Torts II

Principle Authority

GENERAL NEGLIGENCE
To succeed in an action in negligence, plaintiff must establish the ff: Edusei J, Alhassa Kotokoli v Moro Hausa[timber truck ride]
- There exists a legal duty
- There was a breach of that duty
- Damages resulted from the breach

Where a duty of care is not expressly directed to the plaintiff, it Haynes v Harwood per Greer J
includes him if he is one of a class affected by the want of care
[policeman was a lawful user of the highway]

If what is relied, on as novus actus interveniens is the very kind of thing Haynes v Harwood [policeman and horses]
which is likely to happen if the want of care which is alleged in the case
takes place, then it is no defence to say that there has been a novus
actus interveniens

A test of negligence is reasonable foreseeability. The damage inflicted Bourhill v Young

on a plaintiff by a defendant should have been reasonably foreseeable King v Phillips [mother, tricycle]
by the defendant

there is no such thing as negligence in the air; liability only arises King v Phillips, McNair J
where there is a duty to take care and where failure in that duty has
caused damage

The Concept of Duty of Care

Want of attention, amounting to a want of ordinary care, is not a good Brett MR, Heaven v Pender [ship painter]
cause of action, although injury ensues from such want, unless the
person charged with such want of ordinary care had a duty to the
person complaining.

Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position Brett MR, Heaven v Pender
with regard to another that anyone of ordinary sense who did think
would at once recognise that, if he did not use ordinary care and skill in
his own conduct with regard to those circumstances, he would cause
danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to
use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger.

The infliction of damage on a plaintiff in itself does not give a cause of Bourhill v Young [pregnant woman, motorist]
action. The damage must be attributable to the breach of a duty owed to
the plaintiff

A duty of care could be owed by a professional man to third parties in Caparo Industries v Dickman & Ors [Touche Ross & Co]
cases where there was no contractual relationship between them, if the Hedley Byrne v Heller & Partners
professional giving advice or information was fully aware of the nature Candler v Crane, Christmas & Co [Denning’s dissent correct
of the transaction which the plaintiff had in contemplation, knew that statement of the law]
the advice or information would be communicated to him directly or Cann v Willson [decision overruled]
indirectly and knew that it was very likely that the plaintiff would rely
on that advice or information in deciding whether or not to engage in
the transaction in contemplation.

For a duty of care to exist there must be reasonable foreseeability, a Caparo Industries v Dickman
close and direct relationship of "proximity" between the parties and it
must be fair, just and reasonable to impose liability

Rescue Principle
If a person chooses to do an act the ordinary consequence of which is Scrutton LJ in Cutler v United Diaries
that damage may ensue, the damage must be on his own head

The doctrine of [voluntary] assumption of risk does not apply where the Prof Goodhart: Rescue & Voluntary Assumption of Risk
plaintiff has, under an exigency caused by the defendants' wrongful
misconduct, consciously and deliberately faced a risk, even of death, to Eckert v Long Island Railroad
rescue another from imminent danger of personal injury or death,
whether the person endangered is one to whom he owes a duty of
protection, as a member of his family, or is a mere stranger to whom he
owes no such special duty

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Nervous Shock
Mere fright not followed by consequent physical damage will not Kennedy J, Dulieu v White [pregnant woman, carriage driven into a
support an action, but if it is followed by consequent physical damage, bar]
then, if the fright was the natural result of the defendants' negligence,
an action lies, and the physical damage is not too remote to support it.
Where there is a legal duty on the defendant not to frighten the plaintiff Phillimore J, Dulieu v White [1901]
by his negligence, then fright with consequent physical damage will
support an action
To give a cause of action, shock must be the result of a fear of Dulieu v White [1901] per Kennedy J
immediate personal danger to one self. Bourhill v Young [1943] principle upheld
King v Phillips [1953] principle upheld
To give rise to a cause of action the act which terrifies must Dulieu v White per Phillimore J
be either wilful or negligent.

Pecuniary Loss
In case of a wrong done to a chattel the common law does not Cattle v Stockton Waterworks
recognise a person whose only rights are a contractual right to have the Leigh & Sallivan v Aliakmon Shipping Co
use or services of the chattel for purposes of making profits or gains
without possession of or property in the chattel.

EMPLOYER’S DUTY TO HIS WORKMEN

At common law, a master owes a duty of care to his workers. The duty
is a personal one of a general nature.

The master’s obligation to his workmen is three-fold;

- provision of competent fellow workmen
- provision of adequate material or tools
- provision of a safe system of work and proper supervision

Each workman’s particular circumstances which are known or which Paris v Stepney [one-eyed garage hand hit a U-bolt with a steel
ought to be known to the employer will determine the standard of care hammer and a piece of metal entered his good eye losing sight in
to be taken that one too. Negligence action, employer should have provided
goggles and made him wear it. Trial court found for P, CA
overturned on grounds that although he had a risk of greater injury,
there was no greater risk of injury to make D negligent. HL
overturned on ground that if the results of an accident will be more
serious to A than to B, then it’s the duty of the employer to take such
additional precautions for the safety of A as may be reasonable]

The law does not require employers to dismiss employees if this is the Withers v Perry Chain [P had an attack of dermatitis from a reaction
only way of avoiding liability. to grease used in her job. When she returned to work, she was given
work D thought was best for her in the circumstances but the
It however appears there may be circumstances where the nature and dermatitis exacerbated and she sued for negligence. Held; all
magnitude of the risk might entail that an employer would be negligent reasonable care was taken and employer hadn’t been negligent in
in permitting an employee to undertake a particular form of work, even allowing her to resume work as no legal duty on an employer to
if the employee consents to run the risk in question. prevent an adult employee from doing work which he is willing to
do]

The duty of the employer is a personal one. Thus he is not discharged Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co. v English [P, at the end of his day shift
just because he engages others to do the work on his behalf. He’s liable and on his way to the pit bottom of the colliery where he worked,
unless those he asked to do the work exercise reasonable care and are was crushed when a haulage plant was set in motion. Industry
competent to do the work as required of them practice was that both events were mutually exclusive. D claimed
they had hired a competent manager to control the mine. Held; D
liable because obligation not fulfilled by just entrusting it to a
servant]

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Qualcast Ltd v Haynes [38 yr old moulder who had been a moulder
all his working life spilled hot molten metal on his foot while
working at D’s foundry. He was not wearing protective gear but
spats he knew spats were available on request from their stores and
he could BUY protective boots from the stores if he was so minded.
D never advised him to wear protective clothing. In an action for
negligence, held; no failure of duty of D est’d. P with his experience
should have known better so was contributorily negligent] HUH???

Competent Workmen
Employer is under a duty to appoint and put in charge people Black (Butler) v Fife Coal Co. [P’s husband died when carbon
competent to deal with the dangers arising from the operations of the monoxide leaked into the mine in which he was working. The
employer manager had failed to remove the workers from the pit when some
started getting ill in order to investigate the cause. Also, the fireman
Where an employer appoints an inexperienced person to carry out failed to record the presence of a haze he had noticed two days
highly dangerous activities, then the employer may be liable if, as a earlier. Trial court found for P but CA reversed on ground that there
result of lack of experience, another employee is injured was no negligence but liability under Employers’ Liability Act. HL
reversed CA based on this principle]

Where an employer is aware that a workman, by his habitual conduct, Hudson v Ridge Manufacturing Co. [P fractured his wrist when a
was likely to prove a source of danger to his fellow workmen, it is the habitual prankster of a colleague pulled a prank on him. employers
employers' duty to remove that source of danger. were aware of his conduct over 4 years but only warned him while
keeping him in their employ. Held; D had been negligent in not
providing competent workmen for P hence liable for his injuries]

However, if the employer is unaware that practical jokes are being Smith v Crossley Brothers [compressed air pipe up the rectum of P.
played, he will not be found liable as such acts fall outside of the scope first time employees did that and D could not have foreseen it so
of the employer's business cured it]

Provision of Adequate Tools

The employer is under a duty to provide adequate appliances. He need Davie v New Merton Board Mills [P was blinded when a particle of
not manufacture the tools and as long as he takes care to procure them metal chipped off the tool with which he was working due to a defect
from reputable manufacturers or from market overt, he is discharged in the tool’s manufacture. D had bought the tool from reputable
from this duty suppliers who got it from reputable manufacturers. Held; duty of D
to provide adequate tools had been discharged hence no liability]

If the work involves special risks, the employer must provide protective Clifford v Challen & Sons [P contracted dermatitis due to the
materials and reasonable steps should be taken to ensure that they are synthetic glue he worked with. A gov’t notice on the notice board set
used i.e. the employer must protect his employees from foreseeable out how to prevent it by using a special cream and washing any part
harm. on which the glue fell. However cream kept in store which workmen
had access and foreman took no steps to ensure its use. Held; cream
Where reasonable care for the safety of the employee has been taken, should have been provided in the shop itself and a system est’d
the employer is discharged if employee doesn’t use protective measures where the men would use it according to the gov’t notice. Thus
provided and incur injuries failure to do so constituted a breach and hence D liable but P
contributorily negligent so damages to be borne equally]

Smith v Leech Brain & Co [cancer from splash of molten metal on

lips of P’s husband. Held; D liable although he could not have
foreseen the ultimate consequences]

Woods v Durable Suites Ltd [experienced workman specifically

instructed to use protective measures against synthetic glue in order
to avert contracting dermatitis didn’t observe them. Held; D had
discharged their duty]

Safe System of Work

The employer has a duty to ensure that all aspects of the work are safe Kusasi v Ghana Cargo Handling [while driving D’s forklift at work,
including the time of work, its organisation, the parts played by the a pallet of 36 bags of rice crashed from a crane driven by co-D’s
various employees, etc. driver on him. res ipsa loquitur. A lookout man should have been
provided for P; no supervisor; system of work not safe, D liable for
A master did not provide a safe system of work by merely providing a damages]
manual to an illiterate workman if no responsible person on behalf of
the defendants supervised the workman Issah v Mim Timber [dead branch from timber tree fell on P’s arm
leading to amputation. P failed to prove that system of work was
unsafe or against industry practice]

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Ali Chana v Konongo Gold Mines [

Defences
Contributory negligence Clifford v Challen

If the employment necessarily involves particular risks, the employer Withers v Perry Chain
would be held to have no duty to remove these risks and a workman
injured in consequence of undertaking them will not recover in
negligence

An employer who delegates to an independent contractor will probably Davie v New Merton Board Mills
be liable for the latter’s negligence if the work might normally have
been done by the employer’s servant

EMPLOYER’S LIABILITY (DUTY) TO THIRD PERSONS (VICARIOUS LIABILITY)

An employer is answerable to the victim(s) of his servant’s torts. A
master will be held liable for the torts of his servants who commit the
wrong during the course of his master’s business

There are 3 tests to determine whether a workman is an employee or an

independent contractor
- integration test
- entrepreneurial test
- control test

Integration [laid down by Denning in Stevenson v Macdonald] – Stevenson v Macdonald [author assigned copyright to textbook on
whether the person is under a contract OF service or a contract FOR business management to publishers, D, based on experience
service acquired during his employment with P. contained lectures he had
given in the course of his employment and processes iro particular
Under the former, the person is employed as part of the business and client work. Held; no disclosure of secret or confidential info and
his work is done as an integral part of the business. info in book the result of the know-how of the author as a
professional man; lectures were not made under the contract of
In the latter, the work done is only accessory to the business i.e. the services; sections of particular assignments were made under the
workman is an independent contractor contract of service so should be excluded]

Other factors to consider as stated in Short v Henderson [P was a docker and a member of a trade union
- master’s power of selection of his servant which worked under a group system. When ships are discharged, the
- payment of wages and other remuneration ship owners pay a lump sum a steamship broker who gives it to the
- right to control the method of work leader of the group which is divided among the members. Held he
- right of suspension and dismissal was an employee of the broker]

per Mackenna J in Ready Mixed, a contract of service existed if Ready Mixed Concrete v Minister of Pensions [a contract between
(a) the servant agreed in consideration of a wage or other remuneration the appellant and a workman declared him to be an independent
to provide his own work and skill in the performance of some service contractor. He carried concrete for the company at his own expense
for his master and was paid per mileage. The vehicle he bought from a finance
(b) the servant agreed expressly or impliedly that, in performance of the company assoc’d with the company was to made available
service he would be subject to the control of the other party sufficiently throughout the contract period. He was made to get a carrier’s
to make him the master, and licence and to attach a mixer with the company’s logo on it to the
(c) the other provisions of the contract were consistent with its being a truck. He was obliged to wear the company’s uniform, comply with
contract of service; the company’s rules and prohibited from carrying goods or anyone
else. Company had control over major repairs on the vehicle and
power to ensure his accounts were prepared by an accountant in a
form approved by the company. The respondent claimed the man
was an employed person under a service of contract. appellant
appealed. Held; an obligation to do work subject to the other party's
control was not invariably a sufficient condition of a contract of
service; it’s relevant to consider who owned the assets and bore the
financial risks]

Massey v Crown Life Insurance [2 contracts as employee and agent.

For purposes of tax, one contract as a self-employed person.
Dismissed by D with one month’s notice and he claimed unfair
termination since he was an employee. The 2nd transaction changed
his status as an employee to a self-employed person, action
dismissed]

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Young & Woods v West [P chose to be treated as self-employed so

apart from wages, no paid holidays, sickness benefits, etc but when
dismissed claimed unfair termination. Employment tribunal found
for him. on appeal, held; The label with which parties described
their relationship did not alter the true relationship, and the legal
relationship between parties had to be classified not by appearance
but by reality. P was not a self-employed agent working
independently of the company, in business on his own account. Apart
from not getting the other benefits, his conditions of employment
were same as everyone else. D liable]

Market Investigations v Min of Social Security

Entrepreneurial Test – if A is the owner of the business and carries it Mersey Docks v Coggins [driver is employed by harbour authority
out for himself and bears the loss or benefits from the profit, then A is which pays him and has authority to dismiss him but conditions of
an independent contractor. Critical questions are; hire to stevedoring company is that he should be considered as a
servant of the stevedores. The stevedoring company however cannot
- whose business is it? tell him how to do his work, only control the moving of the cargo.
- Is the party carrying on the business for himself or a Held; he’s an employee of the harbour authority thus harbour
superior? authority liable vicariously for his torts]
- Is the party taking a financial risk with the chance of loss as
well as profit? O’Reilly v Imperial Chemical Industries [P, a driver was employed
by the British Road Services who paid him and had power to dismiss
him but he was at the disposal of the defendant on a full time basis
and they controlled and assisted in the loading of the lorry. Due to
an unsafe method of loading, plaintiff sustained injuries. Held; the
employer who owes the employee the duty of care is his employer]

Control test – the person who controls the workman as his employer is Performing Rights Society v Mitchell & Booker [held; determination
vicariously answerable for his wrongs depended on the nature and degree of detailed control over the
person alleged to be the servant]

Yewens v Noakes [employee is anyone who is subject to the

command of the master as to the manner in which he shall do his
work]

Kusasi v Ghana Cargo Handling [D had power of controlling P and

dismissing him for disobedience]

Issues
- Whether the tortfeasor is an employee of the defendant
- Whether conduct tortious even if an employee
- Whether employee was acting in the course of employment

Whether the servant acted in the course of employment Century Insurance v Northern Ireland Road Transport Board
[employee delivering petrol from tanker negligently threw away a lit
match for his cigarette. Considerable damage caused to property.
Whether employed by tanker owner or refinery?]

Beard v London Omnibus [conductor driving bus while driver took a

break and knocked down boy on bike. Held; conductor not acting
within course of employment]

Akyigina v Adjei [employer’s driver knocked down a person while

carting sand and stone. Held; since employer has not been able to
show that driver didn’t act in the course of employment, employer
liable]

Rickets v Tilling [conductor turned bus around while driver sat

beside him. bus mounted pavement, injured several persons and one
died. Driver was negligent to let conductor drive, negligence was in
the course of his employment thus employer liable vicariously]

Packer v Sekondi/Takoradi Municipal Council [foreman orders

driver to drive him home during a heavy downpour. Duty of driver to
obey orders. Company claimed bus had been withdrawn from service
so it was outside the course of employment of the defendant. Held;
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he was in the course of duty]

An employer will be held vicariously liable for the acts of an employer Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [warden abuses kids with special problems;
who does a wrong close to what he was employed to do or wrongful he wouldn’t have had access to the boys but for his job]
performance of an authorised act
Whatman v Pearson [further than a ¼ of a mile to eat, left horse and
carriage unattended; employer held vicariously liable]

When an employee is on a frolic of his own, using his master’s

resources, his employer is not held vicariously liable for his torts i.e. Zagloul v Kumasi Brewery [allowed to take delivery van home, got
where he is doing an act not authorised by his master. drunk, run into P’s car, employer held liable cuz D had no
restriction iro time and direction home]

Rayner v Mitchell [delivers coffin for personal purpose with

employer’s van, he picks up empties on the way and runs into P,
master not liable]

When the servant is prohibited by the master from doing certain things Canadian Pacific Railway Co v Lockhart [uninsured car driven by
and he goes out of his way to do that thing, his ‘disobedience’ will not carpenter altho told not to use uninsured cars; master liable for both
necessarily exculpate the employer from liability benefits and liabilities of employer]

If what is prohibited is an improper method of carrying out the Morris v Martin [theft of mink coat by servant entrusted with
servant’s authorised duty, it will be within the course of employment cleaning it. Master held liable]

A servant is under a duty to take reasonable steps to protect his Poland v Parr [man thought boy about to steal from his master’s
master’s property in case of emergency wagon and hit on the back of the head, causing boy to fall under
wheels of the wagon and hurt his foot. Held; he was protecting his
Whether servant’s act exceed this implied authorisation is a matter of master’s property thus had implied authorisation. Master thus liable
degree for the battery]

Dyer v Munday [while removing from P’s house furniture he had let
under a hire purchase agreement to a previous lodger, P resisted
and defendant’s servant committed an assault on him. held; he was
acting within scope of his authority]

Warren v Henlys Ltd [Erroneously believing P had tried to drive

away from the garage without paying or surrendering coupons for
petrol which had been put into the tank of his car, a petrol pump
attendant used violent language to him. P paid his bill and gave up
the necessary coupons, and, after calling the police, told the pump
attendant that he would report him to his employers. The pump
attendant then assaulted and injured him. In an action for damages
for personal injury by plaintiff against the employers: Held
defendants were not liable for the wrongful act of their employee,
since that act was one of personal vengeance on the employee’s part
and was not done in the course of his employment, it not being an act
of a class which the employee was authorised to do or a mode of
doing an act within that class]

NEGLIGENCE IN RELATION TO PREMISES / OCCUPIER’S LIABILITY

The obligations of the occupier for damage which occurs on his
premises depend on the character of the entrant i.e. lawful or unlawful
visitors

Lawful visitors cover

- Contractual visitors
- Invitees
- Licencees
- Persons entering as of right

The unlawful visitor is the trespasser

An occupier is the one who is in occupation or control of the premises

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i.e. the one with a right to possession of the premises with a power to
exclude all other persons

Contractual Visitors
A contractual visitor is a person who enters premises in pursuance of a
contract or for a pecuniary consideration e.g. hotel guest, spectator at a
paid event, moviegoer

An occupier warrants that his premises are as safe, for the purposes of Francis v Cockrell [grandstand to watch a steeplechase collapsed
the contract, as reasonable care and skill on the part of anyone can due to negligence of manufacturer. D didn’t know about defect in the
make them construction. Held there’s an implied warranty that due care has
been used to make the premises safe]
Where the occupier could not have discovered the defect, even by the
exercise of reasonable care, there is no liability Maclenan v Segar [fire on 4th floor of hotel; P on 2nd floor, not
knowing where stairs were sought to escape through window and got
Where the use of the premises is only ancillary to the main purpose of hurt; fire due to negligently fixed fire scheme. D should have made
the contract, the liability of the occupier is assimilated to that of his further enquiries from the previous owner as there had been a fire
liability to an invitee before thus liable; P not contributorily negligent]

It is no defence for the occupier to say that the defect was an open Gillmore v London County Council [one-leg-hop-lung; everyone
danger which was obvious to all wearing rubber shoes; P slipped and fell; P hadn’t agreed to this
risk hence no defence of VNFI; found that council’s duty to provide
floor which was reasonably safe hence liable]

Bell v Travco Hotels [P slipped and fell on a driveway leading up to

a hotel where she was a guest; found: no evidence to the contrary
that D had not taken reasonable skill and care to ensure the drive
was safe for its purpose; no unusual danger detected. Falling is an
everyday occurrence, no one need to pay for each fall a person takes
(Goddard LJ)]

Invitees
An invitee is a person who enters the premises for a purpose in which Indermaur v Dames [gas fitter]
the visitor and the occupier have a mutual economic, material or Griffiths v Smith [mother of pupil in the school]
business interest, upon the occupier’s invitation whether implied or Pearson v Coleman Bros [watch circus]
express, and not on a bare permission e.g. a customer in a shop

Elements
- The defendant must be the occupier
- The plaintiff should be on the premises for a purpose which the
occupier has a material interest
- There was an unusual danger known to the defendant
- The danger was unusual with respect to the plaintiff
- Defendant did not warn plaintiff of this unusual danger or take
reasonable care to avert it via notice for example

An occupier must take reasonable care to prevent injury to an invitee Indermaur v Dames [gasfitter falls down an unfenced shaft in D’s
from unusual danger of which he knows or ought to know sugar refinery while inspecting gas fittings which he had installed
days earlier to ensure they were working properly; D had earlier
objected to P working on the premises. Held; shaft should have been
fenced off]

Griffiths v Smith [mother attends exhibition on invitation from son’s

school. Floor collapses. Held that the school should have warned
them. Although the school is liable, the action was statute barred]

Danger is unusual if it is not customary to have such a danger in the Mersey Docks v Procter [boilermaker falls through unchained rails
place where it is found and should be unusual with regard to the and drowns. Held; D’s failure to keep chain up not in breach of duty
particular complainant owed to P’s husband who should not have been near the rails on that
side]
Even if there is unusual danger, the occupier is only liable for those
dangers about which he knows or ought to know

To discharge the duty, the occupier must warn the invitees through Indermaur v Dames
notice or lighting, guarding or otherwise, to prevent injury to them Pearson v Coleman Bros

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The law protects as invitee so long as he keeps within the limits of his Walker v Midland Rail Co [deceased woke up in the middle of the
invitation; if he exceeds his invitation, he may become a trespasser. An night to use toilet. Although well-lit toilets on the floor, chose to go a
invitation may thus be limited to a place and time dark service room, fell down unguarded well of a lift at the end of
the room and died. Held; no negligence on part of innkeeper; duty of
an innkeeper to take proper care for the safety of his guests does not
extend to every room in his house, at all hours of night or day, and
irrespective of whether a guest has a right, or some reasonable
cause for being there]

Mersey Docks v Procter [P’s husband shouldn’t have been near rails
where he drowned]

Persons Entering As of Right

Same as occupier’s duty to invitee

Licensees
A licensee is one who enters the premises by the permission of the
occupier for their own purpose or for a purpose which is not for
business or material in any nature e.g. a social purpose

He may also be on the premises because the occupier chooses to

tolerate him out of grace

A licensee must take premises which he is merely permitted to enter as Mersey Docks v Procter [per Lord Sumner]
he finds it. The duty of the occupier is to warn the licensee of concealed
dangers actually known to him and not known to the licensee or
obvious to him. thus, he must not expose the licensee to a concealed
danger or trap

If the danger is obvious or a reasonable man using reasonable care Fairman v Perpetual Investment Building [sister-in-law of tenant in
would have seen it, the licensee will fail because there is no duty of D’s bldg. caught heel in a depression on the stairs and fell. Held;
care owed him state of staircase not dangerous at time of the accident]

Once permission has been given to people to use the premises, the Lowery v Walker [D’s land had for a long time been used as a
occupier has to warn them of new dangers created by him shortcut to a railway station although he had protested but not
prosecuted. He put in the field a savage horse which attacked P.
held; D is liable for the damages]

If the danger is not known to the occupier, then no duty is owed by him Morgan v Girls’ Friendly Society [man steps through lift shaft when
he enters partially opened lift door]

Trespasser
A trespasser is one who enters the land and has neither the right nor the
permission to be there. His presence is unknown and if known,
practically rejected by the occupier

The law before Addie’s case was that neither the occupier nor his Bird v Holdbrook [chasing stray chicken onto D’s tulip garden,
servants should inflict intentional injuries on a trespasser. Thus the spring gun injured him. held; D liable although P a trespasser
steps taken by the occupier should be reasonable because he had displayed notices warning of the presence of the
guns]
Generally, a trespasser enters premises at his own risk, except where Excelsior Wire Rope Co v Callan [D operated a haulage machinery
deliberate harm is caused to him. If the trespasser’s presence is known, adjoining a playground and to their knowledge children played
the occupier must refrain from doing anything with reckless disregard around the ropes. D’s servants set the rope in motion without
to his presence checking whether there were any children on it when indeed there
was one who consequently got hurt. Held; D owed duty to the girl to
take precautions to ensure that she’s not injured by the dangerous
machine]

The occupier is also not to create new dangers without warning where Mourton v Poulter [D felled a tree on an unfenced piece of land
he has notice of the presence of the trespasser on the land. However to where children were playing; tree fell on the child and injured him.
make the occupier liable, there must be some act done with the held; he should have warned the children thus liable]
deliberate intention of doing harm to the trespasser, or at least some act
done with reckless disregard for the presence of the trespassers

Generally speaking, no duty is owed to the trespasser Addie v Dumbreck [4 yr old crushed to death in the terminal wheel
of a haulage system belonging to a colliery company. Wheel set in

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motion by servants of D in a field which was insufficiently fenced w/o

any measures to avoid accident to persons who frequented the place.
Wheel very attractive to children, and child’s father had warned him
off the area. Held; no liability]

However, a person who by his fault creates a situation of peril must Videan v BTC [2 yr old boy held to be a trespasser but judgment
answer for it to anyone who attempts to rescue, whether or not the was given in favour of the stationmaster as a rescuer of the
victim rescued has a right of action. trespasser]

The duty of common humanity was developed to the effect that, no Herrington v British Railway Board [6 yr old boy playing near a
man has a duty to make his land safe for trespassers but if he has made field close to an electrified railway track trespassed on the land
it dangerous and the danger he has created is not apparent, he may have through a broken fence and was severely injured. Stationmaster had
a duty to warn people who might come there of the danger of doing so earlier been told that children had been seen on the line but the fence
especially where a conscientious humane man with his knowledge, skill was not repaired. Held; defendants negligent in not repairing the
and resources could reasonably have been expected to have done or fence since the emergence of a child trespasser was reasonably
refrained from doing before the accident, something which would have foreseeable]
avoided it.
Ogwo v Taylor [D negligently started a fire which caused his house
This duty however varies according to the occupier’s knowledge, to burn down. While a fireman, P, in standard protective gear was
ability and resources. putting off the fire, he sustained injuries from the steam generated by
pouring water on the fire. He sued, held; anyone who negligently
Elements starts a fire owes a duty to the firemen for any injuries suffered if it
- The occupier must have actual knowledge either of the presence of can be foreseen that firemen will have to attend to put out the fire
the trespasser on the land or facts which make it likely that the notwithstanding exceptional or ordinary risks taken by the fireman]
trespasser will come on to his land in addition to actual knowledge
of facts as to the condition of the land or activities carried on it Pannet v McGuinness & Co [D, contractors engaged in the
which are likely to cause personal injury to the trespasser who is demolition of a warehouse were burning the rubbish inside the
unaware of the danger warehouse. There was a playground next to the warehouse and they
- Knowledge of the risk will be fixed on the occupier if a reasonable knew the burning would attract the kids so appointed 3 servants to
man possessed of the actual knowledge of the occupier would chase them away. They however absented themselves once and the
recognise that likelihood and that risk plaintiff, a 5 yr old boy went into the warehouse, fell into one of the
- The occupier must take reasonable steps to enable the trespasser fires and got hurt. Held; in view of the extreme likelihood of children
avoid danger entering the premises and the danger presented to them by the fires,
- The degree of likelihood to give rise to the duty is as would impel common sense and common humanity imposed on the defendants the
a man of ordinary humane feelings to take some steps to mitigate duty to take all reasonable steps for the safety of children who might
the risk of injury to the trespasser which the particular danger trespass on the site]
exposes him to

Test of Common Humanity

- Knowledge of the occupier
- Ability of the occupier
- Resources of the occupier

NEGLIGENCE IN RELATION TO CHATTELS / PRODUCTS LIABILITY

Initially, the law was concerned with negligence in relation to chattels Dixon v Bell [loaded gun to servant]
dangerous in themselves
Langridge v Levy [P’s hands shattered by the bursting of a gun
which his father bought for his use based on a false and fraudulent
representation that it was safe. Held party guilty of fraud liable]

Heaven v Pender [duty to take care in respect of dangers of which

the defendant ought to be aware]

Dominion Natural Gas [gas explosion negligently installed]

There is a duty on those who distribute articles which are dangerous in

themselves to take the necessary precaution; the duty is owed to the
immediate transferee as well as to any person into whose hands the
article falls, provided that due notice is not given

Where a thing isn’t dangerous per se, a duty of care will be owed in the
event of injury where
- there’s a contractual relationship between the seller and the user of
the article,
- the defect is known to the seller and he doesn’t disclose it to the
purchaser
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here, duty to immediate transferee only

A manufacturer of products which he sells in such a form as to show Donoghue v Stevenson [snail in ginger beer bought by P’s friend
that he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in from a vendor for P]
which they left him with no reasonable possibility of intermediate
examination and with the knowledge that the absence of reasonable
care in the preparation or putting up of the products will result in an
injury to the consumer’s life or property, owes a duty to the consumer
to take that reasonable care

Manufacturer includes producers, repairers, masons, assemblers, and Brown v Cotterill [tombstone fell on P who was lawfully in
suppliers of articles provided the suppliers do some work on the article churchyard. Held; mason is a manufacturer]
supplied

Product means anything capable of causing damage including things Grant v Australian Knitting Mills [dermatitis causing underwear
taken internally, externally or merely for other use e.g. vehicles, which contained excess sulphite]
buildings

With respect to sale, it doesn’t matter whether the product is bought or Hawkins v Couldson & Purley UDC [defective steps plus insufficient
a free sample so long as injury results. Covers driver giving a friend a lighting; statement of the law]
lift, hospital treating a person gratuitously

The ultimate consumer covers any user whether known or unknown to Stennet v Hancock [a bystander injured by flange of a lorry’s wheel
the manufacturer and it covers anyone foreseeably harmed by the fixed negligently by a garage owner]
‘defective’ product

Iro of no possibility of intermediate inspection, the issue should be Dransfield v British Insulated Cables [P’s husband killed by the
whether the manufacturer contemplated that any defect in the goods breaking of a bull-ring (wheel) when knocked from a wagon. Held;
would remain there at the time of their use by the plaintiff, despite their although manufacturer negligent, there was reasonable possibility of
passing through many intermediaries. intermediate examination by P’s employer which could have
disclosed the defect in the ring]
If the plaintiff knows of the defect and still uses the chattel, then this
may affect the liability of the manufacturer. Manufacturer may not be Aswan v Lupdine [using a biro pen to open a milk tin]
completely exculpated but plaintiff might be held to be contributorily
negligent.

If the manufacturer gives a warning or instructions relating to use of the

product [e.g. test before use], it’s sufficient discharge of the duty

If the consumer uses the product in an unfashionable way, the

manufacturer will not be liable

Burden of proof iro want of reasonable care lay on the plaintiff thus no Grant v Australian Knitting Mills
room to rely on res ipsa loquitur
Aboagye v KBL [palm-nut in beer, KBL held liable for damages, res
In Ghana, res ipsa loquitur would apply to create a presumption of ipsa]
negligence in appropriate circumstances
Acheampong v Overseas Breweries Ltd [kerosene in Club beer,
held; negligence on part of manufacturer, res ipsa]

Daniels & Daniels v White [carbolic acid in lemonade. Action

dismissed because method of filling and cleaning bottles fool proof]

Preparation or putting up – it covers not only negligence in the Watson v Buckley [D1 dyes P’s hair with pdt manufactured by D3
manufacture of the product but defects in its design, container, and distributed by D2. Pdt was intended to contain a 4% solution of
labelling, packaging, etc acid, to be diluted to a 2 per cent solution before application. D2
advertised the pdt as absolutely safe and harmless, needing no
preliminary test before use. D1 showed ads to P and told him she
had not tested the pdt and had had no experience of it. P, upon whom
no preliminary test was made, decided to try it, D1, applied it in
accordance with D2’s directions. In fact lotion was a 10% solution
instead of a 4% solution, thus P contracted dermatitis. The solution
had not been examined by D2 before they passed it on to D1. D2
had, in the course of their negotiations with D3, been informed that
the solution should not be more than a 4 per cent solution but took
no precautions to make strict conformity with this requirement a

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term of their contract, nor did they at any time test the solution
supplied. P sued D1 in contract and D2 for negligence. Held (1) the
hairdresser was liable in contract, as, by using the product, she had
impliedly warranted that it was a merchantable hair dye; (2) D2
liable, as they’ve been negligent, and by their ads had intentionally
excluded interference with, or examination of, the article by the
consumer and hence had brought themselves into direct relationship
with him; (3) the product was itself a dangerous one, even if only the
proper percentage of acid had been present, and hence an unusual
standard of care was required, and D2, on this further ground, owed
a duty to take care towards plaintiff, and were in breach of that duty]

Andrews v Hopkinson [D was a dealer in second-hand cars, his

sales manager showed P a car which D had had for about a week.
The manager said: ‘It’s a good little bus. I would stake my life on it.
You will have no trouble with it’. P bought it on hire purchase
through a finance company. P got into an accident and was seriously
injured. The accident was due to a defect in the steering mechanism
of the car. The defective condition, although probably not
discoverable by an ordinary owner-driver, could have been easily
discovered by any competent mechanic. Any motor dealer should
had the car checked. Held (1) the words used by defendant’s sales
manager amounted to a warranty that the car was in good condition
thus P could enforce the warranty although he was not a purchaser
from defendant; (2) damages recoverable for both the difference
between the value of the car as warranted and its value as delivered,
damages for P’s injuries; (3) D also liable in damages to P for
negligence in delivering to P for use a car which was in a dangerous
condition when the defect could have been discovered by reasonable
diligence on D’s part and he had failed either to have the car
examined or to warn plaintiff that it had not been examined]

Life or property now covers economic loss Murphy v Brentwood District Council [D negligently approved plans
for a building. P bought it and it developed cracks which were too
expensive to fix so he sold the house less the damage. He sued the
local authority for negligence and claimed the loss. Held allowing
D’s appeal; the principle in Donoghue v Stevenson extended only to
latent defects; thus, where a defect was discovered before any injury
to person or health or damage to property other than the defective
house itself had been done, the expense incurred by a subsequent
purchaser of the house in putting the defect right was pure economic
loss; hence to hold that a local authority, in supervising compliance
with the building regulations or byelaws, was under a common law
duty to take reasonable care to avoid putting a purchaser of a house
in a position in which he would be obliged to incur such economic
loss was an extension of principle that should not, as a matter of
policy, be affirmed]

LIABILITY FOR MISSTATEMENTS

It arises in 3 main ways – deceit, negligent misstatements and
defamation

Deceit
The tort of deceit is committed when one makes a fraudulent
misrepresentation to another who acts upon it to his detriment. To
succeed in deceit, the plaintiff must be able to establish fraud in the
maker of the statement

Fraud is a false representation which is made without belief in its truth Derry v Peek
or recklessly, careless whether it be true or false

There must be a representation of fact which is made with an intention

that it be relied upon and the plaintiff must actually have relied upon
the statement

Silence gives no cause of action but where a person is under an Carter v Boehm

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obligation to speak and he deliberately refuses, he is guilty of fraud With v O’Flanagan

Where the statement is made to a limited class, there is no liability to Peek v Gurney
those outside the class

A careless statement which is not dishonest will not found an action in Arthur v Basil
tort Le Lievre v Gould

Elements
- D must make a fraudulent representation which he either knows is
false or is made recklessly
- D must intend that P acts on the representation
- P must suffer damage as a result of reliance on the representation

Fraudulent rep

- A statement of future intention is actionable if at the time of West London Commercial Bank v Kitson [directors of a company
making it D didn’t have that intention and there is sufficient accepted cheques on behalf of the company when the company had
factual content in the representation no power to accept cheques by statute. They used the cheque to pay
their debt and the debtor made to withdraw it from P. held; D were
- There is liability for stating half-truths, ambiguities and actions liable as by their accepted they had represented that the y had the
taken to conceal the truth authority to accept on behalf of the company which was a false
representation as a matter of fact and not of law thus liable]
- Where events subsequent to making a statement make it no longer
true, or where a statement is made and its falsity is later Smith v Land & Housing Property
discovered but not corrected, a person is liable

- Where a servant commits deceit in the course of his employment, Schneider v Heath [D sold ship to P which had been described as
his master is vicariously liable good as when launched. P paid a deposit and had the ship examined.
Turned out that the bottom was worm eaten and the seller had
intentionally kept the ship afloat so no one would detect it. In an
action to recover the down payment, held; the representation was
fraudulent which vitiated the contract]

Curtis v Chemical Dyeing

Representation need not be made to the plaintiff but where it’s made to Langridge v Levy [father bought the gun but boy got hurt and was
a limited class of people, there is no liability to those outside the class the plaintiff]

The plaintiff must rely on the statement i.e. it must be proved that the Smith v Chadwick [false rep about a VIP being on the board didn’t
representation was at least one of the reasons for the plaintiff acting as influence P to buy shares in the company]
he did

P must suffer damage. Typically a claim in deceit is for pecuniary or Smith v Chadwick
economic loss but personal injury and property damage are recoverable
Kusi v Kusi [P gave loan to D secured by farms and an uncompleted
house which turned out to be family property. Family sued P and set
aside sale of the property when he exercised his right of sale due to
default. P sued D for damages for deceit. Held; D liable]

Remedy in action for deceit is damages Dolby v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd

Liability for Negligent Misstatements

At first, the principle was that anyone who negligently made a false Candler v Crane Christmas [accountants negligently prepare
statement is not liable to one who relies on it to his detriment and accounts which P relies on to make an investment in a company
suffers damage thereby, except where there is a contractual or fiduciary which subsequently goes into liquidation. Held; although negligent,
relationship or fraud no duty of care between the parties, also pecuniary loss alone not
sufficient to support a claim in negligence]

Nocton v Ashburton [reliance on advise of solicitor with respect to

mortgages]

Appenteng v BWA [shareholders sued Bank of WA for negligent

financial advice given to their company for which it suffered
damages being commission paid to the bank, and other sums leading

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to it being wound up. Held; shareholders cannot sue in respect of a

wrong done to the company, unless the wrong is against the
individual rights of the shareholders as distinct from the corporate
rights of the company; pecuniary loss alone is not sufficient to
support a claim in negligence; there must be physical personal
damage or damage to property]

Reasons for not recognising duty

- Statement may be made without an intention that it be relied on
- Loss might be considered remote as liability is based on reliance
on the statement and not the statement itself
- Fear of excessive liability as D may be held liable for all the
foreseeable loss arising from a negligent statement

A duty of care in making non-negligent statements will be imposed Hedly Byrne v Heller & Partners [creditworthiness of Easipower
whenever a special relationship exists between the parties and Ltd, disclaimer by bank, no liability]
responsibility is not disclaimed by the maker of the statement
Anderson v Rhodes [P and D1 were wholesalers in a vegetable mkt.
There must be close proximity between the maker and the recipient of sometimes D1 acted as commission agent for other buyers. Payment
the advice was usually after delivery. As a result of D1’s accounts not being up
- There must be knowledge for the purpose for which the info is to date, they didn’t realise a client for whom D2 (salesman) had
required placed an order with P was in arrears. D2 represented to P that the
- The adviser must know the statement will be communicated to the client was creditworthy. They took delivery of the potatoes and sold
advisee in order that it will be used for that purpose to P but were unable to pay for them having become insolvent. Held;
- It is known that the advisee will act on the advice for that purpose representation not made fraudulently thus D not liable]
without further enquiry
- It is acted upon by the advisee for the purpose to his detriment
- The duty will also arise if the adviser gains financially from
reliance by the advisee on the advice

DEFAMATION
Legal protection for a person’s reputation is governed by two regimes
in Ghana – customary law and the received English common law in
addition to the 1992 Constitution

The applicable law of two persons in a torts dispute in Ghana shall be S54, Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459)
their personal laws.

Personal law = system of customary law a person is subject. In the

absence of one, the personal law shall be the common law

Customary law Common law

- The scope of defamation protects reputation and injured feelings - It protects only reputation
- There is no distinction between libel and slander - Libel refers to written defamation while slander, oral
- Slander at customary law is actionable without proof of special - Slander is only actionable upon proof of special damages
damages - Truth is a solid defence at common law
- Truth isn’t always a defence

At customary law, defamation protects both reputation and injured Wankyiwaa v Wereduwaa [“your vagina stinks”, trial court ruled
feelings. that since the words were used during a quarrel and were mere
vituperations, action dismissed. On appeal, held; abuse by itself is a
Slander under customary law is actionable without proof of special wrong redressible by damages according to customary law, that the
damage provided it is false words are spoken in the heat of a quarrel may be considered as a
mitigating factor but it doesn’t negative liability. if words meant P
The essence of bringing an action for slander under customary law is to habitually unclean, it will be a reflection on her character and
clear the plaintiff's good name and not merely to make money. In slanderous thus actionable without proof of any special damage]
former times the guilty person among other things was compelled to
recant his base falsehood, and to confess his disgraceful behaviour. Ampong v Aboraa [P was candidate for Akropong stool, D referred
to him as ‘slave’ and ‘beast’. Held; ‘slave’ by itself constitutes
slander at customary law and required no further specific pleading]

Afriyie v Dansowah [D called P a witch who killed someone and

took over her stall at Takoradi mkt, held; Customary Law gives full
recognition to all claims for damages for insulting words or
language used verbally against any person, judgment for plaintiff]

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Afful v Okyere [P called a witch, responsible for death of D1’s two

kids, D2 beating pan and calling her a witch to the hearing of all.
Held; per customary law, slander actionable without proof of special
damages]

Constitutionalisation of defamation law with a purpose to preserve the

balance between right to free speech and individual’s right to protect
his reputation
- Freedom of speech Art. 21(1)(a)

- Freedom and independence of media Art. 162 (1 – 5)

- No censorship in Ghana
- No impediment in the establishment of private press; also no
licence requirement
- Editors and publishers of newspapers to not be subject to control
and interference by gov’t
- Agencies of mass media to uphold constitution and ensure
responsibility and accountability of gov’t

- Right to rejoinder Art. 162(6)

- Publications subject to laws in respect of national security, public Art. 164
order, etc

- Protection of privacy iro home, property, correspondence and Art. 18(2)

communication

Libel developed in the court of star chamber and used to refer to both Anthony v UCC [‘traditional hairdo’ at the back of postcard from
written and oral defamation. Now = defamation conveyed by writing, picture taken by Catholic Standard at a charitable event, libelled by
signs, pictures and other means which confer some kind of permanence innuendo that she was a married woman of weak morals who
on statements. Libel is actionable without proof of special damages consented to the publication and thrived on publications from cheap
ads. Held; photograph capable of having the meaning ascribed to it
Libel conveys the impression of deliberate calculation to injure by P, immaterial whether D knew of the external facts which turned
reputation. When the imputation is written, permanent and visible to a presumptively innocent publication into a defamatory one,
the eye, it amounts to libel. Although generally in writing, the unlawful invasion of the privacy, judgment for P]
defamatory matter may be conveyed in some other permanent form of
statute, caricature, effigy, chalk marks on a wall, signs or pictures. Monsoon v Tussauds [wax figure of an alleged murderer who was
not convicted placed in the chamber of horrors; held to be libellous]
Reading aloud from a written material is libel
Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures Ltd [Rasputin movie]

Forrester v Tyrrel [D received anonymous letter while at a meeting

of a lodge where both P and D were members. He caused the letter
to be read to the members present after he had read it himself. Held;
reading was publication of the libel]

Medlum v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [held; reading from

a script amounted to slander only]

At common law, slander is neither actionable per se as a tort or a

criminal offence. It’s born out of sudden irritability
Elements of Defamation
1. The communication should be capable of a defamatory meaning
a. A publication without justification or lawful excuse Parmiter v Couplands [late mayor imputed to be corrupt and
calculated to injure the reputation of another by ignorant of his duties]
exposing him to hatred, ridicule or contempt Berkoff v Burchill [Ogre]
b. Publication which renders P ridiculous or tends to hinder Youssoupouff v MGM Pictures [she’ll be shunned]
mankind from associating or having intercourse with Villers v Monsley [stinker]
him Tournier v Nat’l Provincial Bank [cheque, third party, bookmaker]
c. Words used which damage a person in his profession, Jones v Jones [
business, office or trade Sim v Stretch [housemaid telegram]
d. The words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation f Cassidy v Daily Mirror Newspaper [engagement announcement of
right-thinking members of the society generally married man]
2. Interpretation of the words to determine whether they are in fact Anthony v UCC [publication of picture]
defamatory. Grubb v Bristol Utd Press [rector charging money for wedding bells]
a. True and false innuendo Lewis v Daily Express [Fraud Squad investigations of a company]
3. The defamatory matter must be in reference to the plaintiff Hough v London Express [photo of boxer and his curly-headed wife]
4. The defamatory matter must be published since without Knupfer v London Express [association of political refugees]
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publication a person’s reputation suffers nothing. Immaterial that Le Fanu v Malcolmson [cruelty in P’s factory]
the writer did not intend to refer to the plaintiff Browne v DC Thomson & Co [RC authorities’ order iro dismissal of
protestant shop assistants]
Newstead v London Express [Camberwell man. Barman not
hairdresser]
Bonsu v Forson [‘thief’, ‘hopeless lawyer’, ‘hopeless MP’]

1a. A defamatory matter is one which is a false publication, published Parmiter v Couplands [late mayor imputed to be corrupt and
without justification or lawful excuse calculated to injure the reputation ignorant of his duties]
of another by subjecting his reputation to hatred, ridicule or contempt
Berkoff v Burchill [P described as hideously ugly. Exposure to
ridicule]

1b. A defamatory matter must cause others to shun the plaintiff’s Youssoupoff v MGM Pictures Ltd [Russian princess alleged the film
company or bring the plaintiff into disfavour Rasputin made by D suggested she’d been raped or seduced by a
monk. Held; D liable as defamatory to say of woman that she’s been
ravished as she may be shunned and avoided although it involved no
moral turpitude on her part]

Villers v Monsley [P said to stink of brimstone and he had the itch.

He’d be shunned]

1c. A defamatory matter must adversely affect the plaintiff in office, Tournier v Nat’l Provincial Bank [cheque indorsed and given to
profession or trade third party described as bookmaker]

However if uttered in the heat of quarrel, it’s not defamatory Jones v Jones

Bonsu v Forson [‘thief’, ‘hopeless lawyer if not for O, no clients’,

‘hopeless MP’. Held; although words capable of being defamatory,
spoken in the heat of a quarrel thus no defamation]

1d. The published words should be capable of lowering a person in the Sim v Stretch [P’s housemaid enticed away, telegram asking for her
estimation of right thinking members of the society generally possession, money borrowed from her and her wages. Action failed
as words not capable of defamatory meaning]

Cassidy v Daily Mirror Newspaper [photograph of a married man

and a lady published imputing that they had just announced their
engagement. Wife brought action for libel pleading innuendo. Held;
photograph could be defamatory]

Anthony v UCC [married woman of weak morals]

2. interpretation Grubb v Bristol Utd Press [D published that P, a rector of a parish,

charged money for wedding bells. P pled innuendo. Held; the words
The words must be construed in their fair and natural meaning as bore the interpretation imputed to them thus defamatory in their
reasonable, ordinary people will understand it except where innuendo is ordinary meaning, innuendo claim fails]
pleaded. The words must be interpreted in context. P cannot select out
of a passage which, read as a whole, is not defamatory. Lewis v Daily Express [D published Fraud Squad investigations of a
company of which P chairman. Words defamatory in ordinary
An innuendo is a defamatory imputation whereby extrinsic facts, meaning, innuendo claim failed]
known to the reader or listener, import into the words spoken or the
statement some secondary meaning, in addition to or alteration of their Hough v London Express [photo of boxer and his curly-headed wife
ordinary meaning. was published. His wife proper brought action with witnesses who
claimed they read the statement to mean P wasn’t his wife. Held,
Hence if the words bear the meaning imputed to them, they are people who possessed special facts understood words in a
defamatory in their ordinary meaning defamatory sense, judgment for P]

If part of an article is pled as being libellous, another part of it may not

be used as the sole support for an innuendo

3. Reference Knupfer v London Express [article about an association of political

There must be something in the defamatory statement pointing to the refugees. Held; could have been defamatory if written about a named
plaintiff. individual but as written about a class, P’s failed to show that they
were pointed at him as an individual]
This doesn’t mean the plaintiff must be specifically mentioned by
name, there need be only evidence connecting the plaintiff to the Le Fanu v Malcolmson [article alleging cruelty in P’s factory. Held;
statement a person can, by innuendo, show that defamatory matter referred to
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him n thus can maintain an action. P’s name need not be specifically
Where the defamatory matter is iro a class of people, applicant isn’t mentioned]
entitled to damages if he doesn’t show that they were pointed at him as
an individual Browne v DC Thomson & Co [article alleging that RC authorities
had ordered that protestant shop assistants should be dismissed.
Even where defamatory statement referring to a class of people, a Only 7 persons carried religious authority on behalf of the Roman
person can, by innuendo show that it referred to him and maintain an Catholic Church and they sued for libel. Held; possible for
action in defamation individuals in a group of people to show that they had been
damnified]
It’s immaterial whether the writer didn’t intend to refer to the plaintiff.
What’s important is what the people around the area think of the words Newstead v London Express [publication of a court trial for bigamy
of a Harold Newstead, a 30 yrs old Camberwell man. Statement was
NB: size of class, generality of charge, extravagance of accusation true of a barman but P, a hairdresser, fit the description. Held; no
defence that the words were intended to refer to another person]

4. Publication Pullman v Hill [letter

Unless defamatory matter published, a person’s reputation suffers
nothing. Publication means making known the defamatory matter, after
it’s been written or spoken, to some person other than the person of
whom it’s written or said. It needn’t be to a large audience

Per Anin J in Dumgya v Sports Council of Ghana - the maxim res ipsa loquitur comes into operation (i) on proof of the
happening of the unexplained occurrence; (ii) when the occurrence is one which would not have happened in the ordinary
course of things without negligence [p.175] on the part of somebody other than the plaintiff; and (iii) the circumstances point
to the negligence in question being that of the defendant rather than that of any other person.”

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