0% found this document useful (0 votes)
47 views

AES Security Protocol Implementation For Automobile Remote Keyless System

This document proposes a new AES security protocol for automobile remote keyless systems. It uses AES encryption with both a fixed key and variable key to enhance security. The fixed key is used to encrypt handshake messages and a pseudo-random number. This random number acts as the variable key, making cipher texts different each time and preventing masquerade attacks. The keys are 124-bit lengths to withstand common attacks like brute-force guessing. This approach aims to provide stronger security for remote keyless systems compared to existing methods.

Uploaded by

paney93346
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
47 views

AES Security Protocol Implementation For Automobile Remote Keyless System

This document proposes a new AES security protocol for automobile remote keyless systems. It uses AES encryption with both a fixed key and variable key to enhance security. The fixed key is used to encrypt handshake messages and a pseudo-random number. This random number acts as the variable key, making cipher texts different each time and preventing masquerade attacks. The keys are 124-bit lengths to withstand common attacks like brute-force guessing. This approach aims to provide stronger security for remote keyless systems compared to existing methods.

Uploaded by

paney93346
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 4

AES Security Protocol Implementation for

Automobile Remote Keyless System


Xiao Ni1,2, Weiren Shi Victor Foo Siang Fook
College of Automation1 Systems and Security Department2
Chongqing University Institute for Infocomm Research
Chongqing City, P. R. China Singapore
[email protected], [email protected] [email protected]

Abstract—The remote keyless system is widely used in radio signal between the automoile and key fob. A tech-savvy
automobile industry to lock or unlock the automobile’s door, car thief can then analyze the intercepted radio pattern and
trunk, and start the ignition. It comprises a handheld key fob to deduce certain security characteristics to crack the remote
be held by the driver and a set of radio transceiver devices keyless system. Conventionally, the remote keyless system
located in the automobile. Operation commands are represented works on a relatively straightforward way in which the settings
by strings of wireless signal transmitted between the key fob and of a DIP switch component in a circuitry specify the intended
the radio transceiver to realize various car operations. Because communication source and target. Typically, there is no
the radio signal is transmitted in proximity of open area, the cryptographic measure taken. The car thief can simply
remote keyless system has the possibility of exposing the key
intercept the radio pattern, and then masquerade as the car
secret commands to a car thief. The operation commands which
owner to spoof the car receiver. This kind of the remote keyless
are denoted by plaintexts or even cipher texts cannot overcome
this security problem. This paper proposes a new approach in
system provides a poor security capability to the automobile.
which encryption of the operation commands is realized by a The Texas Instruments (TI) has designed a Digital
model of AES algorithm computed with a fixed key and a Signature Transponder (DST) tag [1] which is
variable key. In the newly designed AES security protocol, the cryptographically enabled and has Advanced Encryption
key fob and radio device will be engaged in the protocol Standard (AES) [2] encryption deployed with a 40-bit-length
interrogation after the key fob initiates a connection. The fixed cryptographic key. This tag is applied in the automobile
key can be defined by car manufacturer or car dealer, and it is
immobilizer system. A DST sends a 24-bit factory-set
used for the encryption of handshake message and a pseudo
identifier, and then authenticates itself by engaging in a
random number (PRN). This PRN is proposed by the key fob,
and will serve as the variable key. This method can effectively challenge-response protocol. The reader initiates the protocol
defeat today’s common attack tricks such as brute-force key by sending a 40-bit challenge. The DST encrypts this challenge
guess attack, statistics attack, masquerade attack, etc. under its key and returns a 24-bit response. Therefore, it is the
secrecy of the key that ultimately protects the DST against
Keywords-AES security algorithm; encryption (decryption) key; cloning and simulation. However, a 40-bit key is relatively
remote keyless system short according to today’s cryptographic standard, and is
vulnerable to brute-force key guessing attack. Steve Bono, M.
I. INTRODUCTION Green, et al., claim they have cracked the DST by observing
DST responses when presented with a large amount of
The remote keyless system is widely used to remotely specially chosen challenges [3]. In addition, a fixed key
perform operations such as locking or unlocking an algorithm is easily attacked by an eavesdrop-and-masquerade
automobile’s door, trunk or glove compartment, starting the attack because the radio pattern is always consistent with
ignition, etc. It duplicates the features of a car key with added respect to time, especially for the automobile remote keyless
operating convenience that allows the car owner to manipulate system which has a relatively small set of radio patterns.
the key operations at a distance. A remote keyless system can
include both a remote keyless entry system (RKE) and a This paper proposes a new wireless protocol, named AES
remote keyless ignition system (RKI). It consists of a handheld Security Protocol (ASP), which has an enhanced security
radio key fob which is attached on a keychain and a radio mechanism for the remote keyless system. It uses AES
transceiver which is located at the automobile. This system cryptographic algorithm with fixed key and variable key
works on the principle of sending pulses of radio frequency combined model. Both the fixed and the variable key are 124-
energy between the key fob and the automobile on a particular bit-length, and should be long enough to defeat current
frequency. These pulses are then received and interpreted by commonly-seen attacks such as statistics and brute-force
the transceiver in the automobile, which in turn performs the attack. The fixed key encryption is used for protection of
appropriate function. handshake message and distribution of a pseudo random
number produced by the key fob after the handshake is
Since the radio signal is transmitted in a proximity open confirmed. PRN will act as the variable key after both the car
area around the automobile, security is a very critical concern. transceiver and the key fob are key-synchronized. Since cipher
Car thief can use an inexpensive radio scanner to receive the texts encrypted from a message by the variable keys are

1550-2252/$25.00 ©2007 IEEE 2526


different in every time of operation, this model can effectively 02 03 01 01  S 0.0 S 0.1 S 0.2 S 0.3  S '0.0 S '0.1 S '0.2 S '0.3
defend it from a masquerade attack.      
 01 02 03 01  S 1.0 S1.1
×
S1.2 S1.3   S '1.0 S '1.1
=
S '1.2 S '1.3 
 01 01 02 03  S 2.0 S 2.1 S 2.2 S 2.3  S '2.0 S '2.1 S '2.2 S '2.3
     
II. THE ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD IN BRIEF  03 01 01 02  S 3.0 S 3.1 S 3.2 S 3.3  S '3.0 S '3.1 S '3.2 S '3.3
(1)
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a block cipher
encryption standard. It is derived from the Data Encryption
Standard (DES). AES algorithm requires small memory and Fig.2. depicts the AES encryption and decryption process.
can be easily implemented in both software and hardware Encryption (decryption) runs through 10 rounds of state
platform. It is also fast to execute. computation and modification. Each round includes four stages
mentioned above, except the tenth round. Finally, the result of
With every time of encryption or decryption, AES operates the state is copied out and served as the output matrix.
on a 4×4 square matrix of bytes, termed the state (shown in
Fig. 1). In Fig.1, every cell represents one byte in the state.

S0 S4 S8 S12 Plaintext Key Plaintext


S1 S5 S9 S13
S2 S6 S10 S14 Add round key w[0,3] Add round key
S3 S7 S11 S15

Round 10
Substitute bytes Expand key Inverse sub bytes

Figure 1. AES Data Structure Shift rows Inverse shift rows

Round 1
Mix columns Inverse mix cols
Thus, the whole state is a 128-bit block. The AES key is
also 128-bit long. The states will be computed and modified at Add round key w[4,7] Add round key

Round 9
four stages during the process of encryption and decryption.


Inverse sub bytes
The four stages are called Add_Round_Key, Substitute_Bytes,
Shift_Rows and Mix_Columns. Substitute bytes Inverse shift rows

In Add_Round_Key stage, the 128 bits of state are


Shift rows
straightforwardly XORed with the 128 bits of round key. The
Round 9

round key is a kind of transformation of the cipher key. Mix columns Inverse mix cols

Substitute_Bytes stage is the modification of byte Add round key

Round 1
w[36,39] Add round key
replacement. AES defines a 16x16 matrix of byte, which is
called S-box. The S-box contains all possible 256 8-bit values. Substitute bytes Inverse sub bytes
Every byte in the AES state will be replaced by a byte in the S-
Round 10

Shift rows Inverse shift rows


box according to the following mapping way: The leftmost of
4-bit value of each state cell serves as row reference index to Mix columns w[40,43] Add round key
the S-box, and the rightmost 4-bit value of that state cell serves
as column reference index to the S-box. The selected byte of Plaintext Ciphertext

the S-box replaces the byte of the state cell. (a) Encryption (b) Decryption

The Shift_Rows transformation stage is a row level shift Figure 2. The AES Security Protocol
operation in which the first row of state is not modified. For the
second row, a 1-byte circular left shift is performed. According
to the same way, a 2-byte circular left shift and a 3-byte III. AES SECURITY PROTOCOL
circular left shift are performed to the second and the third row
respectively. A. ASP Sequence
Contrary to the Shift_Rows transformation, Mix_Columns As the wireless medium for transmitting signal is not
is a column operation. In the Mix_Columns stage, each byte of reliable and data loss is common, ASP adopts a connection-
a column is replaced by a new value which is a function of all oriented communication style, i.e. after sending out a packet,
four bytes in the same column. The function is depicted in the sender will not send another packet until a positive
Equation 1, where S is the original value, and S’ represents a response for the previous packet is received. If a negative
new value which is used to replace the original value. response is received, the sender will send the previous packet
again. The connection-oriented communication increases
transmitting reliability at the cost of more overhead data
transferring.

2527
ASP’s data link layer, in particular, provides sufficient
information to describe how the key fob and the car transceiver
Car transceiver Key Fob should implement the data transmission mechanism in order to
provide reliable communications of data. The packet structure
HANDSHAKE REQ
m1 = Dko (c1) c1 = Eko (" Car _ ID" ) is shown in Fig.4.
HANDSHAKE ACK

PRN ISSUE Car


m2 = Dko (c 2) c 2 = Eko (" PRN " ) Length Direction Type Command Data Checksum
PRN ACK ID
OPERATION REQ
m3 = DkPRN (c3) c3 = EkPRN (" Operation " ) Figure 4. ASP Packet Structure
OPERATION ACK

where

Operation = Lock Door


Unlock Door
TIMEOUT&COM END Lock Trunk • Length - Total number of bytes in a packet.
Ignition Authentication
• Car ID - The car unique ID.
Figure 3. The AES Security Protocol
• Direction – There are two possibilities. Packet is sent
from the key fob (0x00). Packet is sent from the car
In ASP, AES is introduced to serve as cryptographic transceiver (0x01).
algorithm. In a complete round of protocol interrogation, the
cryptographical procedure is divided into two stages which • Type - Command type: commands are categorized into
feature a fixed key encryption at the early stage and a variable Request (0x00) and Acknowledgment (0x01).
key encryption at the late stage respectively. The 128-bit-
length fixed key is set in both the car transceiver and the key • Command - Command codes which are defined as:
fob by the automobile dealer or the car manufacturer. It varies Handshake (0x00), PRN Issue (0x01), Car Operation option
with different cars. In order to enhance the protection (0x02), Disconnection (0x03).
capability to prevent masquerade attack, a 128-bit-length • Data – Its contents may vary depending on command
pseudo random number is created by the key fob and type. For example, in the case of command “handshake”, there
distributed to the car transceiver to work as the variable key is no such field in the request packet. However, in its response
later on. packet, there is one byte which is 0x00 to mean positive
The ASP sequence is illustrated in Fig.3. Firstly, the key acknowledgment and 0x01 to mean negative acknowledgment.
fob sends a handshake request to the car transceiver. Equation For command “Operation request”, this field is filled with a
c1 = Eko("Car _ ID") means cipher text c1 is the result of door operation option in request packet, and a positive (or
negative) acknowledgment in the response packet respectively.
encryption calculation performed on the car ID with the
In the case of pseudo random number issue, the data field is
original fixed key ko. Equation m1 = Dko (c1) means plain the 128 bits pseudo random number in the issuing packet, and
message m1 is the function of the decryption calculation the same acknowledgment byte as in the handshake case in the
performed on c1 with the key ko. Obviously m1 is the car ID. response packet.
After the car ID is authenticated, the car transceiver sends a
positive acknowledgement to the key fob. All the • Checksum – CRC16
acknowledgement messages are in plaintext form. The key fob
The ASP packet will be encrypted with the right cipher key
then creates a 128-bit-length pseudo random number and
in transmission except the fields Length and Checksum. During
encrypts it with ko. This process is denoted by the equation
the connection stage, if a radio device (could be either the key
c 2 = Eko(" PRN " ) . If the car transceiver correctly receives and
fob or the car transceiver) receives a packet, it first checks the
decrypts c2, it sends out an acknowledgement packet. When packet’s checksum. If successful, it then decrypts the cipher
the car fob receives this acknowledgement, PRN working as text and compares the car ID. If the car ID is its own, it will
the variable key in both the car transceiver and the key fob will perform the operations according to the fields of the packet.
be synchronized. Thereafter the protocol steps into an
operation iteration which includes commands: “unlock (or
C. ASP State Machine
lock) door”, “open trunk”, “authenticate immobilizer”, etc.
Equation c3 = EkPRN (" Operation" ) means the operation is In ASP, 3 states are defined for the radio devices. As shown
encrypted by the variable key kPRN. The number of operations in Fig.5, it consists of the Disconnected State, PRN
is optional, but a specified timeout counter is set for counting Distribution State and Door Operation State. The later two
time elapse from the point of the last operation. The key fob pertain to connected state category. One state can transfer to
will issue a disconnection command after the timeout counter another state if a pre-specified positive acknowledgement
is expired. packet is received. For example, when the key fob receives the
positive acknowledgement of handshake request, the key fob
shifts into the PRN Distribution State. In order to avoid cases
B. Date Link layer in which the communication accidentally breaks out, timers are
defined for the two connected states to guarantee them
returning back to the Disconnected State after the timer
expires.

2528
E. Hardware Implementation
In the hardware design, there are several factors to take into
consideration such as lifespan of the key fob’s battery, key fob
Disconnected size, system cost, customer-acceptable protocol execution time,
radio coverage range, etc.
Handshaking ACK. Disconnecting ACK.
We adopt a low-cost 8-bit ATMega128L microprocessor
and CC2420 RF transceiver chip for both the car transceiver
PRN Door
Distribution Operation and the key fob. The two components are typically used in
PRN PRN ACK. Operation
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) [4]. ATMega128L operates
Reissue Iteration on 7.37MHz frequency, and CC2420 works on 2.4 GHz
unlicensed ISM band with max 250 kbits/sec data transmission
Figure 5. ASP State Machine rate. With an antenna length of one-quarter wavelength of 2.4
GHz, the transmission range is around 50 meters. The key fob
has a similar size of a coin, and is powered by 3V button cell.
Statistically, one cell can sustain around 3800 times of
D. Security Analysis operation. Assuming 1 operation lasts for three seconds and 5
One of the most important principles in cryptographic operations are conducted per day, 3800 operations is equivalent
design is that the security of a system should be based on the to 2 years battery lifespan.
secrecy of the keys, not on the secrecy of the algorithm and the
encryption procedures. Car thief intercepts the cipher and the
plain messages transmitted between the car and the key fob in IV. CONCLUSION AND ONGOING WORKS
the close proximity, and then use these messages to try to This paper proposes a wireless protocol with a fixed and a
deduce the cryptographic key or simulate the message. variable key in AES for confidentiality protection of messages
Typically a car thief cracks the automobile keyless system by transmitted in the automobile keyless system. The protocol can
three attack methods: brute-force key guessing attack, statistics effectively defeat today’s common attack tricks. In the
attack, and masquerade attack. implementation, several practical factors are considered so that
ASP can be widely adopted. Lastly, we also try to make the car
1) Brute-force key guessing attack transceiver as a general wireless hardware platform in which
With the brute-force key guessing attack, the method to more function modules could be deployed.
guess the key is by continuously trying to send a large amount
of different key-encrypted-ciphers until the system gives an
appropriate response, and thus the secret key is reached. In REFERENCES
ASP, the variable key is a pseudo random number and it differs [1] TI product datasheet http://www.ti.com/rfid/docs/manuals/pdfSpecs/RI-
with each time of operation. Thus, only guessing the fixed key TRP-V9WK_ds.pdf.
for the attacker is meaningful. But the fixed key has 128-bit- [2] William Stallings, “Cryptography and Network Security Principle and
Practice”, third edition, chapter 5.
length with which gives 2128 ≈ 3.4 × e 38 possible variants.
[3] Steve Bono, Matthew Green, Adam Stubblefield, and Avi Rubin,
Such a large number actually makes the attack impossible. “Analysis of the Texas Instruments DST RFID”
Johns Hopkins University from http://rfid-analysis.org/.
2) Statistics attack
[4] Crossbow sensor network manufacturer http://www.xbow.com/.
The statistics attack is the way that a few words of cipher
[5] Open SSL http://www.openssl.org.
texts and their corresponding plain texts are presumed to be
[6] Wireless medium access control and physical layer specifications for
known. The attacker analyzes the relationship between them low-rate wireless personal area network. IEEE Standard, 802.15.4-2003,
and finally concludes out the secret key. The more texts known, May 2003.
the more likelihood the key will be cracked. ASP has only the [7] AES Wikipedia web site: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AES.
car ID encrypted by the fixed key. Even though the attacker is [8] Ansaf Ibrahem Alrabady, “Analysis of Attacks Against the Security of
assumed to know the car ID and its cipher, it is unlikely to Keyless-Entry Systems for Vehicles and Suggestions for Improved
deduce the key just from this single plain-cipher text pair. Designs,” IEEE transactions on vehicular technology, vol. 54, No. 1,
January 2005.
3) Masquerade attack [9] A. I. Alrabady and S. M. M, “Some attacks against vehicles’ passive
The masquerade attack is the way that the car thief entry security systems and their solutions,” IEEE Transactions. Veh.
intercepts the wireless signals which are sent from the car Technol., vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 431–439, Mar. 2003.
owner to accomplish the car door operations. The car thief does [10] “Microchip Inc., data sheet for HCS412,” in KeeLoq Code Hopping
not try to analyze these signal patterns to reach the plaintext; Encoder and Transponder. Chandler, AZ: Microchip Technol., Inc.,
2000.
rather, he will pretend to be the car owner to gain access to the
[11] Daniel J. B., “Cache-timing attacks on AES,”The University of Illinois.
car. Obviously the variable key is effective to defeat the
masquerade attack because its value is only valid for that time [12] Secure hash standard, Federal Information Processing Standard 180-2,
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Washington. URL:
of operation, and not correlated with the next time. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/.
[13] David B., Remote timing attacks are practical (2003). URL:
http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/ssl-timing.pdf.

2529

You might also like