E.K. Scheuch

THE ANNALS
OF
THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF SOCIOLOGY
NEW SERIES - VOLUME 7
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF SOCIOLOGY
The International Institute of Sociology is the oldest continuous sociological asso-
ciation in existence. It was founded in 1893 in Paris by Rene Worms. Early distin-
guished members included scholars such as Max Weber, Lujo Brentano, Enrico
Ferri, Franklin Giddings, Ludwig Gumplowicz, Achille Loria, Alfred Marshall,
Carl Menger, Edward A. Ross, Gustav Schmoller, Georg Simmel, Albion Small,
Gabriel Tarde, Edward B. Tylor, Ferdinand Tonnies, Alexandre Tchouprov,
Thorstein Veblen, Lester Ward, Sidney and Beatrix Webb, and Wilhelm Wundt.
Executive Board 1993-1997
President ERWIN K. SCHEUCH (Germany)
Past President WILLIAM V D'ANTONIO (U.S.A.)
Vice Presidents R. ALAN HEDLEY (Canada)

MASAMIcHI SASAKI (Japan)
VLADIMIR YADOW (Russia)
Councillors KAREN S. COOK (U.S.A.)

FATIMAH BAUD (Malaysia)
ALBERTO GASPARINI (Italy)
WERNER GEPHART (Germany)
ELKE KOCH-WESER AMMASSARI (Italy)
Auditor RENZO GUBERT (Italy)

THE ANNALS
OF
THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE
OF SOCIOLOGY
SOCIETIES, CORPORATIONS
AND THE NATION STATE
NEW SERIES - VOLUME 7
EDITED BY
E.K. SCHEUCH AND D. SCIULLI
BRILL
LEIDEN • BOSTON • KOLN
2000
Gedruckt mit Unterstutzung der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft
Printed with support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Societies, corporations and the nation state / ed. by E.K. Scheuch
and D. Sciulli. - Leiden ; Boston ; Koln : Brill, 2000
ISBN 90-04-11664-8
ISBN 90 04 116648
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CONTENTS
1. ERWIN K. SCHEUCH, Societies, Corporations, and the Nation

State 1
2. RAYMOND BOUDON, Values in a Polytheistic World 24
3. PIERPAOLO DONATI, Freedom vs. Control in Post-Modern

Society: A Relational Approach 47
4. MARGARET S. ARCHER, The Universality of Freedom and

Control 77
5. S.N. EISENSTADT, The Contemporary Scene—Multiple

Modernities 97
6. WILLIAM V. D'ANTONIO, Communitarianism and the

Privatization of Belief: The Case of U.S. Catholics 109
7. SASKIA SASSEN, Beyond Sovereignty: De-Facto Transnationalism

in Immigration Policy 128
8. NIKOLAI GENOV, Transition to Democracy and Nation-State in

Eastern Europe 149
9. EUGEEN ROOSENS, National Identity, Social Order and Political

System in Western Europe: Primordial Autochthony 162
10. MATTEI DOGAN, Nationalism in Europe: Decline in the West,

Revival in the East 181
11. MASAYUKI MUNAKATA, A Speculation on Some Features of

Japanese Production Practices: 8 Points of Discussion 201
12. ERICH WEEDE, Law and Liberty, Capitalism and Democracy in

China and the West 207
VI CONTENTS
13. GISELA TROMMSDORFF, Psychological Factors Limiting

Institutional Rehabilitation 216
14. FRIEDRICH FURSTENBERG, Social Regression and the Decline of

Competence 236
15. TAKASHI Usui, Cultural Diversity or Cultural Confusion? The

Viewpoint of Decentralization and Network 244
List of Editors and Contributors 255

1. SOCIETIES, CORPORATIONS, AND THE NATION STATE
Erwin K. Scheuch
Usually, titles of congresses addressing a whole discipline do not mean very

much. Each general congress in sociology is a kind of test how much cohe-
sion remains in a discipline that is most alive in its many specializations.
To require adherance to just one topic would be unreasonable.
In planning for this congress we followed nevertheless one Leitmotiv: The
return to the classices. This cannot possibly mean that we turn into unde-
tached Durkheimians or Rossians, Spencerians or Weberians.
What this was meant to signal is the usefulness in reconsidering the con-
cerns of the classics, their topics and not their answers. In this way sociol-
ogy might regain some of its societal usefulness as a science of orientation.
For us today it is hard to believe that at the turn of the century the New
York Times sent journalists to cover the Yale lectures of Ross, or that a soci-
ologist such as Tonnies could write a bestseller that had fourteen editions,
or that Simmel was the star of intellectual salons.
Sociology has since become quite useful in many applied fields, and there
is nothing to be said against sociotechnics as it is one way to test the use-
fulness of codified knowledge. However, the dramatic changes that we expe-
rienced in the last decade or so appear to increase in momentum. The
intellectual public must gain the impression that sociologists in their empha-
sis on micro sociology become as irrelevant for intellectual orientation in
our time as the models of micro economics are for the understanding of
modern economies.
There is one very good reason why many sociologists—probably the great
majority—feel uncomfortable with macro sociology and the events it has to
deal with. The metaphor of a train is apt here. Those in a speeding train
looking backwards see the unfolding of an orderly landscape, but those look-
ing out of the window as the landscape slides by witness an unconnected
plurality of pictures that do not seem to be part of a coherent whole. That
is the core of the difficulty in practicing macro sociology in rapidly chang-
ing societies.
True, at any one time the mass of details tends to overwhelm comprehen-
sion. However, for the historian the passing of time has served as a sorting
2, ERWIN K. SCHEUGH
out of what is of longterm significance, and what was of merely peripheral

importance. The sociologist needs to opt for one of several perspectives, a
perspective that guides his attention in the hope that what is ignored is of
far less importance than what is at the center of his attention.
Emphasizing social change is a promising priority, especially if one makes
the right choice in understanding this change as modernization. There is
an often ignored central aspect to the kind of social change that we christen
"modernity." To contemporaries in such societies the present is experienced
as a transitory situation moving to a new and more agreeable equilibrium.
This is historically a quite ununsual way in living with the disarrangements
of the day, but in the West this has been taken for granted ever since the
last two centuries. There are many varieties in identifying what is central
to the process of modernisation or the state of modernity. We ourselves
maintain that modernization has no telos, and that only further change and
no new equilibrium can be expected.
The revolution in transport and communication, the world-wide market-
ing of goods and services, the breakdown of the bipolar world order lead-
ing to a fluid political pattern with (currently) 27 small scale wars—all of
this rapidly increases the interdependence between cultures and states. Un-
avoidably this leads to strains and destabilization—in addition to opening
opportunities. Sociology is called upon to help the interested public to under-
stand better these processes of change.
To the classics of our discipline, the processes of disintegration were more
tangible than the elements of cohesion. "Would the confused change of the
day lead to a new order?" was the common theme around the fin de siecle.
The discipline is once again called upon to choose "big topics" and avoid
being drowned in a mass of small studies.
In our time we live with a perplexing disintegration of seemingly mono-
lithic orders side by side with the reemergence of cultures and ethnic iden-
tities long believed to have been submerged. Obviously, there is both less
stability in large scale systems and more stability in smaller entities than
had been assumed by intellectuals. And equally obvious, we have to take
long-term views and include a historical dimension in our analysis of cur-
rent affairs. This is a situation where sociology could regain the centrality
for an intellectual discussion of the large issues that it had in several advanced
countries around the turn of the century.
The organization of societies into states is vastly more complicated than
earlier assumed, given that much of the thinking has been based on Western
Experience. We are now realizing that the penetration of the state into soci-
ety is not as deep nor as lasting as was originally expected by the elites
SOCIETIES, CORPORATIONS, AND THE NATION STATE 5
who imposed these changes. The units that once constituted the USSR offer
important lessons in this regard. Furthermore, conditions are even more
complicated if the physical space of societies and of states do not coincide,
as is the case in most of Africa. And yet the existence of the state is by
now virtually indispensable for modern institutions.
In the social sciences evidence has accumulated that "mediating institu-
tions," the units and organizations between the private worlds of daily liv-
ing and the institutions and groupings at the level of the collectivity (such
as local bureaucracies, corporations, voluntary associations), are of crucial
importance for an understanding of the relations between society and the
State. Mediating institutions appear also to be the carriers of traditions, and
a minimum of traditional stability—compare also non-Western experiences—
is the condition for successful modernizations.
Given sociology's emphasis on processes of social differentiation, we have
not concentrated equally on the forces of social cohesion. While earlier socio-
logists thought that societies rested on social control (Ross) and normative
consent (Parsons), we discarded these notions when we began to explain
processes of diversification and decay, emphasizing microsociology (e.g. "ratio-
nal choice"). However, by redirecting our attention to a "middie level" of
social organization, i.e. mediating institutions, we can perhaps gain a bet-
ter view of the tension and balance between both the centrifugal and cen-
tripetal forces in societies.
There are two ways to miss the intellectual challenge. One way is the
flight into specialization. This is not a rejection of specialization—as it affords
concrete insights—but a critique of specialization that fails to ask what is
in it for the discipline at large. And there is the even more misguided reac-
tion to the turmoils of the day by appealing to kind feelings and uplifting
thoughts. Problems of cultural clashes and conflicts of interest need to be
viewed as realities. In much of the 19th century economics was called the
"dark science" because it was very often the bearer of bleak tidings. At the
end of the century sociology must not be afraid to be the "dark science"
if it is that what needs to be reported. But sociology would also fail if it
were to neglect the counterveiling forces of stability in a situation of turmoil.
The International Institute of Sociology needs to be the forum for the
large issues at a time when other fori are being submerged by the routines
of what Kuhn christened "normal science".
4 ERWIN K. SCHEUGH
II
That people in countries such as the USA, or Japan, or Germany live under
conditions and in ways that are—by and large—unprecedented should be
undisputed.1 It should also be acceptable to label this condition "moder-
nity", and the changes leading to this condition "modernization". It is highly
controversial what constitutes the defining criteria of this condition.2 On the
way to specifying our own approach we identified 11 other perspectives:
(1) Modernization as the realization of the programs of the Enlightment
(e.g. Jurgen Habermas, Ralf Dahrendorf, Richard Munch)3
(2) Modernization as the dominance of individuality and subjectivism (e.g.
Georg Simmel, Friedrich Nietzsche)4
(3) Modernization as the movement from community to society (presum-
ably Ferdinand Tonnies, but definitely Charles Cooley and William G.
Summer)3
(4) Modernity as the prevalence of "modern" personalities—due to mod-
ernizing experiences (the "individual modernity school": Alex Inkeles,
Daniel Lerner)6
1
There is, however, a controversy whether modernity is a stage in the process of evolu-
tion the end of which is still open, or a quantum jump into something unprecedented. We
are still undecided on this issue but if pressed would take the position of an evolutionist.
The opposite position, that modernity is a condition of discontinuity in social history, is a
central thought in the writings of Anthony Giddens, e.g. The Consequences of Modernity. Polity
Press, Cambridge (UK), 1990.
2
Erwin K. Scheuch: "Schwierigkeiten der Soziologen mit dem ProzeB der Modernitat".
In: Wolfgang Zapf (Hg.): Die Modernisierung moderner Gesellschaften. Frankfurt 1991, pp. 109-139.
3
The names of three authors that differ in their general orientations signals that we are
here not referring to a "school." Rather, we illustrate a shared and yet broad outlook that
is dominant in the cultural intelligentsia with three social philosophers. Ralf Dahrendorf:
Gesellschqft und Demokratie in Deutschland. Munchen 1965; Jurgen Habermas: Der philosophische
Diskurs der Moderne 1985; Richard Munch: Die Kultur der Moderne. Frankfurt 1989.
4
Donald N. Levine (ed.): George Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms. The University of
Chicago Press. Chicago 1971, especially section IV through VI. Also Georg Simmel:
Gesamtausgabe, vol. II Frankfurt 1992; idem: Philosophie des Geldes. Berlin, 6th edit. 1958.
5
Charles H. Cooley in: Human Nature and the Social Order, 1902, and in: Social Organization
1909. Around the turn of the century the dominant paradigm was modernization as a move-
ment from a "warm" to a "cold" form of human existence. William G. Sumner's postulate
of social change as a movement from "folkways" to "stateways" is as much part of such a
shared problem understanding as is Durkheim's view of social evolution as a change from
mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity. Even Max Weber was part of this mood in the
social sciences. "Gemeinschaft" versus "Gesellschaft" fits only in part into this evolutionary
model, as Tonnies did not believe that a social order as a system dominated only by
"Kurwille" (the type of action characteristic for "Gesellschaft") would be possible; societies
would differ in the degree to which they were "Gesellschaft", but none could do without
elements of Gemeinschaft.
6
Daniel Lerner: The Passing of Traditional Society—Modernizing the Middle East. Glencoe (111)
(5) Modernity as the consequence of modernizing elites (Joseph Schumpeter;

David McCelland)7
(6) Modernization as the movement from the dominance of the primary
sector to that of the secondary sectors, and again from a dominance
of the secondary sector to that of the tertiary sector (Charles Fourastie,
Colin Clarke, Walt Rostow)8
(7) Modernization as the necessary consequence of democratisation fol-
lowing successful bourgeois revolutions (e.g. Barrington Moore)9
(8) Modernization as the consequence of mass participation in public affairs
(e.g. Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba, in a way also Samuel Huntington)10
(9) Modernization as an "extension of citizenship"—the granting of "polit-
ical rights", "economic rights", and "social rights" (T.H. Marshall)11
(10) Modernization as the process of "nation building"—and nation build-
ing as a sucession of characteristic conflicts (Stein Rokkan)12
(11) Moderinzation as the institutionalisation of market economy, welfare
systems, and political democracy (Wolfgang Zapf). 13
1958; Alex Inkeles and D.H. Smith: Becoming Modern—Individual Changes in Six Developing
Countries. Cambridge (Mass) 1974. A defense of this approach against criticism is to be found
in Alex Inkeles: "Understanding and Misunderstanding in Individual Modernity." In: Louis
Coser and Otto N. Larsen (eds.): The Uses of Controversy in Sociology. New York 1976.
7
David C. McClelland: The Achieving Society. Princeton 1961. Clelland explicitely bases his
concept of modernization—as a consequence of a sufficient number of persons with high
"n-achievement"—on Joseph Schumpeter's view of the key role of entrepreneurs.
8
Colin Clark: The Conditions of Economic Progress. London 1940; Charles Fourastie: Die groBe
Hqffnung des 20. fahrhundert. Koln, 2nd edit. 1969; Walt Rostow: Stadien des wirtschaftli-
chen Wachstums, Gottingen 1966; idem: Politics and the Stages of Growth. Cambridge (Mass.)
1971. A concise but in our opinion sufficient presentation of the "stages"-school can be
found in Gunter Wiswede: Soziologie. Verlag moderne Industrie, Landsberg, 2nd edit. 1991 pp.
252 ff.
9
Barrington Moore: Political Power and Social Theory. Cambridge (Mass.) 1958; idem: Soziale
Ursprunge von Diktatur und Demokratie. Frankfurt 1969; idem: Injustice. London 1978.
10
High rates of participation were for a long time taken as an indicator of modernity,
especially in American political science. The "classic" of this orientation is Gabriel Almond
and Sidney Verba: The Civic Culture. Princeton 1963. See also Sidney Verba, Norman H.
Nie, and Jae-On Kim: The Modes of Democratic participation. Beverly Hills 1971; Sidney Verba
and Norman H. Nie: Political Participation in America. New York 1972; Sidney Verba, Norman
H. Nie and Jae-on Kim: Participation and Political Equality. Cambridge (UK) 1978 (this inter-
national survey includes Japan). For a critical assessment see W.R. Schofeld: "The Meaning
of Democratic Participation." In: World Politics, vol. 28 (October 1975), p. 141; Samuel P.
Huntington: "Postindustrial Politics—How Benign Will it Be?" in: Comparative Politics, vol. 6
(January 1974), pp. 163-191. The most important international study with this "participa-
tion-is-good, more-participation-is-better" outlook is Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase (eds.):
Political Action. Beverly Hills 1979.
" T.H. Marshall: Class, Citizenship, and Social Development. New York 1965.
12
Stein Rokkan: Citizens, Elections, Parties. Oslo 1970; idem: The Politics of Territorial Identity.
London 1982; idem: Centre-Periphery Structure in Europe. Frankfurt 1987.
13
Wolfgang Zapf (ed.): Theorien des sozialen Wandels. Koln 1971.
6 ERWIN K. SCHEUCH
All these aspects are undoubtedly associated with what we intuitively under-
stand as modernity and modernization, but with the exception of the notions
6 through 11 they are not really referring to structural aspects. And any
characterization of modernity that omits references to structural changes is
deficient in a major way. Whatever the one-sidedness of these other approaches
may be, by their very diversity they demonstrate that the state of being
modern should be viewed as a system of great complexity, far from earlier
notions of modern societies as rationally constructed machines. Therefore it
is not reasonable to expect a single concept that catches all facets of "moder-
nity." Rather it is necessary to be selective in identifying features that hope-
fully catch structural universals.14 In such an attempt both macro and micro
features of social existence should be combined, as the option for one or
the other appears to us as a major weakness of many of the theories referred
to above.
As societies such as Japan, Germany and the United States differ from
one another in many ways, a question, whether there is more than one way
to modernity? sounds moot. And yet such a question casts doubts on an
idea central to most modernity theories, namely the underlying sameness of
all non-traditional societies. Social science history shows us that the start of
former traditional social orders on their way to modernity differed not only
in time but also in their existence as social entities: some were already nation
states, other had fragmented political orders—such as Germany and Italy;
some of these societies were—by the standards of their time—both popu-
lous and affluent such as France, while others such as Sweden were poor.
The roads to the current state of modernity were not identical either, as
there was wide-spread diffusion and consequently different "learning times."
The oldest industrial nation was of course England. In its initial stages of
economic modernization several features of the type of wage labor charac-
teristic for late medieval agriculture in Western Europe were carried over
into mining in greater depth than hitherto, and into early textile mills.15
Thus, contracts were given to whole families, and this meant that males,
females, and children were at first working in coal mines and factories.
Working under industrial conditions, however, forces individual work con-
tracts, requires (so far!) a separation of work from the habitat.16
14
Such a structural approach as the one sketched here is rejected by Robert Nisbet on
principled grounds: He argues that circumstances that are particular to a time and a loca-
tion take primacy against structural factors when accounting for social change; cf. Social
Change and History. London 1969.
15
For details see Peter Mathias: The First Industrial Nation, London, 2nd edit. 1990.
1(5
The "classical" author for the British Experience is E.J. Hobsbawm: The Age of
No other major industrialising country repeated the employment of whole

families on the scale of Britain. The concept of an individual work contract
to labor in a central place (the mill or factory) as the way to organize wage
labor quickly diffused.
Which leads to a third feature that was usually neglected when discussing
modernization as processes of change in Western societies: The readiness to
learn from other experiences.17 Contemporaries in other countries of the
early industrialization in Britain observed the social costs of this change, as
it e.g. was reported by the various Royal Commissions, and they were deter-
mined to counter such developments.18 T.H. Marshall described for Britain
the extension of the right to vote as a means that would channel the great
social conflicts and ills into managable processes.19 By way of contrast,
Germany introduced a welfare system to counter directly the social costs of
industrialization, and specifically to give workers a stake in their society at
a time of rising conflicts between Western European nation states. Japan is
the prime case of modernizing as eclectic yet systematic social borrowing—
thus taking the Prussian army, but the British navy as models.20
Last but not least there were attempts to harness economic forces to serve
better political goals. For Germany the peculiar mixture of socialistic ele-
ments with those of state-capitalism that the Nazis introduced as an eco-
nomic order is a case in point. The Leitmotiv of this order was: technological
Revolution 1789-1848. London, 5th edit. 1995, and The Age of Capital 1848-1875. London
10th edit. 1995.
17
An example is the development of welfare measures as part of the employer-employee
relationship e.g. in France to counteract the "pauperization" of the factory worker. Peter N.
Stearns contrasts this with developments in Britain and in Germany in: "Die Herausbildung
einer sozialen Gesinnung im Fruhindustrialismus." In: Peter Christian Ludz (ed.): Soziologie
und Sozialgeschichte. Special Issue no. 19 of the Kolner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie,
1972, pp. 320-342.
18
These reports of the Royal Commissions were no unbiased sources on the conditions
in early industrialization but written with the hope to trigger remedial legislation. However,
many contemporaries read these reports as factual descriptions—such as Karl Marx for whom
they were the empirical base for theories such as "fallende Profitrate" or "Verelendung".
Friedrich List formulated his program for protective tariffs first for the Deutsche Bund and
then for the USA with reference to the crippling consequences of free trade in England.
19
T.H. Marshall, op. cit.
20
Manfred Pohl: "Die Systeme sozialer Sicherung in Japan und der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland: Versuch eines wertenden Vergleichs". In: Christian Deubner, Leo KiBler and
Rene Lasserre (eds.): Modell Japan? Frankfurt 1990, pp. 17-32. In the same anthology also
Edgar Andreani: Das japanische System der sozialen Sicherung: ein Modell Japan fur die europaischen
Industriegesellschaften?, pp. 33ff. Sehr instruktiv ist Stephan Leibfried: "Sozialstaat" oder "Wohlfahrts-
gesellschaft"—Thesen zu einem japanisch-deutschen Sozialpolitikvergleich. In: Soziale Welt,
vol. 45 (1994), pp. 389-410. The coexistence of modern and premodern features is claimed
to be also characteristic for Japan; Thomas Immoos: Japan = Archische Moderne. Munchen
1992.
8 ERWIN K. SCHEUCH
modernization yes, economic modernization only in individual firms but not

in the economy, and in social life a return to imagined forefathers.21 As the
Nazis had only six years until the start of World War II it is impossible to
judge whether this peculiar order that Jeffrey Hert christened "reactionary
modernism" would really have penetrated into all of society, but the ease
with which Germany after 1945 returned to a Weimar social order gives
grounds for doubts.22
Modern societies are not carbon copies of each other, nor are the cur-
rent so-called post-modern societies. That they each have peculiar features
does not invalidate the assertion that due to structural identities they show
a family likeness.23 This assertion requires an abstract conceptualization for
what is meant by modernity that enables us to characterize a society both
in its distinct features and in its characteristic likeness with others.
Societies that were latecomers to economic developments are hospitable
to debates about their uniqueness. Germany is one case where historians
have argued about a special road ("Sonderweg") of Germany into the mod-
ern world. Japan is another case in point. But for Japan the assertions of
being a special case go further: Not only was there a special road to the
present order, but the resulting order itself was distinct—so the assertions
go. Proceeding from the writing of Tominaga, Y. Lilulu and F. Wang claim
that there is an Asian variety of modernism: There are now attempts to
postulate an Islamic Road to modernity and a muslim way of being mod-
ern. In Iran this is the official ideology.24
21
Goffrey Hert: Reactionary Modernism—Culture in Weimar and the Third Reich. Cambridge
(Mass.) 1984, identifies as one of the modernizing parts of the politics of the NS govern-
ment the conscious adoption of the American experience of former luxury goods to become
articles of mass culture.
22
Erwin K. Scheuch: "Eine andere Republik?" In: Politik und Kultur, vol. 8, no. 4. Berlin
1981, pp. 3-23.
23
An instructive recent study of 15,000 Managers and Executives in the USA, Canada,
the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan shows both important differences and
structural likeness. Charles Hampden-Turner and Alfons Trompenaars: The Seven Cultures of
Capitalism. New York 1993. See also Klaus Hildebrand: "Der deutsche Eigenweg." In: Manfred
Funke et al. (eds.): Demokratie und Diktatur. Bonn 1987, S. 15-34.
24
In: International Sociology, vol. 6, no. 1 (March 1991), pp. 25-36; Cf. Timothy Mitchell
and Lilu Abu-Lughed: Questions of Modernity. In: Items, Dec. 1993, pp. 79-83.
III
The concept of "Wirtschqftsgesellschqft"
The classics in sociology identified as the process central to modernization

and the resulting modernity the mechanism of social differentiation. Emile
Durkheim called it "division du travail", but social differentiation was what
he meant. In this process that can be described both in micro and macro-
sociological terms the differentiated sectors can unfold their "Eigendynamik".
"Eigendynamik" refers to the kind of rationality and consequent efficiency
that is characteristic to a sector in society.25 "Eigendynamik" has as yet no
translation or real conceptual equivalent in other languages. It is a combi-
nation of two mechanisms: a feedback within a system that leads to a rein-
forcement. The result is a presumed stream-lining plus self-serving as a
common pathology. It seems that in the English language the general term
"social dynamics" suffices. This can be observed in religion being organized
into churches, in the military becoming businesslike, and above all in bureau-
cracies and in economic matters.
The current Germany considers itself a social market economy. As Walter
Eucken conceived his model of a market economy, and as it was developed
further by Alfred Muller-Armack, the "Soziale Marktwirtschaft" was a mar-
ket economy within a set of constraints ("Datenkranz") that were socially
and politically stipulated. This is quite the opposite of the current American
conception of monetarism in a globalized economy, determined by the acts
of individual firms being managed according to the principle of shareholder
value. With globalization, practices such as hostile take-overs diffuse inter-
nationally.
This dominant process triggers resistance, which in the economy has as
its most important form the moralization of products. Thus, in the USA
grapes from southern California or oranges from South Africa changed from
being a fruit to a product of evil. Another example is the rating of com-
panies as socially responsible. Science is another differentiated area. In
Germany, the chief mechanism used to control science is the assertion of
unacceptable risks resulting from research. To maintain that the central
characteristic of modernization is social differentiation does not imply that
this development is conflict free; quite the contrary.26
25
A theoretical presentation of "Eigendynamik" with many instructive examples is to be
found in Renate Mayntz and Birgitta Nedelmann: "Eigendynamische soziale Prozesse." In:
Kolner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, vol. 33 (1987), pp. 648-668.
26
A summary of the resistances to modernity is attempted in: "Schwierigkeiten mit der
10 ERWIN K. SCHEUCH
And differentiation is accompanied by processes of de-differentiation—de-

differentiation being often the condition for further differentiation.27 In agrar-
ian societies with partial literacy, "scribe" was a skilled trade. With the
spread of printing, writing became a "cultural technique" that in modern
society everyone is expected to master as much as one now eats with uten-
sils. Other skills that earlier were specialized occupations are driving a vehi-
cle or minor forms of bookkeeping. In our days operating a PC is becoming
a cultural technique with the consequence that the typist is a dying occu-
pation. The latter example is instructive in its illustration of a twist that
social differentiation has shown in the 20th century.
Social differentiation is the dominant trend on the macro level. On the
micro level it is accompanied by a pressure to learn to function as the low-
skilled companion to a craftsman. This is what we call the "new division
of labor".28 We need basic skills as electricians, plumbers, carpenters, gar-
deners, even lawyers and physicians to be fully comfortable in a modern
society. As a shadow to the visible further specialization, especially in skilled
occupations, there developed lay roles for the same area. Functionally, one
can interpret this array of lay roles that we consider a characteristic by-
product of differentiation in the 20th century as a means to tie the highly
specialized occupations back into the social fabric.
One major aspect of modernization is the change in the meaning of space
and time. Through technical developments in transportation people living
under "modern" conditions have a much larger life space, and in turn this
possibility for high individual mobility is a prerequisite for further differentia-
tion in the economy, in social contacts, and in culture. In the USA the tele-
phone is said to have invigorated kinship ties. With modern communication
technologies distances shrink further.
It was only about 150 years ago that minutes came in use to specify
time—e.g. for train departures. Time zones were defined that allow us to
synchronize behavior world-wide. The computer enables us to make time
schedules, including work relations, highly flexible. And the social differentiation
Modernitat als Kultur". In: Erwin K. and Ute Scheuch: Wie deulsch sind die Deulschen? 2nd
edit. 1992. Bergisch Gladbach. pp. 52–82. Erwin K. Scheuch: "Vom schmrzlichen Werden
einer modernen Gesellschaft." In: Hamburger fahrbuch fur Wirtschajh- und Gesellschafispolilik,
Vol. 35 (1990), pp. 27-51; S. Kalberg: "The Origin and Extension of Culture Pessimism."
In: Sociological Theory, vol. 5 (1987), pp. 150-164.
27
E. BuB and M. Schops: "Die gesellschaftliche Entdifferenzierung." In: Zeitschrift fur
Soziologie, vol. 8 (1979), pp. 315—329; also Hartmut Tyrell: "Anfragen an die Theorie der
gesellschaftlichen Differenzierung." In: Zeitschrifi fur Soziologie, vol. 7 (1978), pp. 175-193.
28
Erwin K. Scheuch: "Das Verhalten der Bevolkerung als Teil des Gesundheitssystems."
In: Harald Bogs et al. (eds.): Gesundheitspolitik zwischen Staat und Sdbstoerwaltung. Koln 1982,
especially pp. 102-105.
creates a demand for flexibility, for time arrangements to be tailored to

individual needs. At the same time the time horizon widens we need to
plan ahead for longer time periods, consider retirement conditions already
at the time when we enter the labor force.29 Time management becomes a
crucial social skill at the micro level. At the macro level this is paralled by
treating time as an economic commodity of central importance.
With all this differentiation there is still social integration, albeit a pre-
carious one. The "Eigendynamik" occurs within boundaries set by a soci-
ety. Countries differ as to the space between boundaries—in the USA the
space for Eigendynamik of the economy being larger than in Western Europe.
But Eigendynamik without boundaries would be selfdestructive—as in the
case of a completely globalised economy where speculation in non-existing
assets such a derivatives, futurers, or strippings is the most important road
to dominance.
In Western cultures that understand themselves as modern, the economic
arguments do certainly not enjoy unlimited respect, but take precedence
before other considerations in those spheres where economic Eigendynamik
is culturally defined as acceptable, often even as desirable. From this per-
spective we think the best characterization of these societies is not "indus-
trial societies"; this may have been plausible for the second half of the 19th
century. 5 " For the 20th century "Wirtschaftsgesellschaft" is the more appro-
priate designation. Two different translations into English are possible: Market
societies or Commercial societies.
IV
To the classics the mode of thinking and action that characterized modern
economics was pervasive for society at large. "Rechenhaftigkeit" was the
label that was to denote this style in interpersonal relation31—and that has
since become the model for an approach in sociology, namely rational
'-'' Ansgar Weymann: "Modernisierung, Generationsverhaltnisse und die Okonomie der

Lebensze'it." In: Soziale Welt, vol. 46 (1995), pp. 369 384.
•"' In German the term "Industrie" is much narrower than "industry" in English, "hidustricllc
Produktion" in German is largely tantamount to physical manipulation in factories. Consequently,
the familiar term "Industriegesellschaft" is quite misleading as at no time a majority labored
under these conditions. The English term, however, has a much wider meaning, ranging
from diligence to involvement in a trade. The Webster defines industry as "systematic labor
especially for some useful purpose or the creation of something of value". Therefore in
English there is no problem in speaking of "the tourism industry", while in German the
equivalent "Tourismus-Industrie" sounds at best alien.
31
Max Weber is frequently misunderstood, especially in the United States, in his empha-
sis on rationality as a characteristic of modernization. "Das reale Handeln verlauft in der
12 ERWIN K. SCHEUCH
choice.32 "Rationality" was for the classics, however, not so much a descrip-
tion of actual behavior but rather a cultural norm—just as the companion
notion "Verwissenschaftlichung".33
At this point it should be helpful to introduce the conception "life sphere".34
"Life sphere" denotes an area in social life that as the result of social
differentiation is seen as being governed by its particular set of norms, that
is being respected as having an "Eigendynamic". Actors in such a life
sphere—work, leisure, commercial transactions, politics, family life—are
expected to behave appropriate to that space, and exclude for the moment
habits and orientations that guide these very same actors in other life spheres.
This is possible through "privacy", i.e. the ignorance of or neglect to ascer-
tain what alter does outside the particular life sphere at issue. Through
differentiation privacy becomes a structural possibility, and the development
of norms in reaction to this is the basis of even formal rights to privacy in
several spheres. At the same time the connections between the differentiated
life sectors are loosened: modern societies are "loosely coupled"—even though
Embree coined this term to catch a characteristic of some modernizing so-
cieties.35 Loose coupling is a condition for the Eigendynamik in the econ-
omy, technology, and science. What keeps the system from exploding is
what Simmel called the crossing of social circles (Kreuzung sozialer Kreise).
Rationality as the cultural norm for actual behavior is expected in those
life sectors that are held to be guided by the norms of functional specificity,
groBen Masse seiner Falle in dumpfer HalbbewuBtheit oder UnbewuBtheit seines 'gemein-
ten Sinns'. Der Handelnde 'fuhlt' ihn mehr unbestimmt, als daB er ihn wuBte oder 'sich
klar machte', handelt in der Mehrzahl der Falle triebhaft oder gewohnheitsmaBig. Nur gele-
gentlich . . . wird ein (sei es rationaler, sei es irrationaler) Sinn des Handelns ins BewuBtsein
gehoben". "Rational" is the interpretative frame in accounting for action and the cultural
norm in appropropriate action fields. Max Weber: Soziologische Grundbegriffe. J.C.B. Mohr (Paul
Siebeck). Tubingen 1960 (an excerpt from Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft). The quote is taken
from the explanations to §1, the definition of sociology, section I, no. 11, last paragraph.
32
For a variety of views on rational choice see Brian Barry and Russell Hardin (eds.):
Rational Man and Irrational Society? Beverly Hills 1982.
33
A fuller exposition of "Rechenhaftigkeit" as a cultural norm can be found in R. Penrose:
The Emperors New Mind. Oxford 1989; also idem: Shadows of the Mind. Oxford 1994. The "clas-
sical" source is of course Simmel: Philosophie des Geldes, op. cit.
34
A more detailed explanation of "life sphere" is given in Erwin K. Scheuch and Marvin
B. Sussman: "Gesellschaftliche Modernitat und Modernitat der Familie." In: Kolner Zeitschrift
fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, special issue no. 14 Soziologie der Familie, 1970, pp. 239-253.
The article also explains the empirical approach favored by us at that time, "options analysis".
35
J.F. Embree: "Thailand—A Loosely Structured Social System." In: American Anthropologist,
vol. 52 no. 2 (1950), pp. 183-191; also H.D. Evers (ed): Loosely Structured Social Systems-
Thailand in Comparative Perspective. New Haven 1969; R.B. Glasman: "Persistence of Loose
Coupling in Living Systems." In: Behavioral Science, vol. 18 (1973), pp. 83-98;-K.E. Weick:
"Educational Systems as loosely Coupled Systems." In: Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 21
(1976), pp. 1-19; Erik Cohen: Thai Society in Comparative Perspective. Bangkok 1991, especially
chapter 3: The Problem of Thai Modernization.
universalistic standards, affective neutrality, and oriented towards actual per-

formance—to use the pattern variables of Talcott Parsons. From the many
meanings of rationality we use in this context economic rationality, leaving
open whether this manifests itself in a concrete situation as a short term or
a long term profit maximizing. The latter, too is part of calculating behav-
ior—of course in the sense of bounded rationality.
Even in the economy there is less individual rationality in actual behav-
ior than is the cultural norm. Team-work, group work, motivational train-
ing, courses in empathy are fully legitimate deviations from individual profit
maximizing. To turn an objective relationship into one where subjective
meanings become apparently dominant is a familiar trick in sales ("friend-
ship price") and in personnel management ("because its you"). In this way
universalistic standards are neutralized and the rules of the game are changed.
Rationality can be experienced as perilious—even by top managers, as the
wide-spread use of absurd gurus, fads, and cults among business leaders
demonstrates—by the same business leaders that officially make decisions
on the basis of fractions of a percentage point.
In contrast to the perspective of the classics, we postulate that rational-
ity is not pervasive. As life spheres that are considered crucial for the well-
being of the collectivity, especially the economy, become more rational—the
current globalization is a case in point—other life spheres become emo-
tionalized.
A prime example of this switching of areas where by now emotionality
is required is the Western family. Until about 200 years earlier it was, much
as today's firms, considered to be a working unit. Marriages were arranged,
the selection of partners being guided by rational criteria—which meant
largely materialistic ones. Marriage was understood to be an institution, and
institutions cannot be built reliably on emotions. At the same time emo-
tions such as trust and feelings of mutual obligations were prerequisites for
economic relationships that were meant to last—transactions in markets
being a partial exception. Philip Aries has shown how matter-of-fact rela-
tionships between parents and their children were at that time.36 According
to Gernsheim-Beck there developed in the early part of the 19th century a
new standard for middle class families in Western Europe. Wives should—
rather than could—now love their husbands and experience his successes
as the realization of their own longings. Then children and parents were
expected to love one another, and finally as a last stage in the emotionalizing
of the bourgeois family husbands were required to love their wives.37
Philippe Aries: L'enfant et la vie familiale sous I'ancien regime. Paris 1960.
Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim: "Wir wollen niemals auseinandergehen—zur Geschichte von
14 ERWIN K. SCHEUGH
Emile Durkheim in his "lois du contraction" has provided us with the

analytical apparatus for this process. The shrinking size of the family due
to modern life conditions is paralled by a loss of functions. Care in the case
of illness and/or old age becomes the task of physicians and hospitals, for
learning the most important cultural techniques children are sent to schools,
and as a unit of production the private households loose functions. At the
same time mutual emotional support gains in importance. Rene Konig iden-
tified the emotional wellbeing of family members as the central function of
today's nuclear families in the economically developed countries.38
A society with only rational relations and only rational institutions is an
anthropological impossibility. It is incorrect to invoke Tonnies as an opponent
of this view. To him community and society were endpoints of a scale to
characterize existing societies—none of which would be like those analytical
endpoints. In support of our position we would like to cite Max Weber as
the most important proponent of modernity as increasing rationality. In his
vision for the future Weber shivered at the thought of a rational bureaucracy
dominating all spheres of life. Would the "iron cage of bureaucracy" be the
final stage of the rationalization of human existence? Let us add that Weber,
of course, did not equate the dominance of bureaucracy with the expan-
sion of the state but with an institutionalized mode of dealing with tasks.39
Habermas christens the assumed inroads of technical-economic rational-
ity—in the terminology of neomarxism "instrumental rationality"—into the
private worlds of every-day life "colonialization" (in the original "Kolonisierung
der Lebenswelten"). In so far as this occurs it is the same process as the
presumed "commercialization" of life spheres where other standards should
prevail. We will not take issue with the observations that commercialization
and instrumental reasoning can be observed in situations where they are
illegitimate, but we do take issue with the contention that the occurrence
in these situations is something new.40
We consider this notion of modern society as a melange of the cultural
Partnerwahl und Ehe." In: Deutsches Jugendinstitut (ed.): Wie geht es der Familie? Ein Handbuch
zur Situation der Familie heute. Munich 1988; idem: "Von der Liebe zur Beziehung." In: Soziale
Weit. Special issue no. 4. I. Berger (ed.): Die Moderne—Kontinuitaten und Zasuren. Gottingen 1986.
38
According to Konig this has two major emphases: the socialization with its newer dom-
inance of close parent-child relations as the "second socio-cultural birth", and the emotional
support of parents for another. Rene Konig: Die Familie der Gegenwart—ein interkultureller Vergleich.
Munich 1974, especially chapters IV and VI.
39
It is probably due to the timing of his speech that Weber's warning against socialism
is rarely cited. In 1917 in Vienna Weber cautioned that socialism was in effect the fusion
of two bureaucracies, of governments and of industry. The very fact that at present they
often opposed each other limited bureaucratic control over lives.
40
Cf. Jurgen Habermas: Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Frankfurt 1981; idem: Der philo-
sophische Diskurs der Moderne.
norms of rationality and emotionality central for our understanding of moder-

nity. The many criticism of "commercialization" are an indicator for the
resistance to extending economic rationality to such spheres where "it does
not belong".41 "Rationality" is expected as a style of problem solving in all
spheres and for all aspects that are not considered to be one's private con-
cerns. To do justice to the importance of non-rational, especially non-eco-
nomic elements, it is not advisable to introduce a new label such as "post
modern", as this suggests a novel condition; which is definitely not the case.42
There is no society with a high degree of functional differentiation that
would not be a balance of contradictions.43
The spirit of this assertion runs, of course, very much counter to the per-
spective of mainstream sociology. The majority of sociologists would agree
that at any given time all complex societies are full of contradictions. Having
acknowledged that, however, they would argue that this is the consequence
of unequal speed of change for different life spheres. While many would
object to being linked to the "cultural lag" theory of William F. Ogburn,
in reality his view of change has become part of our "cultural knowledge".
There is a direct analogy to the evolutionism of Herbert Spencer.
We advocate as a perspective to view contradictions as a constant fea-
ture of complex systems forcing ever new states of equilibrium.44 It is pre-
cisely these tensions that—if managed—cause the dynamics of modern society
as against the stability of older systems of High Culture (Hochkulturen) after
their having found an equilibrium.
Some German sociologists maintain that the decisive structural feature of

societal modernism is the breakdown of social regularities such as common
role obligations, that the determining character of social conditions declines,
and that positions lose their importance in prescribing behavior.45 UIrich
41
On the notion of "instrumental rationality" see Erwin K. Scheuch: "Instrumental Reason
As a Concept and a Characteristic of Modern Societies." In: Carlos Mongardini (ed.): Due
Dimensioni Delia Societa—L'Utile E La Morale. Rome 1991, pp. 145-150.
42
As the inventor of "post modernism" credit is usually given to Jean Francois Lyotard:
The. Post-Modem Condition. Minneapolis 1985. A critique of post modernism is found in Anthony
Giddens: The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge (UK) 1990.
43
For a further discussion of contradictions as an integral part of the social structure of
a given society see Enzo Mingione: Fragmented Societies. Oxford 1991.
44
For such a succession of equilibria economists use the concept "FlieBgleichgewicht".
45
Hartmut Esser: "Verfallt die soziologische Methode?". In: Wolfgang Zapf, op. cit.
S. 743-769. With "Soziologische Methode" Esser means structural functionalism would indeed
be pointless if structural influences were to evaporate. That they leave more room today for
16 ERWIN K. SCHEUCH
Beck even writes about the individualization of society—which in its literal

meaning would be, of course, a conceptual impossibility.46 This school of
thought is an overreaction to a real change that we prefer to characterise
differently, namely as the widening latitude between constraints, as the change
from determination to limiting conditions for choice.
Beck argues in addition that "modern" means that we are living with un-
precedented risks without being able to hold someone or some institution
responsible. By way of contrast we agree with Anthony Giddens that char-
acteristic for the current situation are low-probability high-consequence risks
that are controversial and counterfactual at the same time.47 As Giddens
argues, this is far from the imagination of Max Weber that eventually the
iron cage of bureaucracy would provide a stable control over individuals. To
Giddens, modernity is rather a "juggernaut", a giant moving "something"
that is out of control and crushes everyone that stands in its way.
We think this is a completely ahistorical argument. Early death and incur-
able ailments were part of the consciousness of medieval man; the admonition
"memento mori" was all present. Beck's and Giddens' view of risks as a
distinguishing feature of modernity is also blind to the certainty of gigantic
natural disasters such as vulcanism, earthquakes and collisions with meteorites.
Differentiation leads to the specification of life spheres, and privacy as a
new norm allows as to function in such an area largely regardless of what
we are in other areas. We are used to a life where work and the private
residence are separated, where we are able to function differently with
bureaucratic organizations and a leisure group of our choice. Managing the
differences between the various spheres becomes a necessary social skill.
Totalitarianism is the attempt to negate this kind of differentiation by enforc-
ing the same ultimate meaning across all life spheres.
In most of these life spheres there is room for choice: the further away
they are from economic transactions, bureaucratic interchange and require-
ments due to technology, the greater the room for choices. Family life is a
case in point. There is still the image of the "normal" family situation: A
man and a wife with their underage offspring, but at any given time only
around 25 percent of adults in Western Europe live in such a situation. For
many it is a phase in the life cycle followed by other ones that are likely
to last longer; for still others it is a life form that they reject or fail to attain.
Ego may chose to be single, or live as a single parent; be a "dink" (double
individual responses than earlier, that there is freedom within constraints, does not invali-
date the approach.
46
UIrich Beck: Risikogesellschaft—auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Frankfurt 1986.
47
Anthony Giddens, op cit., pp. 124-134.
income, no kids) or part of a dual work family, which further subdivides

by the meaning of work (career or income); live in a three-generation-
household or try out a commune. To Beck this is proof that the family as
in institution is a thing of the past—but that is definitely in error. Structural
regularities remain such as the pattern of neo local residence, bilaterality in
the definition of relatives, and in spite of high rates of divorce the family
is monogamous. Very few people remain life-long unmarried—much fewer
than e.g. in Medieval times. And with an average duration of marriage of
15 years today this is about the average length of marriage in earlier German
society. The major difference is the mode of ending a pair-relationship: ear-
lier death, now (in approximately one-third of marriages) divorce.
On the micro level, the characteristic of living in a modern society is
having to make choices, the characteristic at the macro level providing or
opening up choices. Choices follow from differentiation—particularly in
spheres where we are not expected to be rational. Where alternatives are
chosen primarily according to ego's values or taste we suggest labeling them
"options". It follows from the approach outlined above that options increase
specifically in the sector of the AGIL scheme that Parsons named "inte-
grative". The higher the demands following from rationalization in a large
part of life, the greater the functional necessity of options in others. "Options"
refer to a structural element that is objective and related to macrolevel fea-
tures. The compliment at the micro level is "option awareness"—the abil-
ity of members in a modern society to perceive alternatives.48
Managing the differences between life spheres and being aware of options
is not the same as what Beck means by individualization.49 Pluralization is
the more adequate descriptive term. After all, the preferences are exercised
within constraints, and they are by no means to be viewed as arbitrary. Much
as options are a functional imperative following from differentiation and
rationalization, they do not lead to the the same acceptance of the results
as do norms that leave no choice. In economics the consequence of hav-
ing to make a choice between two desirable alternatives means a feeling of
loss; the technical term for this is opportunity costs. If in the former GDR
after years spent waiting until at long last the poor imitation of an auto-
mobile called Trabant was finally delivered, it could satisfy more than now
a decision between immediately available attractive real automobiles.
48
For a more detailed exposition see Erwin K. Scheuch and Marvin Susman, op. cit.
49
Ulrich Beck: "Der Konflikt der zwei Modernen". In: Wolfgang Zapf (ed.), op. cit., pp.
40-53. Largely in agreement with Beck is Stefan Hradil: "Sozialstrukturelle Paradoxien und
gesellschaftliche Modernisierung", ibid., pp. 361-369.
18 ERWIN K. SCHEUCH
A social system with a wide range of choices and options has a struc-
tural problem: Predictability of behavior. If actors cannot predict the behav-
ior of their alteri, efficiency in social interchange declines drastically, and
conflicts become omnipresent. In our own "Lebenswelten", we know that
this is not so, that we experience most interactions as free of surprises. This
can be accounted for conceptually if we postulate that increasingly the stan-
dardization of persons in a society is being replaced by the standardization
of situations, including the definition of some such situations as room for
innovation and the unexpected. The very same person that we just experi-
enced as very reliable in one situation will most likely surprise us if we meet
him in a different and for us as yet unfamiliar setting.
We can refine this notion further with reference to the analysis of mo-
dernity as experienced in daily life. Let us combine the idea of a stan-
dardization of situations with the concept of life sphere. In those life spheres
where rational behavior is presumed to govern interactions, the situations
need to be standardized regardless who the alteri are as "whole" persons.
Conversely, in life spheres that are part of our private life, expectations do
not abstract from the concrete partner in a situation. It is here that the
"true person" can realize itself by displaying aspects of himself that—for
better of for worse—are surprising. On the individual level this calls for
"understanding" as a socio-cultural skill to manage one's private life. It was
Georg Simmel who maintained that the "psychologysing" of relations was
a central element of modern societies.50 In this way we can account for the
seeming paradox that modern societies are experienced at the same time
as highly standardized (high "role pressure"), and individualistic.
These were the main considerations guiding us in developing a frame-
work for the congress. Of course not all meetings were conceived with ref-
erence to the concerns and conceptual framework here. Even if one had
attempted to do this, it would have been an impossibility as this is the first
time the framework is presented even though aspects had been published
in various places, and the first part had indeed been sent to colleagues
whom we wished to involve in the World Congress.
With five plenary sessions and approximately 36 working groups with
around 200 papers one can only be sure when all those proposing a meet-
ing do actually show up, and still others may arrive at the congress with
very acceptable suggestions for ad hoc meetings. Such a congress must try
to accommodate as many orientations and colleagues as can be justified.
Yet in spite of all this diversity this World Congress was meant to have
50
This does not apply to all life spheres in a modern system. Psychologysing in a situation
where actors are presumed to meet as rational beings is disapproved as a form of intrusion.
some overriding perspectives, which is what the scientific congresses of the

IIS had in its earlier years.
We have a congress within the congress. The European Community pre-
sents on Monday and Tuesday is TSER Program looking at Social Exclusion
and Social Integration. Thus, this Conference within the Congress has a
unifying theme, too.
And to emphasize our advocacy of looking at the classics we appeal to
your senses as well: One of our colleagues is an accomplished artist. For
this World Congress he has assembled some of his works: Picture of the
classics in sociology.
APPENDIX
VI
National identity
Using observations from a cross section of individuals, it is concievable that

we can arrange societies in a rank order of increasing "modernity". But
with such an empirical base we are likely to miss the elements that are dis-
tinctive for a country. After decades of comparative research using surveys
we know that we cannot account for the differences between France, Eng-
land, the United States and Japan on the basis of differences in marginals
for individual responses. Japan and Germany are good cases in point.
Evaluations of newer technologies on the individual level do not differ very
much from each other in Japan and Germany, but the kind of technolog-
ical solutions and the technology as a social institution in the two countries
is as different from each other as are the technology policies in the two
polities. The Japanese and the Germans as aggregates do not account for
the distinctiveness of Japan and Germany as countries.51
When in the Western world modernization spread from early moderniz-
ing parts of the economy such as mining and textile to other branches, and
from the economy to administration, the military and so on, this did not
51
On the basis of this experience we proposed the term "individualistic fallacy" for an
attempt to use aggregated individual values to characterize a collectivity. Erwin K. Scheuch:
"The Development of Comparative Research—Towards Causal Explanations". In: Else 0yen
(ed.): Comparative Methodology. London 1990, pp. 19-37. See also Henry Teune: "'Comparing
Countries—Lessons Learned'" in the same volume. This experience motivated the publica-
tion by Hans-Peter Meier-Dallach, Rolf Ritschard and Rolf Nef: Nationale Identitat—ein FaB
ohm empirischen Boden. Zurich 1990.
20 ERWIN K. SCHEUCH
occur within a vacuum. Unlike the thinking in some of the schools of moder-
nity the traditional institutions were not swept away but rather transformed,
changed their functions in part, and arrangements between traditional insti-
tutions and newly developed ones were found.52 As Stein Rokkan argued,
the modern societies of Western Europe show a strong family-likeness as
they had to cope with similar conflicts of central importance. National iden-
tity can then be conceptualized as national specificities in outcomes of these
central conflicts plus the changes in the character of pre-modern interme-
diary institutions.53 The Scottish parliament, the German Handwerkskammer,
and the French system of academic certifications are cases in point.
Both Germany and Japan are widely understood in political sociology to
be cases of corporatistic intermediation, and of social and economic antag-
onisms tempered by consensualism.54 Not only in contrast to the United
States—which, by the way, is the aberrent case with respect to intermedi-
ary surviving institutions—but also in comparison with France and England,
Japan is most Japanese in the survival of pre-modern intermediary institutions
and consensual mechanism, and also Germany is distinctly German in this
respect, and in its adjustment of these structures to the modern economy.55
The corporatism of Germany is not merely a survival of pre-modern con-
ditions but also a result of social engineering by the national socialist regime
during the second half of the thirties. At that time the existing corporations
and voluntary associations were restructured to serve as "transmission belts"
for the central government and the Nazi party. For example, the voluntary
student association (AStA) of the Weimar Republic time was transformed
into a corporation with mandatory membership. Guilds had survived in
Germany for many occupations; the Nazis made the operation of a shop
or a craft dependent on membership in the appropriate guild. At the same
time, competition between shop keepers was reduced by making the open-
ing of a shop dependent on a "needs test"; shop keepers of the same trade
had to decide whether a new shop was needed. Other mechanisms for elim-
52
Rolf Vente: "Industrialization as Culture". In: Rolf E. Vente and Peter Chen (eds.):
Culture and Industrialization. Singapore 1982, pp. 86-111.
53
Stein Rokkan: "Nation-Building and the Structuring of Mass Politics". In: Shmuel N.
Eisenstadt (ed.): Political Sociology. New York 1971, pp. 293-411. Dankwart Rustow: A World
of Nations. Washington 1968. Reinhard Bendix: Nation Building and Citizenship. New York 1964.
54
Philippe C. Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch: Trend toward Corporatist Intermediation.
Beverly Hills 1979. Erwin K. Scheuch: Wird die Bundesrepublik unregierbar? Koln 1976. One of
the earliest authors to stress the positive functions of intermediary institutions, instead of
treating them as remnants of traditional orders, and obstacles to mobilization, was William
Kornhauser: The Politics of Mass Society. New York 1959.
55
Erwin K. Scheuch: "Continuity and Change in German Social Structure". In: Historical
Social Research, vol. 13 (1988), pp. 31-121.
inating competition were examinations of knowledge and skills in an area.

Thus, if one wanted to operate a cigar store, a test of competence with
smoking material had to be mastered.
Contrary to the ideology of the left, the Nazis were distrustful of capi-
talism and markets. Consequently, they introduced a peculiar form of planned
economy. "Four year plans" defined the economic goals in terms of quan-
tity for each branch, later down to the level of firms. The capitalists were
transformed into rent-collectors; while nominally they remained owners, they
were told what to produce in what quantity and at what price. They had
to calculate the cost of operations according to a binding accounting scheme
(the "LSO"), but they were allowed to charge 6 percent on top of cost as
earnings.
According to a description by Yusada Yawata for the policies in Japan
in the thirties,56 there were considerable similarities to policies in Germany
for an identical reason: the power structure imagined that eventually an
armed conflict was inevitable, and that capitalism as a system was inad-
equate to mobilize and concentrate resources for that eventuality. The
strengthening of traditional institutions and values was therefore not the
result of a criticism of competitive structures in the economy, but followed
from the wish to subordinate other goals to the one of military preparedness
and that to serve the increase in the power base: power took precedence
before economic benefit.
Many of these newly instituted or revitalized features of a "pre-modern"
era survived after 1945, and in retrospect they were advantageous in the
first postwar decade. After that the market type of economy was a stimu-
lant in reconstruction even though it was unfamiliar as Germany was a clas-
sic country for agreements on constraint of trade.57 The system remained
largely consensual. Dissent is bought off—the introduction and operation of
co-determination is an example. Until recently, the political and economic
system was a highly predictable consensual system, where the economy
received market signals from its involvement in the global markets—nearly
one-third of the GNP resulting from exports. "Germany represents the type
of 'cooperative capitalism', while the United Kingdom is an example for
'competitive capitalism'"—that is the conclusion at the end of an empirical
investigation of interlocking directorates of the 623 largest German corpo-
rations and the 520 largest English enterprises.
56
Yawata (in the process of publication).
57
Paul Winhold and Jurgen Beyer. "Kooperativer Kapitalismus". In: Kolner Zeitschrift fur
Soziologie und Sozalpsychologie, vol. 47 (1995), pp. 1-36. See also Erwin K. and Ute Scheuch:
"Burokraten auf den Chefetagen". Reinbek 1995, pp. 55-81 and pp. 231-241.
22 ERWIN K. SCHEUGH
Intermediary institutions were added in the process of modernization. A

very important case is the system of voluntary associations: cooperatives,
interest groups, trade unions, professional associations, political parties (of
the Western European type), and a large and increasing number of "pri-
vate" associations (i.e. "Vereine").58
In the Western part of Germany more than half of the adult population
is a member in at least one of those "private" associations; in addition about
25 percent are members of a special interest association. Contrary to the
views spread by culture criticism, networks of private relations are impor-
tant in the life of around 85 percent of West Germans, both for emotional
support ("strong ties") and for help in managing one's life in a both com-
mercial and bureaucratic environment ("weak ties").59
Networks serve two types of functions: linking levels of a society and struc-
turing relationships between the units at any one particular level. In con-
centrating on individuals and organizations as actors in sociology, too little
attention has been given to relationships as units of analysis. Georg Simmel
or Leopold von Wiese, and in the USA Howard S. Becker, with their
emphases on relationships as the building blocks of society, had little impact
on the profession. The dominant paradigm was the actor as a unit of analy-
sis—whether as a person or as a collective actor. The relationship between
units on the intermediary level are largely unresearched, the empirical stud-
ies at the Max Planck Institut in Cologne being a rare exception. "It is
argued that both in the economy and in policy making, network phenom-
ena are in fact becoming more prominent. This is linked to functional
differentiation, a core process of societal modernization which implies the
existence of partly autonomous societal subsystems ... In this structural con-
text, interorganizational networks . . . can provide a solution to coordination
problems typical of modern societies".60
To summarize these arguments, we view economically developed coun-
tries as networks in which institutions and institutions, people and people,
as well as people and institutions are loosely coupled. Cultural norms between
58
The best overview about German "Vereine" is currently Heinrich Best (ed.): Der Verein.
Bonn 1993. See also Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.): Datenreport 1994. Bonn 1994, Part II, sec-
tion B.
59
Usually, it is support networks that are discussed. The classical source is M. Granovetter:
"The Strength of Weak Ties". In: American Journal of Sociology, vol. 78 (1973), pp. 1360-1380.
Our own understanding was strongly influenced by Barry Wellman: Network Analysis—some
Basic Principles. In: R. Collins (ed.): Sociological Theory. San Francisco 1983. To use social
network information to characterize macro structures compare Edward Lauman: The Bonds
of Pluralism. New York 1973.
60
Renate Mayntz: "Modernization and the Logic of Interorganizational Networks". MPIFG
Discussion Paper no. 8, 1991, Cologne.
different life spheres are contradictory, and people are expected to make
choices as a way to keep social dynamics going. These social systems are
politically organized as nation-states that gain their specific national char-
acters mainly from the mesh of intermediary institutions and connectivities.
The meaning of the political organization is changing with the increase in
international interpenetrations.
The impact of globalization diminishes national sovereignty as it is increas-
ingly difficult to direct the economy by way of an economic policy. This does
not mean the withering away of nation-states. The systems of social secu-
rity were developed according to different principles in the political frame-
work of sovereign nation states. Today, the most important function of the
political shell called nation-state is to guarantee the systems of entitlements.
There is an inherent contradiction between globalization—with financial
transactions and not production as its core—and the expectations of the cit-
izenry. As the newest study by the RISC group shows, the wish for a high
level of social security increases while the importance of so-called post-
modernistic values declines. The result of studies on values shows: Good
times permit emphases on self actualization, bad time are good for tradi-
tional values. Not only behavior is contingent, but the hierarchy of values
is contingent as well. The worlds of immediate experiences, the "Lebenswelt",
and the macro developments are drifting apart.
The globalization in economic processes, in consumer goods and in notions
of the good life, greatly stimulated by developments in global media, is often
seen as the coca-colazisation of everyone. On closer look it is less obvious
than assumed what this means. Coca cola in different parts of the world
comes in culture specific flavors: the bottle is the same, the content is not.
The same goes for Nescafe: The cans are the same everywhere, but there
seven different varieties in taste. The satellites reach into all corners of the
world but experience shows by now: the basic diet has to be regional, if
not local, with international programs added as "flavor".
Globalization does not penetrate, much as the nation-states did not com-
pletely penetrate their societies. Globalization as a further step in the modern-
ization process does not create a global society but adds further contradictions
to the ones that we live with—and can live with because we are modern.
2. VALUES IN A POLYTHEISTIC WORLD
Raymond Boudon
Introduction: "polytheism of values"
The idea that we would live in a world where "common values" would
have disappeared, in a world irreversibly characterized by a Weberian "poly-
theism of values" has become a widespread belief. It is an essential by-
product of the relativistic worldview that is so influential today. According
to this dominant relativistic view, values would be objectively ungrounded
and ultimately a purely individual matter.
This axiological relativism explains many features of modern societies.
Thus, a prominent sociologist of law, Mary Ann Glendon (1996) has recently
shown that in the US lawyers and judges tend to see their role, even at
the level of the Supreme Court, in a new way. Instead of accepting the
idea that a judicial decision should aim, in principle at least, at being
grounded on impersonal reasons, they develop a "romantic" conception of
their role. They are namely convinced that the answer to the question as
to what is right or wrong is of a basically subjective character and that per-
sonal conviction is the only basis on which their decisions and actions can
be legitimately grounded.
Tocqueville had the impression that America developed often in advance
features that were likely to appear in Europe after some delay. This seems
to be the case in the example I have just considered. In France, too, many
observers consider that the judges tend to have a new conception of their
role: this role would not merely consist in a prudent application of the law;
it would imply that they develop their own ideas as to what is right or
wrong. To take an example illustrating the influence of relativism from the
field of education, a movement called the "value clarification movement"
has developed in the US. It starts from the principle that values are a mat-
ter of purely individual decision and draws from this principle the con-
sequence that any effort to teach values and norms would be incompatible
with the dignity of individuals and should consequently be banished.
This axiological relativism also has consequences in a field of special inter-
est to us, the history of sociology. Weber is becoming popular again in socio-
logical circles because he would have anticipated the success of relativism
in the postmodern world. Postmodernist writers interpret his "polytheism of
VALUES IN A POLYTHEISTIC WORLD 25
values" as meaning that we would have definitely recognized the subjec-

tive character of our positive and normative ideas about the world. Values
would be an entirely private matter. Individuals can endorse any values they
want with a unique provision: that by so doing they do not limit the free-
dom of other individuals to follow the values of their choice. Thus, Bryan
Turner (1992, p. 7) writes: "(. . .) the revival of interest in Nietzsche (. . .)
for the development of poststructuralism and postmodernism (. . .) has been
parallel to the revival of interest in the shaping of Weberian sociology by
Nietzsche".
The difficulty however is that the shaping of Weberian sociology by
Nietzsche and the Nietzschean interpretation of Weber's "polytheism of val-
ues" in particular are actually foreign to Weber's original intuition. Weber
meant by this expression a simple idea: that the moral synthesis produced
by Christianism had irreversibly lost its strength in the modern world and
that, against the hope of a Comte or a Durkheim, it would not likely be
replaced by a new, modern, non religious synthesis. Weber never said that
relativism was the ultimate truth in descriptive and prescriptive matters. He
cannot be held as a forerunner of postmodernism.
Axiological relativism contradicted by evidence
What matters is that the Nietzschean postmodernist interpretation is con-

trary to easily observable facts. Most people agree that democracy is a bet-
ter political regime than the various forms of despotism, that liquidating
apartheid in South Africa was a good thing, that corruption is a bad thing,
etc. In other words, on innumerable subjects people have the impression,
not less today than yesterday, that the normative statements and the values
they endorse, far for being private, can be considered objectively valid. So
the current axiological relativism is contradicted by the beliefs of people.
Of course these beliefs can be illusory. But, if we were to accept the view
defended by postmodernist writers that they are illusory by nature, we should
have to analyze the causes of such widespread "false consciousness": a ques-
tion which postmodern writers do not answer satisfactorily when they raise
it at all.
This axiological relativism is also contradicted by the fact that, as opin-
ions polls show, the opinions of people, far from being randomly distrib-
uted, are on the contrary highly structured on many subjects. Thus, in a
recent strike in France, young French doctors opposed a measure pro-
posed by the government according to which if the sum of the individual
26 RAYMOND BOUDON
medical prescriptions would in a region exceed some threshold fixed in

advance, each physician would have to refund a proportional part of his
earnings to the social security system. A strong majority supported the strike
because people felt that the measure contradicted the principle according
to which one should not be made responsible for the actions of other peo-
ple. In that case, the axiological reaction was grounded on a basic principle
without which the inscription of the idea of responsibility in the social world
is not possible.
This discrepancy between the theory according to which values would be
mere opinions in a postmodern world and the fact that many values are
lived as objectively grounded raises interesting questions. Why this discrep-
ancy? Why is the subjectivist postmodernist theory of value so influential?
Are value feelings an expression of "false consciousness"? What are the avail-
able alternative explanations? How should value feelings be properly ex-
plained? Here are the questions which I would like to examine in the present
communication.
A question in the sociology of knowledge
Dealing with the first question, I will leave aside the general causes as to
why relativism is widely spread to concentrate on a single point, namely
the responsibility of the social sciences in the legitimation of this modern
relativism. It should indeed be noted that the social sciences owe to some
extent their influence to the fact that they have frequently stressed, against
other traditions, the idea that positive and normative beliefs might be illu-
sions. Some examples illustrate easily this idea.
- To Marx and the Marxian tradition, moral feelings are mental ghosts in
the human mind.
— To Freud and the psychoanalytical tradition, moral feelings are the prod-
uct of the Oedipus complex.
- To the positivist tradition, ought cannot be derived from is.
Hence, it can never be shown that something is good or bad or that it

should be done. If I have the feeling that X is good and that it is my duty
to do X, this feeling is necessarily an illusion. Its causes cannot lie in the
reasons on which the subject believes wrongly it would be grounded. This
positivist argument can be found in Pareto's work and in many others'.
- To behaviorists in the style of Skinner, moral feelings are produced by

social conditioning.
- To sociologists belonging to the Durkheimian tradition, values and norms
are cultural features which tend to be perceived as good by social actors
because they have been socialized to them.
— To anthropologists, values are features developed by singular cultures. To
the members of a culture they appear as objectively grounded. To the
outside observer, they appear as arbitrary. Frenchmen shake hands, for
instance; Englishmen do not.
Montaigne expressed this latter theory perhaps for the first time, when
he contended that we tend to consider as good or bad what is generally
considered as good or bad by most people around us. The prominent an-
thropologist Geertz (1984) quotes Montaigne in his classical paper on "Anti-
anti-relativism", in which he contends that anthropology would have definitely
shown the truth of relativism, i.e. the theory according to which there would
be no truth, neither positive nor normative.
On the whole, it is easily checked that the most visible and possibly
influential contemporary social scientists and philosophers have contributed,
each in his fashion, to the idea that values are mere illusions: they would
be "socially constructed" illusions; to others, as Foucault, they reflect rela-
tions of power among classes or individuals.
Why have such theories been so easily accepted? One reason, rightly
underlined by Nisbet (1966), is that since Freud and Durkheim the idea
that illusion is a normal state of mind, that our ideas are produced by forces
that we are unable to control or even be aware of, has become a com-
monsensical idea in the social and human sciences.
I quote Nisbet (1966, p. 82):
Durkheim shares with Freud a large part of the responsibility for turning con-
temporary social thought from the classic rationalist categories of volition, will,
and individual consciousness to aspects which are, in a strict sense, non voli-
tional and non-rational. Freud's has been the more widely recognized influence.
But there is every reason to regard Durkheim's reaction to individualistic ratio-
nalism as more fundamental and encompassing than Freud's. Freud, after all,
never doubted the primacy of the individual and intra-individual forces when
he analyzed human behavior. Non-rational influences proceed, in Freud's inter-
pretation, from the unconscious mind within the individual, even though it is
related genetically to a racial past. The individual, in short, remains the solid
reality in Freud's thought. In Durkheim, however, it is community that has
prior reality, and it is from community that the essential elements of reason
flow.
28 RAYMOND BOUDON
On one point, though, I would propose to correct Nisbet's statement: it is

true of Freud, but rather of neo-Durkheimians than of Durkheim himself,
since, notably in his Elementary Forms of Religious Life, the French sociologist
stresses the fact that religious beliefs should not be treated as illusions, and
that generally illusions cannot last (Boudon, 1999).
The naturalistic reaction
The discrepancy between the theories proposed by Marxians, Durkheimians,

anthropologists, positivists, and other intellectual movements, according to
which values would be illusions even as the conviction of people is that they
are not, has produced a reaction in recent years. Against the relativistic-
culturalist view of values, some philosophers, sociologists and anthropolo-
gists have proposed naturalistic theories.
Is there a moral sense?
The American criminologist and political scientist James Wilson (1993), pos-
sibly one of the most interesting theorists in this category, proposes to go
back to the old notion of human nature and to recognize that our moral
sense is a crucial ingredient of it. Wilson's version of the Aristotelian tradition
is interesting because it is grounded on the findings of modern social sciences,
particularly social psychology. More precisely, Wilson claims that the findings
produced by these disciplines confirm Aristotle's views on moral sense.
Wilson is not the only social scientist to propose this intellectual move of
going back to the venerable notion of human nature. The anthropologists
Melford Spiro (1987), Roger Masters (1993) among others have also tried
to rehabilitate this notion and, by so doing, to avoid the deadends of cul-
turalism and relativism. Some writers, such as the sociobiologist Michael
Ruse (1993), go even further on the path indicated by Wilson: they not
only analyze moral feelings as natural, but try to show that they are the
product of biological evolution. Sociobiology would be, according to Ruse,
the discipline specifically habilitated to account for moral feelings, since they
should be analyzed as the unconscious product of biological evolution. He
even goes as far as to claim that the very fact that we do not see the rea-
sons for many of the moral obligations we normally follow should be ana-
lyzed as the product of the wisdom of biological evolution. The fact that
we are unaware of the effects of biological evolution on our minds would
be the cunning of nature, a List der Natur. Philosophers, such as MacIntyre
(1981), have also proposed modernized versions of the theory of morals once
advocated by Aristotle. Returning to Wilson, his general thesis can be sum-
marized by the statement: "we have a core self, not wholly the product of
culture" (Wilson, 1993: 11). We owe our moral sense to our human nature.
Four features of human nature
To Wilson, the reality of this moral sense can be detected as the existence
of sympathy, of a sense of fairness, of self control and a sense of duty.
Cultural variations would develop on these basic features of human nature,
but, as such, these features should be considered as universal. To ground
his theory, Wilson gathers findings from psychology and social psychology
and draws fascinating conclusions from well selected works.
Some observations are frequently brought against the notion of an instinct
of sympathy, for example that people being attacked in the subway often
do not get any help from fellow passengers. But social psychology shows
that such facts should not be interpreted as they usually are. Many socio-
psychological experiments show that the smaller the number of people pre-
sent when such an attack occurs, the higher the probability that the victim
will be helped. This suggests that people are reluctant to help, not because
they would not like to, but because they do not feel entitled to decide in
a unilateral fashion that they should themselves enjoy the social approval
which normally rewards those who help others. This social approval is of
course in itself also a symptom of the instinct of sympathy.
Beside this sense of sympathy, we are led in our behaviour and feelings
by a sense of fairness. Here again, experiments from social psychology sup-
port Wilson's claims. In an illuminating experiment, subjects are asked to
play a game called the ultimatum game: £100 are available in the pocket
of the experimenter. Subject A is allowed to make any proposal he wishes
as to the way the £100 should be shared between himself, A, and another
person B. B only has the right to approve or reject A's proposal. If he
rejects it, the £100 remain in the experimenter's pocket. If he accepts it,
he gets the sum allocated to him by A. With the "rational choice model"
in mind, according to which people are exclusively concerned with maxi-
mizing the difference between benefits and costs, one would predict that A
would make proposals of the type "£70 for me A, £30 for him, B". For
in that case, B would not refuse the proposal and A would maximize his
gains. In fact, the most frequent proposal is equal sharing. It is true that
this outcome contradicts the utilitarian axiomatics of the rational choice
model in its current version.
30 RAYMOND BOUDON
That moral sense should not be diluted, as the utilitarian tradition proposes,
into the rewards people get from their behaviour that can be detected be-
cause compliments make us uncomfortable rather than happy when we feel
that we do not deserve them. The bright pupil who receives a good grade
because his teacher is positively prejudiced toward him does not appreciate
the compliment, as many observations from social psychology demonstrate.
I will not insist on self control, another feature of human nature, accord-
ing to Wilson. He again follows Aristotle here, who made it a main virtue.
The ground for the importance of self control is best expressed by a metaphor
forged by Konrad Lorenz. Man is a bundle of instincts. He needs a "par-
liament of instincts", says Lorenz, to decide which of those instincts should
be satisfied and which repressed. Self control has the function of being this
parliament. Its social importance can be easily checked. Those who put this
parliament on vacation lose the respect and esteem of others. The political
man without self control is not likely to have a very long public career.
Even if drug addicts are better treated, handled and considered today than
yesterday, yielding to drug addiction is never considered positively, even by
drug addicts themselves.
As to the sense of duty, the last component of human nature considered
by Wilson, it is true that people often behave altruistically without being
forced to do so. As Adam Smith wrote, we follow the orders of "the man
in the beast".
Wilson is surely right to stress the limits of social conditioning against all
these anthropologists, sociologists and other culturalists to whom any behav-
ior is the product of socialization. He rightly recalls that young children
cannot be socialized indifferently to any stimulus. It is possible to induce
the fear of snakes by an appropriate conditioning, not of opera glasses.
Should moral convictions be explained by moral sense?
What should we think of Wilson's theory? I certainly do not claim for my

part there is no moral sense, but only that this factor can explain moral
and generally normative feelings to a very limited extent. Wilson leaves us
disappointed, it seems to me, in the sense that his theory is far from being
general: a lot of evidence about moral feelings cannot be explained.
For example, some redistribution policies produce the impression in the
minds of social actors that they are fair, others that they are not. Now, the
evaluations we bring to bear on social policies can evidently not be ana-
lyzed as a mere effect of human nature, even though they can be influenced
by a sense of fairness. Another objection: how can a moral theory based
on human nature explain the historical variations of our moral sensibility?

Tocqueville reports, in his Democracy in America, that Madame de Sevigne, a
French writer of the 17th century, describes in one of her letters to her
daughter how greatly she enjoyed attending a public execution. Capital pun-
ishment has not been abolished everywhere, but nobody today would admit
enjoying, and probably few people would have the capacity to enjoy, such
an event. Those with this capacity would be considered to be affected by
serious psychological problems, while Madame de Sevigne is considered to
be a normal person of her time. How can a theory based on human nature
explain such changes in our moral sensitivity?
Or take Wilson's analysis of fairness. We certainly have a sense of fair-
ness, and more generally a sense of values. But why are these values pre-
ferred in particular circumstances and not in others? Why is fairness denned
in such a way in some circumstances and otherwise in others? In many
cases, people are very eager to see for instance that rewards are exactly
proportional to contributions and define fairness as the correspondence
between contributions and rewards. In other cases, they seem not to care
about this point. In some circumstances, fairness is defined by the notion
of equality, in others by that of equity.
A cultural theory would provide an explanation for many of these obser-
vations more easily than a naturalistic one: we do not live in the same cul-
ture as Madame de Sevigne, hence our values are different. But such an
explanation would not explain why our values are different. In other words,
we are facing a dilemma: Wilson's natural theory fails to explain many obser-
vations, while cultural theories provide truncated explanations.
In fact, it is not necessary to choose between nurture and nature. A very
simple example shows that we do not need to evoke any moral sense, or
cultural conditioning, to explain familiar moral reactions. The Swiss psy-
chologist and sociologist Piaget made himself famous by memorable pages
on the marbles game. When a child playing marbles cheats, he will imme-
diately attract a negative reaction from the other children. Why? Not because
they would have internalized cultural norms according to which playing
marbles and following the rules of the marbles game would be good, for,
without having been told that cheating at marbles is bad, any child reacts
negatively against cheating. Nor because the rules of the marbles game
would be written in our genes, which have probably nothing against cheat-
ing in marbles games. Why this reaction? Because the children find the
game interesting, and for this reason play it. Now, cheating destroys the
game: it makes it uninteresting. So, children have strong reasons to reject
cheating and, as many observations show, they are aware of these reasons
at a very early age.
32 RAYMOND BOUDON
This simple example illustrates possibly what Max Weber called axiologi-
cal rationality. Though the sense of this notion has been widely discussed, I
would take it as meaning that people believe in norms and values because
they make sense to them, and more precisely because they have reasons to
endorse them. In other words, when taken in this sense, the very notion of
axiological rationality tells us that the reasons people have to believe what
they believe are the causes and the only causes of their normative beliefs.
In spite of its apparent simplicity, this idea is a powerful and fruitful ingre-
dient of any theory of moral sentiments. It implies that instead of using a
cultural or a natural theory of moral feelings, we can interpret moral feel-
ings in a rational fashion. "Neither nature nor nurture, but reason" would
be the formula summarizing it. Moreover, from the basic point in Weber's
writings of the distinction between instrumental and axiological rationality,
we draw the statement that axiological rationality is non instrumental, i.e.
non consequential: it considers reasons that have nothing to do with the
consequences of an action or of a state of affairs.
The reasons of moral convictions
The marbles players have strong reasons not to accept cheating. Generalizing
from this example, I would contend that when we believe that X is good
or bad, we always have strong reasons—though we can be more or less con-
scious of these reasons—for believing that X is good or bad. This assump-
tion implies, in other words, that moral conviction is not different in essence
from positive conviction. I believe that the square root of 2 is irrational in
the mathematical sense, that it cannot be expressed as the ratio of two inte-
gers p and q, because I have strong reasons for believing so. If we take
seriously the notion of axiological rationality as I interpret it, we should also
accept the idea that the source of moral convictions lies in strong reasons
which, of course, can be context dependent. To use a somewhat provoca-
tive formulation, I would say that moral truths are established in the same
way as cognitive truths.
Strange as the idea may appear at first glance, it is not difficult to illus-
trate. I will start with a trivial example. Why is democracy considered a
good thing? Because the statement that it is a good thing is grounded on
solid reasons.
I need only refer here briefly to classical theories to make this point more
concrete. A good government serves the interests of the citizens rather than
its own interests. For this reason, the members of a government should be
exposed to the risks of elections. Electing the government does not insure
that the best candidates will be elected, but it limits the risk that they will
disregard the interests of the people. Democracy does not and cannot pre-
vent corruption. But it makes it less likely than other types of regimes. A
legally elected government can overthrow democracy and there is no absolute
protection against this risk. An independent press and an independent judi-
ciary are indispensable elements of a democracy, since, by their critical func-
tion, they can expose and prosecute corruption or political mismanagement.
Of course, judges and the media can be corrupted. But other judges and
media people will plausibly have an interest in denouncing the corruption
of their colleagues.
If we examine these arguments, it is possible to see that they derive from
principles, for instance that any government should serve the interests of
the people rather than its own. Starting from this principle, the argument
then shows that elections, an independent press or judiciary system are ap-
propriate means to reach the goal of making it more rather than less likely
that the government serves the interests of the people rather than its own.
My objective is not to defend democracy (it obviously does not need my
defending it), nor to be original in matters of political philosophy, but only
to suggest that there is no substantial difference between the ways in which
positive and normative statements are grounded. We believe that the square
root of two is irrational because we have strong reasons for believing so.
We believe that democracy is a good thing because we have strong reasons
for believing so, reasons which have been developed by writers such as
Montesquieu, John Stuart Mill, Tocqueville1 and others. We feel entitled to
proselytize, to expect and help the expansion of democracy around the world
because we believe it is good, and we believe it is good because we have
strong reasons for believing so. We would never dream of explaining our
belief in physical statements by making them the effect of some obscure
instinct or of socialization. Why should we evoke such mysterious mecha-
nisms as far as normative statements are concerned?
The objection will possibly be made at this point that political philoso-
phers develop their theories from principles, and that these principles can-
not be demonstrated. Otherwise, they would not be principles. This is so
but the same objection can be raised against any theory, positive as well as
normative. Any physical theory, for instance, also rests on principles. And
the principles cannot be demonstrated except by other principles and thus
ad infinitum. This paradox, called after H. Albert as Munchhausen's trilemma,
because it evokes this German legendary figure who tried to get out of a
1
I have left aside here the consequentialist arguments in favor of democracy (as: it makes
economic development easier). They have been developed again recently by Olson (1993).
34 RAYMOND BOUDON
pool by pulling on his own hair, has never stopped science. As Karl Popper
has shown, the fact that we need frameworks to think on any subject and
principles to develop any theory does not prevent us from criticizing the
frameworks and principles. We endorse principles in normative as well as
in positive matters, because they are fruitful. If they are not, we reject them.
Even the statement that a number should be even or odd was not always
obvious, as is borne out by the fact that Greek mathematicians considered
the number one as neither odd nor even. This example shows that even in
the case of arithmetic, we need not accept the idea that principles should
be obvious.
Trivial as it may appear, Popper's observation that we need principles
before we can derive consequences from them and that we need to see the
consequences before we can judge the principles, implies that knowledge,
as against a received idea, is circular. This has been stressed by some sharp-
minded thinkers, such as the German sociologist and philosopher Georg
Simmel. Curiously enough, we reject this idea and perceive it as unac-
ceptable as far as positive knowledge is concerned, while we accept it much
more easily as far as normative knowledge is concerned. The reason for
this difference is that we believe in the possibility of a positive truth, but
not of a normative truth. In both cases, however, we have to accept the
validity of Munchhausen's trilemma and recognize by so doing that knowl-
edge—positive and normative—is circular. So, the trilemma does not con-
tradict the possibility of reaching truth and objectivity. Otherwise, we would
have to accept that science cannot reach objectivity.
The example of democracy suffices possibly to show that a value state-
ment "X is good" can be as objective as any positive statement. If the feel-
ing that "democracy is a good thing" were not objectively grounded, one
would not observe a general consensus on the subject in democratic soci-
eties. One would not understand that against the principles—basic in inter-
national relations—which require respect for the sovereignty of foreign states,
pressures on foreign governments which aim to begin or develop democ-
racy are generally well understood and approved by public opinion. How
could these collective feelings be otherwise explained? Theory and empiri-
cal sociology converge here. Of course, I am not saying that consensus is
a proof of truth, but only that when consensus appears, it has to be explained
by making it the product of reasons likely to be perceived as objectively
strong.
An objection can be made here, namely that democracy is not actually
considered by all as a good thing and that it was certainly not always con-
sidered so. To the first objection, it can be easily answered that non believ-
ers are also easily found as far as the best established scientific truths are
concerned. The other objection is less easily rejected. The consensus on

democracy is recent. Before the First World War, universal suffrage was
criticized. Pareto, for instance, saw in this right another of the symptoms
of human craziness which he liked to collect and prophesied that it would
generate social chaos. Does this not show that our belief that democracy is
good is a product of socialization rather than of reason and that it has lit-
tle to do with our beliefs in scientific statements?
The fact that moral truths are historical is a deadly objection against the-
ories of moral feelings that propose to derive these feelings from human
instincts and, in particular against Wilson's theory, but it is not contrary to
a rational theory of moral feelings. It is true that we tend to consider ratio-
nality and historicity as incompatible. Probably this belief is due to some
extent to the fact that Hegel, who made the two organically interdepend-
ent, has a rather bad reputation today. But Hegel was right here, provided
that we interpret him carefully.
Consider scientific beliefs. In Aristotelian physics, any physical movement
is produced by some force or set of forces. This sheet of paper moves
because I apply force to it. If I did not apply force, it would not move. So,
Aristotelian physicists had strong reasons for believing that any movement
is the effect of some force. But they drew conclusions from this statement
that were acceptable to them but unacceptable to us, namely that when a
ship keeps on moving after the wind has fallen some force should be respon-
sible for this movement. They tried therefore to figure out what this force
could be, and introduced the assumption that the movement of a ship pro-
duces a turbulence which would keep the boat moving. After a while, an
objection was raised against this theory: "if this argument is right, the hypo-
thetical turbulence would have the effect that the straw in a strawheap on
the ship would fly in opposite directions depending on whether the heap is
located at the front or at the back of the deck". Since the direction in which
the straw flies does not actually depend on the location of the straw heap
on the deck of a ship, the Aristotelian physicists came—slowly—to the con-
clusion that the principle according to which there could be no movement
without a force producing it was false. And they came to a new principle,
which we now consider as evident, namely, that a body that moves needs
a force to be stopped, exactly as a body not moving needs a force to be
brought into movement. This is the so-called "principle of inertia". The
feeling of obviousness which it produces today in our mind is the product
of historical processes by which ideas are produced and socially selected.
The same kind of story could be told about normative as well as posi-
tive statements. Imagination is the weakest of our faculties. When radiowaves
were discovered, it was generally thought that the use of this discovery would
36 RAYMOND BOUDON
be limited to making possible communication between boats and the coast

during foggy weather.
This weakness of our imagination is not less in moral matters. As sug-
gested by George Trevelyan, Voltaire did not believe before he came to
England that a society could function in an orderly manner if writers were
allowed to publish what they wanted. And, to come back to my earlier
example, as long as actual democratic regimes or at least political regimes
embodying some of the features of what we call democracy did not actu-
ally exist, nobody could imagine them, nor give them a fortiori a positive
value. Then, during the civil war in England in the seventeenth century,
the principle of the separation of the executive and legislative powers appeared
and its effects started being evaluated and positively appreciated. Later, the-
ories of democracy were developed by analysts such as Montesquieu, John
Stuart Mill and others who presented the principle of the separation of pow-
ers as crucial. At this point this principle came to be perceived as evident
in the same fashion as the principle of inertia appeared to be evident after
it was understood that it solved many physical puzzles.
But the story does not end here and further objections were made to
other principles of democracy we consider today as obvious. As I said before,
even at the beginning of the century, the argument that universal voting
would produce chaotic political effects was developed by political theorists.
In fact, the word "democracy" had generally a negative connotation until
late in the nineteenth century. But universal voting was introduced in many
places without producing chaotic effects. So, an argument which had pre-
viously been plausible was weakened by the evidence of experience. It was
also argued that freedom of the press would produce all kinds of undesir-
able effects, before this too was eroded. Freedom of the press does produce
undesirable effects. But restricting it produces even more undesirable effects.
Nobody would now doubt this. In the same way it has also been argued
that capital punishment is necessary because without capital punishment,
homicides will increase. Capital punishment was abolished in many coun-
tries without producing any increase in homicide rates. From that moment,
it was perceived, in many Western countries not only as barbarian, and
contradictory to basic values, but as useless, so that the public evaluation
of it changed progressively, exactly as the Aristotelian notion of the turbu-
lence responsible for the movement of ships and arrows was progressively
eroded. Some months ago The Economist published an article on the rein-
troduction of capital punishment in several American States. The weekly
periodical argued against it on the ground that capital punishment would
be more expensive than a long term jail sentence. One has immediately the
impression that this argument is not the right one: perhaps the author of
the article devised reasons likely to appeal to his readers, but was against
capital punishment for reasons different from those he exposed. But the
important point is that the article conveyed the sense that one should be
against capital punishment.
The rational (or alternatively, the cognitivist) theory of moral and gener-
ally axiological feelings which I propose here is not only not contradicted
by the fact that moral convictions change over time, but it can explain such
change more easily than other types of theories.2 The fact that science is
historical, that a statement treated yesterday as false is treated today as true,
was never held as an argument against the possibility of reaching truth in
scientific matters; in the same way, in moral matters, the fact that some
institutions were held as bad yesterday and are now considered good is not
an argument against the fact that moral evaluations are grounded on strong
reasons in the minds of people. Moreover, it is hard to see that normative
irreversibilities, as scientific irreversibilities, could be explained in a satis-
factory fashion, if not rationally. The principle of inertia is considered irre-
versibly valid because it is objectively better than the principles it replaced.
In the same fashion, as noted by Tocqueville, we will never again hear
somebody explaining that he or she enjoyed being the spectator of a cap-
ital execution. Capital punishment can be reintroduced depending on polit-
ical circumstances; but we will never be able to experience and express the
feelings of Madame de Sevigne.
I do not contend namely that there are no historical contingencies, on
the contrary. If there were no contingencies, there would be no innova-
tions, neither scientific nor moral. On this point, we must definitely stop
following Hegel's intuitions. Tomorrow, totalitarian regimes can reappear.
But unless human memory is destroyed, the idea that democracy is better
than despotic regimes will remain present in human minds.
The argument that change in moral values confirms relativism rests fin-
ally on a fallacy. Truth, whether moral or positive, is not historical. But the
research for truth, positive or normative, is historical. The fact that science
has a history is not an argument against the possibility of scientific truth.
The fact that morals have a history is not an argument in favor of moral
relativism. Truth cannot be reached at once. History does not legitimate
historicism (in the sense of moral relativism), contextual variation does not
justify sociologism or culturalism.
2
Elsewhere, as in Boudon and Betton (1999) and Boudon (2000), I propose to call it
"judicatory", using the english translation of the qualification ("urteilsartig") Max Scheler
rightly applies to Adam Smith's theory of moral sentiments.
38 RAYMOND BOUDON
Of course, I do not contend that an axiological truth lies hidden ready

to be discovered on all subjects. This view is false as far as positive knowl-
edge is concerned. We did not know until recent years whether bees have
a language or not in spite of the fact that von Frisch got the Nobel Prize
in 1953 for having "proved" it. On many moral questions, we are in the
same situation. Life continuously brings to the surface new positive and
normative questions. Many of them remain provisionally unsolved, while
others are possibly unsolvable.
The false evidence of a gap between ought and is
If our moral convictions rest upon strong reasons, why then is the similar-
ity in this respect between the positive and the normative ill perceived? The
main reason is that it contradicts many influential traditions, which I have
already evoked at the beginning of this article. The empiricist and the pos-
itivist traditions insist that ought cannot be drawn from is, as already men-
tioned. Ayer was so convinced on logical grounds that ought cannot be
logically drawn from is that he defended the view that moral feelings should
be interpreted as hidden, ill expressed or badly theorized commands. "You
ought do so" would mean according to him "Do so", or "I would like you
to do so". Moral feelings would then be the expression of commands, of
wishes or of feelings.
Ayer (I960) 3 follows the same line of argument as Pareto before him.
Pareto was so convinced that normative statements could not be demon-
strated that he also interpreted normative statements as the hidden expres-
sion of feelings. Hence his sarcasms against Kant. Kant claimed that he
had demonstrated the truth of the categorical imperative and hence the
truth of a statement such as "one should not steal". To Pareto, because it
is impossible to draw ought from is, Kant's proof is not a genuine proof but
rather the socially acceptable formulation of a wish. "Do not steal" would
mean, according to Pareto: "do what Kant likes; since he does not like steal-
ing, do not steal".
On the whole, the idea that moral statements cannot be objectively
grounded was treated as evident, but by a host of influential thinkers who
differ from one another in all other respects. Strangely enough, positivism
and empiricism converge in their interpretation of moral feelings with the
irrational sociological theories of Marx and Durkheim and with the irrational
psychological theory of Freud. All these thinkers agree with one another that
See also Urmson (1968).

moral convictions cannot be grounded rationally. The reasons on which

subjects believe that their axiological beliefs are grounded are to Marx,
Freud, Nietzsche or Durkheim, as well as to Ayer and Pareto, inspired by
"false consciousness". The reasons subjects see grounding their beliefs should
not be considered as their genuine causes but as mere "rationalizations".
Existentialists for their part, in the same way as positivists, consider that
moral beliefs cannot be grounded and, like them, propose treating the rea-
sons given by subjects as illusory. Moral decisions would be "absurd" in
Sartre's vocabulary.
Consequential reasons
So, the idea that normative beliefs cannot be grounded has become wide-
spread under the influence of various social factors which I cannot analyze
here for lack of space, but also because it has been supported by many
influential intellectual and social scientific movements. Empiricism, positiv-
ism, Marxism, Freudianism, existentialism, sociologism, postmodernism and
other -isms, different as they are from one another in most respects, agree
on one point, namely that moral and generally normative convictions can-
not be rationally grounded.
But the idea that normative beliefs cannot be grounded has also been
reinforced by the relative weakness of the rational theories of moral and
normative feelings developed by sociologists. These theories are rational in
the sense that, to them, the reasons for the normative beliefs of social actors
are their causes. But, with the exception of Max Weber and a few other
writers, most rational theories of axiological beliefs explain moral values by
their consequences. Some of these theories are powerful, but, because of
this consequentialist restriction, none of them can be considered a general
theory of normative feelings. Consequently, they cannot efficiently counter-
balance the influence of the irrational theories of normative beliefs.
We can consider as an example functionalism. In its most acceptable versions,
it says that an institution is good if it is congruent with the adequate func-
tioning of a social system which people appreciate. The example of Piaget's
marbles game is relevant here. Cheating is considered bad because it destroys
a game children are interested in. In the same fashion, restricting the admis-
sion of new candidates to a club is generally considered to be good because
free admission would be detrimental to the aims followed by the club. These
functional explanations can of course be easily accepted. But functionalism
cannot be considered a general theory which could be applied to all value
statements. Thus, it can explain why admission to clubs is generally restricted,
40 RAYMOND BOUDON
but not why we believe people should be free to leave a club. We are
morally shocked when sects retain members against their will. The source
of our moral indignation evidently lies not in the fact that retaining mem-
bers is detrimental to the sect.
Consider as another example the contractualist tradition. Rousseau says we
should accept to be "forced to be free". By this famous statement, he meant
that, in the absence of legal and social constraints, we would be tempted
to be free riders to our own disadvantage as well as to the detriment of all.
Without traffic lights, all of us would gain some freedom, but traffic would
freeze. So, we are better off when we accept the constraint of traffic ligths
as well as all kinds of political constraints. In this case also the bad conse-
quences of natural freedom is the reason why, according to Rousseau, ex-
changing our natural freedom with all its advantages for civil freedom is a
good thing.
A very influential contemporary theory, so-called "rational choice theory" has
tried to show that social norms should always be explained by the antici-
pation of their consequences. Many current decisions in private or public
life can effectively be accounted for by this "rational choice model".
So, the axiom common to functionalism, contractualism and the 'ratio-
nal choice theory', according to which "X is good" if the consequences of
X are good and bad if they are bad, is a powerful one. These theories are
sufficient to explain many axiological beliefs.
Axiological reasons
But they cannot however be held to provide a general axiological theory.

This is because the reasons underlying the axiological belief that "X is good
or bad" do not always deal exclusively with the consequences of X. This
is a crucial point. Irrational theories of norms and values to a great extent
draw their strength from the fact that, on many subjects, we have the strong
conviction that X is good or bad without the consequences of X being
clearly good or bad. Examples are easily found in terms of normative and
particularly moral feelings which can be explained, not by consequential
reasons, but by reasons which I propose to call axiological, in deference to
Max Weber. Recognizing their existence extends the power of the rational
theory of moral feelings and considerably weakens the irrational position.
As it is well known, Weber distinguished between instrumental (Zweckra-
tionalitat) and axiological rationality (Wertrationalitat). Though the distinction
is not clear in Weber's writings, it can be interpreted as pointing to the dis-
tinction I have in mind between consequential and non consequential rea-
sons. If the reasons of social actors were only of the consequential type, the
category of instrumental rationality would be sufficient. Traffic lights are
good because without them the situation of all would be worse. In the same
way, if a bridge were not built in an appropriate fashion, the consequences
would be bad: the bridge might collapse. Therefore, consequential and instru-
mental rationality are one and the same thing. The most classical example
in discussions about morals, the example of the negative value attached to
the act of stealing, shows, however, that many moral feelings are not the
product of instrumental rationality.
The idea that moral judgments are basically irrational has been expressed
in the most provocative fashion by Mandeville. Stealing provokes a nega-
tive feeling. But this feeling cannot be rationally justified, suggests Mandeville.
Of course, stealing has negative consequences as far as the victim is con-
cerned, but the consequences are good to the thief. Society mobilizes all
kinds of threats and penalties against thieves. But if the thief can be deterred
from stealing, he cannot be convinced that stealing is bad.
Mandeville's argument was used by Karl Marx, who evokes it and makes
it more systematic in Capital: the social consequences of stealing are ambigu-
ous, he contends, some being socially bad, some good. It is bad to the rich,
but provides jobs to lawyers and locksmiths. We could easily go further than
Marx. Thieves are a blessing to insurance companies. And not only to them.
Today, thanks to thieves, people in poor urban areas can get at lower prices
many goods, such as electronic goods, which they could not afford other-
wise. They do not even necessarily know that the low price they pay for
them is the effect of the fact that the goods have been stolen. In many
cases, they simply have the impression of being offered a bargain. This dual
market has the happy consequence of inverting Caplovitz' famous theorem.
Since, because of their scarce resources, the poor are limited to low qual-
ity products, said Caplovitz, it turns out that "the poor pay more" for their
refrigerators or washing machines. This may be so, but thanks to thieves
"the poor pay less" for their video-, tape-recorders or HiFi sets. Possibly,
this unintended redistribution from the rich to the poor is more efficient
than the redistribution generated by fiscal policies. In that case, thieves
would achieve what politicians are unable to accomplish. Moreover, since
it makes the demand broader, stealing has a positive effect on supply. So,
stealing is possibly good, not only from a social, but also from a macroeconomic
viewpoint, since it could have the positive effect of reducing unemployment.
Mandeville and Marx's sarcasms and paradoxes are more profound than
they seem. They demonstrate by a reductio ad absurdum that it is impossible
to show that stealing is a bad thing, when starting from a consequential
viewpoint. Nobody has proposed to legalize stealing, though. From which
42 RAYMOND BOUDON
source, then, does our conviction come that stealing is bad? Not from its
consequences. From what then?
To explain the normal feeling that "stealing is bad", one has to recon-
struct the non consequential reasons behind it. They are not difficult to
find. Social order is based on an adequation between retribution and con-
tribution. With the exception of particular circumstances when, for instance,
citizens are physically or mentally unable to contribute, a reward must cor-
respond to a contribution. Now, stealing is a typical violation of these basic
principles of social organization, since the thief unilaterally attributes to him-
self a reward without offering any contribution as a counterpart.
Obvious as it is, this case shows that reasons, though of the non conse-
quential type, can easily be discovered behind the negative feelings normally
aroused by the act of stealing. This example has important consequences:
it shows that the basic argument on which the irrational theories of morals
are grounded, namely that no reasons can be found behind the negative
feelings produced by stealing and other deviant forms of behavior, need not
be accepted. No consequential argument can prove that stealing is bad. No
instrumental reason can convince us that thieves should be prosecuted. But
axiological reasons can.
The same analysis could be extended to many other examples of moral
feelings. Thus, corruption has of course negative effects on the well-being
of taxpayers and consumers. But this effect is small and hardly visible. People
tend to be very sensitive to corruption, though. A few years ago, the Spanish
and French governments were dismissed by voters because they had not
struggled against corruption. The negative feeelings against corruption are pro-
duced by reasons, but by reasons of the axiological, not consequential type.
These examples suffice to suggest that the Weberian notion of axiologi-
cal rationality, once properly developed, solves very important theoretical
problems and many sociological puzzles. It explains why a theft, even of
minor value, produces such a strong reaction on the part of the victim.
Observers often fail to understand this crucial point: "Why such a strong
reaction to a minor theft, when the thief is a poor man, a marginal indi-
vidual toward whom society is so unfair?". Yes, but the theft violates the
basic principles of any social exchange. This example has also the advantage
of showing that a utilitarian analysis in the style of the rational choice model
is irrelevant here. The indignation of the observer of a theft will grow, other
things being equal, if the thief has robbed a weak human being, an old
woman for instance. But it will hardly grow with the amount stolen. So-
called minor delinquency is an important social problem today not because
the amount of the minor violations of the law has increased, but because
the small rate of prosecution gives the public the feeling that the political
authorities do not care enough to enforce the basic principles of the social
bond. These puzzles cannot be explained without the category of axiologi-
cal rationality.
The examples I have just evoked were taken from ordinary life. Other
examples can be taken from political life, such as the action of the Western
powers against apartheid in South Africa. Introducing democracy in South
Africa was ex ante risky: the process was exposed to potential severe dangers.
Hence, from a consequential viewpoint it was hard to decide whether the
action should be taken. But axiological reasons prevailed here over conse-
quential reasons and axiological principles of a lower order. This explains
why the political pressures against apartheid were generally approved by pub-
lic opinion in the West.
This example shows that one should not present the choice between
Verantwortungsethik and Gesinnungsethik, the ethics of responsibility and the ethics
of conviction, as being always an open choice, because in some cases axio-
logical rationality dominates consequential rationality. Thus, progress in med-
icine has reduced infant mortality and this circumstance is generally and
rightly acknowledged as being an important cause of underdevelopment and
hence of all the evils generated by underdevelopment. But who would accept
that reducing infant mortality was not desirable progress? In that case axio-
logical rationality dominates consequential rationality, and the ethics of con-
viction dominates the ethics of responsibility.
At this point, I would like to introduce two incidental remarks of interest
from the point of view of sociological theory. The first one is that not only
exchange theory but also the contractualist or the 'rational choice theory'
may be seen a special cases of the cognitivist theory proposed here, since
they consider normative feelings as grounded on reasons—but of a special
kind in each case.
The second incidental remark is that the sentiments of justice or injustice,
legitimacy or illegitimacy are rightly so called since they include an affective
dimension; nothing is more painful than injustice. But they are at the same
time grounded on reasons. Moreover, the strength of the sentiments is pro-
portional to the strength of the reasons: I suffer more from injustice if I am
convinced of the validity of my rights. Finally, the "cognitivist" analysis of
these sentiments has the advantage of explaining easily why, when I believe
that "X is good, legitimate, fair, etc.", I am at the same time convinced
that the generalized Other should endorse the same statement. My senti-
ment is grounded on reasons which I hold to be transsubjectively valid in
the sense that I have the feeling that other people should have the same
sentiment. In its "cognitivist" version, methodological individualism is clearly
immune to the objections against atomism.
44 RAYMOND BOUDON
The objection of pluralism
Another objection is often presented against any rational theory of values,

namely that while descriptive truths are unique prescritive truths are often
not. To this it can objected that prescriptive truths can be unique. Thus
democracy is universally considered as a better regime than despotism. On
the other hand, the context can explain why, say, a given institution is con-
sidered as good here and as bad there. Thus, Popkin (1979) has shown that
in village societies people have strong reasons to prefer unanimity to major-
ity rule, while in modern democratic societies we have strong reasons to
prefer in most collective decisions a majority rule. The fact that X is per-
ceived as good here and bad there does not imply that the value statement
is arbitrary. It can be grounded in the two cases on strong reasons.
Also, it should be recognized that many prescriptive questions can be
answered in several equally satisfactory fashion. Thus, the State has the
function to make sure that when a citizen is victim of the violation of law
by another citizen, this injustice is repaired, but, according to the British
tradition, this does not imply that the State itself should have a right of
prosecution against the violations of law. The British common law starts on
the contrary from the principle that the victim itself, not the State, should
originate the prosecution. In continental systems, the same basic principle
according to which an injustice suffered by a citizen should be repaired is
enforced by making the State responsible for the prosecution. The two solu-
tions have their advantages and disadvantages, but the two are grounded
on strong reasons.
Conclusion
I have tried to show that axiological convictions are experienced as evident

because they rest upon systems of reasons that, though often half-conscious,
are perceived as objective. The feeling that "X is fair" implies that the sub-
ject believes that everybody else would also endorse this statement. The
value statement "X is good" is perceived as transsubjective, this adjective mean-
ing that the subject cannot endorse it personally if he does not have the
impression that everyone should endorse it.
A non-negligible theoretical benefit of the rational or cognitive theory
which I have argued for here is that it clarifies the nature of the moral
constraints which puzzled Durkheim. In what sense do we use the notion
of "constraint" when we say that we have the feeling of a moral constraint?
Exactly in the same sense as we have a feeling of constraint in the case of
mathematical statements. Once we have understood the reasons as to why

the square root of 2 is irrational, we cannot think otherwise: we feel con-
strained to think so. In the same fashion, once we have the moral convic-
tion that we have spent an unfair time, say, on a case, we cannot think
otherwise because this statement is unconsciously grounded in our mind on
strong reasons. Constraint, consensus, conviction, reasons constitute a sys-
tem of elements which belong together. Reasons are not reasons when they
cannot be publicly defended. They cannot be experienced as reasons if one
does not have the feeling that others would also endorse them. This inter-
pretation of moral constraints drawn from the rational cognitive theory I
propose is easier to accept than Durkeim's metaphors and implausible assump-
tions about the mysterious social forces constraining the minds of social
actors.
Again, the main reason why a rational theory of moral feelings may
appear to be shocking lies in the strength of all these traditions that see a
wide gap between ought and is. The disenchantment of the world has still
widened this gap. Moreover, the rational theories of norms and values avail-
able today, the "rational choice" theory or in particular the functionalist
theory, fail to explain such trivial phenomena as the negative reaction against
stealing or the public reaction against minor delinquency. We solve many
of these difficulties by extending the notion of rationality and taking seri-
ously Weber's distinction between axiological and instrumental rationality.
But, if we do so, we have to accept the idea that there are axiological truths
in the same way that there are, say, medical or physical truths.
Maybe this rational theory of norms has a special relevance in today's
world where "community" seems to have become the ultimate moral ref-
erent. Clearly, the positive value granted to the idea of community has to
be related to the fact that culturalism is so popular today. Culturalism legit-
imates the idea of community. We do not, however live in a world of incom-
mensurable "communities" and "cultures", and we feel concerned by what
happens in other communities. The simple fact that most people feel con-
cerned by what happens in Bosnia, China, Rwanda or Sudan constitutes a
challenge to culturalism.
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M. (eds.), Central Currents in Sociological Theory (8 volumes), London: Sage.
46 RAYMOND BOUDON
(2000), The origin of Values, Essays in the sociology and philosophy of values, Somerset, NJ:
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MacIntyre, A. (1981), After virtue, London: Duckworth.
Masters, R.D. (1993), Beyond Relativism: Science and Human Values. Hanover, N.H.: University
Press of New England.
Nisbet, R. (1966), The sociological tradition, Glencoe, I11.: The Free Press.
Olson, M. (1993), "Dictatorship, Democracy and Development", American Political Science Review,
87(3): 567-576.
Popkin, S. (1979), The Rational Peasant. The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam, Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Rorty, R. (1989), Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Ruse, M., (1993), "Une defense de I'ethique evolutionniste", in Changeux, J.-P. (ed.), Les
fondements naturels de I'ethique, Paris: Seuil, 35-64.
Spiro, M.E. (1987), Culture and Human Nature: Theoretical papers of Melford E. Spiro, edited by
B. Kilborne, and L.L. Langness. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Turner, Bryan S. (1992), Max Weber: from history to modernity, London: Routledge.
Urmson, J.O. (1968), The Emotive Theory of Ethics, London: Hutchinson.
Wilson, J.Q. (1993), The Moral Sense, New York: Macmillan.
3. FREEDOM VS. CONTROL IN POST-MODERN SOCIETY:
A RELATIONAL APPROACH
Pierpaolo Donati
1. The problem, and theses of this paper
Modern sociological theory was born based on a specific reflection as to

the antithesis between freedom and social order (the latter in the sense of
control), as polarities irreducible to one another within which social life
unfolds. Freedom is generally thought of as the possibility of action unbound
by conditioning. On the contrary, order (control) is intended as a bind that
conditions action from the outside. Conditioning and binds are first con-
ceived as naturalistic, then as normative, and finally mechanical.
The point to which I wish to draw your attention is that, to moderns,
freedom is outside control (i.e. extrinsic to its forms). Social control as such
cannot make one free, cannot be a component of freedom, but only expand
or diminish the chance for freedom, which is built on other foundations.
Freedom lies in the subject (individual, collective or historical), while social
control lies in external constrictions (in the form of rules, either structural,
normative or functional).
The previous statement may be mitigated by saying that both liberty and
control are conceived within a shared framework characterized by ratio-
nality, contractuality and conventionalism. One assumes that both sides of
the distinction may and must be made increasingly rational, contractual,
conventional. What this means is explained by the various competing con-
cepts of rationality, contract and conventionalism.
Some have observed that western social thought, compared to other cul-
tures, places freedom ("liberation" of the subject, beginning with the indi-
vidual) as a priority and as a limitation of control. But I'm not so sure this
is true. Of course, only in the West do we find radically libertarian theo-
ries, unknown to other societies. But it would be stretching to maintain that
modern sociological thought interprets society only as a process of libera-
tion or, vice-versa, only as a process of control, although these unilateral
temptations are anything but absent.
We can instead state that modern sociological theories still differ today
on the side of the distinction (freedom/control) from which they choose
to observe society: some see society from the side of freedom and as a
48 PIERPAOLO DONATI
function of freedom (I will call these lib theories), while others see it from
the side of control and as a function of social control (I will call these lab
theories). In both cases, however, social aspects are defined and analyzed
according to conceptual categories that are substantially identical (referring
to the same meanings) and fall within the same binary distinction logic.1
As modernity develops, the "lib/lab complex" increases, in which the two
poles—lib and lab—are gradually placed in increasing synergy. Sociology
legitimates a configuration of society in which lib and lab feed one another,
however opposite they appear. This is the framework that should be high-
lighted (§. 2).
Observing social reality from a lib/lab standpoint has certain consequences:
(i) it leads to theoretical paradoxes, and (ii) it contradicts many aspects of
empirical reality. Modern and contemporary social theories raise these two
sets of problems. In an attempt to respond to these problems, sociology
transforms its very nature: from an explanatory and/or interpretive narration
of social reality, seen as a phenomenon that emerges independently, it be-
comes a means for the paradoxical construction of social reality itself (§. 3).
Those who have sought a non-paradoxical composition between freedom
and control within the paradigms of modernity, specifically Talcott Parsons,
have failed. No matter how hard they try, sociological theories which refer
to the classics (up to and including Parsons) do not see how freedom and
control can be reconciled, in the sense of mutual support or at least significant
relations with one another. Freedom and control are assumed as two tracks—
infinitely parallel—along which sociological theory runs, but nothing is said
about how they are intrinsically connected. Sociology therefore finds itself
with the continuous need to return to the discussion on the categories of
freedom and control. In doing so, it generates theories that are by neces-
sity anti-modern, neo-modern or post-modern (§. 4).
This highlights the fact that modernity has made a bet. It has configured
the relationship between freedom and control as a typical synergic antithesis
between the two terms of the distinction. But today this bet seems about
to be lost. As a matter of fact, in today's western society, we can note that
the contingencies for both freedom and control are increasing, that both
1
The fundamental binary distinction is that of freedom/equality. Some might object that
these are not antithetical terms, since "equality of the conditions of freedom" also exists. But
one might respond to this objection that the conceptual category "equality of the conditions
of freedom" is paradoxical, and therefore does not eliminate the binary nature of the lib/lab
distinction. Indeed, sociological analysis reveals that the processes that encourage liberty are
against social equality, and vice-versa social controls are introduced to reduce the inequal-
ity deriving from the existence of certain freedoms.
FREEDOM VS. CONTROL IN POST-MODERN SOCIETY 49
sides tend to pursue their own paths, that their meaningful bonds no longer
hold—at least those that were considered meaningful until recently.
The relationship between liberty and control cycles endlessly and ends in
a void, or it remains limited by forms of self-understanding (lib/lab) that
prevent society from developing new stable and meaningful relations. As a
matter of fact, if the lib/lab logic is radically extended to all forms of social
life, it generates catastrophes. If instead it is restricted to inhibit further pos-
sibilities for synergy, it runs the risk of leading to degenerative processes,
e.g. a regression to pre-modern forms of social life or a leap into post-
modern destructuration. Modern management of the freedom/control cou-
pling becomes increasingly problematic.
At the end of the twentieth century, many are reintroducing a neo-mod-
ern reading of society understood as a system that can simultaneously increase
freedom and social control, making both rational, contractual, conventional.
But this is an illusory dream. The synergy no longer acts as a guiding cri-
terion for all of society (for its logic consumes what is human in the social
much more than it can produce it). At the most, the lib/lab logic may be
reproduced in strictly limited sectors. In any case, the binary distinction of
freedom/control no longer interprets the figure of the dialectic between civil
society and the State, which lies at the foundation of the modern era. The
freedom/control distinction is reduced to a mere conceptual pair, analyti-
cal in nature, that no longer grasps the meaning nor the functions it held
in modernity. One wonders, then, whether modern sociological theories that
reason in terms of lib/lab might contain some actual ideological biases based
on a type of society which, with the twenty-first century on the horizon,
now appears obsolete.
In truth, the very crisis of the dialectic between freedom and control leads
us to believe that we are entering a post-modern era, such as to impose
substantial changes to the most general assumptions of sociological theory.
The society of globalization changes the categories of modern times. Many
feel that freedom manifests itself as "new subjects" and control as "new
social rules". New theories are born for subjects and social rules. But even
these representations are insufficient for interpreting what is happening—
the passage to the post-modern—because they do not grasp the novelty in
the social realm. Theories that remain within the lib/lab framework see subjects
and rules, but not the generation of society. Generating society becomes—pecu-
liarly, for the first time in human history—building a network of com-
municative relationship networks (§. 5).
The thesis of this paper is that the passage from modern to post-modern
society is specifically distinguished by the need to move towards a relational
approach to the freedom/control distinction, which is post-lib and post-lab,
50 PIERPAOLO DONATI
post-individualistic, post-holistic. Such an approach may allow us to see the

new, historically unique aspects of social formation that are taking place
before us more clearly (§. 6).
2. Lib and lab meet and shake hands
2.1. In modern sociology, despite the debates between lib and lab thinkers—
or, if we prefer, methodological individualism and holism—society is seen
through the common framework of a historical process that conceives of
itself as individual and/or collective liberation from the ascriptive ties of the
community (Gemeinschafi) (read: life-worlds), to move towards progress in
which Reason, be it individual or collective, micro or macro, of action or
social systems, leaves its contractualistic mark on society.
Within this scenario, freedom is intended as freedom "from" (thus as an
opening of contingencies of existence, and not merely dependencies), rather
than as freedom "for" something or someone. And within this framework,
social control is intended as external, coercive regulations rather than as
intentional and purposeful choices according to a moral conscience inher-
ent in the subjects and their relationships.
Some might object that this is simply the positivistic, functionalistic side
of sociology, so to speak. I feel the same way. But the point is that within
modernity no great western sociological theory appears immune from creep-
ing positivism, which even pervades those theories intended to be non-
functionalistic or even anti-functionalist (Marxian theories, for example).
Why is positivistic functionalism considered to be limiting and simplistic
but then permeates every theory and ends up winning in the end?
I believe the reason lies in the fact that lib and lab theories are not truly
opposites, but largely complementary: they "dance together", so to speak. This
very dance is what feeds positivistic functionalism. Freedom and regulation,
whether aimed at the individual or collective, work together in a certain
way (to be defined below) to build that symbolic and institutional complex
(lib/lab) that contains the collective conscience of our times and "good sys-
tem governance". The categorical imperative says: we must expand all free-
doms under the sole condition that they do not create a constriction for
anyone; and good governance is considered an expansion of all possible
freedoms as long as they are "compatible" with one another and with the
concurrent principles (especially equality and solidarity) that act as external
binds.
a) From a methodological standpoint, this means that individualism and
holism "shake hands", support and complement one another.
b) From an applied standpoint, this means that society is conceived as a

game between freedom and control along the Individual-Government axis,
through continuous re-negotiation between the market and the state.
Even empirical research sees through the same lenses. To give an exam-
ple, anyone wishing to prove that school choices are individual rather than
controlled by the system can do so. But everyone is forced to admit, in
empirical results, that the growth of individual freedom does not alter
stratification structures (R. Boudon, 1979). Individualism and holism meet
and shake hands.
This is the lib/lab paradigm inherent in modernity. It proposes a synergy
between freedom and social control that constitutes the "propulsive engine"
for the entire historical-social formation. The engine works like this: social
control is used to free individuals, and freedom is used to make control
more rational and functional to progress, under the assumption that one
can be freed from the binding nature of social relationships without putting
social order in danger.
2.2. Even today, western sociological theory thinks of society in these terms:
as the battle between the forces of freedom, representing the propulsive (inno-
vative) thrust, generally free of any need for a priori ethical justification, and
the forces of social control, representing a brake (self-preservation, safety) and
generally requiring justification, which must become increasingly technical-
functional. The burden of proof is on control. The brake refers to the pub-
lic sphere and must be used only when others' private freedom is violated,
not before and not for any other reason. The fuel for the history machine
is the liberty/control distinction used as a synergic antithesis between the
private and public.2
The engine of the modernity machine, thus configured, is fueled by a
potentially infinite energy—or at least that is how it is represented. "Pro-
gressively" removing constrictions to freedom, making it potentially unlim-
ited, means creating an inexhaustible source of resources. If one then manages,
in a complementary fashion, to invent a form of social control that does
not block this process of liberation, but instead uses control to expand free-
doms, then social control itself is no longer an insurmountable obstacle, but
rather a mere identification of temporary limits and functionally necessary
mechanisms to ensure that the freedom machine runs smoothly.
2
By this expression I mean the use of the public to privatize the private, and vice-versa,
the use of the private to publicize the public. It is important to emphasize that this takes
place for the development of one based on the development of the other, according to a
mutual system/environment relationship.
52 PIERPAOLO DONATI
Those forms of society that interrupt this process are viewed as devia-
tions, pure accidents, temporary halts or stopovers. This is how we inter-
pret, on the one hand, political dictatorships (whether they be communist,
fascist, Nazi, or other types) that eliminate freedoms, and, on the other hand,
those forms of capitalism considered "rampant" or haphazard (casino capi-
talism), which do not guarantee equal freedoms for all. In the eyes of the
lib/lab paradigm, dictatorships and unregulated capitalism are "unintentional
effects" which must be once again subjected to the (same) freedom/control
directive distinction. Modernity is convinced that the lib/lab machine is
expandable in terms of progressive upgrades. It refuses the idea that this
logic has extra or meta-social binds or limitations, and that each new cycle
may generate situations that are more problematic than before.
This is how the West represents itself: as the best of all possible worlds.
Dominant sociological theories reassure it that this is indeed the case.
The West believes it has harnessed the freedom/control antithesis as the
engine of history. The engine of society has certain analogies with a nuclear
propulsion engine: it is considered to have practically unlimited resources,
with extremely high performance, although with some inherent risks. This
is how the globalized society of communication is considered. It is assumed
that the risks are generally controllable, but this re-introduces the same guid-
ing distinction within what has just been distinguished. The problem of dis-
covering what might be achieved by changing the guiding distinctions of
this arrangement is systematically avoided.
This configuration characterizes modern sociological theory from the nine-
teenth century to the present. Indeed, my thesis maintains that a theory is
considered all the more "modern" the more it assumes this very configuration.
To avoid it means risking the development of a pre-modern or anti-modern
sociology.
The dance where lib and lab shake hands is still the prevailing arrange-
ment of western society. In the meantime, however, its limits have become
apparent. We are gradually realizing that it prevents the observer from see-
ing beyond the—quite limited—horizon at which it appears that all possi-
bilities have their place, while instead the opposite occurs. Indeed, many
possibilities are not at all thematized or discussed, and many of those that
are prove to be more virtual than real in the end. In brief, one realizes
that the lib/lab approach does not see the morphogenesis within society as
an emerging associative or surplus form that combines freedom and con-
trol according to means that escape modern logic.
3. The modern concept of the freedom vs. control dialectic leads to paradoxes
and contrasts with the empirical reality
3.1. The lib/lab configuration begins to be placed under serious discussion

when it encounters systematic malfunctions, thus when one realizes that it
can no longer function structurally. There are many crisis paradigms. Most
of these take note that a development machine, as conceived, encounters
structural limitations in its external and internal environments (to cite just
one author, see F. Hirsch, 1995). One cannot exploit nature indefinitely
(physical resources). One cannot make the ecosystem indefinitely artificial.
One cannot polarize social relationships indefinitely towards total isolation
or total constriction, under penalty of pathological repercussions.
Yet, not everyone sees that critical results are the product of specific rela-
tionship processes between freedom and social control that generate vicious
or perverse circles. What I would like to emphasize here is that the lib/lab
complex intrinsically, in itself, leads to situations that are unsolvable para-
doxes and that contrast mightily with the needs and experiences of daily
life. Let us examine these two aspects.
3.2. In the first place, to describe society specifically as a synergic antithe-

sis between freedom and control leads to unsolvable paradoxes, which come
in two forms: (a) freedom enters into contradiction with itself; (b) social con-
trol loses its legitimacy. Let us examine these separately.
(a) The exaltation of freedom as the absence of restrictions—in particu-

lar normative restrictions—internal to agency and its subject thwarts free-
dom and eventually causes it to self-destruct. Early modernity still works
with a concept of freedom that means interdependency, thus the choice of
the environment from which to depend. But in the symbolic code that
modernity generates, it is written that this is a purely temporary limitation,
because freedom as such consists of the possibility of abandoning interde-
pendency or the choice of dependencies. Is it perhaps not true that money,
with the freedom to choose a specific transaction, must also transmit an in-
crease of freedom as the possibility of escaping other constrictions for further
transactions? The guiding norm of society is no longer a pattern of value,
but the convertibility of anything into anything else (P. Donati, 1991, chap. 4).
As long as this process remains restricted to limited groups of people (the
modern elite), only the highest social classes experience a lifestyle in which
freedom is an end unto itself. Only they, for the moment, enter the paradoxes.
When the process becomes a mass phenomenon, one realizes that all of
54 PIERPAOLO DONATI
society takes on the characteristics of a "deviant majority". We are at the

"drift of liberalism" (M. Schooyans, 1991), thus within a social arrangement
in which freedoms cancel each other out. One must then note that the civil
society born of the Protestant Reformation no longer exists (A. Seligman,
1992), that it has run out or defeated itself. The very idea of civil comes
under discussion. To generate a civil life one must create new social insti-
tutions which—far from encouraging a "lightening of ethics" (as A. Gehlen
believes, 1986)—manage to intertwine freedoms and controls through morally
significant relationships between them.
When the old relationships fall, one must seek new rules for the creation
of social institutions that reflect an ethic of freedom not entirely detached
from control. But the horizon of resources and possibilities remains limited.
Since it is imperative to be modern, and since we are modern to the extent
to which we do not seek rules which can constitute freedom from within,
but only mechanisms to reduce the undesired effects of freedom, then social
norms are unintentionally configured as vicious circles within the system of
freedom. To put it bluntly: many private behaviours are permitted, but their
public effects are punished or blamed (as happens when a country permits
a certain use of drugs in the private sphere, but punishes those who sell it
and blames those who become drug-addicted).
(b) Something similar takes place for control. A concept of social control
as external and coercive towards action and its subject removes all sub-
stantial legitimacy from social order and renders functionally ineffective those
mechanisms (institutions and rules) that should ensure it. The more social
rules are separated from the subjects' motivations and interior aims, the
more they are perceived as purely artificial and constrictive, and therefore
free of any human sense; they become purely a technical necessity, which
may in turn be artificially reduced.
There are abundant indicators of these results. We might briefly recall:
the collapse of conditional normative orders (based on norms such as "if x
occurs then do y"); the collapse of the institutional welfare state; the fact
that the law has changed from guarantor of social order to a source of
social disorder. In all of these instances, social control is first delegitimized
in terms of aims and values, then reduced to a technical point and thus
subject to procedural rules that chase their own tail. For example, the wel-
fare state was created to achieve greater social justice, but was then reduced
to a functional fact of redistributing resources. It was then subjected to rules
of effectiveness which not only made entitlements depend on the existence
of a surplus of economic resources which are necessarily always scarce, but
may be pursued even outside a certain political-institutional setup, thus

making the ethos of welfare more and more evanescent.
The control machine begins to waver. This phenomenon may be described
as the emergence of an order based on chaos or entropy (M. Forse, 1989),
or as a differentiation that creates more problems than it solves (N. Luhmann,
1984). Some, using other language, speak of the death of public goods, while
others declare the death of privacy. But few see that these demises are
produced by that very modernity that exalts the lib/lab synergy, i.e. the pur-
suit of greater freedom through controls carried out as a function of non-
normative freedoms.3
3.3. In the second place, the lib/lab code contradicts empirical evidence and
subjective experiences of daily life. Modern sociology describes the rela-
tionship between freedom and control as a synergic antithesis that always
finds a new and better balance. But that is not how things really are.
In common sense experience, the growth of freedom is always problem-
atic, as is the growth of social controls. To conceive of society as a "soci-
ety of individuals" (N. Elias, 1978) with increasing "individualization", i.e.
as a society capable of "individualizing individuals" (U. Beck, 1992) accord-
ing to increasingly less constricting rules, appears to be highly misleading
for at least two reasons, (i) Firstly, this underestimates the fact that the indi-
vidual is prey to new herd instincts, new forms of alienation directions and
orgiastic and herd group dynamics, (ii) Secondly, this also does not men-
tion the fact that new forms of institutionalizing individuals appear that are
not functional to the subject's freedom (in the end, what else have many
authors such as M. Foucault and J. Donzelot told us?).
It is beyond doubt that new freedoms appear on the one side, and new
controls on the other. Nevertheless, this growth is not parallel. Most of the
time it is asymmetrical in space and time, and remains highly problematic
in the rules that guide social processes. The idea that social control may
be configured in such a way as to ensure greater individual freedoms without
3
By non-normative freedoms I mean those freedoms that are purely negative (i.e. intended
as freedoms "from" something or someone). Negative freedoms see the alter only as a limit
and constraint to ego's action. On the contrary, positive (i.e. normative) freedoms are those
that are oriented towards (they are "for") something or someone. The latter see the alter not
merely as a limit, but as a condition and resource for ego's agency. In this case, ego is free
to act insofar as he/she can promote altefs freedom as a condition and resource of his/her
own action. Contrary to the unrelated concept of negative freedoms, the positive concept
emphasizes the relational nexus existing between ego and alter, which becomes the focus of
sociological interest. Of course, positive freedom does not deny negative freedom; on the
contrary, it guarantees it.
56 PIERPAOLO DONATI
significant relations between freedom and control lead to mystifying forms

of systemic control, which bring about the schizophrenia typical of daily life
in our times.
The experience of contemporary men and women is that they live between
two entirely discrepant levels of reality. On the one hand, they are theo-
retically free to do anything they like, on the condition that it remains pri-
vate. The culture of globalization reinforces this feeling in them, which is
that they may "privately" enter the realm of virtual reality, so to speak. On
the other hand, when they deal with the facts, men and women find that
the opportunities to satisfy their social needs are socially limited and struc-
tured. Many specific freedoms and identities are denied. The ideology of
egalitarian control ensures that men and women have the same freedoms
and opportunities, but in practice the opposite occurs. Social freedoms and
opportunities are gendered., or differentiated by gender, and the egalitarian
viewpoint does not allow us to see the new inequalities that are generated.
And yet the globalizing machine of modernity provides a representation that
denies this fact. It may admit the existence of inequality only as a tempo-
rary situation, while waiting for the synergic lib/lab antithesis to continue
further, and thus engender forms of control that ensure more freedom.
The conclusion is that in the globalization processes under way today the
ideology of freedom masks widespread non-freedoms, and the ideology of
equality masks new inequalities. Social control is not functional to many
freedoms nor to many equalities that one would like to pursue from the
standpoint of human needs and rights.
4. Attempts to reconcile freedom and control conducted within modernity
4.1. In the course of its history, lib/lab thought has tended to represent soci-
ety as a construction in which everything works out in the end, thanks to
the fact that conflicts may be led back to rationality through the synergic
antithesis of freedom/control. It may be said that this attitude constitutes
the sociological mainstream even today.
Parsons' theory represents the finish line and point of greatest morpho-
static equilibrium in modern sociological thought between freedom of action
and the need for social order, between private and public, or, to use the
words of J.C. Alexander (1983), between substantial and formal voluntarism.
Parsons is the last of the moderns to theorize as to the horizon of that con-
tact between reason and revelation which, according to many (A. Seligman,
1992), is the origin of the modern spirit and its idea of freedom (civil soci-
ety) that may be regulated through a system (State) conceived as a struc-
tural form of conditioning needed in order to reach common goals. In

Parsons, the societal community may combine freedom and control only because
it still has something that transcends both. It incarnates the spirit of a free-
dom that is born "from within" social actors, and can compromise with the
social system because it rests on a cultural system with religious roots. But
Parsons is no longer able to justify this arrangement, which appears to be
grounded in an unduly normative vision of society. Because of how his the-
ory (read: AGIL diagram) is formulated, it absorbs and rationalizes the tran-
scendent element, the vital source (of values) of the system. Within the very
logic of Parsons' AGIL, the subject of freedom disappears against the deter-
minations and structural limitations of social action. Indeed, in Parsons it
is already evident that society (even as civil society) is the immense con-
traption that secularizes transcendent (i.e. religious) concepts and values.
With Parsons and immediately thereafter ends the dream of the starry
heaven above that is reflected within us. The Kantian spirit of modern soci-
ology dissolves. It is no longer so easy to reconcile freedom and control.
The lib/lab synergy can no longer be considered a normally functioning
process. Normality becomes the very fact that the mutual conciliation of
freedom and control no longer works.
Parsons thought that freedom consisted of individuals internalizing the
value patterns and control mechanisms of the Protestant ethic and Freudian
schematics in socialization terms. Now this ethic no longer exists, and Freud-
ianism has been overturned. Thus it is revealed that this kind of thinking
was "modern" only in part; it actually reflected a few pre-modern convic-
tions. Specifically, modernity thinks that freedom cannot be founded (con-
stituted) on control. This is the exact point where Parsons fails, and must
be abandoned.
It becomes clearer why and how Parsons never found a way out of the
dilemma that lies at the heart of all modern sociological theory, and that
can be expressed by the guiding question: how is it possible to limit the
(modern) social system's demand to control all areas of human life, be-
ginning with the pretense that something comes before the system and
that, through it, legitimizes its institutions? Parsons' theory still assumes
that: freedom and control (i) work within a certain symbolic framework of
values, and (ii) increase each other by respecting the famous cybernetic
hierarchy (LIGA). But both of these conditions have collapsed today. Thus
the guiding question becomes: how can the social system develop, or even
survive, if it globalizes contingencies and searches for its regulatory form
within this globalization? Parsons' theory is by now useless in answering this
question.
58 PIERPAOLO DONATI
4.2. Sociology in recent decades is a declaration of the failure of Parsons'

theory as the apex of modern theorization on the freedom/control dilemma.
Three alternatives arise after Parsons:
a. run the risk of being anti-modern, and thus refute that freedom and
control are merely external limitations for one another, therefore making
use of connections and interdependencies that reciprocally bind freedom and
control together under the aegis of whatever structure or prerequisite or
meta-social requirement;
b. define oneself as neo-modern, thus reintroduce the synergic antithesis
between freedom and control in search of new forms of compatibility achieved
by adjusting re-selected mixes and contingencies;
c. or, one may enter the post-modern, further destructuring the two terms
and their relationships.
These are three different ways of criticizing the modern view of society and
of foreseeing the post-modern.4 Of course, various configurations of mixes
between these three modes are also possible. And indeed, the real post-
modern is a mixture of these three "pure" types of response. Let us briefly
examine them.
a. The anti-moderns are characterized by claiming alternative systems for

distinguishing freedom/control from those used by modernity. They high-
light how society performs selective reductions of complexity that differ from
those typically used in modernity. These distinctions and selections gener-
ally have a "community" outlook (indeed, this category includes many of
the so-called "communitarians"). There is no lack of traditions in this sense.
K. Polany is one, F. Le Play another. K. Marx, E. Durkheim, M. Mauss
could well be considered the fathers of yet other traditions, all in a different
voice. But, apart from the observation that, today, only a few schools put
forth approaches that reject a lib/lab interpretation of the contingency play,
what is most relevant here is to consider that contemporary sociology has
developed a new sensibility. Reasoning about our society requires something
more than simply recalling a classical perspective. It requires that one be
4
It is not difficult to place the various currents of today's social and philosophical thought
within these three ways of responding to the crisis of modernity. In terms of the morpho-
genetic theory (Archer, 1995), they may be easily classified: the first category includes the
neo-communitarians (who commit errors of downward conflation); the second includes the neo-
liberals (who commit errors of upward conflation); and the third are the neo-relationists (who
commit errors of central conflation).
able to point out more highly differentiated and complex means of reduc-
ing the globalization of contingencies. Anti-modern cannot be pre-modern.
And many of the above mentioned schools seem to be unable to avoid these
pitfalls.
b. The neo-moderns distinguish themselves by reinterpreting society within

the lib/lab synergy, more loosely and with a few variations. Many of them
repeat Parsons without Parsons' faith. They are uncertain as to exactly what
parts of Parsons may be preserved, and what must be changed. But they
essentially propose bringing multidimensionality into the primary assump-
tions of Parsonian thought, which means opening the theory to greater con-
tingency. They also intend to reconcile freedom and control in the form of
lib/lab democracy. But to what extent is this possible when the basic assump-
tions of control in the cybernetic hierarchy within the AGIL framework fail?
This is not at all clear. And thus the freedom/control dialectic is now even
more uncertain, more replete with indetermination. J.C. Alexander (1994)
attributes its possibility to exist and develop to the ability of cultural tradi-
tions to produce and reproduce, but this solution appears highly problem-
atic. J. Habermas said it long ago, proposing his own solution of an "unlimited
community of discourse", which in turn is Utopian.
The neo-moderns expand the contingencies of freedom and controls, but
in doing so lose certain essential prerequisites for preserving both. They
realize that freedoms must have independent subjects, but the latter are by
now a ("deviant") minority since most individuals are prey to systemic mech-
anisms and pervasive heteronomous pressures. They are still searching for
forms of control that should meet functional needs, but a functionalist expla-
nation of control runs up against a chronic deficit of meaning where moder-
nity is carried to extremes. In short, the neo-moderns attempt to re-launch
modernity without the myths and illusions that gave modernity its forward
thrust. They want to "purify its spirit". But, in my opinion, the attempt
appears conceptually backward compared to the phenomena under way.
The neo-moderns prove themselves unable to grasp the new.
c. Those who instead draw the radically coherent consequences of the

loss of normativity in social systems are followers of post-modern thought,
whose greatest breaking point with humanistic tradition lies in systemic neo-
functionalist thought. Luhmann (1984) elaborates a theory intended to immu-
nize from the crucial problem implicit in neo-modern thought: i.e. making
the freedom/control relationship depend on the ability of traditional cul-
tures to regenerate. With Luhmann, freedom is radically placed outside the
system, in the so-called system environment, where the human subject may
60 PIERPAOLO DONATI
fluctuate as desired. For him, communication is enough to create control.

There is no more need for culture as a necessary prerequisite and frame-
work to organize the relationship between freedom and social control.
Neo-functionalism thereby reaches a decisive turning point in the direc-
tion of a radically contingent relationism between freedom and control. With
Luhmann, sociology proves itself ready to be placed in that crucible of post-
modern thought that cuts all human ties between freedom and control. In
this light, Luhmann appears simultaneously as the grave-digger of moder-
nity and the lark of post-modernity. This lark, however, has no wings;
Luhmann's post-modernity cannot take flight. Beyond the metaphor, it can-
not indicate any cultural innovations complete with a sense of humanity. It
cannot distinguish the human-social from the inhuman-social. On the con-
trary, this is the core problem of the post-modern world.
4.3. The difficulties that modernity encounters in managing the freedom/

control relationship foster a multitude of theories based on the paradoxes
and contradictions between the two terms of the relationship. It would re-
quire a great deal of space to deal with this topic as a whole. Here, I would
rather call your attention to the fact that the end of modernity is revealed
by its inability to achieve its promises, summarized in the triad of freedom/
equality/fraternity. From this standpoint, one realizes that the lib/lab com-
plex (freedom/equality) has made solidarity residual and continues to corrode
the primary and secondary forms of social integration (non-systemic). The
lib/lab complex systemically empties the fabric of sociality (P. Donati, 1993).
Society discovers that it is a powerful machine that turns life into merchandise.
The appearance of the post-modern is marked by the need to reintroduce
the third pole (solidarity) within a historical context in which the freedom/
control combination has taken on the abstract form of general intellect (of
Marxian memory) that appears and materializes more each day in the glob-
alization processes implemented by the new communication technologies.
The crisis of the lib/lab complex is manifest as soon as one must appeal
to some form of social solidarity—not occasional or marginal—and realizes
that the lib/lab setup does not provide for it. Then, and only then, when
one realizes that the destruction of solidarity has exceeded the critical points
of social cohesion, does it become apparent that lib/lab sociology can describe
society only as a paradox. The crisis emerges gradually, asymmetrically in var-
ious systems and social institutions, and at different rates for different societies.
But, at a certain point, one is led to wonder: what is the glue of society?
Within the winning model of western modernization, beyond the thresh-
old where solidarity is radically eroded, the existence of sociability, as a sui
generis reality, may no longer be assigned to freedom nor control, nor to a
combination thereof, simply because the modern definitions of freedom and

control implode. The only alternative that remains is to conceive of socio-
logical theory as the construction (and management) of paradoxes.5 The
dialectic between freedom and control becomes something else in relation
to the dream of primitive modern civil society. The reconciliation between
freedom and control appears increasingly despairing, because these two real-
ities separate beneath the figure of an environment (containing freedoms)
that fluctuates around the system (containing control) without the two being
able to communicate. Sociology must choose whether to continue to rea-
son within this framework, or to consider an alternative.
In this regard, my thesis is that many of today's attempts to examine the
relationship between freedom and control end up merely taking note of
implosions, irrationalities and distortions, rather than seeing positive aspects.
They do not go beyond the crucial boundary of modernity, which is not
to see the origination and originality of the social sphere as a reality sui
generis. I would now like to prove this with reference to a peculiar analysis
of society, concluding with a reflection on the theoretical implications of my
discourse, leading to a change in the paradigm of how the freedom/con-
trol relationship is understood in post-modern society.
5. Limitations and obsolescence of the lib/lab paradigm: must we think in

terms of subjectivity and communication rules?
5.1. In late modernity, the freedom/control dialectic meets structural and

cultural limitations beyond which it may not go. What are these limits? We
may summarize them briefly by stating that the late-capitalist arrangement:
a) identifies control with mere technical needs, or functional mechanisms,

which should be managed by impersonal systems (regulated through nego-
tiations between the state and the market),
b) identifies freedoms using the yardstick of market freedom, thus gener-
alizing freedoms with mercantilism by analogy,
c) makes all associative spheres of social solidarity (i.e. non-profit oriented
actors, otherwise called "social private" spheres) residual, allowed only to
survive in the most marginal regions of society,
5
Neo-functionalists offer several paradigmatic versions of this. Alexander (1997) sees civil
society as prey for a paradoxical nemesis between freedom and control, the particular and
the universal, rather than as an expression of a functional synergy between them. Luhmann
(1990) sees society as a paradox in itself and elaborates what he calls "eurialistics", intended
as a strategy to prevent being blinded by it.
62 PIERPAOLO DONATI
d) weakens the civil culture of the life-world, i.e. debilitates the civic com-
mitment of families and informal networks through privatized and stan-
dardized forms of consumption and behavior.
The lib/lab arrangement now stands on a process of ethical un-differentiation;

or, as others say, on ethical-cultural relativism (as a matter of fact, unlike
other societal systems, ethics does not have a proper internal differentation
symbolic code). This is the background against which advanced society,
entering the twenty-first century, no longer represents itself as the best of
all possible worlds, but only as one of the many possible variations of one
world that is infinitely "otherwise possible".
Indeed, many old problems remain unsolved, and others arise that the
lib/lab arrangement cannot confront. These problems have to do with:
— the crisis of the welfare state induced by the growth of freedoms guar-
anteed regardless of the negative consequences of private behaviors (L. Mead,
1986),
- the overflowing of markets beyond national confines and other control
apparatuses (L. Scott, J. Urry, 1987; C. Offe, 1988),
- the unregulated dynamism of mass-media networks which create what
is called the new global society (D. de Kerckhove, 1997),
— the increasing risk of amoral behavior by subjects, against the increas-
ingly "mechanical" nature of control systems which have by now long stopped
relying on the purposeful, intentional motivations of subjects in areas such
as drug taking and selling, environmental pollution, the diffusion of haz-
ardous lifestyles, the perverse effects of the mass media—especially TV—on
people and their communicative relationships (U. Beck, 1992).
5.2. All of this shows that the lib/lab paradigm has become obsolete in
understanding what is going on in many areas of social life. It no longer
interprets the deepest meaning of problems, no longer offers viable solutions
for managing them with an acceptable degree of satisfaction. The inadequacy
of the paradigm is revealed in the fundamental subsystems of society.
a. Politics no longer has control of the supporting structures of society

(state and market), and tends to close itself into a self-referential political-
administrative subsystem, while on the other hand it would be necessary to
see the political nature of the various spheres of life.
b. New civil and human claims for freedom emerge that cannot be derived
from market freedoms or generalizations thereof, but lead instead to other
spheres and require other generalized symbolic means (different from money).
c. New intermediate social formations arise, with their own subjectivity,

that cannot be included within the individual-state axis, the hinge of mod-
ern citizenship.
d. An ethical question about nature has emerged ("ecology") that cannot
be related to political ethics (which remains governmental) nor business (mar-
ket) ethics, i.e. the two ethics whose symbiosis has formed the hinge of gov-
ernment in the modern system.
The lib/lab distinction becomes obsolete as the guiding distinction of soci-

ety precisely when it is no longer able to see:
i) the developments within each subsystem of society,

ii) the relations that change the relationships between these subsystems,
iii) the emerging effects of their interaction.
An analysis of all of this would require a great deal of space. To my mind,

the end result, however, is that the lib/lab arrangement must be limited to
its own terrain. The lib/lab code must be functionally specialized and lim-
ited to a few concrete mechanisms of social protection that safeguard the
basic acquisitions of modernity in the form of a minimal safety net. These
functions cannot be any longer the guiding functions of the societal system.
To go further, society needs a fundamental change in the guiding distinc-
tions upon which social institutions are built.
5.3. At the present time, the passage to new paradigms of relationship

between freedom and control is marked by a language and symbolic codes
that refer to the interplay between the subjectivity of the actors and social
rules, mediated by the "world of communications". The post-modern society
tends to be described and interpreted within the framework: subjectivity of
actors/communications system (with its symbolic codes, means and rules of
communication). This is the system with which we would like to confront the
emerging phenomena that are expressed today: in the increasingly apolitical
attitude pervading all of society, in the form of autos (need to render auto-
nomous the links between freedom and control within each sphere of life); in
the development of new, alternative markets (known as "social" markets since
they are non-profit); in the appearance of new social networks and aggre-
gations; in the emergence of new cultures of difference. All of these phe-
nomena are barely present or not at all foreseen within the lib/lab arrangement.
The framework that I call "communications paradigm" takes note of these
new phenomena. But how does it interpret the changes under way? It gives
many answers. But, generally speaking, communicationists believe:
64 PIERPAOLO DONATI
- that the apolitical attitude of society may be resolved by allowing the

rules to emerge from the "community of discourse" of the subjects and from
the so-called communicative hyper-cycles; however, it remains to be seen
whether this leads to a re-politicization of the social sphere or produces an
additional gap in the political character of society;
- that freedoms may be managed by translating them into new forms of
communication, including new, non-monetary forms of "money"; here, again,
it remains to be seen whether these means activate a new sociality or, on
the contrary, put the social context within which communication takes place
into latency, thereby distorting social reality;
— that the new subjects must be understood as communicative actors, no
longer protagonists of historical revolutionary battles nor activators of col-
lective resources but rather bearers of new cultural codes in which identity
and interests blend in a vital-existential manner;
- that the relationships between society and nature may be rethought as
"clean ecological communication"; but it remains to be seen whether it is
possible to avoid the further artificialization of nature itself, beyond limit-
ing a Faustian exploitation.
The new paradigm of globalization centered around subjectivity and social

rules mediated by communication on a planetary scale certainly revises the
lib/lab logic, as a logic of modernization. But in turn, it leaves the rela-
tionships between freedom and control hanging. The communications sys-
tem is often once again viewed as a product between administrative and
market demands into which it is difficult to introduce elements of Lebenswelt.
At the end of the 20th century, a representation of society as the world
of communication—or rather, as an infinite number of cohabiting worlds
of communication—becomes dominant. One wonders: how and to what
extent does this new paradigm manage to go beyond the limits of the lib/lab
arrangement? It acquires a few new advantageous features, but also persis-
tent weaknesses. The gains lie in the fact that the subject is now seen as
freer to express his internal self and relate to others. The weaknesses per-
sist in the fact that this paradigm once again has problems accounting for
the social pathologies that derive from the progressive scission between free-
dom and control, intended respectively as interior and exterior, intimate
relationships and generalized relationships, private and public. To manage
these scissions solely through mere communications leads to an additional
loss in the ability of actors to relate to each other. The logical consequence
are the various theorems of the death of the subject and the implosion of
social ties (Taylor, 1989).
My thesis is that the two paradigms—lib/lab and communications—cer-

tainly contain discontinuities. The paradigm of society as communication
lends itself better than the previous one (lib/lab) to grasping the new social
aspects. But I also believe that the communications paradigm does not offer
an adequate view of freedom and control as social relations.
5.4. In the new communications paradigm, freedom lies in the subjects and
control in the procedures of the communication system. But one wonders:
what relationships exist between the subjects and the communication sys-
tem? Supporters of these paradigm fall into two distinct positions.
On the one hand there are those who maintain that subjects and the
social system have in common only communication and no more than com-
munication. They assure us that communication can act on its own as a
vehicle for both freedom and control, making both of them more contin-
gent because freedom and control take on the nature of pure communication.
This seems to dissolve the paradoxes and contradictions towards non-virtual
reality.
On the other hand are those who state that the "society of communica-
tion" is far from being that way. They note that communication is always
embedded in social relations which come first and go beyond subjects and
the communication system. They emphasize that freedom and control are
achieved in a context where choices do not depend on pure communica-
tion, much less correspond to pure contingencies. This raises the view of a
truly "relational" society as opposed to the relationistic (non-relational) fad-
ing society of the "pure" communicationists (who reduce relations to sim-
ple communication).
The view of pure communicationists leads us to observe that freedoms,
far from having content, are increasingly formal and empty, and do not
create that minimum of "political" glue upon which the vitality of the spheres
of daily life depend. They even have trouble directing exchanges towards
a social purpose. We note that daily life dissolves into a globalization that
is a standardization of the Mind. The rules to which social control is entrusted
appear increasingly impersonal, more systemic, and increasingly less of the
life-world and social interaction. The world of the media does not show
(does not generate!) those spheres of social integration and symbolic cultures
(ethos) needed to fill the void left by the modern.
By contrast, we note that freedom and control can relate only in certain
contexts and under specific conditions, in such a way as to express action
aimed towards values and capable of social integration. Note that this takes
place:
66 PIERPAOLO DONATI
a) in personal care services and within a new professional ethic of social

work, conceived as services to the alter while respecting his characteristics,
potential, and membership perspective;
b) in service organizations, where private freedoms are enacted for pur-
poses of community utility rather than solely for the instrumental interests
of the members of these organizations;
c) in social relationships that undertake to assume a new attitude to-
wards "nature", considered not as a mere physical ecosystem but espe-
cially as a symbolic referent that offers new mediations of meaning for
human life.
Within these environments and types of social relations arises something in

common that reveals the novelty of the social sphere. This is the sui generis
reality of society, when expressed in an original and originative manner. Original,
since social relations arise in peculiar and independent ways outside the sys-
temic regulations of the State-market complex. Originative, since social rela-
tions come into existence through an otherness of symbolic exchange that
is not imposed from outside nor an aim unto itself because it operates as
an ordering I need, as a pattern of value, as a rule and as a medium. Why
create caring relationships, why respect actors for their differences and pecu-
liarities, why work for the good of others, why celebrate the value of nature?
Because, in all of these cases, the relationship between freedom and con-
trol is configured with a relational structure and culture of symbolic exchange
whose paradigm lies in giving, not elsewhere.
One wonders: is one who makes a gift free or forced to do so? From a
common sense viewpoint, the answer is that the first to do so, of his own
spontaneous volition, is free, while he who reciprocates is in some way forced
by the norm of reciprocity. But, to my mind, this distinction does not hold.
Within the giving circuit it is difficult to track down the "first" move. Who
or what is the primum movens of giving? The subject's freedom or the norm of
reciprocity as a symbolic exchange? If we admit that an individual may be totally
free as a speck, an atom, that moves throughout the emptiness of social space
as it pleases, then the primum movens is the individual. But such an individual
does not exist in the social field (M. Archer, 1995). Anyone who gives a
gift responds to internal and external needs that are born and live in a con-
text of relationships within which only the gift has meaning (A. Caille, 1996).
The gift is a relationship in itself, where the subject's "freedom meets social
constrictions. Each impulse takes place in a social environment and achieves
a social reality, and is not imposed in an entirely binding fashion on that
concrete individual. This human freedom lies within social determinism but
at the same time transcends it. With this observation we go beyond simply
noting that human beings move freely within social determinism (discussed
by G. Gurvitch, 1963). We find that the system of social relevancy has changed.
5.5. The society of communication goes beyond the lib/lab concept if and
to the extent to which it performs two operations: first, it makes "other"
freedoms and "other" forms of control possible; second, it relates them
according to a new symbolic code. If it does so, it is because it places the
relationship as the underlying assumption of a new metaphysics of the social
world, after western technology has replaced the classical, rational ontology
of beings.
There are many different ways to interpret society as a social relationship
between freedom and control (thus with different AGIL-relationships). Only
a few of these ways are innovative. Among them, there are those marked
by instrumental motives (which remain within the A-G complex), and those
marked by symbolic exchange motives (mutual giving) which stem from
L-I. As M. Mauss has demonstrated (A. Caille, 1996), only reciprocal giv-
ing can generate new forms of sociability, while instrumental motives are
more likely to lead to its consumption.
The new civil society is born as a place where human relationships are
taken seriously. In order to provide care, to organize a collective service,
to respect and emphasize nature, it is necessary to make specific choices.
In these domains, one must develop social relationships in which freedom
and control penetrate each other, and thus remain interdependent, interpenetrated,
and interactive according to new processes. Civility emerges to the extent that
human relations become significant "otherwise" in the sense of taking on
the significance of a good in itself, and to the extent that this "relational good"
is pursued as such.
In short, this is my thesis. Society is (and is becoming) post-modern if and
to the extent to which it takes the originative and original nature of social
relations seriously, sees them and enacts them, placing communication within
the relationship and not making the relationship a by-product or superstructure
of communication (as late modernity does). For this type of society to emerge,
freedom and control must distinguish themselves and rejoin relationally (as
it happens within the logic of reciprocity), rather than act as a binary divi-
sion that proceeds by progressively excluding one side from the other through
the logic of re-entry (as envisaged by G. Spencer Brown, 1979). Only if things
are seen in this light can one realize that post-modern society is divided
into many social spheres which differ because they conjugate the meaning
of freedom and control—and their relationships—differently. In particular,
we can distinguish four types of spheres:
68 PIERPAOLO DONATI
- market spheres, where freedom means competition for profit, and con-
trol is assigned to the pricing system;
- government spheres, where freedom is represented by exercising the
right to vote, and control is entrusted to obedience of laws;
- service spheres, where freedom means symbolic exchange, and control
lies with associative social exchange rules;
- the spheres of family and informal networks, where freedom is an action
of mutual giving, and control is entrusted to the rules which make this rela-
tionship valuable.
This multitude of intertwining spheres is the foundation of a new societal

configuration.
6. A relational approach to freedom vs. control dilemmas in post-modern society:

possible scenarios
6.1.1 have described the crisis of late-modern society as a product of that

peculiar, synergic antithesis between freedom and control which has been
postulated since the beginning of modernity. I have also maintained that
this symbolic code (lib/lab) can no longer act as the guiding code for the
entire societal system. It becomes a mechanism for highly limited choices
in specialized social sectors. I would now like to draw the theoretical impli-
cations of this way of interpreting society beyond modernity.
The overall premise lies in assuming that the freedom/control relationship
is an antithesis only in particular instances. The antithesis—especially when
synergic—is only one of the possible reductions of the relational dilemmas
between the two poles. It lends itself to describing the relationship between
state and market, but not relations within and between the other spheres
of life. Generally speaking, a complex, multi-faceted relationship arises between
freedom and control.
When this reality takes on a new appearance, we enter the after-modern
world6 where alternative relating processes emerge because the relationship
6
The term "after"-modernity means simply what comes historically after the modern era
at the very moment when the basic criteria of social action and organization are no longer
referred primarily and exclusively to the concepts of freedom and equality as they have been
envisaged by modern Enlightment. The concepts of freedom and control, lib and lab, become
only two operators among many, and are not absolute, but must be referred to other prin-
ciples which, in turn, may reveal more relevant. I introduce the term "after"-modern in
order to avoid the many ambiguities inherent in the "post"-modern discourse.
between freedom and control may now be seen and enacted with many
more degrees of contingency on both sides. This contingency is selectively
reduced in different ways, according to communication contexts, since these
are relational contexts. That this type of society presents new problems, and
even immense risks, is intrinsic to its relational nature.
6.2. From a theoretical standpoint, a fact then emerges: freedom and con-
trol are not simply two dimensions inherent in every social relation, but are
social relations themselves which must be conjugated differently in different
social environments.7 We must define freedom and control as social rela-
tions, and do it without making their interaction with other relations and
dimensions of social action—such as for example with solidarity—antithetic
or even perverse.
Freedom not only stands outside control, but also inside it; freedom is a
form of control and its source of justification. Control not only offers greater
or lesser opportunities for freedom, but constitutes it, in the sense that it
creates the various forms and degrees of freedom itself.8 Freedom and con-
trol work together, not mutually exclusive alternatives. Instead they are con-
texts and opportunities that develop one another. To see this, we must
consider the freedom/control distinction as a relationship of social relations.
But how is it possible to consider freedom and control as social relations?
a) As far as freedom is concerned, modernity has viewed it as a social

relationship that may be played in many ways. By introducing new distinc-
tions (differentiations), it has made unique relational universes possible.
For example, by introducing the distinction between freedom "from" (negative)
and freedom "for" (positive), it has on the one hand expanded negative free-
doms as demands for non-interference, and on the other opened new hori-
zons of positive freedoms as needs to achieve significant goals. As another
example, by introducing the distinction between procedural freedom and substantial
freedom, it has on the one hand increased the possibilities for automatic social
relations and on the other made new relationships of significant human in-
tention possible.
7
To claim that freedom and control are social relations themselves means that they can
be conceived of as AGIL-relationships, which in turn means that freedom must have its own
internal controls, while control must have its own internal freedoms. Or, otherwise stated,
you cannot disconnect freedom and control entirely, but you can only redefine the relations
among their components.
8
To use the philosophical language of Erich Przywara (1962), one might say that moder-
nity (from Kant to Parsons) adopts a logic of "above -*• within" that negates the reciprocal,
thus the logic of the "within -+ above".
70 PIERPAOLO DONATI
The lib/lab complex, however, still sees the first side of these relation-
ships almost exclusively. It mainly sees negative and procedural freedoms,
while it has great difficulty seeing positive and substantial freedoms. This
explains why much of sociology has observed freedom essentially in the form
of the contingency inherent in "money" (as a generalized symbolic means),
releasing the adaptive function (the A of AGIL) from the rules of input/
output exchange and from all forms of self-restriction, thereby making all
social relationships abstract and instrumental. By doing so, sociology has
obscured the reverse processes, those through which new embodied, value-
based, heavily intertwined and at the same time self-restricting social relation-
ships have produced social forms outside those regulated according to the
lib/lab logic. Many sociological theories have not realized that the social
relationship is a mutual action, and have thus ignored the fact that vital
associative worlds produce positive and substantial freedoms outside the state-
market complex.
b) The same has happened for control. Modernity generated new dis-
tinctions of social control; that is, it created control as a social relationship
that can be played out in many diverse ways. For example, by introducing
the distinction between systemic control and social integration control, it has on the
one hand built new rules without human intentional meaning, and on the
other opened up room for norms otherwise rife with significant intentional
meaning. As another example, by introducing the distinction between hetero-
control and self-control, it has on the one hand been able to construct imper-
sonal apparatuses of social security and regulation, and on the other to
explore the worlds of internal regulation (mainly biopsychological, and only
marginally conscience-based).
The libIlab complex still sees the first side of these relationships almost
exclusively: it sees systemic and coercive control towards subjects, while it
has difficulty seeing the control of informal rules within subjects and social
actions. This explains why sociology has ended up seeing the social domain
as that which negates the authenticity of the self (i.e. society as a powerful
machine that denies the bio-psychological identity, or "individuality"), rather
than that which makes it possible.
6.3. Modernity tends to play out freedom and control as opposite dimen-
sions, negatively correlated, that define a sort of "relational hyperbola" between
refero and religo9 in which they may develop only inversely (fig. 1). In moder-
9
On these dimensions, which refer to the Weber (refero) and Durkheim (religo) traditions,
see P. Donati (1991). The expression "relational hyperbola" is explained and handled within
the modern cultural and philosophical context by A. Cevolini (1997).
nity it is assumed that if freedom is expanded along the refero axis, then
control is reduced along the religo axis, and vice-versa. It is always improb-
able to find a balance point on the hyperbola (and this difficulty leads to
the constant reduction of the social world to a series of problems only, viz.
the well-known process of Problematizierung). Consequently, society is described
as an antithetical oscillation between statu nascenti movements and processes
of institutionalization.
In the course of developing this dynamic, the forms of social control tend
to liberate freedoms as much as possible. As long as the game remains
within certain limits, it is possible to find mixed solutions while remaining
on the hyperbola. But it is no longer possible beyond certain thresholds.
The asymptotic development of control must expunge freedom in the sys-
tem environment (thus outside institutions). The same occurs for the asymp-
totic development of freedom, which confines controls to its environment
(thus only within system operations). In one direction, freedoms are placed
outside the social sphere (thus outside social institutions), and in the other
social control becomes only systemic (i.e. mechanical) and remains without
justifying values.
The lib/lab complex thus ends up stretching the social sphere asymptot-
ically towards "polar layouts", dominated by control (along the religo axis of
functional limitations) or freedom (along the refero axis of merely symbolic
references). I hypothesize that this formula of reading modernity may be
generalized using the AGIL diagram, to observe post-modern society as a
relational society born of modernity (fig. 2). In representing society as a
hyperbolic organization (interpreted according to the AGIL diagram: fig. 2),
the space of relations between freedom (refero) and control (religo) delineates
the scenarios for both micro and macro social forms emerging in post-
modern societies. We have eight possible hyperbolic escapes10 (fig. 2):
a. G A: decisional (political) freedom is asymptotically reduced to the

economic mechanisms of the market;
b. A G: the mechanisms (binds) of the market are cancelled out by free
political decisions;
10
The "hyperbolic escape" may be defined as follows: if the AGIL-system is reduced to
one dimension (refero or religo, in one of their dual poles), the other dimension is placed in
its environment (the asymptote corresponds here to the re-entry of the systemic differentiation
according to N. Luhmann). For example, if the love relationship becomes "pure" (intimacy,
as though suspended in a normative vacuum), or, otherwise stated, when the love relation-
ship is reduced to the pure L of AGIL, then the institution (the religo in the couple) is placed
outside the AGIL-system formed by the pure love relationship (in other words, the social
institution of the couple becomes only one of the many possibilities represented on the hori-
zon of the pure love relationship).
72 PIERPAOLO DONATI
Figure 1. The relational hyperbola of modernity1
Figure 2. The relational nature of post-modern society
11
The distinction refero/religo is, in its turn, relational. To understand this, take for
instance the dilemma competition (marketization) vs. social control (welfare provisions). This
dilemma can be played by putting these two poles either as refero/religo or as religo/refero
respectively, depending on the point of view of the observer/actor of the situation (who
stresses one as freedom against the other as control). The hyperbola of fig. 1 becomes specified
only when it is articulated within fig. 2.
c. G I: decisional (political) freedom is reduced to the rules of social

exchange in the so-called third sector;
d. I G: social exchanges in the third sector give way to political deci-
sions;
e. L A: informal relationships take on the characteristics, especially the
restrictions, of the market;
f. A L: the market is cancelled out within the network of informal rela-
tionships;
g. L I: informal networks give way to third sector organizations;
h. I L: third sector organizations accentuate their nature as informal net-
works.
To describe society as a relational-hyperbolic tendency of social forms is an

alternative to the description based on the functional primacy of one of the
four functional prerequisites A,G,I,L. The functional primacy of one of the
four poles is no longer possible (as Parsons and Luhmann still believe) for
the entire society. Only trends are possible, as asymptotic convergences of
the hyperbolas on one of the relational poles (A,G,I,L around fig. 2); these
however cannot—as a single dimension—ever absorb the others, which are
pushed to develop in other social spheres. To develop a code for the free-
dom-control interaction in one direction (in a certain relational sphere) means
to push for other codes of that interaction to be developed in other direc-
tions (in other relational spheres).
If we consider the vertical axis in fig. 2 (refero) as culture and the hori-
zontal axis (religd) as structure, we can summarize the four possible response
scenarios to modernity as follows. Social forms may:
1) remain on the hyperbola, i.e. in some intermediate point; this is the neo-
modern scenario that still bases itself on the lib/lab yardstick;
2) escape into the refero, for G or L through charismatic movements char-
acterized by a purely intentional ethic (even irrational); in these cases, pre-
modern types of political movements may emerge (meaning that they
un-differentiate the system in the G pole), or cultural movements of post-
modern action (which give primacy to latency values in L); in these instances,
affirmations of freedom prevail over demands for control;
3) escape into the religo, for A or I; in the first instance we are faced with
hyperfunctionalism, in the second with new social markets;
4) finally, they may produce a morphogenesis of the social (and therefore of
the societal system) through relations emerging from the interaction of all
of these dimensions. This marks an after-modern society. Its main character
consists in going beyond modern forms of social differentiation through new
74 PIERPAOLO DONATI
competitive as well as solidaristic games among the different dimensions of

social relations, thereby generating social forms unknown to the previous
society. These new forms will be vital insofar as they are original and orig-
inative, as I have said before. Of course, strains, conflicts, and even strug-
gles will not disappear. Just the contrary is true.
The new society will result from this "game". Paths 2 and 3 remain
"exceptional", in my view, in the sense that they may occur in spatially and
temporally limited spheres of the social realm. As far as the general frame-
work of the societal system is concerned, the global challenge is played out
between paths 1 and 4.
All of this may be stated in yet another way. We may hypothesize that soci-
ety changes its structure from a hyperbolic configuration, typical of the modern,
to a relational configuration, typical of the post-modern. In the former, free-
dom and control are played out as a synergic antithesis, while in the latter
they are played out relationally (i.e. as an emergent property of reciprocal
action). The underlying theoretical hypothesis, which will obviously require
several empirical studies for verification, says: the more freedom and con-
trol differentiate, the less they become separable and must be newly bound
and referred to one another. This may happen by staying in one of the four
hyperbolas; in this case, solutions to social issues will still be "modern"
(although giving room to "other modernities"). But it may also happen that
a new relational AGIL-complex will be born (when both binds and refer-
ences change for the whole AGIL-system); in this case, solutions to social
issues will be after-modern, in the sense that they escape from the synergic
antithesis between freedom and control. Freedom and control will be con-
figured as qualitatively new relationships with new cultural (refero) and struc-
tural (religo) dimensions. Then, society rediscovers its relational nature, the
fact that it is made up of relationships where relationship itself implies ref-
erences and binds which interconnect in a sui generis manner. In conclusion:
the more society becomes post-modern, the more each relationship (each
sphere of social relations) must be based on its own guiding distinction that
sees freedom and control not as identifiable or collective attributes in an
antithetic contraposition, but as characteristics of differentiated, specific net-
works of relationships that are regulated (and regenerated) based on an
autonomous nexus between freedom and control.
6.4. I do not believe that debates on agency and structure, on subjectivity

and rules, have highlighted this new reality clearly enough. They have
undoubtedly contributed to seeing many aspects of the morphogenesis under
way today (T. Burns, T. Dietz, 1992). But they have not seen the overall
relationality of the social sphere. Most times they have reduced the new
relational quality of society to a single hyperbola. Just to cite an example,
consider the "pure relationship" theorized by A. Giddens (1992), which rep-
resents an escape from a pre-imposed social structure through the hyper-
bolic paths that tend asymptotically to the flight toward pure latency (L in
fig. 2).
Perhaps by adopting a relational paradigm sociology may see how norms
of freedom and control lie neither simply in individuals (as "abstract" sub-
jects) nor in systems (the "fully structured"), but in social relations when
taken seriously for what they are: real (fully social) reciprocal action be-
tween subjects. Herein lies the novelty of civil society, which beyond
modernity no longer coincides with the formalities of political democratiza-
tion, but rather with social subjects that express a new process of civiliza-
tion (P. Donati, 1997). The political expression of this project is "societal
citizenship", intended as citizenship distinct from the governmental sense.
Societal citizenship is built as a co-growth of freedom and control within a
framework of social solidarity, through distance relationships between civil
society and the state, rather than as an ascriptive emanation of the nation-
state (implemented, as in modernity, through the principle of progressive
inclusion of the populace in it).
Social relationality is the new glue of society, not the state, an abstract
normative system, or an abstract adaptation system. It may perhaps be called
"the political" (le politique) of social exchanges, as opposed to "the politics"
of the political party system (la politique) (according to the distinction made
by A. Caille, 1993). But we must see that the political stuff of society con-
sists of its "relational glue", and we must observe it in an adequate way.
"The political" has become simultaneously more global and more local. It
has spread throughout all relational dimensions of society and at the same
time has become differentiated within each societal sphere, according to
autonomous intersections (nexi) between freedom and control. In the 21st
century, society will be able to manage "the political" only as a form of
relationality unknown to the moderns.
REFERENCES
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1994, pp. 165-197.
, "La societa civile democratica: istituzioni e valori", in P. Donati (a cura di), L'etica
civile alla fine del XX secolo: tre scenari, Leonardo, Milano, 1997, pp. 107-156.
76 PIERPAOLO DONATI
Archer, M., Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1995.
Beck, U., Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity, (Engl. transl.) Sage, London, 1992.
Boudon, R., La logique du social, Hachette, Paris, 1979.
Burns, T., Dietz, T., "Cultural Evolution: Social Rule Systems, Selection and Human Agency",
in International Sociology, vol. 7, n. 3, 1992, pp. 259-283.
Caille, A., La demission des clercs. La crise des sciences sociales et I'oubli du politique, La Decouverte,
Paris, 1993.
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Cevolini, A., L'iperbole relazionale della modemita, Doctoral Thesis, Faculty of Political Sciences,
University of Bologna, 11 July 1997.
Connolly, W.E., Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, Cornell University
Press, Ithaca-London, 1991.
De Kerckhove, D., "I nuovi media e la societa civile", in P. Donati (a cura di), L'etica civile
alia fine del XX secolo: tre scenari, Leonardo, Milano, 1997, pp. 83-106.
Donati, P., Teoria relazionale della societa, Angeli, Milano, 1991.
, La cittadinanza societaria, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1993.
, "Alia ricerca di una societa civile. Che cosa dobbiamo fare per aumentare le capa-
cita di civilizzazione del Paese?", in P. Donati (a cura di), La societa civile in Italia, Mondadori,
Milano, 1997.
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Forse, M., L'ordre improbable. Entropie et processus sociaux, Puf, Paris, 1989.
Gehlen, A., Urmensch und Spatkultur. Philosophische Ergebnisse und Aussagen, Verlag GmbH,
Wiesbaden, 1986.
Giddens, A., The Transformation of Intimacy. Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies, Polity
Press, Cambridge, 1992.
Gurvitch, G., Determinismes sociaux et liberte humaine. Vers I'etude sociologique des cheminements de la
liberte, Puf, Paris, 1963.
Hirsch, F., Social Limits to Growth, Routledge, London, 1995.
Luhmann, N., Soziale Systems. Grundriss einer allgemeinen Theorie, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M.,
1984.
, "Sthenography", in Stanford Literature Review, vol. 7, n. 1-2, Spring-Fall 1990, pp.
133-137.
Mead, L., Beyond Entitlement. The Social Obligations of Citizenship, The Free Press, New York,
1986.
Offe, C., Disorganized Capitalism, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1988.
Przywara, E., Schriften, Band III: Analogia entis. Metaphysik. Ur-Struktur und All-Rythmus, Johannes
Verlag, Einsiedeln, 1962.
Schooyans, M., La derive totalitaire du liberalisme, Editions Universitaires, Paris, 1991.
Scott, L., Urry, J., The End of Organized Capitalism, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1987.
Seligman, A., The Idea of Civil Society, The Free Press, New York, 1992.
Spencer Brown, G., Laws of Form, Dutton, New York, 1979.
Taylor, C., Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modem Identity, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1989.
4. THE UNIVERSALITY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL
Margaret S. Archer
Choice or Conundrum
Political philosophy recognised the freedom/control relationship as a conun-

drum: the Social Sciences represented it as a choice. Thus Rousseau's dic-
tum, "man is born free but is everywhere in chains," states a dilemma for
what follows. Should we seek his emancipation from social bonds in the
belief that there is a real possibility of human action unbounded by soci-
ety's conditioning, or should we rather study humanity's bounded state? The
latter might seem to take up Rousseau's own suggestion that we cannot
conceive of individuals prior to the institutions by which they live, since in
every form of society individuals have reasons for their will, and these rea-
sons vary with the form of social institutions. Yet, if relativism were the end
of the matter, then who "signed" the social contract? Philosophically, the
conundrum reappears. Historically, however, the social sciences accentuated
the choice over the conundrum and basically within each discipline there
was a polarisation between those choosing freedom versus control, or vice
versa. The following array is illustrative rather than exhaustive:
Figure 1. Freedom and Control in the Social Sciences
Politics - Liberalism Vs Collectivism

Economics — Free Market Vs Planning
Law Rights Vs Obligations
Industrial Relations - Deregulation Vs Regulation
Psychology - Active Agent Vs Passive Agent
Psycho-Analysis Id Vs Super-Ego
Sociology - Voluntarism Vs Determinism
Everything in the left hand column represents what Donati1 calls "lib"
choices: everything in the right constitutes "lab" choices. He is completely
correct that from modernity onwards, theorists have eventually settled for
1
Pierpaolo Donati, "Freedom versus control in post-modern society: a relational approach".
33rd World Congress of the International Institute of Sociology, Cologne, 1997.
78 MARGARET S. ARCHER
some version of a "lib/lab" alliance. What I seek to show is that this is

necessarily the case, and because necessary it is universal and, as such, can-
not be the particular characteristic of modernity, post modernity or any par-
ticular period whatsoever. Ideas and institutions have distinctive historical
forms, but the generic interdependence of freedom and control cannot be
historicised to free the future as the potential moment for either untram-
melled freedom, immune from constraints, or for unresisted control, insu-
lated against subversion.
Instead we need to re-state the generic dilemma which, with consider-
able loss of elegance, runs "man is born with certain degrees of freedom
but is everywhere subject to conditioning constraints". This itself merely
repeats Marx's appreciation that "Man makes history, but not under the
circumstances of his choosing", or from the other side, John Stuart Mill's
acceptance that enlightened self-interest needs the helping hand of educa-
tion for enlightenment about our real interests.
Thus, the body of this paper falls into four sections. The fast advances
the argument that the relationship between concepts of "freedom" and "con-
trol" has a particular logical status, one of four possible relations, namely that
of a "constraining contradiction" which means that the two terms are simul-
taneously incongruent but mutually invoking.2 Secondly, it is argued that their
ineluctable relationship confronts advocates of either with an inescapable sit-
uational logic, namely the need to elaborate a form of syncretism which
links the two concepts rather than repudiating one of the terms (and the
same goes for any institutional arrangements which are advocated). Here it
will be shown that extreme one-sided syncretic endeavours, seeking vastly to priv-
ilege "freedom" or "control," have failed because of the need to appeal to
elements of the antipathetic term, which cannot be eradicated but whose
incorporation challenges the main term in whose defence such theories are
cast. The whole "choice" approach, listed in the introduction for the vari-
ous social sciences, merely replicates this scenario in each discipline and has
served to set all back for years. Thirdly, relatively new attempts at confronting
the dilemma by "concept-stretching" to elaborate a more generous form of
syncretism (which does not mean that the truth lies in the middle, since the
"old" middle ground is vacated too) are examined for how far they can
deal satisfactorily with "how", "when" and "under what conditions" there
will be more freedom and voluntarism or more control and determinism.
The main contenders in Sociology are held deficient in this respect because
the two syncretic formulae advanced suffer, respectively, from a generalised
2
See Margaret S. Archer, Culture and Agency, Cambridge University Press, 1988 and 1996
for a full discussion of the relationship, chapter 6.
THE UNIVERSALITY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL 79
indeterminacy (Giddens) or an overly historical specificity (Habermas). The

root causes of both are traced to their inadequacies in re-conceptualising
relations between "the parts and the people", or in other words "social and
system integration", or again "structure and agency", which is merely another
way of stating the generic dilemma of "freedom and control". If Giddens
fails, it is because he seeks to transcend these pairs rather than relating
them, and if Habermas fails it is because he seeks to historcise their rela-
tionship as a one-time encounter. The conclusion therefore is that the inter-
play between freedom and control is a universal one whose variations can
only be understood relationally in terms of the degrees of freedom (and the
strategic uses made of them) and the stringency of constraints (as condi-
tional not determining influences), in a given society (or societal sector) at
any particular time—with both society being transformational and, over
time, its agents being transformed in the self-same process of seeking soci-
etal transformation.
1. Freedom and Control as a Constraining Contradiction
Constraining contradictions' are logical properties of the relationship between

two items in the Cultural System which exert an effect when anyone wishes
to maintain either element (whether a theory, a belief or an ideal). The
whole effect of the constraining contradiction is dependent upon human
activity, for the existence of the incompatibility between items A and B is
of no social consequence if no one asserts or advocates either. However,
where "freedom" and "control" represent our A and B we are never short
of historical takers (or for that matter social scientific proponents). Their
contradictory element is obvious, to the point where freedom and control
could (simplistically) be viewed as zero-sum, or (with more sophistication) as
a minimax formula. However, that would leave the two in the position of
a competing contradiction, where both parties accrue maximum benefit from
inflicting maximal damage on the other and reducing it to minimal pro-
portions, if total elimination is not on (in argument or reality). Instead, here
we confront a constraining contradiction whose key feature is that, given pro-
tagonists of A exist, then their action in invoking A (freedom) also ineluctably
evokes B (control) and with the logical contradiction between them.
The reason for this is a necessary connection between A and B, that is,
the "dependence" of A on part of the general preserve of B. For A can-
not stand alone; it is compelled to call upon B, to operate in terms of B,
to address B, in order to work at all. This is part and parcel of the theo-
retical constitution of A; but part of the parcel that is B constitutes a threat
to A because it simultaneously contravenes it. Thus those seeking to sustain

A are heavily constrained. They cannot simply repudiate B for they must
invoke part of it, but if B is fully actualised it threatens to render A unten-
able. And when freedom and control represent our A and B, this state of
affairs is the same for defenders of the two, for both the contradiction and
the constraint are fully symmetrical. Let us see how this is the case for both.
Where freedom (A) is concerned, the constraining element arises because
in order to be conceptualised, let alone exercised, any version of freedoms
from (negative) or freedoms for (positive) depends upon the control of others.
At its minimum, any freedom conceived of in a social context necessitates the (controlled)
non-interference of other parties. Often such freedoms evoke more control (e.g.
for two antagonistic groups to enjoy freedom of assembly involves controls
on both and on third parties, witness Northern Ireland). Classical models
of the free-market presumed such non-interference as a transcendental con-
dition of their possibility and necessarily resorted to the controls of mono-
poly commissions when threatened by cartelization in practice. Equally,
utilitarian models of felicific calculus quickly embraced the Benthemite
Panoptican, for imprisoning the brutish who, incapable of acting on their
own enlightened self-interest, endangered that of others. Indeed it is pre-
cisely this recognition that freedoms cannot be exercised without control,
which has led some to deem the language of rights to be pointless and to
substitute for it the language of obligations (procedural or substantive con-
trols) (e.g. a "right to work" has become a standard feature of the 160 or
so Constitutions in the world as well as being enshrined in the UN's 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As such it coexists with the most
variable employment rates and appears to have no effect upon levels of
unemployment).3
In parallel, where control (B) is concerned, the impossibility of complete
"codification" against every contingency, necessitates "smart" controls, entail-
ing assessment, evaluation, judgement and innovation, in short the freedom
to respond appropriately to unforeseen exigencies. For error-detection can
be mechanical, but error-correction usually needs to be intelligent. (Or, as
some historians might put it, if absolute power corrupts absolutely then some
need to be free of absolutist control to protect authoritarianism against itself).
Equally, control exerted by legitimate authority is dependent upon self-
control, for it requires both a self who is free enough to confer legiti-
macy (which otherwise is merely manipulated consensus) and a robust enough
self who can exercise self control (and not seek a referendum on every
3
Mary Ann Glendon "The Right to Work: Towards full employment", paper presented
to the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, Rome, April 1997.
decision). This requires neo-Kantian man who can heed the stern voice of
duty and choose to over-ride pressing desires, because neo-Humean man
(as the slave of his passions or prisoner of his subjective mental set)4 is inca-
pable of heeding the uncongenial obligations of current control even when
it is in his long term interest. At its minimum, then, controls conceived of in a
social context require that agents (collective and individual) have sufficient freedom to
evince the intelligent response productive of the preferred state designated by controllers.
(Hence the observation that free labour was better for productivity than
control-intensive slavery).
Thus there is no effective method of containing the problematic rela-
tionship between "freedom" and "control" and there is no way of evading
the problem by the simple repudiation of one term or the other. This is
the force of the "constraining contradiction'. It relentlessly fosters a clash
between the two contradictory components and does so through the situa-
tional logic it creates for the actors involved. For if A and B ("freedom"
and "control") are logically inconsistent then no genuine resolution is pos-
sible between them, but if B remains unaltered it threatens the credibility
or tenability of A and vice versa. Consequently, the situational logic dic-
tates that continued adherence to A renders a correction of its relationship
with B mandatory. Corrective action involves addressing the contradiction
and seeking to repair it by re-interpretation of the components involved.
The basic proposition advanced is that the situational logic generated by
the constraining contradiction, which is concerned with the correction of incon-
sistency, generically results in ideational syncretism (that is, the attempt to sink
differences and effect union between contradictory elements concerned).
Correction can thus follow three paths:
(1) A B, i.e. correcting B so it becomes consistent with A.

(2) A B, i.e. correcting both A and B so they become mutually consistent.
(3) A B, i.e. correcting A so it becomes consistent with B.
All three paths lead to syncretism, but they differ considerably in terms of
which element changes and how much it alters in the course of the repair
work.
4
See Martin Hollis, The Cunning of Reason, Cambridge University Press, 1988, ch. 6.
2. Freedom and Control: One-sided syncretism
Obviously, for adherents to A, (whether this stands for "freedom" or "con-

trol") the preferred solution is (1), since here it is B which undergoes the
revision, then leaving A both intact and in congruence with redefined B.
Thus the situational logic of correction places the onus on those who
adhere to A to engage in the active project of eliminating the contradic-
tion by furnishing a re-interpretation of B (sufficient minimally to remove
their inconsistency and maximally to present B as doing nothing but serve
A). This constitutes a real assault on the logical problem, at the Cultural
System level, for basically it seeks to substitute a re-interpreted B1, which is
compatible with A, for the original B which was in contradiction with A.
If an inconsistency can be corrected by method (1), which can be called
"one-sided syncretism", the situational logic provides no impetus whatsoever
towards more generous syncretic moves. Thus Jirm protagonists of 'freedom" or
"control" (those who have made their choice on figure 1) have to confront the situational
logic, by re-definition of the opposing term, sufficient to allow its (unavoidable) syncretic
incorporation, without this entailing substantial alterations in the principal term (be it
"freedom" or "control') and, above all, without in any way ceding its primacy. In
Donati's terms, this spells robust "lib" theories incorporating some subordinate
and re-defined "lab" concessions, or, equally robust theories of "control"
integrating minimal concessions to "freedom", again appropriately re-defined.
What will also be underlined is the difficulty, once syncretism has been con-
ceded, in holding to method (1), that is in sustaining it as one-sided.
Method 1 and its problems
Initially, the syncretic element is limited to the drive to produce B1 which,

in resolving the inconsistency, leaves A triumphant—"freedom" or "control"
retain their primacy. This manoeuvre can be tracked for the strong pro-
gramme of "freedom", whose ontological base was pugnacious individualism,
whose explanatory framework was full-blooded methodological individual-
ism and whose political philosophy vaunted the free-market, the open soci-
ety and the absence of constraints upon either, since otherwise this would
spell the Road to Serfdom. Syncretic concessions were obvious from the
fifties onwards in the treatment of both individual and society.3 Basically,
3
Hence from the beginning the Individualists individual was a creature strangely over-
burdened by social properties. Thus Watkins' classical statement of Methodological individ-
ualism, namely that "according to this principle, the ultimate constituents of the social world
are individual people who act more or less appropriately in the light of their dispositions
the problem was one of how to present untrammelled freedom in a social

context and the "solution" consisted in portraying social constraints in a
one-sided reductionist manner, namely, such elements of control emanated
simply from "other people" (this represented the re-defined B1).
The advancement of B1 was necessary because social reality cannot be
confined to individuals and their dispositions. Hence those aspects of the
social context which are indispensable for both identification and explana-
tion were themselves incorporated into individual terms (that is, as features
of "people'). The acceptable predicates of "rock-bottom explanations" could
include "statements about the dispositions, beliefs, resources and interrela-
tions of individuals" as well as their "situations . . . physical resources and
environment".6 As Lukes puts it, "the relevant features of the social context
are, so to speak, built into the individual."7 There are two serious onto-
logical objections to this syncretic procedure of incorporating the social con-
text by re-defining it as "other people". On the one hand, in what recognisable
sense are we still talking about "the individual" when he or she has now
been burdened with so many inalienable features of both social and nat-
ural reality (cultural systems, socio-cultural relations, physical resources and
the environment)? On the other hand, can the social context (let alone the
natural world) really be disaggregated in this way, such that role relations
are purely interpersonal matters, belief systems are only what certain peo-
ple hold and resources are just what you or I have laid our hands on? This
syncretic manoeuvre has sought to leave our voluntarism (freedom) untram-
melled by reinterpreting social constraints and enablements (controls, albeit
conditional ones) as predicates of people.
In fact this type of monadism characterised both sides of the debate. In
order to work at all, the Individualist ontology had grossly to inflate "the
individual" by incorporating into people anything social to which it may be
necessary to refer. In strict parallel, the strong form of Collectivism strips
the individual of everything of interest, leaving him or her as nothing but
Durkheim's "indeterminate material", by bundling personal properties (thoughts,
convictions, feelings) into collectivities—as the "collective conscience"—and
thus representing them as predicates of "the social". These then constitute
and understanding of the situation" immediately raised the problem that such individual peo-
ple confronted situations which were social rather than individual, (which was recognised in
Popper and Wisdom's preferred designations of their positions as "Situational Individualism"),
see J.W.N. Watkins, "Methodological Individualism and social tendencies", in May Brodbeck
(ed.) Readings in the Philosophy of the social sciences, Macmillan, New York, 1971, p. 270.
6
Ibid., pp. 270-1.
7
Steven Lukes, "Methodological Individualism Reconsidered", British Journal of Sociology,
1968, 19:2, p. 125.
equal and opposite ontological defects but represent exactly the same form of
one-sided syncretism, conducted respectively by the liberal defenders of indi-
vidual freedom and the collectivist advocates of society's hegemonic control.
The problem here, with both sides, is that "mean" syncretism was devoted
to the redefinition of B alone such that a minimalistic element of control
could be injected into our individual freedoms (without significantly limit-
ing them) or an equally minimal degree of freedom could be allowed in
merely to energise control systems (without a significant ability to alter them).
As the two locked into the protracted battle between Individualism and
Collectivism (plus their explanatory programmes), on neither side could a
method of correction prove workable which consisted in the re-interpreta-
tion of the other side alone. Successive versions of B1, B2, Bn failed to elim-
inate the contradiction because the original B resurfaced to discountenance
the Bn substitutes. On the contrary, adducing them merely reanimated the
contradiction and served to render more controversial the central tenets of
A—pure individual freedom in society or purely collectivist control of society.
Since neither could produce a triumphalistic A through the "simple" syn-
cretic manoeuvre of correcting B so that the two became congruent—this
serves to account for why theorists then engaged in a more thorough-going
form of syncretism. For, on the face of it, this is contrary to their initial
ideational interests. But if and when method (1) fails, not only is there a
stimulus to further syncretic endeavour, but some of the tools for it have
also been forged in the process of failing—criticism which progressively
assumes an elaborative character and critics who are as familiar with the
enemy terrain as with their own.
Method 2 and its problems
Basically, this more generous type of syncretism consists in the accommo-

dation of A to B (method (2)) in order for the former to survive at all. Here
it is A which bears the brunt of re-interpretation in the process of correc-
tive adjustment to B, under the pressure of mounting critique. In short this
corrective adjustment of A to some version of B spells a radical change in
its character: a shift to an A1, A2 and then A3 often indicates social demise
of the theory in relation to the salience originally achieved for A and a
degenerating problem-shift within the theory itself. The change in charac-
ter can be profound when an idea is on the run. This degenerative trans-
formation can be traced for both the "freedom" and the "control" paradigms.
Thus, on the one hand, liberal individualism presented itself as having a
new lease of life in Rational Choice Theory, a redefined A1 whose promise
consisted in the supposed ability to account for the unacknowledged conditions
of action and to derive complex social structures from its "model of Man",
i.e. from some property pertaining to the free human being. The promis-
sory note consisted in a new advanced analysis of social organisation as the
product of human interactions, freely entered into. Progressively, however,
the "model of man" who could deliver the goods had to undergo succes-
sive re-definitions to enable him to account for social structure, its proper-
ties and powers of control. Eventually the fourth generation model (of refined
A) entered the degenerative problem shift stage—a route which is only fol-
lowed when the situational logic leaves no other means of correction avail-
able and which signals bare survival tactics.
The unacknowledged conditions of action were always one of the main
problems with the individualist view which regards society from the bot-
tom-up, seeing structure and culture as resulting from contemporary indi-
viduals, their dispositions and combinations. This, as was argued, burdens
contemporary agency with responsibility for all current features of society.
Since it over-accentuates voluntarism, it also constitutes an under-constrained
picture of "wo/man" (or an under-enabled one for that matter). This is
because it makes no allowance for inherited structures, their resistance to
change, the influence they exert on attitudes to change and, the delineation
of agents capable of seeking change. Hence the initial enthusiasm for the
Rational Choice calculus which would reveal these forms of social control
as the products of individual freedom, which did not curtail it.
The first contender (A1) was "rational man" of classical economics, whose
calculus, consistency and selfishness organised his desires, resulting in choices
which summed to produce social reality.8 The fact that this model of "ra-
tional man" could not cope with phenomena like voluntary collective behav-
iour or the voluntary creation of public goods, led some (who conceded
defeat over the Prisoner's Dilemma or the Free-Rider problem) to comple-
ment him with an inner running mate. Enter "normative man" (A2), who
shifts to a different logic of action under circumstances in which he realises
he is dependent upon others for his own welfare.9 Yet again, inexplicable
macro-level effects remained, and "emotional man" (A3) joined the team to
mop up structural and cultural properties based on expressive solidarity or
willingness to share.10 The trouble with this multiplication of complements,
all inhabiting the same being, is that it eventually comes full circle ending
8
Amartya Sen, "Rationality and Uncertainty", Theory and Decision, 1985, 18.
9
See Amitai Etzioni, The Moral Dimension: towards a New Economics, 1988, Free Press, New
York.
10
See Helena Flam, "Emotional Man: 1. The Emotional Man and the problem of Collective
Action", International Sociology, 1990, 5:1 "Emotional Man: II Corporate Actors as Emotion-
Motivated Emotion Managers", International Sociology, 1990, 5.2.
up with the "multiple self"11 and the suggestion that we treat "man" like
an organisation (A4). Yet this is a completely vicious circle and a degener-
ating spiral: some sort of "man" was wanted to explain that which was
problematic, namely social organisation, but now we are enjoined to use
the explanandum in order to conceptualise the explanans, the nature of
man! What is going wrong here is still the original and desperate incorpo-
ration of all emergent and aggregate social properties into the individual.
The syncretic end of the line has been reached from the side of "freedom"
for on method 3, the most generous syncretism has not enabled a re-defined
A (a model of man) to be adduced whose nature can freely account for the
constraints of his social environment, thus effecting ideational unification
with those defending the causal efficacy of controlling structures. Instead of
sinking the differences between the two elements of the constraining con-
tradiction, individualism has sunk itself.
On the other hand, much the same scenario unreeled for the collectivist
defenders of the control paradigm. Here the early attempts to incorporate
Durkheim's "indeterminate material" as the mere energiser of the social sys-
tem were most blatant in Parsonian Functionalism. In the later works the
linkage basically consisted in according hegemony to the institutional com-
ponents constituting the social system (AGIL) and feeding in the people
through a maturational process of socialisation conducted via the same com-
ponents, but running the opposite way round (LIGA).12 For Parsons and
later Luhmann, this was not an abstract model but an endorsement of the
autonomous existence of systemic processes which defined and controlled
courses of differentiation from the surrounding environment. The parts are
symbiotically connected to one another and their adaptive interaction runs
free from human decision-making.
After the long barrage of criticism to which the original formulations were
submitted, the emergence of neo-functionalism in the 1980s had syncretism
as its explicit agenda, since Alexander and Colomy13 defined their project
as one of making systemic functionalism and action theory mutually com-
patible. The fundamental manoeuvre was to discountenance systems as self-
activating and to re-conceptualise them (A1) as merely framing the conditions
of action which establish broad limits on the types of new social arrange-
ments which are likely to arise—it being admitted that similar systemic
11
Jon Elster, The Multiple Self, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986.
12
See M. Devereux in Max Black (ed.) The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons, New Jersey,
Prentice Hall, 1961.
13
Jeffrey C. Alexander and Paul Colomy, "Towards Neofunctionalism", Sociological Theory,
3:1, 1985, p. 22.
configurations can produce a variety of institutional outcomes due to the

diversity of possible agential interventions. Nevertheless, an institutional
change can only enhance systemic survival if it contributes to its functional
needs. Yet the latter are now not only non-controlling but they are also
opaque (except in Luhmann's re-interpretation, when crises make them trans-
parent). Thus it becomes doubtful whether they can retain any explanatory
power whatsoever, particularly if it is further conceded that, in any case,
societal action is underdetermined by functional needs. The rescue bid (A2)
consists in arguments that systemic crises pressurise agents to generate change,
that those changes which stick do so through trial and error, until reduc-
tion in the crisis state signals that functional necessities have been met and
the new form of differentiation thus becomes reinforced and stabilised.
These addenda, coming from beyond neo-functionalism itself, produced
a major problem for the "neo-functionalists" syncretic formula (A1). For it
was they themselves who insisted that new levels of differentiation do not
coincide with systemic solutions since their effects are dependent upon the
perceptions, interests and reactions of agency. Again we see the same syn-
cretic implosion as Individualism underwent: a system, A, has been so
redefined to incorporate social action that there is no-longer a relatively
autonomous systemic whole by virtue of whose functional needs outcomes
can be evaluated as functional or non-functional. If the system and systemic
requirements no longer function as any kind of control-centre, since outcomes
have been ceded to agency, then the degenerative programme shift has been
entered here too since systemic thinking survives only on the diluted claim
to supply a descriptive model (A3) or over-view which serves to detect impor-
tant processes and to organise data. Yet if the descriptive model of func-
tioning social systems now makes no claims to causal efficacy, why should
it even be retained as a framework of description? If influential power has
now been ceded to agential interaction, why should one expect its outcomes
to conform to the functionalist picture? It is hard to avoid the conclusion
that the system itself has been killed off in these re-definitional manoeuvres.
3. Freedom and Control: a new synthesis
One of the standard accompaniments of degenerating research programmes

is desertion by their adherents, generally associated with calls to "transcend"
the terms of the original dilemma and heralding new approaches which
promise to go "beyond . . .". This was undoubtedly the case here, as revised
forms of Individualism and Collectivism failed to solve the problem of freedom
versus control in their own terms, by either "mean" or "generous" syncretic
endeavours. What is often neglected however, by those calling a plague on

both old houses, is that their novel attempts to "transcend" the traditional
debate in question are nevertheless responses to the same constraining con-
tradiction whose situational logic still makes the discovery of a synthesis
between freedom and control imperative—precisely because neither concept
can repudiate the other. What ensues is a different type of syncretism, but
the theoretical endeavour is still to syncretise the two: what changes is that
the process is no longer one-way, for all efforts are no-longer focused on
re-definitions of A or B alone. They consist in correcting both A and B
simultaneously so that they become mutually consistent (method 2).
Fundamentally, this form of syncretism is achieved through A and B both
undergoing re-interpretation or "concept-stretching" such that A1 or An
becomes consistent with B1 or Bn, the two new versions having shed the
contradiction which dogged their ancestors. The fact that a shift occurs in
the nature of A and B alike should not lead syncretism to be construed as
a process of convergence, for correction has nothing to do with finding a
via media. On the contrary, this form of syncretism is morphogenetic, it
amplifies deviations from both points of departure and the syncretic repair
performed on their derivatives signals a new arrival point—genuine cultural
elaboration takes place.
In general, method (2) leads to progressive problem-shifts as theorists are
propelled towards bolder syncretism. Those who failed to produce a "good-
ness of fit" by tampering with A or B alone, became a body of adept tam-
perers. As Durkheim noted, once reason, criticism and the spirit of reflectiveness
develop, simple fidelism is destroyed by the development of techniques to
defend the faith. It is not necessarily the case that the successful syncretic
technique is propounded by the original adherents of A or B. Indeed what
increases is the critical readiness of later advocates to identify and incor-
porate techniques appropriate to the task.
Syncretism is morphogenetic because through it a new item enters the
intelligibilia—a new theory or a new doctrine—but it is not always possi-
ble. A syncretic formula rendering an A1 and B1 congruent may simply not
be found, or found convincing, and it is not always the end of the story,
for syncretism is often a rolling stone rather than a fixed resting place pro-
viding lasting shelter for adherents to A1 /B1. This is what I will argue was
the case for two principle assaults on the problem of combining freedom and
control—those of Giddens and Habermas.
Structuration theory explicitly aims to transcend the old dualities,14 par-
14
Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, MacMillan, London 1979, pp. 4-5.
ticularly that of freedom (voluntarism) determinism (control) and it does so

by boldly reconceptualising them as an inseparable duality. In other words,
syncretism here entails the substitution of a new A/B amalgam, such that
freedom and control are mutually constitutive. This rests upon a novel
"ontology of praxis" where structural properties (i.e. constraints or enable-
ments which are another way of portraying social controls) have to be drawn
upon in the routine production of action, which by instantiating them is
also responsible for their reproduction or transformation. Hence the core
ontological notion of "structure as the medium and the outcome of the
reproduction of practices",15 where elements of social control have now been
rendered activity-dependent (upon highly "knowledgeable" agents whose free-
dom of action severes them completely from the passive "cultural dope").
Therefore such controls have no independence from the practices which
constitute them (though structural properties are omnipresent because nec-
essarily drawn upon in each and every practical act) (Archer 1982, 1988,
1995).16
As a syncretic solution, Giddens's theory ultimately ends in indetermi-
nacy. This arises because endorsement of inseparability results in a funda-
mental inability to examine the interplay between voluntarism and determinism
because freedom and control presuppose one another too tightly. The only
way in which the two can be examined "independently" is through an arti-
ficial exercise of "methodological bracketing". On the one hand, institutional
analysis (of structural constraints/enablements) brackets strategic action and
treats these controlling properties as "chronically reproduced features of
social systems" which emphasises their recursiveness. (Here critics would inter-
ject that such features have differential durability—compare the slow change
of feudalism with frequent changes in interest-rates—yet the capacity to
differentiate between them is forfeited in structuration theory). On the other,
in examining strategic action or the uses to which freedom is put, then insti-
tutional analysis is bracketed and what is studied is the voluntaristic mobil-
isation of society's rules and resources by agents. This leads immediately to
the reverse of recursiveness, instead change or its potentiality, is thus inher-
ent in all moments of social reproduction.17 Here an equally spurious change-
ability appears as a product of this methodological device—the malleability
of structural controls (constraints/enablements) is not only high but is constant
over time. (Critics would counter that these different structural features have
15
Ibid., p. 69.
16
Margaret Archer, "Morphogenesis verus Structuration", British Journal of Sociology, 33,
1982, see also Culture and Agency, Cambridge University Press, 1988, chapter 4 and Realist
Social Theory: the Morphogenetic Approach, Cambridge University Press, chapter 4, 1995.
'' Anthony Giddens, Central Problems, op. cit., p. 114.
to be seen as differentially malleable or resistant to change because of what

they themselves are rather solely due to the practices adopted towards them—
which in any case are conditioned by them). In sum, the bracketing device
produces a pendular swing between divergent images—of the chronic recur-
siveness of controls and, alternatively, of total voluntaristic transformation.
Indeterminacy is thus compounded. Since what is bracketed are the two
aspects of the "duality of structure", then controlling properties (constraints/
enablements) and agential freedoms are separated out by placing a method-
ological epoche upon each turn. But because these are the two sides of the
same thing, then the pocketed elements must thus be conterminous in time (the
co-existence of the epoches confines analysis to the same epoque). It follows
from this that the historical interplay between structure and agency (between condi-
tioning control and agential freedom) logically cannot be examined.
Thus, the central syncretic notion of "duality" precludes any specification
of the conditions under which agency can most readily induce change, com-
pared with circumstances under which they are constrained to reproduce
the status quo. Because it cannot theorise about the interplay between the
relative stringency of constraints and the strategic use made of agential degrees
of freedom, the theory then retreats into broad generalisation about the
"essential importance of tradition and routinisation in social life"18 to account
for recursiveness. Where transformation is concerned, Giddens allows at
most that there are "critical situations" or "critical phases" where the dras-
tic disruption of routine heightens susceptibility to alternatives. Then "there
is established a kind of 'spot welding' of institutions. . . which may subse-
quently become resistant to further change".19 Not only is such a post hoc
designation dubious, but Giddens himself concedes that this constitutes the
explanatory limits of structuration theory, accepting that "there is little point
in looking for an overall theory of stability and change in social systems,
since the conditions of reproduction vary widely between different types of
society.20 As a syncretic formula, seeking to transcend the duality between
freedom and control, it collapses into complete indeterminacy as to when
and where there will be more voluntarism or greater determinism. His syn-
cretism is acknowledged merely to represent a "sensitisation device": it tells
us correctly, that there will universally be elements of freedom and control
present, but that is the nature of our problem: it is not its solution21—which
requires historical specification.
18
Ibid., p. 7.
19
Ibid., p. 229.
20
Ibid., p. 215.
21
Consequently Giddens admits he "does not think this is useful, as some others have
In Habermas we confront the exact opposite, namely, a theory which is

highly historically specific about the clash between freedom and control, but
which denies the universality of their problematic interplay. This difficulty
is fundamentally rooted in the A2 and B2 terms which Habermas advances
as his syncretic resolution of the problem of freedom and control. Quite
unlike Giddens's conflationary formula of "duality", Habermas's and A2 and
B2 stand for distinct parts of society (the lifeworld and the system respec-
tively), which far from being mutually constitutive are distinct ("uncoupled")
and set on a historical collision course.
Thus, on the one hand, the lifeworld represents the site of freedom and
consensus, his A2, whilst on the other hand the system, with its controlling
media of money and power, which operates behind our backs, constitutes
his new B2. The differentiation or "uncoupling" of the system from the life-
world in early modernity, the colonising by the former of the latter in high
modernity, then sets the scene for a decisive encounter between freedom
and control in the present time of late modernity. The implication is three-
fold: (a) that once there was a time of unendangered freedom, (b) that the
constraints emanating from systemic controls are restricted to a given epoque,
and, thus, (c) that a time of freedom can come again.
I would query all three, and to do so by questioning his conception of
the lifeworld as the site of freedom, his conception of the system as the site
of control and from there go on to question their confrontation as a one-
time episode which can resolve their antinomy and establish human eman-
cipation. To query A2 and B2 leads directly to querying the historicity of
their supposed one-time A 2 /B 2 confrontation/resolution.
Habermas's whole point in insisting that the "archaic" components of the
Lifeworld (language and culture) were communal, uncontroversial and con-
scious was that there existed nothing in it which was other than a resource
to agency. Therefore, in stressing exclusively enabling role of culture, the
Lifeworld becomes the universal ground of human freedom, since by defini-
tion it is fully shared, fully known and fully sufficient for all eventualities.
Elsewhere, I have argued against the attribution of all three properties to
it as constituting yet another version of the evergreen Myth of Cultural
Integration.22 In other words, Habermas presents culture as an exclusively
enabling force for freedom and reserves constraints for influences intruding from
the system, particularly from the controls of their steering media, money
tried to do, to 'apply' structuration theory as a whole in research projects" A. Giddens,

"Structuration Theory and Sociological Analysis", in J. Clark, G. Modgil and S. Modgil,
(eds.) Anthony Giddens: consensus and controversy, Falmer, Basingstoke, 1990, pp. 310-11.
22
Margaret S. Archer, Culture and Agency, second edition, 1996, op. cit., chapter 10.
and power. In this way he lays the foundations of his evolutionary account
of growing systemic colonisation of the lifeworld, which then constrains and
distorts rationalised communicative action, preventing the latter following its
intrinsic "inner logic" which, under conditions of rationally motivated under-
standing, would ensure a consensus formation that rests in the end on the
authority of the better argument.23
Thus whilst the Theory of Communicative Action eschews the compact-
ing of "freedom" and "control", characteristic of Structuration Theory, it is
equally incapable of providing an analytical tool kit of general applicability
for examining the interplay between "freedom" and "control" at all times,
since it substitutes for this its historically over-specific account. Instead, the
analysis is (i) contemporary, (ii) thematic and (iii) metaphorical. Thus, within
modernity the system intrudes on the lifeworld through various forms of
"colonisation"—"interference', "mediatisation" or "technicisation"—to which
the lifeworld eventually responds with "resistance" in the form of new social
movements which attempt to defend the quality of life.
To insist (i) that the present conjuncture is where the relative importance
of freedom versus control, voluntarism versus determinism or the social ver-
sus the systemic will be decided, conveys a feeling that we live in exciting
times, when the gargantuan antagonism which has evolved between the
Lifeworld and System will be resolved for good or evil. But this sets up a
contrast category, the past, which has to be examined in different terms
which boil down to a rather speculative historical treatment of (ii), the themes
of progressive rationalisation and differentiation. The methodological effect
is to dichotomise the pre-Enlightenment dark ages, unamenable to analysis
in terms of interplay between social and system integration, as distinct from
enlightened times, when the outcome of the so-called "enlightenment pro-
ject" depends upon how the antagonism is resolved. Yet, (iii) the metaphor-
ical heroics of "resistance" contra "intrusion" may endow new social movements
with millenarian significance, but once the metaphors are cashed in propo-
sitionally they appear to be heralding an unlikely dawn in which quality of
life can be determined free from "interference" by the control of money
and power or the constraints of polity and economy, that is from the effects
of materially-based structures.
This is idealism in both senses: a philosophical idealism which looks to
a cultural hegemony regained in the future because Lifeworld domination,
it is maintained, once held sway in the past. It is also Utopian idealism in
its rhetoric of "reclaiming" those areas of the Lifeworld which have succumbed
23
Jurgen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 2, Lifeworld and System, Cambridge,
Polity, 1987, p. 145.
to incursions from the System, that is to any of us who regard the inter-
play between the two as universal and inevitable. Habermas's avoidance of
the constant need to examine, explore and explain the interplay between
the social and the systemic represents an unhelpful misappropriation of
Lockwood's original distinction24 between properties of agents and those of
structures. For Habermas's interpretation "not only misrepresents dynamics
within the modern economy and polity", it also leads away from Lockwood's
basic insight that every social whole, whether a kinship group, a traditional
community, a voluntary association or a business organisation can and must
be viewed from both a social-and a system-integration point of view—both
as a set of interacting actors and as a configuration of institutionalised parts
and complexes that both enable and constrain actors and the games they
play with each other.25
4. Conclusion
For those who confront the conundrum of freedom and control (together
with all their cognate terms) yet refuse to conceptualise their relationship as
a matter of mutual constitution, which is historically indeterminate, or of
historical evolution, which culminates in one over-determinate moment, the
problem remains one of syncretism. We are still dealing with a constrain-
ing contradiction between freedom and control, that is between two elements
(contra Giddens) and ones which are universally in tension (contra Habermas).
Therefore, we remain searching (on method 2) for an An Bn which enables
us to theorise the interplay between freedom and control over time.
It is suggested the social realism provides the basis for such a syncretic
formula since it disengages the emergent powers of the people from those
of parts of society (thus dealing with a universal dynamics), and enjoins
examination of their interplay at all times and all levels (for it is not lim-
ited to the present conjuncture) since the properties and powers of the parts
and the people are sui generis, yet transformable, transforming and transfor-
mative—which is what social theorising is all about.
What is crucial then is that the morphogenetic perspective (as the method-
ological complement of social realism) maintains that freedom and control
operate over different tracts of time—an assertion which is based on its two
24
David Lockwood, "Social Intergration and System integration" in G.K. Zollschan and
W. Hirsch (eds.), Explorations in Social Change.
25
Nicos Mouzelis, "Social and System integration: Habermas' view", British Journal of
Sociology, Vol. 43, 1992.
simple propositions: that structure (its constraints and enablements) necessarily

predates the actions (conditioned but not determined) which transform it,
and that structural (or cultural) elaboration necessarily post-dates those actions
(which are the conjoint product of human freedoms exercised within the
context of inherited controls).
In structural conditioning, systemic properties are viewed as the emergent
consequences of past actions: they are the products of "current" degrees of
freedom strategically utilised under the "historic" constraints then confronted.
Once structural and cultural controls have been elaborated over time they are
held to exert a causal influence upon subsequent interaction. Fundamentally,
they do so by shaping the situations in which later "generations" of actors
find themselves and by endowing various agents with different vested inter-
ests according to the positions they occupy in the structures they "inherit"
(in the class structure, in the social distribution of resources, or in the edu-
cational system for example). From this follows a conviction that "the prop-
erties of social structures and systems must be taken as given when analysing
the processes of action and interaction,26 because of the conditional influence
exerted by the former on the latter. In short, when we talk about struc-
tural properties and their effects from the morphogenetic perspective, we
are also endorsing the realist notion of emergence and its causal powers.
Thus we accept that the results of past actions have effects in their own
rights later on, as constraining or facilitating influences upon actors, which
are not attributable or reducible to the practices of other agents, in the pre-
sent tense.
However, Social Interaction is seen as being structurally and culturally con-
ditioned but never as determined by either (since agents possess their own
irreducible emergent powers). On the one hand, the mediatory mechanism
which transmits structural and cultural influences to human actors consists
in the former moulding frustrating or rewarding contexts for different groups
of agents, depending upon the social positions they occupy and the ideas
they endorse. In turn it is argued that these experiences of frustrations or
benefits condition different situational interpretations and dissimilar action
patterns: groups experiencing exigencies seek to eradicate them (thus pur-
suing structural or cultural change) and those experiencing rewards try to
retain them (thus defending structural or cultural stability). Regularities of
this kind, detectable in subsequent patterns of interaction, are reflections of
these objective opportunity costs. Nonetheless, their effect is only conditional:
they force no-one, but simply set a price on acting against one's self declared
26
Percy S. Cohen, Modern Social Theory, London, Heinemann, 1968, p. 205.
interests and a premium on following them (consequently, detectable regu-

larities do not even approximate to constant conjunctures). To acknowledge
this involves nothing more sinister than the Weberian assumption that most
of the time for most people there is a rough congruence between their inter-
ests, interpretations and actions. On the other hand, since conditioning is
not determinism, the middle element of the cycle also recognises the pro-
motive and creative freedom of interest groups and incorporates their capac-
ity for innovative responses in the face of contextual constraints. Equally, it
accommodates the possibility of reflective self-sacrifice of inherited vested
interests on the part of individuals or groups, but always at a price.
The Structural or Cultural Elaboration which then ensues is interpreted as
being a largely unintended consequence. The modification of previous sys-
temic properties and the introduction of new ones is the combined prod-
uct of the different outcomes pursued simultaneously by various social groups.
The unintended element largely results from group conflict and concession
which together mean that the consequential elaboration is often what no-
one sought or wanted. (This is what separates the morophogenetic approach
from simple cybernetic models based on goal steering: here the positive and
negative feedback loops, resulting in structural and cultural elaboration and
reproduction respectively, run free of any control centre. This is also what
unites it with the realist assertion about the non-predictability of change in
open systems.) The end-point and the whole point of examining any par-
ticular cycle is that we will then have provided an analytical history of emer-
gence of the problematic properties under investigation. At this point, which
is also the start of another cycle, the elaborated structure constitutes a new
conditional influence upon subsequent interaction, and the concepts and the-
ories we employ to deal with this next cycle may well have to change in
order to explain this change that our subject matter has undergone. In other
words, "freedom" and "control" vary not only in degree over time, but also
in their institutional or ideational expressions.
Thus every morphogenetic cycle distinguishes three broad analytical phases
consisting of (a) a given structure or culture, (a complex set of relations
between parts), which conditions but does not determine (b), social or socio-
cultural interaction. Here, (b) also arises in part from action orientations
unconditioned by social organisation or the cultural status quo but ema-
nating from current agents, and in turn leads to (c) structural/cultural elab-
oration or modification—that is to a change in the relations between parts,
where morphogenesis rather than morphostasis ensued. The cycle is then
repeated. Transition from (a) to (c) is not direct, precisely because structural/
cultural conditioning is not the sole determinant of interaction patterns. Only
collectivists conceptualise a movement straight from (a) to (c) without medi-

ation; the realism endorsed here cannot countenance such a move.
What methodological individualists claim is that action alone (b) consti-
tutes the necessary and sufficient conditions for the explanation of (c). To
them (a) can be eradicated. Advocates of the morphogenetic perspective do
not deny that social interaction is the ultimate source of complex phenom-
ena (which include both unintended, aggregate and emergent consequences):
they simply maintain that because this causal chain unravels over time and
each anterior action sequence was itself structurally conditioned (i.e. subject
to control), we acknowledge that we cannot deduce (c) from (b) alone and
thus have to consider agents' activities (strategic of degrees of freedom), to
be necessary but not sufficient conditions of structural/cultural change.
Therefore, to account for the occurrence of structural or cultural elabora-
tion (c), interactional analysis (b), is essential, but inadequate unless under-
taken in conjunction with (a), the study of prior structural or cultural
conditioning.
Hence, the distinctive feature of the social realist approach is its recog-
nition of the temporal dimension, through which and in which structure
and agency shape one another via morphogenesis and the double morpho-
genesis (in which agency is itself transformed and transforms its own free-
dom of action in the course of seeking social transformation).
This dialectical interplay of freedom and control recognises (a) that nei-
ther term can effectively be reduced to an epiphenomenon of the other, (b)
that nor can they be elided together as two faces of the same phenome-
non, who consequence is to preclude examination of their interplay, (c) that
freedom and control are necessarily and therefore universally intertwined in
a "tensed" interaction, such that (d) by not conflating them, it becomes pos-
sible to investigate the stringency of systemic control in combination with
the degrees of agential freedom, at any given time and in any particular
context, and from that (e) to explain how specific outcomes are sometimes
more attributable to agents strategically capitalising on their freedoms, yet at
other times are more explicable as the result of a enduring stringency of
constraints—in a social setting which, like all others never allows agents
untrammelled freedom, nor hedges them about by deterministic control.
5. THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE
MULTIPLE MODERNITIES
S.N. Eisenstadt
As we are approaching the end of the twentieth century, new visions or

understandings of modernity, of modern civilization, are emerging through-
out the world, be it in the West—Europe, the United States—where the
first cultural programme of modernity developed, or among Asian, Latin
American and African societies. All these developments call out to a far-
reaching reappraisal of the classical visions of modernity and modernization.l
Such a reappraisal should be based on several considerations. It should
be based first of all on the recognition that the expansion of modernity has
to be viewed as the crystallization of a new type of civilisation—not unlike
the expansion of Great Religions, or great Imperial expansions in past times.
Because however, the expansion of this civilisation almost always and con-
tinually combined economic, political, and ideological aspects and forces to
a much longer, its impact on the societies to which it spread was much
more intense than in most historical cases.
This expansion indeed spawned a tendency—rather new and practically
unique in the history of mankind—to the development of universal, world-
wide institutional and symbolic frameworks and systems. This new civiliza-
tion that emerged first in Europe later expanded through the world, created
a series of international frameworks or systems, each based on some of the
basic premises of this civilization; and each rooted in one of its basic insti-
tutional dimensions. Several economic, political, ideological, almost world-
wide systems—all of them multi-centered and heterogenous—emerged, each
generating its own dynamics, its continual change in constant relations to
the others. The interrelations among them have never been "static" or
unchanging, and the dynamics of these international frameworks or settings
gave rise to continuous changes in these societies.
Just as the expansion of all historical civilisations, so also that of the civil-
isation of modernity undermined the symbolic and institutional premises of
' S.N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, 1966;
idem, Tradition, Change and Modernity, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1973; idem, Modernita,
Modernizzazione e Oltre, Roma, Armando Editore, 1997.
98 S.N. EISENSTADT
the societies incorporated into it, opening up new options and possibilities.
As a result of this a great variety of modern or modernizing societies, shar-
ing many common characteristics but also evincing great differences among
themselves, developed out of these responses and continual interactions.
The first, "original" modernity as it developed in the West combined sev-
eral closely interconnected dimensions or aspects: first, the structural, organ-
isational one—the development of the many specific aspects of modern social
structure, such as growing structural differentiation, urbanisation, industri-
alisation, growing communications and the like, which have been identified
and analyzed in the first studies of modernisation after the Second World
War; second, the institutional one—the development of the new institutional
formations, of the modern nation-state, of modern especially national col-
lectivities, of new and above all capitalist-political economies; and last and
not least a distinct cultural programme and closely related specific modes
of structuration of the major arenas of social life.
The "classical theories" of modernisation, of the fifties of the twentieth
century, indeed the classical sociological analyses of Marx, Durkheim and
to a large extent even of Weber2—or at least in one reading of him, have
implicitly or explicitly conflated these different dimensions of modernity;
even if analytically distinct, they come historically together to become basi-
cally inseparable. Moreover, most of the classics of sociology as well as the
studies of modernisation of the forties and fifties have assumed, even if only
implicitly, that the basic institutional constellations which came together in
European modernity and the cultural program of modernity as it developed
in the West will "naturally" be ultimately taken over in all modernizing
societies. The studies of modernization and of convergence of modern
societies have indeed assumed that this project of modernity with its hege-
monic and homogenizing tendencies will continue in the West, and with
the expansion of modernity, prevail throughout the world. Implicit in all
these approaches was the assumption that the modes of institutional inte-
gration attendant on the development of such relatively autonomous, differ-
entiated institutional spheres will be on the whole similar in all modern
societies.
But the reality that emerged proved to be radically different. The actual
developments indicated in all or most societies that the various institutional
2
E. Kamenka, ed., The Portable Karl Marx, New York, Viking Press, 1983; M. Weber, Die
Protestantische Ethik: Kritiken und Antikritiken, Guetersloh Germany, Guetersloher Verlagshaus,
1978; idem, Politik als Beruf, Berlin, Dunker and Humblot, 1968; idem, On Charisma and
Institution Building: Selected Papers, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968; Emile Durkheim
on Morality and Society: Selected Writings, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1973.
THE CONTEMPORARY SCENE MULTIPLE MODERNITIES 99
arenas—the economic, the political and that of family—exhibit continually

relatively autonomous dimensions that come together in different ways in
different societies and in different periods of their development. Indeed, the
developments in the contemporary era did not bear out this assumption of
"convergence" and have emphasized the great diversity of modern societies,
even of societies similar in terms of economic development, like the major
industrial capitalist societies—the European ones, the U.S. and Japan.
Sombart's old question: "Why is there no socialism in the U.S.?" formu-
lated in the first decades of this century attests to the first, even if still only
implicit, recognition of this fact. Far-reaching variability developed even
within the West—within Europe itself, and above all between Europe, or
Europe and the Americas—the U.S., Latin America and Canada.3
The same was even more true with respect to the relation between the
cultural and structural dimensions of modernity. A very strong, even if
implicit, assumption of the studies of modernisation was that the cultural
dimensions or aspects of modernisation—the basic cultural premises of West-
ern modernity—are inherently and necessarily interwoven with the struc-
tural ones. This became highly questionable. While different dimensions of
the original Western project have indeed constituted the crucial starting and
continual reference points for the processes that developed among different
societies throughout the world, the developments in these societies have gone
far beyond the homogenizing and hegemonic dimensions of the original cul-
tural programme of modernity.
Modernity has indeed spread to most of the world, but did not give rise
to a single civilization or to one institutional pattern, but to the develop-
ment of several modern civilizations or at least civilizational patterns, i.e.
civilizations which share common characteristics but which tend to develop
different even if cognate ideological and institutional dynamics. Moreover,
far-reaching changes which go beyond their original premises of modernity
have been taking place also in Western societies.
II
The civilization of modernity as it developed first in the West was from its
very beginning beset by internal antinomies and contradictions, giving rise
to continual critical discourse which focused on the relations, tensions and
3
W. Sombart, Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?, New York, ME Sharpe, 1976
(1st ed 1906).
100 S.N. EISENSTADT
contradictions between its premises and between these premises and the
institutional development of modern societies. The importance of these ten-
sions was fully understood in the classical sociological literature—Tocqueville,
Marx, Weber or Durkheim—and was later taken up in the thirties, above
all in the Frankfurt school. So-called "critical" sociology, however, focused
mainly on the problems of fascism and then became neglected in post-
Second World War studies of modernization. It came again lately to the
forefront to constitute a continual component of the analysis of modernity.4
The tensions and antinomies that have developed within the basic premises
of this programme were: first, between totalizing and more diversified or
pluralistic conceptions of the major components of this programme—of the
very conception of reason and its place in human life and society, and of
the construction of nature, of human society and its history; second, between
reflexivity and active construction of nature and society; third, between
different evaluations of major dimensions of human experience; and fourth,
between control and autonomy. In the political arena these tensions coa-
lesced with those: between a constructivist approach, which views politics
as the process of reconstruction of society and especially of democratic pol-
itics, as against a view which accepts society in its concrete composition;
between liberty and equality; between the autonomy of civil society and the
charismatisation of state power; between the civil and the Utopian compo-
nents of the cultural and political program of modernity; between freedom
and emancipation in the name of some, often Utopian, social vision; above
all between Jacobin and more pluralistic orientations or approaches to the
social and political order; and between the closely related tension between,
to use Bruce Ackerman's formulation, "normal" and "revolutionary" politics.5
These various tensions in the political programme of modernity were closely
related to those between different modes of legitimation of modern regimes,
especially but not only of constitutional and democratic polities. On the one
hand, a tendency to seek procedural legitimation in terms of civil adher-
ence to rules of the game or in different "substantive" terms. On the other
4
H. Joas, "The Modernity of War: Modernization Theory and the Problem of Violence,"
Symposium on War and Modernization Theory—International Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1999, pp.
457-472; idem, "For Fear of New Horrors: A Reply to Edward Tiryakian and Ian Roxborough,"
Symposium on War and Modernization Theory—International Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1999, pp.
501-504; E. Tiryakian, "War: The Covered Side of Modernity," Symposium on War and
Modernisation Theory—International Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1999, pp. 473-490; I. Roxborough,
"The Persistence of War as a Sociological Problem," Symposium on War and Modernization
Theory—International Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1999, pp. 491-500; H. Joas, "Die Modernitat
des Krieges," Leviathan, Vol. 24, 1996, pp. 13-27.
:)
B. Ackerman, We The People, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1991.
hand, a very strong tendency to promulgate other modes or bases of legit-

imation—above all, to use Edward Shils' terminology, various primordial,
"sacred" (religious or secular) ideological components.6
It was around these tensions that there developed the critical discourse
of modernity. The most radical "external" criticism of modernity denied the
possibility of the grounding of any social order, of morality, in the basic
premises of the cultural programme of modernity, especially in autonomy
of individuals and supremacy of reason. It denied that these premises could
be seen as grounded in any transcendental vision. It denied also the closely
related claims that these premises and the institutional development of mod-
ernity could be seen as the epitome of human creativity. Such criticisms
claimed that these premises and institutional developments denied human
creativity, flattened human experience, and eroded moral order, the moral—
and transcendental—bases of society, thereby alienating man from nature
and from society. The more internal criticisms of this programme, which
could often overlap or become interwoven with the "external" ones evalu-
ated the institutional development of modern societies from the point of
view of the promises of the cultural and political programmes of modernity
as well as from the point of view of the basic antinomies and contradic-
tions inherent in this program. Of special importance here was the multi-
faced, continual and continually changing confrontation of the claims of the
programme to enhance freedom and autonomy with the strong tendency to
control; to inequality and continual dislocation of various social sectors that
developed with the crystallization of modern institutional formations.
III
All these antinomies and tensions developed from the very beginning of the
institutionalization of modern regimes in Europe. The continual prevalence
of these antinomies and contradictions had also—as the classics of sociol-
ogy were fully aware of, but as was to no small extent forgotten or neglected
in the studies of modernization—far-reaching institutional implications and
were closely interwoven with different patterns of institutional constellations
and dynamics that developed in different modern societies. With the expan-
sion of modern civilizations beyond the West, in some ways already be-
yond Europe to the Americas, and with the dynamics of the continually
6
E. Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties," in idem, ed., Center and Periphery:
Essays in Macrosociology, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1975, pp. 111-126.
102 S.N. EISENSTADT
developing international frameworks or settings, several new crucial elements

have become central in the constitution of modern societies.
Of special importance in this context, the relative place of the non-Western
societies in the various—economic, political, ideological—international sys-
tems differed greatly from that of the Western ones. It was not only that
it was Western societies which were the "originators" of this new civiliza-
tion. Beyond this and above all was the fact that the expansion of these
systems, especially in so far as it took place through colonialization and
imperialist expansion—gave to the Western institutions the hegemonic place
in these systems. But it was in the nature of these international systems that
they generated a dynamic which gave rise both to political and ideological
challenges to existing hegemonies, as well as to continual shifts in the loci
of hegemony within Europe, from Europe to the United States, then also
to Japan and East Asia.
But it was not only the economic, military-political and ideological expan-
sion of the civilization of modernity from the West throughout the world
that was important in this process. Of no lesser—possibly even of greater
importance—was the fact that this expansion has given rise to continual
confrontation between the cultural and institutional premises of Western
modernity and those of other civilizations, of other Axial civilizations7 as
well as non-Axial ones, the most important of which has been, of course,
Japan. Truly enough, many of the basic premises and symbols of Western
modernity as well as its institutions—representative, legal and administra-
tive—have become indeed seemingly accepted within these civilizations. But
at the same time, far-reaching transformations have taken place and new
problems have arisen.
The attraction of these themes—and of some of these institutions for
many groups within these civilizations—lied in the fact that their appropri-
ation permitted many groups in non-European nations—especially elites and
intellectuals—to participate actively in the new modern (i.e. initially Western)
universal tradition, and selectively to reject many of its aspects and Western
"control" or hegemony. The appropriation of these themes made it possible
for elites and broader strata of many non-European societies to incorporate
some of the universalistic elements of modernity in the construction of their
new collective identities without necessarily giving up specific components
of their traditional identities or their negative attitude towards the West.
' On the Axial Age Civilizations, see S.N. Eisenstadt, "The Axial Age: The Emergence
of Transcendental Visions and the Rise of Clerics," European Journal of Sociology, 23/2, 1982,
pp. 294-314; idem, ed., The Origins and Diversity of Axial-Age Civilizations, Albany, NY: SUNY
Press, 1986.
The attraction of these themes of political discourse to many sectors in

the non-Western European countries was also intensified by the fact that
their appropriation in these countries entailed the transposition to the inter-
national scene of the struggle between hierarchy and equality. Although ini-
tially couched in European terms, it could find resonances in the political
traditions of many of these societies. Such transposition of these themes from
the Western European to Central and Eastern Europe and to non-European
settings was reinforced by the combination, in many of the programmes
promulgated by these groups, of orientations of protest with institution-build-
ing and center-formation.
Such transposition was generated not only by the higher hierarchical
standing, actual hegemony of the Western countries in these new interna-
tional settings, but also by the fact that the non-Western civilizations were
put in an inferior position in the evaluation of societies which was pro-
mulgated by the seemingly universalistic premises of the new modern civi-
lizations. Thus various groups and elites in East European, Asian and African
societies were able to refer to both the tradition of protest and the tradi-
tion of center-formation in these societies, and to cope with problems of
reconstructing their own centers and traditions in terms of the new setting.
From this perspective the most important aspect of the expansion of these
themes beyond Western Europe and of their appropriation by different
groups in the non-Western societies lied in the fact that it was possible to
rebel against the institutional realities of the new modern civilization in
terms of its own symbols and premises.8
IV
But the appropriation of different themes and institutional patterns of the

original Western modern civilisation in non-Western societies did not entail
their acceptance in their original form. Rather, it entailed the continuous
selection, reinterpretation and reformulation of such themes, giving rise to
a continual crystallization of new cultural and political programmes of moder-
nity, and the development and reconstruction of new institutional patterns.
The cultural programmes that have been continuing developing in these
societies entailed different interpretations and far-reaching reformulations of
the initial cultural programme of modernity. They entailed different emphases
8
See S.N. Eisenstadt, Fudnamentalism, Sectarianism and Revolutions: The Jacobin Dimension of
Modernity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, esp. ch. 4, and idem, "Multiple
Modernities," Daedalus—Special Issue on Multiple Modernities, forthcoming Spring 2000.
104 S.N. EISENSTADT
on different components of this programme, on its different tensions and

antinomies and the concomitant crystallisation of distinct institutional pat-
terns. These different programmes and institutional constellations have devel-
oped first of all with respect to the interpretation of the basic conceptions
and premises of the ways of modernity as they have been reinterpreted in
different modern civilizations; in their conception of themselves and of their
past; and with respect to the construction of symbols of collective identities
and their negative or positive attitudes to modernity in general and to the
West in particular.
These differences between the different cultural programmes of moder-
nity were not purely "cultural" or academic. They were closely related to
some basic problems inherent in the political and institutional programmes
of modernity. Thus, in the political realm, they were closely related to the
tension between the Utopian and the civil components in the construction
of modern politics; between "revolutionary" and "normal" politics, or the
general will and the will of all; between civil society and the state, individ-
ual and collectivity. These different cultural programmes of modernity entailed
also different conceptions of authority and of its accountability, different
modes of protest and of political activity, and questioning the basic premises
of the modern order and different institutional formations. In close relation
to the crystallisation of the different cultural programmes of modernity there
has been taking place in different modern societies a continual process of
crystallization of different institutional patterns and of different modes of
critical discourse. The focus here has been on interrelations and tensions
between different institutional arenas, and between them and the different
premises of the cultural and political programmes of modernity and their
continual reinterpretations.
The preceding considerations about the multiple programmes of moder-
nity do not negate the obvious fact that in many central aspects of their
institutional structure—be it in occupational and industrial structure or in
the structure of education and cities—very strong convergences have devel-
oped in different modern societies. These convergences have indeed gener-
ated common problems, but the modes of coping with these problems, i.e.
the institutional dynamics attendant on the development of these problems,
differed greatly between these civilizations.
But it is not only with the societies of Asia or Latin America that devel-
opments took place which went beyond the initial model of Western soci-
ety. At the same time in Western societies themselves there have developed
new discourses which have greatly transformed the initial model of moder-
nity and which have undermined the original vision of modern and indus-
trial society with its hegemonic and homogenizing vision. There has emerged
a growing tendency to distinguish between Zweckrationalitat and Wertrationalitat,

and to recognize a great multiplicity of different Wertrationalitaten. Cognitive
rationality—especially as epitomized in the extreme forms of scientism—has
certainly become dethroned from its hegemonic position, as has also been
the idea of the "conquest" or mastery of the environment, whether of soci-
ety or of nature.
These different cultural programmes and institutional patterns of modernity

were not shaped by what has been sometimes presented in some of the ear-
lier studies of modernization as natural evolutionary potentialities of these
societies; or, as in the earlier criticisms thereof by the natural unfolding of
their respective traditions; nor by their placement in the new international
settings. Rather they were shaped by the continuous interaction between
several factors. In most general terms they were shaped by the historical
experience of these societies in civilization, and by the mode of impinge-
ment of modernity on them and of their incorporation into modern polit-
ical, economic and ideological international frameworks.
In greater detail these programmes were shaped by several continually
changing factors. First, they were shaped by basic premises of cosmic and
social order that were prevalent in these societies in their "orthodox" and
"heterodox" formulations alike as they have crystallized in these societies
throughout their histories. Second, they were shaped by the pattern of insti-
tutional formations that developed within these civilizations, especially in
their encounter with other societies or civilizations. Third, they were shaped
by the encounter and continual interaction between these processes, and the
new cultural and political programme of modernity, the premises and modes
of social and political discourse prevalent in the different societies and civ-
ilizations as they were incorporated into the new international systems. In
this encounter of special importance were the internal antinomies and ten-
sions or contradictions in the basic cultural and above all in the political
programme of modernity, as it developed initially in the West—and even
in the West in a great variety of ways, and as it became transformed with
its expansion—and with the internal changes in Western societies. Fourth,
the dynamics and internal tensions and contradictions that developed in
conjunction with structural-demographic economic and political changes
attending the institutionalization of modern institutional frameworks.
It was the continual interaction between these factors that generated con-
tinual changes in cultural programmes and their continual reinterprelations.
106 S.N. EISENSTADT
The major actors in such processes of reinterpretation and formation of new

institutional patterns were various political activists and intellectuals in con-
junction above all with social movements. Such activists, intellectuals and
leaders of movements promulgated and reinterpreted the major symbols and
components of the cultural programmes of modernity and addressed them-
selves to antinomies and contradictions within these programmes and between
them and institutional realities.
In all modern societies, such movements arose in relation to the prob-
lems attending the institutionalization and development of modern political
regimes and their democratization, of modern collectivities and the expan-
sion of capitalism and new economic and class formations. Whatever the
concrete details of these agendas, they highlighted the continual challenge
of the contradiction between, on the one hand, encompassing, totalistic,
potentially totalitarian overtones based either on collective, national, reli-
gious and/or Jacobin visions, and, on the other, a commitment to plural-
istic premises. None of the modern pluralistic constitutional regimes has
been able to do entirely away—or can even possibly do away—with either
Jacobin component. The ubiquity of this challenge has also highlighted the
possibility of crises and breakdowns in the very nature of modernity.
VI
Thus within all modern societies continuously developed new questionings

and reinterpretations of different dimensions of modernity, and in all of
them there have developed different cultural agendas. These developments
attest to the growing diversification of the visions and understanding of
modernity, of the basic cultural agendas of the elites of different societies—
far beyond the homogenic and hegemonic vision modernity that were preva-
lent in the fifties. While the common starting point of many of these
developments was indeed the cultural programme of modernity as it devel-
oped in the West, more recent developments gave rise to a multiplicity of
cultural social formations which go far beyond the very homogenizing and
hegemonizing aspects of this original version.
Thus many if not all of the components of the initial cultural vision of
modernity have been challenged in the last decade or so. These challenges
claimed that the modern era has basically ended, giving rise to the post-
modern one, and were in their turn counter challenged by those, like Jurgen
Habermas, who claimed that the various post-modern developments basi-
cally constitute either a repetition, in a new form of criticisms of modernity
which existed from the very beginning, or constitute yet another manifes-
tation of the continual unfolding of modernity.9 Indeed, it can be argued

that the very tendency or potential to such radical reinterpretations constitutes
an inherent component of the civilization or civilizations of modernity.
This is even true—even if in a very paradoxical manner—of the most
extreme anti-modern movements that developed in the contemporary period,
namely communal-religious, especially fundamentalist ones. Their basic struc-
ture, or phenomenology of their vision and action, is in many crucial and
seemingly paradoxical ways a modern one, just as has been the case with
the totalitarian movements of the twenties and thirties. These movements
bear within themselves the seeds of very intensive and virulent revolution-
ary Jacobinism, seeds which can, under appropriate circumstances, come to
full-blown fruition.
VII
Thus, while the spread of modernity has indeed taken place throughout
most of the world, it did not give rise to just one civilization, one pattern
of ideological and institutional response, but to several basic variants—and
to continual refracting. In order to understand these different patterns, it is
necessary to take into account the pattern of historical experience of these
civilizations. The importance of the historical experience of the various civ-
ilizations in shaping the concrete contours of modern societies which devel-
oped in the historical spaces of these civilizations does not mean, as S.P.
Huntington seems to imply in his influential "The Clash of Civilizations,"10
that these processes give rise to several closed civilizations which basically
constitute a continuation of historical civilization. It is not only, as Hunting-
ton correctly indicates, that modernisation does not automatically imply
Westernization. What is of crucial importance is that there takes place the
crystallization of continually interacting modern civilizations in which even
inclusive particularistic tendencies are constructed in typically modern ways.
But it is not only that there has been continually developed multiple mod-
ern civilizations. These civilizations, which shared many common compo-
nents and which continually constituted mutual reference points, have been
continually developing, unfolding, giving rise to new problematiques and
continual reinterpretations of basic premises of modernity.
9
J. Habermas, Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1989.
10
S.P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Future of the West, New York, Simon &
Schuster, 1996.
108 S.N. EISENSTADT
Within all societies there developed new questionings and reinterpreta-

tions of different dimensions of modernity, and in all of them there have
been different cultural agendas. All attest to the growing diversification of
the visions and understanding of modernity, of the basic cultural agendas
of different sectors of modern societies, far beyond the homogenic and hege-
monic vision modernity that were prevalent in the fifties. The fundamen-
talist—and the new communal-national—movements constitute one such
new development—in the unfolding of the potentialities and antinomies of
modernity. Such development may indeed give rise also to highly con-
frontational stances—especially to the West—but these stances are promul-
gated in continually changing modern idioms, and they may entail a continual
transformation of the cultural programs of modernity. While such diversity
has certainly undermined the old hegemonies, it was also closely connected—
perhaps paradoxically—with the development of new multiple common ref-
erence points and networks, with a globalization of cultural networks and
channels of communication far beyond what existed before.
At the same time the various components of modern life and culture were
refracted and reconstructed in ways which went beyond the confines of any
institutional boundaries, especially those of the nation-state—giving rise to a
multiple pattern of globalization, studied by such scholars as Arjun Appendurai,
Ulf Hammerz, and Roland Robertson.11 It is this combination of growing
diversity in the continuous reinterpretation of modernity and a developing
of multiple global trends and mutual reference points that is characteristic
of the contemporary scene.
11
A. Appendurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, Minneapolis, University
of Minnesota Press, 1996; U. Hannerz, Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places, London,
Routledge, 1996; R. Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture, London, Sage,
1992.
6. COMMUNITARIANISM AND THE PRIVATIZATION
OF BELIEF: THE CASE OF U.S. CATHOLICS
William V. D'Antonio, Ph.D.
This paper examines two related questions: first, the paper examines the
thesis that American Roman Catholics continue to exhibit a communitar-
ian ethic that urges them to use government to help others. We suggest it
is this ethic that moved the U.S. bishops into the public arena, in the 1970s
to promote anti-abortion legislation, and in the 1980s to urge dialogue about
nuclear war and peace, and the U.S. economy. Further, I look for evidence
that Catholics as voters expressed this ethic to a greater degree than did
Protestants in their support of President Clinton and the Democrats in the
1996 elections.
Second, even if it is possible to show that a communitarian ethic exists
in more than an ephemeral way among U.S. Catholics, the question remains,
what impact if any has it had on the so-called privatization of religious
belief that is reported to have swept over the country since the 1960s? In
addition to examining the behavior of the bishops and the voting of the
laity, the paper presents information that shows signs of a significant com-
munitarian movement that may radically change the way at least some
Catholics see their Church and their roles in society. This phenomenon is
the growth within the Catholic Church of small groups called small Christian
communities (SCCs), known also as small Church communities, small faith
communities, or comunidades eclesiales de base (base Ecclesial communities).
These groups are in some measure a part of the phenomenon of small
group growth that was documented by Robert Wuthnow in his 1994 book,
Sharing the Journey. While Wuthnow's overall evaluation of the small group
movement was positive, one of his concerns about it was that the groups
were too often closed in on themselves, rather than looking out for ways
to improve the common weal. Thus, it is important to ask if the SCCs
within the Catholic Church are similarly oriented, or whether they may
presage a further breach in the privatization wall?
At issue is the question whether there continues to exist within the Catholic
religion a quality that David Tracy (1981) had identified as the "analogical
imagination," which he contrasted with the more "dialectical imagination"
that he found among Protestants. Tracy proceeded to explain how the ana-
logical imagination was more likely to produce a communitarian ethic among
110 WILLIAM V. D'ANTONIO
its adherents than was the dialectical imagination among Protestants. The
dialectical imagination was more likely to produce the individualistic ethic
that has so strongly characterized American society from its founding.
Building on Tracy's work, Greeley (1989) decided to test the thesis that
"the fundamental differences between Catholicism and Protestantism are not
doctrinal, but are manifestations of more fundamental differing sets of sym-
bols" (1989: 486). According to Greeley, the communitarian ethic that is a
product of these symbols should manifest itself in human relationships that
are other centered, and that seek the common good, and ultimately, that
"express a special option for the poor." Greeley made clear that the differences
between Catholics and Protestants were not to be taken as of a zero-sum
nature, but rather as tendencies that were more or less present in one or
the other religious imagination. Thus, it is not as if Catholics are only
"other-centered," while Protestants are only "self-centered." Indeed, there is
more than enough evidence from social research of the strength of indi-
vidualism across Catholic as well as Protestant groups in the United States.
In a later section we will summarize Greeley's findings and relate them to
the purposes of this paper. Here we raise the following questions:
a - Is the communitarian imagination reflected in the policy issues addressed

by the U.S. bishops in American politics during the past quarter century?
b — Is it found in the kinds of Catholics who are elected to the U.S.
Congress?
c - Is it to be found in Catholic more than in Protestant voting patterns?
d - And is there evidence for it in the goals set forth by the leaders of the
organizations that are fostering SCC development in the United States?
e - Finally, is there any evidence of this ethic in the activities, attitudes,
values, and beliefs of Catholics who belong to these small Christian
communities (hereinafter referred to as SCCs)?
A Word About the Privatization of Religion
There has been much writing about how the events of the 1960s in the
United States brought about the demise of religion as an effective force in
the public arena. Indeed, the decade began with the election of the first
Catholic as President of the United States. But in campaigning for election,
Kennedy had made clear that he was a strong supporter of the Constitutional
principle of the separation of church and state. In doing so, he set the stage
for the ensuing secular liberalism in American politics. Beyond that trend,
the 1960s brought with them assassinations, social movements, the Vietnam
COMMUNITARIANISM AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF BELIEF 1 11
War, and especially within the Catholic Church, the great debate over birth
control and the pill, Vatican II and issues of freedom of conscience and
structural reform of the Church, and a special concern for the poor. In its
wake came two important encyclicals, Populorum Progressio, 1967 (On the Progress
of Peoples), and Humanae Vitae, 1968, (On Human Life). The former provided
a strong critique of contemporary economic systems, especially the individ-
ualistic excesses of the West. The latter encyclical reiterated the Church's
ban on contraception other than rhythm, while for the first time acknowl-
edging marital sexuality as a good in itself.
Meanwhile, mainline churches faltered in the face of the challenges posed
by the Civil Rights, Women's and Students' Rights Movements and the
Vietnam War. Traditional authority structures within all major social insti-
tutions were shaken, and some institutions like the U.S. federal government
and the mainline religious bodies, have been slow to recover their former
legitimacy (D'Antonio et al., 1996: 29-30).
In their review of this period, Roof and McKinney (1987) concluded that
a major result of these events was that religion had "lost force as an inte-
grative influence in America". What they meant of course, was that main-
line Protestant liberal religion had lost its influence. "With the collapse of
the religious and cultural middle," they asserted, "the result is the effective
elimination of religious values and symbols from the conduct of public dis-
course" (1987: 33). Religious values and beliefs among the moderates and
liberals persist in a highly privatized form, that is, they are to be found if
at all in highly individualized religious psychology, without the benefits of
strong supportive attachments to believing communities (1987: 7-8), that is,
mainline denominations. Indeed, so great was this collapse in their eyes,
that they feared that American society was now threatened by a rising
amoralism on the one hand, and on the other hand, a reactionary sectar-
ianism rising from the newly emerging religious right.
Stephen Carter, a Yale Law Professor and self-acknowledged liberal, offered
a severe critique on how American law and politics under liberal leadership
had trivialized religious devotion (The Culture of Disbelief, 1993). In his view,
Political leaders, commentators, scholars, and voters are coming to view any
religious element in public moral discourse as a tool of the radical right for
reshaping American society. But the effort to banish religion for polities' sake
has led us astray: in our sensible zeal to keep religion from dominating our
politics, we have created a political and legal culture that presses the religiously
faithful to be other than themselves, to act publicly, and sometimes privately
as well, as though their faith does not matter to them (1993: 3).
Thus, in the eyes of the critics, it was not so much that people did not
believe, as that they no longer looked to the mainline religious institutions
as the source for norms of daily conduct. The irony was that the religious
right, while constituting only a minority of the population, had become
highly organized at local levels, and had begun to exert influence on national
politics across a range of socio-sexual issues (sex education, abortion), as
Roof and McKinney had projected.
The rise of the religious right as a force in American public life led some
scholars to argue that the country was split in two by a kind of culture war
(Hunter, 1991). DiMaggio et al. (1996) tested the culture war thesis and
found that American society was less polarized in the 1990s than it had
been in the 1970s, and that even without the supposedly leavening influence
of mainstream religious bodies, a broad national consensus had emerged.
This consensus was evidenced also in studies of American Catholics
(Greeley. February 22, 1997: 11-15; D'Antonio et al., 1989; 1996) which
have consistently shown that growing majorities of American Catholics have
developed a consensus on sexual issues, divorce and remarriage, a married
priesthood, ordaining women, and conscience as against automatic obedi-
ence to the teachings of the pope. As Greeley noted, the Church's formal
teachings on sexual matters are supported by only a minority of Catholics.
What is at stake is the legitimacy of the moral authority of the papacy when
it acts in an autocratic manner. A minority of vocal traditional and politi-
cally conservative Catholics support an autocratic papacy, and insist that
opposition to it constitutes a culture war.
The manner in which the Vatican and the U.S. bishops have handled
the issues of human sexuality on the one hand and social justice on the
other hand, has led to an increasing privatism among Catholics regarding
the former, and a moderate communitarianism regarding the latter (Casa-
nova: 1994: 175ff; Davidson et al., 1997). Thus, while the great majority
of Catholics ignore the Church's teachings on sexual matters, many of those
same Catholics do support the Vatican and the American bishops in mat-
ters of social justice, and outreach to the poor (D'Antonio et al., 1989;
Davidson et al., 1997).
Breaching the Privatization Wall
A review of the actions of the U.S. bishops in the 1970s and 1980s is
instructive. The Supreme Court decision in Roe V. Wade in 1973, creating
a Constitutional right to abortion for a woman, was the launching pad for
the U.S. bishops into the public arena, as it was for the many-right-to-life
and pro-life groups among Catholics and fundamentalist Protestants. In the
ensuing 25 years, the bishops have expended large amounts of time, energy,
COMMUNITARIANISM AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF BELIEF 113
money and political resources trying to bring about an amendment to the

Constitution that would make abortion illegal under all circumstances. This
great, ongoing and divisive debate has effectively brought religious belief
back into the public arena. Interestingly, among Catholics, only a minority
have given their support to the bishops. The 1992 and 1993 Gallup sur-
veys (D'Antonio et al., 1996: 61-62) as well as most other major national
surveys, have found that only 13% of all Catholics, and 22% of the Church's
most highly committed Catholics, support the position of the bishops and
the Vatican. However, with support also from fundamentalist Protestant
groups, particularly Southern Baptists, and from the Mormon Church, a
well-organized anti-abortion movement has made significant gains in the
public arena, causing a number of modifications in the laws governing abor-
tion. Moreover, the anti-abortion movement has been politically adroit in
helping to elect anti-abortion candidates to the U.S. Congress.
Ironically, it seems reasonable to argue that the privatism era ended with
the 1973 Supreme Court decision, which at the time seemed like the ulti-
mate victory of secular liberalism. DiMaggio et al. (1996: 738) noted that
abortion was the only major social issue on which there was more rather
than less polarization in the 1990s compared with the 1970s.
Enlarging the Breach in the Wall of Separation
While the U.S. bishops were focusing on the abortion issue, and trying to
recover from the devastating effects of the birth control debate, the Church
in Africa and Latin America was moving ahead with efforts to bring alive
the social, economic and Church reform teachings of Vatican II. Among
these efforts was the establishment on both continents of small faith com-
munities which focused on "a preferential option for the poor."
The 1980s ushered in the Reagan years in American politics, with empha-
sis on consumerism, individualism, virulent anti-communism, a saber-rattling
militarism, and the notion that the government was the cause of most of
our social problems.
In this setting the bishops surprised everyone with two pastoral letters,
one on nuclear war and peace (1983), and the other on economic justice
for all (1986). In their original draft form, the documents were much more
critical of the Reagan administration policies than were the final statements.
Conservative Catholics within and outside the Reagan Administration man-
aged to bring about significant modifications. Still, the pastoral letters were
considered by mainline religious bodies of all denominations as well as other
progressive groups, as strong statements calling for nuclear disarmament and
1 14 WILLIAM V. D'ANTONIO
for more government help to overcome poverty and its attendant ills. Thus,
they clearly marked the further participation of the Catholic hierarchy into
the arena of American public life.
It is important to note here the distinct ways in which the bishops have
entered the public arena, first in the 1970s regarding abortion, and then in
the 1980s regarding war and peace and the economy. In the former case,
the bishops took an absolutist and fundamentalist approach to the abortion
issue, using the natural law and deductive logic to make their claim that
abortion was not simply a Catholic but a universal human rights issue,
always an intrinsically evil act (Casanova, 1994; Burns, 1993).
On the other hand, they used the inductive method with their pastoral
letters on peace and the economy. For the general U.S. public these pas-
toral letters were to be taken as documents for public reflection and delib-
eration which have the "function of helping to establish collective norms
with which to evaluate the morality of public policies and of economic struc-
tural practices" (Casanova, 1994: 188-189).
Among Catholic liberals the two letters were hailed originally as fore-
runners of a more democratic, participatory Church. However, the bishops
have not to date put significant financial resources in support of these issues.
Nor have they built alliances with liberal senators, many of whom are pro-
choice Catholics.1 Not surprisingly, their results in terms of laws and pol-
icy changes have been meager. And on these issues the bishops have failed
to gain any support from the main body of anti-abortion Catholics.
To summarize, the bishops have entered the public arena of American
politics: first, they have taken an absolutist stand on the abortion issue, and
with the help of a well-organized minority of Catholics and fundamentalist
Protestants, they have succeeded in narrowing the scope of Roe V. Wade.
1
A look at the religious composition of the U.S. Congress provides further evidence for
a Catholic Communitarian ethic. As of the 1996 elections, the U.S. Senate includes 55
Republicans and 45 Democrats. Among the 55 Republicans are 8 Catholics, all Conservative
and most openly anti-abortion.
There are 15 Catholics among the Democrats, all with liberal voting records according
to the rankings of the Americans for Democratic Action and the Consumer Federation of
America. These Senators who are Catholic are also to varying degrees pro-choice on abortion.
The odds that Catholics would be elected to the U.S. Senate in the proportions that are
reported here are three to one against that happening by chance. A similar pattern was
found among members of the U.S. House of Representatives, although the odds in that case
were only two to one against the pattern happening by chance.
The only other religious denomination in the Senate in which Democrats significantly out-
numbered Republicans was Jews, with nine Democrats and only 1 Republican. American
Jews have been the most liberal religious denomination politically, and these findings sim-
ply add more evidence to the thesis that Jews and Catholics are the most communitarian-
oriented among the U.S. religious groups.
COMMUNITARIANISM AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF BELIEF 1 15
Second, they have taken a much more cautious approach to the issues
of war and peace, and the economy, but have been unable to find or unwill-
ing to develop an effective, organized lobby to support their concerns for
the poor. Indeed, they were much more openly supportive of Senator Robert
Dole, the Republican candidate for President in the 1996 elections, because
of his and the Republican Party's anti-abortion stands. The fact that the
Democratic Party Platform and Policies were closer to the bishops on mat-
ters of concern for the poor, and equal justice for all, seemed to have got-
ten lost in the process. And the main explanation seems to be the strong
pro-choice stands of most Democrats, including the Catholic Senators and
members of the House of Representatives.
The religious right has been eager to work with the U.S. Catholic bish-
ops on issues such as abortion, but they do not lend their support when
the bishops turn their agenda to welfare, housing, medicaid for the aged,
capital punishment, or the environment.2
Small Groups and the Public Agenda
Our study of SCCs has as its point of departure a massive study of the
small group participation of the U.S. adult population. In his book based
on this research (Sharing the Journey, 1994) Robert Wuthnow reported that
some 40% of all American adults belonged to at least one small group,
more than half of which have a religious or spiritual orientation.
Wuthnow found that small groups provided a high level of encourage-
ment and support to their members, as well as a high level of personal sat-
isfaction. He also reported that more than half of American adults said they
became more interested in peace or social justice issues as a result of their
group membership. Group members were more likely than non members
to have done volunteer work.
Further, according to Wuthnow, "having had some kind of profound reli-
gious experience or spiritual awakening was a major reason why people in
2
Nor have the bishops found support from the religious right on the issue of capital pun-
ishment. The U.S. bishops, with strong support from the Vatican, have attempted to broaden
their pro-life stance by increasingly challenging capital punishment as being against the pro-
life principle. The tide of public opinion in the U.S. has turned in favor of capital punish-
ment in the past 20 years, led by the conservatives in general, including strong support from
the religious right, which has so far rejected the connection between their anti-abortion stand
and the strong anti-capital punishment stand of the bishops. Again, the bishops have eschewed
seeking support from Catholic liberals, who tend to support them in their opposition to cap-
ital punishment.
small groups became involved in community service" (Ch. 11). Small groups
seemed to heighten involvement and giving among religious conservatives
better than among religious liberals. On balance, Wuthnow concluded the
evidence suggested that small groups reinforced conservative political ori-
entations in our society more than liberal political perspectives.
Wuthnow focused his attention on small groups in general, and made
only passing reference to groups emerging under the broad umbrella of the
Catholic Church. Our study includes both a national sample of the adult
U.S. Catholic population, and an intensive series of surveys, questionnaires,
participant observations and interviews with people who are members of six
particular types of small groups, here called small Christian communities
(SCCs). Also, a major focus of our study has to do with the degree to which
Catholics in the general population, as well as Catholics within SCCs, reflect
the communitarian ethic in their activities and commitments.
Greeley and Communitarianism
As noted earlier, Greeley (1989) constructed a series of hypotheses to test

whether the communitarian, analogical imagination, traditionally more evi-
dent in Catholic than in individualistically oriented Protestant behavior, per-
sists in the modern industrial, urban, homogenized world. Among other
things, Greeley argued, Catholics were more likely than Protestants to value
social relationships, and to seek for social justice in this world.
Using survey data from the U.S. and Europe, Greeley found that he had
to reject a series of null hypotheses which had predicted no denominational
differences in values and the religious imagination. He concluded: "There
is no evidence in the data analyzed in this paper that the analogical imag-
ination is either extinct or becoming extinct. The Protestant ethic and the
Catholic ethic are alive and well" (1989: 500).
A Case in Point: the 1996 U.S. Elections
I take the Catholic vote and by implication the Protestant vote in the U.S.
1996 Presidential elections to provide further support for the existence of a
still viable Catholic communitarian ethic capable of manifesting itself in the
public arena. A brief review of that vote will serve as a prelude to data
from our study of SCCs.
The Catholic vote in the 1996 presidential elections went strongly for
President Clinton (53% to 37%). Looking closely at the demographics of
COMMUNITARIANISM AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF BELEF 117
Table 1. Issues that Mattered Most to Catholic Voters, 1996 by Rank Order of
Importance (in percentages).
Issue All Clinton Dole Perot
Catholics Catholics Catholics Catholics
Economy /Jobs 23 61 28 9
Medicare /Social Security 16 71 21 8
Education 12 85 11 3
Deficit 11 27 54 17
Taxes 11 19 73 8
Crime /Drugs 7 46 44 9
Foreign Policy 4 45 48 7
Source: Voter News and Surveys, exit polls. November 5, 1996.
that vote we find: women (59%), young people aged 18-29 (57%), first time
voters (61%), and Hispanic/Latinos (81%), in particular gave Clinton sup-
port well above his ultimate margin of victory over Dole (49% to 41%). In
all, 32% of Clinton's total vote was from Catholics, who constitute between
25% and 28% of the voting population. Parenthetically, Dole received most
of his support from Protestants, mainline as well as of the Christian right.
Why did Catholics vote so strongly for Clinton? Table 1 provides some
insights. According to exit polling (Voter News Service, 1996), the three issues
that mattered most to Catholics were "economy/jobs, medicare/social secu-
rity, and education." On these issues Clinton's support among Catholics
ranged from 61% to 85%. (See also White and D'Antonio, 1997). Interestingly,
these are among the issues most frequently supported by the U.S. Catholic
bishops in their public statements on social justice, and in their lobbying
efforts before Congress.
Candidate Dole and the Republicans made a great effort to use the abor-
tion issue to garner Catholic votes. Many bishops openly and/or covertly
supported Dole and the Republicans. But polls taken over recent years have
shown a majority of American Catholics supporting the legality of abortion
in at least some circumstances. The 1992 Gallup survey (D'Antonio et al.,
1996: 62) showed only 13% of all Catholics and 22% of the most highly
committed Catholics to be totally opposed to abortion. So it was not sur-
prising to find that Catholics who believed that abortion should be "always
legal" or "mostly legal" voted for Clinton 68% and 55% respectively. When
Clinton declared that abortion should be "safe, legal and rare" he was
expressing the view of the great majority of American Catholics, and of
Americans in general.
Thus, I would argue that the 1996 elections provide some support for
the continued existence of a Catholic communal consciousness, or commu-
nitarianism. This evidence is bolstered by the findings cited in Footnote 1
above regarding the kinds of Catholics likely to be elected to the U.S. House
and the Senate. Communitarian type Catholics are two and three times
respectively more likely to be elected than are conservative, more individ-
ualistically oriented Catholics. Meanwhile, Protestants dominate the Republi-
can ranks.
Small Christian Communities: their Mission
I turn now to our study of SCCs. These small groups, by whatever name,
have been blessed by Popes Paul VI and John Paul II.3
The Charismatic Prayer Groups (Ch) trace their history back to the late
1960s, and reflect one major response to Vatican II. While their movement
has lost much of the excitement and momentum that attracted millions of
Catholics to it in the 1970s, it is still an important movement, generally
traditional and supportive of the papacy. Also an outgrowth of Vatican II
are groups linked with the Call to Action Movement identified in our study
either as Call To Action (CTA) or as Eucharist Centered Communities
(ECC). The essential difference between CTA and ECC is whether or not
the group specifically included the celebration of the Eucharist as a central
part of its gathering activity. These groups tended to be autonomous, and
relatively independent of the institutional church, while the charismatics were
highly institutionalized, even while enjoying considerable lay leadership and
autonomy (Csordas, 1997).
The largest SCC types in terms of numbers are the small general com-
3
For an excellent historical overview, see John Vandenakker, Small Christian Communities
in the Catholic Church, 1993. Kansas City: Sheed and Ward. Vandenakker traced the history
of small faith communities back to the early Church, and provided a social and theological
critique of their emergence in Africa and Latin America as an outcome of Vatican II. He
then devoted a major portion of the book to the organizations within the United States that
were promoting the growth of small Christian communities, evaluated their theological ground-
ings, and indicated which ones seemed to fit the criteria set forth in the writings and speeches
of Popes Paul VI and John Paul II. In addition to the organizations he cited, we have added
others that fit a broader definition of small Christian communities. For purposes of this
paper, the important criterion under consideration is the degree to which they are com-
mitted to a broad communitarian view of the world.
munity types (SGC), a composite of the types identified by Vandenakker.

Despite strong institutional ties, these types also enjoy a significant amount
of lay leadership and autonomy. The Hispanics are rapidly growing, espe-
cially in the South, Southwest and California. And college campus com-
munities (CCC) are beginning to show signs of development beyond the
more traditional kinds of campus ministry.4
We began our study knowing that the groups on the left were openly
committed to both church reform, and to living the gospel in the world,
seeking various levels of involvement. We soon learned through interviews
and reading of documents published by the groups in the middle, that the
leaders of the groups feeding into the SCC movement had a long term
vision of commitment, what they called the Church's mission to the world.
For example, a movement called RENEW began in 1978 under the spon-
sorship of Bishop Gerity of the Newark, NJ. Diocese, as an effort to keep
alive the spirit of Vatican II. In the past 17 years it has spread to 124 dio-
ceses in the U.S. and in some places in England and in other countries. In
the U.S. it is estimated that some 3.5 million Catholics in groups of 8-10
each have participated in RENEW, studying scripture, praying, and learn-
ing to share faith stories, in six week periods during Lent and Advent, for
periods up to three years.
The leaders of the RENEW Movement see the initial three year approach
as a stepping stone to long term, community involvement which they are
now promoting as part of what they call Post-RENEW. They are explicit
about anchoring their program in parish-based communities. Further, they
explain the purpose of the community is to help people live more like Christ.
And that means living a message with social implications, namely how peo-
ple love one another. A small Christian community's journey includes reach-
ing out to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, comfort the afflicted. These
small communities are different from service clubs to the extent the people
are conscious of the implications of the mission of Jesus. This may mean
at the individual level something as simple as being a care giver for an
elderly person, or at the group level it may mean working to replace unjust
laws and policies regarding medical benefits or housing for the elderly.
4
Research on Catholics across generations (Davidson et al., 1997; D'Antonio et al., 1996)
have consistently shown that younger Catholics are less bound to the Church as institution,
more privatized in their beliefs. So the question arises, if communitarianism is part of the
Catholic ethos, and if that ethos is at least in some degree provided to generations via the
institutional Church and its teachings, in this case its teachings on social responsibility, may
not the privatization that has resulted from the young people's rejection of the Church's
teachings on sexual matters, have negative consequences for its social teachings? Thus, the
growth of SCCs on college campuses may be a vital element in the continued vitality of a
Catholic communitarian ethic.
Thus, the SCCs have as one of their explicit goals bringing the message
of Jesus to the public arena. Preliminary examination of the research data
suggests there are three stages in the development of a social conscience that
leads to outreach in more than general, vague verbal support for the poor.
Stage 1: people act primarily to help members of the group to which they
belong;
Stage 2: people move out into the larger public community and volunteer
their time in soup kitchens, AIDS hospitals, and the like, and
donate money to worthy public causes;
Stage 3: people address issues of Church and civil society, with the hope
of bringing about some change in laws and policies.
Research Findings
Stage 1: Membership in small groups over time invariably led people to

see members as part of an extended family. Thus, when members
needed help they came to expect and receive support from other
group members. We found this to be as normal as Wuthnow did
(1994). The data showed that most people were preoccupied with
meeting the needs and demands of other group members, and did
not proceed beyond stage 1.
Stage 2: We found also that over time, a smaller percentage of people
moved beyond the confines of their group to participate in some
kind of outreach activity. Whether the activity was a function of
the group or of the individual acting on her/his own but inspired
by the group seemed to depend on the size of the group. The
smaller the group the more active it was as a group in helping its
members. But the less able it was to participate in community
wide activities especially as the latter might appear to be contro-
versial. There is a long history of Stage 2 volunteerism in American
society, and it currently enjoys bipartisan political support. (Bezilla,
ed.; 1992-93; The New Volunterism Campaign, Newsweek, April
28, 1997: 28-32).
Stage 3: The third stage was achieved only by a small number of groups,
and generally these groups had been in existence for longer peri-
ods of time.
In examining the data from our study, we have continually asked the ques-
tion posed by Greeley, namely, is there evidence of a persisting communi-
Table 2. Activities SCCs Engage in at Every Meeting, by SGC Type

(in percentages)
ECC CTA SGC CCC H/L CH
Prayer 80 92 92 95 97 100
Faith Sharing 59 83 85 57 78 85
Read/Discuss Scripture 63 70 78 52 94 76
Spirituality 59 61 58 71 61 15
Group Silence 30 38 36 19 32 64
Weekend Eucharist 64 14 - 57 34 25
Theological Reflection 33 32 24 29 22 12
Sharing Visions 31 32 20 5 18 21
Home Eucharist 34 4 3 10 4 6
Evangelization 3 3 - 10 45 30
Helping SCC Members 27 19 23 24 31 17
Helping in Need 27 18 16 24 21 12
Issues 21 25 8 10 19 2
N 70 94 526 21 104 98
Note: In many cases, percentages do not add up to 100% because missing cases (people
who did not answer the question for one reason or another) are not included.
ECC (Eucharistic Centered Communities)
CTA (Call to Action)
SGC (Small General Communities)
CCC (College Campus Communities)
H/L (Hispanic/Latino Communities)
CH (Charismatics)
tarian ethic among Catholics that will lead them (a) into small communi-
ties, and then eventually (b) from stages 1 and 2 to stage 3? And if so, what
is the nature of the behavior that qualifies it as communitarian?
The findings are summarized in two tables. Table 2 reports what SCCs
do when they gather; Table 3 compares four SCC types with a national
survey of Catholics on a range of attitudes, including religious, political ori-
entations, and attitudes toward helping others, as well as actual behaviors
involving possible kinds of mission outreach.
SCC members tend to be highly educated, with large majorities of some
types (ECC and CTA especially) having graduate and professional degrees
beyond the BA. The great majority of members are aged 50 and older,
with financial security, and beyond the child-rearing stages of life. The most
notable exception to these generalizations are the Hispanics; they are younger,
with half their membership under age forty, and still struggling to find their
place in the American economy. And, of course, the campus groups are
made up primarily of undergraduate and graduate students.
Table 2 shows the activities that the six types of SCCs engaged in at
their regular meetings. As expected, prayer, faith sharing, reading and dis-
cussion of scriptures were common activities of all types. A majority of all
types also said that spiritual nourishment in one form or another was a reg-
ular practice at every meeting.
Much less common to the six types were the activities listed at the bot-
tom of the table. These items in their full statement read:
a Helping members of our SCC;

b — reaching out to the parish and the wider community to serve in soup
kitchens, hospices, tutorial work and other acts of charity;
c - addressing structural issues of Church or civil society.
The Hispanics were most likely to say they devoted some time at each meet-
ing to helping fellow members. All groups provided social support in times
of grief, trauma and crises: providing food to members who were ill, or to
families grieving the death of a member was a common cross-type experi-
ence. So was prayer. Overall, about one in four groups within each type
devoted some time to this activity at every meeting.
While ECC, Hispanic and College groups were about as likely to reach
out into stage 2 activities, Charismatics and perhaps the General SC type
were somewhat less likely to confront these issues at their every meeting.
When it came to addressing structural issues, again only three types had
as many as 20% engaged in this activity on a regular basis. ECC and CTA
groups addressed racial, sexual issues, welfare reform, human rights viola-
tions in Central America, the Gulf War and the like and what they could
do to counter prevailing trends, while Hispanics tried to confront their own
socio-economic situation and how to overcome bias and discrimination as
they struggled to find their place in American society.
Table 3 presents findings from a national random sample of U.S. adult
Catholics, which we have compared with random samples from four of the
six SCCs.5 For purposes of this paper, the national sample data were divided
into two groups:
a - American Roman Catholics (ARC) who still identified themselves as

Roman Catholics, but who responded to an open-ended question to
5
The college groups were in final examinations and not able to complete the questionnaire;
the return rate for Hispanics was well below 50%, so they were also not included in this
part of the study.
Table 3. Attitudes and Behaviors of U.S. Catholics on a Range of Issues

(in percentages and by types)
ECC CTA SGC Ch ARC CGP

N = 103 114 188 105 401 266
1. Mass Attendance
a. daily 4 18 17 37 3 8
b. weekly 57 58 74 58 30 50
c. at least monthly 35 19 7 2 21 19
d. seldom/never 3 3 - 1 46 23
2. Religiously
a. conservative 4 17 44 70 33 43
b. moderate 5 21 23 19 21 19
c. liberal 88 63 31 5 42 36
3. Politically
a. conservative 8 21 45 71 34 39
b. moderate 12 18 22 15 19 18
c. liberal 77 62 32 6 38 40
4. You can be a good
Catholic without
donating time or money
to help the needy
a. Agree 19 18 33 23 64 50
b. disagree 71 73 59 63 34 49
5. Helping others is very
important to me 89 88 83 83 73 83
6. Work in soup kitchen 48 60 44 50 20 31
7. Attend mtg. Catholic
Social Justice group 61 72 39 26 8 20
8. Participate in local
politics, service clubs 48 48 28 17 25 40
9. Political issues are very
important to me 47 32 24 20 26 24
10. Member, Right-to-
Life group 5 9 12 33 6 5
ECC - Eucharist-centered Communities CTA - Call To Action
SGC - Small General Communities Ch - Charismatic Groups
ARC - Average Roman Catholics in CGp - Roman Catholics in
national sample, not members national sample who belong
of religious groups to a religious group
the effect that they had not been nor were they now members of any
small group with a religious or spiritual orientation.
b - Roman Catholics (CGp) who responded to the open-ended question by
stating and specifying the small group or groups with a religious/spir-
itual orientation they had been or still were members of. This group
(one in three Catholics) is identified in the table as CRGs (Catholics
in Religious Groups).
Table 3 provides a broader picture of the US Catholic population, its atti-

tudes and behaviors regarding a possible communitarian ethic. The Ns here
for the SCC types represent individual members of SCC groups. Regarding
daily and weekly Mass attendance, the Charismatics were the most likely
to attend at least weekly, with the average Catholics the least likely to attend
Mass at least weekly. But the more interesting finding may simply be that
small group membership was a strong predictor of Mass attendance among
all types of Catholics.
ECC and CTA were the most liberal both religiously and politically (items
1 and 3), with the Charismatics the most conservative in both instances.
Both Catholic subtypes in the national sample were slightly more liberal
than conservative.
We have asked question 4 in two previous national surveys of adult
Catholics (D'Antonio et al., 1989 and 1996). In the more recent survey
(1996: 79) a majority agreed, and in the earlier survey (1989: 57), 44%
agreed that a person could be a good Catholic without donating time or
money to help the needy. Thus, Catholics in the national sample mirrored
the national trends in their attitudes toward the poor and welfare. But the
same cannot be said of members of SCCs. Strong majorities of all four
types disagreed with this statement, thus, supporting the ethic of social
responsibility.
In contrast, a question taken from another part of the survey, asking peo-
ple what things were important in their lives, showed a much more sym-
pathetic response to helping others. Of course, this response could simply
mean helping others in their group, or simple outreach activities like serving
in a soup kitchen once or twice a month. And these activities have been long
extolled as a part of American volunteerism. Even Ronald Reagan gave
verbal support to these activities, as long as they were non-governmental.
Indeed, almost half of all SCC types said they did work in soup kitchens
on a regular basis. By contrast, only a minority of the two Catholic types
in the national sample said they worked in a soup kitchen, or did other
acts of charity.
Items 7, 8 and 9 show that the ECC and CTA members were much
more likely than any of the others to actually attend meetings or consider
as very important to themselves social justice and political issues. These were
the Catholics who represented the broadest meaning of communitarianism.
Finally, we see that one in three Charismatics said they belonged to a
right-to-life group, while small percentages of all others also did.
Discussion
Does the evidence (a) support the proposition that U.S. Catholics, led by
the bishops, have breached the wall of separation of religious belief from the
public arena, and (b)support the existence of a communitarian ethic in the
U.S. Catholic population that may be expected to manifest itself as a grow-
ing force in the public arena in the next millennium?
1 To the extent that support for Medicare, Medicaid, education, envi-
ronment, Family Leave and related legislation reflects the communitarian
spirit, and I believe it does, then Catholics more than Protestants evidenced
it in our 1996 national elections.
2 - To the extent that helping others, being concerned for others beyond
the narrow confines of one's own group, reflects a communitarian ethic,
then Table 3 showed that at least some types of Catholics (ECC and CTA
especially), and SGC to a lesser extent, do reflect this ethic. The evidence
is much weaker in the national samples.6
CTA and ECC types are the smallest in numbers of groups and total
members, with a total known adult population around 20,000. SGC has
large numbers, about 300,000 adults, spread throughout all regions of the
country.
There is certainly a movement to restore a moderate/liberal voice to
American politics. A recently formed Interfaith Alliance of religious and
other leaders, including Catholics, has begun to speak out on matters of
national policy as a counter to the Christian right.
3 - Consider: the leaders of the national organizations devoted to the growth
of SCCs, see mission to the world as the ultimate goal of SCC activity.
What are the possibilities?
6
In a 1997 study of U.S. Catholics, the authors reported that "over 90% say that help-
ing the needy is an important part of their own religious beliefs, and 58% accept the idea
that Catholics have a special responsibility to help close the gap between the rich and the
poor" (Davidson et al., 1997: 201).
a — Catholic women gave 59% of their vote to Clinton;

b — Catholic women outnumber men in all but one SCC type;
c - Catholic women in SCCs are highly educated, generally beyond the
child-rearing years, and increasingly open to what they call "a new way
of being church."
d — Hispanics gave 81% of their vote to Clinton; the economy, immigra-
tion issues and social legislation aimed at helping the disadvantaged
will appeal to them for many years to come.
e - Hispanics are the most rapidly growing segment of the U.S. and Catholic
populations.
f — Some 11,000 young Catholics have become active in SCCs on college
campuses. Will they, can they grow to become a leadership core for
the next generation? And will communitarian ideals outweigh the strong
current of individualism that still pervades American society? In the
1996 election, 57% of young Catholics ages 18-29 voted for Clinton.
g — Jews and Catholics are the most Democratic of all major religious
denominations in the U.S. Senate, currently constituting 53% of all
Democrats in the Senate. And they have been consistent in their sup-
port of communitarian programs. Catholics, now numbering about one
in four U.S. citizens, will probably increase their numbers in the com-
ing decades, with the growth of Hispanic and Asian-American groups,
which while no longer overwhelmingly Catholic, can be expected to
remain majority Catholic. Thus, the Catholic vote and the degree to
which that vote reflects a communitarian ethic can have important
implications for the direction of U.S. policies in the coming decade.
So far at least, the U.S. bishops have been more active in promoting their
anti-abortion stand than in promoting social issues. Only a minority of the
laity stand with the bishops on their absolutist position against abortion.
While the bishops have strong support in both houses of Congress among
anti-abortion Catholics (overwhelmingly Republican), they appear not to
have been willing or able to establish close working ties with communitarian-
oriented Catholics (especially Democrats) in the House and Senate.7
Can the SCC movement, with its vision of commitment to the public
arena, succeed with primarily lay leadership? The next three to five years
7
At this writing, we are carrying out a longitudinal study of the religious affiliation of
Senate and House members, and relating it to their voting patterns on major social legisla-
tion. It may well be as Greeley has argued, that both the communitarian and individualis-
tic ethics reflected in Catholic and Jewish cultural patterns on the one hand and Protestant
patterns on the other are alive in American politics, even if in muted form.
may well tell us whether this movement like so many before it has run its
course, or, has the staying power to find and support communitarian-oriented
candidates for public office.
REFERENCES
Burns, Gene. 1992. The Frontiers of Catholicism. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Carter, Stephen. 1993. The Culture of Disbelief. New York: Basic Books.
Casanova, Jose. 1994. Public Religion in the Modern World. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Csordas, T.J. 1997. Language, Charisma, and Creativity: The Ritual Life of a Religious Movement.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
D'Antonio, W.V. et al., 1989. American Catholic Laity in a Changing Church. Kansas City: Sheed
and Ward.
1996. Laity, American and Catholic Transforming the Church. Kansas City: Sheed and Ward.
Davidson, J.D. et al., 1997. The Search for Common Ground. Huntington, Ind: Our Sunday
Visitor Publ. Co.
DiMaggio, P. et al., 1996. "Have Americans' Social Attitudes Become More Polarized?"
American Journal of Sociology. 102:3 (690—755).
Greeley, Andrew M. February 22, 1997. "Polarized Catholics? Don't Believe Your Mail."
America.
1989. "Protestant and Catholic: Is the Analogical Imagination Extinct?" American Sociological
Review 54:485-502.
Hunter, J.D. 1991. Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. New York: Basic Books.
Paul VI, Pope. 1967. Populorum Progressio (On the Progress of People). Vatican City.
1968. Humanae Vitae (On Human Life). Vatican City.
Roof, W. Clark, and W. McKinney. 1987. America's Mainline Religion. Its Changing Shape and
Future. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.
Tracy, David. 1982. The Analogical Imagination. New York: Seabury Press.
Vandennaker, John. 1993. Small Christian Communities and the Parish. Kansas City: Sheed and
Ward.
White, J. and W.V. D'Antonio, 1997. "The Catholic Vote in Election '96", in The Public
Perspective. 8: 4 (45-48).
Wuthnow, Robert. 1994. Sharing the Journey. New York: Free Press.
7. BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY: DE-FACTO TRANSNATIONALISM
IN IMMIGRATION POLICY1
Saskia Sassen
While the state continues to play the most important role in immigration
policy making and implementation, the state itself has been transformed by
the growth of a global economic system and other transnational processes.
These have brought on conditions that bear on the state's regulatory role
and its autonomy. Two particular aspects of this development are of significance
to the role of the state in immigration policy making and implementation:
One is the relocation of various components of state authority to suprana-
tional organizations such as the institutions of the European Union, the
newly formed World Trade Organization, or the international human rights
code. A second is the de-facto privatization of various governance functions
as a result of the privatization of public sector activities and of economic
deregulation. This privatization assumes particular meanings in the context
of the internationalization of trade and investment. Corporations, markets
and free trade agreements are now in charge of "governing" an increas-
ing share of cross-border flows, including cross-border flows of specialized
professional workers as part of the international trade and investment in
services.
The major implication for immigration policy is that these developments
have had an impact on the sovereignty of the state and, further, that the
state itself has been a participant in the implementation of many of these
new arrangements. The state has contributed to the formation of the global
economic system and has furthered the consensus around the pursuit of eco-
nomic globalization. (See various chapters in Mittelman, 1996; Sassen, 1999).
Both the impact on the state's sovereignty and the state's participation in
the new global economic system have transformed the state itself, affected
the power of different agencies within it, and furthered the international-
ization of the inter-state system through a proliferation of bi- and multilat-
eral agreements.
1
Reprinted from European Journal of Migration and Law 1: 177-198 (1999), based on a paper
originally delivered at the 1997 International Meeting of the Institute of Sociology. The
broader issues about the state and the global economy are developed in the author's Losing
Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (Columbia University Press, 1996) and in Guests
and Aliens (New York: New Press, 1999).
DE-FACTO TRANSNATIONALISM IN IMMIGRATION POLICY 129
Immigration policy is deeply embedded in the question of state sover-

eignty and the inter-state system. As a result it is no longer sufficient sim-
ply to assert the sovereign role of the state in immigration policy design
and implementation; it is necessary to examine also the transformation of
the state itself and what that can entail for migration policy and the regu-
lation of migration flows and settlement. As I argue elsewhere (1999b), it is
becoming important to factor in the possibility of declining state sovereignty
precisely because the state is a major actor in immigration policy and reg-
ulation. Nor is it sufficient simply to assert that globalization has brought
with it a declining significance of the state in economic regulation. Why?
Because the state has been a participant in this process and is the strategic
institution for the legislative changes and innovations necessary for economic
globalization as we know it today.
This may seem far removed from the question of immigration policy. But
we need to expand the analytic terrain within which we examine the options
in immigration policy making in the highly developed countries. And we
cannot simply use the state as a background fact, a given.
One of the crucial issues in the transformation of the state that is rele-
vant to immigration policy making has to do with the enormous work of
legal innovation necessary for the formation of a global economy. The global
economy is both a set of practices and a set of legal innovations within
which to encase those practices (Sassen, 1996). Economic globalization has
created a new geography of power within which the state finds its sover-
eign power reconstituted, often diminished. And it has contributed to the
formation of new legal regimes and much legal and policy innovation, much
of it representing a relocation of authority away from the state.
Immigration policy-making in contrast, has suffered from a lack of inno-
vation in most highly developed countries, with the exception of the work
around the formation of the European Union and free trade agreements
such as NAFTA and the Uruguay Round of the GATT. In the case of
Europe, such policy changes as free movement within the Union and the
shift of some immigration policy components to the European level, have
required considerable innovation in international law. NAFTA and WTO
required the formation of specialized regimes for the circulation of profes-
sional services and other kinds of providers; this is likely to include indi-
viduals, particularly in the case of many professional services. These regimes
within NAFTA and WTO can be seen as containing a form of "migrant
worker policy," only that it is addressed to highly specialized workers.
Although they are supra-national regimes, there is a growing influence of
private sector interests.
These are the issues briefly discussed in this article. One organizing
130 SASKIA SASSEN
argument is that this reconfiguration has brought with it a de-facto trans-

nationalism in the handling of a growing number of immigration issues,
both domestically and internationally. This can take many forms: the shift
of certain elements of immigration policy onto supra-national institutions in
the European Union; the sharp increase in the extent and content of col-
laboration in the US-Mexico Binational Immigration Commisssion; the rapid
increase in the use of international human rights instruments by judges adju-
dicating on immigration and refugee questions in both Europe and the US;
and the already mentioned formation of a privatized regime for the circu-
lation of service workers in the major free-trade agreements as part of the
liberalization of international trade and investment in services. I consider
these and other developments a de-facto transnationalism because they are
fragmented, incipient and have not been fully captured at the most formal
levels of international public law and conventions, nor in national repre-
sentations of the sovereign state. My argument is, then, that there is more
on-the-ground transnationalism than hits the formal eye.
In order to develop this particular way of framing the evidence it is impor-
tant first to bring some precision to concepts such as economic globaliza-
tion and transnationalism and their impact on sovereignty and exclusive
state authority over its territory. This is the subject of a first, very brief sec-
tion, confined largely to states operating under the rule of law. The second
and third sections focus on the constraints faced by the state in highly devel-
oped countries in the making of immigration policy today.
I. The State and the New Economic Regime
Two notions underlie much of the discussion about globalization. One is

the proposition that what the global economy gains, the national state loses
and vice versa. The other is the proposition that if an event (from business
transactions to judiciary decisions) takes place in a national territory it is a
national event. In other words, dualism and geography (in a narrow terri-
torial sense) are the hallmarks of this type of understanding.
But there is by now a considerable body of scholarship that has shown
us that the spatiality of the global economy does not simply lie somewhere
in the interstices between states (e.g. various chapters in Mittelman, 1996,
and in Knox and Taylor, 1995). To a good extent global processes and
institutional arrangements materialize in national territories; even the most
digitalized global financial market is grounded in a set of very material
resources and spaces largely embedded in national territories. As has been
said often, one of the key properties of the current phase in the long his-
tory of the world economy is the ascendance of information technologies,

the associated increase in the mobility and liquidity of capital, and the result-
ing decline in the regulatory capacities of national states over key sectors
of their economies. This is well illustrated by the case of the leading infor-
mation industries, finance and the advanced corporate services. These tend
to have a space economy that is transnational and is partly embedded in
electronic spaces that override conventional jurisdictions and boundaries.
Yet, this is also a space economy which reveals the need for strategic
sites with vast concentrations of resources and infrastructure, sites that are
situated in national territories and are far less mobile than much of the gen-
eral commentary on the global economy suggests. The excessive emphasis
on the hypermobility and liquidity of capital is a partial account. We need
to distinguish between the capacity for global transmission/communication
and the material conditions that make this possible, between the globaliza-
tion of the financial industry and the array of resources—from buildings to
labor inputs—that makes this possible; and so on for other sectors as well.2
Place is central to the multiple circuits through which economic globaliza-
tion is constituted. One strategic type of place for these developments is the
global city.3
As a consequence of this embedding of global processes in national ter-
ritories, notably in global cities, one of the key features of the role of the
state vis a vis economic globalization (unlike earlier forms of the global econ-
omy) has been to negotiate the intersection of national law and foreign
actors—whether firms, markets or individuals. We generally use the term
"deregulation" to describe the outcome of this negotiation. The problem with
this term is that it only captures the withdrawal of the state from regulat-
ing its economy. It does not register all the ways in which the state participates
2
Alongside the well-documented spatial dispersal of economic activities, new forms of ter-
ritorial centralization of top-level management and control operations have appeared. National
and global markets as well as globally integrated operations require central places where the
work of globalization gets done. Further, information industries require a vast physical infra-
structure containing strategic nodes with hyperconcentrations of facilities. Finally, even the
most advanced information industries have a work process—that is, a complex of workers,
machines and buildings that are more place-bound than the imagery of information outputs
suggests. I develop this in Sassen, 2000.
3
Global cities are centers for the servicing and financing of international trade, investment,
and headquarter operations. That is to say, the multiplicity of specialized activities present
in global cities are crucial in the valorization, indeed overvalorization of leading sectors of
capital today. And in this sense they are strategic production sites for today's leading eco-
nomic sectors. Elsewhere (Sassen, 2000) I have looked at cities as production sites for the
leading service industries of our time; one concern was to recover the infrastructure of activ-
ities, firms and jobs, that is necessary to run the advanced corporate economy. I focused on
the practice of global control: the work of producing and reproducing the organization and
management of a global production system and a global marketplace for finance.
132 SASKIA SASSEN
in setting up the new frameworks through which globalization is furthered;

nor does it capture the associated transformations inside the state. (See
Sassen, 1996; see also e.g. Smith et al., 1999; Olds et al., 1999; Biersteker
et al., forthcoming; Drache and Gertler, 1991)
Coding everything that involves the national state as an instance of the
national is simply inadequate. The theoretical and methodological challenge
presented by the current phase of globalization is that it entails a tran-
scending of exclusive national territoriality and of the interstate system yet
is implanted in national territories and institutions. Hence globalization
directly engages two marking features of the nation state: exclusive territo-
riality and sovereignty.
Similary, the emergent international human rights regime engages terri-
toriality and sovereignty. What matters here is not so much the moral force
of the idea, but the far more practical fact of a rapid multiplication of
instruments available to judges and the build-up of case law where this
applies, as in the US for example (e.g. Jacobson, 1996; Reisman, 1990).
The key issue here is the fact that international regimes or codes, such as
human rights, largely become operative in national courts. One could of
course simply assert that in such cases we are dealing with what is ulti-
mately a national institution. To do so means discounting even the possi-
bility that the ascendance of such international regimes engages the sovereignty
and territoriality of the national state. And since the multiplication of instru-
ments and their growing use by national courts is a very recent develop-
ment—unlike the concept of human rights—we must at least allow for the
possibility that there are new processes afoot also in this realm.
In terms of sovereignty, the emergent consensus in the community of
states to further globalization has created a set of specific obligations on
participating states. The state remains as the ultimate guarantor of the
"rights" of global capital, i.e. the protection of contracts and property rights.
Thus the state has incorporated the global project of its own shrinking role
in regulating economic transactions (Cox, 1987; Panitch, 1996). Firms oper-
ating transnationally want to ensure the functions traditionally exercised by
the state in the national realm of the economy, notably guaranteeing prop-
erty rights and contracts. The state here can be conceived of as represent-
ing a technical administrative capacity which cannot be replicated at this
time by any other institutional arrangement; furthermore, this is a capacity
backed by military power, with global power in the case of some states.
Deregulation and other policies furthering economic globalization cannot
simply be considered as an instance of a declining significance of the state.
Deregulation is a vehicle through which a growing number of states are
furthering economic globalization and guaranteeing the rights of global cap-
ital, an essential ingredient of the former. Deregulation and kindred poli-

cies constitute the elements of a new legal regime dependent on consensus
among states to further globalization. This manner of conceptualizing dereg-
ulation suggests that the duality national-global as mutually exclusive is prob-
lematic in that it does not adequately represent what economic globalization
has actually entailed for national states.
While central, the role of the state in producing the legal encasements
for economic globalization is no longer as exclusive as it was in earlier peri-
ods. Economic globalization has also been accompanied by the creation of
new legal regimes and legal practices and the expansion and renovation of
some older forms that bypass national legal systems. Among the most impor-
tant ones in the private sector today are international commercial arbitra-
tion and the variety of institutions which fulfill rating and advisory functions
that have become essential for the operation of the global economy.
These and other such transnational institutions and regimes do raise ques-
tions about the relation between state sovereignty and the governance of
global economic processes. International commercial arbitration is basically
a private justice system and credit rating agencies are private gate-keeping
systems. Along with other such institutions they have emerged as important
governance mechanisms whose authority is not centered in the state. They
contribute to maintain order at the top, one could say.
All of this has had an impact on sovereignty and on the mutually exclusive
territoriality that has marked the history of the modern state. This is an
extremely complex and highly differentiated history that cannot be adequately
described here. There is an enormously rich scholarship on this subject.4
There are two points I would want to emphasize about this history here
because they are relevant to the subject of this article, particularly the notion
that we may need considerable innovation in immigration policy given today's
major transformations. One of these points is the fact that at various periods
of major transitions there was a coexistence of multiple systems of rule. This
was the case, for instance in the transition from the medieval system of rule
to the modern state.3 And it may well be the case today in this period of tran-
sition to a global economy. As I will argue later, supranational organizations
4
This is a scholarship with a diversity of intellectual lineages: e.g. Ruggie, 1993; Wallerstein,
1988; Arrighi, 1995; Jessop, 1999; Rosenau, 1992; Spruyt, 1994. See Sassen, 1996 for a dis-
cussion of this literature as it concerns the particular question under discussion here.
5
Thus, there were centralizing monarchies in Western Europe, city-states in Italy and
city-leagues in Germany (See Wallerstein, 1988). Further, even at a time when we see the
emergence of nation states with exclusive territoriality and sovereignty, it can be argued that
other forms might have become effective alternatives, e.g. the analysis in Spruyt (1994) on
the Italian city-states and the Hanseatic league in northern Europe.
134 SASKIA SASSEN
today and regimes such as GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services)

and NAFTA may well signal the strengthening of other non-exclusive sys-
tems of rule today. A second element in the history of the modern state
that matters here is the fact of enormous contestation to the formation of
and claims by central states (see Tilly, 1990). Again I see this as relevant
to the contemporary period in that it signals the possibility of regimes that
go beyond state sovereignty or that involve far more developed instances of
multilateralism notwithstanding strong resistance among policy makers and
analysts to even the idea of such a possibility.
While these new conditions for transnational economies are being pro-
duced and implemented by governments and economic actors in highly
developed countries, immigration policy in those same countries remains
centered in older conceptions about control and regulation. One of the key
obstacles to even beginning to think along totally different lines about immi-
gration policy is the widespread conviction that any other approach than
border control would lead to massive invasions from the Third World. Much
general commentary and policy making wittingly or not tends to proceed
as if most people in less developed countries want to go to a rich country,
as if all immigrants want to become permanent settlers, as if the problem
of current immigration policy has to do basically with gaps or failures in
enforcement, as if raising the levels of border control is an effective way of
regulating immigration. This type of understanding of immigration clearly
leads to a certain type of immigration policy, one centered on the fear of
being invaded by people from less developed countries everywhere and hence
on border control as the only answer. The evidence on immigration shows
that most people do not want to leave their countries, that overall levels of
permanent immigration are not very large, that there is considerable cir-
culation and return migration, that most migration flows eventually stabi-
lize if not decline (See Sassen, 1999 for a review of the evidence on these
issues). Making these the central facts about the reality of immigration should
allow for a broader set of options when it comes to immigration policy than
would be the case with mass emigration and invasion. (See also Isbister,
1996).
Can the state escape the types of transformations described here regard-
ing economic globalization, and the pressures towards transnationalism they
entail, when it comes to a very different domain, that of immigration pol-
icy design and implementation?
II. Beyond Sovereignty: Constraints on States' Policy Making
In the case of immigration policy, states under the rule of law increasingly
confront a range of rights and obligations, pressures from both inside and
outside, from universal human rights to not so universal ethnic lobbies.
First, we see emerging a de facto regime, centered in international agree-
ments and conventions as well as in various rights gained by immigrants,
that limits the state's role in controlling immigration. An example of such
an agreement is the International Convention adopted by the General
Assembly of the UN on Dec. 18, 1990 on the protection of the rights of
all migrant workers and members of their families (Resolution 45/158).6
Further, there is a set of rights of resident immigrants widely upheld by
legal authorities. We have also seen the gradual expansion over the last
three decades of civil and social rights to marginal populations, whether
women, ethnic minorities, or immigrants and refugees.
In this context, the new 1996 US immigration law, which curtails the
rights of undocumented and legal immigrants, can be seen as a rejection
of these international instruments. Nonetheless, precisely because these instru-
ments exist the stage is set for at least some contestation. Indeed, some of
the provisions restricting the rights of resident immigrants to welfare sup-
port have already had to be eliminated or diluted.
We have seen this contestation frequently in the long and arduous his-
tory of international human rights codes. The extension of rights, which has
taken place mostly through the judiciary has confronted states with a num-
ber of constraints in the area of immigration and refugee policy. For instance,
there have been attempts by the legislature in France and Germany to limit
family reunification which were blocked by administrative and constitutional
courts on the grounds that such restrictions would violate international agree-
ments. The courts have also regularly supported a combination of rights of
resident immigrants which have the effect of limiting the government's power
over resident immigrants. Similarly such courts have limited the ability of
governments to restrict or stop asylum seekers from entering the country.
Efforts that mix the conventions on universal human rights and national
judiciaries assume many different forms. Some of the instances in the US
are the sanctuary movement in the 1980s which sought to establish protected
b
It should be said that no developed country has signed this convention, mainly because
they are unwilling to relinquish discretionary control over migrant workers. Yet the Convention
does have moral authority and has served its purposes on various occasions in Europe, dis-
cussed later. The European Commission's 1994 Communication on Immigration and Asylum
proposed that all member states ratify the UN Convention on workers.
136 SASKIA SASSEN
areas, typically in churches, for refugees from Central America; judicial bat-
tles, such as those around the status of Salvadoreans granted indefinite stays
though formally defined as illegal; the fight for the rights of detained Haitians
in an earlier wave of boat lifts. It is clear that notwithstanding the lack of
an enforcement apparatus, human rights limit the discretion of states in how
they treat non-nationals on their territory. It is also worth noting in this
regard that UNHCR is the only UN agency with a universally conceded
right of access to a country experiencing a refugee crisis.
The growing influence of human rights law is particularly evident in
Europe. It was not until the 1980s that the same began in the US, though
it still lags behind.7 This has been seen partly as a result of American
definitions of personhood which have led courts in some cases to address
the matter of undocumented immigrants within American constitutionalism,
notably the idea of inalienable and natural rights of people and persons,
without territorial confines. The emphasis on persons makes possible inter-
pretations about undocumented immigrants, in a way it would not if the
emphasis were on citizens. (For a debate on these issues see Indiana Journal
of Global Legal Studies, 2000.) It was not till the mid 1970s and the early
1980s that domestic courts began to consider human rights codes as nor-
mative instruments in their own right. The rapid growth of undocumented
immigration and the sense of the state's incapacity to control the flow and
to regulate the various categories in its population was a factor leading
courts to consider the international human rights regime; it allows courts
to rule on basic protections of individuals not formally accounted in the
national territory and legal system, notably undocumented aliens and unau-
thorized refugees.8
The growing accountability, in principle, of states under the rule of law
to international human rights codes and institutions, together with the fact
that individuals and non-state actors can make claims on those states in
terms of those codes, signals a development that goes beyond the expan-
sion of human rights within the framework of nation-states. It contributes
to redefine the bases of legitimacy of states under the rule of law and the
notion of nationality. Under human rights regimes states must increasingly
7
And its weight in many of the Latin American countries is dubious. For a very detailed
(and harrowing) account of the situation in Mexico, see Redding, 1996. See also generally
Sikkink, 1993.
8
For instance, the Universal Declaration was cited in 76 federal cases from 1948 through
1994; over 90% of those cases took place since 1980 and of those, 49 percent involved
immigration issues, and 54% if we add refugees (Jacobson, 1996: 97). Jacobson also found
that the term "human rights" was referred to in 19 federal cases before the 20th century,
34 times from 1900 to 1944. 191 from 1945 to 1969, 803 cases in the 1970s, over 2,000
in the 1980s, and, estimated at 4,000 cases through the 1990s.
take account of persons qua persons, rather than qua citizens. The indi-
vidual is now an object of law and a site for rights regardless of whether
a citizen or an alien.9
Finally, the numbers and kinds of political actors involved in immigra-
tion policy debates and policy making in Western Europe, North America,
and Japan are far greater than they were two decades ago: the European
Union, anti-immigrant parties, vast networks of organizations in both Europe
and North America that often represent immigrants, or claim to do so, and
fight for immigrant rights, immigrant associations and immigrant politicians,
mostly in the second generation, and, especially in the US so-called ethnic
lobbies.10 The policy process for immigration is no longer confined to a nar-
row governmental arena of ministerial and administrative interaction. Public
opinion and public political debate have become part of the arena wherein
immigration policy is shaped." Whole parties position themselves politically
in terms of their stand on immigration, especially in some of the European
countries.
These developments are particularly evident in the case of the Euro-
pean Union.12 Europe's single market program has had a powerful impact
9
There is a whole debate about the notion of citizenship and what it means in the cur-
rent context (See Soysal, 1994; Baubock, 1994; Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 2000).
One trend in this debate is a return to notions of cities and citizenship, particularly in so-
called global cities, which are partly de-nationalized territories and have high concentrations
of non-nationals from many different parts of the world (e.g. Holston, 1996; Friedmann,
1995; Knox and Taylor, 1995; Social Justice, 1993; Copjec and Sorkin, 1999). The ascen-
dance of human rights codes strengthens these tendencies to move away from nationality
and national territory as absolute categories.
10
While these developments are well known for the cases of Europe and North America,
there is not much general awareness of the fact that we are seeing incipient forms in Japan
as well (See, e.g. Shank, 1995; Sassen, 2000; 1998: chapter 4). For instance in Japan today
we see a strong group of human rights advocates for immigrants; efforts by non-official
unions to organize undocumented immigrant workers; organizations working on behalf of
immigrants which receive funding from individuals or government institutions in sending
countries (e.g. the Thai Ambassador to Japan announced in October 1995 that his govern-
ment will give a total of 2.5 million baht, about US$ 100,000, to five civic groups that assist
Thai migrant workers, especially undocumented ones; see Japan Times, October 18 1995).
11
Further, the growth of immigration, refugee flows, ethnicity and regionalism, raise ques-
tions about the accepted notion of citizenship in contemporary nation-states and hence about
the formal structures for accountability. My research on the international circulation of capital
and labor has raised questions for me on the meaning of such concepts as national economy
and national workforce under conditions of growing internationalization of capital and the
growing presence of immigrant workers in major industrial countries. Furthermore, the rise
of ethnicity in the US and in Europe among a mobile work-force raises questions about the
content of the concept of nation-based citizenship. The portability of national identity raises
questions about the bonds with other countries, or localities within them; and the resurgence
of ethnic regionalism creates barriers to the political incorporation of new immigrants.
12
There is a large and rich literature on the development of immigration policy at the
European level. A bibliography and analyses on the particular angle under discussion
138 SASKIA SASSEN
in raising the prominence of various issues associated with free circulation

of people as an essential element in creating a frontier-free community; ear-
lier EC institutions lacked the legal competence to deal with many of these
issues but had to begin to address them. Gradually EC institutions wound
up more deeply involved with visa policy, family reunification and migra-
tion policy—all formerly exclusively in the domain of the individual national
states. National governments resisted EC (and later EU) involvement in these
once exclusively national domains. But now both legal and practical issues
have made such involvement acceptable and inevitable notwithstanding many
public pronouncements to the contrary.
It is becoming evident that many aspects of immigration and refugee pol-
icy intersect with EU legal competence. A key nexus here is the free move-
ment of persons and attendant social rights as part of the formation of a
single market. In practice the EU is assuming an increasingly important role
and the fact that immigration is a long-term feature in these countries is
slowly being acknowledged. The monetary and economic union would require
greater flexibility in movement of workers and their families and thereby
pose increasing problems for national immigration laws regarding non-EU
nationals in EU member states. Although the third-country national popu-
lation is very small, politically they are a very important issue. There is now
growing recognition for the need of an EU-wide immigration policy, some-
thing denied for a long time by individual states.
In the case of the US, the combination of forces at the governmental
level is quite different yet has similar general implications about the state's
constraints in immigration policy making. Immigration policy in the US is
today largely debated and shaped by Congress, and hence is highly public
and subject to a vast multiplicity of local interests, notably ethnic lobbies.13
here—limitations on the autonomy of the state in making immigration policy—can be found

in Sassen, 1999b).
13
Jurisdiction over immigration matters in the US Congress lies with the Judiciary
Committee, not with the Foreign Affairs Committee as might have been the case. Congressional
intent on immigration is often at odds with the foreign affairs priorities of the Executive.
There is a certain policy making tug of war (Mitchell, 1989). It has not always been this
way. In the late 1940s and 1950s there was great concern with how immigration policy
could be used to advance foreign policy objectives. The history of what government agency
was responsible for immigration is rather interesting. Earlier, when the Department of Labor
(DOL) was created in 1914 it got the responsibility for immigration policy. On June 1933,
President Roosevelt combined functions into the Immigration and Naturalization Service
within DOL. The advent of WWII brought a shift in the administrative responsibility for
the country's immigration policy: in 1940 President Roosevelt recommended it be shifted to
the Department of Justice, because of the supposed political threat represented by immi-
grants from enemy countries. This was meant to last for the war and then INS was to be
returned to the DOL. But it never was. It also meant that immigration wound up in Congress
This has made it a very public process, quite different from other processes
of policy making.14
The fact that immigration in the US has historically been the preserve
of the Federal government assumes new meaning in today's context of rad-
ical devolution—the return of powers to the states.15 Aman Jr. (1995) has
noted that although political and constitutional arguments for reallocating
federal power to the states are not new, the recent re-ernergence of the
Tenth Amendment as a politically viable and popular guideline is a major
political shift since the New Deal in the relations between the federal gov-
ernment and the states. There is now an emerging conflict between several
state governments and the Federal government around the particular issue
of federal mandates concerning immigrants—such as access to public health
care and schools—without mandatory federal funding. Thus states with dis-
proportionate shares of immigrants are asserting that they are dispropor-
tionately burdened by the putative costs of immigration. In the US the costs
of immigration are an area of great debate and wide ranging estimates.16
At the heart of this conflict is the fact that the Federal Government sets
policy but does not assume responsibility, financial or otherwise for the
implementation of many key aspects of immigration policy. The radical
devolution under way now is going to accentuate some of these divisions
further.
States are beginning to request reimbursement from the Federal Government
for the costs of benefits and services that they are required to provide, espe-
cially to undocumented immigrants (Clark et al, 1994; GAO, 1994; 1995a).
In 1994, six states (Arizona, California, Florida, New Jersey, New York and
in committees traditionally reserved for lawyers, as are the Senate and House Judiciary
Committees. It has been said that this is why immigration law is so complicated (and, I
would add, so centered on the legalities of entry and so unconcerned with broader issues).
14
There are diverse social forces shaping the role of the state depending on the matter
at hand. Thus in the early 1980s bank crisis, for instance, the players were few and well
coordinated; the state basically relinquished the organizing capacity to the banks, the IMF,
and a few other actors. All very discreet, indeed so discreet that if you look closely the gov-
ernment was hardly a player in that crisis. This is quite a contrast with the deliberations
around the passing of the 1986 Immigration and Reform Control Act—which was a sort of
national brawl. In trade liberalization discussions there are often multiple players, and the
executive may or may not relinquish powers to congress.
15
In this light it is worth noting that in November 1995 a federal judge ruled large sec-
tions of Proposition 187 (passed by referendum in the state of California to be instituted in
that state) unconstitutional, citing individual rights and the fact that "the state is powerless
to enact its own scheme to regulate immigration," this being the preserve of the Federal
government of the US.
16
An important study by the Washington based Urban Institute (Clark et al., 1994) found
that immigrants contributed US$ 30 billion more in taxes than they take in services in the
early 1990s.
140 SASKIA SASSEN
Texas) filed separate suits in federal district courts to recover costs they
claimed to have sustained because of the Federal Government's failure to
enforce US immigration policy, protect the nation's borders, and provide
adequate resources for immigration emergencies (Dunlap and Morse, 1995).17
The amounts range from $50.5 million in New Jersey for Fiscal Year 1993
costs of imprisoning 500 undocumented criminal felons and construction of
future facilities, to 33.6 billion in NY for all state and county costs associ-
ated with undocumented immigration between 1988 to 1993. US District
Court judges have dismissed all six lawsuits; some of the states are appeal-
ing the decision. The conflict is illustrated by the notorious case of the state
of California and its US$ 377 million lawsuit against the Federal govern-
ment. The radical devolution under way now is going to accentuate some
of these divisions further.
One of the questions raised by these developments concerns the nature
of the control by national states in regulating immigration. The question
here is not so much, how effective is a state's control over its borders—we
know it is never absolute. The question concerns rather the substantive
nature of state control over immigration given international human rights
agreements, the extension of various social and political rights to resident
immigrants over the last twenty years, the multiplication of political actors
involved with the immigration question, and the variety of other dynamics
within which immigration is embedded—some of which may be connected
to foreign policies of the receiving states (Sassen, 1999).
We can illuminate the issue of the substantive nature of the control by
states over immigration with a twist on the zero sum argument. If a gov-
ernment closes one kind of entry category, recent history shows that another
one will have a rise in numbers. A variant on this dynamic is that if a gov-
ernment has, for instance, a very liberal policy on asylum, public opinion
may turn against all asylum seekers and close up the country totally; this
in turn is likely to promote an increase in irregular entries.18
17
Pres. Clinton's 1994 crime bill earmarked 1.8 billion in disbursements over 6 years to
help reimburse states for these incarcerations costs.
18
Increasingly, unilateral policy by a major immigration country is problematic. One of
the dramatic examples was that of Germany which began to receive massive numbers of
entrants as the other European states gradually tightened their policies and Germany kept
its very liberal asylum policy. Another case is the importance for the EU today that the
Mediterranean countries—Italy, Spain and Portugal—control their borders regarding non-
EU entrants.
III. When Different Regimes Intersect
Immigration policy continues to be characterized by its formal isolation from

other major processes, as if it were possible to handle migration as a bounded,
closed event. There are one could say, two major epistemic communities—
one concerning the flow of capital and information; the other, immigration.
Both of these epistemic communities are international, and both enjoy wide-
spread consensus in the community of states.
The coexistence of such different regimes for capital and for immigrants
has not been seen as an issue in the US. The case of the EU is of inter-
est here because it represents an advanced stage of formalization, and in
this effort European states are discovering the difficulties if not impossibil-
ity of maintaining two such diverse regimes. The European Community and
the national governments of member states have found the juxtaposition of
the divergent regimes for immigration flows and for other types of flows
rather difficult to handle. The discussion, design and implementation of pol-
icy aimed at forming a European Union make it evident that immigration
policy has to account for the facts of rapid economic internationalization.
The European Union shows us with great clarity the moment when states
need to confront this contradiction in their design of formal policy frame-
works. The other major regional systems in the world are far from that
moment and may never reach it. Yet they contain less formalized versions
of the juxtaposition between border-free economies and border controls to
keep immigrants out. NAFTA is one such instance, as are, in a more diffuse
way, various initiatives for greater economic integration in the Western
Hemisphere.
Though less clearly than in Western Europe, these issues are present in
other regions with cross-border migrations. These are regional systems con-
stituted partly as zones of influence of major economic or geo-political pow-
ers, e.g. the long term dominance of the US over the Caribbean Basin.
What matters here is that to a good extent major international migration
flows have been embedded in some or another variant of these regional sys-
tems. The quasi-transnational economic integration characterizing such
regional systems produces its own variety of contradictions between drives
for border-free economic spaces and border-control to keep immigrants and
refugees out.
There are strategic sites where it becomes clear that the existence of two
very different regimes for the circulation of capital and the circulation of
immigrants poses problems that cannot be solved through the old rules of
the game, where the facts of transnationalization weigh in on the state's
decisions regarding immigration. For instance, the need to create special
142 SASKIA SASSEN
regimes for the circulation of service workers both within the GATS and
NAFTA as part of the further internationalization of trade and investment
in services. This regime for the circulation of service workers has been
uncoupled from any notion of migration; but it represents in fact a version
of temporary labor migration. It is a regime for labor mobility which is in
good part under the oversight of entities that are quite autonomous from
the government. This points to an institutional reshuffling of some of the
components of sovereign power over entry and can be seen as an exten-
sion of the general set of processes whereby state sovereignty is partly being
decentered onto other non- or quasi-governmental entities for the gover-
nance of the global economy (Sassen, 1996).19
The development of provisions for workers and business persons signals
the difficulty of not dealing with the circulation of people in the implemen-
tation of free trade and investment frameworks. In their own specific ways
each of these efforts—NAFTA, GATS and the European Union—has had
to address cross-border labor circulation.
One instantiation of the impact of globalization on governmental policy
making can be seen in Japan's immigration law Amendment passed in 1990.
While this is quite different from how the issue plays in the context of free
trade agreements, it nonetheless illustrates one way of handling the need
for cross-border circulation of professional workers in a context of resistance
to the notion of open borders. This legislation opened the country to sev-
eral categories of highly specialized professionals with a western background
(e.g. experts in international finance, in western-style accounting, in western
medicine, etc.) in recognition of the growing internationalization of the pro-
fessional world in Japan; it made the entry of what is referred to as "sim-
ple labor" illegal (Sassen, 2000: chapter 9). This can be read as importing
"western human capital" and closing borders to immigrants.
19
For instance, NAFTA's chapters on services, financial services, telecommunications and
"business persons" contain considerable detail on the various aspects relating to people oper-
ating in a country that is not their country of citizenship. For instance, Chapter Twelve,
"Cross-Border Trade in Services" of the NAFTA (White House document, September 29,
1993) includes among its five types of measures those covering "the presence in its territory
of a service provider of another Party" under Article 1201, including both provisions for
firms and for individual workers. Under that same article there are also clear affirmations
that nothing in the agreement on cross-border trade in services imposes any obligation regard-
ing a non-national seeking access to the employment market of the other country, or to
expect any right with respect to employment. Article 1202 contains explicit conditions of
treatment of non-national service providers, so do Articles 1203, 1205, 1210 (especially Annex
1210.5), and 1213.2a and b. Similarly, Chapter Thirteen on Telecommunications and Chapter
Fourteen on Financial Services contain specific provisions for service providers, including
detailed regulations applying to workers. Chapter Sixteen on "Temporary Entry for Business
Persons" covers provisions for those "engaged in trade in goods, the provision of services or
the conduct of investment activities" (Article 1608).
Further, the need to address cross-border circulation of people has also

become evident in free trade agreements in the less developed world, notably
in Latin America. (For more detailed accounts, including the original treaty
documents see Acuerdo de Cartagena, 1991a,b,c; Leon and Kratochwil,
1993; CEPAL, 1994; Torales, 1993; Marmora, 1993; Stein, 1993) There
has been a sharp increase in activity around the international circulation of
people in each of the major regional trading blocks: Mercosur, the Grupo
Andino and the Mercado Comun de Centroamerica. Each one has launched
a variety of initiatives in the early 1990s on international labor migration
among their member countries. This is in many ways a newy development.
Some of the founding treaties precede the flurry of meetings on labor migra-
tions and the circulation of people. But it is clear that conditions in the
early 1990s forced this issue on the agenda. When one examines what actu-
ally happened it becomes evident that the common markets for investment
and commerce in each of these regions had themselves become activated
under the impact of globalization, deregulation, privatisation. It was the
increased circulation of capital, goods and information under the impact of
globalization, deregulation and privatisation that forced the question of the
circulation of people on the agenda.
In the case of the US and its major immigration source country, Mexico,
it appears that the signing of NAFTA has also had the effect of activating
a series of new initiatives regarding migration—a sort of de-facto bilateral-
ism which represents a radically new phase in the handling of migration
between these two countries. It is worth providing some detail on these.
Not unlike what was the case in Latin America, we are seeing a re-activa-
tion of older instruments and a flurry of new activity around the question
of international migration. To provide better coordination between the two
countries Presidents Carter and Lopez Portillo established the US-Mexico
Consultative Mechanism. This eventually led to the formation of the US-
Mexico Binational Commission in 1981 to serve as a forum for meetings
between Cabinet-level officials from both countries. It was conceived as a
flexible mechanism that would meet once or twice a year. One of the early
working groups formed was the Border Relations Action group, in 1981.
What is different since the mid-1990s is the frequency, focus and actual
work that is getting done in the meetings of the working groups. NAFTA
has further contributed to strengthen the contacts and collaboration in the
working groups. Particularly active is the working group on Migration and
Consular Affairs.20 There are also disagreements between the two delegations,
20
The US Delegation for this group is chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for
Consular Affairs and the INS Commissioner.
144 SASKIA SASSEN
which are discussed openly. Notably, the Mexican delegation is deeply con-
cerned about the growing anti-immigrant feeling and measures in the US,
the US delegation has agreed to work together to combat these develop-
ments. The Mexican delegation also expressed concern at the US proposal
to expand and strengthen border fences to improve security in various loca-
tions. They emphasized the negative effects of such a measure on the bor-
der communities and Mexican efforts to resolve the problems in the most
troubled locations. Notwithstanding these serious disagreements, and per-
haps precisely because of them, both delegations are convinced of the impor-
tance to continue the collaboration and communication that has developed
over the last two years.
Conclusion
All of these developments have the effect of a) reducing the autonomy of

the state in immigration policy making; and b) multiplying the sectors within
the state that are addressing immigration policy and therewith multiply-
ing the room for conflicts within the state. The assertion that the state is
in charge of immigration policy is less and less helpful. Policy making regard-
ing international issues can engage very different parts of the government.
The state itself has not only been transformed by its participation in the
global economy, but has of course never been a homogeneous actor. It is
constituted through multiple agencies and social forces. Indeed it could be
said (Mitchell, 1989) that although the state has central control over immi-
gration policy, the work of exercising that claimed power often begins with
a limited contest between the state and interested social forces. These inter-
est groups include agribusiness, manufacturing, humanitarian groups, unions,
ethnic organizations, zero population growth efforts. Today we need to add
to this the fact that the hierarchies of power and influence within the state
are being reconfigured by the furthering of economic globalization.21
The conditions within which immigration policy is being made and imple-
mented today range from the pressures of economic globalization and its
implications for the role of the state to international agreements on human
rights. And the institutional setting within which immigration policy is being
21
For instance, an item on internal changes in the state which may have impacts on
immigration policy is the ascendance of what Charles Keely has called soft security issues.
According to some observers, recent government reorganization in the departments of State,
Defense, and the CIA reflects an implicit redefinition of national security.
made and implemented ranges from national states and local states to supra-
national organizations.
Why does this transformation of the state and the inter-state system mat-
ter for the regulation of immigration? The displacement of governance func-
tions away from the state to non-state entities affects the state's capacity to
control or keep controlling its borders. New systems of governance are being
created. Increasingly they may create conflicts with the state's capacity to
keep on regulating immigration in the same ways. Further, the transfor-
mation of the state itself through its role in the implementation of global
processes, may well contribute to new constraints, options and vested inter-
ests. The ascendance of agencies linked to furthering globalization and the
decline of those linked to domestic equity questions is quite likely to even-
tually have an effect on the immigration agenda.
The developments described here point to a number of trends that may
become increasingly important for sound immigration policy making. First,
where the effort towards the formation of transnational economic spaces has
gone the farthest and been most formalized it has become very clear that
existing frameworks for immigration policy are problematic. It is not the
case that the coexistence of very different regimes for the circulation of cap-
ital and for that of people, is free of tension and contention. This is most
evident in the legislative work necessary for the formation of the European
Union. Lesser versions of this tension are evident in the need to design spe-
cial provisions for the circulation of workers in all the major free trade
agreements.
Second, we see the beginning of a displacement of government functions
on to non-governmental or quasi-governmental institutions. This is most evi-
dent in the new transnational legal and regulatory regimes created in the
context of economic globalization. But it is also intersecting with questions
of migration, specifically temporary labor migration, as is evident in the cre-
ation of special regimes for the circulation of service workers and business
persons both within the GATS and NAFTA as part of the further inter-
nationalization of trade and investment in services. This regime for the cir-
culation of service workers has been separated from any notion of migration;
but it represents in fact a version of temporary labor migration. It is a
regime for labor mobility which is in good part under the oversight of enti-
tites that are quite autonomous from the government. We can see in this
displacement the elements of a privatization of certain aspects of the regu-
lation of cross-border labor mobility.
Third, the legitimation process for states under the rule of law calls for
respect and enforcement of international human rights codes, regardless
of the nationality and legal status of an individual. While enforcement is
146 SASKIA SASSEN
precarious, it nonetheless signals a major shift in the legitimation process.

This is perhaps most evident in the strategic role that the judiciary has
assumed in the highly developed countries when it comes to the rights of
immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers.
Finally, the state itself has been transformed by this combination of devel-
opments. This is so partly because the state under the rule of law is one
of the key institutional arenas for the implementation of these new transna-
tional regimes—whether the global rights of capital or the human rights of
all individuals regardless of nationality. And it is partly because the state
has incorporated the objective of furthering a global economy, as is evident
in the ascendance of certain government agencies, i.e. Treasury, and the
decline of others, such as those linked to the social fund.
Because so many processes are transnational, goverments are increasingly
not competent to address some of today's major issues unilaterally or even
from the exclusive confines of the inter-state system narrowly defined. This
is not the end of state sovereignty, but rather that the "exclusivity and scope
of their competence" (cf. Rosenau, 1992) has altered, that there is a narrowing
range within which the state's authority and legitimacy are operative.
There is no doubt that some of the intellectual technology that governments
have and that allow them to control, i.e. Foucault's governmentality, has now
shifted to non-state institutions. This is dramatically illustrated in the new pri-
vatized transnational regimes for cross-border business and the growing power
of the logic of the global capital market over national economic policy described.
These are transformations in the making as we speak. My reading is that
they matter. It is easy to argue the opposite: the state is still absolute and
nothing much has changed. But it may well be the case that these developments
signal the beginning of a new era. Scholarship on mentalities has shown
how difficult it is for people to recognize systemic change in their contem-
porary conditions. Seeing continuity is much simpler and often reassuring.
Official immigration policy today is not part of the explicated rules of
the new game. Is this helpful in seeking to have a more effective and fair
long term immigration policy in today's globalizing world?
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8 TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND NATION-STATE
IN EASTERN EUROPE
Nikolai Genov
1. From Convergence to Divergence in Eastern Europe
A trend toward convergence dominated Eastern Europe for several decades

that was politically imposed and maintained. Yet, this trend was also simi-
lar to policies taken in the European Community to reduce economic dis-
crepancies between its member countries. In the East, the less developed
economies of Romania and Bulgaria received support in order to increase
economic homogeneity across the region. This goal did not seem unrealis-
tic because all of the member states were centralized and so could easily
mobilize national resources. Moreover, even as national political elites rec-
ognized that cultures and political traditions differed across the region, they
nonetheless tried to follow the same pattern of political mobilization. This,
along with the dominant ideology of internationalism, facilitated a mutual
adaptation of economic and political institutions across Eastern Europe.
The European Community's programmes for regional development and
common agricultural policy could hardly apply to Eastern Europe, however.
In the East, the more efficient national economies extracted larger profits
in regional trade. Plus, the region's marked political homogenization rested
on violence in both domestic and international politics. The ideology of
internationalism did not take firm root in mass consciousness and behav-
iour. Nevertheless, it seemed on the surface in 1989 that East European
societies would begin their transformation from communism to capitalism
at similar starting positions. For many observers the region was indeed a
monolith, the "Eastern bloc." Naturally, more informed analysts knew that
Romania was rather poor, but also debt free. Czechoslovakia's foreign debt
was also minimal. Hungary had the highest per capita foreign debt in the
region, but most of it consisted of long-term loans guaranteed by foreign
states. Bulgaria's per capita foreign debt was lower, but its terms were more
unfavourable, consisting mainly of short-term loans from private banks—
without guarantees from foreign states.
Despite these differences, even well informed observers expected to see a
basically similar process of transformation across the region because it seemed
that all of the countries had to resolve common problems. Seen from today's
150 NIKOLAI GENOV
point of view, however, we now appreciate that four global trends chal-
lenging all contemporary societies nonetheless do so in rather different ways
(Genov, 1997a: 21f).
First, providing economic and political actors with greater room for dis-
cretion and initiative, consistent with a universal trend toward instrumental
activism, required firmer cultural and institutional support in Eastern Europe.
A major institutional development here, of course, was the turn to market
exchange and competitive politics. Second, another universal trend, toward
individualism, had already permeated all walks of life in the region because
central control could only postpone this, not stop it. Rapid industrialization
and urbanization had fostered individualism despite collectivist institutional
arrangements to the contrary. The task, however, was to transform these
arrangements to correspond with those that support a more institutional-
ized individualism. Third, organizational structures in Eastern European soci-
eties could not resist rationalization, another universal or systemic pressure.
Observers expected the dissolution of large state bureaucracies to give way
to smaller, more flexible organizational forms, those better adapted to mar-
kets and competitive politics. Fourth, the region's isolation and cultural rigid-
ity undoubtedly ran counter to universalism in values and norms, another
world-wide trend. Observers expected the transformation to overcome the
region's parochialism, and a confrontational pattern that often dominated
its culture despite the official ideology of internationalism.
As it turned out, the countries of the region adapted to these global trends
in strikingly different ways. Their seemingly common starting point dissolved
rather readily into diverging paths of development. A wide variety of cul-
tural and political affiliations reappeared to shape how they adapted to a
market economy and democratic institutions. Differences in Catholic, Protestant
and Orthodox traditions reappeared. The heritage of the Austro-Hungarian,
Ottoman and the Russian empires turned out to be surprisingly preserved
below the surface of modernity itself and, therefore, more influential than
expected. Memories of wars, territorial divisions, ethnic conflicts, and cul-
tural disparities shaped both cultural orientations and political preferences.
Differing speeds of continental and global integration as well as qualitative
difference in the associations that emerged in various countries only increased
the region's economic, political and cultural differences. National rivalries
became unavoidable (Comisso, 1997; Genov, 1996a; Glatzer, 1996; Hatschikjan
and Weilemann, 1995; Offe, 1996; Weldenfeld, 1996; World Development
Report, 1996).
The sheer complexity of the transformation and the complicated paths
that domestic and international developments took increased the uncertain-
ties of the process. In fact, individuals and groups in all East European soci-
DEMOCRACY AND NATION-STATE IN EASTERN EUROPE 151
eties are now confronting the undesirable effects of their own pasts. Seen
from this point of view, the region contains numerous exemplars of "risk
societies" (Genov, 1996b). Some countries in the region manage to cope
with today's risks more or less successfully, namely the former socialist coun-
tries in Central Europe. While future developments might easily alter this,
right now this sub-region's relative economic and political stability is self-
evident. Leaders here made well-conceived decisions concerning privatiza-
tion, investment, integration in international structures, and other matters,
and then implemented them.
But this has not been the case in the rest of Eastern Europe, and my
thesis is that the major reason for failure and unevenness is the quality of
the states that developed immediately after the transformation began. The
disappearance of the East German state and the dissolution of the state in
Czechoslovakia, former Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union are simply the
most visible manifestations of a more general pattern. In many other cases,
a weakening of the nation-state itself now accounts for declines in national
production and increases in inflation, unemployment and crime. Another
major factor in the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe is the rapid
acceleration of individualism. Seen in general terms, this is simply part of
a global trend (Beck and Beck-Gersheim, 1994). But seen in the specific
context of Eastern Europe, increasing individualism exhibits some specific
characteristics that are closely connected to the weakening of nation-states
in the region.
2. Individualism and Nation-State
There are many ways of defining today's ongoing transformation in Eastern

Europe but one is to say that it marks a triumph of individualism over col-
lectivism. Before 1989, constitutional arrangements across the region had
stressed collectivism, and yet major rights and duties of individuals were
recognized in formal law, if not honored in legal practice. What changed
is that the optic or orientation of the new constitutions and constitutional
amendments shifted radically. The state's responsibility to preserve and enrich
the common good remains a major point of reference, but now the very
core of constitutional provisions is various individual rights. Thus it might
seem to some that a key problem in adapting to the global trend of indi-
vidualism has already been solved. But social reality is more complex than
legal provisions.
A new obstacle to transparency has surfaced. It is now more difficult to
discern the cultural orientation and practical action of individuals than it
152 NIKOLAI GENOV
was under the old centralized state. The major reason why this has hap-
pened is as universal as the global trend toward individualism itself. In fact,
only one generation ago, hierarchies in most agricultural East European
societies were well known and respected. Patterns of action, tested by tra-
dition, were widely accepted. Facts were clearly defined, and largely uncon-
troversial. Now, after an initial delay, East European societies are rapidly
embracing the culture and practices of advanced individualism in their full
complexity. As a result, "the competition is on; knowledge has to be defended
at every point; the open society guarantees nothing" (Douglas, 1993: 11).
As modernization proceeds in the region, the stability, transparency and
certainty that attended hierarchy have given way to a mosaic of not only
modern elements of social life but also post-modern elements. One typical
reaction to the uncertainty that this has caused is an obsession with myths,
unconventional religions and magic has become fashionable. These exotic
beliefs and practices hold out the promise of filling the vacuum left by once
well-defined structures, roles, and expectations. The result is paradoxical.
On the one hand, most people in the region suffer from basic problems of
modernity, namely unemployment, impoverishment and existential troubles.
On the other, many of those who are more secure economically are increas-
ingly responding to uncertainty by indulging in post-modern pursuits, namely
the many subtleties of entertainment, hobbies, and other leisure time pur-
suits. A tiny faction of the new rich, in fact, is narcissistically preoccupied
with health, fitness and bodybuilding, a phenomenon more spread in advanced
societies. The political equivalent of this practice in Eastern Europe, how-
ever, is more foreboding, namely a mass longing for a "strong man" to
reduce the general state of uncertainty and anxiety in everyday life. Many
individuals suffer from loneliness as they face the unpredictable changes tak-
ing place all around them.
Still, a note of precaution is also in order. There is no doubt that the
diagnosis above speaks to major problems that span many advanced societies.
Modern man is always a stranger even when his environment is more famil-
iar because he or she is still caught up in a rapid stream of events. It always
seems that social time is accelerating. Moreover, it is sobering to recall that
Max Weber drew attention to the radical uncertainty of modern life when
he prepared his speech "Science as a Vocation" immediately after the First
World War (Weber, 1992 [1919]). Clearly, individualism and its manifold
effects have a history that precedes the travails of people today. Yet, there
are sound reasons for insisting that developments in the last two or three
decades have substantially increased the tensions and conflicts attending the
spread of individualism. And these negative effects are amplified in Eastern
Europe by the region's severe economic crisis, political instability and cultural
disorientation. This, in turn, complicates any remedial action that might be

taken, which then only increases the pathologies of individualism.
Consider the following sources of uncertainty. First, it is widely hoped in
Eastern Europe that foreign investment and transfers of know-how from
advanced societies will facilitate and accelerate technological innovation in
the region. Moreover, Easterners often examine the recent experience of
the advanced world for instruction about their own future. They appreci-
ate that rapid technological change in the West rendered whole occupations
and professions obsolete, thereby eliminating the security that once came
with certain levels of educational attainment, training and productive skills.
Coal mining is a classic example. But technological restructuring today causes
even greater social dislocations due to increasing global competition and
global transfers of technologies. Thus, metallurgical plants that are currently
prosperous in Eastern Europe are likely to follow the fate of steel mills in
Chicago or the Ruhr valley. Since it is not easy to predict where the next
breakthroughs in science and technology will come, no one can be certain
about the prospects for specific lines of production or about the careers
prospects of those working in them. So technological innovation will remain
as great a source of instability in the East's transitional economies as it is
in the West's advanced societies.
Second, in sharp contrast to the nearly full employment that the region
experienced before 1989, there is now double digit unemployment in most
East European countries. The major exception, the Czech Republic, only
proves the rule (Economic Survey of Europe, 1997). So far, regional unem-
ployment is caused mainly by a general recession, but it will soon become
more structural as technological change accelerates. The experience of
advanced societies demonstrates that we have no reason to expect substan-
tial improvement in the foreseeable future. Rather, we can expect unem-
ployment to increase as technological and organizational change imposes
stricter requirements. In this situation, large parts of the workforce have
good reason to fear that they will soon join the millions of unemployed.
The result is a fierce competition for jobs in which the outcome for every-
body involved is unpredictable. There is no doubt that being unemployed
is itself a violation of basic human rights. Yet, large groups of people in
Eastern Europe cope with this violation now, and many more will have to
do so in the future. Moreover, an increasingly global competition for jobs
can only complicate investment decisions. Rather than investing automati-
cally in countries with the lowest labor costs, investors look at various fac-
tors, including political stability, deposits of raw materials, proximity to
expanding markets, and others.
Third, even the most successful East European societies have become
154 NIKOLAI GENOV
more dependent on global changes in technological transfers, commercial

and financial exchanges, and political instabilities. Even the best-informed
analysts cannot predict how such diverse factors will combine to influence
economic processes. So millions of people have to live permanently with
uncertainty because their economic situation might be ruined by interna-
tional financial speculation or by shifts in production and markets originat-
ing at distant parts of the globe.
Fourth, due to political, economic and criminal factors, the once low level
of economic stratification that marked Eastern Europe has given way to an
increasing gap in income between the highest and lowest wage earners.
Moreover, the income gap between East European countries and their rich
neighbours to the West has also widened. The effects of this recent devel-
opment are manifold. German analysts see growing numbers of citizens lack-
ing access to the technical infrastructure of advanced societies (Brock, 1994:
70). In the long run, this will result not only in individuals experiencing
greater personal uncertainty but also to their feeling that social cohesion is
declining more generally. Both trends can become mutually reinforcing. With
this, individuals' sense of uncertainty can intensify irrespective of how the
poverty line is defined culturally in any particular country. In Eastern Europe,
this is the case not only with the elderly, the unemployed and minorities
but also more recently with young people generally, single mothers, divorced
persons, drug addicts, and many others.
Fifth, democratic political systems today not only strengthen individuals'
legal and institutional positions but also shift basic responsibilities to them.
Individuals now make major decisions about education, economic activity,
family planning, and health care insurance. Since society is growing more
and more complex, the cognitive requirements for making these decisions
rationally are far too high for large parts of the population to meet. Thus,
these decisions are being made under conditions of imperfect rationality,
and in impoverished or disintegrating societies these conditions are become
more and more imperfect.
Sixth, the increasing heterogeneity of life-styles renders obsolete many tra-
ditional, well-established forms of solidarity and the certainty they contributed
to social life. The result is that people enter more and more relationships
on a more short-term basis. New personal relationships now dominate the
horizon of decisions and actions in which people operate. Certainty is over.
The life-world is now filled with individuals who live as if they are perma-
nent strangers, deciphering ever anew the symbols around them.
Seventh, during the 1980s post-materialist values had taken firm root
among the younger, better educated generation in Eastern Europe. In fact,
the spread of these values became an important dimension in the process
of increasing individualism itself. Stressing nonconformity and innovation,

post-materialist values left considerable room for personal preferences and
choices. But to what end? Answering this question in the midst of the increas-
ing commercialization of everyday life today, along with the looming risk
of unemployment and financial instability, is hardly an easy task. The absence
of a clear answer only reinforces uncertainty.
Eighth, under the influence of today's ongoing process of individualism,
and keeping in mind the complex institutional options now available to East
European decision makers, individuals are being pressed to balance mutu-
ally exclusive preferences as they ponder their own alternatives. Should one
prefer personal distance in contacts or seek greater intimacy in a social envi-
ronment that is generally alienating? Should one emphasize achievement,
along with competition, or will a more cooperative approach prove to be
more promising in the specific circumstances of today's transformation?
Should one prefer to take risks in pursuit of personal success or seek more
institutionalized routines? Again, not every one has the knowledge, predic-
tive capacity, general intelligence or moral integrity needed to make these
decisions rationally. The result is that policymaking in the transition occurs
within a more or less permanent situation of schizophrenia.
Ninth, but not least, the sheer number and variety of messages that indi-
viduals receive from competing sources of information do not necessarily
increase their cognitive rationality. Rather, because information is either
manipulated or distorted, or else is lacking in certain areas, the cognitive
basis of orientation and action is shakier. Thus, despite people's immersion
in a flood of information coming from all sides, they currently make deci-
sions under conditions of information deficits.
Having identified these nine sources of uncertainty in individuals' orien-
tations, decisions and actions, we are nevertheless tempted to doubt that
the situation is really this dire and hopeless. In fact, even as individualism
extends uncertainty, and potential embarrassment, to millions of people, it
is also a blessing for millions of others. Why is this the case?
In advanced societies, the answer is clear. Efficient institutions and organiza-
tions eventually emerged to reduce uncertainty. Advanced societies are first
of all organization societies. Some organizations may be badly structured
and more dysfunctional than problem solving; others may shift their goals;
still others may be guided by undemocratic or even antihuman ideologies.
But there is no other way to reduce complexity in modern life than to
develop and employ organizations. Individualism may well originate with the
values and norms of particular groups of people, but it is supported institu-
tionally by various organizations that reduce uncertainty "from cradle to grave"
and thereby help individuals to manage risks. Educational and health care
156 NIKOLAI GENOV
organizations, labour and social welfare offices, pension funds and insurance
companies all make the existential problems that individuals face more trans-
parent and manageable, even in the midst of increasing individualism.
Therefore, it is certainly an exaggeration to refer to radical uncertainty
when describing individualism in advanced societies. Here we need to take
note of the ongoing interaction between individuals and the organizations
that reduce uncertainty and thereby support individualism. Kafka's vision
of individuals lost in a labyrinth of anonymous organizations is more liter-
ary metaphor than sound social science because institutions and organiza-
tions are typically transparent and stable in the so-called First World of
advanced societies.
The picture is different, however, in the Second World of the former
communist bloc. The core difference between the East and West today is
the weakening of state institutions in Eastern Europe. This is what makes
individualism unnecessarily risky. The weakening of state institutions makes
the very process of maintaining the common good problematic.
3. Integration of Nation-States and Supra-National Integration
Eastern Europe's increasing involvement in institutions of European inte-

gration is often regarded as a key issue in the International Politics of the
states of the region. Numerous programmes are designed to support efforts
by national legislatures to adjust to the European Union. The PHARE
Programme, for instance, offers financial incentives for improving institu-
tions and infrastructure. It seems that extending the European Union east-
ward serves geostrategic interests on both sides (Weidenfeld, 1997: 79f).
But what are the real conditions of this process? One might try to answer
this question by using Bulgaria as an example. Because it deviates from the
general stability of East European nation-states in the mid-1990s, Bulgaria
reveals in sharper relief the region's general problems and prospects (Genov,
1997b). International agencies could not have anticipated a 10.9 percent
decline in Bulgarian GDP in 1996, for instance, but this may signal poten-
tial problems of transformation across the region. Moreover, the implica-
tions may be even broader. Crises in the East might be similar to crises
elsewhere, in the South, the Mexican crisis of 1994 being one case in point.
A careful examination of Bulgaria's critical situation reveals that the cen-
tral problem is precisely the capacity of this nation-state to manage the
transformation by maintaining and developing integration at a national level.
This is also the central problem in integrating Bulgaria into supranational
structures. In fact the crucial role of nation-states in managing today's eco-
nomic and social processes has been underlined by the World Bank, which
until recently had stressed the integrating capacities of market forces (World
Development Report, 1997). The Bulgarian state experienced failures in
managing the national economy in 1991, 1994 and 1996 (Genov, 1996c;
Genov, 1997b). Such frequent incidents of unmanageability suggest that the
causes are more deeply rooted, extending beyond the economy alone.
As was the case in all East European countries, Bulgaria began its trans-
formation with an all-mighty state. Strictly speaking, Bulgarian society was
dominated by a state that was coterminous with the then ruling party. Across
earlier decades, the state's centralized integration of society had facilitated
rapid modernization by concentrating rather scarce resources in strategic
areas. Thus, a speedy transition to an industrial, urbanized society became
a possibility (Genov, 1997a: 42f).
The creative potential of this state-centered model of social and economic
change was soon exhausted, however. Bulgaria's type of social and economic
organization became an obstacle to further social innovation. Thus, the high
rate of economic growth that Bulgaria experienced during the 1960s and
1970s declined substantially during the 1980s, as was also the case across
the region (Human Development Report, 1996: 14). The level of foreign
debt accumulated in 1990—$10.9 billion in US dollars—clearly revealed
that central planning now lacked developmental potential. Thus, a differ-
entiation of the economy from politics became unavoidable, and then also
an internal differentiation of politics itself. This process was substantially
facilitated by global requirements for greater economic effectiveness, politi-
cal democracy, and value-normative universalism.
Although it began belatedly and under unfavourable international condi-
tions, Bulgaria had the potential of adapting creatively to these global require-
ments when it began its transformation in 1989. However, a series of hasty
and incompetent political decisions moved the country from political cen-
tralization to destructive chaos. The Bulgarian state retreated from bearing
responsibilities that are regarded as the top priorities of any government in
advanced societies. This retreat occurred not only in the areas of science
and technological development but also in the areas of national investment
and control of the banking system. Thus, the dissolution of the centralized
state turned into the dissolution of the state's capacity to integrate the
national society.
When the reforms began, it was assumed that separating economic processes
from state control would result immediately in the economy attaining a
degree of integration autonomously, by economic forces alone. Economic
integration, in turn, was expected to provide the basis for a grander integration
of the economy with politics and culture. This assumption turned out to be
158 NIKOLAI GENOV
mistaken. State-owned enterprises did not possess the free capital needed to
compete autonomously in the market. Key market institutions, such as the
stock exchange, had not yet been created. Foreign trade had to be radically
re-oriented. The skills of market activity had to be developed from scratch
in most cases.
The complexity and urgency of these problems could not be handled
effectively without massive interventions by the state, but political deadlock
prevented this from happening. Instead, the newly autonomous economic
enterprises transferred their own inefficiency to the state budget by default-
ing on their loans. As economic production declined and the state lost control
over the economy, the banking system collapsed. It turned out that more
often than not, economic reforms had been driven by corruption, not policy
or planning. The social security system was not able to cope with the massive
increase in unemployment and impoverishment.
It became obvious that the state cannot simply retreat from managing
the transformation without simultaneously jeopardizing the integrity of the
entire social system. In spite of this (Genov, 1997b: chapter 1), the weak-
ening of the nation state continued under the impact of both domestic and
international factors. The motivation of state officials declined precipitously.
An accelerating turnover of governments prevented strategic thinking on the
part of major state institutions. This was all the more vital, however, because
now it was widely appreciated that restructuring the economy was not sim-
ply a matter of privatizising investment and production.
Clearly stated, the restructuring should have been guided by setting pri-
orities for branches of industry, technologies, products, markets, and other
matters. But there was no clear vision about how to proceed in any of these
major economic areas, about the ends and means involved. Moreover, chan-
nels of information had been destroyed. On the one hand, existing institu-
tions were inadequate for the new requirements of the transformation. On
the other, new institutions were introduced slowly, tentatively. Neither a
strong state will nor a public consensus on strategic issues of national devel-
opment could be found. This was clear when decisions had to be made
regarding whether to close large inefficient enterprises, but it was equally
obvious in the tentative ways in which authorities responded to the restruc-
turing of economy and then the collapse of the national banking system. In
broader terms, deficits of administrative rationality in the state's managing
of the transformation exacerbated the strategic challenges facing the Bulgarian
economy. International events such as the Gulf War and the UN embargo
on Yugoslavia, along with the rather limited international support for reforms
of the Bulgarian economy, only deepened the crisis.
Thus, when stressing the need to free economic activity from excessive
state control, one can rationally make this case only by assuming that this
process will be undertaken by the state itself. The paradox is rooted in real-
ity itself. Only effective state action is capable of changing the very basis of
social integration in a civilized, effective way. More precisely, the effective dis-
solution of a centralized state can only be achieved through a state-managed
process. That is why strengthening state institutions is central to effectively
reducing the economic, political and social dislocations that accumulate dur-
ing any transformation. Otherwise, the very existence of the nation-state is
placed in jeopardy. Such a strong statement merits elaboration.
First, it is clear that a spontaneous development of market forces alone
cannot mitigate the negative trends of transformation. Rather, the need for
a "small" but effective state becomes more acute. But the region lost the
ideal time for developing state priorities for economic development at the
beginning of the 1990s. As a result, privatization is being carried out in a
most ineffective way, in the absence of any strategic planning. Moreover,
the weakening of the state and delay of privatization, along with the way
it was eventually initiated, lent support to a widespread suspicion that the
process had been undertaken with an eye to powerful private interests rather
than to the common good.
Second, given this turn of events, it became strategically important to sta-
bilize state finances, and the introduction of a Currency Board in mid-1997
was a clear admission that the state could not handle this task by itself. It
also strengthens the point that the excessively liberal strategies of the early
1990s had failed to facilitate the transformation.
Third, the "window of opportunities" for developing Bulgarian society re-
mains open, but it is narrowing. This is why a political and cultural consensus
concerning the Currency Board is a precondition for success. We can assume,
however, that the pressure groups that profited immensely from a "big" but in-
effective state are hardly likely to support this policy change. The fact that the
introduction of the Currency Board was delayed at several points reflects this.
Fourth, even if the Currency Board is initially successful, there is no guar-
anty it can consolidate these gains and then use them as a foundation for
future action. The core problem is a need to coordinate the efforts taken
to stabilize the financial system with the efforts taken to restructure major
institutions in other fields of activity. If the process of financial stabilization
is not coupled with efforts to stabilize production, to reform social security,
and to innovate in regional and local government, then the overall effect
might compromise the Currency Board itself. This will certainly result if
international support for reform is delayed or remains insufficient.
Fifth, even if the Currency Board succeeds, the economic and social in-
tegration of large groups of people will remain problematic, namely the
160 NIKOLAI GENOV
impoverished groups, the long-term unemployed, young people, pensioneers,

gypsies, and others.
Thus, the crucial problem today is to re-establish the state's capacity to
manage the transformation and, thus, to establish and maintain the degree
of social integration necessary for long-term, sustainable development. This
is also a precondition for successfully integrating Bulgaria into supra-national
structures, particularly those of the European Union (Axt, 1996). Both social
integration and supra-national integration require greater transparency and
predictability in national structures and processes. After all, this will simul-
taneously facilitate Bulgaria's efforts to raise international support for national
reform. However, we can also expect international institutions in general
and the institutions of the European Union in particular to undergo substantial
reforms of their own, as they endeavor to promote continental integration.
Here, too, a well-conceived, cautious strategy is need (Berend, 1997: 27-28).
The tasks involved in managing large-scale transformation processes are
enormous. Risks of various types are omnipresent. The success of the trans-
formation in Eastern Europe might strengthen democratic states in the region
and thus facilitate continent-wide democracy, economic effectiveness, and a
general climate of peace and co-operation. But less benign outcomes are
also possible. We can easily imagine ongoing failures in the transformation,
as the Bulgarian case illustrates. It is unrealistic to exclude from consider-
ation the possibility that unsuccessful reforms might lead to efforts to reduce
accumulating dislocations in a non-democratic way.
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Nikolai. (ed.) Society and politics in South-East Europe. Sofia: National and Global
Development, pp. 33-46.
Beck, Ulrich and Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim (1994a) "Individualisierung in modernen
Gesellschaften-Perspektiven und Kontroversen einer subjektorientierten Soziologie". In:
Ulrich Beck and Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim (eds.) Riskante Freiheiten. Individualiserung
in modernen Gesellschaften. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, pp. 10-39.
Berend, Ivan T. (ed.) (1997) Long-Term Structural changes in Transforming Central &
Eastern Europe The 1990's. Munchen: Sudosteuropa-Gesellschaft.
Brock, D. (1994) "Ruckkehr der Klassengesellschaft? Die neeuen sozialen Graben in einer
materiellen Kultur", in: Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck Gernsheim (eds.) Riskante Frei-
heiten. . . . pp. 61—88.
Comisso, Ellen (1997) "Is the Glass Half Full or Half-Empty? Reflections on Five Years of
Competitive Politics in Eastern Europe". In: Ivan T. Berend (ed.). Long-Term Structural
Changes . . ., pp. 29-54.
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Commission for Europe.
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Global Development.
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Becker and Arnaud Marks (eds.), Social Sciences in Transition Social Science Information
Needs and provision in a Changing Europe. Bonn: Informationszentrum Sozialwissenschaften,
1996, pp. 39-54.
(ed.) (1997a) Bulgaria—today and tomorrow. Sofia: Friedrich Ebert Foundation (in
Bulgarian).
(ed.) (1997b) Bulgaria 1997. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP.
Glatzer, Wolfgang (ed.) (1996) Lebensverhaltnisse in Osteuropa. Prekare Entwicklungen und
neue Konturen. Frankfurt am Main: Campus.
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im neuen Osteuropa. Koln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik.
Human Development Report 1996 (1996) New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Cambridge: Polity.
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17. Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr/Paul Siebeck.
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Union. Gutersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung.
(ed.) (1997) Neue Ostpolitik—Strategic fur eine gesamteuropaische Entwicklung. Gutersloh:
Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung.
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World Bank.
1997. The State in a Changing Society (1997) Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
9. NATIONAL IDENTITY, SOCIAL ORDER AND
POLITICAL SYSTEM IN WESTERN EUROPE:
PRIMORDIAL AUTOCHTHONY
Eugeen Roosens
Scope
The present paper will focus on the principle of primordial autochthony as

a cultural construct and value. I conceive primordial autochthony as a qual-
ity attributed to an individual, a social category or group of people, based
on being born on a well-defined territory from parents and ancestors who
are and have been "first occupants". In most cases, the notion of one's
"own soil" is associated with a biological link, formulated in terms of pop-
ular biology. "Blood" is frequently used as expressing this genealogical and
genetic link. In the cases discussed in the present paper a biological link is
implied as the basic "genuine" foundation of autochthony. Primordial auto-
chthony is bestowing an intrinsic quality nobody can erase, defining a per-
son in a durable and encompassing way.
In my view, the combination of blood and soil—Blut und Boden—is a
strong cultural construct and value in that it combines, symbolically, two
dimensions in human life which are quasi universally recognised as instru-
mentally and expressively important and eminently real: the biologically
based inexhaustible goodwill contained in relations of filiation and kinship,
and the familiar space of the land on which one is born and grew up. A
regional, ethnic, or national, religious or so-called "cultural" affiliation and
identity based upon these dimensions of life which are felt and assessed by
most people as deeply human and securing is perceived as "natural". Nothing
wrong seems to be involved. That is exactly why ethnicity and nationality
can be depicted as positive and constructive values (Miller, 1995). But the
intimate inclusion in a tight circle on grounds of biological filiation and pri-
mordial autochthony at the same time excludes numerous other human be-
ings in one and the same move, and can easily be converted into xenophobia
and outright racism.
In this contribution I concentrate on the micro-social level: individuals
and face-to-face groups in daily life, without neglecting the link to the meso-
and macro-level. I will build my presentation on three empirical case stud-
ies: 1) Solo-research about First Peoples (formerly called "Indians") in Quebec,
NATIONAL IDENTITY, SOCIAL ORDER AND POLITICAL SYSTEM 163
including fieldwork among the Wendat (former "Hurons") (periodically

between 1968 and 1996) (Roosens, 1989). 2) A long-term study about Turkish,
Moroccan and Japanese allochthons in Brussels which I have been initiat-
ing and directing (Roosens, 1992, 1993, 1994b, 1995). 3) Occasionally, I
will refer to research about immigrants in California conducted by American
colleagues at UC Berkeley, UCLA and UC San Diego. I have attended this
research for eight periods from two to ten weeks, spread over the last 16
years. First, I will use the case of the Aboriginals of Canada to generate
an interpretative model that I will apply in the second, main part of my
paper to Belgium, and more specifically to Brussels as the self-proclaimed
capital of Europe.
Primordial Autochthony in the New World
On the present international scene, primordial autochthony is an highly

respected principle. In Canada, a prestigious Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples published a report of more the 4000 pages (1996) at the cost of
millions of dollars in which the condition of being an Aboriginal or an
autochthon was given its full weight. According to this Report, the fact that
the ancestors of the Cree, the Wendat, the Innu, the Inuit, etc. have been
living for thousands of years on the territory of what is now called Canada
gives them an "inherent" status of first inhabitants—Aboriginals or First
Peoples—which is higher than the status of all those who descend from
newcomers or immigrants. Aboriginals have more right to be here than
others.
The First Peoples (also called First Nations) of Canada stress by their self-
attributed title their quality of autochthony (fieldwork Roosens, 1996). This
form of self-valuation seems to work very well in today's political climate.
Nobody on the public scene of Canada dares to put this cultural construct
in doubt. Nobody is ridiculing the notion of Aboriginals, First Nations or
First Peoples. The formerly despised label of "Aboriginals" has been con-
verted into a prestigious title. No protest has been formulated by "new-
comers" against the idea that to live first on a given land is to bestow some
form of priority and a number of "inherent" rights. It is widely accepted
as self-evident that the so-called "Indians" and "Eskimos" (the Aboriginals)
have been the first. Also, quite a number of today's "registered Indians"
and Inuit have much to do with these primordial populations in terms of
"blood" and descent. In a paper they presented to the Quebecois commis-
sion on constitutional issues, a group of Canadians of various non-Aboriginal
164 EUGEEN ROOSENS
backgrounds who support the case of the First Peoples of Quebec were even
induced to call themselves "allochthons" (Le Comite d'appui aux Premieres
Nations, 1990).
Exactly which criteria must be met to qualify as an Aboriginal can be a
matter of discussion. The Report states that membership should not be a
question of genetics but of culture, and of feelings of belonging. But the
cultural images used in daily life, e.g., in Wendake (formerly "Village Huron"),
almost always imply a biological link as the "ideal", "pure", "natural" basis
of Aboriginality.
The fact that the former Indians and Eskimos identify as First Peoples
and Aboriginals evokes, in the Canadian context and also worldwide, the
idea that they have been followed by other, "secondary" peoples or nations
who came as immigrants and colonisers. "Allochthons" did not really belong
and can only be tolerated or admitted by the consent of the Aboriginals.
Since colonisation has been universally condemned and collapsed almost
forty years ago in most parts of the world, staying a coloniser in the late
90s as the Canadian State is doing is a shameful condition, a source of
embarrassment. In this perspective the First Peoples claim their autonomy
not as a right delegated by the Canadian State but as an inherent right that
has been there from time immemorial, and that they never gave up. They
ask "the newcomers" to stop colonisation as all civilised nations in the world
have already done, decades ago.
The general consensus that primordial autochthony and the inherent rights
attached to this condition can no longer be ignored is reinforced by the
fact that also the Parti quebecois at the provincial level, and the Bloc quebe-
cois at the level of the Federal State are calling for a halt to colonisation.
Also the French consider themselves to be a "peuple fondateur"; they claim
to have been the first to live on the present soil of Quebec, well before the
English who put them under colonial rule. It is remarkable how the sou-
verainistes "forget" that they themselves have been colonising the "Indians".
True, the Government of Quebec has collected the remarks of the Autochthones
while preparing the referendum expected to bring independence in the early
90s. But at the same time, the Quebec Government has been suggesting at
various occasions that huge parts of Northern Quebec were still "terra nul-
lius" when the French arrived in the 16th and 17th centuries (Coon Come,
1996). This view is forcefully rejected by the Aboriginals or First Peoples
who contend that the entire space of Quebec had been occupied for mil-
lennia before the "very recent" conquest by the French colonisers. The
Aboriginal position is fully endorsed by the Royal Commission and has been
published in its Report commissioned by the Federal Government.
Although Aboriginal leaders fear that the Canadian authorities will sim-
ply ignore the Report, "as they always do with that kind of studies",
Prime Minister Jean Chretien put important recommendations of the Re-
port on his election program in May 1997 (Expanding opportunity . . . 1997).
The quality of primordial autochthony including inherent rights, which is
also stipulated in the repatriated constitution of 1982, is mentioned with
deference.
The Report of the Royal Commission is proposing the restitution of con-
siderable parts of the Canadian territory to its first occupants. Billions of
dollars are asked from the Federal and Provincial Governments in order to
establish the autonomy of the Aboriginals based on economic self-reliance.
What the Report is proposing is a true reversal of history. All this in the
name of what we call "primordial autochthony" and its inherent rights.
The Report also demands the full restoration of Aboriginal languages and
culture. The Aboriginals must have the right to use their Aboriginal lan-
guages not only in private life, but also in formal education and in all mat-
ters of administration. Culture, language and the prescribed use of language,
are considered to be congruent with a given territory, exactly as obtains in
the territories of the two "founding Peoples" of Canada, the Francophone
and the Anglophone Canadians.
It seems self-evident that unlike the Aboriginals and the two other "found-
ing" Canadian communities, recent "immigrants" can not claim the same
rights. They have to "adapt". Only the "autochthonous" parts of the nation
are granted these collective rights. Immigrants are entitled, however, to use
their language and to keep and develop their culture in the private sphere.
Aboriginal leaders hasten to stress that their peoples, although numerical
minorities, must not be conflated with the "ethnic minorities" who are new-
comers ("One-Onti" Gros-Louis, 1990). Leading political theorists Kymlicka
(1996), Burelle (1995) and others (Taylor, 1994) tend to subscribe to this
distinction between "national minorities" and "ethnic minorities", the first
being autochthonous, the second allochthonous populations.
The link between territory and biological filiation is strongly emphasised
by the Canadian Aboriginals. The expression "ancestral lands" is frequently
used. Their land is "Mother Earth", considered a goddess, and the link
between the ancestors and the grounds is even traced back to the time of
creation: the Creator himself put the ancestors on their grounds as keepers
of the land and of all the creatures living on it. Again and again, the reli-
gious nature of the relationship with the lands is stressed. So much so that
not recognising this relationship might figure as a lack of respect for tradi-
tional religion (Sioui, 1994). This "culturally specific" religious relationship
was also used by a number of Wendat to win the now famous Sioui case
before the Highest Court of Canada in 1990 (Vaugeois, 1995).
166 EUGEEN ROOSENS
Aboriginal leaders have noticed that their claims founded in "primordial

autochthony" have not been openly rebutted until now. This successful out-
come has reinforced their conviction that their strategy was right and has
encouraged them to seek international support. They recently (April 1997)
sent delegations to several countries of the EU and to the European Authorities
in Brussels. The only negative reaction came from their official Protector,
the Queen of England, who refused to see them.
It may be worthwhile to mention here briefly that in another country of
the New World, the US, where nationality is also officially considered a
matter of option and contract "republican" style, just like in Canada, Blut
und Boden have been re-emerging as criteria of affiliation and belonging in
recent decades, be it in a more "symbolic" fashion and projected into a
remote past. Respect for "primordial autochthony" is widely used and pro-
claimed by US American citizens and residents when they claim and assert
their ethnic identities. Their so-called hyphenated identities—Euro-American,
Black American, Asian American, Indigenous or Native American, Mexican
American, etc.—are referring to territories, parts of the world, their respec-
tive places of origin to which they relate through descent. Also in US popu-
lar imagination, the idea of biological filiation and "blood" is associated with
territorial "origins". This connection between land, filiation and identity also
surfaces in the demands of persons from "mixed descent" who ask that
"mixed identities" (e.g. "Native Asian American") be officially recognised by
the US administration in the next census. Just like everybody else, a per-
son of mixed origin, must be able to identify in harmony with her feelings.
In his book, Postethnic America (1995), Hollinger underlines that the so-called
ethnic groups used in the census are in fact disguised "racial" blocks—the
racist classification of the 19th century wrapped up in another wording. As
already said, the parental or ancestral link to territory is essential. Also in
US popular discourse today, origin in terms of "blood" and territory are
considered "authentic". Ethnic tourism confirms this. Granted, quite a num-
ber of US citizens refuse hyphenation and simply identify as "Americans",
but the overwhelming majority acts as if affiliation flowing from blood and
soil were more basic and genuine than membership brought about by self-
ascription and "republican contract". Just like in present Canada, contrac-
tual and purely legal and conventional grounds of belonging are considered
by many as being of lower value than Blut und Boden.
Exactly the same principle of primordial autochthony is at work in
European settings, as will appear from field data collected in Belgium, mainly
in the Brussels area. Brussels is hosting as many international delegations
and civil servants, embassies and lobbies as Washington, D.C. People belong-
ing to more than 100 nations are registered residents in Brussels. More than
30% of the population is allochthonous, and some of the nine townships

contain more than 50% recent migrants and immigrants (Van der Haegen,
1996).
Primordial Autochthony in Belgium as a Part of Europe
Natives
Considered at the macro-level, Belgium is a federal state composed of three

communities and three regions: the Flemish Community, the French Com-
munity, and the German-speaking Community combined with a Flemish
Region, a Walloon Region and a Brussels Capital Region. Communities
handle person-linked issues like language and culture, while regions are con-
cerned primarily with economics. Accordingly, Belgium has technically speak-
ing seven different governments, the Federal Government being in charge
of foreign affairs, defence, justice, etc.
As appears from the nomenclature, the names of the Flemish and the
French Communities are derived from their populations: these Communities
speak Flemish and French respectively, and are supposed to carry a Flemish
and a French culture. When considered at the macro-level of the official
federal institutions being a Fleming or a French speaking Belgian or a
Walloon is not based on filiation or primordial autochthony. When looking
closer, however, one notices that the Flemish and the French Communities
are congruent with the respective Regions, the Flemish and the Walloon
areas. Moreover, in terms of popular culture, it is a very widespread prac-
tice to consider community affiliation and regional affiliation as interchange-
able. One's identity is constructed both in terms of territory and language
and culture. And there is more: someone who inhabits the Flemish Region
and does speak Flemish most of the time is presumed to have Flemish par-
ents. In the popular imagination, there is a strong congruence between bio-
logical filiation, territory, language and culture. A person with a Mediterranean
or Black African phenotype living in the Flemish region will not be con-
sidered a "genuine" Fleming, whatever his fluency in the Flemish language
may be. Moreover, nobody can become a Fleming through naturalisation:
there is no procedure to do so.
A quite similar situation can be found, mutatis mutandis, in the French
community established in the Walloon Region. (It is interesting to note that
the region inhabited by members of the French community is not labelled
"French Region"—the pendant of the Flemish region—, but the "Walloon
Region". The term "Walloon" differentiates this area from the territory of
168 EUGEEN ROOSENS
France, which is adjacent). However, it should be mentioned at once that

the notions and political realities of Flanders and Wallonia are not entirely
symmetrical. While huge numbers of Flemings will consider the Flemings
as a volk, a people, just like many of today's Quebecois consider themselves
a peuple, only a limited part of the Walloons are doing so. In Wallonian
discourse Wallonia is a "region" in the first place. Although movements of
nation building are active in Wallonia, this dynamic does not seem to take
off. One reason may be that, historically speaking, the composing parts of
Wallonia presented less of a unity than Flanders. But another factor may
be more important. For very many years, the Francophone population of
Belgium has been identifying and identified with the Belgian State, as their
language, French, was the only official one. Political power, and even catholic
church power, was in the hands of Francophones. Very many Dutch speak-
ers were opposing this kind of Belgian State while the Francophones were
the State (Wils, 1994). It would not be correct, then, to describe the Flemish
and the Walloons as just two "tribes" or two ethnic groups.
The Region of Brussels Capital belongs on equal terms to the Flemish
and the French Communities which both overlap the Brussels Region.
Officially, there is no community of "Brusselers". The Brussels Region takes
its name not from the inhabitants, but from the Capital, which the "Walloons"
and the Flemings share. The historiography of Brussels in terms of popu-
lation, language, culture and communities, still is a matter of dispute. But
as Brussels is entirely surrounded by Flemish territory, some militant Flemings
consider Brussels as primordially Flemish land. If the splitting up of the
Communities ever occurs—which Flemish nationalists hope for—they would
claim Brussels as Flemish soil. At the other hand, the overwhelming major-
ity of the population of Brussels—French speaking Belgians—, do see Brussels
as a French speaking city, primordially "French" territory.
As the Brussels Capital Region is bilingual and bicultural, it is impossi-
ble to predict anyone's community belonging from just her birth place.
"Brussels" as a locus of origin can mean both Flemish or French Community
affiliation. In the case of Brussels, descent is a better predictor. Although
things have been different in the past when being a Fleming in Brussels
connoted lower socioeconomic status, in the last decades, Flemish parents
have tended to educate their children as Flemings. Biological filiation, then,
is important in terms of belonging and identity, especially in the Capital.
But as the official structures and most of private services and businesses are
bilingual and social control is very weak, one can easily pass into the other
camp in the routines of daily life. A Fleming may even end up as a mem-
ber of the French community if he or she really wishes to do so, which is
rather unusual. Or one can become someone in between. Or, if asked or
pressed, one may identify as a Belgian, a "unitarian", rejecting the "chau-

vinistic" or "tribalistic" fragmentation of the country. The same is true for
a French speaking person or Walloon.
The people who are considered or presumed to have been "the first pre-
sent" on a given territory—the primordial autochthons—set the rules in the
field of language and in official collective provisions and rights. In the Flemish
region the official language of the administration is Dutch (also called Flemish).
The same applies to the entire sector of education, universities included.
The Walloon region, where the official language is French, displays identi-
cal structures, while Brussels, a contested territory, offers both French and
Flemish education and administrative services in both languages.
French or German speaking Belgians immigrating into a Flemish town
or village are expected to "adapt": if they wish to send their children to a
local school they have to accept the local official language as the language
of instruction. No one is entitled to expect French from the state adminis-
tration or state services. The language and culture in the realm of private
life, however, are entirely undetermined, and the language used in local
small business, voluntary associations, etc. is a question of goodwill, assertive-
ness and negotiation. Ideally speaking, however, Belgian internal migrants are
expected to adapt. This adaptation has serious consequences in the field of
formal education. Additive acculturation of the children is a minimum require-
ment. The same principles prevail at the other side of the "linguistic" bound-
ary, separating the Flemish and the Walloon areas.
Just as being a Fleming or a Walloon is grounded in filiation and terri-
tory, so is Belgian identity at the level of the nation-state. Here too descent
is a predominant criterion: the parent's nationality is determining the national
belonging of the children. At least one parent must be Belgian at the time
of birth. The country of birth is not relevant. The same model is imposed
on foreign residents living in Belgium: their children follow their parents or
one of their parents. It is descent which gives you the right to feel at home
on a given territory, in casu Belgium. Territoriality is "derived" from descent.
The situation I just analysed is the result of a long struggle. The Flemings—
roughly 60% of the total population—who have been the underdog since
the foundation of Belgium in 1830 to the end of the second World War
had to fight for the recognition of their language as an official language
even in their own part of the country: in higher education, in the army, in
the administration and justice, etc. Equal opportunity in State employment
was another issue. The Flemings eventually won the battle and today are
much better off than the southern, Francophone part of the country, so-
called Wallonia. A considerable part of the Flemish elite, especially in the
19th century, has passed into the other camp. Their descendants still speak
170 EUGEEN ROOSENS
French among themselves even in the cities and towns of Flanders. In the
media as well as in academic jargon they are labelled "ethnic Flemings",
suggesting that their "true nature", deep down, is still Flemish. Genealogy
is considered to override linguistic and social behaviour.
It is typical that the somewhat 60000 Germanophone Belgians living in
the eastern "Cantons" of the country only emerge in collective memory at
official occasions, e.g. in the King's annually formal address to the "National
Established Bodies", when the Monarch all of a sudden switches from Dutch
and French to German. In daily life, the political native debate in Belgium
is bipolar, dualistic.
EU Immigrants
It is within this cultural and historical frame of reference that the social and
political insertion of both EU and non-EU migrants and immigrants is to
be interpreted and understood. As already mentioned, a limited but visi-
ble number of Flemings living in Brussels consider Brussels to be Flemish
soil. This soil, so they feel, has been "frenchified" in an undue fashion.
In their view, Brussels is a city taken over by the Francophones and the
French-speaking "ethnic Flemings" who passed into the camp of the enemy.
Officially, Brussels is a bilingual city, but only 20% of the population is
Dutch or Flemish speaking, while roughly 50% is Francophone. About 30%
of the population is of foreign origin (Van der Haegen, 1996). Many
allochthons are not speaking any local language, just their native English,
Spanish, Turkish or Moroccan dialects, etc. But if they do so, they mostly
use French.
This raises a particular tension in the debate beween the two native cat-
egories of Belgians. Some Flemish pressure groups feel overwhelmed not
only by the French-speaking Belgians but also by the huge numbers of for-
eigners. To begin with, they resent the presence of the European Parliament
and the other "international institutions", fearing that the well-to-do Eurocrats
will impose the use of their respective languages. Especially English, but also
French, they say, will be forced upon restaurants, shops, hotels and other
services who want to sell their goods in the first place, whatever the lan-
guage of their patrons might be. Besides establishing a kind of undue hege-
mony which they could never dream of either in London or Washington,
these wealthy allochthons act to the advantage of the Brussels Francophones.
If they ever speak a native language, this will be French, which is confirmed
by recent research (Viaene, 1996). And when in the year 2000 the aliens
of European origin will be allowed to vote in local elections, their prefer-
ences will turn into a catastrophe for the Flemish minority in Brussels. As
happens in many other countries of the world, an allochthonous constituency

of this kind is going to vote for the local majority, namely the French speak-
ing Belgian Brussels majority.
But there is more. Besides the presence of culturally and linguistically
domineering alien Europeans and other well-to-do allochthons, Brussels
counts more than 19000 Turks and 79000 Moroccans (Leman, 1993) and
an unknown but important number of undocumented migrants coming from
Africa, Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America (Leman, 1995). The over-
whelming majority of these people either do not speak any native language,
or when they do, speak French. French is the second or even the first lan-
guage of the Moroccans and of many Black Africans. The Flemings of
Brussels could well end up being sandwiched between an upper layer of
wealthy allochthons and a poor but numerically important alien underclass.
Already for years, enfranchising alien residents, also non-EU foreigners,
has been an element of debate in many political circles. The question came
up again in full force recently (in 1997) after huge numbers of Belgian cit-
izens were deeply moved by the discovery of the body of Lubna Benaissa,
a little girl who had been violated and murdered by a Belgian criminal.
The child was given a kind of national burial covered by television and
other media. Thousands of Belgians assisted, and the non-Muslim parents
of Belgian abused and murdered children—also the mothers—were allowed
to address the audience inside the main mosque of Brussels, a quite excep-
tional event in Muslim tradition. At that particular occasion many Belgians
discovered the Muslim migrants as their fellow human beings, and the same
day the question of giving voting rights to "the migrants" emerged in full
force and was debated for weeks in a row in the media and in political
party committees. As could be expected, the opponents, after a few hours
of silence, defined this upsurge as tasteless. Using this abominable murder
of a young child as an emotional argument in deciding political matters
was despicable, they stated. The question is still unresolved, but a leading
political majority party decided in May 1997 to postpone the decision until
2006, a far distant election year. If non-EU residents wish to participate
fully in Belgian politics, they must naturalise and become Belgians, party
leaders state.
It is in the perspective of these developments that the political position-
ing of the aliens is taking place. We distinguish EU and non-EU aliens; and
within each group, unskilled migrant workers and their families, and middle
class and upper-middle class social layers (Roosens, 1994b).
Well-to-do EU aliens, like for instance European functionaries, are fully
entitled to live and work on Belgian soil while firmly staying French, Spanish,
British, etc. Just like the Natives, all of them feel free to identify not only
172 EUGEEN ROOSENS
by nationality but also by sub-nationality, region of origin and language.

Also in their own circles, biological filiation is seen as a determining factor:
although the official ideology about national belonging in the country of
origin may be different—for instance "republican", as in France—biologi-
cal filiation is nevertheless a determining element in the social field. Also
language is, just like in the Belgian case, a solid marker. And in quite a
number of contexts, well-to-do EU aliens are even able to impose the use
of their language of origin on Belgian soil.
The way they see their belonging and insertion in a European context
is graphically reflected in the kind of school they designed for their chil-
dren: the "European school". In 1994 there were nine European Schools
in Europe, three of them in Belgium (Schola Europaea . . . 1993). When the
European institutions came into being after World War II, the founding
persons were strongly motivated to bridge the gap between European coun-
tries, especially between the former enemies. In order to prepare the young
for this demanding task, they started from the education of their own chil-
dren. Instead of importing "foreign" schools in each of the member coun-
tries where expatriated functionaries would be working, they opted for a
type of integrated school. Children of different nationalities would come to
school in the same building. Every single child would be entitled to study
in its own first language (LI) from age 6 until age 18. However, courses
considered of an easier nature, like geography, history, economy would be
dispensed in L2 only. Learning a second language is compulsory and start-
ing at age 6 when entering the school. L3 follows in the second year of
secondary school, and a fourth language is optional in the second last year.
L2 is called a vehicular language. History, geography, etc. are taught by
teachers who are native speakers of the L2 of their audience. In this audi-
ence children from different nationalities are sitting together.
When looking at this type of education in its ideal form, such as presented
by the organising authorities, this school model allows for the following.
Children and youngsters can grow up using their own language, the language
in which they have been raised in their first years and which they use at home.
The same is true for many other aspects of their culture, as for literature,
ways of speaking, body language, etc. There is a continuity between the
family and the school. It is reassuring that Ll and Cl are respected by the
Institution which organises and manages the school program. At the same
time youngsters become aware of the existence of other languages and cul-
tures which they learn, and learn about in their courses. They also live and
sit together with children hailing from other backgrounds. All this becomes
a matter of daily routine, spread over the years, so that idealisation as well
as the formation of unfounded stereotypes about foreigners are prevented.
This structure of formal education reflects a certain vision of international

interaction and of the place every nation should occupy in the Europe-
to-become. To begin with, nobody is thinking of giving up his own lan-
guage in favour of more widespread idiom like English of French. The same
applies to the other dimensions of culture. Acculturation as a result of putting
youngsters of various backgrounds together, is conceived as additive, not
sub tractive acculturation (Roosens, 1995). L2 and L3 do not replace Ll.
Equivalence has also inspired the vehicular language system. Every single
child has to take an equal load, whatever its national background. Being
and feeling a European does not exclude feeling and being French, German
or British; quite to the contrary, these forms of national belonging are pre-
supposed by the European identity. And in that sense—at least in princi-
ple—the European Union will never be like the United States in a foreseeable
future. The founding majority of the US has been imposing its language
and many of its cultural traits upon the Natives, the imported Black slaves
and the incoming immigrants. Schools of "foreign" expression have been
closed down between 1880 and 1920 in several States. President Roosevelt
reminded the Americans of German ancestry that there was only room for
one language in the US, and the English-only-movement is still with us.
The much talked about ethnicity and multiculturality in the US is, with a
few exceptions, largely "symbolic" in the sense Gans (1979) has given to
this expression. This is not to say that Europe has found a solution to its
linguistic diversity; quite to the contrary. But up to now the predominant
figure is juxtaposition, not substitution or absorption.
Benign juxtaposition is also found between the native majorities and the
EU immigrant workers and their families who came from Spain some thirty
years ago (Roosens, 1992). Three years of fieldwork among the Spaniards
of Antwerp revealed that the men and women who immigrated as "guest
workers" in the 60s were classified as "strangers" at their arrival, just like
the Moroccans and the Turks who were there successors. The attitude of the
surrounding population was not welcoming at all. This changed over the
years, however. Although only a few people out of the more than 80 fam-
ilies we have interviewed learned Dutch—the local language—the Spaniards
were considered well integrated by the surrounding Belgian population in
the late 80s and the early 90s. When scratching the surface, we detected
that contact with the Flemish population outside the work place was almost
nil. The "Spanish" continued to identify with their region and sub-national
group of origin, and to speak their own dialects. They invested their money
in an house or an apartment—or several of them—in their home region
which they visited for periods of several weeks a year, while in Antwerp
they continued to live in the poorer quarters of the city among Belgians
174 EUGEEN ROOSENS
and other allochthons. They had their own cafes and restaurants which were
also visited by Belgian patrons. Their formula of "good integration" was
quite simple: the Spaniards had discovered the art of becoming and stay-
ing invisible. They abstained from Belgian politics, and once in a while
organised a Spanish goodwill party attended by lots of native citizens. Go-
existence with a minimum of contact seemed perfectly possible. When the
internal boundaries of Europe were abolished for Europeans in the early
90s, EU immigrants were all of a sudden at home all over Europe.
Naturalisation which had been promoted as a means of integration by
some politicians until the late 80s became redundant and meaningless. This
mega-transformation at the macro-level made it possible to keep one's nation-
ality and ethnic affiliation intact, to speak one's language and to preserve
one's culture, even when living on what just a few days earlier had been
considered "foreign soil", and protected all Europeans from the attack of
extreme nationalists. Racism and xenophobia concentrated mainly on Moroccan
and Turkish immigrant workers and other non-EU aliens (Suarez-Orozco,
1994).
But in contrast with the category of privileged EU functionaries, the use
of Ll, and study of Cl and Hl for the children of EU workers is over-
whelmingly a matter of the private sphere. Optional courses are available,
but Belgian schools do not offer the same opportunities of continuity in the
field of language and culture as the European Schools. Lower socioeconomic
categories of foreigners get more and more culturally and linguistically
absorbed by the surrounding native majorities in their "second generation".
To put it another way, a genuine multicultural setting is a privilege of the
wealthy. The children of the Antwerp Spaniards have adapted to the Belgian
surroundings in several ways. Their national identity has never been waver-
ing: they all identify as Spanish. Culturally however, diversity is to be found.
About 50% of the cases we studied feel very close to their Belgian peers
and prepare to stay in Belgium for good. Another 15% experience their
dual culture as uncomfortable and are not sure how to handle their problems.
Almost the same number of youngsters is very pleased with the opportunity
the two different cultures are offering and are fond of manipulating this
situation to their advantage. Still another group of youngsters strongly iden-
tify with Spain, not only through their nationality but also through cultural
contents. They prepare their return to Spain in a very realistic fashion.
Relations and friendship with Belgian youth are widespread throughout the
four categories of young people. As one can see from these data, a diver-
sity of relations exist between national identity and cultural contents. The
two are almost functionally independent. If the political authorities of the
EU continue to guarantee the preservation of the national identity and even
the right to keep one's language and culture alive—whatever this means prac-
tically speaking—it is perfectly possible that people with diverse national
identities will co-exist in the same city or village for many years to come.
It is highly probable that national, sub-national and ethnic identities will
stay unchanged for a long period while cultural differences will become more
and more "symbolic", being reduced to a few cultural markers. Nationality could
grow apart from language, territory and culture (Soysal, 1994). Paradoxically,
to keep one's nationality of origin through filiation may become an emblem
of genuine European citizenship. Hyphenation will be entirely redundant.
Non-EU Immigrants
The logic of inclusion we have been analysing is identically a logic of exclu-

sion. If one uses the criteria the autochthons and the EU residents apply
to themselves in order to situate migrants and immigrants hailing from non-
EU countries, the latter are automatically excluded from the right to live
on Belgian soil as equals. At most, they can be tolerated, condoned, pro-
tected, but, quite logically, they can not really belong. It is exactly this con-
sequence flowing from the prevailing logic of affiliation which the Vlaams
Blok is using against the migrant workers coming from Morocco and Turkey
(Billiet, 1990; Swyngedouw, 1991; Verlinden, 1991).
For about ten years, the expression "the migrants" has been narrowing
to contain workers of Moroccan and Turkish origin only. In the Brussels area,
"Moroccans" are the migrants par excellence. Well-to-do Turks are not considered
to be migrants. Neither are Japanese managers. More than twenty years of
research among Moroccans and ten years of fieldwork among Turkish groups
conducted by members of Cimo clearly show that the first generation over-
w'helmingly continue to take their region of origin as their main reference
(Cammaert, 1985; Hermans, 1994; Foblets, 1994; Timmerman, 1996). What
they hope to implement by migration—mostly a very sad experience at the
start—is measured by the norms of the home region. Just like many Mexican
migrants in the US, Moroccans and Turks send money and presents home,
and invest their savings in grounds, apartments and houses in their region
of origin. They return home for their long four or five week annual vacations
and display the goods they have acquired in the North. During their vaca-
tions parents look for marriage partners for their sons and daughters, search-
ing the conservative families for a subdued son- or daughter-in-law who will
keep their own child on the right track in Belgium. Although small groups
from both sides try to build bridges, the distrust towards the "immoral" and
"godless" surrounding majority culture has remained a strong barrier between
the migrant Muslim religious faithful and native Belgian society.
176 EUGEEN ROOSENS
Just as with the native Belgians, affiliation for Turks and Moroccans of
both the first and the second generation is running through biological descent
and religion, and in a secondary fashion through the nation-state of origin.
The kinship network is especially instrumental in the chain migration process
and underpins the migrant communities in Belgium. Ethnicity and nation-
ality are symbolised and experienced as eminently familial, and hence, "pri-
mordial" (Roosens, 1994a). In television debates, e.g., immigrant youngsters
affirm that it is simply impossible to change that kind of identity, even if
one becomes a naturalised Belgian. Moreover, as Muslims are required to
be buried in a way that is not matching Belgian regulations, and special
cemeteries would be required, the body of the deceased is repatriated to
their region of origin in most cases. Migrants and their families pay special
insurance to private companies in order to make this expensive repatriation
affordable. Many elderly people openly state that they prefer to "rest" in
their home country, where they really belong.
It strikes social scientists of all kinds as well as many Turkish and Moroccans
insiders that Muslim "migrants", once on foreign soil, tend to identify and
behave much more as Muslims than their counterparts who stayed behind
in the home country, enhancing a feeling of community. At the same time, by
stressing their religious affiliation, Muslim migrants find a shelter in the niche
of religious freedom provided by the Belgian system. Moreover, allochthons
get more prestige by identifying by means of Islam, a world religion, than
by their immigrant status. But, almost unavoidably, this strong Muslim
identification contributes in a marked fashion to their social exclusion. In
most native circles, Islam is not perceived as a friendly religion, and openly
identifying by one's religion is felt as "passe", backward social behaviour.
By now, both Moroccan and Turkish Muslim migrants have been for more
than ten years under heavy fire from the extreme-right political movements
and parties. The nationalistic Vlaams Blok has stated repeatedly that the non-
EU migrants are fully entitled to keep their ethnic and national identities,
their religion and culture, that they should be encouraged to do so, that
this is their natural right. But not on Flemish soil. Uprooting for everybody
would become unavoidable. Hence, these aliens who belong to an entirely
different culture should "go home", even if they were born in Belgium.
These are not simply the attitudes of a tiny Flemish nationalistic minor-
ity (Billiet, 1990). In the important city of Antwerp, one of Europe's largest
sea ports, more than 28% of the population has recently voted for the
Vlaams Blok, which made the Blok the largest political party in the town-
ship. The same party obtained about 10% throughout Flanders and Brussels.
This important victory caused fear among rival political parties who decided
to isolate the Blok by what they call a cordon sanitaire. It is striking that the
Blok has only belatedly mentioned the overwhelming presence of the well-
to-do aliens in Brussels as a menace to the Flemish culture. Non-EU immi-
grant workers from the South are an easier target. Moreover, many of them
can be spotted by their phenotype and treated accordingly. What is expected
from the internal Belgian migrants who move from Flanders to the Walloon
region or vice versa, is also expected from non-EU migrants: if they want
to stay and to be tolerated, they will have to learn the local language and
send their children to the local Belgian school. Even more so than with
their EU-worker-colleagues, their language and culture are considered almost
entirely as a private matter, and the courses in Ll and Cl are optional and
marginal, left in the hands of ill-prepared teachers sent by the respective
countries of origin (Rapport communautaire. . . 1992).
Not all allochthons coming from non-EU countries undergo the same
fate. Economic power and status are important factors providing different
conditions and treatment. The well-to-do Japanese expatriates in Brussels
studied by a researcher of our team from 1991 through 1996 are a clear
illustration (Pang, 1995). With subsidies of the Japanese State and major
Japanese Companies, these approximately 3000 Japanese "expatriates" simply
transplanted a segment of their society, including their school system, unto
Belgian soil. The Japanese school in Brussels, like other Japanese schools all
over the world, is identical to the institutions of the home country. The school
even follows the Japanese calendar, starting the academic year in the Spring
and respecting the Japanese holidays. Unlike most Spanish youngsters, the
young Japanese keep tightly to their own circles and do not socialise with
the natives or other young people. These Japanese allochthons in Brussels live
on a social, political and cultural island. As they import capital and employ-
ment, however, nobody ever told them in earnest that they better go home.
When considered from the point of view of culture as an objectifiable phe-
nomenon, the particular cultural content of the respective groups discussed
in this paper diminishes at different speeds. The subcultures of non-EU
migrant workers are eroded at a much higher pace than those of the well-
to-do allochthons. A daughter of a "migrant" hailing from the High Atlas
in Morocco has much less chances to feel at home in her own language
and culture of origin than a child of a high-middle class Japanese well-to-
do expatriate or a European functionary.
Conclusions
The same set of constructs and values we are calling "primordial autochthony"
can be used both to liberate oppressed minorities, as the case of the Aboriginals
178 EUGEEN ROOSENS
of Canada shows, and to exclude minorities, as the studies of non-EU

migrant workers illustrate.
With respect to the Belgian Natives and other Europeans, the various forms
of primordial autochthony reinforce each other: territories include each other
in a concentric fashion. EU people do not have to change: the territory
has changed. The soil under their feet has been given an additional,
European layer. Belgian Natives can affiliate in at least three different fash-
ions: as Flemish/French/German speakers, as Belgians and as Europeans.
In the three cases they refer to a territory which is officially defined at the
macro-social level. Territory appears to be a solid inter-subjective marker.
But the way a subject relates to these various territorial entities is biologi-
cal filiation in the popular sense of the term. Language and history are two
other important markers. Language is absolutely objective, transcending the
individual and collective "interpretations", while "history" is unavoidably
more subjectively tainted and can be almost entirely invented or fabricated.
All anti-racist propaganda and "republican" nation building notwithstand-
ing, biologically defined kinship remains the strongest social criterion of
belonging at the micro-, meso- and macro-level in present-day Belgium as
a part of Europe. For EU citizens living in another European state, it is
not a privilege at all to be granted naturalisation. The privilege of being a
European is precisely the opposite: a European citizen can keep all her ini-
tial identities based on her original territorial belonging and filiation—
regional, ethnic and national—and move to another State while still feeling
on her own soil, with all the rights attached. By the same token, non-EU
allochthons are excluded in a triple fashion. Fortress Europe, while abol-
ishing internal boundaries for European citizens, is reinforcing its external
walls (Stolcke, 1995). This reverberates on the non-EU aliens who happen
to be living in the Citadel, especially on the socioeconomically weaker.
As the phenomena show, the logic of primordial autochthony is not oper-
ating in an entirely automatic fashion. It can either be activated to exclude
aliens, or can stay dimmed or ignored as well, if the presence of non-EU
allochthons looks profitable.
Within the present setting of power relations, the ideology of multicul-
turalism is mostly working to the advantage of native groups or so-called
national minorities, and of the socioeconomic stronger allochthons. Alloch-
thonous people with a low socioeconomic position are disadvantaged across
the board. The higher the socioeconomic position of the allochthons, the
more of their language and culture they are able to preserve in the receiv-
ing country. This especially applies to the education of their children, and,
hence, to the continuation or the fading of their cultural heritage. Additionally,
a "high" sub-culture"—the culture of people with an advanced education—
has much more chances to survive on foreign soil than a labourer's sub-
culture. Here is still another concurrent logic at work: not all cultures and
subcultures are equally good in dealing with the external non-man made
world, as Hannerz aptly put it (Hannerz, 1992). Cultures which include
advanced sciences and technology are fitter survivors in a world of so-called
global competition.
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10. NATIONALISM IN EUROPE: DECLINE IN THE WEST,
REVIVAL IN THE EAST
Mattei Dogan
ABSTRACT
One can distinguish two Europes, especially from the point of view of national construction, stability of fron-
tiers, national integration, maturity of the nation-state and nationalistic feelings. Six contrasts between Eastern
Europe and Western Europe are considered: 1) New States with disputed frontiers versus old states with
recognized frontiers; 2) Conflicting ethnic intermingling versus consensual pluralism; 3) National churches ver-
sus secularization of the State; 4) Hostile confinement versus multiple exchanges; 5) Reciprocal mistrust
between immediate neighbors, versus mutual trust; 6) National armies versus supranational armies. Ethnonationalism
but not racism in the East.
Nationalism had been perceived by many historians of the nineteenth cen-

tury as the maturation of the modern nation-state.1 A substantial empirical
evidence covering eighteen Western European countries shows that in these
advanced post-industrial societies a decline of nationalist feelings and a weak-
ening of the image of the nation-state have been observed during the last
two decades (European Values, 1981, World Values, 1991, Eurobarometer,
1973-1997 and survey research in various countries).2 In each Western Euro-
pean country the nationalistic attitudes within Western Europe are in a phase
of erosion, in the sense that the trait no longer appears as a basic characteristic
of the civic culture.
Six indicators are particularly significant: mitigated national pride, low level
of confidence in the army, unwillingness to fight for the country in case of
war, mutual confidence among Western European Nations, the blossoming
of an European consciousness, and rise of individualism. Moreover, an inter-
generational dynamic of the decline of nationalism is visible in empirical
research.
Nationalism is still the most significant political value in the contemporary
world, but not in Western Europe. This major exception can be explained
in terms of asynchronism.
1
Edward, A. Tiryakian, "The Wild Cards of Modernity" Daedelus, 126, Spring (1997), pp.
147-181.
2
Eurobarometer, Public Opinion in the European Community, (1971-1997), Nos 1-46. Euro-
barometer, Special Issue on Racism and Xenophobia (1989), November, Eurobarometer, Special
Issue on Trust in other Nationalitie, (1980), December.
182 MATTEI DOGAN
1. Asynchronism of Nationalisms
Nations are located not only in space but also in time. Given the great
variety of nationalisms, it is hard to encapsulate them in a single definition.
An asynchronic view would help us better to understand the originality of
Western and Eastern Europes in the world today.
Nationalism as a doctrine was generated in Europe at the beginning of
the nineteenth century. It is a product of European thought. It occurred at
a specific period in European history and was later propagated throughout
the entire world with the exception of the democratic "melting pots".
As Anthony Birch emphasizes, most of the present countries do not cor-
respond to the ideal model described by theorists of nationalism. Most of
the Third World states have artificial boundaries established by their for-
mer colonial rulers. Too often these boundaries divide ethnic groups. As a
result, "most African states south of the Sahara could be described as
multi-tribal in character, since tribal identities and loyalties are still more
important than national identities and loyalties".3
Most of the 170 independent countries are currently at the stage of
national construction or consolidation, a phase in which Western European
countries found themselves six or seven generations ago. Thus, it is not sur-
prising to observe a decline of nationalism in Western old Europe at the
moment when nationalism is the dominant ideology in most other coun-
tries in the world. This asynchronism could be explained by the fact that
nations, like individuals, do not have the same age, either in terms of national
maturation or socio-economic development. At the moment when most coun-
tries in the Third World are discovering nationalistic values, these same val-
ues are fading in Western Europe. The countries of Western Europe and
those of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe coexist socio-
logically in a diachronic manner. As this century draws to a close, Western
Europe is not only a geographical reality but also a temporal category, a
phase in world history.
In a temporal dimension we can distinguish five varieties of countries:
First, there are those countries whose people are still loyal to their pri-
mordial ties and have not yet acquired a national feeling. They are in a
pre-nationalistic phase. Most of them belong to the category of the poorest
of the poorer countries, the so-called Fourth World. The second type con-
sists of the modernizing countries, the richest among the poor countries.
Almost all are relatively young nations that achieved their national inde-
pendence only recently. These are the most nationalistic. It took a long time
Anthony Birch, Nationalism and National Integration, London, Unuwin-Hyman (1989).

NATIONALISM IN EUROPE 183
for Britain, France and Spain to mature. Can the long experience of cen-
turies be compressed into one generation?
The third type is clearly located in time and space: today in Western
Europe, where the national maturity is followed by a post-nationalistic
Weltanschauung. The fourth type includes a few countries where the roots of
nationhood are not based on "ancestral soil" and where patriotism has con-
sequently taken a novel form, as in Canada or Australia. The fifth type is
characterized by a resurrection of nationalism after a long period of foreign
subjugation, as in Eastern Europe. As G. Csepeli and A. Orkeny write, by
the end of twentieth century, the nations of Eastern Europe had only caught
up to late nineteenth-century Western Europe.4
This asynchronism is visible also in many other domains. According to
demographic indicators (particularly birth rate, infant mortality, life expectancy,
ratio of old people to young people), Europe is ahead of Third World coun-
tries by several generations.5
2. The American case in a European perspective
Hans Kohn6 distinguishes between the nationalism corresponding to a "closed

society," which "stresses the nation's autochthonous character, the common
origins (race, blood) and rootedness in the ancestral soil," and the nation-
alism of the "open society," which reflects "a nation of fellow citizens irre-
spective of race or ethnic descent" and "finds its ideal image in a future
that will build bridges over the separations of the past. The open nation-
alism stresses the free self-determination of the individual; the closed nation-
alism, biological or historical determinism". This dichotomy seems appropriate
for stressing the historical difference between nationalism on each side of
the Atlantic. The United States is a multiethnic society with a heteroge-
neous culture lacking common traditional roots. This country does not in-
voke "common ancestry", "common descent," "common blood," a "mythical
father" or an atavistic feeling. The American society had been at a certain
moment, for the white population, a "melting pot". Its ethnic diversity was
continuously renewed. "Ethnic, cultural or historical criteria of the identity
4
Gyorgy Csepeli and Antal Orkeny, "The Changing Facets of Hungarian Nationalism",
Social Research, 63, 1, Spring (1996), p. 261.
0
Mattei Dogan, "Comparing the Decline of Nationalisms in Western Europe: The Gene-
rational Dynamic", International Social Science Journal, 136, May (1993), pp. 177-198.
6
Hans Kohn, "Nationalism", International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, (New York,
Macmillan, 1968).
184 MATTEI DOGAN
of descent can no longer be constitutive for the formation of a nation in

an ethnically heterogeneous society".7
In the 1980s for four out of every ten Americans at least one of their
grandparents was born outside the United States.8 In Europe, such a mix-
ing is significant for only a few countries that have experienced an impor-
tant influx of immigrants during several generations. France—the first western
country in modern history to have known a decline in birth-rate—has
received several waves of immigrants of European origin since the begin-
ning of the century: Italians, Poles, Spaniards, Portuguese, Hungarians,
Greeks, Armenians and others. Many national cataclysms around the world
have left a layer of refugees in France. How many contemporary French
citizens have at least one grandparent of foreign ancestry? An evaluation
can be attempted, taking into consideration the available statistics on nat-
uralizations during the last century. Including the more recent immigrants
of non-European origin, particularly those from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia
and Vietnam, it appears that one out of every five French citizens is to
some degree of "foreign stock".9 This is a much lower proportion than that
found in the US population. The French school system has facilitated the
assimilation of millions of sons and daughters of these "foreigners". The
number of immigrants has been less important for other European countries.
When asked to give the reasons for their national pride, Americans are
the only ones among Western peoples to rank "freedom and liberty" high-
est, and not historical reasons: 71 percent of respondents mentioned free-
dom or liberty as the source of their greatest national pride.10
In most cases exacerbated nationalism is directed against a neighboring
nation. Most wars occur between contiguous countries about territorial dis-
putes. The United States has only two contiguous neighbors. The northern
neighbor has become, from many viewpoints, like the fifty-first American
state. This border is permeable because Canadians, with the exception of
those living in Quebec, are anglophones. For the southern neighbor, California
is clearly not a kind of Alsace-Lorraine, even though Mexican-Spanish is
slowly becoming the second official language in Southern California.
According to all available empirical evidence in the United-States nation-
7
M. Rainer Lepsuis, "The Nation and Nationalism in Germany", Social Research, 52, 1
(1985), pp. 43-64.
8
Everett C. Ladd, "Examining the American Idea of Nation", Paper at the Congress of the
International Political Science Association, (1995).
9
Michele Tribalat, "Combien sont les Francais d'origine etrangere", Economie et Statistique,
242, April (1991), pp. 17-29.
10
Frederick Turner and Everett C. Ladd, "Nationalism, Leadership and the American
Creed", Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism (1986) XIII, 2, pp. 118-198.
alistic values are not in a process of erosion. There are objective reasons
for this. Among them, one could mention the size of the country, its sus-
tained economic growth, its achievements in many domains, its successes in
world affairs (the American army has saved European democracies on three
occasions: during the First and Second World Wars and during the Cold
War, by opening the atomic umbrella). But this country has experienced
more than most Western European countries during the last twenty five
years an erosion of trust in political institutions and even of the mutual trust
among people.11
For some observers, one among the many reasons for this decline of
mutual trust is increasing ethnic and racial heterogeneity. If, as president
Clinton has suggested in San Diego in June 1997, the United States will
become "the first multiracial democracy", new tensions may appear be-
tween the various segments of such a society. The rhetoric of such tensions
does not use a nationalistic vocabulary. It is based on ethnic and racial
cleavages.
3. Blurring demarcation between Eastern and Western Europe
Where is the line of demarcation today between Eastern and Western Europe?
This line does not coincide with the former "iron curtain". We can ask
about several countries. Considering its old democratic experience and the
structure of its economy, the Czech Republic could be included in the West.
The same questions can be said about Slovenia, which shows more analo-
gies to its Western neighbors than to the other republics of ex-Yugoslavia.
Ireland, in spite of its Atlantic rim, is by its social structure and religious
culture nearer to Poland than to Britain. Greece, in spite of its mem-
bership in the European Community, is from various points of view closer
to Eastern Europe. Whether we accept such adjustments or not, the cen-
tral ideas presented here are not affected: it is sufficient to admit some
exceptions.
A second line of demarcation can be traced, one which marks the east-
ern border of Eastern Europe. Should we include the Ukraine and Belarus
within Eastern Europe or should we leave them outside? The principal cri-
teria may to be the size of the country. In spite of multiple amputations,
Russia remains a mastodon. It is not a country of European dimensions. It
is a continent, the largest country on the planet, which constitutes a whole
11
Mattei Dogan, "Erosion of Confidence in Advanced Democraties" Studies in Comparative
International Development, Fall (1997) Vol. 32, 3, 3-29.
186 MATTEI DOGAN
in itself, similar to China, India or the United States. The size of their
country could be a reason for national pride for the Russians. As some
Russian geographers admit, we could consider the western frontier of Russia
to be the eastern limit of Eastern Europe.
Admitting that there are two Europes, we count eighteen countries in the
West, including Iceland and Malta, and 24 countries in the East, including
Cyprus and Moldova. In the light of this partition, internal diversity in each
half of Europe remains in the shadow. Of course there are also regional
differences within Western European countries. But there is no incompati-
bility between the revival of Catalan identity, for instance, and the decline
of nationalism in the whole of Spain. On the contrary, it is precisely among
these regions that one can observe the greatest European fervor.
We will consider eight contrasts. The first two are generally well-known
and we will skip them. First, the gaps in the standards of living as mea-
sured by per capita GNP. Second, the phenomenon of the "freezing" of a
national culture under a totalitarian dictatorship which lasted from 45 to
70 years, according to the country, as opposed to the pluralist culture of
Western Europe. It is true that Spain and Portugal also had totalitarian
regimes, but the Franco regime beginning in the fifties softened to such an
extent that sociologists, such as Juan Linz, called it a "one-party authori-
tarian system". Totalitarianism characterized Spain for only some twelve
years. In Portugal the regime also progressively softened. Let us look now
at the six other contrasts.
4. New states with disputed frontiers versus old states with recognized frontiers
Eastern Europe is a region of young states, born after centuries of servi-

tude, on the ruins of four empires: Turkish, Czarist, Austrian and German.
Among the twenty-four independent nations in 1997, with twenty two tongues
and dozens of dialects, only three can pride themselves on having been
independent at the beginning of the century: Greece, since 1830, and
Romania and Serbia since 1878. Two other nations became independent
just before the First World War: Bulgaria, in 1908 and Albania, in 1912.
Three others in 1919: Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Of these eight
countries, seven were to become "satellites", after having enjoyed independ-
ence for less than one generation. Three other new states born in 1918,
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, succumbed in 1940. The implosion of the
Soviet Union in 1989 permitted the resurrection of these three countries
and access to independence by three other countries: Ukraine, Belarus and
Moldova. In the beginning of the 1990s, Czechoslovakia broke into two

states and Yugoslavia into five pieces, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia,
and Bosnia. Poland has now four new neighbors, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania,
and Russia (through the former Kaliningrad enclave).
In other words, among the independent states of Eastern Europe, nine-
teen were not fully sovereign in 1989 on the eve of the Soviet implosion.
They were occupied or controlled. The exceptions were Greece, Albania,
Cyprus and the former Yugoslavia. Some of these new states have only
recently printed national stamps, and two of them do not yet have definitive
names, the Czech Republic and Macedonia. All of these new states are
mobilizing armies of historians in order to attest to their national ancestry
and territorial rights. Ukraine and Belarus must rewrite their national his-
tories from the depths of their collective memories.
The current territory of Belarus, for instance, fell to Mongols in the thir-
teenth century and became part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the
fourteenth. The Grand Duchy merged with Poland in 1569, creating the
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and subjugating Belarus. In the eighteenth
century Belarus was divided during the three partitions of Poland, and later
was incorporated into the Russian empire, before becoming a Soviet repub-
lic. It recovered its national independence by miracle after seven centuries,
when the Soviet Union imploded.
During many generations Ukraine had not been an independent nation.
In the 1990s it is perceived as "patchwork of nationalities". Ethnic-regional
cleavages are the most important fracturing forces, particularly the concen-
tration of Russian-speaking population in the eastern part of the country.
The original inhabitants of the region, the Tartars, were brutally deported
by Stalin in 1994. They have returned, claiming disposed properties. The
situation is even more confused in the former Soviet Union. According to
some geographers, in 1991 out of 23 borders within the Community of
Independent States, only three were not disputed.
The nationalism manifested by these young states in Eastern Europe is
like a juvenile acne. It is a natural phenomenon not well understood by
Western observers.
In contrast, in the other half of Europe most states have existed for many
centuries. There are few exceptions: Norway, recognized as independent in
1905, Ireland, Finland, and two small islands, Malta and Iceland. It is true
that Germany and Italy have also achieved their national unification very
late, in 1866 and 1870, but we must not confuse the unification of inde-
pendent states with national independence. In 1870, Prussia was already an
old state, and the various states which were to make up Italy were already
188 MATTEI DOGAN
sovereign. The age of the nation-state is a determining factor in the upward

or downward direction of nationalism.
New states mean new frontiers, contested in many places by their neigh-
bors. Of the twenty four Eastern European states, only four have all their
frontiers recognized by their immediate neighbors. All Poland's frontiers have
been the object of litigation. Greece must face claims from her neighbors,
particularly Albania and Bulgaria. Cyprus is divided by a recent internal
frontier. In May 1993, the Hungarian parliament ratified a Ukrainian-
Hungarian treaty recognizing the frontiers between these two countries. A
similar agreement was concluded between Romania and Hungary in 1996.
But all of the problems of the Hungarian minorities in several of these coun-
tries have not yet been fully resolved. Moldova seems to be a temporary
buffer between Romania and Ukraine. The destiny of Moldova is not yet
known. It may become part of Romania. The frontiers between the former
Yugoslavian states are still contested.
This situation in Eastern Europe contrasts to the old frontiers of the
Western European states. It is inconceivable today that a war could break
out anywhere within the European Community, except possibly in Northern
Ireland. Regional autonomy within existing nations (Catalonia, in the Basque
area, and Corsica) is a different matter, as is local autonomy in some Italian
regions.
5. Conflicting ethnic intermingling versus consensual pluralism
Whether recognized or concealed, disputes on contested borders are often

related to the problems of ethnic intermingling. In Eastern Europe ethnic
conflicts are generated in most cases by an amalgam of language and reli-
gion. In Western Europe today religion alone is no longer a source of
conflict, even if in the rest of the world, including Eastern Europe and,
paradoxically, the United States, religion is still a major factor of political
unrest. A millennium after Charlemagne, Western Europe is religiously
pacified, partly because it has also been largely "deconfessionalized".12
On the contrary, in Eastern Europe religion still impregnates the national
culture. In many cases religion is reinforced by language. Together they
build strong ethnic identities. People are predetermined from childhood by
two primordial roots which have a cumulative effect in engendering a kind
12
Mattel Dogan, "The Decline of Religious Beliefs in Western Europe", International Social
Science Journal, 145, September (1995), pp. 405-418.
of ethnic isolation. In Transylvannia some people speak Hungarian and are

at the same time Catholic. Others speak Romanian and are Orthodox.
Mixed marriages are rare, people intermix but they do not really meet
because of the double barriers of religion and language. Debates in the
social sciences about ethnic conflicts are somewhat confused because schol-
ars do not pay sufficient attention to the cumulative effects of language and
religion.
In some cases the uniqueness of the language generates a feeling of lone-
liness: "The linguistic uniqueness of Hungarians was a basis for their feel-
ings of loneliness, dispair, anxiety, and guilt".13 In this case the language
separates Catholics from other Catholics.
It is possible to distinguish four kinds of ethnic ecology: cleavage, con-
tainment, intermingling and dispersion. We are in the presence of a cleav-
age when two ethnic groups are concentrated in territories between which
it is possible to draw a boundary. This is the case of the separation between
the Czech region and Slovakia, or between the Greek and Turkish part of
Cyprus. Such territorial cleavages can also be observed in Switzerland.
We can speak about containment when one ethnic group, in majority in
its own territory, is encircled by another, much more numerous. This is the
case of the Hungarian minority in the southeast of Transylvania in the heart
of Romania. A famous case of containment is the Armenian High-Karabakh,
a region isolated among the population of Azerbaijan. In the case of such
containment territorial partition is impossible.
Ethnic intermingling results from the difficulty or the impossibility of draw-
ing a recognizable border. This is the case in Bosnia and Macedonia, where
ethnic pockets are inextricably intermixed (entire villages, districts of large
cities or small cities). This resulted in part from Turkish invasions and forced
conversions. In the Balkans the current ethnic geography has old historical
roots. In the former Czechoslovakia there is clear territorial division per-
mitting a peaceful separation, but in the former Yugoslavia an extended
intermingling makes a peaceful solution difficult.
The fourth type of ethnic ecology, dispersion (diaspora), refers to indi-
viduals and not to communities. Here, we are dealing with people origin-
ally from an independent nation, but who have emigrated to another
independent nation while maintaining their language, religion or ethnic tra-
ditions. That is the case of the 25,000,000 Russians who, today, live out-
side Russia. In the Ukraine, 17% of the population are not ethnically
Ukrainians; in Belarus, 20% of the population have other ethnic roots; in
Csepeli and Orkeny, ibid. p. 252.

190 MATTEI DOGAN
Lithuania, 48%; In Latvia, 20%; in Moldova, 35%. Among the 24 Eastern

European countries, 18 include ethnic minorities numerically important (see
Table). There are two exceptions: Poland and the Czech Republic, which
merit particular attention.
The current territory of Poland is only partially an ancestral territory. In
1945, it slid from east to west, losing immense territories in the east and
gaining others in the west. Before the war it included three large ethnic
minorities: Belarusan, German and Jewish, totaling about eight million peo-
ple. After the Holocaust, the forced transfers of population, and voluntary
emigration, there remained only a few thousand individuals from the last
two minorities who were strongly "polonized": the price paid for this invo-
luntary ethnic homogenization was the massacre or forced departure of one-
third of the population that had lived in the country in 1939.
Before the war Czechoslovakia was an extreme example of a multinational
country, one of the richest in the world, and an exemplary democracy with
a government of five parties (the Petka). The funeral eulogy of the defunct
Czechoslovakia was pronounced by the then prime minister Petr Pithart,
who described how the Czech Republic was "involuntarily" divided: "For
the first time in more than one thousand years the Czechs will no longer
live in a multinational state. For me, the Czech identity is unthinkable with-
out the 700 years of history with the Germans. It is unthinkable without
the Jews and the Ruthenes . . . The war got rid of the Germans, we lost
the Jews in the Holocaust, we abandoned Ruthenia to Stalin without react-
ing and now, in three years, we have abandoned our weapons to the Slovaks".
Of the four kinds of ethnic ecology that can be observed in Eastern
Europe, two, intermingling and containment, cannot be found in Western
Europe. Moreover, the amalgam between language and religion is excep-
tional. The Walloons and the Flemish are both Catholic. In the Netherlands,
the various religious communities speak the same language, In Austria, good
Catholics and anticlerical people communicate in German. In Switzerland,
linguistic distribution and religious distribution do not coincide. In Belgium
ethnolinguistic cleavage has resulted in territorial federalism and in a lin-
guistic proportionalism in the governmental sphere. The same proportion-
alism has been adopted in Switzerland. In the Netherlands, where individual
confessional affiliation is dispersed over the entire territory, it is the reli-
gious proportionality which is the basic criterion. In Austria, where neither
the language nor the confessional affiliation is the dividing factor but rather
the religious beliefs, pluralism is contained in the parties. Everywhere in
Western Europe, electoral systems favor political pluralism and a search for
solutions by consensus. The absence of the double barriers has facilitated
the adoption of consensual solutions in these countries.
The difference between Eastern and Western Europe is in a sense tran-

sitory: the East is behind by a generation or more, but growing urbaniza-
tion, the reduction of the agricultural population, mobility of population,
and trade are reducing the gap.
6. National churches versus secularization of the State
The secularization of society is a major theme in modernization theories.

In Western Europe, with the exception of Ireland, the separation of church
and state has long been a fait accompli. This separation in the West contrasts
with the symbiosis of church and state in Eastern Europe. Such a symbio-
sis in the East can be explained by the history of these long time oppressed
nations which have found in religion a double salutary refuge: against impe-
rialism or foreign colonization and against totalitarian indoctrination. In
Eastern Europe, nationalism had always been intimately related to religion.
Today in Western Europe nationalism is no longer nourished by religion;
the churches are no longer the network of nationalist movements, even if
it remains true that Spanish culture centuries ago was shaped by the Catholic
Church, and even if the bloody battles of the Thirty Years' War resulted
in a multitude of German political entities born out of religious strife. Only
in a few regions of Western Europe are the primordial ties still strong, the
Basque region being the most famous. No doubt, even in the West the altar
has favored nationalist movements in the past, as in Spain and Portugal,
but with few exceptions, like Ireland, and Ulster more in internal policies
than in fights for national independence.
By contrast, in Eastern Europe, churches have been historically the fortresses
of national survival, and this religious impregnation is still visible and nation-
alism is still intimately related to religion, as many social scientists testify.
For the majority of Poles, Catholicism has become the core of their national
identity. The convergence of religious and national consciousness nursed
both Catholicism and nationalism. Over centuries past, Catholicism became
a national necessity in Poland and fidelity to the church became synony-
mous with faithfulness to the nation. This nexus characterized the Solidarnost
movement in the 1980s.
Bulgarian nationalism was born, bred, nursed, and sustained for eleven hun-
dred years by the National Orthodox Church. Patriarchs, bishops, and priests
have served this cause under tsars and sultans for centuries. Priests, but not
bishops, continued to serve this cause during the communist dictatorship. It
is widely held that nationalism and the Catholic Church in Lithuania are
intimately related, that their interests are virtually indistinguishable, and that
192 MATTEI DOGAN
Lithuanian nationalist activity was to a large degree the defense of the

church and religious rights against the repressive policies of the Soviet regime.
The linkage of Catholicism and nationalism is manifest in the church's pro-
tection of the interests of Croats in Croatia, the interests of Slovenes in
Slovenia, and the interests of Croats in Bosnia.
In Hungary before the war, the Catholic church assumed the official functions
of education and health, controlling most of the school systems and the hos-
pitals. The Church's hospital system owned a half million hectares of cul-
tivable land. All bishops were, by right, members of parliament. Until the
eve the Second World War, one could observe a post-medieval imprint on
Hungarian institutions.
Greece was not until recently a secular state. Orthodoxy was part of the
national identity. Before 1992, it was impossible to have a civil marriage in
Greece. The Church played the role of registrar for births, marriages, and
deaths, even for agnostic people. In 1996, the government proposed a reform
of the civil code, but due to pressure from the Holy Synod it retreated from
this position and accepted that religious marriages have also legal status.
The Ukrainian Autocephalic Church was always considered the cradle of
national renaissance, and the Russian Orthodox Church has long been per-
ceived as an agent of Russification, rather than evangelization. The slogan,
"An independent church is the foundation of an independent nation" is
widely spread today in Ukraine.
Even historically in Western Europe the Church had also sustained nation-
alist and conservative movements. But today, churches as institutions no
longer nourish nationalism, and they have ceased to hatch nationalist move-
ments. Moreover, in several Western countries national unification was
achieved against the will of the Church and of the high clergy, Italy being
the most notable example.
Because of these religious roots and the geo-historical context, national-
ism in Eastern Europe is of a different kind than that in Western Europe.
What can be said about the erosion of nationalism in the West cannot be
extrapolated to the East. The fundamental fact to be underscored is that
in Eastern Europe, the Church has traditionally played the role of the keeper
of national identity, and in more recent times, the role of resistance to total-
itarian dictatorship. Now that these Eastern European countries are no
longer under Marxist-Leninist ideology, and have recovered their national
independence, it is quite probable that the religious-national symbiosis will
progressively weaken, and that national consciousness will be progressively
secularized.
7. Hostile confinement versus multiple exchanges
The theory of transactional flow formulated by Karl Deutsch14 and the appli-
cation of cybernetic models to international relations have shown how an
aggregate of isolated nations is transformed into a coherent whole. Such a
process implies exchanges in various domains and a system of communica-
tion which reinforces the interdependence of the constituent parties. The
essential notion to be retained is the degree of interdependence of the states
in a given region, primarily at the economic level. Statistics concerning
transportation of people give significant indications about the degree of
regional integration. Air traffic and railway traffic are much heavier between
Western and Eastern countries than among the Eastern countries them-
selves. It is difficult to travel from north to south within Eastern Europe.
To go from Warsaw to Bucharest, it is better to go via Vienna. Few peo-
ple cross the Danube between Romania and Bulgaria or the frontier between
Bulgaria and Greece. A trip from Athens to Riga risks being longer than
a trip from London to Sydney.
Until very recently there were few cultural encounters between Hungarians,
Romanians, Poles, Bulgarians or Greeks. Scholars in these countries more
often met in the West. Certainly, radio and television are received in the
capitals of Eastern Europe, but they are not practical because of the lin-
guistic cacophony. When Poles and Hungarians meet, they talk in English
or French. There is relatively little cooperation between scientists from these
countries and very few academic exchanges. The Orthodox churches are
autocephalous, ignoring each other superbly. The works of writers and artists
are not known in the contiguous countries in advance of their being dis-
covered in the West. Bulgarians are informed about Hungary through the
Western mass media, and vice versa. Kafka yesterday or Kadare recently
were first discovered in the West. Hungarian newspapers are not available
in Bratislava nor Slovak newspapers in Budapest. A large number of Western
newspapers and weekly magazines are available in Prague or Warsaw, but
there is no exchange of printed media in Czech or Polish between these
two capitals. Statistics on telephone traffic show the poor communications
among the Eastern European countries. Recently the frontiers have been
opened, favoring tourism between neighboring countries, particularly Poland,
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, but tourism between these adja-
cent countries remains modest. Slovenia communicates much more with the
West than with her Eastern neighbors. When the Romanian government
sent a military contingent in April 1997 to join West Europeans in Albania
14
Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication. (1953) M.I.T. Press.
194 MATTEI DOGAN
it was one of the first efforts in international cooperation between these

countries in a long time.
The economies of Eastern European countries are complementary in few
domains, and this is the main obstacle. There is not a system of exchanges
and communication which could make an integrated region. Each country
currently lives in isolation of the immediate neighbours communicating only
with far away Western countries. There is no a feeling of community of
interests between immediate neighbors. Each one protects its own borders.
The relationship of Romania and Moldova is an exceptional case, explain-
able by common language and history. In such confinement, political con-
sciousness of belonging to the same region cannot germinate. Even in the
past, there were few attempts to integrate these countries politically. Before
World War II, the Petite Entente between Czechoslovakia, Romania and
Yugoslavia extinguished itself rapidly. During the Soviet hegemony the "satel-
lites" never succeeded in synchronizing their liberation movements. Even
now there were revolts in Berlin, Budapest, Prague, Gdansk, and elsewhere,
but not at the same time, until in 1989 when Soviet power melted. Until
then Eastern Europe as such had never played an important role in world
politics. There is no an Eastern European bloc in the United Nations. Each
country retreats into its own shell. Nevertheless, all these countries together
represent a power potential totaling a population of 150 million people.
Conversely, in the West European consciousness has made enormous
progress in the last decades. Several surveys have shown the rapid "Euro-
peanization" of national cultures. Today, people, ideas, and goods circulate
freely within the European Community. During the last forty years, more
Europeans have crossed the intra-European borders than during the previ-
ous eight centuries. Dozens of millions of vacationers migrate from the north
to the south every summer. Television ignores national boundaries. Eurovision
is a reality. The French/German television channel has become a cultural
power. In spite of linguistic diversity, Western cultures are becoming less
and less national and more and more eclectic, especially among young peo-
ple. This mixing of cultures does not happen equally everywhere. In recent
years, the majority of Germans have taken vacations in another European
country. Every year, Spain and Italy receive a number of European tourists
greater than their adult populations. The resorts of Constanta and Varna
and the Dalmatian coast do not draw tourists from other Eastern European
countries as much as the Greek beaches do from Western Europe. This
blossoming of a supranational consciousness in Western Europe contrasts
with the confinement of the Eastern European countries.
8. Reciprocal mistrust between neighbors versus mutual trust
Mutual trust between Western European countries contrasts with the mis-
trust that prevails in Eastern Europe. In a survey conducted in 1990, a
majority of Poles declared that they did not trust the Russians (69%),
Belarusans (63%), Romanians (64%) Bulgarians (56%) or Czechs (61%); only
2% of the Poles declared that they trusted the Russians, Ukrainians, or
Belarusans. For 10% of the Poles the Americans, British, Italians, and Swiss
are the only people "worthy of trust". Collective memory remains alive fifty
years after the end of the War: 70% of the Poles mistrust the Germans.15
Clearly, the majority of Poles have the feeling of living in a hostile envi-
ronment, which only encourages nationalist attitudes. In 1990 the Czechs
also believed that they were in a hostile environment, since 62% didn't trust
the Russians, 77%, the Poles and the Romanians, 67%, the Hungarians,
and 64%, the Bulgarians, while only 44% were suspicious of the Germans.
At that time, before the separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, a
strong minority of Czechs stated that they mistrusted the Slovaks.16
How do we explain such mistrust between the countries of Eastern Europe?
First, there is the collective memory of each nation. Genocide and atrocities
cannot be forgotten: More than two generations ago, the massacres of Arme-
nians by Turks occured; the genocide of Jews during the second World War
is present in the memory of all Europeans; in 1940 ten thousand Polish
officers were killed at Katyn by Soviet authorities; in more recent years Serbs
and Croats procedeed to mutual "ethnic purification"—the list is long. Recent
territorial conflicts and contested frontiers nourish the reciprocal mistrust.
National folklore is also a vector of stereotypes and xenophobia. In folk-
lore passed down to children, the role of the bad guy is always incarnated
in someone from a neighboring country. Manuals and school books main-
tain this distrust. They transmit a xenophobic mentality from one genera-
tion to another. These stereotypes are molded into children's vulnerable
minds. Between the two wars, in most Eastern European countries, in the
schools children were taught to regard neighbouring nations as culturally
and morally inferior to their own. For decades, nothing was done to pro-
mote mutual knowledge and understanding between neighbours.
A comparative analysis of the content of school books used in the East
and the West yesterday and today would reveal a very different process of
socialization. Today, manuals used in Germany, France, Italy, and Spain
15
Eurobarometer, December (1990) p. 47.
16
Eurobarometer, December (1990) p. A. 47.
196 MATTEI DOGAN
and almost everywhere in Western Europe (except possibly Greece) are

cleansed of any visible xenophobia.
In the East each country is considered by most of its neighbors as a
potential enemy. This aversion is ancestral. The most hated country in
Poland and Romania is Russia, white or red. Most Romanians peasants be-
lieve that their country is encircled by enemies, with the exception of Serbia.
They particularly detest Ukrainians, described in the Romanian folklore as
people who "have heads as round as apples". The Greeks also see themselves
surrounded by enemies: the Turks in the east, the Bulgarians and Albanians
in the north. The reciprocal hate between Serbs and Croats, fueled by the
recent atrocities, will remain in the collective memory for generations.
Mutual ignorance, as between Poland and Romania, is a relatively favor-
able situation. There are nevertheless a few exceptions. Poland and Hungary,
due to their similar national destinies, have maintained cordial relations for
a long time, but they have no common frontiers. The three Baltic coun-
tries feel a solidarity resulting from their common national destinies. We do
not yet know what the relationship will be between Ukraine and Belarus.
In Eastern Europe in most cases, national integrity has been achieved by
wars between neighbors. The heritage is heavy in territorial claims. Obviously,
a country that has no confidence in its neighbors can only be nationalistic.
Sterotypes and prejudices survived during the communist regime. In
Bulgaria, in 1992, for instance one every of two Christian Bulgarians con-
sidered the Turkish minority as "a threat to the national security". Gypsies
were even less tolerated: 72% of the Bulgarians were in favor of "a segre-
gation of Gypsies in the place of living", and 90% believed that they have
"criminal proclivities"; 48% of Bulgarians were not willing to hire a Turk
and 30%, to be hired by a Turk.17 In Hungary, surveys conducted in the
1980s and 1990s have shown that stereotypes concerning the neighboring
nations were all negative except toward the Austrians.18 At the same moment
(spring 1990) the absolute majority in each of the twelve countries of the
European Union expressed a feeling of trust toward the other nations of
Western Europe. The level of trust has increased between 1976 and 1990.
The most spectacular trend is the growth of mutual trust between France
and Germany during the last four decades.19
17
Dimitrina Dimitrova "The World of Work", in Nikolai Genov, ed. Sociology in a Society
in Transition, Sofia, Bulgarian Sociological Association (1994) p. 71.
18
Csepeli and Orkeny, idem, p. 270.
19
Mattei Dogan, op. cit. 1993, p. 196.
9. National armies versus supranational armies
Are you willing to fight for your own country? Under what conditions? To
defend the country or an ideology? Against which enemy? With what chances
of survival? Some empirical data are available to reply to these questions.
Even if the threat of the Red Army has disappeared, in almost all Western
European countries a significant part of the population does not have com-
plete confidence in the capacity of its national army to defend the nation,
particularly in the event of a thermonuclear war.20 We do not have com-
parable empirical data for the Eastern European countries. But even if they
were available, a comparison between the two Europes would not be valid
because the circumstances are not the same.
In Eastern Europe the potential enemy could not be a superpower but
a next-door neighbor of modest size. The objective would be the defense
of a frontier and not a planetary ambition. The potential army would be
a small army which would have to fight against another small army.
Conversely, in Western Europe a war between neighboring countries is
unthinkable (except in Northern Ireland), because no country has territorial
claims, whereas in the East, precisely these types of claims are possible rea-
sons for local armed conflict. The missions of national armies are simply
not the same on both sides of Europe. In Western Europe most countries
are moving toward a supranational professional army, which presumably
will not have any role to play in the maintenance of frontiers within the
European Community: an integrated European army is already envisioned.
But the army maintains its importance in the East, continuing to nourish
nationalist reflexes. Romania, Hungary, Croatia, Estonia, and Greece still
need a good national army. But what would be the use of a Portuguese,
Dutch, or Danish army, if not as a part of a multinational European army?
10. Ethnonationalism but not racism in the East
In Eastern Europe, nationalism has no racist overtones. In spite of the diver-

sity of their ancestries, sometimes mythological, the twenty-four nations in
that region are only distinguished by language, religion, and folklore—even
if the proportion of people with blond hair in Poland is higher than in
Bulgaria, and even if the Croats are taller than the Ukrainians. The willingness
20
Jean Stoetzel, "Defeatism in Western Europe: Reluctance to Fight for the Country, in
Mattei Dogan, ed., Comparing Pluralist Democracies: Stains on Legitimacy, (Boulder, Co., Westview
Press 1988), pp. 169-180.
198 MATTEI DOGAN
to assimilate ethnic minorities is symptomatic: Romania has tried until

recently to "romanize" the Hungarians in Transylvania, with little success,
however. Slovakia has made the usage of Hungarian first names difficult.
In 1984 all the names of Bulgarian Muslims were changed into Bulgarian.
This resulted in a confrontation between the Turkish minority and the gov-
ernment, and many Bulgarian have emigrated to Turkey. The right to have
a Turkish name was recognized in 1990. The Serbs wanted the Bosnian
Muslims to renounce their religion. It has been made difficult everywhere
to teach the minority language. But religious freedom is respected. This pol-
icy of assimilation pursued by national governments shows that nationalism
has no racist basis, as is the case elsewhere in the world. All the nations of
Eastern Europe are white. There is no real racial diversity in that region,
and here appears a new contrast with Western Europe and the United
States which now have millions of immigrants of non-European and non-
Mediterranean stocks, particularly in Britain.
In the process of integration and assimilation, the most significant stage
is that of mixed marriages. Retaining this criterion, assimilation has only
modestly reached this stage: in 1990 there were less than 6% of mixed mar-
riages between Czechs and Slovaks and perhaps no more in Transylvania
between Romanians and Hungarians. Ex-Yugoslavia is a true laboratory for
social sciences. In a survey conducted in 1966, and repeated in 1990, peo-
ple have been asked in each of the ex-Yugoslavian states, whether they
would find it acceptable to marry a person of another nationality. In Serbia,
only 35% of the people responded that they do not reject a priori a mar-
riage with a Croat, and 39%, with a Slovenian. But in Croatia, only 10%
have found it acceptable to marry a Serb, and only 8%, a Macedonian.
This is an astonishing finding after half of a century of common experience
in a "socialist federation" which had done so much to reduce the tradi-
tional vertical cleavages.
Most of the nations of Eastern Europe had been without self-government
during their long history, swinging back and forth between empires. In the
twentieth century their national destiny was decided in Versailles, Trianon,
Munich, and Yalta. Sociologists and economists have revised the history of
Latin America, by forging the theory of "dependence". An application of
this theory to Eastern Europe might bring a clarifying interpretation.
The history of these contiguous countries has often been marked by sim-
ilar upheavals. Most of them achieved national independence at the same
time, in 1918-1919. Together they fell under Soviet rule in 1945. Certainly,
they did not succeed in coordinating their revolts while under Soviet hege-
mony; in revenge, they freed themselves in 1989 1991, as if a kind of good
virus had been propagated by radio and television.
In spite of this geo-historical conditioning, today these countries do not

represent a commonwealth but an aggregate of countries with disputable
and disputed frontiers. Liberated recently, they find themselves in a new
nationalist phase of their development. They manifest a nationalism of prox-
imity and neighborhood. At the same time, they aspire, as shown by many
surveys, to a fusion with Western Europe. They mistrust their immediate
neighbors, but they trust those farther away in the West. Europe as a
panacea is more popular in Poland, Romania, Hungary, the Czech Republic,
and Greece than in the core of Western Europe, particularly in Britain,
France, Switzerland, Denmark.
The major causes of this failure of regional integration are the vertical
cleavages (language, religion, ethnicity) and economic inequality between
regions. The best example is Slovenia and Croatia, which did not accept
sacrifices in favor of the economic development of Kosovo and Montenegro.
Slovakia felt that it was the poor relative of Bohemia. The first to predict
the dismemberment of the Soviet Union were, paradoxically, some Russian
nationalist intellectuals who emphasized the low economic development of
some of the Central Asian republics.
There is a foolproof way to create enormous difficulties for the European
Community: a premature extension toward the East with the incorporation
of a large number of countries with non-competitive economies. Considering
the economic gaps between the two Europes, a European federation from
Lisbon to Riga would imply, first of all, an economic transfer of industrial
plants from the rich countries to the others and emigration of people from
East to West. It is precisely these two issues, "delocalization" and immi-
gration, that have met with the strongest opposition in public opinion in
twelve countries of Western Europe.21 The theory of "communicating ves-
sels" is generous rhetoric but fallacious. Since Italians in the North were
reluctant to accept sacrifices to help their brothers in the South, one needs
a big dose of optimism in order to hope that the British and the French—
some of whom have trouble locating the Vistula on the map and who con-
fuse Bucharest and Budapest—will accept tightening their belts for far-away
countries. The Western politicians who are advocating such generosity, which
is laudable from a political point of view risk being punished by their tax-
paying voters, because people do not look as far ahead as do the political
and intellectual elite.
In the East, disenchantment could be even more rapid because the opening
of frontiers would offer new markets to competitive industries in the West,
21
Eurobarometer, 38, (1992) and Eurobarometer, Les Preoccupations des Europeens,
(1993).
200 MATTEI DOGAN
without helping the Eastern European economies. President Mitterrand de-

clared in September 1994: "If the ex-Communist countries would enter the
Common Market now they would be devoured by foreign capitals", but he
did not mention the risk of a massive "delocalization" of industry in search
of low salaries, which undoubtedly would engender reactions in the West.
During centuries it has been a national misfortune for Eastern European
nations to have Russia as a neighbor, whether Czarist or Soviet. Their fel-
ings are reflected in their national folklores. After having gravitated around
the Red Star, will the former "satellites", which together represent an enor-
mous potential, progressively create a new independent constellation?
Ethnic minorities in Eastern-Central Europe
Estimation: Mini Maxi
Bosnia 49% 55%

Latvia 43% 47%
Estonia 32% 38%
Moldova 32% 35%
Macedonia 30% 34%
Serbia 26% 31%
Montenegro 25% 30%
Ukraine 25% 27%
Cyprus 23% 24%
Belarus 18% 21%
Czech Republic 18% 18%
Lithuania 18% 20%
Bulgaria 17% 26%
Slovakia 14% 22%
Croatia 14% 16%
Romania 11% 17%
Slovenia 6% 8%
Greece 5% 14%
Hungary 3% 13%
Albania 2% 6%
Poland 2% 3%
Source: Institute of International Sociology, Gorizia, 1996
11. A SPECULATION ON SOME FEATURES OF JAPANESE
PRODUCTION PRACTICES: 8 POINTS OF DISCUSSION
Masayuki Munakata
1. Focussed Sector
Among economic activities in Japan the production sector is most worth

observing in terms of international competitiveness or international com-
parison. Especially the mass production sector has shown itself as the main
driving force of Japanese economy after the Second World War—from steel,
auto and electronics to piano manufacturing—and drawn keen attention
and interest from the industrial and academic world. We choose this sec-
tor for the focus of our observation to make clear features of a Japanese
way in comparison with those in western and in other Asian countries. The
so-called 'Japan model", "Japanese type" of production system or "lean
production" conception is basically formed by analyzing the experiences of
the Japanese mass production industries, especially the automobile industry,
as symbolically shown in the terminology of "Toyotism" or "JIT/TQC"
(Schonberger, 1984; Shimokawa et al., 1997).
2. Viewpoint
We grasp the production system basically as composed of technological, soci-

ological and economic aspects: that is, we understand that any production
system realizes its economic rationality by combining in a special mode a
technological logic with a specific societal relationship as a reflection of the
social settings of countries, so that we find various possibilities and manners
of realizing economic rationality other than, or at least as the variations of,
the apparently universal "one best way" (Appelbaum/Batt, 1994; Ortmann,
1995).
3. History
From the last half of the 19th century until recent times the fundamental
Japanese industrial strategy has been to learn the essentials of western
202 MASAYUKI MUNAKATA
technologies as genuinely as possible and embed them in our social context

in a manner to realize their highest economic advantages at any social costs,
that is, even if this strategy and the following mobilization of the people
could disturb the established societal order and stability within society. The
highest value has been placed on "catch up" rather than "keep order". You
can easily witness cases exemplifying this common inclination in the history
of our industrial progress, from the introduction of "scientific management"
in the 1910's, "mass production and quality control techniques" in the
1950's, to "micro electronics" in the 1970's and 1980's.
4. Technological System Features
The essential technological feature of Japanese production system and prac-

tices is to be found in the "quest for perfection" (Womack, et al., 1990) in
process technology for manufacturing products of well-balanced but not
unique design or technological specialty. In this sense, we may follow more
genuinely than western people the so-called "machine principle" (Reuleaux,
1875), a symbol of western modernity which indicates the exclusion of all
elements of disturbance from the system. Prerequisites for this ideal are a
high level of machine tool technology, thorough standardization, and strict
process analysis, planning and control, as F.W. Taylor and H. Ford had
told us so energetically and repeatedly more than a half century ago (Taylor,
1903, 1911; Ford, 1926). Especially the experiences before and during the
Second World War taught us the keen necessity of re-learning more com-
pletely the lessons from the classics, which became the common target and
backbone of restoration and development since then. Even flexibility in pro-
duction, or "Japanese-type flexible mass production" with her swift die
change and mixed flow line, is based on the results of further standardiza-
tion and mechanization.
5. Human Side of the System
You can not expect to realize the technological "machine principle" by

merely applying the societal "machine principle" in production practices, as
in the cases of western ways of so-called "Taylorism" or "Fordism" in their
present terminology. The logic of its impossibility is to be found in essence
in the "uncertainties" necessarily arising in the real process of production.
Its possibility increases as the degree of technological level, flexibility and
complexity of the system advance (Munakata, 1989, 1993; Thomas, 1994).
SOME FEATURES OF THE JAPANESE PRODUCTION PRACTICES 203
The Japanese way to cope with this issue on the human side of the system
is to follow basically the principles of specialization and division of labour
in technological and human functions of production but not to combine the
specialized production function with a fixed or "mechanistic" staffing of per-
sonnel. Our way is to combine it with human organization which permits
more flexible and free mobilization, and exploitation of qualitative, creative
abilities of human resources of all ranks as well as quantitative energies from
them. The quest for perfection in the production process with perpetual
"kaizen" (improvement) toward a "zero defect" ideal is otherwise almost
unexpected. The result is a sort of special unification of the so-called "mech-
anistic" and "organic" types of system or organization in the western social
context (Burns/Stalker, 1961). In this manner, you can expect ideally to
maintain mechanical factory orders and production while at the same time
utilizing with less limitation the organic ability of the people even on the
shop floor for more creative and qualitative functions for the system. In the
social context of the traditional western world, this is only expected and
permitted by the upper rank staffs, managers and specialists or experts. Here
you can see a sort of unification of two basic factors of societal system, that
is, requirements for social order and those for exploitation and utilization
of full human abilities. Their relation has been often grasped as a "trade-
off" or "dilemma" in the western context as shown in the confrontation of
"Taylorism" and a "Socio-technical Approach". The former approach implies
that some limitation of flexible deployment and qualitative utilization of
human resources is unavoidable for the sake of keeping the production and
class order. The latter implies that a sort of political autonomy is to be
given to the shop floor people in order to expect the utilization of their cre-
ative abilities and "learning effect" (Berggren, 1991).
6. Societal Characteristics
The special unification found in the Japanese way may be of little use in
terms of economic rationality if it results in excessive and additional pro-
duction costs for industry and firm. There exits in the Japanese macro and
micro societal system a mechanism to restrain the realization of this sort of
"danger". Two interrelated system elements are especially to be taken into
consideration: (a) the in essence closed nature of the system and (b) the only
"functionally", not "substantially", formed hierarchy within the system. The
former element compels people to accept this mode of practice by nar-
rowing the alternatives they have in their working lives for equal conditions.
The latter element gives people greater opportunities and motivations
for advancing up the social ladder in the system by their own initiatives,
and competitive and collaborative abilities with one another on a relatively
equal footing. The functionally precisely formed and effective, and in "sub-
stance" not solid or specific but rather fluid class nature of the Japanese
society, makes it possible. It gives our micro and macro system a dual char-
acter. The opportunity for full development of human abilities for most peo-
ple, on the one hand, and the menace of limitless exploitation of human
resources for the sake of industry, on the other, are central to explaining
the rise of international "human and inhuman controversy" in "Japanese
Management".
7. The "Japan Model" and Types of Nation-State
If this sort of structural and behavioral nature of Japanese production prac-

tice and system has any theoretical implications in terms of comparative
production system and production system perspectives as a "Japan Model",
it may be necessary to indicate some operational parameters or variables to
explain its genesis or formation. We need to place the relative significance
of the model and the position into the various possibilities of system designs
or "system models" in the present era of global competition. In this respect
a lot of discussion and reasoning is possible, from historical to religious and
cultural viewpoints often connected to issues of east-west comparison. I only
point out that the societal nature of the micro system has some relation to
the way and nature of the formation of social order, and this mode in turn
has some correlation to basic types of the modern nation-state.
As classic studies on "nationalism" tell us, two basic components of the
ideal of modern nation-state are the border formation (and mutual sanc-
tions); and cultural integration (esp. language) (Lemberg, 1964). When we
make a two dimensional matrix in respect to basic types of modern nation-
state according to the mode of formation (x: predetermined — P/artificial
= A), (y: predetermined — p/artificial = a), Japanese peculiarity lies in her
belonging to (P.p) type. In a sense we may say that we had established the
basic configuration of nation-state long before the modern era of nation-
state formation in the western world, relatively free from the societal issues
of "western modernity" (Toulmin, 1990). The historical and societal mean-
ings and implications involved in this type may shed at least some light on
the variables specific of Japan's production system. We only mention the
relatively low grade of necessity for maintaining the "substantial" class order
or hierarchy to keep fundamental social stability and for identifying her
nationhood and citizenship (Brubaker, 1992); the tolerance for high mobil-
SOME FEATURES OF THE JAPANESE PRODUCTION PRACTICES 205
ity of people among ranks; and the high information flow based on the
implicit creditability and reliance people have generally within the national
society. Our very simple and formal classification may form a rough check
point to grasp national features for the international comparison of social
aspects of economic behavior.
8. Perspectives
The special mode of integration of technological, societal and economic

aspects in the Japanese production system may explain at least some part
of international competitiveness of the Japanese industry. The logic and prin-
ciples extracted from our production experiences often grasped as the 'Japan
Model" may have some implications and contributions for the transforma-
tion and improvement of industrial practices in other countries, east and
west. But in fields of economic activities other than production or manu-
facturing, where more than "industrious" and collaborative attitudes towards
skill and technology is needed, such as commerce, finance or even public
administration, the reversal side of the "Japanese" coin could come to the
front. It could result in neither rational nor effective economic behavior, as
you see in recent scandals and difficulties in our financial sector. In an age
of globalization and international "mega" competition, the universal adapt-
ability of the Japanese system with her closed and only "functional" flexibility
within this framework is to be reconsidered as well.
REFERENCES
Appelbaum, E./R. Batt, The New American Workplace, NY 1994.

Berggren, Von Ford zu Volvo: Automobilherstellung in Sweden, Berlin/Heidelberg/NY 1991 (The
Volvo Experience: Alternatives to Lean Production in the Swedisch Auto Industry, NY 1992).
Brubaker, R., Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge/London 1992.
Burns, T./G.M. Stalker, The Management of Innovation, London 1961.
Ford, H., Today and Tomorrow, NY & London 1926.
Lemberg, E., Nationalisms, 1: Psychologie und Geschichte; 2. Soziologie und Politische Paedagogik,
Muenchen 1964.
Munakata, M., (Gijyutu no Riron: Genndai Kougyokeiei Monndai eno Gijyutu-
ronteki Sekkin; A Theory of Technology: A Technological Approach to Contemporary Issues of Industrial
Management), Tokyo 1989.
, "Social Innovation as a Condition for Technological Progress", Pleitner, H.J. ed., Small
and Medium-sized Enterprises on their Way into the Next Century, St. Gallen 1993.
, "Das Japanische Produktionssytem im Kontext des Internationalen Vergleichs", The
Annals of the School of Business Administration, Kobe University, No. 39, 1995.
, "The End of 'Mass Production System' and Changes in Working Practices", Hase-
gawa, H./G.D. Hook, ed., Japanese Business Management: Restructuring for Low Growth and
Globalization, London/NY 1998.
Ortmann, G., Formen der Produktion: Organisation und Rekursivitaet, Opladen 1995.
Schonberger, R., Japanese Manufacturing Techniques: Nine Hidden Lessons in Simplicity, NY/London
1982.
Shimokawa, K./U. Juergens/Fujimoto, T. ed., Transforming Automobile Assembly: Experiences in
Automation and Work Organization, Berlin/Heidelberg/NY 1997.
Taylor, F.W., "Shop Management" 1903, "Principles of Scientific Management" 1911, in
Scientific Management NY/London 1947.
Reuleaux, F., Theoretische Kinematik: Grundzuege einer Theorie des Maschinenwesens, Braunschweig
1875.
Thomas, RJ., What Machines Can't Do: Politics and Technology in the Industrial Enterprises, Berkeley/Los
Angels/London 1994.
Toulmin, S., Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity, NY 1990.
Womack, J.P., et al., The Machine That Changed the World, NY 1990.
12. LAW AND LIBERTY, CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN
CHINA AND THE WEST
Erich Weede
ABSTRACT
In the last jive hundred years the West overtook China scientifically, technologically and, most importantly,
economically. The Western miracle consisted of overcoming mass poverty for the first time in human history.
Why did the West overtake the great Asian civilizations that were more advanced than Europe in the mid-
dle ages? Here, it is argued that Western disunity is the root cause of Western achievements. Rivalry between
European princes and rulers forced them to respect the property rights of producers and merchants, to estab-
lish something like the rule of law, and to concede ever more liberty to subjects who later became citizens.
Safe property rights, limited government and decentralized decision-making provided the political background
conditions for capitalism and economic growth in the West. By contrast, China suffered the economic con-
sequences of political unity, arbitrary government and insecure property rights. Even the reascent of China in
recent decades may be explained by political fragmentation. The first Chinese province to overcome mass
poverty has been Taiwan, which never was subordinated to the PRC's government. As long as the central
government monopolized economic decision-making instead of sharing it with provinces competing for capital
and investment, the Chinese economy performed poorly. Since much economic decision-making has been del-
egated to lower levels of authority, something like market-preserving competition or even 'federalism' has come
into existence. A flourishing economy on the Chinese mainland may eventually push China towards democ-
ratization, as a flourishing economy did in the past on the Chinese island of Taiwan.
1. Law and Liberty, Property Rights and Capitalism
For a quarter of a millennium Westerners have ruled the world. The global
dominance of the West has been exceptional. Five hundred years ago, Ming
China, Mughal India and Ottoman Turkey were at least as advanced as
the West economically, militarily, scientifically, and technologically. Three
hundred years ago, Mughal India began its decline, but the Turks were still
close to the gates of Vienna, and China was still quite safe from Western
encroachments. How and why could the West ever overtake the great civ-
ilizations of Asia?
The main distinction between all of the great Asian civilizations and the
West in the past five hundred years is that the great Asian empires were
huge, comparable in size to Western Europe at least (where Western Europe
refers to the Catholic and Protestant parts of Europe, but excluding the
Greek and Russian varieties of Christendom). Most West European "states"
were comparable in size to Chinese provinces or districts, not to China as
a whole. The distinguishing characteristic between Western Europe on the
one hand, and the great Asian civilizations of China, India, and Turkey on
208 ERICH WEEDE
the other hand is the fact that Western civilization was always disunited
and politically fragmented, whereas the great Asian civilizations unified vast
territories politically and militarily.
The most obvious component of Western disunity and political fragmen-
tation was the existence of a multitude of effectively sovereign states, capa-
ble of waging war against each other. There also was the legacy of the
middle ages and the Protestant reformation: fairly autonomous towns; a
political voice for some merchants, artisans and educated men without nobel
pedigree in royal councils, parliaments, and courts; competing churches and
denominations, i.e., spiritual pluralism at the European, if not state level.
Political fragmentation in Western Europe promoted political competition
between elites. This competition between ruling elites in Europe was never
ultimately settled in favour of any contender. But it was the most impor-
tant determinant of the limitation of arbitrary government in Europe and
of the slow process of the West European "invention" of the rule of law.
The rule of law is important because it generates predictability. This in
itself is important for economic development. Moreover, Western law dis-
persed property rights widely in society. Whereas Chinese emperors claimed
to be the ultimate owner of all land, whereas such claims served to under-
mine the safety of property rights in China, West European gentry and
peasants held fairly safe property rights. Similarly, while Chinese merchants
had to suffer arbitrary taxation and even confiscation, West European rulers
had to compete for merchant capital and talent to enrich their domains of
authority. Even the lot of the lowest strata of society in Western Europe
was less miserable than in China or elsewhere in Asia because the property
rights of people in their own labor power was respected earlier and to a
greater degree in Western Europe than elsewhere. Of course, exit oppor-
tunities for peasants—in the middle ages from countryside to towns, from
one principality to another, and later to the Americas—played some role
in forcing European authorities to respect the rights of ordinary men. The
need to recruit fighters for the European wars from all strata and classes
reinforced this emergent respect for ordinary men. Women's rights are a
different matter. By and large, there was less respect for women's rights
than for men's rights. But again the situation was worse in Asia than in
Europe.
Recognition of widely dispersed property rights, whether in land, capital
goods, merchandise, or labor power, has been a determinant of the European
miracle. Safe property rights provide incentives for resource owners to use
their assets productively. For peasants, artisans and workers this implies an
incentive to work hard. Dispersed property rights imply decentralized deci-
sion-making, i.e., lots of people are free to make their own decisions, on
LAW AND LIBERTY, CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY 209
their own account. Dispersed private property rights and the rule of law
make individual liberty and social cooperation compatible. Everybody has
an incentive to put his resources to good use. Only those who produce what
others want do well in the market. Therefore, everybody in a competitive
economy faces an incentive to become useful to others. Moreover, every-
body enjoys the liberty to do what he knows best. As we can learn from
the Austrian Nobel laureate Hayek, decentralized decision-making is the
only way to mobilize the widely dispersed knowledge of society. West Euro-
pean and North American societies pioneered the empowerment of ordi-
nary people by granting them property rights and liberty, and by making
them bear the consequences of their decisions. By contrast to the West,
Confucianism legitimized the subordination of peasants under an educated
and office-holding elite and the discrimination of traders. Certainly, there
was no law in China which effectively protected peasants or traders from
their superiors.
Individual rather than government decision-making is the engine of inno-
vation. Until the fifteenth century Chinese navigators explored the Indian
and Pacific oceans. Then they were stopped by imperial decree. Thereafter,
Europeans could take over and begin their age of exploration. None of the
European rulers had the power to stop exploration. Whereas government
decisions could hold China back for centuries, European rulers enjoyed less
decision-latitude. Most policy errors in Europe affected fairly small territo-
ries rather than an entire civilization. Europeans were not less error-prone
than Asians, but European rulers had not enough power to commit errors
on a truly grand or continental scale. Innovation from below could not be
suppressed. Wise rulers even welcomed it. Somewhere in Europe innovation
was always tolerated.
Political fragmentation and disunity are important for another reason. In
huge empires the authorities have some chance of controlling prices, of
enforcing so-called just prices. Almost everywhere just prices are traditional
prices. By definition, such prices cannot rapidly respond to changes in
demand and supply. Therefore, they cannot reflect scarcity, and cannot
guide efficient resource allocation. Political fragmentation and disunity in
Europe made it ever more difficult for authorities to enforce just prices.
This political weakness overcame irrational pricing and ultimately contributed
to economic strength.
My sketch on the European miracle claims that European disunity in
contrast to the huge Asian empires, like China, promoted the rule of law,
dispersed property rights, innovation, and scarcity prices. These characteristics,
in turn, promoted economic growth by fostering hard work, use and accu-
mulation of information, and efficient resource allocation. Western capitalism
210 ERICH WEEDE
and markets for the first time overcame mass poverty. By contrast, mass
poverty in Asia persists to the present day, most of all in India and Bangladesh,
but even in China the last episode of mass starvation (1959-61) happened
only a single generation ago. In North Korea we witness another famine
generated by too strong a government.
Adherents of government guidance of economies frequently point to the
beneficial consequences of strong governments in Japan, South Korea, or
Taiwan. Admittedly, the governments of these states engaged in industrial
policies which, by and large, did less harm than elsewhere. Why? First, it
is much easier for late-comers in economic development to conduct a suc-
cessful industrial policy than for the pioneers. Since Japan has caught up
with US in the 1990s, the superiority of the Japanese model of guided cap-
italism over American style "laissez faire" is no longer obvious. Second,
strong governments in East Asia suffered and benefited from national secu-
rity constraints that prevented them from preying upon workers and peas-
ants, producers and merchants, as ruling classes in much of Latin America
or post-colonial Africa could afford to do. Government and ruling classes
in East Asian miracle economies knew that their national independence,
tenure of office and privileges had to be build on prosperous economies
and strong armies. Third, the governments of East Asian miracle economies
were prevented from some popular economic policy errors by their weak-
ness in the world. This is illustrated by Meiji-Japan which was bound by
treaties not to levy high customs duties on imports from the West. This is
also illustrated by the small size of the Korean and Taiwanese economies
in the 1950s or 1960s which soon dissuaded governments from inward look-
ing industrialization and pushed them toward export-orientation and the
pursuit of comparative advantage. Since Korean or Taiwanese exporters
had to submit to competition on global markets, they had no choice but
to become efficient (or to fail). While being subject to competition is always
inconvenient, the long-run consequences of not being subject to it are stag-
nation and decay.
One may argue against my analysis of the Western experience by point-
ing to recent events in Mainland China. Since the late 1970s and Deng
Xiaoping's reforms, the Chinese economy grows rapidly. But private prop-
erty rights remain precarious and unsafe. The rule of law is at most a dis-
tant aspiration. In my view, the delegation of much economic decision-making
from the central government in Beijing to provincial and even local leaderships
generated a functional equivalent to safe property rights. Local leaders have
to compete for capital and entrepreneurs. If they do not respect the property
rights of investors, investors will turn to better administered provinces, cities
and counties. As in European history, political fragmentation and decentraliza-
LAW AND LIBERTY, CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY 2 11
tion constrain the political leadership to treat capitalists, investors and mer-
chants well. Constraints on politicians are the root cause of economic growth.
2. Capitalism and Democracy
Some degree of rule of law, of safe property rights, and of individual lib-
erty for broad categories of people preceeded capitalism in the West and
were a prerequisite for its development. But capitalism itself preceeded
democracy, as we currently understand the term. While England experi-
enced representative government at least since 1689, only at the end of
World War I voting rights were extended to most of the adult population.
Thus, British capitalism preceded full democracy in Britain. The temporal
precedence of capitalism before democracy is even clearer in Germany.
France is a more complicated case because of political instability and regime
changes from more to less democratic regimes and back in the 19th cen-
tury. Even in America we observe the temporal precedence of capitalism
before democracy. Private property, some reasonable degree of rule of law,
and production for the market existed under British colonial rule, i.e., before
independence and the introduction of democracy.
In Asia, the same pattern of capitalist development before democracy holds.
Japan began a vigorous process of capitalist development immediately after
the Meiji Restoration, but democracy grew deep roots only after the defeat
in World War II. Taiwan and South Korea became successful players on
global markets first, but only in the late 1980s the process of democrati-
zation gathered some speed. Since 1979 Mainland China has reintroduced
something remotely similar to dispersed private property rights. China still
has far to go before the rule of law is established, before private property
rights are as safe as they were in Europe two or three hundred years ago.
But the toleration of creeping capitalism by a nominally still communist
government has started another economic miracle. While capitalism is in-
creasingly tolerated in China, democracy is not yet. Most of the successful
transitions from poverty and subsistence production to capitalism, growth,
and wealth have occurred under still authoritarian governments. Ordinary
subjects were free to make their own decision in economies, before they
were allowed to participate in public decision-making by casting ballots and
electing or rejecting their rulers.
There are some great nations which deviated from the standard pattern
of capitalist development first, democratization later: Russia or the Soviet
Union and India. Under Communism before Gorbachev, the Soviet Union
was neither capitalist nor democratic. Gorbachev was more successful in
212 ERICH WEEDE
promoting democracy—the process of democratization strongly contributed

to the dissolution of the Soviet Union—than in promoting the rule of law,
property rights, and decentralized economic decision-making. Yeltsin con-
tinued these policies. Russians now have a say in electing their leaders, but
the economy still is in transition. It is hard to imagine, how democracy in
Russia can survive for long, if living standards do not pick up.
India is another great experiment in democracy before capitalism. The
founding generation of independent India was committed to democracy, but
under the influence of (British) Fabian socialism. So, there was no com-
mitment to decentralized decision-making or to letting prices reflect global
scarcities rather than government fiat. Miraculously, Indian democracy sur-
vives to this day, but the economic gap between India on the one hand
and Taiwan or South Korea on the other hand has always widened since
the 1960s. Since 1979, even nominally still Communist China decisively out-
performs India.
Only capitalism can overcome mass poverty. The secret of capitalism is
its simultaneous minimization of political decision-making, i.e., of the need
to apply coercion or to rely on consent. By its nature, coercion kills the
incentive to work hard, to serve customers, to cut costs, to innovate. The
only "innovation" forced labor is interested in is better ways of shirking.
(And I do not blame forced labor for shirking!) Consent sounds much better
than coercion, but suffers from a number of shortcomings. In large groups,
it is either inapplicable because full consent will never be achieved or it
reverts to some degree of coercion, at best coerced submission of minori-
ties under majorities. Moreover, the requirement of consent kills innovation.
Where new ideas presuppose almost universal acceptance, before they can
be adopted, progress is effectively ruled out. Innovation requires majorities
to tolerate experimentation by minorities.
Capitalism needs little coercion. It relies on freely entered contracts to
cooperate in production or to exchange. In principle, coercion is needed
only to safeguard property rights and to enforce voluntarily agreed upon
contracts. The role of consent is similarly restricted. If two actors want to
trade goods with each other at prices they can agree upon, or if an employer
and a worker agree on the terms of employment, nobody else's consent is
required. Neither bystanders (including unions), nor government should even
be asked (unless there are significant externalities). The minimization of coer-
cion and consent requirements in commerce and industry permits a maxi-
mum of liberty, a maximum of individual and innovative efforts to improve
their own welfare by serving others (i.e., customers) ever more efficiently.
Wheras capitalism is built on individual liberty and individual decision-
making, democracy is built on participation in collective decision-making.
Democracy is obviously preferable to despotism. Compared to individual

decision-making and private contracting in markets, however, any collective
decision-making, including democratic government, is a rather poor second
best. Nowhere in the West or in Asia it is possible to express the intensity
of one's preferences by voting. The weight of one's vote is the same, whether
or not one cares for the outcome. Moreover, mass democracy fosters ra-
tional ignorance. If one's vote is one in millions or tens of millions, it is
unlikely that one's vote is decisive in producing a better government or bet-
ter policies. Thus, there is little reason for a rational or utility-maximizing
voter to be well informed in casting his vote. While suffering the conse-
quences of one's actions in the market generates responsibility in the pri-
vate economy, the extremely tenuous link between individual voting and
policies in mass democracies undermines responsibility in politics.
Given rational ignorance among most voters, politicians and bureaucrats
are no longer constrained to serve majority or public interests. Take agri-
culture as an example. Everybody consumes food, but only a small minor-
ity of the population in industrial societies produces food. Nevertheless, the
agricultural policies of almost all industrial democracies serve the interests
of the tiny minority of producers much better than the interests of the over-
whelming majority of consumers. Why are farmers subsidized at the tax-
payer's expense and protected from foreign competition at the consumer's
expense? The main reason is the difference in attentiveness of farmers and
other voters to agricultural policies. Farmers will cast their vote in order to
gain protection and subsidies. Consumers and taxpayers tend to be ration-
ally ignorant. Therefore, rational politicans will respond to farmer demands,
but neglect consumer and taxpayer interests.
Agriculture is merely an example of a much wider problem. By and large,
politicians in democracies do not and cannot respond to individual inter-
ests weighted by numbers. Instead, policies respond to organized interests,
but overlook unorganized interests. Politicians respond to attentive and
informed interests, but overlook others. Democratic government tends to
become the arena of a distributional struggle, where interest groups attempt
to capture parties and governments.
Unfortunately, redistribution is a negative sum game. Of course, there
are some winners. But the sum of all losers loses more than the sum of all
winners wins. The more the government interferes with the economy, the
more profits and income depend on government favor rather than on one's
capability to serve customers better than others do. Rational actors respond
to such a structure of incentives by investing ever more time, effort, and
resources in the political redistribution game and ever less effort in directly
productive work. This is the road to economic decline. By and large, the
214 ERICH WEEDE
older English-speaking democracies were ahead of younger democracies, like

Germany and Japan, on this downward path of development until the 1980s.
In the older democracies, like Britain or the United States, interest groups
had had plenty of time to organize and to pressure for redistributive, but
inefficient policies. Since Reagan and Thatcher at least tried to roll back
the state, taxation and red tape, some English-speaking countries improved
their performance, whereas much of Continental Europe accelerated its com-
parative decline.
Responsiveness to interest groups and redistributive policies are not the
only dilemmas of the contemporary West. They are related to the size of
government which can be crudely measured by general government expen-
diture as a share of GDP or GNP. The larger the share of government,
the smaller the size of the competitive private economy, the slower eco-
nomic growth rates. There is a major difference between America and
Continental Europe in government size. European government is bloated,
America's is lean. That is why Europe in comparison to America is in
decline.
3. Asian and Western Prospects
The comparative economic history of Western Europe (and its American

offspring) and East Asia may be summarized in stark terms: The West suc-
ceeded first in limiting arbitrary government interference with the economy,
it first empowered merchants and producers, it first provided the proper
incentives to work hard, to use knowledge, to innovate. The West did not
plan to overcome mass poverty by some clever design. Instead efficient eco-
nomic policies evolved because of political fragmentation and the compar-
ative weakness of Western ruling classes. Therefore, the West raced ahead
of East Asia for at least three hundred years.
While prosperity promotes democracy, the reverse is unfortunately not
true. Most successful capitalist countries are by now democracies. But demo-
cratic governments respond to distributional coalitions, increase budgets and
deficits, interfere with market prices, competition and free trade. The increas-
ing diversion of effort from production to redistribution promotes decline.
East Asia is not yet significantly affected by this Western disease. Of course,
there is some redistribution by politics in Asia. As in Europe, such redis-
tribution tends to be regressive. Always it tends to interfere with growth.
But in most of East Asia, mass participation in the negative sum game of
redistribution has not yet arrived. Success in the market is less effectively
deterred by taxation, and failure is less lavishly rewarded by welfare pay-
ments in East Asia than in Europe. That is why East Asia is destined to
grow faster than the West for some decades to come. Where Asian gov-
ernments protect producers from the consequences of their mistakes, as in
the state-owned enterprises of the PRC, they get the usual dismal results.
The twenty-first century will no longer be an age of Western supremacy.
Conceiveably, it becomes an age of East Asian supremacy. Given the numer-
ical weight of China in East Asia, East Asian supremacy, of course, is just
another name for Chinese supremacy, if China should succeed in its tran-
sition to capitalism and prosperity.
This paper is a summary of some of the main ideas of a book: Erich
Weede. 1996. Economic Development, Social Order, and World Politics (with spe-
cial emphasis on War, Freedom, the Rise and Decline of the West, and the
Future of East Asia). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. More recently, these
ideas have been elaborated in much more detail in another book: Erich
Weede. 2000. Asien und der Westen: Politische und kulturelle Determinanten der
wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
13. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS LIMITING INSTITUTIONAL
REHABILITATION
Gisela Trommsdorff*
ABSTRACT
The understanding of whether and what kind of institutional rehabilitation is needed depends (a) on the
method used, and (b) on the objectives (values, goals etc.) of such analyses. The results of such analyses of
dysfunctional or functional elements depend on the frame of reference. The best methods used for diagnosis
are not very effective if the data are not interpreted in a broader frame of reference, e.g. in relation to other
institutions and, more important, in relation to the social and economic problems at hand. Furthermore, social
change implies difficulties. The understanding of the problems at hand is especially difficult in times of rapid
socio-economic change since the people involved in such diagnosis have been socialized in the systems which
are undergoing change. Another problem of institutional rehabilitation lies in the transformation of the diag-
nosis into practice. Are the policies chosen in the way that they are taking into account the problems of the
present situation and its embeddedness in a global situation, plus its embeddedness in future development and
change?
Finally, any institutional change will be ineffective if the needs and goals of the individual persons who
have to make the institutions work do not match with the institutional goals and constraints. Not only the
question of accepting certain institutions and changes of institutions is relevant here. The question rather is
how far do individual goals and abilities jit with institutional resources and constraints. The goodness of jit
must, again, be seen in the context of change; (a) in the context of socio-economic and institutional changes
and (b) in the context of changes of the individual person during his or her life course. Institutional change
will not successfully achieve the level of institutional rehabilitation if individual persons could identify with
such changes and cannot match their own interests with the goals for such changes. Thus, the goodness of
fit between individuals and their qualification and goals on the one side and institutional resources and con-
straints on the other side in the process of socio-economic change are to be taken into account.
Introduction
Complaints about societal decay abound; they correlate with complaints

about institutional decay (e.g., decay of the party system, educational insti-
tutions) and the call for institutional rehabilitation. The purpose of the pre-
sent contribution is to study some of the psychological conditions that limit
institutional rehabilitation.
It is not attempted here to explain institutional malfunctions and limita-
tions of institutional rehabilitation by reducing institutions to individual actors.
* Prof. Dr. Gisela Trommsdorff holds the chair for Developmental and Cross-Cultural
Psychology at the University of Konstanz. She is a member of several scientific boards and
co-editor of several national and international journals. Currently the main emphasis of her
research is in socio-emotional development and the value of children and family in different
cultures.
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS LIMITING REHABILITATION 217
Rather, the view taken here is that institutions and individual actors are
part of a socio-cultural and economic system, both interacting with each
other as well as with other aspects of this system. Accordingly, it is assumed
that institutional malfunction and limits of institutional rehabilitation depend
on the way macro-, meso-, and micro-levels of the society interact and on
the way intermediate processes of individual and interpersonal actions con-
nect these levels. Thus, a multi-level approach for the understanding of
social phenomena is suggested by focusing on individual actors in interac-
tion with their institutionalized environment.
Social scientists are usually less interested in the role of individual actors
in institutions and the psychological processes involved in individual behav-
ior. On the other hand, psychologists usually ignore the specific quality of
social contexts, including social institutions, and its influence on the behav-
ior of individuals.
The individual level is of interest here since social institutions cannot func-
tion without the participation of individuals supporting the goals of the insti-
tution and investing in achieving these goals. Individuals' support and
investment will decline in the event of a mismatch between individual expec-
tations and perceived performance of the institutions. Such discrepancies
will induce cognitive and motivational processes in the person which may
result in dissatisfaction and frustration. This, in turn, may induce behav-
ioral changes on the intra-individual level, e.g., decreasing achievement,
motivation and loyalty. Opposition to institutional goals may shift to deviant
behavior (corruption, cheating) or disengagement (retreat and anomie). On
the level of interindividual relations, this may contribute to a decline in
social consensus and greater interpersonal conflict. This is a basis for and
a consequence of institutional malfunction and also for limits of institutional
rehabilitation. In contrast, the success of effective institutional rehabilitation
is based on individual mobilization and support and on interindividual coop-
eration matching institutional demands. Accordingly, measures for rehabilitation
should focus on both—institutional goals and structures as well as individ-
ual goals and behavior—while taking into account that institutions are always
part of a broader system. Chances of rehabilitation of institutions increase
when the goals and structure of the institution match the goals and abili-
ties of the individual members in the institution (see Figure 1). In the fol-
lowing, first some problems of diagnosis of decay are discussed; then we
focus on individuals and on interactions between individuals and institutions
as constraints on institutional rehabilitation; finally, some cultural factors
limiting rehabilitation are studied.
218 GISELA TROMMSDORFF
Figure 1. Interrelations between Institutions and Individual Actors
1. Where rehabilitation starts: Diagnosis
Rehabilitation means that actions are taken to improve a system (organism)

that does not function well. Before policies of rehabilitation are applied, a
valid diagnosis should be carried out in order to clarify indicators of insti-
tutional decay and remedies for institutional rehabilitation. Such a diagno-
sis consists of several steps and is related to several problems.
(1) What are the goals of a valid diagnosis, and which problems have to
be dealt with? First, in order to specify failures of an institution it is neces-
sary to describe the present situation, including the goals of these institu-
tions and the assumed areas of malfunction. The diagnosis should also specify
how the broader system matches goals and outcomes of the institutions and
how the institutions match the needs and qualifications of individuals. Second,
besides description of the situation, a valid diagnosis should specify the causes
to which malfunctioning is to be attributed.
There are, however, several difficulties in arriving at a valid diagnosis of
dysfunctions. A more difficult problem is a valid analyses of the relevant
conditions contributing to this malfunctioning. When a diagnosis is based
on reliable judgments, the question of validity is not yet solved. A consen-
sual diagnosis may be reliable but not necessarily valid. For example, not
many people disagree about the dysfunctional state of the German welfare
or educational system. However, as one can see from public statements,
there is considerable disagreement about which aspects of such institutions
are dysfunctional and what the reasons for such dysfunctions are, not to
mention remedies for changing the present situation. Usually, such discrep-
ancy between opinions is related to differences in value orientations, goals
and interests.
Indicators of decay can be interpreted as indicators of efficient function-
ing, depending on the underlying value orientation and interests. Especially
in times of social change, discrepancies between individual judgments should
occur with respect to diagnosis of decay or efficient functioning. To give an
example, in Europe we can presently observe significant value changes: loss
of Utopia and dissolution of ideologies, a decay of charisma and leadership,
a decay of values such as social solidarity, achievement, and responsibility;
and, at the same time, we can observe an increase in hedonism and secu-
larization. This value change is carried on by individuals and their subjec-
tive beliefs and interaction styles. Thus, this value change will also affect
institutional change. Institutions and individuals can gain or lose from such
value change depending on the value orientation, the level of aspiration,
the level of comparison, or the perspective taken. In a pluralistic society it
will be difficult to achieve consensus on judgments of institutional func-
tioning. It may be easier to gain consensus when diagnosing institutional
decay. Whether this assumption holds and how this can be explained (e.g.,
negativity bias with respect to institutions in general) remains to be answered
by empirical studies.
Since any diagnosis of institutional malfunctions is based on more or less
complex judgments, one cannot exclude the possible effect of underlying
and hidden subjective beliefs and interests on these judgments. Besides prob-
lems of motivation underlying the evaluation process, a diagnosis may start
from too high a level of aspiration or be based on one-sided pessimistic esti-
mates of expected future outcomes (including misjudgment of winners and
losers) of institutional decay. Therefore, a valid diagnosis has to be checked
with respect to the effect of biased information processing related to subjective
beliefs and interests. This precaution will be even more important when a
valid evaluation of strategies for rehabilitation is worked out later on.
One indicator of institutional functioning or decay is whether the insti-
tution itself provides the basis to carry out a valid diagnosis of the given
situation and to transform the results of the diagnosis into strategies for
rehabilitation. For example, the decay of certain institutions, especially the
economic system in East Germany, was not adequately analyzed before the
collapse occurred. The collapse was not anticipated either by insiders or
outsiders. This may be an example of the unwillingness of the elite to carry
out a valid diagnosis in order to maintain power. Here, one can see that
the act of diagnosing problems and the act of pointing out the necessity of
rehabilitation may itself be used as an instrument not to improve but to
harm the institution.
(2) From a psychological perspective, a diagnosis of decay must focus on

the individual actors involved in these institutions either as members or
clients. Here, theoretical assumptions on person-environment relations become
relevant. A valid diagnosis has to include psychological aspects of individu-
als and their proximate environment, focusing on individual motivation and
abilities on the one hand, and on situational resources and constraints, or
institutionalized structures and goals, on the other hand. A specification of
person-environment relations can clarify some causes for and consequences
of institutions' malfunctioning on the individual and interpersonal level, e.g.,
a lack of cooperation, a prevalence of hostility and conflict between mem-
bers of the institutions. Such studies are not easy to do since they deal with
interactions and processes on a micro-level which may be embedded in
changing socio-economic contexts on a macro-level.
(3) The diagnosis has to be complemented by a "valid" description of whether

or not and how a transformation of the present state into the desired state
can be achieved. Even if a diagnosis of malfunctions is valid, we have to
ask whether this entails a need for rehabilitation. The answer again depends
on the criteria for assessing gains or losses of malfunction and rehabilita-
tion. It could very well be argued that a rehabilitation of the church or the
educational system is not advisable (another question would be if it was fea-

sible). Such a judgment has again to take into account individual needs and
resources, the context of other cultural and societal phenomena, and the
interaction between both. This requires the use of multi-method and multi-
level methods and an extension of perspective into the future.
2. Constraints on institutional rehabilitation on the individual level
A valid diagnosis is only one step on the way to institutional rehabilitation.

There are more steps to be taken in order to achieve rehabilitation. In the
following, we will focus on psychological phenomena, one of the conditions
for limited institutional rehabilitation. Some of these psychological phe-
nomena are universal and presumably effective any time under any insti-
tutional and situational conditions. In the following, some cognitive and
motivational factors are discussed which can function as constraints on insti-
tutional rehabilitation.
2.1 Cognitive and motivational constraints
The degree of rationality of individual behavior is often overestimated. An

individual does not follow principles of mechanical rationality, but usually
bases his/her actions on "subjective rationality" ("bounded rationality") which
is related to certain cognitive shortcomings, to motivational and affective
factors, and to social conditions.
Human beings are not scientists; we normally act on the basis of naive
subjective theories which are part of the socio-cultural environment in which
we have been socialized. We only have limited cognitive abilities to process
information, to understand the world, and to understand how certain prob-
lems can be solved. Cognitive abilities develop in the process of individual
development, and they are activated under certain situational conditions.
People's intuitive heuristics normally works well even though some funda-
mental "errors" are part of such heuristics (cf. Janis, 1996; Kahneman &
Tversky, 1996):
— relative underestimation (or overestimation) of risk;

- limitations in understanding complex systems and interrelations between
elements of these systems;
— limitations in causal thinking: people usually have difficulty understand-
ing that multiple causes have to be taken into account to explain certain
effects in a complex system; they also have difficulty understanding that

causal relations in social systems are not usually unidirectional and have
reciprocal effects;
— limitations in understanding changing processes: people have difficulty
understanding that a certain event is only part of a process in a contin-
uous chain of events which differs in its functional importance depend-
ing on the time and length of its occurrence;
— limitations in the ability to foresee changes: the near future is usually
more relevant than the far future; therefore, the long-term effects, e.g. of
present political actions, are not usually taken into account to a sufficient
extent;
— furthermore, culture-specific effects on cognitive errors (e.g., attribution
bias; reasoning about contradictions) (Trommsdorff, in press) have to be
taken into account.
Cognitive training can only reduce the limitations in risk estimation or

multidimensional thinking to a certain degree. These limitations are typical
in the thinking and behavior of naive actors and also of expert members
of institutions, and they can induce institutional malfunctions and also lim-
itations of institutional rehabilitation. The scientific approach to the study
of (the rehabilitation of) institutions may itself be subject to such short-
comings. At least it cannot ignore such errors as normal characteristics of
people's planning, problem-solving, and acting in an institution.
These cognitive shortcomings are related to motivational and affective
dynamics in human thinking and behavior. Therefore, it is useful to ana-
lyze whether specific motivational conditions contribute to limitations of
institutional rehabilitation. Well-known phenomena include the preference
for immediate rewards instead of delay of gratification. This contrasts with
rehabilitation strategies that often require the motivation to delay (individ-
ual) gratification in order to accumulate resources over time (which can be
shared with the individual members later on). Other motivational constraints
can be seen, e.g., in the "individualistic" preference for maximizing indi-
vidual outcomes while institutional rehabilitation requires a "collectivistic"
orientation accepting the interdependence of goals and the necessity to refrain
from egoistic goal pursuit.
Both the cognitive and motivational conditions of individual action are
affected by the individual's socialization in a certain cohort and socio-cul-
tural and economic context and by the individual's socio-emotional and cog-
nitive development. Depending on individual biography and given social
and individual resources, the person evaluates his/her relation to the envi-
ronment, defines his/her goals (which are embedded in a certain motiva-

tion system), and acts in a given situation (see Figure 2).
2.2 Person-institution relations as constraints
Other psychological phenomena only occur in certain person-environment

relations, e.g., the subjective perception of institutional malfunction, related
disappointment of frustration, and the activation of certain behavior. Here,
the interplay between person and environment, or more precisely, between
person and institution are relevant.
What are the psychological processes when people are involved in insti-
tutional rehabilitation? From a motivational theoretical framework, a per-
son's behavior is structured around his/her dominant goals which are part
of his/her identity (Cantor, Norem, Niedenthal, Langston, & Brower, 1987).
These goals ("current concerns," "personal projects") represent what one
wants to obtain or to preserve. In periods of institutional rehabilitation these
individual goals and ways of achieving these goals may be negatively affected.
Any experience of frustration of important individual goals will induce neg-
ative emotions and activate psychological processes which allow problem
solving and coping in line with one's personal goals and need fulfillment.
Depending on the conflict between individual goals and institutionalized
goals (or goals for institutional rehabilitation), an individual's motivation to
support and foster such rehabilitation procedures can be increased or de-
creased. Individual action can even become a major obstacle to the achieve-
ment of institutional rehabilitation. This is the case when the relation between
the individual and the institution is problematic in one of the following
ways: (a) individual and institutional goals do not match; (b) individual abil-
ities and motivations to achieve institutional goals do not match as regards
the inputs required for institutional rehabilitation; (c) the institution does not
provide the necessary means for the individual to achieve his/her goals.
3. Interactions between person and institution
Next, some examples are discussed that describe how institutionalized and
individual constraints interact and can be the basis for failure for institu-
tional rehabilitation—e.g., the rehabilitation of the elite, of political pro-
grams, of political decision making.
Figure 2. Transformation of Institutions in Time of Social Change

3.1 Institutionalized constraints on individual mobilization and institutional

rehabilitation
Institutional decay and failure of rehabilitation may result from institution-

alized structures which constrain the mobilization of individual resources.
In the following, some examples are given.
(a) The Russian situation demonstrates that socio-economic recovery, includ-

ing the development of an elite, is blocked by the establishment. The estab-
lishment holds power on the basis of past position and party-based social
network but less on the basis of democratic decision making, competition
and achievement. Individual success is often based on implicit rules includ-
ing corruption. Disappointed expectations of enjoying democracy and an
efficient new system leaves a frustrated intelligentsia in search of a new
Utopia or actually leaving the country. This frustrated new generation feels
handicapped in overcoming the quasi-institutionalized egoistic accumula-
tion of power. Goals for rehabilitation focus on changing the present eco-
nomic and social situation, but, the perceived lack of control may foster
passive compliance.
(b) The present situation in Germany demonstrates that constructive polit-

ical decision making and action is blocked by the institutionalized control
of power. Such control was established by the constitution after the Second
World War in order to prevent a misuse of power. However, this has become
an institutionalized way of preventing political action. The institutionalized
blocking of major decision making by legalized action can be seen as a mis-
use of this control of power or as an indicator of decay in the party sys-
tem. Furthermore, even the institutionalized control of power in Germany
does not necessarily function effectively as current scandals of corruption,
illegal personal profit or scandals of party financing demonstrate.
The advantage of an institutionalized control of power based on a demo-
cratic system is to secure a stable and predictable government. The disad-
vantage, however, is that major political changes are quite impossible,
especially in a situation in which major changes are needed, e.g., when the
economic, social, and political situation is in great need of a major transi-
tion. Such transition, however, may be hindered by institutionalized con-
straints. An example of party politics in Germany are inter-group processes
of accusing the other party of being responsible for the present malfunc-
tioning of institutions without taking responsibility and acting on institutional
rehabilitation.
(c) The effects of globalization can block the rehabilitation of institutions in

our society, e.g., German companies get cheap labor abroad while the more
expensive labor in one's own country is laid off. The German welfare sys-
tem has to take care of the unemployed while companies avoid participat-
ing in supporting the welfare system by moving their companies to countries
with lower taxes. While the welfare system and the taxpayers pay the costs,
the companies enjoy the profits of globalization. The government cannot
intervene. The institutionalized means of control and sanctions are very lim-
ited when capital and companies can move freely in the new global world.
Here, the rules of justice are harmed while the values of competition and
economic success have priority.
Another example of limits to the rehabilitation of national institutions lies
in the fact that globalization can change the effectiveness of national insti-
tutions. This can presently be observed in conflicts between the national
and European law system. Furthermore, institutionalized values may dete-
riorate and have little chance of rehabilitation when regulations on the
national level are no longer effective due to interventions on the global level.
To give an example, we can presently observe significant differences between
nations with respect to pollution control. Why should one country invest in
ecologically necessary technologies and behavior when other countries refrain
from such investments and thereby increase the ecological problem for every-
one? Rehabilitation of related institutions on the national level is not sufficient
to solve a general world-wide problem. For such issues, a world institution
is necessary. Here, limits of rehabilitation are related to the kind of the
problem and its quality of interdependence in a broader system. This in
turn has consequences for the individual motivation to engage in institu-
tional rehabilitation.
3.2 Psychological constraints on institutional rehabilitation: Decreased acceptance of

norms and regulations
The limits of rehabilitation can be seen in the deficiencies in matching the
individual's motivation and abilities and the needs for institutional rehabilitation.
(a) There is wide agreement that individual misuses of resources of the wel-
fare system is an indicator of institutional decay. Statistics show that about
50% of manual labor in Germany is done by moonlighters. Here, the inter-
play between institutionalized constraints and individual action feeds the fol-
lowing spiral: the legal working hour is costly on account of taxes which
have to be deducted; therefore, it is unattractive to take a legal job while
an illegal job makes sense. The relationship between institutionalized tax
deductions (which are necessary to pay for the system, including the welfare
system) and the expenses for legal work can become dysfunctional. Such work
relationships start to escape the control of the tax system and regress into
personal relationships between private persons exchanging money for labor.
(b) It is a well-known fact that corruption is on the increase, especially in

the construction business. For example, local officials who give a certain
project to a construction firm can profit personally from this decision; at
the same time, costs for the project will increase since the kickbacks have
to be compensated for. Instead, the government (i.e., taxpayer) has to pay
the extra costs. Official building inspectors, whose job it is to make sure
that certain rules and standards are followed in construction style to pre-
serve ecological niches, are another example. Officials can misuse their power
by changing these rules to receive financial rewards. Even though corrup-
tion is not very typical and extreme in Germany in contrast to certain other
countries, there are many such cases which come quite close to illegal acts
of profiting from public property, as Scheuch and Scheuch (1992) have
demonstrated in their fascinating case studies. Recently more cases of mis-
use of political office and political leaders obtaining personal privileges have
been made public in Germany. The Christian Democratic party in Germany
is presently undergoing a severe crisis due to recently discovered uncon-
ventional practices of financing party activities.
The sociological aspect of this phenomenon is that the misuse of an official
role in order to gain personal profits indicates institutional decay. This decay,
in turn, is based on individual behavior, for example, giving up one's pro-
fessional ethic as a governmental official. One psychological aspect of this
phenomenon is that those who are governmental officials no longer pursue
the goals of the institution since they no longer identify with these goals
and related regulations nor give priority to institutional goals instead of their
personal goals. Another psychological aspect related to the consequences of
such events is that such scandals do not support the individual's acceptance
and trust in institutions, nor do they mobilize individual motivation to engage
in citizenship and responsibility.
Does the deviant behavior of individual private persons and individual
officials really indicate institutional decay? If individual deviance has social
effects, one could operationalize this as an indicator of decay, but it does
not specify the degree and quality of institutional decay. However, the psy-
chological effect of perceiving other people behaving illegally and profiting
at the expense of the public has implications for institutional decay. When
several individuals engage in such illegal activities, several psychological
mechanisms become activated.
Psychological reasons for engaging in behavior reducing chances for insti-

tutional rehabilitation are manifold. Several psychological theories can explain
such behavior. For example, learning theory predicts modeling and imita-
tion of successful deviance. The diffusion of illegal behavior thereby becomes
normal and hinders institutional rehabilitation. Theories on distributive jus-
tice predict that once the belief in a just world is shaken, efforts of restruc-
turing this belief are undertaken. Such efforts may result in a decrease in
individual investments in institutional rehabilitation.
3.3 Frustrated expectations as constraints on individual rehabilitation
Let us have a closer look at the implications of this theory. A general psy-
chological thesis is that the belief in a just world and a related need for
justice regulate our behavior (Lerner & Lerner, 1981). However, whether
people subjectively experience justice or not depends to a large degree on
the way they evaluate their own investments and returns. Justice is experi-
enced if the person believes that input and output match. One does not
want to invest more than one receives. Also, one does not want others to
earn more than they have invested. When experiencing injustice, activities
are taken to reestablish justice. For example, one may quit one relationship
and enter another where more justice is expected. The experience of injus-
tice can activate a negative emotional state. For example, being the victim
of injustice can affect one's self-concept negatively and can also activate hos-
tile feelings against those responsible for an injustice. These feelings may
motivate a person to harm this source or to reestablish justice by another
means.
When individuals observe that the institution allows certain other indi-
viduals to increase their own benefits by breaking the rules this can result
in imitation and diffusion of responsibility. Imitating the illegal behavior of
others reduces one's feelings of guilt which otherwise would serve as inter-
nalized control and prevent such behavior. Furthermore, the intra-individual
reorganization of one's belief in a just world can attach a new value of jus-
tice to illegal behavior and thus reduce the chance for institutional reha-
bilitation. People justify their own illegal behavior by claiming that everyone
else is doing the same thing. In this manner, one's belief in a just world
can be supported. Constraints of institutional rehabilitation may thus result
from imitating the illegal behavior of others and creating a new informal
individualized system of justice. The free-rider system follows a similar line
of reasoning. When the institutionalized control system has lost its accep-
tance, individuals pursue individual goals at the cost of the public and build
on constraints on institutional rehabilitation.
Once an institution is regarded as incompatible with the rules of justice,

it will lose its legitimization and the individual person's illegal behavior is
justified. Illegal acts do not induce guilt feelings since one can interpret the
situation as compensation for past experiences of injustice. Accordingly, the
subjective experience of injustice in one's individual relation to an institu-
tion could decrease loyalty and justify illegal behavior, thus contributing to
the decay of person-institution relations and building constraints on institu-
tional rehabilitation.
People may experience a feeling of injustice when reflecting on the German
public health system. German tax payers contribute to the system by pay-
ing a considerable amount of money, but if they are not currently in need
of medical care or social support, they do not receive the corresponding
amount of care or support in return. The rationale underlying the institu-
tionalized rule of the welfare system is that the input of the healthy person
will benefit those in need of care at that time; of course, any given healthy
person may develop a need at any point in time and thus unexpectedly
profit from the welfare system. The calculation of each individual's input is
based on a calculation of average risk, including the costs to make the sys-
tem work. Any expectation of the individual that he/she should receive
more than he/she invests (e.g., since some revenues should be paid back)
is unrealistic. However, such expectations are often held and their frustra-
tion can induce a feeling of unjust treatment and the related motivation to
reestablish justice by illegal means. The wish to counterbalance injustice by
harming the institution may increase when a person believes that other peo-
ple profit from the welfare system more than oneself without really deserv-
ing it. The experience of injustice is related to over- or underestimating
balance of inputs and outputs.
In most western cultures, there is a tendency to underestimate the input
of the other party and to overestimate one's own input (attribution bias)
and also to feel entitled to certain outcomes without personal investment.
Accordingly, the evaluation of "who deserves what" can be biased. Such
bias is increased by in-group and out-group differentiation and by negative
stereotyping of out-group members. When Germans feel that people from
other countries live in Germany under much better economic conditions
than "at home", but at the expense of the German welfare system and at
the German taxpayer, hostile feelings may arise, not only towards the wel-
fare system, but also towards foreigners.
A collective calculation of justice does not necessarily coincide with individ-
ual calculations of justice. People who follow their subjective view of indi-
vidualized justice in contrast to a collective one withdraw a basic source of
legitimacy for the system. When this attitude becomes a generalized belief
shared by other people, such social construction of injustice contributes to

institutional decay and hinders institutional rehabilitation.
4. Constraints on institutional rehabilitation in different cultures and in

times of social change
4.1 Cultural differences: Individualistic and collectivistic interests
It is not at all surprising that human beings strive for individual goals and
pursue hedonistic values. People want a solid income, a satisfying lifestyle,
and an accepted social status. The pursuit of such needs is only functional
for the system if people are willing and able to organize their goals
and related behavior in ways that are compatible with the goals of specific
institutions.
Of course, there are not only individual but also cultural differences with
respect to giving priority to individual goals or institutionalized demands
and rules in the accommodation of personal interests (cf. Trommsdorff, 1999;
in press). Cultural differences are obvious when comparing collectivistic and
individualistic cultures with respect to the way public interests are preserved
at the expense of individual needs. Individualistic as compared to collec-
tivistic cultures differ, e.g., with respect to the preference of public vs. pri-
vate goals or with respect to justice rules. In individualistic systems a preference
for equity prevails, while in collectivistic societies a preference for equality
(everyone should gain the same as everyone else) dominates. In individual-
istic societies, the preference for autonomy and independence contrasts
significantly with the preference for accepting authority and institutionalized
rules in collectivistic societies. If one's investment serves the interests of the
group, e.g., one's family, foregoing individual gains do not mean personal
disadvantage for people in collectivistic societies (Hofstede, 1980; Kim,
Triandis, Kagitcibasi, Choi, & Yoon, 1994; Trommsdorff, 1999).
Here, value differences with respect to giving priority to one's own per-
sonal profit versus giving priority to the profit of the community come into
play. In tribal cultures, individual and family profit are usually experienced
as being the same. Therefore, corruption by promoting the interests of the
family members or members of one's in-group is not unusual. The exten-
sion of a person's needs and goals—to oneself, to the in-group, or to an
anonymous system—is thus an important mediating factor for accepting the
frame for actions as provided by the institution.
Here lies another difficulty with regard to the realization of institutional
change. In the modern industrialized and highly individualized western world,
people have learned to focus on their own needs and achieve an identity
which is directed by hedonistic goal attainment. This orientation can be
dysfunctional for certain institutions, especially in terms of fulfilling social
needs or needs of social groups. These examples demonstrate that it is not
sufficient to focus on a few psychological aspects in human behavior; one
must also consider the culture-specific socialization experiences of the indi-
viduals who act in certain institutions, and the cultural background in which
this socialization took place, focusing on the impact of macro-variables on
individual behavior, especially in times of social change. To what extent do
the goals of the institutions subjectively match the identity of the individu-
als engaged in these institutions (as members or as clients)?
4.2 Social change and socialization as a means of promoting goodness of jit
Since human behavior is guided by individual interests, appealing to these

interests will improve the functioning of institutions. Of course, such appeals
can be paired with a certain system of positive or negative sanctions. When
these sanctions are internalized by the individual, the institution will save a
lot of energy and costs for controlling individual behavior. Under certain
conditions, internalized values and competence turn out not to be more
effective. In times of social change, the individual may experience drastic
failures of institutions and may look for a new way to match individual
needs and institutionalized goals. In this case, new ways of appraisal and
reappraisal, including problem solving and coping strategies, become nec-
essary (see Figure 2).
An individual is usually socialized in a such a way as to assimilate insti-
tutionalized constraints and to accommodate institutionalized demands to a
certain degree. This does not however, mean that individuals simply follow
the rules of institutionalized demands. An individual learns to find ways of
interpreting and changing such constraints according to his/her individual
needs and goals which, again, are not completely independent of institu-
tionalized constraints. However, the effects of socialization may also bring
about constraints on institutional rehabilitation since routine, tradition, and
established individual behavior patterns are preserved.
One example of the interdependence of institutions and individual behav-
ior is the institutionalized transformations after the turnabout in East Germany.
The institutions were completely replaced; however, the people were not
necessarily replaced. Simply replacing institutions does not guarantee that
the new institutions function in the intended way. People serving in these
institutions can make the institutions function in ways that fit their belief
systems and previous customs (Trommsdorff, 2000). To give other examples,
the institutionalization of democracy in Japan or in Singapore has produced

completely different ways of democratic institution building as compared to
Western societies due to the different culture-specific socialization of the peo-
ple in these institutions. In turn, the introduction of the free market system
in Eastern Europe has had the unexpected effects of increasing socio-eco-
nomic inequality and corruption, again partly due to the different social-
ization experiences of the people.
The limits of institutional change and transformation may thus consist in
the perpetuation of "traditional" ways of behavior in times of social change
as can be seen in the Russian agriculture (Stahl-Rolf, 1999). The dominance
of certain behavioral styles which have proved to be successful under different
institutionalized conditions may therefore be another reason why individu-
als can (even unintentionally) block the rehabilitation and transformation of
institutions. This also applies to necessary behavioral change in postmodern
societies. Changes in institutions and related changes in people's behavior
are not possible unless people are willing to give up established beliefs.
Institutional rehabilitation is in certain ways limited by processes on the
individual level. However, these interact with phenomena on the institu-
tional level which again interact with contextual phenomena. Therefore, the
limitations of institutional rehabilitation cannot be studied by focusing on
single variables such as individual motivation and behavior. One must view
these variables in a broader context in order to understand their meaning
and function.
5. Conclusions and outlook
It is obvious to many of us that new ways have to be found in order to

deal with the accumulation of ecological, social, economic, and political
problems in a global and future-oriented perspective. Such changes imply
institutional changes and, furthermore, according to my previous thesis,
changes in individual beliefs and behavior patterns.
Thinking in a global and a future-oriented perspective is not very cus-
tomary or easy for most people. Future orientation requires a certain time
perspective and a cognitive and motivational readiness to anticipate short-
and long-term, latent and manifest future consequences of present behavior
(Trommsdorff, 1994). This also entails taking uncertainty into account and
dealing with responsibility beyond one's own present existence. Even though
Western thinking allows for a linear time perspective and future-oriented
delay of gratification, the demands with respect to a problem focused, inno-
vative future orientation surpass what we are accustomed to in our every-
day life and usual planning behavior. Such cognitive and motivational short-
comings of individuals (Kahneman & Tversky, 1996), and even more so of
social groups (cf. Janis, 1996), are serious obstacles for institutionalized reha-
bilitation.
Another obstacle lies in the human need to form an identity which is
part of one's socialization experiences and as such is closely connected to
one's immediate socio-cultural environment. One's personal identity is usu-
ally related to one's social identity and its regional, ethnic, or local roots.
If one's social identity does not correspond to the demands of the institu-
tion, problems for both—the person and the institution—can be expected.
Even in a pluralistic and individualistic society, human beings do not
simply function in a way that their identity is based on autonomy and sep-
arateness. In contrast, the basic human need for affiliation and social accep-
tance requires some emotional bonding and embeddedness in a social group,
even in individualistic cultures (Trommsdorff, 1999). However, cross-cultural
research has shown enormous cultural differences with respect to the degree
of need for individuality and independence versus social orientation and
interdependence.
Also, the related ability to accept multiple identities and multiple open
in-groups instead of traditional in-group-out-group boundaries depends on
one's culture-specific socialization (Trommsdorff, in press). The readiness to
tolerate or even identify with different cultural groups depends on the extent
of independence and interdependence in one's identity and the fluidity and
range of in-group-out-group boundaries. However, it does not seem very
realistic to expect people to achieve a "global identity," to accept global
cultural encounters, and the global interplay of institutions which are related
to such multiple imports and exports of cultural identity and which are nec-
essary for transformation and rehabilitation of present institutions.
To conclude, whether and what kind of institutional rehabilitation is
needed depends on the quality of the diagnosis, and therefore on the qual-
ity of the methods used. However, the best methods used for diagnoses are
not very effective if the data are interpreted in a biased framework. In times
of social change, more difficulties have to be dealt with in arriving at a
valid diagnosis and a sound interpretation of the empirical data. Another
problem of institutional rehabilitation lies in the transformation of the diag-
nosis into rehabilitation therapy. Do the policies chosen take into account
the people's present abilities and motives and the institutions' problems,
including their embeddedness in processes of global change and development?
Any institutional change will be ineffective if the needs and goals of the
individuals who have to make the institutions work do not match the insti-
tutional goals and constraints. Not only 'the question of accepting certain
institutions and changes in institutions is relevant here. The question con-

cerns the extent to which individual goals and abilities fit institutional resources
and constraints now and in the future. The goodness of fit between the
individual and the institution must, again, be seen in the context of change
(a) in the context of socio-economic and institutional change, and (b) in the
context of change in the individual during his/her life course. Institutional
change will not reach the level of institutional rehabilitation if the individ-
ual does not identify with such changes and does not see his/her own inter-
ests in the goals of such changes. Thus, the fit between an individual's
qualification and goals, on the one hand, and institutional resources and
constraints, on the other, are to be taken into account in the process of
socio-economic change.
Decreasing motivation and decreasing identification with the goals of an
institution on the part of the members and the clients of that institution are
the beginning of the system's decay and induce the need for institutional
rehabilitation and social change. However, there are limitations in the "lim-
itations of institutional rehabilitation" which are also tied to individual behav-
ior. The individual's motivation and abilities not only restrict the efficiency
of institutional changes, they may also be the basis of fundamental social
change and related institutional change as can be seen in the historical case
of the turnabout in East Germany. The people changed the system by aban-
doning it and initiating a peaceful revolution. In the case of the turnabout
in East Germany, institutional rehabilitation has been enacted as a com-
plete exchange of institutions. The effectiveness of such "treatment," how-
ever, depends on individual behavior and its social interconnectedness.
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14. SOCIAL REGRESSION AND THE DECLINE
OF COMPETENCE
Friedrich Furstenberg
ABSTRACT
The more society is transformed into a complex and multidimensional system of dependencies at practically
all levels of social activity, the more situational competence (meaning the ability to handle problem situa-
tions) is needed for its maintenance. Its loss may initiate a process of involution, taking the shape of social
regression. It is characterized by the appearance of former modes of action, organization, and orientation,
indicating reduced complexity and a dissolution of the social fabric. There is ample evidence for such phe-
nomena which will be discussed with reference to interaction and communication structures, formal organi-
zations and frameworks for societal orientation. The functions of social regression as transitory survival pattern
and as a prerequisite for planned or unavoidable change will be discussed as well as the possibility of a
definite loss of culture. This leads to a final consideration of prerequisites for promoting situational compe-
tence at all levels of social action.
There can be no doubt that social decay has been a major concern of mod-
ern social thought. In the main, it has used history and analytical constructs
to formulate critical comments on contemporary conditions with the under-
lying intention of staving off disaster. Modern societies, rely on "rational
systems" for the exploitation of nature and the utilization of human resources,
but these systems are "artificial" and therefore exposed to a special type of
crisis: loss of situational competence, which might result in social regression.
"Situational competence" means the ability to handle problems using per-
sonally and socially acceptable standards of performance. Social regression
involves a relapse into less accepted, less integrated, less cultivated patterns
of interaction as a consequence of not meeting a given situational challenge
at a given level of aspiration.
I will present an empirical based structural analysis of social regression
at micro- (interactional), meso- (organizational) and macro- (ideational) lev-
els of society and then discuss how an adequate situational competence is
established and possibly institutionalized.
Social Regression in Primary Interaction Structures
The micro-level of social phenomena is characterized by face-to-face inter-

action and communication. Situational competence at this level derives from
two fundamental prerequisites: an action field structured by the various sta-
tus positions of actors and the roles or behaviors appropriate to them. Social
SOCIAL REGRESSION AND THE DECLINE OF COMPETENCE 237
structure is closely related to the generation of status. Therefore, any process

of social regression ultimately can be traced to the decline in status struc-
ture, no matter whether it is a retreat from interaction, role dissolution or
loss of identity and even anomie.
Status and situational competence are linked by positional requirements
and claims. Thus, the individual is committed to recognize tasks and to par-
ticipate in their fulfillment. If these tasks become burdens, increasingly unbear-
able and unintelligible, one might avoid them by withdrawing entirely from
the demanding situations as a strategy of survival. Such cases are observ-
able, for example, when status systems are used by political powers for
extreme political exploitation—taxation is an instance—so that traditional
bonds with the indigenous population a mafia-type clan formation or even
conditions of vagrancy and robbery (the "Robin-Hood-phenomenon").
Status also may become obsolete through drastic changes in value orienta-
tions and norms or through changing functional requirements of institutions.
This happened during the decline of feudalism and the abandonment of
aristocracy. But status dissolution also occurs in modern society, for exam-
ple, with the disappearance of certain professions as a consequence of tech-
nological and economic change. Individuals are groups so affected often
are marked by social regression along with the loss of their relevant sub-
cultures. Striking examples are given in studies of the effect of long-term
unemployment.
Our main thesis is that loss of status is connected with a loss of situa-
tional competence and therefore tends to result in interaction and commu-
nication at socioculturally "lower" levels. The loss of situational competence
in social interaction is often conceived as arising from deficient or faulty
socialization. When individuals, for whatever reason, fail to internalize social
and ethical norms, self-centeredness and anomie behavior can result. This
view implies that an individual lack or incapacity is the principle explana-
tory factor. But the phenomenon of social regression refers to insufficient
normative orientations and therefore to structural deficiencies which, in turn,
make internalization increasingly inefficient in view of the situational chal-
lenges facing the individual. If there is no meaningful status, no rewarding
role, no socially respected activity available, or if the given status obliga-
tions and claims do not match situational requirements, a withdrawal to less
demanding positions, a regression to less complex interaction patterns will
result.
238 FRIEDRICH FURSTENBERG
Social Regression in Formal Organizational Structures
Goal-oriented cooperation and competition within and between "secondary

groups" mark the meso-level of social phenomena. Cooperation is stabilized
by organizing interaction processes, matching the interests of participants
with the functional requirements for goal attainment. This is achieved by
establishing a regulative framework for both procedures and their evalua-
tion. Situational competence at the organizational level can be measured
by such efficiency criteria as competitiveness, stability or growth. Defi-
ciencies here may result in social regression, but a more common result is
disintegration: the organization structure dissolves due to its inability to main-
tain an effective division of labor. The resulting breakdown of coopera-
tion can affect both functional coordination and voluntary participation, the
latter form being closely connected to the assignment and recognition of
status.
With this, we can characterize social regression in organization structures
more precisely. A decline in functional coordination within organizations usually
implies a reduction in the division of labor and its productivity. If, due to
a system defect, a man-machine-(computer) dialogue is disturbed, recourse
may be taken to a series of phone calls or even a face-to-face conference.
Often the return to a former level of the division of labor diminishes exchange
relationships. In order to avoid the pitfalls of inefficient functional coordi-
nation, an organization relying on self-support is set up. In the example
above, the inaccessibility of centralized data might lead to establishing a
personal information file (card index) which grants more independence at
the cost of slower work.
More fundamental are the effects of social regression through diminished
functional coordination among organizations. The classical case is the dis-
ruption of economic structure due to wartime destruction or galloping
inflation. At such times, functional coordination through monetary market
exchange breaks down and people regress to direct barter of goods and
services. Voluntary forms of this process may be found among religious and
ideological sectarians who retreat to more self-sufficient and self-supportive
rural life.
This also illustrates a decline in cooperation due to a refusal to partici-
pate voluntarily. A transitory phenomenon of this kind is the strike. In fact,
the strike usually leads to a temporary social regression in intra- and inter-
organization structures. The breakdown of cooperation spawns all kinds of
self-help activities at lower performance levels.
More subtle forms of diminishing voluntary participation are task avoidance,
willful deficiencies in role fulfillment, voluntary absenteeism, and separation
of organization members. Perhaps the most sensitive and early indicator of

developments in this direction is a recurrent disturbance in communication
patterns.
Major factors leading to a decline in both functional coordination and
voluntary participation within organizations are a lack of resources and a
lack of control over their application due to a breakdown in coercion or in
commitment. In modern organizations physical coercion is replaced gradu-
ally by more elaborate means such as internalization of values, structuring
of exchange processes, symbolic identification, and so on. The remaining
antagonism between persons and groups with different stakes in defining
organizational goals, deciding strategies and distributing outcomes, may be
regulated within participative status structures. If this "democratic" trans-
formation fails, regression into manipulation and coercion follows, with the
effect of diminishing commitment. Cooperation, then, is reduced to rigid
functional coordination. Individual strategies of flexible role adjustment
according to interests and preconceived goals are increasingly replaced by
strategies of role avoidance. The formal organization declines into sets of
cliques and self-centered individuals.
Organizations have to survive in a more or less competitive environment
of scarcity. Internal cooperation is their major social asset. Increasing com-
petition and diminishing resources may become challenges that are too great
for cooperative activities to overcome at a given level. In such a case, either
innovation of new organization structures or regression to lower levels of
situational competence will result.
Social Regression in Societal Orientation
It is at the macro-level that basic societal orientation for individuals, groups,

and formal organizations is provided. Four major types may be distinguished:
(1) an institutionalized (generally sanctioned) framework of procedures and
role prescriptions forming a normative order; (2) sets of ideas, beliefs, and
symbols as frames of reference for ethic orientations; (3) a stock of avail-
able knowledge with provisions for its maintenance and augmentation; and
(4) semantic codes for meaningful communication, especially language.
1. The societal normative framework has two major aspects: conventions,
based upon habits and customs, and law, based upon formal regulations.
Both convention and law are the means by which social structures and
processes become institutionalized. Social regression in this area of social
phenomena appears as a setback in institutionalization. But cautious analy-
sis is necessary. Conventions and laws may become obsolete in the course
of social change. This does not yet imply social regression, if they are
replaced by more adequate and substantial forms of institutionalization. An
example is the transformation of personal into functional authority. Even
when norms are dissolving we must also apply the criterion of diminished
situational competence because deregulation becomes socially regressive only
when a given level of social interaction and organization can no longer be
maintained. A typical example is the decontrol of drug traffic. Social con-
trol of drug consumption, then, is no longer regulated by general rules but
by erratic exchange processes.
Social regression within the normative framework, therefore, results in
arbitrary and erratic uses of power. This, however, does not justify the con-
clusion that an increase in social control is necessary to prevent social regres-
sion. Just the contrary may be the case, due to a functionally overburdened
normative framework. A social "bond" is increasingly perceived as "bondage".
Thus, a growth in formal institutionalization may become a handicap to
equivalent improvement in internalization of norms.
2. Ethic orientation is rendered possible by value based convictions and beliefs.
A wide range of these—from objectified forms such as universal religions
and ideologies to subjective ideas and conceptions—generates a pluralistic
structure of competing value orientations. Recent empirical studies suggest
profound trends toward more individualized, even privatized forms, com-
bined with a decline in the acceptance of obligations and an increase in
self-centered orientations toward personal autonomy. Such observations do
not necessarily hint at regression phenomena because modern life is seg-
mented into highly organized rational action systems and emotional affiliations
based in small groups. This segmentation, in turn, corresponds to a differ-
entiation into business-like performance based upon contractual obligation
and ego-involvement based upon voluntary attachment and devotion.
The crucial indicator is the decline in value-based orientation as a func-
tion of individual action and consensus in interaction. The resulting anomic
state may lead to regression into orientation at lower levels and segments
of social reality. An example would be the decline of social orientation from
the societal to the clan level or the retreat from "public" to "private" virtues.
In his Fall of Public Man Richard Sennett analyzes the Forest Hills conflict
in New York City (301—08). Forest Hills is a middle-class, mostly Jewish
section of the borough of Queens that was threatened with the building of
a City-planned housing project and influx of lower-class blacks into the
neighborhood. Sennett recounts how a community group that originally
sought political goals eventually withdrew into their own communal refuge.
In this case, a regression in value-based orientations was marked by a loss
at a societal level. In the same book, Sennett gives ample evidence of de-
clining "public" virtues, such as value-based solidarity within the larger soci-
etal context—a feature of social movements—, being replaced by greater
fraternity within small local circles. Society at large is no longer perceived
as a horizon for convictions and beliefs. As a consequence, any conception
of a societal ethos appears to be obsolete and increasingly an obstacle to
gaining situational competence. Such a situation signals social regression
much more than any shift in people's relative preferences for work or leisure,
which is so much debated within the context of a possible end of society
based on work roles and ethics.
3. While convictions and beliefs shape preferences, knowledge determines
action. Practicable orientation in modern society is based upon realistic con-
ceptions of the world provided by knowledge derived from science and technology.
Modern science and technology have developed through a long process of
rationalizing both experience and argumentation. Technology and special-
ized knowledge are only rational when its users take into consideration the
interdependence of that particular knowledge with the whole system of ratio-
nal interpretation. But the production and transfer of modern knowledge
are only partly planned and systematic. Furthermore, the total amount of
accessible knowledge is no longer available in manageable forms. Therefore,
we can observe a trend toward regression into less complex structures of
explanation, so-called models with a limited set of variables that facilitate
technical applications in "systems" with limited dimensions. This efficient,
partial control of reality is achieved at a cost of leaving the environment
less intelligible. Thus, the larger orientation function of knowledge dimin-
ishes paradoxically and at the same time as the total amount of knowledge
increases in an utterly unbalanced way through specialized applications.
In an effort to bridge the gap between scientific control of reality and
understanding of its larger context, all kinds of reductionist simplifications
may be tried: class-barriers may be abolished with better public education;
unemployment may be overcome by deregulating industrial relations; cities
may be humanized with appropriate architecture; the might of nations
depends upon the controllable defense budget. All of these examples are
marked by regressions into partial explanations that, in a second step, are
presented with a claim to being more general or universal.
This regression in modern societal knowledge is exacerbated when a
decline in its basic prerequisites takes place. Objectivity always is endan-
gered by partisanship. Universality is threatened by the influence of status
and power structures which control knowledge in order to maintain or
achieve dominance. The result is that truly scientific handling of knowl-
edge is compromised by prescientific influence in research, analysis, and
argumentation.
4. Finally, I mentioned a fourth type of basic social orientation: semantic

codes for meaningful communication. Among these, language, especially, supplies
clear examples where we may watch processes of social regression at work
as more elaborated codes are restricted and communicative competence
diminishes. So far, social regression in meaningful communication appears
to be a consequence of structural change rather than an independent phe-
nomenon. But it is a subtle and early indicator of a loosened social bond.
Social Regression—A Transitory State
A panoramic view of regression phenomena reveals that they are widespread

at all levels of social reality. Social regression can be imposed by pressures
upon a complex, fragile context of once meaningful and efficient social activ-
ities. But there are also examples of voluntary strategies of social regression
as a means of coping with situational challenges. These strategies may even
be advanced ideologically. In fact, any revolutionary ideology proposes an
initial, disruptive societal situation; in this situation an existing "negative"
structure has to be reduced to a level from which societal reconstruction
becomes possible based on a new "positive" image. In such a scheme, social
regression is a means to an end; as such, it is a transitory phenomenon. In
reality, however, it is by no means easy to regain or restore a lost level of
interaction, communication, or organization.
Involuntary destruction leading to social regression may also be consid-
ered a transitory survival pattern. Within any modern sociocultural context
productive activities by far out-number the chances of meaningful applica-
tion. From an economic point of view, there is always a certain amount of
sociocultural waste which may eventually become a hindrance when new
challenges arise. This is obvious, for example, in the field of legislation. The
same is true in college curricula, in fashion trends as a basis for mass pro-
duction, and certainly in surplus armaments. In these cases, activities that
continue at a given level eventually reduce competence in problem situa-
tions. Thus, reducing these activities and even regressing to earlier practices
may re-establish situational competence and also release potentials for different,
more meaningful activities. From this point of view, social regression is a
rather normal phase within a circular process of social change.
Of course, social regression cannot be interpreted only by the way it func-
tions to promote either planned or unavoidable social change. There is too
much evidence that it may also signal a breakdown of social relations and
social order, leading to a definite loss of culture at least for those directly
concerned.
The Re-establishment of Situational Competence
The appearance of social regression calls for efforts to re-establish relevant

situational competence. Rather than applying a social technology in a sort
of crash course, situational competence results from a complex set of pre-
conditions spanning both within the individuals and groups concerned and
their more or less structured societal environment. This structured frame
given, situational competence is achieved through continuous learning by
matching knowledge and capability with perceived challenges. This requires
motivation.
In the past, existent cultures provided such prerequisites by establishing
and safeguarding status structures. Some trends in postmodern social thought
are marked by the conviction that man can do without such status bonds
and that individual rational choice might ultimately replace the social fab-
ric, dissolved into ever-changing constellations. Such thinking already indi-
cates a considerable degree of social regression.
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in die Zukunft. Berlin: Severin, 1981, 84-93.
Durkheim, Ernile: The Division of Labor in Society [1893]. Trans. George Simpson. New York:
Macmillan, 1933.
Jahoda, Marie, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and Hans Zeisel: Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal. Leipzig:
Hirzel, 1933.
Klages, Helmut: Die unruhige Gesellschqft. Munchen: Beck, 1975.
Luhmann, Niklas: Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalitat. Tubingen: Mohr, 1968.
Merton, Robert K.: Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press, 1968.
Montesquieu, Charles Secondat Baron de la Brede: Considerations sur les causes de la grandeur
des Romains et de leur decadence [1734]. Paris: Garnier, n.d.
Rokeach, Milton: The Nature of Human Values. New York: Free Press, 1973.
Sennett, Richard: The Fall of Public Man. New York: Knopf, 1974.
Stark, Werner: The Social Bond. 5 vols. New York: Fordham UP, 1976-87.
Thurn, Hans Peter: Abbau von Kultur: Dekulturation. Kultur und Gesellschqft. Sonderheft der Kb'lner
Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie. Opladen: Westdeutscher, 1986, 379-96.
15. CULTURAL DIVERSITY OR CULTURAL CONFUSION?
THE VIEWPOINT OF DECENTRALIZATION AND NETWORK*
Takashi Usui
How do the decentralization and network correspond to the cultural diver-

sity? Centralization, decentralization and network of the social system are
contrastive and continuous to some extent, as shown in Table 1. Centralization
corresponds generally to cultural uniformity and standardization. Both decen-
tralization and network correspond generally to cultural diversity, although
the former is more structured than the latter. To begin with, let me illus-
trate several examples of the relationship between decentralization and cul-
tural diversity in Western countries.
Several Examples from Western Countries
As the cases of Switzerland, Canada, Belgium, Spain and Yugoslavia illus-

trate, cultural diversity, especially that of language and cultural autonomy,
is related to decentralization. In Switzerland there are people who speak
German, French, Italian and Roman, and the federal system of cantons cor-
responds to this linguistic autonomy. In Canada the federal system is said
to be centrifugal (Iwasaki, 1985). But as long as French speaking Quebec
remains in Canada, the federal system is indispensable to guaranteeing the
official position of the French language. In Belgium the new federal system
is organized according to the principle of linguistic areas, namely Dutch,
French, and German. In Spain both Catalonia and Basque had been sup-
pressed during the Franco regime, but under today's policy of autonomous
community (Comunidad Autonoma) the autonomy and coexistence of both
provinces is now being supported. These examples from the field of lan-
guages illustrate the positive interrelationship between cultural diversity and
* This paper was presented to the Plenary Session of 33rd World Congress of Sociology,
International Institute of Sociology, in Cologne, Germany, on July 11, 1997. With a few
revisions, this was again presented to the Kyoto Conference of RC 07, Future Studies, of
ISA (the International Sociological Association), Bukkyou University, on September 19, 1997.
I am indebted to Mr. Peter Edwards, Ms. Chizuko Usui and Mr. Masahiro Tsushima for
editorial help.
CULTURAL DIVERSITY OR CULTURAL CONFUSION? 245
decentralization (especially federalism). But when cultural diversity causes

conflict and reduces system integration, we can call the result "cultural con-
fusion." To our regret, the case of old Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia and
Hercegovina, illustrates this process.
What conditions prevent cultural confusion and maintain both cultural
diversity and productive vitality? One possible method would be to articu-
late the system and formulate boundaries between sub-systems in order to
prevent unnecessary confusion stemming from increasing diversity. But, actu-
ally, I wonder if this solution is universally available because the situation
in every country is so different.
Diversity and Overdiversity

A decentralized system may facilitate various forms of diversity, but its pos-
itive effects are limited. The figure by De Gre (1946) which depicts rela-
tionships between concentrations of power and free institutions (Figure 1) is
instructive in this regard. De Gre divides the stages of power concentration
into five categories, from minimal to maximal. The greatest freedom is
enjoyed at medial or "pluralist" stages whereas both maximal and minimal
stages yield the least freedom. Too much decentralization disperses power
too widely, thereby decreasing freedom and increasing confusion.
How can we distinguish productive decentralization from excessive de-
centralization, productive diversity from disorganizing diversity? De Gre's
approach is again helpful, drawing attention to three characteristics of pro-
ductive diversity. First, subsystems and subcultural systems are sufficiently
articulated so that they maintain consistent meaning and uphold social norms.
Second, subsystems and subcultural systems are sufficiently connected so that
they are integrated into the larger social and cultural system and, in addi-
tion, contain network-type connections that span subsystems. Third, people
can act according to comprehensive, yet flexible standards, thereby devel-
oping their unique characters and increasing their productivity. All three
requirements are necessary to ensure productive diversity.
By contrast, there is a phase of disorganizing diversity during which the
requirements of productive diversity are not met. First, when the institu-
tional boundary is lost and the system is in a state of anomie, we find dis-
organizing diversity. Second, when subsystems and subcultural systems are
not integrated into the larger system, we find system disorganization. Third,
when people cannot select their own ways positively in the midst of enor-
mous diversity, we find cultural confusion and disorganizing diversity. We
can say more about this phase by looking at the boundary of the system.
Figure 1. Centralization of Power and Degree of Freedom (De Gre, 1946)
Diversity and Boundary
Niklas Luhmann proposes that the boundary of a system is a mechanism

for reducing complexity (diversity). Since diversity is potentially endless, we
divide the world into segments as we endeavor to articulate social "reality."
In this process we focus on a categorical similarity in one particular seg-
ment of society. Given that diversity is logically endless, however, one can
select any characteristic or type of difference as the basis for identifying a
segment or category. After all, not only is every group different, but every
member of each group is also different. Thus, everything in social life is
ultimately different. But this limiting case thesis produces two entirely oppo-
site effects. One is a supporting effect, namely to support each other in the
system and to guarantee rights of minorities and the deprived. This is the
first step to cultural pluralism. The other is an enervating effect, the most
extreme case being separatism. "We are different, so let's separate."
Yet, in spite of all the potential differences, we can still perceive system
integrity, the wholeness of a social system, at its border. The term "bounded
system" means that diversity (complexity) is in fact being reduced at least
somewhat, that some kind of uniformity is being established within a social
system. This uniformity is the essence of institutionalization and cultural pat-
terning. A decentralizing social system means that subsystems are being artic-
ulated and diversity is being facilitated at the border. A fully decentralized
system may be effective in keeping the diversity of the system productive
and in avoiding cultural confusion stemming from primary diversity.
A network also has a boundary, but one that is so flexible and shifting that
a network appears to be "borderless." Let me point to one example from
network analysis. E.M. Rogers and R.A. Rogers (1985) identify four types
of networks (Figure 2), namely gatekeeper, liaison, opinion leader and cosmo-
polite. A gatekeeper selects information at the entrance to a particular system.
A liaison combines one system with another one. A cosmopolite is a network
located at the border between a particular system and its environment.
Where these three types maintain and develop the boundary of the network
system, the fourth type, an opinion leader, is located in the midst of a system.
These four types are taken from organizational analysis, but we can adopt
a similar logic in exploring system boundaries at a more macro level. Among
the constituent countries of the European Union, for example, physical and
technical barriers are falling and custom duties and tax barriers are being
abolished. Thus, the European Union is surely becoming a sort of border-
less society. Yet, this new inter-state network now operates within a new
border, namely one with non-EU countries in the region. In addition, the
EU's constituent nation states still retain their borders to some extent. The
248 TAKASHI USUI
Figure 2. Types of Networkers (Rogers and Rogers, 1985)

situation, therefore, is not borderless as such but rather one of a coexis-

tence of both borders and borderlessness.
1. Decentralization and Life World
From Centralization to Decentralization
Sociologists today typically treat Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy as a cen-

tralized ruling system because he characterized it as Monokratie, that is a rule
by one person. But they have also divided this ideal type into its many ele-
ments, including standardization, formalization, centralization and others.
Many sociologists, including Peter Blau, have found decentralizing tenden-
cies in bureaucratic organizations, therefore, even when their size and stan-
dardization were increasing. As a result, they now treat centralization and
decentralization as a continuum. I believe there is also a continuum between
decentralization and network.
Federal System, Decentralization and Organizational Paradigm
The most important indicator of decentralization is whether the state is orga-

nized in a federal form, a decentralized system. We typically find federalism
in the areas of cultural and social welfare policy whereas a more centralized
system typically prevails in the areas of diplomacy, defense, and monetary policy.
We also find relatively unstable federal states in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia
and relatively stable ones in Germany and Switzerland. Belgium adopted a
federal system in order to adjust to cultural pluralism and prevent cultural
conflict, and more unitary states like Japan can learn from this example.
More generally, studies of decentralization in federal states may well yield
a theory of cultural diversity. As ideal types, centralization and decentral-
ization institutionalize opposite orientations which have been discussed in
various ways such as unitary vs. pluralistic, centripetal vs. centrifugal, or
bureaucratic vs. professional. Yet, they are more complementary than opposed.
Centralization presupposes decentralization and decentralization presupposes
centralization. Processes of centralization can usually be found where resources
such as finance, personnel, information and so on are being gathered or
accumulated. Processes of decentralization are usually found where prob-
lems of the life world (Lebenswelt) are being addressed.
In Arthur Benz's organizational paradigm (1985), he draws various contrasts
between centralization and decentralization (Table 2), including the following
seven:
250 TAKASHI USUI
Table 1. Centralization, Decentralization and Network
formal structured possibility of element

vertical system (local components)
structure disorganization centered
centralization x high less

decentralization x middle more x
network - low more x
on-the- uniformity diversity satisfaction voluntarism

spot standardization motivation
centered
less less
x — x more more
x - x most more
Table 2. Organizational Paradigm of Centralization and Decentralization
centralization decentralization
1 regulation of conflict power consensus
2 interorganizational hierarchical cooperative
relationship
3 norms of action standardization problem-oriented
4 methodology of deductive inductive
planning
5 interaction with technocratic participative
lower level social
systems
6 problem perception quantity-oriented quality-oriented
(cognition)
7 perception of social as hierarchically as network
reality structured
as controllable as not controllable
(A. Benz, 1985)
power versus consensus concerning the regulation of conflict;

hierarchical versus cooperative concerning interorganizational relationships;
standardization versus problem-oriented concerning norms of action;
deductive versus inductive concerning methodologies of planning;
technocracy versus participative concerning interrelations with lower levels
of a social system;
• quality oriented vs. quantity oriented concerning how problems are per-
ceived; and
• hierarchically structured vs. network concerning how "social reality" is
perceived.
Taking all seven contrasts together, we can say that they revolve around
"control" versus "life world," and "standardized equality or uniformity" ver-
sus "liberty or diversity."
Nearness to the Citizen in Decentralization
We have just seen that decentralization tends to occur near the life world (Lebens-
weltndhe) and, thus, near the citizen (Burgerndhe], near the matters or affairs
at hand (Sachnahe), and near the problem (Problemndhe). Two German scholars,
Benz (1985) and Peter Schafer (1982), develop this point. According to Schafer,
in decentralizing processes of legislation, finance and planning, it is impor-
tant to leave details undefined and, thus, to maintain Burgerndhe and Sachndhe.
Yet the German federal system has become too centralized since the early
1970s due to the increasing use of federal planning and grants-in-aid. Local
governments in Japan also depend on grants-in-aid from the central gov-
ernment. According to Benz, decentralization involves an inductive way of
solving problems, thereby retaining a concern with quality of life issues and
with establishing consensus through communication. These ways of think-
ing about decentralization are consistent with a focus on social networks
because the latter essentially engage in gathering information on the spot.
2. Network and On-The--Spot-Information
Japanese scholars Imai Ken'ichi and Kaneko Ikuyou (1988) stress that one
aspect of a "network" is the dynamic gathering of information. A network's
on-the-spot-information binds its members together and can be a source of
creative activity because of its synergetic effect. This is what happens at
work sites as participants deal with matters and problems in everyday life.
Such on-the-spot-information is the opposite of high level or centralized
information, which is typically more abstract and ideal. Where the meaning
of on-the-spot-information is molded in processes of interaction, more static
information—such as numerical data, memoranda, and manuals—is a product
of these processes. This is the reason why some scholars (such as J. Lipnack
and J. Stamps, and Arthur Benz) identify networks with decentralization.
252 TAKASHI USUI
Table 3. Components and Extension of Network
Components of Extension of Network

Network personal community organization national global
(kinship) (regional)
personal (household) 1 2 3 4 5
community - 6 7 8 9
organization - 10 11 12 13
national — 14 15 16 17
Components and Extension of Networks
Despite their nearness to the life-world, the scope of networks is not lim-
ited this narrowly. Rather it ranges across areas of different size, including
those that are global. In contemporary society, systems of social networks
are developing in various forms and performing various types of functions.
With innovations in information technology in particular, networks seem
increasingly borderless. Yet, however loosely they may be combined across
areas, they nonetheless retain loose borders of one kind or another. In addi-
tion, however broadly they may extend, even global networks retain bor-
ders. We can call the widest range of a network's activity its "extension,"
and we can call its constituent parts its "components" or "elements" and
its "actors."
There are various types of networks, of course, but we can classify them
according to their extension and components. The main types of compo-
nents can be individuals (including households), communities, organizations,
nations, or other units. The main types of extension can be personal, com-
munal, organizational, national, or global. By identifying how these factors
are combined, we can classify networks in terms of how they correspond
to the cells in Table 3. The following three examples illustrate the fruitful-
ness of this approach. First, if the components of networks are municipali-
ties and if networks extend globally or regionally, we can call them "glocal"
(that is, global + local) networks—as is sometimes done in Japan (cells 9
and 13). Second, if the components are nation-states and if networks extend
globally or regionally, this represents a confederation of states, such as
ASEAN (cell 17). Third, if the components are individual volunteers and if
networks extend nationally or globally, they illustrate cells 4 and 5.
Conclusion: Adaptation to Diversity in Decentralization and Network
The process of Sachnahe that occurs in decentralization and the process of

gathering on-the-spot-information in network are basically identical. Both
rely on methodologies of problem-solving at specific sites. Both resist cen-
tralization in which information flows from the top down, or from center
to periphery. Decentralization is a mechanism for adapting pragmatically to
diversity. Networks and formal organizations complement each other. Aside
from decentralizing, a system can adapt to diversity by gathering on-the-
spot-information at various specific sites. We can expect future societies to
adapt to diversity in creative ways by decentralizing and employing networks.
REFERENCES
Benz, Arthur, Foderalismus als dynamisches System, 1985.

Blau, Peter and Schoenherr, Richard A., The Structure of Organizations, 1971.
De Gre, Gerard, "Freedom and Social Structure", American Sociological Review, 1946:11, 529-536,
1946.
Imai, Ken'ichi and Kaneko, Ikuyou, Network Soshikiron (Networking Organization, in Japanese),
1988.
Iwasaki, Mikiko, Canada Renpousei no Seijibunseki (Political Analysis of Canadian Federalism
with Special Reference to Intergovernmental Grants, in Japanese), 1985.
Luhmann, Niklas, Soziale Systeme, 1984.
Luhmann, N., The Differentiation of Society, 1982.
Lipnack, J. and Stamps, J., Networking, 1982.
Rogers, E.M. and Rogers, R.A., Sosiki Communication (Communication in Organizations, Japan-
ese edition translated by Uno, Yosiyasu and Hamada, Tomoko), 1985.
Schafer, Peter, Centralisation und Decentralisation, 1982.
Scharpe, L.J. (ed.), The Rise of Meso Government in Europe, 1993.
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LIST OF EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS
Editors
Erwin K. Scheuch (1928) is Emeritus Professor in Sociology at the University

of Cologne (Germany). He was lecturer at Columbia University, Berkeley,
Harvard and had guest professorships at Princeton, in Auckland, Paris,
Stockholm, Berlin, China and Manchuria. He was the founder and direc-
tor of the Kolner Institut fur Angewandte Sozialforschung (Institute for
Comparative Social Research), one of the major sociological institutes in
Germany. From 1989 till 1997 he was vice-president and later president of
the International Institute of Sociology. Professor Scheuch is a member of
many academic organizations and wrote dozens of books about technolo-
gies of empirical research, mass communications, political sociology and
social issues. His latest book was about the donation crisis in German polit-
ical parties (Rowohlt, 2000).
David Sciulli is professor of sociology of Texas A&M University and most

recently the author of Corporate Power in Civil Society: An Application of Societal
Constitutionalism (NYU Press, forthcoming). His earlier publications include
Corporations Vs. Court: Private Power, Public Interests (Lynne Reinner Publishers,
1999) and Theory of Societal Constitutionalism: Foundations of a Non-Marxist Critical
Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1992).
Contributors
Margaret S. Archer is professor of sociology at the University of Warwick.

She is the author of the trilogy Culture and Agency (CUP, 1989), Realist Social
Theory (CUP, 1996) and Being Human: the Problem of Agency (CUP, forthcom-
ing). She was President of the International Sociological Association (1986—90)
and is a Councillor of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences.
Raymond Boudon, born 1934, Professor at the University of Paris-Sorbonne,

is member of the Institut de France, the Academia Europaea, the British
Academy, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has published:
Education, Opportunity and Social Inequality, New York, Wiley, 1974; The Unintended
Consequences of Social Action, London, Macmillan, 1982; Theories of Social Change:
a Critical Appraisal, London, Basil Blackwell/Polity, 1986; The Analysis of Ideology,
256 LIST OF EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS
London, Polity Press, 1989; A Critical Dictionary of Sociology, Chicago/London,

The University of Chicago Press & Routledge, 1989 (with F. Bourricaud);
The Art of Self Persuasion., London, Polity, 1994; The Origin of Values, Somerset
NJ, Transaction (forthc. 2000).
William V. D'Antonio, Ph.D., Michigan State University; Professor Emeritus,

University of Connecticut; Executive Officer, American Sociological Association,
1982-1991; Visiting Research Professor, Catholic Univeristy, 1993-; Co-
Author and co-editor of nine books, articles in refereed journal, chapters in
books; Past President of the International Institute of Sociology, and four
other academic associations. Current research: The Religious Factor in the
U.S. Congress.
Mattei Dogan is Director of Research at the Centre National de la Recherche

Scientifique in Paris and Professor of Political Science at the University of
California, Los Angeles. He is chairman of the Comparative Sociology Com-
mittee of the International Sociology Association and also of the Committee
on Political Elites of the International Political Science Association. His re-
cent publications include: Pathways to Power (1989), L'innovation dans les sciences
sociales (1991), Comparing Nations (1994).
Pierpaolo Donati is Full Professor of Advanced Sociology at the Faculty of

Political Sciences of the University of Bologna, and Past-President of the
Italian Sociological Association. He has published widely on many topics,
particularly general theory, sociology of the family, citizenship and social
policy. Amongst his recent books: Relational Theory of Society (Angeli, 1997),
Civil Society in Italy (Mondadori, 1997), Handbook of Family Sociology (Laterza,
1998).
S.N. Eisenstadt (b. 1923) is Emeritus Professor at the Department of Sociol-

ogy and Anthropology and the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the
Advancement of Peace.
Dr. Dr. h.c. Friedrich Fiirstenberg was born in Berlin 1930; 1953 Dr. rer.
pol. Full professor of sociology; 1963-1966. Technical University in Clausthal;
1966-1981 Linz University; 1981-1986 Bochum University; since 1986 Bonn
University. Areas of research: Industrial sociology (field studies in Europe,
then USA and Japan), sociology of religion, theory of social structure.
Nikolai Genov is Professor at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.

LIST OF EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS 257
Masayuki Munakata (June 12, 1940, Osaka, Japan) is Professor of Industrial

& Technology Management and Comparative Production System at the
Graduate School of Business Administration, Kobe University. Doctor of
Business Administration (Kobe University).
Eugeen Roosens is Professor of Anthropology and Head of the Department

at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and "professeur extraordinaire" at the
UCL. He has been the P.P. Rubens Professor 1989-1990 at the University
of California, Berkeley, and the holder of the National Francqui Chair
1997-1998 at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. He is the author of Creating eth-
nicity (Sage, 1989) and Eigen grand eerst? (Acco, 1998).
Prof.dr. Gisela Trommsdorff holds the chair for Developmental and Cross-
Cultural Psychology at the University of Konstanz. She is a member of sev-
eral scientific boards and co-editor of several national and international
journals. Currently the main emphasis of her research is in socio-emotional
development and the value of children and family in different cultures.
Saskia Sassen is Professor of Sociology, The University of Chicago and

Centennial Visiting Professor, London School of Economics. Her most recent
books are Guests and Aliens (New York: New Press, 1999) and Globalization
and its Discontents (New York: New Press, 1998). Her books have been trans-
lated into ten languages. Two of her books are appearing in 2000 in fully
updated editions: The Global City (Princeton University Press) and Cities in a
World Economy (Pine Forge/Sage). She continues work on two projects, "Cities
and their Crossborder Networks" sponsored by the United Nations Univer-
sity, and "Governance and Accountability in a Global Economy." She is a
member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a Visiting Fellow of the
American Bar Foundation.
Takashi Usui is Professor of Sociology at Kanazawa University, Kanazawa

City, Japan.
Erich Weede (b. 1942), is Professor of Sociology at the University of Bonn,

Germany. In 1982/83 he was President of the Peace Science Society
(International) and in 1985/86 Vice President (International) of the Interna-
tional Studies Association. In fall-winter 1986/87 he was Visiting Professor
of International Relations at the Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins
University. He is a member of the editorial boards of International Interactions
(USA), Journal of Conflict Resolution (USA), and Pacific Focus (Korea).

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THE ANNALS

Executive Board 1993-1997

President ERWIN K. SCHEUCH (Germany)

Past President WILLIAM V D'ANTONIO (U.S.A.)

Vice Presidents R. ALAN HEDLEY (Canada)

Councillors KAREN S. COOK (U.S.A.)

Auditor RENZO GUBERT (Italy)

E.K. SCHEUCH AND D. SCIULLI

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

© Copyright 2000 by the International Institute of Sociology / Koninklijke Brill NV,

Authorization to photocopy itemsfor internal or personal

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

1. ERWIN K. SCHEUCH, Societies, Corporations, and the Nation

2. RAYMOND BOUDON, Values in a Polytheistic World 24

3. PIERPAOLO DONATI, Freedom vs. Control in Post-Modern

4. MARGARET S. ARCHER, The Universality of Freedom and

5. S.N. EISENSTADT, The Contemporary Scene—Multiple

6. WILLIAM V. D'ANTONIO, Communitarianism and the

7. SASKIA SASSEN, Beyond Sovereignty: De-Facto Transnationalism

8. NIKOLAI GENOV, Transition to Democracy and Nation-State in

9. EUGEEN ROOSENS, National Identity, Social Order and Political

10. MATTEI DOGAN, Nationalism in Europe: Decline in the West,

11. MASAYUKI MUNAKATA, A Speculation on Some Features of

12. ERICH WEEDE, Law and Liberty, Capitalism and Democracy in

13. GISELA TROMMSDORFF, Psychological Factors Limiting

14. FRIEDRICH FURSTENBERG, Social Regression and the Decline of

15. TAKASHI Usui, Cultural Diversity or Cultural Confusion? The

List of Editors and Contributors 255

Usually, titles of congresses addressing a whole discipline do not mean very

out of what is of longterm significance, and what was of merely peripheral

(5) Modernity as the consequence of modernizing elites (Joseph Schumpeter;

No other major industrialising country repeated the employment of whole

modernization yes, economic modernization only in individual firms but not

The concept of "Wirtschqftsgesellschqft"

The classics in sociology identified as the process central to modernization

And differentiation is accompanied by processes of de-differentiation—de-

creates a demand for flexibility, for time arrangements to be tailored to

'-'' Ansgar Weymann: "Modernisierung, Generationsverhaltnisse und die Okonomie der

universalistic standards, affective neutrality, and oriented towards actual per-

Emile Durkheim in his "lois du contraction" has provided us with the

norms of rationality and emotionality central for our understanding of moder-

Some German sociologists maintain that the decisive structural feature of

Beck even writes about the individualization of society—which in its literal

income, no kids) or part of a dual work family, which further subdivides

some overriding perspectives, which is what the scientific congresses of the

Using observations from a cross section of individuals, it is concievable that

inating competition were examinations of knowledge and skills in an area.

Intermediary institutions were added in the process of modernization. A

Introduction: "polytheism of values"

values" as meaning that we would have definitely recognized the subjec-

Axiological relativism contradicted by evidence

What matters is that the Nietzschean postmodernist interpretation is con-

medical prescriptions would in a region exceed some threshold fixed in

A question in the sociology of knowledge

Hence, it can never be shown that something is good or bad or that it

- To behaviorists in the style of Skinner, moral feelings are produced by

On one point, though, I would propose to correct Nisbet's statement: it is