Republic of the Philippines

CAVITE STATE UNIVERSITY

Don Severino de las Alas Campus
Indang, Cavite
🕾 (046) 862-1654
www.cvsu.edu.ph

COLLEGE OF ECONOMICS, MANAGEMENT, AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

CASE DIGESTION
PROJECT

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the subject

HRMT 80: Labor Relations and Negotiation

Submitted to:
Ms. Patricia Sullano

Submitted by:
Cruz, Jericho Ryan
Rivera, Shekinah Grace
Sabio, Sheila Mae

BSBM-HRDM 3-2
 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS AND UNIONS

A. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, ITS AUTHORITY AND FUNCTIONS......4
B. BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE AND UNION………………….…………….6

II. STRIKES, PICKETING, AND LOCKOUTS..…………….……..…………………..8

III. POST-EMPLOYMENT, TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

A. ELEMENTS ATTENDANT TO SHOW EXISTENCE OF
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP…………………………………….10
B. RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE AND WORKERS ENJOYING SUCH
RIGHT……………………………………….……………………………………...12

IV. JUST CAUSE AND DUE PROCESS OF EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION

A. IDENTIFICATION OF JUST OR AUTHORIZED CAUSES OF
DISMISSAL…………………………………………………………………….…..14
B. COMPULSORY ARBITRATION FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL CASES
THROUGH NLRC………………………………....………………………………16

V. ISSUES ON JURISDICTIONS AND LABOR TRIBUNALS

A. LABOR ARBITER…………………………………..……………………………..18
B. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSIONS…………...………………..21

VI. DIFFERENT KINDS OF LABOR DISPUTES

A. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION…………………………..………………………...23

VII. ISSUES IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

A. CLOSED SHOP AGREEMENT……………………………..………….………..25

VIII. ISSUES ON UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

A. CHECK-OFF…………………………………………………..………….………..27
 3

IX. POWERS OF NLRC

A. THE POWER TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATION…………………………….....29

X. DIFFERENT REMEDIES OR APPEALS

A. RULE 65, SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI………….…………….32
B. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES…..….…………………….34
 4

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS AND UNIONS

BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, IT’S AUTHORITY AND FUNCTION

The Case: G.R. No. 76185 March 30, 1988

THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS; PHILIPPINE AGRICULTURAL,

COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL WORKERS UNION (PACIWU); and
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA WARREN MANUFACTURING
CORP.-ALLIANCE OF NATIONALIST AND GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
(SMWMC-ANGLO), plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.

WARREN MANUFACTURING WORKERS UNION (WMWU), defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

The petition for a certification election was submitted on June 13, 1985, by the
Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial Workers Union (PACIWU), who
claimed that the jurisdictional conditions had been met.

On July 7, 1985, the petitioner, through counsel, filed a move to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that the respondent and the Warren Mfg. had a C.B.A. A
union that went into force on July 16, 1985, and would end on July 31, 1986. During
the petition hearing, the PACIWU filed a Notice of Strike, and at the conciliation
session, a Return-to-Work Agreement was signed, providing assurance that the
conflict over union representation at Warren Mfg. would be settled. On August 25,
1985, at the company's location and under the observation of MOLE, a consent
election among the rank and file was held as per the parties' agreement to Corp. The
current CBA of the corporation is expected to be upheld and implemented by the
certified union in the aforementioned projected election until that agreement ends on
July 31, 1986.

PACIWU filed a Notice of Strike and at the conciliation meeting, a

Return-to-Work Agreement was signed stipulating that to resolve the issue of union
representation at Warren Mfg. Corp. Warren Manufacturing Corporation opposed
both petitions on the grounds that neither has 30% support, that both are barred by
the one-year no certification election law, and that both exist. The PACIWU filed a
petition for certification election on June 5, 1986, and the Samahan ng Manggagawa
 5

sa Warren Manufacturing Corporation-Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor

Organizations (Anglo for short) filed a petition for the same purposes.

ISSUE:

Whether the certification election should be granted.

RULING:

Yes. According to the documents, the petitioner acknowledged that the event
that took place on August 25, 1985 at the Company's headquarters and gave rise to
this dispute was a consent election rather than a certification election. A certification
election is intended to identify the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the
employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining, whereas a consent election is an agreed-upon process that only aims to
determine the issue of majority representation of all the workers in the appropriate
collective bargaining unit.

The finality of the findings of fact of the Med-Arbiter that the petition and
intervention filed in the case at bar were supported by 30% of the members of the
workers is clear and definite. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED,
 6

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS AND UNIONS

BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE AND UNION

The Case: G.R. No. 170830 August 11, 2010

PHIMCO INDUSTRIES LABOR ASSOCIATION (PILA), and ERLINDA VAZQUEZ,

RICARDO SACRISTAN, LEONIDA CATALAN, MAXIMO PEDRO, NATHANIELA
DIMACULANGAN, RODOLFO MOJICO, ROMEO CARAMANZA, REYNALDO
GANITANO, ALBERTO BASCONCILLO, and RAMON FALCIS, in their capacity
as officers of PILA, and ANGELITA BALOSA, DANILO BANAAG, ABRAHAM
CADAY, ALFONSO CLAUDIO, FRANCISCO DALISAY,ANGELITO DEJAN, PHILIP
GARCES, NICANOR ILAGAN, FLORENCIO LIBONGCOGON, NEMESIO
MAMONONG, TEOFILO MANALILI, ALFREDO PEARSON, MARIO PEREA,
RENATO RAMOS, MARIANO ROSALES, PABLO SARMIENTO, RODOLFO
TOLENTINO, FELIPE VILLAREAL, ARSENIO ZAMORA, DANILO BALTAZAR,
ROGER CABER, REYNALDO CAMARIN, BERNARDO CUADRA, ANGELITO DE
GUZMAN, GERARDO FELICIANO, ALEX IBAÑEZ, BENJAMIN JUAN, SR.,
RAMON MACAALAY, GONZALO MANALILI, RAUL MICIANO, HILARIO PEÑA,
TERESA PERMOCILLO, ERNESTO RIO, RODOLFO SANIDAD, RAFAEL STA.
ANA, JULIAN TUGUIN and AMELIA ZAMORA, as members of PILA,
plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC., accused-appellant.

FACTS:

The respondent, the Phimco Industries Labor Association (PILA), is the legally
recognized representative in negotiations for PHIMCO's daily-paid employees.
workers. The forty-seven (47) respondents that have been named individually are
PILA officers and members just before the last collective bargaining agreement was
due to end.

Its renewal was arranged between PILA and PHIMCO. Economic difficulties
were not resolved throughout the discussion, mostly as a result of differences over
pay raises and benefits. Due to the impasse in negotiations, PILA submitted a Notice
of Strike to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). It organized a
strike. To prevent the strikers from obstructing the entry and exit of non-striking
employees into and out of the workplace using force, intimidation, and coercion,
 7

PHIMCO filed a petition for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
(TRO) with the NLRC corporate facilities. Ex-parte TRO was issued by NLRC.

After three days, one hundred and thirty-six (136) union members were made
aware of their termination. PILA submitted an unlawful termination case) before the
NLRC raffled off to Jose S. Brillantes, then Acting Secretary of Labor. PHIMCO
asked the NLRC to fire PILA officers and members who knowingly took part in the
illegal strike in a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal (illegal strike case). The
situation was raffled off to LA Young Ll. Mayor. The matter was resolved by the LA
Mayor, who determined the strike to be unlawful. As a result, the LA Mayor decreed
that the responsive staff members, PILA officers, and... members, have lost their
work status. The NLRC, Leave the LA Mayor's choice alone. The union's illegal
dismissal case was decided by LA Espiritu. He declared the respondents' termination
to be unlawful and ordered their reinstatement with back pay. The NLRC issued its
Decision in the merged cases, completely siding with the union. CA rejected
PHIMCO's certiorari petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the NLRC did not act with grave
abuse of discretion in ruling that the union's strike was legal.

RULING:

These union members risk being fired for their involvement in illegally
obstructing access to and exit from corporate property during the union's strike.
However, we find that when PHIMCO fired the respondents, it did so in violation of
the Labor Code's provisions for due process. According to Labor Code Article
277(b)[79], the employer is required to provide the employee who is about to be
terminated with a written notice outlining the reason(s) for the termination and to
allow the employee a chance to be heard and present a defense. WHEREFORE, in
view of all the aforementioned, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision
of the Court of Appeals.
 8

STRIKES, PICKETING, AND LOCKOUTS

STRIKES

The Case: G.R. No. 114521 November 27, 1998

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and COCA-COLA BOTTLERS,

PHIL., INC., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.

CCBPI POSTMIX WORKERS UNION, defendant-appellant.

The Case: G.R. No. 123491 November 27, 1998

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CCBPI POSTMIX WORKERS

UNION, MARTIN GUMARANG, LUISITO PIEDAD, EDMAR BASCO, VICTORIANO
JUMALON and JUANITO DAYAO, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHIL., INC., defendant-appellant.

FACTS:

Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. All regular office and sales employees of
CCBPI Postmix Division (hereinafter referred to as the "company") are represented
by Postmix Workers union (hereinafter referred to as the "union"). With the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the parties set to expire on June 30, 1986,
several negotiations were held in an effort to extend it. The union filed a Notice of
Strike with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on March 9, 1987, as
no agreement could be reached during the discussions. In response, the DOLE
called conciliation sessions with the parties to end the impasse in negotiations. On
April 14, 1987, the union conducted a strike vote because they were still unable to
come to an agreement. The outcome of which amply demonstrated the members'
support for conducting a strike. 20 April 1987 saw a union strike. On the even date,
the company filed a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal, alleging that the union had
engaged in a strike despite being required to observe a seven-day strike ban under
Labor Code Article 264 and that the strike had been conducted in bad faith because
the union had not fully utilized the conciliation period.
 9

The Labor Arbiter issued a Decision dismissing the Petition to Declare Strike
Illegal for lack of merit, finding that the union had complied substantially with the
required seven-day strike ban by striking on the sixth day following the submission of
the strike vote results to the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter's Decision was overturned by
the NLRC on appeal. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) determined
in its Resolution dated December 28, 1993 that the seven-day strike ban must be
met before a union can go on strike, and that "a strike held even on the seventh day
of the aforementioned seven-day ban, would be unconstitutional."

ISSUE:

Whether or not a strike held on the sixth day of the 7th day ban would be
illegal.

RULING:

The strike is illegal. We disagree with the idea that the union should be
regarded as basically complying with the legal prerequisites for a strike. Without
these requirements, the strike will be deemed illegal under the Labor Code. In
conclusion, we hold that the strike on April 20, 1987 was unlawful since the striking
union did not observe and comply with the seven-day mandatory strike ban.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 114251 ("CCBPI Postmix Workers

union vs. NLRC and Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phil., Inc.) is DISMISSED. The assailed
Resolution dated December 28, 1993 declaring the strike illegal is AFFIRMED but
only the union officers found herein to be such are hereby declared to have lost their
employment status. The petition in G.R. No. 123491 (CCBPI vs. NLRC et al.) is
DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated December 12, 1995 is AFFIRMED.
Petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. is hereby ordered to reinstate Edmar L.
Basco to his former position, without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
appurtenant thereto, with full back wages from the time of his dismissal until he is
actually reinstated, or to pay him separation pay, if reinstatement is no longer
feasible. COSTS against the petitioners in each case.
 10

POST-EMPLOYMENT, TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

ELEMENTS ATTENDANT TO SHOW EXISTENCE OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE

RELATIONSHIP

The Case: G.R. No. 184517 October 8, 2013

PEREGRIN T. DE GUZMAN,EDUARDO M. AGUSTIN, JR., ELICERIO GASPAR, ,

RICARDO GASPAR JR., EUFEMIA ROSETE, FIDEL ESPIRITU,
SIMEONESPIRITU, JR., and LIBERATO MANGOBA, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.

SME BANK INC., ABELARDO P. SAMSON, OLGA SAMSON and AURELIO

VILLAFLOR, JR., defendants-appellants.

The Case: G.R. No. 186641

ELICERIO GASPAR, RICARDO GASPAR, JR., EUFEMIA ROSETE, FIDEL

ESPIRITU, SIMEONESPIRITU, JR., and LIBERATO MANGOBA,
plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.

SME BANK INC., ABELARDO P. SAMSON, OLGA SAMSON and AURELIO

VILLAFLOR, JR., defendants-appellants.

FACTS:

SME Bank ran into financial issues in June 2001. To remedy the crisis, the
bank executives offered its sale to Abelardo Samson (Samson). As a result,
discussions developed and Samson received an official offer. Samson then
addressed legal letters (Letter Agreements) to Agustin and De Guzman through his
actual attorney, Tomas S. Gomez IV, requesting the following as prerequisites for the
sale of SME Bank's stock; You shall guarantee the peaceful turn over of all assets as
well as the peaceful transition of management of the bank and shall terminate/retire
the employees we mutually agree upon, upon transfer of shares in favor of our
group's nominees.

All retirement benefits, if any of the above officers/stockholders/board of

directors are hereby waived upon consummation of the above sale. The retirement
benefits of the rank and file employees including the managers shall be honored by
the new management in accordance with B.R. No. 10, S. 1997. The general
 11

manager of SME Bank, Simeon Espiritu, called a conference with all of the staff
members of the corporate office as well as the Talavera and Muoz branches and
convinced them to submit their resignations with the assurance that they would be
rehired upon reapplying. His instruction allegedly took place at the petitioner Olga
Samson's request. The respondents' petitions for the payment of their respective
separation benefits were turned down. Respondent employees, who were upset
about losing their jobs, filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, accusing SME Bank,
spouses Abelardo and Olga Samson, and Aurelio Villaflor (the Samson Group) of
engaging in unfair labor practices, illegally terminating employees, making
deductions without authorization, underpaying employees, and failing to pay
allowances, separation pay, and 13th month pay. They later changed their complaint
to add Agustin and De Guzman as defendants.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent employees were illegally dismissed and, if so, which of
the parties are liable for the claims of the employees and the extent of the reliefs that
may be awarded to these employees.

RULING:
Respondent employees were illegally dismissed. SME Bank, Eduardo M.
Agustin, Jr. and Peregrin de Guzman, Jr. are liable for illegal dismissal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petitions for Review are

PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 97510 dated 13 March 2008 and 1 September
2008,respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as it held
Abelardo P. Samson, Olga Samson and Aurelio Villaflor, Jr. solidarily liable for illegal
dismissal. We REVERSE our ruling in Manlimos v. NLRC insofar as it upheld that, in
a stock sale, the buyer in good faith has no obligation to retain the employees of the
selling corporation, and that the dismissal of the affected employees is lawful even
absent a just or authorized cause.
 12

POST-EMPLOYMENT, TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE AND WORKERS ENJOYING SUCH RIGHT

The Case: G.R. No. 176484 November 25, 2008

CALAMBA MEDICAL CENTER, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, RONALDO LANZANAS AND
MERCEDITHA* LANZANAS, respondents.

FACTS:

As part of its staff of resident physicians, the privately owned Calamba

Medical Center hired the services of spouses of two physicians, Ronaldo Lanzanas
(Dr. Lanzanas) and Merceditha Lanzanas (Dr. Merceditha). Respondents received a
monthly "retainer" in exchange for working twenty-four hour shifts twice a week at
the hospital.

In addition to their predetermined monthly retainer, it appears that resident

physicians were also granted a percentage portion of the costs associated with
out-of-pocket expenses, operating room help, and discharge billings. The medical
director of the petitioner set the work schedules for the residents on the team.
Additionally, the petitioner provided them with identification cards, and they signed
up for the Social Security System (SSS). They had income taxes deducted. Dr.
Meluz Trinidad (Dr. Trinidad), a resident physician at the hospital, unintentionally
overheard respondent Dr. Lanzanas speaking on the phone with another worker.
Evidently, they were talking about the low "census" or hospital admittance of
patients.

After submitting the note to her husband Dr. Lanzanas, the petitioner
strangely failed to provide respondent Dr. Merceditha, who was not engaged in the
incident, with a work schedule or explain why; nonetheless, she was later told by the
respatients. Officer from the Human Resource Department (HRD), who was let go as
part of the petitioner's cost-cutting efforts. In response to the memo, Dr. Lanzanas
acknowledged that when he spoke with Miscala over the phone, Dr. Trinidad
misinterpreted their exchange.
 13

The rank-and-file employees union of the petitioner went on strike due to

unresolved grievances over terms and conditions of employment. Dr. Lanzanas filed
a complaint for illegal suspension. Given that there was no employer-employee
relationship between the parties, as required by the fourth condition, known as the
"control test," in the Labor Arbiter's decision, the spouses' complaints were
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. the finding that an employment bond is missing.
The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter's conclusions, and the CA the NLRC decision
in an Amended.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship between

petitioner and the spouses-respondents.

RULING:

No, employer-employee connection exists between the resident physicians

and the training hospitals, unless there is a training agreement between them, and
the training program is duly certified or approved by the appropriate government
agency. In the case of the respondents, no specialist training was being received.
Petitioner thus failed to observe the two requirements,before dismissal can be
affected notice and hearing which constitute essential elements of the statutory
process; the first to apprise the employee of the particular acts or omissions for
which his dismissal... is sought, and the second to inform the employee of the
employer's decision to dismiss him.Non-observance of these requirements runs afoul
of the procedural mandate. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 75871 is AFFIRMED
 14

JUST CAUSE AND DUE PROCESS OF EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION

IDENTIFICATION OF JUST OR AUTHORIZED CAUSES OF DISMISSAL

The Case: G.R. No. 115491 November 24, 1998

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), COCA-COLA

BOTTLERS, PHILIPPINES, INC. (Zamboanga Plant), RENE P. HORRILLENO,
Plant Manager and NORIEL B. ENRIQUEZ, Plant Finance Manager,
plaintiffs-appellee,
vs.
ALEJANDRO Y. CAOILE, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:

Petitioner Alejandro Y. Caoile was an Electronic Data Processing (EDP)

Supervisor for private respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines Inc. (CCBPI) in its
Zamboanga plant. As such supervisor, he was tasked to directly supervise the
installation of the company’s house wiring project in the plant premises. For the said
project, he contracted the services of a contractor. Since the project falls under his
direct supervision, all cash advances by the contractor were coursed through him.

He was later dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence for his
direct involvement in the anomalous encashment of check payments to such
contractors. Contesting his dismissal, petitioner filed a complaint against CCBPI and
its officers.for illegal dismissal and money claims. The NLRC ruled that the petitioner
committed acts constituting a breach of trust and confidence reposed in him by his
employer, thus, his dismissal is justified.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the dismissal is justified.

RULING:

The dismissal was justified. Loss of confidence as a just cause for termination
of employment is premised from the fact that an employee concerned holds a
position of trust and confidence. However, in order to constitute a just cause for
dismissal, the act complained of must be work-related such as would show the
employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the employer.
 15

In the present case, the petitioner is not an ordinary rank-and-file employee.

He is the EDP Supervisor tasked to directly supervise the installation of the house
wiring project in the company’s premises. He should have realized that such a
sensitive position requires the full trust and confidence of his employer. He ought to
know that his job requires that he keep the trust and confidence bestowed on him by
his employer unsullied. Breaching that trust and confidence by pocketing money as
“kickback” for himself in the course of the implementation of the project under his
supervision could only mean dismissal from employment. [CaoIie vs. NLRC et al,
G.R. No. 115491, November 24, 1998--FIRST DlVISION; Quisumbing,J.]
 16

JUST CAUSE AND DUE PROCESS OF EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION

COMPULSORY ARBITRATION FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL CASES THROUGH

NLRC

The Case: G.R. No. 123184 January 22, 1999

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PAMFILO POMBO SR., and

ANTONIO QUEBEC, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
SERAFIN QUEBEC SR., defendant-appellant.
FACTS:

Petitioner Serafin Quebec, Sr. was the owner of the Canhagimet Express, a
transportation company before it was sold. In September 1981, respondent Antonio,
brother of petitioner, was hired by the company as inspector and liaison officer with
the powers and duties of a supervisor/manager. In 1991, the latter was dismissed
without notice and hearing by the wife of the petitioner on suspicion of covering up
the womanizing activities of Serafin and that the petitioner suspected him of
misappropriating Canhagimet funds by the mere fact that he was unable to explain
his wherewithal to buy a house and lot in a short time.

Meanwhile, on November 5,1981, private respondent Pamfilo Pombo, Sr. was

hired as driver-mechanic and co-manager of Antonio in Catbalogan. In 1990, he was
dismissed without notice and hearing on the ground of non-payment of freight at the
Canhagimet buses in transporting his rattan and stalagmites, and his inability to help
in the repair of a bus. They both filed a case for illegal dismissal which were later on
consolidated. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner alleging that the
dismissal was valid since an employee could be terminated from employment for
lack of confidence due to serious misconduct. Feeling aggrieved, the respondents
went to NLRC which reversed the decision of the labor arbiter. Hence, this appeal by
the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondents were illegally dismissed.

 17

RULING:

Respondents were illegally dismissed. Basic is the rule that when there is no
showing of a clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law
considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal and the burden is on the employer to
prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause. This burden of proof
appropriately lies on the shoulders of the employer and not on the employee
because a worker’s job has some of the characteristics of property rights and is
therefore within the constitutional mantle of protection.

In the case at bar, the contentions of the petitioner were never substantiated
by any evidence other than the barefaced allegations in the affidavits of petitioner
and his witnesses, aside from the fact that there was the absence of notice and
hearing. Hence, a mere accusation of wrongdoing or a mere pronouncement of lack
of confidence is not sufficient cause for a valid dismissal of an employee, [Quebec,
Sr. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 123184; January 22, 1999; BeIIosillo, J.]
 18

ISSUES ON JURISDICTIONS AND LABOR TRIBUNALS

LABOR ARBITER

The Case: G.R. No. 168382 June 6, 2011

AIRLINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., defendant-appellee.

FACTS:

The present case arose from a labor dispute between petitioner Philippine
Airlines, Inc. (PAL) and respondent Airline Pilots' Association of the Philippines
(ALPAP), a duly registered labor organization and the exclusive bargaining agent of
all commercial pilots of PAL. ALPAP filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) a notice of strike alleging that PAL committed unfair labor
practice. The Secretary of DOLE (SOLE) assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and
thereafter prohibited ALPAP from staging a strike and committing any act that could
exacerbate the dispute.

Despite the prohibition by the SOLE, ALPAP staged a strike. A return-to-work

order was issued by the SOLE but ALPAP defied the same and went on with their
strike. The SOLE issued a resolution which declared the illegality of the strike staged
by ALPAP and the loss of employment status of the officers who participated in the
strike. The SOLE's resolution was upheld by the CA and the matter was eventually
elevated to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court dismissed ALPAP's petition for
failure to show that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion or a reversible error.
The resolution attained finality. Almost eight (8) months from the finality. PAL filed
before the LA a complaint for damages against ALPAP, as well as some of its officers
and members. The LA dismissed PAL's complaint. It ruled that it had no jurisdiction
to resolve the issue of damages. It noted that the SOLE did not certify the
controversy for compulsory arbitration to the NLRC nor on any occasion did the
parties agree to refer the same to voluntary arbitration under Article 263(h) of the
Labor Code. Hence, jurisdiction to resolve all issues arising from the labor dispute,
 19

including the claim for damages arising from the illegal strike, was left with the SOLE
to the exclusion of all other fora.

Aggrieved, PAL elevated an appeal to the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed with
modification the LA’s decision. It ruled that labor tribunals have no jurisdiction over
the claims interposed by PAL. It opined that the reliefs prayed for by PAL should
have been ventilated before the regular courts considering that they are based on
tortious acts. It explained that the airline pilots' refusal to fly their assigned aircrafts
constitutes breach of contractual obligation which is intrinsically a civil dispute. The
CA partially granted PAL's petition. It ruled that while the NLRC correctly sustained
the LA's dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, it declared that the NLRC
gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the LA's pronouncement that PAL's
cause of action had already been prescribed. The appellate court concurred with the
NLRC's opinion that exclusive jurisdiction over PAL's claim for damages lies with the
regular courts and not with the SOLE. Causes of action based on an obligation or
duty not provided under the labor laws are beyond the SOLE's jurisdiction. Only
those issues that arise from the assumed labor dispute, which has a direct causal
connection to the employer-employee relationship between the parties, will fall under
the jurisdiction of the SOLE. It pointed out that the damages caused by the willful
acts of the striking pilots in abandoning their aircraft are recoverable under civil law
and are thus within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the NLRC and the LA have jurisdiction over PAL’s claims
against ALPAP for Damages Incurred as a Consequence of the latter’s actions
during the illegal strike.

RULING:

The decision of the Court of Appeals is sustained. The records reveals that in
NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97, the DOLE Secretary declared the ALPAP officers and
members to have lost their employment status based on either of two grounds, viz:
their participation in the illegal strike on June 5, 1998 or their defiance of the
return-to-work order of the DOLE Secretary. The records of the case unveil the
names of each of these returning pilots. The logbook with the heading "Return To
 20

Work Compliance/ Returnees" bears their individual signature signifying their

conformity that they were among those workers who returned to work only on June
26, 1998 or after the deadline imposed by DOLE. From this crucial and vital piece of
evidence, it is apparent that each of these pilots is bound by the judgment. Besides,
the complaint for illegal lockout was filed on behalf of all these returnees. Thus, a
finding that there was no illegal lockout would be enforceable against them. In fine,
only those returning pilots, irrespective of whether they comprise the entire
membership of ALPAP, are bound by the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated December 22, 2004 and Resolution dated May 30, 2005 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 79686 are AFFIRMED.
 21

ISSUES ON JURISDICTIONS AND LABOR TRIBUNALS

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSIONS

The Case: G.R. No. 147590 April 2, 2007

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ISABEL G.

PANGANIBAN-ORTIGUERRA, as Executive Labor Arbiter, NAFLU, and
MARIVELES APPAREL CORPORATION LABOR UNION, plaintiffs-appellee,

vs.

ANTONIO C. CARAG, defendants-appellants

FACTS:

The National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) and Mariveles Apparel

Corporation Labor Union (MACLU), on behalf of the rank and file employees of
Mariveles Apparel Corporation (MAC) filed a complaint against MAC for illegal
dismissal brought about by its illegal closure of business. The dispute started when,
in the absence of the required notice of cessation of its business, MAC ceased its
operations with the intention of completely closing its shop or factory. Such intention
was manifested in a letter, allegedly claimed by MAC as its notice was filed only on
the same day that the operations closed. As a result of the said business closure, the
workers who rendered their services were not paid their salaries or wages. Hence,
the rank and file employees claimed that the manner of closure of the operations of
MAC was illegal. While the complaint was lodged before the Labor Arbiter, the
complainant filed a motion to impeach MAC‘s Chairman of the Board Antonio Carag
and MAC‘s President Armando David. The inclusion of Carag and David in the
complaint is to guarantee the satisfaction of any judgment favorable to the
complainants. However, the counsel for respondents, submitted a position paper and
stated that complainants should not have impeached Carag and David because
MAC is actually owned by a consortium of banks. Carag and David own shares in
MAC only to qualify them to serve as MAC’s officers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Antonio Carag be held solidarily liable for the payment of the
illegally dismissed employees.
 22

RULING:

The rule is that a director is not personally liable for the debts of the
corporation, which has a separate legal personality of its own. It was an error for
Arbiter Ortiguerra, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals to hold Carag personally
liable for the separation pay owed by MAC to complainants based solely on Article
212(e) of the Labor Code. Article 212(e) does not state that corporate officers are
personally liable for the unpaid salaries or separation pay of employees of the
corporation. The liability of corporate officers for corporate debts remains governed
by Section 31 of the Corporation Code.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision dated

29 February 2000 and the Resolution dated 27 March 2001 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 54404-06 insofar as petitioner Antonio Carag is concerned.
 23

DIFFERENT KINDS OF LABOR DISPUTES

VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION

The Case: G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and

NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL
CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR
EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing

Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang
Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the
Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed a claim for Paternity Leave,
Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to
the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the
Union. This, after his wife, Marife, had a premature delivery which resulted in the
death of their unborn child.

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave

but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of
the death and accident insurance. It posited that the express provision of the CBA
did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits on the death of

his unborn child.

RULING:

Yes, Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits. The Court emphasizes that

bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid
to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered
 24

the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss
arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of
38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child
was born alive but died subsequently.

The court also emphasized that life is not synonymous with civil personality.
One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child
inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of
the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the
mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the
child being delivered, qualifies as death.
 25

ISSUES IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

CLOSED SHOP AGREEMENT

The Case: G.R. No. 232687 February 4, 2019

SLORD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

BENERANDO M. NOYA, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:

On September 9, 2008, Noya began working as a welder for SLORD

Development Corporation. A CBA between the company and Nagkakaisang Lakas
ng Manggagawa-Katipunan (NLM-Katipunan), the company's sole and exclusive
bargaining representative for all regular rank-and-file employees, covered Noya's
employment from April 14, 2009 to April 15, 2014. The company claims that Noya
asked several employees to sign their names on a piece of blank yellow paper at
some point in December 2013 in order to start a new union. Noya established a new
union and on February 20, 2014, the Bantay Manggagawa sa SLORD Development
Corporation (BMSDC) was officially registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). On February 27, 2014, Noya received a notice of expulsion on
the grounds of disloyalty from NLM-Katipunan. Then, NLM-Katipunan demanded that
Noya be fired in accordance with the union security clause of the CBA. On March 19,
2014, Noya's employment was terminated.

Noya filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, and illegal
deduction against the company before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), asserting that he did not break any CBA provisions because he lawfully
organized BMSDC during the freedom period. On August 27, 2014, the LA
dismissed the case. It is noteworthy that the CBA contains a valid closed shop
agreement for NLM-Katipunan, which stipulates that members must maintain their
union membership in order to maintain their employment. Noya petitioned to NLRC.
The NLRC modified the LA Decision in a decision dated September 30, 2014 by
ordering the company to pay Noya ₱10,000 in nominal damages. The NLRC
discovered that even though Noya had violated the terms of the closed shop
 26

agreement, the company had not given him enough time to defend himself via
written notices and a subsequent hearing. Noya moved for reconsideration after
being dissatisfied, but the motion was denied in a resolution dated November 14,
2014. As a result, Noya petitioned to the CA. In a Decision dated January 25, 2017,
the CA ruled that his dismissal was "illegal" and granted his petition. It required the
company to immediately reinstate him, pay his full back pay and other benefits
calculated from the time he was wrongfully terminated until the time he was actually
reinstated, and pay attorney's fees equal to 10% of the total monetary award. It
declared that there was insufficient evidence to support the union's decision to expel
him and that there was no reason to terminate his employment. Finally, it discovered
that Noya had been denied a fair procedural hearing. A July 7, 2017, Resolution
rejected the company's request for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA was correct in ruling that respondent was illegally
dismissed.

RULING:

The records fail to show that the company accorded Noya ample opportunity
to defend himself through written notices and subsequent hearing. Thus, as held by
the NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, Noya’s right to procedural due process was
violated, entitling him to the payment of nominal damages, which the Court deems
proper to increase from ₱10,000.00 to ₱30,000.00 in line with existing jurisprudence.
It is settled that in cases involving dismissals for just cause but without observance
of the twin requirements of notice and hearing, the validity of the dismissal shall be
upheld, but the employer shall be ordered to pay nominal damages in the amount of
₱30,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 25,

2017 and the Resolution dated July 7, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in .CA-G.R. SP
No. 138705 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
September 30, 2014 and the Resolution dated November 14, 2014 of the National
Labor Relations Commission in NLRC LAC No. 09-002333-14 are REINSTATED
with the MODIFICATION increasing the award of nominal damages to ₱30,000.00.
 27

ISSUES ON UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

CHECK-OFF

The Case: G.R. No. 170112 April 30, 2008

DEL PILAR ACADEMY, EDUARDO ESPEJO and ELISEO OCAMPO, JR.,

plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.

DEL PILAR ACADEMY EMPLOYEES UNION, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:

Del Pilar Academy Employees Union (the UNION) is the authorized collective
bargaining agent for the teaching and non-teaching staff of the Imus, Cavite, Del
Pilar Academy (DEL PILAR). The UNION and DEL PILAR signed a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) on September 15, 1994, which gave teaching and
non-teaching staff salary increases and other benefits. After that, the UNION
assessed agency fees against non-union workers and asked DEL PILAR to deduct
those fees from the workers' salaries and wages. However, DEL PILAR refused to
implement deductions, claiming that non-union workers would not be amenable to it.
The UNION negotiated the extension of the CBA in September 1997.

However, DEL PILAR refused to renew it until the clause relating to the right
to two (2) months of paid summer vacation leave was changed to only apply to
teachers who had provided at least three (3) consecutive academic years of
satisfactory service. The UNION opposed the proposal, claiming that the benefits
would be reduced. The refusal of DEL PILAR to ratify the CBA led to a
disagreement. When DEL PILAR allegedly declined the UNION's request to submit
the matter for voluntary arbitration, the UNION filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice with the Labor Arbiter against DEL PILAR, its president, Eduardo Espejo,
and the chairman of the board of trustees, Eliseo Ocampo, Jr.

Through the complaint, DEL PILAR denied any unfair labor practices against
the UNION. The lack of individual check-off consent from the non-union employees
served as justification for not deducting the agency fees. On appeal, the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) upheld the Arbiter's decision. DEL PILAR
 28

claimed that the proposal to amend the CBA's provision on summer vacation leave
with pay cannot be considered unfair because it was done to make the provision
compliant with the DECS' Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.

Overall, it upheld the UNION's right to an agency fee but did not deem DEL
PILAR's failure to deduct the same an unfair labor practice. After the UNION's
motion for reconsideration was rejected, the CA was given notice via certiorari. On
July 19, 2005, the CA issued the contested ruling, upholding the NLRC's resolutions
subject to modification. Similar to the Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA upheld the
UNION's right to collect agency fees from non-union employees, but it did not hold
DEL PILAR accountable for unfair labor practices. However, it mandated that DEL
PILAR deduct agency fees from the pay of non-union employees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the UNION is entitled to collect agency fees from non-union
members, and if so, whether an individual written authorization is necessary for a
valid check off.

RULING:

The collection of agency fees in an amount equivalent to union dues and fees,
from employees who are not union members, is recognized by Article 248(e) of the
Labor Code. When so stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement or authorized
in writing by the employees concerned, the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules
recognize it to be the duty of the employer to deduct the sum equivalent to the
amount of union dues, as agency fees, from the employees' wages for direct
remittance to the union. The system is referred to as check off. No requirement of
written authorization from the non-union employees is necessary if the non-union
employees accept the benefits resulting from the CBA.

The Court finds that the CA did not err in upholding the UNION’s right to
collect agency fees. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86868, are AFFIRMED.
 29

POWERS OF NLRC

THE POWER TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATION

The Case: G.R. No. 175251 May 30, 2011

RODOLFO LUNA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

ALLADO CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., and/or RAMON ALLADO,

defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

Sometime in the afternoon of November 24, 2001, petitioner alleges that he

was given a travel order dated to proceed to respondents’ main office in Davao City
for reassignment. Upon arrival at the office, he was asked to sign several sets of
"Contract of Project Employment". He refused. Thus, he was not given a
reassignment or any other work. These incidents prompted him to file the complaint.
Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that petitioner applied for a leave of
absence which was granted. Upon expiration of his leave, he was advised to report
to the company's project in Sarangani Province. However, he refused and claimed
instead that he had been dismissed illegally.

Finding that petitioner is deemed resigned, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed
petitioner's complaint for illegal dismissal, but ordered respondent to pay the former
the amount of ₱18,000.00 by way of financial assistance. Respondents appealed
with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which reversed the decision
of the LA, declared respondents guilty of illegal dismissal, and ordered them to pay
petitioner one-month salary for every year of service as separation pay.
Respondents moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied.

Respondents elevated their cause to the CA via petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. The CA granted respondents petition for certiorari and deleted the award of
financial assistance. Further, the CA held that it was grave abuse of discretion for the
NLRC to rule on the issue of illegal dismissal when such issue was not raised on
appeal. Petitioner filed an MR but this was denied by the CA.
 30

ISSUES:

Whether or not the NLRC, in the exercise of its inherent powers, could still
review issues not brought during the appeal;

Whether or not respondent court of appeals exercised grave abuse of

discretion in disregarding (1) the findings of fact of the NLRC; (2) the principle of
social justice; and (3) existing jurisprudence with respect to award of financial
assistance; and

Whether or not respondent court of appeals exhibited bias and partiality when
it rendered the subject decision and resolution considering the hasty and improvident
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to frustrate petitioner in implementing the
final and executory judgment of the NLRC rendered in favor of petitioner.

RULING:

The 2002 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, which was in effect at the time
respondents appealed the Labor Arbiters decision, provided that the NLRC shall limit
itself only to the specific issues that were elevated for review. Here, the NLRC
passed upon the issue of illegal dismissal although this was not brought up in the
appeal. Therefore, by considering the arguments and issues in the reply/opposition
to appeal which were not properly raised by timely appeal nor comprehended within
the scope of the issue raised in petitioners appeal, public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

As shown by the records, inconsistent with his claim that he was actually
dismissed, petitioner applied for and was granted a week long leave. Petitioner did
not deny this. He merely claimed that he went on leave since he was not given any
work assignment by the Company. However, the leave application form which bore
his signature clearly stated that his reason for going on leave was "to settle [his]
personal problem." Indeed, the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in reversing the
Labor Arbiters decision on mere conjectures and insubstantial grounds.

We are not unmindful of the rule that financial assistance is allowed only in
instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious
misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. But we must stress that this
 31

Court did allow the grant of financial assistance as a measure of social justice and
exceptional circumstances, and as an equitable concession.There appears to be no
reason why petitioner, who has served respondent corporation for more than eight
years without committing any infraction, cannot be extended the reasonable financial
assistance of P18,000.00 as awarded by the Labor Arbiter on equity considerations.

Granting of a TRO by a justice of the CA even without the concurrence of the

other associate justices in the division, is allowed in cases of extreme urgency. Here,
the records of this case would attest to the urgency of the situation. When the TRO
was issued, the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No. XI was already in the process
of enforcing the assailed Resolution of the NLRC dated May 9, 2003 as evidenced
by its issuance of a Notice of Hearingfor a pre-execution conference which was
impelled by a motion made by petitioner. The pre-execution conference was
conducted as scheduled, thus, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision

dated July 28, 2006 as well as the Resolution dated September 28, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81703 are AFFIRMED WITH THE
MODIFICATION that the award of financial assistance is REINSTATED. The Labor
Arbiter’s Decision dated June 26, 2002 is AFFIRMED in toto.
 32

DIFFERENT REMEDIES OR APPEALS

RULE 65, SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI

The Case: G.R. No. 184116 June 19, 2013

CENTURY IRON WORKS, INC. and BENITO CHUA, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.

ELETO B. BANAS, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:

From July 5, 2000, until his firing on June 18, 2002, Eleto B. Banas worked for
Century Iron. Banas filed a claim for unlawful termination, a request for
reinstatement, and monetary demands in response to his termination. Banas,
according to Century Iron, was an inventory controller.

Sometime in 2002, Century Iron's gas suppliers allegedly received letters of

complaint alleging a severe shortage of empty gas cylinders. In response to the
letters, Century Iron launched an investigation and discovered that Banas failed to
report the missing cylinders. Banas argued in his defense that he was just an
inventory clerk and wasn't responsible for the missing cylinders. He claimed that,
unlike a supervisory employee, he was exempt from posting a bond and that, unlike
a warehouseman, he lacked the power to receive and/or release cylinders. The
petitioners, however, asserted that Banas, a supervisory worker, was in charge of the
lost cylinders. They claimed that Banas repeatedly neglected his obligations as an
officer by breaking numerous rules.

The employer company filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court after the NLRC denied the motion for reconsideration that Century
Iron subsequently submitted. In his Comment, Banas makes the claim that the
petition only raises factual issues, which are not appropriate for a petition for review
on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Courts. He further asserts that the
lower tribunals and the CA have thoroughly considered and rejected the petitioners'
arguments.
 33

ISSUES:

Whether or not questions of fact may be inquired into in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court;

Whether or not Bañas occupied a position of trust and confidence, or was

routinely charged with the care and custody of Century Iron’s money or property; and

Whether or not Century Iron terminated Bañas for just and valid causes.

A. Whether or not loss of confidence is a ground for terminating a

rank-and-file employee who is not routinely charged with the care and
custody of the employer’s money or property; and
B. Whether or not Bañas was grossly and habitually neglectful of his
duties.

RULING:

The court clarifies that the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court before the CA. In several Supreme Court cases, the court
has clearly differentiated between a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. A petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 is an appeal from a ruling of a lower tribunal on pure questions of law. It is
only in exceptional circumstances that we admit and review questions of fact. The
petition before us involves mixed questions of fact and law.

The evidence on record shows that Bañas committed numerous infractions in

his one year and eleven-month stay in Century Iron. Article 282 of the Labor Code
provides that one of the just causes for terminating an employment is the employee’s
gross and habitual neglect of his duties. Besides, the determination of who to keep in
employment and who to dismiss for cause is one of Century Iron's prerogatives. It
would be the height of injustice if we force an employer to retain the services of an
employee who does not value his work.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. The

assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint for illegal dismissal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs
against respondent Eleto B. Bañas.
 34

DIFFERENT REMEDIES OR APPEALS

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

The Case: G.R. No.137862 November 11, 2004

ALFREDO ESTRADA, RENATO T. CANILANG and MANUEL C. LIM,

plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS AND BACNOTAN CEMENT CORPORATION (BCC),

defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

On July 31, 1996, Alfredo Estrada, Renato T. Canilang, and Manuel C. Lim
filed a complaint for injunction and damages with a request for a preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order against Bacnotan Cement Corp. (BCC),
Wawandue Fishing Port, Inc. (WFPI), Jeffrey Khong Hun as President of WFPI,
Manuel Molina as Mayor of Subic, Zambales (DENR).

The complaint asserts that: the sublease between WFPI and BCC violates the
original lease because the cement plant that BCC intended to operate in Wawandue,
Subic, Zambales, is unrelated to the fish port business of WFPI; and BCC's cement
plant is an annoyance because it will pollute and endanger the health, life, and limb
of nearby residents. Defendants WFPI/Khong Hun and BCC each submitted a
motion to dismiss, arguing that the complaint fails to state a claim for relief. The
plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit, the
complaint was filed too soon, and the RTC lacks jurisdiction, according to BCC's
motion. The petitioners contend: Since allowing the cement repacking plant to
operate in Wawandue, Subic, and Zambales would result in significant and
irreparable harm, prior recourse to an administrative agency is pointless and
unnecessary; Since the DENR-Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) lacks the authority
to issue the necessary writ of injunction prayed for by petitioners, only the court can
provide them with swift, effective, and immediate relief; E.O. No. 192, R.A. No. 3931
or the P.D. 984 does not explicitly deny the RTC the power to decide whether
pollution from respondent's cement repacking plant is a nuisance per se or a
 35

nuisance per accidens, and the RTC may decide on both factual and legal issues
related to this determination. Additionally, the Constitution grants the lower court the
authority to resolve pollution-related disputes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the instant case falls under the exceptional cases where prior
resort to administrative agencies need not be made before going to court.

RULING:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be

first made with the administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling
under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to a court of justice for
review. If a remedy within the administrative machinery is still available, with a
procedure pursuant to law for an administrative officer to decide the controversy, a
party should first exhaust such remedy before going to court. A premature invocation
of a court’s intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and
dismissible on such ground.

While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is flexible and

may be disregarded in certain instances, such as:

● when there is a violation of due process,

● when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
● when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction,
● when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,
● when there is irreparable injury,
● when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of
the President bears [sic] the implied and assumed approval of the latter,
● when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable,
● when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
● when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
● when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
 36

● when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention,

● when no administrative review is provided by law,
● where the rule of qualified political agency applies, and
● when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot.

The court, however, found that the instant case does not fall under any of the
recognized exceptional circumstances. Clearly, the claim of petitioners that their
immediate recourse to the regular courts is justified because the DENR is powerless
to grant them proper relief is without basis.

The Court of Appeals correctly found that the petitioners failed to exhaust
administrative remedies before going to court which renders their complaint
dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. WHEREFORE, the petition is
denied for lack of merit.
 37

REFERENCES:

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS AND UNIONS

● https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/mar1988/gr_76185_1988.html

● https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_170830_2010.html

STRIKES, PICKETING AND LOCKOUTS

● https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1998/nov1998/gr_114521_1998.html

POST-EMPLOYMENT, TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

● https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/oct2013/gr_184517_2013.html

● https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/nov2008/gr_176484_2008.html

JUST CAUSE AND DUE PROCESS OF EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION

● https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1998/nov1998/gr_1154

91_1998.php

● https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/jan1999/gr_123184_1999.html

ISSUES ON JURISDICTIONS AND LABOR TRIBUNALS

● https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/jun2011/gr_168382_2011.html

● https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/apr2007/gr_147590_2007.html

DIFFERENT KINDS OF LABOR DISPUTES

● https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/oct2009/gr_182836_2009.html

ISSUES IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

● https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2019/feb2019/gr_232687_2019.html

ISSUES ON UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

● https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/apr2008/gr_170112_2008.html

POWERS OF NLRC

● https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/may2011/gr_175251_2011.html

DIFFERENT REMEDIES OR APPEALS

● https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_184116_2013.html

● https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/nov2004/gr_137862_2004.html