to fly the aircraft to the Middle East. However,
before the pilot could fly the aircraft towards the Middle East, the offenders were subdued and the
aircraft landed. What crime was committed?
Ans: The aircraft was not yet in flight. Considering that the stewardess was still waiting for the
passenger manifest, the doors were still open. Hence, the anti hi-jacking law is not applicable.
Instead, the Revised Penal Code shall govern. The crime committed was grave coercion or grave
threat, depending upon whether or not any serious offense violence was inflicted upon the pilot.
However, if the aircraft were of foreign registry, the act would already be subject to the anti hi-
jacking law because there is no requirement for foreign aircraft to be in flight before such law
would apply. The reason for the distinction is that as long as such aircraft has not returned to its
home base, technically, it is still considered in transit or in flight.
As to numbers 3 and 4 of Republic Act No. 6235, the distinction is whether the aircraft is a
passenger aircraft or a cargo aircraft. In both cases, however, the law applies only to public
utility aircraft in the Philippines. Private aircrafts are not subject to the anti hi-jacking law, in so
far as transporting prohibited substances are concerned.
If the aircraft is a passenger aircraft, the prohibition is absolute. Carrying of any prohibited,
flammable, corrosive, or explosive substance is a crime under Republic Act No. 6235. But if the
aircraft is only a cargo aircraft, the law is violated only when the transporting of the prohibited
substance was not done in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the Air
Transportation Office in the matter of shipment of such things. The Board of Transportation
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provides the manner of packing of such kind of articles, the quantity in which they may be loaded
at any time, etc. Otherwise, the anti hi-jacking law does not apply.
Q: During a random inspection inside a Malaysian Airlines at the NAIA and before take off, Mr.
X, a passenger from Syria was found in possession of an explosive substance. The passengers
panicked. Mr. X was arrested. What crime did Mr. X commit? Why?
Ans: Mr. X committed the crime of violation of the Anti-Hijacking Law. The law punishes
carrying or loading on board a public utility passenger aircraft operating in the Philippines, any
flammable, corrosive or poisonous substance.
Q: In the course of the hi-jack, a passenger or complement was shot and killed. What crime or
crimes were committed?
Ans: The crime remains to be a violation of the anti hi-jacking law, but the penalty thereof shall
be higher because a passenger or complement of the aircraft had been killed. The crime of
homicide or murder is not committed.
Q: The hi-jackers threatened to detonate a bomb in the course of the hi-jack. What crime or
crimes were committed?
Ans: Again, the crime is violation of the anti hi-jacking law. The separate crime of grave threat is
not committed. This is considered as a qualifying circumstance that shall serve to increase the
penalty.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9372 --- HUMAN SECURITY ACT OF 2007 AN ACT TO SECURE
THE STATE AND PROTECT OUR PEOPLE FROM TERRORISM
What is Terrorism?
Acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or
particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or any other
nature that may be invoked to justify them.
"Any act intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the
purpose of:
A: The crime of Terrorism is committed by any person who engages in any of the following acts
punishable under the Revised Penal Code and other special laws:
Special Laws:
(1) The act committed sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace;
(2) In order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.
Q: Have the enumerated felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the crimes under the
specified special laws been entirely repealed by RA 9372? Are there no more crimes of Piracy,
Rebellion, Coup d' etat, Murder, Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, Illegal Possession of
Firearms, Hijacking, Piracy and the like?
A: No. The said felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the crimes under the aforementioned
special laws still exist.
Thus, when a person kills another with the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery, the
felony committed is still Murder.
The killing becomes Terrorism only if Murder has reached that magnitude as to sow and create a
condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand.
A careful scrutiny of the definition of terrorism would show that the crime can be committed only if
any of the crimes listed under RA 9372 is committed and it sows and creates a condition of widespread
and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in
to an unlawful demand.
Mere Conspiracy to commit Terrorism is punishable. The moment the conspirators commit any
act of terrorism however, they are no longer liable for Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism. They are
already liable for the crime of Terrorism.
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Who are the persons liable for Terrorism and Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism?
ACCOMPLICE TO THE CRIME OF TERRORISM is any person who, not being a principal
under Art. 17 of the RPC or a conspirator as defined in Sec. 4 of RA 9372, cooperates in the
execution of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism by previous or
simultaneous acts. (Sec. 5, RA 9372)
ACCESSORY TO THE CRIME OF TERRORISM is any person who having knowledge and
without having participated t herein, either as principal or accomplice under Articles 17 and 18 of
the RPC, takes part subsequent to its omission in any of the following manner:
Accessories to the Crime of Terrorism Who are Exempt from Criminal Liability
No penalties shall be imposed upon the following:
"Spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural and adopted brothers and sisters or
relatives by affinity within the same degrees in paragraphs (b) and (c)."
Notes: The relatives mentioned above are the same as those listed in mitigating circumstances of
vindication of a grave offense [Art. 13(5)] and in the alternative circumstances (Art. 15) and Art.
20 of the Revised Penal Code.
2. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities (Art. 125);
6. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained
(Art. 129);
Crimes under this title are those which violate the Bill of Rights accorded to the citizens under the
Constitution. Under this title, the offenders are public officers, except as to the last crime –
offending the religious feelings under Article 133, which refers to any person.
Article 124. Arbitrary detention. — Any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds,
detains a person, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if the detention has not exceeded three days;
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
detention has continued more than three but not more than fifteen days;
3. The penalty of prision mayor, if the detention has continued for more than fifteen
days but not more than six months; and
4. That of reclusion temporal, if the detention shall have exceeded six months.
The commission of a crime, or violent insanity or any other ailment requiring the
compulsory confinement of the patient in a hospital, shall be considered legal grounds for
the detention of any person.
Elements
2. He detains a person;
3. The person detained has no ailment which requires compulsory confinement in a hospital.
1. Commission of a crime
2. Violent insanity or other ailment requiring compulsory confinement of a patient in a hospital.
19
Usual cause of arbitrary detention – a public officer arrests & detains somebody without any
warrant.
Note: In the crime of arbitrary detention, although the offender is a public officer, not any public
officer can commit this crime. Only those public officers whose official duties carry with it the
authority to make an arrest and detain persons can be guilty of this crime. So, if the offender does
not possess such authority, the crime committed by him is illegal detention. A public officer who
is acting outside the scope of his official duties is no better than a private citizen.
Under Rule 113, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, the following are considered as legal grounds
for a warrantless arrest and for detaining a person, without violating the law on arbitrary
detention: when the person to be arrested has committed, is already committing or is attempting
to commit an offense in the presence of the public officer; or when an offense has in fact been
committed and he has personal knowledge of the fact that the person to be arrested has
committed it; or when the person to be arrested is an escaped prisoner.
Example: A janitor at the Quezon City Hall was assigned in cleaning the men’s room. One day,
he noticed a fellow urinating so carelessly that instead of urinating at the bowl, he was actually
urinating partly on the floor. The janitor resented this. He stepped out of the men’s room and
locked the same. He left. The fellow was able to come out only after several hours when people
from the outside forcibly opened the door. Is the janitor liable for arbitrary detention?
Ans: No. Even if he is a public officer, he is not permitted by his official function to arrest and
detain persons. Therefore, he is guilty only of illegal detention. While the offender is a public
officer, his duty does not include the authority to make arrest; hence, the crime committed is
illegal detention.
Example: A municipal treasurer has been courting his secretary. However, the latter always
turned him down. Thereafter, she tried to avoid him. One afternoon, the municipal treasurer
locked the secretary inside their office until she started crying. The treasurer opened the door and
allowed her to go home. What crime was committed?
Ans: Illegal detention. This is because the municipal treasurer has no authority to detain a person
although he is a public officer.
Whether the crime is arbitrary detention or illegal detention, it is necessary that there must be an
actual restraint of liberty of the offended party. If there is no actual restraint, as the offended
party may still go to the place where he wants to go, even though there have been warnings, the
crime of arbitrary detention or illegal detention is not committed. There is either grave or light
threat.
However, if the victim is under guard in his movement such that there is still restraint of liberty,
then the crime of either arbitrary or illegal detention is still committed.
20
(1) As to offender
In arbitrary detention, the offender is a public officer possessed with authority to make
arrests.
In arbitrary detention, the main reason for detaining the offended party is to deny him of
his liberty.
In unlawful arrest, the purpose is to accuse the offended party of a crime he did not
commit, to deliver the person to the proper authority, and to file the necessary charges in
a way trying to incriminate him.
When a person is unlawfully arrested, his subsequent detention is without legal grounds.
Article 125. Delay in the Delivery of Detained Persons to the Proper Judicial Authorities.-
The penalties provided in the next preceding articles shall be imposed upon the public
officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to
deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of twelve (12) hours,
for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours
for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent, and thirty-
six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their
equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention
and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his
attorney or counsel. (As amended by Executive Order Nos. 59 and 72, Nov. 7,1986 and July
25, 1987, respectively.)
Elements
In this offense, the initial detention of the person is lawful unlike the situation contemplated
under Article 124, wherein the detention of the person is unlawful from the very beginning. The
only reason why the offender under Article 125 is punished for arbitrary detention is because of
his failure to deliver the offended party to the proper judicial officer within the period prescribed
by law. (See Executive Order No. 272 which directs the delivery of any person deprived of his
liberty to judicial officers within 12 hours if the crime committed is light; 18 hours if the crime
committed is less grave and within 36 hours if the crime committed is grave.)
Article 125 covers situations wherein the person detained has been arrested without a warrant but
his arrest is nonetheless lawful. It is a felony committed by omission because of the failure of the
offender to deliver the detained person to the proper judicial authority within 12 hours, 18 hours
21
and 36 hours as the case may be. Under the law, when the person detained is charged with a
crime punishable by light penalties, he should be referred to the proper judicial authorities within
12 hours; 18 hours if he is charged of an offense punishable by correctional penalties; and 36
hours if he is charged of an offense punishable by afflictive penalties.
When a person is detained for the commission of a crime, his arrest having been effected
without a warrant and his case is within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, he may ask
for a preliminary investigation but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125, as
amended. When such is availed of by the accused, the preliminary investigation must be
terminated within a period of fifteen (15) days from its inception. This is the requirement of
Section 7, par. 2, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
This article does not apply if the arrest is with a warrant. The situation contemplated here is an
arrest without a warrant.
Q: Within what period should a police officer who has arrested a person under a warrant of arrest
turn over the arrested person to the judicial authority?
A: There is no time limit specified except that the return must be made within a reasonable time.
The period fixed by law under Article 125 does not apply because the arrest was made by virtue
of a warrant of arrest.
Q: The arrest of the suspect was done in Baguio City. On the way to Manila, where the crime
was committed, there was a typhoon so the suspect could not be brought to Manila until three
days later. Was there a violation of Article 125?
A: There was a violation of Article 125. The crime committed was arbitrary detention in the
form of delay in the delivery of arrested person to the proper judicial authority. The typhoon or
flood is a matter of defense to be proved by the accused, the arresting officer, as to whether he is
liable. In this situation, he may be exempt under paragraph 7 of Article 12.
Q: What if the law violated is a special law? What is the allowable period that the said person be
detained by the policemen?
A: In case the law violated is a special law, check the penalty imposable by the special law and
determine if it is grave, less grave or light felony. That is the basis for determining the period of
time during which an arresting officer can legally hold on to the person arrested with legal ground
and without a warrant of arrest.
Q: What should be done by an arresting officer who legally arrested a person without warrant of
arrest.
A: Have the person arrested charged in court within the proper period provided for under Art. 125
so that he will not be liable for Ar bitrary detention. Filing of the appropriate case at the fiscal's
office i s a sufficient compliance of the law. If he cannot file the case for whatever reason, valid or not,
he should release the person nrrested from detention.
Example: A police officer arrested a person without warrant of arrest with legal ground in a far
flung place for the crime of Attempted Homicide. In bringing the person arrested to the
municipality, they have to cross seven mountains, seven hills and seven seas. Under the law,
Attempted Homicide is punishable with Prision correccional which has a legal duration of 6
months and one day to 6 years. Since the penalty is a correctional penalty, the arresting officer
should file the case within 18 hours from the time that he arrested the person.
What if for the reason given above, the arresting officer fails to cause the filing of the case within
the time provided for by law, was there violation of Art. 125?
22
Ans: Yes, there was a violation of Art. 125 and the arresting officer maybe charged criminally.
Q: If you were the counsel for the arresting officer what is your defense?
Ans: If I were the counsel for the arresting officer, I will invoke as defense the exempting
circumstance of insuperable cause under paragraph 7 of Art. 12 of the Revised Penal Code. The
arresting officer was prevented from performing an act
required by law by the physical impossibility of bringing the person arrested to the fold of law.
SEC. 18. Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest. - The provisions of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement
personnel, who, having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken
custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of
conspiracy to commit terrorism shall, without incurring any criminal liability for delay in the
delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities, deliver said charged or suspected
person to the proper judicial authority within a period of three (3) days counted from the moment
the said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into
custody by the said police, or law enforcement personnel: Provided, That the arrest of those
suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result from the
surveillance under Section 7 and examination of bank deposits under Section 27 of this Act.
The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before detaining the person suspected
of the crime of terrorism, present him or her before any judge at the latter's residence or office
nearest the place where the arrest took place at any time of the day or night. It shall be the duty of
the judge, among other things, to ascertain the identity of the police or law enforcement personnel
and the person or persons they have arrested and presented before him or her, to inquire of them
the reasons why they have arrested the person and determine by questioning and personal
observation whether or not the suspect has been subjected to any physical, moral or psychological
torture by whom and why. The judge shall then submit a written report of what he/she had
observed when the subject was brought before him to the proper court that has jurisdiction over
the case of the person thus arrested, the judge shall forthwith submit his/her report within three
(3) calendar days from the time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office.
Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism
or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law enforcement personnel shall notify in writing
the judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest: Provided, That where the arrest
is made during saturdays, sundays, holidays or after office hours, the written notice shall be
served at the residence of the judge nearest the place where the accused was arrested.
The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed
upon the police or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify any judge as provided in the
preceding paragraph.
SEC. 19 Period of Detention in the Event of an Actual or Imminent Terrorist Attack. - In the event
of an actual or imminent terrorist attack, suspects may not be detained for more than three (3)
days without the written approval of a municipal, city, provincial or regional official of a Human
Rights Commission or judge of the municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice
of the Court of Appeals nearest the place of the arrest. If the arrest is made during Saturdays,
Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the arresting police or law enforcement personnel shall
bring the person thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is
nearest the place where the accused was arrested. The approval in writing of any of the said
officials shall be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned within five (5)
days after the date of the detention of the persons concerned: Provided, however, That within
three (3) days after the detention the suspects, whose connection with the terror attack or threat is
not established, shall be released immediately.
SEC. 20. Penalty for Failure to Deliver Suspect to the Proper Judicial Authority Within Three (3)
Days. - The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be
imposed upon any police or law enforcement personnel who has apprehended or arrested,
detained and taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
23
conspiracy to commit terrorism and fails to deliver such charged or suspected person to the
proper judicial authority within the period of three (3) days.
What are the liabilities of public officers under the Human Security Act?
1. Failure to turn over detainee within three (3) days to judicial authorities.
2. Infidelity in the custody of detainees.
3. Furnishing false evidence, forged document or spurious evidence.
Article 126. Delaying Release. - The penalties provided for in Article 124 shall be imposed
upon any public officer or employee who delays for the period of time specified therein the
performance of any judicial or executive order for the release of a prisoner or detention
prisoner, or unduly delays the service of the notice of such order to said prisoner or the
proceedings upon any petition for the liberation of such person.
Acts punished
1. Delaying the performance of a judicial or executive order for the release of a prisoner;
2. Unduly delaying the service of the notice of such order to said prisoner;
3. Unduly delaying the proceedings upon any petition for the liberation of such person.
Elements
2. There is a judicial or executive order for the release of a prisoner or detention prisoner, or
that there is a proceeding upon a petition for the liberation of such person;
b. the performance of such judicial or executive order for the release of the
prisoner; or
Example: The judge ordered the dismissal of the criminal case & ordered the release of the
prisoner but the Warden refused to release the accused – liable.
The public officers most likely to commit this offense are the wardens, jailers and peace officers,
temporarily in charge of prisoners or detained persons.
Article 127. Expulsion. - The penalty of prision correctional shall be imposed upon any
public officer or employee who, not being thereunto authorized by law, shall expel any
person from the Philippine Islands or shall compel such person to change his residence.
There are two acts made punishable under this law: One is by expelling a person from the
Philippines; and the other is by compelling a person to change his residence.
Elements
2. He either –
This crime should be correlated with Section 6, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution. – what is
violated here is your liberty of abode.
Only the President of the Philippines can expel a person (power of deportation) thru the
Commission of Immigration – overstaying aliens. The power of the President to deport aliens is
an ACT OF THE STATE where the SC has no power to interfere with or to control the action of
the President. The discretionary power to deport “undesirable aliens” whose continued presence
in the country is a menace to the peace and safety of the community is an act of the State.
The essence of this crime is coercion but the specific crime is “expulsion” when committed by a
public officer. If committed by a private person, the crime is grave coercion.
Article 128. Violation of Domicile. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who, not being authorized by
judicial order, shall enter any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof, search papers
or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner, or, having sur-
reptitiously entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the premises, shall refuse to
do so.
If the offense be committed in the nighttime, or if any papers or effects not constituting
evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the offender, the
penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Element:
2. He is not authorized by judicial order to enter the dwelling or to make a search therein for
papers or other effects.
1. If committed at nighttime; or
2. If any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime are not returned immediately
after the search made by offender.
In order to commit this crime, the entry must be against the will of the owner. If the entry is only
without the consent of the owner, the crime of violation of domicile is not committed.
The primary object of the law is to preserve the privacy of abode of the offended party. Hence, if
the privacy is already lost, as when the offender has been allowed by the owner to enter the
dwelling together with other persons, any subsequent change of attitude will not restore the
privacy which was already lost. When privacy is waived, trespass to dwelling or violation of
domicile cannot be committed.
Take Note: Article 128 is limited to public officers. The public officers who may be liable for
crimes against the fundamental laws are those who are possessed of the authority to execute
search warrants and warrants of arrests.
Under Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court, when a person to be arrested enters a premise and
closes it thereafter, the public officer, after giving notice of an arrest, can break into the premise.
He shall not be liable for violation of domicile.
There are only three recognized instances when search without a warrant is considered valid, and,
therefore, the seizure of any evidence done is also valid. Outside of these, search would be
invalid and the objects seized would not be admissible in evidence.
25
(2) Where the search was made on a moving vehicle or vessel such that the exigency of he
situation prevents the searching officer from securing a search warrant;
(3) When the article seized is within plain view of the officer making the seizure without
making a search therefore.
(2) Searching papers or other effects without the previous consent of the owner;
(3) Refusing to leave the premises after having surreptitious entered said dwelling and after
having been required to leave.
Q: A person surreptitiously enters the dwelling of another. What crime or crimes were possibly
committed?
Ans: The crimes committed are (1) qualified trespass to dwelling under Article 280, if there was
an express or implied prohibition against entering. This is tantamount to entering against the will
of the owner; and (2) violation of domicile in the third form if he refuses to leave after being told
to.
Article 129. Search Warrants Maliciously Obtained, and Abuse in the Service of Those
Legally Obtained - In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission
of any other offense, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding Two Hundred Thousand pesos
shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall procure a search warrant
without just cause, or, having legally procured the same, shall exceed his authority or use
unnecessary severity in executing the same. (As amended by Republic Act 10951)
Acts punished
Elements
Elements
The true test of lack of just cause is whether the sworn statement filed in support of the
application for search warrant has been done in such a manner that perjury could be charged and
the affiant can be held liable for making such false statement. The oath required refers to the truth
of the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant and his witnesses.
Q: SP02 Martinez led a team of policemen that implemented a search warrant in the house of
Mary Ann. While they were conducting the search, Martinez destroyed the dividing walls and
employed violence upon Mary Ann and the members of her household inflicting physical injuries
upon them. What crime or crimes can SP02 Martinez be charged with?
Ans: SP02 Martinez can be charged with Violation of Domicile and separate crimes of Physical
Injuries. There is no complex crime. The two felonies have different elements
Article 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee who, in cases
where a search is proper, shall search the domicile, papers or other belongings of any
person, in the absence of the latter, any member of his family, or in their default, without
the presence of two witnesses residing in the same locality.
The offender in this case is legally armed with a search warrant but he conducts the search in the
absence of the owner or any member of the family or two witnesses residing in the same locality.
The law says that even if you are not around, search may be made if there are members of his
family. The policemen do not have to wait for the owner of the house to arrive. – if any member
of his family is present – pwede na. – or in default, any 2 witnesses from the neighborhood who
is usually barangay officials.
“Sec. 7, Rule 121, No search of a house, room or any other premises shall be made except in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the
latter, in the presence of 2 witnesses of sufficient age & discretion residing in the same locality.”
The papers and effects mentioned in the law must be found inside the dwelling house. Article
130 has no application to search and seizure made on moving vehicles because the application of
this law is limited to dwelling and personal properties such as papers and effects found therein.
The obvious reason behind this requirement is to avoid incriminatory machination or planting of
evidence.
Article 131. Prohibition, interruption, and dissolution of peaceful meetings. — The penalty of
prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any public officer or
employee who, without legal ground, shall prohibit or interrupt the holding of a peaceful
meeting, or shall dissolve the same.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall
hinder any person from joining any lawful association or from attending any of its
meetings.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee who shall
prohibit or hinder any person from addressing, either alone or together with others, any
petition to the authorities for the correction of abuses or redress grievances.
27
(1) by prohibiting or interrupting, without legal ground, the holding of a peaceful meeting or by
dissolving the same;
(2) by hindering any person from joining any lawful association or from attending any of its
meetings; and,
(3) by prohibiting or hindering any person from addressing, either alone or together with others,
any petition to the authorities for the correction of abuses or redress of grievances.
This right however is not absolute. It may be regulated in order that it may not cause injury to its
equal enjoyment by others having equal rights. The power to regulate is justified under the police
power of the State.
Under this Article, the policemen/public officers or employee do not have the right to prevent
a peaceful meeting. If they do - then they are liable.
Q: The Municipal Mayor was presiding a meeting attended by VM, SB members, Punong
Barangays and the Chief of Police. When a Councilor was speaking, - the COP stood up &
said that the councilor should not proceed with his speech – heated argument followed –
disorder- the meeting was dissolved. The COP was prosecuted under Art. 131. Prosecution
said that although the accused did not prohibit the holding of the meeting in question, but he
interrupted the holding of the meeting which is within the meaning of Art. 131. Is the COP
liable?
A: NO. In order, therefore, to make said provision applicable, it is necessary that the accused
be a stranger, not a participant of the meeting that has been interrupted and eventually
dissolved.
Important: The offender here who is a public officer must be a stranger, not a participant in
the meeting.
There are two criteria to determine whether Article 131 would be violated:
(1) Dangerous tendency rule – applicable in times of national unrest such as to prevent coup
d’etat.
(2) Clear and present danger rule – applied in times of peace. Stricter rule.
Read: Ruiz vs Gordon 126 SCRA 233,en banc and Reyes vs Bagatsing (Anti-Bases Coalition),
125 SCRA 553(en banc)
Article 132. Interruption of religious worship. —The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall prevent or
disturb the ceremonies or manifestations of any religion.
If the crime shall have been committed with violence or threats, the penalty shall be prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
There are 2 acts that are punishable here: 1) to prevent the holding of ceremonies of any religion
and 2) to disturb the ceremonies or manifestations
Elements
2. Religious ceremonies or manifestations of any religious are about to take place or are
going on;
Under this article, the offender is a public officer or employee who prevents or disturbs a
religious ceremony or a manifestation of any religion which is about to take place or is going on.
If the ceremony is prevented or disturbed with the use of violence or threat, it will qualify the
crime and the penalty is correspondingly increased.
There is no provision of law which requires religious services to be conducted in a certain form or
style. So persons who meet for the purpose of religious worship, by any method which is not
indecent and unlawful, have a right to do so without being molested (Hull vs. State, 120 Ind. 153,
cited in the case of U.S. vs. Balcorta, 25 Phil. 279).
Article 133. Offending the religious feelings. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a
place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony shall
perform acts notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful.
Elements
1. Acts complained of were performed in a place devoted to religious worship, or during the
celebration of any religious ceremony;
Note: A private individual may be liable here because the law says “anyone” unlike in Art. 132.
Take Note: That the act must be notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful and
performed in a place devoted to religious worship or during the celebration of a religious
ceremony.
An act be notoriously offensive to the religious feelings must be directed against a religious
practice or dogma. An act intended to ridicule or mock another religion.—mocks or scoffs at
anything devoted to religious ceremonies; plays or destroys any object of veneration by the
faithful. In determining whether an act is offensive to the feelings of the faithful, the same must
be viewed or judged from the standpoint of the offended religion and not from the point of view
of the offended (Pp vs Baes, 68 Phil. 203)
Article 134. Rebellion or insurrection — How committed. — The crime of rebellion or insurrection
is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic
of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
or prerogatives. (As amended by R.A. No. 6968, approved on October 24, 1990.)
Elements
a. to remove from the allegiance to the government or its laws Philippine territory
or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or other armed forces;
or
The essence of Rebellion is public uprising and taking arms against the government. Rebellion is
a mass movement. It must be committed by a multitude. Therefore, it cannot be committed by a
handful of men.
Purpose of Rebellion:
(1) To overthrow the government or to remove from the allegiance to the government or from its
laws Philippine territory or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval or the armed
forces; or
(2) To deprive the Chief Executive or Congress wholly or partially of any of their powers or
prerogatives.
Rebellion and insurrection are not synonymous. Rebellion is more frequently used where the
object of the movement is completely to overthrow and supersede the existing government; while
insurrection is more commonly employed in reference to a movement which seeks merely to
effect some change of minor importance, or to prevent the exercise of governmental authority
with respect to particular matters of subjects.
SYNOPSIS: On February 27,1990, then Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested on the strength of a warrant issued by Judge Jaime Salazar, in Criminal Case No. 90-
10941. The information in the said criminal case charged Enrile, together with the Sps. Panlilio
and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December
10, 1990. Enrile was detained without bail, hence, he filed a petition for habeas corpus, alleging
among others that he had been deprived of his constitutional rights for being held to answer for a
criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books. The Solicitor General defended his
position by contending that the Hernandez ruling being invoked by petitioner, is not applicable in
his case because the information in the "Hernandez case" charged murders and other common
crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas, the information
against petitioner charged murder and frustrated murder committed "on the occasion, but not in
furtherance of rebellion." In other words, he makes a distinction between the complex crime
(delito complejo) arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which
is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime (delito compuesto) arising from a
single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses, with which the Hernandez ruling
was not concerned.
The Court further ruled that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an
offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, the indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. The
contention of petitioner that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books,
while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with
other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of
rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner
with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
30
2. TREASON – there is levying of war against the government during war time;
REBELLION - there is levying of war against the government during peace time;
4. TREASON – the purpose is to deliver the government to the enemy or to pave the way
for the coming of the enemy;
REBELLION – the purpose is to substitute the existing government with another.
Article 134-A. Coup d'etat—How committed. — The crime of coup d'etat is a swift attack
accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, directed against duly
constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines, or any military camp or
installation, communications networks, public utilities or other facilities needed for the
exercise and continued possession of power, singly or simultaneously carried out anywhere
in the Philippines by any person or persons, belonging to the military or police or holding
any public office or employment, with or without civilian support or participation for the
purpose of seizing or diminishing state power. (As amended by R.A. 6968)
Q: At the break of dawn, two platoons of the marines attacked ABS-CBN Radio network and
forcibly took over its management. They controlled the broadcast media and aired their grievance
against the military and the government. What crime did they commit?
Ans: They committed Coup d'etat. They swiftly attacked a communication network and the
purpose was to destabilize the government.
(1) Rebellion is committed by any person whether a private individual or a public officer
whereas in coup d'etat, the offender is a member of the military or police force or
holding a public office or employment.
(2) In rebellion, the object is to alienate the allegiance of a people in a territory, whether
wholly or partially, from the duly constituted government; in coup d'etat, the object or
purpose is to seize or diminish state power.
(3) In both instances, the offenders intend to substitute themselves in place of those who
are in power.
Article 135. Penalty for rebellion or insurrection or coup d'etat. — Any person who promotes,
maintains, or heads a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Any person who leads or in any manner directs or commands others to undertake a coup
d'etat shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Any person in the government service who participates, or executes directions or commands
of others in undertaking a coup d'etat shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period.
Any person not in the government service who participates, or in any manner supports,
finances, abets or aids in undertaking a coup d'etat shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor
in its maximum period.
When the rebellion, insurrection, or coup d'etat shall be under the command of unknown
leaders, any person who in fact directed the others, spoke for them, signed receipts and
other documents issued in their name, or performed similar acts, on behalf of the rebels,
shall be deemed a leader of such rebellion, insurrection, or coup d'etat. (As amended by R.A.
No. 6968.)
Persons liable for rebellion, insurrection or coup d' etat under Article 135
1. The leaders –
b. Any person who leads, directs or commands others to undertake a coup d' etat;
2. The participants –
b. Any person not in the government service who participates, supports, finances,
abets or aids in undertaking a coup d' etat.
An important point to consider in the discussion of the crime of rebellion is the concept
of continuing crime or offense. Here, the offender performs a series of acts and the same may be
done on separate dates, time and places and yet the offender is held liable for only one crime. So,
assuming that a municipal treasurer supports a rebellion by delivering municipal funds to the
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leaders of the rebellion and he did this on several occasions. In such a case, he will be liable only
for the crime of rebellion. Take note that if the municipal treasurer diverted the funds not for
political purposes, he would be held liable for malversation. So, for as long as the rebellion is in
existence and people like the municipal treasurer in the example above continues to aid the
movement and they are motivated by the same purpose, the idea of a continuing offense is
present. This is called delito continuado under the Revised Penal Code.
In order to make out a case of rebellion, what motivation for the killing of the victim by the
offender must be shown?
Merely because it is alleged in the affidavit that private respondents were members of the
CCP/NPA who engaged government troops in a firefight resulting in the death of a government
trooper and the wounding of four others does not necessarily mean that the killing and wounding
of the victims was made in furtherance of a rebellion. Otherwise, as in People vs. Ompad (233
SCRA, 1994) although it was shown that the accused was an NPA commander, he was
nonetheless convicted of murder for the killing of a person suspected of being a government
informer.
When a criminal act has elements common to more than one offense, who has the option to
choose the case to file?
In Baylosis vs. Chavez (202 SCRA, 1991) the Court said that the public prosecutor should
have the option to ascertain which prosecutions should be initiated on the basis of the evidence at
hand. That a criminal act may have elements common to more than one offense does not rob the
prosecutor of that option (or discretion) and mandatorily require him to charge the lesser offense
although the evidence before him may warrant prosecution of the more serious one.
Case: Lt.Senior Grade Gonzales, Trillanes et.al. vs Abaya, 498 SCRA 445, August 10, 2006 (en
banc)
On July 26, 2003, PGMA received intelligence reports that some members of the AFP, with high-
powered weapons, had abandoned their designated places of assignment. Their aim was to
destabilize the government. The President then directed the AFP and the Philippine National
Police (PNP) to track and arrest them.
On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted
men of the AFP – mostly from the elite units of the Army’s Scout Rangers and the Navy’s
Special Warfare Group – entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments.
They disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices around the building
Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red armbands emblazoned with
the emblem of the “Magdalo” faction of the Katipunan. The troops then, through broadcast
media, announced their grievances against the administration of PGMA, such as the graft and
corruption in the military, the illegal sale of arms and ammunition to the “enemies” of the State,
and the bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more military assistance from the US
government. They declared their withdrawal of support from their Commander-in-Chief and
demanded that she resign as President of the Republic. They also called for the resignation of
her cabinet members and the top brass of the AFP and PNP
About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring a state
of rebellion, followed by General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all necessary
measures to suppress the rebellion then taking place in Makati City. She then called the soldiers
to surrender their weapons at five o’clock in the afternoon of that same day.
In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the
soldiers. The aim was to persuade them to peacefully return to the fold of the law. After several
hours of negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay down their arms
and defuse the explosives placed around the premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually,
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they returned to their barracks. A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to
the authorities.
The NBI investigated the incident and recommended that those involved be charged with coup
d’etat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. On
July 31, 2003, the DOJ recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against them.
Meanwhile, on August 2, 2003, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General
Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the
Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation.
On August 5, 2003, DOJ filed with the RTC, Makati City an Information for coup d’etat against
those soldiers. Gen. Abaya then issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial Investigation
Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations
of the Articles of War under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, against the same military
personnel.
Specifically, the charges are: (a) violation of Article 63 for disrespect toward the President, the
Secretary of National Defense, etc., (b) violation of Article 64 for disrespect toward a superior
officer, (c) violation of Article 67 for mutiny or sedition, (d) violation of Article 96 for conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and (e) violation of Article 97 for conduct prejudicial to
good order and military discipline.
Some of the accused filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume
jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7055 - AN ACT STRENGTHENING CIVILIAN SUPREMACY OVER THE
MILITARY BY RETURNING TO THE CIVIL COURTS THE JURISDICTION OVER
CERTAIN OFFENSES INVOLVING MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, OTHER PERSONS SUBJECT TO MILITARY LAW, AND THE
MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OFFICE, REPEALING FOR THE
PURPOSE CERTAIN PRESIDENTIAL DECREES
The RTC said that all charges before the court martial against the accused…are hereby declared
not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup
d’etat.”
Petitioners filed with the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO) a motion praying for the
suspension of its proceedings until after the RTC shall have resolved their motion to assume
jurisdiction.
Ultimately, the officers involved in the Oakwood mutiny shall be charged for violation of Article
96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War
The AFP JAGO then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge. Instead of
complying, they filed with the SC a Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents-JAGO be
ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War in
relation to the Oakwood incident.
Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11,
2004 that the offense for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman)
of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d’etat, the
military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction
The OSG contends that all the accused is charged of an offense which is “service connected” in
accordance with RA 7055, thus the Court Martial has jurisdiction
SC: The offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is
expressly provided in Section 1 par 2 of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge
against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the
Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and
disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional
conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative of the “service-connected” nature of
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the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same – dismissal from the service – imposable only
by the military court. Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to
cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military
discipline.
SC: Obviously, there is no merit in petitioners’ argument that they can no longer be charged
before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has
been declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as “not service-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat,” hence, triable by said court
(RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly
vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over “service-connected crimes or offenses.” What the
law has conferred the court should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that
bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an
action.
SC: The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law “as they find it, not as
they like it to be.” Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.
Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion are two different crimes, namely:
Article 137. Disloyalty of public officers or employees. — The penalty of prision correccional
in its minimum period shall be imposed upon public officers or employees who have failed
to resist a rebellion by all the means in their power, or shall continue to discharge the duties
of their offices under the control of the rebels or shall accept appointment to office under
them. (Restored by E.O. No. 187.)
Acts punished
2. By continuing to discharge the duties of their offices under the control of the rebels; or
While the law speaks only of rebellion and not of any other crime, the author ventures to say that
the crime of coup d'etat is included. Article 134 gives us the manner how rebellion is committed.
This law was amended not for the purpose of modifying the crime of rebellion but in order to add
another form of overthrowing the government which is called coup d'etat. The primary distinction
between rebellion and coup d'etat is that the latter is committed by persons belonging to the
military or police establishment or by public officers, with or without civilian support, for the
purpose of seizing or diminishing state power. That is why we now have Article 134-A which
provides the modalities on how coup d'etat is committed.
Disloyalty as a crime is not limited to rebellion alone but should now include the crime of
coup d'etat. Rebellion is essentially a crime committed by private individuals while coup d'etat is
35
a crime that should be classified as a crime committed by public officers like malversation,
bribery, dereliction of duty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
In defining disloyalty as a crime, it limits the offender only to public officers and
employees, who, during a rebellion (which should now include coup d'etat), fail to prevent the
crimes herein mentioned when the same are within their means or power to prevent; or who
continue to perform the duties of their office under the authority of the rebels or who accept a
position in the new government of the rebels. It would appear therefore that the crime of
disloyalty cannot be committed if there is no actual rebellion or coup d'etat.
When one is appointed to serve the government, he becomes a public officer. He takes an
oath to uphold and defend the Constitution and to obey its laws. By such oath, he acknowledges
that a public office is a public trust; that he shall serve the government with utmost
responsibility, integrity and honesty; that he shall account or is accountable to our people in all
his acts and activities as a public officer.
The act of accepting the authority of the new dispensation is prohibited under this article
and it is punished as disloyalty.
It should be stressed that if the public officer or employee, aside from being disloyal, does
or commits acts constituting the crime of rebellion or coup d'etat, he will no longer be charged
for the simple crime of disloyalty but he shall be proceeded against for the grave offense of
rebellion or coup d'etat.
Article 138. Inciting to Rebellion or Insurrection — The penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, without taking arms or being in
open hostility against the Government, shall incite others to the execution of any of the acts
specified in Article 134 of this Code, by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, em-
blems, banners or other representations tending to the same end. (Restored by E.O. No. 187.)
Elements
1. Offender does not take arms or is not in open hostility against the government;
2. In proposal, the person who proposes has decided to commit rebellion; in inciting to
rebellion, it is not required that the offender has decided to commit rebellion.
3. In proposal, the person who proposes the execution of the crime uses secret means; in
inciting to rebellion, the act of inciting is done publicly.
Article 139. Sedition. — How committed. — The crime of sedition is committed by persons
who rise publicly and tumultuously in order to attain by force, intimidation, or by other
means outside of legal methods, any of the following objects:
1. To prevent the promulgation or execution of any law or the holding of any popular
election;
3. To inflict any act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of any public
officer or employee;
4. To commit, for any political or social end, any act of hate or revenge against private
persons or any social class; and
5. To despoil, for any political or social end, any person, municipality or province, or
the National Government (or the Government of the United States) of all its property or any
part thereof. (As amended by Com. Act No. 202.)
The crime of sedition is committed by rising publicly and tumultuously. The two elements
must concur. The disturbance becomes tumultuous only when more than three armed malefactors
participate in creating the commotion or disturbance.
When there is only public uprising and same is not tumultuous, the crime of sedition is not
committed. The offenders may still be liable for other crimes like direct assault under Article 148
when the offended party is a public officer who is prevented from performing his duties by
means of force or violence.
In rebellion, common crimes committed in furtherance thereof are absorbed. This is not
so in the case of sedition. In the tumultuous public uprising performed by the offenders in
sedition which is done by force or intimidation, it can happen that serious common
crimes are committed. In this case, the theory of absorption will not apply. So if in
committing sedition, the force or violence employed results in death constituting
homicide or murder, or in deprivation of liberty denominated as kidnapping, or in
intentional burning known as arson, the offenders will be separately charged or indicted
for such offenses.
The objective of the law in criminalizing sedition is to put a limit to the freedom of expression or
the right of the people to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. In order
that one may enjoy this freedom, the assembly must be peaceful.
Article 140. Penalty for sedition. — The leader of a sedition shall suffer the penalty of
prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000).
Other persons participating therein shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in
its maximum period and a fine not exceeding One Million Pesos (P1,000,000) (As
amended by RA 10951)
Article 141. Conspiracy to Commit Sedition — Persons conspiring to commit the crime of
sedition shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium period and a fine not ex-
ceeding Four Hundred Thousan Pesos (400,000.00) (As amended by RA 10951)
As a general rule, conspiracy is not a crime. But when the conspiracy is to commit the
crime of sedition under this article.
The conspiracy must be to prevent the promulgation or execution of any law or the holding
of any popular election. It may also be a conspiracy to prevent national and local public officials
from freely exercising their duties and functions, or to prevent the execution of un administrative
order.
In the crime of rebellion, both conspiracy and proposal to commit the same are made
punishable. In sedition, the proposal to commit the same is not punishable.
Article 142. Inciting to sedition. — The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
and a fine not exceeding Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person who, without taking any direct part in the crime of sedition, should incite
others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition, by means of
speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, cartoons, banners, or other representations
tending to the same end, or upon any person or persons who shall utter seditious words or
speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government (of the United
States or the Government of the Commonwealth) of the Philippines, or any of the duly
constituted authorities thereof, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in ex-
ecuting the functions of his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal and meet
together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots,
which lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace
of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal
such evil practices. (As restored by E.O. No. 187.)
Acts punished
1. Inciting others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition by
means of speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems, etc.;
2. Uttering seditious words or speeches which tend to disturb the public peace;
3. Writing, publishing, or circulating scurrilous libels against the government or any of the
duly constituted authorities thereof, which tend to disturb the public peace.
Elements
2. He incites others to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition; and
The offender in the crime of inciting to sedition must not be a participant to any public uprising
against the government. The reason is simple. If he is already committing the crime of sedition,
the act of urging the people through speeches, writings, drama or emblems to rise up against the
government would constitute an element of the crime of sedition. Inciting to sedition is an
element of sedition. It cannot be treated as a separate offense against one who is a part of a group
that rose up publicly and tumultuously and fought the forces of government. Remember the basic
principle that when there is only one intent or one criminal design, the offender should be charged
for only one crime.
Article 143. Acts tending to prevent the meeting of the assembly and similar bodies. — The
penalty of prision correccional or a fine ranging from Forty Thousand to Four Hundred
Thousand Pesos or both, shall be imposed upon any person who, by force or fraud, prevents
the meeting of the National Assembly (Congress of the Philippines) or of any of its
committees or subcommittees, constitutional commissions or committees or divisions
thereof, or of any provincial board or city or municipal council or board. (As amended by
RA 10951)
Elements
2. Offender, who may be any person, prevents such meetings by force or fraud.
The crime is against popular representation because it is directed against officers whose
primary function is to meet and enact laws.
Article 144. Disturbance of proceedings. — The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from Forty
Thousand Pesos to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos shall be imposed upon any person who
disturbs the meetings of the National Assembly (Congress of the Philippines) or of any of its
committees or sub-committees, constitutional commissions or committees or divisions
thereof, or of any provincial board or city or municipal council or board, or in the presence
of any such bodies should behave in such manner as to interrupt its proceeding or to impair
the respect due it. (As amended by RA 10951.)
Elements
The disturbance can be in the form of utterances, speeches or any form of expressing dissent
which is not done peacefully but implemented in such a way that it substantially interrupts the
meeting of the assembly or adversely affects the respect due the assembly or its members.
Article 145. Violation of parliamentary immunity. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall use force, intimidation, threats or fraud to prevent any
member of the National Assembly from attending the meetings of the Assembly or of any of
its committees, constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof, from
expressing his opinions or casting his vote; and the penalty of prision correccional shall be
imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall, while the Assembly is in regular or
special session, arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has
committed a crime punishable under this Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor. (As
amended by Com. Act No. 264.)
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Acts punished
1. Using force, intimidation, threats, or frauds to prevent any member of Congress from
attending the meetings of Congress or of any of its committees or subcommittees,
constitutional commissions or committees or divisions thereof, or from expressing his
opinion or casting his vote;
Elements
Elements
4. The member arrested or searched has not committed a crime punishable under
the Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor.
Under Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution, a public officer who arrests a member of
Congress who has committed a crime punishable by prision mayor (six years and one day, to 12
years) is not liable Article 145.
Article 146. Illegal assemblies. — The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon the organizers or leaders of
any meeting attended by armed persons for the purpose of committing any of the crimes
punishable under this Code, or of any meeting in which the audience is incited to the
commission of the crime of treason, rebellion or insurrection, sedition or assault upon a
person in authority or his agents. Persons merely present at such meeting shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor, unless they are armed, in which case the penalty shall be prision
correccional.
NOTE: This law punishes a gathering of people for illegal purpose. The unlawful purpose must
be punished under the Revised Penal Code. If the unlawful purpose is punishable by special law,
illegal assembly is not committed.
1) a meeting attended by armed persons for the purpose of committing any crime
punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and,
Elements:
a. There is a meeting, gathering or group of persons, whether in fixed place or moving;
b. The meeting is attended by armed persons;
c. The purpose of the meeting is to commit any of the crimes punishable under the
Revised Penal Code.
Note: If a group of armed men gathered and conspired for the purpose of committing kidnapping,
illegal assembly is committed not because of the conspiracy but because of the gathering of
armed men. Kidnapping is punished under the Revised Penal Code.
2) a meeting in which the audience is incited to commit the crimes of treason, rebellion,
or insurrection, sedition or assault upon a person in authority or his agent.
Elements:
2. Persons merely present at the meeting, who must have a common intent to commit the
felony of illegal assembly.
The persons liable under this article are the organizers or leaders and those merely
attending the meeting. Where a person is found to carry an unlicensed firearm in the aforesaid
meeting, it shall be presumed that the purpose of the meeting, insofar as he is concerned, is to
commit acts punishable under the Revised Penal Code. At the same time, such person shall
likewise be presumed and considered as the leader or organizer of the meeting.
In the same manner, those who incite the audience, by means of speeches, printed matters,
and other representation, to commit treason, rebellion or insurrection, sedition or assault a person
in authority, shall be deemed leaders or organizers of said meeting.
If any person present at the meeting carries an unlicensed firearm, it is presumed that the
purpose of the meeting insofar as he is concerned is to commit acts punishable under the Revised
Penal Code, and he is considered a leader or organizer of the meeting. (Art. 146, par. 2)
The gravamen of the offense is mere assembly of or gathering of people for illegal
purpose punishable by the Revised Penal Code. Without gathering, there is no illegal assembly.
If unlawful purpose is a crime under a special law, there is no illegal assembly. For example, the
gathering of drug pushers to facilitate drug trafficking is not illegal assembly because the purpose
is not violative of the Revised Penal Code but of The Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Problem: A group of drug pushers had a meeting in the campus of a university. They agreed and
decided to distribute and sell shabu and other illegal drugs to the students of the colleges and
universities in the city. Are the members of the group liable for Illegal Assembly?
Ans: No, they are not liable for illegal assembly. This crime is committed by a gathering of people for
illegal purpose punishable by the Revised Penal Code. The gathering of drug pushers to facilitate
drug trafficking is not illegal assembly because the purpose is not violative of the Revised Penal
Code but of the drugs law which is a special law.
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Problem: Suppose the purpose of the meeting is to incite the audience to commit rebellion,
insurrection, sedition or assault upon a person in authority, what is the crime committed if any?
Why?
Ans: The crime committed is illegal assembly because the audience is incited to commit rebellion
or insurrection, sedition or an assault upon a person in authority.
Article 147. Illegal association. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium period and a fine not exceeding Two Hundred Thousand pesos (P200,000.00) shall
be imposed upon the founders, directors, and presidents of associations totally or partially
organized for the purpose of committing any of the crimes punishable under this Code or
for some purpose contrary to public morals. Mere members of said associations shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor. (As amended by RA 10951)
a) those totally or partially organized for the purpose of committing any of the crimes
punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and
b) those totally or partially organized for some purpose contrary to public morals.
Persons liable
In illegal assembly, it is the meeting and attendance at such meeting that are punished.
3. In illegal association, the persons liable are (1) the founders, directors and president; and
(2) the members.
In illegal assembly, the persons liable are (1) the organizers or leaders of the meeting and
(2) the persons present at meeting.
4. In illegal assembly, the basis of liability is the gathering for an illegal purpose which
constitutes a crime under the Revised Penal Code.
Article 148. Direct Assault. —Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in de -
fining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or seriously
42
intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance, shall suffer the penalty
of prision correctional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), when the assault is committed with a weapon or
when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a
person in authority. If none of these circumstances be present, the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) shall be imposed. (As amended by RA 10951)
Problem: X is a sugarcane planter in Hacienda Luisita. He nurtured a grudge and ill feeling
against Don Simeon, the owner of the hacienda because the latter had not been giving his workers
their due share and benefits. X attacked Don Simeon with fist blows and kick blows. What crime
did X commit? Why?
Ans: X committed Direct Assault. Without a public uprising, he attacked and employed force against a
private person for a social end. This is an object of Sedition (Art. 139, par. 4). Had there been public
uprising, the crime committed is Direct Assault of the first kind.
Note: Remember that the offender must know that the person assaulted is a person in authority or
his agent.
The crime of direct assault can only be committed by means of dolo. It cannot be committed
through negligence or culpa.
Problem: Mayor Bautista was conducting a meeting with barangay officials regarding the
dissemination and implementation of the law that prohibits the selling of liquor to minors. X, a
store owner and defiant of the law, stabbed the mayor who died as a result. What crime or crimes
did X commit? Why?
Ans: X committed the complex crime of Homicide with Direct Assault upon a person in authority. He
committed Homicide for stabbing the mayor to death. He also committed Direct Assault upon a
43
person in authority because he attacked the mayor while he was engaged in the performance of
his duties. Considering however that the two crimes were committed by the performance of a
single act, that of stabbing the mayor, a complex crime under the contemplation of Art. 48 of the
Revised Penal Code is brought about. A single act resulted to one grave felony (Homicide) and
another less grave felony (Direct Assault). The two crimes cannot be separately filed.
Problem: SP02 Ginez was pacifying the protagonists A and B. Instead of being pacified, A
vented his ire upon the policeman and boxed the latter. What crime did A commit? Why?
Ans: A committed Direct Assault upon an agent of a person in authority. He attacked the policeman
while the latter was engaged in the performance of his duties.
Problem: Judge Lamar found X guilty of the crime of Robbery and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment. After serving the sentence imposed, X was released from prison. One day, he met
Judge Lamar. X remembered that the judge convicted him and sent him to prison. X attacked the
judge by boxing him on different parts of his body. What crime or crimes did X commit? Why?
Ans: X committed Direct Assault upon a person in authority. He attacked the judge by reason of past
performance of his duty
Problem: What if in the immediately preceding problem, the judge already retired from the
service when X attacked him, what crime did X commit? Why?
Ans: X committed Physical Injuries. It cannot be Assault upon a person in authority because the
victim was no longer a judge at the time of the assault. Once he retired, he is no longer considered
a person in authority.
PERSON IN AUTHORITY (PA) — any public officer vested with jurisdiction recognized in
law and clothed with authority in law, whether individually or as a member of boards or corporate
body. It includes a barangay chairman (and members of Lupong Tagapagkasundo — see Local
Government Code on Katarungang Pambarangay).
Teachers, lawyers and heads of schools recognized by the government are PA only for purposes
of Art. 152 in relation to Articles 148 and 151, and in connection with their duties. In other cases,
they are not considered PA.
Section 388 of the Local Government Code of 1991 expands the definition of a PA by
expressly providing that "for purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay,
sangguniang barangay members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay
shall be deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions. (People vs. Sion, August 1997)
The offended party in direct assault must not be the aggressor. If there is unlawful
aggression employed by the public officer, any form of resistance which may be in the nature of
force against him will be considered as an act of legitimate defense (People vs. Hernandez, 59
Phil. 343).
Suppose the offended party who is a person in authority or his agent, is challenged to a fight
because of the performance of a lawful duty and the public officer accepts the challenge. As a
result he is assaulted by the accused. What crime, if any, is committed by the offender? Direct
Assault. The character of the person in authority or his agent is not laid off at will or removed at
the pleasure of the public officer, but attached to him for as long as he remains in public office
(Justo vs. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil. 453).
44
Q: May there be assault even if the public officer at the time of assault is not actually performing
an official duty?
A: The phraseology "on the occasion of such performance" found in Article 148 gives or offers
an affirmative answer as it means "because" or by reason of the past performance of official duty.
The evident purpose of the law is to allow public officials and their agents to discharge their
official acts without fear of being haunted for such performance (Justo vs. Court of Appeals,
supra).
When an attack is made to a person in authority while in the performance of his duty, the
crime is Direct Assault, whatever his reason may be for attacking. If made when officer is off-
duty, the offender's reason for the attack should be examined. If the reason for the attack is
related to the past performance of his duties, there is Direct Assault; otherwise, none. (Given,
1995 Bar) Here, motive becomes material in the proper determination of the offense committed.
In the second form, you have to distinguish a situation where a person in authority or his
agent was attacked while performing official functions, from a situation when he is not
performing such functions. If attack was done during the exercise of official functions, the crime
is always direct assault. It is enough that the offender knew that the person in authority was
performing an official function whatever may be the reason for the attack, although what may
have happened was a purely private affair.
In one case, the offender and the offended party are both public officers. The Supreme
Court said that assault may still be committed, as in fact the offender is even subjected to a
greater penalty (U.S. vs. Vallejo, 11 Phil. 193).
Q: May a person be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with direct assault?
A: Yes, provided the information alleges both offenses (People vs. Regala, et al., 113 SCRA
613).
If the crime of direct assault is committed with the use of force and it resulted in the
infliction of slight physical injuries, the latter shall not be considered as a separate offense. It
shall be absorbed by the greater crime of direct assault (People vs. Acierto, 57 Phil. 614).
Read: Enrique vs People, June 30, 2005 and People vs Asilan, April 11, 2012; Lydia Gelig vs
People, G.R. No. 173150, July 28, 2010
Problem: X attacked the Vice Mayor while the latter was in the process of making consultations
with a group of people regarding the enactment of needed ordinances. Y attacked the Vice Mayor
by slapping him. George, who was at the meeting, went to help the Vice Mayor by pacifying X.
Instead of being pacified, X boxed George. What crime or crimes did X commit? Why?
Ans: With respect to the Vice Mayor, X committed Direct Assault upon a person in authority. He
attacked the Vice Mayor while he was engaged in the performance of his duties. With respect to
George, X committed Direct Assault upon an agent of a person in authority. A private person who
comes to the aid of a person in authority automatically becomes an agent of a person in authority.
Problem: X a motorist got mad at police officer Y for accosting him when he parked at a no
parking sign. Y demanded that X gives him his driver's license. Instead of complying with the
lawful order, X kicked the police officer. Y ran away but he was pursued by X. Renz went to the
45
aid of the policeman by pacifying X but X threw him to the ground and kicked him. What crime
or crimes did X commit? Why?
Ans: For attacking the policeman while he was engaged in the performance of his duties, X
committed Direct Assault upon an agent of a person in authority.
Problem: During a rainy season, Jose was waiting for a taxi cab. lie was finally able to flag
down a taxi. Before he could enter the taxi though, a person opened the right back door and
immediately took his seat. Infuriated, Jose entered the taxi cab and forcibly pushed the man out of
the taxi. That man suffered injuries. It turned out that the person is a judge. Is Jose liable for
Direct Assault upon a person in authority? Why?
Ans: No,he is not liable. Jose did not know that the person is a judge. Under the law, the offender
must know that the person assaulted is a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority as
the case may be. Besides, the judge was not in the performance of his duties or was assaulted by
reason of such performance.
Article 149. Indirect Assault — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods and a fine not exceeding One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) shall
be imposed upon any person who shall make use of force or intimidation upon any person
coming to the aid of the authorities or their agents on occasion of the commission of any of
the crimes defined in the next preceding article. (As amended by RA 10951)
The situation contemplated under this article is one wherein direct assault is committed against
an agent of a person in authority. The private individual comes to the aid of the public officer
being assaulted and in giving aid or assistance, the private individual is equally or likewise
assaulted. In this case, there are two offended parties, the agent of a person in authority and the
private individual who comes to his rescue.
Note: The assistance rendered must be to an agent of a person in authority. The situation is
entirely different if the aid or assistance rendered is to a person in authority. In this case, the
private individual on such occasion, becomes an agent of a person in authority, and any force or
intimidation employed against him, while coming to the aid of a person in authority is for all
intents and purposes, considered direct assault. This is the spirit under which Republic Act No.
1978 was enacted and promulgated.
Q: When the offended is a civilian who aids a PA or an APA, what crime or crimes are
committed?
A: When the officer aided is a PA, the crime cannot be Indirect Assault because he himself
becomes an APA. The Direct Assault must be on the APA and another person aided him for
Indirect Assault to be committed. The offended party (who came to the aid of a PA) is either a
civilian or a public officer who is not a PA, and he comes to the aid of an APA. Consequently, for
Indirect Assault to be committed there must be DA. Without Direct Assault, there can be no
Indirect Assault.
The victim in indirect assault should be a private person who comes in aid of an agent of a person
in authority. The assault is upon a person who comes in aid of the person in authority. The victim
cannot be the person in authority or his agent.
Take note that under Article 152, as amended, when any person comes in aid of a person in
authority, said person at that moment is no longer a civilian – he is constituted as an agent of the
person in authority. If such person were the one attacked, the crime would be direct assault.
46
Due to the amendment of Article 152, without the corresponding amendment in Article 150, the
crime of indirect assault can only be committed when assault is upon a civilian giving aid to an
agent of the person in authority. He does not become another agent of the person in authority.
ART. 150. Disobedience to summons issued by the National Assembly, its committees or
subcommittees, by the Constitutional Commissions, its committees, subcommittees or divisions.
— The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00)
to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000,00) , or both such fine and imprisonment, shall
be imposed upon any person who, having been duly summoned to attend as a witness before
the National Assembly (Congress), its special or standing committees and subcommittees,
the Constitutional commissions and its committees, subcommittees or divisions or before
any commission or committee chairman or member authorized to summon witnesses,
refuses, without legal excuse, to obey such summons, or being present before any such legis -
lative or constitutional body or official, refuses to be sworn or placed under affirmation or
to answer any legal inquiry or to produce any books, papers, documents, or records in his
possession, when required by them to do so in the exercise of their functions. The same
penalty shall be imposed upon any person who shall restrain another from attending as a
witness, or who shall induce disobedience to a summons or refusal to be sworn by any such
body or official. (As amended RA 10951)
Acts punished
1. By refusing, without legal excuse, to obey summons of Congress, its special or standing
committees and subcommittees, the Constitutional Commissions and its committees,
subcommittees or divisions, or by any commission or committee chairman or member
authorized to summon witnesses;
2. By refusing to be sworn or placed under affirmation while being before such legislative
or constitutional body or official;
3. By refusing to answer any legal inquiry or to produce any books, papers, documents, or
records in his possession, when required by them to do so in the exercise of their
functions;
The act punished is refusal, without legal excuse, to obey summons issued by the House
of Representatives or the Senate. If a Constitutional Commission is created, it shall enjoy the
same privilege. As these legislative bodies work or perform their duties through their created
committees, such power of issuing summons is likewise extended to them and it must be honored
and obeyed.
Also made punishable under this article is the refusal of a subject, after appearing before
said bodies, to take an oath or affirmation before he testifies; it may also refer to one who is on
the witness stand but who refuses to answer a legal inquiry, or to produce books, papers and other
documents. It may also be in the form of preventing or restraining another from attending as
witness or inducing a witness to disobey summons or to be placed under oath. Remember that the
law punishes acts against Congress and the Constitutional Commissions and does not include
local legislative bodies.
In the earlier case of Jean Arnault vs. Balagtas, 97 Phil. 358 (1955), the Supreme Court
declared that Congress or any of its legislative body has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses as the same is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied
or incidental to the exercise of legislative power. For how could a legislative body obtain the
knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel
disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power
and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of
47
powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have
intended each department's authority to be full and complete, independent of the other's authority
or power. For how could authority and power be complete if every act of defiance, every act of
contumacy against it, the legislative body is required to resort to the judicial department for the
appropriate remedy? So, even in the absence of an express constitutional provision, the Supreme
Court sustained the power of Congress to punish persons for contempt. Hence, the unexplored
area of jurisprudence has been opened and the raison d'etre for the grant of power has been
supplied and explained.
So, it is now clear that the exercise by the legislature of its contempt power is a matter of
self-preservation, independent of the judicial branch. The contempt power of the legislature is
inherent and sui generis.
In the case of Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. The Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Dumaguete, et al. (155 SCRA 421), the Hon. Supreme Court declared that the
power to punish contempt is not extended to local, legislative bodies. The reason given is that
local legislative bodied are but a creation of law and therefore, for them to exercise the power of
contempt, there must be an express grant of the same. The Local Government Code prevailing at
the time the case of Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative was resolved was Batas Pambansa
Bilang 337, which did not grant local legislative bodies the power to issue subpoena to compel
attendance of witnesses, neither were they given the power to punish non-members for contempt.
Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991), is silent on the matter.
Chapter 2 on the "general powers and attributes of local government units," do not provide for
the same. As a matter of fact, Section 48 on local legislation and Section 50 on the internal rules
of procedure, merely enumerate what the rules or procedure shall provide, but nowhere in the
said law was it mentioned or suggested that the local legislative body shall have the power to
issue summons or subpoena to compel the attendance of witnesses under pain of punishment. The
reason is obvious. The power to issue compulsory processes such as summons and subpoenas
under pain of contempt is by its very nature judicial in concept. They cannot be implied in the
grant of legislative power. Neither can it exist as an incident to the exercise of legislative
function. To give in to such meaning would be to grant powers to local legislative units which
run afoul with the doctrine of separation of powers. And although Section 5 of the Local
Government Code provides for liberal interpretation in favor of the local units, the grant of such
power of contempt should be made the exception because the power to punish operates to
diminish individual rights. Such power in a democratic and republican state belongs only to the
judiciary.
Article 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person.
— The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who not being included in the provisions of
the preceding articles shall resist or seriously disobey any person in authority, or the agents
of such person, while engaged in the performance of official duties.
1. A person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives
a lawful order to the offender;
3. The act of the offender is not included in the provision of Articles 148, 149 and 150.
The offended party in this case is a public officer who is either a person in authority or
his agent. The public officer must be in the actual performance of his duties at the time the
resistance or disobedience is made by the offender. The resistance must be serious in order to
constitute the first situation. If the resistance is not serious, then the crime committed will only be
simple disobedience. What is contemplated by the law is the failure to comply with the verbal or-
ders issued by the public officer who is in the actual performance of his duties. In the case of US
vs. Ramayrat, 22 Phil. 183, the Supreme Court held that: "the violation does not refer to
resistance or disobedience to the legal provisions of the law, nor to judicial decisions defining or
declaring the rights and obligations of the parties for the same give reliefs only in the form of
civil actions. Rather, the disobedience or resistance is to the orders directly issued by the
authorities in the exercise of their official duties."
1. In resistance, the person in authority or his agent must be in actual performance of his
duties.
In direct assault, the person in authority or his agent must be engaged in the performance
of official duties or that he is assaulted by reason thereof.
Direct assault (the second form) is committed in four ways, that is, (1) by attacking, (2)
by employing force, (3) by seriously intimidating, and (4) by seriously resisting a persons
in authority or his agent.
3. In both resistance against an agent of a person in authority and direct assault by resisting
an agent of a person in authority, there is force employed, but the use of force in
resistance is not so serious, as there is no manifest intention to defy the law and the
officers enforcing it.
ART. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority — Who shall be deemed as
such. — In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any
person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some
court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in
authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in
authority.
In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors,
and persons, charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools,
colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties
or on the occasion of such performance shall be deemed persons in authority. (As amended
by BP Big. 873, approved June 12, 1985)
1) Municipal mayor;
2) Division superintendent of schools;
3) Public and private school teachers;
4) Teacher-nurse;
5. President of sanitary division;
6. Provincial fiscal;
7. Justice of peace;
8. Municipal councilor;
9. Barrio captain and barangay chairman;
10. Members of Sangguniang Barangay; and
1 1. Members of Lupng Tagapayapa and Pangkat Tagapagkasun- do.
The legal significance of knowing the difference between a person in authority and
agents of persons in authority comes into play when they are assaulted in the performance of their
duties. When the offender lays hands upon a person in authority, the penalty is higher. This is not
so when the offended party is merely an agent of a person in authority. And when the offended
party is a person in authority and while being assaulted, a private individual comes to his rescue,
such private individual, by operation of law, mutates mutandis becomes an agent of a person in
authority. Any assault committed against such person is direct assault, and not indirect assault.
But if the person assaulted is an agent of a person in authority, and a private individual comes to
his rescue and is himself assaulted while giving the assistance, as earlier discussed, the crime
committed is indirect assault. The private individual does not become an agent of a person in
authority because the help was extended to one who is already an agent or enjoying a delegated
power. Under the principle ofpotestas delegata non delegare, what has been delegated cannot be
further delegated. A different interpretation will constitute an undue delegation of legislative
power. The law on indirect assault is justified under the police power of the state which is meant
to encourage private individuals to render help to agents of a person in authority in the
performance of their duties to maintain peace and order and to protect life, liberty and property.
Facts: Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in selling shabu, police
officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy
operation at the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC and around 3 o'clock
in the afternoon of September 13, 1997, the same police operatives went to Gil Tudtud St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to petitioner.
They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and closely guarded the place where the
subject ran for cover. SPO3 Masnayon requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few
minutes thereafter, his men returned with two barangay tanods.
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner named
Dolly del Castillo, searched the house of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner
allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but
one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including
four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Consequently, the articles that were
confiscated were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The contents of the four
(4) heat- sealed transparent plastic packs were subjected to laboratory examination, the result of
which proved positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.
Issue: What is the category of a barangay tanod? Are they persons in authority or agents of
persons in authority?
SC: Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police
authorities who effected the searched warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as
agents of persons in authority.
RA 7160>>>> SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the
punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in
each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions, while other
barangay officials and members who may be designated by law or ordinance and charged
with the maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and property, or the
50
maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay member who
comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in authority .
Art. 153. Tumults and other disturbances of public order — Tumultuous disturbance or
interruption liable to cause disturbance. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period
to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall cause any
serious disturbance in a public place, office or establishment, or shall interrupt or disturb
public performances, functions or gatherings, or peaceful meetings, if the act is not included
in the provisions of Articles 131 and 132.
The penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon persons causing any
disturbance or interruption of a tumultuous character.
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who in any meeting,
association, or public place, shall make any outcry tending to incite rebellion or sedition or
in such place shall display placards or emblems which provoke a disturbance of the public
order.
The penalty of arresto menor and a fine not to exceed Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00) shall be imposed upon those persons who in violation of the provisions
contained in the last clause of Article 85, shall bury with pomp the body of a person who has
been legally executed. (As amended by RA 10951)
Acts punished
3. Making any outcry tending to incite rebellion or sedition in any meeting, association or
public place;
5. Burying with pomp the body of a person who has been legally executed.
The essence is creating public disorder. This crime is brought about by creating serious
disturbances in public places, public buildings, and even in private places where public functions
or performances are being held.
For a crime to be under this article, it must not fall under Articles 131 (prohibition, interruption,
and dissolution of peaceful meetings) and 132 (interruption of religious worship).
In the act of making outcry during speech tending to incite rebellion or sedition, the situation
must be distinguished from inciting to sedition or rebellion. If the speaker, even before he
delivered his speech, already had the criminal intent to incite the listeners to rise to sedition, the
crime would be inciting to sedition. However, if the offender had no such criminal intent, but in
the course of his speech, tempers went high and so the speaker started inciting the audience to
rise in sedition against the government, the crime is disturbance of the public order.
51
The disturbance of the pubic order is tumultuous and the penalty is increased if it is brought about
by armed men. The term “armed” does not refer to firearms but includes even big stones capable
of causing grave injury.
It is also disturbance of the public order if a convict legally put to death is buried with pomp. He
should not be made out as a martyr; it might incite others to hatred.
Article 154. Unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances. — The penalty
of arresto mayor and a fine ranging from Forty Thosusand Pesos (P40,000.00) to Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who by means of printing, lithography, or any other means of
publication shall publish or cause to be published as news any false news which may
endanger the public order, or cause damage to the interest or credit of the State;
2. Any person who by the same means, or by words, utterances or speeches, shall
encourage disobedience to the law or to the constituted authorities or praise, justify, or ex -
tol any act punished by law;
3. Any person who shall maliciously publish or cause to be published any official
resolution or document without proper authority, or before they have been published offi-
cially; or
4. Any person who shall print, publish, or distribute or cause to be printed,
published, or distributed books, pamphlets, periodicals, or leaflets which do not bear the
real printer's name, or which are classified as anonymous. (As amended by RA 10951)
4. Printing, publishing or distributing (or causing the same) books, pamphlets, periodicals,
or leaflets which do not bear the real printer’s name, or which are classified as
anonymous.
The purpose of the law is to punish the spreading of false information which tends to cause
panic, confusion, distrust and divide people in their loyalty to the duly constituted authorities.
To protect public interest, any person who publishes false information and does not use his
real name and take refuge in the use of a fictitious name, said person is also made criminally
liable under this article. The reason given is that the publication of any literary work is a mark of
distinction which should motivate the author to put or place his real name in the article so
published. If he uses a fictitious name, more often the publication is used to slander or libel the
good name of another person or that the news item is false and serves only one purpose and that
is to mislead the public. The author hopes to escape criminal liability by using a fictitious name.
The article also punishes any person who knowingly publishes official acts or documents
which are not officially promulgated.
52
Article 155. Alarms and scandals. — The penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding
Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who within any town or public place, shall discharge any firearm,
rocket, firecracker, or other explosive calculated to cause alarm or danger;
2. Any person who shall instigate or take an active part n any charivari or other
disorderly meeting offensive to another or prejudicial to public tranquility;
3. Any person who, while wandering about at night or while engaged in any other
nocturnal amusements, shall disturb the public peace; or
4. Any person who, while intoxicated or otherwise, shall cause any disturbance or
scandal in public places, provided, that the circumstances of the case shall not make the
provisions of Article 153 applicable. (As amended by RA 10951)
Acts punished
1. Discharging any firearm, rocket, firecracker, or other explosive within any town or public
place, calculated to cause (which produces) alarm of danger;
2. Instigating or taking an active part in any charivari or other disorderly meeting offensive
to another or prejudicial to public tranquility;
3. Disturbing the public peace while wandering about at night or while engaged in any other
nocturnal amusements;
The term used in the law is the "discharge" of the firearm in a public place. There are,
however, other provisions of law that we have to consider. If the firearm is fired or discharged
and is not pointed to a particular person, alarm and scandal is committed. If the firearm is
discharged and is pointed to a particular person but the offender has no intention whatsoever to
kill the person, the crime committed is illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254. When the
firearm is discharged and is pointed to a particular person with the offender having in mind to kill
the offended party, the crime committed may be classified as attempted or frustrated homicide,
murder, parricide or infanticide. When a firearm is discharged in a public place, one has to con-
sider the circumstances mentioned above, as a guide in the course of action that may be taken
against the offender.
The crime of alarms and scandal constitutes only one crime. Scandal here does not refer to moral
scandal in the contemplation of Art. 200 of the Revised Penal Code. Art. 155 deals with
disturbance of public peace and tranquility.
What is charivari? ----- Charivari is a mock serenade where the offender actually disturbs the
peace by using cans, pans, utensils, etc. This brings about the crime of alarms and scandals. This
is equivalent to breach of the peace in municipal ordinances.
53
a. Alarms and scandals — Disturbing the public in general by playing noisily, for
example, during midnight in the neighborhood.
Even if the persons involved are engaged in nocturnal activity like those playing patintero at
night, or selling balut, if they conduct their activity in such a way that disturbs public peace, they
may commit the crime of alarms and scandals.
Article 156. Delivering Prisoners from Jail — The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who
shall remove from any jail or penal establishment any person confined therein or shall help
the escape of such person, by means of violence, intimidation or bribery. If other means are
used, the penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed.
If the escape of the prisoner shall take place outside of said establishments by taking the
guards by surprise, the same penalties shall be imposed in their minimum period
Elements
2. Offender removes therefrom such person, or helps the escape of such person.
The person confined could either be: A (1) detention prisoner (Art. 29, RPC); and, (2) Convict
serving sentence.
A: It depends:
(1) If the offender is the jail guard or jail warden who has custody of the person, he commits
Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoners.
(2) If the person who removed the person confined in jail is not the custodian, he commits
the crime of Delivery of Prisoner from Jail.
Problem: Rodrigo is confined in jail. Patricio, a friend of Rodrigo approached Mauricio, the jail
guard and offered him Php20,000.00 in exchange of the freedom of Rodrigo. Mauricio left the
cell of Rodrigo closed but unlocked. In the middle of the night, Rodrigo noticed that his cell was
not locked. Rodrigo took advantage thereof and escaped. Determine the criminal liabilities of
Patricio, Mauricio and Rodrigo.
Ans: Patricio is liable for two crimes. He is liable for Corruption of Public Officer (Art. 212) because
he bribed the jail guard Mauricio in allowing the escape of Rodrigo. He is also liable for Delivery
of Prisoner from Jail because he caused or helped in the escape of Rodrigo.
54
Mauricio, the jail guard is also liable for two crimes. He is liable for Direct Bribery (Art. 210)
because he received something in consideration of the performance of an act amounting to a
crime. He is also liable for Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner (Art. 223) because he consented in the
escape of the prisoner under his custody or charge.
With respect to Rodrigo, his liability depends on the following: If he is convict serving sentence, he
is liable for Evasion of Service of Sentence (Art. 157). But if he is only a detention prisoner, the answer
is it depends. If he knew the plan of Patricio and Mauricio to allow him to escape, he is liable for
Delivery of Prisoner from Jail as principal by indispensable cooperation. If he was not aware of the plan,
he is not liable. There is no law punishing that act.
Article 157. Evasion of Service of Sentence. ---- The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service
of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment. However, if such evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful
entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false
keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or
employees of the penal institution, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its maximum
period.
Elements
3. He evades service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment.
(1) By simply leaving or escaping from the penal establishment under Article 157;
(2) Failure to return within 48 hours after having left the penal establishment because of a
calamity, conflagration or mutiny and such calamity, conflagration or mutiny has been
announced as already passed under Article 158;
Q: What then is the concept of evasion of service of sentence under Article 157 of the Revised
Penal Code.
A: Reason dictates that one can escape only after he has started service of sentence.
By the very nature of the crime, it cannot be committed when the prisoner involved is merely a
detention prisoner. But it applies to persons convicted by final judgment with a penalty of
destierro. So even though what appears apparent in the definition of the crime of evasion of
service of sentence is that the prisoner should be in jail and therefore deprived of his liberty, the
Supreme Court, however, ruled that one who is sentenced to destierro violates this provision if he
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enters the prohibited radius of 25 kms. from the place where the crime was committed which is
usually specified in the decision (People vs. Abilong, 82 Phil. 174-175).
Read: Pangan vs Gatbalite, January 21, 2005. (it reiterated the ruling in Tanega case)
Convicts who, under the circumstances mentioned in the preceding paragraph, shall
give themselves up to the authorities within the above mentioned period of 48 hours, shall
be entitled to the deduction provided in Article 98.
Elements
a. conflagration;
b. earthquake;
c. explosion; or
d. similar catastrophe; or
3. He evades the service of his sentence by leaving the penal institution where he is
confined, on the occasion of such disorder or during the mutiny;
4. He fails to give himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a
proclamation by the Chief Executive announcing the passing away of such calamity.
In this case, the offender is a prisoner serving sentence and is confined in a penal institution; he
evades the service of his sentence by leaving or escaping from the penal institution, taking
advantage of an unusual occurrence which may be in the form of a conflagration, earthquake,
explosion or catastrophe or during a mutiny.
For such event to be considered as a calamity, the President must declare it to be so. He must also
issue a proclamation to the effect that the calamity is over. Logically, even if the events herein
mentioned may be considered a calamity, there is a need for the Chief Executive to make such
announcement. Absent such declaration, even if the prisoner will return to the penal institution
where he was confined, the same is of no moment as in the meantime he has committed a
violation of the law, not under the present article but for pure evasion of service of sentence under
Article 157.
Q: What is the effect if the prisoner who escaped on the occasion of a calamity returns within 48
hours following the announcement of the passing away of the calamity?
Ans: He will be rewarded. He will be given a penalty deduction equivalent to 1/5 of the original sentence.
We call this special time allowance for loyalty under Art. 98 of the Revised Penal Code. If he fails to
return, he will be penalized with additional 1/5 penalty based on the remaining sentence.
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“ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. – A deduction of one fifth of the period of his
sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded his preventive imprisonment or
the service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this Code,
gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a proclamation
announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article. A
deduction of two-fifths of the period of his sentence shall be granted in case said prisoner
chose to stay in the place of his confinement notwithstanding the existence of a calamity or
catastrophe enumerated in Article 158 of this Code.
“This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing preventive imprisonment or
serving sentence.”
Problem: Typhoon Ondoy lashed its fury in northern Luzon. X, a prisoner at the Baguio City Jail
took advantage of the confusion and escaped. He was arrested after a few days. There was no
proclamation of the passing of the calamity. He was charged with Evasion of Service of Sentence
on the occasion of a calamity. Is the charge correct?
Ans: No, the answer is not correct. He was arrested and did not return. Besides, there was no
announcement of the passing of the calamity. He is liable for Evasion of Service of Sentence
under Art. 157.
The crime of evasion of service of sentence may be committed even if the sentence is destierro,
and this is committed if the convict sentenced to destierro will enter the prohibited places or come
within the prohibited radius of 25 kilometers to such places as stated in the judgment.
If the sentence violated is destierro, the penalty upon the convict is to be served by way of
destierro also, not imprisonment. This is so because the penalty for the evasion can not be more
severe than the penalty evaded.
Article 159. Other Cases of Evasion of Service of Sentence — The penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the convict who, having been
granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such
pardon. However, if the penalty remitted by the granting of such pardon be higher than six
years, the convict shall then suffer the unexpired portion of his original sentence.
The convict shall be released from prison by virtue of the conditional pardon and in view of his
commitment that he shall abide by the terms of the pardon. If he violates any of the terms of the
pardon, he is deemed not to have a genuine interest to comply with 1 he conditions of the pardon
upon him. Thus, if he violates any of the conditions of the pardon, the crime he committed is still
Evasion of Service of Sentence.
unexpired portion of the sentence that was pardoned. However, if the penalty remitted by the
pardon is higher than six years, there is no additional penalty because the convict shall then suffer
the unexpired portion of his original sentence.
(1) There is a penalty of prision correccional minimum for the violation of the conditional
pardon;
(2) There is no new penalty imposed for the violation of the conditional pardon. Instead, the
convict will be required to serve the unserved portion of the sentence.
If the remitted portion of the sentence is less than six years or up to six years, there is an added
penalty of prision correccional minimum. Hence, the violation is a substantive offense because in
this case a new penalty is imposed for the violation of the conditional pardon.
But if the remitted portion of the sentence exceeds six years, the violation of the
conditional pardon is not a substantive offense because no new penalty is imposed for the
violation.
Exception: where the violation of the condition of the pardon will constitute evasion of service of
sentence, even though committed beyond the remaining period of the sentence. This is when the
conditional pardon expressly so provides or the language of the conditional pardon clearly shows
the intention to make the condition perpetual even beyond the unserved portion of the sentence.
In such case, the convict may be required to serve the unserved portion of the sentence even
though the violation has taken place when the sentence has already lapsed.
In order that the conditional pardon may be violated, it is conditional that the pardonee received
the conditional pardon. If he is released without conformity to the conditional pardon, he will not
be liable for the crime of evasion of service of sentence.
Article 159 is a distinct felony. It is a substantive crime. For one to suffer the consequence of its
violation, the prisoner must be formally charged in court. He will be entitled to a full blown
hearing, in full enjoyment of his right to due process. Only after a final judgment has been
rendered against him may he suffer the penalty prescribed under Article 159 (Torres vs.
Gonzales, et al., 152 SCRA 292).
Article 160. Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another
previous offense — Penalty. — Besides the provisions of Rule 5 of Article 62, any person
who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning
to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period
of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.
Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be
pardoned at the age of seventy years if he shall have already served out his original
sentence, or when he shall complete it after reaching said age, unless by reason of his
conduct or other circumstances he shall not be worthy of such clemency.
Elements
2. He committed a new felony before beginning to serve such sentence or while serving the
same.
Problem: X was convicted of Theft. The judgment became final. Before he could start serving
sentence, X committed Attempted Homicide. Is X a quasi recidivist?
An: Yes, X is a quasi recidivist. Before serving sentence, he committed Attempted Homicide, a felony.
Problem: X was convicted of Falsification. While serving sentence, X committed Violation of the
Drugs Law. Is X a quasi recidivist?
Ans: No, he is not a quasi recidivist. While serving sentence, he committed a crime, a violation of the
drugs law. What the law provides is that before serving sentence or while serving sentence, the
convict must commit a felony.
Problem: X was convicted of Illegal recruitment. Before serving sentence, he committed Murder.
Is X a quasi recidivist?
Ans: Yes, X is a quasi recidivist. Before serving sentence, he committed Murder, a felony. The
nature of the first offense does not matter. Whether it is a felony or a crime is of no moment.
What determines quasi recidivism is that before serving sentence or while serving sentence, the
convict must commit a felony. If he commits a crime and not a felony before or while serving
sentence, he is not a quasi recidivist.
Problem: X was convicted of Illegal Possession of firearm. While serving sentence, X committed
a Violation of BP 22, a special law. Is X a quasi recidivist?
Ans: No, X is not a quasi recidivist. While serving sentence, X committed a crime and not a felony.
Article 161 Article 161. Counterfeiting the great seal of the Government of the Philippine
Islands, forging the signature or stamp of the Chief Executive. — The penalty of reclusion
temporal shall be imposed upon any person who shall forge the Great Seal of the
Government of the Philippine Islands or the signature or stamp of the Chief Executive.
Acts punished
The crimes under this title are perpetrated against the public in general. That is the reason
why they are called crimes against public interest.
There is deceit employed in the commission of the crime, just like in estafa or swindling.
However, in estafa, the deceit is employed against a particular person or group of persons. In the
crime of forgeries contemplated under Articles 161 and 162, the deceit is against the public in
general.
What is contemplated under Article 161 is a situation wherein the offender counterfeits
the great seal of the Government. After forging the great seal of the Government, the signature of
the president or stamp of the president, he is found in possession of the same. The fact of forging
is what is punished under the law.
If the forged signature of the president is used to defraud a particular person or individual
and the deceit employed violates the provision of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code on
estafa, the crime committed will not be forgery or falsification under Article 161 but plain estafa.
It must be so because the damage is caused to a particular person or personal interest and not
public interest as provided by law. In the same manner, if the forged signature is used to pardon a
convict, then the crime would be forging the signature of the Chief Executive under Article 161.
Obviously, it is a crime against the public in general.
Article 162. Using forged signature or counterfeit seal or stamp. — The penalty ofprision
mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall knowingly make use of the counterfeit
seal or forged signature or stamp mentioned in the preceding article.
Elements
1. The great seal of the Republic was counterfeited or the signature or stamp of the Chief
Executive was forged by another person;
Article 163. Making and importing and uttering false coins. — Any person who makes,
imports, and utters false coins, in connivance with counterfeiters or importers, shall suffer:
1) Prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not to exceed Four
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00), if the counterfeited coin be silver coin
of the Philippines or coin of the Central Bank of the Philippines of ten-centavo
denomination or above.
2) Prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not to
exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) if the counterfeited coins
be any of the minor coinage of the Philippines or of the Central Bank of the
Philippines below ten-centavo denomination.
3) Prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed 1,000 pesos,
if the counterfeited coin be currency of a foreign country. (As amended by Rep.
Act No. 10951)
Elements
3. In case of uttering such false or counterfeited coins, he connived with the counterfeiters
or importers.
1. Silver coins of the Philippines or coins of the Central Bank of the Philippines;
2. Coins of the minor coinage of the Philippines or of the Central Bank of the Philippines;
Problem: X went to the SM grocery store and purchased food stuff for the celebration of the
birthday of MM. He paid the groceries with 3 one thousand peso bills. When the cashier looked at
the bills she had doubts if they were genuine. She compared them with the genuine money and
she discovered that the bills are counterfeit. Is X liable for possession of counterfeit money?
Ans: No, X is not liable for possession of counterfeit money. Two elements must be present: (1)
intent to use the counterfeit money, and (2) knowledge that the money in his possession is a
counterfeit money. These elements are not attendant in the instant case.
Problem: PIolo in connivance with a politician distributed counterfeit money to voters knowing
full well that the money is counterfeit. Is he liable? Why?
Ans: Yes, he is liable. It having been established that Piolo acted in connivance with the
counterfeiting, it is not necessary anymore to prove that he knew the money to be counterfeited.
The connivance amply shows that he has knowledge thereof and he actually used it.
Article 164. Mutilation of coins — Importation and utterance of mutilated coins. — The
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed Four
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall mu-
tilate coins of the legal currency of the Philippine or import or utter mutilated current
coins, in connivance with the mutilator or importer. (As amended by RA 10951)
Acts punished
1. Mutilating coins of the legal currency, with the further requirements that there be intent
to damage or to defraud another;
2. Importing or uttering such mutilated coins, with the further requirement that there must
be connivances with the mutilator or importer in case of uttering.
(2) Forgery – refers to instruments of credit and obligations and securities issued by the
Philippine government or any banking institution authorized by the Philippine
government to issue the same;
In so far as coins in circulation are concerned, there are two crimes that may be committed:
(1) Counterfeiting coins -- This is the crime of remaking or manufacturing without any
authority to do so.
In the crime of counterfeiting, the law is not concerned with the fraud upon the public such that
even though the coin is no longer legal tender, the act of imitating or manufacturing the coin of
the government is penalized. In punishing the crime of counterfeiting, the law wants to prevent
people from trying their ingenuity in their imitation of the manufacture of money.
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(2) Mutilation of coins -- This refers to the deliberate act of diminishing the proper metal
contents of the coin either by scraping, scratching or filling the edges of the coin and the
offender gathers the metal dust that has been scraped from the coin.
Importation of coins means to bring within the Philippine Archipelago false coins. Even
before they are put into circulation, the crime is already committed because what is made
punishable is the importation of fake coins.
Uttering of false coins means to circulate, to deliver, to transfer to another with full
knowledge that the coin is counterfeit.
Mutilation of coins means to diminish the previous metal value of the genuine coin. It may
be done through the application of chemicals, thereby reducing or diminishing the intrinsic value
of the coin. Note that the coin subject matter of the mutilation should be of legal tender.
(2) Offender gains from the precious metal dust abstracted from the coin; and
Mutilation of coins is a crime only if the coin mutilated is legal tender. If the coin whose metal
content has been depreciated through scraping, scratching, or filing the coin and the offender
collecting the precious metal dust, even if he would use the coin after its intrinsic value had been
reduced, nobody will accept the same. If it is not legal tender anymore, no one will accept it, so
nobody will be defrauded. But if the coin is of legal tender, and the offender minimizes or
decreases the precious metal dust content of the coin, the crime of mutilation is committed.
The offender must deliberately reduce the precious metal in the coin. Deliberate intent arises
only when the offender collects the precious metal dust from the mutilated coin. If the offender
does not collect such dust, intent to mutilate is absent, but Presidential Decree No. 247 will
apply.
It shall be unlawful for any person to willfully deface, mutilate, tear, burn, or destroy in any
manner whatsoever, currency notes and coins issued by the Central Bank.
Mutilation under the Revised Penal Code is true only to coins. It cannot be a crime under the
Revised Penal Code to mutilate paper bills because the idea of mutilation under the code is
collecting the precious metal dust. However, under Presidential Decree No. 247, mutilation is not
limited to coins.
Q: The people playing cara y cruz, before they throw the coin in the air would rub the money to
the sidewalk thereby diminishing the intrinsic value of the coin. Is the crime of mutilation
committed?
A: Mutilation, under the Revised Penal Code, is not committed because they do not collect the
precious metal content that is being scraped from the coin. However, this will amount to
violation of Presidential Decree No. 247.
Q: When the image of Jose Rizal on a five-peso bill is transformed into that of Randy Santiago, is
there a violation of Presidential Decree No. 247?
A: Yes. Presidential Decree No. 247 is violated by such act.
Q: A certain customer in a restaurant wanted to show off and used a P 20.00 bill to light his
cigarette. Was he guilty of violating Presidential Decree No. 247?
A: He was guilty of violating of Presidential Decree No. 247. Anyone who is in possession of
defaced money is the one who is the violator of Presidential Decree No. 247. The intention of
Presidential Decree No. 247 is not to punish the act of defrauding the public but what is being
punished is the act of destruction of money issued by the Central Bank of the Philippines.
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Note that persons making bracelets out of some coins violate Presidential Decree No. 247.
The primary purpose of Presidential Decree No. 247 at the time it was ordained was to stop the
practice of people writing at the back or on the edges of the paper bills, such as "wanted: pen
pal".
Article 165. Selling of false or mutilated coin, without connivance. — Any person who
knowingly, although without the connivance mentioned in the preceding articles, shall pos-
sess false or mutilated coin with intent to utter the same, or shall actually utter such coin,
shall suffer a penalty lower by one degree than that prescribed in said articles.
Acts punished
1. Possession of coin, counterfeited or mutilated by another person, with intent to utter the
same, knowing that it is false or mutilated;
Elements
1. Possession;
3. Knowledge.
2. Actually uttering such false or mutilated coin, knowing the same to be false or mutilated.
Elements
2. Knowledge.
Article 166. Forging treasury or bank notes or other documents payable to bearer; importing,
and uttering such false or forged notes and documents. — The forging or falsification of
treasury or bank notes or certificates or other obligations and securities payable to bearer
and the importation and uttering in connivance with forgers or importers of such false or
forged obligations or notes, shall be punished as follows:
1) By reclusion temporal in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00), if the document which has been falsified,
counterfeited, or altered is an obligation or security of the Philippine Islands.
The words "obligation or security of the Philippine Islands" shall be held to mean
all bonds, certificates of indebtedness, national bank notes, coupons, Philippine notes,
treasury notes, fractional notes, certificates of deposit, bills, checks, or drafts for money,
drawn by or upon authorized officers of the Philippine, and other representatives of value,
of whatever denomination, which have been or may be issued under any act of Congress.
2) By prision mayor in its maximum period and a fine not to exceed One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00), if the falsified or altered document is a circulating note
issued by any banking association duly authorized by law to issue the same.
3) By prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not to exceed One Million
Pesos (1,000,000), if the falsified or counterfeited document was issued by a
foreign government.
4) By prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed Four Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P400,000,00), when the forged or altered document is a
circulating note or bill issued by a foreign bank duly authorized therefor. (As
amended by RA 10951)
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Acts punished
3. Uttering of such false or forged obligations or notes in connivance with the forgers or
importers.
Forgery is the act of erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any means the figures,
letters, words, or signs contained in a genuine document. It can also be done by giving a
commercial document the appearance of a true genuine document.
The article under consideration punishes forgery of securities which may consist of bonds,
certificates of indebtedness, certificates of deposits, bills, checks or notes issued and guaranteed
by the Philippine government. It may also refer to bank notes issued by banking institutions
authorized by law to do the same, regardless of whether the bank is domestic or foreign.
Article 166 uses the term forgery or falsification to describe the crime committed thus, giving the
impression that forgery and falsification are one and the same. But for one to apply Article 166,
the document that must be falsified should be a treasury or a bank note or certificate or other
obligations and securities payable to bearer. If the falsification is done on a document that is
classified as a government security, then the crime is punished under Article 166. On the other
hand, if it is not a government security, then the offender may either have violated Article 171 or
172.
Article 167. Counterfeiting, importing, and uttering instruments not payable to bearer. — Any
person who shall forge, import, or utter, in connivance with the forgers or importers, any
instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer, shall suffer
the penalties of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not
exceeding One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000.00). (As amended by RA
10951)
Elements
1. There is an instrument payable to order or other documents of credit not payable to bearer;
Article 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments
of credit. — Unless the act be one of those coming under the provisions of any of the
preceding articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in his possession, with intent
to use, any of the false or falsified instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the
penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles.
Elements
1. Any treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer,
or any instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer is
forged or falsified by another person;
3. He either –
Article 169. How forgery is committed. — The forgery referred to in this section may be
committed by any of the following means:
The situation contemplated under paragraph No.(l) refers to a person who commits forgery
with respect to an instrument that is not genuine, but which is made to appear as genuine or
authentic. Forgery is committed for as long as the document involved is a treas ury or bank note
or any instrument payable to bearer or order.
In paragraph No. (2), the instrument is genuine, but the alteration is introduced to change its
meaning. It would appear that even if the change does not materially affect the integrity of the
document, forgery is still committed. What is being protected by the law is not the interest of a
particular individual but public interest in general.
The essence of forgery is giving a document the appearance of a true and genuine
document. Not any alteration of a letter, number, figure or design would amount to forgery. At
most, it would only be frustrated forgery.
When what is being counterfeited is obligation or securities, which under the Revised Penal
Code is given a status of money or legal tender, the crime committed is forgery.
Problem: Instead of the peso sign (P), somebody replaced it with a dollar sign ($). Was the
crime of forgery committed?
The legislative documents referred to in this article are bills, resolutions, or ordinances
already enacted or pending approval by Congress or any Provincial Board, City Council, or
Municipal Board or Municipal Council.
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did
not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than
those in fact made by them;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry,
or official book.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall commit any of
the offenses enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of this article, with respect to any record or
document of such character that its falsification may affect the civil status of persons.
Any written instrument which establishes a right or by which an obligation is extinguished. A deed or
agreement executed by a person setting forth any disposition or condition wherein rights and obligations
may arise
Kinds of Documents:
Public document — Any instrument notarized by a notary public or placed under oath by public officers
with the solemnities required by law.
Official document — Any instrument issued by the government or its agent or its officers having the
authority to do so and the offices, which in accordance with their creations are authorized to issue the same.
The officer or public employee must issue the instrument in the performance of his duty.
Commercial document — Any instrument executed in accordance with the Code of Commerce and the
Civil Code of the Philippines or any mercantile law containing a disposition of commercial rights or
obligations
Private document — Any instrument or deed executed by a private person or between private
persons without the intervention of the notary public or public officers authorized to administer
oath, and which writing has created a right or has extinguished an obligation.
Under this article, only public officers, employees or notary public or ecclesiastical
ministers can be the offender. The offender takes advantage of his official position by falsifying
any of the documents mentioned above. Either he has the duty to intervene in the preparation of
the document or it may be a situation wherein the public officer has official custody of the
document.
Thus, a clerk of court who maliciously and deliberately changed the return of the
summons issued in a civil case such that instead of the statement "not duly served," he falsifies
the same by placing the words "duly served" and for which a judgment by default was ren dered
by the court against the defaulting defendant, the clerk of court is obviously guilty of falsification
under this article.
Q: Suppose in the same set of facts, the falsification was done by a municipal mayor. Can we
hold him guilty of falsification under Article 171?
A: No, because although he is a public officer, he did not take advantage of his official position in
causing the falsification. He is, however, liable for falsification under Article 172.
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Example No. 1:
The Sandiganbayan has five divisions. Each division is composed of three justices with one of
them acting as chairman. The unanimous vote of the three justices in a decision is required to
render a decision. If the decision is signed by only two justices and the sig nature of the third
member was imitated by the chairman in order to make it appear that there was unanimity in
rendering the decision, the chairman, for such imitation, is guilty of falsification under the first
situation or mode.
Example No. 2:
A court employee imitated the signature of the judge in the order of release of a detention
prisoner who posted a bond for his provisional liberty. The document is genuine. The crime of
Falsification is committed by imitating the genuine signature of the judge.
Second Situation: “Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any pro ceeding
when they did not so participate.”
Example No. 1:
In a meeting of the city council of Quezon City, Councilor Andres Genito was absent. In order to
reflect in the record that there was quorum, the councilors present, made it appear that he was
present and that it was Mr. Genito who moved for the adjournment of the meeting.
Example No. 2:
The check is made payable to Mr. ABC. The offender endorsed the check by writing the name of
Mr. ABC. He did not copy or imitate or counterfeit the signature of the payee. In so doing, while
there is no imitation, he is still liable for the crime of falsification for making it appear that a
person has participated in a proceeding when he did not in fact so participate.
Third Situation: “Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or pro ceeding
statements other than those in fact made by them.”
Example No. 1:
Juan and Maria are the owners of a parcel of land. In a civil suit they filed against Maximo
Reyes, they requested a friend named Nicasio Capule to represent them in the suit since they are
unlettered. When Capule went to the notary public for the preparation of the special power of
attorney, in conspiracy with the latter, a deed of sale of a parcel of land belonging to the couple
was prepared in favor of Capule. Since Juan and Maria were illiterate, they signed the document
which were brought to them by Capule. They never appeared before the notary public. In this
case, Nicasio Capule was convicted of falsification for making a document attributing to Juan and
Maria statements other than those in fact made by them (U.S. vs. Nicasio Capule, 24 Phil. 13).
Example No. 2:
Fabian, a tricycle driver was in dire need of money. His wife was in the hospital and was
due for a caesarian operation. Kahian went to Don Segundo and obtained a Php20,000 loan. He
gave his tricycle as collateral to the loan. Instead of preparing a Chattel Mortgage which was the
agreement, the notary public prepared an absolute deed of sale which Fabian signed not knowing
the import of the document because of his meager education. The notary public is liable for
falsification. Fabian really participated in the transaction. The notary public attributed to Fabian statement
other than those in fact made by him.
Elements:
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1)The offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated;
2)There must be a wrongful intent to injure a third party; and
3)Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.
Example No. 1: “Legal obligation of the offender to disclose the truth of the facts narrated”
Eugene is a bar candidate. He filled up an application form to take the bar examination.
In the form, there is a question..."have you ever been charged or convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude?" Eugene answered "NO" when in fact and in truth he was previously convicted
of Robbery. Eugene is liable for falsification. He had the legal obligation to tell the truth of the facts
narrated by him. He made an untruthful statement in a narration of facts..
Example No. 2:
Martin is an employee of the Social Security System. He filed an application to take the Civil
Service First Grade Examination. He filled up the application form and filled up "college
graduate" in the space provided for. The truth is, he did not graduate because he lacked 1.5 units
in military science (ROTC). He passed the examination. It was found out though that he did not
graduate in college because of the deficiency. He was charged of falsification. Is the charge
correct?
Ans: Yes, the charge is correct. He had the legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated
by him. He did not do so. He made an untruthful statement.
In the same problem, what if before Martin filled up the application form, he asked an employee
of the Civil Service Commission if he is considered college graduate because he had finished all
the academic requirements of the course and he lacks only 1.5 units of military science. The
employee advised him that he is considered a college graduate because military science is not an
academic requirement of the course. If you were the lawyer for Martin, what is your defense?
Ans: If I were the lawyer for Martin, I will invoke good faith and honest mistake of fact as a
defense. Falsification is an intentional offense. He had no wrongful intent when he made the
entries in the application form. He inquired from an employee of the Civil Service Commission
about his status and he was advised that he is considered a college graduate. He did not
maliciously pervert the truth. (Llamoso v. Sandiganbayan, August 7, 1985) There was honest
mistake of fact on his part. (US v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil 488)
The perversion of the truth in the narration of facts must be made with the wrongful intent of
injuring a third person.
A municipal treasurer issues a certification to the effect that funds are available for the
construction of a municipal bridge. On the basis of such certification, the municipal mayor
entered into a contract with a private contractor for the implementation of the project after a
public bidding. If it turns out that there are no available funds for such project and the
certification was issued by the treasurer with full knowledge that there are actually no funds to
construct a bridge, then the municipal treasurer is liable for falsification under the fourth
paragraph.
For falsification to take place under this paragraph, the date of the document must be
material to the right created or to the obligation that is extinguished. So, if in a promissory note,
the indebtedness is due 30 days from the date of execution, and the offender- debtor alters the
date of execution, such that instead of January 1, 1999, it was made January 1, 2000, there is
falsification because the date is essential to the agreement between the parties.
68
Example: On March 21, 2010 SPOl Bautista arrested and detained Gilbong without a warrant
because the latter inflicted physical injuries on Pudol in his presence. Under Art. 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, SPOl Bautista should file the case in court within 12 hours from the time of
the warrantless arrest. He put in the blotter the date March 21, 2010 as the date of arrest. For one
reason or another SPOl Bautista failed to file the case within the prescribed period. It was only on
March 24, 2010 that he realized that he detained Gilbong beyond the time allowed by law. To
avert a criminal prosecution for Arbitrary Detention, SPOl Bautista altered the date. He changed
the date March 21, 2010 to March 23, 2010. SPOl Bautista is liable for falsification. Date is material to
the document. He altered the date and that changes the substance thereof. The document was made to
state a falsity.
Note: But an honest alteration in order to make a document speak for the truth is not falsification.
The essence of falsification is to make a document speak a falsity. Thus if the alteration is made
to rectify and make the document speak the truth falsification is not committed.
Elements:
1)There is a genuine document;
2)An alteration or intercalation is made therein;
3)Such alteration or intercalation changes the meaning of the document; and
4)The change made the document speak something false.
Example No. 1:
The police blotter is an official document or record. For a crime committed on September 6,
1930, Mr. Juan was arrested and his detention was entered in the police blotter. He was able to
post bail on the same date, September 6, 1930. The order of release was likewise entered in the
police blotter. However, notwithstanding the order of release, the chief of police continued to
detain Juan in jail. The chief of police was charged with arbitrary detention. To escape criminal
liability, he altered the entries in the police blotter by making it appear that accused Juan was
arrested and released on September 13, 1930 (People vs. Montano and Cabagsang, 57 Phil. 599).
Example No. 2:
Accused Rodolfo Manansala is a taxi driver. For his several apprehensions for reckless driving,
he was issued a traffic violation report (TVR). The law provides that on his fourth violation, a
TVR will not be sufficient but instead he will be placed under arrest. To avoid being arrested on
the fourth violation, Manansala altered the TVR issued against him such that the written figure
"III" and the written word "three" after the words "pending cases" were changed by him by
writing and superimposing the number "1" and the word "one." The alteration was made to
conceal his previous pending traffic violations and thereby avoid immediate arrest. In this case,
Manansala was found guilty of falsification of official document by making alterations on a
genuine document which changed its meaning (People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).
Elements:
Alteration is an act of making a change or changes in a document making the document speak for
something the parties did not intend to speak.
The acts of falsification mentioned in this paragraph are committed by a public officer or by a
notary public who takes advantage of his official position as custodian of the document. It can
69
also refer to a public officer or notary who prepared and retained a copy of the document. The
falsification can be done in two ways. It can be a certification purporting to show that the
document issued is a copy of the original on record when no such original exists. It can also be in
the form of a certification to the effect that the document on file contains statements or including
in the copy issued, entries which are not found or contrary to, or different from that of the original
genuine document on file.
Example:
The civil registrar of Manila issues a birth certificate to Mr. B. J. Palattao, certifying to the latter's
fact of birth in Manila, when in truth and in fact B. J. was not born in Manila but in Auitan, San
Pablo, Isabela. If, in fact, B. J. was born in Manila, the fact of the existence of his birth certificate
in the custody of the civil registrar of Manila is true. But if the certificate of live birth issued by
the civil registrar would make it appear that he is a Filipino, when what appears in his birth
certificate on file is that he is a Chinese citizen, a statement different or contrary to what is
contained in the genuine original, the crime committed is falsification of document in violation of
paragraph seven.
(1) Alteration or changes to make the document speak the truth do not constitute falsification
(U.S. vs. Mateo, 25 Phil. 324).
(2) There is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document (People vs.
Paquitalan, [C.A.], 38 O.G. 410). In this case, the offender is the son of the creditor. He
came to know that the offended party is indebted to his father in the amount of P5,000.
(4) The possession and use of a falsified document give rise to the presumption that the
possessor was the one who falsified the document (Koh Tieck Heng vs. People, 192
SCRA 533).
(6) Falsification is not a continuing offense. So, where public documents inside a ballot box
were falsified in one municipality, the fact that said ballot box was carried to another
municipality did not confer jurisdiction upon the municipal court of the latter to try the
case of falsification of said documents (Alfelor Sr. vs. Judge Bonifacio Intia, 70 SCRA
460).
Article 172. Falsification by Private Individual and Use of Falsified Documents — The
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more
than One Million Pesos (1,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in
the next preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any
other kind of commercial document; and
Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such
damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in
the next preceding article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the
damage of another or who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall use any of the false
documents embraced in the next preceding article or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of
this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree. (As amended by RA
10951)
Acts punished
1. Offender is a private individual or public officer or employee who did not take advantage
of his official position;
Under the first paragraph, the offender can be a public officer or employee who committed the
falsification without taking advantage of his official position. While he is also liable for
falsification, he indictment will be under Article 172, which imposes a lesser penalty than Article
171.
The first paragraph of Article 172 deals invariably on falsification committed by private
individuals. It is primarily intended to punish private persons who commit falsification in the
manner pro- vided and described under Article 171.
Problem: X found a lost check in the amount of Php50,000 payable to Y. It is a complete but
undelivered instrument. X counterfeited the signature of Y and presented the check with the
drawee bank. X is liable for falsification of a commercial document by a private person
Pointers:
Revised Penal Code. It may also be complexed with other crimes like malversation of public
funds.
>>>When the document that is falsified is a private document, the falsification cannot be
complexed with estafa (People vs. Villalon, 192 SCRA 521). The rule is, when an element of a
crime is common to more than one crime, you can only use that element to make up one crime.
The same element cannot be used more than once. Remember the right of the accused against
being punished twice for the same offense.
1. Offender committed any of the acts of falsification except Article 171(7), that is, issuing in an
authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no
such original exists, or including in such a copy a statement contrary to, or different from,
that of the genuine original;
3. Falsification causes damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with
intent to cause such damage.
Ans: No, A is not liable for falsification of private document. Mere falsification of a private document is
not a crime. There must be damage or at least intent to cause damage on the part of the offender.
In the instant case, B the creditor did not sustain damage. There is also no intent to cause damage
that can be inferred from the mere act of falsification.
Problem: In the same problem, suppose after the falsification B went to A and tried to collect
from A. In the process, A claimed that he had already paid his indebtedness in full and showed
the receipt that he falsified. Is A liable for falsification of private document?
Ans: Yes, A is liable for falsification of private document. His act of claiming to B that he had
paid in full his indebtedness and his showing the receipt that he falsified more than indicate intent
to cause damage on his part.
When the document falsified is a public, official, or commercial document, the falsification may
be complexed with the felony of estafa or some other felonies. Thus, there can be estafa thru
falsification of commercial document
Illustration:
X found a check payable to Y. Thereafter, X went to the drawee bank and affixed a
signature purporting to be that of Y. He was able to encash the check. The bank and Y similarly
incurred damage. The bank or Y may file a complex crime of Estafa thru falsification of a commercial
document. (Delito Complejo under Art. 48 of the RPC)
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If the document falsified were a private document there can be no complex crime of Estafa
thru Falsification of Private Document. In estafa, damage is an essential element. Damage is also an
essential element of falsification of private document. Therefore, damage is an essential element
of both estafa and falsification of private document. We cannot use the same element of damage
to prove estafa and at the same time falsification of private document. We cannot use the same
element of a crime twice.
4. The use caused damage to another or at least used with intent to cause damage .
(2) Falsification of document is a separate and distinct offense from that of the use
of falsified documents. So if the falsification of document was done or performed because
it was necessary to the use of the same and in the commission of the crime, then we may
have a complex crime defined and punished under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
Example:
The accused signed the name of a deceased heir in a deed of sale with the authority of the
children of the deceased heir. The court ruled that it is a defense in falsification of a public
document as the accused did not do it with malice (People vs. Unico, et al., C.A., 56 O.G. 1681).
(4) Mere falsification of a private document is not enough to commit the crime under
paragraph 2 of Article 172. Two acts must be done by the offender. He must have performed in
the private document the falsification contemplated under Article 171. In addition, he must have
performed an independent act which operates to cause damage or prejudice to a third person. The
third person mentioned herein may include the government (U.S. vs. Paraiso, 1 Phil. 127).
Damage is not limited to money or pecuniary prejudice. Damage to one's honor, reputation or
good name is included (People vs. Marasigan, G.R. No. 6040, Oct. 18, 1940).
5 The user of the falsified document is deemed the falsifier or author of the falsification if:
73
a. the use was so closely connected in time with the falsification; and
b. the user had the capacity of falsifying the document
Article 173. Falsification of wireless, cable, telegraph, and telephone messages, and use of said
falsified messages. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed upon any officer or employee of the Government or of any private
corporation or concern engaged in the service of sending or receiving wireless, cable, tel -
egraph, or telephone messages who utters a fictitious wireless, telegraph, or telephone
message of any system or falsifies the same.
Any person who shall use such falsified dispatch to the prejudice of a third party or with the
intent to cause such prejudice, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree.
>>> In this article, the offender must be a public officer or employee who is engaged in the
business of sending or receiving wireless, cable, telegraph, or telephone message. The offender
utters wireless, cable, telegraph, or telephone message or falsifies wireless, cable, telegraph or
telephone message. Under the first paragraph of Article 173, damage is not necessary for one to
commit the crime.
>>>However, under the second paragraph of the article, damage is an indispensable element or
intent to cause damage appears to have motivated the offender.
Article 174. False medical certificates, false certificates of merit or service, etc. — The
penalties of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum pe-
riod and a fine not to exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (200,000.00) shall be imposed
upon:
1. Any physician or surgeon who, in connection with the practice of his profession,
shall issue false certificate; and
2. Any public officer who shall issue a false certificate of merit or service, good
conduct, or similar circumstances.
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any private person who shall falsify a
certificate falling within the classes mentioned in the two preceding subdivisions. (As
amended by RA 10951)
Persons liable
1. Physician or surgeon who, in connection with the practice of his profession, issues a false
certificate (it must refer to the illness or injury of a person);
2. Public officer who issues a false certificate of merit of service, good conduct or similar
circumstances;
3. Private person who falsifies a certificate falling within the classes mentioned in the two
preceding subdivisions.
Article 175. Using false certificates. — The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon
any one who shall knowingly use any of the false certificates mentioned in the next
preceding article.
>>>>What we have learned under Articles 171 and 172 should be remembered all the time when
we articulate on the meaning of falsification. Under Articles 174 and 175, the subject matter is
also falsification, except that this time, the documents are made specific. They are identified as
medical certificate, false certificate of merits or service. But they are documents contemplated
74
under Articles 171 and 172, as they create a right. The manner they are falsified is also the same
as provided under Articles 171 and 172.
Q: So, how come that they are not punished under said articles?
A: The reason is simple. Articles 171 and 172 are of general application and the rule is, whenever
a specific act or omission is the subject matter of a particular provision of the Revised Penal Code
the same should prevail.
Therefore, when the falsification is committed by any physician or surgeon in connection with the
practice of his profession, we hold him criminally liable under Article 174.
Any person who, with the intention of using them, shall have in his possession any of the
instruments or implements mentioned in the preceding paragraph, shall suffer the penalty
next lower in degree than that provided therein. (As amended by RA 10951)
The law imposes a penalty for the unlawful possession of materials and supplies such as
dyes, ink, paper or those used in printing or forging any of the documents contemplated on
crimes committed under the title.
Article 177. Usurpation of authority or official functions. —Any person who shall knowingly
and falsely represent himself to be an officer, agent, or representative of any department or
agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or who, under
pretenses of official position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or
public officer of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or any agency
thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 379.)
There are two ways of committing the crime: (1) By knowingly and falsely representing
oneself to be an officer, agent or representative of any agency of the Philippine government; and ,
(2) by performing any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Phil ippine
government, under pretense of official position.
In usurpation of authority, the mere act of knowingly and falsely representing oneself to be
an officer is sufficient. There is no need for him to perform acts pertaining to public officers.
In usurpation of official function, it is essential that the offender shall perform acts
pertaining to a person in public authority.
>>>>Article 177 also includes public officers of any foreign government. This statement is
understandable because in 1932, when the Revised Penal Code was made applicable in the
Philippines, we were still a colony of America. So, it can be safely concluded that the foreign
government adverted to in this article refers to public officers duly authorized to perform
governmental duties in the Philippines.
The law cannot refer to other foreign governments as its application may bring us to legal
problems which may infringe on constitutional boundaries. The author is referring to public
officers of foreign countries whose form of government is diametrically opposed to our system of
government.
The element of false pretense is necessary to commit the crime of usurpation of authority or
usurpation of official function. So any civic-minded citizen who performs duties pertaining to
75
public officers, like conducting traffic, arresting criminals while committing a crime, and
collecting garbage, would not constitute a crime because of the absence of false pretenses.
One who knowingly and falsely represents himself to be the duly elected mayor of a town
or to be the duly appointed municipal judge, or to be the duly appointed regional police director,
are the offenders that are referred to in this article.
Article 178. Using fictitious name and concealing true name. — The penalty of arresto mayor
and a fine not to exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1000,000) shall be imposed upon
any person who shall publicly use a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime,
evading the execution of a judgment, or causing damage.
Any person who conceals his true name and other personal circumstances shall be punished
by arresto menor or a fine not to exceed Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00). (As amended
by RA 10951)
Acts punished
Elements
1. Offender uses a name other than his real name;
The offender uses a name other than his real name. The offender uses the fictitious name
publicly and the purpose of the offender in using such a fictitious name is to conceal or hide a
crime committed by him, or to evade the execution of a final judgment rendered against him or to
cause damage to public interest.
Elements
The name of a person is what appears in his birth certificate. The name of a person refers
to his first name, surname, and maternal surname. Any other name which a person publicly
applies to himself without authority of law is a fictitious name. The use of aliases is provided
under'Republic Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act No. 6085.
Illustration: Menandro and Hipolito had a drinking spree inside a bar in Magsaysay Avenue,
Olongapo City. They were seen by their common friends. At 10:00 o'clock in the evening they
left the bar together. On their way home they had a heated argument. In the course thereof,
Menandro repeatedly hit Hipolito with a stone resulting to the latter's death. Menandro hid the
cadaver of Hipolito in a grassy portion of a nearby lot. To conceal the crime, Menandro went to
Davao City on the following day and publicly assumed a new name Alejandro. Menandro is
liable for Using Fictitious Name. He publicly used a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a
crime.
76
Illustration: Romano de la Cruz was arrested for violation of the curfew hour. He gave his name
as Levi Castral, 18 years of age, single and a resident of No. 5 Camilla Subdivision, Bacoor,
Cavite. Everything that he stated is false because aside from his false name, he is 24 years old,
married and a resident of Fatima Street, UP Village, Quezon City. He is liable for Concealing true
name because he concealed his true name and other personal circumstances to conceal his
identity.
USE OF UNREGISTERED ALIASES: Commonwealth Act No. 142, regulating the use of
aliases was amended by Republic Act No. 6085 which provides:
"SECTION 1. Except as pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events, where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted
practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at
birth in the office of the local civil registry, or with which he was registered in the Bureau of
Immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent
court: Provided, That persons, whose births have not been registered in any local civil registry
and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this Act within which to
register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patro-
nymic name and one or two surnames.
SECTION 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefore in
proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name, and no
person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for
any alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the name, if an alien, and his
pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or
reasons for the use of the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the christian
name and the alien's immigrant name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no
person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the same is or are
duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.
SECTION 3. No person having been baptized with a name different from that which he was
registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry, or any person who obtained judicial authority
to use an alias, or who uses a pseudonym, shall represent himself in any public or private
transaction or shall sign or execute any public or private document without stating or affixing his
real or original name and all names or aliases or pseudonym he is or may have been authorized to
use.
xxxx
SECTION 5. Any violation of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of from one year to
five years and a fine of P5,000 to P10,000.
x x x."
Q: What is the rationale for enacting C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085 (An Act to
Regulate the Use of Aliases)?
A: The enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the practice among
the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous
confusion in the field of trade.
Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons
cannot be successfully maintained against the Chinese who rightly or wrongly claim they pos -
sessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias unless the
use of such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and registered in the civil
register.
An alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered
at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man’s
name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by
which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these
are known as aliases. 11 Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to
77
another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be
known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the
prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended”
Cesario, an employee of the DENR assigned at Kidapawan, was charged with several
administrative complaints before the Office of the Ombudsman. He tapped the services of Atty.
Francis to defend him, so Atty. Francis wrote a letter to the Office of the Ombudsman requesting
that he be furnished copies of the complaint filed against Cesario. Because Atty. Francis’s
messenger, Oscar Perez was not around, he asked Cesario to personally deliver the letter to the
Office of the Ombudsman. Though Cesario had some misgivings because he is one of the
respondents in the case, he had no choice but to accede to the request of Atty. Francis, who told
him to sign his name as “Oscar Perez” if he received the document. He went to the Office of the
Ombudsman in Davao City. There, he was asked by the security officer to sign his name in the
logbook. Instead of writing his true name, Cesario wrote in the logbook “Oscar Perez”, the
messenger of Atty. Francis. He proceeded to the Administrative Division to get the copy of the
complaint. Upon receipt of the documents, he again signed his name as “Oscar Perez”. When he
was about to leave the office. he met an acquaintance, who works in the Office of the
Ombudsman. Josefa, who owns a gasoline station, knows Cesario, he being a frequent customer
at the gas station. When she learned that Cesario signed her name as “Oscar Perez”, she reported
it to the Deputy Ombudsman, who ordered that Cesario be charged for violation of
Commonwealth Act 142, the Anti-Alias Law. Despite Cesario filing a demurrer to evidence
alleging that the failure of the prosecution to prove that his name used is different from that stated
in his certificate of birth, the trial court convicted him for violation of CA 142. The Court of
Appeals affirmed his conviction.
Q: May Cesario be convicted for violation of the Anti-Alias Law (CA 142 as amended by RA
6085) despite his contention that an alias, is a term which connotes the habitual use of another
name by which a person is also known.?
A: The Supreme Court, after explaining the purpose and intent in regulating the use of aliases
penalized under CA 142 in relation to RA 6085, acquitted him thus:
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him
publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he
is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent
authority. A man’s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by
his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different
names and these are known as aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name
belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user
intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall
within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.
78
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as “Oscar Perez,”
which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the
first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of
the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that “Oscar Perez” is not an
alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name
as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name “Oscar Perez” was made by petitioner
in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he
had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy
of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the
complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper
circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense
within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in
business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as
the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No.
142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a
legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will
avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. 12
Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of
the accused. 13 The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the
object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the
court limited. 14 Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted
on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him.
Wherefore, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the
crime charged.
>>>>>Also treated in the article is the concealment of true name. What the offender does to
violate or commit this act is for him to conceal his true name and other personal circumstances.
His only motive in doing so is to conceal his identity. In concealment of true name, the deception
is done momentarily, just enough to conceal the name of the offender. In the use of a fictitious
name, the offender presents himself before the public with another name.
A person under investigation by the police who gives a false name and false personal
circumstances, upon being interrogated, is guilty of this crime. Other personal circumstances
refer to the place of birth, civil status, citizenship, occupation and place of residence of a person.
All of these circumstances are concealed by suppressing the truth and giving out informations
that are contrary to the real personal circumstances of the informant.
Article 179. Illegal use of uniform or insignia. — The penalty of arresto mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall publicly and improperly make use of insignia,
uniforms, or dress pertaining to an office not held by such person or to class of persons of
which he is not a member.
2. The insignia, uniform or dress pertains to an office not held by the offender or to a class
of persons of which he is not a member.
The uniform contemplated by law carries authority which the public looks up to and respects. The
uniform symbolizes authority. Examples: Philippine Marines, Scout Rangers, Philippine Navy,
Philippine Air force. The offender has no right whatsoever to use the uniform or insignia.
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Wearing the uniform of an imaginary office is not punishable. Example: Roger Padilla uses a
uniform of a certain World Air Force with the rank of Supreme Commander. He is not liable for
Illegal use of uniform. The uniform pertains to a pseudo or fictitious organization.
A swindler who wears publicly the black robe of a Catholic priest and makes himself available in
funeral homes to celebrate mass for the dead and share in the mass collections, makes a good
example of one who may be considered guilty of illegal use of uniform.
The wearing of insignia, badge or emblem of rank of the members of the armed forces of the
Philippines or constabulary (now PNP) is punished by Republic Act No. 493. It is punished by a
fine of not less than P100 and not more than P2,000, or by imprisonment for not less than one
month and not more than two years, or both.
>>>>When the uniform or insignia is used to emphasize the pageantry of a play or drama or in
moving picture films, the crime is not committed.
Note: Illegal manufacture, sale, distribution and use of PNP uniforms, insignias and other
accoutrements are punished by Executive Order No. 297.
The unauthorized manufacture, sale and distribution of PNP uniforms, insignias and other
accoutrements is hereby prohibited.
Any violation of this rule shall, after due notice and hearing, result in the immediate
closure of the establishment, plant and/or office where the uniforms and other items are
manufactured, stored, sold and/or distributed, the cancellation of its business license or permit,
the condemnation, seizure and forfeiture of all paraphernalia used or intended to be used in the
manufacture, sale and/or distribution and the imposition of reasonable administrative fines,
without prejudice to the filing of administrative, civil and/or criminal actions.
The use of PNP uniforms, insignias and other accoutrements by person who is not a
member of the unformed PNP personnel is also prohibited. Any violation of this rule shall, after
due notice and hearing, be penalized by public censure which shall be published at least once in a
newspaper of general circulation without prejudice to the filing of administrative, civil ind/or
criminal actions.
Any person who shall publicly and improperly make use of insignias, uniforms or dress
pertaining exclusively for uniformed PNP personnel and ;he PNP of which he/she is not a
member shall be criminally liable pursuant o Article 179 of the Revised Penal Code.
(a) It cannot be committed through reckless imprudence because false testimony requires
criminal intent or intent to violate the law is an essential element of the crime.
(b) If the false testimony is due to honest mistake or error or there was good faith in
making the false testimony, no crime is committed.
Why is false testimony made a crime?
The rationale given by the Honorable Court of Appeals is enlightening. Falsehood is ever
reprehensible; but it is particularly odious when committed in a judicial proceeding, as it
constitutes an imposition upon the court and seriously exposes it to a miscarriage of justice.
While false testimony in favor of an accused may be less obnoxious than false testimony against
him, both forms are equally repugnant to the orderly administration of justice and deserve to be
rigorously suppressed (People vs. Reyes, [C.A.] 48 O.G. 1837).
Article 180. False Testimony against a Defendant.--- Any person who shall give false
testimony against the defendant in any criminal case shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion temporal, if the defendant in said case shall have been
sentenced to death;
2. The penalty of prision mayor, if the defendant shall have been sentenced to
reclusion temporal or reclusion perpetua;
3. The penalty of prision correccional, if the defendant shall have been sentenced to
any other afflictive penalty and
4. The penalty of arresto mayor, if the defendant shall have been sentenced to a
correctional penalty or a fine, or shall have been acquitted.
In cases provided in subdivisions 3 and 4 of this article, the offender shall further
suffer a fine not to exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00). (As amended by
RA 10951)
To avoid confusion, it is emphasized that the situation contemplated under this article is
the pendency of a criminal case. A false witness is presented by the prosecution against the
accused. After trial the court renders a decision of conviction. The decision becomes final.
Thereafter, an investigation is conducted wherein it is disclosed that during the trial a false
witness was presented. Assuming that the false witness is formally charged of violating the
provisions of Article 180 and is found guilty, the penalty to be imposed on him will depend on
the penalty imposed against the accused where he testified falsely.
To illustrate: The accused is charged of robbery with homicide. Mr. A testified against him
falsely. After trial, the accused was sentenced to death. In imposing the penalty against Mr. A, the
basis will be the sentence imposed against the accused where Mr. A testified falsely.
Accordingly, Mr. A should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal.
On the same set of facts, if the offender is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal or
reclusion perpetua, the false witness should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision mayor.
If the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision correccional or a fine or is acquitted,
the false witness shall be sentenced to suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.
Remember that only after a final judgment of conviction or acquittal may the issue of a false
testimony having been given in a criminal case come into play. In resolving the merits of the false
testimony given by the accused, the witness who gave the false testimony is held liable even if his
testimony was not given any probative value by the court. What is made punishable is the mere
giving of false testimony.
Article 181. False Testimony Favorable to the Defendant — Any person who shall give false
testimony in favor of the defendant in a criminal case, shall suffer the penalties of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to
exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,00.00), if the prosecution is for a felony
81
punishable by an afflictive penalty, and the penalty of arresto mayor in any other case. (As
amended by RA 10951)
In this case, the testimony given is absolutely false. It is intended to favor the accused. This is
what appears to be the intention of the false witness. But the probative value of the testimonial
evidence is subject to the rules of evidence. It may not be considered at all by the judge. But
whether the testimony is credible or not or whether it is appreciated or not in the context that the
false witness wanted it to be, the crime of false testimony is still committed, since it is punished
not because of the effect it produces, but because of its tendency to favor the accused (People vs.
Reyes, C.A., 48 O.G. 1837
Article 182. False Testimony in Civil Cases. --- Any person found guilty of false testimony in
a civil case shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine
not to exceed One Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000), if the amount in
controversy shall exceed One Million Pesos (P1,000,000); and the penalty of arresto mayor in
its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000), if the amount in controversy shall not exceed
said amount or cannot be estimated. (As amended by RA 10951)
If the false witness is found guilty, the basis of the penalty is made to depend upon the
amount in the civil action. The civil action contemplated under this article refers to ordinary civil
actions, like the recovery of a sum of money or for specific performance.
If the false testimony is offered in a special proceeding, the article will not apply (People vs.
Hernandez, C.A., G.R. No. 15619-R, Nov. 20, 1960). Such a case may rightfully be considered as
other cases under Article 183.
Article 183. False Testimony in Other Cases and Perjury in Solemn Affirmation.-- The
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum pe-
riod shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and
not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath,
or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to
administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall
commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this
section, shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein.
Acts punished
The elements of perjury which is punished under this article are the following:
1. The testimony was given in a non-judicial proceeding. It can also be in the form of
an affidavit;
2. The narration given in the non-judicial testimony must be on a material matter;
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By way of emphasis, when one testifies falsely before the court, the crime committed is
false testimony.
If one testifies falsely in a non-judicial proceeding, the crime committed is perjury. In false
testimony, it is not required that the offender asserts a falsehood on a material matter. It is enough
that he testifies falsely with deliberate intent. In perjury, the witness must testify or assert a fact
on a material matter with full knowledge that the information given is essentially contrary to the
truth. For this reason, we should know what is the meaning of a material matter. It means the
main fact which is the subject or object of the inquiry.
Because of the nature of perjury, which is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood, there is
no perjury committed through reckless imprudence or simple negligence under Article 365. Since
admittedly perjury can only be committed by means of dolo, then good faith or lack of malice is
a good defense when one is indicted for the crime of perjury.
1. Perjury is a crime other than false testimony in criminal cases or false testimony in civil
cases.
2. Two contradictory sworn statements are not sufficient to convict the affiant for the crime
of perjury. There must be evidence to show which of the two statements is true and
which is false. The same must be established or proved from sources other than the two
contradictory statements (People vs. Capistrano, 40 Phil. 902).
3. There is no perjury if the accused signed and swore the statement before a person not
authorized to administer oath (People vs. Bella David, C.A., 11 O .G. 496, 1943).
4. The affidavit or sworn statement must be required by law like affidavit of adverse claim
to protect one's interest on real property; or an affidavit of good moral character to take
the bar examination. So if the affidavit was made but the same is not required by law,
even if the allegations are false, the crime of perjury is not committed. (See Diaz vs.
People, 191 SCRA 86.)
Article 184. Offering False Testimony in Evidence — Any person who shall
knowingly offer in evidence a false witness or testimony in any judicial or official
proceedings, shall be punished as guilty of false testimony and shall suffer the respective
penalties provided in this section.
Elements
Article 185. Machinations in public auctions. — Any person who shall solicit any gift or
promise as a consideration for refraining from taking part in any public auction, and any
person who shall attempt to cause bidders to stay away from an auction by threats, gifts,
promises, or any other artifice, with intent to cause the reduction of the price of the thing
auctioned, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine
ranging from 10 to 50 per centum of the value of the thing auctioned.
Acts punished
1. Soliciting any gift or promise as a consideration for refraining from taking part in any
public auction;
Here, the act of soliciting, asking or demanding is already the act that is made punishable. In this
instance, the offender is the solicitor. If the person solicited agrees to the proposition, he also
incurs criminal liability as punished in this article, and as principal to the crime by direct par-
ticipation.
2. The second is the attempt to cause the bidders to stay away from the auction sale by the
employment of threats, gifts, promises or any other artifice. But in both cases, the intention of the
offender is to lower or reduce the price of the thing subject matter of the public auction.
But in both cases, the intention of the offender is to lower or reduce the price of the thing subject
matter of the public auction.
Article 186. Monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from two hundred to six thousand
pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who shall enter into any contract or agreement or shall take part in
any conspiracy or combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, in restraint of trade or
commerce or to prevent by artificial means free competition in the market.
2. Any person who shall monopolize any merchandise or object of trade or
commerce, or shall combine with any other person or persons to monopolize said
merchandise or object in order to alter the price thereof by spreading false rumors or
making use of any other artifice to restrain free competition in the market.
3. Any person who, being a manufacturer, producer, or processor of any
merchandise or object of commerce or an importer of any merchandise or object of
commerce from any foreign country, either as principal or agent, wholesaler or retailer,
shall combine, conspire or agree in any manner with any person likewise engaged in the
manufacture, production, processing, assembling or importation of such merchandise or
object of commerce or with any other persons not so similarly engaged for the purpose of
making transactions prejudicial to lawful commerce, or of increasing the market price in
any part of the Philippines, of any such merchandise or object of commerce manufactured,
produced, processed, assembled in or imported into the Philippines, or of any article in the
manufacture of which such manufactured, produced, processed, or imported merchandise
or object of commerce is used.
If the offense mentioned in this Article affects any food substance, motor fuel or
lubricants, or other articles-of prime necessity, the ptenalty shall be that of prision mayor in
its maximum and medium periods, it being sufficient for the imposition thereof that the
initial steps have been taken toward carrying out the purposes of the combination.
Any property possessed under any contract or by any combination mentioned in the
preceding paragraphs, and being the subject thereof, shall be forfeited to the Government
of the Philippines.
Whenever any of the offenses described above is committed by a corporation or
association, the president and each one of its agents or representatives in the Philippines
in case of a foreign corporation or association, who shall have knowingly permitted or
84
failed to prevent the commission of such offenses, shall be held liable as principals
thereof. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 1956.)
The acts punished as monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade are the following:
The reason why the law punishes monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade is that, what
is being encouraged is competition. In a free society, there must be free competition which is
referred to as the law of the market. The customers should be free to exercise their privilege to
choose the goods available in the market. Even the Constitution supports this provision of the law
when it declared that: "The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest
so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed." (Sec.
19, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution)
Article 187. Importation and disposition of falsely marked articles or merchandise made of
gold, silver, or other precious metals or their alloys. — The penalty of prision correccional or
a fine ranging from Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to Two Hundred Thosuand Pesos
(P200,000), or both, shall be imposed upon any person who shall knowingly import or sell
or dispose of any article or merchandise made of gold, silver or other precious metals, or
their alloys, with stamps, brands or marks which fail to indicate the actual fineness or
quality of said metals or alloys.
Any stamp, brand, label, or mark shall be deemed to fail to indicate the actual fineness of
the article on which it is engraved, printed, stamped, labeled, or attached, when the rest of
the article shows that the quality or fineness thereof is less by more than one-half karat, if
made of gold, and less by more than four one-thousandth, if made of silver, than what is
shown by said stamp, brand, label or mark. But in case of watch cases and flatware made of
gold, the actual fineness of such gold shall not be less than three one-thousandth than the
fineness indicated by said stamp, brand, label or mark.
Here, the offender does the following acts on the articles mentioned above:
To be criminally liable, it is important to establish that the offender knows the fact that the
imported merchandise fail to indicate the actual fineness or quality of the precious metal. If the
importer has no expertise on the matter such that he has no way of knowing how the fraud was
committed, the existence of such fact may be seriously considered as a defense.
Acts punished
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1. Unfair competition;
Elements
Elements
3. Fraudulent registration
Elements
Republic Act No. 8293 (An Act Prescribing the Intellectual Property Code and Establishing
the Intellectual Property Office, Providing for Its Power and Functions, and for Other
Purposes)
Section 170. Penalties. – Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed
by law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging
from Fifty thousand pesos (P 50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P 200,000.00), shall be
imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in Section
155, Section 168 and Subsection 169.1.
Section 155. Remedies; Infringement. – Any person who shall, without the consent of
the owner of the registered mark:
168.1. Any person who has identified in the mind of the public the goods he
manufactures or deals in, his business or services from those of others, whether or not a registered
mark is employed, has a property right in the goodwill of the said goods, business or service so
identified, which will be protected in the same manner as other property rights.
168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith
by which he shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business,
or services for those of the one having established such goodwill, or who shall commit any acts
calculated to produce said result, shall be guilty of unfair competition, and shall be subject to an
action therefor.
168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against
unfair competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:
(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of
goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of
the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, on in any other feature
or their appearance, which would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods
offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who
otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another
of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor
engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose; or
(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means
calculated to induce the false belief that such person is offering the services of another who ahs
identified such services in the mind of the public; or
(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who
shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods,
business or services of another.
168.4. The remedies provided by Section 156, 157 and 161 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
169.1. Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or
misleading representation of fact, which:
Note: It is the declared policy of the State to protect and preserve the integrity and confidentiality
of bank accounts and to ensure that the Philippines shall not be used as a money laundering sit for
the proceeds of any unlawful activity. Consistent of its foreign policy, the State shall extend
cooperation in transnational investigations and prosecutions of persons involved in money
laundering activities wherever committed.
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(a) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or
relates to, the proceeds of any unlawful activity, transacts or attempts to transact said monetary
instrument or property.
(b) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property involves the proceeds
of any unlawful activity, performs or fails to perform any act as a result of which he facilitates the
offense of money laundering referred to in paragraph (a) above.
(c) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property is required under this
Act to be disclosed and filed with the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), fails to do so.
(Sec.4)
Note: The RTC shall have jurisdiction to try all cases on money laundering. Those committed by
public officers shall be under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. (Sec.5)
Q: What are the unlawful activities under the AMLA, as amended by R.A.
10365?
A:
1. Kidnapping for ransom (Art. 267, RPC)
2. Sec. 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
3. Sec. 3, par. B, C, E, G, H and I of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
4. Plunder (R.A. No. 7080)
5. Robbery and extortion (Arts. 294, 295, 296, 299, 300, 301 and 302, RPC)
6. Jueteng and Masiao punished as illegal gambling (P.D. No. 1602)
7. Piracy on the high seas (RPC)
8. Qualified theft (Art. 310, RPC)
9. Swindling (Art. 315, RPC) and Other Forms of Swindling (Art. 316, RPC)
10. Smuggling (R.A. 455 and R.A. 1937)
11. Violations of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000
12. Hijacking (R.A. 6235); destructive arson and murder (RPC)
13. Terrorism and conspiracy to commit terrorism (Sec. 3 and 4, R.A. No. 9372)
14. Financing of terrorism (Sec. 4) and offenses punishable under Sec. 5, 6, 7
and 8 of the Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012
15. Bribery (Arts. 210, 211 and 211-A, RPC) and Corruption of Public Officers
(Art. 212, RPC)
16. Frauds and Illegal Exactions and Transactions (Arts. 213, 214, 215 and
216, RPC)
17. Malversation of Public Funds and Property (Arts. 217 and 222, RPC)
18. Forgeries and Counterfeiting (Arts. 163, 166, 167, 168, 169 and 176, RPC)
19. Violations of:
a. Sec. 4 to 6 of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003
b. Sections 78 to 79 of Chapter IV, of the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines
c. Sections 86 to 106 of Chapter VI, of the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998
d. Sections 101 to 107, and 110 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995
e. Sec. 27(c), (e), (f), (g) and (i), of the Wildlife Resources Conservation and
Protection Act
f. Section 7(b) of the National Caves and Cave Resources Management
Protection Act
g. the Anti-Carnapping Act of 2002
h. Sec. 1, 3 and 5 of the decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful
Possession, Manufacture, Dealing In, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms,
Ammunition or Explosives
i. the Anti-Fencing Law
j. Sec. 6 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995
88
Q: What are the provisional remedies that may be availed of for the enforcement of AMLA?
A:
1. Freezing of monetary instrument or property – The CA, upon application ex
parte by the AMLC and after determination that probable cause exist that
any monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an
unlawful activity, may issue a freeze order which shall be effective
immediately. The freeze order shall be for a period of 20 days unless
extended by the court. The court should act on the petition to freeze
within 24 hours from filing of the petition.
Note: A person whose account has been frozen may file a motion to lift
the freeze order and the court must resolve this motion before the
expiration of the 20-day original freeze order. No court shall issue a
temporary restraining order or a writ of injunction against any freeze
order, except the SC.
To ensure compliance with this Act, the BSP may inquire into or examine
any deposit of investment with any banking institution or non-bank
financial institution when the examination is made in the course of a
periodic or special examination, in accordance with the rules of
examination of the BSP. (Sec.11)
6. The transaction is in any way related to an unlawful activity or offense under this Act
that is about to be, is being or has been committed; or
7. Any transaction that is similar or analogous to any of the foregoing.
The aversion of the State against gambling is not only found in the Revised Penal Code. It
is also made punishable by special laws. And to make it more difficult for gamblers to continue
with their trade, the Civil Code under Articles 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 to 2018, provides that no
action can be maintained by the winner for the collection of what he has won in a game of
chance. To emphasize the State's policy against gambling, the law further provides that any loser
in a game of chance may recover his loss from the winner, v/ith legal interest from the time he
paid the amount lost, and subsidiarily from the operator or manager of the gambling house.
This article has been repealed by Presidential Decree No. 483 (Betting, Game-fixing or Point-
shaving and Machinations in Sport Contests):
Acts punished
3. Any registration or voting days (Republic Act No. 180, Revised Election Code); and
This article has been modified or repealed by Presidential Decree No. 449 (The Cockfighting
Law of 1974):
Only allows one cockpit per municipality, unless the population exceeds 100,000 in
which case two cockpits may be established;
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Cockfights can only be held in licensed cockpits on Sundays and legal holidays and local
fiestas for not more than three days;
Also allowed during provincial, municipal, city, industrial, agricultural fairs, carnivals, or
exposition not more than three days;
Cockfighting not allowed on December 30, June 12, November 30, Holy Thursday, Good
Friday, Election or Referendum Day, and registration days for referendums and elections;
Only municipal and city mayors are allowed to issue licenses for such.
Presidential Decree No. 1602 (Simplifying and Providing Stiffer Penalties for Violations of
Philippine Gambling Laws)
Section 1. Violations and Penalties. -- The penalty of prision mayor in its medium
degree or a fine ranging from Five Hundred Pesos to Two Thousand Pesos and in case of
recidivism the penalty of prision correccional in its medium degree or a fine of ranging from One
Thousand Pesos to Six Thousand Pesos shall be imposed upon:
(a) Any person other than those referred to in the succeeding subsection who in any
manner, shall directly or indirectly take part in any game of cockfighting, jueteng, bookies (jai-
alai or horse racing to include game fixing) and other lotteries, cara y cruz or pompiang and the
like, black jack, lucky nine, “pusoy” or Russian Poker, monte, baccarat and other card games,
palk que, domino, mahjong, high and low, slot machines, roulette, pinball and other mechanical
inventories or devices, dog racing, boat racing, car raising and other races, basketball, volleyball,
boxing, seven-eleven dice games and the like and other contests to include game fixing, point
shaving and other machinations banking or percentage game, or any other game or scheme,
whether upon chance or skill, which do not have a franchise from the national government,
wherein wagers consisting of money, articles of value of representative of value are made;
(b) Any person who shall knowingly permit any form of gambling referred to in the
preceding subdivision to be carried on in inhabited or uninhabited places or any building, vessel
or other means of transportation owned or controlled by him. If the place where gambling is
carried on has a reputation of a gambling place or that prohibited gambling is frequently carried
on therein or the place is a public or government building or barangay hall, the culprit shall be
punished by the penalty provided for in its maximum period and a fine of Six Thousand Pesos.
The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum degree and a fine of Six Thousand
Pesos shall be imposed upon the maintainer, conductor of the above gambling schemes.
The penalty of prision mayor in its medium degree and temporary absolute
disqualification and a fine of Six Thousand Pesos shall be imposed if the maintainer, conductor or
banker is a government official, or if a player, promoter, referee, umpire, judge or coach in cases
of game-fixing, point-shaving and other game machination.
The penalty of prision correccional in its medium degree and a fine ranging from Five
Hundred pesos to Two Thousand Pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall knowingly
and without lawful purpose in any hour of any day shall have in his possession any lottery list,
paper, or other matter containing letter, figures, signs or symbols which pertain to or in any
manner used in the game of jueteng, jai-alai or horse racing bookies and similar game or lottery
which has taken place or about to take place.
Before, the Revised Penal Code considered the skill of the player in classifying whether a game is
gambling or not. But under the new gambling law, the skill of the players is immaterial.
Any game is considered gambling where there are bets or wagers placed with the hope to win a
prize therefrom.
91
Under this law, even sports contents like boxing, would be gambling insofar as those who are
betting therein are concerned. Under the old penal code, if the skill of the player outweighs the
chance or hazard involved in winning the game, the game is not considered gambling but a sport.
It was because of this that betting in boxing and basketball games proliferated.
There are so-called parlor games which have been exempted from the operation of the decree like
when the games are played during a wake to keep the mourners awake at night. Pursuant to a
memorandum circular issued by the Executive Branch, the offshoot of the exemption is the
intentional prolonging of the wake of the dead by gambling lords.
Under this decree, a barangay captain who is responsible for the existence of gambling dens in
their own locality will be held liable and disqualified from office if he fails to prosecute these
gamblers. But this is not being implemented.
Fund-raising campaigns are not gambling. They are for charitable purposes but they have to
obtain a permit from Department of Social Welfare and Development. This includes concerts for
causes, Christmas caroling, and the like.
Article 200. Grave Scandal. -- The penalties of arresto mayor and public censure shall be
imposed upon any person who shall offend against decency or good customs by any highly
scandalous conduct not expressly falling within any other article of this Code.
The crime of grave scandal is a crime against public morals. Necessarily, the of fender must
commit the crime in a public place or within the view of the public. So, besides being contrary to
morals and good customs, the act or acts must be committed within the view of the public as the
publicity of the act is an element of the crime. Such character of the act scandalizes the moral
sensibilities of the person present and witnessing the incident.
Note: The act must be those that can cause public scandal among the persons witnessing them.
Elements
2. Such act or acts be highly scandalous as offending against decency or good customs;
3. The highly scandalous conduct is not expressly falling within any other article of this Code;
and
4. The act or acts complained of be committed in a public place or within the public knowledge
or view.
The word "customs" means accepted usages, social standard of behavior carried on by
tradition whose validity and continued observance is enforced by social disapproval of any
breach thereof.
The highly scandalous conduct must be performed publicly. If it is done privately – not
liable under Art. 200.
If you performed those acts in a house and somebody saw you – Art. 200 is not violated
– this circumstance does not constitute that degree of publicity.
Any act which is notoriously offensive to decency may bring about criminal liability for the
crime of grave scandal provided such act does not constitute some other crime under the
Revised Penal Code. Grave scandal is a crime of last resort.
Distinction should be made as to the place where the offensive act was committed, whether
in the public place or in a private place:
(1) In public place, the criminal liability arises irrespective of whether the immoral act is
open to the public view. In short public view is not required.
(2) When act offensive to decency is done in a private place, public view or public
knowledge is required.
Public view does not require numerous persons. Even if there was only one person who
witnessed the offensive act for as long as the third person was not an intruder, grave scandal is
committed provided the act does not fall under any other crime in the Revised Penal Code.
Illustrations:
(1) A man and a woman enters a movie house which is a public place and then goes to the
darkest part of the balcony and while there the man started performing acts of
lasciviousness on the woman.
If it is against the will of the woman, the crime would be acts of lasciviousness. But if
there is mutuality, this constitutes grave scandal. Public view is not necessary so long as
it is performed in a public place.
(2) A man and a woman went to Luneta and slept there. They covered themselves their
blanket and made the grass their conjugal bed.
It is no defense that she is doing it in her private home. It is still open to the public view.
1996 Bar
Pia, a bold actress living on top floor of a plush condominium in Makati City sunbathed naked at
its penthouse every Sunday morning. She was unaware that the business executives holding
office at the adjoining tall buildings reported to office every Sunday morning and, with the use of
powerful binoculars, kept on gazing at her while she sunbathed. Eventually, her sunbathing
became the talk of the town. What crime, if any did Pia commit? What crime if any did the
business executives commit?
Ans: Pia did not commit a crime. The felony closest to making her liable is grave scandal but
such act is not to be considered as highly scandalous & offensive against decency & good
customs. In the first place, it was not done in public place & within public knowledge of view. As
a matter of fact it was discovered by the executives accidentally & they have to use binoculars to
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have public and full view of Pia sunbathing in nude. The business executives also did not commit
a crime. Their acts could not fall under acts of lasciviousness as there was no overt lustful act as
there was no overt lustful act. Neither will slander apply to them.
Q: Can an act offensive to decency performed in a private place constitute grave scandal?
A: Yes. However, the act must be open to public view for it to be actionable.
Note: If committed in a public place, the performance of the act offensive to decency is already a
crime even though there is no third party looking at it. Public view is not required. The public
character of the place is sufficient.
Q: X, an 11 year-old girl, had sexual intercourse with her 18 year-old boyfriend Y. They
performed the act in a secluded vacant lot. Unknown to them, there was a roving policeman at
that time. Hence, they were arrested. What crime did they commit?
A: The sexual intercourse with the girl constitutes statutory rape. Though the act was carried out
in a public place, criminal liability for grave scandal cannot be incurred.
Article 201. Immoral Doctrines, Obscene Publications and Exhibitions and Indecent Shows.
--The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) to
Two Hundred Thouasnd Pesos (P200,000.00) or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be
imposed upon:
1) Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public
morals;
2) (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form, and
the editors publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling
the same;
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any place, exhibit indecent or
immoral plays, scenes, acts, or shows whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue
hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other
purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or
religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law,
public order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculptures or
literature which are offensive to morals. (As amended by RA 10951)
1) Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public
morals;
2) The authors of the obscene literature which are published with their knowledge;
5) Those who, in theater, fairs, cinematographs or any other place shall exhibit indecent
or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether in film forms or live. Such shows
may also include those that glorify criminals, or serve no other purpose but to satisfy
the market of violence, lust or pornography. It can also include an act offending any
race or origin, or to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs.
Illustration: VINA theatre exhibited pornographic films. The theatre was raided and the rolls of
films were confiscated. The owner of the theatre is liable for Indecent exhibition.
94
Illustration: Ronda, a dancer in a club danced naked in front of her customers. She is liable for
Indecent show.
Illustration: JAX Publications published magazines of nude men and women as well as stories of
sexual desires and experiences. The owner, author, and the editor are liable for Obscene Pub-
lications.
As earlier mentioned, in committing this crime, there must be publicity. It means the act or acts
done must come to the knowledge of third persons
The test of obscenity: The word "obscene" means something offensive to chastity, decency or
good taste. It must have the tendency to corrupt and influence those whose minds are open to
immoral influences.
Illustration:
Held: The accused has exhibited indecent & immoral scenes and acts. It may be conceded
that nudity itself is not inherently indecent or obscene. Mere nudity in painting & sculpture is not
obscenity as they may be considered pieces of art. But the artistic, the aesthetic and the
pulchritude in the nude body of a living woman may readily be transformed into an indecent and
obscene object, by posture & movements of such body which produce perceptible and discernible
reaction in the public or audience witnessing the same. The object of the law is to protect the
morals of the public. The reaction of the public, therefore, during the performance of the dance
should be made the gauge in the determination whether appellant’s dancing was indecent or
immoral. – this is what we call the reaction test.
“Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculptures or literature
which are offensive to morals.”
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Anti-Child Pornography Act of
2009."cralaw
(b) "Child pornography" refers to any public or private representation, by whatever means, of a
child engaged in real or simulated explicit sexual activities or any representation of the sexual
parts of a child for primarily sexual purposes.cralaw
(c) "Child pornography materials" refers to the means and methods by which child pornography
is carried out:cralaw
(1) As to form:cralaw
(i) Visual depiction - which includes not only images of real children but
also digital image, computer image or computer-generated image that is
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(2) As to content:cralaw
Sec. 4. Unlawful or Prohibited Acts. - It shall be unlawful for a person to commit any of the following
acts:cralaw
(a) To hire, employ, use, persuade, induce or coerce a child to perform in the creation or
production of child pornography;cralaw
(b) To produce, direct, manufacture or create any form of child pornography and child
pornography materials;cralaw
(c) To sell, offer, advertise and promote child pornography and child pornography
materials;cralaw
(d) To possess, download, purchase, reproduce or make available child pornography materials
with the intent of selling or distributing them;cralaw
(e) To publish, post, exhibit, disseminate, distribute, transmit or broadcast child pornography or
child pornography materials;cralaw
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(f) To knowingly possess, view, download, purchase or in any way take steps to procure, obtain or
access for personal use child pornography materials; andcralaw
Illustration:
A sexy dancing performed for a 90 year old is not obscene anymore even if the dancer strips
naked. But if performed for a 15 year old kid, then it will corrupt the kid’s mind. (Apply
Kottinger Rule here.)
For the purpose of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge
in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be punished by
arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000), and in case of
recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum
period or a fine ranging from Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) to Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), or both, in the discretion of the court. (As amended by RA
10951)
The term prostitution is applicable to a woman who for profit or money habitually engages in
sexual or lascivious conduct. A man if he engages in the same conduct – sex for money – is not a
prostitute, but a vagrant.
In law the mere indulging in lascivious conduct habitually because of money or gain would
amount to prostitution, even if there is no sexual intercourse. Virginity is not a defense.
Habituality is the controlling factor; is has to be more than one time.
There cannot be prostitution by conspiracy. One who conspires with a woman in the prostitution
business like pimps, taxi drivers or solicitors of clients are guilty of the crime under Article 341
for white slavery.
Section 1. Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Article 202. Prostitutes; Penalty. -For the purposes of this article, women who, for
money or proflt, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct are deemed to be
prostitutes
TITLE SEVEN
CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
Article 203. Who are public officers. — For the purpose of applying the provisions of this and
the preceding titles of the book, any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular
election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of
public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Gov-
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In defining the term "public officers," the law makes reference to the manner by which he
is appointed to public office. He thus becomes a public officer because of his appointment by
competent authority or because he is elected to public office. As an appointed public official or as
an elected public official, there are certain duties that he has to perform which are inherent to or
by reason of his appointment or election. These are the duties known as "by direct provision of
law." A good example would be the position of a vice-mayor in the City of Manila and Quezon
City. By direct provision of the law, they are automatically the presiding officer of the city
council.
Crimes committed by public officers are nothing but corruption in public service. However, what
may be considered as corruption by western countries may be regarded in the East as part of their
culture of gratitude. In the Philippines in particular, a person who gets a favor and fails to
remember his benefactor on Christmas day, even with a Christmas card, is marked down as
ungrateful. And since government is the common dispenser of favors, government officials usu-
ally get the best token of gratitude. Of course, the bigger the favor, the more questionable it is and
the token becomes more than a token.
Definition of Terms:
Malfeasance — Evil doing or wrongdoing or misconduct; the evil performance of a public duty
by public officers; the performance of some act which ought not to be done.
Misfeasance — The doing of a lawful act in an unlawful manner; the improper performance of
an act which may lawfully be done.
Article 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. —Any judge who shall knowingly render an
unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision, shall be punished by prision
mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification.
ELEMENTS:
a. Offender is a judge
c. Judgment is unjust
UNJUST JUDGMENT: one which is contrary to law, or not supported by the evidence, or both
>>>The law requires that the judgment must be written in the official language, personally and
directly prepared by the judge, and signed by him. It must contain a clear and distinct statement
of facts proved or admitted by the defendant and upon which the judgment is based.
>>>The judge is empowered to weigh the evidence and the law. If he acts in good faith, any
mistake on the judgment will not operate or work against him.
>>>To be liable for the above crime, not only must the judgment be proved to be unjust. It must
likewise be established to have been knowingly rendered. There must be a conscious and deliber-
ate intent to an injustice. This usually occurs when the judge entertains hatred, envy, revenge or
greed against one of the parties.
* There must be evidence that the decision rendered is unjust. It is not presumed
* To be liable for the above crime, not only must the judgment be proved to be unjust it must
likewise be established to have been knowingly rendered. There must be a conscious and
deliberate intent to do an injustice. This usually occurs when the judge entertains hatred, envy,
revenge, or greed against one of the parties.
* Abuse of discretion or mere error of judgment cannot likewise serve as basis for rendering an
unjust judgment in the absence of proof or even an allegation of bad faith (motive or improper
consideration).
In Valdez vs Valera, 81 SCRA 246 –“Judges cannot be subjected to civil liability, criminal or
administrative for any of their official acts no matter how erroneous as long as they act in good
faith. It is only when they act fraudulently or corruptly or with gross ignorance of the law that
they may be held criminally or administratively liable.
Error in the appreciation of evidence -- not a ground (Dela Cruz vs Concepcion, 235 SCRA 597)
Article 205. Judgment rendered through negligence. — Any judge who, by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall render a manifestly unjust judgment in any case
submitted to him for decision shall be punished by arresto mayor and temporary special
disqualification.
>>>the unjust judgment is merely the result of inexcusable negligence or ignorance of the law.
The ignorance may refer to substantive or procedural law. There must be an apparent and
notorious manifestation of lack of logic and false interpretation of the law (Cortes v. Catral, 279
SCRA 1).
MANIFESTLY UNJUST JUDGMENT: one that is so contrary to law that even a person
having meager knowledge of the law cannot doubt the injustice
Article 206. Unjust interlocutory order. — Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust
interlocutory order or decree shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period
and suspension; but if he shall have acted by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance
and the interlocutory order or decree be manifestly unjust, the penalty shall be suspension.
>>>An interlocutory order is one that is issued while the case is pending final determination. It
refers to issues that have to be resolved before a judgment is rendered. It leaves something to be
done by the trial court with respect to the merit of the case.
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It is a ruling on collateral issues. It does not decide the merits of the case
Facts: Araullo an employee of Club Filipino filed an Illegal dismissal case against Club Filipino.
The LA & NLRC dismissed it but on appeal both the CA and the SC said that he was illegally
dismissed and ordered for his reinstatement and payment of backwages. Since the judgment
became final, Araullo filed a Motion for issuance of a Writ of Execution. The LA granted and
ordered that Club Filipino pay Araullo the amount of 2.3 M as backwages. Club Filipino filed a
Motion to Quash the writ because it filed a motion to recomputed. As a result, the LA quashed it
and thereafter inhibited the case on the ground that the lawyer of Club Filipino who recently
entered his appearance was his classmate in San Beda.
Aggrieved of the quashal, Araullo filed a petition to set aside the Order to the NLRC but the latter
denied his motion. He filed a complaint before the OMB against the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
chairman and members for violation of Article 206. The OMB dismissed the complaint on the
ground that “xxx the presumption that the respondents regularly performed their official duty was
not overcome by sufficient evidence. The LA’s and NLRC’s rulings were rendered pursuant to
the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. This finding then barred a prosecution for violation of
Article 206 of the RPC.xxxx”
SC: Specifically for the charge of violation of Article 20625 of the RPC which penalizes the
issuance of unjust interlocutory orders, it was necessary to show that, first, the orders issued by
the respondents to his complaint were unjust, and second, the said orders were knowingly
rendered or rendered through inexcusable negligence or ignorance. On this matter, the Office of
the Ombudsman correctly held that LA Anni’s order for the quashal of the writ of execution, and
the NLRC’s resolution affirming it, were not unjust. Contrary to Araullo’s claim, the rulings of
the labor officials were in accordance with law and the rules of the NLRC xxxx Araullo failed to
establish that the labor officials were impelled by any motive other than the correction of this
error.
Article 207. Malicious delay in the administration of justice. — The penalty of prision correccional
in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any judge guilty of malicious delay in the
administration of justice.
>>>>The offender in this article is a judge. There is delay in the administration of justice and the
delay is deliberately and maliciously intended by the judge. Hence, mere delay, without malice in
rendering the judgment will not make the judge criminally liable.
Article 208. Prosecution of offenses; negligence and tolerance. — The penalty of prision correccional
in its minimum period and suspension shall be imposed upon any public officer or officer
of the law, who, in dereliction of the duties of his office, shall maliciously refrain from
instituting prosecution for the punishment of violators of the law, or shall tolerate the
commission of offenses.
>>>>There are two ways of violating the law: maliciously refraining from instituting prosecution
against the offender; and maliciously tolerating the commission of the offense.
>>>In the strict sense of the word, the article also refers to public officers of the prosecution
department whose duty is to institute criminal actions for offenses made known to them or
committed in their presence. In particular, these offenders include prosecutors, members of the
Philippine National Police, NBI and barangay captains.
Can we compel the prosecutors to file an Information? Ans: NO. They are under no compulsion
where they are not convinced that the evidence presented would warrant the filing of an action in
court. Fiscals enjoy wide latitude of discretion – they should be given that discretion to avoid the
courts from being flooded with cases of doubtful merit.
But when there is clearly a prima facie evidence – the fiscal deliberately not file the case – liable.
Article 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor — Revelation of secrets. — In addition to the
proper administrative action, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period, or a
fine ranging from Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
100
(P200,000.00), or both, shall be imposed upon any attorney-at-law or any person duly
authorized to represent and/or assist a party to a case who, by any malicious breach of pro-
fessional duty or of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall prejudice his client, or reveal
any of the secrets of the latter learned by him in his professional capacity.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any attorney- at-law or any person duly
authorized to represent and/or assist a party to a case who, having undertaken the defense
of a client or having received confidential information from said client in a case, shall
undertake the defense of the opposing party in the same case, without the consent of his first
client. (As Amended by RA 10951)
>>The relation between a lawyer and his client is one of confidence. The client is free to tell his
lawyer all about himself which may include the commission of a crime, vice or defect without
fear that such disclosure could later be used against him. The communication given by a client to
his lawyer is a privileged communication. It is impressed with public interest. And to preserve the
sanctity of the institution, a lawyer is held criminally liable for violation of such confidence.
>>A lawyer to whom a case is referred by a client for legal action is forbidden and precluded
from handling the defense of the adverse party, even in a situation where the lawyer has resigned
as counsel of the client in the case. To give force and effect and to preserve the confidentiality of
the information given, a lawyer is made criminally liable not only for revealing the secret of his
client but also in handling the case of the opposing party.
2) Revealing any of the secrets of his client learned by him in his professional capacity;
3) Undertaking the defense of the opposing party in the same case, without the consent of
his first client, after having received confidential information from said client.
REVELATION OF SECRETS
Under the Rules on Evidence, communications made by a client to his lawyer is covered by the
protective mantle of privilege communication. The lawyer and his secretary cannot be examined
on the matter. This applies even if after consultation with his would be lawyer, the client and the
lawyer did not eventually have a lawyer-client relationship. If the lawyer reveals such
communication, he violates the nature of the confidential information that he obtained in his
professional capacity. However, mere revelation of the secrets of a client does not necessarily
amount to a crime. There must be malicious breach of professional duty on the part of the lawyer
A lawyer who had already accepted to handle the cause of a client cannot later on switch side and
undertake the defense of the opposing party in the same case. The motivating rationale is that
having undertaken the defense of a party he had already received confidential matters or
information from his client relative to the case. The only way he can handle the case of the
adverse party is if he does it with the consent of his first client
Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that communications
between an attorney and a client having to do with the client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or
furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to
communications between attorney and a client.
It is well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may
be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of
an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
115439-41, July 16, 1997)
Article 210. Direct bribery.—Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting
a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duties, in consideration of any
offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, , personally or through the
mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine [of not less than the value of the gift and] not less than three times the
value of the gifts, in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the
same shall have been committed.
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act
which does not constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same
penalty provided in the preceding paragraph; and if said act shall not have been
accomplished, the officer shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional, in its medium period
and a fine of not less than the value of such gift.
If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public
officer refrain from doing something which it was his official duty to do, he shall suffer the
penalties of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine [of not less than the value of
the gift] not less than three times the value of such gift.
In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall
suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification.
Acts punished
2. Accepting a gift in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a
crime, in connection with the performance of his official duty;
First Act:
Example: A court steno accepted a promise of 1,000 from X in consideration of which she will
alter the notes taken by her during the trial of a case. The act which the steno promised would
constitute the crime of falsification.
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What if the stenographer agreed to alter the notes but after receiving the bribe money did not alter
the notes. What crime was committed? Ans: Direct bribery. Why? What the law requires is that
the public officer “agrees to perform an act” – so mere agreement is ENOUGH.
Is it necessary that he does the act promised by her? Ans: NO. The crime is already consummated
the moment the public officer agrees.
Problem: A agreed to alter in consideration of P1thousand from B. A altered it but he did not
receive the P1thou. Did A commit the crime? Ans: YES. It is not necessary that A actually
received the P1thou because by agreeing to commit the crime in consideration of an offer will be
enough.
What if there is double crossing? Example: A agrees in consideration of P1thou to alter a record
but in mind in her mind he has no intention of making good the promise. All he wanted is to get
the money. B on the other hand has no intention of paying. What crime is committed here? Ans:
Bribery is committed – consummated pa nga eh.
In all our example, it’s the private individual who made the offer. What if it’s the steno who made
the offer. Is the steno liable for direct bribery? Ans: YES. – the phrase “any public officer who
shall agree to perform an act …” does not only imply na ang public employee lang ang mag
agree – the law applies even if it’s the employee who proposes.
>>the public officer here agrees to do something which does not constitute a crime.
>> a gift is accepted here unlike in the 1st act that the acceptance of gift is unnecessary.
Example: A is the City Health Officer. One of her functions is to conduct sanitation inspection on
restaurants. In consideration of a price or reward, A did not inspect your restaurant.
* Robbery should be distinguished from Bribery where a law enforcer, say a policeman, extorts
money from a person, employing intimidation and threatening to arrest the latter if he will not
come across with money may be guilty of Robbery (Article 294, par. 5) or Bribery (Article 210).
If the victim actually committed a crime, and the policeman demanded money so he will not be
arrested, the crime is Bribery. But if no crime has been committed and the policeman is falsely
charging him of having committed one, threatening to arrest him if he will not come across with
some consideration, the crime is Robbery.
Article 211. Indirect bribery. — The penalties of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods, and public censure shall be imposed upon any public officer who shall
accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office.
Elements
2. He accepts gifts;
In indirect bribery, the public officer receives or accepts gifts, money or anything of value
by reason of his office. If there is only a promise of a gift or money, no crime is committed
because of the language of the law which uses the phrase "shall accept gifts."
>>>The gift is given in anticipation of future favor from the public officer.
>>> In Indirect bribery, the public officer receives or accepts gifts, money or anything of value
by reason of his office. If there is only a promise of a gift or money, no crime is committed
because of the language of the law which uses the phrase “shall accept gifts.”
The public official does not undertake to perform an act or abstain from doing an official duty
from what he received. Instead, the official simply receives or accepts gifts or presents delivered
to him with no other reason except his office or public position. This is always in the
consummated stage. There is no attempted much less frustrated stage in indirect bribery.
>>>There must be clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift offered and
consider the property as his own for that moment. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any
other sign, circumstance or act to show such acceptance is not sufficient to convict the officer
Bribery is direct when a public officer is called upon to perform or refrain from performing an
official act in exchange for the gift, present or consideration given to him.
If he simply accepts a gift or present given to him by reason of his public position, the crime is
indirect bribery. Bear in mind that the gift is given "by reason of his office", not "in
consideration" thereof. So never use the term “consideration.” The public officer in Indirect
bribery is not to perform any official act.
Note however that what may begin as an indirect bribery may actually ripen into direct bribery.
Direct bribery may be committed only in the attempted and consummated stages because, in
frustrated felony, the offender must have performed all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence. In direct bribery, it is possible only if the corruptor concurs
with the offender. Once there is concurrence, the direct bribery is already consummated. In
short, the offender could not have performed all the acts of execution to produce the felony
without consummating the same.
Actually, you cannot have a giver unless there is one who is willing to receive and there cannot
be a receiver unless there is one willing to give. So this crime requires two to commit. It cannot
be said, therefore, that one has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the
felony as a consequence but for reasons independent of the will, the crime was not committed.
It is now settled, therefore, that the crime of bribery and corruption of public officials cannot be
committed in the frustrated stage because this requires two to commit and that means a meeting
of the minds.
Article 212. Corruption of public officials. — The same penalties imposed upon the officer
corrupted, except those of disqualification and suspension, shall be imposed upon any
person who shall have made the offers or promises or given the gifts or presents as
described in the preceding articles.
In this article, it is the giver who is punished under the law. The receiver, as discussed and
articulated above, is liable for the crime of bribery. This provision of law can be confusing to a
student of law. Under Article 17, one who induces another to commit a felony, is a principal by
inducement and the one induced and who will implement the act is criminally liable as principal
by direct participation. However, this principle is not applicable when there is a specific provision
of law that punishes a specific act. We only apply the general principle of law in the absence of a
specific codal provision to deal with the particular situation.
Public officers receiving gifts and private persons giving gifts on any occasion, including
Christmas are liable under PD 46.
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Presidential Decree No. 46 prohibits giving and acceptance of gifts by a public officer or to a
public officer, even during anniversary, or when there is an occasion like Christmas, New Year,
or any gift-giving anniversary. The Presidential Decree punishes both receiver and giver.
The prohibition giving and receiving gifts given by reason of official position, regardless of
whether or not the same is for past or future favors.
The giving of parties by reason of the promotion of a public official is considered a crime even
though it may call for a celebration. The giving of a party is not limited to the public officer only
but also to any member of his family.
The decree grants immunity from prosecution to a private person or public officer who shall
voluntarily give information and testify in a case of bribery or in a case involving a violation of
the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
(1) He voluntarily discloses the transaction he had with the public officer constituting direct
or indirect bribery, or any other corrupt transaction;
(2) He must willingly testify against the public officer involved in the case to be filed against
the latter.
Before the bribe-giver may be dropped from the information, he has to be charged first with the
receiver. Before trial, prosecutor may move for dropping bribe-giver from information and be
granted immunity. But first, five conditions have to be met:
(2) Information is necessary for the proper conviction of the public officer involved;
(3) That the information or testimony to be given is not yet in the possession of the
government or known to the government;
(5) That the information has not been convicted previously for any crime involving moral
turpitude.
These conditions are analogous to the conditions under the State Witness Rule under Criminal
Procedure.
Plunder is a crime defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 7080, which became effective
in 1991. This crime somehow modified certain crimes in the Revised Penal Code insofar as the
overt acts by which a public officer amasses, acquires, or accumulates ill-gotten wealth are
felonies under the Revised Penal Code like bribery (Articles 210, 211, 211-A), fraud against the
public treasury [Article 213], other frauds (Article 214), malversation (Article 217), when the ill-
gotten wealth amounts to a total value of P50,000,000.00. The amount was reduced from
P75,000,000.00 by Republic Act No. 7659 and the penalty was changed from life imprisonment
to reclusion perpetua to death.
Short of the amount, plunder does not arise. Any amount less than P50,000,000.00 is a violation
of the Revised Penal Code or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
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Under the law on plunder, the prescriptive period is 20 years commencing from the time of the
last overt act.
(4) By obtaining, receiving, or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or
any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in
any business or undertaking;
While the crime appears to be malum prohibitum, Republic Act No. 7080 provides that “in the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances shall be considered by the court”.
Read: Estrada vs Sandiganbayan, November 19, 2001; Estrada vs Sandiganbayan, February 26,
2002; Serapio vs Sandiganbayan, January 28, 2003 (en banc); and, The Wellex Group, Inc. vs
Sandiganbayan, June 25, 2012.
Persons Liable:
a. Any public officer who shall perform any of the following acts:
4. Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise
which has pending official business with him during the pendency thereof or within one
year after its termination.
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5. Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial function through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices
or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
6. Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act
within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining
directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material
benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest of giving undue
advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other interested party.
7. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will
profit thereby.
9. Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal gain, or having a material interest
in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a board, panel, or group of which he is
a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the
same or does not participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or group.
10. Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege, or benefit in favor of any
person not qualified for or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege, or
advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or
entitled.
If a public official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his
name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of
proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income.
Properties in the name of the spouse and dependents of such public official may be taken into
consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily
shown.
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Bank deposits in the name of or manifestly excessive expenditures incurred by the public
official, his spouse or any of their dependents including but not limited to activities in any
club or association or any ostentatious display of wealth including frequent travel abroad of a
non-official character by any public official when such activities entail expenses evidently
out of proportion to legitimate income.
III. Competent court: All prosecutions under this Act shall be within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (Sec. 10).
* In case none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27
or higher; PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher of their equivalent,
exclusive jurisdiction over the case shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court as the case may be. The decision of
the court in these cases shall be appealable to the Sandiganbayan which exercises exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over them.
IV. Prescription of offenses: all offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in 15 years
(Sec. 11).
* Once the case is filed with the Sandiganbayan, by express provision of the law, it becomes
incumbent upon the court to place under preventive suspension the public officer who stands
accused before it. However, before the order of suspension is issued, it is necessary that a pre-
suspension hearing be held by the court wherein the accused is afforded the opportunity to
challenge the validity of the information filed against him. Such right of the accused to challenge
the validity of the information covers (a) the right to challenge the sufficiency of the recitals of
the information vis-à-vis the essential elements of the offense as defined by substantive law; (b)
the right to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings leading to the filing of the
information, i.e., that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary investigation, or that
the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of R.A. No.
3019, which would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of this Act;
and (c) the right to raise the issue that the information can be quashed under any of the grounds
provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court (People vs. Albano, 163 SCRA 511
The reason behind the imposition of preventive suspension: Preventive suspension is resorted to
in order to prevent the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his
prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office because the presumption is that unless
the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance
or both (Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, et.al., supra).
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is silent as to how long the accused public officer is supposed to
remain under suspension. In the earlier case of Oliveros vs. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163 (1974), the
issue raised was whether the administrative rule governing suspension of public officers also
applied to crimes. Accused herein was the mayor of Antipolo who was suspended from office
after being charged with violation of the anti-graft law. During the pendency of the criminal
proceedings, he was re-elected to the same office of mayor of Antipolo for a new term. The
Supreme Court ruled that the pending criminal prosecution for violation of R.A. No. 3019
committed by an elective officer during one term may be the basis of his suspension in a subse-
quent term if he is re-elected to the same office and that notwithstanding his re-election, accused
is deemed to continue during the entire pendency of the case. However, in a separate opinion,
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro expressed his reservation to this ruling of the majority in the light of the
first sentence of Section 5 of the Decentralization Act (Republic Act No. 5185, effective on
September 12, 1967) which recites that: "Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
the suspension and removal of elective local officials shall be governed exclusively by the
provisions of this section." Said section provides: "The preventive suspension of the respondent
officer shall not extend beyond sixty days after the date of his suspension. At the expiration of
sixty days, the suspended officer shall be reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation
of the proceedings against him until their completion, unless the delay in the decision of the case
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is due to the fault, neglect or request of the suspended officer, in which case, the time of delay
shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension: Provided, however, That if the
suspended officer shall have been found guilty as charged before the expiration of the thirty days,
his suspension, in the case of municipal and barrio officials, may continue until the case is finally
decided by the Provincial Board.
* Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court must issue the
suspension order as a matter of course and there are no ifs and buts about it (Bayot vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al., 128 SCRA 383).
* Preventive suspension is resorted to in order to prevent the accused from using his office to
intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing malfeasance in office
because the presumption is that unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution
to commit further acts of malfeasance or both (Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., supra).
* “When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is
not finally disposed of by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the
date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be
automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the
case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be
counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.”(Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan)
In the case of Layno vs. Sandiganbayan. 136 SCRA 536 (1985), the Supreme Court made a
determination of whether or not, under the circumstances of the case, an indefinite suspension
becomes unreasonable. Accused herein was a municipal mayor who was charged with violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. He was ordered suspended by the Sandiganbayan pursuant to
Section 13 of the said law but the order of suspension did not state a definite period. The impli -
cation of such an order is that the petitioner may be suspended for the rest of his term office
unless the case is terminated sooner.
And an extended suspension is a distinct possibility considering that the Sandiganbayan has
denied his plea for earlier dates of trial of his cases on the ground that there are other cases set
earlier which have a right to expect priority. The Supreme Court ruled that while preventive
suspension may be justified, its continuance for an unreasonable length of time raises a due
process question because even if thereafter the accused public officer is acquitted, in the
meantime, his right to hold office had been nullified because of his suspension. And the victim in
this injustice is not only the accused. There is also injustice inflicted on his constituents because
thev are being deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. The High
Tribunal went further to rule that such indefinite suspension violates the equal protection clause
hecanseif the case against herein. accused was administrative in character, then the Local
Government Code would apply. Under the said law, there is the emphatic limitation prescribed on
the duration of preventive suspension as it provides that: "In all cases, preventive suspension
shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension." The Court rationalizes that
if this provision applies equally to national government officials where the charge is
administrative in character, there is no reason why a different ruling should be made where the
public officer faces a criminal accusation. And since the policy of the law man dated by the
Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite dura tion, the mere fact that petitioner is facing a
charge under the anti- graft law does not justify a different rule of law. To do so would be to
negate the safeguard of the equal protection guarantee.
>>>Then came the case of Deloso vs. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 409 (1989). It was in this case
where the Supreme Court settled once and for all the duration of preventive suspension under
Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 3019, when it held that "henceforth a preventive suspension of an elective
public officer under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 should be limited to ninety (90) days under
Section 42 of P.D. No. 807, the Civil Service Decree, which period also appears reasonable and
appropriate under the circumstances of this case." Accused herein was elected as governor of
Zambales in 1988. Charged with violation of the anti-graft law, the Sandiganbayan ordered his
suspension from office without stating a definite period therefore. The Supreme Court, acting on
the petition for certiorari filed by -accused, held that the order of the Sandiganbayan suspending
the petitioner for an indefinite period cannot be sanctioned because "it would be most unfair to
the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner to the highest provincial office in their
command if they are deprived of his services for an indefinite period with the termination of his
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case possibly extending beyond his entire term simply because the big number of sequestration;
ill-gotten wealth, murder; malversation of public funds and other-more serious offenses plus
incidents and resolutions that may be brought to the Sandiganbayan prevents the expedited
determination of his innocence or guilt."
>>>>But in Rios vs. Sandiganbayan, 279 SCRA 581 (1997), the Supreme Court ruled that the
Sandiganbayan erred in imposing a 90- days suspension upon the accused for the single case filed
against him. Accused was the incumbent mayor of San Fernando, Romblon, who was charged
with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for his alleged unauthorized
disposition of confiscated lumber. On motion of the special prosecutor, he was suspended for 90
days counted from receipt of the Court's resolution. His motion for reconsideration having been
denied, he filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court and argued among others that the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it provided for suspension of 90 days
in clear disregard of the provision of the Local Government Code. In sustaining this assigned
error, the Supreme Court held that under Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code:
"Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when the evidence
of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the
continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety
and integrity of the records and other evidence: Provided, That, any single preventive suspension
of local elective officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further, That in the
event that, several administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot be
preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or
grounds existing and known at the time of the first suspension."
In Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, 288 SCRA 328 (1998), the Supreme Court reverted to the
ruling laid down in the Deloso case by holding that preventive suspension may not exceed the
maximum period of 90 days pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree),
now Section 52 of the Administrative Code of 1987. Section 42 of P.D. No. 807 provides: "When
the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally
decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of
suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be
automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the
case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be
counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided."
In Layus vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 134272, December 8,1999, the Supreme Court reiterated
its ruling in the Segovia case that preventive suspension may not exceed 90 days in consonance
with Presidential Decree No. 807 (the Civil Service Decree), now Section 52 of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Accused is the elected mayor of Claveria, Cagayan, who was
charged with estafa through falsification of public documents. Suspended for 90 days, she
questioned the same, and cited the resolution of the Supreme Court in Rios vs. Sandiganbayan,
where the Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan erred in imposing a 90-day suspension upon
petitioner for the single case filed against him and reduced the same to 60 days. The Supreme
Court held that the imposed 90-day suspension pendente lite of accused-petitioner does not
exceed the maximum period fixed in the case of Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan. Hence, the
Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion in granting the prosecution's motion to suspend
petitioner
BAR Q. (2003) The Central Bank (Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas)9 by resolution of the monetary
board, hires Theof Sto. Tomas, a retired manager of a leading bank as a consultant. Theof later
receives a valuable gift from a bank under investigation by the Central bank. May Theof be
prosecuted under R.A. No. 3019 (Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for accepting such gift?
Explain.
Suggested Answer: No. Theof may not be prosecuted for accepting gift. The facts do not show
that he intervened in his official capacity in the investigation of the bank which gave the gift.
BAR Q. [2010] May a public officer charged under Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 [directly or
indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage or benefit, for himself or for
any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the government and any
other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law"] also
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be simultaneously or successively charged with direct bribery under Art. 210 of the Revised
Penal Code?
Suggested Answer: Yes, an accused may be charged for both offenses because the elements of
direct bribery are different from R.A. No. 3019
MODIFIED BAR Q. [20101 Proserfina, an assistant public high school principal, acted to
facilitate the release of salary differentials and election duty per diem of classroom teachers with
the agreement that they would reimburse her for her expenses. Did Proserfina commit a violation
of R.A. No. 3019? Explain.
Suggested Answer: No. because even if Proserfina was a public officer, the facts show, however,
that she did not intervene in her official capacity. This is the requirement under R.A. No. 3019
Causing Any Undue Injury To Any Party, Including The Government, Or Giving Any Private
Party Any Unwarranted Benefits, Advantage Or Preference In The Discharge Of His Official
Administrative Or Judicial Functions Through Manifest Partiality, Evident Bad Faith Or
Gross Inexcusable Negligence. This Provision Shall Apply To Officers And Employees Of
Offices Or Government Corporations Charged With The Grant Of Licenses Or Permits Or
Other Concessions.
Q: In order to hold a person liable under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, what facts need to be
proved?
A: To be found guilty under said provision, the following elements must concur:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) the act was done in the discharge of the public officer's official, administrative
or judicial functions;
(3) the act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
(4) the public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference. Sison v.
People, 614 SCRA 670, March 9, 2010
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as
they are wished for rather than as they are." (Sison v. People, March 09, 2010)
Manifest partiality exists when the accused has a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or
predilection to favor one side or one person rather than another. It is synonymous with bias,
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which excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are.
(Reyes v. People, August 04, 2010)
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some
motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. (Sison v. People, March 09, 2010)
Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or
to cause damage. It contemplates a breach of sworn duty through some perverse motive or ill
will. (Reyes v. People, August 04, 2010)
Problem: Dr. Chow, a government doctor, failed to submit his Daily Time Record (DTR) from
January to March 2000 and did not get approval of his sick leave application for April because of
evidence that he was actually moonlighting elsewhere. Thus, the Medical Director caused the
withholding of his salary for the periods in question until he submitted his DTRs in May 2000.
Can Dr. Chow prosecute the medical director for causing him undue injury in violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
a) Yes, since the medical Director acted with evident bad faith.
b) No, since the medical director has full discretion in releasing the salary of
government doctors.
c) Yes, since his salary was withheld without prior hearing.
d) No, since Dr. Chow brought it upon himself\ having failed to submit the
required DTRs.
BAR Q. (2005) During a PNP buy-bust operation, Cao Shih was arrested for selling 20 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) to a poseur-buyer. Cao Shih, through an intermediary,
paid Patrick, the Evidence Custodian of the PNP Forensic Chemistry Section, the amount of
P500,000.00 in consideration for the destruction of the drug. Patrick managed to destroy the drug.
State with reasons whether Patrick committed the following crimes: Direct Bribery; x x x Sec.
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act); Obstruction of Justice under PD
1829.
Suggested Answer: Patrick violated Sec. 3(e) of R. A. No. 3019 by causing undue injury to the
government through evident bad faith, giving unwarranted benefit to the offender by destroying
the evidence of a crime. (Obstruction of justice is likewise committed by destroying evidence
intended to be used in a criminal proceeding)
FACTS: Cesar P. Guy was charged in three (3) separate Informations with violation of Sec. 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection
with the construction of three (3) infrastructure projects in Barangay 36, namely: an elevated path
walk, a basketball court and a day care center. The graft court also found that the construction of
the projects were reported to petitioner employees after the projects had already been completed,
and that these anomalies notwithstanding, petitioner employees certified that the projects were
made in accordance with the plans and that the same were 100% completed. Further, the
Sandiganbayan found that the quality of the day care center project was substandard, the program
of work was not followed, and worse, the contract amounts for the basketball court and the
elevated path walk exceeded the allowable project costs.
RULING: To hold a person liable under this section, the concurrence of the following elements
must be established, viz:
1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the
former;
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2) that said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or
her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions;
3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private
party; and
4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
In the case at bar, all the elements of violation of Sec. 3(e) R.A. No. 3019 are indicated in
the Informations. First, petitioners could not have committed the offense charged were it not for
their official duties or functions as public officials. Their malfeasance or misfeasance in relation
to their duties and functions underlies their violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Second, the
undue injury caused to the government is evident from the clear deviation from the material
specifications indicated in the project plans such as in the case of the basketball court and
elevated path walk, and in the use of substandard materials in the case of the day care center.
Otherwise stated, "the People did not get the full worth of their money in terms of the benefits
they will derive from the (above) substandard infrastructure projects " Third, unwarranted
benefits were accorded to Amago Construction when the three projects were not inspected and
supervised during construction, allowing it to cut costs and save money by using substandard
materials and deviating from the specific materials and measurements prescribed in the work
programs. Moreover, Amago Construction was able to receive payments for the projects even
before the processing of the disbursement vouchers, thereby preventing the government from
refusing or deferring payment on account of discovered defects of the said projects. Fourth, it is
clear that from the very inception of the construction of the subject projects up to their
completion, petitioners had exhibited manifest partiality for Amago Construction, and acted with
evident bad faith against the government and the public which they had sworn to serve.
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) charged Romualdez before the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Romualdez, a public officer being
then the Provincial Governor of the Province of Leyte had himself appointed and/or assigned as
Ambassador to foreign countries, particularly the People's Republic of China (Peking), Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia (Jeddah), and United States of America (Washington D.C.), knowing fully well
that such appointment and/or assignment is in violation of the existing laws as the Office of the
Ambassador or Chief of Mission is incompatible with his position as Governor of the Province of
Leyte, thereby enabling himself to collect dual compensation from both the Department of
Foreign Affairs and the Provincial Government of Leyte.
RULING: The rule is that for criminal violations of R.A. No. 3019, the prescriptive period is
tolled only when the Office of the Ombudsman receives a complaint or otherwise initiates its
investigation. As such preliminary investigation was commenced more than fifteen (15) years
after the imputed acts were committed, the offense had already prescribed as of such time.
Further, the flaw was so fatal that the information could not have been cured or resurrected by
mere amendment, as a new preliminary investigation had to be undertaken, and evidence had
again to be adduced before a new information could be filed.
Q: If there is an allegation of conspiracy, may a private person be held liable together with the
public officer?
A: Yes, if there is an allegation of conspiracy, a private person may be held liable together with
the public officer, in consonance with the avowed policy of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act which is "to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which may
constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. (Guy v. People, 582 SCRA 108,
March 20, 2009)
BAR Q. (2001) Robert Sy, a well known businessman and a founding member of the Makati
Business Club, aside from being a classmate of the newly-elected President of the Philippines,
had investments consisting of shares of stocks in the Urban bank, the PNB, the Rural bank of
Caloocan City and his privately-owned corporation, the RS Builders Corporation and Trans-
Pacific Air, After the President had taken his oath and assumed his office, he appointed Robert as
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Honorary Consul to the Republic of Vietnam. Robert took his oath before the President and after
furnishing the Department of Foreign Affairs with his appointment papers, flew to Saigon, now
Ho Chi Min City, where he organized his staff, put up an office and stayed there for three months
attending to trade opportunities and relations with local businessman. On the fourth month, he
returned to the Philippines to make his report to the President. However, the Anti-Graft League of
the Philippines filed a complaint against Robert for (1) failing to file his Statement of Assets and
Liabilities within thirty (30) days from assumption of office (2) failing to resign from his
businesses, and (3) failing to divest his shares and investments in the banks and corporations
owned by him, as required by the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for public Officials and
Employees. Will the complaint prosper? Explain.
Suggested Answer: As a rule, all public officers are mandated within 30 days from assuming
public office to file a true, detailed sworn statement of assets and liabilities. However, R.A. No.
6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standard for Public Officials and Employees exempts
those who serve the government in an honorary capacity from filing Statements of Assets and
Liabilities. Since Robert Sy was appointed as Honorary Consul, he is exempt from the coverage
of the law. Hence, the complaint against him will fail.
Correlate with RA 1379 -- properly under Remedial Law. This provides the procedure for
forfeiture of the ill-gotten wealth in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
proceedings are civil and not criminal in nature.
Any taxpayer having knowledge that a public officer has amassed wealth out of proportion to this
legitimate income may file a complaint with the prosecutor’s office of the place where the public
officer resides or holds office. The prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation just like in a
criminal case and he will forward his findings to the office of the Solicitor General. The Solicitor
General will determine whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has
accumulated an unexplained wealth.
If the Solicitor General finds probable cause, he would file a petition requesting the court to issue
a writ commanding the respondent to show cause why the ill-gotten wealth described in the
petition should not be forfeited in favor of the government. This is covered by the Rules on Civil
Procedure. The respondent is given 15 days to answer the petition. Thereafter trial would
proceed. Judgment is rendered and appeal is just like in a civil case. Remember that this is not a
criminal proceeding. The basic difference is that the preliminary investigation is conducted by the
prosecutor.
Republic Act No. 9160 – An Act Defining The Crime of Money Laundering – Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001.
Republic Act No. 9194 – An Act Amending RA 9160 Otherwise Known as the Anti- Money
Laundering Act of 2001.
Republic Act No. 10167 – An Act To Further Strengthen The Anti Money Laundering Law.
Republic Act No. 10365 – An Act Further Strengthening The Anti Money Laundering Law. –
passed into law in 2012
derivatives based thereon, valuable objects, cash substitutes and other similar monetary
instruments or property supervised or regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC);
"(4) jewelry dealers in precious metals, who, as a business, trade in precious metals, for
transactions in excess of One million pesos (P1,000,000.00);
"(5) jewelry dealers in precious stones, who, as a business, trade in precious stones, for
transactions in excess of One million pesos (P1,000,000.00);
"(6) company service providers which, as a business, provide any of the following services to
third parties: (i) acting as a formation agent of juridical persons; (ii) acting as (or arranging for
another person to act as) a director or corporate secretary of a company, a partner of a
partnership, or a similar position in relation to other juridical persons; (iii) providing a registered
office, business address or accommodation, correspondence or administrative address for a
company, a partnership or any other legal person or arrangement; and (iv) acting as (or arranging
for another person to act as) a nominee shareholder for another person; and
"(7) persons who provide any of the following services:
"Notwithstanding the foregoing, the term ‘covered persons’ shall exclude lawyers and
accountants acting as independent legal professionals in relation to information concerning their
clients or where disclosure of information would compromise client confidences or the attorney-
client relationship: Provided, That these lawyers and accountants are authorized to practice in the
Philippines and shall continue to be subject to the provisions of their respective codes of conduct
and/or professional responsibility or any of its amendments."
Q: What is a covered transaction?
A: “Covered transaction" is a single, series, or combination of transactions involving a total
amount in excess of Four million Philippine pesos (Php4,000,000.00) or an equivalent amount in
foreign currency based on the prevailing exchange rate within five (5) consecutive banking days
except those between a covered institution and a person who, at the time of the transaction was a
properly identified client and the amount is commensurate with the business or financial capacity
of the client; or those with an underlying legal or trade obligation, purpose, origin or economic
justification.
It likewise refers to a single, series or combination or pattern of unusually large and complex
transactions in excess of Four million Philippine pesos (Php4,000,000.00) especially cash
deposits and investments having no credible purpose or origin, underlying trade obligation or
contract.
(c) "Monetary instrument" refers to:
(1) coins or currency of legal tender of the Philippines, or of any other country;
(2) drafts, checks and notes;
(3) securities or negotiable instruments, bonds, commercial papers, deposit certificates, trust
certificates, custodial receipts or deposit substitute instruments, trading orders, transaction tickets
and confirmations of sale or investments and money market instruments; and
(4) other similar instruments where title thereto passes to another by endorsement, assignment or
delivery.
"(i) ‘Unlawful activity’ refers to any act or omission or series or combination thereof involving or
having direct relation to the following:
"(1) Kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised
Penal Code, as amended;
"(2) Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002;
"(3) Section 3 paragraphs B, C, E, G, H and I of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
"(4) Plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended;
"(5) Robbery and extortion under Articles 294, 295, 296, 299, 300, 301 and 302 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended;
"(6) Jueteng and Masiao punished as illegal gambling under Presidential Decree No. 1602;
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"(7) Piracy on the high seas under the Revised Penal Code, as amended and Presidential Decree
No. 532;
"(8) Qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
"(9) Swindling under Article 315 and Other Forms of Swindling under Article 316 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended;
"(10) Smuggling under Republic Act Nos. 455 and 1937;
"(11) Violations of Republic Act No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000;
"(12) Hijacking and other violations under Republic Act No. 6235; destructive arson and murder,
as defined under the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
"(13) Terrorism and conspiracy to commit terrorism as defined and penalized under Sections 3
and 4 of Republic Act No. 9372;
"(14) Financing of terrorism under Section 4 and offenses punishable under Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8
of Republic Act No. 10168, otherwise known as the Terrorism Financing Prevention and
Suppression Act of 2012:
"(15) Bribery under Articles 210, 211 and 211-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
Corruption of Public Officers under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
"(16) Frauds and Illegal Exactions and Transactions under Articles 213, 214, 215 and 216 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended;
"(17) Malversation of Public Funds and Property under Articles 217 and 222 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended;
"(18) Forgeries and Counterfeiting under Articles 163, 166, 167, 168, 169 and 176 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended;
"(19) Violations of Sections 4 to 6 of Republic Act No. 9208, otherwise known as the Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003;
"(20) Violations of Sections 78 to 79 of Chapter IV, of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, as amended;
"(21) Violations of Sections 86 to 106 of Chapter VI, of Republic Act No. 8550, otherwise known
as the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998;
"(22) Violations of Sections 101 to 107, and 110 of Republic Act No. 7942, otherwise known as
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995;
"(23) Violations of Section 27(c), (e), (f), (g) and (i), of Republic Act No. 9147, otherwise known
as the Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection Act;
"(24) Violation of Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 9072, otherwise known as the National Caves
and Cave Resources Management Protection Act;
"(25) Violation of Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 2002,
as amended;
"(26) Violations of Sections 1, 3 and 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, otherwise
known as the decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing
In, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives;
"(27) Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law;
"(28) Violation of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended by Republic Act No. 10022;
"(29) Violation of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of
the Philippines;
"(30) Violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9995, otherwise known as the Anti-Photo and
Video Voyeurism Act of 2009;
"(31) Violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9775, otherwise known as the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009;
"(32) Violations of Sections 5, 7, 8, 9, 10(c), (d) and (e), 11, 12 and 14 of Republic Act No. 7610,
otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination;
"(33) Fraudulent practices and other violations under Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as
the Securities Regulation Code of 2000; and
"(34) Felonies or offenses of a similar nature that are punishable under the penal laws of other
countries."
(a) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates
to, the proceeds of any unlawful activity, transacts or attempts to transact said monetary
instrument or property.
(b) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property involves the proceeds of any
unlawful activity, performs or fails to perform any act as a result of which he facilitates the
offense of money laundering referred to in paragraph (a) above.
(c) Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property is required under this Act to be
disclosed and filed with the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), fails to do so.
CHAPTER THREE
FRAUDS AND ILLEGAL EXACTIONS AND TRANSACTIONS
Article 213. Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period, or a fine ranging
from Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) pesos, or
both, shall be imposed upon any public officer who:
1) In his official capacity, in dealing with any person with regard to furnishing
supplies, the making of contracts, or the adjustment or settlement of accounts
relating to public property or funds, shall enter into an agreement with any
interested party or speculator or make use of any other scheme, to defraud the
Government;
2) Being entrusted with the collection of taxes, licenses, fees, and other imposts, shall
be guilty of any of the following acts or omissions:
(a) Demanding, directly or indirectly, the payment of sums different from or larger
than those authorized by law;
(b) Failing voluntarily to issue a receipt, as provided by law, for any sum of money
collected by him officially;
When the culprit is an officer or employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the
Bureau of Customs, the provisions of the Administrative Code shall be applied. (As
amended by RA 10951)
1st paragraph: refers to fraud against the public treasury and covers any agreement or any scheme
to defraud the government with regard to furnishing supplies, making contracts and settling
accounts.
>>>What is contemplated in this article is the act of a public officer who enters into an
arrangement with private individuals concerning the furnishing of supplies to the government but
under a scheme adopted to benefit such public officer from the contract or transaction. It is
considered as fraud or deceit against the public treasury because in the end, the transaction will
result in the loss of income to the government.
>>>This is very common in transactions involving the supply of office materials to government
entities. For instance, if the supply officer who enters into a contract with the manufacturer agrees
to mark up the price by 10% on the understanding that once the government pays the amount, the
10% mark up shall be divided equally between the manufacturer or seller and the supply officer,
it is clear that the 10% addition to the actual price is the scheme referred to by the law.
Illustrations:
(1) A public official who is in charge of procuring supplies for the government obtained
funds for the first class materials and buys inferior quality products and pockets the
excess of the funds. This is usually committed by the officials of the Department of
Public Works and Highways.
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Paragraph 2 --- This is a felony by omission – the public officer has failed to do something when
he is required by law to do so. – illegal exaction.
>>Illegal exaction on the other hand refers to a case where a public officer whose duty is to
collect fees or taxes in favor of the government, takes advantage of his official position by
demanding a greater amount or by not issuing a receipt for the sum collected, or by demanding
something in kind of greater value other than money.
Article 214. Other frauds. — In addition to the penalties prescribed in the provisions of
Chapter Six, Title Ten, Book Two of this Code, the penalty of temporary special disqualifi-
cation in its maximum period to perpetual special disqualification shall be imposed upon
any public officer who, taking advantage of his official position, shall commit any of the
frauds or deceits enumerated in said provisions.
Article 215. Prohibited transactions. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period
or a fine ranging from Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000.00), or both, shall be imposed upon any appointive public officer who,
during his incumbency, shall directly or indirectly become interested in any transaction of
exchange or speculation within the territory subject to his jurisdiction. (As amended by RA
10951)
>>>A good example to illustrate this provision is the case of a Provincial Engineer who has
knowledge of the proposed construction of a superhighway that will traverse vast tracks of land.
In anticipation anticipation of the increase in the market value of the land within the area to be
traversed by the superhighway, he buys several parcels of land along the proposed highway
which is within his jurisdiction as Provincial Engineer.
Article 216. Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from Forty
Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00), or both,
shall be imposed upon a public officer who, directly or indirectly, shall become interested in
any contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene.
The mere violation of the prohibition is already punished even if no actual fraud occurs
because of the possibility that fraud may be committed or that the officer may place his own
interest above that of the government or party which he represents (U.S. vs. Udarbe, 28 Phil.
383).
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property — Presumption of malversation. — Any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property,
shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or
property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed Forty Thousand
Pesos (P40,000.00).
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount
involved is more than Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) but does not exceed One
Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000).
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3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, if the amount involved is more than One Million Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000 but is less than Two Million Four Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P2,400,000).
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved is more than Two Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,400,000) but
is less than Four Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P4,400,000). If the amount
exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua.
5. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, if the amount inolved is
more than Four million four hundred thousand pesos (₱4,400,000) but does not exceed
Eight million eight hundred thousand pesos (₱8,800,000). If the amount exceeds the latter,
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of funds malversed or equal to the
total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. (As amended by
Rep. Act No. 10951.)
The penalty for malversation is the same whether committed with dolo or through reckless
imprudence.
>>In determining whether the offender is liable for malversation, it is the nature of the duties of
the public officer that controls. While the name of the office is important, what is controlling is
whether in performing his duties as a public officer, he has to account or is re quired by the nature
of the performance of a duty, to render an account on the money or property that came into his
possession. So, even a mere clerk can commit the crime of malversation.
>>This is one crime where the guilt of the accused is presumed. This is alleged in the last
paragraph of the article. The presumption is disputable and comes into play only after a demand
has been made by a person duly authorized to do so.
To avoid confusion, a distinction should be made between malversation and estafa. The
latter is usually committed by a private individual whereas malversation is committed by
accountable public officers. In estafa, the funds or property subject of misappropriation are
privately owned. In malversation, the object is public fund or property. In estafa, the offender
appropriates personally the funds or properties while in malversation, personal appropriation is
not indispensable because allowing others to commit the misappropriation is also malversation.
In malversation, all that the prosecution has to do is to prove that the offender received
public funds or property and that while the same were in his possession, he could not account for
them or that he did not have them in his possession upon demand by any duly authorized officer,
and he could not give a legal excuse for the disappearance of the same.
Sandiganbayan, 208 SCRA 44; Cabello vs. Sandiganbayan, 197 SCRA 94; Estepa vs.
Sandiganbayan, 182 SCRA 269).
Accused must overcome presumption of guilt under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the case of Arturo de Guzman vs. People of the Philippines, et al. (L-54288, Dec. 15,
1982), the Supreme Court held that in the face of the evidence presented, accused failed to
overcome the presumption under Article 217, that the failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any
public officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds to personal use. In
malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the accused received and is in possession of
public funds, that he did not have them in his possession and he could not account for them nor
could he give a reasonable excuse for the disappearance of the same.
If a public officer reports the loss of money before a cash examination is conducted and
the cause of the loss as reported has a distinct ring of truth to it, the legal presumption of prima
facie evidence of guilt will not apply. In order to support conviction, the prosecution must prove
the actual misappropriation of the missing funds (Salvacion vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 68233, July 11, 1986).
To rebut the presumption of guilt prima facie under Article 217, the accused must raise
the issue of accuracy, correctness and regularity in the conduct of the audit. If he asked for a
second audit before the filing of the information against him and the same was denied, and during
the trial, some disbursement vouchers were introduced which were not considered in the first
audit, the denial of the request for a second audit is fatal to the cause of the prosecution because
in the meantime, the evidence introduced does not establish a fact beyond reasonable doubt. Had
the re-audit requested by the accused been accorded due course, the remaining balance could
have been satisfactorily accounted for (Mahinay vs. The Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 61442, May 9,
1989).
SYNOPSIS: Accused was the duly appointed Cashier of the Treasurer's Office of Albay. During
an audit examination of her cash and accounts, she was found to have incurred a shortage of
P2,522,661.93. Because she failed to produce any cash and valid cash items to effect the shortage
in her accountabilities, she was charged with malversation of public funds. Her defense, based on
the Quizo ruling1, is that she did not benefit a single centavo from the missing funds and that said
funds were disbursed as cash advances to her co-employees in good faith and in continuance of a
practice tolerated in her office.
RULING: The practice of disbursing public funds under the "vale" system as a defense in
malversation cases, was advanced, briefed and argued in Cabello vs. Sandiganbayan, 197 SCRA
94, and found to be unmeritorious. In Cabello, it was ruled that the giving of "vales" by public
officers out of their accountable funds is prohibited by RD. No. 1145, otherwise known as the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines and Memorandum Circular No. 570 dated June 24,
1968 of the General Auditing Office (now the Commission on Audit). The grant of loans through
the vale system is a clear case of an accountable officer consenting to the improper or
unauthorized use of public funds by other persons, which is punishable by law. To tolerate such a
practice is to give a license to every disbursing officer to conduct a lending operation with the use
of public funds. There is no law or regulation allowing accountable officers to extend loans to
anyone against "vales" or chits given in exchange by the borrowers. On the other hand, the
General Auditing Office (now the COA) had, time and again, through repeated official memo-
randa and rulings, warned against the acceptance of "vales" or chits by disbursing officers
because such transactions are really forms of loans.
Besides, under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, it is provided that: "any public officer who,
by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate
the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or prop erty, wholly or
1Quizo a Sandiganbayan, 149 SCRA 108 (1987): The Supreme Court ruled that if an accountable public officer did not put the missing funds
to his personal use and his having allowed others to freely participate in the chits/vales, is a practice which has been tolerated even during the time of
his predecessor and there is no negligence approximating malice or fraud because the wrong payments were made in good faith, said public officer
may be acquitted of malversation of public funds.
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In other words, the granting of cash advances through "vales" by any public officer who
is accountable for public funds or property is an illegal act, whether it is by consenting or through
negligence or abandonment. Hence, to put an end to the unauthorized practice of the "vale"
system, the General Auditing Office laid down the following rules in its Memorandum Circular
No. 570:
A vale, IOU, chit or other form of promissory note, is not acceptable credit to the cash account of
any accountable officer, and is at once excluded during the cash examination from among the
cash items.
The yellow reimbursement receipt properly used only as receipt or proof of petty
expenses in the field, should not be used to replace the general voucher for drawing amounts
which need the approval of several officials before payment, and require adequate description of
the goods or services being paid for.
Cash advance asked by any auditing personnel requires the prior approval of the Auditor
General, or the proper department manager.
Problem: An unlicensed firearm was confiscated by a policeman. Instead of turning over the
firearm to the property custodian for the prosecution of the offender, the policeman sold the
firearm. What crime was committed?
Ans: The crime committed is malversation because that firearm is subject to his accountability.
Having taken custody of the firearm, he is supposed to account for it as evidence for the
prosecution of the offender.
Problem: A member of the Philippine National Police went on absence without leave. He was
charged with malversation of the firearm issued to him. After two years, he came out of hiding
and surrendered the firearm. What crime was committed?
Ans: The crime committed was malversation. Payment of the amount misappropriated or
restitution of property misappropriated does not erase criminal liability but only civil liability.
Problem: There was a long line of payors on the last day of payment for residence certificates.
Employee A of the municipality placed all his collections inside his table and requested his
employee B to watch over his table while he goes to the restroom. B took advantage of A’s
absence and took P50.00 out of the collections. A returned and found his money short. What
crimes have been committed?
Ans: A is guilty of malversation through negligence because he did not exercise due diligence in
the safekeeping of the funds when he did not lock the drawer of his table. Insofar as B is
concerned, the crime is qualified theft.
>>>Under jurisprudence, when the public officer leaves his post without locking his drawer, there
is negligence. Thus, he is liable for the loss.
A private person may also commit malversation under the following situations:
(2) When he has become an accomplice or accessory to a public officer who commits
malversation;
(3) When the private person is made the custodian in whatever capacity of public funds or
property, whether belonging to national or local government, and he misappropriates the
same;
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>>>>Municipal treasurer connives with outsiders to make it appear that the office of the treasurer
was robbed. He worked overtime and the co-conspirators barged in, hog-tied the treasurer and
made it appear that there was a robbery. Crime committed is malversation because the municipal
treasurer was an accountable officer.
Principle: While demand is not an element of the crime of malversation. It is a requisite for
the application of the presumption. Without this presumption, the accused may still be
proved guilty under Art. 217 based on direct evidence of marlversation.
Facts: In 1999, an audit of the disbursement vouchers & payrolls for the period starting July 1998
up to 199 was conducted by the Provincial Government of Sulo. The COA Special Audit Report
stated that there were anomalies in the payment of salary differentials, allowances and benefits.
Pursuant to such findings, 3 Info were filed by the OMB against Estino, then Acting Governor &
Pescadera, the Provincial Treasurer during Estino’s stint. The said charges involved malversation
of public funds under Article 217 and 2 violations of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019. The Sandiganbayan,
convicted both Estino & Pescadera for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 for failure to pay the
RATA of the provincial government employees but acquitted them as to the other charge for the
same violation. As to the charge of marlversation, the SAndiganbayan acquitted Estino but
convicted Pesacadea for failure to remit the GSIS contributions of the provincial government
employees.
Issue: Whether or not Pescadera is liable for malversation for failure to remit the GSIS
contributions no demand was made upon him.
Held: No. There is no proof that Pescadea misappropriated the amount to his personal use.
The demand made by the Provincial Auditor recommending to the Chairperson of the
COA in the “State Auditor’s Opinion on the Financial Statements” where it was stated: “require
the Provincial Treasurer to remit all trust liabilities such as GSIS premiums etc.”, is not the
demand contemplated by law. The demand to account for public funds must be addressed to the
accountable officer. It can be concluded then that Pescadera was not given an opportunity to
explain why the GSIS premiums were not remitted. Without a formal demand, the prima facie
presumption of conversion under Art. 217 cannot be applied.
Principle: A public officer who is not charged of public funds or property by virtue of her
official position, or even a private individual, may be liable thereof if such public officer or
private individual conspires with an accountable public officer to commit it.
Section 13 of RA 3019-suspension and loss of benefits. What is this suspension all about? What
is the characteristic of this suspension? This is the subject of the debate where the
constitutionality of Section 13 was questioned for being derogation or in conflict with the
constitutional guarantee of presumption of innocence.
>>>because if you are suspended while the case is on going – the presumption of
innocence is already destroyed – kasi suspended ka while there is no conviction yet.
1984-Bayot vs Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 383 SC: “that suspension is not penal in character but
merely a preventive measure before final judgment.
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Purpose of the suspension: to prevent the accused from frustrating or hampering his prosecution
by intimidating or influencing witnesses.
This was reiterated in Gonzaga vs Sandiganbayan, 201 SCRA 417 (1991). SC said: preventive
suspension is not violative of the Constitution as it is not a penalty & a person under preventive
suspension remains entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence since his culpability
must still be established”.
Who may be suspended? The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons
indicted upon a valid information --- appointive or elective position.
How? –once the court determines the validity of the information, it becomes ministerial duty of
the Court to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.
For how long the suspension last? – it must not exceed the maximum period of 90 days in
consonance with the provision of the 1987 Administrative Code –Segovia vs sandiganbayan, 288
SCRA 328 (1998)
Q: Can private persons be charged together with the public official in the same proceeding?
A: YES. To avoid repeated & unnecessary presentation of witnesses & exhibits in different
venues especially if the issues involved are the same. If a private person is tried jointly with the
public officer, he may also be convicted jointly – Balmadrid vs Sandiganbayan, 195 SCRA 497
Salvador filed a case before RTC via special civil action for certiorari; prohibition and
mandamus to enjoin MTC from proceeding with the complaint of ejectment against him. The
Judge originally assigned inhibited himself – re-raffled to Judge Pelayo – who denied Salvador’s
application for TRO. Salvador filed a MR but was denied.
Salvador filed with the OMB a complaint against Judge Pelayo for vilation of Art. 206,
207 of the RPC and RA 3019. OMB referred it to the SC. As far as the OMB is concerned the
case is closed & terminated.
Issue: Whether or not the OMB has jurisdiction to entertain criminal charges filed against
a judge of RTC in connection with his handling of cases. Because here he insisted that it should
be the OMB not the SC because the complaint is a criminal charge not administrative charge.
SC: No. In Re: Joaquin Borromeo, 241 SCRA 408 before a civil or criminal action against a
judge for violation of the RPC , art. 204, 205 etc. or RA 3019 can be entertained, there must first
be a “final and authoritative judicial declaration” that the decision or order in question is indeed
unjust.
RA 1379 – the prescriptive period is 4 years from the date of resignation or dismissal. BUT this
has been repealed by express mandate of the 1987 Constitution – Art. XI Section 5 “the right of
the State to recover illegally unlawfully acquired property of a public officer is
IMPRESCRIPTIBLE. – Republic vs Migrinio, 189 SCRA 289
PD 1564 amending Act No. 4075 known as the Solicitation Permit Law.
2 essential elements must be present: (1) Soliciting or receiving contribution for charitable or
public welfare purposes; (2) the omission to secure a permit from the DSWD prior to soliciting of
receiving contribution.
Pp vs Castaneda, 187 SCRA 148 – the priest solicited for the construction of his church building
without securing a permit from the DSWD.
Article 218. Failure of accountable officer to render accounts. — Any public officer, whether in the
service or separated therefrom by resignation or any other cause, who is required by law or
regulation to render accounts to the Insular Auditor (now Commission on Audit), or to the
provincial auditor and who fails to do so for a period of two months after such accounts
123
The public officers who are bound to render accounts are the following:
1) cashiers;
2) storekeepers;
3) warehousemen; and
4) those who by the nature of their position become custodian of
public funds or property.
Demand to render account is not necessary. It is sufficient that there is a law or regulation
requiring him to render account. It is the failure to follow the requirement of the law that is made
punishable. It is not necessary that the offender actually committed malversation because the
object of the law is to prevent the situation of the crime being committed because of the failure of
the accountable officer to render an account
Article 219. Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before leaving the country. —
Any public officer who unlawfully leaves or attempts to leave the Philippine Islands without
securing a certificate from the Insular Auditor (now Commission on Audit), showing that
his accounts have been finally settled, shall be punished by arresto mayor, or a fine ranging
from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both.
>>>Take note of the phrase "unlawfully leaves or attempts to leave." This suggests that the flight
or intent to leave the country is due to the commission of a crime which has not yet been
discovered.
Article 220. Illegal use of public funds or property. — Any public officer who shall apply any
public funds or property under his administration to any public use other than that for
which such funds or property were appropriated by law or ordinance shall suffer the
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from one-half to the
total value of the sum misapplied, if by reason of such misapplication, any damage or
embarrassment shall have resulted to the public service. In either case, the offender shall
also suffer the penalty of temporary special disqualification.
If no damage or embarrassment to the public service has resulted, the penalty shall
be a fine from 5 to 50 percent of the sum misapplied
>>technical malversation because the funds or property are used for a purpose other than
that for which the same was appropriated.
In the illegal use of public funds or property, it is not necessary that the offender derives
monetary benefit from the use of the public funds or property. It is called technical malversation
because the funds or property are used for a purpose other than that for which the same was
appropriated. While the purpose for which the funds had been diverted is also public, the practice
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is not allowed because it could undermine public service. Programs of the government, which are
otherwise good, could suffer because of the diversion of public funds to support projects which
may not have any community value. If public officers are allowed to change or amend the
intended purpose of the appropriation law or ordinance, the act of appropriating a particular sum
for certain worthy projects, would be rendered nugatory. Hence, there is wisdom in this particular
provision of the Code because it gives direction in the implementation of government projects.
So, money appropriated for the construction of a school building cannot be used or diverted for
the construction of a bridge even if in doing so, it will solve an emergency. The diversion of
public funds or property to another public project is not a legal justification because this is the
very essence of the crime which the law is trying to prevent by calling it illegal use of funds or
property. Damage to the government is not an essential element of the crime.
The offender referred to herein, is not a government officer in charge of collecting revenue. It
refers to a public officer who is in charge of administering or implementing a government project
1) Art. 217 & 220 – the offenders are accountable public officers.
2) In Art. 217 – personal benefits are derived from the proceeds of the crime.
In Art. 220 – the offender derives no personal benefit from the commission of the act.
3) In Art. 217 – the conversion is for the personal interest of the offender
In Art. 220 – the object to which the fund is applied is also for public use.
* To rebut the presumption of guilt prima facie under Article 217, the accused must raise the
issue of accuracy, correctness and regularity in the conduct of audit. If asked for a second audit
before the filing of the information against him and the same was denied, and during the trial,
some disbursement vouchers were introduced which were not considered in the first audit, the
denial of the request for a second audit is fatal to the cause of the prosecution because in the
meantime, the evidence introduced does not establish a fact beyond reasonable doubt. Had the re-
audit requested by the accused been accorded due course, the remaining balance could have been
satisfactorily accounted for. (Mahinay vs. The Sandiganbayan. G. R. No. 61442, May 9, 1989)
There is also no malversation when the accountable officer is obliged to go out of his office and
borrow the amount corresponding to the shortage and later, the missing amount is found in an
unaccustomed place
A person whose negligence made possible the commission of malversation by another can be
held liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation
* It is not necessary that the accountable public officer should actually misappropriate the fund or
property involved. It is enough that he has violated the trust reposed on him in connection with
the property.
* Note that damage on the part of the government is not considered an essential element. It is
enough that the proprietary rights of the government over the funds have been disturbed through
breach of trust.
A private person may also commit malversation under the following situations:
(2) When he has become an accomplice or accessory to a public officer who commits
malversation;
(3) When the private person is made the custodian in whatever capacity of public funds or
property, whether belonging to national or local government, and he misappropriates the
same;
Article 221. Failure to make delivery of public funds or property. — Any public officer under
obligation to make payment from Government funds in his possession, who shall fail to
make such payment, shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine from 5 to 25 percent of the
sum which he failed to pay.
This provision shall apply to any public officer who, being ordered by competent authority
to deliver any property in his custody or under his administration, shall refuse to make such
delivery.
The fine shall be graduated in such a case by the value of the thing, provided that it shall
not be less than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000). (as amended by RA 10951)
Under this article, there are two (2) acts that are made punishable: the failure to make the
payment required of the public officer; and, the refusal to deliver property in the custody or
administration of a public officer despite an order by competent authority. The refusal must be
malicious because if the same is lawful, no crime is committed.
Article 222. Officers included in the preceding provisions. — The provisions of this chapter shall
apply to private individuals who, in any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular,'
provincial or municipal funds, revenues, or property and to any administrator or
depository of funds or property attached, seized or deposited by public authority, even if
such property belongs to a private individual.
Article 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasions. — Any public officer who shall consent to
the escape of a pris- ler in his custody or charge, shall be punished:
1. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and temporary special
disqualification in its maxium period to perpetual special disqualification, if the fugitive
shall have been sentenced by final judgment to any penalty.
2. By prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary special disqualification,
in case the fugitive shall not have been finally convicted but only held as a detention
prisoner for any crime or violation of law or municipal ordinance.
>>without connivance on the part of the person in charge, Art. 223 is not committed.
Note: Laxity in the performance of duties does not necessarily constitute a violation of Art. 223.
Article 224. Evasion through negligence. — If the evasion of the prisoner shall have taken place
through the negligence of the officer charged with the conveyance or custody of the
escaping prisoner, said officer shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary special disqualification.
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Not every error is negligence under this article. To be liable, the negligence must be notorious
and apparent. The laxity must be definite and must seriously suggest a deliberate non-
performance of a duty.
What kind of negligence is required for a public officer? --- POSITIVE NEGLIGENCE.
If the prisoner is only a detention prisoner, he commits no crime for escaping. But if the person
detained is a prisoner serving sentence by final judgment, he commits the crime of evasion of
service of sentence under Article 157.
Article 225. Escape of prisoners under the custody of a person not a public officer.—Any private
person to whom the conveyance or custody of a prisoner or person under arrest shall have
been confided, who shall commit any of the offenses mentioned in the two preceding
articles, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed for the public
officer.
The offender in this case is a private individual. The conveyance or custody of a prisoner or
person under arrest is entrusted to him. The prisoner or person under arrest escapes because the
offender gave his consent or that the escape takes place through his negligence.
The penalty to be imposed against the offender is one degree lower than that imposed on public
officers.
ELEMENTS:
a. That the offender is a private person (note: must be on duty)
d. That the offender consents to the escape of the prisoner or person under arrest, or
that the escape takes place through his negligence
Note: This article is not applicable if a private person made the arrest and he consented to the
escape of the person he arrested.
>>>The offender under this article is not the one who arrested the escaping prisoner but one who
agreed to have the custody or charge of the prisoner or person under arrest.
A policeman escorted a prisoner to court. After the court hearing, this policeman was shot at with
a view to liberate the prisoner from his custody. The policeman fought the attacker but he was
fatally wounded. When he could no longer control the prisoner, he went to a nearby house, talked
to the head of the family of that house and asked him if he could give the custody of the prisoner
to him. He said yes. After the prisoner was handcuffed in his hands, the policeman expired.
Thereafter, the head of the family of that private house asked the prisoner if he could afford to
give something so that he would allow him to go. The prisoner said, “Yes, if you would allow
me to leave, you can come with me and I will give the money to you.” This private persons went
with the prisoner and when the money was given, he allowed him to go. What crime/s had been
committed?
Under Article 225, the crime can be committed by a private person to whom the custody of a
prisoner has been confided.
Where such private person, while performing a private function by virtue of a provision of law,
shall accept any consideration or gift for the non-performance of a duty confided to him, Bribery
is also committed. So the crime committed by him is infidelity in the custody of prisoners and
bribery.
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If the crime is delivering prisoners from jail, bribery is just a means, under Article 156, that
would call for the imposition of a heavier penalty, but not a separate charge of bribery under
Article 156.
But under Article 225 in infidelity, what is basically punished is the breach of trust because the
offender is the custodian. For that, the crime is infidelity. If he violates the trust because of some
consideration, bribery is also committed.
Article 226. Removal, concealment or destruction of documents. —Any public officer who shall
remove, destroy or conceal documents or papers officially entrusted to him, shall suffer:
1) The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000), whenever serious damage shall have been caused thereby to a third
party or to the public interest;
2) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium period and a fine not
exceeding Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000) whenever the damage caused
to a third party or to the public interest shall not have been serious.
The offender in this case is a public officer who obstructs, destroys or conceals a document
or paper entrusted to him by reason of his office. The act of obstruction, destruction or
concealment must cause damage to a third party or to the public interest. Damage to a third party
is usually pecuniary; but damage to public interest may consist in mere alarm to the public or the
alienation of its confidence on any branch of the government service.
In these three instances of committing infidelity in the custody of documents, the act of
removal, destruction or concealment should be coupled with criminal intent or malice
(Manzanaris vs. Sandiganbayan, et.al., G.R. No. 64750, Jan. 30, 1984)
If the removal of the document is for a lawful purpose and that is, to secure the same from
imminent danger of loss, there is no crime committed under the law (Kataniag vs. People, 74
Phil. 45).
The document contemplated under this article must be reconciled in its meaning with the
documents already discussed in Articles 171 and 172. It must refer to an instrument or writing
that has created or established a right or has extinguished an obligation. This concept must be
construed strictly.
The foregoing discussion strictly refers only to documents. It does not refer to papers
officially entrusted to a public officer. The term "papers" in this article has a legal meaning. It
means negotiable instruments like checks, promissory notes and paper money. So paper bills
(money) enclosed in a letter and sent thru the mail which are abstracted by the postmaster renders
the latter guilty of infidelity in the custody of documents (U.S. vs. Gorospe, 31 Phil. 285)
Where in case for bribery or corruption, the monetary considerations was marked as
exhibits, such considerations acquires the nature of a document such that if the same would be
spent by the custodian the crime is not malversation but Infidelity in the custody of public
records, because the money adduced as exhibits partake the nature of a document and not as
money.
Although such monetary consideration acquires the nature of a document, the best evidence rule
does not apply here. Example, photocopies may be presented in evidence.
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Article 227. Officer breaking seal. — Any public officer charged with the custody of papers or
property sealed by proper authority, who shall break the seals or permit them to be broken,
shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,
temporary special disqualification and a fine not exceeding Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P400,000). (As amended by RA 10951)
Article 228. Opening of closed documents. — Any public officer not included in the provisions
of the next preceding article who, without proper authority, shall open or shall permit to be
opened any closed papers, documents or objects entrusted to his custody, shall suffer the
penalties of arresto mayor, temporary special disqualification and a fine not exceeding Four
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000). (As amended by RA 10951)
In Article 227, the mere breaking of the seal is what is made punishable while in Article
228, the mere opening of closed documents is enough to hold the offender criminally liable. The
breaking of the seal or the opening of the closed document must be done with out lawful authority
or order from competent authority. In both offenses, damage to the public interest is not required.
Article 229. Revelation of secrets by an officer. — Any public officer who shall reveal any secret
known to him by reason of his official capacity, or shall wrongfully deliver papers or copies
of papers of which he may have charge and which should not be published, shall suffer the
penalties of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, perpetual special
disqualification and a fine not exceeding Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000) if the
revelation of such secrets or the delivery of such papers shall have caused serious damage to
the public interest; otherwise, the penalties of prision correccional in its minimum period,
temporary special disqualification and a fine not exceeding One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000) shall be imposed. (As amended by RA 10951)
The secrets referred to in this article are those which have an official or public character. It
does not include secret information regarding private individuals. Nor does it include military or
State secrets inasmuch as the revelation of the same is classified as espionage, a crime in
violation of the national security of the State. The article refers to minor betrayals or revelation of
secrets of little consequence and affecting usually the administration of justice.
Article 230. Public officer revealing secrets of private indiividual.—Any public officer to whom the
secrets of any private individual shall become known by reason of his office who shall reveal
such secrets, shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000). (As amended by RA 10951)
The offender in this case is a public officer who knows or comes ;o know the secrets of a
private individual by reason of his office or vhile performing his duties, and reveals such secrets
without au- ;hoxity or legal justification. Public revelation is not required. Revelation to one
person is enough. The intention of the law is to encourage people to confide their problems,
specially with regard to the administration of justice.
Article 231. Open disobedience. — Any judicial or executive officer who shall openly refuse to
execute the judgment, decision or order of any superior authority made within the scope of
the jurisdiction of the latter and issued with all the legal formalities, shall suffer the
penalties of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period,
temporary special disqualification in its maximum period and a fine not exceeding Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000). (As amended by RA 10951).
The offender herein is a public officer who is appointed either in the judiciary or in the
executive branch of the government. There is a decision, judgment or order originating from
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higher authority directing the performance of a duty. The judgment is final and executory and
issued with all the formalities required by law. The gravamen of the offense is the open refusal of
the offender to execute the order without justifiable reason. This can be in the form of an order
directing the performance of a duty where the offender refuses to perform or obey what is
directed to be done.
The term "execute" as found in the law does not only mean the performance of an act since
the judgment, decision or order may also direct the non-performance of an act. Either way, if
there is an open refusal to obey the order, the crime is committed.
The article does not apply to the members of Congress
Article 232. Disobedience to order of superior officer, when said order was suspended by inferior officer.
— Any public officer who, having for any reason*suspended the execution of the orders of
his superiors, shall disobey such superiors after the latter have disapproved the suspension,
shall suffer the penalties ofprision correccional in its minimum and medium periods and
perpetual special disqualification.
The offender in this case is a public officer who for some reason or another has suspended
the execution of an order of his superior officer. The superior officer, after being notified by the
interested party of the suspension of the execution of the order, disapproves the order of
suspension and directs the execution of the order. And the offender, for no reason, disobeys the
order of his superior.
What is contemplated here is a situation where the subordinate has some doubts regarding
the legality of the order. Hence, he is afforded an opportunity to suspend the execution of the
order, so as to give him time to further study the same. He commits no crime for doing this act.
However, if he continues to suspend the execution of the order notwithstanding the disapproval
by his superior of the stay of execution, such refusal on his part already constitutes a crime
punishable under this article. There is wisdom in this article, since it tends to promote efficiency
in public service.
Article 233. Refusal of assistance. — The penalties of arresto mayor in its medium period to
prision correccional in its minimum period, perpetual special disqualification and a fine not
exceeding Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000), shall be imposed upon a public officer
who, upon demand from competent authority, shall fail to lend his cooperation towards the
administration of justice or other public service, if such failure shall result in serious
damage to the public interest, or to a third party; otherwise, arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine not exceeding One Hundred thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall
be imposed. (As amended by RA 10951)
Again, the offender in this case is a public officer who fails to lend his cooperation towards the
administration of justice or other public service after demand was made upon him by competent
authority.
Damage is essential, whether great or small. But the penalty is affected by the seriousness of the
damage. Note that the refusal must be done with malice.
Article 234. Refusal to discharge elective office. — The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not
exceeding Two Hudred Thousand Pesos (P200,000) or both, shall be imposed upon any
person who, having been elected by popular election to a public office, shall refuse without
legal motive to be sworn in or to discharge the duties of said office.
The offender in this case is an elected candidate to a public of fice who refuses without
legal motive to be sworn in or to discharge the duties of his office.
Article 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to
prision correccional in its minimum period, in addition to his liability for the physical injuries
or damage caused, shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall overdo
himself in the correction or handling of a prisoner or detention prisoner under his charge,
by the imposition of punishments not authorized by the regulations, or by inflicting such
punishments in a cruel and humiliating manner.
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2 kinds of Maltreatment:
The prisoner maltreated here must be “under the actual charge” of the public officer and not by
legal fiction.
The offended party must be a prisoner in the legal sense. The mere fact that a private citizen had
been apprehended or arrested by law officers does not automatically constitute him a prisoner. To
be a prisoner, he must have been booked and incarcerated no matter how short it is.
The maltreatment here must contemplate (1) maltreatment in relation to the correction or
handling of the prisoner (2) maltreatment for the purpose of extorting confession.
Q: A was a detention prisoner for 5 days in the Sta. Ana Police Station. B was assigned to the
said station and upon his arrival, B saw A in the jail who once upon a time mauled B in a disco 1
year ago. B mauled A. A suffered physical injuries. Is B guilty of maltreatment?
A: NO. B is only liable for physical injuries. The maltreatment here is personal to the jailer and
not for the purpose of correction or handling or extorting a confession.
Note: If in the process of imposing discipline, the prisoner suffers physical injuries, this offense
will be treated as a separate crime. If the maltreatment is employed to extract a confession or to
obtain information from the prisoner, the same will be considered as a qualifying circumstance
and will be treated as such to increase the penalty against the offender.
But if as a result of the maltreatment, physical injuries were caused to the prisoner, a separate
crime for the physical injuries shall be filed. You do not complex the crime of physical injuries
with the maltreatment. --- But if it is the custodian who effected the maltreatment, the crime will
be maltreatment of prisoners plus a separate charge for physical injuries.
Article 236. Anticipation of duties of a public office. — Any person who shall assume the
performance of the duties and powers of any public office or employment without first
being sworn in or having given the bond required by law, shall be suspended from such
office or employment until he shall have complied with the respective formalities and shall
be fined from Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000) to One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000). (as amended by RA 10951)
The offender in this article is a public officer who was appointed by competent authority; or
a public officer who was duly elected to hold office. The law requires that before assuming the
duties of the office, he should first take his oath or give a bond. The offender per forms the duties
of his office without taking the necessary oath or without posting a bond.
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Article 237. Prolonging performance of duties and powers. — Any public officer who shall
continue to exercise the duties and powers of his office, employment or commission, beyond
the period provided by law, regulations or special provisions applicable to the case, shall
suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its minimum period, special temporary
disqualification in its minimum period, and a fine not exceeding One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000). (as amended by RA 10951)
More often, it refers to a public officer whose government service has been terminated by his
compulsory retirement from the government upon reaching a certain age. It may also refer to
termination of employment because of the termination of the term or tenure of office. The crime
is committed when such officer continues to exercise the duties and powers of his office,
employment or commission beyond the period provided by law, regulation or special provision of law
applicable to the case. In other words, the crime is committed only if the public officer has lost
every right to the office because there are offices which require the officer to continue serving as
such until properly relieved. The law is intended to put an end to the principle of hold-over.
Article 238. Abandonment of office or position. — Any public officer who, before the acceptance
of his resignation, shall abandon his office to the detriment of the public service, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor.
If such office shall have been abandoned in order to evade the discharge of the duties of
preventing, prosecuting, or punishing any of the crimes falling within Title One, and
Chapter One of Title Three of Book Two of this Code, the offender shall be punished by
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, and by arresto mayor, if the purpose
of such abandonment is to evade the duty of preventing, prosecuting, or punishing any
other crime.
Oral resignation is not allowed. The resignation must be in writing and directed to the appointing
power who has the authority to accept or disapprove the same.
The situation of one leaving his office even before the acceptance of his resignation is done
usually by a public officer who refuses to prosecute a case either because of fear or for other
personal reasons. If the abandonment is done to evade the duty of prosecuting cases in
violation of the national security of the State or for violation of the law of nations, the penalty
to be imposed against the offender is one degree higher.
Article 239. Usurpation of legislative powers. — The penalties of prision correccional in its
minimum period, temporary special disqualification and a fine not exceeding Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000), shall be imposed upon any public officer who shall encroach
upon the powers of the legislative branch of the Government, either by making general
rules or regulations beyond the scope of his authority, or by attempting to repeal a law or
suspending the execution thereof. (as amended by RA 10951)
Article 240. Usurpation of executive functions. — Any judge who shall assume any power
pertaining to the executive authorities, or shall obstruct the latter in the lawful exercise of
their powers, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period.
Article 241. Usurpation of judicial functions. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period
to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any officer of the
executive branch of the Government who shall assume judicial powers or shall obstruct the
execution of any order or decision rendered by any judge within his jurisdiction.
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Article 242. Disobeying request for disqualification. — Any public officer who, before the question
of jurisdiction is decided, shall continue any proceeding after having been lawfully required
to refrain from so doing, shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000). (as amended by RA 10951)
Article 243. Orders or requests by executive officers to any judicial authority. — Any executive officer
who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case
or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000).
(as amended by RA 10951)
Article 244. Unlawful appointments. — Any public officer who shall knowingly nominate or
appoint to any public office any person lacking the legal qualifications therefor, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000). (as amended by RA 10951)
As the title suggests, the offender in this article is a public of ficer who nominates or appoints a
person to a public office. The person nominated or appointed is not qualified and his lack of
qualification is known to the party making the nomination or appointment. The qualification of a
public officer to hold a particular position in the government is provided by law. The purpose of
the law is to ensure that the person appointed is competent to perform the duties of the office,
thereby promoting efficiency in rendering public service.
The qualification to hold public office may refer to educational attainment, civil service eligibility
or experience. For instance, for one to be appointed as judge, he must be a lawyer. So if the
Judicial and Bar Council nominates a person for appointment as judge knowing him to be not a
member of the Philippine Bar, such act constitutes a violation of the law under consideration.
The word "nominate" is not the same as "recommend." To nominate is to guarantee to the
appointing power that the person nominated has all the qualifications to the office. A good
example of this would be the nomination of candidates for appointment to the judiciary, made by
the judicial and bar council.
Recommendation on the other hand does not make any guarantee as to the legal fitness of
the candidate to public office. It is usually done by private individuals. The act of nominating is
an official duty and can be performed only by a public officer. Recommending a person for
appointment to a public office with knowledge that the recommendee has no qualification is not a
crime.
Article 245. Abuses against chastity — Penalties. — Thepienalties of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and temporary special disqualification shall be imposed:
1. Upon any public officer who shall solicit or make immoral or indecent advances to a
woman interested in matters pending before such officer for decision, or with
respect to which he is required to submit a report to or consult with superior
officer;
2. Any warden or other public officer directly charged with the care and custody of
prisoners or persons under arrest who shall solicit or make immoral or indecent
advances i a woman under his custody.
If the person solicited be the wife, daughter, sister, or Native within the same degree by
affinity of any person in ie custody of such warden or officer, the penalties shall be prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods and temporary special disqualification.
There are three ways of committing the crime of "abuses against chastity":
2) By soliciting or making immoral or indecent advances to a man under the custody of the
offending officer;
133
The word "solicit" means to demand earnestly. In this case, the demand is for sexual favor. It
must be immoral or indecent and done by the public officer taking advantage of his position as
one who can help by rendering a favorable decision or unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to a person under his custody.
It is not necessary for the offended party to surrender her virtue to consummate the crime. Mere
proposal is sufficient to consummate the crime.
In one case, the offended party was able to prove sexual intercourse with the accused while she
was in his custody as detention prisoner. However, there was no proof that the accused made im -
moral or indecent advances to the victim before the sexual favor was extended to him. The Court
ruled that it would be a strange interpretation to place upon said law that failure in proof to show
solicitation is sufficient to relieve the accused from responsibility. Sexual intercourse under the
circumstances presumes the existence of immoral and indecent proposals (U.S. vs. Morelos, 29
Phil. 572).
If the warden is also a woman but is a lesbian, it is submitted that this crime could be committed,
as the law does not require that the custodian be a man but requires that the offended be a woman.
> Committed by any person having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a
work, training or education environment when he or she demands, requests, or otherwise requires
any sexual favor from the other regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement for
submission is accepted by the object of the said act (for a passing grade, or granting of
scholarship or honors, or payment of a stipend, allowances, benefits, considerations; favorable
compensation terms, conditions, promotions or when the refusal to do so results in a detrimental
consequence for the victim).
> Also holds liable any person who directs or induces another to commit any act of sexual
harassment, or who cooperates in the commission, the head of the office, educational or training
institution solidarily.
Article 246. Parricide. — Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse, shall be
guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. (As
amended by R.A. No. 7659.)
Elements:
1) A person is killed;
2) The victim is killed by the accused; and
3) The victim is the father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate
ascendant or descendant or legal spouse of the accused.
Parricide is a crime of relationship. This is a crime committed between people who are related by
blood. However, between spouses even if they are not related by blood, the crime is also Par-
ricide.
1. Except between husband and wife, the offender must be related to the offended party by
blood;
2. Such blood relationship must be in the direct line not in a collateral line;
3. Between parent and child, the relationship may be legitimate or illegitimate; all other
relationships must be legitimate;
4. Knowledge of relationship is not necessary because the law does not require knowledge
of the relationship as an indispensable element of the crime;
5. Parents and children are not included in the term "ascendants or descendants
6. The relationship between ascendants and descendants must be legitimate;
7. The child mentioned in the law must not be less than three days old; Otherwise, it would
be infanticide.
8. The spouse must be legitimate (People vs. Ignacio, 270 SCRA 445);
9. Relationship must be alleged; and,
10. A stranger who cooperates in the commission of parricide is not guilty of
parricide but only of homicide or murder, as the case may be (People vs. Patricio, 46 Phil.
875).
A spouse of B conspires with C to kill B. C is the stranger in the relationship. C killed B with
treachery. The means employed is made known to A and A agreed that the killing will be done by
poisoning.
As far as A is concerned, the crime is based on his relationship with B. It is therefore parricide.
The treachery that was employed in killing Bong will only be generic aggravating circumstance
in the crime of parricide because this is not one crime that requires a qualifying circumstance.
But that same treachery, insofar as C is concerned, as a stranger who cooperated in the killing,
makes the crime murder; treachery becomes a qualifying circumstance.
Problem: Lex and Ruth do not believe in the sanctity of marriage. They just lived together in the
concept of husband and wife. Ruth killed Lex. Ruth is not liable for Parricide. If the offender is a
spouse, they must be legally married to make the offender liable for Parricide. Ruth is liable for
Homicide or Murder as the case may be.
Problem: A and B are husband and wife. Their marital union was not blessed with a child. They
adopted a child and named him Y. When the adopted child grew up, he killed A his adoptive
father. Y is not liable for Parricide because he is not related to A by blood.
Problem: A is the parent of B, the illegitimate daughter. B married C and they begot a
legitimate child D. If D, daughter of B and C, would kill A, the grandmother, the crime cannot be
parricide anymore because of the intervening illegitimacy. The relationship between A and D is
no longer legitimate. Hence, the crime committed is homicide or murder.
Problem: A, an illegitimate son of B, who killed the legitimate father of the latter, is not guilty of
Parricide because in case of other ascendants (grandparents, great grandparents, etc.), the
relationship with the killer must be legitimate. The same is true with other descendants – that is,
grandchildren, great grandchildren, etc.
Problem: Johnny and Susan are first cousins. They got married against the objection of their
parents. Johnny killed Susan. It is submitted that Johnny is not liable for Parricide. Their marriage
is contrary to law and public policy. Their marriage is void ab initio.
Notwithstanding the provision of the law which suggests that parricide is essentially a felony
committed by means of dolo and is therefore punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, Article
365 expressly provides that parricide can be committed through reckless imprudence. The penalty
will not be under Article 246 but under Article 365.
Problem: Romualdo killed Thomas not knowing that the latter is his son. Is he liable for
Parricide?
Ans: Yes, Romualdo is liable for Parricide. Even if the offender did not know that the person he
had killed is his son, he is still liable for parricide because the law does not require knowledge of
the relationship.
Article 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. — Any legally
married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer
the penalty of destierro. If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he
shall be exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with
respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while the daugh-
ters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter,
or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse, shall not be entitled to
the benefits of this article.
Note: Article 247 does not define a felony. It merely grants a privilege or benefit to an offender
who kills or inflicts physical injuries to another because of marital infidelity.
(1) The innocent spouse surprised the other spouse with a paramour or mistress in flagrante
delicto. They must be in the act of sexual intercourse.
(2) The innocent spouse kills or inflicts injury upon the other spouse and paramour or
mistress while in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately after surprising them having sexual
intercourse.
First Stage: The Unfaithful Spouse and Paramour/Mistress are Surprised While having
Sexual Intercourse:
The innocent spouse surprised the other spouse with a par amour or mistress in flagrante
delicto. They must be in the act of sexual intercourse.
Second Stage: Killing or Infliction of Serious Physical Injury while in the Act of Sexual
Intercourse or Immediately Thereafter:
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The attack on the unfaithful spouse and the spoiler of his/her honor must take place while
the sexual intercourse is going on. If the attack takes place before or after the surprising discovery
of the sexual intercourse, Art. 247 does not apply. The killing or the infliction of physical injuries
must be done while in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.
The offender finds his spouse in actual sexual intercourse with another. The latter escapes with
the offended spouse in hot pursuit. The offender must inflict serious physical injuries or cause the
killing of the offending parties without interruption or interval of time (U.S. vs. Alano, 32 Phil.
381).
In one case, the husband saw his wife responding blissfully to the embrace and kisses
showered on her by an amorous lover. The husband patiently waited for them to have carnal
knowledge or sexual intercourse before attacking them with a deadly weapon and inflicted upon
them serious physical injuries. Here, the Supreme Court granted the husband the privilege of
Article 247 (People vs. Gabriel, 63 Phil. 1063).
>>>Art 247 is applicable when the accused did not see his spouse in the act of sexual intercourse
with another person. However, it is enough that circumstances reasonably show that the carnal act
is being committed or has been committed
>>> It is not necessary that the spouse actually saw the sexual intercourse being committed. It is
enough that he/she surprised them under such circumstances that no other reasonable conclusion
can be inferred but that a carnal act was being performed or has just been committed.
* Article 247 does not provide that the victim is to be killed instantly by the accused after
surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse. What is required is that the killing is the proximate
result of the outrage overwhelming the accused upon the discovery of the infidelity of his spouse.
The killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse.
RULING: The provision of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code applies in the instant case.
There is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case,
in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of
passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married
person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and
(2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements
are present in this case. The trial court in convicting the accused-appellant of murder, therefore
erred. Though quite a length of time had passed between the time the accused-ap- pellant
discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually
shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the
accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them
or both of them . . . immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say
that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the
proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the
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basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind
impulse, and must not have been influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-
product of the accused's rage.
Neither is the accused liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.
Accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one
committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule presupposes that the
act done amounts to a felony which is not so in this case, since it was already ruled that accused
was not committing murder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. This does not mean,
however, that accused is totally free from any responsibility. Granting the fact that, he was not
performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he cannot be said to be entirely
without fault. The warning words he uttered before firing at the deceased is not enough a
precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados. Hence, he is held liable
under the first paragraph of Article 365, that is, less serious physical injuries through simple
imprudence or negligence.
* So if the surprising took place before any actual sexual intercourse could be done because the
parties are only in their preliminaries, the article cannot be invoked anymore.
* IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER: means that the discovery, escape, pursuit and the killing
must all form parts of one continuous act
* The phrase “immediately thereafter” has been interpreted to mean that between the surprising
and the killing of the inflicting of the physical injury, there should be no break of time. In other
words, it must be a continuous process.
* If there was already a break of time between the sexual act and the killing or inflicting of the
injury, the law presupposes that the offender regained his reason and therefore, the article will not
apply anymore.
* The killing must be the direct by-product of the rage of the accused
* A person who acts under Article 247 is not committing a crime. Since this is merely an
exempting circumstance, the accused must first be charged with:
(2) Murder or homicide – depending on how the killing was done insofar as the paramour or
the mistress is concerned;
* If death results or the physical injuries are serious, there is criminal liability although the
penalty is only destierro. The banishment is intended more for the protection of the offender
rather than a penalty.
Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall
kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall by punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1) With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed
men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to
insure or afford impunity;
2) In consideration of a price, reward or promise;
3) By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment of or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, or by
means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great
waste and ruin;
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Note that except for "outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse," all the qualifying
circumstances enumerated in the article to upgrade the killing to murder are found in Article 14,
which defines aggravating circumstances in general. Note further, that not all the 21 aggravating
circumstances under Article 14 will qualify the killing to murder. It is limited only to qualifying
circumstances enumerated under Article 248. So, if what is alleged in the information to qualify
the killing to murder is "nighttime," then the offender cannot be convicted of murder, for the
simple reason that nighttime is not mentioned under Article 248 to qualify the crime to murder
although nighttime is indubitably an aggravating circumstance under Article 14. So, if a situation
of this nature occurs, then the court should just appreciate nighttime as a generic aggravating
circumstance.
*The victim must be killed in order to consummate the offense. Otherwise, it would be attempted
or frustrated murder.
First: Treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, aid or armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;
>>>>There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof that tend directly and especially to
insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.
>>>>This circumstance involves means, methods, form in the execution of the killing which may
actually be an aggravating circumstance also, in which case, the treachery absorbs the same.
Illustration: A person who is determined to kill resorted to the cover of darkness at nighttime to
insure the killing. Nocturnity becomes a means that constitutes treachery and the killing would
be murder. But if the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity is considered by itself, it is not one
of those which qualify a homicide to murder. One might think the killing is homicide unless
nocturnity is considered as constituting treachery, in which case the crime is murder.
The essence of treachery is that the offended party was denied the chance to defend himself
because of the means, methods, form in executing the crime deliberately adopted by the
offender. It is a matter of whether or not the offended party was denied the chance of
defending himself.
Note: One attendant qualifying circumstance is enough. If there are more than one qualifying
circumstance alleged in the information for murder, only one circumstance will qualify the killing
to murder and the other circumstances will be taken as generic.
Generally, murder cannot be committed if at the beginning, the offended had no intent to kill
because the qualifying circumstances must be resorted to with a view of killing the offended
party. So if the killing were at the “spur of the moment”, even though the victim was denied the
chance to defend himself because of the suddenness of the attack, the crime would only be
homicide. Treachery contemplates that the means, methods and form in the execution were
consciously adopted and deliberately resorted to by the offender, and were not merely incidental
to the killing.
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If the offender may have not intended to kill the victim but he only wanted to commit a crime
against him in the beginning, he will still be liable for murder if in the manner of committing the
felony there was treachery and as a consequence thereof the victim died. This is based on the
rule that a person committing a felony shall be liable for the consequences thereof although
different from that which he intended.
Illustration: The accused, three young men, resented the fact that the victim continued to visit a
girl in their neighborhood despite the warning they gave him. So one evening, after the victim
had visited the girl, they seized and tied him to a tree, with both arms and legs around the tree.
They thought they would give him a lesson by whipping him with branches of gumamela until
the victim fell unconscious. The accused left not knowing that the victim died.
The crime committed was murder. The accused deprived the victim of the chance to defend
himself when the latter was tied to a tree. Treachery is a circumstance referring to the manner of
committing the crime. There was no risk to the accused arising from the defense by the victim.
Although what was initially intended was physical injury, the manner adopted by the accused was
treacherous and since the victim died as a consequence thereof, the crime is murder -- although
originally, there was no intent to kill.
When the victim is already dead, intent to kill becomes irrelevant. It is important only if the
victim did not die to determine if the felony is physical injury or attempted or frustrated
homicide.
So long as the means, methods and form in the execution is deliberately adopted, even if there
was no intent to kill, there is treachery.
The only problem insofar as the killing by fire is concerned is whether it would be arson with
homicide, or murder.
When a person is killed by fire, the primordial criminal intent of the offender is considered. If the
primordial criminal intent of the offender is to kill and fire was only used as a means to do so, the
crime is only murder. If the primordial criminal intent of the offender is to destroy property with
the use of pyrotechnics and incidentally, somebody within the premises is killed, the crime is
arson with homicide. But this is not a complex crime under Article 48. This is single indivisible
crime penalized under Article 326, which is death as a consequence of arson. That somebody
died during such fire would not bring about murder because there is no intent to kill in the mind
of the offender. He intended only to destroy property. However, a higher penalty will be applied.
When the qualifying circumstance is the use of fire, what variant crimes may result?
1) To conceal the killing so that the nipa hut where the victims were was burned, 2 separate
crimes are committed: homicide and arson.
2) As a means to kill: murder and even if property were burned — arson is still not
committed. If in the course
thereof, other houses were burned, it is a generic aggravating circumstance.
3) To burn a house but there is somebody inside who was killed, arson aggravated by
homicide.
4) Resorted to as a joke, but death resulted, homicide because the use of fire must be
purposefully resorted to in order to kill.
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* When the actual victim turns out to be different from the intended victim, premeditation is not
aggravating. (People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307)
In the case of U.S. vs. Manalide, 14 Phil. 77, the Supreme Court appreciated the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation even if the offender did not know the victims prior to the
killing. Here, accused claims that he was induced by a Datu Mapuck to go amuck
("hurumentado") and kill two persons he would happen to meet in Cotabato. In consideration
thereof, Datu Mapuck promised to give him a pretty woman if he is able to carry out the order.
Armed with a native bolo known as "kris," accused traveled one day and one night to reach the
town of Cotabato. Upon reaching the place, he saw a Spaniard whose back was turned from him.
Wasting no time, he hacked the Spaniard to death. Immediately thereafter, he saw a Chinaman
whom he also attacked and hacked to death. In both cases, accused admitted not knowing either
of his victims prior to the attack. Neither were they his enemies.
In People vs. Canete, accused assaulted the victim with a knife. In the course of their fight,
accused managed to inflict a serious cut on the thigh of the victim who turned and ran away with
the accused in hot pursuit. After running a short distance, the victim fell on the ground and while
thus lying flat on the ground with his face down, accused caught up with him and delivered a fatal
thrust on his back. The Supreme Court ruled that there is no treachery in the killing of the victim
because the aggression was continuous until the consummation of the offense. Accused was
convicted of simple homicide.
In People vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil. 385, the accused entered the office of the victim who was the
governor of Bataan. Finding the latter unarmed, accused drew his gun and shot the governor who
was hit on the shoulder. The injury being minor, the victim was able to run but was again shot by
the accused. Although wounded, the victim managed to reach the end of the hallway where he hid
himself inside a closet. Accused tried to open the closet but failed to do so.
In the meantime, the victim screamed for help. Accused tried to ascertain from the victim's voice
the latter's position and aimed his gun at the perceived direction of the head. The bullet penetrated
the closet and struck the governor in the forehead causing his death. The Supreme Court held that
at the beginning, the assault was continuous. Had the governor been hit by the second shot, the
crime would have only been homicide. However, after the governor hid himself in the closet,
there was no way for him to see what the accused was doing. Hence, in declaring the presence of
treachery in the killing of the victim on the third shot, the Supreme Court said, "it was as if the
victim had been bound or blindfolded or had been treacherously attacked from behind in a path
obscured by the darkness of the night."
Cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse.
Cruelty includes the situation where the victim is already dead and yet, acts were committed
which would decry or scoff the corpse of the victim. The crime becomes murder.
Hence, this is not actually limited to cruelty. It goes beyond that because even if the victim is
already a corpse when the acts deliberately augmenting the wrong done to him were committed,
the killing is still qualified to murder although the acts done no longer amount to cruelty.
Under Article 14, the generic aggravating circumstance of cruelty requires that the victim be
alive, when the cruel wounds were inflicted and, therefore, must be evidence to that effect. Yet,
in murder, aside from cruelty, any act that would amount to scoffing or decrying the corpse of the
victim will qualify the killing to murder.
Illustration: Two people engaged in a quarrel and they hacked each other, one killing the other.
Up to that point, the crime is homicide. However, if the killer tried to dismember the different
parts of the body of the victim, indicative of an intention to scoff at or decry or humiliate the
141
corpse of the victim, then what would have murder because this circumstance is recognized under
Article 248, even though it was inflicted or was committed when the victim was already dead.
"The act of the accused in having anal intercourse with the woman after killing her is,
undoubtedly an outrage of her corpse. The crime is Murder." (People v. Butler, G.R. No. L-50276,
January 27, 1983)
If the victim was already dead when the acts of mutilation were being performed on him, this
would also qualify the killing to murder due to scoffing or outraging of his corpse.
The following are holdings of the Supreme Court with respect to the crime of murder:
(1) Killing of a child of tender age is murder qualified by treachery because the weakness of
the child due to his tender age results in the absence of any danger to the aggressor.
(5) Where one of the accused, who were charged with murder, was the wife of the deceased
but here relationship to the deceased was not alleged in the information, she also should
be convicted of murder but the relationship should be appreciated as aggravating.
(6) Killing of the victims hit by hand grenade thrown at them is murder qualified by
explosion not by treachery.
(7) Where the accused housemaid gagged a three year old boy, son of her master, with
stockings, placed him in a box with head down and legs upward and covered the box with some
sacks and other boxes, and the child instantly died because of suffocation, and then the accused
demanded ransom from the parents, such did not convert the offense into kidnapping with
murder. The accused was well aware that the child could be suffocated to death in a few minutes
after she left. Ransom was only a part of the diabolical scheme to murder the child, to conceal his
body and then demand money before discovery of the body.
People vs Feliciano et.al., May 5, 2014 – Sigma Rho vs Scintilla Juris – UP-Diliman --- wearing
masks and/or other forms of disguise --- aggravating circumstance ---- Disguise – to remain
anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crime. ----“that the masks fell of does not
prevent them from including disguise as an aggravating circumstance. What is important in
alleging disguise xxxxx is that there was a concealment of identity by the accused ----- treachery,
superior strength and aid of armed men.
Article 249. Homicide. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246,
shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next
preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
Homicide defined. --- It is the killing of a person which is neither parricide, murder or infanticide.
4. That the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, parricide
or infanticide.
In homicide, the offended party must die in order to consummate the crime. If he does not die, the
crime is either attempted or frustrated homicide.
In attempted or frustrated homicide, the offender must have the intent to kill the victim. If there is
no intent to kill on the part of the offender, he is liable only for physical injuries.
Even if there is no intent to kill, if death resulted from the injuries inflicted, the crime is still
homicide. It cannot be physical injuries because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the
law looks upon the result of the act of the offender and holds him responsible for all the
consequences of said acts.
* Intent to kill is conclusively presumed when death resulted. Hence, evidence of intent to kill is
required only in attempted or frustrated homicide
Corpus delicti means body of the crime. It does not refer to the body of the murdered person. In
all crimes against persons in which the death of the victim is an element of the crime, there must
be proof of the fact of death and identity of the victim (Cortez vs. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA
139).
* In all crimes against persons in which the death of the victim is an element, there must be
satisfactory evidence of (1) the fact of death and (2) the identity of the victim
In physical injuries, there is none. However, if as a result of the physical injuries inflicted, the
victim died, the crime will be homicide because the law punishes the result, and not the intent of
the act.
What changes were brought about by R.A. No. 8294 on P.D. No. 1866?
>>>Penalty for mere possession of unlicensed firearm shall be based on whether the firearm is
low-pow- ered or high-powered. High-powered firearms are those with bores bigger than .38 cal.
and 9 mm and those with lesser bores but considered as powerful, such as a .357 cal. and .22
center-fire magnum, and firearms with firing capability of full automatic or by a burst of two or
three.
>>>"Unlicensed firearm" shall include: a) firearms with expired license, or b) unauthorized use
of licensed firearm in the commission of the crime.
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the
elements thereof, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm; and
(b)the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or
permit to possess the same.
143
The latter is a negative fact which constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal
possession, and it is the duty of the prosecution not only to allege it but also to prove it beyond
reasonable doubt. (People vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA) In the case at bench, the testimony of a repre-
sentative of, or a certification from the PNP (FEU) that petitioner was not a licensee of the said
firearm would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second
element of the crime of illegal possession. (People vs. Solayao, September 1996) The absence of
the foregoing is fatal to the prosecution's case and renders petitioner's conviction erroneous.
(Mallari vs. CA, December 1996)
Q: When the gun is a paltik (a home-made gun), will that dispense of the necessity to prove that it
is unlicensed?
Ans: No. Indeed, accused cannot be convicted even of simple illegal possession of firearm
because of lack of evidence that the firearm is unlicensed. The trial court based its deci sion
simply on the fact that the firearm used in this case is a paltik, apparently being of the opinion
that a paltik cannot be licensed. This view was rejected in People vs. Ramos. The court there did
not say that paltiks can in no case be issued a license or permit, and that proof that a firearm is a
paltik dispenses with the proof that it is unlicensed. (People vs. Evangelista, May 1996)
What important amendment did R.A. No. 8294 introduce on Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866?
Under the old second paragraph of Section l of P.D. No. 1866, if the killing of a person is
committed with the use of the unlicensed firearm, the accused can be prosecuted for, and
convicted of: (1) illegal possession of firearm in the aggravated form, and (2) either murder or
homicide. But pursuant to the amendment of R.A. No. 8294, the use of an unlicensed firearm in
the commission of murder or homicide is treated as an aggravating circumstance. Therefore, the
illegal possession or use of the unlicensed firearm is no longer separately punished. In short,
only one offense should be punished, viz., either homicide or murder, and the use of the
unlicensed firearm should only be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Being a favorable
statute, this provision may be given retroactive application. Considering that accused in fact was
convicted for parricide, it follows that he should be acquitted in the case for illegal possession of
firearm. (People vs. Nepomuceno, June 1999)
P.D. No. 1866, which codified the laws on illegal possession of firearms, was amended on June 6,
1997 by Republic Act 8294. Aside from lowering the penalty for said crime, R.A. No. 8294 also
provided that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use
shall be considered as a special aggravating circumstance. This amendment has two
implications:/?^, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of homicide or murder shall
not be treated as a separate offense, but merely as a special aggravating circumstance; second, as
only a single crime (homicide or murder with the aggravating circumstance of illegal possession
of firearm) is committed under the law, only one penalty shall be imposed on the accused.
(People vs. Castillo, February 2000)
The crime was committed before July 6, 1997, when Republic Act No. 8294 took effect. This law
is advantageous to the accused as it spares him from a separate conviction for the crime of illegal
possession of firearm. Hence, said law should be applied retroactively. (People vs. Lazaro,
October 1999)
All pending cases involving illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted and
tried if no other crime expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 is involved (murder or
homicide under Section 1; and rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat under
Section 3). (People vs. Lazaro, October 1999)
Q: How should homicide committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm be denominated?
A: The crime should be denominated homicide, aggravated by illegal possession of firearm, and
not illegal possession of firearm, aggravated by homicide as ruled by the trial court as it is the
former offense which aggravates the crime of homicide under the amendatory law. (People vs.
Castillo, February 2000)
Q: When unlicensed firearm was used in the killing, how many offenses must be filed?
144
A: Only one. The violation of P.D. No. 1866 should have been punished separately under the
ruling in People vs. Quijada. Nevertheless, fortunately for Bergante, P.D. No. 1866 was recently
amended by R.A. No. 8294. The third paragraph of Section 1 of said Act provides that "if homi-
cide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance." In short, only one offense shall be
punished, viz., either homicide or murder, and the use of the unlicensed firearm should only be
considered as an aggravating circumstance. Being favorable to Bergante, this provision may be
given retroactive effect pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, he not being a habitual
criminal.
The unvarying rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only
actual possession, but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control
and management. (Gonzales vs. CA, August 1997)
What are the kinds of possession punished by P.D. No. 1866? Is ownership a requisite for
conviction for illegal possession of firearm?
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, which was passed to curb criminality affecting public order and
safety punishes, inter alia, both actual physical possession and constructive possession of
firearms, ammunition, and explosives without authority or license therefor. Ownership is thus not
an essential element.
In the case of constructive possession, it refers to the subjection of the articles in question to one's
control and management. Once the prosecution evidence indubitably points to possession without
the requisite authority or license, coupled with animus possidendi or intent to possess on the part
of the accused, conviction for violation of the said law must follow. (Id.)
(Important: Under the new law, illegal possession of firearm and murder or homicide
cannot be prosecuted separately. The use of the unlicensed firearm is now only an ag-
gravating circumstance in the prosecution of the homicide or murder.)
(Note: In R.A. No. 8294 when the crime committed through the use of an unlicensed
firearm is rebellion, insurrection, sedition or coup, such use is absorbed as an element of
these crimes.)
Q: Can an accused be convicted even if the firearm was not presented in evidence in Court?
SC: Yes. The straightforward and positive testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses on the
accused’ firearm and the circumstances surrounding it amply established the corpus delicti
(Escalante vs People, January 9, 2013)
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10591 --- AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE LAW
ON FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS THEREOF (2012)
possession of an individual other than the licensee and those with revoked licenses in accordance
with the rules and regulations.
THe new provision for the use of a loose firearm in the commission of the crime:
“SEC. 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the Commission of a Crime. – The use of a loose firearm,
when inherent in the commission of a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code or
other special laws, shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance: Provided, That if the
crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum
penalty which is lower than that prescribed in the preceding section for illegal possession of
firearm, the penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall be imposed in lieu of the penalty
for the crime charged: Provided, further, That if the crime committed with the use of a loose
firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty which is equal to that imposed
under the preceding section for illegal possession of firearms, the penalty of prision mayor in
its minimum period shall be imposed in addition to the penalty for the crime punishable
under the Revised Penal Code or other special laws of which he/she is found guilty.
If the violation of this Act is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with
the crime of rebellion of insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat, such violation shall be
absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat.
If the crime is committed by the person without using the loose firearm, the
violation of this Act shall be considered as a distinct and separate offense.”
Section 1. Sec. 1 Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as
follows:cralaw
"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000) shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes
those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as
caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber
.357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full
automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed
by the person arrested.
"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
"If the violation of this Sec. is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an
element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat.
"The same penalty shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other
responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity, who shall
willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or
entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the
preceding paragraphs or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unlicensed firearms or
firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their
employment.
Article 250. Penalty for frustrated parricide, murder, or homicide. — The courts, in view of the facts
of the case, may impose upon the person guilty of the frustrated crime of parricide, murder
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or homicide, defined and penalized in the preceding articles, a penalty lower by one degree
than that which should be imposed under the provisions of Article 50.
The courts, considering the facts of the case, may likewise reduce by one degree the
penalty which under Article 51 should be imposed for an attempt to commit any of such
crimes.
Article 251 . Death caused in a tumultuous affray.—When, while several persons, not composing
groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in
the course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed
the deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be
identified, such person or persons shall be punished by prision mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the deceased, the
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all
those who shall have used violence upon the person of the victim.
Tumultuous affray means confused and confusing fight between several persons not composing
groups in the course of which a person is killed or wounded and the person responsible cannot be
ascertained. It is a confrontation of several protagonists. “Several” means more than 3 persons.
Tumultuous affray is a legal concept which means that the assault was attended by at least four
Example: There was a rumble or a free for all fight. After the smoke of battle had cleared, X was
seen sprawled on the ground lifeless. It cannot be ascertained who killed him. But a witness
identified Y as the person who inflicted serious physical injuries upon X. Y is liable for Death
caused in a tumultuous affray.
>>if it can be ascertained who actually killed the deceased, then out na ang Art. 251 – it becomes Art. 249.
>>the offense defined here presents a situation where there is a commotion – tumult – confusion – it would be
impossible to identify who is the killer if somebody died. But the person or persons who used violence can be
identified – liable ka.
What if somebody died in a fight – but he is not a participant – Will Art. 251 apply? ANS: Yes – the law says
“ someone is killed”.
Who are liable? (a) the person or persons who inflicted the serious physical injuries are liable (par. 1); (b) If it
is not known who inflicted serious physical injuries on the deceased, all the persons who used violence upon
the person of the victim are liable, but with lesser liability (par. 2)
When there are two identified groups of men who assault each other, then there is no
tumultuous affray. The person killed in the affray need not be one of the participants.
If the participant in the affray who inflicted the serious physical injuries is identified, he
alone is liable for the death caused in a tumultuous affray.
Problem: During a fiesta celebration, a free for all fight erupted at the middle of the public plaza.
After the smoke of battle had cleared X was found dead. The person who killed him cannot be
ascertained. Two witnesses however, pointed to A and B as the persons who stabbed X. It cannot
be ascertained though who between A and B inflicted the fatal blow that caused the death of X. A
and B should be charged with Homicide not Death caused in a tumultuous affray because the
identities of the killers are known.
Article 252. Physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray. — When in a tumultuous affray as
referred to in the preceding article, only serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
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participants thereof and the person responsible therefor cannot be identified, all those who
appear to have used violence upon the person of the offended party shall suffer the penalty
next lower in degree than that provided for the physical injuries so inflicted.
When the physical injuries inflicted are of a less serious nature and the person responsible
therefor cannot be identified, all those who appear to have used any violence upon the
person of the offended party shall be punished by arresto menor from five to fifteen days.
Whereas in Article 251, death is caused in a tumultuous affray, in the above article, only serious
physical injuries is inflicted. In this case, the offender cannot be identified or is unknown. The
law provides an alternative solution to the problem — the authorities may determine the identity
of those who employed violence on the person of the victim. Once these persons are identified
and convicted, they shall suffer the penalty one degree lower to that prescribed for the crime of
serious physical injuries.
Unlike in Article 251, where the victim need not be one of the participants, the injured party in
the crime of physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray must be one or some of those
involved in the quarrel.
Note that if slight physical injuries is inflicted in a tumultuous affray and the identity of the
offender is established, the provisions of this article will not be observed. Instead, the offender
shall be prosecuted in the ordinary course of law. This must be the correct view as it appears that
only serious and less serious physical injuries committed or inflicted in a tumultuous affray are
covered in this article.
Article 253. Giving assistance to suicide. — Any person who shall assist another to commit
suicide shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor, if such person lends his assistance to another
to the extent of doing the killing himself, he shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal.
However, if the suicide is not consummated, the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed.
BQ 2009: Mark and Leslie are sweethearts. Their parents are opposed to their relationship
because they are first cousins. To prove to their parents how much they love each other, Mark and
Leslie decided to commit suicide. Pursuant to the suicide pact they agreed to shoot each other's
head with a gun, which they did simultaneously. Leslie died but Mark survived. What crime did
Mark commit?
Ans: Mark committed the crime of Giving assistance to suicide. Leslie was determined to commit
suicide and Mark cooperated in the execution thereof.
Note: The law punishes assistance to suicide but does not punish the person who attempts at
suicide. There is no law punishing the person committing suicide.
Committing suicide is not a crime. One who attempts to commit suicide but who is discovered
together with all the means necessary for its commission, is not criminally liable. And the
reason for this is simple. The law does not provide a penalty for committing suicide.
This article should be reconciled with the provision of Article 4. As earlier discussed, one incurs
criminal liability for the result, even if not intended, as long as what is committed is a felony. So
if a pregnant woman takes poison to kill herself but does not die due to timely medical
attendance, but in the meantime suffers an abortion because of the poison she took, she incurs no
criminal liability for the attempt on her own life. In the same way, she incurs no criminal liability
for abortion since the same did not result from a felony.
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Q: What is Euthanasia?
A: The term "euthanasia" means mercy killing. It is the practice of putting to death with the use
of pain reliever a person who is suffering from incurable disease. In this case, the person
responsible for the "mercy killing" may believe that he is doing the patient a favor or that he is
rendering a humanitarian service but in the eyes of the law, such person is liable for murder under
Article 148 of this Code since in euthanasia, the victim does not wish to die.
The doctor who resorts to mercy killing is not liable under Art. 253 but liable for murder.
Problem: Amir is a jilted lover. He cannot accept his fate in the cruel hands of love. To him
losing someone he loves in favor of another man is intolerably painful. He decided to end his life.
He went atop a school building and jumped to his death. Amir fell on Romeo, a law student who
was walking towards the law library. Romeo died but Amir survived. Is Amir liable for the death
of Romeo? Why? Explain.
Ans: There are two schools of thought. The first school of thought says that Amir is not criminally
liable for the death of Redentor. When Amir jumped from atop the building, he was not committing
a felony. Under the law, a person committing a felony (delito) is criminally liable although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended, (par. 1, Art. 4, RPC) When Amir
jumped from the building he was not committing a felony. Suicide is not a felony under the
Revised Penal Code.
The second school of thought opines that Amir is liable for the death of the victim. Amir
lacked foresight. Considering that he was committing suicide he should have thought of doing it
in a place where no one will be injured or affected. He omitted that degree of care and cautions to
prevent harm or injury to another person. He is liable therefore for Reckless Imprudence resulting in
homicide.
Note: It is submitted that the first school of thought is more plausible. The second school thought
demands too much from the person committing suicide. Precisely, he is committing suicide
because he is no longer in his proper senses. He cannot be expected to anticipate that others may
be injured by his act of ending his life.
Article 254. Discharge of firearms. — Any person who shall shoot at another with any firearm
shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, unless the
facts of the case are such that the act can be held to constitute frustrated or attempted
parricide, murder, homicide, or any other crime for which a higher penalty is prescribed
by any of the articles of this Code.
In the discharge of firearm under this article, the intention of the offender is only to frighten or
intimidate the offended party. There must be absolutely no intention on the part of the offender to
kill the offended party. Absence of such intent can be shown or demonstrated from the range or
distance at which the gun is fired, as when the gun has only a 100 meter firing range and the
offender fired it at a distance of 200 meters.
Q: When is Firing of a Gun Illegal Discharge of Firearm, Attempted Homicide or Alarm and
Scandal?
Ans: Firing of a gun is Illegal discharge of firearm if a person fires his gun at another without
intent to kill. It is attempted homicide if a person fires his gun at another person with intent to kill
but does not inflict a mortal or serious wound. It is alarm and scandal if a person fires his gun in a
public place causing alarm or danger. (Art. 155)
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The gun used in this crime must be licensed, or the person using the firearm must be authorized to
carry the same, otherwise, in addition to the crime punished under this article, accused may also
be held liable for illegal possession of firearm.
Q: What if, you discharge the firearm towards the house of the victim. Is Art. 254 committed?
A: NO, because it was not directed to the person of the victim himself. “shall shoot another” –
>>>the law requires that the discharge must be directed towards the victim – hence, this crime
cannot be committed thru imprudence because it requires that the discharge must be directed at
another.
What if the discharge is not directed towards a person ---the crime is “Alarm and Scandal” under
Art. 155 par. 1.
Article 255. Infanticide. — The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for murder
in Article 248 shall be imposed upon any person who shall kill any child less than three days
of age.
If the crime penalized in this Article be committed by the mother of the child for the
purpose of concealing her dishonor, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium
and maximum periods, and if said crime be committed for the same purpose by the
maternal grandparents or either of them, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal. (As
amended by RA. No. 7659.)
ELEMENTS:
2. That the deceased child was less than three days (72 hours) of age.
This crime is based on the age of the child. The child should be less than 3 days old. If the child is
exactly 3 days old, the crime is Murder with the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
treachery. The child is not in a position to defend himself.
* When the offender is the father, mother or legitimate ascendant, he shall suffer the penalty
prescribed for parricide. If the offender is any other person, the penalty is that for murder. In
either case, the proper qualification for the offense is infanticide
* Even if the killer is the mother or the father or the legitimate grandparents, the crime is still
Infanticide and not Parricide. The penalty however, is that for Parricide.
* If the offender in the crime of infanticide is the child's mother and the killing was done by her
in order to conceal her dishonor, the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum
periods and not the penalty for parricide, shall be imposed on her. The law extends the same
privilege of exempting the offender from the penalty for parricide to the maternal grandparents
or either of them, except that the penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed instead of
prision mayor.
(1) In Parricide, the age of the child should be 3 days and above. In Infanticide, the age of the
child is less than 3 days;
(2) Parricide can be committed if the victim and the offender are related by blood. In
Infanticide, the offender may or may not be related to the child;
* Concealment of dishonor is not an element of infanticide. It merely lowers the penalty. If the
child is abandoned without any intent to kill and death results as a consequence, the crime
committed is not infanticide but abandonment under Article 276.
* If the purpose of the mother is to conceal her dishonor, infanticide through imprudence is not
committed because the purpose of concealing the dishonor is incompatible with the absence of
malice in culpable felonies.
* There is no infanticide when the child was born dead, or although born alive it could not sustain
an independent life when it was killed
>> When infanticide is committed by the mother or maternal grandmother in order to conceal the
dishonor, such fact is only mitigating.
>>The delinquent mother who claims that she committed the offense to conceal the dishonor
must be of good reputation. Hence, if she is a prostitute, she is not entitled to a lesser penalty
because she has no honor to conceal.
Article 256. Intentional abortion.—Any person who shall intentionally cause an abortion shall
suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion temporal, if he shall use any violence upon the person of
the pregnant woman.
2. The penalty of prision mayor, if, without using violence, he shall act without the
consent of the woman.
The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the woman
shall have consented.
ELEMENTS:
2. That violence is exerted, or drugs or beverages administered, or that the accused otherwise
acts upon such pregnant woman.
3. That as a result of the use of violence or drugs or beverages upon her, or any other act of the
accused, the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom.
Abortion as the willful killing of the fetus in the uterus or the violent expulsion of the fetus from
the maternal womb, which results in the death of the fetus.
Abortion – the child is incapable of sustaining an independent life outside of the maternal womb
Infanticide – the child is already capable – the fetus can sustain an independent life after its
separation from the maternal womb.
> Abortion is not a crime against the woman but against the fetus. If mother as a consequence of
abortion suffers death or physical injuries, you have a complex crime of murder or physical
injuries and abortion.
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> In intentional abortion, the offender must know of the pregnancy because the particular
criminal intention is to cause an abortion. Therefore, the offender must have known of the
pregnancy for otherwise, he would not try an abortion.
> If the woman turns out not to be pregnant and someone performs an abortion upon her, he is
liable for an impossible crime if the woman suffers no physical injury. If she does, the crime will
be homicide, serious physical injuries, etc.
> Under Article 40 of the Civil Code, birth determines personality. A person is considered born
at the time when the umbilical cord is cut. He then acquires a personality separate from the
mother.
> But even though the umbilical cord has been cut, Article 41 of the Civil Code provides that if
the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it must survive at least 24 hours after
the umbilical cord is cut for it to be considered born.
Article 257. Unintentional abortion. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods shall be imposed upon any person who shall cause an abortion by
violence, but unintentionally.
Note: Violence was intentionally exerted to the pregnant woman which unintentionally results to
abortion. –the violence must be physical & must be deliberate and voluntary. Mere intimidation is
not enough unless the degree of intimidation already approximates violence.
* While there is no intention on the part of the accused to cause an abortion, nonetheless, the
violence that he employs on the pregnant woman must be intentional. In other words, only the
abortion is unintended.
>>in fact this crime may be committed through negligence – it is enough that the use of violence
is voluntary.
Article 258. Abortion practiced by the woman herself or by her parents. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a woman who shall
practice an abortion upon herself or shall consent that any other person should do so.
Any woman who shall commit this offense to conceal her dishonor shall suffer the penalty of
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
ELEMENTS
b. any other person, with her consent, or any of her parents, with her consent for the
purpose of concealing her dishonor
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Notes: If the abortion is resorted to by the pregnant woman to conceal her dishonor, the penalty
is lower.
If the abortion is caused by the woman's parents or either of them for the purpose of
concealing the girl's dishonor, the penalty to be imposed on the parents will be the same as if the
abortion was done by any other person.
Article 259. Abortion practiced by a physician or midwife and dispensing of abortives. — The
penalties provided in Article 256 shall be imposed in their maximum period, respectively,
upon any physician or midwife who, taking advantage of their scientific knowledge or skill,
shall cause an abortion or assist in causing the same.
Any pharmacist who, without the proper prescription from a physician, shall
dispense any abortive shall suffer arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000). (As amended by RA 10951)
ELEMENTS:
3. That the offender, who must be a physician or midwife, causes or assists in causing the
abortion.
4. That said physician or midwife takes advantage of his or her scientific knowledge or skill.
Notes:
* It is not necessary that the pharmacist knew that the abortive would be used to cause abortion.
What is punished is the act of dispensing an abortive without the proper prescription . It is not
necessary that the abortive be actually used
* If the pharmacist knew that the abortive would be used to cause abortion and abortion results,
he is liable as an accomplice
* If the abortion is produced by a physician to save the life of the mother, there is no liability.
This is known as a therapeutic abortion. But abortion without medical necessity to warrant it is
punishable even with the consent of the woman or her husband.
Problem: A woman who is pregnant got sick. The doctor administered a medicine which resulted
in Abortion. The crime committed was unintentional abortion through negligence or imprudence.
Ans: What is the liability of a physician who aborts the fetus to save the life of the mother?
None. This is a case of therapeutic abortion which is done out of a state of necessity.
Therefore, the requisites under Article 11, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code must be
present. There must be no other practical or less harmful means of saving the life of the mother
to make the killing justified.
In any other case, the combatants shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor, although no
physical injuries have been inflicted.
Article 261. Challenging to a duel. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon any person who shall challenge another, or incite another to
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give or accept a challenge to a duel, or shall scoff at or decry another publicly for having
refused to accept a challenge to fight a duel.
Article 262. Mutilation. — The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall intentionally mutilate another by depriving him, either
totally or partially, of some essential organ for reproduction.
Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium and
maximum periods.
The term mutilation means the lopping or clipping off of some parts of the body (U.S. vs.
Bogel, 7 Phil. 285).
a) The first kind is by intentionally mutilating another by depriving him, either totally or
partially of some essential organ of reproduction.
b) The second kind is by intentionally making other mutilations, that is, by lopping or clip-
ping off any part of the body other than the essential organ for reproduction, thus
depriving the offended party of such part of his body.
>>In order to commit the crime of mutilation, the offender must have the intention either to
deprive the offended party of some organ necessary for generation, such as the penis or ovary; or
to dismember the offended party.
>>When the loss of an organ for reproduction is not intended, or if the dismembering of the
offended party was unintentional, the crime if mutilation is not committed. The offender will only
be liable for serious physical injuries
* The intent to deliberately cut off the particular part of the body that was removed from the
offended party must be established. If there is no intent to deprive victim of particular part of
body, the crime is only serious physical injury.
* The common mistake is to associate this with the reproductive organs only. Mutilation includes
any part of the human body that is not susceptible to grow again.
* If what was cut off was a reproductive organ, the penalty is much higher than that for homicide.
* In the first kind of mutilation, the castration must be made purposely. Otherwise, it will be
considered as mutilation of the second kind
Article 263. Serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault
another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the
injured person shall be- some insane, imbecile, impotent or blind;
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if in
consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have lost the use of
speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm, or
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a leg, or shall have lost the use of any such member, or shall have become incapacitated for
the work in which he was theretofor habitually engaged;
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if in
consequence of the physical inju- ies inflicted, the person injured shall have become
deformed, or shall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have lost he use thereof, or
shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in which he was
habitually engaged Dr a period of more than ninety days;
4. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period o prision correccional in its
minimum period, if the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness or incapacity
for labor of the injured person for more than thirty days.
If the offense shall have been committed against any of the persons enumerated in
Article 246, or with attendance of any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248, the
case covered by subdivision number 1 of this article shall be pun- shed by reclusion temporal
in its medium and maximum periods; the case covered by subdivision number 2 by prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period; the case
covered by subdivision number 3 by prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods; and the case covered by subdivision number 4 by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to a parent who
shall inflict physical injuries upon his child by excessive chastisement.
>>this assumes that the wounding, beating or assaulting must be without intent to kill.
What is the penalty for SPI? – it depends on the seriousness of the injury.
Par. 1-P.Mayor
Par.2 –PC medium & maximum
Par. 3 –PC min & medium
Par. 4 – Arrestor Mayor Maximum to PC minimum
Q: But what if you inflicted physical injuries to a person without intent to kill or wounding but
the victim dies?
A: The crime is converted into homicide. Why homicide when I do’nt have intent to kill? ---- the
principle is “once the victim dies, intent to kill is presumed --- although the penalty shall be
mitigated.
The article under consideration does not deal with a crime. It refers to a means of committing
serious physical injuries. The offender must have no intention to kill the victim because if he has
such intention, the crime may be considered as frustrated murder.
>>>>to “administer” an injurious substance or beverage within the meaning of Art. 264---- means
to direct or cause said substance or beverage to be taken orally by the injured persons who suffers
SPI as a result.
>>what if the injuries results to serious --- then art. 264 does not apply.
Note: there must be no intent to kill otherwise, it will become frustrated murder.
Article 265. Less serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall inflict upon another
physical injuries not described in the preceding articles, but which shall incapacitate the of-
fended party for labor for ten days or more, or shall require medical attendance for the
same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of
arrests mayor.
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Whenever less serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted with the manifest intent to
insult or offend the injured person, or under circumstances adding ignominy to the offense,
in addition to the penalty of arresto mayor a fine not exceeding Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000) shall be imposed. (As amended by RA 10951)
Any less serious physical injuries inflicted upon the offender's parents, ascendants,
guardians, curators, teachers, or persons of rank, or persons in authority, shall be punished
by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, provided that, in the case of
persons in authority, the deed does not constitute the crime of assault upon such persons.
“shall require medical attendance” – the number of days that the victim is under actual medical
attendance.
But for example the victim does not want to go to the hospital but he was incapacitated or cannot
work for 11 days? What crime is committed? Ans: Still less serious physical injuries because the
law says “shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for 10 days or more”.
Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. — The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical at -
tendance during the same period;
2. By arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000) and
censure when the offender has caused physical injuries which do not prevent the offended
party from engaging in his habitual work nor require medical attendance;
3. By arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000) when the offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing any injury.
1. Physical injuries which incapacitate the offended party from labor from one (1) day to
nine (9) days; or which require medical attendance for the duration of the same period;
2. Physical injuries which do not prevent the victim from engaging in his habitual work or
which do not require medical attendance;
3. Ill-treatment of another by deed without causing any injury
The crime of maltreatment is a form of slight physical injuries. While the term is included in
identifying the forms of slight physical injuries, the law, however, failed to define what it is all
about. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, it must be another form of ill-treatment. A good
example of maltreatment would be the slapping of the victim's face which does not produce any
injury.
The crime of physical injuries is a crime of consequence. The degree of punishment to be
imposed on the offender is based on the extent of the injuries inflicted. While technically it is a
material crime since it is divided in three categories (namely serious, less serious and slight),
nonetheless, upon reaching such stage, it cannot be further divided as to constitute it as attempted
or frustrated physical injuries. In a sense, it is called a formal crime because it does not admit of
stages in its commission.
Par. 3 --- slapping of the face of the victim without causing dishonor otherwise it shall become
slander by deed.
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>>>>slander by deed is committed when a person publicly subjects another to an act intended or
calculated to cast dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon the victim.
>>>>absent this – that will come within par. 3 of Art. 266.
Medical attendance
A wounded the arm of B which would have held for 8 days, B did not see a doctor and he
continued working. So, there was no incapacity and there also no day of medical attendance. On
the 9th day, mao gihapon. What crime was committed up to that point –----meaning on the 9 th day?
Ans: It is slight PI. But under what paragraph? --- Paragraph 2 and not paragraph 1 because
paragraph 1 requires incapacity or medical attendance for a period of 1-9 days.
30 days have passed, still B continued working & was never incapacitated. He did not got
o the doctor or hospital. However, the wound was not healed.
A & B are sons of X. X was furious because A & B did not return home. They attended a fluvial
parade of the Our Lady of Peñafrancia. Y, their mother fetched them and persuaded them to
return home as the latter hesitated as tehyy are afraid of the father. When A and B finally returned
home, X confronted them. X beat them with a stick of wood which was later broken. X brought
them outside the house and tied their hands and feet to a coconut tree and beat them. A sustained
injuries while B lost consciousness. X stopped the beating after henoticed that B slipped from the
coconut tree. Y, attempted to revive B to no avai., B died. Y noted that there is crack on B’s head
and injuries on his leg. On the following day, X surrendered himself to the police. X was charged
for parricide for B’s death and physical injuries for A. Convicted. On appeal, X argued he has no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that which was committed as he m erely intended to
discipline B and not to kill him.
SC: In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to
commit, it is indispensible (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved
person be the direct consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator. Here, there is no doubt
appellant in beating his son Noemar and inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a
direct consequence of the beating suffered by the child, he expired. Appellant’s criminal liability for the
death of his son, Noemar, is thus clear.
“The imposition of parental discipline on children of tender years must always be with the view
of correcting their erroneous behavior. A parent or guardian must exercise restraint and caution
in administering the proper punishment. They must not exceed the parameters of their parental
duty to discipline their minor children. It is incumbent upon them to remain rational and refrain
from being motivated by anger in enforcing the intended punishment. A deviation will
undoubtedly result in sadism.”
SECTION 1. Short Title. — This Act shall be known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997."
SEC. 2. Rape as a Crime Against Persons. — The crime of rape shall hereafter be classified as a
Crime Against Persons under Title Eight of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as the
Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, there shall be incorporated into Title Eight of the same Code a
new chapter to be known as Chapter Three on Rape, to read as follows:
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Article 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities or
any law enforcement or penal institution;
3. When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the
children or other relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity;
4. When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious vocation or
calling and is personally known to be such by the offender before or at the time of the
commission the crime;
5. When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;
6. When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Human Immuno-deficiency
Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune-deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other sexually
transmissible disease and the virus or disease is transmitted to the victim;
7. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or para-
military units thereof or e Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency penal
institution, when the offender took advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of
the crime;
8. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the 3tim has suffered permanent
physical mutilation or disability;
9. When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at the time of the
commission of the crime; and
10. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or
physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.
Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article will be punished by prision
mayor.
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Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be prision mayor to reclusion temporal.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be reclusion tempo-
When the rape is attempted and a homicide is commit- by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide committed, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua.
Reclusion temporal shall also be imposed if the rape is committed with any of the ten
aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in this article.
Article 266-C. Effect of pardon. — The subsequent valid marriage between the offender and
the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the
wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That
the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void
ab initio.
Article 266-D. Presumptions. — Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against the
act of rape in any degree from the offended party, or where the offended party is so situated
as to render her/him incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the
prosecution of the acts punished under Article 266-A.
Under Republic Act No. 8353, the crime of rape has been classified as a crime against person.
Accordingly, the amendment is now incorporated into Title Eight, which refers to crimes against
persons and which is now identified as Article 266-A. As amended, rape can now be committed
not only by a man having carnal knowledge of a woman by having sexual intercourse with her. It
can also be committed by means of sexual assault, as by inserting the penis into the victim's
mouth or anal orifice; or by inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of
the victim.
Because of this amendment which reclassified rape as a crime against person instead of a crime
against chastity, an impossible crime may now be committed in the case of rape; that is, if there is
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
c. less than 18 yrs old and there is relationship (e.g. parent etc); mandatory death
Classification of rape
1) Traditional concept under Article 335 – carnal knowledge with a woman against her will.
The offended party is always a woman and the offender is always a man.
2) Sexual assault - committed with an instrument or an object or use of the penis with
penetration of mouth or anal orifice. The offended party or the offender can either be
man or woman, that is, if a woman or a man uses an instrument on anal orifice of male,
she or he can be liable for rape.
In People vs Pareja – January 15, 2014 – there are 2 kinds of rape: (1) Organ Rape/Penile Rape
and (2) Instrument or Object Rape or Gender-Free Rape.
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Since rape is not a private crime anymore, it can be prosecuted even if the woman does not file a
complaint.
Rape is not just a simple physical violence –it debases a woman’s dignity, leaving a stigma on her
honor and scarring her psyche for life.
>>>>the crime of Rape under the first paragraph can only be committed by a man against a
woman
>>>>>>>>”carnal knowledge” – sexual intercourse.
“through force, threat or intimidation” – what kind of force? Force employed against the victim
need not be of such character as could not be resisted. It is enough that the force used is sufficient
to consummate the offender’s purpose of copulating with the victim.
“force/violence” – it is a relative term because it depends on the age, size, strength of the parties
and their relation to each other.
How about intimidation? --- Intimidation is addressed to the mind of the victim --- subjective.
There is no hard & fast rule in determining the degree of intimidation --- because it all depends
on the how the victim perceived the intimidation at the time the crime was committed. ---
peoples’ reaction vary depending on the situation --- People vs Oan, 259 SCRA 90 and PP vs
Edelino, 271 SCRA 189.
Q: Is it necessary that in the commission of the crime of rape, there should be violence?
A: NO. Force or violence is not necessary because intimidation is sufficient. --- this exists when
the victim was cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile.
>>>the force required in Rape need not be overpowering or irresistible when applied --- relative.
Just because the victim did not shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make the victim’s
submission voluntary.
>>>then what kind of force is necessary? --- What is necessary is that the force employed in
accomplishing it is sufficient to consummate the purpose which the offender has in his mind.
BECAUSE proof of injuries is not necessary --- not being an element of the crime.
In rape committed by a father against his own child, the father’s moral ascendancy and influence
substitute for violence & intimidation.
>>>>Even if the man puts no hand on a woman, yet if, by the use of mental & moral coercion the
accused so overpowers her mind out of fear that as a result she does not resist the dastardly act
--- the crime is committed.
Note: In order to consummate the crime of rape, it is not necessary that there is full penetration of
the female organ by the male organ. Penetration, no matter how slight, even if there is no
ejaculation, consummates the crime of rape.
In fact, the presence or absence of semen is immaterial, since it is penetration, however, slight
and nit ejaculation that makes the crime of rape.
>>>>mere penetration on the female labia consummates the crime of rape.
What happens if there is an attempt to penetrate but there was no penetration at all? What crime is
committed? --- rape in the attempted stage
PP vs Hangdaan, 201 SCRA 568 --- accused with a very big penis tried to enter into the vagina of
the woman SC: mere entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen
or laceration of the vagina, constitutes consummated rape.
PP vs Salinas, 232 SCRA 774 SC: “there are no half-measures or even quarter measures, nor is
there gravity graduated by the inches of entry. Partial penile penetration is as serious as full penile
penetration --- consummated rape.
Said the SC: “In the manner of speaking, bombardment of the drawbridge is invasion enough,
even if the troops do not succeed in entering the castle”.
Penile penetration assumes that there is erection. If there is no erection, rape is not consummated
but attempted.
“when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious” ---meaning the woman
has no will..
>>>example: insane woman/feebleminded woman
In PP vs Lintag, 126 SCRA 511 --- the woman was under the influence of anesthesia --- it is on
this condition that she was attacked. The woman admitted that she knew what was happening and
that she was conscious --- the defense contended that there was no rape, she consented it. SC: If
the woman’s will is affected by the anaesthetic that the connection is without her consent, though
she be more or less conscious, it is rape --- PP vs Isip, Jr. 188 SCRA 648
When the offended party is under 12 years old or is demented – STATUTORY RAPE
Elements: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman (2) that such act is committed
when the victim is under 12 years of age.
Pp vs Romeo Jalosjos, G.R. No. 132875-76, November 16, 2001 thru: Justice Ynares-Santiago
SC: “This Court has declared that the state policy on the heinous offense of rape is clear and
unmistakable. Under certain circumstances, some of them present in this case, the offender may
be sentenced to a long period of confinement, or he may suffer death. The crime is an assault on
human dignity. No legal system worthy of the name can afford to ignore the traumatic
consequences for the unfortunate victim and grievous injury to the peace and good order of the
community.”
Rape is particularly odious, one which figuratively scrapes the bottom of the barrel of moral
depravity, when committed against a minor.
In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved,
the testimony of the complainant is always scrutinized with extreme caution.
In the present case, there are certain particulars which impelled the court to devote an even more
painstaking and meticulous examination of the facts on record and a similarly conscientious
evaluation of the arguments of the parties. The victim of rape in this case is a minor below
twelve (12) years of age. As narrated by her, the details of the rape are mesmerically sordid and
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repulsive. The victim was peddled for commercial sex by her own guardian whom she treated as
a foster father. Because the complainant was a willing victim, the acts of rape were preceded by
several acts of lasciviousness on distinctly separate occasions.
The accused is also a most unlikely rapist. He is a member of Congress. Inspite of his having
been charged and convicted by the trial court for statutory rape, his constituents liked him so
much that they knowingly re-elected him to his congressional office, the duties of which he could
not perform.
Statutory rape committed by a distinguished Congressman on an eleven (11) year old commercial
sex worker is bound to attract widespread media and public attention. In the words of accused-
appellant, “he has been demonized in the press most unfairly, his image transmogrified into that
of a dastardly, ogre, out to get his slimy hands on innocent and naïve girls to satiate his lustful
desires.” This Court, therefore, punctiliously considered accused-appellant’s claim that he
suffered “invidiously discriminatory treatment.”
Held: In statutory rape, mere sexual congress with a woman below twelve years of age
consummates the crime of statutory rape regardless of her consent to the act or lack of it. The
law presumes that a woman of tender age does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving
intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, it was held that carnal knowledge of a child below
twelve years old even if she is engaged in prostitution is still considered statutory rape. The
application of force and intimidation or the deprivation of reason of the victim becomes
irrelevant. The absence of struggle or outcry of the victim or even her passive submission to the
sexual act will not mitigate nor absolve the accused from liability.
Where the victim is over 12 years old, it must be shown that the carnal knowledge with her was
obtained against her will. It is necessary that there be evidence of some resistance put up by the
offended woman. It is not, however, necessary that the offended party should exert all her efforts
to prevent the carnal intercourse. It is enough that from her resistance, it would appear that the
carnal intercourse is against her will.
Mere initial resistance, which does not indicate refusal on the part of the offended party to the
sexual intercourse, will not be enough to bring about the crime of rape.
Note that it has been held that in the crime of rape, conviction does not require medico-legal
finding of any penetration on the part of the woman. A medico-legal certificate is not necessary
or indispensable to convict the accused of the crime of rape.
People vs. Primo Campuhan (G.R. No. 129433, March 30, 2000)
SYNOPSIS: The case of People vs. Orita (G.R. No. 88724, April 3, 1990), laid a new doctrine in
Philippine penal law insofar as the crime of rape is concerned, as it finally did away with frus-
trated rape and allowed only attempted rape and consummated rape to remain in our statute
books. The instant case of Campuhan on the other hand, drew the line between attempted rape
and consummated rape.
Primo Campuhan was found guilty by the lower court of statutory rape and was meted the
extreme penalty of death. On automatic review by the Supreme Court, the basic issue revolved
on whether there was sufficient and convincing proof that the penis of accused indeed touched
the labia or slid into the female organ of the victim who was only 4 years old. The Court, in
resolving the issue, endeavored to define what was meant by the phrase mere touching by the
penis of the external genitalia” as being sufficient to consummate the sexual act, for settled is
the rule that in order for rape to be consummated, perfect penetration is not essential. Any
penetration of the female organ by the male organ, however slight, consummates the crime. In
other words, entry into_the labia or lips of the female organ, even without rupture of the hymen
or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction for consummated rape.
RULING: The act of "touching" should be understood as inherently part of the entry of the penis
into the labia of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the
pudendum. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora (or the outer lips of the female organ)
must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of
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the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis
of the pudendum not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the
slightest penetration of the female organ by the penis, there can be no consummated rape, at most,
it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.
Under Article 266-C, the offended woman may pardon the offender through a subsequent valid
marriage, the effect of which would be the extinction of the offender’s liability . Similarly, the
legal husband may be pardoned by forgiveness of the wife provided that the marriage is not void
ab initio. Obviously, under the new law, the husband may be liable for rape if his wife does not
want to have sex with him. It is enough that there is indication of any amount of resistance as to
make it rape.
An accused may be convicted of rape on the sole testimony of the offended woman. It does not
require that testimony be corroborated before a conviction may stand. This is particularly true if
the commission of the rape is such that the narration of the offended woman would lead to no
other conclusion except that the rape was committed.
Incestuous rape was coined in Supreme Court decisions. It refers to rape committed by an
ascendant of the offended woman. In such cases, the force and intimidation need not be of such
nature as would be required in rape cases had the accused been a stranger. Conversely, the
Supreme Court expected that if the offender is not known to the woman, it is necessary that there
be evidence of affirmative resistance put up by the offended woman. Mere “no, no” is not
enough if the offender is a stranger, although if the rape is incestuous, this is enough.
The main distinction between the crime of attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the intent
to lie with the offended woman.
In a case where the accused jumped upon a woman and threw her to the ground, although the
accused raised her skirts, the accused did not make any effort to remove her underwear. Instead,
he removed his own underwear and placed himself on top of the woman and started performing
sexual movements. Thereafter, when he was finished, he stood up and left. The crime committed
is only acts of lasciviousness and not attempted rape. The fact that he did not remove the
underwear of the victim indicates that he does not have a real intention to effect a penetration. It
was only to satisfy a lewd design.
1. An accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove, but more difficult for
the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
2. In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution
Henceforth, the Court shall withhold the real name of the victim-survivor, i.e., the woman or
child-victim of violence, and shall use fictitious initials instead
to represent her.
Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims-survivors or any other information tending to
establish or compromise their identities, as well as those of their immediate family or household
members, shall not be disclosed
Melchor Cabalquinto was charged with having raped his then eight-year old daughter, AAA, on
two (2) occasions. He denied the charge and averred that the cases filed against him were the
offshoot of frequent quarrels between his common-law wife, ABC, and his brother. He claimed
that there were material inconsistencies between the testimonies of AAA and ABC.
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The trial court convicted Cabalquinto of two (2) counts of rape. Taking into account the
qualifying circumstances of the victim’s minority and her relationship with Cabalquinto, it
imposed upon Cabalquinto the death penalty on both counts. This was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Resolution dated February 14, 2006, A.M. No. 99-7-06-SC in In Re Internet Web Page of the
Supreme Court.
In a letter addressed to the Chief Justice, the mother of a child abuse victim expressed anxiety
over the posting of full text decisions of the Court in child sexual abuse cases on its Internet Web
Page. She submitted that confidentiality and the best interest of the child must prevail over public
access to information.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) commented that the posting of the full text of
decisions in child abuse cases on the Supreme Court Web Page violates the right to privacy of the
aggrieved parties. According to the OSG, the fact that the aggrieved child may have consented,
through a parent or guardian, to a public hearing of the case does not negate the expectation of
privacy which the child may later invoke because child victims cannot be presumed to have
intended their initial agreement to extend beyond the termination of their case to the posting of
the decision reached by the Court on the Web Page. Moreover, such an expectation of privacy is
reasonable. Short of withdrawing the full text of decisions in such cases from the Web Page, the
OSG proposed that the Court instead replace the material information, such as the name of the
child-victim, in its decisions.
In this case and henceforth, the Court shall withhold the real name of the victim-survivor, i.e., the
woman or child-victim of violence, and shall use fictitious initials instead to represent her.
Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims-survivors or any other information tending to
establish or compromise their identities, as well as those of their immediate family or household
members, shall not be disclosed.
How is this committed? – by a man having oral sex with a woman, provided that it was
committed under the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1.
In 2006, Padit enticed the 4 year old girl to enter his house. Once inside Padit “rubbed his
penis” into the vagina of the girl & she felt pain. The doctor who examined found slight
hymenal abrasion upon examination of her vulva. The prosecution charged the accused of
Rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the RPC although at the time of the
commission of the crime RA 8353 came into effect already in 1997. The RTC convicted
the accused of the crime of rape under Art. 335 of the RPC. Padit raised the issue that he
should be acquitted because it was the testimony of the victim that his penis merely
rubbed the vagina of the victim.
SC: “AAA, who was then four years old at the time of the molestation, was
not expected to be knowledgeable about sexual intercourse and every stage thereof. The
fact that she claimed that accused-appellant rubbed his penis against her vagina did not
mean that there was no penetration. Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man
having sexual bodily connections with a woman. This explains why the slightest
penetration of the female genitalia consummates the rape. As such, a mere touching of
the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act already
constitutes consummated rape. In the present case, AAA testified that she felt pain when
accused-appellant “rubbed his penis [against her] vagina.” This Court has held that rape
is committed on the victim's testimony that she felt pain. In fact, AAA still felt severe
pain in her vagina when she was being given a bath by her mother after her molestation.
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This kind of pain could not have been the result of mere superficial rubbing of
accusedappellant's sex organ with that of the victim. Such pain could be nothing but the
result of penile penetration sufficient to constitute rape.”
Marital rape is impliedly recognized. Rape committed against the wife, also known as “marital
rape”, is impliedly acknowledged under the new law, which provides that the subsequent
forgiveness by the wife as the offended party, in case it’s the husband who is the offender, shall
extinguish the criminal action or the penalty. (Article 266-C)
SC: The irrevocable implied consent theory evolved have already been superseded by modern
global principles on the equality of rights between men and women and respect for human dignity
established in various international
conventions, such as the CEDAW. xxxxThe Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW,
recognized that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and
in the family is needed to achieve full equality between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to
take all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women. One of such measures is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it
eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute
proprietary rights over his wife’s body and thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy with
him is always obligatory or at least presumed.
Xxxx
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has
sexual intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital
consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal
to that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to
engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent. xxxxx It is true that the Family Code,
obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions affection and sexual intimacy, as
expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally
exacted by force or coercion.
xxxx
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife excludes
cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual communion. It is a function
which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an
expressive interest in each other’s feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long
way in deepening marital relationship. When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in
order to advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step
in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State policies. Besides, a
husband who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested wife’s absolute refusal to engage
in sexual intimacy may legally seek the court’s intervention todeclare her psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital obligation. But
he cannot and should not demand sexual intimacy from her coercively or violently.
Article 266-C. Effect of pardon. — The subsequent valid marriage between the
offender and the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the
wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That
the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void
ab initio.
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Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term “man” in defining
rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist’s legal
relationship with his victim.
Thus, when the wife has valid reasons to deny her husband the exercise of his right like when she
is sick or exhausted, then the husband cannot force himself upon the wife with the use of
violence, threats or intimidation. If he does, he commits marital rape.
Article 266-C. Effect of pardon. — The subsequent valid marriage between the
offender and the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the
wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That
the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void
ab initio.
Problem: Cornelio and Sanita are husband and wife. One day, Cornelio forced himself upon the
wife with the use of force, violence or intimidation. Sanita filed a case of Rape against Cornelio.
During the pendency of the case, Cornelio asked for pardon from his wife. Sanita pardoned him.
What happens to the case?
Ans: The case shall be dismissed. The pardon given by the wife extinguished the incipient
criminal liability of Cornelio.
Problem: Suppose in the same problem Sanita pardoned her husband after a judgment of
conviction had been rendered and that her husband is already serving sentence? What is the effect
of the pardon?
Ans:The pardon shall extinguish the criminal liability of Cornelio and shall abate the penalty
imposed.
FACTS: On December 5, 1986, Ruben Lim raped Delilah Lim. On February 24, 1988 the victim
filed a complaint for rape against Lim. The delay of the filing was due to the threats made by the
accused that he will kill her and her relatives if she reports what happened to anyone. On March
1, 1988, the complainant executed an affidavit of desistance. On April 22, 1988, the accused
surrendered. He moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the affidavit of desis tance
executed by Delilah Lim stating that the rape case arose out of a mere misunderstanding
extinguished criminal liability.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case be dismissed on the ground that the victim's retraction or pardon
extinguished the criminal action.
HELD: The motion to dismiss was denied. The court ruled that to warrant the dismissal of the
complaint the victim's retraction or pardon should have been made prior to the institution of the
criminal action. The case was filed on February 24, 1988, while the affidavit of desistance was
executed only in March 1, 1988.
The only act that, according to Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code extinguishes the penal action
after the institution of criminal action, or remit the penalty already imposed upon him, is the marriage
between the offender and the offended party
“when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim became insane” – the penalty is death
when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed ---the penalty shall be
death. ---SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.
Q: What if 3 persons rape a girl, one after the other. How many information should you file?
A: 3 Informations each or a total of 9 Information. Each one of the accused is not only guilty for
the rape that he committed but also for the rapes committed by the other two. One will be
convicted of rape 3 times and sentenced to the appropriate penalty 3 times.
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In People vs Sanchez, January 25, 1999 and Sanchez vs Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627—
Mayor Sanchez argued that the 7 informations (x 7=49) charging 7 separate homicide are absurd
because the victim could not have died 7 times.
SC: there will be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes with homicide
committed. “The presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to
the higher degree. Thus, homicide, committed on the occasion or by reason of the rape, loses its
character as an independent offense and assumes a new character and function as a qualifying
circumstance. The 7 information filed against each of them alleged that each of the 7 successive
rape is complexed by the subsequent slaying of Aileen Sarmenta.”
Q: You wanted to kill A, you stab her. When you saw that A is still breathing, you raped her.
What crime was committed? Is it Rape with Homicide?
A: NO. In rape with homicide, this presupposes that you raped a woman after which you killed
her. What is now the crime? MURDER. Rape here is considered as an aggravating circumstance
–ignominy –you cause disregard to the victim or cruelty.
The Revised Penal Code defines rape as the carnal knowledge of a woman by using force or
intimidation, or when she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or when she is under 12
years of age. (Art. 335, RPC).
The elements that constitute the crime of rape under Art. 266- A, par. 1(a) of RA 8353 are carnal
knowledge, force or intimidation and the commission of the act without the consent, or against
the will of the victim.
Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days;
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been in flicted upon the person kidnapped
or detained, or if threats o kill him shall have been made;
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a mi- nor, except when the accused is
any of the parents, female or public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for
the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the cir
cumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
Elements:
Article 267 has been modified by Republic Act No. 7659 in the following respects:
(1) Illegal detention becomes serious when it shall have lasted for more than three days,
instead of five days as originally provided;
(2) In paragraph 4, if the person kidnapped or detained was a minor and the offender was
anyone of the parents, the latter has been expressly excluded from the provision. The
liability of the parent is provided for in the last paragraph of Article 271;
Note: This amendment brings about a composite crime of kidnapping with homicide when it is
the victim of the kidnapping who was killed, or dies as a consequence of the detention and, thus,
only one penalty is imposed which is death.
When a person is deprived of his liberty or is seized and forcibly taken to another place, the
inquiry would, be what is the purpose of the offender in taking him or her away:
>>>>If the seizure is only to facilitate the killing of the victim the crime committed would either
be homicide or murder and the crime of kidnapping is absorbed.
>>>>>If the seizure or deprivation of liberty is only to compel the victim to perform an act, be it
right or wrong, the crime committed would only be grave coercion (People vs. Astorga, 283
SCRA 420).
>>>>If the deprivation of liberty is to take away the victim to satisfy the lewd design of the
offender, the crime would only be forcible abduction.
>>>>If the seizure of the victim is solely to deprive him of his liberty, the crime is illegal
detention.
The essence of the offense is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the intent
of the accused to effect it. There must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactor
was to deprive the offended party of liberty. The restraint however need not be permanent.
(People vs. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676).
In the penultimate paragraph of Article 267, there is deprivation of liberty but not for any of the
purposes enumerated above. It is for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or from any
other person. The law classifies the crime committed by the offender as serious illegal detention
even if none of the circumstances to make it serious is present in the commission of the crime. In
this particular mode of committing the crime of serious illegal detention, demand for ransom is an
indispensable element (People vs. Bustamante, G.R. No. 66427, Dec. 4, 1991)
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It is only the private individual who will commit this crime --- meaning a private individual will
detain another. Because if it is a public official – then arbitrary detention is committed under Art.
124.
Essence of illegal detention is: that a person is detained or in any other manner deprived him of
his liberty – there is restriction of one’s freedom --- to move.
It is not necessary that the victim be tied or locked up in a room. There is illegal detention when
the freedom of movement is restricted. --- you are brought to a safehouse – you can move but
you cannot get out.
Robber in a bank said: “Don’t move”—this is only momentary deprivation of your liberty
---- for it to apply, the intention must be to deprive the victim of his liberty.
What makes the crime of illegal detention serious is the presence of the circumstance enumerated
in Art. 267
A: (1) When the illegal detention lasted for more than 3 days; (2) When the illegal detention was
made simulating public authority; (3) If serious physical injuries have been inflicted upon the
person detained; (4) If threats to kill the person detained is made; and, (5) If the person kidnapped
is a minor.
Demand for ransom is a law which originated from the United States of America. They
call it the Lindbergh Law. The U.S. Supreme Court interpreted rannsom to mean money, price or
consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person or persons; payment
which releases one from captivity.
In the case of People vs. Kamad Akiran, et al., 18 SCRA 239, the accused claims that he
should not be convicted of kidnapping because his intention at most was merely to compel the
victim to fulfill his promise of defraying the hospital expenses of one Hayam. The Supreme Court
declared that such purpose to compel payment is embraced by the phrase kidnapping for ransom.
The gravamen of the crime of kidnapping is the taking and transporting of a person against his
will from one place to another. The crime of kidnapping is committed if the purpose is to extort
ransom.
The gravamen of illegal detention is restraining of a person of his freedom or liberty. There need
not be actual lock out. It is enough that a person's freedom of movement or locomotion is
restrained. One can be illegally detained without necessarily transporting him from one place to
another.
Illegal detention is committed by a private person who kidnaps, detains, or otherwise deprives
another of his liberty.
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Arbitrary detention is committed by a public officer who detains a person without legal grounds.
Article 48, on complex crimes, does not govern in this case. But Article 48 will govern if any
other person is killed aside, because the provision specifically refers to “victim”. Accordingly,
the rulings in cases of People v. Parulan, People v. Ging Sam, and other similar cases where the
accused were convicted for the complex crimes of kidnapping with murder have become
academic.
In the composite crime of kidnapping with homicide, the term “homicide” is used in the generic
sense and, thus, covers all forms of killing whether in the nature of murder or otherwise. It does
not matter whether the purpose of the kidnapping was to kill the victim or not, as long as the
victim was killed, or died as a consequence of the kidnapping or detention. There is no more
separate crime of kidnapping and murder if the victim was kidnapped not for the purpose of
killing her.
If the victim was raped, this brings about the composite crime of kidnapping with rape. Being a
composite crime, not a complex crime, the same is regarded as a single indivisible offense as in
fact the law punishes such acts with only a single penalty. In a way, the amendment depreciated
the seriousness of the rape because no matter how many times the victim was raped, there will
only be one kidnapping with rape. This would not be the consequence if rape were a separate
crime from kidnapping because each act of rape would be a distinct count.
However for the crime to be kidnapping with rape, the offender should not have taken the victim
with lewd designs as otherwise the crime would be forcible abduction; and if the victim was
raped, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape would be committed. If the taking was
forcible abduction, and the woman was raped several times, there would only be one crime of
forcible abduction with rape, and each of the other rapes would constitute distinct counts of rape.
This was the ruling in the case of People v. Bacalso.
In People v. Lactao, decided on October 29, 1993, the Supreme Court stressed that the crime is
serious illegal detention if the purpose was to deprive the offended party of her liberty. And if in
the course of the illegal detention, the offended party was raped, a separate crime of rape would
be committed. This is so because there is no complex crime of serious illegal detention with rape
since the illegal detention was not a necessary means to the commission of rape.
In People v. Bernal, 131 SCRA 1, the appellants were held guilty of separate crimes of serious
illegal detention and of multiple rapes. With the amendment by Republic Act No. 7659 making
rape a qualifying circumstance in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, the
jurisprudence is superseded to the effect that the rape should be a distinct crime. Article 48 on
complex crimes may not apply when serious illegal detention and rape are committed by the same
offender. The offender will be charged for the composite crime of serious illegal detention with
rape as a single indivisible offense, regardless of the number of times that the victim was raped.
Also, when the victim of the kidnapping and serious illegal detention was subjected to torture and
sustained physical injuries, a composite crime of kidnapping with physical injuries is committed.
Problem: Where after taking the victim with her car, the accused called the house of the victim
asking for ransom but upon going to their safehouse saw several police cars chasing them,
prompting them to kill their victim inside the car, there were two crimes committed – Kidnapping
for Ransom and Murder, not a complex crime of Kidnapping with Murder as she was not taken or
carried away to be killed, killing being an afterthought . (People vs. Evanoria, 209 SCRA 577).
Article 268. Slight illegal detention. — The penalty of re clusion temporal shall be imposed
upon any private individual who shall commit the crimes described in the next preceding
article without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated therein.
The same penalty shall be incurred by anyone who shall furnish the place for the
perpetration of the crime.
If the offender shall voluntarily release the person so kidnapped or detained within three
days from the commencement of the detention, without having attained the purpose
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intended, and before the institution of criminal proceedings against him, the penalty shall
be prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000). (As amended by Republic Act No. 10951)
Elements:
Although the law says “slight”, it is not to be considered as a light felony --- because in fact the
penalty is RT –grave felony
If the offender:
a. voluntarily releases the person so kidnapped or detained within 3 days from the
commencement of the detention
Illegal detention is committed by a private individual who detains or deprives another of liberty.
Arbitrary detention is committed by a public officer who detains or deprives another of liberty.
Illustration: Teddy detained Rafael. Teddy released Rafael after 2 days. The crime is Slight
Illegal Detention. The detention did not last for more than 3 days.
Article 269. Unlawful arrest. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed upon any person who, in any case
other than those authorized by law, or without reasonable ground therefor, shall arrest or
detain another for the purpose of delivering him to the proper authorities. (As amended by
RA 10951)
ELEMENTS:
2. That the purpose of the offender is to deliver him to the proper authorities
3. That the arrest or detention is not authorized by law or there is no reasonable ground
therefor.
>>>if a person does not commit a crime, he cannot be arrested. Otherwise, you will violate Art.
269 even if your purpose is to deliver that person to the proper authorities.
For example: A stabbed B. C who saw it informed D. D went to A’s house & arrested him for the
purpose of delivering A to the proper authorities. What crime is committed by D? Ans: Unlawful
Arrest
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Example: A and B had a dispute over a parcel of land. This disagreement led to a fistfight where
A had the upper hand. He was able to hogtie B with a piece of rope and thereafter, he brought B
to the municipal judge of the town, who in turn ordered the immediate re lease of B. In this
example, the fact that the accused immediately brought the victim to the municipal judge does not
exonerate him from being liable for the crime of unlawful arrest.
Illustration: At around 5:00 o'clock in the morning, Renante, the Municipal secretary was
awakened from his sleep because of commotions outside. When he went out of his room, he saw
his wife quarreling with his driver. He arrested his driver and brought him to the police station.
What crime did Renante commit?
Ans: Renante committed Unlawful arrest. The arrest was unauthorized by law or there is no
reasonable ground for the arrest. Mere quarreling is not a crime. The purpose of the arrest was
however to deliver the person to the authorities. Renante brought his driver to the police station.
1)In arbitrary detention –the public officer detains another without legal ground.
Unlawful Arrest – a private individual or even a public officer arrests or detains another without
legal grounds.
2)AD-the offender who is a public officer-his normal duty is law enforcement –policemen-he has
no warrant of arrest & the detention is without legal ground.
UD-a private individual or even public officer arrest another without authority – he is not a peace
officer.
Article 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon any person who, being entrusted with the custody of a minor person,
shall deliberately fail to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. (As amended by
Republic Act No. 18.)
Elements:
(1) The offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person (whether over or under
seven years but less than 18 years of age);
(2) He deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians.
Problem: Darren is a 7-year old child. While the child was playing in the school grounds,
Bamboo do took him away without the knowledge of his parents. He was charged with
Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. Is the charge correct? If not, what crime is committed?
Why?
Ans: No, the charge is not correct. Bamboo was not entrusted with the custody of the child. He is
liable for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 because the person
kidnapped is a minor.
In People v. Mendoza, where a minor child was taken by the accused without the knowledge and
consent of his parents, it was held that the crime is kidnapping and serious illegal detention under
Article 267, not kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270.
Article 271. Inducing a minor to abandon his home. — The penalty of prision correccional
and a fine not exceeding One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed upon
anyone who shall induce a minor to abandon the home of his parents or guardians or the
persons entrusted with his custody.
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If the person committing any of the crimes covered by the two preceding articles
shall be the father or the mother of the minor, the penalty shall be arresto mayor or a fine
not exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000) or both. (As amended by Republic Act No.
10951)
Elements:
I. A minor (whether over or under seven years of age) is living in the home of his parents or
guardians or the person entrusted with his custody;
Mere inducement consummates the crime. It is not necessary that the minor abandons his/her
home as a result of the inducement.
The father or mother of the minor may also commit this crime.
>>>this felony is committed by anyone who shall induce a minor to abandon the house
of his parents or guardian or the person entrusted with his custody.
Note: this is crime is committed by the mere inducement of the minor to abandon the house of his
parents.
The inducement must be actually done with malice and a determined will to cause damage.
(People vs. Paalam, C.A., O.G. 8267-8268). But where the victims abandoned their respective
homes out of an irresponsible spirit of restlessness and adventure, the crime is not committed.
>>it is not necessary that the minor actually abandons the house.
Article 272. Slavery. — The penalty ofprision mayor and a fine not exceeding 10,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon anyone who shall purchase, sell, kidnap, or detain a human being for
the purpose of enslaving him.
If the crime be committed for the purpose of assigning the offended party to some immoral
traffic, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
ELEMENTS:
SLAVERY is the treatment of a human being as a mere property, stripped of dignity and human
rights. The person is reduced to the level of an ordinary animal, a mere chattel with material value
capable of pecuniary estimation and for which reason, the offender purchases and sells the same.
As far as the accused is concerned, the human being is capable of appropriation and therefore
within the commerce of man.
What matters most here is the purpose ---- if the purpose in detaining a person is for enslaving
------ then it is Slavery, if not it would be illegal detention.
Obliging a person to render service to one to whom he is indebted without remuneration and to
remain there as long as the debt is not paid constitute Slavery.
Note: Qualifying circumstance – if the purpose of the offender is to assign the offended party to
some immoral traffic (prostitution), the penalty is higher
* This is distinguished from illegal detention by the purpose. If the purpose of the kidnapping or
detention is to enslave the offended party, slavery is committed.
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* The crime is slavery if the offender is not engaged in the business of prostitution. If he is, the
crime is white slave trade under Article 341.
Purpose:
The purpose is to enslave the victim or to assign him to immoral traffic. The penalty is made
higher if the purpose is to assign the victim to some immoral activities.
Illustration: X purchased Y from Z for P50,000. X detained Y in his house and let him work as
his slave letting him do or perform odd jobs. X is liable for Slavery.
Note: If the purpose of the kidnapping or detention is to enslave the victim, the crime is Slavery
and the penalty imposable is Prision Mayor.
If the purpose of the kidnapping is to restrain a person of his liberty whether permanent or
temporary, the crime is Kidnapping and Illegal Detention. The penalty is Reclusion Perpetua to
death.
RA 9208
ANTI-AIR TRAFFICKING OF PERSONS ACT OF 2003
(1) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means,
including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or
apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced
labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
(2) To introduce or match for money, profit, or material, economic or other consideration,
any person or, as provided for under Republic Act No. 6955, any Filipino woman to a
foreign national, for marriage for the purpose of acquiring, buying, offering, selling or
trading him/her to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor,
slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
(3) To offer or contract marriage, real or simulated, for the purpose of acquiring, buying,
offering, selling, or trading them to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual
exploitation, forced labor or slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
(4) To undertake or organize tours and travel plans consisting of tourism packages or
activities for the purpose of utilizing and offering persons for prostitution, pornography
or sexual exploitation;
(5) To maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography;
(6) To adopt or facilitate the adoption of persons for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt
bondage;
(7) To recruit, hire, adopt, transport or abduct a person, by means of threats or use of force,
fraud, deceit, violence, coercion, or intimidation for the purpose of removal or sale of
organs of said person; and
(8) To recruit, transport or adopt a child to engage in armed activities in the Philippines or
abroad.
b) When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise known as the
"Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995" and said adoption is for the purpose of
prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary
servitude or dept bondage;
d) When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guni'dimi or a person who exercises
authority over the trafficked perwon or when the offense is committed by an officer or
employee;
e) When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitu tion with any member of the
military or law enforcement agencies;
f) When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies; and
g) When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the offended party
dies, becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).
RA 9231 amended RA 7160 by imposing heavier penalties on parents, guardians and employers
of children below 18 years and below who commit any of the following acts:
(1) Making the child work beyond the maximum numbers of working hours provided by
said law;
(2) Misappropriating the earnings of the child and/ or failure to set up a trust fund for the
latter and render a semi-annual accounting of such;
(3) Using, procuring or offering the child for purpose of prostitution or pornographic
activities;
(4) Using, procuring or offering the child for illicit activities, such as trafficking of drugs
and other illegal substances;
(6) Subjecting the child to various forms of slavery as defined in RA 9028, including
Trafficking of children, recruitment of child soldiers, etc.
Article 274. Services rendered under compulsion in payment of debt. — The penalty of arresto mayor
in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon
any person who, in order to require or enforce the payment of a debt, shall compel the
debtor to work for him, against his will, as household servant or farm laborer.
The elements of the crime as suggested in the article are the following:
1. The offender compels a debtor to render work for him, either as household servant or
farm laborer;
2. That it is done against the will of the debtor; and
3. That the purpose is to require or to enforce the payment of a debt.
This article deals with another form of slavery. It is a way of giving force and effect to the
constitutional provision which prohibits all forms of involuntary servitude or service. In this
article, no distinction is made whether the offended is a minor or an adult.
1) 274-the debtor himself is the one who compelled to work for the offender.
273-it is the minor who is compelled to render services for the supposed debt of his
parent or guardian.
Article 275. Abandonment of persons in danger and abandonment of one's own victim. —
The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon:
1. Anyone who shall fail to render assistance to any person whom he shall find in an
uninhabited place wounded or in danger of dying, when he can render such assistance
without detriment to himself, unless such omission shall constitute a more serious offense;
2. Anyone who shall fail to help or render assistance to another whom he has
accidentally wounded or injured;
3. Anyone who, having found an abandoned child under seven years of age, shall
fail to deliver said child to the authorities or to his family, or shall fail to take him to a safe
place.
Elements:
>>>>The first situation refers to one who fails to render assistance to any person whom he finds
in an uninhabited place helplessly wounded or in danger of dying. The law commands him to
render help or assistance. But should the assistance endanger the life of the person giving help,
his failure to render assistance would constitute an exemplary circumstance.
Where the person is already wounded and already in danger of dying, there is an
obligation to render assistance only if he is found in an uninhabited place. If the mortally
wounded, dying person is found in a place not uninhabited in legal contemplation, abandonment
will not bring about this crime. An uninhabited place is determined by possibility of person
receiving assistance from another. Even if there are many houses around, the place may still be
uninhabited if possibility of receiving assistance is remote.
>>>>The second situation refers to the failure to give help or render assistance to another whom
the offender has accidentally wounded or injured.
>>>>The third situation refers to the failure to deliver a child less than seven (7) years of age
whom the offender has found abandoned, to the authorities or to his family; or the failure of the
offender to take such a child to a safe place.
* If what happened was an accident at first, there would be no liability pursuant to Article 12 (4)
of the RPC – damnum absque injuria. But if you abandon your victim, you will be liable under
Article 275. Here, the character of the place is immaterial. As long as the victim was injured
because of the accident caused by the offender, the offender would be liable for abandonment if
he would not render assistance to the victim.
Illustration: AA went to the forest to hunt wild boars. While there, he saw an old man profusely
bleeding. The old man pleaded to him to bring him to the hospital as he was losing blood. AA
ignored the pleas of the old man and left. Eduardo is liable for abiandonment of a person in
danger.
Illustration: Artemio and Muldon went fishing. While they were at the middle of the sea, they
came upon Serafico on board his banca. Serafico was sick and very weak. Serafico asked Artemio
and Muldon to help him. Artemio and Muldon did not find pity in their hearts and left the
helpless Serafico. Artemio and Muldon are liable for Abandonment of a person in danger. The
possibility for Serafico to receive help from others is the main reason why the failure to render
assistance is punished.
Illustration: KC, a 4-year old child was abandoned by his parents in the busy streets of Manila.
KC was shivering in cold under the heavy rain. His cries called the attention of Virginia who
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simply did nothing but look at the child. Virginia failed to bring the child to the authorities or
failed to take him to a safe place. Virginia is liable for Abandonment of helpless person.
Read: People vs Hadja Jarma Lalli and Ronie Aringoy, October 12, 2011
Article 277. Abandonment of minor by person entrusted with his custody; indifference of
parents. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed upon anyone who, having charge of the rearing or
education of a minor, shall deliver said minor to a public institution or other persons,
without the consent of the one who entrusted such child to his care or in the absence of the
latter, without the consent of the proper authorities.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon the parents who shall neglect their children
by not giving them the education which their station in life requires and financial conditions
permit. (As amended by RA 10951)
>>the failure of the parents to give their children the proper education must be deliberate –
because of the failure is due to the reason that the father lost his job then the father is not liable.
Art. 59 par. 4 of PD 603 which punishes parents who neglect their child by not giving him the
education which the family’s station in life & financial condition permits.
Article 278. Exploitation of minors. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods and a fine not exceeding One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be
imposed upon:
“1. Any person who shall cause any boy or girl under sixteen (16) years of age to
perform any dangerous feat of balancing, physical strength, or contortion.
“2. Any person who, being an acrobat, gymnast, rope-walker, diver, wild-animal
tamer or circus manager or engaged in a similar calling, shall employ in
exhibitions of these kinds children under sixteen (16) years of age who are not his
children or descendants.
“3. Any person engaged in any of the callings enumerated in the next preceding
paragraph who shall employ any descendsant of his under twelve years (12) years
of age in such dangerous exhibitions.
“4. Any ascendant, guardian, teacher or person entrusted in any capacity with
the care of a child under sixteen (16) Years of age, who shall deliver such child
gratuitously to any person following any of the callings enumerated in paragraph
2 hereof, or to any habitual vagrant or beggar.
“If the delivery shall have been made in consideration of any price,
compensation, or promise, the penalty shall in every case be imposed in its
maximum period.
“In either case, the guardian or curator convicted shall also be removed from
office as guardian or curator; and in the case of the parents of the child, they may
be deprived, temporarily or perpetually, in the discretion of the court, of their
parental authority.
“5. Any person who shall induce any child under sixteen (16) years of age to
abandon tthe home of its ascendants, guardians, curators or teachers to follow any
person engaged in any of the callings mentioned in paragraph 2 hereof, or to
accompany any habitual vagrant or beggar.”
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Note: Qualifying Circumstance – if the delivery of the child to any person following
any of the callings of acrobat, rope-walker, diver or wild-animal trainer or circus manager or to
any habitual vagrant of beggar is made in consideration of any price, compensation or promise,
the penalty is higher.
* The offender is engaged in a kind of business that would place the life or limb of the minor in
danger, even though working for him is not against the will of the minor.
Nature of the Business – This involves circuses which generally attract children so they
themselves may enjoy working there unaware of the danger to their own lives and limbs.
Age – Must be below 16 years. At this age, the minor is still growing.
* If the employer is an ascendant, the crime is not committed, unless the minor is less than 12
years old. Because if the employer is an ascendant, the law regards that he would look after the
welfare and protection of the child; hence, the age is lowered to 12 years. Below that age, the
crime is committed.
* But remember Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act). It applies to minors below 18 years old, not 16 years old as
in the Revised Penal Code. As long as the employment is inimical – even though there is no
physical risk – and detrimental to the child’s interest – against moral, intellectual, physical, and
mental development of the minor – the establishment will be closed.
* Article 278 has no application if minor is 16 years old and above. But the exploitation will be
dealt with by Republic Act No. 7610.
* If the minor so employed would suffer some injuries as a result of a violation of Article 278,
Article 279 provides that there would be additional criminal liability for the resulting felony.
Article 279. Additional penalties for other offenses. — The imposition of the penalties prescribed
in the preceding articles, shall not prevent the imposition upon the same person of the
penalty provided for any other felonies defined and punished by this Code.
Article 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling.—Any private person who shall enter the dwelling
of another against the latter's will, shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine not
exceeding Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000).
If the offense be committed by means of violence or intimidation, the penalty shall be prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000).
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable to any person who shall enter another's
dwelling for the purpose of preventing some serious harm to himself, the occu pants of the
dwelling, or a third person, nor shall it be appli cable to any person who shall enter a
dwelling for the purpose of rendering some service to humanity or justice, nor to anyone
who shall enter cafes, taverns, inns, and other public houses, while the same are open.
Dwelling means any building or structure devoted for rest and comfort. A building becomes a
dwelling place when it is put to use as a place of rest and comfort.
ELEMENTS:
Trespass to dwelling is committed by a private individual who shall enter the dwelling of another
against his will.
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>>If it is the public officer who shall enter a dwelling against the will of the owner --- then the
crime that is committed is Violation of Domicile under Art. 128
The provisions of this article are not applicable even if there is trespass to dwelling :
1. When the entry is done for the purpose of preventing some serious harm to himself, the
occupants of the dwelling or a third person;
2. When the entry is made in order to render some service to humanity or justice; and
3. When the entry is made for the reason that the place is public and the same is open.
* Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a person who believes that a crime has
been committed against him has every right to go after the culprit and arrest him without any
warrant even if in the process he enters the house of another against the latter’s will.
“Against the will” ----- the entrance is either expressly or impliedly prohibited or the prohibition
is presumed. It is not necessary that the prohibition be expressed by direct words.
* If the entry is made by a way not intended for entry, that is presumed to be against the will of
the occupant (example, entry through a window). It is not necessary that there be a breaking.
>>>>>Even if the door is not locked, for as long as it is closed, the prohibition is presumed
especially if the entry was done at the late hour of the night or at an unholy hour of the day (U.S.
vs. Mesina, 21 Phil. 615).
So, one who enters a building is not presumed to be a tres passer until the owner tells him to leave
the building. In such a case, if he refuses to leave, then his entry shall now be considered to have
been made without the express consent of the owner (People vs. De Peralta, 42 Phil. 69).
What is intended to be protected & preserved by the law is the PRIVACY of one’s dwelling.
Q: What happened if you enter the house of another at 12:00 midnite and once inside, somebody
saw you & accosted you. You inflicted on the person serious physical injuries. What crime or
crimes did you commit?
A: If the purpose in entering the dwelling is not shown, trespass is committed. If the purpose is
shown, it may be absorbed in the crime as in robbery with force upon things, the trespass yielding
to the more serious crime. But if the purpose is not shown and while inside the dwelling he was
found by the occupants, one of whom was injured by him, the crime committed will be trespass to
dwelling and frustrated homicide, physical injuries, or if there was no injury, unjust vexation.
>>>If the purpose is shown --- it may be absorbed in the crime of robbery.
Medina case: when the accused entered the dwelling through the window, he had no intent to kill
any person inside, but the intention to kill came to his mind when he was being arrested by the
occupants thereof, the crime of trespass to dwelling is a separate and distinct offense from
frustrated homicide.
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Article 281. Other forms of trespass. — The penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding
Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000), or both, shall be imposed upon any person who shall enter
the closed premises or the fenced estate of another, while either of them is uninhabited, if
the prohibition to enter be manifest and the trespasser has not secured the permission of the
owner jr the caretaker thereof.
ELEMENTS:
1. That the offender enters the closed premises or the fenced estate of another.
4. That the trespasser has not secured the permission of the owner or the caretaker thereof
>>the law says that the prohibition “not to enter must be manifest” --- what do we mean by this?
>>>>Example: You enter a land with the permission from the owner? Did you commit this
crime? Ans: NO, because there is no manifest prohibition not to enter.
(1) When a person enters the dwelling of another for the purpose of preventing some serious
harm to himself, the occupants of the building or a third person;
(2) When the purpose of the offender is to render service to humanity or justice;
(3) When a person enters cafes, taverns, inns or other public houses while they are open;
Article 282. Grave threats. — Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon
the person, honor, or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a
crime, shall suffer:
The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the crime he threatened to
commit, if the offender shall have made the threat demanding money or imposing any other
condition, even though not unlawful, and said offender shall have attained his purpose. If
the offender shall not have attained his purpose, the penalty lower by two degrees shall be
imposed.
If the threat be made in writing or through a middle man, the penalty shall be imposed in its
maximum period.
The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000), if the threat shall not have been made subject to a condition. (As amended by
RA 10951)
Concept of threats
It is a declaration of an intention or determination made orally or in writing, to injure another by
the commission upon his person, honor or property, or upon that of his family of some wrong,
which may or may not amount to a crime.
How is this committed? This is committed when an offender threatens another with the infliction
upon the person, honor or property of the latter or his family of any wrong amounting to a crime.
Juan calls Pedro by phone and tells him that if he does not deliver P10,000, Juan will cut
off one of Pedro's fingers. The threat to injure Pedro is a crime against persons which is punished
as physical injury.
Juan calls Pedro by phone and tells him that unless he sends P10,000 to Juan at the end of the
day, Juan will destroy Pedro's brand new car. Here, the threat to destroy Pedro's car is a crime
against property which is called malicious mischief.
Juan calls Petra by phone and tells her to deliver P10,000 to him (Juan), otherwise, he will report
Petra's acts of adultery to her husband. Here, adultery is a crime against chastity which will de-
grade and put to shame the person of Petra.
A wrote B and demanded from B to give him P50,000.00 if not, he will cause the exposure in
public of the sexual videos of B and his mistress. A is liable for Grave Threats. Under the law,
threat could be in the form of demand for money or any other condition or imposition.
>>>>In the examples cited above, the penalty to be imposed on the offender is one degree lower
than the penalty for the crime threatened to be committed if the offender attained his purpose. So,
if in the first example, Juan succeeded in getting P10,000 from Pedro, the penalty to be imposed
on Juan will be the penalty for physical injuries but it is reduced by one degree.
>>>If the offender does not attain his purpose, the penalty shall be two degrees lower than that
provided by law for the crime threatened.
(1) As to intimidation – In robbery, the intimidation is actual and immediate; in threat, the
intimidation is future and conditional.
(3) As to subject matter – Robbery refers to personal property; threat may refer to the person,
honor or property.
(4) As to intent to gain – In robbery, there is intent to gain; in threats, intent to gain is not an
essential element.
(5) In robbery, the robber makes the danger involved in his threats directly imminent to the
victim and the obtainment of his gain immediate, thereby also taking rights to his person
by the opposition or resistance which the victim might offer; in threat, the danger to the
victim is not instantly imminent nor the gain of the culprit immediate.
Article 283. Light threats. — A threat to commit a wrong not constituting a crime, made in
the manner expressed in subdivision 1 of the next preceding article, shall be punished by
arresto mayor.
ELEMENTS:
3. That there is a demand for money or that other condition is imposed, even though not
unlawful
4. That the offender has attained his purpose or, that he has not attained his purpose
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>>>This is a less grave felony because of the penalty imposed which is arresto mayor.
* In order to convict a person of the crime of light threats, the harm threatened must not be in the
nature of crime and there is a demand for money or any other condition is imposed, even though
lawful.
The manner of committing light threats is the same as in grave threats except that the act
threatened to be committed does not con stitute a crime. Some authorities claim that another name
for light threats is "blackmail" which refers to the extortion of money by appealing to the fear of
the victim.
Illustration: X threatened to report to the wife of Y the latter's illicit relationship with another
woman unless Y give him money. This is actually blackmailing. X commits Light threats. X
threatened to commit a wrong not amounting to a crime.
Problem: Jayson is about to take the Bar examination. Jayson impregnated Zorayda, his
girlfriend who is 17 years of age. Ma- tias, the father of Zorayda threatened to report to the
Supreme Court the sexual indiscretion of Jayson unless Jayson agrees to marry his minor
daughter. Matias is not liable for Light threats. He has performed a lawful act. A would be
member of the Bar must be a paragon of good and moral conduct.
Article 284. Bond for good behavior. — In all cases falling within the two next preceding
articles, the person making the threats may also be required to give bail not to molest the
person threatened, or if he shall fail to give such bail, he shall be sentenced to destierro.
>>>>In this article, the law presumes that the accused was convicted of grave or light threats.
Bond for good behavior means the posting of bond on the part of the accused in order to
guarantee that he will not molest the offended party. It is in the nature of an additional penalty.
>>>>Bond to keep the peace under Article 35 is applicable to all cases and is treated as a distinct
penalty. If the sentenced prisoner fails to give the bond, he shall be detained for a period not
exceeding six months if the crime for which he was convicted is classified as grave or less grave
felony or for a period not exceeding thirty days if convicted for a light felony.
Article 285. Other light threats. — The penalty of arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine
not exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000) shall be imposed upon:
2. Any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding
article, shall threaten another with a weapon, or draw such weapon in a quarrel, unless it be
in lawful self-defense;
2. Any person who, in the heat of anger, shall orally threaten another with some harm not
constituting a crime, and who by subsequent acts shows that he did not persist in the idea
involved in his threat, provided that the circumstances of the offense shall not bring it
within the provisions of Article 282 of this Code;
3. Any person who shall orally threaten to do another any harm not constituting a felony.
(As amended by RA 10951)
In the crime of light threats, there is no demand for money and the threat made is not planned or
done with deliberate intent. So threats which would otherwise qualify as grave threats, when
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made in the heat of anger or which is a product of a spur of the moment are generally considered
as light threats.
Whether it is grave or light threats, the crime is committed even ' in the absence of the person to
whom the threat is directed.
Illustration: A and B had an argument. In the course thereof, their verbal tussle became heated.
In a heat of anger A shouted at B, "I will kill you, you will not last this day." The day passed
without A killing B. A is liable for Light threats. He threatened to kill the aggrieved party in heat
of anger but who by subsequent acts did not persist in the idea involved in his threat.
Article 286. Grave coercions. — The penalty of prision correccional and a fine not exceeding
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed upon any person who, without
authority of law, shall by means of violence, threats or intimidation, prevent another from
doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his will,
whether it be right or wrong.
If the coercion be committed violation of the exercise of the right of suffrage, or for the
purpose of compelling another to perform any religious act or to prevent him from exercis -
ing such right or from so doing such act, the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed.
(As amended by RA 10951)
1) by preventing another by means of violence from doing some thing which is not
prohibited by law; and
When a person will do something for as long as it is not illegal – you do not have the right to
prevent him by way of violence or intimidation. You can prevent him in some other way but not
by violence or intimidation. Otherwise, you will commit the first act under Art. 286.
Example of coercion by preventing another from doing something not prohibited by law:
Juan was inside his classroom when Pedro, by means of violence, dragged him outside to
prevent him from attending his class. Here there is no law which prohibits Juan from attending
his class.
However, suppose Juan had a hand grenade with him at the time he was attending his
class and Pedro, by means of violence, forcibly ejected him from the classroom. In such a case,
can Pedro be held liable for grave coercion? The answer is no because Juan was prevented from
doing something which is prohibited by law.
In grave coercion, the act of preventing by force must be made at the time the offended party
was doing or was about to do the act to be prevented.
You do not have the right to compel a person to do something even if it is the right thing.
The driver of a private vehicle was waiting for his employer when he was asked by two
police officers to drive for them since they were in a hurry to report for duty. The driver refused
because he cannot use the car of his employer without the latter's permission. Because of his
refusal, the two police officers grabbed the driver by his collar and took the car's key from him.
Pushing him on the side, the policemen drove away with the car.
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The law uses the word “something” --- what is this something? – this is why we can say that this
is a very broad crime – the accused here compels another to do something or prevents the latter
from doing an act without the law telling us what is that something or what that act is.
What we should remember here is this: If the act prevented or the act compelled to be committed
is specified under a more specific provision of the RPC --- then that specific provision prevails.
For ex. --- a public officer with the use of violence prevents the holding of a religious ceremony.
Would he be liable for Grave Coercion? Ans: NO. But he is liable under Art. 132 ===
“Interruption of Religious Worship” – there is coercion here but this provision is more specific.
For ex. – I will prevent the Congressman not to attend the Session – you violated Article 143.
The objective of the law on coercion is to enforce the principle that no person is allowed to take
the law into his hands; that ours is a government of law and not of men.
A is the landowner and B is his tenant. A ejected B thru force & violence from tilling the land.
What crime is committed? – Grave Coercion
A is the owner of an apartment. He forcefully ousted B who has not been paying his rent for 1
year. What crime is committed? – Grave Coercion. A is putting the law on his own hands. –
Court order by filing an unlawful detainer case.
Article 287. Light coercions.—Any person who, by means of violence, shall seize anything
belonging to his debtor for the purpose of applying the same to the payment of the debt,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and a fine equivalent to the
value of the thing, but in no case less than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000).
Any other coercion or unjust vexation shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging
from Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000), or both. (As amended by RA 10951)
>>>The first paragraph refers to a creditor who seizes anything belonging to his debtor for the purpose of
applying the same to the payment of the debt.
>>>The second paragraph refers to another form of light coercion popularly known as unjust vexation. It is
committed by one who annoys or vexes or irritates another, even if the act is not productive of actual
"material or physical harm."
Article 288. Other similar coercions — (Compulsory purchase of merchandise and payment of wages by
means of tokens). — The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000) to One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000), or both, shall be imposed upon any
person, agent, or officer of any association or corporation who shall force or compel,
directly or indirectly, or shall knowingly permit any laborer or employee employed by him
or by such firm or corporation to be forced or compelled, to purchase merchandise or
commodities of any kind.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon any person who shall pay the wages due a laborer
or employee employed by him, by means of token or objects other than the legal tender
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currency of the Philippine Islands, unless expressly requested by the laborer or employee.
(As amended by RA 10951)
The foregoing elements constitute the manner of committing the first form of "similar coercions."
a)That the offender pays the wages due his laborer or employee by means of tokens or objects;
b)That these tokens or objects are other than the legal currency of the Philippines; and
c)That such employee or laborer did not expressly request that he be paid by means of token or
objects.
Article 289. Formation, maintenance, and prohibition of combination of capital or labor through
violence or threats. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding Sixty Thousand
Pesos (P60,000) shall be imposed upon any person who, for the purpose of organizing,
maintaining, or preventing coalitions of capital or labor, strike of laborers, or lockout of
employers, shall employ violence or threats in such a degree as to compel or force the
laborers or employers in the free and legal exercise of their industry or work, if the act shall
not constitute a more serious offense in accordance with the provisions of this Code. (As
amended by RA 10951)
a) The offender employs violence or threats in such a degree as to compel or force the laborer or
employer from the free and legal exercise of their work or industry; and
b) That the purpose is to organize, maintain or prevent the coalition of capital or labor, strike of
laborers or lockout of employers.
>>>>Peaceful picketing is part of the freedom of speech and is not covered by this article.
>>>>Preventing employees or laborers from joining any registered labor organization is punished
under Art. 248 of the Labor Code.
Article 290. Discovering secrets through seizure of correspondence. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed upon any private individual who, in order to
discover secrets of another, shall seize his papers or letters and reveal the contents thereof.
If the offender shall not reveal such secret, the penalty shall be arresto mayor and a fine not
exceeding One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000).
This provision shall not be applicable to parents, guardians, or persons entrusted with the
custody of minors with respect to the papers or letters of the children or minors placed
under their care or custody, nor to spouses with respect to the papers or letters of either of
them. (As amended by RA 10951)
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This article is not applicable to parents, guardians or persons entrusted with the custody of minors
with respect to papers or letters of the children or minors placed under their care or custody; or to
spouses with respect to the papers or letters of either of them.
>>>this is the penal sanction to the constitutional guarantee that the privacy of communication
and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court when public safety
or order requires otherwise. Navarro vs CA, august 26, 1999
Case: Atty. Pacifico Capuchino vs Apolonio et.al. court personnel of MTCC Br. 2, Santiago
City, Isabela, September 5, 2011.
Facts: Atty. Campuchino is the counsel of Valencia who is an accused in a BP 22 case filed by
Valmote. Valencia was convicted but Atty. Campuchino filed an MR. While the MR is pending,
Atty. Campuchino and Valencia tried to settle the case with Valmonte. But Vlamonte was
demanding a higher amount. Valencia requested Duque, a court personnel to hold the amount he
was bringing. Upon Valencia’s insistence, Duque received the amount in trust for Valencia and
issued a provisional receipt. A, B, C and D, court personnel learned of this. They ifnormed the
judge about it. One day, Atty. Campuchino and Valencia went to the court to attend a hearing but
the Judge was absent. A, B, C and D led them inside the courtroom and began asking question on
Atty. Campuchino and Valencia about Duque’s act of receiving the amount from Valencia.
Unknown to Atty. Campuchino and Valencia, their conversation was taped recorded b A, B, C
and D. Out of the taped conversation, A,B, C and D filed and administrative case against Duque.
Atty. Campuchino on the other hand filed an admin case against A, B, C and D for grave
misconduct
SC: Their concerted acts – of leading Atty. Capuchino and Valencia into the court sala,
engaging them in conversation regarding the money deposited with Duque, taping their
conversation without Capuchino’s & Valencia’s knowledge, and later using the taped
conversation as basis of the complaint they filed against Duque – constitute misconduct.
Case: Frank Chavez vs DOJ Secretary and the NTC et.al., February 15, 2008 (en banc)
Facts: (1) The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004 national and local
elections. On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition was
planning to destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone
conversation allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a
high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The conversation was
audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping. Later, in a Malacañang press briefing, Secretary
Bunye produced two versions of the tape, one supposedly the complete version, and the other, a
spliced, “doctored” or altered version, which would suggest that the President had instructed the
COMELEC official to manipulate the election results in the President’s favor. 2[6] It seems that
Secretary Bunye admitted that the voice was that of President Arroyo, but subsequently made a
retraction.
(2) On June 7, 2005, former counsel of deposed President Joseph Estrada, Atty. Alan Paguia,
subsequently released an alleged authentic tape recording of the wiretap. Included in the tapes
were purported conversations of the President, the First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo,
COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano, and the late Senator Barbers.
(3) On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned
reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or
publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. These persons
included Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said
tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had personal
knowledge if the crime was committed or was being committed in their presence.
(4) On June 9, 2005, in another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales ordered the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to go after media organizations “found to have caused the spread, the playing
and the printing of the contents of a tape” of an alleged wiretapped conversation involving the
2
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President about fixing votes in the 2004 national elections. Gonzales said that he was going to
start with Inq7.net, a joint venture between the Philippine Daily Inquirer and GMA7 television
network, because by the very nature of the Internet medium, it was able to disseminate the
contents of the tape more widely. He then expressed his intention of inviting the editors and
managers of Inq7.net and GMA7 to a probe, and supposedly declared, “I [have] asked the NBI to
conduct a tactical interrogation of all concerned.”
(5) On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued this press release:
xxxx
It has been subsequently established that the said tapes are false and/or fraudulent after a
prosecution or appropriate investigation, the concerned radio and television companies are hereby
warned that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall
be just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations
issued to the said companies.
The [NTC] will not hesitate, after observing the requirements of due process, to
apply with full force the provisions of said Circulars and their accompanying sanctions on
erring radio and television stations and their owners/operators.
SC: The constitutional imperative for us to strike down unconstitutional acts should always be
exercised with care and in light of the distinct facts of each case. For there are no hard and fast
rules when it comes to slippery constitutional questions, and the limits and construct of relative
freedoms are never set in stone. Issues revolving on their construct must be decided on a case to
case basis, always based on the peculiar shapes and shadows of each case. But in cases where the
challenged acts are patent invasions of a constitutionally protected right, we should be swift in
striking them down as nullities per se. A blow too soon struck for freedom is preferred than a
blow too late.
Facts: Jalbuena and Lingan, are reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City. Together
with Ilagan they went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was showing nude
dancers. After the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer
appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act. As she removed her brassieres, Jalbuena
brought out his camera and took a picture.
At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached
Jalbuena and demanded to know why he took a picture. Jalbuena replied: “Wala kang pakialam,
because this is my job.” Commotion ensued. When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out
his gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his companion. They went straight to the police
station to have it blottered. When they arrived thereat, 3 policemen were drinking including
Navarro. These policemen asked Jalbuena and his companions to join them. Jalbuena declined
and went to the desk officer, Sgt. Añonuevo, to report the incident. In a while, Liquin and Sioco
arrived on a motorcycle. Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them
in a corner for around fifteen minutes. Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and,
pushing him to the wall, said to him: “Putang ina, kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni
Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba kilala?” Petitioner Navarro then pulled out his firearm and cocked it,
and, pressing it on the face of Jalbuena, said, “Ano, uutasin na kita?”
At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner Navarro: “Huwag namang ganyan,
pumarito kami para magpa-blotter”. Lingan and Navarro had verbal tussle. Navarro said,
“walang press press dito”. This has angered Lingan who challenged Navarro to a fight. Navarro
mauled Lingan and floored him hitting his head on the floor. Lingan was brought to the hospital
but died. Unknown to Navarro the incident was recorded by Jalbuena in his tape recorder.
Navarro was charged for Homicide and one of the evidences offered aside from the testimony of
Jalbuena is the tape wchih recorded the incident. Covicted by the RTC. Navarro questioned the
admissibility of the tape record because it is a violation of the RA 4200.
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SC: “Indeed, Jalbuena’s testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made. It may be
asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping.
The answer is in the affirmative. The law provides:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts
penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc
record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured
either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to
replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either
verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any
other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil,
criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by
this prohibition.
....
SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained
obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.
Sec. 8. Formal Application for Judicial Authorization. - The written order of the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record
communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words of any person
suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall only be
granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals upon an ex parte written application
of a police or of a law enforcement official who has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-
Terrorism Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file such ex parte application, and upon
examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce to
establish: (a) that there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the said crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism has been
committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed; (b) that there is probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that evidence, which is essential
to the conviction of any charged or suspected person for, or to the solution or prevention of, any
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such crimes, will be obtained; and, (c) that there is no other effective means readily available for
acquiring such evidence.
Sec. 16. Penalty for Unauthorized or Malicious Interceptions and/or Recordings. - Any police
or law enforcement personnel who, not being authorized to do so by the authorizing division of
the Court of Appeals, tracks down, taps, listens to, intercepts, and records in whatever manner or
form any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written word of a
person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to
commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and
one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other offense, the
penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment and the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office shall be imposed upon any police
or law enforcement personnel who maliciously obtained an authority from the Court of Appeals
to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record in whatever manner or form any
communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words of a person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism: Provided,
That notwithstanding Section 13 of this Act, the party aggrieved by such authorization shall be
allowed access to the sealed envelope or sealed package and the contents thereof as evidence for
the prosecution of any police or law enforcement personnel who maliciously procured said
authorization.
Sec. 27. Judicial Authorization Required to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. -
The provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 as amended, to the contrary notwithstanding, the
justices of the Court of Appeals designated as a special court to handle anti-terrorism cases after
satisfying themselves of the existence of probable cause in a hearing called for that purpose that:
(1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or, conspiracy to commit
terrorism, (2) of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of
persons; and (3) of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association,
or group of persons, may authorize in writing any police or law enforcement officer and the
members of his/her team duly authorized in writing by the anti-terrorism council to: (a) examine,
or cause the examination of, the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records in a bank
or financial institution; and (b) gather or cause the gathering of any relevant information about
such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records from a bank or financial institution.
The bank or financial institution concerned, shall not refuse to allow such examination or to
provide the desired information, when so, ordered by and served with the written order of the
Court of Appeals.
Sec. 28. Application to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The written order of
the Court of Appeals authorizing the examination of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets, and records: (1) of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) of any judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization,
association, or group of persons, or (3) of any member of such organization, association, or group
of persons in a bank or financial institution, and the gathering of any relevant information about
the same from said bank or financial institution, shall only be granted by the authorizing division
of the Court of Appeals upon an ex parte application to that effect of a police or of a law
enforcement official who has been duly authorized in writing to file such ex parte application by
the Anti-Terrorism Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file such ex parte application, and
upon examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and, the witnesses he may produce to
establish the facts that will justify the need and urgency of examining and freezing the bank
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records: (1) of the person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) of a judicially declared
and outlawed terrorist organization, association or group of persons; or (3) of any member of
such organization, association, or group of persons.
Sec. 29. Classification and Contents of the Court Order Authorizing the Examination of Bank
Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The written order granted by the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals as well as its order, if any, to extend or renew the same, the original ex parte
application of the applicant, including his ex parte application to extend or renew, if any, and the
written authorizations of the Anti-Terrorism Council, shall be deemed and are hereby declared as
classified information: Provided, That the person whose bank deposits, placements, trust
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accounts, assets, and records have been examined, frozen, sequestered and seized by law
enforcement authorities has the right to be informed of the acts done by the law enforcement
authorities in the premises or to challenge, if he or she intends to do so, the legality of the
interference. The written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals designated to
handle cases involving terrorism shall specify: (a) the identify of the said: (1) person charged with
or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) judicially declared
and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; and (3) member of such
judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons, as the case may
be. whose deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are to be examined or the
information to be gathered; (b) the identity of the bank or financial Institution where such
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are held and maintained; (c) the identity
of the persons who will conduct the said examination and the gathering of the desired
information; and, (d) the length of time the authorization shall be carried out.cralawlibrary
Sec. 37. Penalty of Bank Officials and Employees Defying a Court Authorization. - An
employee, official, or a member of the board of directors of a bank or financial institution, who
refuses to allow the examination of the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records
of: (1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to
commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of
persons; or (3) a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or
group of persons in said bank or financial institution, when duly served with the written order of
the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the
penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment
Article 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine
not exceeding One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed upon any
manager, employee or servant who, in such capacity, shall learn the secrets of his principal
or master and shall reveal such secrets. (As amended by RA 10951)
Article 292. Revelation of industrial secrets. — The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000) shall be imposed upon the person in charge, employee, or workman of any
manufacturing or industrial establishment who, to the prejudice of the owner thereof, shall
reveal the secrets of the industry of the latter. (As amended by RA 10951)
Article 293. Who are guilty of robbery. — Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any
personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person, or using force upon anything, shall be guilty of robbery.
Robbery defined.
Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by
means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything.
ELEMENTS:
4.That there is violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon anything
>>There is no requirement under the law that the property must belong to the person robbed. ----
it merely says that it belongs to another.
Principle: The offended party need not be the owner of the property. Mere possession is enough
as long as the offended is not the owner thereof.
The object of robbery is a movable property — a personal property. Real property or immovable
property cannot be the object of robbery.
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Unlawful taking is an essential element of robbery. The taking must be against the will of the
owner or lawful possessor of a personal property. As an element of robbery taking must have the
character of permanency. If the dispossession of a personal property is only temporary and there
is no intention on the part of the offender to deprive the owner or lawful possessor of a thing
permanently of his possession, robbery is not committed.
Intent to gain is presumed from the taking of a personal property belonging to another. Mere
intent to gain is enough. Actual gain is not an element.
What is unlawful taking? --- it means appropriating a thing belonging to another and placing it
under one’s control and possession no matter how momentary his possession or control might be.
Q: Through force or violence, I robbed you of your Playboy shades. I ran but before I can run
farther, a policeman caught me & so I returned your sunglasses. Was the taking complete when I
had only few seconds of holding your glasses? A: YES. ---From the moment I succeeded in
removing your glasses from the owner and I ran away, the taking is consummated ---
consummated robbery.
“The taking must be with intent to gain” ---- (animus lucrandi) --- intent to obtain from the
appropriation of the thing some utility, advantage or benefit. It is not necessary that the gain be
realized as mere intent is enough --- so, actual gain is not an element.
Principle: The felonious intent or Animus Lucrandi must exist prior to or at least, coetaneously
with the unlawful taking. Not only must the felonious intent or A.L. exist, but it must exist at the
same time the property is taken.
Two kinds of robbery: 1) robbery with violence or intimidation and 2) robbery with force upon
things.
4. In robbery, the taking is done either with the use of violence or intimidation of person or the
employment of force upon things; whereas in theft, the taking is done simply without the
knowledge and consent of the owner.
5.
Robbery Bribery
X didn’t commit crime but is intimidated to X has committed a crime and gives
deprive him of his property money as a way to avoid arrest or
prosecution
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Article 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons — Penalties. — Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall
suffer:
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, when
or if by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in
subdivision 1 of Article 263 shall have been inflicted.
3.The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, any of
the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the next
preceding paragraph, shall have been inflicted.
4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
medium period, if the violence or intimidation employed in the commission of the robbery
shall have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the commission of the crime, or
when in the course of its execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person not
responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4
of said Article 263.
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period in other cases. (As amended by R.A. No. 7659.)
First paragraph – this is the worst thing that will happen---you ribbed a person thru violence – he
died – Robbery with Homicide.----SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME. There is only 1 crime here
but Article 48 does not apply.
“The crime of homicide shall have been committed” --- so somebody died – the killing must
happen during or immediately after the robbery.
(a) I will kill you first so that I can take your jewelries --- so that there will be no hassles ---
Robbery with Homicide
(b)When I started taking your jewelries, you resisted, in the course of the struggle, I killed you
--- Robbery with Homicide ---- that is the meaning of “in the course of”.
(c)Suppose I successfully removed your jewelries. I started to leave you but I realized that you
recognized me and because of that – I killed you --- robbery with homicide still.
What is the controlling factor in determining whether the crime is a special complex crime of
robbery with homicide? Ans: The presence or absence of intent to gain.
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Q: A, B and C robbed a bank. During the robbery A decided to double cross B & C and so A
killed B & C. Is A liable for the crime of Robbery with Homicide?
A: Yes. Because the law does not distinguish as to who is killed. The important thing is that a
homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery.
Q: What if the victim during the robbery died because of heart attack. Issue: Whether or not the
robbers are liable for robbery with homicide when they did not kill the victim.
A: Liable for robbery with homicide – you are liable for the direct, logical and natural
consequence of your felonious act.
>>>>that is why in robbery with homicide it is essential that you must prove that property was
taken. You must establish robbery otherwise, you cannot have conviction for this ---- only for
homicide or murder ---PP vs Peroles, 226 SCRA 554
The crime is Robbery with Homicide when by reason or on the occasion of the robbery the crime
of homicide is committed. Provided, however, that the robbery is consummated. This is a special
complex crime or single indivisible offense or a composite crime. There is no such crime as Robbery
with Double Homicide or Robbery with Multiple Homicide or Robbery with Murder. The term
"homicide" is used in its generic sense to include double or multiple homicide or murder. As long
as there is only one robbery regardless of the number of persons killed the crime is still called
Robbery with Homicide.
When in the course of the robbery someone is killed but rape and arson are also committed the
crime is still Robbery with Homicide. The rape and arson can be appreciated as ag gravating
circumstances
Second Paragraph ----Robbery with Rape ---composite crime. Rape is committed in the occasion
of the robbery.
Q: Robbery is committed. The woman was brought outside of her house and was raped. What is
now the crime?
A: Robbery with Rape. Why? It is not necessary that the victim in rape is inside the house when
she was raped.
It is different if after the robbery, the woman was brought to a hotel, where she was raped. Here,
the crime would be: (1) robbery (2) complex crime of abduction with rape. Why, because the
victim was forcibly taken from her home against her will and with lewd design. The forcible
abduction here was a necessary means to commit the crime of rape.
When the main purpose is to commit robbery and rape is also committed, the crime committed is
Robbery with Rape.
Note: When the purpose is to commit rape but robbery is also committed there are two separate
crimes of Rape and Robbery or theft as the case may be.
When by reason or on the occasion of robbery, arson is committed, the crime committed is
Robbery with Arson.
When by reason or on the occasion of robbery, intentional mutilation is committed the crime
committed is Robbery with Intentional Mutilation.
When by reason or on the occasion of robbery, Berious physical injuries is committed, the crime
committed is Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries.
Special complex crime of Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries -- this is committed when by
reason of or on the occasion of robbery, the victim became insane, imbecile or was seriously
injured.
>>>what if the physical injuries sustained is less serious? Covered ba? Ans: Yes under paragraph
4 which states that “if the violence or intimidation employed in the occasion of the robbery shall
have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the commission of the crime” ---- the
violence there could definitely cause less serious physical injuries.
Under paragraphs 1, 2, & 3 ---- the law says “by reason of or on occasion of” but this phrase is
not found in paragraph 4.
Pars. 1, 2 & 3 –because the law uses the phrase “by reason xxxxx” --- the violence may be
before, during & after the taking.
Pars. 4 & 5 --- the violence must be before or at least in the course of, the taking of the property.
“In the course of” is the same as “in the occasion of” --- not “by reason of”
SPI inflicted which falls under subdivisions 3 & 4 of Art. 263 --- the SPI must be inflicted before
or during the taking --- it should not be after.
But if SPI inflicted falls under subdivisions 1 & 2 of art. 263 then you are liable for robbery with
SPI punished under par. 1, 2, & 3.
Note: Any kind of killing by reason or on the occasion of robbery will bring about the special
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide. This is true even if the victim was murdered, or the
victims are two or more or even if the victim is less than 3 days old.
Important: But if the victim of robbery gives a fight and kills the robber in the process to protect
himself, this provision does not apply. It applies to the robbers who commit the crime.
Treachery can be Appreciated Only in Crimes against Persons: not Applicable in Robery
with Homicide
Problem: A, B and C committed robbery at the house of Angelica. When the robbers were about
to leave, A fired his gun to scare the members of the house. Unknown to him, the bullet hit
Jimmy who hid in the ceiling. What is the liability of A, B and C?
Ans: They are liable for Robbery with Homicide. The death of the victim was by reason or on the
occasion of robbery.
Problem: A, B and C committed robbery in the house of Angelica. In the course of the robbery,
A killed 5 occupants of the house. What is the crime committed by them?
Ans: A, B and C are liable for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. There is no such crime as
Robbery with Multiple Homicide. The term homicide is used in its generic sense to include
multiple homicide
Problem: A, B and C decided to rob a building. The building turned out to be a pension house.
There were different guests in the different rooms. They robbed six separate rooms and killed
separately the six occupants.
Ans: The crimes cannot be considered as separate counts of Robbery with Homicide. The robbers
were impelled by a single criminal intent to rob hence, there is only one count of robbery. This is
in accordance with the Single Larceny doctrine. The several homicides committed would only be
a part of a single robbery. They are liable for Robbery with Homicide.
Problem: A, B and C committed robbery in the house of Angelica. In the course of the robbery A
dropped his gun on the floor as a result of which the gun exploded killing Y, a guest.
Ans: There is no such crime as Robbery with Homicide resulting from Reckless Imprudence.
The crime is still Robbery with Homicide even if the killing may have resulted from negligence
or imprudence.
Problem: A, B and C committed robbery in the house of Angelica. In the course of the robbery,
A sat on the 2 day old baby of the house helper of Angelica who died as a result.
Ans: The crime committed is not Robbery with Infanticide because there is no such crime. The
crime is Robbery with Homicide. The word homicide is used in its generic sense to include any
kind of death.
Problem: A, B and C committed robbery in the house of X. They were chased by responding
policemen. In the course of the pursuit, a firefight ensued. As a result, A shot and killed a
policeman.
Ans: A, B and C are liable for Robbery with Homicide. The death of the policeman was by reason
or on the occasion of robbery.
Problem: A, B and C committed robbery in the house of X. After the robbery, the three went to
their hideout. In the course of the division of the loot, A wanted to have the lion's share. B
disagreed with him and they had a heated argument. In the course thereof, A shot B to death.
Ans: A is liable for Robbery with Homicide. The killing was still by reason of the robbery
committed. This is true even if the one killed is one of the robbers.
Problem: A, B and C committed robbery in the house of X. Randy, the father of X put up a fight.
He tried to wrestle the gun from the possession of A. The gun fired and hit a person who was
passing by was hit and killed.
Ans: A, B and C are liable for Robbery with Homicide. The death of the passerby was by reason or
on the occasion of robbery.
Problem: A, B and C committed robbery in the house of Angelica. Simeon, the houseboy of
Angelica put up a fight. He tried to wrest the gun from the hand of A. In the process, the gun fired
hitting A who died as a result.
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Ans: Simeon is not liable for Robbery with Homicide. His act was in accordance with law. The
crime applies to the robbers themselves. Thus, B and C are liable for Robbery with Homicide.
The death of their companion A was by reason or on the occasion of robbery.
When Robbery is Consummated but Homicide is Attempted or Frustrated, there are Two
Separate Crimes:
If the robbery is consummated but the homicide is attempted or frustrated there will be 2 separate
crimes. There is no such crime as Robbery with Attempted Homicide or Robbery with Frustrated
Homicide.
The crimes are robbery and attempted homicide or frustrated homicide as the case may be
Article 295. Robbery with physical injuries, committed in an uninhabited place and by a band, or with the
use of firearrm on a street, road or alley. — If the offenses mentioned in subdivisions three, four,
and five of the next preceding article shall have been committed in an uninhabited place or
by . band, or by attacking a moving train, street car, motor vehicle or airship, or by
entering the passengers' compartments in a train or, in any manner, taking the passengers
thereof by surprise in the respective conveyances, or on a street road, highway, or alley, and
the intimidation is made with the use f a firearm, the offender shall be punished by the
maximum period of the proper penalties. (As amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 2 and 373.)
In the same cases, the penalty next higher in degree shall e imposed upon the leader of the
band. (As amended by Rep. cts Nos. 12 and 373.)
How is Art. 295 applied? --- you committed robbery defined in par. 3 and it is by a band? ---
becomes a qualifying circumstance. So, if it is a qualifying circumstance, it cannot be offset by
any ordinary aggravating circumstance.
Article 296. Definition of a band and penalty incurred by the members thereof. — When more than
three armed malefactors take part in the commission of a robbery, it shall be deemed to
have been committed by a band. When any of the arms used in the commission of the
offense be an unlicensed firearm, the penalty to be imposed upon all the malefactors shall
be the maximum of the corresponding penalty provided by law, without prejudice to the
criminal liability for illegal possession of such unlicensed firearms.
Any member of a band who is present at the commission of a robbery by the band, shall be
punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by the band, unless it be shown that
he attempted to prevent the same. (As amended by R.A. No. 12.)
Q: What if there are 6 malefactors but only 2 are armed? Is there robbery by a band?
A: NO --- there is no robbery by a band.
Article 297. Attempted and frustrated robbery committed under certain circumstances. — When by
reason or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated robbery a homicide is committed, the
person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period
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to reclusion perpetua, unless the homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty under the
provisions of this Code.
>>>>this is a special complex crime known as Attempted or Frustrated Robbery with Homicide
>>>Attempted robbery with homicide is committed when the killing the victim was merely
incidental to and an off-shoot of the plan to carry out the robbery which, however, was not
consummated because of the resistance of the deceased --- PP vs Dio, 130 SCRA 151
Notes:
* When the robbery is attempted or frustrated, Art. 294 has no application because the robbery
and the homicide must be both consummated.
* Where the homicide is only attempted or frustrated, Article 297 does not apply. In the same
manner, where the attempted or frustrated robbery results in the commission of serious physical
injuries, Article 297 has no application. In such a case, the crime shall be treated under the
provisions of Article 48 on ordinary complex crimes. Consequently, the penalty prescribed by
Article 48 shall be observed.
Article 298. Execution of deeds by means of violence or intimidation. — Any person who, with intent
to defraud another, by means of violence or intimidation, shall compel him to sign, execute
or deliver any public instrument or document, shall be held guilty of robbery and punished
by the penalties respectively prescribed in this Chapter.
In robbery under this Article, such fear us produced by threatening to cause an evil or damage
which is immediate.
Article 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public builder edifice devoted to worship. — Any armed
person who shall commit robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice
devoted to religious worship, shall be punished ?elusion temporal, if the value of the property
taken shall exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000) and if —
(a) The malefactors shall enter the house or building in which the robbery was
committed, by any of the following ns:
1. Through an opening not intended for entrance or egress;
2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or window;
3. By using false keys, picklocks or similar tools;
4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public authority.
Or if —
(b) The robbery be committed under any of the follow- circumstances:
1. By the breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of locked or sealed
furniture or receptacle;
2. By taking such furniture or objects to be broken or forced open outside the place of the
robbery.
When the offenders do not carry arms and the value of the property taken exceeds
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000), the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed.
The same rule shall be applied when the offenders are armed, but the value of the
property taken does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000).
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When said offenders do not carry arms and the value of the property taken does not
exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000), they shall suffer the penalty prescribed in the two
next preceding paragraphs, in its minimum period.
If the robbery is committed in one of the dependencies of an inhabited house, public building, or
building dedicated to religious worship, the penalties next lower in degree than those prescribed in this
article shall be imposed. (As amended by R.A. No. 10951.)
Discussion:
“Through an opening not intended for entrance or egress” ---- meaning --- you must enter a
building.
Q: Suppose you saw car being parked, nobody is around and so with the use of force, you
forcibly removed the knob, you removed the stereo, the tires, etc. Will you be liable for robbery?
A: NO, only for Theft. Why? Although you use force in removing the things inside the car but
you did not enter any building. A car is not a building.
Q: Where the accused broke the show window without entering the building but merely
introduced his hand & abstracted the watch. What crime is committed?
A: There is no robbery because he did not enter the building.
Under the law, when you make an entry through the window ---- even if you do not employ force
as the window is open --- the law calls it a “constructive force” upon things.
Take Note: The entry is what matters and not the exit. For example, you entered through the
window and exited through the door. Is there robbery? Ans: Yes, because what is important is
that the entry was through the window which is an opening not intended for entrance.
The law cares on how did you get in and not on how did you get out. Like---you entered through
the door and exited through the window --- there is no robbery but only theft.
How about fire exit door? --- misulod ka---is there robbery? Ans: YES. ---fire exit is not intended
for ordinary egress and ingress.
“By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or window” ---the accused used a
saw in opening the wall of a store through which they entered and took the clothes.
>>>the door is closed so that you cannot enter the house, you destroyed the door --- this is actual
force ---literal –robbery yan.
Problem: The accused entered a church while open and remained inside until it was closed for the
night, then took valuable objects & destroyed the lock of the door to get out, ---theft not robbery
is committed.
Prying a sliding door from its groove where entrance was effected is not breaking. The words
“breaking of a door or window” imply more than the mere “forcing of a door or window”. Also,
the act of removing sliding door constitutes theft and not robbery, which requires the actual
breaking or opening of a door or window.
What if it is the padlock that is being destroyed? Ans: No robbery – padlock is not part of the
door – it is a detachable gadget.
What if it is a lock that is destroyed? Ans: Robbery because it is permanently attached to the
door.
The door referred to here must be an outside the door not inside door ----Main door or Back door.
Example: The door of the house is open – you did not break anything. You want to enter the
bedroom --- but is locked, so you destroyed the door for you to enter the bedroom. ---There is no
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robbery here. The door that should be broken must be an outside door ---pultahan pasulod dili
pultahan padulong pasolod.
“By using false keys, picklocks or similar tools” ---- False keys—see art. 305
>>>genuine keys stolen from the owner ---false key- not literal.
>>False key – it is a key used to enter the house not the rooms inside the house.
“By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public authority”
Example: Accused representing themselves to be detectives were able to enter the establishment
of the offended party & once inside, one of the them feigned taking a revolver from his belt and
ordered the victim to turn over all the money he had. What crime was committed? Ans: Robbery
because they were able to enter the establishment by simulating public authority.
“By taking such furniture or objects to be broken or forced open outside the place of the
robbery”
>>>>the object must be taken from inside the house to be broken outside.
>>>>>If the object is found outside & then you break open --- there is no robbery but
Theft.
Is it necessary that the object actually be broken opened? Ans: NO, it is sufficient that it is taken
away.
When you take the receptacle inside and bring it outside for the purpose of opening it, even if you
did not actually break it open the receptacle, still robbery under par. 2 is committed because it is
not the opening which will make it consummated --- it is the taking.
>>the value of the property taken >> the value taken should be
is irrelevant considered in the determination of
the proper penalty.
>>As long as there is violence, >> Not every force use upon thing
the crime is robbery whether will make the taking of property
the victim died or merely injured. Robbery.
Article 300. Robbery in an uninhabited place and by a band. — The robbery mentioned in the next
preceding article, if committed in an uninhabited place and by a band, shall be punished by
the maximum period of the penalty provided therefor.
When robbery with force upon things is committed in an uninhabited place and by a band, the
robbery becomes qualified. In the same manner, where robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons is committed by a band or in an uninhabited place, the crime becomes
qualified.
The place is considered uninhabited when it is not used as a dwelling. It may refer to a building
or a house which is not used as a dwelling. A warehouse is a good example of a building or a
place which is not inhabited.
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If a house is inhabited and its owners or occupants temporarily left the place to take a short
vacation in another place, their casual absence will not make the place or house uninhabited (U.S.
vs. Ventura, 39 Phil. 523).
A garage may also be classified as a dependency. However, it must be incorporated to the main
house or building in such a manner that entry to the garage would give an intruder free access to
all parts of the house or building. If the garage is maintained as an independent unit or entity and
is used only for such purpose without it having the nomenclature of a house or building, the
forcible entry to the same will not constitute force upon things as would categorize the act done
as robbery.
As earlier intimated, the force upon things must be employed in order to enter a building or a
house. If the force is employed not on a building or a house but on a garage, such force assumes
no legal significance as it will convert the acct committed to robbery with the use of force upon
things.
Article 301. What is an inhabited house, public building or building dedicated to religious
worship and their dependencies. — Inhabited house means any shelter, ship or vessel
constituting the dwelling of one or more persons, even though the inhabitants thereof shall
temporarily be absent therefrom when the robbery is committed.
All interior courts, corrals, warehouses, granaries, barns, coach-houses, stables, or
other departments, or inclosed places contiguous to the building or edifice, having an inte-
rior entrance connected therewith and which form part of the whole, shall be deemed
dependencies of an inhabited house, public building or building dedicated to religious wor-
ship.
Orchards and other lands used for cultivation or production are not included in the
terms of the next preceding paragraph, even if closed, contiguous to the building, and
having direct connection therewith.
The term "public building" includes every building owned by the Government or
belonging to a private person but used or rented by the Government, although temporarily
unoccupied by the same.
What is a public building? It includes every building owned by the government. It may also
include private buildings which are used or rented by the government.
What is an inhabited house? When a house or building is used as a dwelling place, meaning
where one stays for comfort and rest or where he keeps his family and enjoys the amenities of
life, the house or building is considered a dwelling place. His temporary absence in the premises
will not detract from nor affect the nature of the premises as being inhabited.
Q: But you entered the house, no one is there because everybody is in the province? --- Is it still
robbery in an inhabited place?
A: Yes. “The crime is robbery in an inhabited house since the building was used as a dwelling,
although there was no one actually present in the house at the time of the robbery. Such casual
absence cannot bring the crime within the classisification of robbery in an uninhabited place for
the reason was ordinarily inhabited and intended as a dwelling, the inhabitants of which might
have suffered bodily harm during the commission of the crime. It is on this account that the penal
law punishes more severely the robbery of a house used as a dwelling than that committed in an
uninhabited place (US vs Ventura, 39 Phil. 523)
1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening not intended for entrance
or egress;
2. If any wall, roof, floor or outside door or window has been broken;
3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of false keys, picklocks, or other
similar tools;
4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or receptacle has
been broken;
5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, has
been removed, even if the same be broken open elsewhere.
When the value of the property taken does not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000),
the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed.
In the cases specified in Articles 294, 295, 297, 299, 300, and 302 of this Code, when the
property taken is mail matter or large cattle, the offender shall suffer the penalties next
higher in degree than those provided in said articles. (As amended by RA 10951)
In this article, the offender enters a building which is not inhabited as it is not being used
as a dwelling house, a public building nor an edifice devoted to religious worship. In entering the
building the entrance is effected in the following manner enumerated in this article.
More often, when robbery is committed, it is either through the use of force upon person
or upon things. However, this article deals on other forms of robbery committed without the use
of force. So, when entry into a building is done through an opening not intended for the purpose
and personal belongings are taken therefrom with intent to gain, the crime of robbery is
committed even though no force was employed upon things. Likewise, when the entry to a build-
ing is done with the use of a false key, picklock or other similar tools, the crime of robbery is
committed although no force was used against things.
What is an inhabited house? It is any structure used as shelter, or a ship or vessel constituting the
dwelling of one or more persons. It also refers to the place used as residence, domicile or where
one takes his rest and comfort.
In a case decided by the Supreme Court, it was held that a freight car is not a building.
The legal significance of this ruling cannot be overemphasized for in this case, the offender
forcibly removed the strip of cloth placed over the door of the freight and thereafter abstracted
sacks of sugar contained in the freight car. The Supreme Court ruled that the crime committed is
only theft, not robbery because although there was force upon things, the same was not employed
against a building (People vs. Jaranilla, 55 SCRA 563).
Article 303. Robbery of cereals, fruits, or firewood in an uninhabited place or private building.
— In the cases enumerated in Articles 299 and 302, when the robbery consists in the taking
of cereals, fruits, or firewood, the culprit shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than
that prescribed in said articles.
>>>>this is another example of robbery with force upon things because the article refers to Art.
299 and Art. 302.
“ceral” ---semilla --- for seedling purposes--- It does not include hulled rice. It may include palay
or unhulled palay.
While the law uses the term uninhabited place, it however refers to uninhabited building
and its dependencies. If the cereals, fruits or firewood were taken outside a building and its
dependencies, the crime committed would only be theft even though the taking was done in an
uninhabited place.
So, if what was taken in the bodega are sacks of rice? --- you cannot use Art. 303 but Art. 302 ---
because what the law contemplates is for seedling purposes.
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Article 304. Possession of picklocks or similar tools. — Any person who shall, without lawful
cause, have in his possession picklocks or similar tools specially adopted to the commission
of the crime of robbery, shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who shall make such tools. If the
offender be a locksmith he shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.
The crime of illegal possession of picklocks or similar tools has two important elements:
1. The possession of picklocks or similar tools must have only one purpose, that is, to use
the same for the commission of robbery; and
2. The possessor has no legal reason or lawful cause to possess the tools in question.
>>Mere possession being preparatory acts are generally not punishable except Art. 304.
>>>Actual use of the pick locks or tools is not necessary to constitute illegal possession thereof.
>>>The law also prohibits the manufacture or fabrication of such tools. If the manufacturer or
maker or locksmith himself is the offender, a higher penalty is prescribed by law.
Supposing that in the crime of robbery, the offender used a picklock to enter a building. Can he
be charged of illegal possession of picklocks or similar tools? The answer is NO since the same
posses- on of these tools is already absorbed in the graver crime of robbery.
“Carnapping” is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without
the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force
upon things.
Any vehicle which is motorized using the streets which are public, not exclusively for private use
is covered within the concept of motor vehicle under the Anti-Carnapping Law. A tricycle which
is not included in the enumeration of exempted vehicles under the Carnapping Law is deemed to
be motor vehicle as defined in the law, the stealing of which comes within its penal sanction
(Izon vs People, 107 SCRA 118)
If the vehicle uses the streets with or without the required license, the same comes within the
protection of the law, for the severity of the offense is not to be measured by what kind of street
or highway the same is used but by the nature of the vehicle itself and the case to which it is
devoted. ---tricycle is covered (Izon, et al., vs. People, 107 SCRA 118)
“Section 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term
is defined in Section two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be
punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than
seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or
intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen
years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of
life imprisonment to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
motor vehicle is killed in the commission of the carnapping.”
Elements of Carnapping:
Considering the phraseology of amended Section 14 of RA 6539, the carnapping and killing (or
the rape) may be considered a single or indivisible or a special complex crime which, however, is
not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. As such, the killing (or the rape) merely
qualifies the crime of carnapping which for lack of specific nomenclature may be known as
qualified carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated form.
Since Section 14 of RA 6539 uses the words "IS KILLED" no distinction must be made
between homicide and murder.
Whether it is one or the other, is committed, in the course of carnapping or on the occasion
thereof makes no difference insofar is the penalty is concerned. It follows then that the killing of
the driver, whether it be homicide or murder — cannot be treated as a separate offense, but they
should only be considered to quality the crime of carnapping.
Article 305. False keys. — The term "false keys" shall be deemed to include:
Article 306. Who are brigands — Penalty. — When more than three armed persons form a
band of robbers for the purpose of committing robbery in the highway, or kidnapping
persons for the purpose of extortion to obtain ransom or for any other purpose to be
attained by means of force and violence, they shall be deemed highway robbers or brigands.
Persons found guilty of this offense shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium period
to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the act or acts committed by them are not
punishable by higher penalties, in which case, they shall suffer such high penalties.
If any of the arms carried by any of said persons be an unlicensed firearm, it shall be
presumed that said persons are highway robbers or brigands, and in case of conviction, the
penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period.
Elements of brigandage:
Presumption of Brigandage:
When band was discussed under Article 14, it was made clear that band must consist of more
than three armed men. So, in the crime of robbery in band, the robbery must necessarily be
committed by at least four armed men.
PD 532
The object of PD 532 is to deter and punish lawless elements who commit acts of depredation
upon persons and properties of innocent, and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to
another which acts constitute either piracy or highway robbery/brigandage. It is directed against
acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person on Philippine highways
and not those committed against a predetermined or particular victim. Accordingly, a robbery
committed on a Philippine highway by persons who are not members of the prescribed lawless
elements or directed only against a specific, intended or preconceived victim, is not a violation of
PD 532. (People v. Laurente, G.R. No. 116734, March 29, 1996)
Illustration: Arthur is a drug dependent. To sustain his vice, he resorts to unlawful acts or
activities. He stood by a dark portion of Marcos Highway. Not long after, two young boys passed
by. Arthur accosted them and at the point of a knife, he divested them of their wallets and
watches. Arthur is liable for Brigandage. He committed an indiscriminate highway robbery. A
single person can now commit Brigandage under the contemplation of PD 532.
Problem: Anna went to Banco de Oro to withdraw money. Unknown to her, she was followed
secretly by X and Y. After she made the withdrawal, Anna rode on her car and drove towards
Diversion Road. X and Y boarded their car and chased Anna. At a junction in Ma-a Road, X and
Y blocked the path of Anna which forced her to stop. Thereupon, X and Y got the money of
Anna by means of intimidation. What crime did X and Y commit? Are they liable for
Brigandage? Why?
Ans: James and Thomas committed robbery with intimidation. They are not liable for Brigandage
because under the Iaw brigandage is indiscriminate highway robbery. In the case at bar, the
victim of the robbery was predetermined.
* The primary object on the law on brigandage is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers.
Hence, if the formed band commits robbery with the use of force upon persons or force upon
things, their criminal liability shall be limited to the commission of such crimes.
(1) Highway Robbery under PD 532 is committed indiscriminately against persons while
ordinary Robbery under the RPC committed on a highway is committed against prede-
termined victims;
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(2) Under PD 532 the offender is a brigand who roams in public highways and carries out his
robbery in public highways. It is ordinary robbery under the RPC when the commission
of the robbery is only incidental and the offender is not a brigand.
Mere Fact that Robbery was Committed on A Philippine Highway does not give Rise to
Highway Robbery or Brigandage under PD 532.
"It would be absurd to adopt a liberal interpretation that any unlawful taking of property
committed in the highway would be covered by highway robbery or brigandage. It is an
elementary rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law should not be
subordinated to the letter thereof.
Thus, if a motor vehicle either stationary or moving on a highway is forcibly taken, the
crime is not covered by PD 532. The crime is still Carnapping and the Anti-Carnapping Law applies.
And if the subject matter of the unlawful asportation is a large cat tle, the crime is Cattle
Hustling and the anti-Cattle Rustling Law applies and not PD 532. (People v. Puno, 219 SCRA
85)
Article 307. Aiding and abetting a band of brigands. — Any person knowingly and in any
manner aiding, abetting, or protecting a band of brigands as described in the next
preceding article, or giving them information of the movements of the police or other peace
officers of the Government (or of the forces of the United States Army, when the latter are
acting in aid of the Government), or acquiring or receiving the property taken by such
brigands, shall be punished by prision orreccional in its medium period to prision mayor in
its minimum period.
It shall be presumed that the person performing any of the acts provided in this
article has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
----repealed by PD 532 Section 4---the person aiding brigands or abetting brigandage is now
punished as an accomplice to the principal offender.
The article provides for the crime known as Aiding or abetting brigandage.
SECTION 1. x x x
SEC. 5. Repealing Clause. — Pertinent portions of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the
Revised Penal Code, and all laws, decrees, or orders or instructions, or parts thereof, insofar as
they are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Presidential Decree No. 532 which punished brigandage is not inconsistent with Article 306 of
the Revised Penal Code and therefore is not deemed to have repealed but has only modified the
latter. Under the Revised Penal Code, mere conspiracy of more than three armed persons forming
a band of robbers for the purpose of committing a robbery in the highway, or kidnapping persons
for the purpose of extortion or to obtain ransom for any other purpose is brigandage. The Code
calls these offenders highway robbers or brigands. The gist of the offense is the formation of a
band for any of the purposes indicated in the law. If, for example, a group often armed men were
arrested roaming in a public highway for the purpose of kidnapping persons for ransom, they are
already liable for brigandage under Article 306. On the other hand, if the kidnapping for ransom
in the highway is actually committed, then Presidential Decree No. 532 will apply. The decree
does not punish mere conspiracy to constitute the offense of brigandage. Under the decree, the
offenders need not constitute a band
>>The situation that would call for the application of PD 532 is that ---highway robbers or
brigands –mag atang sa highway – they will rob anybody that passes --- mura ba ug to whom it
may concern.
* Brigandage under Presidential Decree No. 532 refers to the actual commission of the robbery
on the highway and can be committed by one person alone. It is this brigandage which deserves
some attention because not any robbery in a highway is brigandage or highway robbery. A
distinction should be made between highway robbery/brigandage under the decree and ordinary
robbery committed on a highway under the Revised Penal Code.
* In People v. Puno, decided February 17, 1993, the trial court convicted the accused of highway
robbery/ brigandage under Presidential Decree No. 532 and sentenced them to reclusion
perpetua. On appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment and found the accused guilty of
simple robbery as punished in Article 294 (5), in relation to Article 295, and sentenced them
accordingly. The Supreme Court pointed out that the purpose of brigandage “is, inter alia,
indiscriminate highway robbery. And that PD 532 punishes as highway robbery or Brigandage
only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on a
Philippine highway as defined therein, not acts committed against a predetermined or particular
victim”. A single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by the offender as his
specific victim, even if committed on a highway, is not highway robbery or brigandage.
* In US v. Feliciano, 3 Phil. 422, it was pointed out that highway robbery or brigandage is more
than ordinary robbery committed on a highway. The purpose of brigandage is indiscriminate
robbery in highways. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery or
robbery in band, if there are at least four armed participants.
police so that the group can commit highway robbery with impunity. X is liable for Abetting
brigandage. He gives the brigands information about the movements of the police
Article 308. Who are liable for theft. — Theft is committed by any person who, with intent
to gain but without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall
take personal property of another without the latter's consent.
ELEMENTS:
5. That the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things.
Under the article, the offender can commit theft in four ways:
1) When, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor
force upon things, he takes personal property belonging to another without the latter's
consent.
2) When he has found lost property and fails to deliver the same to the local authorities or to
its owner.
3) When he has maliciously damaged the property of another and thereafter removes or
makes use of the fruits or object of the damaged property.
>>>>this is more or less similar to robbery EXCEPT for the fact that personal property is taken
without violence against or intimidation.
“unlawful taking” ---- when is there taking? When is taking complete? Ans: This is complete
upon the material occupation of the thing by the offender and placing it unde his control with
ability to dispose it.
In the crime of theft, the law makes use only of the term "taking" and not "taking away." The
non-inclusion of the word "away" is significant because it means that as soon as the culprit takes
possession of the thing taken by him, the crime of theft is already consummated since the law
does not require that the thief be able to carry away the thing taken from the owner (People vs.
Jaranilla, 55 SCRA 563).
In Jain vs IAC, September 21, 1984 --- SC: that the condition sine qua non for theft to be
committed is there must be physical handling of personal property.
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In one case, the accused was a truck driver who was suspected to be responsible for the loss of
bed sheets contained in boxes while the same were in transit from the bodega to the point of
destination. Without the suspect's knowledge, a detective was hired to pose as another truck
helper. So, while boxes of bed sheets were again being delivered to prospective customers, the
undercover agent witnessed how the accused dumped to the ground one box containing 120
bedsheets. The accused was charged with the consummated crime of theft. During the trial, he
maintained that he is liable only for attempted or frustrated theft, and not for consummated theft
since he was not able to perform all the acts of execution as provided under Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Supreme Court held that in the legal sense, the consummation of the
crime of theft takes place upon the voluntary and malicious taking of the property belonging to
another which is realized by the material occupation of the thing. The property need not be
actually taken away by the thief. It is enough that he has obtained, at some particular moment,
complete control and possession of the thing desired, adverse to the right of the lawful owner
(People vs. Naval, 46 O.G. 2641).
The accused received from an Igorot a bar of gold to be examined for its intrinsic value
by a silversmith. While in possession of the gold bar, accused sold the same to another and
appropriated the value thereof. In this case, since accused received the property from its owner,
its taking is lawful. Yet he was convicted of theft. Why? Because the possession by the accused
of the gold bar was purely physical. What was transferred to him was merely material possession
of the property. The owner retained juridical possession of the thing (U.S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil.
1000).
Juridical possession of a thing is transferred to another when he receives the thing in trust
or on commission or for administration, or under a quasi-contract or a contract of bailment. When
possession by the offender is under any of these circumstances and he misappropriates the thing
received, he cannot be held guilty of theft but of estafa because here, he has both the physical and
juridical possession of the property.
“Intent to Gain”-“personal property must belong to another” --- intent to gain is presumed from
the unlawful taking of personal property belonging to another.
“gain” – the acquisition of a thing useful to the purpose of life. In includes the benefit which in
any other sense may be derived or expected from the act performed.
“when there is a color of title to the taking of the property, there is no theft –because there is
absence of intent to gain.
“without the consent of the owner” --- A attended a mass inside a church – he was kneeling—the
thief took his wallet from his pocket and A felt it. He was aware/he knew that somebody is
taking his wallet but he does not want to disturb the proceeding. Prosecuted for theft---the
defense is ---- there was consent on the part of A when he took the wallet from his pocket because
he was aware, he has the knowledge eh. SC: The law uses the word “without the latter’s consent”
and “not without the latter’s knowledge”. You may have the knowledge that your property is
taken but it does not mean that it has your consent.
“Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local
authorities or to its owner”
Under the present Code, it is not necessary that the owner of the lost property be known
to the accused. What is important is that he knows or has reason to know that the property was
lost and for this fact alone, it is his duty to turn it over to the authorities. If he does otherwise,
like, if he sells the thing to another, then the crime of theft is committed.
Essential elements: (1) the time of the seizure of the property (b) that it was a lost property
belonging to another (c) that the accused having the chance to deliver the same to the owner or
local authorities refrain himself from doing so.
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The word "lost" is used in the generic sense. It embraces loss by stealing or by any act of
a person other than the owner, as well as the act of the owner, or through some casual occurrence
(People vs.Rlodrigo, 16 SCRA 475).
The felony is not limited to the actual finder. Theft of a lost property may be committed
even by a person who is not the actual finder. In People vs. Avila, 44 Phil. 720, the wife of Lucio
Pilares left in a caretela, a purse containing money and other valuables with a total value of
P4,500.00. The purse was found by the rig driver. Leaning from the papers contained in the purse,
that its owner was one Mrs. Pilares, the rig driver gave the purse to Avila, a police officer, for the
latter to turn it over to Pilares. But Avila did not return the purse to its owner and instead
appropriated the same for his personal benefit. The Supreme Court held that: Avila is guilty of
theft even though he was not the original finder. The word "finding" in Art. 308 includes not only
the original finder but also the person to whom the original finder gave the lost object. --- the
policeman here is considered as the “finder in law”.
If you find something while walking in Abreeza, do not keep it – do not believe on the principle
of: “FINDER’S KEEPER” – you must turn over the thing to the autohorities.
Art. 719 of the Civil Code. Whoever finds a movable, w/c is not treasure, mast return it to its
previous possessor. If the latter is unknown, the finder shall immediately deposit it w/ the mavor
of the citv or municipality where the finding has taken place.
The finding shall be publicly announce by the mator for 2 consecutive weeks in the way he deems
it best.
If the movable cannot be kept w/o detrioration, or w/o expenses w/c considerably diminish its
value, it shall be sold at public aution 8 days after the publication.
Six months from the publication having elapsed w/o the owner having appeared, the thing found,
or its value, shall be awarded to the finder. The finder and the owner shall be obliged, as the case
may be. to reimburse the expenses
“Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove
or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and”
>>>where a cow entered the offender’s plantation and was killed. Its meat was then appropriated
and distributed ----THEFT under PD 533, the crime would be cattle rustling.
Cattle Rustling and Qualified Theft of Large Cattle – The crime of cattle-rustling is defined
and punished under Presidential Decree No. 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling law of 1974, as the
taking by any means, method or scheme, of any large cattle, with or without intent to gain and
whether committed with or without violence against or intimidation of person or force upon
things, so long as the taking is without the consent of the owner/breed thereof. The crime
includes the killing or taking the meat or hide of large cattle without the consent of the owner.
Since the intent to gain is not essential, the killing or destruction of large cattle, even without
taking any part thereof, is not a crime of malicious mischief but cattle-rustling.
The Presidential Decree, however, does not supersede the crime of qualified theft of large cattle
under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, but merely modified the penalties provided for theft
of large cattle and, to that extent, amended Articles 309 and 310. Note that the overt act that
gives rise to the crime of cattle-rustling is the taking or killing of large cattle . Where the large
cattle was not taken, but received by the offender from the owner/overseer thereof, the crime is
not cattle-rustling; it is qualified theft of large cattle.
Theft of damaged property occurs only after the accused has committed the crime of malicious
mischief. In malicious mischief, the offender destroys the property of another because of hatred,
resentment or other evil motive against the owner. So, a neighbor who shoots and kills a goat
which has destroyed his flower plants and thereafter slaughters and eats the meat of the
wandering goat is guilty of theft.
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In this case, what is considered as the fruit or object of the property damaged is the meat of the
goat. So when the offender, after committing malicious mischief, makes use of the fruits or object
of his crime, he becomes liable for the crime of theft.
“Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or
which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the
same or shall gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm products” ----mere entrance is not
enough –trespass but you must hunt fish --- so that it will become theft.
The entrance to an enclosed estate where the prohibition is obvious and manifest is a crime
by itself. This is punished under Article 281 of the Revised Penal Code. If the offender, while
inside, hunts, fish or gathers fruits or other forest products therein, he will be liable for the crime
of theft. He does not commit the complex crime of trespass with theft since the act of trespass is
absorbed in the crime of theft as suggested by the language of the article involved.
Fishing under this article must not be done in a fishpond. If the fishing is done in a
fishpond, then the crime committed is qualified theft under Article 310.
Illustration: X left his bag on the table and went to make an additional order at the counter of a
Jollibee stall. Y got the bag of X and ran away with it. Y is liable for theft. He took the bag of X
without the knowledge or consent of X.
Illustration: X was on his way home. Along the way, he saw a brown envelope at the edge of the
road. He picked up and opened the envelope. It contained P50,000.00, credit cards, identification
cards and passport belonging to Y. He did not return the items to Y nor deliver the same to the
authorities. X is liable for theft. Finders are not keepers. Finders of lost properties have the duty
to deliver them to the owner if known or to the local authorities if not known. In the instant case,
X kept the lost items for himself.
Illustration: The hen of X entered the backyard of Y and destroyed the plants of the latter. Y got
mad and shot the hen with his air rifle. He got the hen, cooked it and had it as dinner. Y is liable
for theft because damaging or killing the property of another made use of the object of the
damage caused by him. But if he did not take the hen, he is liable for Malicious Mischief under Art.
327. He destroyed a property belonging to another because of hate, revenge or other evil motive
Article 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
“1. The penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than One million two hundred thousand pesos
(₱1,200,000) but does not exceed Two million two hundred thousand pesos
(₱2,200,000); but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the
penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and
one (1) year for each additional One million pesos (₱1,000,000), but the total of the
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty (20) years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
“2. The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if
the value of the thing stolen is more than Six hundred thousand pesos (₱600,000)
but does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000).
“3. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if
the value of the property stolen is more than Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000) but
does not exceed Six hundred thousand pesos (₱600,000).
“4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisión correccional in its minimum
period, if the value of the property stolen is over Five thousand pesos (₱5,000) but
does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000).
“5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over Five hundred pesos
(₱500) but does not exceed Five thousand pesos (₱5,000).
210
“6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not
exceed Five hundred pesos (₱500).
“7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000), if
the theft is committed under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the
next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed Five
hundred pesos (₱500). If such value exceeds said amount, the provisions of any of
the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
“8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine of not exceeding Five
thousand pesos (₱5,000), when the value of the thing stolen is not over Five
hundred pesos (₱500), and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of
hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself
or his family.” (As amended by RA 10951)
Things to remember:
b) If the property has some value but it is not proven with reasonable certainty, the minimum
penalty shall be imposed under par. 6 of Art. 309 (People vs. Reyes, 58 Phil. 964).
c)When there is no evidence as to the value of the property stolen, the court is allowed to take
judicial knowledge of the value of such property (People vs. dela Cruz, 43 O.G. 3206). ---
imposed the minimum penalty under par. 6 of Art. 309
d)When the resulting penalty for the accessory to the crime of theft has no medium period, the
court can impose the penalty which is found favorable to the accused (Cristobal vs. People, 84
Phil. 473).
Article 310. Qualified theft. — The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next
higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in tfienext preceding article, if
committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property
stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond, or fishery, or if a property is taken on
the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity,
vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Big. 71, approved
May 1, 1980.)
---it has the same element in Art. 308 but in addition one of the qualifying circumstances
enumerated in this article 310 is present.
* In the case of abuse of confidence, the latter must be “grave” in order to comply with the
requirement of the law because abuse of confidence is not enough. There must be an allegation in
the information that there is a relation between the accused and the offended party wherein the
latter confided his security as to his person, life and property to the accused with such degree of
confidence and that the accused abused the same.
* Abuse of confidence is determined from the trust reposed by the offended party to the offender .
It may also refer to the nature of the work of the offender which must necessarily involve trust
and confidence.
* Abuse of confidence is also an element of estafa. To avoid confusion between theft with abuse
of confidence (qualified theft) and estafa with abuse of confidence, where the offender
misappropriates a thing after he receives it from the victim, the student must remember that in
qualified theft, only the physical or material possession of the thing is transferred. If the offender
acquires the juridical as well as the physical possession of the thing and he misappropriates it,
the crime committed is estafa. Juridical possession of the thing is acquired when one holds the
thing in trust, or on commission, or for administration or under any other obligation involving the
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duty to deliver or to return the thing received. If the possession of the offender is not under any of
these concepts, the crime is qualified theft.
* Where only the material possession is transferred, conversion of the property gives rise to the
crime of theft. Where both the material and juridical possession is transferred, misappropriation
of the property would constitute estafa. When the material and juridical possession of the thing
transfers ownership of the property to the possessor, any misappropriation made by the possessor
will not result in the commission of any crime, either for theft of estafa.
Qualified: if done by one who has access to place where stolen property is kept e.g., guards,
tellers
Frustrated Theft ---no such crime---- Valenzuela vs People, June 21, 2007 (en banc)
(1) There is rampant robbery and thievery of government and private properties;
(2) Such robbery and thievery have become profitable on the part of the lawless elements
because of the existence of ready buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen
properties;
(3) A fence can be prosecuted only as an accessory;
(4) It is imperative to impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the
crimes of robbery and theft.
"It is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy,
receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other
manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known
to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."
(b) Accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime, buys, receives, possess,
keeps, acquires, conceals, or disposes or buys and sells or in any manner deals in any article, item
object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of said crime;
© The accused knows or should have known that said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
(d) There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
Q: Riza is engaged in the buy and sell of used garments, more popularly known as "ukay- ukay."
Among the items found by the police in a raid of her store in Baguio City were brand-new LV
Bag. Riza was charged with "fencing." Will the charge prosper? Why or why not? BAR Q.
[2010]
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Ans: Yes, provided the prosecution can prove that Riza knew or should have known that said item
had been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
Q: ARE THE CRIMES OF ROBBERY AND THEFT SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM
FENCING?
A: The crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are separate and
distinct offenses. Under P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held liable as an
accessory, as the term is defined in Art. 19 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty applicable to
an accessory is obviously light under the rules prescribed in Arts. 53, 55, and 57 of the Revised
Penal Code, subject to the qualification set forth in Art. 60 thereof.
Noting, however, the reports from law enforcement agencii'N that "there is rampant robbery and
thievery of government and private properties" and that "such robbery and thievery have beconw
profitable on the part of the lawless elements because of the existence of ready buyers, commonly
known as fence, of stolen properties," P.I), No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy penalties on
persons who profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft"
Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and thefl could be prosecuted as such under the
Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, he ceases to be a mere
accessory but becomes a principal in the crime of fencing. Elsewi.sc stated, the crimes of robbery
and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are separate and distinct offenses. The state
may thus choose to prosecute him either under the Revised Penal Code or P.D. No. 1612,
although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable considering that fencing is a malum
prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing and prescribes a higher- penalty
based on the value of the property. (Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, 234 SCRA 63 [1994])
a) A fence is punished as a principal under P.D. No. 1612 and the penalty is higher,
whereas an accessory to robbery or theft under the Revised Penal Code is punished
two degrees lower than the principal as a general rule.
b) Fencing is a malum prohibitum and therefore there is no need to prove criminal intent
of the accused. Good faith is not a defense. In accessory to robbery or theft under the
Revised Penal Code, intent is an element of the crime and therefore, good faith is a
proper defense.
c) All the acts of one who is an accessory to the crimes of robbery or theft are included
in the acts defined as fencing. Corollarily, the accessory in the crimes of robbery or
theft could be prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or as a fence under
P.D. No. 1612.
Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot
penetrate the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is contained therein, it must
determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that person. And given two equally
plausible states of cognition or mental awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains
the constitutional presumption of innocence. (Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, 234 SCRA 63 [1994])
Fencing is malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of
fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything
of value which has been the subject of robbery or theft, and prescribes a higher penalty based on
the value of the property. The stolen property subject of the charge is not indispensable to prove
fencing. It is merely corroborative of the testimonies and other evidence adduced by the
prosecution to prove the crime of fencing. (Francisco v. People, 434 SCRA 122 [2004])
In Dumlao, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 788 (1996), the Court notes that the stolen
articles were found displayed on petitioner's shelves inside his compound. It went on to say that if
petitioner were merely keeping the farrowing crates and G.I. pipes for the men aboard the jeep,
why did he display them?
Presidential Decree No. 1612 (The Anti-Fencing Law): Intent to Gain is not an Element
Mere possession of any article or object which are the proceeds of theft or robbery is
prima facie evidence of fencing.
Intent to gain need not be proved in crimes punishable by a special law such as PD 1612.
Further, the law does not inquire proof of purchase of the stolen articles by practitioner, as mere
possession thereof is enough to give rise to a presumption of fencing. (Dumlao, Sr. v. CA, G.R.
No. 11343, August 22, 1996)
Fencing is not a continuing offense. The offender may be prosecuted at the place where
he took hold of the property and not at the place of the commission of the theft or Robbery.
A: Sec. 6 underscores the importance of securing a clearance or permit in dealing with the buy
and sell activities. It thus mandates:
All stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buy and sell of any
good, article item, object of anything of value obtained from an unlicensed
dealer or supplier thereof shall before offering the same for sale to the
public, secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station
commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where
such store, establishment or entity is located.
Any person who fails to secure the clearance or permit required by this
section or who violates any of the provisions of the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder shall upon conviction be punished as a fence."
Q: UNDER THE SAID RULES AND REGULATIONS, TO WHAT ITEMS DOES THE TERM
"USED SECONDHAND ARTICLE" REFER TO?
A: It shall refer to any goods, article, item, object or anything of value obtained from an
unlicensed dealer or supplier, regardless of whether the same has actually or in fact been used
Article 311. Theft of the property of the National Library and National Museum. — If the
property stolen be any property of the National Library or of the National Museum, the
penalty shall be arresto mayor or a fine ranging from Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000) to
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or both, unless a higher penalty should be
provided under other provisions of this Code, in which case, the offender shall be punished
by such higher penalty.
Article 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property. — Any
person who, by means of violence against or intimidation of person, shall take possession of
any real property or shall usurp any real rights in property belonging to another, in
addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him, shall be punished
by a fine of from 50 to 100 per centum of the gain which he shall have obtained, but not less
than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000). (as amended by RA 10951)
If the value of the gain cannot be ascertained, a fine from Forty thousand pesos
(₱40,000) to One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000) shall be imposed. (as amended by
RA 10951)
2) Usurping any real rights in property belonging to another by means of violence against
or intimidation of persons.
From the foregoing definition of the acts made punishable in this article, the following elements
are culled:
i. A person has taken possession of real property or has usurped real rights
in property;
ii. The property occupied or the real rights usurped belong to another;
* Since this is a crime against property, there must be intent to gain. In the absence of the intent
to gain, the act may constitute coercion.
* Use the degree of intimidation to determine the degree of the penalty to be applied for the
usurpation.
* Usurpation under Article 312 is committed in the same way as robbery with violence or
intimidation of persons. The main difference is that in robbery, personal property is
involved; while in usurpation of real rights, it is real property. (People v. Judge Alfeche,
July 23, 1992)
* The possession of the land or real rights must be done by means of violence or intimidation. So,
if the evidence of the prosecution shows that the accused entered the premises by means of
strategy, stealth or methods other than the employment of violence, no crime was committed by
the offender. (People vs. Alfeche, Jr., 211 SCRA 770)
* Usurpation of real rights and property should not be complexed using Article 48 when violence
or intimidation is committed. There is only a single crime, but a two-tiered penalty is prescribed
to be determined on whether the acts of violence used is akin to that in robbery in Article 294,
grave threats or grave coercion and an incremental penalty of fine based on the value of the gain
obtained by the offender.
* There is no crime of threat and usurpation of real property since threat is an indispensable
element of usurpation of real rights. Hence, where threats are uttered to the owner of real property
by one illegally occupying it, the crime committed is not the complex crime of usurpation of real
property with grave threats because making a threat is an inherent element of usurpation of real
property. (Castrodes vs. Cubelo, 83 SCRA 670)
On squatting
PD 772 of 1975 ---Section 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or
taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or
possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential commercial or any other
purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months to one year or a fine of
not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Squatting used to be a crime under Presidential Decree No. 772 (Penalizing Squatting and Other
Similar Acts), issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on 20 August 1975. PD 772 made it a
crime for any "person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of
the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of
the latter against his will for residential commercial or any other purposes." PD 772 was
subsequently repealed by Republic Act No. 8368, also known as the Anti-Squatting Law Repeal
Act of 1997, which took effect in 27 December 1997. RA 8368 was enacted solely for the
purpose of expressly repealing PD 772.
The repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law, however, does not mean that people now have the
unbridled license to illegally occupy lands they do not own. The legislature considered RA 8368
as a major piece of legislation on the country’s anti-poverty program as it sought to confront the
perennial problem of poverty at its root, abolish an otherwise inutile and oppressive law, and pave
the way for a genuine urban housing and land reform program. Senate records reveal that it is the
manifest intent of the authors of R.A. 8368 to decriminalize squatting but does not encourage or
protect acts of squatting on somebody else’s land. The law is not intended to compromise the
property rights of legitimate landowners.
According to the Urban Development and Housing Act RA 7279 of 1992, the following are
squatters:
1. Those who have the capacity or means to pay rent or for legitimate housing but are
squatting anyway;
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2. Also the persons who were awarded lots but sold or lease them out;
"Professional squatters" refers to individuals or groups who occupy lands without the express
consent of the landowner and who have sufficient income for legitimate housing. The term shall
also apply to persons who have previously been awarded homelots or housing units by the
Government but who sold, leased or transferred the same to settle illegally in the same place or in
another urban area, and non-bona fide occupants and intruders of lands reserved for socialized
housing. The term shall not apply to individuals or groups who simply rent land and housing from
professional squatters or squatting syndicates;
* The complainant must be the person upon whom violence was employed. If a tenant was
occupying the property and he was threatened by the offender, but it was the owner who was not
in possession of the property who was named as the offended party, the same may be quashed as
it does not charge an offense. The owner would, at most, be entitled to civil recourse only.
Article 313. Altering boundaries or landmarks. —Any person who shall alter the boundary
marks or monuments of towns, provinces, or estates, or any other marks intended to
designate the boundaries of the same, shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000), or both.
Article 314. Fraudulent insolvency. — Any person who shall abscond with his property to the
prejudice of his creditors, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor, if he be a merchant, and
the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period,
if he be not a merchant.
To be liable for fraudulent insolvency, the disposal of the merchandise must be done with malice.
The mere circumstance that a person has disposed of his merchandise by removing them from the
place where they were kept would not necessarily imply fraud. What is required is actual
prejudice to the creditor. The intention of the accused alone is not enough (People vs. Guzman,
C.A., 40 O.G. 2655).
The law does not require that the offender be a merchant. The law says "any person," and this
refers to anyone who becomes a debtor and performs the acts made punishable by the law.
The property which the offender may abscond with consists of both real and personal property.
Hence, real property could be the subject of fraudulent insolvency (People vs. Chong Chuy
Lingobo, 45 Phil. 372).
The law on fraudulent insolvency is different from the Insol vency Law. For the Insolvency Law
to apply, the criminal act must have been committed after the institution of the insolvency
proceedings against the offending debtor. But under the present article, there is no requirement
that the accused should be adjudged bankrupt or insolvent.
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned herein below shall be punished by:
hundred thousand pesos (₱2,400,000) but does not exceed Four million four
hundred thousand pesos (₱4,400,000), and if such amount exceeds the latter sum,
the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional Two million pesos (₱2,000,000); but the total
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if
the amount of the fraud is over One million two hundred thousand pesos
(₱1,200,000) but does not exceed Two million four hundred thousand pesos
(₱2,400,000).
4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if such amount does
not exceed Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000): Provided, That in the four cases
mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
1. That the accused defrauded another (a.) by abuse of confidence, or (b) or means of deceit and
2. That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or
third person
* The concept of damage under this article does not mean actual or real damage. It may consist in
mere disturbance of the property rights of the offended party. However, the damage must be
capable of pecuniary estimation. This requirement is important because in estafa, the penalty is
dependent on the value of the property.
* Since estafa is a material crime, it can be divided into consummated, attempted or frustrated
stages. In the latter case, the damage can be in the form of temporary prejudice or suffering , or
inconvenience capable of pecuniary estimation.
* The accused does not receive the goods but delivers a thing under an onerous obligation which
is not in accordance with the substance, quantity or quality agreed upon. It is the altering of the
substance, quality or quantity of the thing delivered which makes the offender liable for the crime
of estafa.
* The word “onerous” means that the offended party has fully complied with his obligations to
pay. So, if the thing delivered whose substance was altered, is not yet fully or partially paid, then
the crime of estafa is not committed.
Illustration: X paid Y the amount of P100,000.00 for the latter to deliver 50 cavans of palay at
60 kilos each. True enough, Y delivered to X 50 cavans of palay. It turned out however, that Y
delivered to X 50 cavans of palay at 50 kilos each only. Y is liable for Estafa with abuse of
confidence. He is under obligation to deliver 50 cavans of palay at 60 kilos each. He defrauded X
because he delivered 50 cavans of palay at 50 kilos each only. He altered the quantity of the thing
that he was under obligation to deliver.
Illustration: X paid Y the amount of P50,000.00 for the latter to deliver to him 5 cavans of
Sinandomeng rice. Y delivered 5 cavans of rice. It turned out that what Y delivered were 5 cavans
of NFA rice. Y is liable for Estafa with abuse of confidence. He altered the quality of the rice that
he was under obligation to deliver.
“By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same,
even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying
having received such money, goods, or other property.”
Elements:
1. That money, goods, or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return, the same.
(The fourth element is not necessary when there is evidence of misappropriation of the goods by
the defendant. [Tubb v. People, et al., 101 Phil. 114] ).
* It is necessary in this kind of estafa, for the money, goods or personal property to have been
received by the offender in trust, or on commission or for administration. He must acquire both
material or physical as well as juridical possession of the thing received. In these instances, the
offender, who is the transferee, acquires a right over a thing which he may set up even against
the owner.
* A money market transaction however partakes of the nature of a loan, and non-payment thereof
would not give rise to criminal liability for Estafa through misappropriation or conversion. In
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money market placements, the unpaid investor should institute against the middleman or dealer,
before the ordinary courts, a simple action for recovery of the amount he had invested, and if
there is allegation of fraud, the proper forum would be the Securities and Exchange Commission.
(Sesbreno vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 240 SCRA 606).
Illustration: X gave Y P50,000.00 for the latter to buy him a laptop. Instead of buying a laptop
for X, Y went on a shopping spree and spent the money of X. Despite repeated demands, Y failed
to return the money of X. Y is liable for Estafa with abuse of confidence. He misappropriated the
money he received in trust for the purchase of a laptop.
Illustration: X, a basketball player, entrusted to Y his watch because he, X was about to play
basketball. Upon receiving the watch, left, and pawned the watch of X. Despite repeated deands,
Y failed to return the watch. Y is liable for Estafa with abuse of confidence. He misappropriated
the thing he received in trust.
Note: When in the prosecution for malversation the public officer is acquitted, the private
individual allegedly in conspiracy with him may be held liable for estafa
Offenders are entrusted with funds or offenders are entrusted with funds or
property and are continuing offenses property and are continuing offenses
Funds: always private Funds: public funds or property
Offender: private individual, or public officer Offender: public officer accountable for
not accountable public funds
Committed by misappropriating, converting, Committed by appropriating, taking,
denying having received money misappropriating
“By taking undue advantage of the signature of the offended party in blank, and by writing
any document above such signature in blank, to the prejudice of the offended party or any
third person.”
1. That the paper with the signature of the offended party be in blank.
3. That above the signature of the offended party a document is written by the offender without
authority to do so.
4. That the document so written creates a liability of, or causes damage to, the offended party or
any third person.
* The element of this estafa is also abuse of confidence. The offended party leaves a blank paper
with his signature to another, with specific instructions to make entries thereon according to the
wishes of the offended party. But contrary to such instructions and wishes, the accused makes
entries in writing which creates liabilities against the owner of the signature.
* If the unauthorized writings were done by a person other than the one to whom the owner of the
signature delivered the paper in blank, and it caused damage to the offended party, the crime
committed by the third party is not estafa but falsification.
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Note: If the paper with signature in blank was stolen – Falsification if by making it appear that he
participated in a transaction when in fact he did not so participate
1. that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
2. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.
3. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent
means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false
pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means.
Notes:
* There must be evidence that the pretense of the accused that he possesses power/influence is
false.
* The representation that accused possessed influence, to deceive and inveigle the complainant
into parting with his money must however be false to constitute deceit under No. 2 of Article
315, RPC. (Dela Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 265 SCRA 299).
Elements of estafa by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts under Article 315 (2)
* In the prosecution of estafa under Article 315, no. 2(a), it is indispensable that the element of
deceit consisting in the false statement or fraudulent representation of the accused, be made prior
to, before or at least simultaneously with the delivery of the thing by the offended party. The
added requirement that such false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very
motive or the only reason or cause which induces the offended party to part with the thing while
they may be false representation after the delivery of the goods or the thing by the aggrieved
party, such false statement or false representation, no matter how fraudulent and obnoxious it
may appear, cannot serve as a basis for prosecution under this category of estafa. For the case to
prosper against the accused, the prosecution must prove two indispensable elements: deceit and
damage to another. (Celino vs. Court of Appeals, 163 SCRA 97)
CREDIT means the ability to buy things or merchandise on the basis of one’s character, capacity
to pay or goodwill in the business community. So, if it is used to deceive another and the
deception is the principal reason for the delivery of the goods which results in damage to the
offended party, the crime committed is estafa.
Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers' Act) was amended by RA 10022 which was approved
on March 8, 2010. The old law imposes the penalty of illegal recuirtment in large scale: life
imprisonment and fine of not less than P500,000.00 nor more than Pl ,000,000.00. In Republic
Act No. 10022 the imposable fine to not less than P2,000,000.00 nor more than P5,000,000.00.
Facts: Spouses represented to the five persons that they can facilitate their hiring in Mandarin
Oriental in Macau, China. These five persons gave the spouses in several instances the amount
they were required to pay as processing fees and documentation. They have agreed to meet up
together bound for Manila in the airport of Cagayan de Oro City. On the day of their departure,
the spouses did not show up. The spouses were charged for syndicated illegal recruitment in a
large scale and estafa. The RTC convicted the spouses which was affirmed by the CA.
On appeal the spouses argued that they neither recruited nor promised private complainants any
work in Macau
SC: To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale under Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant
Workers' Act), three elements must concur:
(a) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage
in recruitment and placement of workers;
(b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and
placement" under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated
under Article 34 of the same Code (now Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042); and,
(c) the offender committed the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.
There are three ways of committing estafa under Article 315 (a) of the Revised Penal Code: (1)
by using a fictitious name; (2) by falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; and (3) by
means of other similar deceits. Under this class of estafa, the element of deceit is indispensable.
Likewise, it is essential that the false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very
cause or the only motive which induces the complainant to part with the thing of value.
In the present case, private complainants were led to believe by accused spouses that they
possessed the power and qualifications to provide them with work in Macau when in fact they
were neither licensed nor authorized to do so. Accused spouses made it appear to private
complainants that Beatriz was requested by her employer to hire workers for Macau, when in fact
she was not. They even recruited their own relatives in the guise of helping them get better jobs
with higher pays abroad for them to improve their standard of living. Likewise, private
complainants were deceived by accused spouses by pretending that the latter could arrange their
employment in Macau, China. With these misrepresentations, false assurances and deceit, they
suffered damages and they were forced to part with their hard-earned money, as one of them even
testified to have mortgaged her house and another, to have borrowed money from a lending
institution just to raise the alleged processing fees
(Remember that it is the check that is supposed to be the sole consideration for the other
party to have entered into the obligation. For example, Rose wants to purchase a bracelet
and draws a check without insufficient funds. The jeweler sells her the bracelet solely
because of the consideration in the check.)
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(3) It does not cover checks where the purpose of drawing the check is to guarantee a loan as
this is not an obligation contemplated in this paragraph.
* The check must be genuine. If the check is falsified and is cashed with the bank or exchanged
for cash, the crime is estafa thru falsification of a commercial document.
* The general rule is that the accused must be able to obtain something from the offended party
by means of the check he issued and delivered. Exception: when the check is issued not in
payment of an obligation.
* dishonor for lack of funds - prima facie evidence of deceit or failure to make good within three
days after notice of.
* If the checks were issued by the defendant and he received money for them, then stopped
payment and did not return the money, and he had an intention to stop payment when he issued
the check, there is estafa.
* Deceit is presumed if the drawer fails to deposit the amount necessary to cover the check within
three days from receipt of notice of dishonor or insufficiency of funds in the bank.
* It is therefore essential that the check be issued in payment of a simultaneous obligation. The
check in question must be utilized by the offender in order to defraud the offended party. So, if
the check was issued in payment of a promissory note which had matured and the check was
dishonored, there is not estafa since the accused did not obtain anything by means of said check.
(People vs. Canlas, O. G. 1092)
* Offender must be able to obtain something from the offended party by means of the check he
issues and delivers
* The check must be issued in payment of an obligation. If the check was issued without any
obligation or if there is lack of consideration and the check is subsequently dishonored, the crime
of estafa is not committed.
Q: WHAT IS A CHECK?
A: In Mitra v. People, July 05, 2010, the Supreme Court had the occasion to explain what a check
is. It held that a check is a negotiable instrument that serves as a substitute for money and as a
convenient form of payment in financial transactions and obligations. The use of checks as
payment allows commercial and banking transactions to proceed without the actual handling of
money, thus, doing away with the need to physically count bills and coins whenever payment is
made. It permits commercial and banking transactions to be carried out quickly and efficiently.
But the convenience afforded by checks is damaged by unfunded checks that adversely affect
confidence in our commercial and banking activities, and ultimately injure public interest.
In Jaime U. Gosiaco v. Leticia Ching and Edwin, Casta G.R. No. 173807, 16 April 2009,
it was held that B.P. 22 was enacted to address the rampant issuance of bouncing checks as
payment for preexisting obligations. The circulation of bouncing checks adversely affected
confidence in trade and commerce. The State criminalized such practice because it was deemed
injurious to public interests and was found to be pernicious and inimical to public welfare. B.P.
22 punishes the act of making and issuing bouncing checks. The law is an offense against public
order and not an offense against property. It penalizes the issuance of a check without regard to
its purpose
BAR Q. (1986)
On January 1, 1986, Bonifacio sold to Antonio a wrist watch for P1,000.00. Antonio took
the watch and drew a check for P1,000.00 payable to Bonifacio or order. Per agreement, the
check was postdated to January 25, 1986.
On January 25, 1986, Antonio called up Bonifacio and requested him not to present the
check until January 30,1986 by which time the check would be fully funded. Bonifacio agreed
but on the condition that Antonio issue him another check for P200.00 to cover the interest.
Antonio agreed and issued the second check to Bonifacio. On January 25, 1986, Bonifacio
discounted the first check to Carlos for P900.00. Carlos paid Bonifacio P900.00 and Bonifacio
endorsed the check to Carlos. Bonifacio assured Carlos that the check was good and maybe
encashed oh the date indicated thereon. Carlos presented the check on January 30, 1986. the
check was dishonored by the bank for lack of funds. Carlos immediately notified Antonio and
Bonifacio of the dishonor of the check. Both failed to make good the check.
May Antonio and Bonifacio be held liable under B.P. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law?
Explain your answer.
Ans: Antonio is liable for violation of B.P. 22. All the elements of the offense are present:
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a) The accused drew a check to apply to account or for value. In this case, Antonio
issued the check in payment of the price of a watch for PI,000 and was therefore
issued for value;
b) Antonio knew at the time of the issuance that he did not have sufficient funds in the
drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment
c) The check was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds and there was failure to make good the check within 5 banking days from
receipt of the notice of dishonor and demand for payment.
With respect to Bonifacio, he is not liable. Settled is the rule that an endorser is not liable for
violation of B.P. 22. Only the person who makes or draws or issues any check which is not
funded is liable.
Q: When does a prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds arise? (Sec. 2)
A: There is a prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds when the check was
presented within 90 days from the date appearing on the check and was dishonored, unless:
a) Such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon within 5
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee;
or
b) Makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within (5)
banking days after receiving notice of non-payment.
Respecting the second element of the crime, the Supreme Court ruled in Tan v. Philippine
Commercial International Bank, 552 SCRA 532, April 23, 2008, that the prosecution must prove
the accused knew, at the time of issuance, that he does not have sufficient funds or credit for the
full payment of the check upon its presentment. The element of "knowledge" involves a state of
mind that obviously would be difficult to establish, hence, the statute creates a prima facie
presumption of knowledge on the insufficiency of funds or credit coincidental with the attendance
of the two other elements.
Q: What is the consequence if there is failure to deposit the check within the 90 day-period?
A: The only consequence of the failure to present the check for payment within the 90-day period
is that there is no prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. (Nagrarnpa v.
People, 386 SCRA 412)
Q: Cite the importance of notice of dishonor to establish a prima facie evidence of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds.
A: The presumption is brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a
notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the
check or to make arrangements for its payment. The presumption or prima facie evidence as
provided in this section cannot arise, if such notice of nonpayment by the drawee bank is not sent
to the maker or drawer, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer,
since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period. (Azarcon v. Gonzales,
G.R. No. 185906, June 29, 2010)
(1) Procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor of a check be given the
signatory—the absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an
opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. (Marigomen v. People, 459 SCRA 169)
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(2) Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not by themselves prove receipt -
they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters, claimed to
be a noticed of dishonor. (Rico v. People, 392 SCRA 61)
Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. But in criminal cases, the
quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. In Moster v. People, 546 SCRA 286,
February 19, 2008, the prosecution merely presented a copy of the demand letter allegedly sent to
petitioner through registered mail and the registry return card. There was no attempt to
authenticate or identify the signature on the registry return card. All that was on record is an
illegible signature on the registry receipt as evidence that someone received the letter. As to
whether this signature is that of petitioner or her authorized agent remains a mystery.
(3) It is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the
drawee of the check. The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice
because the fact of service provided for in the Inw is reckoned from receipt of such notice
of dishonor by the drawee of the check. (Cabrera v. People, 407 Si 7Ik 247)
Procedural due process requires that a notice of dishonor be sent to and received by the
petitioner to afford the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. 22. In Suarez v. People 555,
SCRA 238, June 19, 2008, the evidence shows that the prosecution proved that a notice of
dishonor was sent to petitioner through registered mail. The prosecution presented a copy of the
demand letter and properly authenticated the registry return receipt. However, it is not enough for
the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the petitioner. It is also incumbent
upon the prosecution to show that the drawer of the check received the said notice because the
fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the
drawee of the check.
(4) Possibilities cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt. When there is insufficient
proof of receipt of notice of dishonor, as in this case, the presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds cannot arise. A notice of dishonor personally sent to and received
by the accused is necessary before one can be held liable under B.P. 22. The failure of the
prosecution to prove the receipt by petitioner of the requisite written notice of dishonor
and that she was given at least five banking days within which to settle her account
constitutes sufficient ground for her acquittal. (Ting v. Court of Appeals, 344 SCRA 551)
(5) Registry return cards must be authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of letters sent
through registered mail. Thus, [the Court] held: "...it must appear that the same was
served on the addressee or a duly authorized agent of the addressee. In fact, the registry
return receipt itself provides that '[a] registered article must not be delivered to anyone
but the addressee, or upon the addressee's written order, in which case the authorized
agent must write the addressee's name on the proper space and then affix legibly his own
signature below it." (Suarez v. People, 555 SCRA 238, June 19, 2008
The notice must be in writing. A mere oral notice to pay a dishonored check will not
suffice. The lack of a written notice is fatal for the prosecution. (Azarcon v. Gonzales, G.R. No.
185906, June 29, 2010)
Unlike in estafa, the accused in this case obtain nothing when he issued the check, his debt for the
payment thereof had been contracted prior to its issuance.
1) Checks issued to a person who was not authorized to collect and receive the same are
without valuable consideration and are also considered issued for a non-existing
account. (Carino v. De Castro, 553 SCRA 688, April 30, 2008)
2) The presentation of the registry card, with an unauthorized signature, does not meet
the required proof beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner received such noticed,
especially considering that he denied receiving it. As there is insufficient proof that
the petitioner received notice of dishonor, the presumption that he had knowledge of
insufficiency of funds cannot arise. (Suarez v. People, 555 SCRA 238, June 19, 2008)
4) Only a full payment at the time of its presentment or during the five-day grace period
could exonerate one from criminal liability under B.P. 22 and that subsequent
payments can only affect the civil, but not the criminal, liability. (Tan v. Philippine
Commercial International Bank, 552 SCRA 532, April 23, 2008)
5) Under B.P. 22, the prosecution must prove not only that the accused issued a check
that was subsequently dishonored. It must also establish that the accused was actually
notified that the check was dishonored, and that he or she failed, within five (5)
banking days from receipt of the notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount
due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment. Absent proof that the accused
received such notice, a prosecution for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law cannot
prosper.
In the case of Ambito v. People and CA, G.R. No. 127327, 13 February 2009, there is
nothing in the records that would indicate co-petitioner was given any notice of dishonor when
the subject checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds upon presentment for payment.
There being no proof that he was given any written notice informing him of the fact that his
checks were dishonored and giving him five (5) banking days within which to make
arrangements for payment of the said checks, the rebuttable presumption that he had knowledge
of the insufficiency of his funds has no application in the present case.
6) To be liable under Sec. 1 of B.P. 22, the check must be dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonored for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
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In Tan v. People, 349 SCRA 777 (2001), the Court acquitted the petitioner therein who
was indicted underB.P. 22, upon a check which was dishonored for the reason DAUD, among
others. Even without relying on the credit line, petitioner's bank account covered the check she
issued because even though there were some deposits that were still uncollected the deposits
became "good" and the bank certified that the check was "funded." To be liable under Sec. 1 of
B.P. 22, the check must be dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment.
7) B.P. 22 speaks only of insufficiency of funds and does not treat of uncollected
deposits.
In Dy v. People, 571 SCRA 59, November 14,2008, the High Court declared that the law
cannot be interpreted in such a way as to expand its provision to encompass the situation of
uncollected deposits because it would make the law more onerous on the part of the accused.
Again, criminal statutes are strictly construed against the Government and liberally in favor of the
accused.
8) Prescription is a proper defense. The prescriptive period is 4 years reckoned from the
lapse of the 5 banking days from notice of dishonor within which to make good the
check.
9) Forgery of the signature appearing on the check. When a signature is forged or made
without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be the check is
wholly inoperative unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is
precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority. (Ilusorio v. Court of
Appeals, 353 SCRA 89)
Q: IS LACK OF VALUABLE CONSIDERATION A PROPER DEFENSE IN VIOLATION OF
B.P. 22?
A: No. The issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on
dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of
B.P. 22. (Dreamwork Construction, Inc. v. Janiola, 591 SCRA 466, June 30, 2009)
In Lunaria v. People, 570 SCRA 572, November 11, 2008, the Supreme Court stated that
even in cases where there had been payment, through compensation or some other means, there
could still be prosecution for violation of B.P. 22. The gravamen of the offense under this law is
the act of issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for
payment, not the nonpayment of the obligation.
It is well settled that the mere act of issuing a worthless check, even if merely as an
accommodation, is covered by B.P. 22. The Court has held that the agreement surrounding the
issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of B.P. 22
BAR Q. (1988) Raul Doria gave in trust two acrylic paintings to Amar Solo to be sold on
commission basis for P20,000.00 Failing to sell them to George Ty, Amar consigned the
paintings to Alcanto Gallery. In the same month, Amar retrieved one painting and tried to return
in to Raul who refused to receive it without the other painting. The other painting was bought by
Mr. Lomot whose check, which
Amar gave to Raul, bounced, so that Amar paid Raul his own check of P6,500.00 promising in
writing to pay the P3,500.00 balanceless his commission.
Is Amar liable for estafa? Why? How about Mr. Lomot, what crime, if any did he commit?
Suggested Answer: Amar is not liable for estafa. Deceit or abuse of confidence is not present. To
constitute estafa, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of obligation must be the
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efficient cause of defraudation and, as such, it should be either prior to, or simultaneous with, the
act of fraud. This is absent in this case. On the other hand, Mr. Lomot is liable for violation of
B.P. 22 for the mere act of issuing a worthless check.
A mere notice of STOP PAYMENT is not a proper defense if the reason for dishonor is
insufficiency of funds. Intent to defraud and damage is not an element of the crime.
Note: Failure to make good within 5 banking days prima facie evididence of knowledge of lack
and insufficiency
Distinction between estafa under Article 315 (2) (d) of the Revised Penal Code and violation
of BP 22:
(1) Under both Article 315 (2) (d) and BP 22, there is criminal liability if the check is drawn
for non-pre-existing obligation.
If the check is drawn for a pre-existing obligation, there is criminal liability only under
BP 22.
(2) Estafa under Article 315 (2) (d) is a crime against property while BP 22 is a crime against
public interest. The gravamen for the former is the deceit employed, while in the latter, it
is the issuance of the check. Hence, there is no double jeopardy.
(3) In the estafa under Article 315 (2) (d), deceit and damage are material, while in BP 22,
they are immaterial.
(4) In estafa under Article 315 (2) (d), knowledge by the drawer of insufficient funds is not
required, while in BP 22, knowledge by the drawer of insufficient funds is required.
Exceptions
a. Pays the holder of the check the amount due within five banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee;
b. Makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five
banking days after notice of non-payment
* The drawee must cause to be written or stamped in plain language the reason for the dishonor.
* If the drawee bank received an order of stop-payment from the drawer with no reason, it must
be stated that the funds are insufficient to be prosecuted here.
* If the drawer has valid reasons for stopping payment, he cannot be held criminally liable under
B.P. Blg. 22.
* The unpaid or dishonored check with the stamped information re: refusal to pay is prima facie
evidence of (1) the making or issuance of the check; (2) the due presentment to the drawee for
payment & the dishonor thereof; and (3) the fact that the check was properly dishonored for the
reason stamped on the check.
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* The mere issuance of any kind of check regardless of the intent of the parties, whether the
check is intended to serve merely as a guarantee or as a deposit, makes the drawer liable under
BP 22 if the check bounces. As a matter of public policy, the issuance of a worthless check is a
public nuisance and must be abated.
* Each act of drawing and issuing a bouncing check constitutes a violation of BP 22.
* In De Villa v. CA, decided April 18, 1991, it was held that under BP 22, there is no distinction
as to the kind of check issued. As long as it is delivered within Philippine territory, the Philippine
courts have jurisdiction. Even if the check is only presented to and dishonored in a Philippine
bank, BP 22 applies. This is true in the case of dollar or foreign currency checks. Where the law
makes no distinction, none should be made.
* In People v. Nitafan, it was held that as long as instrument is a check under the negotiable
instrument law, it is covered by BP. 22. A memorandum check is not a promissory note, it is a
check which have the word “memo,” “mem”, “memorandum” written across the face of the check
which signifies that if the holder upon maturity of the check presents the same to the drawer, it
will be paid absolutely. But there is no prohibition against drawer from depositing memorandum
check in a bank.
*Whatever be the agreement of the parties in respect of the issuance of a check is inconsequential
to a violation to Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check bounces.
* Cross checks do not make them non-negotiable and therefore they are within the coverage of B.
P. Blg. 22.
* The law does not distinguish between foreign and local checks. (De Villa vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., 195 SCRA 722).
* But overdraft or credit arrangement may be allowed by banks as to their preferred clients and
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 does not apply. If check bounces, it is because bank has been remiss in
honoring agreement.
* The check must be presented for payment within a 90-day period. If presented for payment
beyond the 90 day period and the drawer’s funds are insufficient to cover it, there is no BP 22
violation.
* Where check was issued prior to August 8, 1984, when Circular No. 12 of the Department of
the Justice took effect, and the drawer relied on the then prevailing Circular No. 4 of the Ministry
of Justice to the effect that checks issued as part of an arrangement/agreement of the parties to
guarantee or secure fulfillment of an obligation are not covered by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, no
criminal liability should be incurred by the drawer. Circular should not be given retroactive
effect. (Lazaro v. CA, November 11, 1993, citing People v. Alberto, October 28, 1993)
On March 10, 1988, petitioners issued a check for P10,000.00 to the General Agency for
Reconnaissance, Detection, and Security, Inc. (GARDS) in partial payment of the security
services rendered by GARDS to Ervine. The check was drawn on the China Banking Corporation
(CBC). When deposited in the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIBank) branch at
Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, the check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
After trial, petitioners were found guilty of the charge and each was sentenced to suffer one (1)
year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000.00 and the costs.
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. It was appealed to the SC.
Petitioners pray that the case against them be dismissed or, in the alternative, that the decision of
the trial court be modified by sentencing each to an increased fine but without imprisonment.
After due review of the decision in this case, the SC found that petitioners’ conviction for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is well founded.
One of the issues or prayer raised by the petitioners is that, in the alternative, the penalty be
modified by deleting the sentence of imprisonment and, in lieu thereof, a fine in an increased
amount be imposed on them. In support of their plea, they allege that they do not have any record
of prior conviction; that Eduardo Vaca is of advanced age (late 60s); and, that they come from
good families. Petitioners claim that “with their family background and social standing there is
no reason why they will refuse to pay a due and demandable debt of only P10,000.00. It is
precisely because of their founded belief that the subject obligation has been paid that they
refused to be intimidated by a criminal charge.”
B.P. Blg. 22, §1, par. 1 provides a penalty of “imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not
more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than, but not more than double, the amount of the
check which fine shall in no case exceed two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the Court.” Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are
Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national economy. Apparently, they
brought this appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly, that they had not committed
a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise, they could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial
court and applied for probation to evade a prison term. It would best serve the ends of criminal
justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by §1, par. 1, the same
philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming
valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and
economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. In this case we believe
that a fine in an amount equal to double the amount of the check involved is an appropriate
penalty to impose on each of the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that
the sentence of imprisonment is deleted and petitioners are each ordered to pay a fine of
P20,000.00 equivalent to double the amount of the check.
Dimaguiba issued 13 checks in favor of Susan Go which all bounced. Dimaguiba was prosecuted
before the MTC which convicted him of 13 counts and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for
a period of 3 months for each of the 13 counts. Dimaguiba appealed to the RTC. RTC sustained
his conviction. The decision became final since no appeal was made. MTCC issued an order of
arrest for Dimaguiba to serve the sentence. Dimaguiba filed a MR arguing na dapat fine lang
walang imprisonment. MTCC denied. Dimaguiba was subsequently arrested and detained. He
filed with the RTC a Petition for Habeas Corpus. RTC after hearing ordered for his immediate
release and requiring him to pay P100,000.00 in lieu of imprisonment. In justifying its
modification of the MTCC Decision, the RTC invoked Vaca v. Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court Administrative Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-2000, which allegedly required the imposition of
a fine only instead of imprisonment also for BP 22 violations, if the accused was not a recidivist
or a habitual delinquent. The RTC held that this rule should be retroactively applied in favor of
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Dimagiba. It further noted that (1) he was a first-time offender and an employer of at least 200
workers who would be displaced as a result of his imprisonment; and (2) the civil liability had
already been satisfied through the levy of his properties.
On October 22, 2001, Petitioner Go filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Orders dated
October 10 and 11, 2001. That Motion was denied on January 18, 2002.
Hence, this Petition filed directly with this Court on pure questions of law.
Ruling: Because the Circular merely lays down a rule of preference, it serves only as a guideline
for the trial courts. Thus, it is addressed to the judges, who are directed to consider the factual
circumstances of each case prior to imposing the appropriate penalty. In other words, the
Administrative Circular does not confer any new right in favor of the accused, much less those
convicted by final judgment.
The competence to determine the proper penalty belongs to the court rendering the decision
against the accused. That decision is subject only to appeal on grounds of errors of fact or law, or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Another trial court may not
encroach upon this authority. Indeed, SC-AC No. 12-2000 necessarily requires a review of all
factual circumstances of each case. Such a review can no longer be done if the judgment has
become final and executory.
In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had full knowledge of all relevant circumstances
from which respondent’s conviction and sentence were based. The penalty imposed was well
within the confines of the law. Upon appeal, the conviction was sustained by RTC-Branch 4 of
Baguio City. Eventually, the Decision attained finality. Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the
jurisdiction to modify the lawful judgment in the guise of granting a writ of habeas corpus.
The doctrine of equal protection of laws does not apply for the same reasons as those on
retroactivity. Foremost of these reasons is that the Circular is not a law that deletes the penalty of
imprisonment. As explained earlier, it is merely a rule of preference as to which penalty should
be imposed under the peculiar circumstances of a case. At any rate, this matter deserves scant
consideration, because respondent failed to raise any substantial argument to support his
contention.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Orders NULLIFIED. Respondent’s
Petition for habeas corpus is hereby DENIED. Let this case be REMANDED to MTCC of Baguio
City for the re-arrest of respondent and the completion of his sentence.
Also: read De Joya vs Jail Warden of Batangas, 417 SCRA 636, December 10, 2003.
2. a. Obtaining credit at
any of the establishments;
3. a. Abandoning or
surreptitiously removing any part of his baggage in the establishment;
233
c. Without paying
* Failure to pay food or accommodation in a hotel, restaurant or inn usually gives rise to civil
liability but if the intent to defraud is clear like a surreptitious removal of baggage from the hotel,
or resorting to deceitful means to evade payment, the act shall be punished criminally as Estafa.
Estafa by inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign any document (par. 3[a]).
Example: Pedro asked Juan to prepare a special power of attorney authorizing Juan to represent
Pedro in court in a suit involving a parcel of land belonging to Pedro. Contrary to the instruction
given and taking advantage of Pedro's illiteracy, Juan made Pedro sign a deed of sale involving
the property in litigation and wherein Juan was made to appear as the vendee. The Court ruled
that Juan is guilty of estafa (U.S. vs. Malog, 36 Phil. 821).
Estafa by resorting to some fraudulent practice to insure success in a gambling game (par. 31 b/).
Example:
The accused who changed the position of the gaff (tari) from one of the gamecocks under
the pretense that the same was authorized by the owner of the cock, and in so doing, the
gamecock was unable to inflict mortal injury against its opponent was held to be guilty of estafa
under this paragraph (U.S. vs. Ner, 18 Phil. 534).
Estafa by removing, concealing or destroying, in whole or in part, any court record, office
files, documents or any other papers (par. 3[c]).
In order to commit this crime, the offender must have the intention to defraud. In other
words, the removal, concealment or destruction of the court record should be done with the
intent to defraud the victim. This is distinguished from the crime of removal, concealment or
destruction of documents under Article 226 wherein fraud is not an element of the crime, and
which is committed only by public officers. What is punished under this Article is the damage to
public interest.
If the act of removing, concealing or destroying results from hatred, revenge or other evil
motive, the crime committed is malicious mischief under Article 327.
Syndicated Estafa.
P.D. No. 1889 has amended the penalty for swindling under Articles 315 and 316, from
life imprisonment to death if the crime is committed by a syndicate of five or more persons
formed with intent to carry out an unlawful or illegal act, transaction or scheme and defraudation
which results in misappropriation of money contributed by stockholders or members of rural
banks, cooperatives, samahang nayon or farmers' association; or funds contributed by cor-
234
porations or associations for the general welfare. If not committed by a syndicate, the penalty is
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua if the amount involved exceeds P100,000.00
In relation to P.D. No. 818, the amendment refers to deceit through the use of a bouncing
check which is considered false pretense under Article 315, par. 2(d), as amended by Republic
Act No. 4885. If the estafa is committed through the medium of a bouncing check and the
accused is correspondingly charged under this decree, the penalty to be imposed on the offender
will not be what is provided under Article 315 as amended by P.D. No. 4885, but rather what is
prescribed by P.D. No. 818 which imposes a higher penalty, the same not to exceed thirty (30)
years. Under Article 315 as amended, the maximum penalty that can be imposed by the court is
only reclusion temporal.
Article 316. Other forms of swindling. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more
than three times such value, shall be imposed upon:
(a) Any person who, pretending to be the owner of any real property, shall convey,
sell, encumber, or mortgage the same;
(b) Any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose of the
same, although such encumbrance be not recorded;
(c) The owner of any personal property who shall wrongfully take it from its lawful
possessor, to the prejudice of the latter or any third person;
(d) Any person who, to the prejudice of another, shall execute any fictitious
contract;
(e) Any person who shall accept any compensation sfiven him under the belief that it
was in payment of services rendered or labor performed by him, when in fact he did not
actually perform such services or labor;
Any person who, while being a surety in a bond given n a criminal or civil action,
without express authority from he court or before the cancellation of his bond or before
being relieved from the obligation contracted by him, shall sell, nortgage, or, in any other
manner, encumber the real prope rty or properties with which he guaranteed the
fulfillment f such obligation.
Elements:
a) The object of the crime is immovable property such as a parcel of land or a building;
b) The offender who is not the owner of the property misrepresents himself to be so;
c) The offender exercises acts of ownership over the property by selling, leasing,
encumbering or mortgaging it; and
d) The act done by the offender causes prejudice to the owner or a third person.
Example: John Paul is the owner of a house and lot in Quezon City. He sells the same to Carlo
with the condition that he (John Paul) shall retain possession of the property as lessee. However,
while in possession of the property as lessee, he executes an absolute deed of sale involving the
same property, in favor of Shiela, thus making it appear that he is still the owner of the property.
The crime committed by John Paul is estafa.
Example:
John Paul executes a real-estate mortgage over his house and lot in Quezon City in favor of
Carlo. Unable to pay the mortgage debt to Carlo on its due date, John Paul goes to BJ for a loan
and offers as security the same property earlier mortgaged to Carlo, with the representation that it
is free from encumbrance despite the fact of its previous mortgage in favor of Carlo. BJ, unaware
of the previous mortgage, lent money to John Paul and accepted the property as se curity by way
of mortgage. In this case, John Paul is guilty of estafa.
235
Par. 3 — “Swindling committed by the owner of personal property who wrongfully takes it from
its lawful possessor.”
Example:
John Paul is the owner of a ring. He borrows PI,000 from Carlo with the ring as collateral.
Unable to pay his debt on its due date, he goes to Carlo and misrepresents that he has a buyer for
the ring and that his debt will be paid out of the proceeds of the sale. Carlo re turns the ring but
John Paul, after obtaining possession thereof, never made good his undertaking. He is guilty of
estafa.
Example:
John Paul sues Carlo for a sum of money. After the judgment has become final, a writ of
execution is issued to levy on the properties of Carlo. Carlo, in order to avoid the judgment,
executes a fictitious deed of sale conveying all his properties to Peter Doe, a person who has
been dead for 10 years. Carlo is guilty of estafa.
Par. 5 — “Swindling by accepting compensation for services or labor not actually rendered or
performed.”
Example:
John engages the services of Carlo as waiter in his restaurant named Pepeton for P200 a day.
Carlo worked only for 5 days but made it appear that he rendered work for 10 days, thus upon
claiming his salary, he was paid for 10 days. The crime committed by Carlo is estafa.
Par. 6 — “Swindling by selling, mortgaging, encumbering real property with which the offender
guaranteed the fulfillment of his obligation as surety.”
Example:
John Paul is charged with murder. To secure his provisional liberty, Carlo offers his real property
in Quezon City as property bond. Before the cancellation of the bond and without the court's
authority, Carlo sells the land. John Paul fails to appear during his arraignment. The government
proceeds against the property bond but no property could be levied upon as in the meantime it has
already been sold. The crime committed by Carlo is estafa.
Article 317. Swindling a minor. — Any person who, taking advantage of the inexperience or
emotions or feelings of a minor to his detriment, shall induce him to assume any obligation
or to give any release or execute a transfer of any property right in consideration of some
loan of money, credit, or other personal property, whether the loan clearly appears in the
document or is shown in any other form, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine
of a sum ranging from 10 to 50 percent of the value of the obligation contracted by the
minor.
The property referred to in this article is not real property. It is limited to personal
propertv since a minor cannot convey real property without judicial intervention. So, if what is
involved is real property, the crime of Swindling a minor under this article is not committed even
if the offender succeeds in inducing the minor to deal with such real property since no damage or
detriment is caused against the minor.
236
While the Civil Code provides that one who is under 21 years of age is a minor, under the
Family Code, a minor refers to one who is below eighteen years of age.
Article 318. Other deceits. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the
amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be imposed upon
any person who shall defraud or damage another by any other deceit not mentioned in the
preceding articles of this chapter.
Any person who, for profit or gain, shall interpret dreams, make forecasts, tell fortunes, or
take advantage of the credulity of the public in any other similar manner, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000). (As
amended by RA 10951)
The meaning of other deceits under this article has reference to a situation wherein fraud
or damage is done to another by any other form of deception which is not covered by the
preceding articles.
Another form of deceit would in the nature of interpreting dreams, or making forecasts,
telling fortunes or simply by taking advantage of the credulity of the public by any other similar
manner, done for profit or gain.
Example: John is indebted to Carlo in the amount of PI,000.00. To secure the obligation, John
mortgages to Carlo a parcel of land located in Don Antonio Village, which Carlo accepts after
being shown the property by John. Upon maturity of the obligation, John convinces Carlo to buy
the property so he can pay the mortgage debt. Carlo buys the property but upon presentation of
the deed of sale to the Register of Deeds, he discovers that the property which John sold to him,
had been donated to John with the condition that it cannot be conveyed to another for a period of
50 years, a condition known to John at the
time he sold the property to Carlo. John is guilty of estafa.
Article 319. Removal, sale or pledge of mortgaged property. — The penalty of arresto mayor
or a fine amounting to twice the value of the property shall be imposed upon:
Any person who shall knowingly remove any personal property mortgaged under the
Chattel Mortgage Law to any province or city other than the one in which it was located at
the time of the execution of the mortgage, without the written consent of the mortgagee or
his executors, administrators or assigns.
Any mortgagor who shall sell or pledge personal property already pledged, or any part
thereof, under the terms of the Chattel Mortgage Law, without the consent of the mort-
gagee written on the back of the mortgage and noted on the record hereof in the office of
the Register of Deeds of the province where such property is located.
There are two acts which are made punishable under the law:
(a) By knowingly removing any personal property mortgaged under the Chattel Mortgage Law, to
any province or city other than the one where it was located at the time of the execution of the
mortgage without the written consent of the mortgagee or executors, administrators or assigns;
and
(b) By selling or pledging property already pledged or any part thereof, under the terms of the
Chattel Mortgage, written on the back of the mortgage document and noted on the record
thereof in the office of the Register of Deeds of the province where the property is located.
For one to be liable under the first situation, the personal property must be encumbered under the
Chattel Mortgage Law. The offender must know that such property has been mortgaged and he
removes said mortgaged personal property to any province or city other than the one where it
was located at the time of the execution of the mortgage. The removal must be permanent and
must be done without the written consent of the mortgagee or his executors, administrators or
assigns.
237
It would appear that it is not only the mortgagor who is made liable if the personal property
is transferred to the prohibited place. The liability extends to third persons who shall knowingly
remove the mortgaged property to another city or province.
Under the Chattel Mortgage Law (Act No. 1508), registration of the mortgage with the Register
of Deeds is not necessary in order to render the mortgage valid. Article 2140 of the Civil Code,
which is a subsequent law to Act No. 1508, requires registration of the mortgage with the
Register of Deeds in order to make it valid and legal as a chattel mortgage. A fortiori, if the
chattel mortgage is not registered, there is no violation of Article 319.
Linda mortgaged her library books located in Davao City to the ABC Corporation, in
order to secure the payment of her debt in the amount of P20,000. Without the knowledge and
consent of ABC Corp., she took the library books to Butuan City.
The second situation involves a violation of the law by selling or pledging personal
property which has already been pledged. In this case, the personal property is already pledged
under the Chattel Mortgage Law. The accused who is the mortgagor of the property, sells or
pledges the same or any part thereof without the consent of the mortgagee written on the dorsal
side of the mortgage and duly noted in the records of the Register of Deeds.
ARSON
Note: Articles 320 to 326-B are repealed or amended by Presidential Decree No. 1613.
When any person burns of sets fire to the property of another, or his own property
under circumstance which expose to danger the life or property of another.
Kinds of Arson:
(1) One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a
result of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.
(2) Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or
where people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not
limited to, official governmental function or business, private transaction, commerce,
trade workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely incidental to a definite purpose
such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or
stops or terminals, regardless of whether the offender had knowledge that there are
persons in said building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of
whether the building is actually inhabited or not
(3) Any train or locomotives, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation
or conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.
(4) Any building factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which
are devoted to the service of public utilities.
(5)Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of conceal- ing or destroying
evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding
creditors or to collect form insurance.
But when a person who intends to burn a structure by collecting and placing rags soaked in a
gasoline and placed them near the wall of the building but who was discovered as he was about to
set fire to the rags is liable for attempted arson.
(d) If the building or property is insured for substantially more than its actual value at the
time of the issuance of the policy.
(e)If during the lifetime of the corresponding fire insurance policy more than two fires have
occurred in the same or other premises owned or under the control of the offender and/or insured.
(f)If shortly before the fire, a substantial portion of the effects insured and stored in a
building or property had been withdrawn from the premises except in the ordinary course of
business.
(g)If a demand for money or other valuable consideration was made before the fire in
exchange for the desistance of the offender or for the safety of the person or property of the
victim.
mechanical, chemical or electronic contrivance designed to start a fire; or ashes or traces of such
objects which are found in the ruins of the burned premises.
Notes:
* If the crime of arson was employed by the offender as a means to kill the offended party, the
crime committed is murder. The burning of the property as the means to kill the victim is
what is contemplated by the word “fire” under Article 248 which qualifies the crime to
murder. (People vs. Villarosa, 54 O. G. 3482)
* When the burning of the property was done by the offender only to cause damage but the arson
resulted to death of a person, the crime committed is still arson because the death of the
victim is a mere consequence and not the intention of the offender. (People vs. Paterno, 47
O. G. 4600)
* There is no special complex crime of arson with homicide. What matters in resolving cases
involving intentional arson is the criminal intent of the offender.
* There is such a crime as reckless imprudence resulting in the commission of arson. When the
arson results from reckless imprudence and it leads to death, serious physical injuries and
damage to the property of another, the penalty to be imposed shall not be for the crime of
arson under P. D. No. 1613 but rather, the penalty shall be based on Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code as a felony committed by means of culpa.
Malicious Mischief is the willful destruction of another's property for the sake of
inflicting damage due to hate, revenge or other evil motive.
Article 327. Who are liable for malicious mischief. — Any person who shall deliberately
cause to the property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next
preceding chapter, shall be guilty of malicious mischief.
Eements:
It means not only loss but a diminution of the value of one's property. It includes
defacing, deforming or rendering it useless for the purpose for which it was made.
* No negligence
Examples:
240
(a) Two pigs were in the middle of the road when Juan arrived. Testing his ability to shoot, he
aimed at both pigs which both fell dead with one bullet each. During the trial, he raised the
defense that he acted out of the desire to obtain pleasure and not with malicious intent. The
Supreme Court held the accused to be guilty of malicious mischief (People vs. Siddayao, C.A., 53
O.G. 8163).
(b) Accused, while butchering a cow not belonging to them, were asked by the owner to
explain their act. One of them answered "because it entered our property." The Court convicted
them of malicious mischief (People vs. Valiente, C.A., G.R. No. 9442-R Dec. 29, 1953).
ART. 328. Special cases of malicious mischief.— Any person who shall cause damage to
obstruct the performance of public functions, or using any poisonous or corrosive
substance; or spreading any infection or contagion among cattle; or who causes damage
to the property of the National Museum or National Library, or to any archive or
registry, waterworks, road, promenade, or any other thing used in common by the
public, shall be punished:
2. Bv arresto mayor if such value does not exceed the abovementioned amount
but is over Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000); and
3. By arresto menor, if such value does not exceed Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000).
(As amended by RA 10951)
The cases of malicious mischief enumerated in this article are the so-called qualified malicious
mischief. The crime becomes qualified either because of the nature of the damage caused to
obstruct a public; or because of the kind of substance used to cause the damage. The crime is still
malicious mischief because the offender has no intent to gain but derives satisfaction from the act
because of hate, revenge or other evil motive.
ART. 329. Other mischiefs.— The mischiefs not included in the next preceding article
shall be punished:
1. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the
damage caused exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000);
2. By arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value is over
Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) but does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos
(₱200,000); and
3. By arresto menor or a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not
more than Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000), if the amount involved does not exceed
Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) or cannot be estimated. (As amended by RA 10951)
>>>>To fall under this article, the mischief must not be included or embraced in Article 228. The
offender is punished according to the value of the damage caused to the offended party. If the
damage cannot be estimated, the minimum penalty of arresto menor or a fine of not more than
200 pesos shall be imposed on the offender.
Examples of this kind of malicious mischief would be the case of servant who released a bird
from its cage because he hated its owner; or a servant who, out of his hatred towards the owner
of a horse, deliberately starves the horse to death.
Article 330. Damage and obstruction to means of communication. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its med ium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person who
shall damage any railway, telegraph or telephone nes.
If the damage shall result in any derailment of cars, collision, or other accident, the penalty
of prision mayor shall e imposed, without prejudice to the criminal liability of the ffender
for the other consequences of his criminal act.
241
For the purpose of the provisions of this article, the elect ric wires, traction cables, signal
system, and other things ertaining to railways, shall be deemed to constitute an integ ral
part of a railway system.
The concept of malicious mischief is still present in causing damage to any railway, telegraph or
telephone lines. The penalty is correspondingly increased if the damage shall cause the
derailment of cars or other accident.
If the damage was intended to cause derailment only without any intention to kill, it will be a
crime involving destruction under Article 324. If the derailment is intentionally done to cause the
death of a person, the crime committed will be murder under Article 248.
Article 331. Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments, or paintings. — Any person
who shall destroy or damage statues or any other useful or ornamental public monuments,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period.
Any person who shall destroy or damage any useful or ornamental painting of a public
nature shall suffer the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Forty Thousand
Pesos (P40,000), or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. (As
amended by RA 10951)
Article 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. — No criminal, but only civil liability
shall result from the commission on of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief
committed or caused mutually by the following persons:
The crimes covered by the exemption as provided in this article are theft, swindling (estafa)
and malicious mischief. If the crime committed is not one of the above-mentioned crimes, the
offender will not be entitled to the exemption. If the crime committed is robbery or falsification
and the offender is any of the relatives mentioned in the article, the exemption will not likewise
apply, hence, they will be held criminally liable for the crime committed.
In the same manner, if the crime is committed by the relatives 'the offended party, in
conspiracy with strangers, the latter will not be accorded the benefit of the privilege since the
same is limited to spouses, ascendants, descendants or relatives by affinity in the same line or
category.
A is indebted to B in the sum of P100.00. C, the son of B, approaches A without the knowledge
or consent of his father and falsely represents that he had been sent by his father to collect the
debt. After A delivers the money to C, the latter, instead of turning it over to his father, spends it
for himself.
The exemption is based on filial relationship, since, as between the offender and the
offended party, there is presumed to be co-ownership of the property involved.
For the exemption to apply insofar as brothers and sisters, and brothers-in-law and
sisters-in-law are concerned, they must be living together at the time of the commission of any of
the crimes of theft, estafa or malicious mischief.
242
The term relatives by affinity in the same line includes parents- in-law like mother-in-law
and father-in-law. And since the language of the law is that the offense is "caused mutually," it is
understood to refer to cases committed under the circumstances enumerated by the law wherein
the offender and the offended parties are in-laws in the same line.
Common law spouses are included within the provision of the article_because of their presumed
co-ownership of the property involved. Under Article 144 of the Civil Code, a man and a woman
living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage shall enjoy the right of co-
ownership over "property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages or salaries.
* The crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness are the so-
called private crimes. They cannot be prosecuted except upon the complaint initiated by the
offended party. The law regards the privacy of the offended party here as more important than
the disturbance to the order of society. For the law gives the offended party the preference
whether to sue or not to sue. But the moment the offended party has initiated the criminal
complaint, the public prosecutor will take over and continue with prosecution of the offender.
That is why under Article 344, if the offended party pardons the offender, that pardon will only
be valid if it comes before the prosecution starts. The moment the prosecution starts, the crime
has already become public and it is beyond the offended party to pardon the offender.
Article 333. Who are guilty of adultery. —Adultery is committed by any married woman
who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has
carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently
declared void.
Adultery shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
If the person guilty of adultery committed this offense while being abandoned without
justification by the offended spouse, the penalty next lower in degree than that provided in
the next preceding paragraph shall be imposed.
ELEMENTS:
2. That she has sexual intercourse with a man not her husband.
3. That as regards the man with whom she has sexual intercourses, he must know her to be
married.
Notes:
* There are two reasons why adultery is made punishable by law. Primarily, it is a violation of
the marital vow and secondarily, it paves the way to the introduction of a spurious child into the
family.
243
* Adultery is a crime not only of the married woman but also of the man who had intercourse
with a married woman knowing her to be married. Even if the man proves later on that he does
not know the woman to be married, at the beginning, he must still be included in the complaint or
information. This is so because whether he knows the woman to be married or not is a matter of
defense and its up to him to ventilate that in formal investigations or a formal trial.
* If after preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor is convinced that the man did not know
that the woman is married, then he could simply file the case against the woman.
* The acquittal of the woman does not necessarily result in the acquittal of her co-accused
In order to constitute adultery, there must be a joint physical act. Joint criminal intent is
not necessary. Although the criminal intent may exist in the mind of one of the parties to the
physical act, there may be no such intent in the mind of the other party. One may be guilty of the
criminal intent, the other innocent, and yet the joint physical act necessary to constitute the
adultery may be complete. So, if the man had no knowledge that the woman was married, he
would be innocent insofar as the crime of adultery is concerned but the woman would still be
guilty; the former would have to be acquitted and the latter found guilty, although they were tried
together.
*A husband committing concubinage may be required to support his wife committing adultery
under the rule in pari delicto.
*For adultery to exist, there must be a marriage although it be subsequently annulled. There is no
adultery, if the marriage is void from the beginning.
* Adultery is an instantaneous crime which is consummated and completed at the moment of the
carnal union. Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery. Adultery is not a
continuing crime unlike concubinage.
Illustration:
Madamme X is a married woman residing in Butuan City. She met a man, Y, while she was
window shopping. She agreed to go with Y to GenSan, supposedly to come back the next day.
When they were in Davao City, they stayed in a motel, having sexual intercourse there. After
that, they proceeded again and stopped at Digos City, where they went to a motel and had sexual
intercourse.
* There are two counts of adultery committed in this instance: one adultery in Davao City, and
another adultery in Digos City. Even if it involves the same man, each intercourse is a separate
crime of adultery.
* Mitigated if wife was abandoned without justification by the offended spouse (woman is entitled
to this mitigating circumstance)
* Abandonment without justification is not exempting but only a mitigating circumstance. One
who invokes abandonment in the crime of adultery hypothetically admits criminal liability for the
crime charged. (U. S. vs. Serrano, et al., 28 Phil. 230)
* In the case of People vs. Pontio Guinucud, et al., (58 Phil. 621), a private agreement was
entered into between the husband and wife for them to separate from bed and board and for each
of them to go for his and her own separate way. Thereafter, the wife Rosario Tagayum lived with
her co-accused Pontio Guinucud in a nearby barangay. Their love affair ultimately embroiled the
spouses’ conservative and reputable families in a human drama exposed in legal battles and
whispers of unwanted gossips. In dismissing the complaint, the Court ruled that while a private
agreement between the husband and wife was null and void, the same was admissible proof of the
express consent given by the condescending husband to the prodigal wife, a license for her to
commit adultery. Such agreement bars the husband from instituting a criminal complaint for
adultery.
244
* After filing the complaint for adultery and while the case is pending trial and resolution by the
trial court, the offended spouse must not have sexual intercourse with the adulterous wife since
an act of intercourse subsequent to the adulterous conduct is considered as implied pardon.
(People vs. Muguerza, et al., 13 C.A. Rep. 1079)
Article 334. Concubinage. — Any husband who shall keep istress in the conjugal dwelling,
or, shall have sexual in- ;ourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman, who is not
his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other ce, shall be punished by prision correccional
in its mini- m and medium periods.
a) The offender must be a married man who commits the following acts:
b) He keeps a mistress in the conjugal dwelling;
c) He has sexual intercourse with a woman not his wife under scandalous circumstances;
and
d) He cohabits with her in any other place.
e) As regards the woman, she must know the man to be married.
Like adultery, concubinage is punished because of the violation of the marital vow on the part of
the husband. (See the case ofLaguitan vs. Tinio, 179 SCRA 837.) But unlike adultery,
concubinage does not involve the danger of bringing to the family a spurious child which is
sought to be avoided when a woman commits the crime of adultery.
Note: “Scandal” consists in any reprehensible word/deed that offends public conscience,
redounds to the detriment of the feelings of honest persons and gives occasions to the neighbor’s
spiritual damage and ruin
* With respect to concubinage the same principle applies: only the offended spouse can bring the
prosecution. This is a crime committed by the married man, the husband. Similarly, it includes
the woman who had a relationship with the married man.
* It has been asked why the penalty for adultery is higher than concubinage when both crimes are
infidelities to the marital vows. The reason given for this is that when the wife commits adultery,
there is a probability that she will bring a stranger into the family. If the husband commits
concubinage, this probability does not arise because the mother of the child will always carry the
child with her. So even if the husband brings with him the child, it is clearly known that the child
is a stranger.
Not in the case of a married woman who may bring a child to the family under the guise of a
legitimate child. This is the reason why in the former crime the penalty is higher than the latter.
* When spies are employed to chronicle the activities of the accused and the evidence presented
to prove scandalous circumstances are those taken by the detectives, it is obvious that the sexual
intercourse done by the offenders was not under scandalous circumstances. (U.S. vs. Campos-
Rueda, 35 Phil. 51)
*Causal sexual intercourse with a woman in a hotel is not concubinage. Likewise, keeping of a
mistress in a townhouse procured and furnished by a married man who does not live or sleep with
her in said townhouse does not constitute concubinage since there is no cohabitation.
* The rule is that, if a married man’s conduct with a woman who is not his wife was not confined
to occasional or transient interview for carnal intercourse but is carried n in the manner of
husband and wife and for some period of time, then such association is sufficient to constitute
cohabitation. (People vs. Zuniga, CA 57 O.G. 2497)
245
* If the evidence of the prosecution consists of a marriage contract between the offender and the
offended party, and the additional fact of the birth certificate of a child showing the accused to be
the father of the child with the alleged cocubine, the same will not be sufficient to convict the
accused of concubinage since the law clearly states that the act must be one of those provided by
law.
Meaning of "cohabit."
It means to dwell together in the manner of husband and wife for some period of time. It can be
weeks, months or even years. It is at a single act of sexual intercourse. Thus, casual sexual
intercourse ith a woman in a hotel is not concubinage. Likewise, the keeping of mistress in a
townhouse procured and furnished by a married man ho does not live or sleep with her in said
townhouse does not consti- ite concubinage since there is no cohabitation.
Article 336. Acts oflasciviousness. —Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness
upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the
preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.
Elements:
Note that there are two kinds of acts of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code: (1) under
Article 336, and (2) under Article 339.
Under this article, the offended party may be a man or a woman. The crime committed,
when the act performed with lewd design was perpetrated under circumstances which
would have brought about the crime of rape if sexual intercourse was effected, is acts of
lasciviousness under this article. This means that the offended party is either –
(2) being over 12 years of age, the lascivious acts were committed on him or
her through violence or intimidation, or while the offender party was deprived of
reason, or otherwise unconscious.
2. Article 339. Acts of Lasciviousness with the Consent of the Offended Party:
Under this article, the victim is limited only to a woman. The circumstances under which
the lascivious acts were committed must be that of qualified seduction or simple
seduction, that is, the offender took advantage of his position of ascendancy over the
offender woman either because he is a person in authority, a domestic, a househelp, a
priest, a teacher or a guardian, or there was a deceitful promise of marriage which never
would really be fulfilled.
* Always remember that there can be no frustration of acts of lasciviousness, rape or adultery
because no matter how far the offender may have gone towards the realization of his purpose, if
his participation amounts to performing all the acts of execution, the felony is necessarily
produced as a consequence thereof.
* Intent to rape is not a necessary element of the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Otherwise, there
would be no crime of attempted rape.
246
* In the crime of acts of lasciviousness, the intention of the wrongdoer is not very material. The
motive that impelled the accused to commit the offense is of no importance because the essence
of lewdness is in the act itself.
* What constitutes lewd or lascivious conduct must be determined from the circumstances of each
case. The demarcation line is not always easy to determine but in order to sustain a conviction for
acts of lasciviousness, it is essential that the acts complained of be prompted by lust or lewd
designs and the victim did not consent to nor encouraged the act.
* To be guilty of this crime however, the acts of lasciviousness must be committed under any of
the circumstances that had there been sexual intercourse, the crime would have been Rape.
Where circumstances however are such, indicating a clear intention to lie with the offended party,
the crime committed as Attempted Rape.
* This crime (Art. 336) can be committed by either sex unlike in Acts of Lasciviousness with
Consent under Article 339. Thus, a lesbian who toyed with the private part of an eleven-year-old
girl who enjoyed it since she was given $50 dollars before the act, is guilty of Act of
Lasciviousness under this Article as the victim is below twelve year old; and had sexual
intercourse been possible and done, the act would have been Rape.
In the case of People vs. Bailoses, 2 Phil. 49, accused was convicted of acts of lasciviousness
after he compelled the victim to remove her clothes and dance before him and his guests for her
failure to pay her debt despite demand. While apparently, accused was motivated by revenge for
the girl's failure to pay her indebtedness, the Court held that the actuation of accused manifested
lasciviousness.
In People vs. Gatchalian, C.A., 35 O.G. 1417, accused was found guilty of acts of lasciviousness
after he placed himself on top of the sleeping victim, kissed her on the breast and other parts of
her body and tried to pull her legs apart. The victim woke up and was able to resist and overcome
the sexual advances of the accused.
In yet another case, the complainant, Honorata Alforma, was cooking in the kitchen of her house
when all of a sudden, someone came from behind her, embraced her, kissed her on the nape and
held her breast tightly. As this person started lifting the victim's skirt, she looked back and
recognized Victor Remulla who entered her house without her knowledge and consent. She
shouted for help prompting Remulla to flee after the victim's aunt came to her rescue. Here, the
Court held Remulla guilty of acts of lasciviousness.
Article 337. Qualified seduction. — The seduction of a virgin over twelve years and under
eighteen years of age, committed by any person in public authority, priest, house servant,
domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any capacity, shall be entrusted with the
education or custody of the woman seduced, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.
The penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon any person who shall
seduce his sister or descendant, whether or not she be a virgin or over eighteen years of age.
Under the provisions of this Chapter, seduction is committed when the offender has
carnal knowledge of any of the persons and under the circumstances described herein.
There are two classes of qualified seduction. The first is the seduction of a virgin 12 years but not
over 18 years of age, by certain persons such as a person in authority, a priest, a teacher, a
domestic and a guardian. The second is the seduction of a sister by a brother; or of a descendant
by her ascendant, regardless of her age or reputation.
Elements:
1.That the offended party is a virgin, (presumed if she unmarried and of good reputation.)
4.That there is abuse of authority, confidence or relationship on the part of the offender (
person entrusted with education or custody of victim; person in public authority, priest;
servant)
Persons liable:
* This crime also involves sexual intercourse. The offended woman must be over 12 but below
18 years.
* The distinction between qualified seduction and simple seduction lies in the fact, among others,
that the woman is a virgin in qualified seduction, while in simple seduction, it is not necessary
that the woman be a virgin. It is enough that she is of good repute.
* For purposes of qualified seduction, virginity does not mean physical virginity. It means that
the offended party has not had any experience before.
* The virginity referred to here, is not to be understood in so material a sense as to exclude the
idea of abduction of a virtuous woman of a good reputation.
* Although in qualified seduction, the age of the offended woman is considered, if the offended
party is a descendant or a sister of the offender – no matter how old she is or whether she is a
prostitute – the crime of qualified seduction is committed.
Illustration:
If a person goes to a sauna parlor and finds there a descendant and despite that, had sexual
intercourse with her, regardless of her reputation or age, the crime of qualified seduction is
committed.
* In the case of a teacher, it is not necessary that the offended woman be his student. It is enough
that she is enrolled in the same school.
*Deceit is not necessary in qualified seduction. Qualified seduction is committed even though no
deceit intervened or even when such carnal knowledge was voluntary on the part of the virgin.
This is because in such a case, the law takes for granted the existence of the deceit as an integral
element of the crime and punishes it with greater severity than it does the simple seduction,
taking into account the abuse of confidence on the part of the agent. Abuse of confidence here
implies fraud.
* The fact that the offended party gave her consent to the sexual intercourse is not a defense. Lack
of consent on the part of the complainant is not an element of the crime.
* The term domestic refers to a person usually living under the same roof with the offended party.
It includes all those persons residing with the family and who are members of the same
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household, regardless of the fact that their residence may only be temporary or that they may be
paying for their board and lodging.
* A domestic should not be confused with a house servant. A domestic is not necessarily a house
servant.
* Where the offended party is below 12 years of age, regardless of whether the victim is a sister
or a descendant of the offender, the crime committed is rape.
* If the offended party is married and over 12 years of age, the crime committed will be adultery.
* One who is charged with qualified seduction can be convicted of rape. But one who is charged
with rape cannot be convicted of qualified seduction under the same information. (People vs.
Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144)
* Even if the woman has already lost her virginity because of rape, in the eyes of the law, she
remains a virtuous woman even if physically she is no longer a virgin.
Article 338. Simple seduction. — The seduction of a woman who is single or a widow of good
reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age, committed by means of deceit, shall
be punished by arresto mayor.
ELEMENTS:
>>>>In simple seduction, it is necessary that the woman is single or a widow of good reputation.
She must be over 12 but less than 18 years of age. The accused must succeed in having sexual
intercourse with her through deceit. Note that while virginity is a requisite in qualified seduction,
that is not so with simple seduction.
* Deceit generally takes the form of unfulfilled promise to marry. The promise of marriage must
serve as the inducement. The woman must yield on account of the promise of marriage or other
forms of inducement. (People vs. Hernandez, 29 Phil. 109)
> A promise of marriage made by the accused after sexual intercourse had taken place, or after
the woman had yielded her body to the man by mutual consent will not render the man liable for
simple seduction.
* The offended woman must be under 18 but not less than 12 years old; otherwise, the crime is
statutory rape.
* Unlike in qualified seduction, virginity is not essential in this crime. What is required is that
the woman be unmarried and of good reputation. Simple seduction is not synonymous with loss
of virginity. If the woman is married, the crime will be adultery.
Article 341. White slave trade. — The penalty of prision reccional in its medium and
maximum periods shall be aosed upon any person who, in any manner, or under any stext,
shall engage in the business or shall profit by prostitution or shall enlist the services of any
other for the purpose prostitution.
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3 acts punished under this provision of the law are the folding:
* The person liable under Article 341 is the one who maintains or engages in the trade of
prostitution. A white slave is a woman held unwillingly for purposes of commercial prostitution.
A white slaver on the other hand is one engaged in white slave traffic, procurer of white slaves or
prostitutes.
* The most common way of committing this crime would be through the maintenance of a bar or
saloon where women engage in prostitution. For each intercourse, the women pay the maintainer
or owner of a certain amount in this case, the maintainer of owner of the bar or saloon is liable for
white slave trade. (People vs. Go Lo, 56 O.G. 4056)
Article 342. Forcible abduction. — The abduction of any woman against her will and with
lewd designs shall be punted by reclusion temporal.
The same penalty shall be imposed in every case, if the female abducted be under twelve
years of age.
It is the taking away of any woman against her will, from her ase or the place where she
may be, for the purpose of carrying her another place with intent to marry or corrupt her.
ELEMENTS:
1. That the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation.
Crimes against chastity where age and reputation of victim are immaterial: rape, acts of
lasciviousness, qualified seduction of sister/descendant, forcible abduction
* A woman is carried against her will or brought from one place to another against her will with
lewd design.
* Unlike in Rape and Seduction, in the crime of Abduction, whether Forcible or Consented, there
is no sexual intercourse. The acts are limited to taking away from a place the victim, but the
same must be with lewd designs, that is, with unchaste design manifested by kissing and touching
the victim’s private parts.
* If the element of lewd design is present, the carrying of the woman would qualify as abduction;
otherwise, it would amount to kidnapping. If the woman was only brought to a certain place in
order to break her will and make her agree to marry the offender, the crime is only grave coercion
because the criminal intent of the offender is to force his will upon the woman and not really to
restrain the woman of her liberty.
* Where lewd design was not proved or shown, and the victim was deprived of her liberty, the
crime is Kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention under this Article 267, RPC.
* The element of lewd designs, which is essential to the crime of abduction through violence
refers to the intention to abuse the abducted woman. If such intention is lacking or does not exist,
the crime may be illegal detention. It is necessary to establish the unchaste design or purpose of
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the offender. But it is sufficient that the intent to seduce the girl is present. The evil purpose of the
offender may be established or inferred from the overt acts of the accused.
* If the offended woman is under 12 years old, even if she consented to the abduction, the crime
is forcible abduction and not consented abduction.
* Where the offended woman is below the age of consent, even though she had gone with the
offender through some deceitful promises revealed upon her to go with him and they live together
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, the ruling is that forcible abduction is
committed by the mere carrying of the woman as long as that intent is already shown. In other
words, where the man cannot possibly give the woman the benefit of an honorable life, all that
man promised are just machinations of a lewd design and, therefore, the carrying of the woman
is characterized with lewd design and would bring about the crime of abduction and not
kidnapping. This is also true if the woman is deprived of reason and if the woman is mentally
retardate. Forcible abduction is committed and not consented abduction.
* Lewd designs may be demonstrated by the lascivious acts performed by the offender on her.
Since this crime does not involve sexual intercourse, if the victim is subjected to this, then a crime
of rape is further committed and a complex crime of forcible abduction with rape is committed.
* Lewd design does not include sexual intercourse. So, if sexual intercourse is committed against
the offended party after her forcible abduction, the offender commits another crime separate and
distinct from forcible abduction. In this case, the accused should be charged with forcible
abduction with rape. (People vs. Jose, et al., 37 SCRA 450)
* If the accused carried or took away the victim by means of force and with lewd design and
thereafter raped her, the crime is Forcible Abduction with Rape, the former being a necessary
means to commit the latter. The subsequent two (2) other sexual intercourse committed against
the will of the complainant would be treated as independent separate crimes of Rape. (People vs.
Bacalso, 210 SCRA 206).
* If the main object of the offender is to rape the victim, and the forcible abduction was resorted
to by the accused in order to facilitate the commission of the rape, then the crime committed is
only rape. (People vs. Toledo, 83 Phil. 777)
* Where the victim was taken from one place to another, solely for the purpose of killing him and
not detaining him for any legal length of time, the crime committed is murder. (People vs. Ong,
62 SCRA 174)
* True intention of the offender should be ascertained. If the detention is only incidental, the
same should be considered as absorbed. Otherwise, it should be treated as a separate offense.
When such a situation arises, we should consider the application of Article 48 on complex crimes.
* The taking away of the woman may be accomplished by means of deceit at the beginning and
then by means of violence and intimidation later.
* The virginity of the complaining witness is not a determining factor in forcible abduction.
* In order to demonstrate the presence of the lewd design, illicit criminal relations with the person
abducted need not be shown. The intent to seduce a girl is sufficient.
* If there is a separation in fact, the taking by the husband of his wife against her will constitutes
grave coercion.
When a woman is kidnapped with lewd or unchaste designs, the crime committed is forcible
abduction.
When the kidnapping is without lewd designs, the crime committed is illegal detention.
> But where the offended party was forcibly taken to the house of the defendant to coerce her to
marry him, it was held that only grave coercion was committed and not illegal detention.
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* Forcible abduction must be distinguished from the crime of kidnapping. When the violent
taking of a woman is motivated by lewd design, the crime committed is forcible abduction. But if
the motive of the offender is to deprive the woman of her liberty, the crime committed is
kidnapping. Abduction is a crime against chastity while kidnapping is a crime against personal
liberty.
Article 343. Consented abduction. — The abduction of a virgin over twelve and under
eighteen years of age, carried out with her consent and with lewd designs, shall be punished
by the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
Virginity may be presumed from the fact that the offended party is unmarried and has been
leading a moral life. Virginity or maidenhood should not be understood in such a matter of fact
as to completely exclude a woman who has had previous sexual intercourse. If the previous
sexual intercourse was the result of the crime of rape, the intercourse committed with her against
her will and over her violent objection should not render her unchaste and a woman of bad
reputation.
If the virgin is under 12 years old, the crime committed is forcible abdiuction because of the
theory that a child below 12 years of age has no will of her own.
The purpose of the law on consented abduction is to punish the offender for causing disgrace and
scandal to the family of the offended The law does not punish the offender for the wrong done to
the woman since in the eyes of the law, she consented to her seduction.
The deceit which is termed by the law as solicitation or cajolerymay be in the form of honeyed
promises of marriage. Thus, where cused, by means of honeyed promises of marriage was able to
induce a minor to leave her home and while in the company of the accused the latter was able to
deflower her with her consent, the crime committed is consented abduction (People vs. Cabrera,
C.A., to. 229, Sept. 18, 1937).
Article 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape,
and acts of lasciviousness. — The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be pros-
ecuted except upon complaint filed by the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty
parties if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the
offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named
persons, as the case may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the marriage of the
offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty al-
ready imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the
co-principals, accomplices, and accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes.
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1. Adultery and concubinage must be prosecuted upon complaint signed by the offended spouse
a. offended party
b. by her parents
c. grandparents
d. guardians in the order in which they are named above
* The crimes of adultery and concubinage must be prosecuted upon a complaint signed by the
offended spouse. In the complaint, the offended party must include both guilty parties if they are
both alive.
* Distinguished between a private crime and a public crime. In the case of a private crime, the
same cannot be prosecuted de oficio, meaning it cannot be initiated by any person except the
offended party. These are the crimes against chastity such as seduction, adultery, concubinage
and acts of lasciviousness. These are crimes which are initiated with the filing of an information.
A public crime is one which can be prosecuted de officio, meaning it can be prosecuted by any
person interested to prosecute the same. The accusation is usually initiated with the filling of an
information.
* The law requires that the complaint must be initiated by the said persons in order that they are
named or enumerated in the article. If this legal requirement is not observed, the case should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
* If the offended party is of age and is in complete possession of her mental faculties, she alone
can file the complaint (People vs. Mandia, 60 Phil. 372)
* If the offended party cannot sign the complaint because of her tender age, the parents can do it
for her. The same can be done either by the father or the mother. (U.S. vs. Gariboso, 25 Phil
171 )
* The word guardian as mentioned in the law refers to the guardian appointed by the court.
(People vs. Formento, et al., 60 Phil. 434)
What is the meaning of “shall have consented” which bars the institution of criminal action
for adultery or concubinage?
The term “consent” has reference to the tie prior to the commission of the crime. In other words,
the offended party gives his or her consent to the future infidelity of the offending spouse.
> And so, while consent refers to the offense prior to its commission, pardon refers to the offense
after its commission. (People vs. Schnekenburger, et al., 73 Phil. 413)
Note: Marriage of the offender with the offended party extinguishes the criminal action or remit
the penalty already imposed upon him. This applies as well to the accomplices, accessories-after-
the-fact. But marriages must be in good faith. This rule does not apply in case of multiple rape
* In the crimes involving rape, abduction, seduction, and acts of lasciviousness, the marriage by
the offender with the offended woman generally extinguishes criminal liability, not only of the
principal but also of the accomplice and accessory. However, the mere fact of marriage is not
enough because it is already decided that if the offender marries the offended woman without any
intention to perform the duties of a husband as shown by the fact that after the marriage, he
already left her, the marriage would appear as having been contracted only to avoid the
punishment. Even with that marriage, the offended woman could still prosecute the offender and
that marriage will not have the effect of extinguishing the criminal liability.
*Pardon by the offended woman of the offender is not a manner of extinguishing criminal liability
but only a bar to the prosecution of the offender. Therefore, that pardon must come before the
prosecution is commenced. When the prosecution is already commenced or initiated, pardon by
the offended woman will no longer be effective because pardon may preclude prosecution but not
prevent the same.
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*Pardon in crimes against chastity, is a bar to prosecution. But it must come before the institution
of the criminal action. (See the cases of People vs. Villorente, 210 SCRA 647; People vs. Avila,
192 SCRA 635) To be effective, it must include both accused.
How about pardon declared by the offended party during the trial of the case? Such a
declaration is not a ground for the dismissal of the case. Pardon is a matter of defense which the
accused must plead and prove during the trial. (People vs. Riotes, C.A., 49 O.G.3403).
* All these private crimes – except rape – cannot be prosecuted de officio. If any slander or
written defamation is made out of any of these crimes, the complaint of the offended party is still
necessary before such case for libel or oral defamation may proceed. It will not prosper because
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over these crimes unless there is a complaint from the
offended party. The paramount decision of whether he or she wanted the crime committed on
him or her to be made public is his or hers alone, because the indignity or dishonor brought about
by these crimes affects more the offended party than social order. The offended party may prefer
to suffer the outrage in silence rather than to vindicate his honor in public.
Article 345. Civil liability of persons guilty of crimes against chastity. — Persons guilty of
rape, seduction, or abduction, shall also be sentenced:
The adulterer and the concubine in the case provided r in Articles 333 and 334 may
also be sentenced, in the same roceeding or in a separate civil proceeding, to indemnify r
damages caused to the offended spouse.
The civil liability of the adulterer and the concubine is limited indemnity for damages
caused to the offended spouse. The law does not mention the adulteress in the crime of adultery
such that only the adulterer shall be held civilly liable.
There is likewise no mention of the offender in the crime of acts lasciviousness, as being
liable for civil damages under Article 345. The law only mentioned the crimes of rape, seduction
and abduction.
Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be covered in seduction,
abduction, rape or other lascivious acts. The crimes of adultery and concubinage are also
included.
In People vs. Fontanilla, G.R. No. L-25354, June 28, 1968, the appellate court declared
that moral damages may be recovered both the offended party and by her parents.
In the application of Article 345 in relation to Article 283 of the Civil Code, the court is
required in the criminal case to make a declaration whether the child is a natural child under
Articles 276 to 286 the Civil Code, which allow his recognition by the putative father, the child
falls under the provisions of Articles 287 to 289, which deal with illegitimate children who
cannot be recognized. (See the cases of People vs. Sartagoda, 221SCRA 251 and People vs. Rizo,
189 :RA 265.)
Article 346. Liability of ascendants, guardians, teachers, other persons entrusted with the
custody of the offended party. — The ascendants, guardians, curators, teachers and y
person who, by abuse of authority or confidential relationship, shall cooperate as
accomplices in the perpetration the crimes embraced in chapters second, third, and fourth
this title, shall be punished as principals.
Teachers or other persons in any other capacity entrusted with the education and
guidance of youth, shall also suffer the penalty of temporary special disqualification in its
maximum period to perpetual special disqualification.
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Any person falling within the terms of this article, and any other person guilty of
corruption of minors for the benefit of another, shall be punished by special disqualification
from filling the office of guardian.
Article 347. Simulation of births, substitution of one child • another, and concealment or
abandonment of a legitimate ild. — The simulation of births and the substitution of one child
for another shall be punished by prision mayor and a fine of not exceeding Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000).
The same penalties shall be imposed upon any person 10 shall conceal or abandon any
legitimate child with intent to cause such child to lose its civil status.
Any physician or surgeon or public officer who, in violation of the duties of his profession or
office, shall cooperate the execution of any of the crimes mentioned in the two next
preceding paragraphs shall suffer the penalties therein ascribed and also the penalty of
temporary special disqualification. (As amended by RA 10951)
There are three separate offenses punished under this arti- . They are the following:
1. Simulation of birth;
2. Substitution of one child for another; and
3. Concealing or abandoning any legitimate child with intent to cause such child to lose its
civil status.
Simulation of birth takes place when a woman pretends to be pregnant when in fact she is
not and on the day of the supposed delivery, she takes the child of another and declares the child
to be her own. This is done by entering in the birth certificate of the child that the offender is the
alleged mother of the child when in fact the child belongs to another.
Substituting one child for another can be explained by the following illustration: Bill and
Monica have a child named John. Edward and Diana also have a child named Paul. Saddam, the
offender, with intent to cause loss of any trace of their respective filiation, interchanges John and
Paul without the knowledge of their parents. Saddam is guilty of substituting one child for an-
other.
The third offense punished under this article is the concealment or abandonment of any
legitimate child. As suggested by the law, the child must be legitimate. The offender conceals or
abandons such child with the intention of causing such child to lose its civil status.
When a child is abandoned, the criminal liability of the offender is determined by her
intention. To illustrate: A woman gives birth to a child and thereafter places the child in front of a
church with the letter "to whom it may concern... please take care of my child." If the real purpose
of the woman was merely to free herself from the obligation of feeding and caring for the child,
she is liable under Article 276 and not Article 347 of the Revised Penal Code.
Illustration:
People who have no child and who buy and adopt the child without going through legal adoption.
If the child is being kidnapped and they knew that the kidnappers are not the real parents of their
child, then simulation of birth is committed. If the parents are parties to the simulation by
making it appear in the birth certificate that the parents who bought the child are the real
parents, the crime is not falsification on the part of the parents and the real parents but simulation
of birth.
Q: A woman who has given birth to a child abandons the child in a certain place to free herself of
the obligation and duty of rearing and caring for the child. What crime is committed by the
woman?
A: The crime committed is abandoning a minor under Article 276.
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Q: Suppose that the purpose of the woman is abandoning the child is to preserve the inheritance
of her child by a former marriage, what then is the crime committed?
A: The crime would fall under the second paragraph of Article 347. The purpose of the woman is
to cause the child to lose its civil status so that it may not be able to share in the inheritance.
Problem: Suppose a child, one day after his birth, was taken to and left in the midst of a lonely
forest, and he was found by a hunter who took him home. What crime was committed by the
person who left it in the forest?
Ans: It is attempted infanticide, as the act of the offender is an attempt against the life of the
child. See US v. Capillo, et al., 30 Phil. 349.
Article 348. Usurpation of civil status. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
any person who shall usurp the civil status of another, should he do so for the pur pose of
defrauding the offended party or his heirs; otherwise, the penalty of prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed.
Notes:
* There must be criminal intent to enjoy the civil rights of another by the offender knowing he is
not entitled thereto
* The term "civil status" includes one's public station, or the rights, duties, capacities and
incapacities which determine a person to a given class. It seems that the term "civil status"
includes one's profession.
Circumstances qualifying the offense: penalty is heavier when the purpose of the impersonation
is to defraud the offended party or his heirs
Article 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
ELEMENTS:
2.That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the civil code.
4.That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
* The crime does not fall within the category of private crimes that can be prosecuted only at the
instance of the offended party PUBLIC CRIME
* A simulated marriage is not marriage at all and can be used as a defense for bigamy
* One who, although not yet married before, knowingly consents to be married to one who is
already married is guilty of bigamy knowing that the latter’s marriage is still valid and subsisting.
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For the crime of bigamy to prosper the first marriage must be valid. If the first marriage is void
from the beginning, such nullity of the marriage is a defense in a charge of bigamy. If the first
marriage is voidable, the same is not a defense. Consequently, when raised as a defense, the
accused should be convicted since until and unless annulled, the bond of matrimony remains or is
maintained.
The language of the law is clear when it declared "before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved." The Supreme Court said that even if the accused, as plaintiff in the civil case prevails,
and his first marriage is annulled, such pronouncement has no retroactive effect as to exculpate
him in the bigamy case. Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge its nullity, for only
competent courts have such authority (Landicho vs. Relova, 22 SCRA 731, 735). Significantly,
the civil case for annulment of the first marriage does not pose a prejudicial question as to
warrant the suspension of the trial and proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy (Roco, et al.,
vs. Cinco - al., 68 O.G. 2952).
There are two causes which may produce the legal dissolution of the first marriage. One is the
death of one of the contracting pares. The other is by judicial decree annulling a voidable
marriage.
The second marriage must have all the essential requisites of a valid marriage and its only
infirmity is the existence of a first marriage.
In the crime of bigamy, the second spouse is not necessarily liable. The language of Article 349
indicates that the crime of bigamy committed by one person who contracts a subsequent marriage
while the former marriage is valid and subsisting. If the second wife knew of the previous
marriage of the accused, she will be liable for the crime of bigamy but only as an accomplice.
Bigamy is a public crime. So, it is immaterial whether it is the first or the second spouse who
initiates the action against the offending spouse.
Q: May a person who is convicted of bigamy be prosecuted for the private offense of concubinage?
A: Yes, since the offender has committed two distinct offenses in law and in fact. Bigamy is a
crime against civil status and admittedly a public crime. Concubinage a private offense and is a
crime against chastity.
Bigamy is a form of illegal marriage. The offender must have a valid and subsisting marriage.
Despite the fact that the marriage is still subsisting, he contracts a subsequent marriage.
Illegal marriage includes also such other marriages which are performed without complying with
the requirements of law, or such premature marriages, or such marriage which was solemnized by
one who is not authorized to solemnize the same.
One convicted of bigamy may also be prosecuted for concubinage as both are distinct offenses.
The first is an offense against civil status, which may be prosecuted at the instance of the state.
The second is an offense against chastity, and may be prosecuted only at the instance of the
offended party.
A married person who contracts a marriage before his petition for the declaration of nullity of
his/her marriage under Art. 36 of the family Code is granted or before judgment thereof becomes
final is liable for Bigamy.
What is the liability if any of a person who knowingly acts as wit ness to a bigamous
marriage?
257
Problem: Romy is married to Elsa. Ambo, his best friend stood as best man during their
marriage and stood as godfather in the baptism of the child of the spouses. Romy fell in love with
Nelia. He married Nelia and Ambo willingly stood as principal witness. Elsa came to know about
the second marriage. Determine the criminal liabilities of Romy, Nelia and Ambo.
Ans: Romy is liable as principal by direct participation in the crime of Bigamy. Nelia is not
liable for Bigamy because she was not aware of the previous marriage of Romy. She was in good
faith. For his part, Ambo is liable as accomplice to the crime of Bigamy. He has prior knowledge
of the first marriage of Romy and still stood as a principal witness to the second marriage of
Romy.
Article 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of ,ws. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person who,
without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article, shall contract
marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the
marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment.
If either of the contracting parties shall obtain the consent of the other by means of
violence, intimidation, or fraud, he shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty
provided in the next preceding paragraph.
The law further provides that for accused to be liable under this article, he should not be guilty of
bigamy because otherwise, the crime punished under Article 350 is deemed absorbed in the
bigamy.
Article 353. Definition of libel. — A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or
of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circum-
stance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person,
or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Under the common law, there were two crimes known as libel and slander. When the malicious
imputation is done in writing or is expressed in writing, it is called libel and if the same is
expressed orally or verbally, it is called slander. It used to be that we make a distinction between
calumny, insult and libel. Under the Revised Penal Code, all kinds of attack against honor and
reputation is either libel under Article 353 or slander under Article 358.
Q: What is Libel?
258
A: Libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, vice or defect, real or imaginary or any
act, omission, condition, status, or circumstances tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
a) That there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any
act, omission, condition, status or circumstance;
b) That the imputation must be made publicly;
c) That it must be malicious;
d) That the imputation must be directed at a natural or juridical person or one who is dead; and
e) That the imputation must tend to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person
defamed. (See Alonzo vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 51.)
Test of Defamatory Imputation: It is what the article conveyed to a fair and reasonable man
that should be considered, not the intent of the writer.
Where the comments are worded in praise of the plaintiff, like describing him with
qualities which plaintiff does not deserve because of his social, political and economic status in
the community which is too well known to all concerned, and which are intended to ridicule
rather than praise him, the publication is deemed libelous (Jimenez vs. Reyes, 27 Phil. 52).
The offended party must be identifiable as the object of the defamatory statement. It must
be shown from the statement that the victim is identifiable by a third person or even a stranger.
In one case, it was held that the word "supot" (uncircumcised) does not categorically
pertain to a particular person.
Malice defined.
Malice has been defined as a term used to indicate the fact that the defamer is prompted
by personal ill or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of
the person defamed.
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Kinds of malice:
a) Malice in law — This is assumed and is inferred from the defamatory character of an
imputation. The presumption of malice attaches to the defamatory statement especially if it
appears to be insulting per se. The law presumes that the defamer made the imputation without
good intention or justifiable motive.
b) Malice in fact — This refers to malice as a fact. The presence and existence of personal ill-will
or spite may still appear even if the statement is not defamatory. So, where the defamatory acts
imputed refer to the private life of the individual, malice may be presumed from the publication
of the defamatory statement because no one has a right to invade another's privacy.
Malice in fact is shown by proof of ill-will, hatred, or purpose to injure. It is also known as
EXPRESS MALICE. It is the malice that the complainant must prove to exist to hold the
accused criminally and civilly liable. This kind of malice is important in qualified privileged
statements. Even if malice in fact exists and is proved, there is no criminal liability if the
statements are absolutely privileged in character
Malice in law is presumed to be malicious from the defama tory imputation even if it is true if the
offender cannot establish justifiable reasons or good motives therefor. Proof is not required
because it is presumed to exist from the defamatory words.
The law on the matter speaks of presumption of malice. When the imputation is defamatory, the
law presumes that the offender in making the statement was motivated by ill-will or spite. It is
known as malice in law. Significantly, because of this presumption, the prosecution or the
plaintiff need not prove malice on the part of the accused. The law presumes that accused was
motivated by ill-will when he made the defamatory statement. On the assumption that the de-
amatory statement is true, will the presumption of malice still exist ? The answer is yes. The
accused has to proved good intention and justifiable motive for making such a statement. This is
so because of Article 354 which provides "every defamatory imputation is presumed o be
malicious even if it be true."
a) The defamatory imputation is true, in case the law allows proof of the truth of the
imputation (see Art. 361);
b) It is published with good intention;
c) There is justifiable motive for making it.
MALICE is not presumed in the following cases involving qualifiedly privileged communication:
(1) Private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty.
(2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks of any
judicial, legislative, or other proceedings which are not of confidential nature or of
260
any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
1) that the accused published the defamatory imputation with good intention;
2) that there is justifiable motive for making it;
3) that the communication made is privileged; and
4) accused must prove the truth of the defamatory imputation in those cases wherein
truth is a defense.
When the defamatory imputation comes under the criteria of an absolute privileged
communication, the presumption of malice under Article 354 has no application.
Qualified privileged statements require that the complainant must establish malice in fact. The
offender is still liable if all the elements of qualifiedly privileged communication are not present.
The presumption of malice, however, comes into play when the defamatory statement is a
conditional or qualified privileged communication. To overcome this presumption of malice in
law, the de- famer must prove during the proceeding that the defamatory imputation was
committed because of a legal, moral or social duty.
I. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral
or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in
the exercise of their functions.
1) That the person who made the communication had a legal, moral or social duty to make
the communication, or at least, he had an interest to be upheld;
2) That the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having
some interest or duty in the matter;
3) That the statements in the communication are made in good faith
Requisites of the Second Kind of Privileged Communication: (Fair and true report made in
good faith)
1) That it is fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings
which are not of a confidential nature, or of a statement, report or speech delivered in
said proceedings, or of any other act performed by a public officer in the exercise of
his functions;
2) That it is made in good faith;
3) That it is without any comments or remarks
Things to Remember:
1) A qualified privileged communication must be made with malice and bad faith in
order to be actionable.
Vasquez and several residents of Tondo, Manila, went to the NHA Manager regarding
their complaint against Olmedo, their barangay chairman. After the meeting, media interviewed
them. On the following day, an article was published in a local newspaper wherein Vasquez as
spokesperson charged Olmedo of having conspired with scrupulous NHA officials of land
grabbing. Vasquez also alleged that Olmedo is engaged in illegal gambling and stealing of
chicken in their barangay. Vasquez was charged before the RTC of libel. Vasquez presented
evidence of his basis why he stated so. RTC convicted him. CA affirmed. Appealed to the SC.
SC: The question is whether from the fact that the statements were defamatory, malice can be
presumed so that it was incumbent upon petitioner to overcome such presumption. Under Art.
361 of the Revised Penal Code, if the defamatory statement is made against a public official with
respect to the discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the allegation is
shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does not prove that the
imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends. Notably, Vasquez was able
to prove the truth of his charges against the barangay official.
For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it relates to
official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with
actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not. This is the gist of the ruling in the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan,25
which this Court has cited with approval in several of its own decisions. 26 This is the rule of
actual malice. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges made by
petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or with
reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official
misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only
be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code. It would, above all, infringe on the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Such a rule would deter citizens from
performing their duties as members of a self- governing community. Without free speech and
assembly, discussions of our most abiding concerns as a nation would be stifled. As Justice
Brandeis has said, public discussion is a political duty and the greatest menace to freedom is an
inert people.
2
2
262
Facts: Roberto Brillante (Brillante), questioned his convictions for libel for writing and causing
to be published in 1988 an open letter addressed to then President of the Republic of the
Philippines Corazon C. Aquino discussing the alleged participation of Binay, then the "OIC
Mayor" and a candidate for the position of Mayor in the Municipality (now City) of Makati, and
Dr. Nemesio Prudente (Prudente), then President of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines,
in an assassination plot against Augusto Syjuco (Syjuco), another candidate for Mayor of Makati
at that time.
On January 7, 1988, Brillante, then a candidate for the position of Councilor in Makati, held a
press conference at the Makati Sports Club which was attended by some 50 journalists. In the
course of the press conference, Brillante accused Binay of plotting the assassination of Syjuco.
He further accused Binay of terrorism, intimidation and harassment of the Makati electorate.
Brillante also circulated among the journalists copies of an open letter to President Aquino which
discussed in detail his charges against Binay.3
Several journalists who attended the press conference wrote news articles about the same. Angel
Gonong, a writer for the People's Journal, wrote a news article entitled "Binay Accused of
Plotting Slays of Rivals." It was cleared for publication by Max Buan, Jr. (Buan), and Luis
Camino (Camino), Editor-in-Chief and News Editor, respectively, of the People's Journal. Gloria
Hernandez (Hernandez) wrote a similar article entitled "Binay Slay Plan on Syjuco" which was
cleared for publication by Augusto Villanueva (Villanueva) and Virgilio Manuel (Manuel),
Editor-in-Chief and News Editor, respectively, of the News Today.4
The open letter was subsequently published under the title "Plea to Cory - -Save Makati" in
newspapers such as the People's Journal.
As a result of the publication of the open letter, Binay filed with the Makati fiscal's office four
complaints for libel against Brillante, as the author of the letter; Gonong, Buan and Camino for
writing and publishing the news article on Brillante's accusations against him in the People's
Journal;7 Hernandez, Villanueva and Manuel for writing and publishing a similar news article in
the News Today;8 and for publishing the open letter, Buan and Camino of the People's Journal;9
and Arcadio A. Sison (Sison) as President of A. Sison and Associates, an advertising agency.
Francisco Baloloy (Baloloy), who was identified in the open letter as among the persons who
attended the meeting organized by Binay and Prudente to plan the assassination of Syjuco,
likewise filed a criminal complaint for libel against Brillante, Domingo Quimlat (Quimlat),
Publisher and Editor-in-Chief of Balita, and Sison as President of A. Sison and Associates.
It is further asserted by Brillante that since Binay, the subject of the allegedly defamatory
statements is a public figure, his (Brillante's) comments affecting Binay's reputation is
constitutionally protected speech.
SC: Brillante claims that he wrote the open letter and uttered the statement complained of during
the January 7, 1988 press conference out of a social duty to disclose to all concerned the dangers
to which he and his fellow candidate Syjuco were exposed in view of the concerted actions of
263
Binay and Prudente.73 In effect, he argues that his defamatory statements and utterances fall under
Article 354, No. 1 and are in the nature of privileged communication; hence, malice cannot be
presumed but must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
It is, however, the absence of the second element of a privileged communication that
unequivocally negates the characterization of Brillante's statements as privileged communication.
The law requires that for a defamatory imputation made out of a legal, moral or social duty to be
privileged, such statement must be communicated only to the person or persons who have some
interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish the protection sought by
the author of the statement.
In the cases at bar, although the open letter was primarily addressed to then President Aquino, the
communication thereof was not limited to her alone. It was also published in several newspapers
of general circulation and was thus made known to the general public. Even if the interest sought
to be protected belongs not just to Brillante but to the public in general, certainly, the general
public does not have the power to remedy the alleged dangers sought to be prevented by Brillante
in publishing the open letter or in uttering similar statements during the January 7, 1988 press
conference. Brillante employed the shotgun approach to disseminate the information which
essentially destroyed the reputations of the complainants. His lack of selectivity is indicative of
malice and is anathema to his claim of privileged communication.
The Court agrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the statements made by Brillante
during the press conference and in the open letter do not qualify as privileged communication.
The Court in Orfanel v. People of the Philippines, 141 Phil. 519, differentiated absolutely
privileged communication from conditionally privileged communication in this manner:
A communication is said to be absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if its author
acted in bad faith.
Specially recognized in the Constitution as absolutely privileged are speeches or statements made
in official proceedings of Congress by members thereof. Thus, if a Congressman delivers a
privilege speech and in the course thereof casts aspersions or make criminal imputations against
another member of the house or even the President for that matter, he is not criminally liable for
Libel or Oral Defamation. His speech, although it contains defamatory statements is covered by
the protective mantle of parliamentary immunity. He can only be questioned in the house for
violation of house rules or ethical conduct.
Statements made in Judicial Proceedings are Privileged but only If Pertinent or Relevant to
Case Involved
264
"It is a settled principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of judicial
proceedings are absolutely privileged. This absolute privilege remains regardless of the
defamatory tenor and the presence of malice if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to the
cause in hand or subject of the inquiry."
Thus, the person who made these statements such as judge, lawyer or witness does not
thereby incur the risk of being found liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or in an action for
the recovery of damages.
Sarcastic, pungent, and harsh allegations in a pleading al though tending to detract from
the dignity that should characterize proceedings in courts of justice are absolutely privileged , if
relevant to the issue. (Navarette v. CA, 325 SCRA, February 2000)
In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualifiedly privileged
communication under Article 354, No. 1:
(1) The person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the
communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his
own or of the one to whom it is made;
Facts: A is the elected President of the homeowner’s association. B lost to A during the election.
B began questioning the election. In retaliation, A wrote in their newsletter and alleged B is a
mandurugas. B charged A for libel. A said that the offensive words found in the subject article are
not actually defamatory. According to petitioner, the word "mandurugas" and other words and
phrases used in the questioned article do not impute to private complainant any crime, vice or
defect which would be injurious or damaging to his name and reputation. As far as petitioner is
concerned, the descriptive words and phrases used should be considered as mere epithets which
are a form of non-actionable opinion, because while they may express petitioner’s strong
emotional feelings of dislike, they do not mean to reflect adversely on private complainant’s
reputation. A also asserted that the letter is a privilege communication
SC: The question is not what the writer of an alleged libel means, but what the words used by him
mean. Here, the defamatory character of the words used by the petitioner are shown by the very
recitals thereof in the questioned article. No evidence aliunde need be adduced to prove it.
Petitioner used the following words and phrases in describing the private complainant:
"mandurugas," "mag-ingat sa panlilinlang," "matagal na tayong niloloko," "may kasamang
pagyayabang," "ang ating pobreng super kulit," patuloy na kabulastugan, "mastermind sa
paninirang puri," etc. Jurisprudence has laid down a test to determine the defamatory character of
words used in the following manner:
“Words calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more effective to destroy reputation
than false charges directly made. Ironical and metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for
slander. A charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and
understand that the person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain
offenses, or are sufficient to impeach their honesty, virtue, or reputation, or to hold the person or
persons up to public ridicule.”
Petitioner avers that he wrote the article not to malign the private complainant, but merely to
correct the misinformation being circulated by Reyes and some quarters within the community
about the petitioner and the association he heads. He did it therefore, in response to some moral,
265
social or civic duty as he was at that time the President of their homeowners’ association and
editor of its newsletter. Hence, the article falls under the first exception of Article 354.
"As a rule, it is the right and duty of a citizen to make a complaint of any misconduct on the part
of public officials, which comes to his notice, to those charged with supervision over them. Such
a communication is qualifiedly privileged and the author is not guilty of libel. The rule on
privilege, however, imposes an additional requirement. Such complaints should be addressed
solely to some official having jurisdiction to inquire into the charges, or power to redress the
grievance or has some duty to perform or interest in connection therewith."
virtua1aw library
In the instant case, none of the homeowners for whom the newsletter was published was vested
with the power of supervision over the private complainant or the authority to investigate the
charges made against the latter. Moreover, a written letter containing libelous matter cannot be
classified as privileged when it is published and circulated among the public, to as what the
petitioner did in this case.
In his final attempt to come under the protective mantle of privileged communication, petitioner
alleges that the subject article likewise constitutes a fair and true report on the actuations of a
public official falling under the second exception of Article 354, since private complainant was a
public relations consultant in the Department of Trade and Industry at the time the allegedly
libelous article was published on February 10, 1984.
On this point, the rule is that defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or acts of public
officers which are related to the discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel if the
defendant proves the truth of the imputation. But any attack upon the private character of the
public officer on matters which are not related to the discharge of their official functions may
constitute libel. 12 This is clear by express provision of Article 354, exception number two (2)
which refers to "any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions."
"It is likewise settled that a single defamatory statement, if published several times, gives rise to
as many offenses as there are publications. This is the 'multiple publication rule' which is
followed in our jurisdiction, as explained in Soriano v. Intermediate Appellate Court." (167
SCRA 222)
"We follow the 'multiple publication' rule in the Philippines. Thus, in the cases of Montinola v.
Montalvo (34 Phil. 662 [1916]) and United States v. Sotto (36 Phil. 389 [1917]), this Court ruled
that each and every publication of the same libel constitutes a distinct offense. Stated more succinctly,
for purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction under Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
every time the same written matter is communicated such communi cation is considered a distinct
and separate publication of the libel."
ART. 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means.— A libel committed by means of
writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical
exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished
by prisión correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from Forty
thousand pesos (₱40,000) to One million two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000), or
both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party. (As
amended by RA 10951)
In the enumeration above, television is not included, probably because at the time the Revised
Penal Code was conceived, television had not yet been invented. However, the law provides "or
any similar means" which easily qualifies television is such species or category (People vs.
Casten, C.A., G.R. No. 07924-CR promulgated December 13, 1974).
A: Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, issued on January 25, 2008, laid down a rule of preference
for the imposition of a fine only rather than imprisonment in libel cases.
1) It does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for the crime of libel under
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code;
2) The Judges may in the exercise of sound discretion and taking into consideration the
peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone
would best serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose
imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the
social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;
3) Should only a fine be, imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no
legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment. (Art. 39, RPC
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes libel by means of writings or similar
means with prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200
to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended
party.
In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, where petitioners therein were convicted of B.P. 22 which
provides for alternative penalties of fine or imprisonment or both fine and imprisonment, we
deleted the prison sentence imposed upon petitioners and instead ordered them only to pay a fine
equivalent to double the amount of the check."
"In the subsequent case of Lim v. People, we did the same and deleted the penalty of
imprisonment and merely imposed a fine for
violation of B.P. 22, concluding that such would best serve the ends of criminal justice."
"Adopting these cases, we issued Administrative Circular No. 12-2000. On February 14,
2001, we issued Administrative Circular 13-2001 which modified Administrative Circular No. 12-
2000 by stressing that the clear tenor of Administrative Circular No. 12- 2000 is not to remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of
the penalties provided for in B.P. 22."
ART. 356. Threatening to publish and offer to prevent such publication for a
compensation.— The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from Forty thousand pesos
(₱40,000) to Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000), or both, shall be imposed upon
any person who threatens another to publish a libel concerning him or the parents,
spouse, child, or other member of the family of the latter, or upon anyone who shall offer
to prevent the publication of such libel for a compensation or money consideration.(As
amended by RA 10951)
Acts punished
1. Threatening another to publish a libel concerning him, or his parents, spouse, child, or
other members of his family;
* It involves the unlawful extortion of money by appealing to the fear of the victim, through
threats of accusation or exposure. It contemplates of two offenses: a threat to establish a libel and
267
an offer to prevent such publication. The gravamen of the crime is the intent to extort money or
other things of value.
Blackmail – In its metaphorical sense, blackmail may be defined as any unlawful extortion of
money by threats of accusation or exposure. Two words are expressive of the crime – hush
money. (US v. Eguia, et al., 38 Phil. 857) Blackmail is possible in (1) light threats under
Article 283; and (2) threatening to publish, or offering to prevent the publication of, a libel for
compensation, under Article 356.
ART. 357. Prohibited publication of acts referred to in the course of official proceedings.
— The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine of Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) to Two
hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000), or both, shall be imposed upon any reporter, editor
or manager of a newspaper, daily or magazine, who shall publish facts connected with
the private life of another and offensive to the honor, virtue and reputation of said
person, even though said publication be made in connection with or under the pretext
that it is necessary in the narration of any judicial or administrative proceedings
wherein such facts have been mentioned. (As amended by RA 10951)
Note:
* Even though made in connection with or under the pretext that it is necessary in the narration of
any judicial or administrative proceedings wherein such facts have been mentioned.
* With its provisions, Article 357 has come to be known as the “Gag Law.” It prohibits
reporters, editors or managers of newspapers from publishing articles containing facts connected
with the private life of an individual; facts which are offensive to the honor, virtue and reputation
of persons. But these must refer to facts which are intimately related to the offended party’s
family and home. Occasionally, it involves conjugal troubles and quarrels because of infidelity,
adultery or crimes involving chastity.
* Under Republic Act No. 1477, amending Rep. Act. No. 58, the publisher, editor, columnist or
duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot
be compelled to reveal the source of any news report information appearing in the said
publication which was related to him in confidence unless the court or a house or committee of
Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the security of the State.
ART. 358. Slander.— Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prisión correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and
insulting nature; otherwise the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding
Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000). (as amended by RA 10951)
a) expressions used
Notes:
* The gravity of oral defamation depends not only on the expressions but also on the personal
relation of the accused with the offended party. Other circumstances like the presence of
important people when the crime was committed, the social standing and position of the offended
268
party are factors which may influence the gravity and defamatory imputation (Victorio vs. Court
of Appeals, 173 SCRA 645).
* Note that slander can be committed even if the defamatory remark was done in the absence of
the offended party. (People vs. Clarin, C.A., 37 O.G. 1106)
*Words uttered in the heat of anger constitute light oral defamation (P v Doronilla)
* If the utterances were made publicly and were heard by many people and the accused at the
same time levelled his finger at the complainant, oral defamation is committed (P v Salleque)
* The word “puta ” does not impute that the complainant is prostitute. (People vs. Atienza, G.R.
No. L-19857, Oct. 26, 1968 ) It is a common expression of anger or displeasure. It is seldom
taken in its literal sense by the hearer. It is viewed more as a threat on the part of the accused to
manifest and emphasize a point. (Reyes vs. People, 27 SCRA 686)
ART. 359. Slander by deed.— The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prisión correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from Twenty thousand
pesos (₱20,000) to One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000) shall be imposed upon any
person who shall perform any act not included and punished in this title, which shall cast
dishonor, discredit or contempt upon another person. If said act is not of a serious
nature. the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding Twenty thousand pesos
(₱20,000). (As amended by RA 10951)
Slander by deed is a defamation committed by the offender against the complainant through the
performance of any act which casts dishonor, discredit or contempt upon another person
* Whether a certain slanderous act constitutes slander by deed of a serious nature or not,
depends on the social standing of the offended party, the circumstances under which the act was
committed, the occasion, etc.
* The acts of slapping and boxing the woman, a teacher, in the presence of many people has put
her to dishonor, contempt and ridicule. (P v Costa)
* If the acts committed against the offended party caused her physical injury which did not
require medical attendance, then the crime would be maltreatment which is classified as slight
physical injuries.
P v Motita
> Accused held a mirror between the legs of complainant to reflect her private parts. The crowd
laughed. Guilty of slander by deed.
Distinctions:
ART. 360. Persons responsible. — Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same.
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamation as
provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of
First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published
or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose
office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or the city or province where the
libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold
office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where he held office at the time if the commission of the offense or where
the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a
private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or
city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the
libelous matter is printed and first published: Provided, further, That the civil action for
damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: And provided
finally. That this amendment shall not apply to cases of written defamations, the civil and/or
criminal actions to which have been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this law.
(1) The person who publishes, exhibits or causes the publication or exhibition of any defamation
in writing or similar means.
(3) The editor or business manager of a daily newspaper magazine or serial publication.
(4) The owner of the printing plant which publishes a libelous article with his consent and all
other persons who in any way participate in or have connection with its publication.
* A defamatory statement by itself is not a crime. It is the undue publication of the defamatory
imputation which makes it a crime. It is therefore in this concept that proprietors and editors of
periodicals are also made responsible for the appearance of defamatory matters in any newspaper
under their management.
Venue of criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamation:
b. where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense
* Libel cases are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
Inferior courts have no jurisdiction to try written defamation. (People vs. Hechanova, 54 SCRA
101)
b. Otherwise
- RTC of the city/province where he held office at the time of offense OR
- where the article is 1st published
* In order to prevent controversies as to the venue of criminal actions for written defamation, the
information or complaint must contain averments as to whether the offended party is a private or
public officer at the time of the commission of the offense and whenever possible, the place
where the written defamation was printed and first published. (Agbayani, et al., vs. Hon. Sayo, et
al., L-47880, April 30, 1979)
Note: Offended party must file complaint for defamation imputing a crime which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio (e.g. adultery, concubinage, rape, seduction, abduction, and acts of
lasciviousness)
* Under the last paragraph of Article 360, only defamation consisting of the imputation of private
offenses such as adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness shall be
prosecuted by the offended party by filing a complaint. Outside of this enumeration by law, the
crime is considered a public crime which may be prosecuted de oficio.
Soriano v IAC
> The Philippines follows the multiple publication rule which means that every time the same
written matter is communicated, such communication is considered a distinct and separate
publication of libel.
* Where the publication is libelous per se, actual damages need not be established. This is so
because libel, by its very nature, causes dishonor, disrepute and discredit and injury to the
reputation of the offended party. It is something inherent and natural in the crime of libel. (Lu
Chu Sing vs. Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669)
ART. 361. Proof of the truth. — In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given
in evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, and
moreover, that is was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendant
shall be acquitted.
In such cases, if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he
shall be acquitted.
Admissible when:
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a. the act or omission imputed constitutes a crime regardless of whether the offended
party is a private individual or a public officer
b. the offended party is a government employee, even if the act or omission imputed does
not constitute a crime provided it is related to the discharge of his official duties
a. it appears that the matter charged as libelous is TRUE (for situations 1 and 2 above)
b. it was published with good motives and for a justifiable end (for situation 1 only)
Notes: The proof of the truth of the accusation cannot be made to rest upon mere hearsay, rumors,
or suspicion. It must rest upon positive direct evidence, upon which a definite finding may be
made by the court (US v Sotto)
* Admission on the part of the accused that he committed a mistake will not serve to free him
from criminal liability. But it may serve to mitigate the penalty imposed on him or lessen his civil
liability. ( Phee vs. La Vanguardia, 45 Phil 211 )
ART. 362. Libelous remarks. — Libelous remarks or comments connected with the matter
privileged under the provision of Art. 354, if made with malice, shall not exempt the author
thereof nor the editor or the managing editor of a newspaper from criminal liability.
A person who makes libelous remarks or comments connected with the matter privileged
under the provisions of Art. 354, if made with malice shall not exempt the author thereof nor the
editor or managing editor of a newspaper from criminal liability.
* The main thrust of the law is to punish libelous remarks or comments on matters which are
privileged, if made with malice in fact. So, a newspaper reporter who distorts facts connected
with official proceedings or who adds comments thereon as to cast aspersion on the character of
the parties involved, is guilty of libel even through the defamatory matter is published in
connection with a privileged communication. (Dorr vs. U. S., 11 Phil. 706
Article 363. Incriminating innocent person. — Any person who, by any act not constituting
perjury, shall directly incriminate or impute to an innocent person the commission f a
crime, shall be punished by arresto mayor
Article 364. Intriguing against honor. — The penalty of arresto menor or fine not exceeding
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000) shall be imposed for any intrigue which has for its
principal purpose to blemish the honor or reputation of a person.
The crime is committed by resorting to any form of scheme or plot designed to blemish the
reputation of a person. The offender does not employ written or spoken words, pictures or
caricatures to ridicule his victim. Rather, he uses some ingenious, crafty and secret plot which
produces the same effect.
In Intriguing against honor, the offender resorts to gossips for the purpose of disparaging the
honor or reputation of another.
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In Incriminating an innocent person, the offender performs an act that would incriminate or
impute to an innocent person the commission of a crime.
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence.— Any person who, by reckless imprudence,
shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in
its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted
a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in
damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from
an amount equal to the value of said damages to three (3) times such value, but which
shall in no case be Less than Five thousand pesos (₱5,000).
A fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (₱40.000) and censure shall be imposed
upon any person, who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong
which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion,
without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those
provided in the first two (2) paragraphs of this article, in which case the court
shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed
in the period which they may deem proper to apply.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which
the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed
upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be
in his hands to give. (as amended by RA 10951)
Concept of negligence.
The Revised Penal Code defines a felony as any act or omission punishable by law. The word
"omission" which describes the other mode of committing a felony is the subject matter of Article
365. It is more commonly known as culpa or negligence. It is a term used to indicate the legal
delinquency which results whenever a man fails to exhibit the care required of those who have
control of the agencies involving danger.
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Test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in the doing of an act which
results in injury or damage to another person or his property.
Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed,
foresee harm to the person injured? If so, the law imposes on the doer, the duty to refrain from
that course of action or to take precaution against such result. Failure to do so constitutes
negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring the admonition borne of this
provisions, is the constitutive fact of negligence (Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 809, 813).
Culpa as a mode of committing a crime, is made punishable because it has as its element
"voluntariness." The presence of the latter would make the act performed as being attended by the
elements of freedom, intelligence and lack of foresight. Article 365 which refers to reckless
imprudence, expressly states that it "consists in voluntarily but without malice" doing or failing to
do an act.
When the danger or peril sought to be avoided is manifest or is clear and visible and the
offender fails to exercise the diligence of a food father of a family as required by law to avoid the
accident, and the negligence results in the commission of a crime, the crime committed is reckless
imprudence resulting to injury or damage.
When the danger is not visible or is not manifest and the offender fails to take the
necessary precaution to avoid the accident and his negligence results in the commission of a
crime, the crime committed is simple negligence.
With this observation, it is not difficult to convey the idea that when negligence does not
result in any injury to persons or damage to property, then no crime is committed. Negligence
becomes punishable when it results in the commission of a crime (Lontok, Jr. vs. Ion. Gorgonio,
L-37396, April 30, 1979, 75 O.G. 7763).
Test of Negligence
Did t he defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use the reasonable care and caution which
an ordinary prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary
conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman Law. The existence of negligence in a given
case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before
him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that (Picart vs. Smith, supra
(a) If the reckless imprudence or simple negligence causes damage to property only,
the penalty is a fine which is equal to the value of said damage to three times such value but
in no case less than P25.00. In appropriate cases subsidiary imprisonment may be imposed
under Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 5465.
(b) When death or physical injuries result, the penalty is imprisonment.
(c) In simple negligence or imprudence resulting in a light felony, the penalty is
censure and a fine not exceeding P200.00. In this case, since censure has no fixed duration
as it is not served by confinement, the court cannot impose subsidiary imprisonment in the
judgment of conviction (People vs. Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518).
Under Section 56 of the Land and Transportation and Traffic Code, any accident resulting in
death or injury to any person due to the fault of the motor vehicle operator as a result of
negligence or reckless or unreasonable fast driving is to be punished under the Revised Penal
Code.
The penalties under Article 365 has no application in the following cases:
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(a) When the penalty provided for the offense is equal or lower than that provided in pars. 1 and 2
of Article 365. In this case, the penalty shall be that which is next lower in degree than that which
should be imposed, in the period which the court may deem proper to apply.
(b) When by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, the death of a
person is caused, the penalty is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Contributory negligence.
The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed
through reckless imprudence. It is against public policy to invoke the negligence of another to
escape criminal liability (People vs. Quinones, C.A., 44 O.G. 1520).
Under this principle, the fact that another driver entered a "do not enter" street bears no
influence on the criminal liability of the accused. He will not be relieved of such liability because
despite the admitted fact, the accused who had the right of way had the time and opportunity to
avoid the mishap if he had been sufficiently careful and cautious.
The last paragraph in Article 365 authorizes the court to impose the penalty next higher
in degree if the offender fails to lend on the spot to the injured party such help as may be in his
hand to give. This is a qualifying circumstance which raises the penalty by one degree. Therefore,
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it must necessarily be alleged in the information in order to apprise the accused of the charge
against him and for him to be able to overcome the same in his defense (People vs. Beduya, C.A., 60
O.G. 2668-2669).
Overtaking of another vehicle is a normal occurrence in driving. But when the overtaking
is done from the right, it shows recklessness and disregard of traffic laws and regulations. It is
likewise so when the overtaking is done while another vehicle is approaching from the opposite
direction. This is a violation of Section 59(b) of the Motor Vehicle Law (People vs. Songalla,
C.A., 67 O.G. 8330).
Driving within the speed limit is not a guaranty of due care. Speed limits merely impose
the maximum speed which should not be exceeded. The degree of care required of a motorist is
not governed by speed limits but by the circumstances and conditions obtaining in the place at a
particular time. So, if the maximum speed limit is 80 kilometers per hour and the vehicle is driven
at 30 kilometers per hour, but because of the very slow pace of the vehicle, an accident occurs,
the observance of the speed limit will not be acceptable evidence of due care (People vs. Caluza,
C.A., 58 O. G. 8060).
Notes taken from The Revised Penal Code Book 1 by Luis B. Reyes; Criminal Law Book 1 of the Revised Penal Code by Abelardo
Estrada 2008 Edition; Padilla’s Ultimate Criminal Law Study Guide and Reviewer Vol. 1 2009 Edition; Notes and Cases by Boado
2002 Edition; Criminal Law Book 1 by Judge Ruperto Kapunan, Jr.,; Notes of Elmer P. Brabante Criminal Law Review for the 2011
Bar; Lecture Notes of Dean Hildegardo F. Inigo; U.P. Answers to Bar Questions and some decided cases of the Supreme Court.