CIV. NO.

09-1569 (PG)
United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico

Hernandez v. Castillo
Decided Aug 24, 2010

CIV. NO. 09-1569 (PG). 2002; Zoe M. Laboy Alvarado ("Laboy")

for September 1998 to December 2000;
August 24, 2010 Nydia M. Cotto Vives ("Cotto") for
January 1997 to June 1998; and Joseph
OPINION AND ORDER Colon Morales ("Colon") for December
1994 to December 1996.

JUAN PEREZ-GIMENEZ, District Judge 2 Defendants Pereira, Cotto, Colon, and their

respective conjugal partnerships never

Plaintiff Angel Luis Feliciano Hernandez
answered the complaint and were thus held
(hereinafter "Plaintiff" or "Feliciano") brings suit
in default. (See Docket Nos. 17 29.)
against former Secretaries and Administrators of
the Puerto Rico Department of Corrections and I. Factual Background
Rehabilitation (hereinafter "DOC").1 Plaintiff's
The Court draws the following facts from
complaint is premised upon violations of the Fifth,
Plaintiff's complaint (Docket No. 1) and takes
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
them as true for purposes of resolving Defendant's
States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
motion to dismiss.
("Section 1983"). Those violations arise from his
allegedly unlawful incarceration by DOC officials A. Facts Underlying Plaintiff's
who purportedly knew but were deliberately Incarceration
indifferent to the fact that he was serving time
beyond his sentence, subjecting Plaintiff to over On April 14, 1981, Plaintiff was sentenced by the
fifteen years of imprisonment without penological Superior Court of Mayaguez for a term of
justification. Only defendant Zoe M. Laboy "perpetual imprisonment, for treatment until his
Alvarado (hereinafter "Defendant" or "Laboy") social rehabilitation is accomplished" with a
moved to dismiss (Docket No. 10) the complaint.2 minimum of twelve (12) years imprisonment.3
Plaintiff timely opposed the motion to dismiss People v. Feliciano Hernandez, Crim. No. G-80-
(Docket No. 14). For the reasons that follow, 603-06 (Super. Ct. Mayaguez Apr. 14, 1981). The
which apply equally to all of the named judgment was affirmed by the Puerto Rico
defendants in the complaint, the Court GRANTS Supreme Court. The People of Puerto Rico v.
2 Defendant's motion to dismiss. *2 Angel Feliciano Hernandez, 13 P.R. Offic. Trans.
481 (P.R. 1982). Summarizing the procedural and
1 Five defendants are named in the factual history of the case, the supreme court
complaint for their tenures as DOC
reiterated that Plaintiff was charged with attempt
Secretaries. In reverse chronological order,
to commit rape, lewd and indecent acts,
they are: Miguel A. Pereira Castillo
aggravated restraint of liberty, and illegal
("Pereira") for events on or before June 24,
possession of firearms, for events taking place on
2008; Victor M. Rivera Gonzalez
("Rivera") for January 2001 to December
3 the *3 night of September 8, 1980.4 The court

1
 Hernandez v. Castillo CIV. NO. 09-1569 (PG) (D.P.R. Aug. 24, 2010)

noted, however, the lower court's peremptory to their dates of effectiveness). The Penal
acquittal of the charge for attempt to commit rape Code was extensively reformed by Act No.

after hearing the evidence. The supreme court also 149 of June 18, 2004.

mentioned that the superior court, in handing out 4 More specifically, Plaintiff was charged
its sentence, had discussed Feliciano's recidivism with one (1) attempt to commit rape; two
based on four (4) previous convictions and (2) violations of art. 105 of the Penal Code,
sentences for sexual offenses, and took judicial P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33 § 4067 (lewd and
notice of those former convictions. The supreme indecent acts); two (2) violations of art.
court affirmed the lower court's order permanently 131, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33 § 4172
separating the convict from society, through life (aggravated restraint of liberty); and one

imprisonment, to receive treatment until he was (1) violation of art. 4 of the Weapons Law,

rehabilitated, with a minimum term of P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 25 § 414, repealed
by Act Sept. 11, 2000, No. 404, § 6.13,
imprisonment of twelve (12) years.
effective Mar. 1, 2001.
3 The original sentence, in Spanish, reads: "

Reclusión perpetua, para tratamiento hasta The DOC determined that based on the sentence
que se logre su readaptación social. Se affirmed by the Puerto Rico Supreme Court,
dispone que el mínimo de esta reclusión no Plaintiff would complete minimum imprisonment
será menor de 12 anos naturales." This on January 30, 1993. On that date, Plaintiff alleges
archaically-worded sentence appears to be that he completed treatment and social
a product of Puerto Rico's Penal Code of rehabilitation. Plaintiff was not released from
1974, which adopted a model of prison, however, until June 24, 2008, after
indeterminate sentencing and contained
successful habeas corpus proceedings. Thus,
specific provisions for sentencing habitual
Plaintiff states that he was "unlawfully imprisoned
offenders like Plaintiff. See P.R. Laws, Act
and confined in the correctional system of Puerto
No. 115 of July 22, 1974. Specifically,
Rico in excess of fifteen (15) years." (Compl. ¶
section 74 provided: "a person convicted of
15.)
an offense punishable by imprisonment
who has been convicted of two or more The DOC did not provide Plaintiff with any good-
offenses punishable by that kind of penalty,
time credit and sentence reductions, despite
committed at different times and
positive evaluations and progress reports with
independent from each other and who
regard to assigned training and tasks. During his
shows a persistent tendency to offend, shall
term of imprisonment, Plaintiff received training
be declared by the Court to be a habitual
in several trades and occupations, such as
criminal and confined for his treatment
until such time as his social rehabilitation
gardening, agriculture, laundry, floor polishing,
is completed." 1974 P.R. Laws 439-440 warehousing, truck and heavy equipment
(emphasis added). In 1980, amendments to operations, and handicrafts. The positive
the Penal Code produced a switch to a evaluations and progress reports reflected a
determinate sentencing system in which the rehabilitation process which Plaintiff claims
judge imposed a punishment with a fixed should have been considered in the reports that the
term and the convict "qualified for parole DOC Secretaries had a duty to prepare. Inapposite
upon serving half of the jail term." See P.R. to applicable regulations, the [DOC], and the
Laws, Act No. 149 of June 18, 2004; see defendants, for purposes of sentence reductions
generally Pueblo v. Reyes Moran, 23 P.R.
4 did not consider Feliciano Hernandez's *4
Offic. Trans. 682 (P.R. 1989) (detailing the
achievements in his assigned training and tasks."
history of reforms to the habitual offender
(Compl. ¶ 18.) If they had been considered,
sentencing provisions, including the delays

2
 Hernandez v. Castillo CIV. NO. 09-1569 (PG) (D.P.R. Aug. 24, 2010)

Plaintiff submits that even his minimum twelve nature of Plaintiff's sentence and of his right to be
(12) year sentence would have been significantly released upon rehabilitation. On June 2001,
reduced. Plaintiff's wife, Carmen Negron Ortiz, certified
that she would accept him in her home both for
After completing the minimum imprisonment term
visitation and liberty on parole. On October 2002,
in 1993, Plaintiff was evaluated several times by
however, Plaintiff's wife died without Plaintiff
the Parole Board of the Commonwealth of Puerto
receiving leave to spend time with her, their
Rico (the "Parole Board"). After 1993, the Parole
daughter, and grandchildren.
Board would review Plaintiff's case on a yearly
basis and his request for parole was always denied In May of 2000, Plaintiff was referred to a
"through diverse excuses and asserted exigencies psychological program sponsored by the DOC
which the plaintiff had already met." (Compl. ¶ called "Learning to Live Without Violence." The
20.) The Parole Board never granted Plaintiff final report of Plaintiff's achievements in this
parole nor did it notify DOC administrators of the program, dated April 18, 2001, showed, among
nature of Plaintiff's sentence and of his right to be other things, that: he has borderline intelligence;
released from imprisonment upon rehabilitation. he does not show indicators of anxiety, fear, or
indecision; and his affective area, behavioral
During his imprisonment, Plaintiff was subjected
problems, and physical reaction to tensions were
to drug and alcohol tests, the results of which were
all within normal limits.
negative. Plaintiff even became an ordained
pastor. Psychological evaluations conducted after During 2003 and 2004, DOC employees informed
having served the twelve (12) year minimum their supervisors that Plaintiff had been
sentence found Plaintiff to be of sound mind, imprisoned in excess of twenty-two (22) years and
showing that he had rational, logical and coherent had been classified on minimal custody for more
thoughts; showed regrets for errors committed; than eight (8) years. They also informed their
had proper manners; had an interest in dedicating supervisors that Plaintiff was sixty-one (61) years
himself to his family and community; and did not old at the time, that he did not require further
show interpersonal problems or problems with therapy, and that his work was uninterrupted and
authority. The evaluation recommended that satisfactory.
Plaintiff be granted any privilege due. After
The DOC, however, maintained its designation of
serving the minimum twelve (12) year sentence,
Plaintiff's sentence as "perpetual imprisonment"
Plaintiff was never subject to complaint or
and of his conviction for rape or attempted rape,
disciplinary proceeding. In 1996, he was
which were not the offenses for which he had been
reclassified to minimal custody status, which he
last sentenced. On September 14, 2005, Plaintiff
maintained until his release from prison.
pursued mandamus proceedings before the Puerto
In 1998, Plaintiff appeared pro se before the Rico Superior Court, moving for a court order
Puerto Rico courts claiming his right to be requiring the DOC to rectify its records to
released from prison. On June 23, 1998, a court properly show the offenses for which he had been
order was issued requiring the DOC explain the sentenced. The court granted the mandamus
reason for Plaintiff's incarceration in view of the petition. The DOC nevertheless insisted in
April 14, 1981 judgment. The DOC informed the denying Plaintiff any relief under the reasoning
court that Plaintiff's case was before the Parole that he had been condemned to "perpetual
Board, which denied his request for parole once imprisonment."
again on August 16 of the same year without
5 giving notice to the *5 DOC administrators of the

3
 Hernandez v. Castillo CIV. NO. 09-1569 (PG) (D.P.R. Aug. 24, 2010)

On May 29, 2007, Plaintiff, represented by categorized the crimes for which he had been
6 counsel, filed a habeas corpus *6 petition before sentenced." (Id. ¶ 45.) Finally, Plaintiff pleads
the Superior Court of Mayaguez. On April 25, supplementary Puerto Rico law claims for the
2008, that court determined that from the date the violation of his rights to equal protection under the
minimal sentence requirement was met, the DOC law, liberty, and due process, under the Puerto
was required to "conduct yearly evaluations of the Rico Constitution, actionable under Puerto Rico
petitioner to determine when it should cease the tort law, Article 1802 of the Civil Code, P.R.
security measurement imposed" which the DOC LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141. Plaintiff requests
did not do. Therefore, on June 24, 2008, the relief in the form of joint and several liability
superior court granted habeas corpus, holding that against all defendants for $5,000,000.00 in
Plaintiff's sentence had expired after he had served compensatory damages and $2,000,000.00 in
the twelve (12) years of minimum imprisonment punitive damages, as well as attorneys fees and
and ordering Plaintiff's immediate release from costs.
prison. On June 23, 2009, Plaintiff filed the
complaint in the case at bar. II. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard of
Review
B. Plaintiff's Legal Claims "The general rules of pleading require a short and
Plaintiff's Section 1983 cause of action against the plain statement of the claim showing that the
defendants is premised upon violations of the pleader is entitled to relief. . . . This short and
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and plain statement need only give the defendant fair
unusual punishment and of the Fifth and notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process Clauses. upon which it rests." Gargano v. Liberty Intern.
Plaintiff submits that "[e]ach defendant, during the Underwriters, Inc., 572 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2009)
time he/she held supervisory position at the DOC, (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
knew that to subject an inmate to incarceration
Motions to dismiss brought under Federal Rule of
beyond the expiration of his sentence, was
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) are subject
deprivation of the inmate['s] Eighth Amendment
to the same standard of review. See Negron-
rights and due process of law." (Compl. ¶ 38.)
Gaztambide v. Hernandez-Torres, 35 F.3d 25, 27
Thus, "[i]n keeping the plaintiff confined beyond
(1st Cir. 1994). When ruling on a motion to
the term of his sentence, each defendant acted
dismiss for failure to state a claim, a district court
with deliberate indifference and/or reckless
"must accept as true the well-pleaded factual
disregard of the plaintiff's Eight Amendment
allegations of the complaint, draw all reasonable
rights and due process of law." (Id. ¶ 39.) Each
inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor, and
defendant is imputed with unjustifiably depriving
determine whether the complaint, so read, limns
Plaintiff of liberty in violation of his Eighth
facts sufficient to justify recovery on any
Amendment and due process rights.
cognizable theory." Rivera v. Centro Medico de
Plaintiff also states a cause of action predicated Turabo, Inc., 575 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2009)
upon the defendants' supervisory liability for their (citing LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 142
failure to adequately train, monitor, and discipline F.3d 507, 508 (1st Cir. 1998)). Courts "may
personnel under their charge, as was their duty. augment the facts in the complaint by reference to
"Had the defendants complied with their (i) documents annexed to the complaint or fairly
supervisory duties, they would have identified 8 incorporated *8 into it, and (ii) matters susceptible
those employees that did not properly register the
7 plaintiff's classification *7 and inaccurately

4
 Hernandez v. Castillo CIV. NO. 09-1569 (PG) (D.P.R. Aug. 24, 2010)

to judicial notice."Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 9 specific task that requires the reviewing *9 court
301, 306 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal citations and to draw on its judicial experience and common
quotation marks omitted). sense." Id. at 1950.

"Yet [the Court] need not accept as true legal III. Discussion
conclusions from the complaint or naked
Defendant Laboy, the former Secretary and
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement."
Administrator of the DOC from September 1998
Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 266 (1st
to December 2000, moved to dismiss the
Cir. 2009) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
1937, 1960 (2009)). Although a complaint
12(b)(6), arguing, first, that Plaintiff's claims are
attacked by a motion to dismiss pursuant to
time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) "does not
for a Section 1983 cause of action. Second,
need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's
Defendant raises a sovereign immunity defense
obligation to provide the grounds of his
under the Eleventh Amendment for claims against
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
her in an official capacity. Third, Defendant
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
submits that Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claim
elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell
applies only to federal actors, not state officials
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
like the DOC officers. Fourth, Defendant argues
(2007) (internal citations and quotation marks
abstention based on Colorado River Water
omitted).
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
Moreover, "even under the liberal pleading (1976), due to the presence of a concurrent state
standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, the proceeding. Fifth and finally, Defendant states that
Supreme Court has . . . held that to survive a she is entitled to qualified immunity because she
motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege a did not violate any clearly established
plausible entitlement to relief." Rodriguez-Ortiz v. constitutional rights. Because all federal claims
Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 95 (1st Cir. 2007) should be dismissed, adds Defendant, Plaintiff's
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). "A claim supplementary state law claims should be
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads dismissed as well.
factual content that allows the court to draw the
Plaintiff responds that Defendant failed to address
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
his claims of cruel and unusual punishment under
for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
the Eighth Amendment, which he briefly fleshes
1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That is, "
out in the opposition, and of denial of due process
[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does the
right to relief above the speculative level . . . on
motion to dismiss make any reference, states
the assumption that all the allegations in the
Plaintiff, to his theory of supervisory liability for
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact). . . ."
failure to "train, monitor, classify, evaluate and
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and
discipline" wrongdoing by subordinate employees.
quotation marks omitted). In other words, while
Finally, Plaintiff rejects Defendant's numerous
the Rule 8 pleading standard does not require
arguments raised in the motion to dismiss,
detailed factual allegations, it "demands more than
affirming that his complaint is not time-barred;
an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
that the complaint is not an official capacity suit
me accusation." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign
"Determining whether a complaint states a
immunity, but rather a personal capacity suit for
plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-
10 monetary *10 damages; that Defendant's acts
violate due process under the Fourteenth

5
 Hernandez v. Castillo CIV. NO. 09-1569 (PG) (D.P.R. Aug. 24, 2010)

Amendment, irrespective of the Fifth On May 18, 2009, the Supreme Court case
5
Amendment ; thatColorado River abstention is Ashcroft v. Iqbal concluded that in the context of
inapplicable; and that Defendant is not entitled to Bivens suits "Government officials may not be
qualified immunity because Defendant violated held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their
clearly established constitutional rights. 11 subordinates under a theory of *11 respondeat
superior." 129 S. Ct. at 1948. The Court extended
5 The Court interprets Plaintiff's argument as
this ruling to suits under Section 1983, holding
a waiver of his Fifth Amendment due
that Section 1983 plaintiffs "must plead that each
process claim, especially since he does not
articulate it with any support of legal
Government-official defendant, through the
authority. Moreover, as Defendant argued official's own individual actions, has violated the
correctly, the Fifth Amendment applies to Constitution." Id. at 1948, 1949 ("[E]ach
actions of the federal government and not Government official, his or her title
to those of state or local governments. notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own
Martinez-Rivera v. Sanchez Ramos, 498 misconduct"). The First Circuit, in an opinion
F.3d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 2007). As plaintiffs do penned by Chief Judge Lynch, noted that the
not allege that any of the defendants are Supreme Court's language in Iqbal "may call into
federal actors, any Fifth Amendment claim question our prior circuit law on the standard for
must be dismissed with prejudice. holding a public official liable for damages under
The Court now proceeds to examine the merits of § 1983 on a theory of supervisory liability."
Plaintiff's claims in light of Defendant's Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 275 n. 7
challenges. (1st Cir. 2009). However, the First Circuit did not
render a final verdict or furnish any guidance to
A. Viability of Section 1983 Claims: the district courts on this question because the
Establishing Personal or Supervisory appellate court found that the plaintiffs had not
Liability pled facts sufficient to make out a plausible
entitlement to relief under the First Circuit's
"Section 1983 'creates a remedy for violations of previous formulation of supervisory liability.
federal rights committed by persons acting under
color of state law.'"Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, Notwithstanding the Chief Judge's foreboding, the
590 F.3d 31, 40-41 (2009) (quoting Haywood v. First Circuit has continued to employ and develop
Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108 (2009)). While prisoners its previously articulated standard of supervisory
experience a reduction in many privileges and liability under Section 1983.6 To this statement of
rights, they retain those constitutional rights that the law, the Court now turns. Conforming to the
are not inconsistent with their status as a prisoner Supreme Court's language, the First Circuit has
or with the legitimate penological objectives of the held that "[a]lthough Government officials may
corrections system. Id. In general, to establish not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct
liability under Section 1983, plaintiffs must show of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat
that (1) the defendant acted under color of state superior. . . . supervisory officials may be held
law, and (2) his or her conduct deprived the liable on the basis of their own acts or
plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or by omissions."Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d at 49
federal law. See Brenes-Laroche v. Toledo Davila, (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "
682 F. Supp. 2d 179, 185 (D.P.R. 2010) (citation [O] fficials may be held liable if the plaintiff can
omitted). The second element requires that 12 establish that her constitutional injury resulted *12
plaintiffs show the defendant's conduct was the from the direct acts or omissions of the official, or
cause-in-fact of the alleged deprivation. Id. from indirect conduct that amounts to condonation

6
 Hernandez v. Castillo CIV. NO. 09-1569 (PG) (D.P.R. Aug. 24, 2010)

or tacit authorization. . . ." Rodriguez-Garcia v. "Under either a direct or indirect theory of

Miranda-Marin, No. 08-2319, 2010 WL 2473321, liability, the plaintiff must [nevertheless] show
at *7 (1st Cir. June 21, 2010) (internal quotation that the official had actual or constructive notice
marks and citation omitted); see also Pereira- of the constitutional violation."Miranda-Marin,
Castillo, 590 F.3d at 49 (noting that supervisory 2010 WL 2473321, at *7 (internal quotation
liability typically arises either when the supervisor marks and citations omitted). "An important factor
is the "primary violator or direct participant in the in making the determination of liability is whether
rights-violating incident" or the official the official was put on some kind of notice of the
responsible for supervising, training, hiring a alleged violations, for one cannot make a
subordinate "with deliberate indifference toward 'deliberate' or 'conscious' choice to act or not to act
the possibility that deficient performance of the unless confronted with a problem that requires the
task eventually may contribute to a civil rights taking of affirmative steps." Lipsett v. Univ. of
deprivation.") (internal quotation marks and P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 902 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting
citation omitted). In indirect conduct cases, the Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-
analysis focuses on whether the supervisor's 84 (1986)). In either case, Section 1983 plaintiffs
actions displayed deliberate indifference toward must always show an "affirmative link," whether
the rights of third parties and had some causal through direct participation or through conduct
connection to the subsequent wrongdoing. See 13 *13 that amounts to tacit authorization between the
id.;see also Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, actor and the underlying violation. Pereira-
275 (1st Cir. 2009) ("[S]upervisory liability under Castillo, 590 F.3d at 49.
a theory of deliberate indifference will be found
only if it would be manifest to any reasonable B. Why Plaintiff's Claims Fail to
official that his conduct was very likely to violate Establish Liability
an individual's constitutional rights.") (internal In the case at bar, there is no question that
quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant and the other DOC officer-defendants
6 The First Circuit has sided with those acted under color of law as officers who possessed
circuit courts' supervisory liability power by virtue of state law and whose alleged
standards that, as one noted commentator wrongdoings were made possible only because
observed, "only survive Iqbal to the extent they were clothed with the authority of state law.
they authorize § 1983 liability against a However, Plaintiff's complaint raises serious
supervisory official on the basis of the questions about whether the allegations and
supervisor's own unconstitutional conduct pleadings contained therein establish the requisite
or, at least, conduct that sets the
causation between Laboy's acts or omissions (or
unconstitutional wheels in motion." Martin
those of the other DOC-Secretary defendants for
A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation:
that matter) and Plaintiff's constitutional injury,
Claims and Defenses, § 7.19[D] (4th ed.
sufficient to make out a claim of personal or
2010). "The issue, then is one of causation,
supervisory liability against her. As the First
i.e., whether the supervisor's conduct was a
proximate cause of the violation of the
Circuit did inSanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, this
plaintiff's constitutional rights." Id.; see Court turns to Plaintiff's complaint and finds "that
generally Dodds v. Richardson, No. 09- it does little more than assert a legal conclusion
6157, 2010 WL 3064002 (10th Cir. Aug. 6, about the involvement of the administrative
2010) (describing in detail how the circuit correctional defendants in the underlying
courts have tackled supervisory liability constitutional violation." 590 F.3d at 49.
post-Iqbal). Specifically, Plaintiff states that:

7
 Hernandez v. Castillo CIV. NO. 09-1569 (PG) (D.P.R. Aug. 24, 2010)

(1) Each defendant, during his or her (Compl. ¶¶ 37-46.) In the factual statement of the
supervisory tenure, "knew" that to subject parties, Plaintiff also states that defendant Laboy,
inmates to incarceration beyond the DOC Secretary from 1998-2000, is being sued "on
expiration of sentence was a deprivation of the basis of his [sic] deliberate indifference"
their Eighth Amendment and Due Process toward Plaintiff's rights, and for:
rights.
her failure to take any action upon being
(2) Each defendant "acted with deliberate notified of the violations of the plaintiff's
indifference and/or reckless disregard" of rights, denying him due process of law,
Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment and Due and for failure to assure adequate training
Process rights in keeping Plaintiff confined and supervision of personnel under her
beyond the term of his sentence. supervision and failure to implement
effectual practice and procedures to protect
(3) Each defendant "unjustifiably
the interests and constitutional rights of the
deprived" Plaintiff of liberty in violation of
plaintiff.
his Eighth Amendment and Due Process
rights. (Compl. ¶ 6.) This same language was used to
describe the basis of liability for the four other
(4) Each defendant "was responsible for
DOC Secretary-defendants, lending support to the
the monitoring, disciplining, evaluating,
Court's deduction that Plaintiff's complaint
training and supervising" of any and all
consists of cut-and-pasted boilerplate legal
personnel under their charge.
conclusions "parroting" the First Circuit's standard
(5) The defendants "failed in their duty to for supervisory liability. See Pereira-Castillo, 590
assure adequate monitoring, disciplining, F.3d at 49.
evaluating, training and supervising" of
In Pereira-Castillo, the complaint's allegations
any and all personnel under their charge
against some of the defendant DOC officials
"to assure that all inmates were properly
(including the same DOC Secretary-defendant for
classified and released upon completion of
which both cases are captioned) stated that they
their sentence."
"'were responsible for ensuring that the
(6) "Had the defendants complied with correctional officers under their command
their supervisory duties, they would have followed practices and procedures [that] would
identified those employees that did not respect the rights" of the plaintiff, and that "'they
properly register the plaintiff's failed to do [so] with deliberate indifference
classification and inaccurately categorized and/or reckless disregard'" of the plaintiff's rights.
the crimes for which he had been The First Circuit held that these allegations were
sentenced." insufficient to establish those defendants'
supervisory liability in order to survive a motion
(7) Each defendant's "failure in
to dismiss. The court observed that the above-
14 monitoring, disciplining, evaluating, *14
mentioned language consisted of "precisely the
training and supervising" any and all
type of 'the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me'
personnel under their charge "caused
allegation that the Supreme Court has determined
profound continuous and successive
should not be given credence when standing
damages" to Plaintiff.
alone." Id. The court added that the only
additional reference to those DOC officials' role in
the constitutional wrongdoing, beyond "parroting"

8
 Hernandez v. Castillo CIV. NO. 09-1569 (PG) (D.P.R. Aug. 24, 2010)

the Circuit's standard of supervisory liability, was equal responsibility for broadly-worded and
15 to Secretary *15 Pereira designing and generalized conduct that fails to rise above legal
promulgating the challenged strip search and x-ray conclusion or, as the Supreme Court has
policy. See id. at 49-50. The court concluded that articulated, the "sheer possibility that a defendant
the "deliberate indifference required to establish a has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949
supervisory liability/failure to train claim cannot ("Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely
be plausibly inferred from the mere existence of a 16 consistent with a defendant's *16 liability, it stops
poorly-implemented . . . policy and a bald short of the line between possibility and
assertion that [the wrongdoing] somehow resulted plausibility of entitlement to relief.") (internal
from those policies."7 Id.; c.f. Maldonado v. quotation marks and citation omitted). The
Fontanes, 568 F.2d 263, 275 (1st Cir. 2009) language Plaintiff employs that Defendant failed
(holding that a mayor's promulgation of a pet to "implement practices and procedures" or to
policy, coupled with his presence at a challenged "assure adequate training and supervision of
pet raid resulting in their mass extermination, was personnel" and that she "acted with deliberate
"insufficient to create the affirmative link indifference and/or reckless disregard" is almost
necessary for a finding of supervisory liability, identical to that found lacking by Judge Lipez in
even under a theory of deliberate indifference.") Pereira-Castillo. If the pleadings in Pereira-
On the contrary, Pereira-Castillo held that the Castillo were found infirm under Iqbal, despite
allegations against two other defendants did containing more specific allegations linking the
satisfy Iqbal because the plaintiff successfully defendant to the challenged policy at issue, then
pleaded their direct involvement as "primary the more broadly-worded pleadings in this case,
violators in the rights-violating incident," by, for which make no effort to supply any particularized
example, stating that they conducted or ordered facts with respect to any individual defendant,
the challenged searches at issue. 590 F.3d at 50. must also fail.
7 The court noted, however, that the Additional support is found in a factually
complaint contained more specific factual analogous case predating Iqbal in which this Court
allegations averring that Secretary Pereira dismissed the plaintiff's claims for substantially
was responsible for the challenged policies similar reasons. In Ayuso-Figueroa v. Victor
and for failing to adequately train DOC Rivera Gonzalez, the plaintiff sued DOC officials
personnel regarding those special types of
under Section 1983 for failing to grant her time
searches, but that since the court found no
credits and participation in early release programs,
underlying constitutional violation arising
alleging that she suffered damages because her
from those policies, it did not have to
imprisonment term was lengthened several years.
decide whether those claims of supervisory
liability would pass muster. See 590 F.3d at
Ayuso-Figueroa, No. 02-1606 (D.P.R. filed Sept.
50 n. 9. 30, 2003) (Docket No. 33). The Court found that
the complaint contained only "general allegations
In this case, much like in Pereira-Castillo, Plaintiff concerning Co-defendants as playing roles in
parroted the circuit's supervisory liability standard supervisory positions, which entailed, among
without much if any factual enhancement tying others, the enforcing the proper implementation of
defendant Laboy, or any of the other named rules and regulations, and the discipline and
defendants, to his constitutional injury. Plaintiff training of all personnel working under the
lumps together all five of the DOC Secretaries [DOC]." Id. at 8. These conclusory statements,
who were at the helm of the Department during added the Court, are:
Plaintiff's fifteen or more years of allegedly
excessive incarceration as defendants sharing

9
 Hernandez v. Castillo CIV. NO. 09-1569 (PG) (D.P.R. Aug. 24, 2010)

precisely the kind of generalized Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant
asseverations which have been repeatedly promulgated any policy that led to the bungling of
held insufficient to purport a cognizable his sentence, nor does he specify which practices
cause of action against a governmental and procedures Defendant failed to implement to
officer, more so when the concerned protect Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Plaintiff
officer is a high ranking Cabinet Member fails to allege any facts specifically linking
that usually lacks personal involvement in Defendant's training or supervision of subordinate
the taking of decisions at the regional and personnel to the erroneous classification of his
district level of the Department that he sentence, which the Court surmises is normally
heads. the responsibility of DOC record-keepers. Indeed,
Plaintiff would have fared better in lodging a
Id. (emphasis added). Since there were no facts
complaint against those lower-echelon DOC
from which it could be inferred that the defendants
employees directly handling his case, such as the
were "personally involved in the alleged
prison's record-keepers or the Parole Board
17 constitutional *17 deprivation[,]" the Court
members who repeatedly denied his requests for
dismissed the complaint. Id. In this case, as in
18 release. Plaintiff shoots *18 himself in the foot
Ayuso-Figueroa and Pereira-Castillo, the plaintiff
when he states that the Parole Board knew but
pleads only generalized asseverations concerning
never gave notice to the DOC Secretaries of the
high ranking government officials who oversaw
nature of Plaintiff's sentence or of his right to be
Puerto Rico's entire correctional system.
released upon rehabilitation. This statement
Plaintiff fails to specify how Defendant knew that undermines any role that the defendants may have
Plaintiff was wrongfully incarcerated or how she played in acting deliberately indifferent toward
acted with deliberate indifference in keeping Plaintiff's plight.
Plaintiff confined beyond the term of his sentence,
As previously explained, notice is an important
despite the possibility that she may not even have
factor in making a determination of liability
had notice of the alleged wrongdoing as an agency
because one cannot act with deliberate
head overseeing a large prison population.
indifference toward a person's constitutional rights
Plaintiff does not, for example, aver that he ever
if one does not know that his rights are being
wrote a letter or communicated his plight in any
violated in the first place. To illustrate this, in the
direct way to Defendant, such that she would have
context of an Eighth Amendment claim for
been put on notice of the alleged violations,
incarceration beyond the termination of sentence,
requiring her to confront the problem by taking or
Courts of Appeals have required plaintiffs to show
failing to take affirmative steps. At most, Plaintiff
that:
makes a general allegation that "[d]uring 2003 and
2004, [DOC] employees informed their (1) a prison official had knowledge of the
supervisors of the plaintiff's unlawful prisoner's problem; (2) the official either
incarceration" detailing how long he had been failed to act or took only ineffectual action
imprisoned and how he had achieved under the circumstances, indicating that his
rehabilitation. (See Compl. ¶ 30.) Who those response to the problem was a product of
supervisors were, whether those supervisors were deliberate indifference to the prisoner's
mid or high-level DOC employees, and whether plight; and (3) a causal connection
they communicated any information to the between the official's response to the
defendants in this case are vital questions left problem and the unjustified detention.
unanswered.

10
 Hernandez v. Castillo CIV. NO. 09-1569 (PG) (D.P.R. Aug. 24, 2010)

Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243, 252 (3d with sufficient specificity to the violation of either
Cir. 2010) (citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment right to be free from
1099, 1110 (3rd Cir. 1989)).8 This three-pronged incarceration without penological justification or
test highlights the importance of notice in his Fourteenth Amendment right to be afforded
establishing the defendant's deliberate indifference due process to challenge the length of his sentence
and thus in proving an affirmative link between in an administrative forum. The only facts specific
the prison official's conduct and the prisoner's to Laboy's personal involvement are set forth in
constitutional harm. See, e.g., Moore v. Tartler, Plaintiff's argument against Defendant's qualified
986 F.2d 682, 686 (3rd Cir. 1993) (deliberate immunity defense. (See Opp. Mot. Dismiss 17.)
indifference is more typically shown "in those There, Plaintiff submits that Laboy violated
cases where prison officials were put on notice clearly established law with respect to his
and then simply refused to investigate a prisoner's incarceration because this Court had so inferred
claim of sentence miscalculation.") Indeed, even if with respect to the prison system as a whole in the
19 Plaintiff were able to show some form of *19 undersigned's Opinion and Order Morales-
notice given to Defendant, he would still have to Feliciano v. Rossello Gonzalez, No. 79-4 (D.P.R.
go further, for "not every official who is aware of filed Jan. 25, 2000) (Docket No. 7478). In that
a problem exhibits deliberate indifference by Opinion, this Court laid out detailed factual
failing to resolve it." Id. (internal quotation marks findings and conclusions of law dealing with the
and citation omitted). While Plaintiff's complaint DOC's widespread and systemic constitutional
is dismissed on the basis of Iqbal, the Court finds violations in the administration of its prisons.
it highly doubtful that Plaintiff would be able to While Plaintiff is correct that this Court had
state a plausible Eighth Amendment violation previously found that Laboy was aware of the
against Defendant under the three-pronged test constitutional deficiencies, including those
elaborated above. relating to classification of crimes, plaguing the
prison system since the beginning of the Morales-
8 The First Circuit has not had the
Feliciano litigation, these allegations do not
opportunity to articulate any particular
establish a causal connection between Laboy's
standard for reviewing an Eighth
Amendment claim for incarceration
general management of a prison system and
beyond the expiration of sentence under Plaintiff's specific harm at his regional prison.
Section 1983. Most Courts of Appeals, 20 This is *20 especially true in light of the stark
however, have enunciated a standard like difference in context between a claim for
the one stated above requiring a showing of injunctive relief in Morales-Feliciano and a claim
"deliberate indifference" by the appropriate for monetary damages under Section 1983 in this
prison official to establish liability. See, case. Plaintiff is left with no other choice but to
e.g., Campell v. Peters, 256 F.3d 695, 700 rely on the generalized, broadly-worded, and
(7th Cir. 2001) (citing Moore v. Tartler, conclusory language that all of the defendants
986 F.2d 682, 686 (3rd Cir. 1993); Sample "acted with deliberate indifference."
v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1108-09 (3rd Cir.
1989);Haywood v. Younger, 769 F.2d If the Supreme Court and the First Circuit have
1350, 1354-55 (9th Cir. 1985)). ruled that such language is not enough to survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, then this Court
Plaintiff's allegations, taken as true, simply do not
will take no liberty in defying this precedent. The
allow for the inference that Laboy or any of the
Court holds that Plaintiff's claims must be
other named defendants were personally involved
dismissed for failure to satisfy the causation
in the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional
requirement of Section 1983 under the rigors of
rights. The facts do not link any of the defendants

11
 Hernandez v. Castillo CIV. NO. 09-1569 (PG) (D.P.R. Aug. 24, 2010)

the Supreme Court's Iqbal pleading standards. an early stage in the litigation.") Since all of
This dismissal on this basis obviates any need to Plaintiff' federal claims are dismissed, the Court
tread deeper into the uncharted waters of will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim or to expend Plaintiffs' remaining state law claims, which are
unnecessary judicial resources to make up for his dismissed without prejudice.
inadequately-pled and unadorned Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim.9 IV. Conclusion
Assuming the complaint's facts are true, the Court
9 Beyond stating that Defendant violated
laments the sad saga that Plaintiff was forced to
Plaintiff's rights to due process, Plaintiff
endure as a prisoner whose Kafkaesque plight
never fills in the gaps of that very rough
appeared to be repeatedly ignored by the DOC.
skeletal pleading, be it in his complaint or
However, the Court cannot replace its
opposition to Defendant's motion to
dismiss. Plaintiff fails to plead, for
constitutional directive to judge facts indifferently
example, whether Defendant is sued for through the eyes of the law with its sympathy for
violating substantive or procedural due Plaintiff having suffered a terrible injustice.
process and how Plaintiff would meet the Plaintiff simply failed to state a plausible claim for
appropriate standards for proving either of relief by painting too broad a brush and not
those claims. If procedural due process, a digging deeper beyond the surface of a
likely candidate in this case, is indeed the generalized grievance against the heads of a
constitutional peg for Plaintiff's Fourteenth department. By not doing the extra legal work
Amendment claim, Plaintiff fails to point required to make those specific causal connections
to any DOC regulation or policy
between his alleged harm and those responsible
establishing a procedure that Defendant
for it, he missed his opportunity to obtain any
failed to follow in order for the Court to be
relief. As things currently stand, the Court can go
able to determine what process was due
no further. The Court GRANTS Defendant's
under the Supreme Court's familiar
motion to dismiss (Docket No. 10). Plaintiff's
Mathews v. Eldridge test. See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976);see,
Section 1983 claims against all of the defendants
e.g., Watson v. Caton, 984 F.2d 537, 540- are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE while
41 (1st Cir. 1993) ("The process due supplementary Puerto Rico law claims against all
depends on the circumstances.") of the defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
C. Other Defenses and Puerto Rico
Law Claims IT IS SO ORDERED.
1 *1
In the wise administration of judicial resources,
the Court refrains from entertaining numerous
other arguments relating to qualified immunity,
Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Colorado
River abstention. The Court should also decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims when all federal claims are dismissed. See
Camelio v. American Federation, 137 F.3d 666,
672 (1st Cir. 1998) ("The balance of factors
21 ordinarily weigh strongly in favor *21 of declining
jurisdiction over state law claims where the
foundational federal claims have been dismissed at

12
Hernandez v. Castillo CIV. NO. 09-1569 (PG) (D.P.R. Aug. 24, 2010)

13