Paraconsistent Logic

First published Tue Sep 24, 1996; substantive revision Mon Feb 21, 2022

A standard contemporary logical view has it that, from contradictory

premises, anything follows. A logical consequence relation is explosive if
according to it any arbitrary conclusion BB is entailed by any arbitrary
contradiction AA, ¬A¬A (ex contradictione quodlibet (ECQ)). Classical
logic, and most standard ‘non-classical’ logics too such as intuitionist
logic, are explosive. Inconsistency, according to received wisdom, cannot
be coherently reasoned about.

Paraconsistent logic challenges this standard view. A logical consequence

relation is said to be paraconsistent if it is not explosive. Thus, if a
consequence relation is paraconsistent, then even in circumstances where
the available information is inconsistent, the consequence relation does
not explode into triviality. Thus, paraconsistent logic accommodates
inconsistency in a controlled way that treats inconsistent information as
potentially informative.

The prefix ‘para’ in English has two meanings: ‘quasi’ (or ‘similar to,
modelled on’) or ‘beyond’. When the term ‘paraconsistent’ was
coined by Miró Quesada at the Third Latin America Conference on
Mathematical Logic in 1976, he seems to have had the first meaning in
mind. Many paraconsistent logicians, however, have taken it to mean the
second, which provided different reasons for the development of
paraconsistent logic as we will see below.

Paraconsistent logic is defined negatively: any logic is paraconsistent as

long as it is not explosive. This means there is no single set of open
problems or programs in paraconsistent logic. As such, this entry is not a
complete survey of paraconsistent logic. The aim is to describe some
philosophically salient features of a diverse field.

1. Paraconsistency

o 1.1 Dialetheism
 o 1.2 A Brief History of ex contradictione quodlibet

o 1.3 Modern History of Paraconsistent Logic

2. Motivations

o 2.1 Inconsistency without Triviality

2.1.1 Non-Trivial Theories

2.1.2 True Contradictions

2.1.3 Linguistics

o 2.2 Artificial Intelligence

2.2.1 Automated Reasoning

2.2.2 Belief Revision

o 2.3 Formal Semantics and Set Theory

2.3.1 Truth Theory

2.3.2 Set Theory

2.3.3 Mathematics in general

o 2.4 Arithmetic and Gödel’s Theorem

o 2.5 Vagueness

3. Systems of Paraconsistent Logic

o 3.1 Discussive Logic

o 3.2 Non-Adjunctive Systems

o 3.3 Preservationism

o 3.4 Adaptive Logics

o 3.5 Logics of Formal Inconsistency

o 3.6 Many-Valued Logics

o 3.7 Relevant Logics

 Bibliography

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1. Paraconsistency

A logic is paraconsistent iff its logical consequence relation (⊨ (⊨ , either

semantic or proof theoretic) is not explosive. Paraconsistency is a
property of a consequence relation. The argument ex contradictione
quodlibet (ECQ) is paraconsistently invalid: in general, it is not the case
that AA, ¬A⊨ B¬A⊨ B.

The role often played by the notion of consistency in orthodox logics,

namely, the most basic requirement that any theory must meet, is relaxed
to the notion of coherence: no theory can include every sentence
whatsoever if it is to be considered tenable. Simple consistency of a
theory (no contradictions) is a special case of absolute consistency,
or non-triviality (not every sentence is a part of the theory). As we will see
below, many paraconsistent logics do validate the Law of
Non-Contradiction (LNC), ⊨ ¬(A ∧ ¬A) ⊨ ¬(A ∧ ¬A), even though they
invalidate ECQ.

Beyond the basic, definitional requirement that a paraconsistent

consequence relation be non-explosive, there is a huge divergence of
paraconsistent logics. At this stage of development, well into the
twenty-first century, it seems fair to say that ‘paraconsistency’ does not
single out one particular approach to logic, but is rather a property that
some logics have and others do not (like, say, compactness, or multiple
conclusions).

1.1 Dialetheism
In the literature, especially in the part of it that contains objections to
paraconsistent logic, there has been some tendency to confuse
paraconsistency with dialetheism, the view that there are true
contradictions (see the entry on dialetheism). The view that a
consequence relation should be paraconsistent does not entail the view
that there are true contradictions. Paraconsistency is a property of a
consequence relation whereas dialetheism is a view about truth. The fact
that one can define a non-explosive consequence relation does not mean
that some sentences are true. The fact that one can construct a model
where a contradiction holds but not every sentence of the language holds
(or where this is the case at some world) does not mean that the
contradiction is true per se. Hence paraconsistency must be distinguished
from dialetheism. This has been argued recently by Barrio and Da Ré
(2018), and an explicitly non-dialetheic interpretation of paraconsistency
is given by Carnielli and Rodrigues (2021). For reasons that
paraconsistency may lead to dialetheism after all, see Asmus 2012.

Dialetheism is the view that some contradiction is true, which is a distinct

thesis from ‘trivialism’, the view that everything whatsoever (including
every contradiction) is true; if dialetheism is to be coherent, then it seems
a dialethiest’s preferred logic must be paraconsistent (though even this
has been challenged by Barrio and Da Ré, based on work by Ripley and
others e.g. Ripley 2012). A paraconsistent logician may feel some pull
towards dialetheism, but most paraconsistent logics are not ‘dialetheic’
logics. In a discussion of paraconsistent logic, the primary focus is not the
obtainability of contradictions but the explosive nature of a consequence
relation.

1.2 A Brief History of ex contradictione quodlibet

It is now standard to view ex contradictione quodlibet as valid. This

contemporary view, however, should be put in a historical perspective. It
was towards the end of the nineteenth century, when the study of logic
achieved mathematical articulation, that an explosive logical theory
became the standard. With the work of logicians such as Boole, Frege,
Russell and Hilbert, classical logic became the orthodox logical account.

In antiquity, however, no one seems to have endorsed the validity of ECQ.

Aristotle presented what is sometimes called the connexive principle: “it
is impossible that the same thing should be necessitated by the being
and by the not-being of the same thing ” (Prior Analytic II 4 57b3).
(Connexive logic has recently been reinvigorated by Wansing, e.g. Omori
and Wansing 2019; see the entry on connexive logic that has been
developed based on this principle.) This principle became a topic of
debates in the Middle Ages or Medieval time. Though the medieval
debates seem to have been carried out in the context of conditionals, we
can also see it as debates about consequences. The principle was taken
up by Boethius (480 – 524 or 525) and Abelard (1079 – 1142), who
considered two accounts of consequences. The first one is a familiar one:
it is impossible for the premises to be true but conclusion false. The first
account is thus similar to the contemporary notion of truth-preservation.
The second one is less accepted recently: the sense of the premises
contains that of the conclusion. This account, as in some relevant
logics (like Brady’s logic of meaning containment (Brady 2006)), does not
permit an inference whose conclusion is arbitrary. Abelard held that the
first account fails to meet the connexive principle and that the second
account (the account of containment) captured Aristotle’s principle.

Abelard’s position was shown to face a difficulty by Alberic of Paris in the

1130s. Most medieval logicians didn’t, however, abandon the account of
validity based on containment or something similar (see, for example,
Martin 1987). But one way to handle the difficulty is to reject the
connexive principle. This approach, which has become most influential,
was accepted by the followers of Adam Balsham or Parvipontanus (or
sometimes known as Adam of The Little Bridge [12th century]). The
Parvipontanians embraced the truth-preservation account of
consequences and the ‘paradoxes’ that are associated with it. In fact, it
was a member of the Parvipontanians, William of Soissons, who
discovered in the twelfth century what we now call the C.I. Lewis
(independent) argument for ECQ (see Martin 1986).

The containment account, however, did not disappear. John Duns

Scotus (1266–1308) and his followers accepted the containment account
(see Martin 1996). The Cologne School of the late fifteenth century
argued against ECQ by rejecting disjunctive syllogism (see Sylvan 2000).

In the history of logic in Asia, there is a tendency (for example, in Jaina

and Buddhist traditions) to consider the possibility of statements being
both true and false. Moreover, the logics developed by the major
Buddhist logicians, Dign ā ga (5th century) and Dharmakī rti (7th century)
do not embrace ECQ. Their logical account is, in fact, based on the
‘pervasion’ (Skt: vyāpti, Tib: khyab pa) relation among the elements of
an argument. Just like the containment account of Abelard, there must be
a tighter connection between the premises and conclusion than the
truth-preservation account allows. For the logic of Dharmak ī rti and its
subsequent development, see for example Dunne 2004, and Tillemans
1999, 2016.

1.3 Modern History of Paraconsistent Logic

In the twentieth century, alternatives to an explosive account of logical

consequence occurred to different people at different times and places
independently of each other. They were often motivated by different
considerations. The earliest paraconsistent logics in the contemporary era
seem to have been given by two Russians. Starting about 1910, Vasil’év
proposed a modified Aristotelian syllogistic including statements of the
form: SS is both PP and not PP. In 1929, Orlov gave the first
axiomatisation of the relevant logic RR which is paraconsistent. (On Vasil’
év, see Arruda 1977 and Arruda 1989: 102f; on Orlov, see Anderson,
Belnap, & Dunn 1992: xvii.)

The work of Vasil’év or Orlov did not make any impact at the time. The
first (formal) logician to have developed paraconsistent logic was
Jaśkowski in Poland, who was a student of Łukasiewicz, who himself had
envisaged paraconsistent logic in his critique of Aristotle on the LNC
(Łukasiewicz 1951). Almost at the same time, Halldén (1949) presented
work on the logic of nonsense, but again this went mostly unnoticed.

Paraconsistent logics were developed independently in South America by

Florencio Asenjo and especially Newton da Costa in their doctoral
dissertations, in 1954 and 1963 respectively, with an emphasis on
mathematical applications (see Asenjo 1966, da Costa 1974). An active
group of logicians has been researching paraconsistent logic
continuously ever since, especially in Campinas and São Paulo, Brazil, with
a focus on logics of formal inconsistency. Carnielli and Coniglio (2016)
give a comprehensive recent account of this work.

Paraconsistent logics in the forms of relevant logics were proposed in

England by Smiley in 1959 and also at about the same time, in a much
more developed form, in the United States by Anderson and Belnap. An
active group of relevant logicians grew up in Pittsburgh including Dunn,
Meyer, and Urquhart. The development of paraconsistent logics (in the
form of relevant logics) was transported to Australia. R. Routley (later
Sylvan) and V. Routley (later Plumwood) discovered an intentional
semantics for some of Anderson/Belnap relevant logics. A school
developed around them in Canberra which included Brady and
Mortensen, and later Priest who, together with R. Routley, incorporated
dialetheism to the development.

Since the 1970s, the development of paraconsistent logic has been

international. Some of the major schools of thought are canvassed below,
including adaptive logic (as in Batens 2001) and preservationism (as in
Schotch, Brown, & Jennings 2009). There is work being done in in
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, the Czech Republic, England,
Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Scotland,
Spain, the United States, and more. There has been a series of major
international conferences about paraconsistent logic. In 1997, the First
World Congress on Paraconsistency was held at the University of Ghent in
Belgium. The Second World Congress was held in São Sebastião (São
Paulo, Brazil) in 2000, the Third in Toulous (France) in 2003 and the Fourth
in Melbourne (Australia) in 2008. A Fifth World Congress was held in
Kolkata, India in 2013. Another major paraconsistency conference in 2014
was held in Munich (Andreas & Verdée 2016). See the bibliography
section on World Congress Proceedings.

2. Motivations

The reasons for paraconsistency that have been put forward are specific
to the development of the particular formal systems of paraconsistent
logic. However, there are several general reasons for thinking that logic
should be paraconsistent. Before we summarise the systems of
paraconsistent logic, we present some motivations for paraconsistent
logic.

2.1 Inconsistency without Triviality

A most telling reason for paraconsistent logic is, prima facie, the fact that
there are theories which are inconsistent but non-trivial. If we admit the
existence of such theories, their underlying logics must be paraconsistent
(though see Michael 2016).

2.1.1 Non-Trivial Theories

Examples of apparently inconsistent but non-trivial theories are easy to

produce. One example can be derived from the history of science.
Consider Bohr’s theory of the atom. According to this, an electron orbits
the nucleus of the atom without radiating energy. However, according to
Maxwell ’ s equations, which formed an integral part of the theory, an
electron which is accelerating in orbit must radiate energy. Hence Bohr’s
account of the behaviour of the atom was inconsistent. Yet, patently, not
everything concerning the behavior of electrons was inferred from it, nor
should it have been. Hence, whatever inference mechanism it was that
underlay it, arguably this must have been paraconsistent (Brown & Priest
2015).

2.1.2 True Contradictions

Despite the fact that dialetheism and paraconsistency must be
distinguished, dialetheism can be a motivation for paraconsistent logic.
One candidate for a dialetheia (a true contradiction) is the liar paradox.
Consider the sentence:‘This sentence is not true’. There are two options:
either the sentence is true or it is not. Suppose it is true. Then what it says
is the case. Hence the sentence is not true. Suppose, on the other hand, it
is not true. This is what it says. Hence the sentence is true. In either case it
is both true and not true. (See the entry on dialetheism.)

2.1.3 Linguistics

Natural languages are another possible site of non-trivial inconsistency. In

linguistics, it has been observed that normal lexical features are preserved
even in inconsistent contexts. For example, words like‘near’have spatial
connotations that are not disturbed even when dealing with impossible
objects (McGinnis 2013):

If I tell you that I painted a spherical cube brown, you take its
exterior to be brown …, and if I am inside it, you know I am
not near it. (Chomsky 1995: 20)

Hence if natural language can be said to have a logic, paraconsistent

logics could be a candidate for formalizing it.

2.2 Artificial Intelligence

Paraconsistent logic is motivated not only by philosophical considerations,

but also by its applications and implications.

2.2.1 Automated Reasoning

One of the applications is automated reasoning (information processing).

Consider a computer which stores a large amount of information, as in
Belnap 1992. While the computer stores the information, it is also used to
operate on it, and, crucially, to infer from it. Now it is quite common for
the computer to contain inconsistent information, because of mistakes by
the data entry operators or because of multiple sourcing. This is certainly
a problem for database operations with theorem-provers, and so has
drawn much attention from computer scientists. Techniques for removing
inconsistent information have been investigated. Yet all have limited
applicability, and, in any case, are not guaranteed to produce consistency.
(There is no general algorithm for logical falsehood.) Hence, even if steps
are taken to get rid of contradictions when they are found, an underlying
paraconsistent logic is desirable if hidden contradictions are not to
generate spurious answers to queries.

Nelson ’ s paraconsistent (four-valued) logic N4 has been specifically

studied for applications in computer science (Kamide & Wansing 2012).
Annotated logics were proposed by Subrahmanian (1987) and then by da
Costa, Subrahmanian, and Vago (1991); these tools are now being
extended to robotics, expert systems for medical diagnosis, and
engineering, with recent work gathered in the volumes edited by Abe,
Akama, and Nakamatsu (2015) and Akama (2016).

2.2.2 Belief Revision

Belief revision is the study of rationally revising bodies of belief in the

light of new evidence. Notoriously, people have inconsistent beliefs. They
may even be rational in doing so. For example, there may be apparently
overwhelming evidence for both something and its negation. There may
even be cases where it is in principle impossible to eliminate such
inconsistency. For example, consider the ‘ paradox of the preface ’ . A
rational person, after thorough research, writes a book in which they
claim A1A1, … , AnAn. But they are also aware that no book of any
complexity contains only truths. So they rationally believe ¬(A1 ∧ … ∧
An)¬(A1 ∧ … ∧ An) too. Hence, principles of rational belief revision must
work on inconsistent sets of beliefs. Standard accounts of belief revision,
e.g. the AGM theory (see the logic of belief revision), all fail to do this,
since they are based on classical logic (Tanaka 2005). A more adequate
account may be based on a paraconsistent logic; see Girard and Tanaka
2016.

2.3 Formal Semantics and Set Theory

Paraconsistency can be taken as a response to logical paradoxes in formal
semantics and set theory.

2.3.1 Truth Theory

Semantics is the study that aims to spell out a theoretical understanding

of meaning. Most accounts of semantics insist that to spell out the
meaning of a sentence is, in some sense, to spell out its truth-conditions.
Now, prima facie at least, truth is a predicate characterised by the Tarski
T-scheme:

T(A)↔ AT(A)↔ A
where AA is a sentence and AA is its name. But given any standard means
of self-reference, e.g., arithmetisation, one can construct a sentence, BB,
which says that ¬T(B)¬T(B). The T-scheme gives that T(B) ↔ ¬T(B)T(B) ↔
¬T(B). It then follows that T(B)∧¬T(B)T(B)∧¬T(B). (This is, of course, just
the liar paradox.) A full development of a theory of truth in paraconsistent
logic is given by Beall (2009); for more general details see Beall et al 2018.

2.3.2 Set Theory

The situation is similar in set theory. The naive, and arguably intuitively
correct, axioms of set theory are the Comprehension
Schema and Extensionality Principle:

∃y∀x(x∈y↔ A)∀x(x∈y↔ x∈z)→y=z∃y∀x(x∈y↔ A)∀x(x∈y↔ x∈z)→y=z

As was discovered by Russell, any theory that contains the
Comprehension Schema is inconsistent. For putting ‘y∉ yy∉ y’ for AA in
the Comprehension Schema and instantiating the existential quantifier to
an arbitrary such object ‘rr’ gives:

∀y(y∈r↔ y∉ y)∀y(y∈r↔ y∉ y)
So, instantiating the universal quantifier to ‘rr’ gives:

r∈r↔ r∉ rr∈r↔ r∉ r
It then follows that r∈r∧r∉ rr∈r∧r∉ r.

The standard approaches to these problems of inconsistency are, by and

large, ones of expedience. A paraconsistent approach makes it possible to
have theories of truth and sethood in which the mathematically
fundamental intuitions about these notions are respected. For example,
as Brady (1989; 2006) has shown, contradictions may be allowed to arise
in a paraconsistent set theory, but these need not infect the whole theory.

There are several approaches to set theory with naive comprehension via
paraconsistent logic. Models for paraconsistent set theory are described
by Libert (2005). The theories of ordinal and cardinal numbers are
developed axiomatically using relevant logic in Weber 2010b, 2012. The
possibility of adding a consistency operator to track non-paradoxical
fragments of the theory is considered in Omori 2015, taking a cue from
the tradition of da Costa. Naive set theory using adaptive logic is
presented by Verdée (2013); see Batens 2020 for current developments in
adaptive Fregean Set Theory.

Incurvati (2020, chapter 4) gives a detailed critique of the paraconsistent

approach to naive set theory. Recent work in algebra-valued models of
paraconsistent set theory gets away from naive set theory and is about
placing the axioms of standard Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory (ZF) in a
paraconsistent framework. Algebraic models along these lines are being
vigorously investigated by Tarafder, Venturi, and Jockwich (see Jockwich
and Venturi 2021), following Löwe and Tarafder 2015.

2.3.3 Mathematics in general

According to da Costa (1974: 498),

It would be as interesting to study the inconsistent systems

as, for instance, the non-euclidean geometries: we would
obtain a better idea of the nature of paradoxes, could have a
better insight on the connections amongst the various
logical principles necessary to obtain determinate results,
etc. … It is not our aim to eliminate the inconsistencies, but
to analyze and study them.
A recent step in this direction is in Weber 2021. For further developments
of mathematics in paraconsistent logics, see entry on inconsistent
mathematics.

2.4 Arithmetic and Gödel’s Theorem

Unlike formal semantics and set theory, there may not be any obvious
arithmetical principles that give rise to contradiction. Nonetheless, just
like the classical non-standard models of arithmetic, there is a class
of inconsistent models of arithmetic (or more accurately models of
inconsistent arithmetic) which have an interesting and important
mathematical structure.

One interesting implication of the existence of inconsistent models of

arithmetic is that some of them are finite (unlike the classical
non-standard models). This means that there are some significant
applications in the metamathematical theorems. For example, the
classical Löwenheim-Skolem theorem states that QQ (Robinson ’ s
arithmetic which is a fragment of Peano arithmetic) has models of every
infinite cardinality but has no finite models. But, QQ can be shown to have
models of finite size too by referring to the inconsistent models of
arithmetic.

It is not only the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem but also other

metamathematical theorems can be given a paraconsistent treatment. In
the case of other theorems, however, the negative results that are often
shown by the limitative theorems of metamathematics may no longer
hold. One important such theorem is Gödel’s theorem.

One version of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem states that for any
consistent axiomatic theory of arithmetic, which can be recognised to be
sound, there will be an arithmetic truth — viz., its Gödel sentence — not
provable in it, but which can be established as true by intuitively correct
reasoning. The heart of Gödel ’ s theorem is, in fact, a paradox that
concerns the sentence, GG, ‘ This sentence is not provable ’ . If GG is
provable, then it is true and so not provable. Thus GG is proved.
Hence GG is true and so unprovable. If an underlying paraconsistent logic
is used to formalise the arithmetic, and the theory therefore allowed to be
inconsistent, the Gödel sentence may well be provable in the theory
(essentially by the above reasoning). So a paraconsistent approach to
arithmetic overcomes the limitations of arithmetic that are supposed (by
many) to follow from Gödel’s theorem. For other ‘limitative’ theorems
of metamathematics, see Priest 2002. For some of the original work by
Meyer applying paraconsistent logic to arithmetic, and new
commentaries and developments, see the collection Ferguson and Priest
2021.

2.5 Vagueness

From the start, paraconsistent logics were intended in part to deal with
problems of vagueness and the sorites paradox (Jaśkowski 1948 [1969]).
Some empirical evidence suggest that vagueness in natural language is a
good candidate for paraconsistent treatment (Ripley 2011).

A few different paraconsistent approaches to vagueness have been

suggested. Subvaluationism is the logical dual to supervaluationism: if a
claim is true on some acceptable sharpening of a vague predicate, then it
is true. Where the supervaluationist sees indeterminacy, or truth-value
gaps, the subvaluationist sees overdeterminacy, truth-value gluts. A
subvaluation logic will, like its supervaluational dual, preserve all classical
tautologies, as long as the definition of validity is restricted to the
non-glutty cases. Because it is so structurally similar to supervaluationism,
subvaluationism is also subject to most of the same criticisms (Hyde
1997).

More broadly, (dialetheic) paraconsistency has been used in

straightforward three-valued truth-functional approaches to vagueness.
The aim is to preserve both of the following intuitive claims:

1. Tolerance: For vague FF, it is not the case that xx is FF but some
very FF-similar xx is not FF
 2. Cutoffs: For all FF, if some xx is FF and some yy is not, and there is
an ordered FF-progression from xx to yy, then there is some
last FF and some first non-FF

Again, the key to the analysis is to take cutoffs as sites for inconsistency,
for objects both F and not F. Then all tolerance claims (about vague F) are
taken as true; but since, paraconsistently, the inference of disjunctive
syllogism is not generally valid, these claims do not imply absurdities like
‘ everyone is bald ’ . Paraconsistent models place a great deal of
emphasis on cutoff points of vague predicates, attributing much of the
trouble with the sorties paradox to underlying inconsistency of vague
predicates (Weber 2010a).

There is debate as to whether the sorties paradox is of a kind with the

other well-known semantic and set theoretic paradoxes, like Russell’s and
the liar. If it is, then a paraconsistent approach to one would be as natural
as to the other.

3. Systems of Paraconsistent Logic

A number of formal techniques to invalidate ECQ have been devised. As

the interest in paraconsistent logic grew, different techniques developed
in different parts of the world. As a result, the development of the
techniques has somewhat a regional flavour (though there are, of course,
exceptions, and the regional differences can be over-exaggerated; see
Tanaka 2003). Some of these have been summarised in Brown 2002 and
Priest 2002. The list of systems canvassed here is by no means exhaustive
and will be expanded in future updates.

Most paraconsistent logicians do not propose a wholesale rejection of

classical logic. They usually accept the validity of classical inferences in
consistent contexts. It is the need to isolate an inconsistency without
spreading everywhere that motivates the rejection of ECQ. Depending on
how much revision one thinks is needed, we have a technique for
paraconsistency. The taxonomy given here is based on the degree of
revision to classical logic. (On comparing paraconsistent logics based on
proximity to classical logic, see Arieli, Avron and Zamansky (2011) and for
more methodological concerns Wansing and Odinstov (2016).) Since the
logical novelty can be seen at the propositional level, we will concentrate
on the propositional paraconsistent logics.

3.1 Discussive Logic

The first formal paraconsistent logic to have been developed

was discussive (or discursive) logic by the Polish logician Jaśkowski (1948).
The thought behind discussive logic is that, in a discourse, each
participant puts forward some information, beliefs or opinions. Each
assertion is true according to the participant who puts it forward in a
discourse. But what is true in a discourse on whole is the sum of assertions
put forward by participants. Each participant ’ s opinions may be
self-consistent, yet may be inconsistent with those of others. Jaśkowski
formalised this idea in the form of discussive logic.

A formalisation of discussive logic is by means of modelling a discourse in

a modal logic. For simplicity, Jaśkowski chose S5. We think of each
participant ’ s belief set as the set of sentences true at a world in an S5
model MM. Thus, a sentence AA asserted by a participant in a discourse is
interpreted as “ it is possible that AA ” or a sentence ⬦ A ⬦ A of S5.
Then AA holds in a discourse iff AA is true at some world in MM.
Since AA may hold in one world but not in another,
both AA and ¬A¬A may hold in a discourse. Indeed, one should expect
that participants disagree on some issue in a rational discourse. The idea,
then, is that BB is a discussive consequence of A1,…,AnA1,…,An iff ⬦ B⬦
B is an S5 consequence of ⬦ A1…⬦ An⬦ A1…⬦ An.

To see that discussive logic is paraconsistent, consider an S5 model, MM,

such that AA holds at w1w1, ¬A¬A holds at a different world w2w2,
but BB does not hold at any world for some BB. Then
both AA and ¬A¬A hold, yet BB does not hold in MM. Hence discussive
logic invalidates ECQ.

However, there is no S5 model where A∧¬AA∧¬A holds at some world.

So an inference of the form {A∧¬A}⊨ B{A∧¬A}⊨ B is valid in discussive
logic. This means that, in discussive logic, adjunction ({A,¬A} ⊨ A ∧
¬A)({A,¬A}⊨ A∧¬A) fails. But one can define a discussive conjunction, ∧
d∧d, as A∧⬦ BA∧⬦ B (or ⬦ A∧B)⬦ A∧B). Then adjunction holds for ∧d
∧d (Jaśkowski 1949).

One difficulty is a formulation of a conditional. In S5, the inference

from ⬦ p ⬦ p and ⬦ (p⊃ q) ⬦ (p ⊃ q) to ⬦ q ⬦ q fails. Jaśkowski chose to
introduce a connective which he called discussive implication, ⊃ d ⊃ d,
defined as ⬦ A ⊃ B ⬦ A ⊃ B. This connective can be understood to mean
that “ if some participant states that AA, then BB ” . As the inference
from ⬦ A ⊃ B ⬦ A ⊃ B and ⬦ A ⬦ A to ⬦ B ⬦ B is valid in S5, modus
ponens for ⊃d⊃d holds in discussive logic. A discussive bi-implication, ≡
d≡ d, can also be defined as ( ⬦ A⊃B)∧⬦ (⬦ B⊃A)( ⬦ A⊃B) ∧ ⬦ (⬦ B⊃
A) (or ⬦ (⬦ A⊃B)∧(⬦ B⊃A))⬦ (⬦ A⊃B)∧(⬦ B⊃A)). For some history of
work on Jaśkowski ’ s logic and axiomatizations thereof, see Omori and
Alama (2018).

3.2 Non-Adjunctive Systems

A non-adjunctive system is a system that does not validate adjunction

(i.e., {A,B}⊭ A∧B){A,B}⊭ A∧B). As we saw above, discussive logic without a
discussive conjunction is non-adjunctive. Another non-adjunctive
strategy was suggested by Rescher and Manor (1970). In effect, we can
conjoin premises, but only up to maximal consistency. Specifically, if ΣΣ is
a set of premises, a maximally consistent subset is any consistent
subset Σ′Σ′ such that if A∈Σ−Σ′A∈Σ−Σ′ then Σ′∪{A}Σ′∪{A} is inconsistent.
Then we say that AA is a consequence of Σ Σ iff AA is a classical
consequence of Σ′Σ′ for some maximally consistent subset Σ′Σ′. Then {p,q}
⊨ p∧q{p,q}⊨ p∧q but {p,¬p}⊭ p∧¬p{p,¬p}⊭ p∧¬p.

3.3 Preservationism

In the non-adjunctive system of Rescher and Manor, a consequence

relation is defined over some maximally consistent subset of the premises.
This can be seen as a way to ‘measure’ the level of consistency in the
premise set. The level of {p,q}{p,q} is 1 since the maximally consistent
subset is the set itself. The level of {p,¬p}{p,¬p}, however, is
2: {p}{p} and {¬p}{¬p}.

If we define a consequence relation over some maximally consistent

subset, then the relation can be thought of as preserving the level of
consistent fragments. This is the approach which has come to be
called preservationism. It was first developed by the Canadian logicians
Ray Jennings and Peter Schotch.

To be more precise, a (finite) set of formulas, ΣΣ, can be partitioned into

classically consistent fragments whose union is Σ Σ . Let ⊢ ⊢ be the
classical consequence relation. A covering of ΣΣ is a set {Σi:i ∈I}{Σi:i∈I},
where each member is consistent, and Σ = ⋃ i ∈ I Σ i Σ = ⋃ i ∈ I Σ i.
The level of Σ ,l( Σ ) Σ ,l( Σ ), is the least nn such that Σ Σ can be partitioned
into nn sets if there is such nn, or ∞ ∞ if there is no such nn. A
consequence relation, called forcing, ⊩ ⊩ , is defined as follows. Σ⊩ AΣ⊩
A iff l(Σ)=∞l(Σ)=∞, or l(Σ)=nl(Σ)=n and for every covering of size nn there
is a j∈Ij∈I such that Σj⊢ AΣj⊢ A. If l(Σ)=1l(Σ)=1 or ∞∞ then the forcing
relation coincides with classical consequence relation. In case where l(Σ)=
∞l(Σ)=∞, there must be a sentence of the form A∧¬AA∧¬A and so the
forcing relation explodes.

A chunking strategy has also been applied to capture the inferential

mechanism underlying some theories in science and mathematics. In
mathematics, the best available theory concerning infinitesimals was
inconsistent. In the original calculus of Leibniz, in the calculation of a
derivative infinitesimals had to be both zero and non-zero. (Cf. Colyvan
2012, chapter 7. Newton used ‘fluxions’, which play a similar role.) In
order to capture the inference mechanism underlying this (and Bohr ’ s
theory of the atom), we need to add to the chunking a mechanism that
allows a limited amount of information to flow between the consistent
fragments of these inconsistent but non-trivial theories. That is, certain
information from one chunk may permeate into other chunks. The
inference procedure underlying the theories must be Chunk and
Permeate.
Let C={ Σ i:i ∈ I}C={ Σ i:i ∈ I} and ϱϱ a permeability relation on CC such
that ϱϱ is a map from I×II×I to subsets of formulas of the language. If i0∈
Ii0 ∈ I, then any structure ⟨ C,ϱ,i0 ⟩ ⟨ C,ϱ,i0 ⟩ is called a C&P structure
on ΣΣ. If BB is a C&P structure on ΣΣ, we define the C&P consequences
of ΣΣ with respect to BB, as follows. For each i∈Ii∈I, a set of sentences, Σ
niΣin, is defined by recursion on nn:

Σ0i=Σ⊢ iΣn+1i=(Σni∪⋃ j∈I(Σnj∩ρ(j,i)))⊢ Σi0=Σi⊢ Σin+1=(Σin∪⋃ j∈I(Σjn∩

ρ(j,i)))⊢
That is, Σ n+1i Σ in+1 comprises the consequences from Σ ni Σ in together
with the information that permeates into chunk ii from the other chunk at
level nn. We then collect up all finite stages:

Σωi=⋃ n<ωΣniΣiω=⋃ n<ωΣin

The C&P consequences of Σ Σ can be defined in terms of the sentences
that can be inferred in the designated chunk i0i0 when all appropriate
information has been allowed to flow along the permeability relations
(see Brown & Priest 2004, 2015.)

3.4 Adaptive Logics

One may think not only that an inconsistency needs to be isolated but
also that a serious need for the consideration of inconsistencies is a rare
occurrence. The thought may be that consistency is the norm until proven
otherwise: we should treat a sentence or a theory as consistently as
possible. This is essentially the motivation for adaptive logics, pioneered
by Diderik Batens in Belgium.

An adaptive logic is a logic that adapts itself to the situation at the time of
application of inference rules. It models the dynamics of our reasoning.
There are two senses in which reasoning is dynamic: external and internal.
Reasoning is externally dynamic if as new information becomes available
expanding the premise set, consequences inferred previously may have to
be withdrawn. The external dynamics is thus
the non-monotonic character of some consequence relations: Γ ⊢ A Γ ⊢
A and Γ∪Δ⊬ AΓ∪Δ⊬ A for some Γ,ΔΓ,Δ and AA. However, even if the
premise-set remains constant, some previously inferred conclusion may
be considered as not derivable at a later stage. As our reasoning proceeds
from a premise set, we may encounter a situation where we infer a
consequence provided that no abnormality, in particular no contradiction,
obtains at some stage of the reasoning process. If we are forced to infer a
contradiction at a later stage, our reasoning has to adapt itself so that an
application of the previously used inference rule is withdrawn. In such a
case, reasoning is internally dynamic. Our reasoning may be internally
dynamic if the set of valid inferences is not recursively enumerable (i.e.,
there is no decision procedure that leads to ‘yes’ after finitely many
steps if the inference is indeed valid). It is the internal dynamics that
adaptive logics are devised to capture.

In order to illustrate the idea behind adaptive logics, consider the premise
set Γ ={p,¬p ∨ r,¬r ∨ s,¬s,s ∨ t} Γ ={p,¬p ∨ r,¬r ∨ s,¬s,s ∨ t}. One may start
reasoning with ¬s¬s and s∨ts∨t, using the Disjunctive Syllogism (DS) to
infer tt, given that s ∧ ¬ss ∧ ¬s does not obtain. We then reason
with pp and ¬p ∨ r¬p ∨ r, to infer rr with the DS, given that p ∧ ¬pp ∧
¬p does not obtain. Now, we can apply the DS to ¬r ∨s¬r∨ s and rr to
derive ss, provided that r ∧ ¬rr ∧ ¬r does not obtain. However, by
conjoining ss and ¬s¬s, we can obtain s ∧ ¬ss ∧ ¬s. Hence we must
withdraw the first application of DS, and so the proof of tt lapses. A
consequence of this reasoning is what cannot be defeated at any stage of
the process.

A system of adaptive logic can generally be characterised as consisting of

three elements:

1. A lower limit logic (LLL)

2. A set of abnormalities

3. An adaptive strategy

LLL is the part of an adaptive logic that is not subject to adaptation. It

consists essentially of a number of inferential rules (and/or axioms) that
one is happy to accept regardless of the situation in a reasoning process.
A set of abnormalities is a set of formulas that are presupposed as not
holding (or as absurd) at the beginning of reasoning until they are shown
to be otherwise. For many adaptive logics, a formula in this set is of the
form A∧¬AA∧¬A. An adaptive strategy specifies a strategy of handling
the applications of inference rules based on the set of abnormalities. If LLL
is extended with the requirement that no abnormality is logically possible,
one obtains the upper limit logic (ULL). ULL essentially contains not only
the inferential rules (and/or axioms) of LLL but also supplementary rules
(and/or axioms) that can be applied in the absence of abnormality, such
as DS. By specifying these three elements, one obtains a system of
adaptive logic.

3.5 Logics of Formal Inconsistency

The approaches taken for motivating the systems of paraconsistent logic

which we have so far seen isolate inconsistency from consistent parts of
the given theory. The aim is to retain as much classical machinery as
possible in developing a system of paraconsistent logic which,
nonetheless, avoids explosion when faced with a contradiction. One way
to make this aim explicit is to extend the expressive power of our
language by encoding the metatheoretical notions of consistency (and
inconsistency) in the object language. The Logics of Formal
Inconsistency (LFIs) are a family of paraconsistent logics that constitute
consistent fragments of classical logic yet which reject the explosion
principle where a contradiction is present. The investigation of this family
of logics was initiated by Newton da Costa in Brazil.

An effect of encoding consistency (and inconsistency) in the object

language is that we can explicitly separate inconsistency from triviality.
With a language rich enough to express inconsistency (and consistency),
we can study inconsistent theories without assuming that they are
necessarily trivial. This makes it explicit that the presence of a
contradiction is a separate issue from the non-trivial nature of
paraconsistent inferences.
The thought behind LFIs is that we should respect classical logic as much
as possible. It is only when there is a contradiction that logic should
deviate from it. This means that we can admit the validity of ECQ in the
absence of contradictions. In order to do so, we encode ‘consistency’
into our object language by ∘ ∘ . Then ⊢ ⊢ is a consequence relation of
an LFI iff

1. ∃Γ∃A∃B(Γ,A,¬A⊬ B)∃Γ∃A∃B(Γ,A,¬A⊬ B) and

2. ∀Γ∀A∀B(Γ,∘A,A,¬A⊢ B)∀Γ∀A∀B(Γ,∘A,A,¬A⊢ B).

Let ⊢ C⊢ C be the classical consequence (or derivability) relation and ∘(Γ)

∘ ( Γ ) express the consistency of the set of formulas Γ Γ such that if ∘ A ∘
A and ∘ B ∘ B then ∘ (A ∗ B) ∘ (A ∗ B) where ∗ ∗ is any two place logical
connective. Then we can capture derivability in the consistent context in
terms of the equivalence: ∀Γ∀B∃Δ(Γ⊢ CB∀Γ∀B∃Δ(Γ⊢ CB iff ∘(Δ),Γ⊢ B)∘
(Δ),Γ⊢ B).

Now take the positive fragment of classical logic with modus ponens plus
double negation elimination (¬¬A →A)(¬¬A →A) as an axiom and some
axioms governing ∘∘:

∘A→(A→(¬A→B))(∘A∧∘B)→∘(A∧B)(∘A→∘B)→∘(A→B)∘A→(A→(¬A→B))(∘
A∧∘B)→∘(A∧B)(∘A→∘B)→∘(A→B)
Then ⊢ ⊢ provides da Costa’s system C1C1. If we let A1A1 abbreviate
the formula ¬(A ∧ ¬A)¬(A ∧ ¬A) and An+1An+1 the formula (¬(An ∧
¬An))1(¬(An ∧ ¬An))1, then we obtain CiCi for each natural
number ii greater than 1.

To obtain da Costa’s system CωCω, instead of the positive fragment of

classical logic, we start with positive intuitionist logic instead. CiCi systems
for finite ii do not rule out (An ∧ ¬An ∧ An+1)(An ∧ ¬An ∧ An+1) from
holding in a theory. By going up the hierarchy to ωω, CωCω rules out this
possibility. Note, however, that CωCω is not a LFC as it does not contain
classical positive logic. For the semantics for da Costa’s CC-systems, see
for example da Costa and Alves 1977 and Loparic 1977.
The LFIs are a powerful expansion of these ideas. A comprehensive
overview and further work in this tradition is in Carnielli and Coniglio 2016.
Further work on looking for consistency or recovery operators is in Barrio
and Carnielli 2020.

3.6 Many-Valued Logics

Perhaps the simplest way of generating a paraconsistent logic, first

proposed by Asenjo in his PhD dissertation, is to use a many-valued logic.
Classically, there are exactly two truth values. The many-valued approach
is to drop this classical assumption and allow more than two truth values.
The simplest strategy is to use three truth values: true (only), false
(only) and both (true and false) for the evaluations of formulas. The truth
tables for logical connectives, except conditional, can be given as follows:

¬¬
tt ff
bb bb
ff tt

∧∧ tt bb ff
tt tt bb ff
bb bb bb ff
ff ff ff ff

∨∨ tt bb ff
tt tt tt tt
bb tt bb bb
ff tt bb ff
These tables are essentially those of Kleene’s and Łukasiewicz’s three
valued logics where the middle value is thought of
as indeterminate or neither (true nor false).

For a conditional ⊃⊃, following Kleene’s strong three valued logic, we

might specify a truth table as follows:
 ⊃⊃ tt bb ff
tt tt bb ff
bb tt bb bb
ff tt tt tt
Let tt and bb be the designated values. These are the values that are
preserved in valid inferences. If we define a consequence relation in terms
of preservation of these designated values, then we have the
paraconsistent logic LP (Priest 1979). In LP, ECQ is invalid. To see this, we
assign bb to pp and ff to qq. Then ¬p¬p is also evaluated as bb and so
both pp and ¬p¬p are designated. Yet qq is not evaluated as having a
designated value. Hence ECQ is invalid in LP.

As we can see, LP invalidates ECQ by assigning a designated value, both

true and false, to a contradiction. Thus, LP departs from classical logic
more so than the systems that we have seen previously, and is often
aligned with dialetheism. However, we can interpret truth values not in an
aletheic sense but in an epistemic sense: truth values (or designated
values) express epistemic or doxastic commitments (see for example
Belnap 1992). Or we might think that the value both is needed for a
semantic reason: we might be required to express the contradictory
nature of some of our beliefs, assertions and so on (see Dunn 1976: 157).
If this interpretative strategy is successful, we can separate LP from
necessarily falling under dialetheism.

One feature of LP which requires some attention is that in LP modus

ponens comes out to be invalid. For if pp is both true and false
but qq false (only), then p ⊃ qp ⊃ q is both true and false and hence is
designated. So both pp and p ⊃ qp ⊃ q are designated, yet the
conclusion qq is not. Hence modus ponens for ⊃⊃ is invalid in LP. (One
way to rectify the problem is to add an appropriate conditional
connective as we will see in the section on relevant logics.)

Another way to develop a many-valued paraconsistent logic is to think of

an assignment of a truth value not as a function but as a relation.
Let PP be the set of propositional parameters. Then an evaluation, ηη, is a
subset of P×{0,1}P×{0,1}. A proposition may only relate to 1 (true), it may
only relate to 0 (false), it may relate to both 1 and 0 or it may relate to
neither 1 nor 0. The evaluation is extended to a relation for all formulas by
the following recursive clauses:

¬Aη1 iff Aη0¬Aη0 iff Aη1A∧Bη1 iff Aη1 and Bη1A∧Bη0 iff Aη0 or Bη0A
∨Bη1 iff Aη1 or Bη1A∨Bη0 iff Aη0 and Bη0¬Aη1 iff Aη0¬Aη0 iff Aη1A∧
Bη1 iff Aη1 and Bη1A∧Bη0 iff Aη0 or Bη0A∨Bη1 iff Aη1 or Bη1A∨Bη
0 iff Aη0 and Bη0
If we define validity in terms of truth preservation under all relational
evaluations then we obtain First Degree Entailment (FDE) which is a
fragment of relevant logics. These relational semantics for FDE are due to
Dunn 1976; cf. Omori and Wansing 2017. A different approach is explored
through the idea of non-deterministic matrices, studied by Avron and his
collaborators (for example, Avron & Lev 2005).

3.7 Relevant Logics

The approaches to paraconsistency we have examined above all focus on

the inevitable presence or the truth of some contradictions. A rejection of
ECQ, in these approaches, depends on an analysis of the premises
containing a contradiction. One might think that the real problem with
ECQ is not to do with the contradictory premises but to do with the lack
of connection between the premises and the conclusion. The thought is
that the conclusion must be relevant to the premises in a valid inference.

Relevant logics were pioneered in order to study the relevance of the

conclusion with respect to the premises by Anderson and Belnap (1975) in
Pittsburgh. Anderson and Belnap motivated the development of relevant
logics using natural deduction systems; yet they developed a family of
relevant logics in axiomatic systems. As development proceeded and was
carried out also in Australia, more focus was given to the semantics.

The semantics for relevant logics were developed by Fine (1974), Routley
and Routley (1972), Routley and Meyer (1993) and Urquhart (1972). (There
are also algebraic semantics; see for example Dunn & Restall 2002: 48ff.)
Routley-Meyer semantics is based on possible-world semantics, which is
the most studied semantics for relevant logics, especially in Australasia. In
this semantics, conjunction and disjunction behave in the usual way. But
each world, ww, has an associate world, w ∗ w ∗ , and negation is
evaluated in terms of w ∗ :¬Aw ∗ :¬A is true at ww iff AA is false, not
at ww, but at w∗ w∗ . Thus, if AA is true at ww, but false at w∗ w∗ , then A
∧ ¬AA ∧ ¬A is true at ww. To obtain the standard relevant logics, one
needs to add the constraint that w∗ ∗ =ww∗ ∗ =w. As is clear, negation
in these semantics is an intensional operator.

The primary concern with relevant logics is not so much with negation as
with a conditional connective →→ (satisfying modus ponens). In relevant
logics, if A→BA→B is a logical truth, then AA is relevant to BB, in the sense
that AA and BB share at least one propositional variable.

Semantics for the relevant conditional are obtained by furnishing each

Routley-Meyer model with a ternary relation. In the simplified semantics
of Priest and Sylvan (1992) and Restall (1993, 1995), worlds are divided
into normal and non-normal. If ww is a normal world, A →BA → B is true
at ww iff at all worlds where AA is true, BB is true. If ww is non-normal, A
→ BA→B is true at ww iff for all x,yx,y, such that RwxyRwxy, if AA is true
at x,Bx,B is true at yy. If BB is true at xx but not at yy where RwxyRwxy,
then B→BB→B is not true at ww. Then one can show that A→(B→B)A→(B
→ B) is not a logical truth. (Validity is defined as truth preservation
over normal worlds.) This gives the basic relevant logic, BB. Stronger
logics, such as the logic RR, are obtained by adding constraints on the
ternary relation.

There are also versions of world-semantics for relevant logics based on

Dunn ’ s relational semantics for FDE. Then negation is extensional. A
conditional connective, now needs to be given both truth and falsity
conditions. So we have: A → BA → B is true at ww iff for all x,yx,y, such
that RwxyRwxy, if AA is true at x,Bx,B is true at yy; and A→BA→B is false
at ww iff for some x,yx,y, such that RwxyRwxy, if AA is true at x,Bx,B is false
at yy. Adding various constraints on the ternary relation provides stronger
 logics. However, these logics are not the standard relevant logics
developed by Anderson and Belnap. To obtain the standard family of
relevant logics, one needs neighbourhood frames (see Mares 2004).
Further details can be found in the entry on relevant logics.

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World Congress of Paraconsistency Volumes

 [First Congress] Batens, Diderik, Chris Mortensen, Graham Priest,

and Jean-Paul van Bendegem (eds.), 2000, Frontiers of Paraconsistent
Logic (Studies in Logic and Computation 8), Baldock, England: Research
Studies Press.

 [Second Congress] Carnielli, Walter A., M. Coniglio, and Itala Maria

Lof D ’ ottaviano (eds.), 2002, Paraconsistency: the Logical Way to the
Inconsistent (Lecture Notes in Pure and Applied Mathematics: Volume
228), Boca Raton: CRC Press.

 [Third Congress] Beziau, Jean-Yves, Walter A. Carnielli, and Dov M.

Gabbay (eds.), 2007, Handbook of Paraconsistency (Studies in Logic 9),
London: College Publications.

 [Fourth Congress] Tanaka, Koji, Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares, and

Francesco Paoli (eds.), 2013, Paraconsistency: Logic and
Applications (Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science 26),
Dordrecht: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-94-007-4438-7

 [Fifth Congress] Beziau, Jean-Yves, Mihir Chakraborty, and Soma

Dutta (eds.), 2015, New Directions in Paraconsistent Logic, Dordrecht:
Springer. doi:10.1007/978-81-322-2719-9

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Acknowledgments

The editors and authors would like to thank Joy Britten for noticing an
error in the example of adaptive logic reasoning in Section 3.4, and to
Hitoshi Omori for identification and discussion of an error in the section
on discussive logic Section 3.1.

Copyright © 2022 by
Graham Priest <[email protected]>
Koji Tanaka <[email protected]>
Zach Weber <[email protected]>