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    1 G.R. No. 41423 March 19, 1935 - People of The Phil. v. Crisanto Tamayo

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    Sittie Ainnie Batua
    1) The appellant was convicted in a lower court of violating a municipal ordinance, but appealed the conviction. 2) While the appeal was pending, the section of the municipal ordinance he was convicted of violating was repealed. 3) The court found that while repeal of a law does not automatically destroy criminal liability, a person cannot be prosecuted or punished for acts that are no longer considered criminal. Therefore, the court dismissed the proceedings against the appellant.

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    1 G.R. No. 41423 March 19, 1935 - People of The Phil. v. Crisanto Tamayo

    Uploaded by

    Sittie Ainnie Batua
    19 views2 pages
    1) The appellant was convicted in a lower court of violating a municipal ordinance, but appealed the conviction. 2) While the appeal was pending, the section of the municipal ordinance he was convicted of violating was repealed. 3) The court found that while repeal of a law does not automatically destroy criminal liability, a person cannot be prosecuted or punished for acts that are no longer considered criminal. Therefore, the court dismissed the proceedings against the appellant.

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    1 g.r. No. 41423 March 19, 1935 - People of the Phil. v. Crisanto Tamayo

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    1) The appellant was convicted in a lower court of violating a municipal ordinance, but appealed the conviction. 2) While the appeal was pending, the section of the municipal ordinance he was convicted of violating was repealed. 3) The court found that while repeal of a law does not automatically destroy criminal liability, a person cannot be prosecuted or punished for acts that are no longer considered criminal. Therefore, the court dismissed the proceedings against the appellant.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    19 views2 pages

    1 G.R. No. 41423 March 19, 1935 - People of The Phil. v. Crisanto Tamayo

    Uploaded by

    Sittie Ainnie Batua
    1) The appellant was convicted in a lower court of violating a municipal ordinance, but appealed the conviction. 2) While the appeal was pending, the section of the municipal ordinance he was convicted of violating was repealed. 3) The court found that while repeal of a law does not automatically destroy criminal liability, a person cannot be prosecuted or punished for acts that are no longer considered criminal. Therefore, the court dismissed the proceedings against the appellant.

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    of 2

    G.R. No. 41423 March 19, 1935 - PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v.

    CRISANTO TAMAYO

    061 Phil 225:

    EN BANC

    [G.R. No. 41423. March 19, 1935.]

    THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CRISANTO


    TAMAYO, Defendant-Appellant.

    Juan Amor and Simeon J. Tolentino for Appellant.

    Solicitor-General Hilado for Appellee.

    SYLLABUS

    1. CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION, CONVICTION AND


    PUNISHMENT FOR ACTS NO LONGER CRIMINAL. — Appellant moved for the dismissal of
    the action against him on account of the repeal of the section of the municipal
    ordinance under which he had been convicted in the lower court. It would be illogical for
    this court to attempt to sentence appellant for an offense that no longer exists.

    2. ID.; ID. — In the leading cases of the United States v. Cuna (12 Phil., 241), and
    Wing v. United States (218 U. S., 272), the doctrine was clearly established that in the
    Philippines repeal of a criminal Act by its reenactment, even without a saving clause,
    would not destroy criminal liability. But not a single sentence in either decision indicates
    that there was any desire to hold that a person could be prosecuted, convicted, and
    punished for acts no longer criminal.

    DECISION

    HULL, J.:

    Appellant was convicted in the justice of the peace court of Magsingal, Province of
    Ilocos Sur, of a violation of section 2, municipal ordinance No. 5, series of 1932, of said
    municipality. Upon appeal to the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur conviction resulted
    and a fine was imposed. From that decision this appeal was brought.

    While this appeal was pending, the municipal council repealed section 2 in question,
    which repeal was duly approved by the provincial board, and the act complained of,
    instead of being a violation of the municipal ordinances, is now legal in that
    municipality.

    Appellant has moved for a dismissal of the action against him on account of that repeal.

    In the leading cases of the United States v. Cuna (12 Phil., 241), and Wing v. United
    States (218 U. S., 272), the doctrine was clearly established that in the Philippines
    repeal of a criminal Act by its reenactment, even without a saving clause, would not
    destroy criminal liability. But not a single sentence in either decision indicates that
    there was any desire to hold that person could be prosecuted, convicted, and punished
    for acts no longer criminal.

    There is no question that at common law and in America a much more favorable
    attitude towards the accused exist relative to statutes that have been repealed than has
    been adopted here. Our rule is more in conformity with the Spanish doctrine, but even
    in Spain, where the offense ceases to be criminal, prosecution cannot be had. (1
    Pacheco Commentaries, 296.)

    The repeal here was absolute, and not a reenactment and repeal by implication. Nor
    was there any saving clause. The legislative intent as shown by the action of the
    municipal council is that such conduct, formerly denounced, is no longer deemed
    criminal, and it would be illogical for this court to attempt to sentence appellant for an
    offense that no longer exists. We are therefore of the opinion that the proceedings
    against appellant must be dismissed. So ordered. Costs de oficio.

    Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Vickers, Imperial, Butte, Goddard
    and Diaz, JJ., concur.

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