F- this is the study of how one should life

L
study of morality

Morality is how one should live

studying ethics allows you to communicate with others about

ethical issues

two approaches to ethics

1. Theory - Led C. normative ethics )

2. Circumstances led ( applied ethics)

1. An ethical theory usually involves a set of principles that

are meant to apply universally to anyone and what

they should do in general

[apply theory to see what we should do]
[ e. 9 . Utilitarian theory ]
Pick the most reasonable and one that makes
the most sense → most justified ,
has the
most explanatory power

2. 5W Who ,
What ,
Where , when why
,

pays attention to the aspects of a

given
scenario that are morally relevant
pay attention to causes and conditions
of scenario
 /

In ethics we care about the reasons behind

why he should do it and whether these
reasons themselves are good or bad

civics →
study of how one should live as a citizen
It is the study of our rights and
duties to the state and to each other as
citizens of a state in relation to
which we

draw benefits and Protection

Learning how to communicate with others about civic issues

what sort of state is in question in addition to how citizens

relate to it and each other

ethics and civics is about an (exchange of reasons Deny or

negate the reasons that someone has for their belief

to show that their beliefs are rationally unsupported and
their position is unreasonable → no reason to believe what
they
believe
normative claim -
what we
ought to / should do

descriptive claim -
a particular state of affair

morally relevant reason is a kind of reason that is

'

relevant for claims

supporting normative
When providing supporting reasons :

ensure that others understand how you rationally arrive at a

certain position

-
Have in mind a fellow student who is unfamiliar with the content

when presenting

-
Never assume that they should make argumentative connections
themselves

provide an
argument for your belief with as much or as little
contextual info as required by situation

aim of discussion rationally

The is either
convincing the other

of your position or
clarifying where the fundamental disagreements
lie

TO ensure others understand our reasons

Concepts allow a common ground for discussion ,

to be
more precise and accurate in saying something

Concepts are only imp when they serve the purpose of

supporting beliefs in of
rationally your an
exchange reasons

Concepts are understood in terms of their conditions

Good reason is conceptually clear

Conditions are the elements by which we define and understand concepts

precisely and accurately

sufficiency ( enough) ( if )
'
↳ '
if then or
'
is sufficient for
'
or when
p q p q we represent
it with the logical notation for conditionals :
p→q

Necessity lneedsl ( only if

↳ unlike sufficient conditions there cannot be
any other

conditions for X or S to obtain not

'
Ep
' ' '

only if P ,
then q ,
or p is necessary for q → -

q=q→p

General relationship between necessary and sufficient

when P is a sufficient condition for q , q is a
necessary
condition for p [ only if q ,
P ]

Causal Condition
Constitutive Condition

Biconditional ( it and only if ) conditions go both ways

Regression analysis
[ Establish a conditional relation between dependent variable and
independent Variable

Actions Of a person depend on the conditions under which

they had
to act
By defining the concepts clearly and by providing the necessary and
sufficient conditions our reasons can be clearly understood by others

when providing reasons the structure of your argument should be

explicit cannot just list

Logical structure

Logic -

logical -
Valid

when our beliefs are rationally supported by our reasons , we have a

cogent argument for them

A cogent argument is where reasons are related to each other in

a
logical structure to
garuntee the truth of the conclusion

cogent argument

soundness Premises are true

relations between conclusion conform

premises to a valid structure

Elements of an argument
-
true / false sentences ( in text / speech) A Proposition is a sentence that
-

propositions (in argument form) → aims to discrete

represent a

Logical form ( in formal logic ) state of affairs in the world

-

states of affair / in the world ] ↓

can be true or false
An
argument is a way of
lending support for a particular conclusion

by reasoning from other claims

Formal logic :
a method of
argument Using deduction
i
Argument moves from premises to conclusion

Argument is
logically valid when conclusion logically follows from the premises

Logical necessity : an argument is valid if the conclusion necessarily follows

from the premises

Implied premises : premises that are not stated explicitly

Pro's and Con's presentation of reasons is never an argument
<
no sense of logical relation of the reasons to each other

zero support for any claim / position

input premise can be true but output a false conclusion

missing the point fallacy

L term is understood inaccurately
[ there is a confusion or equivocation

start clearly with a definition ,

give the necessary and sufficient
conditions

Cogency means your arguments should informal fallacy → a type of

-
involve true premises incorrect argument in natural
-
have a valid logical structure language
-

not commit any informal fallacies

criticising an argument
-

Verify that the reasons are false

-

Find that reasons relate to each other in an invalid logical structure

-

There is an informal fallacy

Types of criticisms
-

External criticism CHOW a certain standard is not met )

↳ why would a concept argument be problematic?

-

Internal Criticism ( How claims made / actions performed aÑ

law
contradictory ) → violate law logical of

and time) non contradiction

both A
-

C Cannot be A- at the same

criticisms must themselves meet the standards of cogency if they are

to be convincing

TWO types of reason

Individual reason : A reason that makes reference to properties of s

as sufficient conditions
↳ why is s certain way ?
a
I
structural reason : A reason that makes reference to s's position in
a structure as sufficient conditions

when we ask is the action good or bad ? we need to

-
fix the necessary and sufficient conditions of what a
morally
good / bad action is

Ask whether the properties of the action satisfy these conditions

-

Do general properties of agents qualify as necessary and sufficient

conditions for the agents themselves to be morally good or bad ?

Structure must have all 3

-
A structure has mints that are
[ systematic relation
systematically related to each other

according to principles particular to that structure (e. g. argument ,

market , atom)

Neither type of reason are more reasonable than the other it depends
on the nature of
inquiry and the type of reason required in

an inquiry
reasons can interact and be mutually supportive
Lor need not interact and be not mutual
paying attention to the various types of reasons
-

Helps to answer questions precisely and clearly

-

Helps to understand and appreciate the various possible approaches

Meta -
Ethics : asks questions about the nature and existence of value

and our
knowledge of it

Normative -
Ethics : asks questions about what we should do and how we

should live

Applied ethics : asks questions about specific moral problems

Entitlements : to be free to do something ,

to exercise a power , to

be provided with some benefit

Duties : to refrain from interfering with others freedom ,

to refrain from interfering with others ability to exercise a

power ,
to provide others with some benefit

Legal rights : described in the laws of a country 's legal Jurisdiction , gov
has power to create
,
interpret and enforce the laws,

subject to the laws of specific countries which vary

from place to place and time to time

Rights to healthcare

women's rights to vote

 FUN Human rights
Human rights : Rights we have simply because we exist as human
beings , legal , moral and universal , define and protect
fundamental freedoms and entitlements for all humans

Legal rights : that exists because of a

legal statute or some
other
gov action
,
new legal rights may be
introduced over time
, people in diff jurisdictions
may have diff legal rights

Moral rights :
may exist without being the legal right
[ morality critical Morality , Conventional
, Morality

dignity
'

Respect
'

for the inherent of all humans and equality

L embodied does
by UDHR
/
not enact any legal rights
Lnot a law by itself , asserts a nun of moral rights
[
Proclaims that they should be respected in all nations

Legal =/ right
International human rights treaties

Avoid discrimination
improve the quality of human

beings
set the standard for indiv to be

treated equally

framework for to
gov protect
and promote human rights

Not international law

countries apply some rights and ignore others

-
freedom of religion or worship
-

right to education

right to vote
-

right to basic healthcare

why some rights not Protected and enforced

-
political context ,
limited resources ,
cultural diff
 Diff forms of human
trafficing
-
child abduction

human cage
-

-
forced prostitution , labour ,
marriage child beggar
,

selling baby
-

Organ theft
-

traffic boat
ing
-
Threats of human traffic
ing
-

criminal : use of force ,

coercion , fraud , exploitation
National Security : terrorism ,drugs border security , armed / political conflict
-

Human / social aspects physical / mental

: health consequences
Human rights : prosecution , legislation , advocacy
-

Protection ,

← Impact of pandemic

↓
Human dignity - Kant

commitment to impartiality i everyone deserves equal respect

discrimination fails to respect persons as ends

The principle of humanity prohibits treating someone as mere means : to use them in a way that they could

not rationally consent to

being used
[
deception ,
coercion , exploitation ,
Violations of privacy

highest good that humans can attain

/
Human flourishing -
Eudaimonia ( Aristotle ) [ as intrinsically good ]
A good life can be attained by practising virtues like courage , wisdom , good humour
,
moderation
 THINK

AGAIN
By David A. Feingold

HUMAN
TRAFFICKING
Judging by news headlines, human trafficking is a recent ph

fact, the coerced movement of people across borders is as o

of supply and demand. What is new is the volume of the tr
realization that we have done little to stem the tide. We mus

our raw emotions if we are ever to stop those who trade in h

"Most Victims Are Trafficked into

the Sex Industry"

No. Trafficking of women and children (and, more

International Labour Organization (ILO) found that,
of and
rarely, young men) for prostitution is a vile the estimated 9.5 million victims of forced labor in
Asia, less than 10 percent are trafficked for commer-
heinous violation of human rights, but labor traffick-
ing is probably more widespread. Evidence can
cial be
sexual exploitation. Worldwide, less than half of
found in field studies of trafficking victims across
allthe
trafficking victims are part of the sex trade, accord-
world and in the simple fact that the worldwideing
mar-
to the same report.
Labor trafficking, however, is hardly benign. A
ket for labor is far greater than that for sex. Statistics
on the "end use" of trafficked people are often study
unre- of Burmese domestic workers in Thailand by
Mahidol University's Institute for Population and Social
liable because they tend to overrepresent the sex trade.
For example, men are excluded from the trafficking Research found beatings, sexual assault, forced labor
statistics gathered in Thailand because, according to pay, sleep deprivation, and rape to be common.
without
its national law, men cannot qualify as traffickingAnother
vic- study, by the German Agency for Technical
tims. However, a detailed 2005 study byCooperation the (GTZ), looked at East African girls traf-
ficked to the Middle East and found that most were
bound
David A. Feingold is director of the Ophidian Research Institute for oppressive domestic work, and often raped
and
and international coordinator for HIVIAIDS and Trafficking beaten
Pro- along the way. Boys from Cambodia and
jects for UNESCO Bangkok. This article reflects his ownBurma
views, are also frequently trafficked onto deep-sea
and not necessarily those of UNESCO. commercial fishing boats, some of which stay at sea for

26 FOREIGN POLICY

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 up to two years. Preliminary research suggests 10 per- such gangs could operate in an area bereft of roads and
cent of these young crews never return, and boys that airstrips remains unclear, but that did not stop some U.S.
become ill are frequently thrown overboard. organizations from appealing for funds to send "trained
The focus on the sex industry may galvanize action investigators" to track down the criminals. Although the
through moral outrage, but it can also cloud reason. A devastation wrought by the tsunami certainly rendered
recent example is the unsubstantiated press reports that people vulnerable-mostly through economic disrup-
tsunami orphans in Indonesia's Aceh province were tion-investigations by the United Nations have yet to
being abducted by organized gangs of traffickers. How identify a single confirmed case of sex trafficking.

"Tightening Borders Will Stop Trafficking"

more vulnerable. For example, Burmese law preclud

Wrong. The trafficking issue is often used-some
would say hijacked-to support policies limiting
women under the age of 26 from visiting border ar
immigration. In fact, the recent global tightening
unless of
accompanied by a husband or parent. Althou
asylum admissions has increased trafficking by officials say the law demonstrates the govern
Burmese
0
forcing many desperate people to turn to smug-
o

o ment's concern with the issue, many women believ

glers. In southeast Europe, a GTZ study found that
o
o
r
a_
only increases the cost of travel (particularly from brib
more stringent border controls have led to an
seeking police) and decreases their safety by maki
-j

cr

rr increase in trafficking, as people turned to third

thempar-
dependent on "facilitators" to move them acr
ties to smuggle them out of the country. the border. These women incur greater debt for their p
z
D
LL

sage,
Similarly, other legal efforts to protect women thus making them even more vulnerable
from
0

rz

exploitation
trafficking have had the perverse effect of making them along the way.

SEPTEMBER I OCTOBER 2005 27

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 Think Again

"Trafficking Is a Big Business Controlled

by Organized Crime"
False. Trafficking is big business, but in many about 50 percent of the women and girls smuggled
regions of the world, such as Southeast Asia, traf- into Thailand from Burma, China, and Laos to
ficking involves mostly "disorganized crime": indi- work in brothels. There were also other networks,
viduals or small groups linked on an ad hoc basis. such as the Kabuankarn Loy Fah ("Floating in the
There is no standard profile of traffickers. They Sky") network that specialized in girls for restaurants
range from truck drivers and village "aunties" to and karaoke bars. However, these networks have
labor brokers and police officers. Traffickers are as since faded in importance, owing to changes in the
varied as the circumstances of their victims. structure of the sex industry.
The worldwide trade in persons has been esti-
Although some trafficking victims are literally kid-
napped, most leave their homes voluntarily and by the United Nations Office on Drugs and
mated
become trafficked on their journey. Crime at $7 billion annually, and by the United
Nations
Trafficking "kingpins," along the lines of the Children's Fund at $10 billion-but, of
course, no one really knows. The ILO estimates the
late cocaine boss Pablo Escobar, are rare. Japanese
mafia, or yakuza, do control many of the venuestotalinillicit profits produced by trafficked forced
Japan where trafficked girls end up, but they laborers
are in one year to be just short of $32 billion.
more likely to purchase people than transportAlthough
them. that is hardly an insignificant amount, it is
a small
Doing research in Thailand in 1997, I located the Luk business compared to the more than $320 bil-
Moo ("Piglet") network, which was responsible lion international trade in illicit drugs.
for

"Legalizing Prostitution Will

Increase Trafficking"

It depends on how it's done. The inter-

Moreover, some efforts to prohibit prostitution
section of the highly emotive issues of sex work have increased
and sex workers' risk to the dangers of
human trafficking generates a lot more heat than trafficking,
light. though largely because lawmakers neg-
Some antitrafficking activists equate "prostitution" lected to consult the people the laws were designed
with trafficking and vice versa, despite evidence to to
protect.
the Sweden, for example, is much praised by
contrary. The U.S. government leaves no doubt antiprostitution
as to activists for a 1998 law that aimed
where it stands: According to the State Depart- to protect sex workers by criminalizing their cus-
ment Web site, "Where prostitution is legalized tomers.orBut several independent studies, including
tolerated, there is a greater demand for human one traf-
conducted by the Swedish police, showed that
ficking victims and nearly always an increase in prostitutes to more dangerous clients and
it exposed
the number of women and children trafficked into less safe-sex practices.
commercial sex slavery." By this logic, the state of Others argue that giving sex workers a measure
Nevada should be awash in foreign sex slaves, lead- of legitimacy short of legalization would actually
ing one to wonder what steps the Justice Department discourage trafficking. In Thailand, many opposed to
is taking to free them. Oddly, the Netherlands, the commercial sex industry support extending labor
Australia, and Germany-all of whom have legal- and social security laws to sex workers. Such a move
ized prostitution-received top marks from the could hamper trafficking by opening establishments
Bush administration in the most recent Trafficking to inspection, allowing labor organization, and expos-
in Persons Report. ing underage prostitution.

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 Think Again

"Prosecution Will Stop Traffickers"

Not likely. In the United States, an odd but figures indicate the presence of some 200,000 traf-
effective coalition of liberal Democrats, conserva- ficked victims in the United States. But even with a well-
tive Republicans, committed feminists, and evangel- trained law enforcement and prosecutorial system, less
ical Christians pushed a law through congress in than 500 people have been awarded T visas, the spe-
2000 that aimed to prosecute traffickers and protect cial visas given to victims in return for cooperation with
victims at home, while pressuring other countries to federal prosecutors. In fact, between 2001 and 2003,
take action abroad. The Victims of Trafficking and only 110 traffickers were prosecuted by the Justice
Violence Protection Act recognized trafficking as a Department. Of these, 77 were convicted or pled guilty.
federal crime for the first time and provided a defi- Given the nature of the trafficking business, so few
nition of victims in need of protection and services. convictions will have little effect. Convicting a local
Despite the political energies expended on recruiter or transporter has no significant impact on the
human trafficking, there is little evidence that pros- overall scale of trafficking. If the incentives are right,
ecutions have any significant impact on aggregate he or she is instantly replaced, and the flow of people
levels of trafficking. For example, U.S. government is hardly interrupted.

"Sanctions Will Stop Trafficking"

countries-such as China, Nigeria, or Saudi A

Wrong. The same U.S. law that made trafficking
would
a federal crime also gave the United States the likely
right to backfire, causing these countri
punish other states that do not crack downbecome
on human
less open to dialogue and limiting the fl
trafficking. The State Department is required to send necessary for effective cooperation.
information
Although some countries certainly lack ca
a report to congress each year ranking countries accord-
andthreat-
ing to their success in combating trafficking and create false fronts of activity, others activel
Uncle Sam's seal of approval (and the resource
ening sanctions for those with the worst records.
But international humanitarian agencies see follow)
often the with genuine efforts to combat tra
threat of U.S. sanctions against foreign governments
ing. Bangladesh, for example, received higher m
as largely counterproductive. Practicallyfrom
speaking,
the State Department this year by taking s
sanctions will likely be applied only against
icant coun-
steps against trafficking, despite the coun
tries already subject to sanctions, such aspoverty
Burma and
or limited resources. Incentives, inste
North Korea. Threatening moderately unresponsive
sanctions, might encourage others to do the sam

"Trafficking Victims Should Be Sent

major
Not always. Sending victims home may risk factor in trafficking, impeding and
sim-
ply place them back in the same conditions that victims' return and reintegration.
precluding
endangered them in the first place, particularly in sit-
problem is particularly true for minorities, ind
nous
uations of armed conflict or political unrest. peoples, and informal migrants who of
If crim-
inal gangs were involved in the trafficking,have
theyno way to prove their nationality. In Thail
will
for example, studies by the United Nations
likely threaten the safety of victims and their families.
cational,
To complicate matters, people may have no "home"Scientific and Cultural Organization
to which they can return. Lack of legal demonstrated
status is a that a lack of proof of citizens

30 FOREIGN POLICY

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 Think Again

the single greatest risk factor for a hill tribe girl or In developing countries, one's lack of legal status
woman to be trafficked or otherwise exploited. With- usually begins at birth. Without a birth certificate, a
out citizenship, she cannot get a school diploma, child typically has no legal identity: That is why inter-
register her marriage, own land, or work outside national laws such as the Convention on the Rights of
her home district without special permission. Lack the Child stress that children have the right to be reg-
of legal status prevents a woman from finding istered at birth. Many activists have never considered
alternate means of income, rendering her vulnera- that a fix as simple as promoting birth registration in
ble to trafficking for sex work or the most abusive developing countries is one of the most cost-effective
forms of labor. means to combat human trafficking.

"Trafficking Is Driven by Poverty"

Too simple. Trafficking is often migration

mines of the Amazon jungle. In the Ivory Coast, chil-
gone terribly wrong. In addition to the pushdrenof are frequently sold into slavery to work on cocoa
poverty or political and social instability, traf-
plantations. In China, girls are trafficked as brides in
ficking is influenced by the expanded world
impoverished rural areas, which are devoid of marriage-
views of the victims-the draw of bright lights
age females as a result of China's one-child policy and
and big cities. The lure of urban centers helps to
families' preference for baby boys.
account for why, in parts of Africa, girls fromDoes this mean that "destination" countries or
medium-sized towns are more vulnerable to traf- cities are the beneficiaries of trafficking? Not neces-
ficking than those in rural villages. sarily. What one area or industry may gain in cheap,
docile labor, others--especially those situated near
To fill the demand for ever cheaper labor, many vic-
tims are trafficked within the same economic class ornational borders--often pay for in terms of security,
health costs, and, sometimes, political unrest. Traf-
even within a single country. In Brazil, for example, girls
ficking may answer a demand, but the cost is too
may be trafficked for sex work from rural to urban
areas, whereas males may be sold to work in the gold
steep for this ever shrinking world to bear. IM

Want to Know More?

David Feingold has written extensively on the illegal trade of humans. For a look at the complex rela-
tionship between the trade in drugs and the trade in women, see "The Hell of Good Intentions: Some
Preliminary Thoughts on Opium in the Political Ecology of the Trade in Girls and Women" in Grant
Evans, et al., Where China Meets Southeast Asia: Social & Cultural Change in the Border Regions (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 2000). See also Trading Women, a feature documentary written and directed
by Feingold and narrated by actress Angelina Jolie.

For databases and figures on the extent of human trafficking throughout the world, visit the Web sites
of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's Trafficking Statistics Project, as
well as the sites of the International Labour Organization (ILO), the Child Trafficking Research Hub, and
the digital library of ChildTrafficking.com.

For a series of nuanced and controversial articles on the sex industry, read Lin Lean Lim, ed., The Sex
Sector: The Economic and Social Bases of Prostitution in Southeast Asia (Geneva: ILO, 1998).

))For links to relevant Web sites, access to the FP Archive, and a comprehensive index of related
FOREIGN POLICY articles, go to www.ForeignPolicy.com.

32 FOREIGN POLICY

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650 Million disabled people 804 . of people with disabilities live in poor countries
,

United Nations conventions on the rights of persons with disabilities CUNCRPDI

Social inclusion → encompasses and shapes 3 main domains of

person's life ,
social ,
economic and political .

UNESCO defines it as
'
A society for all in which every indiv, each
with rights and responsibilities has an active role to play
"
.

Social exclusion → systemic disadvantage or discrimination of an indiv based

on their identity , ethnicity , race , religion , descent , sexual orientation , gender , age
disability ,
HIV status
, citizenship , nationality

social exclusion is an issue →

unequal access to participation , denial
of opportunities
Implications of social exclusion
-
Corrosion and breakdown of society because of poor social cohesion
-

entrench and worsen the marginalised conditions of segments of society

-

Communities who are socially excluded face unemp, poor edu outcomes , low income, poor

housing conditions ,
poor health , family breakdown

The excluded disabled

History SG

Shift from
medical to
social
Dignity

Clapham → main goals of human right is the protection of

dignity
Reading Assignment 4: Human Rights Part 2, Disability
1. UN DESA (2016), Report on the World Social Situation 2016: Leaving no one Behind:
The Imperative of Inclusive Development, UN, New York, 17-22.
https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/rwss/2016/full-report.pdf

Social inclusion is defined as the process of improving the terms of participation in society for
people who are disadvantaged on the basis of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin,
religion, or economic or other status, through enhanced opportunities, access to resources,
voice and respect for rights. Thus, social inclusion is both a process and a goal. (p.20)

Social inclusion is both a process and a goal. In the present report, it is

contended that promoting social inclusion requires tackling social exclusion
by removing barriers to people’s participation in society, as well as by taking active
inclusionary steps to facilitate such participation.(p.20)

Social inclusion explicitly refers to people who are disadvantaged on the basis of age, sex,
disability, race, ethnicity, origin, or economic or other status.(p.20)

Social inclusion processes require both addressing the drivers of exclusion, including certain
policies and institutions as well as discriminatory attitudes and behaviours, and actively
“bringing people in”. (p.22)

To the extent that policies and institutions define the “rules of the game” for social
interactions and the distribution of power, status and control over resources, they can drive
social exclusion or, alternatively, mitigate its impacts. (p.22)

Norms, policies and institutions can also result in participation in society but on adverse terms
(Hickey and Du Toit, 2007).(p.22)

2. R. Wong and M.E. Wong (2015), “Social Impact of Policies for the Disabled in Singapore,"
in David Chan (ed), 50 Years of Social Issues in Singapore (Singapore: World Scientific,
2015), 147-150.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/300762355_Social_Impact_of_Policies_for_t
he_Disabled_in_Singapore/link/57430c5a08ae298602ee6ec9/download

The Singapore state tends to focus on economic prerogatives, and to discourage a rights-
based, socio-political understanding of disability. Persons with Disabilities (PWDs) are often
seen as objects of charity rather than as subjects with rights (AWARE, 2012). For instance,
Singapore has no equivalent to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the UK’s Disability
Discrimination Act (DDA). (p.148)

The demographic trend of increasing numbers of elderly persons, an issue of major concern to
Singapore authorities, has had positive consequences for the disabled community. Catering to
the needs of an ageing population has strengthened the case for inclusivity in the last decade.
For example, one way to convince authorities, organisations and individuals of the advantages
of barrier-free environments was to explain the cost implications of a fall, a heightened risk
for the elderly. (p.149)

International developments such as the 2006 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (UNCPRD) have increased the pressure on Singapore to better conform to
international norms. (p.149)

For PWDs especially, their inability to access the general employment sphere serves to
reinforce their societal exclusion. This does not merely trap them in an economically
dependent situation, but also heightens their feelings of inferiority and personal
worthlessness. Many PWDs end up internalising the belief that they are an undesirable
presence in society. (p.156)

Making space for PWDs to contribute economically in the country’s workforce has several key
benefits. Not only does this positively alter their self-perceptions, but more crucially, also
creates an inclusive environment in which the wider population can gradually shift their
attitudes towards PWDs and come to view them as valued members of society. (p.156)

The “medical model” in the early years sought to isolate and “fix” PWDs. The pendulum
swung towards a “social model” in the 1980s and 1990s with the concomitant rise of human
rights and welfare state systems.(p.162)

3. Adrian Hock Guan Tan & Wei Tech Ang (2008) Towards an inclusive society in Asia: The
invisible helping hand, Disability and Rehabilitation: Assistive Technology, 3:6, 366-373.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/262217436_Towards_an_inclusive_society_i
n_Asia_the_invisible_helping_hand/link/5609cefb08ae4d86bb1345ca/download

Law makers and governors had generally regarded the PWD issues to be domestic problems,
and conveniently adopted a hands-off approach. Family members of the PWD would treat
them as embarrassments to the family, and quietly kept them away from the eyes of the
public. (p.2)

The invasion of Western values over the past few decades has had a profound effect on the
Asian people. The general public is becoming more vocal and assertive of their civil rights. The
governments in the region have found themselves sandwiched between the international
movement led by UNESCAP and the growing voices from their own citizens. (p.2)

Two essential building blocks to the construction of an inclusive society:

• A Barrier-Free Society – all those who are able to work are not prevented from doing so by
social or physical barriers; and those who are unable to work have a decent quality of life.
• Empowerment of the PWD – each and every person is encouraged and empowered to
participate and engage in all aspects of life in his/her society, to the best of his/her capability.
(p.2)
Physical barriers refer to not only the obstacles imposed by physical environment, but also the
design features, or a lack thereof, of modern age equipment and facilities that cause
inconvenience or even impediment to PWD. Physical barriers usually stem from two reasons:
(i) a lack of awareness of the needs of PWD; (ii) limited resources. (p.2)

The other barrier to an inclusive society results from social attitudes toward PWD. It is a
common misconception that disabled people are objects of charity, rather than citizens with
equal rights, opportunities, ability to contribute to and participate in society just as other non-
disabled persons. Such a mindset has hindered PWD in many aspects of their lives, such as
education, employment, housing, transportation, and even the willingness to integrate into
society. (p.3)

Government policies play a vital, if not the most important, role in a country’s quest of the
inclusive society ideology. (p.3)

Policies in this context refer to government-led initiatives to implement codes, acts and
mandates to ensure equal rights of disabled persons. Heyer (2000) has noted that there are
two basic policy approaches to disability worldwide – equality of opportunity and equality of
results. The former outlaws discrimination, while the latter emphasizes special needs over
equal rights and mandating quotas. (p.3)
Reproduction ethics
-
Abortion , IVF
,
contraception , egg donation , surrogacy

Roe V Wade overturned C abortion no longer legal / a right in Us )

(
affect poor and minority groups the hardest

The rate of abortion in SG is decreasing

Demographics
 Abortion is not a
dangerous
procedure , women are not

traumatised , does not cause

breast cancer , does not cause

infertility
Virtue ethics is a family of moral theories according to which morally right actions

are explained by the nature of a good life and the good Chara traits needed to live

such a life
Al-Farabi

←
Aristotle
CC0003 Ethics and Civics in a Multicultural World
Readings for Abortion I:

Excerpts from:

A Defense of Abortion
Judith Jarvis Thomson
Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1. (Autumn, 1971),
pp. 47-66. Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0048-
3915%28197123%291%3A1%3C47%3AADOA%3E2.0.CO
%3B2-G
Philosophy and Public Affairs is currently published by
Princeton University Press.

Excerpts:

“Most opposition to abortion relies on the premise that the

fetus is a human
being, a person, from the moment of conception. The premise
is argued for, but,
as I think, not well. Take, for example, the most common
argument. We are
asked to notice that the development of a human being from
conception through
birth into childhood is continuous; then it is said that to draw a
line, to choose
a point in this development and say "before this point the
thing is not a person,
after this point it is a person" is to make an arbitrary choice, a
choice for which
in the nature of things no good reason can be given. It is
concluded that the
fetus is, or anyway that we had better say it is, a per- son from
the moment of
conception. But this conclusion does not follow. Similar
things might be said
about the development of an acorn into an oak tree, and it
does not follow that
acorns are oak trees, or that we had better say they are.
Arguments of this form
are sometimes called "slippery slope arguments -the phrase is
perhaps self explanatory and it is dismaying that opponents of
abortion rely on them so heavily and uncritically.”
(p. 47)

“I propose, then, that we grant that the fetus is a person. from

the moment of
conception. How does the argument go from here? Something
like this, I take
it. Every person has a right to life. So the fetus has a right to
life. No doubt the
mother has a right to decide what shall happen in and to her
body; everyone
would grant that. But surely a person's right to life is stronger
and more
stringent than the mother's right to decide what happens in
and to her body, and
so outweighs it. So the fetus may not be killed; an abortion
may not be
performed.” (p.48)

“It sounds plausible. But now let me ask you to imagine this.
You wake up in the
morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an
unconscious violinist. A
famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a
fatal kidney ailment,
and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the
available medical records and found that you alone have the
right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you,
and last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged
into yours, so that your kidneys
can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your
own. The director
of the hospital now tells you, "Look, we're sorry the Society
of Music Lovers
did this to you-we would never have permitted it if we had
known. But still,
they did it, and the violinist now is plugged into you. To
unplug you would be
to kill him. But never mind, it's only for nine months. By then
he will have
recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from
you." Is it
morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation? No
doubt it would be very
nice of you if you did, a great kindness. But do you have to
accede to it? What
if it were not nine months, but nine years? Or longer still?
What if the director
of the hospital says, "Tough luck, I agree, but you've now got
to stay in bed,
with the violinist plugged into you, for the rest of your life.
Because remember
this. All persons have a right to life, and violinists are persons.
Granted you
have a right to decide what happens in and to your body, but a
person's right to
life outweighs your right to decide what happens in and to
your body. So you
cannot ever be unplugged from him." I imagine you would
regard this as
outrageous, which suggests that something really is wrong
with that plausible sounding argument I mentioned a moment
ago.

In this case, of course, you were kidnapped; you didn't

volunteer for the
operation that plugged the violinist into your kidneys. Can
those who oppose
abortion on the ground I mentioned make an exception for a
pregnancy due to
rape? Certainly. They can say that per- sons have a right to life
only if they
didn't come into existence because of rape; or they can say
that all persons have
a right to life, but that some have less of a right to life than
others, in particular,
that those who came into existence because of rape have less.
But these statements have a rather unpleasant sound. Surely
the question of whether you have
a right to life at all, or how much of it you have, shouldn't turn
on the question
of whether or not you are the product of a rape. And in fact
the people who
oppose abortion on the ground I mentioned do not make this
distinction, and
hence do not make an exception in case of rape.
Nor do they make an exception for a case in which the mother
has to spend the
nine months of her pregnancy in bed. They would agree that
would be a great
pity, and hard on the mother; but all the same, all persons have
a right to life,
the fetus is a person, and so on. I suspect, in fact, that they
would not make an
exception for a case in which, miraculously enough, the
pregnancy went on for
nine years, or even the rest of the mother's life.

Some won't even make an exception for a case in which

continuation of the
pregnancy is likely to shorten the mother's life; they regard
abortion as
impermissible even to save the mother's life.” (pp.48-50)

“Let us look again at the case of you and the violinist. There
you are, in bed with
the violinist, and the director of the hospital says to you, "It's
all most
distressing, and I deeply sympathize, but you see this is
putting an additional
strain on your kidneys, and you'll be dead within the month.
But you have to
stay where you are all the same. Because unplugging you
would be directly killing an innocent violinist, and that's
murder, and that's impermissible." If
anything in the world is true, it is that you do not commit
murder, you do not do
what is impermissible, if you reach around to your back and
unplug yourself
from that violinist to save your life.” (p.52)

This argument treats the right to life as if it were

unproblematic. It is not, and
this seems to me to be precisely the source of the mistake. For
we should now, at long last, ask what it comes to, to have a
right to life. In some views having a right to life includes
having a right to be given at least the bare minimum one
needs for continued life. But suppose that what in fact is the
bare minimum a man needs for continued life is something he
has no right at all to be given? To return to the story I told
earlier, the fact that for continued life that violinist needs the
continued use of your kidneys does not establish that he has a
right to be given the continued use of your kidneys. He
certainly has no
right against you that you should give him continued use of
your kidneys. For
nobody has any right to use your kidneys unless you give him
such a right; and
nobody has the right against you that you shall give him this
right-if you do
allow him to go on using your kidneys, this is a kindness on
your part, and not
something he can claim from you as his due. Nor has he any
right against
anybody else that they should give him continued use of your
kidneys. Certainly
he had no right against the Society of Music Lovers that they
should plug him
into you in the first place. And if you now start to unplug
yourself, having
learned that you will otherwise have to spend nine years in
bed with him, there
is nobody in the world who must try to prevent you, in order
to see to it that he
is given something he has a right to be given.” (p.55)

1
CC0003 Ethics and Civics in a Multicultural World
Readings for Abortion II:

Excerpts from:
Why Abortion is Immoral
Don Marquis
The Journal of Philosophy , Apr., 1989, Vol. 86, No. 4 (Apr., 1989), pp. 183-202 Published by:
Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2026961

Excerpts:

“What primarily makes killing wrong is neither its effect on the murderer nor its effect on the victim's
friends and relatives, but its effect on the victim. The loss of one's life is one of the greatest losses one
can suffer. The loss of one's life deprives one of all the experiences, activities, projects, and
enjoyments that would otherwise have constituted one's future. There- fore, killing someone is wrong,
primarily because the killing inflicts (one of) the greatest possible losses on the victim. To describe
this as the loss of life can be misleading, however. The change in my biological state does not by itself
make killing me wrong. The effect of the loss of my biological life is the loss to me of all those
activities, projects, experiences, and enjoyments which would otherwise have constituted my future
personal life. These activities, projects, experiences, and enjoyments are either valuable for their own
sakes or are means to something else that is valuable for its own sake. Some parts of my future are not
valued by me now, but will come to be valued by me as I grow older and as my values and capacities
change. When I am killed, I am deprived both of what I now value which would have been part of my
future personal life, but also what I would come to value. Therefore, when I die, I am deprived of all
of the value of my future. Inflicting this loss on me is ultimately what makes killing me wrong. This
being the case, it would seem that what makes killing any adult human being prima facie seriously
wrong is the loss of his or her future.” (pp 189-90)

“The claim that what makes killing wrong is the loss of the victim's future is, directly supported by
two considerations. In the first place, this theory explains why we regard killing as one of the worst of
crimes. Killing is especially wrong, because it deprives the victim of more than perhaps any other
crime. In the second place, people with AIDS or cancer who know they are dying believe, of course,
that dying is a very bad thing for them. They believe that the loss of a future to them that they would
otherwise have experienced is what makes their premature death a very bad thing for them. A better
theory of the wrongness of killing would require a different natural property associated with killing
which better fits with the attitudes of the dying. What could it be?

The view that what makes killing wrong is the loss to the victim of the value of the victim's future
gains additional support when some of its implications are examined. In the first place, it is
incompatible with the view that it is wrong to kill only beings who are biologically human. It is
possible that there exists a different species from an- other planet whose members have a future like
ours. Since having a future like that is what makes killing someone wrong, this theory entails that it
would be wrong to kill members of such a species. Hence, this theory is opposed to the claim that
only life that is biologically human has great moral worth, a claim which many anti- abortionists have
seemed to adopt. This opposition, which this theory has in common with personhood theories, seems
to be a merit of the theory.

In the second place, the claim that the loss of one's future is the wrong-making feature of one's being
killed entails the possibility that the futures of some actual nonhuman mammals on our own planet are
sufficiently like ours that it is seriously wrong to kill them also. Whether some animals do have the
same right to life as human beings depends on adding to the account of the wrongness of killing some
additional account of just what it is about my future or the futures of other adult human beings which
makes it wrong to kill us. No such additional account will be offered in this essay. Undoubtedly, the
provision of such an account would be a very difficult matter. Undoubtedly, any such account would
be quite controversial. Hence, it surely should not reflect badly on this sketch of an elementary theory
of the wrongness of killing that it is indeterminate with respect to some very difficult issues regarding
animal rights.

In the third place, the claim that the loss of one's future is the wrong-making feature of one's being
killed does not entail, as sanctity of human life theories do, that active euthanasia is wrong. Per- sons
who are severely and incurably ill, who face a future of pain and despair, and who wish to die will not
have suffered a loss if they are killed. It is, strictly speaking, the value of a human's future which
makes killing wrong in this theory. This being so, killing does not necessarily wrong some persons
who are sick and dying. Of course, there may be other reasons for a prohibition of active euthanasia,
but that is another matter. Sanctity-of-human-life theories seem to hold that active euthanasia is
seriously wrong even in an individual case where there seems to be good reason for it independently
of public policy considerations. This consequence is most implausible, and it is a plus for the claim
that the loss of a future of value is what makes killing wrong that it does not share this consequence.

In the fourth place, the account of the wrongness of killing de- fended in this essay does
straightforwardly entail that it is prima facie seriously wrong to kill children and infants, for we do
presume that they have futures of value. Since we do believe that it is wrong to kill
defenseless little babies, it is important that a theory of the wrong- ness of killing easily account for
this. Personhood theories of the wrongness of killing, on the other hand, cannot straightforwardly
account for the wrongness of killing infants and young children.7 Hence, such theories must add
special ad hoc accounts of the wrongness of killing the young. The plausibility of such ad hoc theories
seems to be a function of how desperately one wants such theories to work. The claim that the
primary wrong-making feature of a killing is the loss to the victim of the value of its future accounts
for the wrongness of killing young children and infants directly; it makes the wrongness of such acts
as obvious as we actually think it is. This is a further merit of this theory. Accordingly, it seems that
this value of a future-like-ours theory of the wrongness of killing shares strengths of both sanctity-of-
life and personhood accounts while avoiding weaknesses of both. In addition, it meshes with a central
intuition concerning what makes killing wrong.

The claim that the primary wrong-making feature of a killing is the loss to the victim of the value of
its future has obvious consequences for the ethics of abortion. The future of a standard fetus includes
a set of experiences, projects, activities, and such which are identical with the futures of adult human
beings and are identical with the futures of young children. Since the reason that is sufficient to ex-
plain why it is wrong to kill human beings after the time of birth is a reason that also applies to
fetuses, it follows that abortion is prima facie seriously morally wrong. ” (pp 190-192)
Euthanasia =
happy death or good death
Types Of Euthanasia

Human action is the main

death

[
cause of

# main cause of death not human

action but injury or disease

Ethical considerations
Greedy cousin
analogy → A : kill the child to
get money ,
B: watch
the child drown without helping
L Bare diff argument
Bare diff between
killing and letting someone die doesn't make a

moral diff
Utilitarianism is a
consequentialist theory → what is moral or not is decided based on the
Ah actions
consequences .
5 An action is morally required it it maximise overall well -

being
→

When it does more to improve overall well-being than any other action you could have done

"
consequentialism is a family of moral theories that share the idea that the

morality of actions, Policies , motives or rules depends on their producing the best actual

or expected results .
 Pleasure

Hinduism
-

Values : Dharma
economic
artha , kcima
/
wealth

moksa
/
Sort Of Salvation

, ,

-
Karma
,
liberation , Ahimsa : in line with euthanasia
CC0003 Ethics and Civics in a Multicultural World
Reading for Euthanasia:

Excerpts from:
Active and Passive Euthanasia
James Rachels
New England Journal of Medicine , Jan., 1975, Vol. 292, No. 2 (Jan., 1975), pp. 78-80 Published by:
Massachusetts Medical Society

Excerpts:

“The distinction between active and passive euthanasia is thought to be crucial for
medical ethics. The idea is that it is permissible, at least in some cases, to withhold
treatment and allow a patient to die, but it is never permissible to take any direct action
designed to kill the patient…”

“However, a strong case can be made against this doctrine. In what follows I will set out
some of the relevant arguments, and urge doctors to reconsider their views on this matter.
To begin with a familiar type of situation, a patient who is dying of incurable
cancer of the throat is in terrible pain, which can no longer be satisfactorily alleviated. He
is certain to die within a few days, even if present treatment is continued, but he does not
want to go on living for those days since the pain is unbearable. So he asks the doctor for
an end to it, and his family joins in the request.

Suppose the doctor agrees to withhold treatment, as the conventional doctrine

says he may. The justification for his doing so is that the patient is in terrible agony, and
since he is going to die anyway, it would he wrong to prolong his suffering needlessly.
But now notice this. If one imply withholds treatment, it may take the patient longer to
die, and so he may suffer more than he would if no direct action were taken and a
lethal injection given. This fact provides strong reason for thinking that, once the initial
decision not to prolong his agony has been made active euthanasia is actually preferable
to passive euthanasia, rather than the reverse. To say otherwise is to endorse the option
that leads to more suffering rather than less, and is contrary to the humanitarian impulse
that prompts the decision not to prolong his life in the first place.

Part of my point is that the process of being "allowed to die" can be relatively
slow and painful, whereas being given a lethal injection is relatively quick and painless…

One reason why so many people think that there is an important moral difference between active and
passive euthanasia is that they think killing someone is morally worse than letting someone die. But is
it? Is killing, in itself, worse than letting die? To investigate this issue, two cases may be considered
that are exactly alike except that one involves killing whereas the
other involves letting someone die. Then, it can be asked whether this difference makes any difference
to the moral assessments. It is important that the cases be exactly alike, except for this one difference,
since otherwise one cannot be confident that it is this difference and not some other that accounts for
any variation in the assessments of the two cases. So, let us consider this pair of cases:

In the first, Smith stands to gain a large inheritance if anything should happen to his six-year-old
cousin. One evening while the child is taking his bath, Smith sneaks into the bathroom and drowns the
child, and then arranges things so that it will look like an accident.

In the second, Jones also stands to gain if anything should happen to his six-year-old cousin. Like
Smith. Jones sneaks in planning to drown the child in his bath. However, just as he enters the
bathroom Jones sees the child slip and hit his head, and fall face down in the water. Jones is delighted;
he stands by, ready to push the child's head back under if it is necessary, but it is not
necessary. With only a little thrashing about, the child drowns all by himself, "accidentally," as Jones
watches and does nothing.

Now Smith killed the child, whereas Jones "merely" let the child die. That is the only difference
between them. Did either man behave better, from a moral point of view? If the difference between
killing and letting die were in itself a morally important matter, one should say that Jones's behavior
was less reprehensible than Smith's. But does one really want to say that? I think not. In the first
place, both men acted from the same motive, personal gain, and both
had exactly the same end in view when they acted. It may be inferred from Smith's conduct that he is
a bad man, although that judgment may be withdrawn or modified if certain further facts are learned
about him - for example, that he is mentally deranged. But would not the very same thing be inferred
about Jones from his conduct? And would not the same further considerations also be relevant to any,
modification of this judgment? Moreover, suppose Jones pleaded, in his own defense, "After all, I
didn't do anything except just stand there and watch the child drown. I didn't kill him; I only let him
die." Again, if letting die were in itself less bad than killing, this defense should have at least some
weight. But it does not. Such a "defense" can only be regarded as a grotesque perversion of moral
reasoning. Morally speaking, it is no defense at
all.”

“…the bare difference between killing and letting die does not, in itself, make a moral difference. If a
doctor lets a patient die, for humane reasons, he is in the same moral position as if he had given the
patient a lethal injection for humane reasons. If his decision was wrong - if, for example, the patient's
illness was in fact curable -the decision would be equally regrettable no matter which method was
used to carry it out. And if the doctor's decision was the right one, the method used is not in itself
important.”
1
 →
Equality

not conceptually meaningful

to talk about total / full /

complete / absolute equality

↓
There will be some form of inequality between indiv /communities / societies

→ Applicable IRL
Aligned with the 2

Moral concepts , the

principle of humanity and

the golden rule

The golden rule

L Treat others as You would like others to treat you
An equitable society secures for all its members equal changes to

achieve their cared outcomes

strength : successfully practised

can equalise access to edu
 THE TYRANNY OF MERIT

our moral and civic life depends on understanding how, over the past four
decades, our social bonds and respect for one another came unraveled.
This book seeks to explain how this happened, and to consider how we
might find our way to a politics of the common good.
INTRODUCTION':
April 2020
Brookline, Massachusetts GETTING IN

I n March 2019, as high school students awaited the results of their college
applications, federal prosecutors made a stunning announcement. They
charged thirty-three wealthy parents with engaging in an elaborate cheat-
ing scheme to get their children admitted to elite universities, including
Yale, Stanford, Georgetown, and the University of Southern California. 1
At the heart of the scam was an unscrupulous college-counseling con-
sultant named William Singer, who ran a business that catered to anxious,
affluent parents. Singer's company specialized in gaming the intensely
competitive college admissions system that had in recent decades become
the primary gateway to prosperity and prestige. For students lacking the
stellar academic credentials top colleges required, Singer devised corrupt
workarounds-paying proctors of standardized tests such as the SAT and
ACT to boost students' scores by correcting their answer sheets, and bribing
coaches to designate applicants as recruited athletes, even if the students
did not play the sport. He even provided fake athletic credentials, photo-
shopping applicants' faces onto action photos of real athletes.
Singer's illicit admissions service did not come cheap. The chairman
of a prestigious law firm paid $75,000 for his daughter to take a college
entrance exam at a test center supervised by a proctor paid by Singer to

6
7
 INTRODUCTION: GETTING IN

THE TYRANNY OF MERIT

"There can be no separate college admissions system for the wealthy:'' But
ensure the student received the score she needed. One family paid Sin- editorial and opinion writers were quick to point out that money routinely
ger $1.2 million to get their daughter admitted to Yale as a soccer recruit, plays a role in admissions, most explicitly in the special consideration many
despite the fact that she did not play soccer. Singer used $400,000 of the pay- American universities accord children of alumni and generous donors.
ment to bribe the obliging Yale soccer coach, who was also indicted. A tele- Responding to Trump supporters' attempts to blame liberal elites for the
vision actress and her husband, a fashion designer, paid Singer $500,000 to get admissions scandal, liberals cited published reports that Jared Kushner, the
their two daughters admitted to USC as bogus recruits to the crew team. president's son-in-law, had been admitted to Harvard despite a modest aca-
Another celebrity, the actress Felicity Huffman, known for her role in the demic record after his father, a wealthy real estate developer, had donated
television series Desperate Housewives, somehow got a bargain rate; for only $2.5 million to the university. Trump himself reportedly gave $1.5 mi1lion
$15,000, Singer put in the fix for her daughter's SAT. 2 to the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania around the time
5
In all, Singer took in $25 million over eight years running his college his children Donald Jr. and lvanka attended the school.
admissions scam.
The admissions scandal provoked universal outrage. In a polarized
time, when Americans could scarcely agree on anything, it drew massive THE ETHICS OF ADMISSION

coverage and condemnation across the political.~ectrum-on Fox News

and MSNBC, in The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times. Every- Singer, the mastermind of the admissions scam, acknowledged that a big
one agreed that bribing and cheating to gain admission to elite colleges was gift sometimes gets marginally qualified applicants admitted through the
reprehensible. But the outrage expressed something deeper than anger at "back door." But he pitched his own technique, which he called the "side
privileged parents using illicit means to help their kids get into prestigious door" as a cost-effective alternative. He told clients that the standard "back
'
door" approach was "ten times as much money" as his cheating scheme,
colleges. In ways that people struggled to articulate, it was an emblematic
scandal, one that raised larger questions about who gets ahead, and why. and less certain. A major gift to the college offered no guarantee of admis-
Inevitably, the expressions of outrage were politically inflected. Sur- sion while his "side door" of bribes and fake test scores did. "My families
'
want a guarantee,"he explame
. d. 6
rogates for President Trump took to Twitter and Fox News to taunt the
Hollywood liberals ensnared in the scam. "Look at who these people are," Although money buys access in both "back door" and "side door" ad-
Lara Trump, the president's daughter-in-law, said on Fox. "The Hollywood missions, these modes of entry are not morally identical. For one thing,
elites, the liberal elites who were always talking about equality for all, and the back door is legal, while the side door is not. The U.S. Attorney made
everyone should get a fair shot, when here is the biggest hypocrisy of all: this clear: "We are not talking about donating a building so that a school
That they're writing checks to cheat and get their kids into these schools- is more likely to take your son or daughter. We are talking about decep-
when the spots really should've gone to kids that were actually deserving tion and fraud, fake test scores, fake athletic credentials, fake photographs,
of them." 3 bribed college officials."7
For their part, liberals agreed that the scam deprived qualified kids of In prosecuting Singer, his clients, and the bribe-taking coaches, the feds
the places they deserved. But they saw the scandal as a blatant instance were not telling colleges they could not sell seats in the freshman class;
of a more pervasive injustice: the role of wealth and privilege in college they were simply cracking down on a fraudulent scheme. Legality aside,
admission; even where no i11egality was involved. In announcing the indict- the back door and the side door differ in this respect: When parents buy
ment, the U.S. Attorney declared what he took to be the principle at stake:
9
8
 THE TYRANNY OF MERIT INTRODUCTION: GETTING IN

their child's admission through a big donation, the money goes to the col- Princeton and Yale, more students come from the top 1 percent than from
lege, which can use it to improve the education it offers all students. With the entire bottom 60 percent of the country_IO This staggering inequality of
Singer's scheme, the money goes to third parties, and so does little or noth- access is due partly to legacy admissions and donor appreciation (the back
ing to help the college itself. (At least one of the coaches Singer bribed, the door), but also to advantages that propel children from well-off families
sailing coach at Stanford, apparently used the bribe to support the sailing through the front door.
program. Others pocketed the money.) Critics point to this inequality as evidence that higher education is not
From the standpoint of fairness, however, it is hard to distinguish be- the meritocracy it claims to be. From this point of view, the college admis-
tween the "back door" and the "side door." Both give an edge to children sions scandal is an egregious instance of the broader, pervasive unfairness
of wealthy parents who are admitted instead of better-qualified applicants. that prevents higher education from living up to the meritocratic principle
Both allow money to override merit. it professes.
Admission based on merit defines entry through the "front door." As Despite their disagreements, those who consider the cheating scandal
Singer put it, the front door "means you get in on your own." This mode a shocking departure from standard admissions practices and those who
of entry is what most people consider fair; applicants should be admitted consider it an extreme example of tendencies already prevalent in college
based on their own merit, not their parents' money. admissions share a common premise: Students should be admitted to col-
In practice, of course, it is not that simple. Mpney hovers over the front lege based on their own abilities and talents, not based on factors beyond
door as well as the back. Measures of merit are hard to disentangle from their control. They agree, in other words, that admission should be based
economic advantage. Standardized tests such as the SAT purport to mea- on merit. They also agree, implicitly at least, that those who get in based on
sure-merit on its own, so that students from modest backgrounds can dem- merit have earned their admission and therefore deserve the benefits that
onstrate intellectual promise. In practice, however, SAT scores closely track flow from it.
family income. The richer a student's family, the higher the score he or she If this familiar view is right, then the problem with meritocracy is not
is likely to receive. 8 with the principle but with our failure to live up to it. Political argument
Not only do wealthy parents enroll their children in SAT prep courses; between conservatives and liberals bears this out. Our public debates are not
they hire private admissions counselors to burnish their college applications, about meritocracy itself but about how to achieve it. Conservatives argue, for
enroll them in dance and music lessons, and train them in elite sports such as example, that affirmative action policies that consider race and ethnicity as
fencing, squash, golf, tennis, crew, lacrosse, and sailing, the better to qualify factors in admission amount to a betrayal of merit-based admission; liberals
for recruitment to college teams. These are among the costly means by which defend affirmative action as a way of remedying persisting unfairness and
affluent, striving parents equip their progeny to compete for admission. argue that a true meritocracy can be achieved only by leveling the playing
And then there is tuition. At all but the handful of colleges wealthy field between the privileged and the disadvantaged.
enough to admit students without regard for their ability to pay, those who But this debate overlooks the possibility that the problem with meritoc-
do not need financial aid are more likely than their needy counterparts to racy runs deeper.
get in.9 Consider again the admissions scandal. Most of the outrage focused on
Given all this, it is not surprising that more than two-thirds of students the cheating, and the unfairness of it. Equally troubling, however, are the
at Ivy League schools come from the top 20 percent of the income scale; at attitudes that fueled the cheating. Lying in the background of the scandal

10 ]]
 THE TYRANNY OF MERIT

'
INTRODUCTION: GETTING IN
I was the assumption, now so familiar that it is scarcely noticed, that ad-
mission to an elite university is a highly sought prize. The scandal was middle-class life. A degree from a name-brand university has come to be
attention-grabbing not only because it implicated celebrities and private seen as the primary vehicle of upward mobility for those seeking to rise and
equity moguls but also because the access they tried to buy was so widely the surest bulwark against downward mobility for those hoping to remain
desired, the object of fevered striving. ensconced in the comfortable classes. This is the mentality that led pan-
Why is this so? Why has admission to prestigious universities become icky, privileged parents to sign up for the college adrri'issions scam.
so fiercely sought that privileged parents commit fraud to get their kids in? But economic anxiety is not the whole story. More than a hedge against
Or, short of fraud, spend tens of thousands of dollars on private admissions downward mobility, Singer's clients were buying something else, some-
consultants and test prep courses to boost their children's chances, turning thing less tangible but more valuable. In securing a place for their kids in
their high school years into a stress-strewn gauntlet of AP classes, resume prestigious universities, they were buying the borrowed luster of merit.
building, and pressure-packed striving? Why has admission to elite colleges
come to loom so large in our society that the FBI would devote massive
law enforcement resources to ferreting out the scam, and that news of the BIDDING FOR MERIT
scandal would command headlines and public attention for months, from
the indictment to the sentencing of the perpetrators? In an unequal society, those who land on top want to believe their success
The admissions obsession has its origins in the growing inequality of is morally justified. In a meritocratic society, this means the winners must
recent decades. It reflects the fact that more is at stake in who gets in where. believe they have earned their success through their own talent and hard
As the wealthiest 10 percent pulled away from the rest, the stakes of attend- work.
ing a prestigious college increased. Fifty years ago, applying to college was Paradoxically, this is the gift the cheating parents wanted to give their
less fraught. Fewer than one in five Americans went to a four-year college, kids. If all they really cared about was enabling their children to live in
and those who did tended to enroll in places close to home. College rank- affluence, they could have given them trust funds. But they wanted some-
ings mattered less than they do today. 11 thing else-the meritocratic cachet that admission to elite colleges confers.
But as inequality increased, and as the earnings gap between those with Singer understood this when he explained that the front door means
and those without a college degree widened, college mattered more. So did "you get in on your own." His cheating scheme was the next best thing. Of
college choice. Today, students commonly seek out the most selective col- course, being admitted on the basis of a rigged SAT or phony athletic cre-
lege that will admit them.12 Parenting styles have also changed, especially dentials is not making it on your own. This is why most of the parents hid
among the professional classes. As the income gap grows, so does the fear their machinations from their kids. Admission through the side door carries
of falling. Seeking to avert this danger, parents became intensely involved the same meritocratic honor as admission through the front door only if the
with their children's lives-managing their time, monitoring their grades, illicit mode of entry is concealed. No one takes pride in announcing, 'Tve
directing their activities, curating their college qualifications.13 been admitted to Stanford because my parents bribed the sailing coach."
This epidemic of overbearing, helicopter parenting did not come from The contrast with admission based on merit seems obvious. Those
no:-1here. It is an anxious but understandable response to rising inequality admitted with sparkling, legitimate credentials take pride in their achieve-
and the_desire of affluent parents to spare their progeny the precarity of ment, and consider that they got in on their own. But this is, in a way, mis-
leading. While it is true that their admission reflects dedication and hard

12
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 INTRODUCTION: GETTING IN

THE TYRANNY OF MERIT

At a time when anger against elites has brought democracy to the
work, it cannot really be said that it is solely their own doing. What about brink, the question of merit takes on a special urgency. We need to ask
whether the solution to our fractious politics is to live more faithfully by
the parents and teachers who helped them on their way? What about tal-
ents and gifts not wholly of their making? What about the good fortune to the principle of merit, or to seek a common good beyond the sorting and
live in a society that cultivates and rewards the talents they happen to have? the striving.
Those who, by dint of effort and talent, prevail in a competitive meri-
tocracy are indebted in ways the competition obscures. As the meritocracy
intensifies, the striving so absorbs us that our indebtedness recedes from
view. In this way, even a fair meritocracy, one without cheating or bribery
or special privileges for the wealthy, induces a mistaken impression-that
we have made it on our own. The years of strenuous effort demanded of
applicants to elite universities almost forces them to believe that their
success is their own doing, and that if they fall short, they have no one to
blame but themselves.
This is a heavy burden for young people .\o bear. It is also corrosive
of civic sensibilities. For the more we think of ourselves as self-made and
self-sufficient, the harder it is to learn gratitude and humility. And without
·these sentiments, it is hard to care for the common good.

College admission is not the only occasion for arguments about merit.
Debates about who deserves what abound in contemporary politics. On the
surface, these debates are about fairness: Does everyone have a truly equal
opportunity to compete for desirable goods and social positions?
But our disagreements about merit are not only about fairness.- They
are also about how we define success and failure, winning and losing-and
about the attitudes the winners should hold toward those less successful
than themselves. These are highly charged questions, and we try to avoid
them until they force themselves upon us.
Finding our way beyond the polarized politics of our time requires a
reckoning with merit. How has the meaning of merit been recast in recent
decades, in ways that erode the dignity of work and leave many people feel-
ing that elites look down on them? Are the winners of globalization justi-
fied in the belief that they have earned and therefore deserve their success,
or is this a matter of meritocratic hubris?
15

14
 1

WINNERS AND LOSERS

T hese are dangerous times for democracy. The danger can be seen in
rising xenophobia and growing public support for autocratic figures
who test the limits of democratic norms. These trends are troubling in
themselves. Equally alarming is the fact that mainstream parties and politi-
cians display little understanding of the discontent that is roiling politics
around the world.
Some denounce the upsurge of populist nationalism as little more
than a racist, xenophobic reaction against immigrants and multicultural-
ism. Others see it mainly in economic terms, as a protest against job losses
broc{ght about by global trade and new technologies.
But it is a mistake to see only the bigotry in populist protest, or to view
it only as an economic complaint. Like the triumph ofBrexit in the United
Kingdom, the election of Donald Trump in 2016 was an angry verdict on
decades of rising inequality and a version of globalization that benefits
those at the top but leaves ordinary citizens feeling disempowered. It was
also a rebuke for a technocratic approach to politics that is tone-deaf to the
resentments of people who feel the economy and the culture have left them
behind.
The hard reality is that Trump was elected by tapping a wellspring of

17
 THE TYRANNY OF MERIT WINNERS AND LOSERS

anxieties, frustrations, and legitimate grievances to which the mainstream according to this account, many workers bridle at the demand to reinvent
parties had no compelling answer. A similar predicament afflicts European themselves as the jobs they once held are outsourced to low-wage countries
democracies. Before they can hope to win back public support, these par- or assigned to robots. They hanker, as if nostalgically, for the stable com-
ties must rethink their mission and purpose. To do so, they should learn munities and careers of the past. Feeling dislocated in the face of the inexo-
from the populist protest that has displaced them-not by replicating its rable forces of globalization and technology, such workers lash out against
xenophobia and strident nationalism, but by taking seriously the legitimate immigrants, free trade; and governing elites. But their fury is misdirected,
grievances with which these ugly sentiments are entangled. for they fail to realize that they are railing against forces as unalterable as
Such thinking should begin with the recognition that these grievances the weather. Their anxieties are best addressed by job-training programs
are not only economic but also moral and cultural; they are not only about and other measures to help them adapt to the imperatives of global and
wages and jobs but also about social esteem. technological change.
The mainstream parties· and governing elites who find themselves the Each of these diagnoses contains an element of truth. But neither gives
target of populist protest struggle to make sense of it. They typically diag- populism its due. Construing populist protest as either malevolent or misdi-
nose the discontent in one of two ways: As animus against immigrants and rected absolves governing elites of responsibility for creating the conditions
racial and ethnic minorities or as anxiety in the face of globalization and that have eroded the dignity of work and left many feeling disrespected and
technological change. Both diagnoses miss sOr'nething important. disempowered. The diminished economic and cultural status of working
people in recent decades is not the result of inexorable forces; it is the result
of the way mainstream political parties and elites have governed.
DIAGNOSING POPULIST DISCONTENT Those elites are now alarmed, and rightly so, at the threat to democratic
norms posed by Trump and other populist-backed autocrats. But they fail to
The first diagnosis sees populist anger against elites mainly as a backlash acknowledge their role in prompting the resentment that led to the populist
against growing racial, ethnic, and gender diversity. Accustomed to domi- backlash. They do not see that the upheavals we are witnessing are a politi-
nating the social hierarchy, the white male working-class voters who sup- cal response to a political failure of historic proportions.
ported Trump feel threatened by the prospect of becoming a minority
within "their" country, "strangers in their own land." They feel that they,
more than women or racial minorities, are the victims of discrimination; TECHNOCRACY AND MARKET-FRIENDLY GLOBALIZATION
and they feel oppressed by the demands of "politically correct" public dis-
course. This diagnosis of injured social status highlights the ugly features of At the heart of this failure is the way mainstream parties conceived and
populist sentiment-the nativism, misogyny, and racism voiced by Trump carried out the project of globalization over the past four decades. Two as-
and other nationalistic populists. pects of this project gave rise to the conditions that fuel populist protest.
The second diagnosis attributes working-class resentment to bewilder- One is its technocratic way of conceiving the public good; the other is its
ment and dislocation wrought by the rapid pace of change in an age of glo- meritocratic way of defining winners and losers.
balization and technology. In the new economic order, the notion of work The technocratic conception of politics is bound up with a faith in
tied to. a lifelong career is over; what matters now are innovation, flexibil- markets-not necessarily unfettered, laissez-faire capitalism, but the broader
ity, entrepreneurialism, and a constant willingness to learn new skills. But, belief that market mechanisms are the primary instruments for achieving

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 WINNERS AND LOSERS
THE TYRANNY OF MERIT
Blair in Britain, Gerhard Schroder in Germany-moderated but consoli-
the public good. This way of thinking about politics is technocratic in the dated the market faith. They softened the harsh edges of unfettered markets
sense that it drains public discourse of substantive moral argument and but did not challenge the central premise of the Reagan-Thatcher era-that
treats ideologically contestable questions as if they were matters of eco- market mechanisms are the primary instruments for achieving the public
nomic efficiency, the province of experts. good. In line with this faith, they embraced a market-friendly version of
It is not difficult to see how the technocratic faith in markets set the globalization and welcomed the growing financializati@n of the economy.
stage for populist discontent. The market-driven version of globalization In the 1990s, the Clinton administration joined with Republicans in
brought growing inequality. It also devalued national identities and -.alle- promoting global trade agreements and deregulating the financial industry.
giances. As goods and capital flowed freely across national borders, those The benefits of these policies flowed mostly to those at the top, but Demo-
who stood astride the global economy valorized cosmopolitan identities as crats did little to address the deepening inequality and the growing power
a progressive, enlightened alternative to the narrow, parochial ways of pro- of money in politics. Having strayed from its traditional mission of taming
tectionism, tribalism, and conflict. The real political divide, they argued, capitalism and holding economic power to democratic account, liberalism
was no longer left versus right but open versus closed. This implied that lost its capacity to inspire.
critics of outsourcing, free-trade agreements, and unrestricted capital flows All that seemed to change when Barack Obama appeared on the politi-
were closed-minded rather than open-minde~, tribal rather than global.' cal scene. In his 2008 presidential campaign, he offered a stirring alterna-
tive to the managerial, technocratic language that had come to characterize
liberal public discourse. He showed that progressive politics could speak a
Meanwhile, the technocratic approach to governance treated many language of moral and spiritual purpose.
public questions as matters of technical expertise beyond the reach of or- But the moral energy and civic idealism he inspired as a candidate did
dinary citizens. This narrowed the scope of democratic argument, hol- not carry over into his presidency. Assuming office in the midst of the fi-
lowed out the terms of publi.,.. discourse, and produced a growing sense of nancial crisis, he appointed economic advisors who had promoted finan-
disempowerment. cial deregulation during the Clinton years. With their encouragement, he
The market-friendly, technocratic conception of glob3lization was bailed out the banks on term, that did not hold them to account for the
embraced by mainstream parties of the left and the right. But it was the behavior that led to the crisis and offered little help for those who had lost
embrace of market thinking and market values by center-left parties that their homes.
proved most consequential-for the globalization project itself and for the His moral voice muted, Obama placated rather than articulated the
populist protest that followed. By the time of Trump's election, the Demo- seething public anger toward Wall Street. Lingering anger over the bailout
cratic Party had become a party of technocratic liberalism more congenial cast a shadow over the Obama presidency and ultimately fueled a mood of
to the professional classes than to the blue-collar and middle-class voters populist protest that reached across the political spectrum-on the left, the
who once constituted its base. The same was true of Britain's Labour Party Occupy movement and the candidacy of Bell)ie Sanders; on the right, the
at the time ofBrexit, and the social democratic parties of Europe. Tea Party movem·ent and the election of Trump.
This transformation had its origins in the 1980s. 2 Ronald Reagan and The populist uprising in the United States, Great Britain, and Europe
Margaret Thatcher had argued that government was the problem and that is a backlash directed generally against elites, but its most conspicuous ca-
markets were the solution. When they passed from the political scene, the sualties have been liberal and center-left political parties-the Democratic
center-left politicians who succeeded them-Bill Clinton in the U.S., Tony

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 THE TYRANNY OF MERIT
WINNERS AND LOSERS
Party in the U.S., the Labour Party in Britain, the Social Democratic Party
(SPD) in Germany (whose share of the vote reached a historic low in the retraining workers whose jobs have disappeared due to globalization and
2017 federal election), Italy's Democratic Party (whose vote share dropped technology; improving access to higher education; and removing barriers
to less than 20 percent), and the Socialist Party in France (whose presiden- of race, ethnicity, and gender. This rhetoric of opportunity is summed up
tial nominee won only 6 percent of the vote in the first round of the 2017 in the slogan that those who work hard and play by the rules should be able
election). to rise "as far as their talents will take them." .,.,
Before they can hope to win back public support, these parties need In recent years, politicians of both parties have reiterated this slogan
to reconsider their market-oriented, technocratic approach to governing. to the point of incantation. Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, and Marco
They need also to rethink something subtler but no less consequential- Rubio among Republicans, and Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, and Hillary
the attitudes toward success and failure that have accompanied the grow- Clinton among Democrats, all invoked it. Obama was fond of a variation
ing inequality of recent decades. They need to ask why those who have of this theme, drawn from a pop song: "You can make it if you try." During
not flourished in the new economy feel that the winners look down with his presidency, he used this line in speeches and public statements more
disdain. than 140 times.4
But the rhetoric of rising now rings hollow. In today's economy, it is
not easy to rise. Americans born to poor parents tend to stay poor as adults.
THE RHETORIC OF RISING Of those born in the bottom fifth of the income scale, only about one in
twenty will make it to the top fifth; most will not even rise to the middle
What, then, has incited the resentment against elites felt by many working- class. 5 It is easier to rise from poverty in Canada or Germany, Denmark,
class and middle-class voters? The answer begins with the rising inequality and other European countries than it is in the United States. 6
of recent decades but does not end there. It has ultimately to do with the This is at odds with the long-standing faith that mobility is America's
changing terms of social recognition and esteem. answer to inequality. The United States, we tell ourselves, can afford to
The age of globalization has bestowed its rewards unevenly, to say the worry less about inequality than the class-bound societies of Europe be-
least. In the United States, most of the nation's income gains since the late cause here, it is possible to rise. Seventy percent of Americans believe the
1970s have gone to the top 10 percent, while the bottom half received vir- poor can make it out of poverty on their own, while only 35 percent of
tually none. In real terms, the median income for working-age men, about Europeans think so. This faith in mobility may explain why the U.S. has a
$36,000, is less than it was four decades ago. Today, the richest 1 percent of less-generous welfare state than most major European countries.7
Americans make more than the bottom half combined.' But today, the countries with the highest mobility tend to be those with
But even this explosion of inequality is not the primary source of popu- the greatest equality. The ability to rise, it seems, depends less on the spur
list anger. Americans have long tolerated inequalities of income and wealth, of poverty than on access to education, health care, and other resources
believing that, whatever one's starting point in life, it is possible to rise from that equip people to succeed in the world of work.
rags to riches. This faith in the possibility of upward mobility is at the heart The explosion of inequality in recent decades has not quickened upward
of the American dream. mobility but, to the contrary, has enabled those on top to consolidate their
In line with this faith, mainstream parties and politicians have re- advantages and pass them on to their children. Over the past half century,
sponded to growing inequality by calling for greater equality of opportunity- elite colleges and universities dismantled barriers of race, religion, gender,
and ethnicity that once restricted admission to the sons of the privileged. The

22
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 THE TYRANNY OF MERIT WINNERS AND LOSERS

Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) was born of the promise to admit students Those who- celebrate the meritocratic ideal and make it the center of their
based on academic merit rather than class and family pedigree. But today's political project overlook this moral question. They also ignore something
meritocracy has hardened into a hereditary aristocracy. more politically potent: the morally unattractive attitudes the meritocratic
Two-thirds of the students at Harvard and Stanford come from•the top ethic promotes, among the winners and also among the losers. Among
fifth of the income scale. Despite generous financial aid policies, fewer than the winners, it generates hubris; among the losers, hurg,iliation and resent-
4 percent oflvy League students come from the bottom fifth. At Harvard and ment. These moral sentiments are at the heart of the populist uprising
other Ivy League colleges, there are more students from families in the top against elites. More than a protest against immigrants and outsourcing,
1 percent (income of more than $630,000 per year) than there are students the populist complaint is about the tyranny of merit. And the complaint
from all the families in the bottom half of the income distribution combined. 8 is justified.
The American faith that, with hard work and talent, anyone can rise no The relentless emphasis on creating a fair meritocracy, in which social
longer fits the facts on the ground. This may explain why the rhetoric of op- positions reflect effort and talent, has a corrosive effect on the way we in-
portunity fails to inspire as it once did. Mobility can no longer compensate terpret our success (or the lack of it). The notion that the system rewards
for inequality. Any serious response to the gap between rich and poor must talent and hard work encourages the winners to consider their success their
reckon directly with inequalities of power and wealth, rather than rest con- own doing, a measure of their virtue-and to look down upon those less
tent with the project of helping people scramble up a ladder whose rungs fortunate than themselves.
grow farther and farther apart. Meritocratic hubris reflects the tendency of winners to inhale too deeply
of their success, to forget the luck and good fortune that helped them on
their way. It is the smug conviction of those who land on top that they
THE MERITOCRATIC ETHIC deserve their fate, and that those on the bottom deserve theirs, too. This
attitude is the moral companion of technocratic politics.
The problem with meritocracy is not only that the practice falls short of the A lively sense of the contingency of our lot conduces to a certain humil-
ideal. If that were the problem, the solution would consist in perfecting ity: "There, but for the grace of God, or the accident of fortune, go I." But a
equality of opportunity, in seeking a society in which people could, what- perfect meritocracy banishes all sense of gift or grace. It diminishes our ca-
ever their starting ·point in life, truly rise as far as their efforts and. talents pacity to see ourselves as sharing a common fate. It leaves little room for the
would take them. But it is doubtful that even a perfect meritocracy would solidarity that can arise when we reflect on the contingency of our talents
be satisfying, either morally or politically. and fortunes. This is what makes merit a kind of tyranny, or unjust rule.
Morally, it is unclear why the talented deserve the outsize rewards that
market-driven societies lavish on the successful. Central to the case for
the meritocratic ethic is the idea that we do not deserve to be rewarded, or THE POLITICS OF HUMILIATION
held back, based on factors beyond our control. But is having (or lacking)
certain talents really our own doing? If not, it is hard to see why those who Seen from below, the hubris of elites is galling. No one likes to be looked
rise thanks to their talents deserve greater rewards than those who may be down upon. But the meritocratic faith adds insult to injury. The notion that
equally hardworking but less endowed with the gifts a market society hap- your fate is in your hands, that "you can make it if you try," is a double-
pens to prize. edged sword, inspiring in one way but invidious in another. It congratulates

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 THE TYRANNY OF MERIT WINNERS AND LOSERS

the winners but denigrates the losers, even in their own eyes. Fm those who won the places that represent two-thirds of America's gross domestic prod-
can't find work or make ends meet, it is hard to escape the demoralizing uct," she told a conference in Mumbai, India, in 2018. "So I won the places
thought that their failure is their own doing, that they simply lack the talent that are optimistic, diverse, dynamic, moving forward." By contrast, Trump
and drive to succeed. drew his support from those who "didn't like black people getting rights"
The politics of humiliation differs in this respect from the politics of in- and "didn't like women ... getting jobs." She had won the votes of the win-
justice. Protest against injustice looks outward; it complains that the system ners of globalization, while Trump had won among th~ losers.W
is rigged, that the winners have cheated or manipulated their way to the The Democratic Party had once stood for farmers and working people
top. Protest against humiliation is psychologically more freighted. It com- against the privileged. Now, in a meritocratic age, its defeated standard
bines resentment of the winners with nagging self-doubt: perhaps the rich bearer boasted that the prosperous, enlightened parts of the country had
are rich because they are more deserving than the poor; maybe the losers voted for her.
are complicit in their misfortune after all. Donald Trump was keenly alive to the politics of humiliation. From
This feature of the politics of humiliation makes it more combustible the standpoint of economic fairness, his populism was fake, a kind of plu-
than other political sentiments. It is a potent ingredient in the volatile brew tocratic populism. He proposed a health plan that would have cut health
of anger and resentment that fuels populist prntest. Though himself a bil- care for many of his working-class supporters and enacted a tax bill that
lionaire, Donald Trump understood and exploited this resentment. Unlike heaped tax cuts on the wealthy. But to focus solely on the hypocrisy misses
Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, who spoke constantly of "opportunity," the point.
Trump scarcely mentioned the word. Instead, he offered blunt talk of winners When he withdrew the United States from the Paris climate change
and losers. (Interestingly, Bernie Sanders, a social democratic populist, also agreement, Trump argued, implausibly, that he was doing so to protect
rarely speaks of opportunity and mobility, focusing instead on inequalities of American jobs. But the real point of his decision, its political rationale, was
power and wealth.) contained in this seemingly stray remark: "At what point does America get
Elites have so valorized a college degree-both as an avenue for ad- demeaned? At what point do they start laughing at us as a country? ... We
. vancement and as the basis for social esteem-that they have difficulty uns don't want other leaders and other countries laughing at us anymore."11
derstanding the hubris a meritocracy can generate, and the harsh judgment Liberating the United States from the supposed burdens of the climate
it imposes on those who have not gone to college. Such attitudes are at the change agreement was not really about jobs or about global warming. It
heart of the populist backlash and Trump's victory. was, in Trump's political imagination, about averting humiliation. This
One of the deepest political divides in American politics today is be- resonated with Trump voters, even those who cared about climate change.
tween those with and those without a college degree. In the 2016 election,
Trump won two-thirds of white voters without a college degree, while Hil-
lary Clinton won decisively among voters with advanced degrees. A similar TECHNOCRATIC MERIT ANO MORAL JUDGMENT

divide appeared in Britain's Brexit referendum. Voters with no college edu-

cation voted overwhelming for Brexit, while the vast majority of those with Taken by itself, the notion that the meritorious should govern is not distinc-
a postgraduate degree voted to remain.9 tive to our time. In ancient China, Confucius taught that those who excelled
Reflecting on her presidential campaign a year and a half later, Hillary in virtue and ability should govern. In ancient Greece, Plato imagined a
Clinton displayed the meritocratic hubris that contributed to her defeat. "] society led by a philosopher-king supported by a public-spirited class of

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 THE TYRANNY OF MERIT WINNERS AND LOSERS

guardians. Aristotle rejected Plato's philosopher-king, but he, too, argued obvious: Over the past four decades, meritocratic elites have not governed
that the meritorious should have the greatest influence in public affairs. For very well. The elites who governed the United States from 1940 to 1980
him the merit relevant to governing was not wealth or noble birth, but ex- were far more successful. They won World War II, helped rebuild Europe
cellence in civic virtue and phronesis, the practical wisdom to reason well and Japan, strengthened the welfare state, dismantled segregation, and pre-
about the common good.12 sided over four decades of economic growth that flow2d to rich and poor
The founders of the American republic called themselves "Men of alike. By contrast, the elites who have governed since have brought us four
Merit," and hoped virtuous, knowledgeable people like themselves would decades of stagnant wages for most workers, inequalities of income and
be elected to office. They opposed hereditary aristocracy, but were not wealth not seen since the 1920s, the Iraq War, a nineteen-year, inconclusive
keen on direct democracy, which they feared could bring demagogues to war in Afghanistan, financial deregulation, the financial crisis of 2008, a
power. They sought to design institutions, such as the indirect election of decaying infrastructure, the highest incarceration rate in the world, and a
the U.S. Senate and the president, that would enable the meritorious to gov- system of campaign finance and gerrymandered congressional districts that
ern. Thomas Jefferson favored a "natural aristocracy" based on "virtue and makes a mockery of democracy.
talents" rather than an "artificial aristocracy founded on wealth and birth." Not only has technocratic merit failed as a mode of governance; it has
''That form of government is the best/' he wrote, which provides "for a pure also narrowed the civic project. Today, the common good is understood
selection of these natural aristoi into the offic~§ of government."13 mainly in economic terms. It is less about cultivating solidarity or deepen-
Despite their differences, these traditional versions of political ing the bonds of citizenship than about satisfying consumer preferences as
meritocracy-from the Confucian to the Platonic to the republican-share measured by the gross domestic product. This makes for an impoverished
the notion that the merits relevant to ·governing include moral and civic public discourse.
virtue. This is because all agree that the common good consists, at least in What passes for political argument these days consists either of nar-
part, in the moral education of citizens. row, managerial, technocratic talk, which inspires no one; or else shouting
Our technocratic version of meritocracy severs the link between merit matches, in which partisans talk past one another, without really listening.
and moral judgment. In the domain of the economy, it simply assumes that Citizens across the political spectrum find this empty public discourse frus-
the common good is defined by GDP, and that the value of people's contri- trating and disempowering. They rightly sense that the absence of robust
butions consists in the market value of the goods or services they sell. In the public debate does not mean that no policies are being decided. It simply
domain of government, it assumes that merit means technocratic expertise. means they are being decided elsewhere, out of public view-by adminis-
This can be seen in the growing role of economists as policy advisors, trative agencies (often captured by the industries they regulate), by central
the increasing reliance on market mechanisms to define and achieve the banks and bond markets, by corporate lobbyists whose campaign contribu-
public good, and the failure of public discourse to address the large moral tions buy influence with public officials.
and civic questions that should be at the center of political debate: What But that's not all. Beyond hollowing out public discourse, the reign of
should we do about rising inequality? What is the moral significance of technocratic merit has reconfigured the terms of social recognition in ways
national borders? What makes for the dignity of work? What do we owe that elevate the prestige of the credentialed, professional classes and depre-
one another as citizens? ciate the contributions of most workers, eroding their social standing and
This morally blinkered way of conceiving merit and the public good esteem. It is this aspect of technocratic merit that contributes most directly
has weakened democratic societies in several ways. The first is the most to the angry, polarized politics of our time.

28 29
 THE TYRANNY OF MERIT WINNERS AND LOSERS

But this misunderstands the populist complaint. It also reflects a de-

THE POPULIST UPRISING fect in the technocratic approach to governing. Conducting our public dis-
course as if it were possible to outsource moral and political judgment to
Six decades ago, a British sociologist named Michael Young anticipated the markets, or to experts and technocrats, has emptied democratic argument
hubris and resentment to which meritocracy gives rise. In fact, it was he of meaning and purpose. Such vacuums of public meaning are invariably
who coined the term. In a book called The Rise of the Meritocracy (1958), filled by harsh, authoritarian forms of identity and be'!'onging-whether in
he asked what would happen if, one day, class barriers were -overcome, so the form of religious fundamentalism or strident nationalism.
that everyone had a truly equal opportunity to rise based solely on his or her That is what we are witnessing today. Four decades of market-driven
own merit 14 globalization have hollowed out public discourse, disempowered ordinary
In one respect, this would be something to celebrate; the children of citizens, and prompted a populist backlash that seeks to clothe the naked
the working class would at last compete fairly, side by side with the chil- public square with an intolerant, vengeful nationalism.
dren of the privileged. But it would not, Young thought, be an unmitigated To reinvigorate democratic politics, we need to find our way to a morally
triumph; for it was bound to foster hubris in the. winners and humiliation more robust public discourse, one that takes seriously the corrosive effect of
among the losers. The winners would consider their success a "just re- meritocratic striving on the social bonds that constitute our common life.
ward for their own capacity, for their own eff6rts, for their own undeniable
achievement," and would therefore look down on those less successful than
themselves. Those who failed to rise would feel they had no one to blame
but themselves. 15
For Young, meritocracy was not an ideal to aim at but a recipe for social
discord. He glimpsed, decades ago, the harsh meritocratic logic that now
p~isons our politics and animates populist anger. For those who feel ag-
gneved by the tyranny of merit, the problem is not only stagnant wages but
also the loss of social esteem.
The loss of jobs to technology and outsourcing has coincided with a
sense that society accords less respect to the kind of work the working class
does. As economic activity has shifted from making things to managing
money, as society has lavished outsize rewards on hedge fund managers,
Wall Street bankers, and the professional classes, the esteem accorded work
in the traditional sense has become fragile and uncertain .
. Mainstream parties and elites miss this dimension of politics. They
thmk the problem with market-driven globalization is simply a matter of
distributive justice; those who have gained from global trade, new technol-
ogies;- and the financialization of the economy have not adequately com-
pensated those who have lost out.

30 31
Globalisation may be defined as the increasing interaction among and integration of the

activities , especially economic activities of human societies around the world

Globalisation is one of the key drivers of Multilulturism

The definition of multiculturalism does not assume that it at least

practically is free from tensions /

challenges

Misunderstandings / miscommunications among diff cultures / ethnicities can arise and potentially
escalate to tensions
among them
[ lack Of understanding

Cosmopolitan view of culture

Universalist ideal of equality

Postcolonial critique
Principle of Humanity

and
' "
Posits always a
being end never
-

to treat human as an as a mere means

"
and
"

Humanity : all rational autonomous beings no matter their species

-

As an end : giving the individual the due respect

-
As a means : treating the individual as a means to your end

The golden rule

-
Treat others as you would like others to treat you
"

Utilitarianism
-
Posits that the morally right action brings about the greatest good for the greatest
number of people

Impartiality : everyone 's happiness counts the same . When one maximizes the

good ,
it is the good impartially considered .

My good counts for no more

than anyone else 's good

'

Agent neutrality : the reason have to promote the overall good is the
-
-
I

same reason anyone else has to 50 promote the good . It is not peculiar to

me
 23 nation c
Europe,
the cons
ofren sec
for vari<
special i
Ricans.
le is l
accomm
that I wi
of grou
rights;(:
Will Kymlicka sentatio1
each, be
raise for
chapter~

1 Three Forms_of Group- or conflictual view of human relationships. I I. Self-,

Differentiated Rights believe that this criticism is profoundly mistaken, states, 1
and that individual rights can be and typically are demand
Virtually all liberal democracies are either multi- used to sustain a wide range of social relation- torial ju
national or polyethnic, or both. The 'challenge of ships. Indeed, the most basic liberal right - free- develop·
multiculturalism' is to accommodate these dom of conscience - is primarily valuable for the interest!
national and ethnic differences in a stable and protection it gives to intrinsically social (and non- may wi
morally defensible way (Gutmann 1993). In this instrumental) activitics. 1 determi
section, I will d iscuss some of the most important However, it is increasingly accepted 111 many state.
ways in which democracies have responded to the countries that some forms of cultura l difference The
demands of national minorities and ethnic can onl y be accommodated through special legal determi
groups. or constitutional measures, above and beyond the mternat
In all liberal democracies, one of the major common rights of citizenshi p. Some forms of Nations
mechanisms for accommodating cultural differ- group difference can only be accommodated if self-det,
ences is the protection of t he civil and political their members have certain group-specific rights defined
rights of individuals. It is impossible to overstate - what Iris Young calls 'differentiated citizen- principl ·
the importance of freedom of association, reli- ship' (I. Young 1989: 258). colonic!
gion, speech, mobility, and political organization for example, a recent govern ment publ ication when ti
for protecting group difference. These rights in Canada noted that: coloniz:
enable individuals to form and maintain the vari- limitati,
ous groups and associations which constitute civil In the Canadian experience, it has not been colonie:
society, to adapt these groups to changi ng cir- enough to protect onl y uni versal individual widely
cumstances, and to promote thei r views and rights. Herc, the ConsLilution .rnd ordinary minorit
interests to the wider population. The protection laws also protect other rights accorded to indi- 'nauorn
.
afforded by these common rights of ciLizenship is vid uals as members of certain communities. determ;
sufficient for many of the legitimate forms of This accommodation of both types of rights self-gO\
di versity in society. makes our constitution uniq ue and rdlects the quishec
Various critics of liberalism - including some Canadian value of equality that accommodates tion int
l\llarxists, communitarians, and femini sts - have difference. The fact that community rights One
argued that the liberal focus on inclivid ual rights exist alongside individual rights goes to the govern1
reflects an atomistic, materialistic, instrumental, ve ry heart of what Canada is all about. betwee1
(Government of Canada 1991a: 3) units (I
Reprinted from \.Viii Kymlick:i, M11l1iwl111ml m_inori1
Citizenship (Clarendon Press, 1995), 26--33, 108-30. It is q uite misleading to say that Canada is unique bounda
Copyright © 1995 by \.\lill Kymlicka. Reprinted by per- in combining uni versal individ ual rights and that th<
mission of Oxford University Press. group-specific 'community ri ghts' . Such a cornbi- of the 1
 Justice and Minority Rights

nation exists in many other federal systems in eralism can provide extensive seJf..:government for
Europe, Asia, and Africa. As I noted earlier, even a national minority, guaranteeing its ability to
the constitution of the United States, which is make decisions in certain areas without being out-
often seen as a paradigm of individualism, allows voted by the larger society.
for various group-specific rights, including the For example, under the federal division of
special status of American Indians and Puerto powers in Canada, the province of~ebec (which
Ricans: - is 80 per cent francophone) has extensive juris-
lt is these special group-specific measures for diction over issues that are crucial to the survival
accommodating national and ethnic differences of the French culture, including control over
that I will focus on. There are at least three forms education, language, culture, as well as significant
of group-specific rights: (I) self-government input into immigration policy. The otlier nine
rights; (2) polycthnic rights; and (3) special repre- provinces also have these powers, but the major
sentation rights. I will say a few words about impetus behind the existing division of powers,
each, before considering some of the issues they and indeed behind the entire federal system, is
raise for liberal-democratic theory in subsequent the need to accommodate the Quebecois. At the
chapters. time of Confederation, most English Canadian
leaders were in favour of a unitary state, like
onships. I J. Self-govern111e111 rig/11s. In most multination Britain, and agreed to a federal system primarily
· mistaken, states, the component nations arc inclined to to accommodate F rench Canadians.
·pically are demand some form of political autonomy or terri- One difficulty in a federal system is maintain-
I relation- torial jurisdiction, so as to ensure the full and free ing the balance between centralization and decen-
~ht - free- development of their cultures and the best tral ization. While most Quebecers want an -even
bie for the interests of their people. At the extreme, nations more decentralized division of powers, most
(and non- may wish to secede, if they think their self- English Canadians favour a stronger central
determination is impossible within the larger government. One of the challenges facing
l in many state. Canada, therefore, is finding an acceptable form
difference The right of national groups to self- of'asymmetrical fed eralism' which grants ~ ebec
1ecial legal determination is given {limited) recognition in powers not given to other provinces. Other fed-
,eyond the international law. According to the United eral states face a similar problem. 3
forms of Nations' Charter, 'all peoples have the right to Federalism is often used to accommodate
iodated if self-determination'. However, the UN has not national diversity, and so some commentators
:ific rights defined 'peoples', and it has generally applied the include the rights and powers attached to federal
d citizen- principle of self-determination only to overseas units amongst the 'collective rights' of national
colonies, not internal national minorities, even minorities (e.g. F . Morton 1985: 77; Van D yke
ublication when the latter were subject to the same sort of 1982: 24-3 l ). Of course, many federal systems
colonization and conquest as the former. This arose for reasons quite unrelated to cultural
limitation on self-determination to overseas di versity. Federalism is ofrcn simply a form of
not been colonies (known as the 'salt-water thesis') is administrati ve decentralization (as in Germany),
individual widely seen as arbitrary, and many national or the result of historical accidents of colonization
ordinary minorities insist that they too are ' peoples' or (as in Austr alia). There is no inherent connection
•d to indi- 'nations' , and, as such, have the right of self- between federalism and cul tural di versity.
1munities1 . determination. They demand certain powers of But federalism is one common strategy of
of rights self-government which they say were not relin- accommodating national minorities. It is not sur-
!fleets the quished by their (often involuntary) incorpora- prising th:it countries which arc 'a federation of
nmodatcs tion into a larger state. 2 peoples' should also form a poli tical federation.~
ity rights One mechanism for recognizing claims to self- In the United States, however, a deli berate
es to the government is federalism, which di vides powers decision was made not to use fcder:ilism to
II abouh between the central govcrnmenr and regional sub- accommodate the self-go,·crnmcnt rights of
tu~its (provinces/stat es/cantons). Where national national minorit ies. l t would ha,·c been quite pos-
rnmoritics . arc regionally conecntratcd , tilt' sible in the nineteenth ccntury ll, create states
is unique boundari es of fedcral subuni ts can he drawn so dominati.:d by the Narn ho, for e:-.amplc, or by
glits and that the national millority forms a majority in one Chicano~, Puerto l{ican~, and nati,·.: 11:twaii:rns.
a combi- of the s11bunits. Under thi.:~e circumstanu·s, fed- At tlit: ti mt thc~t: {!roups wnc incorporated into
 •
Will Kymlicka

the U nited States, th ey fo rm ed majorities in th eir been appro ved by the federa l government. challenge(
homelands. H owever, a deli ber:1te decision w:1s F or the other indige no us peoples in Nort h assumed t
made not to accept any territory as a state unless America, however, self-government has been pri- their ethn
these national groups were outnumbered. In marily tied to the system of reserved la nds cultural n
some cases, t his was ach ieved by drawin g bound - (known as tribal 'reservations' in the U nited lenge sim
aries so that Indian tribes or H ispanic groups States, and band ' reserves' in Canada). right free!
were outnumbered (Florida). In other cases, it S ubstan tial powers have bee~ devolved from the fea r of pr
was achi eved by delayin g stat ehood until anglo- fede ral government to the tribal/band councils stream soc
phone settle rs swamped the older inhabitants which govern each reserve. Indian tribes/ba nds it, that ' pc
(e.g. Hawaii ; th e south- west). In cases where the have been acquiring increasing control over it was air
nati onal minority was no.t likely to be outnum- health, education, family law, polici ng, cri minal I982: 6-I:
be red , a new type o f non-federal political unit justice, and reso urce developm ent. They arc But th
was created, such as the 'commonwealth' of becoming, in effect , a t hird orde r o f government, expanded
Puerto Ri co, or th e ' P rotectorate' of Guam.; with a collectio n of powers that is carved out of that posi ti
As a result, none of th e fift y states can be seen both federa l and sta te/ provi ncial jurisdictions.<• criminatio
as ensuri ng self- gove rnment for a national minor- However, the administrative d ifficu lties arc visible mi1
ity, the way that Quebec ensures self-government dauntin g. India n tri bes/ bands di ffer enormously For th1!
for the Q!.iebecois. Self-governm ent is instead in t he sorts of powers they desire. Moreover, they ered part
achieved through political institutions located are territorially located within ex1st111g Canada ar,
inside existing states (e.g. Indian reservations), or states/ provinces, and must co-ordinate their self- tion curri,
entirely outside the federal system (e.g. Puerto govern m ent with state/provincial agencies. T he tribution
Rico, Guam). This has t end ed to make national exact scope and mechanism s of indigen ous self- arc prima
mino ri ties in the U ni ted States more vulnerable, government in Ca nada and the United States exercise o
since t heir self- government powers do not have t herefore remain unclear. so do not·
the same constitutional protection as states' S imilar systems of self-government exist, or are izenship r
rights. O n the other hand, it has provided greater being sought, by many other ind igenous peoples. Some ,
fl exibility in redefining those powers so as to s ui t A recent international declaration regarding the have also
the needs and interests of each minority. It is ri ghts of indigenous peoples emphasizes the funding o
much easier to negotiate ne,y self-government importance of political self-governm ent. In many the fundi1
provisions for the N avaho or Puerto Ricans than parts of the world, however, the hope for politica l festivals.
to modify the powers of individual states. powers is almost utopian, and the more im med iate fundin g t
Federalism ca n only serve as a m echanism fo r goa l is simply to secure the existing land base serve the
sel_f- government if t he national minority forms a from further erosion by settle rs and resource resources,
majori ty in one of the federal subunits, as the developers. Indeed , a recent stud y showed that associatio:
~1ebecois do in Quebec. This is not true of most th e single largest cause of ethnic con0ict in the heading.
indigenous peoples in North America, who are world today is the struggle by indigenous peoples ing simp
fewer in number and whose communities are fo r the protection o f their land rights.i groups a
o ften d ispersed across state/ provi ncial li nes. Self-gove rnment claims, then , typicall y take fund ing c
M oreover, with few exceptions (such as the t he form of devolving poli tical powe r to a poli tical that pub!
N avaho), no ri.:dra wing of t he boundaries of these unit substantially co ntrolled by the m embers of been bias,
federal subunits would create a state, pro vi nce, or the natio nal m inori ty, and substan tially corre- of cultur;;
territory with an indigenous majority. It wo uld s ponding to their his torical homeland or terri- at ethnic
have been possible to create a state or province tory. It is important to note that these claims are demand -
dominated by an Indian tribe in the nineteenth not seen as a tem porary m easu re, nor as a remedy for the p
century, but, given the massive influx of settlers for a fo rm of oppressio n that we m ight (and tion in sci
since then, it is now virtually inconceivable. ought) someday to eliminate. On the contrary, Perhap
One exception concerns t he Inuit in t he north these rights are often described as 'inherent', and nic group
of Canada, who wis h to divide the Northwest so permanent (which is one reason why nat ional lations t.
T erritories into two, so that t hey will form the minorities seek to have them entr enched in the religious
majority in the eastern half (to be called constitution). Muslims
'Nunavut'). This redrawing of federal boundari es Sunday c
is seen as essential to th e implem entation of the 2. P olyetlmic rights. As I noted earlier, immigrant Sikh men
Inuit's right of self-government, and has recentl y groups in the last thrrty years have successfull y motorcyc
 Justice and Minority Rights

t. challenged rhe 'Anglo-conformity' model which dress-codes of police forces, so that they can wear
n North assumed that they should abandon all aspects of thei r turban; Orthodox Jews in the U nited States
been pri- their ethnic heritage and assimilate to existing have sought the ri ght to wear the -ya rmulka dur-
ed lands cultural norms and customs. At first, this chal- ing military service; and Muslim girls in France
: United lenge simply rook the form of dema nding the have sought exemption- from school dress-codes
Canada). ri ght freely to express their particularity without so that they can wear the chador.9
from the fear of prejudice or discrimination in the main- These group-specific measures - which I call
councils stream society. It was the demand, as Walzer put 'polyethnic ri ghts' - are inte nded to help ethnic
es/bands it that 'politics be separated from nationality - as
) groups and religious minorities express their
TOI over it was already scparnred from religion' (Walzer cultural particularity and pride without it
criminal ]982: 6-11 ). hampering their success in the economic and
!'hey are Bur the dcmnnds of ethnic groups have political institutions of the dominant society.
ernmenr, expanded in important directions. It became clear Like self-government rights, these polyethnic
ed our of char positive steps were required to root our dis- ri ghts are not seen as temporary, because the cul-
dictions.6 crimination and prejudice, particularly against tural differences they protect arc not something
!ties are . visible minorities. we seek to eliminate. But, as I d iscuss in
ormously For this reason, anti-racism policies arc consid- Chapters 5 and 9, unlike self-government ri ghts,
)ver, they ered part of the ' multiculturalism' policy in polyethnic rights arc usually intended to pro-
existing C111ada and Australia, ns are changes to the educa- mote integration into the larger society, not self-
their self- tion curriculum to recognize the history nnd con- government.
cies. The tribution of minorities. However, these policies
1ous self- are primarily directed at ensuring the effective 3. Special represe111atio11 rights. While the tradi-
ed States exercise of the common rights of citizenship, and tional concern of national minorities and ethnic
so do not really qualify as group-di f(erentiated cit- groups has been with either self-government or
:ist, or are izenship ri ghts. polycthnic rights, there has been increasing inter-
s peoples. Some ethnic groups and religious minorities est by these groups, as well as other non-ethnic
.rding the have also demanded va rious forms of public social groups, in the idea of special representation
1sizcs the funding of thei r cul tura l practices. This includes rights .
. ln many the funding of ethnic associations, magazines, and Throughout the Western democracies, there is
ir political festivals. Given t hat most liberal states provide increasing concern that the political process is
.mmediate funding to the arts and museums, so as to pre- ' unrepresentati ve', in the sense that it fails ro
land base serve the richness and d iversity of our cultural reflect the diversity of the population.
resource resources, funding for ethnic studies and ethnic L egislatures in most of these countries are domi-
owed that associations can be seen as falling under this nated by middle- class, able-bodied, white men . A
lier in the heading. Indeed, some people defend this fu nd- more representative process, it is said, would
us peoples ing simply as a way of ensuring that ethnic include members of ethnic and racial minorities,
groups are not discriminated against in state women, the poor, the disabled, etc. The under-
call y take funding of art and cul ture. Some people believe representation of historicall y disadvnntaged
a political
embers of
1 that public funding agencies have traditionall y
been biased in favour of European-derived forms
groups is a genera l phenomenon . In the U ni ted
States and Canada, women, racial minorities, and
ill y carre- 1 of cultural expression, and programmes targeted indigenous peoples all have under one-third of
l or terri-
claims are
; a remedy
l at ethnic groups remedy this bias. A related
demand - discussed at length· in Chapter 58 - is
· the scats they would have based on their demo-
graphic weight. People with d isabilities and the
for the provision of immigrant language educa- economically disad vantaged are nlso significantly
1ight (and
contrary,
~rent', and
I tion in schools.
Perhaps the most controversial demand of eth-
under-representep .10
One way to reform the process is to make
nic groups is for exemptions from laws and re gu- political parties more inclusive, by reducing the
1y national lations that disadvantage them, given thei r barriers which inhibit women, ethnic minorities,
1cd in the religious practices. for example, Jews and or the poor from becoming party candidates or
Muslims in Britain have sought exemption from party leaders; another way is to adopt some form
Sunday closing or animal slaughterin g legislation; of proportional representation, which has hiswri-
immigrant Sikh men in. Canada have sought exemption from cally been associated with gre:Hcr inclusivcnc~s of
ucccssfully rno1orcycle helmet laws and from the official cancl idarcs.
Will Kymlicka

However, there is incre;1sing intere~t in the moclation of differences, and that true equality Any pl:
idea that a certain number of seats in the legisla- requires equal rights for each indi vid ual regard- nize the f:
ture should be reser ved for the members of disad- less of race or erh nicity. 13 As I noted in C hapter-+, national n
va ntaged or marginalized groups. During the this assumption that liberal equali ty precludes believe, w
debate in Canada over the Charlottetown Accord, group-specific righ ts is relatively recent, and R.awls's a
for example, a number of recommendations were arose in part as an (ovcr-)gencralii·A 1tion of the importanc
made for the guaranteed representation of racial desegregation movement in the U nited Indeed in
women, ethnic minorities, official language States. It has some superficial plausibility. In just the sc
minorities, and Aborigi nals. many cases, claims for group-specific rights arc cerned at
Group representation rights are often defended simply an attempt by one group to dominate and and perv;
as a response to some systemic disadvantage or oppress another. 197 1: 96;,
barrier in the political process which makes it But some minority ri ghts eliminate, rather than This
impossible for the group's views and interests to create, inequalities. Some groups arc unfairl y dis- endorse s
be effectively represented. ln so far as these rights advantaged in the cultural market- place, and there acn
are seen as a response to oppression or systemic political recognition and sup port rectify this dis- cultural r.
disadvantage, they arc most plausibly seen as a ad vantage. I will start with the case of national serve to n
temporary measure on the way to a society where minorities. The viability of their societal cul tures imate sco1
the need for special representation no longer may be undermined by economic and political cumstanc,
exists - a forin of political 'affirmative action' . decisions made by the majority. They could be groups ar
Society should seek to remove the oppression and outbid or outvoted on resources and policies that than the (
disadvantage, thereby eliminating the need for are crucial to the survival of their societal cultures. external r
these ri ghts. The members of majority cultures do not face this example,
However, the issue of special representation problem. Given the importance of cultural mem- necessary
rights for groups is complicated, because bership, this is a significant inequality which, if not neces:
special representation is sometimes defended, not not addressed, becomes a serious injustice. ofQ!lebe<
on grounds of oppression, but as a corollary Group-differentiated ri ghts - such as te rri tor- At son:
of self-government. A minority's right to ial autonomy, veto powers, guaranteed represen- or resour,
self-government would be severely weakened if tation in central institutions, land claims, and same opp
some external body could unilaterally revise or language rights - can help rectify this disadvan- cure. Inst,
revoke its powers, without consulting the minor- tage, by alleviating the vulnerability of minority benefits d
ity or securing its consent. H ence it would seem cultures to majority decisions. These external to pursue
to be a corollary of self-government that the protections ensure that members of the minority was clear!
national minority be guaranteed representation have the same opportuni ty to live and wo rk in constituti
01J any body which can interpret or modify its their own culture as members of the majority. controllcc
powers of self-government (e.g. the S upreme As I discussed in Chapter 3, these ri ghts may country,
Court). S ince the claims of self-govcrnmcnr are impose restrictions on the members of the larger levers of i
seen as inherent and permanent, so too are the society, by making it more costly for them to One cc
guarantees of representation which flow from it move into the territory of the minority (e.g. of land re
(unlike guarantees grounded on oppression). 11 longer residency requirements, fewer government be necess
services in their language), or by givi ng minority tections,
members priority in the use of certain land and unequal
2 The Equality Argum.cnt resources (e.g. indigenous hunti ng and fis hing then req
rights). But the sacrifice required of non- peoples b
tvlany defenders of group-specific ri ghts for eth- members by the existence of these rights is far tion as th
nic and national minorities insist that they are less than the sacrifice members would face in the as to assi:
needed to ensure that all citizens arc treated with absence of such ri ghts. world, o
genuine equality. On this ,·iew, ' the accommoda- Where these rights are recognized, mem bers of struggli n
tion of diffe rences is the essence of true the majority who choose to enter the minority's needed tc
equality', 12 and group- specific rights are needed homeland may have to forgo certain benefi ts they tics. But
to accommodate our differences. I think this are accustomed to. T his is a burden. Bur without could exc
argument is correct, within certain li mits. such rights, the members of many minority cul- The h
Proponents of 'benign neglect' will respond tures face the loss of their culture, a loss which depend o
that individual ri ghts already allow for the accom- we cannot reasonably ask people to accept. pie have
 Justice and Minority Rights

rue equality Any plausible theory of justice should recog- stitution should grant a veto power over certai n
:I ual regard- nize the fairness of these external protections for important decisions to some or all of the major
n Chapter 4, national minorities. They are clearly justified, I national groups. This sort of veto power is a
Y precludes believe, within a liberal egalitarian theory, such as familiar feature of various 'consociational democ-
recent, and Rawls's and Dworkin's, which emphasizes the racies' in Europe, and, as I discuss in the next
ation of the importance of rectifying unchosen inequalities. chapter, under certain circumstances it can pro-
the United Indeed inequalities in cultural membership are mote justice. But it would probably be unjust to
usibility. In just the sort which Rawls says we should be con- give privileged groups a veto power before there
c rights are cerned about, since their effects are 'profound has been a dramatic redistribution of wealth and
)minate and and pervasive and present from birth' (Rawls opportunities (Adam 1979: 295). A veto power
]971: 96; cf. Dworkin 1981). 14 can promote justice if it helps protect a minority
, rather than This eq uality-based argument will only from unjust policies that favour rhe majority; but
unfairly dis- endorse special righ ts for national minorities if it is :in obstacle to justice if it allows a privileged
-place, and there actually is a disadvantage with respect to group the leverage to maintain its un just advan-
ify this dis- cultural membership, and if the rights actually tages.
of national serve to rectify the disadvantage. Hence the legit- So the ideal of 'benign neglect' is not in fact
~ral cultures imate scope of these ri ghts will vary with the cir- benign. It ignores the fact that rhe members of a
nd political cumstances. In North America, indigenous nation:il minority face a disadvantage which the
~y could be groups are more vulnerable to majority decisions members of the majority do not face. In any
policies that than the Quebecois or Puerto Ricans, and so their event, the idea that the government could be neu-
ta! cultures. external protections will be more extensive. For tral with respect to ethnic and nation:il groups is
not face this example, restrictions on the sale of land which are patently false. As I noted in Chapter 5, one of the
ltural mem- necessary in the context of indigenous peoples are most important determinants of whether a cul-
:y which, if not necessary, and hence not justified, in the case ture survives is whether its language is the lan-
:ice. of Quebec or Puerto Rico. i; guage of government - i.e. the bnguage of public
as territor- At some point, demands for increased powers schooling, courts, legislatures, welfare agencies,
d represen- or resources will not be necessary to ensure the health services, etc. When the government
:laims, and same opportunity to live and work in one's cul- decides the language of public schooli ng, it is
s disadvan- ture. Instead, they will simply be attempts to gain providing what is probably the most important
of minority benefits denied to others, to have more resources form of support needed by societal cultures, since
se external to pursue one's way of life than others have. This it guarantees the passing on of the language and
1e minority was clearly the case with apartheid, where whites its associated traditions and conventions to the
:id work in constituting under 20 per cent of the population next generation. Refusing ro provide public
ajority. controlled 87 per cent of the land mass of the schooling in a minority langu:ige, by contrast, is
rights may country, and monopolized all the im portant almost inevitably condemning that language to
f the l~rger levers of slate power. ever-increasing m:irginalization . .
)r them to One could imagine a point where the amount The government therefore cannot avoid decid-
1ority (e.g. of land reserved for indigenous peoples would not ing which societal cultures will be supported.
;overnment be necessary to provide reasonable external pro- And if it supports the majority culture, by using
1g minority tections, but r:ither would simply provide the majority's l:i nguage in schools and public
n land and unequal opportuni ties to them. Justice would agencies, it cannot refuse official recognition to
111d fishing then require th:it the holdings of indigenous minority languages on the ground that this vio-
of non- peoples be subject to the same redistributive rax:i- l.Hes 'the separation of state and ethnicity'. This
ights is far tion :is the wealth of other advantaged groups, so shows that the analogy between religion and cul-
face in the as to assist rhe less well off in society. In the real lure is mistaken. As I noted earlier, many liberals
world, of course, most indigenous peoples are say that just as the srate should not recognize,
nembers of struggling ro mainrain the bare minimum of land endorse, or support an y parricular church, so ir
minority's needed to sustain the viability of their comm uni- should not recognize, endorse, or support any
:nefirs they ties. But ir is possible that their land holdings particular culrural group or identity {Ch. I , s. I ).
!ul without could exceed what justice allo\\'s.1'' But the analogy does not \\'Ork. lr is quit e possible
nority cul- The lq;i timacy of cerrain mrnsure~ may also for a su re not 10 ha ve an estahlislH:cl church. Bui
loss which depend 6n their riming. Por example, m:my peo- th <: state cannot he lp but give :it least partial
!pl. ple have suggested that :1 ne\\'.Suuth /\ frican con- tstahlishmenl lO a culture when ir decides which
 •
Wi ll Kyrnlicka

language is to be used 111 public schooli ng, ur i11 political units - wha t level of government should In a dcm
the provis ion uf state services. The state can (and make these decisions? S hould each neighbour- always ha
should) replace religious oaths in courts with sec- hood be able to decide on the language of public ported, ;11
ular oaths, but it cannot replace the use of schooling and public services in that neighbour- tcct its i
English in courts with no language. hood? Or should this decision be left to larger The qucs
This is a significant embarrassment for the units, such as cities or provinces? And how do we same ben
'benign neglect' view, and it is remarkable how decide on the boundaries of these subunits? If we to nation
rarely language rights are discussed in contempo- draw municipal or provincial boundaries in. one clearly ye
rary liberal theory.17 As Brian Weinstein put it, way, then a national minority will not form even a Hence
political theorists have had a lot to say about ' the local majority. But if we draw the boundaries rights cc
language of politics' - that is, the symbols, another way, then the national minority will form which pu
metaphors, and rhetorical devices of political dis- a local majority. In a m ultination state, decisions systemic
course - but have had virtually nothing to say on boundaries and the division of powers arc place, reg
about 'the politics of language' - that is, the deci- inevitably decisions about which national group This is 0 1
sions about which languages to use in political, will ha ve the ability to use which state powers to requires :
legal, and educational forums (Weinstein 1983: sustain its culturc. 1s ferential 1
7-13). Yet language rights are a fun damental For example, as 1 noted in Cha pter 2, the Inuit ferential 1
cause of political conflict, even violence, through- 111 Canada wish to di vide the Northwest This d
out the world, including Canada, Belgium, Spain, Territories into two, so that they will form the reject the
Sri Lanka, the Baltics, Bulgaria, Turkey, and majority in the eastern half. T his is seen as essen- the socie1
many other countries (Horowitz 1985: 219-24 ). tial to the implementation of their right of self- tected, ti
One could argue that decisions about the lan- government. Some liberals object tha t this autonom)
guage of schooling and public services should be proposal violates the separation of state and eth- have an i1
determined, not by officially recognizing the exis- nicity by distributing public benefits and sta te character
tence of various groups, but simply by allowi ng powers so as to make it easier for a specific group particular
each political subu nit to make its own language to preserve its culture. But all decisions regarding maintaini
policy on a democratic basis. If a national minor- boundaries and the distribution of powers in choices o
ity forms a majority in the relevant unit, they can multination states have this effect. We can dra w intervene
decide to have their mother tongue adopted as an boundaries and distribute legislative powers so options c
official language in that unit. But this is because that a national minority has an increased ability penalizin1
they are a local majority, not because the state has within a particular region to protect its social cul- risk of un
officially recognized them as a ' nation'. ture; or we can draw boundaries and distribute (Kymlick
This is sometimes said to be the American legislative powers so tha t the majority nation con- effect of
approach to language rights, since there is no trols decisions regardin g language, education, which are
constitutional definition of language rights in the immigration, etc. on a count ry- wide basis. tions (see
United States. But in fact the American govern- T he whole idea of 'benign neglect' is incoher- Let me
ment has historically tried to make sure that such ent, and reflects a shallow understanding of the n1c grour
' local' decisions are always made by political uni ts relationship between states and nat ions. In the argument
that have an anglophone majority. As discussed in areas of official languages, political boundaries, invokes ti
Chapter 2, decisions about state borckrs, or about and the division of powers, there is no way to ethnicity,
,yhen to admit territories as states, have been avoid supporting this or that societal cul ture, or Chapter
explicitly made with the aim of ensuring that deciding which groups wi ll form a majority in grants, 1
there will be an anglophone majority. States in political uni ts that control culture-affecting deci- involves
the American south-west and Hawaii were only sions regardin g language, education, and immi- culture(s)
offered statehood when the national minorities gration. their old
residing in those area·s were outnumbered by set- So the real question is, what is a fair way to members
tlers and immigrants. And some people oppose recognize languages, draw boundaries, and dis- exist in ti
offering statehood to Puerto Rico precisely on the tribute powers? And the answer, I t hink, is that good of 1
grounds that it will never have an anglophone we should aim at ensuri ng that all national groups primarily
majority (Rubinstein 1993; G lazer 1983: 280). have the opportunity to maintain themselves as a providi ng
This illustrates a more ge neral point. Leaving distinct culture, if they so choose. This ensures of discrirr

_.
decisions about language to political subunits just that the good of cultural membership is equally ing, this i
pushes back the problem. What are the relevant protected for the members of all national groups. I the comrr
 Justice and Minority Rights

it should In a democratic society, the majority nation will group-differentiated rights. In so far as common
ighbour- always have its language and societal culture sup- rights of citizenship in fact create equal access to
of public ported, and will have the legislative power to pro- mainstream culture, then equality with respect to
·ighbour- tect its interests in culture-affecting decisions. cultural membership is achieved.
to larger The question is whether fairness requires that the But even here equality does justify some
)W do we same benefits and opportunities sho.uld be given group-specific rights. Consider the case of public
its? If we to national minorities. The answer, I think, is holidays. Some people object to legislation that
! S m one clearly yes. exempts J ews and Muslims from Sunday closing
·m even a Hence group-differentiated self-government legislation, on the ground that this violates the
)undaries rights compensate for unequal circumsta nces separation of state and ethnicity. But almost any
will form which put the members of minori ty cultures at a decision on public holidays will do so. In the
decisions systemic disad vn magc in 1hc cul tural market- major immigra tion counrrics, public holidays cur-
nvers are place, regardless of their persona l choices in life. rently rcOcct the needs of Christians. Hence
,al group This is one of many areas in which true equnlity government offices are closed on Sunday, and on
powers to requires not identical treatment, but rather dif- the major religious holidays (Easter, Christmas).
ferential treatment in order to accommodate dif- This need not be seen as a deliberate decision to
. the Inuit feren1ial needs. 19 promote Christiani ty ;incl discri minate against
.Jorthwest This does not mean that we should enti rely other fa iths (although this was undoubtedly part
form the reject the iden of the cultural marker-place. O nce of the original moti vation). Decisions about
1as essen- the societal cul tures of national groups arc pro- government holidays were made when there was
1t of self- tected, th rough language rights and territorial fa r less religious di versity, and people just took it
that this autonomy, then the cultural market-place docs for granted that the government work-week
: and eth- have an important role to play in determining the should accommodate Christian beliefs about days
and state character of the culture. Decisions about which of rest and religious celebration.
:ific group particular aspects of one's culture are worth But these decisions can be a significant disad-
regarding maintaining and developing should be left to rhe vantage to the members of other religious faiths.
powers m choices of individual members. F or the state to And havi ng established a work-week that favo urs
can draw inrervenc at rhis point to supporr particular Christians, one can hardl y object to exemptions
powers so options or customs within the culture, while for M uslims or J ews on 1hc ground that they vio-
sed ability penalizing or discouraging others, would run the late the separation of state and ethnicity. These
social cul- risk of unfairly subsidizing some people's choices groups are simply asking that their religious
distribute (Kymlicka 1989/J). But that is not the aim or needs be taken into consideration in the same way
1ation con- effect of many rights for national minorities, that the needs of Christians have always been
education, which are instead concerned with external protec- taken into account. Public holidays are another
SIS . 1ions (sec Ch. 1, s. l ). significant embarrassment for the ' benign neglect'
is incoher- Let me now turn to polyethn ic rights for eth- view, and it is interesti ng to note how rarely they
ling of the nic groups. I believe there is an equality-lrnscd arc discussed in contemporary liberal theory.
,ns. In the argument for these rights as well, which also Similar issues arise regarding government uni-
,oundaries, invokes the impossibility of separating state from for ms. Some people object to the idea that Sikhs
no way to ethnicity, but in a different way. I argued in or Orthodox Jews should be exempted from
cul ture, or Chapter 5 that the context of choice for immi- requirements regarding headgear in the police or
n ajority in grants, unli ke national minorities, primarily military. But here again it is important to recog-
:cting deci- involves equal access l'O the mainstream nize how rhc existing rules about government
and immi- culture(s). H aving uprooted themselves from uniforms have been adopted ro sui t Christians.
their old culture, they arc expected to become For example, existing dress-codes do not prohibit
fair way to members of the national societies which alread y the wearing of wedding rings, which arc an
s, and dis- exist in thei r new country. Hence promoting the importan1 religious symbol for many Christians
.ink, is that good of cultural membership for imm igrants is (and Jews). And ir is virtually inconceivable tha1
anal groups primarily a mauer of enabli ng in1 egra tion , by designers of govern ment cl ress-codcs would have
nselves as a providing language traini ng and fi ghti ng pau crns ever consid ered designing a un iform thar pre-
his ensures of discrimination and prej udice. Gc nerall~ s p c·ak- ,·enrccl pcoplr fro m wr.uing wedd ing rings,
J is equally ing, this is more ,1 mat ter or rigorously enfclrL·ing unk ~<; this was strictly nccessary fo r the job.
ma! groups. lhe commo11 rights of citizenship than providing ,\gain. this sho11ld 1101 be seen a~ a clelibcratc
Will Kyrnlicka

attempt to promote C hristianity. l t simply wo uld arc the resul t o f historical agree me nts, such as the determi na1
have been taken fo r granted that un ifo rms should treaty rights of ind igenous peoples, or t he agree- Obviously
not unnecessarily confli ct with C hristian religious ment by which two or more peoples agreed to boundariei
beliefa. I-lavin g adopted d ress-codes that me et federate. deed ,mp
C hristian needs, one can hard ly object to exemp- There arc a variety of such agreements in peoples w
t ions for Sikhs and Orthodox Jews on the ground Wes tern democracies, although their provisions uncomrno1
that they violate ' benign neglect'. ha ve often been ignored or repudiated . For exam- form a feel,
One can multiply the exam ples. For example, p le, the American government has unilaterally of unequal
many state symbols such as flags, anthems, and abrogated certain treaties with Ind ian tribes, and culture to
mottoes reflect a particular ethnic or religious the Canadian governm ent proposed in 1969 to rights as p
background ('In Goel We Trust'). The d emand extin guish a ll of its Indian t reaties. The language a federatic
by ethni c gro ups fo r some symbolic affirmation of rights guara nteed to Chicanos in th e American ri ght of :
the value of pol yct hnici ty (e.g. in government south-west under the 1848 Treaty of Guadelupe terms of fi
declarations and documents) is simpl y a demand Hidalgo were rescinded by the anglophone set- about how
that their identity be given the same recogni tion tlers as soon as they fo rmed a majority. The lan- For ex;
.is the original Anglo-Saxon settlers. guage and land ri ghts guaranteed to the iV.l etis accorded
It may be possible to avoid some o f these issues under the Manitoba Act of 1870 suffered the confederat
by redesigning public holidays, unifo rms, and same fate in Canada. Yet many treaties and his- differcntia
state symbols. It is relatively easy to replace reli- torical agreements between nati onal gro ups con- ous treati(
gious oaths with secular ones, and so we shou ld. tinue to be recognized, and some have communit
It would be more difficult, but perhaps not considerable legal force. For exam ple, the 1840 these agre
impossible, to replace existing public holidays Treaty of Waitangi signed by Maori chi efs and the Canad
and work-weeks with -more 'neutral' sched ules for British colonists in New Zealand, declared a 'sim- groups. T
schools and government offices.20 ple nullity' in 1877, has re-emerged as a central their self-,
But there is no way to have a complete 'separa- legal and political document (S harp 1990). to join Ca
tion of state and ethnicity'. In various ways, the The im portance of honouring historical agree- promises.
ideal of 'benign neglect' is a myth. Governm ent m e nts is em phasized by proponents of group- these pro
decisions on la nguages, internal boundaries, pub- differentiated rights, but has had little success legally) th
lic holidays, and state symbols unavoidably convincing opponents. Those people who think nitics part
involve recognizing, accommodating, and su p- that group-differentiated rights are unfair have define tht
porting the needs and identities of particular eth- not been appeased by pointing to agreements that agreed to
nic and national gro ups. Nor is there any reason were made by previous generations in different the Canad
to regret this fact. There is no reason to regret the c ircumstances, ofte n undemocratically and in but 1s :
existence of official la nguages and public holi- conditions of substant ial inequality in bargaining (Chartran,
days, and no one gains by creating unnecessary power. Surely some historical agreements arc out In shor
conflicts between government regulations and of date, while others are patently unfair, signed was 111cm
reli gious beliefs. T he onl y question is how to under duress or ignorance. W hy shou ld govern- group-clifl
ensure that these unavoidab le forms of support m ents not do what princ iples of eq ual ity require occurred ·
fo r particular ethnic and nationa l grou ps are pro- now, rather tha n what outdated a nd often unprin- rights m ig
vided fai rly - that is, how to ensure that they do cipled agreements requi re? 21 tion (e.g.
not pri vilege som e groups and d isadvantage oth- One answe r is to reconsider an u nderlying moral arg,
ers. In so far as existing policies support the lan- assumption of the eq uali ty argum ent. The equal- If incorpc
guage, culture, and identity of dominant nations ity argument assumes that the state must treat its tion), the
and ethnic gro ups, there is an argum ent of eq ua l- c itize ns with equal respect. But there is the prior claim of
ity for e nsurin g that som e attempts are m ade to question of determinin g which c it izens should be law whid
provide similar support for minority groups, governed by which states. F or example, how did terms of f
through self- government and polyethnic rights . th e American gove rnment acq uire the legitimate tary feeler:
authority to govern Puerto Rico or the Navaho' T his hi
And how did the Canad ian governm ent acquire rights as
3 The Rol e of Historica l Agreem ents legitimate authority ove r the Quebecois and the group-dif
M eris? historical
A second argument in defence of group-d ifferen- As I noted in Chapter 2, United Nations decla- son of p r
tiated rights for nationa l mi noriti es is t hat they rations state that a ll 'peoples' are entitled to 'self- ment. F o:

die
 Justice and Minority Rights

such as the determination' - i.e. an independent state. for Indian tribes/bands could be justified on the
· the agree- Obviously this principle is not reflected in existing equality argument, if it helps the larger state
; agreed to boundaries, and it would be destabilizing, and in- show equal concern for the members of Indian
deed im possible, to fulfil. Moreover, not all communities. Auronomy is also justified on the
eements in peoples want their own state. Hence it is not historical argument, in so far as Indian peoples
provisions uncommon for two or more peoples to decide to never gave the fed eral government jurisdiction
. For exam- form a federation. And if the two communities are over certain issues.
unilaterally of unequal size, it is not uncommon for the smaller Indeed, it is likely that the equality and -histori-
tribes, and culture to demand various group-differentiated cal arguments will yield similar policies. If local
in 1969 to rights as part of the terms of federation. Forming autonomy is required to ensure that members of a
he language a federation is one way of exercising a people's minority arc not disadvantaged, then it is likely
c American right of sclf-dcrermination, and the historical that the minori ty would have demanded auto n-
Guadelupe terms of federation re0ect the gro up's judgement omy as part of the terms of federation (had the
Jphone set- about how best to exercise that right. negotiations been fair).
:y. The Ian- For example, the group-differentiated rights The negotiations between English and French
> the Metis accorclecl French Canadians in the original regarding the terms of federation in Canada pro-
u ffcreel the confederation agreement in 1867, and the group- vide a clear example of this. The Q1cbecois real-
ics and his- differentiated rights accorded Indians under vari- ized that if they agreed to enter the Canadian
5roups con- ous treaties, reflect the terms under which these state in 1867, they would become a permanent
;omc have communities joined Canada. It can be argued that minority in the country, and so could be outvoted
e, the 1840 these agreements define the terms under which on decisions made at the federal level. They
i chiefa and the Canadian state acquired authority over these therefore faced the question whether they should
lared a 'sim- groups. These communities could have exercised remain outside Confederation, maintaining their
as a central their self-determination in other ways, but chose status as a separate colony within the British
~90). to join Canada, because they were given certain Empire, and hoping one clay to become a separate
)rical agree- promises. If the Canadian government reneges on country with a francophone majority.
; of group- these promises, then it voids (morally, if not Q!.tebecois leaders agreed to join Canada, even
ittlc success legally) the agreement which made those commu- though they would be a minority in the federal
! who think nities part of Canada.22 Because these agreements parliament. But in return they insisted that juris-
unfair have define the terms under which various groups diction over language and education be guaran-
:ements that agreed to federate with Canada, the authority of teed to the provinces, not the federal government.
in different the Canadian stare over these groups flows from, This was 'the non-negotiable condition in return
illy and in bur 1s also limited by, these agreements for which they were prepared to concede the
J bargaining (Chartrand 1991 ; 1993: 240- 1). principle of representation by population' in the
1ents are out In shorr, the way in which a national minority new parliament, a principle that 'would institu-
1fair, signed ·was incorporated often gives rise to certain tionalize their minority position' within the new
,uld govern- group-differentiated rights. If incorporation country 0- Smith 1993: 75) . In deciding whether
aliry require occurred through a voluntary federation, certain to accept the terms of federation, therefore,
.fren unprin- ri ghts might be spelled out in the terms of federa- Qicbccois leaders were explicitly concerned
tion (e.g. in treaties), and there are legal and about equa lity - that is, how to ensure that they
underlying moral arguments for respecting these agreements. would not be disadvantaged in the new country.
. The equal- If incorporation was involu ntary (e.g. coloniza- Since they had considerable bargaining power in
nust treat its tion), then the national minority migh t have a the negotiations, they were able to ensure their
: is the prior claim of self-determination under international equality in the agreement, through gua rantees of
ns should be law which can be exercised_by renegotiating the language rights and provincial autonom y.
pie, how did terms of federation so as to make it a more volun- \,\/hile the equality and historical argum ents
1e legitimate tary federation (Macklem 1993; Danley 1991 ). often lead to the same result, they arc none the
the Navaho? This historical argument ma y justify the same less quite distinct. On the historical argumcnr,
ncnt acquire rights as the equality argumenr. Many of rhe the question is not how should rhc state treat ' its'
cois and the group-differentiated ri ghts which are the resul t of minorities, hm rather what arc rhc terms under
historical agreement s can he seen as providing the which two or more peoples cleciclcd LO become
·at ions dccla- _son of prntecrion req ui red by tht c:quality :1rgu- partners? T he qi.1cstion is nm how should th<:
itled ro 'self- mcnt. l·'or example, the ri ght 10 local autonomy statt act fairly in go,·ern in~ its minorities, but
Will Kyml icka

whac arc the limics to the state's right ro govern under duress. It seems arbitrary anJ unfair that treaties m,
them? some groups signed historical agrccmcnts while changcs in
Fur example, the two argLm1cncs may generate others, through no fault of their own, did not. communiti
diffe rent answers to the question of federa l fund- Where historical agreements arc absent or dis- 1867 m:iy
ing of self-gove rnment rights. U ncler the eq uali ty puted, groups arc likely to appeal to the equality telccommu
argument, fairness may require positi ve state sup- argument. Indian tribes/bands which have dear torica I agre
port for the measures req ui red to maintain the treaty rights often rest their claim for group- needs of m
viability .o f the national group. If fairn ess req uires differentiated status on historical agreement; Because
recognizing self-gove rnment in certain areas of groups who did not sign treaties are more likely because th<
jurisdiction, then presumably fairness will also to appeal to the equality argument . It is often pret, many
require providing the resources needed to make quite arbitrary . whether a particular group hap- gotiate thci
self-government meaningful. T he historica l argu- pened to sign a partict1lar agreement. However, make thei
ment, however, may only generate a negati ve the equali ty argument can help those groups explicit in
right to non-interference from the federal state. ff which, for whatever reason , lack historical expansive.
the members of the na tional minority never gave rights.14 constitutio·
the federal govern me nt the authority to govern Historical agreeme nts arc much less common those Can
them in certain areas, the federal government is in the case of ethnic grou ps, since im migrants arc rights as u
unlikely to accept responsibility for fu nding rarely promised any special ri ghts before arriving entrench, s
minority self-government (unless this is itself in their new country. Indeed, opponents of poly- T his sui
part of the historical agreement). Any federal ethnic ri ghts someti mes say that ethnic groups differential
obligation to support self-government might be should not expect any new group-diffe rentiated historical a
seen more as a form of humanitarian foreign aid rights, precisely because they agreed to come must alwa:
than as a matter of domestic egalitarian justice.13 knowing full well that ·such rights did not exist. to be upd;
Contemporary political philosophers have had Yet there are some cases of polyet hnic rights grou nd th(
very little to say about the mo ral status of such based on historical agreement. For example, the ory of just
historical agreements. for exam ple, while Rawls 1--Iutterites (a Christian sect) were explicitly ments mus
recognizes a moral duty to respect treaties promised by Canadian immigration officials that
between countries (Rawls 197 1: 378), he does not they would be exempted fro m certain laws
say anything about treaties or other agreements regarding education, land ownershi p, and mili- 4 The V:
between nations within a country. This is sur- tary service if they settled in western Canada.
prising, because such agreements played a vital (The Canadian government was anxious at the A third de
role in the creation and expansion of many coun- time to settle the newly opened up western fron- national m
tries, including the U nited States and Canada. tier.) diversity..
Respect for such agreements is important, I This now seems like an :rnomalous case of an virtue of I·
believe, not only to respect the self-determination immigrant group given privileges denied to other culture, s1
of the minority, but also to ensure that citizens citizens, and attempts have been made to elimi- additional
have trust in the actions of government. nate these historical ri ghts. On the other hand, or more c
H istorical agreements signed in good faith give solemn promises we re given to the Hutterites, intercultur
rise to legitimate expectations on the part of citi- who would have emigrated elsewhere had these of pcoplc'i
zens, who come to rely on the agreements made promises not been made. I 11 this sense, they roo (Schwartz
by governme nts, and it is a serious breach of trust can claim that the historical agreement defines rhc This ar
to renege on them. terms under which the Canadian government because it
O ne difficu lty with historical agreemen ts is acquired authori ty over them. of group
that they are often hard to interpret. For exam- In assessing group-d ifferentiated rights claims, how the 1,
ple, the Canadian government claims Quebec's therefore, we need to know whether the ri ghts differcntia
'right to be different' was implicitly recognized in being claimed are rectifying disadvantages, or 'societal di
the original Confederation agreement recognizing historical agreements arising from enriching
(Government of Canada 199 I a: p. vi). But others the terms of federation. Both of these are legiti- resources'.
deny this, and insist that Confederation was a mate grounds for group-diffe rentiated rights, I mcrcasingi
union of provinces, not a compact between two believe, but both raise some difficult issues. overall enl
cultures. Similar disputes arise over the interpre- For example, how should we respond to agree- Whereas t
tation of some Indian treaties. Moreover, some ments that are now unfair, due to changing con- obliga tio1ZS
Indian tribes did not sign treaties, or signed them di tions? T he land claims recognized in ,·arious appeals t<
 Justice and Minority Rights

I unfair that treaties may be too much, or too little, given defends rights in terms of self-interest not justice.
ments· while changes in the size and li festyle of indigenous Cultural diversity is said to be valuable, both in
did not. communities. The powers given to Quebec in the quasi-aesthetic sense that it creates a more
bsem or dis- 1867 may no longer be appropriate in an age of interesting world, and because other cultures
the equality telecommunications. To stick to the letter of his- contain alternative models of social organization
h have clear torical agreements when they no longer meet the that may be useful in adapti ng to new circum-
for group- needs of minorities seems wrong. stances.25 This latter point is often made with
agreement; Because of these changing circumstances, and respect to indigenous peoples, whose traditional
: more likely because the original agreements are hard to inter- li festyles provide a model of a sustainable rela-
. It is often pret, many minority comm unities want to rene- tionship to the environment. As Western atti-
· group hap- gotiate their historical agreements. They want to tudes towards nature are increasingly recognized
lt. However, make their group-differentiated rights more ro be unsustainable and self-destructive, indige-
hose groups explicit in the constitution, and often more nous peoples 'may provide models, inspiration,
:k historical expansive. This is a major cause of the current guidance in the essential work of world order
constitutional crisis in Canada. For it has given redesign' (Falk 1988: 23; cf. Clay 1989: 233;
less common those Canadians who see group-differentiated O'Brien 1987: 358).
1rn1grants arc ri ghrs as unfair a chance to restrict, rather than There is some truth in this argument about the
:fore arriving entrench, such rights. value of cultural diversity. None the less, I think
.ents of poly- This suggests that, if we wish to defend group- it is a mistake to put much weight on it as a
thnic groups differentiated rights, we should not rely solely on defence of national rights. First, one of the basic
jifferentiated historical agreements. Since historical agreements reasons for valuing intracultural diversity has less
!Cd to come must always be interpreted, and inevitably need application to intercultural diversity. The value
iid not exist. to be updated and revised, we must be able to of diversity within a culture is that it creates more
ethnic rights ground the historical agreements in a deeper the- options for each individual, and expands her
example, the ory of justice. The historical and eq uality argu- range of choices. But protecting national minori-
re explicitly ments must work together. ties does not expand the range of choices open to
officials that members of the majority in the same way. As I
certain laws explained in the last chapter, choosing to leave
ip, and mili- 4 The Value of Cultural Diversity one's culture is qual itatively different from
tern Canada. choosing to move around within one's culture.
1xious at the A third defence of group-differentiated rights for The former is a difficult and painful prospect for
western fron- national minorities appeals to the value of cultural most people, and very few people in the main-
diversity. As I have discussed, liberals extol the stream choose to assimilate into a minority cul-
,us case of an virrue of having a diversity of lifestyles within a ture. Indeed, measures to protect national
:nicd to other culture, so presumably they also endorse the minorities may actually reduce diversity within
1ade to clirni- additional diversity which comes from ha ving two the majority culture, compared with a situation
: other hand, or more cultures in the same country. Surely whe re minorities, unable to maintain their own
1e Huttcritcs, intercultural diversity contributes to the richness societal culture, are forced to integrate and add
ere had these of people's lives, as well as intracultural diversity their distinctive contribution to the diversity of
:nse, they too (Schwanz 1986: ch. 1). the mainstream culture. Having two or more cul-
:nt defines the This argument is attractive to many people tures within a state does expand choices for each
1 government because it avoids relying solely on the interests individual , but onl y to a limited degree, and it
of group members, and instead focuses on would be implausible to make this the primary
rights claims, how the larger society also benefits from group- justification for minority rights.
1er the ri ghts differentiated rights. As Richard ralk puts it, There are other aesthetic and educational ben-
dvantagcs, or 'societal diversity enhances the quality of life, by efits from cultural diversity, apart from the value
arising from enriching our experience, expanding cultural of expanding individual choice. But it is not clear
.csc are legiti- resources'. Hence protecring minority cultures 'is that: any of these values by themselves can justify
atccl rights, I increasin gly recognized to be an expression of minority ri ghts. One problem is that the benefits
r issues. overall enlightened self- interest' (ralk 1988: 23). of diversity to rhe majority arc spread thinly and
)one! to agree- Whereas the first t\\'O arguments appeal to rhc widely, whereas the costs for parricul.ir members
changing con- ohliga1io11s of the majority, this third argu mcn1 of the majority are sometimes quite high. Every
.tel in various appeals to rhe i111eres1s of the majoriry, and one may benefit, in a diffuse way, from haring
Will Kymlicka

tlourish ing minority cultures in Quebec and does provide benefits to t he majori ty, and these rights h:T
Puerto Rico. But some members of the majority arc worth pointing out. But these diffuse benefits liberal w
culture arc asked to pay a significant price so th:1t are better seen as a desirable by- product of cally pres
others can gain this diffuse benefit. For example, national ri gh ts, rather than their primary justifi- for ci
unilingual anglophones residing in Quebec or cation. To date, most majority cultures have not without
Puerto Rico are unlikely to get government seen it in their 'enlightened self- interest' to main- remain, ,
employment or publicly fu nded education in tain minority cultures. No doubt this is due in which is
English - benefits \vhich they would take for part to ethnocentric prej udice, but we must rec- who can <
granted elsewhere. Similarly, non-Indians resid- ognize the powerful interests that majority I believe 1
ing on Indian lands may be discriminated against nations often ha ve in reject_ing self-government in terms<
in terms of their access to natural resources, or rights for natio nal minorities - e.g. increased group-di!
their right to vote in local elections. It is not clear access to the minority's land and resources, believe ti
that the diffuse benefits of diversity for society as increased individual mobility, political stability, right of i
a whole justify imposing these sorts of sacrifices etc. ft is unlikely that majorities will accept rests on t
on particular people. It seems to me that these national rights solely on the basis of self-interest, diffcrenti
sacrifices arc only consistent with justice if they without some belief that they have an obligation accepti ng
are needed, not to promote benefits to the mem- of justice to accept them. Conversely, it is This p
bers of the majority, but to prevent even greater unlikely that majorities will accept their obliga- The cxis1
sacrifices to the members of the national minor- tions of justice towards national minorities with- ments to
ity. out a belief that they gain something in the a deep p~
Moreover, there are many ways of promoting process. The diversity argument works best, defend ti
diversity, and it seems likely that protecting therefore, when it is combined wi th arguments of for pcrso
national minorities involves more cost to the justice. This sug
majori ty than other possible ways. For example, a The diversity argument is more plausible as a have an e
society could arguably gain more diversity at less defence of polye th nic rights for ethnic groups. its poli tic
cost by increasing immigration from a variety of U nlike national self- government, these rights do In fac
countries than by protecting national mi norities. contribute directly to diversity withi n the major- reserved
The diversity argument cannot explain why we ity culture. 1\1oreover, they do not involve the become a
have an obligation to sustain the particular sort of same sort of restrictions on the mobility or eco- allegianc,
di versity created by the presence of a viable, self- nomic opportunities of the majority. Indeed, cer- there are
governing national minori ty. tain polycthnic policies can be seen as natural zcnship i
There is one further problem with the diver- extensions of state policies regarding the funding arc refus,
26
sity argument. Let us say that the aesthetic or of the arts, museums, educational television, etc. in terms
educational value of diversity docs justify impos- Yet here agai n the problem arises that there arc the num·
ing certain costs on people in the majority cul- many ways of promoting diversity. Teaching were gci:
ture. Why then docs the value of diversity nor children to be bilingual promotes diversity, but immigra1
also justify imposing a duty on the members of this cannot explain why we should teach immi- at the b
the minority to maintain their traditional culture? grant languages in particular. Hence the diversity people a1
If the benefits of cultural di ve rsity to the larger argument supplements, but cannot replace, jus- pate in ti
society can justify restricting individual liberties tice arguments based on equality or historic:il the ri ght
or op portu nities, why does it matter whether agreement. Citizc1
these restrictions arc imposed on people inside or different
outside the group? I noted earlier that a liberal accept ei
theory of minority ri ghts can accept external pro- 5 The Analogy with States plerely o
tections, but not internal restrictions. It is diffi- few libcr
cult to see how the di versity argument can make So far, I have been assuming that the burden of - then ,
this distinction. Because it appeals to the interests proof lies on those ,vho wish to find room for basis of (
of the larger society, it cannot explain why gro up-differentiated ri ghts within the liberal tra- on the b.
minorities should be able to decide for themselves dition. Bur \\"C can and should question this This,
whether or how ro maintain their cul ture. assumption. In many ways, it is opponents of most lib<
So it seems to me that the diversity argument group-differentiated rights who are proposing a era! thee
is insufficient, by itself, to justify the rights of revision of liberal theory and practice. As I dis- moral cc
national minorities. Protecting national minorities cussed in Chapter 4, certain group-differentiated about th

fitL
 Justice and Minority Rights

and these rights have been a long-established part of the ing or even noticing the shift (Black 1991 ). W hat
,se benefits liberal tradition. Moreover, such ri ghts are logi- can justify restricting the rights of citizenship to
iroduct of calJy presupposed by existing liberal practice. members of a particular group, rather than all
ary justifi- for example, most liberal theorists accept persons who desire it?
:s have not without question that the world is, and will Some cri tics have argued that liberals cannot
:t' to main- remain, composed of separate states, each of justify this restriction, and that the logic of liber-
; is due in which is assumed to have the right to determine alism requires open borders, except perhaps for
· must rec- who can enter its borders and acquire citizenship. temporary restrictions in the name of public
: majority J believe that this assumption can only be justified order. 18 And surely that is ri ght if we cling to the
ovcrnmcnt in rerms of the same sorts of values which ground idea that liberalism should be indifferent to
increased group-differentiated rights within each stare. I people's cultural membership and national iden-
resources, believe that the orthodox liberal view about the tity. Open borders would dramatically increase
11 stability, rirrht
t,
of stares to determine who has citizenship the mobility and opportut1ities of individuals,
.viii accept rests on the same principles which justify group- and, if liberalism requires treating people solely
:If-interest, differentiated citizenship within states, and that 'as individuals' without regard for their group
1 obligation accepting the former leads logically to the latter. membership, then open borders clearly are
scly, it is This point is worth exploring in some depth. preferable from a li beral point of view.
icir obliga- The existence of states, and the right of govern- I believe, however, that some limits on immi-
riries with- ments to control entry across state borders, raises gration can be justified if we recognize that liberal
ing in the a deep paradox for liberals. Most liberal theorists states exist, not only to protect standard rights
vorks best, defend their theories in terms of 'equal respect and opportunities of individuals, but also to pro-
gumenrs of for persons', and the 'equal rights of individ uals'. tect people's cultural membership. Liberals
This suggests that all 'persons' or 'individuals' implicitly assume t hat people are members of
rnsible as a have an equal right to enter a state, participate in societal cultures, that these cultures provide the
mc groups. its political life, and share in its natural resources. context for individ ual choice, and that one of the
;e rights clo In fact, however, these rights are typically functions of ha ving separate states is to recognize
the major- reserved for citizem. And not everyone can the fact that people belong to separate cultures. I
involve the become a citizen, even if they arc willing to swear noted examples of this in the liberal tradition in
lity or eco- allegian ce to liberal principles. On the contrary, Chapter 4, and with Rawls's discussion of citizen-
ndeed, cer- there arc millions of people who want to gain citi- ship and the bonds of culture in Chapter 5. Once
as natural zenship in various liberal democracies, but who we make these assumptions explicit, however, it
the funding are refused. Even the most open Western country is clear that, in multination states, some people's
,ision, etc.26 in terms of immigration accepts only a fraction of cultural membership can only be recognized and
at there are the number of people who would come if there protected by endorsing group-differentiated
. Teaching were genuinely open borders. Indeed, would-be rights within the state.
ve rsity, but immigrants are often refused entry, turned hack Liberal theorists inva riabl y limi t citizenshi p to
·each immi- at the border by armed border guards. These the members of a particular group, rather than all
hc diversity people are refused the right to enter and partici- persons who desire it. The most plausible reason
·eplace, jus- pate in the state because they were not born into for this - namely, to recognize and protect our
ir historical the right group. membership in distinct cultures - is also a reason
Citizenship, there.~ore, is an inherently group- for allowing group-differentiated cit izenship
differentiated notion. U nless one is willing to withi n a state. '1 here may be other reasons for
accept either a single world-government or com- restricting citize nship to a particular group which
pletely open borders between states - and very do nor make any reference to the importance of
few li beral theorists have endorsed either of these cultural groups. It is difficult to say, since few lib-
e burden of - then distributing ri ghts and benefits on the erals actuall y discuss the shift from 'equality of
1d room for basis of citizenshi p is to treat people differentiall y persons' to 'equality of citizens'. Bur I thin k it is
liberal rra- on the basis of their group membership. 27 fai r to say this: in so far as liberal theorisrs acce pt
uestion this This creatt:s a profound contradiction within the principle that citi ,.enship can be restricted t o
pponcnrs of most li beral th eories. As Samuel Black notes, lib- the members of a particular group, the burden of
proposing a eral theorists often begin by talkin !! about the proof lies on them Lo explain why they arc not
;e. 1\s I dis- moral equality of 'p..:rsons', but encl up talkin g :ilso committed 10 accepting group-differentiated
iffcrent iated abour the t:q11a liry or 'citizens', without explain- righ ts \\·i thi n a st:lt{:. 2'J .So long as libt:rals bcliere
 Will Kyrnlicka

in separate states with rcstrictl:cl citizenship, the This equality-based argument for gro up- a manda1
burden of proof lies as much with opponents of differentiated rights for national mi norities is fur- explains
group-diffe rentiated rights as with thei r defenders. ther strengthened by appeals to historical absence c
agreements and the value of cul tural diversity. But if
And it is _confi rmed by the way tha t liberals group-di
6 Conclusion implicitly invoke cul tural membershi p to defend often rej1
existing state borders and restrictions on citizen- explanati
In the last two chapters, I have tried to show that ship. I have also argued that polyethnic ri ghts for on 'abstr.
liberals can and should accept a wide range of ethnic groups can be justi-fied in terms of promot- individu:
group-differentiated rights for na tional minorities ing equality and cultural diversity within the of her cu
and ethnic groups, without sacrificing their core mainstream culture. 4 and 5 I·
commitments to individual freedom and social These claims arc by no means uncontroversial, . .
ignore 11
equality. and the re are many places where they could be culture.
It may be useful briefly to summarize my argu- challenged. One could deny that cultural mean- But th
ment. I have tried to show how freedom of choice ings are depe ndent on a societal culture, or that and self-
is dependent on social practices, cultural mean- individua ls are closely tied to their own particular societal <
ings, and a shared language. Our capacity to form societal culture. One could also deny that mi nor- of minor
and revise a conception of the good is intimately ity cultures are vulnerable to the decisions of the very firs
tied to our membership in a societal culture, since larger society; or that this vulnerability consti- have so
the context of individual choice is the range of tutes an injustice; or that historical agreements ported n
options passed down to us by our culture. have any moral weight; or that cultural diversi ty as group
Deciding how to lead our lives is, in the first is worth promoting. federal a
instance, a matter of exploring the possibi lities Yet I think each of these claims is plausible. historica
made available by our culture. Anyone who disputes them would be required to the exph
However, minority cultures in multination provide some alternative account of what makes eral the,
states may need protection from the economic or meaningful choices available to people, or what contain c
·· political decisions of the majority culture if they justice requires in terms of language rights, pub- modern
are to provide this context for their members. For lic holidays, political boundaries, and the division pluralisti
example, they may need self-governing powers or of powers. Moreover, one would also have to 1s a pen
veto rights over certain decisions rega rding lan- offer an alternative account of the justification for implicit!
guage and culture, and may need to limit the restricting citizenship to the members of a partic- that com
mobility of migrants or immigrants into their ular group, rather than making it available to any- ceptions
homelands. one who desires it. It is not enough to simply is, they f
While these group-differentiated ri ghts for assert that a liberal state should respond to ethnic nic dive
national minorities may seem discriminatory at and national differences with benign neglect. shared I;
first glance, since they allocate individual rights That is an incoherent position that avoids cuss the
and political powers differentially on the basis of addressing the inevitable connections between wi th a c
group membership, they are in fact consistent state and culture. and natit
with liberal principles of equality. They are The idea that grou p- differentiated rights for For c:
indeed required by the view, defended by Rawls national and ethnic gro ups can and should be ern war:
and Dworkin, that justice requires removing or accepted by liberals is hardly a rad ical suggestion. citizens
compensating for undeserved or 'morally arbi- In fact, many multination liberal democracies ground,
trary' disadvantages, particularly if these are 'pro- already accept such an obligation, and provide cal com
found and pervasive and present from birth' public schooling and government services in the allegianc
(Rawls 1971: 96). Were it not for these group- language of national minorities. Many ha,·e also does ass·
differentiated rights, the members of minority adopted some form of federalism , so that national on a 'sl
cul tures would not have the same ability to live minorities will form a majority in one of the fed- 488). Si1
and work in their own language and culture that eral units (states, provinces, or cantons). And of plura
the members of majority cultures take for many polyethnic liberal states have adopted va ri- he equat
granted. This, I argued, can be seen as just as ous forms of polyethnic policies and group- 'complet
profound and morally arbitrary a disadvantage as specific rights or exemptions for immigrant belong t,
the inequalities in race and class that liberals groups. Like Jay Sigler, I believe that providing a n. 8; 199.
more standardly worry about. liberal defence of minority ri ghts 'does not create This
 Justice and Minority Rights

group- a mandate for vast change. Ir merely ratifies and national is rarely explained or defended. It is not
es is fur- explains changes that have taken place in the as if these theorists explicitly reject the possibility
historical absence of theory' (Sigler 1983: 196). that national minorities have special rights, or
jiversity. But if there are strong arguments in favour of directly criticize the arguments of equality or his-
: liberals group-differentiated rights, why have liberals so tory in defence of these rights. On the contrary,
o defend often rejected them? As I noted in Chapter 4, the they simply ignore the issue entirely. There is no
1 citizen- explanation cannot be that liberalism is premissed discussion by contemporary liberal theorists of
rights for on 'abstract individualism', on a conception of the the differences between nation-states and poly-
promot- individual as a solitary atom who is independent ethnic or multination states, or of the arguments
ithin the of her cul tural environment. I hope that Chapters for modifying li beral principles in countries
4 and 5 have dispelled any perception that liberals which are a 'federation of peoples'.
roversial, ignore individ uals' dependence on society and This shows, I think, th:it it is a mistake 10 sub-
could be culture. sume the issue of minority rights under one of
·al mean- Dur this raises a puzzle. If individ ual autonomy the more familiar debates in contemporary
~, or that and self-identity are tied to membership in one's political philosophy - e.g. the debate between
particular societal culture, developing a theory of the rights 'indi vidualists' and 'communitarians', or between
ar minor- of minority cultures would seem to be one of the ' univcrsalists' and 'contextualists', or between
ms of the very first tasks of any liberal theory. Why then 'impartialists' and 'difference theorists', or
y consti- h:we so few contemporary liberal theorists sup- between ' rationalists' and 'postmodernists'. This
;reements ported measures to protect cultural groups, such is a ve ry common tendency (see e.g. I. Young
diversity as group-specific language rights, land claims, or 1993a; Gochnauer 1991; Galenkamp 1993;
federal autonomy? I have explored some of the T rakman 1992; Torres 1991; Addis 1991; cf.
plausible. historical reasons in Chapter 4. Another part of Todorov 1993: 392-9). But it stems from an over-
:quired to the explanation, l think, is that contemporary lib- simplified view of the issues involved in minority
1at makes eral theorists implicitly assume that countries rights. According to many commentators, the
, or what con1ai11 only one nation. They are well aware that central question in assessing minority rights is
;hts, pub- modern states are culturally diverse - indeed, the whether one accepts in principle the idea of giv-
e division pluralistic nature of modern li beral democracies ing poli tical recognition to communities or group
> have to is a pervasive theme in their writings. But they differences. Defenders of individualism and uni-
cation for implicitly assume that this diversity is the sort versalism are then said to be opposed in principle
fa partic- that comes either from variations in people's con- to such recogn1t1on, whereas defenders of
>le to any- ceptions of the good or from immigration - that community and difference are in principle sup-
to simply is, they focus on philosophical, religious, and eth- porti ve of them. But, as I have emphasized, all
I to ethnic nic diversity within a single cul ture based on a political theories must accord recognition to cer-
1 neglect. shared language. 30 T hey do nor recogn ize or dis- tain form s of group differences and support cer-
at avoids cuss the existence of states that are multinational, tain cultural commu nities. This is inevitable in
; between with a di versity of societal cultures, languages, any theory which confronts issues of language
and national groups. policy, public holidays, political boundaries, and
rights for For example, Dworkin notes that ' in the mod- immigration rules. T his i~ as true of liberal indi-
should be ern world of immigration and boundary shifts', vidualists and socialist internationalists as of con-
uggestion. citizens do not share a racial or ethnic back- servati ves, comm unitarians, and posrmodernists.
:mocracies ground, and that the communal life of the politi- So the debate over mi nority rights is not about
d provide cal community cannot include a single 'ethnic whether it is ever legitimate to support 'commu-
ices in the allegiance' (1989: 497). But, as I noted earlier, he nities' or to recognize 'difference'. Rather, the
have also docs assume a common 'cultural structure' based debate is whether tO support the particular sort of
at national on a 'shared language' (1985 : 2:rn, 233; 1989: cultural difference and comm unit y exhibited by
)f the fed- 488). Similarly, while Rawls emphasizes the 'fact national minorities. And, as I have noted, some
ons). And of pluralism ' - particularly religious pluralism - liberals, despite their ' individualism' and 'univer-
>pted vari- he equates the poli1ical communiry wi th a single salism', recogni ze that justice requires extending
1d group- 'complete culrnrc', and with a single 'pcoph.:' who the same support to national minori ties that
immigrant belong to 1he ~ame 'society and cull un.:' ( 1978: 70 ,najorit~ nations receive. Conversely, some com-
1roviding a 11.8; 1993a: 18,222,277; 1993/J:48). mu ni1ari:111s and panicularists, despite their com-
not create Thi~ implicit assumption that !.!ates arc uni- miunc.: 111 to 'communit y' and 'difference', han:
Will Kymli cl<a

been reluctam to accept the demands of national correlate 111 any simple or consistent w;iy with 1992
minorities. They view national minorities in the people's underl ying ph ilosophical and moral pre- 325-
same way they view ethnic groups or new social 1990
misses.
1993
movements - that is, as forms of diffe rence and These larger philosophical debates arc not
pure
community that can and should be accommo- irrelevant to the policy debate over minority cmp:
dated by group-specific rights within the larger rights. But the connection between the two 'life,
society. They are unwilling to accept that national debates is mediated by many additional assum p- 10 ror
minorities require recognition as separate and tions about the nature of ethnic and national dif:. blacl
self-governing societies alongside the mainstream ferenccs, and their role m domestic and C. [
society.31 international politics. It 1s these additional sent:
As I noted in Chapter 4, the history of minor- assumptions that largely account for the actual RCE
ity rights suggests that there is little or no correla- position endorsed by particu lar theorists, what- 11 \Vhi
rcse1
tion between meta-ethical debates and support ever thei r deeper philosophical premisses.
negc
for the rights of national minorities. People's F or this reason, the demands of national
pow
views on minority rights are shaped, not only by minori ties and ethnic gro ups raise a deep chal- fedc
their foundational moral or philosophical pre- lenge to all Western political traditions. All of fcdc
misses, but by more concrete factors, including these traditions have been shaped , implicitly or grou
ethnocentric prejudice, fears about international explicitly, by the same historical influences which fede
peace and superpower relations, and concerns have shaped liberal thinking. The task of devel- sclf-
about the preconditions of democratic consensus oping a consistent and principled theory of 12 Thii
and social harmony. These considerations do not minority rights is not one that liberals face alone. Sup
the
Cha
Bril.
Notes also
13 For
On the importance of individual rights to the pro- an<l cultural diversity, sec Howse and Knop 1993;
F. i
tection of groups, sec Buchanan I 989; Walzer Minow 1990; Majonc 1990; Gagnon 1993; Long
Mai
1990; Macdonald 1989: 122- 3; T omasi 199 1; 1991; Duchacek 1977; Elkins 1992; Norman
rcfe
Kymlicka 1990: chs. 4-6. 1994.
14 I ex
2 Some indigenous peoples have argued before the 5 Hence Nathan Glazer is quite wrong when he says
and
UN that they too have a right to self-determina- that the division of the United States into federal
ch.
tion under the UN Charter (sec J\llif..·11wq Triba l units preceded its ethnic diversity (Glazer 1983
the
Society v Ca1111da (1984) UN Doc. 276-7). This 1s true of the original thirteen
bce1
E/CN.4/Sub.2/204; G rand Co uncil of the Crees colon ies, but decisions about the admission and
the
1992). ror disc ussions of the salt-w:iter thesis, and boundaries of new states were made after the
dcfc
the right of self-determination unde r international incorporation of national minorities, and these
mm
law, see Pomerance 1982; Thornberry 1991: decisions were deliberately made so as to avoid
part
13-21 , 214-18; Crawford 1988; Makinson 1988. creating states dominated by national minorities.
of ti
3 On English Canadian opposition to nationalist 6 For a comparative review of these developments,
tion
demands for decentralization, sec Stark 1992. i\ sec Fleras and Elliot 1992. A proposal to ent rench
15 I an
certain amount of dt" Ji1clo asymmetry in powers Aboriginal sclf'..govc rnmcn t co nstitu tionally as a
the
has been a long-standing aspect of Canadian feder- th ird order of gov(.!rnment in Canada was included
sho·
alism. H oweve r, many Canadians arc unwillin g to m the 1992 Charlottetown i\ccor<l. This wou ld
gro1
recognize this asymmetry formally in the consticu- have covered both the 'ethnic self-government'
gro1
rion (sec Gagnon and Garcea 1988; T aylor 199 1; exercised by band councils on Indian reserves, and
sur,
Cairns 1991). This is one reason why the 1992 the 'public self-government' exercised by the In uit
tion
Charlottetown Accord was defeated in the national majority within the new territory of unan1t (sec
dee
referendum. Some people have claimed that a fed- Asch 1984: ch. 7). For the relation of Ind ian self--
pie,
eral system cannot survive if it accords special sta- government to federalism, sec Resnik 1989;
rou
tus, bur this is refu ted by the experience of many Cassidyancl Bish 1989; L ong 199 1.
16 On
countries. For a suryey of various for ms of asym- 7 Gurr 1993: viii; cf. Nictschman n 1987.
litai
metrical federalism, sec Elazar 1987: 5+-7. 8 Unless otherwise stated, all chapter cross-refer-
199
4 In Germany, federalism was imposed by the Allies ences m this chapter are to J\11ultic11//llrlll
d1at
after World War II to help prcYent the rise of Ci1i::.e11slzip (Oxford, Clarendon Press, I 995).
on
nationalist or authoritarian mo,·cments. For helpful 9 For a discussion of these ri ghts in the British con-
sate
discussions of the relationship between federalism text, see Parekh 1990: 705; 199 I: 197-204; M odood
 Justice and Minority Rights

1992; Poulter 1987. In Canada, sec E. Kallen 1987: were the legal owners of their traditional lands, and'
y with
325-31. In the USA, sec Minow 1990; Sandel because their lands were taken away illegally, they
·al pre-
)990. For the Muslim girls in France, sec Galeoni s hould be compensated for this historical wrong.
J993. Ir is sometimes said that t hese m easures arc Since the debate over land claims is often couched in
re not purely 'symbolic'. But m easures relating to the language of compensatory justice, I should say a
.inority employment arc \'Cry material , afTecting people's word about this. I take it as given that indigenous
1e two ' life chances' not just their 'lifcsrylcs' . peoples have suffered terrible wrongs in being dispos-
,sump- JO F or statistics on the (undcr-)rcprescnration of sessed of their lands, and that they should be com-
1al <lif- blacks and Hispanics in the United States, sec pensated for this in som e way . .Moreover, I believe
e and C. Davidson 1992: 46. For statis tics on the repre- that indigenous peoples continue to have certain
foional sentation of vario us social groups in C1nada, sec property rights under the common law (in former
RCERPF 1991: 93- 6 and 192. British colonies), wherever these have not been
actual
11 While self-government may entail guaramccd rcp- explicitly extinguished by legislation. (That is to say,
, what-
r..-:sentarion on inrcrgo\'crnmcntal bodies which the 1cm1 1111/lius doctrine is wrong in terms both of
negotiate, interpret, and m odify the division of morality and the common law.) But it is a mistake, 1
1ational powers, it may also entail reduced representation on think, to put too much weight on historical property
p chal- federal bodies which legislate in areas of purely rights. For one thing, these claims do nor, by them-
All of federal jurisd iction , in so for as rhe self-governing selves, explain why indigenous peoples have 1ights of
citly or group is not governed by the decisions of these sclf~go\'crnmem . i'vlany groups ha\'c been wrongfully
; which federal bodies. I discuss the relationship between dispossessed of property and other economic oppor-
· d evel- self-government and representation in•Ch. 7. tunities, including women, blacks, and Japanese
:ory of I2 This phrase is from the judgement of the Canadian immi1,rrants in the United States and Canada during
alone. Supreme Court in explainin g its interpretation of World War II. Each of these groups may be entitled
rhe equality guarantees under the Canadian ro certain fom1s of compensatory justice, but this does
Charter of Righrs (Andrel/)s v. Law Society of not by itself explain or justify granting powers of self-
British Columbia I SCR 143; 56 DLR (4th) I). Sec government (rather than compensatory programmes
also Government of Canada 199 1b: I 0. to promote integrarion and equal opportunity within
13 For examples of this view, see Ki10pff 1979; the mainstream). Suncring historical injustice is
op 1993;
F. Morton I 985; Kukathas 1992; 1-lindess 1993; neither necessary nor sufficient for claiming self-
3; Long
Marc 1992: 107-10; Rawls 1975: 88, 93 , and the government rights (see Ch. 2, s. 2).
Norman
references cited in C h. I n. 4. M oreover, the idea of compensating for historical
14 I explored this relationship between national rights wrongs, taken to its logical conclusion, implies that
1 he says
and liberal egalitarian justice in Kymlicka 198911: all the land which was wrongly taken from indige-
o federal
ch. 9. For what it is worth, I continue to endorse nous peoples in the Americas or Australia or New
m 1983
thirteen the argument in that chapter, but I should have Zealand should be returned to them. This would
been clearer about its scope. I would now describe create massive unfairness, given that the original
, ion and
the argument in that chapter as an equality-based European settle rs and later immigrants have now
1ftcr the
defence of certain external protections for national p rod uced hundred s of millions of dcsccndams, and
id these
min orities. I did not use those terms at the time, in t his land is the only hom e they know. C hanging cir-
to avoid
part because I did not have a very clear conception cumstances often make it impossible and undesir-
iri1ics.
or the variety of rights, groups, and m oral justifica- able to compcns.1rc for certain historical wro ngs. As
Jpmcnts,
tions that arc involved in the debate. Jeremy Waldron puts ir, certain histo_rical wrongs
entrench
15 I am here disagreeing with Tamir, who argues that arc 's uperseded' (Waldron 1992). Also, the land
illy as a
included the larger a national mino rity is, the m ore rights it held by some indigenous g roups at the time of con-
is would should have ( I 993: 75). On m y view, if a bi national tact was itself the rcsulr o f rhc conquest or coercion
crnmcnt' group is large enough, it may ha,·e little need for of other indigenous groups (Mu lgan 1989: 30-1;
rvcs, and group-differentiated rig hts, since it can ensure its Crowe 1974: 65-8 1). The compensatory argument
the Inuit s urvival and deve lopment through the usual opera- would presumably require rectifying these pre-con-
avut (sec tion of the economic market- place and dem ocratic tract i1~justices as well. (For other difficulties with
:lian sclf- decision- making. (This migh t be true, for exam - compensatory claims, see Brilmaycr 1992.)
ik 1989; ple, if a national stat e contained I wo nations of The equality ,1rgumcnt docs no t t ry co turn back
roughly eq ual s ize and wealth.) the his torical clock, nor to restore grou ps to the
16 On the role of indigenous land claims in a liberal ega- s ituation rhcy would have been in in the a bsence of
;ss- rcfcr- litarian framework, sec Kym licb I 99\ Penz 1992; any his torical injus1icc. (These compcn sato ry aims
/1ir11//llrn/ 199:i; Russcll 199:l; T ully 199·1. II is im por1:in110 nore ac1ua ll y fit m ore comfon ahl y with Nozick's libcr-
5). 1.ha1 the equality argument for land claims is 1101 bascd 1:iria11 1hcor,· of cn titlemcnr than with a liberal
i1ish con- on noiions of compcns.11or} jus1ic..-:. The co111pcn- egalit arian theory of d istributive justice - sec
. ,\ lodood ~11ory ar1,'l.1ment sa~s tha1 bcc:1use indigenous peoples 1.yons 1981.) The aim of the cqualit:1 argu ment 1s
Will Kymlicka

co provide the sort of land base needed 10 s u~ta in so lo ng as it docs no t involve the explicit legal rcrng~
brca
the viability of sclt:_governing minority con 1111u11i- nit io n of groups. He t hin ks it is one thing to defi ne
latte
tics, and hence to prc,·ent unfair disad vantages the powers and boundaries of a political subuni t so
tain
with respec t to cultural membership now and in as to ensure the protection of a minority culture
nal
t he future. In sho rt, the equality argument situates (,rl;at he calls 'indirect consociationalism'), but quite
theo
land claims within a theory of distributive justice, another for the constit ution o r statute law to cite the
barr
rather th an compensatory justice. existence of that m inorit y as the reason for those
20 Ima,
Waldron assumes that indigenous land claims arc arrangements (what he calls 'gro up rights') (van den
pres
all based on claims for compensatory justice Berghc 1981: 348). 13ut s urely this is hypocritical. If
scve
(Waldron 1992). In fact, however, most indigenous the agreed purpose of indirect consociationalism is to
Chr
groups focus, not on reclaiming all of what they had protect minority culnrres, then anyone who values
cmp
before Eu ropean settlement, but on what they need honesty and transparency in government (as liberals
wee
now to sustain them sci vcs as d is tinct societies (sec claim to do) should want that jus tification to be dear
addi
the declaration of the World Council of Indigenous to everyone. Van d en Berghe's solution violates the
cad
Peoples, quoted in Nettheim 1938: 11 5; Sharp I990: 'pub licity cond ition' which Rawls imposes on liberal
thei
150---3). Historical factors arc, of course, relevant in theories of justice (Rawls 1971: 133). None the less,
this
other ways. T he 'historical agn;cment' argument I this :mirudc seems to be widely s hared. v\lhile most whi,
discuss below is very much history- based. Canadians accept that the powers and bou ndaries of and
17 T he only attempt I know of to reconcile official lan- Quebec were fi xed to accommodate the needs oft he
to n
guages with 'benign neglect' is by Rainer KnopfT. He francophone minority in C.1nada, many objected to ida)
argues that language has two functions: it can function the government's proposal to state in the constiru- and
as the vehicle for the transmission of a particular cul- tion that Quebec formed a ' distinct society' as the and
ture, but it can also function as 'a culturally neutral, or homeland of t he French Canadian nation, because cert
utilitarian, means of communication which allows they saw this as violating the principle that the con- oth,
those of d ifferent cultures to participate in the same stitution should not recognize particular ethnic or diffi
political community' (K nopff 1979: 67). 13y placing national gro ups. Q1cbcccrs, however, arc no longer gov
the emphasis on the utilitarian function, governments willing to have their s pecial starus hidden away. W :1)
'can enact official languages without at the same time T hey view it as a matter of bas ic respect that their rnaj
legislating official cultures . .. in enacting 'olli<;ial lan- separate identity be recognized and affirmed at the gro·
guages', one docs not necessarily imply that the cul- level of constitutional principle (Taylor 199 1: 6-l). holi
tures which these languages transmit and represent 19 This is s imilar to the debate over affirmative action Th,
thereby become 'official cultures' (KnopfT 1979: 67). for women o r people with disabilities. Like self- Th·
Culture, KnopfT argues, 'remains a purely pri vate government rights, affirmative action programmes and
affair' in Canada, for while English and French have asymmetrically distribute righ ts or opportunities on lea1
official backing as the 'utilit.1rian' languages, all lan- the basis of group membership. Proponents argue 21 E.g
guages compete on equal terms for 'cultural' alle- that they arc required for genu ine equal ity. Critics pos
giance. It is the 't.1Sk of the individual members of a respond that the economic market-place (like the the
culture to show the excellence of their product on the culn1 r,1 I market- place) already respects equality, by (T1
cultural market- place, as it were. If they succeed, the treating job applicants without regard for thei r Joh
language of that culture will become attractive to oth- group membership. H owever, an eq uality-based bla,
ers . . . if [a] culture, and hence, lanl,ruagc, cannot argument for group-specific affirmative action can 22 C h
show itself to be worthy of choice in the light of st::111- be made if the actual operation of the economic wit
dards of the good, then it deserves to disappear' market- place works to the disadvantage of certain ) 0 11
(Knopff 1979: 70). This view of language as a 'cultur- groups. As with self-go vernment rights, the equa lity Lilli
ally neutral medium' has been thoroughly discredited argument for affirmative action seeks to show how bee
in the literature. In any event, it is simply not true that the structure of common individual rights 1s 23 It
teaching in the English language in public schools is intended to treat all people equally, but m fact grc
totally divorced from the teaching of the history an d works to the dis.1dvantagc of the members of a par- era
customs of the anglophone society. ticular collectivit y. ?vlany group -specific claims can his
IS Some commentators say that governments sho uld be seen in this way - that is, as compensating for the Ian
draw boundaries and distribute powers so as to pro- disadvan tages and v ulnerabilities of certain groups citi
tect the viability of national minorities, but that they within the structure of common individual righ ts. 24 Fo
should not state in law that they arc doing t his. This Of course, as I discussed in Ch. I , affim1ati,·e bet
enables t he state to continue claiming that it treats all action for women or people with disabilities differs in Ne
ethnic and national differences with 'benil,'ll neglect'. many ways from self-government rights for national M,
For example, van den Berghe argues that deliber- minorities, since they arc compensating for very d if- de,
ately designing or revising federal units to protect ferent kinds of injustices. The former is intended to his
minority cultures is consistent with 'benign neglect', help disadvantaged l,'T0ups integrate into society, by 25 Tt
 Justice and Minority Rights

11rccog~ breaking down unjust barriers to full integration. The the protection of endangered plant and animal
:o define l:ttter is intended to help cultural communities main- species, which arc seen both as enriching the world
bunit so tain their distinctiveness, by protecting against exter- aesthetically, and as providing potential sources of
culture nal decisions. This means that the former arc (in valuable genetic material or other substances that
>ut quite theory) temporary, whereas the latter are permanent, might be of human benefit.
, cite the barring dramatic shifts in population. 26 r,,lany liberals defend state funding of the ans or
or those 20 Imagine that schools and government offices (and museums on the ground that the state has a respon-
(van den presumably private businesses as well) were open sibility to ensure an adequate range of options for
ritical. If se,•en days a week all year round, including
!ism is to
o values
l Chrisrm as and Easter, and that each student and
employee was allowed to choose two days off per
future generations, which the cultural market-place
may fail to protect (Dworkin 1985: ch. 11 ; Raz
1986: 162; 131:ick 1992; Kymlicka 1989h: 893- 5). If
s liberals
, be clear
,btes the
1'
I
week, two weeks' vacation per year, plus, say, five
addirinnal holidays per year. This would maximize
each individual's ability to adapt their schedule to
we accept that active measures arc justified to pre-
serve the richness and di versity of our cultmal
resources, then programmes such as the fundin g of
m liberal their n.:ligious beliefs. Bur I do not know whether ethnic festivals or immigrant language classes can
the less, this is realistic or even desirable, given the extent to be seen as falling under this heading. Indeed, as I
1ile most which social life is built around common weekends noted in Chapter 2, some people defined this fund-
darics of and holi days. /\ s an atheist, I ha,·c no commitment ing simply as a way of ensuring that ethnic groups
ds of the to resting on the sabbath or celebrating religious hol- are not discriminated against in state funding of arr
jected to idays. 13ut I do like rhe fact that most of my friends and culture. (I should note that orhcr liberals view
constitu- and family, regardless of their religion, language, any such sratc fun ding as illegitimate (e.g. Rawls
y' as the and ethnicity, do not work on the weekends or on 1971: 33 1- 2; Waldron 1989).)
because certain public holidays. Maintaining friendships and 27 Hence the popular contrast between 'consocia-
the con- other voluntary associations would be much more tional' and 'universal' modes of incorporating indi-
.:thnic or difficult if society (including schools and other viduals into the state is misleading (e.g. Asch
10 longer government institutions) were nor organized in this 1990). There is a distinction between models of
:n away. way. Perhaps a bcncr solution would be to have one citizenship that incorporate citizens on a uniform
:hat their major holicby from each of the largest religious basis or through membership in some group. llu t
ed at the groups in the countr y. We could have one Christian uniform citizenship is not 1111iversnl citizenship. No
1: 64). holiday (say, Chrism1as), bur replace Easter and country allows for universal citizenship.
vc action Thanksgiving with a Muslim and Jewish holiday. 28 Sec the references in Ch. 5 n. 17.
.ikc self- This would maintain the value of common holidays, 29 One theorist who has attempted to square the circle
b'Tammcs and would also encourage people of each faith to is Michael Walzer. He argues that restricting citizen-
mities on learn something about the beliefs of other faiths. ship in a state to the members of a particular group is
its argue
21 E.g. the Canadian government justified its pro- justified in the name of protecting a distinct culture
y. Critics
posal to eliminate the treaty rights of Indians on (what he calls a 'community of character'). H e recog-
(like the the grounds that 'we can onl y be just in our time' nizes that this same argument can be given for
Jality, by (Trudeau 1969: 295). Trudeau was paraphrasing group-different iated rights mi1hi11 a state, but rejects
for their
John F. Kennedy's famous quote about justice for such rights bcc:111sc they violate our 'shared under-
ity-based blacks in the Un ired States. stand in gs' (Walzer 1983: ch. 2). I h:wc argued else-
ction can
22 Chartrand argues that this is the currcnr situation where that Walzer's argument is unsuccessful
economic
with respect to the Meris in C1nada, who agreed to (Kymlicb 1989a: ch. 11). Sec also Ch. 4. I should
1f certain
join C1nada on the basis of promises m.1de to them emphasize again that my defence of the legitimacy of
: equality
under the 1\llanitoba Act 1870, which have since partially closed b·ordcrs is not intended to defend the
how how
been broken (Cha rtrand 1993: 24 1). right of national groups to maintain more than their
rights 1s
23 It is interesting to note that some Aboriginal fair share of resources. On the contrary, I would
t. ifl fact
groups in Canada insist that their demands for fed- argue that a country forfeits it, right to rcstTic1
of a par-
eral fundin g of self-government arc based solely on immigration if it has failed to li ve up to irs obliga-
laims can
historical compensation for the wrongful raking of tions to share its wealth with the poorer counrrics of
ng for the
land, not on appeals to distributi ve justice berween rhe world. Sec Bader 1995; Ackerman 1980: 256--7.
m groups
citi~.cns (Lyon 198-k 13-14). JO On the tendency of liberals to treat di versity as a
rights.
2-l For a subtle discussion of the complex int eraction matter of variati ons in individual va lues and
!Tirnurivc
between the equaliry and treat y arguments in the beliefs , sec J\. Phillips 1993; Galeotti 1993: 590.
di ffers in
New Z.:-a bnd context, sec S harp 1990: 13:'i- 6; For an exam ple oft his 'overly cerebral' co nccp1io11
r nation:11
Mulgan 1989: ch. -1 . /\s Sharp notes, there is :1 ten- 'of diversity, sec Rawls 199311: pp. xxvii- xxix,
· very dif-
dency ·10 read principks nf equality back into the where he trc:us modern conflicts of race, ethnicity,
tcndcd to
hiqorical 11-c:11 ics. :incl g-cndcr as if the::, \\·ere an:1lo~ous 10 conflict
ocic11·, by
25 Thcsc arv;11mcn1s parallel c<Jmmon :1rg11111en1 s for o, er rcliy;ious bt·licf during I he Reformation - i.e.
Will Kymlicka

as co nfl icts over individu als' beliefs about 'the people equally. C ultural d ifk rencc within a state G akoni, ,\ n
meaning, value and purposes of huma n life' . should be accornmodatecl by i,rroup-diOc rcnriated 1'lac1.: fo r '
31 This is true of Young's postmodernist account of rights within a single society - e.g. by group represen- G lazer, Nat
minority rights. According to her view of 'relational tation within the mainslTeam polity - rather than by (J-farvartl
diffe rence ', cultural groups mus t ' understand them- establis hing two or more separate and self:.govcrning G ochnauer,
selves as participating in the same society', and as ' part societies within a state (I. Yo ung 199311: 135). Like Persons,
of a single polity', whose common decision- making many liberJ!s, she fears the impact of natio nal rights Brrmswiclc
procedures are seen as 'legitimately binding' on all on other political movements or on domes tic pc:1ce. Government ·
Togetlter:
- (199Ih;
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ts Act: A Hindcss, Barry ( 1993), 'Multiculturalism anc.l Monon, F. L. (1985), 'Group Rig hts versus Individual
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Knopff, Rainer (1979), ' Language and C ulture in the Norman, W. J. (1994), 'Towards a Normative Theory
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C111111rlia11 Review ofS111dies i11 Natio11alism, 6/ 1: 66-82. (University of T oronto Press, Toronto), 79-99.
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;iry Press, - - ( 1995), 'Concepts of Community and Social Jusrice', ( Lawrence & W ishart, London), 183- 204.
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English Law, and Human Rights', lntl'matio1111i a11d Ctuuula (University of Toronto Press, Toronto), 53-76.
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Washington, DC), 123-58. U nil'ersity Press, Philade lphia), 123-43.
Tamir, Yael (1993), Liberal N11tio11alism (Princeton
Itends to be )
Total Control Of People
Variations

Singapore
 Most problematic
↓
SENSE OF IDENTITY SOCIETAL ROLES SENSE OF GOALS NORMS & VALUES CLAIMS OF TRUTH GROUP RELATIONS
 ↓
not a political system
Left -

right spectrum → fluid

La categorisation to understand
where political systems fit / Stand

Let Off centre right off centre not communist

Left off centre

right off centre

moderate
majority is loud
Don't care about doing
what is good of society
 A totalitarian regime
suceeds in controlling its people
by
deceiving its people

non -
intuitive , contradictory
✗ Deception→ Crime of critical thinking
indi citizens
mating

severe punishments
 Tocqueville’s Concepts:
Tyranny of the Majority and Democratic Despotism

Additional Notes by Dr. Irm Haleem

Here are the important things to keep in mind when studying Tocqueville’s concepts,
both Tyranny of the Majority and Democratic Despotism:

• Fundamentally, the Tyranny of the Majority and Democratic Despotism are

concepts that warn us against the dangers of liberal democracies
deteriorating into autocracies (one-person rule) or tyrannies (oppressive rule
of government that is polar opposite to a democracy).

• Tocqueville uses the concepts of ‘despotism’ and ‘tyranny’ interchangeably.

So, Tyranny of the Majority can also be understood as Despotism of the
Majority, and Democratic Despotism can also be understood as Democratic
Tyranny.

• Tocqueville also uses the terms ‘anarchy’ (state of disorder and/or absence of
authority) and ‘despotism’ (oppressive use of power by government)
interchangeably. So Democratic Despotism can also be understood as
Democratic Anarchy.
o Democratic Anarchy is essentially the version of Democratic Despotism
that I offer in the lecture on Political Systems.

Tyranny of the Majority

• As explained in the lecture, this is Tocqueville’s notion of how the majority
(whether numerical, racial, ethnic, linguistic) ends up de facto intimidating the
minority (whether numerical, racial, ethnic, linguistic).
• Tocqueville says that this intimidation by the majority does not happen
through threats or use of force, but through an implicit message that if the
minority doesn’t conform to the majority views, the minority will be ostracized.
• And so, the minority conforms to majority view (political view or moral
compass) so as not to be ousted or ostracized. Hence, creating the Tyranny
of the Majority.

Democratic Despotism—The version in the lecture on Political Systems

• The version of Democratic Despotism in the Political Systems lecture is an
interpretation of what might happen when Tyranny of the Majority is left
unchecked.
o It is an interpretation based on the lived experience of Tyranny of the
Majority in the United States.
o It’s a postulation of how extreme elements within the majority
population may take their notion of individual rights to the extreme so
that they understand their individual rights as superseding civic duty,
leading therefore to chaos, riots, rise of extremist groups.
 §This is essentially how the January 06, 2021, riots have been
explained by some critical scholars, as the action of extreme
elements of the majority that feel so emboldened being the
majority that they feel they are above the law and do not need to
honor their civic duty of NOT engaging in violence or destroying
government property.
o It is also a postulation of how frustrated and extreme elements in the
minority population might also take extreme actions to challenge their
historical oppression by the majority. The justification of their
extremism also becomes premised on the notion of individual rights, at
the cost of civic duty.
§ Black Lives Matter movement is a great example here.
§ Black Lives Matter is fundamentally a resistance movement
against oppression of black minority at the hands of the white
majority in the United States.
§ The fringe elements within the Black Lives Matter movement
have also resorted to violence, which is a relevant here because
they have resorted to violence for the same rationale that
extreme elements in the majority population have: the notion of
unbridled individual rights in a liberal democracy.
• The version of Democratic Despotism in the lecture therefore looks at how
unbridled individual rights in a liberal democracy may lead to some feeling
emboldened enough to think that their individual rights supersede civic duty.

Democratic Despotism—Mainstream understanding of the concept

• The mainstream version of Democratic Despotism is different from the one
presented in the lecture. The mainstream version of Democratic Despotism
reflects Tocqueville’s mature and developed thinking about the nature of
democracy in America, while the version uploaded as part of the Political
Systems lecture represents one interpretation of the consequences of
Tocqueville’s Tyranny of the Majority when left unchecked.
• The mainstream version of Democratic Despotism looks at how citizens in a
liberal democracy become complacent about the political process, thereby
consenting to “others ruling in their name.”1
• Tocqueville implies that this is a result of becoming too comfortable
with the democratic system, leading to disconnecting from the political
process, thinking that the system will naturally proceed in their interest.
But in fact, it ultimately does not.
• Tocqueville notes that this complacency is an outcome of individualism.
• But ‘individualism’ for Tocqueville is a dirty word because by
‘individualism’, Tocqueville means the phenomenon where individuals
disconnect from the political process because they prefer to live in their
cocoons with family and friends, and thus put blind faith (full, uncritical
trust) in elected individuals or bureaucrats to represent them.
• Democratic Despotism thus becomes a threat to liberty and democracy
because individual complacency cuts out the individual from the

1
Melvin Richter, “Tocqueville on Threats to Liberty in Democracies”, in Cheryl B. Welch, editor, The Cambridge
Companion to Tocqueville (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 20060, p. 257.
 political process, leaving the elected officials or bureaucrats to go
unchecked and thus ‘rule’ as they wish, as if they were despots, not
democrats.
§ Richter analyzes this as thus: “Political liberty was now most
menaced not by a potential tyrant, but by the materialism,
individualism [in the negative sense of individual compliancy],
and political apathy of the society as a whole.”2
§ “…political apathy…opens the way to the dominance of those
who control the omnipresent centralized bureaucracy”, this is
Democratic Despotism!
• The outcome of the individuals’ political complacency is Democratic
Despotism, which, Tocqueville suggest, can also be understood as:
§ Bureaucratic Despotism
§ Democratic Tyranny
§ Soft Despotism
• Control of society by the bureaucrats and the elected
officials who are left unchecked / without any checks and
balances to limit their power, because the populace has
become complacent and apathetic about the political
process.
• The fact that Trump won the election in 2016 is a direct
outcome of this kind of Democratic Despotism: most
Americans were too comfortable with the faith that
someone extreme like Trump could never be president
because ‘our system’ will make sure of that, thus, we
need not vote (political complacency).
• Less than 60% of Americans voted in 2016, and of the
60%, the majority of the 60% voted for Trump.
• Trump’s victory was therefore not about the majority
American support for him, but an outcome of the majority
complacency in the political process, leading to the
despotism of Trump!

2
Richter, “Tocqueville on Threats to Liberty in Democracies”, p. 258.
non-verbal non-verbal

Talking through associations An expression of

we choose to join independence
 existential reasons → reasons that are common

sense that you can engage makes us understand other

in an equal basis views

I
NO Such thing as absolute
free speech

legal action can be

taken
cannot gives
incite
others information
get makes
someone someone
else
else
to do it
do it
not a subjective principle
Let them express themselves
to prevent something worse

from happening
 (shamed 7

Publicly shame

cases that do not qualify for harm

→ hence do not qualify for litigation
something better than nothing
 important but not
easy to

litigate

something tangible

feeling intimated
Maybe hard to establish harm
 based on Plato's criticism of democracies

because no one
them
is litigating

Too much
What happens before we get to a All the steps that lead to actual Physical
Violence
Point Of Physical Violence

What the Processes Of violence

are

we can all be
victims

even those not engaged

in violence can create the

ground work for violence

through the hate speech
 Freedom of Speech

Academic Tools
Other Internet Resources
Related Entries

1. Introduction: Boundaries of the Debate

The topic of free speech is one of the most contentious issues in liberal
societies. If liberty of expression is not highly valued, as has often been
the case, there is no problem; freedom of expression is simply curtailed in
favor of other values. It becomes a volatile issue when it is highly valued
because only then do the limitations placed upon it become controversial.
The first thing to note in any sensible discussion of freedom of speech is
that it will have to be limited. Every society places some limits on the
exercise of speech because it always takes place within a context of
competing values. In this sense, Stanley Fish is correct when he says that
there is no such thing as free speech (in the sense of unlimited speech).
Free speech is simply a useful term to focus our attention on a particular
form of human interaction and the phrase is not meant to suggest that
speech should never be limited. One does not have to fully agree with Fish
when he says , “free speech in short, is not an independent value but a
political prize” (1994,102) but it is the case that no society has existed
where speech has not been limited to some extent. Haworth (1998) makes
a similar point when he suggests that a right to freedom of speech is not
something we have, not something we own, in the same way as we
possess arms and legs.

Alexander and Horton (1984) agree. They note that “speech” encapsulates
many different activities: speaking, writing, singing, acting, burning flags,
yelling on the street corner, advertising, threats, slander and so on. One
reason for thinking that speech is not special simpiciter is that some of
these forms of communication are more important than others and hence

2 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

 David van Mill

require different levels of protection. For example, the freedom to criticize

a government is generally thought to be more important than the freedom
of an artist to offend her audience. If two speech acts clash (when yelling
prevents a political speech) a decision has to be made to prioritize one
over the other, which means that there can be no unlimited right to free
speech. For example, Alexander and Horton (1984) claim that arguments
defending speech on democratic grounds have many parts. One is a claim
that the public needs a great deal of information in order to make informed
decisions. Another is that because government is the servant of the people,
it should not be allowed to censor them. Such arguments show that one of
the main reasons for justifying free speech (political speech) is important,
not for its own sake but because it allows us to exercise another important
value (democracy). Whatever reasons we offer to protect speech can also
be used to show why some speech is not special. If speech is defended
because it promotes autonomy, we no longer have grounds for protecting
speech acts that undermine this value. If our defence of speech is that it is
crucial to a well-functioning democracy, we have no reason to defend
speech that is irrelevant to, or undermines, this goal. And if we agree with
John Stuart Mill (1978) that speech should be protected because it leads to
the truth, there seems no reason to protect the speech of anti-vaccers or
creationists.

Speech is important because we are socially situated and it makes little

sense to say that Robinson Crusoe has a right to free speech. It only
becomes necessary to talk of such a right within a social setting, and
appeals to an abstract and absolute right to free speech hinder rather than
help the debate. At a minimum, speech will have to be limited for the sake
of order. If we all speak at once, we end up with an incoherent noise.
Without some rules and procedures we cannot have a conversation at all
and consequently speech has to be limited by protocols of basic civility.

Spring 2021 Edition 3

 Freedom of Speech

It is true that many human rights documents give a prominent place to the
right to speech and conscience, but such documents also place limits on
what can be said because of the harm and offense that unlimited speech
can cause, (I will discuss this in more detail later). Outside of the United
States of America speech does not tend to have a specially protected status
and it has to compete with other rights claims for our allegiance. John
Stuart Mill, one of the great defenders of free speech, summarized these
points in On Liberty, where he suggests that a struggle always takes place
between the competing demands of authority and liberty. He claimed that
we cannot have the latter without the former:

All that makes existence valuable to anyone depends on the

enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people. Some
rules of conduct, therefore, must be imposed—by law in the first
place, and by opinion on many things which are not fit subjects for
the operation of law. (1978, 5)

The task, therefore, is not to argue for an unlimited domain of free speech;
such a concept cannot be defended. Instead, we need to decide how much
value we place on speech in relation to other important ideals such as
privacy, security, democratic equality and the prevention of harm and there
is nothing inherent to speech that suggests it must always win out in
competition with these values. Speech is part of a package deal of social
goods: “speech, in short, is never a value in and of itself but is always
produced within the precincts of some assumed conception of the good”
(Fish, 1994, 104). In this essay, I will examine some conceptions of the
good that are deemed to be acceptable limitations on speech. I will start
with the harm principle and then move on to other more encompassing
arguments for limiting speech.

Before we do this, however, the reader might wish to disagree with the
above claims and warn of the dangers of the “slippery slope.” As

4 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

 David van Mill

Frederick Schauer (1985) has demonstrated, slippery slope arguments

make the claim that a current acceptable change (he calls this the instant
case) to the status quo regarding speech will lead to some intolerable
future state of affairs (what he calls the danger case) once the instant case
prohibiting speech is introduced. The assumption is that the instant case is
acceptable; otherwise it would be critiqued in its own right. The complaint
is that a change from the status quo to the instant case will lead to
unwanted future limitations on speech and should be avoided (even if a
change to the instant case would be immediately desirable). The slippery
slope argument has to make a clear distinction between the instant and the
danger case. If the former was part of the latter then it is not a slippery
slope argument but simply an assertion about the unwarranted breadth of
the instant case. The claim being made is that a change to an acceptable
instant case that is distinct from the danger case should nevertheless be
prohibited because a change from the status quo to the instant case will
necessarily transport us to the danger case.

As Schuer says this is not very compelling because it needs to be

demonstrated, rather than merely stated, that the move from the status quo
is so much more likely to lead to the danger case. Part of the problem is
that slippery slope arguments are often presented in a way that suggests
we can be on or off the slope. In fact, no such choice exists: we are
necessarily on the slope whether we like it or not, and the task is always to
decide how far up or down we choose to go, not whether we should step
off the slope altogether. We need to keep in mind that the slippery-slope
claim is not that the proposed instant case will lead to minor changes in
the future, but that a small change now will have drastic and tyrannical
consequences. The slippery-slope argument seems to suggest that the
instant case is so flawed that any change to it from the status quo (which
again, is a position already on the slope) puts us in imminent threat of
sliding into the danger case. Unfortunately, the causal mechanisms for
how this must necessarily happen are usually unspecified. Anyone making

Spring 2021 Edition 5

 Freedom of Speech

such claims should be willing to demonstrate how this unlikely event will
happen before being taken seriously. Such a person is not simply
advocating caution; she is claiming that there is an imminent risk of
moving from an acceptable instant case to an unacceptable danger case.
This is not to say that slippage cannot occur. One safeguard against this is
to be as precise as possible in our use of language. If harm to others is our
preferred stopping point on the slope, we need to specify in clear terms
what counts as harm and what does not. Sometimes we will fail in this
task, but precision puts brakes on the instant case and limits its capacity
for sliding down the slope.

Those who support the slippery slope argument tend to make the claim
that the inevitable consequence of limiting speech is a slide into
censorship and tyranny. It is worth noting, however, that the slippery slope
argument can be used to make the opposite point; one could argue that we
should not allow any removal of government interventions (on speech or
any other type of freedom) because once we do we are on the slippery
slope to anarchy, the state of nature, and a life that Hobbes described in
Leviathan as “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short” (1968, 186).

It is possible that some limits on speech might, over time, lead to further
restrictions—but they might not. And if they do, those limitations might
also be justified. The main point is that once we abandon the incoherent
position that there should be no limits on speech, we have to make
controversial decisions about what can and cannot be expressed; this
comes along with the territory of living together in communities.

Another thing to note before we engage with specific arguments for

limiting speech is that we are in fact free to speak as we like. Hence,
freedom of speech differs from some other types of free action. If the
government wants to prevent citizens engaging in certain actions, riding
motor bikes for example, it can limit their freedom to do so by making

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sure that such vehicles are no longer available; current bikes could be
destroyed and a ban can be placed on future imports. Freedom of speech is
a different case. A government can limit some forms of free expression by
banning books, plays, films etc. but it cannot make it impossible to say
certain things. The only thing it can do is punish people after they have
spoken. This means that we are free to speak in a way that we are not free
to ride outlawed motorbikes. This is an important point; if we insist that
legal prohibitions remove freedom then we have to hold the incoherent
position that a person was unfree at the very moment she performed a
speech act. The government would have to remove our vocal cords for us
to be unfree in the same way as the motorcyclist is unfree.

A more persuasive analysis suggests that the threat of a sanction makes it

more difficult and potentially more costly to exercise our freedom of
speech. Such sanctions take two major forms. The first, and most serious,
is legal punishment by the state, which usually consists of a financial
penalty, but can stretch to imprisonment (which then, of course, further
restricts the persons free speech). The second threat of sanction comes
from social disapprobation. People will often refrain from making public
statements because they fear the ridicule and moral outrage of others. For
example, one could expect to be publicly condemned if one made racist
comments during a public lecture at a university. Usually it is the first type
of sanction that catches our attention but, as we will see, John Stuart Mill
provides a strong warning about the chilling effect of the latter form of
social control.

We seem to have reached a paradoxical position. I started by claiming that

there can be no such thing as a pure form of free speech: now I seem to be
arguing that we are, in fact, free to say anything we like. The paradox is
resolved by thinking of free speech in the following terms. I am, indeed,
free to say (but not necessarily to publish) what I like, but the state and
other individuals can sometimes make that freedom more or less costly to

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exercise. This leads to the conclusion that we can attempt to regulate

speech, but we cannot prevent it if a person is undeterred by the threat of
sanction. The issue, therefore, boils down to assessing how cumbersome
we wish to make it for people to say certain things. I have already
suggested that all societies do (correctly) make some speech more costly
than others. If the reader doubts this, it might be worth considering what
life would be like with no sanctions on libelous statements, child
pornography, advertising content, and releasing state secrets. The list
could go on.

The conclusion to be drawn is that the problem we face is deciding where,

not whether, to place limits on speech, and the next sections look at some
possible solutions to this puzzle.

2. The Harm Principle and Free Speech

2.1 John Stuart Mill's Harm Principle

Given that Mill presented one of the first, and still perhaps the most
famous liberal defense of free speech, I will focus on his arguments in this
essay and use them as a springboard for a more general discussion of free
expression. In the footnote at the beginning of Chapter II of On Liberty,
Mill makes a very bold statement:

If the arguments of the present chapter are of any validity, there

ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, as a
matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it may
be considered. (1978, 15)

This is a very strong defense of free speech; Mill tells us that any doctrine
should be allowed the light of day no matter how immoral it may seem to
everyone else. And Mill does mean everyone:

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