G.R. No.

85279 July 28, 1989

FACTS.
 On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with
a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers
and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building,
preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business
with the SSS;
 that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers
to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a
result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the
strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be
ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
 It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which
included:
1. implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on
check-off of union dues;
2. payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay;
3. conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into
regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and
benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS;
4. and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts
from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor
practices
 The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction [Rollo, p. 71.]
 Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
o To this motion, the SSS filed an opposition, reiterating its prayer for the issuance of a writ of
injunction
o On July 22,1987, in a four-page order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and
converted the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after finding
that the strike was illegal
o motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also denied on August 14, 1988
o petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before SC to
wit it resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals. - Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration thereof, but during its pendency the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
on the referred case. - Petitioners moved to recall the Court of Appeals' decision which the CA
denied.
 Hence, the instant petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
 Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the petitioners from staging another strike or from pursuing the notice of strike they filed with
the Department of Labor and Employment on January 25, 1989 and to maintain the status quo
The Court, taking the comment as answer, and noting the reply and supplemental reply filed by petitioners,
considered the issues joined and the case submitted for decision.
 The position of the petitioners (SSSEA) is that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear the
case initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction, as
jurisdiction lay with the Department of Labor and Employment or the National Labor Relations
Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute.
 On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that the employees of the
SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore
they do not have the right to strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the
dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees from striking.
 CA - In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by
petitioners, the Court of Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are government employees,
they are not allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdiction
over the SSS' complaint for damages, from continuing with their strike.
ISSUE/s.
1. Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?
2. Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to enjoin the strikers
from continuing with the strike and to order them to return to work?
I
RULING.
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee
the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and employees, including
those in the public sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this
impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil Service Commission, it provides, after defining the scope
of the civil service as "all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters," that "[t]he right to
self-organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(l) and (50)].
Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that "[tlhe right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the
Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such
recognition also includes the right to strike.
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these
provisions.
A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution
would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners
intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right
to strike.
It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875), which was repealed by the Labor Code
(P.D. 442) in 1974, expressly banned strikes by employees in the Government, including
instrumentalities exercising governmental functions, but excluding entities entrusted with proprietary
functions:
.Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government. — The terms and conditions of
employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are
governed by law and it is declared to be the policy of this Act that employees therein shall not
strike for the purpose of securing changes or modification in their terms and conditions of
employment. Such employees may belong to any labor organization which does not impose the
obligation to strike or to join in strike: Provided, however, That this section shall apply only
to employees employed in governmental functions and not those employed in
proprietary functions of the Government including but not limited to governmental
corporations.
On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of government employees to organize, the
President issued E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government
employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted
by Congress." The President was apparently referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil
Service Commission under date April 21, 1987 which, "prior to the enactment by Congress of
applicable laws concerning strike by government employees ... enjoins under pain of administrative
sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves,
walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of
public service." The air was thus cleared of the confusion. At present, in the absence of any legislation
allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of
the right, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as
implied in E.O. No. 180. [At this juncture, it must be stated that the validity of Memorandum Circular
No. 6 is not at issue].
But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes? - The Court is of the
considered view that they are.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the
employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one
such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No.
1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295,
November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting
strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government
employees, while clinging to the same philosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation
where the terms and conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed by law. Thus:
.SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or improvements thereof, except those that
are fixed by law, may be the subject of negotiations between duly recognized employees'
organizations and appropriate government authorities.
The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanism for the settlement of labor disputes in the
public sector to wit:
.SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures, whenever applicable, shall be
followed in the resolution of complaints, grievances and cases involving government employees. In
case any dispute remains unresolved after exhausting all the available remedies under existing
laws and procedures, the parties may jointly refer the dispute to the [Public Sector Labor-
Management] Council for appropriate action.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the
betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with
the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any
unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council for
appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other
temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to
their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of
the Right of Government- Employees to Self- Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he
terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof and government- owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and
employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."
II
The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union being prohibited by law,
an injunction may be issued to restrain it.
It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of
injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike. The Labor Code itself provides that terms and
conditions of employment of government employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules
and regulations [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public Sector Labor - Management
Council with jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving government employees [Sec. 16].
Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.
This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not precluded, in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint for
damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for therein. Unlike the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council has not been granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor
disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction
over the instant labor dispute, resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of
injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.
In their supplemental reply, petitioners annexed an order of the Civil Service Commission, dated May
5, 1989, which ruled that the officers of the SSSEA who are not preventively suspended and who are
reporting for work pending the resolution of the administrative cases against them are entitled to their
salaries, year-end bonuses and other fringe benefits and affirmed the previous order of the Merit
Systems Promotion Board.
The matter being extraneous to the issues elevated to this Court, it is Our view that petitioners'
remedy is not to petition this Court to issue an injunction, but to cause the execution of the aforesaid
order, if it has already become final.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the Court of Appeals, the instant petition for review
is hereby DENIED and the decision of the appellate court dated March 9, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is
AFFIRMED. Petitioners' "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction" dated December 13,1988 is
DENIED.