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NATO STANDARD
AEP-55
Volume 1

PROCEDURES FOR EVALUATING THE

PROTECTION LEVEL OF ARMOURED
VEHICLES - KINETIC ENERGY AND
ARTILLERY THREAT
Edition C Version 1

APRIL 2014

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

ALLIED ENGINEERING PUBLICATION

Published by the
NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY (NSA)
© NATO/OTAN

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY (NSA)

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

23 May 2014

1. The enclosed Allied Engineering Publication AEP-55 (C), Volume 1, Version 1

"PROCEDURES FOR EVALUATING THE PROTECTION LEVEL OF ARMOURED
VEHICLES - KINETIC ENERGY AND ARTILLERY THREAT", has been approved
by the nations in the NATO Army Armaments Group, is promulgated herewith. The
agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 4569.

2. AEP-55 (C), Volume 1, Version 1 is effective upon receipt.

3. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,

used commercially, adapted, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of
the publisher. With the exception of commercial sales, this does not apply to
member nations and Partnership for Peace countries, or NATO commands and
bodies.

4. This publication shall be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60.

Dr. Cihangir Ak 1t, TUR Civ

Director NATO Standardization Agency

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RESERVED FOR NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION

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RECORD OF RESERVATIONS

CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS

Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at
time of promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization
Database for the complete list of existing reservations.

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RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

[nation] [detail of reservation]

Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at
time of promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization
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RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

[nation] [detail of reservation]

Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at
time of promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization
Database for the complete list of existing reservations.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ALLIED ENGINEERING PUBLICATION .................................................................................................. 1
1. SCOPE ........................................................................................................................................ 1
2. SIGNIFICANCE AND USE ............................................................................................................. 1
3. SYSTEM ACCEPTANCE PROCESS.............................................................................................. 2
3.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................... 2
3.2 Scoping of acceptance test activities ....................................................................................... 3
3.3 Phase 1: Test plan definition ................................................................................................... 3
3.3.1 Overview ............................................................................................................................ 3
3.3.2 Ballistic test requirements and planning / component selection ............................................... 4
3.3.3 Vehicle target descriptions ................................................................................................... 9
3.3.4 Vehicle armour area descriptions ....................................................................................... 10
3.3.5 Number of shots required for ballistic assessment ............................................................... 13
3.4 Phase 2: Main Areas ballistic evaluation ................................................................................ 15
3.5 Phase 3: Structural Weak Area and Excluded Zone vulnerability evaluation ............................. 16
3.6 Phase 4: Vulnerable Area evaluation ..................................................................................... 17
3.6.1 Vulnerable Area assessment ............................................................................................. 18
4. TEST EQUIPMENT..................................................................................................................... 24
4.1 Test facility and arrangement ................................................................................................ 24
4.2 Launcher to target distance ................................................................................................... 26
4.3 Launching system ................................................................................................................ 26
4.4 Projectiles ............................................................................................................................ 26
4.5 Projectile velocity measurement ............................................................................................ 28
4.6 Projectile yaw measurement and acceptance criteria .............................................................. 28
4.7 Impact location witness ......................................................................................................... 29
4.8 Target types, retention method and orientation ....................................................................... 30
4.9 Witness system.................................................................................................................... 31
5. BALLISTIC TEST PROCEDURE FOR COMPONENT EVALUATION .............................................. 32
5.1 Test range ambient conditions............................................................................................... 32
5.2 Details and marking of targets ............................................................................................... 32
5.3 Hit location and number ........................................................................................................ 34
5.4 Target conditioning ............................................................................................................... 36
5.5 Target positioning and obliquity measurement ........................................................................ 36
5.6 Test impact validity assessment ............................................................................................ 37
5.7 Witness plate and armour examination .................................................................................. 39
5.8 Component performance determination ................................................................................. 39
5.9 Ballistic test report ................................................................................................................ 40

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ANNEX A KE PROTECTION LEVELS FOR OCCUPANTS OF ARMOURED VEHICLES; TEST

CONDITIONS AND PROJECTILES ................................................................................ A-1

ANNEX B MULTIPLE HIT TESTING ............................................................................................... B-1

ANNEX C ARTILLERY THREAT ..................................................................................................... C-1

ANNEX D SHATTER GAP TESTING .............................................................................................. D-1

ANNEX E TEST EQUIPMENT ISSUES ........................................................................................... E-1

ANNEX F FLOW CHART SUMMARY OF THE TESTING AND ACCEPTANCE PROCESS ................ F-1

ANNEX G OPTIONS FOR BALLISTIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION ...........................................G-1

ANNEX H DEFINITIONS................................................................................................................ H-1

ANNEX I REFERENCES – RELATED DOCUMENTS ..................................................................... I-1

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AECTP Allied Environmental Conditions Test Publication

AEP Allied Engineering Publication
AP Armour-Piercing
APDS Armour-Piercing Discarding Sabot
APDS-T Armour-Piercing Discarding Sabot Tracer
APFSDS Armour-Piercing Fin Stabilised Discarding Sabot
APFSDS-T Armour-Piercing Fin Stabilised Discarding Sabot Tracer
API Armour-Piercing Incendiary
AV Armoured Vehicle
AU Unprotected (vulnerable) Area
AP Protected Area
Ao Threatened Area (occupant compartment)
CP Complete Penetration
EPC Expected Protection Capability
EZ Excluded Zone
FSP Fragment Simulating Projectile
HE High Explosive
KE Kinetic Energy
LWA Localized Weak Area
NA National Authority
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSA NATO Standardization Agency
MA Main Area
PfP Partnership for Peace
PP Partial Penetration
RH Relative Humidity
RVA Relative Vulnerable Area
STANAG Standardization Agreement (NATO)
SWA Structural Weak Area
VA Vulnerable Area
WC Wolfram Core (Tungsten Carbide)

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ALLIED ENGINEERING PUBLICATION

PROCEDURES FOR EVALUATING THE PROTECTION LEVELS OF

ARMOURED VEHICLES FOR KINETIC ENERGY AND ARTILLERY THREATS

1. SCOPE
This AEP describes the system qualification and acceptance procedure for determining the
Protection Level of armoured vehicles (AV) for KE and artillery threats. The threats to be
considered are small and medium calibre kinetic energy (KE) ballistic projectiles and fragment
simulating projectiles (FSP) representing artillery shell fragments, as defined in Annex A of
this document.

This process includes standard techniques and reproducible test procedures for evaluating
the ballistic resistance of vehicle armour components (integral, add-on, opaque and
transparent) as well as the required vehicle Vulnerable Area assessment.

Where stated in this document, the National Authority (NA) is an appointed expert.

2. SIGNIFICANCE AND USE

The ballistic procedures described in this document apply equally for ballistic tests on various
target systems including single target plates, fully engineered targets and vehicle targets
(whole or sections). The Protection Level of armoured vehicles shall however be determined
using acceptance tests performed on any component provided they are fully representative of
the armour system used on the vehicle and the protection assessment uses the computation
methodology provided.

The ballistic tests shall be carried out with the specified threat ammunition and under the
impact conditions summarised in Annex A. The ballistic tests should be conducted at a test
range approved by the National Authority. Test ranges may use in-house test facilities and
equipment not covered by this document. The emphasis shall be placed on evaluating the
potential weaknesses of the armour systems provided (worst case) as outlined in the
document.

National Authorities may at their discretion accept any deviation from the procedures outlined
in this AEP, provided the procedures used are judged equivalent and are well documented.
An example is where vehicle protection systems have been assessed using the V50
methodology. When equivalent procedures are used, vehicle Protection Levels will be
classified as “Estimated”.

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In the event of a conflict between the text of this document and the references cited herein,
the text of this document takes precedence. Nothing in this document, however, supersedes
applicable national laws and regulations unless a specific exemption has been obtained.

The evaluation of a product using these test procedures may require the use of materials
and/or equipment that could be hazardous. This document does not purport to address all
the safety aspects associated with their use. It is the responsibility of the organization using
this specification to establish appropriate health and safety practices and to determine the
applicability of any regulatory requirements prior to its use.

Unique requirements for the ballistic testing of specific end-items not covered in this
document should be defined within the National procurement specification.

This AEP does not limit the threats that a National Authority may specify for vehicle armour
testing. Additional ballistic projectiles potentially a threat to a vehicle may be specified but
their inclusion is outside the scope of AEP-55.

This procedure may be updated as further data become available.

3. SYSTEM ACCEPTANCE PROCESS

3.1 Overview
Categorizing armoured vehicles into specific Protection Levels is based simply on establishing
the relative areas of the vehicle armour system that either meet or fail the specified ballistic
threat Level protection requirements. From these relative values the unprotected Vulnerable
Area (VA) may be calculated and judged against the minimum requirement of 90% vehicle
area protection coverage indicated within the AEP.

Ballistic testing is predicated on the proof velocity (Vproof) approach whereby a statistically-
based number of KE threat rounds are fired at targets representative of the armour, the
absence of perforation indicating that the desired immunity level of protection has been
achieved. Ballistic failures are usually associated with areas of the armour where a weakness
exists or has been introduced, e.g. unprotected welded joints in metallic plates and the
influence of the welding process on material properties (heat affected zones). These
potentially vulnerable areas are termed structural weak areas (SWAs). The presence (or
absence) and extent of VA usually effectively determines whether the required vehicle
protection coverage level of 90% is achieved.

The vehicle ballistic protection requirements also include an assessment of the capability of
the armour system to withstand multiple shot impacts. This is achieved by firing the ballistic

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assessment rounds at predetermined separations and patterns. This unique multi-hit test
methodology was developed following the detailed analysis of experimental trials involving
burst fire attack of vehicles in representative and realistic engagement scenarios.

A limited amount of testing with FSP is also included in the vehicle assessment so that the
effects of HE (High Explosive) shell fragmentation are addressed in the vehicle armour
design. No multi-hit testing is required using FSPs.

The ballistic tests that are required by the acceptance process should be performed following
the specific procedures defined in Paras 3 and 5 and with the equipment described in Para 4.

The final VA assessment shall be conducted according to the procedure defined in Para 3.4.
The acceptance criterion is an expected protection capability of 90%.

3.2 Scoping of acceptance test activities

The complete acceptance process used to establish the Protection Level of a defined
vehicular protection system consists of four sequential phases:

Phase 1. Test plan definition.

Phase 2. Main Areas ballistic evaluation.
Phase 3. Structural Weak Areas ballistic evaluation.
Phase 4. Vulnerable Area evaluation and protection assessment.

Each Phase is described in more detail within the following Paras with additional information
provided to clarify the assessment process.

3.3 Phase 1: Test plan definition

3.3.1 Overview
Prior to the assessment commencing, the scope of ballistic testing shall be established. This
is achieved through the following process.

1. Identify all potential targets based on the individual threat / vehicle armour system
geometric combinations or location of different ballistic resistance. This is to
include the Main Areas of the armour system and any SWA (e.g. door panel
interfaces, welded joints etc).
2. Minimise the extent of testing by grouping threats / geometries of ballistic
equivalence and select a representative target undergo ballistic evaluation.

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3. Calculate the number of targets and material requirements to carry out the tests
identified.

The global test plan shall be prepared according to the method defined in Para 3.3.2 and the
ballistic evaluation Phases and number of rounds mentioned in Para 3.3.5.

At the planning Phase, a nomenclature should be established to uniquely and simply identify
the test series, threat, components, target and ballistic impact.

The resulting test, target and threat matrix should be agreed with the National Authority and
remain the reference document covering the scope of ballistic testing prior to any testing
being carried out.

3.3.2 Ballistic test requirements and planning / component selection

The component ballistic acceptance tests in Phases 2 and 3 shall be conducted using the
projectiles, impact velocities and vehicle attack angles as defined in Annex A.

The component ballistic evaluations in Phases 2 and 3 employing the Vproof test shall be
based on the principle of keeping the projectile impact velocity and impact angle constant
within prescribed limits during a test series and these values shall be selected in Phase 1.

The KE threat ballistic resistance testing for Main Areas and SWA shall be in single hit or
multi-hit mode according to Table 1. The details of the ballistic multi-hit requirements for all
threat Levels are contained within Annex B. If the National Authority requires shatter-gap
testing this should be considered at Phase 2.

Table 1 - Ballistic test assessment requirements for Phase 2 and 3

STANAG VProof test requirements

Ballistic test KE bullet threat KE fragment threat
Phase Structural Weak Structural Weak
Main Areas Main Areas
Areas Areas
Multi-hit Single hit
Phase 2 -- --
tests tests

Phase 3 -- Single hit tests -- Single hit tests

Ballistic testing of components in Phase 2 and 3 shall be conducted at the most severe
impact condition allowable which are layed down by NA. Computation of this angle shall take

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into account the projectile attack direction in azimuth and elevation defined for each
Protection Level as well as the inclination of the representative armour panel on the vehicle.
Where attacks at compound angles are required, the details of calculation should be included
in the test plan and test report.

Figure 1 illustrates the angles of vehicle attack specified in Annex A for all Protection Levels.
Figure 2 demonstrates the determination of angles of impact e.g. for sloping plates on actual
vehicles. The impact angle of the artillery threat may be established using the same
methodology but applying 360o of azimuth and the elevation specified for each Protection
Level defined in Annex A.

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Figure 1 - Attack angles defined in Annex A for the KE Protection Levels

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Example 4: KE Level 5-6 (Grey panel):

o o
Orientation: -73 in azimuth; +25 in elevation

Level 5-6 (Appendix 8 angle: azimuth ± 30 ; elev. 0 )

o o

Worst angle of azimuth: -30 {since − 73o − − 30o = 43o (> 0 )}

o o

o
Worst angle of elevation: 0
Test angle of impact:
( ) ( ) (
arcsin sin 2 25o − 0o + cos 2 25o − 0o ⋅ sin 2 − 30o − −73o = 48.5o )
Includes
o o
KE Level 4 (Appendix 8 angle: azimuth 360 ; elev. 0 )
o
Worst angle of azimuth: -73
o
Worst angle of elevation: 0
Test angle of impact: 25 {since -73 – -73 = 0 and 25 – 0 = 25 }
o o o o o o o

and
o o o
KE Level 1-3 (Appendix 8 angle: azimuth 360 ; elev. 0 – 30 )
o
Worst angle of azimuth: -73
Worst angle of elevation: 25 {since 25 – 30 = -5 (< 0 )}
o o o o o
o
Test angle of impact: 0
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Figure 2 - Method for determination of the testing angle of impact (worst angle of attack)

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For a vehicle armour design to meet the requirements of a defined Protection Level it shall
defeat all ammunition threats specified at that threat Level and those specified for any lower
Protection Levels. Testing with projectiles specified for the lower Protection Levels will be
necessary whenever there is reason to believe that the protection system may be vulnerable
to such threats.

For many armours this requirement is automatically met since increasing Protection Level
threats are usually more penetrative. An exception may occur with some geometric armour
designs, for example perforated armour designed for 7.62 mm calibre bullets may
demonstrate a weakness to smaller calibre or lower energy projectiles such as 5.56 mm.
Hence this circumstance may represent more severe test conditions, and additional testing
would need to be included in the test plan.

Components positioned outside the attack angle interval of one Protection Level, but inside
the interval of a lower Level shall be tested at the Level of threat to which they are exposed.
Table 2, derived from Annex A, illustrates the hierarchy of Protection Levels, the subordinate
KE threats and their angles of attack to be considered.

Table 2 - Protection Level hierarchy indicating potential exposure to a lower Level threat

Protection Level Threat Level and test angle of attack to consider

being tested 5-6 4 3
o o
Az: ±30 ;
o
Az: 30 to 330 ; Az: 360o;
5-6
Elev: 0o Elev: 0o Elev: 0o to 30o
-- Az: 360o; Az: 360o;
4 o
Elev: 0 Elev: 0o to 30o
-- -- Az: 360o;
3
Elev: 0o to 30o

3.3.3 Vehicle target descriptions

Ballistics evaluation tests on vehicle protection systems may be performed on a variety of
armour target types dependent on the objectives being sought. Single plate target and
minimum engineered targets may be used for quality control of materials and basic

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assemblies or for R&D test firing on main armour areas to reduce the risk of failure on fully
engineered or vehicle targets. Details of these target types are described within Para 4.8.

Only fully representative armour system targets shall be used for the component ballistic
acceptance tests in Phase 2 and 3 as covered by this AEP through the use of fully engineered
or vehicle targets.

3.3.4 Vehicle armour area descriptions

Fully engineered and vehicle targets contain a number of areas or zones that will be required
to be considered and included within the ballistic assessment process at Phase 2 and 3 as
they may critically influence the VA assessment within Phase 4. These armour areas are
described below.

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1. Vehicle Main Areas (MA): These are the relatively uniform vehicle armour panel areas
that provide protection coverage against the specified ballistic threat Levels. However,
these vehicle MAs may not be fully homogeneous in their protection and could contain
zones of ballistic weakness as follows.

2. Localized Weak Areas (LWA): Where main armour systems are constructed from a
combination of materials or rely on geometrical effects to defeat the threats, the
protection provided may not be fully consistent over the full armour area. A typical
example is the use of ceramic tiles in composite armour where tile joints may present
an area of potential weakness. Where present, LWA are typically distributed
throughout the MA.

3. Structural Weak Areas (SWA): Structural Weak Areas are larger main armour panel
discontinuities that are potentially ballistically weak zones. Such areas are often
unavoidable in the design or construction of a vehicle. SWA are generally edge
oriented and not distributed throughout the MA. Classic examples are component
interfaces (door / windows) and main panel intersections (welded joints and associated
heat affected zones). Again, any testing within the SWA should exploit the LWAs.

4. Excluded Zone (EZ): When the testing of MAs is considered at Phase 2 it is essential
that testing is not carried out within or be unduly influenced by the SWA. However, as
there may be no a priori evidence for the size of the SWA that exists at the target
boundary or around boltholes, an assumption has been made for the size of this zone.
The nominated area around such features, initially excluded for the purposes of MA
testing, is designated the Excluded Zone (EZ). This zone shall be tested in Phase 3 to
validate if the EZ is ballistically resistant or if it is a VA. At the option of the National
Authority, an assessment may be carried out in Phase 3 to determine the actual extent
of the VA within or around the nominated EZ. Details of the EZ dimensions to be
assumed are contained within Annex B, Table B 1.

Hence it is essential that the ballistic evaluation process includes the following aspects as
further described in the relevant Paras of the Annex.

• Any performance assessment of the main armour areas in Phase 2 shall include the
influence of any LWAs present but be outside the designated EZ containing the SWA.
• The performance of any SWAs shall be assessed in Phase 3 within the EZ and again
shall include the influence of any LWAs present.

Figure 3 shows examples of how the definition of EZ is applied at different types of SWA.
Figure 3 a) presents a welded plate lap joint. One discontinuity is found at the first edge of

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the plate and an EZ is defined on each side of this boundary. A second discontinuity is found
at the boundary of the opposite edge, where EZs are applied as for the first case. It can be
seen that the EZ do not overlap leaving a narrow non-EZ region at the centre. Since by
definition every surface must be either an EZ or a MA, this thin zone is clearly a MA and shall
be tested accordingly (see Paras 3.3.2 and 3.3.3). If the area is insufficiently large to allow a
multi-hit assessment then testing should revert to single shot testing as applied to SWAs.
Figure 3 b) shows the example of a rebated plate butt joint where the EZs are shown
overlapping. In this case the whole area from point A to point B is tested as an EZ in Phase
3. Figure 3 c) presents an angled welded butt joint and in this case, the centre of the
discontinuity is at the centre of the welded seam. The EZ then lies on each side of the weld,
regardless of the actual extent of the heat-affected zone in the plate material, when unknown.
For a cylindrical bolt fixing passing through a plate as illustrated in Figure C 3 d), the EZ is a
circle of radius E described about the bolt centreline axis.

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A B

Figure 3 - Examples of generic SWA and the representative EZ

3.3.5 Number of shots required for ballistic assessment

Table 3 stipulates the specified number of accepted impacts of each projectile type and the
armour configuration that shall be used to assess the KE and FSP ballistic Protection Levels 1
- 6. The table also demonstrates how the test Phases are aligned to these assessments.
Refer also to Para 5.3 on impact location.

The following points should be noted:

1. An optional reduced number of shots indicated in parenthesis is available to National
Authorities if during the initial portion of this testing the target back damage is

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judged to give full confidence that further rounds will produce no complete
penetrations (CP).
2. The test requirements for SWAs are reduced compared to those of the MAs in
recognition of the reduced area available and overall economics of the process.

This table should be read in connection with Table 1 on assessment methodology (single hit /
multi-hit tests).

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Table 3.- Minimum number of rounds for each projectile type and armour configuration
Number of shots
KE KE
Phas KE Level FS
Objective Target type Level Level
e 1-3 P
4 5 to 6
Test plan to determine the Covers entire
1 representative panels and vehicle protection Not applicable
impact angles system
Component MAs Fully engineered
acceptance test to and/or vehicle 22 12 12
2 5
determine the ballistic targets (10*) (6*) (4*)
resistance
Component SWAs Vehicle and/or
acceptance test to fully engineered
3 10 5 3 3
determine the ballistic targets
resistance
VA assessment to Covers entire
4 determine system vehicle protection Not applicable
acceptance system
* Could be reduced to 10 shots for Protection Levels 1 to 3, 6 shots for Protection Level 4 and
4 shots for Protection Levels 5 to 6, if the Level of back surface damage is judged by National
Authority to give full confidence that further rounds will produce no CP.

The acceptance criteria (FAIR / UNFAIR impact and target pass / fail) for the ballistic tests
and the procedure for re-test should this be required are covered within Paras 5.6 and 5.7.

3.4 Phase 2: Main Areas ballistic evaluation

This is the main component acceptance test phase which shall be made with the threats and
under the conditions specified in Annex A. Table 3 summarises the test requirements
involved.

All assessments shall be made using either fully engineered targets or vehicle targets to
determine the ballistic resistance of the main surfaces of the armour panels. These main
surfaces may include LWAs. Where this is the case the impact locations selected should
maximise the number of LWAs tested whilst meeting the geometric criteria defined for the
multi-hit procedure (Annex B).

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The ballistic threat testing employs the Vproof test methodology with integrated multi-hit
evaluation.

For KE threat Levels 1 - 3 a minimum of 22 rounds with no CP is normally required

(confidence level 90%).

For KE threats Levels 4 - 6 the minimum number of rounds is normally set to 12 in order to
reduce the ammunition and target numbers required. This reduces the confidence level to
70%.

The artillery threat testing employs the Vproof test methodology using FSPs in single hit mode
(impacts spaced so as not to influence one another) with no requirement for multi-hit testing.

For artillery Protection Levels 1 to 3, testing is not required but may be specified by the
National Authority using 20 mm FSPs (see Annex C).

For artillery Protection Levels 4 to 6, testing is mandatory using the 20 mm FSP and a
minimum of 5 rounds with no CP is required.

Component target performance determination is assessed according to Para 5.8.

Shatter gap testing if required by the National Authority is also carried out in Phase 2 (see
Annex D).

Additionally, the ballistic resistance of targets that have been exposed to environmental test
conditions (e.g. vibration, temperature / humidity tests) is optional, but could be included at
the discretion of the National Authority.

In the event of CP, the options for re-test are described in Para 5.8. A vehicle can still pass
the system acceptance evaluation in Phase 4 if the area represented by the totality of the
failed components identified in Phase 2 and 3 is below the 10% threshold as calculated by the
approved method described in Para 3.6.1.

3.5 Phase 3: Structural Weak Area and Excluded Zone vulnerability evaluation
During this Phase evaluation of targets containing potential SWA is carried out by testing the
EZ with single shot impacts for both the ballistic and FSP threats identified in Annex A. A
reduced level of testing is required compared to MA targets. The nominated size of the EZ is
related to the Protection Level (and ammunition calibre) as indicated in Annex B.

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Vehicle targets are the best target samples for SWA evaluation. Fully engineered targets may
be used as long as the SWA are constructed in the exact same manner as for the actual
vehicle.

SWAs are only potentially vulnerable but are often the critical areas of a LAV. The aims of
the Phase 3 testing on representative armour targets are therefore a combination of the
following activities:

• To evaluate the ballistic resistance of the EZ.

• To detect the presence of VA within SWA and then, at the National Authority
discretion, to determine the extent of the VA.

In the event of CP, the options for re-test are described in Para 5.8. A vehicle can still pass
the system acceptance evaluation in Phase 4 if the area represented by the totality of the
failed components identified in Phase 2 and 3 is below the 10% threshold as calculated by the
approved method described in Para 3.6.1.

3.6 Phase 4: Vulnerable Area evaluation

The effective area of vehicle Protection Level coverage is the ultimate system acceptance
criterion. By computing the tests results of all component acceptance tests of Phases 2 and
3, the total surface area of components sentenced as offering zero ballistic resistance is
determined. If this surface area is lower than 10% for all aspect angles, the protection system
is accepted. If there is no failed component in Phases 2 and 3 and there is no unprotected
area included in the protection system design, the protection system is then automatically
accepted. The details of the VA assessment calculation and analysis are covered within the
following Para 3.6.1.

The 90% expected protection capability shall be provided for every aspect angle that results
from the combination of the azimuth and elevation angles specified in Annex A. The basis of
this calculation shall be confirmed experimentally by testing with each projectile type at the
defined KE Protection Level (stated and below).

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3.6.1 Vulnerable Area assessment

The protection system acceptance Phase 4 is based on a simplified vulnerability analysis
called a Vulnerable Area (VA) assessment. The assumption leading to simplification is that
the protection system should perform to ensure that in 90% of occurrences no projectile could
enter the occupant compartment of a vehicle, even if the projectile’s path does not cross the
position of an occupant. In other words, the VA assessment assumptions are:

1. A CP of a crew / passengers compartment is defined as a failure of the protective

system;

2. The expected protection capability shall be attained for all aspect angles specified
within the azimuth / elevation requirements (Annex A). The component that succeeded
to its most severe impact angle is assumed to resist at the other impact angles
represented by the aspect angles of the VA evaluation.

3. Component probability of hit is to be interpreted as a probability given a hit on the

occupant compartment protection system. No account is taken of munitions dispersion
or aiming effects.

4. The vehicle is sufficiently far from the weapon to consider that all presented area
regions are equally probable of being hit and that all shots potentially hitting the vehicle
are essentially parallel.

Theoretically, the expected protection capability (EPC) is defined as the summation, for all
components, of the probability of hitting the component multiplied by the probability that this
component resists the impact. The term ”component” as used above is defined as parts of
the protection system, i.e. major armour panels or SWAs, and not functional component as
the term is generally used in system vulnerability analysis. The probability of hitting an
armour component is proportional to the projected area of the component onto the plane
perpendicular to the direction of the threat. For the purpose of the VA assessment method, it
is assumed that all components that successfully pass the ballistic evaluation tests during
Phases 2 and 3, for the given Levels threats and conditions defined in Annex A achieve a
100% probability to defeat this threat. The components that fail Phases 2 or 3 are assumed
to be defeated with a 100% probability given a hit, i.e. are certain to be perforated if hit. The
EPC can then be defined as the ratio of the protected area (AP) to the threatened area (Ao):

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AP
EPC = 100% ∗
AO

The Relative Vulnerable Area (RVA) is defined as ratio of the unprotected (vulnerable) area
(AU) to area Ao:

AU
RVA = 100% ∗ = 100% − EPC
AO

Area AO is derived from the parallel projection of the occupant compartment onto the plane
perpendicular to the direction of the threat. Area AP is that proportion of area AO for which the
protection is ensured with respect to the direction of the threat. In contrast, area AU is that
proportion of area AO for which there is no protection with respect to the direction of the
threat.

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To assess the RVA, a series of views representing the assembled armour personnel
compartment (not the entire vehicle) should be produced for analysis. These can be three
dimensional computer-generated plots, or hand drawn views. Figure 4 shows an example for
a 0o and 90o of azimuth (front view and side view respectively), where the crew compartment
is represented by dotted lines. The projected surface area of the crew compartment could be
calculated as well as the projected surface area of the vulnerable zones.

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Figure 4 – Example of Vulnerable Area assessment method

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For a major armour panel component that failed the testing procedure in Phase 2, the surface
area considered as vulnerable corresponds to the presented areas of the component, i.e.
excluding the EZ. On the side view of the example in Figure 4, failed component 1 has an
2
actual area 1 m by 0.8 m = 0.8 m but the projected area to consider in the VA calculation is
1 m x 0.655 m = 0.655 m2 since it is in a 55o plane, which give a projected dimension of
0.8 m sin (55o) = 0.655 m.

For a component tested in Phase 3 (SWA evaluation), the surface area considered as
vulnerable after a failure depends on the geometry of the weak area. For linear weak zones
such as welds, overlaps or edges, the width of the VA is considered by default as being the
width of the EZ representing the SWA on each side of the weak area. By example, the failed
component 2 depicted in Figure 4 (side view) is a plates assembly built as in Figure 3 b), with
EZ overlapping by 2 mm. Assuming that the vehicle in the example is tested for Protection
Level 3 (see Annex B), the total width of the EZs is then 98 mm. With a length of 2 m on the
occupant compartment, the vulnerable surface area of this defeated component is then 2
m x 0.098 m = 0.196 m2.

For circular weak areas such as bolts or small holes, the default dimension considered as
offering no protection is assumed to be a radius of E around the centre of the failed
component, i.e. a diameter of 50 mm for Protection Levels 1 to 3. By example, the vulnerable
surface area of component 3 depicted in Figure 4 (side view) includes a VA corresponding to
π x (50 mm / 2) = 0.00196 m . The total VA of this component (four bolts) is then
2 2

4 x 0.00196 m2 = 0.00785 m2. For circular weak areas of radius larger than E, the edges are
considered the discontinuities and the extent of the EZ is treated as in Figure 3 a), with a
narrow MA at the centre of the weak area.

The default value of the EZ should be used unless evidences approved by National Authority
(e.g. test data) demonstrate that a different value provides 90% probability of resistance to the
hit.

In the example of the side view in Figure 4, the calculation provides a total threatened surface
area Ao of 12.85 m2 and a total vulnerable surface area AU of 0.86 m2, for a RVA of 6.7% and
an EPC of 93.3% for this view.

The acceptance criterion for the Phase 4 is an EPC of 90% for every view represented by the
angles of attack specified in Annex A.

As a minimum, for vehicles with simple geometry, the EPC shall be determined for the front,
sides, rear and highest elevation (e.g. roof at 30o for KE Protection Levels 1 to 3) attack

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angles. The analysis of RVA and EPC should be repeated at least for every 15o of azimuth
and elevation as a minimum. For the Protection Levels 1 to 3, this represents 24 azimuth
angles and 3 elevation angles (0o, 15o and 30o) for a total of 72 views. For Level 4, the total
number of views is 24 (360o of azimuth and a fixed 0o elevation) and for Level 5, it is 5 views
(-30o, -15o, 0o, 15o and 30o of azimuth and a fixed 0o elevation).

The computations associated with VA assessment could also be performed using vulnerability
software that automatically calculates the RVA for every view defined in Annex A with angle of
attack increments smaller than 15o.

On completion of the EPC computations for the entire vehicle protection system, an
acceptance report shall be produced. It should indicate the computation methodology
followed as well as the EPC calculated for every point of view analysed (without automatic
software) or for the point of view showing the lowest EPC (with automatic software).

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4. TEST EQUIPMENT

4.1 Test facility and arrangement

The test facility employed for the ballistic assessments should provide the conditions
necessary to meet the requirements stated in the following Paras. The ballistic test
arrangements should be similar to those shown in Figure 5. This document does not specify
any details of the construction or management of the test facility.

LIGHT SCREENS TARGET

WITNESS SHEET
RADAR

1.0 M
GUN

LASER

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3566228
Test specimen
Velocity detectors
Witness plate

Launcher

x
Firing line
Yaw card and/or
shot position
witness sheet

Figure 5 – Examples of experimental arrangement used for ballistic testing

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4.2 Launcher to target distance

The launcher to target distance shall be selected such that there is a high probability of the
impact conditions being FAIR in terms of velocity (Paras 4.5 and 5.6), yaw (Para 4.6) and
impact position (Paras 5.4, 5.6 and Annex B).

4.3 Launching system

Any launching device may be used provided it is capable of consistently and reproducibly
propelling the test projectiles (bullets or fragment simulators) at the required aiming point with
an acceptable accuracy, impact velocity and angle of impact yaw.

4.4 Projectiles
The KE projectiles used in ballistic testing shall be of the type and calibre specified in Annex A
and C. The FSP used to simulate the artillery threat should conform to Annex A. FSPs
produced in accordance with the drawing and table provided in Figure 6 and Table 4 are
acceptable. The 20 mm FSP is mandatory for Protection Levels 4 to 6 component
acceptance tests.

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NOTES:
1- COLD ROLLED ANNEALED STEEL CONFORMING TO COMPOSITION 4337H, 4340H OR
EQUIVALENT.
2- AFTER MANUFACTURE ITEM SHALL HAVE HARDNESS VALUE OF HRC 30±2.
3- ALL BURRS ARE REMOVED.
4- FINISH 1.6 EXCEPT AS NOTED.
5- ADJUST LENGTH TO MEET INDICATED WEIGHT.
6- DIMENSIONS IN mm.

Figure 6 – Reference drawing for FSPs

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Table 4 – Reference dimensions of FSPs

Fragme Weigh A ØB C D E ØF G ØH
nt t (mm) (mm) (m (mm) (mm) (mm) (mm) (mm)
Simulat (g) m)
or
20 mm 53.8±0 9.27- 19.89±0 24. 1.62±0. 2.31± 20.83+0 0.2 18.80±0
.26 0.4 .05 00 05 0.05 .08 max .12

4.5 Projectile velocity measurement

The velocity of each projectile shall be measured prior to impact with any suitable equipment
(optical, magnetic, acoustic, X-ray, camera, break / make screens, Doppler radar, etc.)
capable of providing an accuracy of ± 0.5%. The recommended measurement plane shall be
located perpendicular to the projectile trajectory, at a maximum distance of 2.5 m ahead of
the aim point on the target. If the striking velocity is measured at a distance greater than
2.5 m from the target, the striking velocity shall then be extrapolated from the point of
measurement to the target using a recognised ballistic drag coefficient for the projectile in
question. Supplementary details on velocity correction are given in Annex E.

4.6 Projectile yaw measurement and acceptance criteria

The yaw angle of the projectile at impact may be measured by any suitable method (e.g. yaw
card, orthogonal photographic or flash X-ray system, Doppler radar system, etc.) that does not
in itself cause projectile instability. A detailed procedure for computing the yaw angle from
yaw card measurement is presented in Annex E.
The projectile yaw shall be within the limits specified in Table 5.

Table 5 - Impact yaw criteria

Threat Protection Impact Yaw criteria

Comment
projectile Level angle (Degrees)
1-3 All <5
< or = 60 <5
KE bullets
4-6 >60 <3
All <3 Spaced targets

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1-3 All <5 Not mandatory

FSP
4-6 All <5

The yaw shall be measured periodically during each test series. If excessive yaw is observed,
all the firings conducted since the previous measured acceptable yaw will be considered
invalid and shall then be repeated.

4.7 Impact location witness

In order to assess impact fairness, a shot location witness should be used to provide evidence
of the exact impact point against the intended impact location of the projectile. A yaw card
can act as a shot location witness (see Figure 5) even if the yaw measurement is achieved by
another method.

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4.8 Target types, retention method and orientation

Four target types can be used for ballistic evaluation.

1. Single plate targets: Such targets consist of a single armour material or combination of
materials (composite armour).
2. Minimum engineered targets: These targets generally consist of various materials
(metals, glass, ceramic, explosives, etc) either loosely assembled or lightly fastened
together usually to aid handling during testing (taped, welded, bolted, glued, etc).
Targets materials may be configured in contact or with air spaces.
3. Fully engineered targets: These targets are constructed to be fully representative of an
actual vehicle armour system. This is achieved by using the same materials, hardware,
construction techniques, fixing and mounting method etc, that would be used in the
actual vehicle system application. These targets may include sections of the real
system (component mock-ups). Engineered targets may be mounted in a target stand
or on a suitable vehicle.
4. Vehicle targets: These targets constitute the actual armour systems. They may be fully
functional vehicles or ballistic test target structures (vehicle minus non-armour related
components such as the power pack, gun system, etc.).

Single plate targets and minimum engineered targets can be used for R&D and quality control
of materials and basics assemblies. Their size and rigidity will normally be reduced compared
to fully engineered or vehicle armour target components. Single plate targets and minimum
engineered targets represent only the materials that constitute armour panel MAs.

Component acceptance tests shall only use fully representative armour systems through the
use of fully engineered or vehicle targets.

For single plate targets and engineered targets, a rigid support fixture shall be used so that
the target remains firmly in place during and after the test event. The frame support and
clamps or mounting fixture should be capable of retaining the target and withstanding shock
resulting from ballistic impact by the test projectiles. The armour test target shall not be
altered between the shots when the fixture needs to be re-tightened. The precise target
boundary conditions used shall be described in such a way that each test is reproducible.

The support fixture shall be capable of ensuring impact point at the desired aim point and
angle of obliquity within a tolerance defined in Para 5.6.

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4.9 Witness system

For testing opaque and transparent armour material targets the witness system shall consist
of a nominal 0.5 mm (± 0.05 mm) thick Aluminium alloy sheet (e.g. 2024 T3 or T4, AlCuMg
ISO/R209 with min. tensile strength of 440 N/mm2). It shall be placed at a standoff distance
of 150 mm (± 10 mm) behind and parallel to the back face surface of the target at the aim
point as illustrated in Figure 5 (refer to distance E). The witness system should extend over a
sufficient area (equal to or larger than the target size) such that all significant projectile or
target debris can be detected.

If vision blocks are to be tested, a thinner witness (e.g. 0.05 mm aluminium foil) positioned at
a shorter standoff distance (e.g. 50 mm) should be used. This arrangement better
reproduces the typical distance from the vision blocks to the eyes and the lower eye injury
tolerance (small width of the aperture requires a close approach by crew to effectively observe
external features).

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5. BALLISTIC TEST PROCEDURE FOR COMPONENT EVALUATION

A typical sequence for conducting ballistic tests on an armour component target consists of
the following steps:

1. Launcher and ammunition preparation and conditioning

2. Range preparation and set up (e.g. chronographs, yaw cards etc).
3. Target preparation and conditioning.
4. Target installation and positioning.
5. Ballistic test firing and impact validity (FAIR / UNFAIR) evaluation.
6. Performance evaluation (partial or complete penetration).
7. Target component pass, fail or re-test assignment.
8. Test report generation and issue.

The following specific procedures and requirements are relevant to the process.

5.1 Test range ambient conditions

All testing procedures should be carried out in a test facility having the standard ambient
conditions, i.e. a temperature of 20° ± 10°C. The temperature and humidity measurements
can be made with any suitable equipment having a minimum accuracy of 1°C for temperature,
and 5% for relative humidity (RH). The temperature and %RH of the test range should be
recorded at the beginning and on completion of a test sequence.

5.2 Details and marking of targets

The test targets for all acceptance tests should only be either fully engineered or vehicle
targets.

Prior to testing, each armour target should be visually or non-destructively examined to verify
that no defect or other damage (dents, cracks, delaminations) exist and to identify potential
LWAs. The critical dimensions and weight of individual component should be recorded.
Based on these studies the required EZ and LWAs should be clearly identified and marked on
all test targets.

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All targets and any separate subcomponents including the witness plate should carry a unique
identifying number that should relate to:

• The trial series number;

• The vehicle facet that the target represents;
• The threat weapon ammunition used in the assessment. Note that use of a threat
code will allow easier / unclassified dissemination of results.

In addition, during testing all ballistic impacts should be individually marked on all components
of the target and witness plate. Numbers should be sequential and account for all serials fired
including any preliminary test rounds or non-FAIR impacts etc.

These unique target and ballistic impact numbers should be recorded within the test facility
report.

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5.3 Hit location and number

When a projectile (bullet or fragment simulator) strikes an armour panel, the material
properties of the panel in a zone surrounding the point of impact are altered. The result of a
subsequent round striking in this zone will be affected by these material changes. For the
multi-hit test protocol, overlapping of shot damage zones is permitted. The separation
distance allowed between shots and the shot pattern used are presented in Annex B.

In order to provide the required protection capability as defined in Annex A for KE threats, the
multi-hit testing protocol described in Annex B (see paragraphs 2, 3, 5 and 6) shall be used.
Note that an optional, lower multi-hit protection capability for transparent armour is acceptable
at the National Authority discretion (see Annex B Para 4), but vehicles classified under this
protocol shall be classified as “STANAG 4569 KE Level X [PARTIAL]”.

The armour target assessments for the following cases are all in single hit mode.

Armour target assessment in the single hit mode is specified for all ballistic impacts on EZ and
all FSP threats. The single hit mode requires that every shot be completely independent and
in original condition target material, i.e. with no interaction with target damage caused by other
shots. Therefore, during testing, care must be taken to avoid any influence from previous
impact damage that might deleteriously affect performance.

For MA testing all accepted impacts shall be at the specified distance away from the edges,
seams and other discontinuities as presented (see Annex B). This distance is called the
Excluded Zone (EZ).

The component area considered for the evaluation of SWAs is the EZ defined on MAs, i.e.
25 mm on each side for Protection Levels 1 to 3 and 50 mm for Protection Levels 4 to 6. To
ensure that the shot is actually testing the SWA, the impact point shall be at a minimum
distance from the aim point or the intended feature but not outside the EZ. Testing any LWAs
present within a potential SWA shall be emphasized. With a welded joint for example, shots
may be aimed at the centre of the seam, at the side of the seam and in any potential heat
affected zone.

The shot locations selected should be such as to maximize the number of LWAs tested that
also incorporate any prevailing geometric criteria i.e. those described in Annex B. With some

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materials (e.g. transparent armour), the weakest point of the panel will generally be at the
perimeter of the component. In this case, the aim point should be chosen close to the border
between the MA and the EZ reserved for SWA testing. For example, in the presence of a
mosaic armour of tiles, the aim point should be at the tiles joint intersection.

In all cases, targets samples shall be of a size representative of the actual component on the
vehicle protection system. If the size of the component is too small to be tested using the
complete multi-hit shot pattern defined for the specified Protection Level, it shall be tested
with only the two first shots of the patterns described in Annex B. If the component is too
small to allow firing even only one pair of shots, it shall then be considered as a SWA and
tested accordingly.

For Protection Levels 1 to 4, more than one four shot group may be fired at a target panel if it
is judged by the National Authority that there is no interaction of the damage caused by the
different shots groups.

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5.4 Target conditioning

Prior to ballistic testing, each target should be pre-conditioned to a temperature of 20° ± 5°C
and a relative humidity (RH) specified by the National Authority for at least 12 hours. The
targets should be reconditioned once their temperature is no longer within the tolerance band
of ± 5°C. If different test conditions from these values are used, they should be clearly
identified and recorded in the test report.

For test conditions where the temperature of the target is not the same as the test range
conditions, the temperature of each target should be measured prior to and immediately
following completion of the test and recorded in the test report.

The National Authority may specify pre-conditioning of targets that are sensitive to humidity.
In those cases where the RH of the range test facility differs from that specified for the target,
the test shall be performed within a maximum time of one hour following the completion of
conditioning. This approach is appropriate to outdoor firing ranges where it is not possible to
control the ambient test conditions.

The National Authority may require testing under extreme environmental conditions. In this
case, the requirement should take into account the climatic zones defined in STANAG 4370
AECTP-200. The precise requirements shall be defined in a specification or technical
description.

5.5 Target positioning and obliquity measurement

Each target submitted for test shall be firmly mounted to a rigid support within the range
facility. When mounting targets for testing to a holding rig or frame, care must be exercised to
ensure that the loads applied or their method of application do not influence the ballistic
response of the target.

The procedure used to position the target should ensure that the specified impact angle to the
line of fire is achieved and measured at the intended point of aim on the target. The specified
tolerance for the target obliquity is ± 0.50°.

The target obliquity should be measured for each round and recorded in the test report.
Target obliquity is conventionally measured as the angle subtended between the normal (900)
to the plate surface and the line of fire. Other angular measurements may be taken provided
a clear description or sketch defines the procedure used.

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Single target angles can be used to represent compound angles provided their method of
calculation is made explicit in the test report.

5.6 Test impact validity assessment

Once the conditions creating the expectation of a valid test are met, the actual firing sequence
is performed with the appropriate measurement equipment. A ballistic impact is considered
FAIR if it meets the criteria defined within this AEP as summarised below but is sentenced as
UNFAIR if the criteria are not met. All ballistic impacts whether FAIR or UNFAIR shall be
recorded in the test report.

• Impact velocity, tolerance ± 20 m/s from the nominal velocity (Annex A)

• Obliquity of impact, tolerance for the target obliquity ± 0.50° (see Para 5.5)
• Yaw, tolerances 3° or 5° (see Para 4.6)
• Multi-hit testing criteria (shot positioning), see Annex B
• Distance from edge to impact point for MA testing (EZ):
o 25 mm for Protection Levels 1 to 3.
o 50 mm for Protection Levels 4 to 6 as well as for transparent armour Protection
Level 1 to 3 PARTIAL (see Annex B).

(A shot impact location witness should be used to assess the edge separation distance, the
distance from the intended point of aim and the distance between shots, when required (see
Annex B)).

All FAIR impacts will contribute to the ballistic assessment of the target and must then be
judged to meet (Partial Penetration, PP) or fail (Complete Penetration, CP) the specified
performance requirement.

However, under certain conditions, impacts classified as UNFAIR may be accepted for the
assessment. This situation arises if the UNFAIR impact creates more severe conditions yet
performance requirements (PP) are met, or creates less severe conditions and results in a
(CP).

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The interpretation of what constitutes a FAIR and UNFAIR impact and whether ballistic tests
are regarded as accepted or rejected depends upon the severity conditions defined in
Table 6.

Table 6 - Individual impact fairness and severity conditions

Relative severity
Criteria Fairness conditions More severe Less severe
conditions conditions
Impact velocity ±20 m/s Faster Slower
Obliquity of impact ± 0.50° (see § 5.5) Lower obliquity Higher obliquity
Yaw angle 0 to 3° or 0 to 5° (see § Not applicable Higher angle
4.6)
Impact position In MA In EZ Not applicable
(Phase 2 only)
Impact separation Single hit: see § 5.3 Shorter distance Not applicable
distance (damage zone
overlapping)
Multi-hit: see Annex B Shorter distance Longer distance
Impact group See Annex B Shorter distance Not applicable
separation (damage zone
overlapping)

If the test conditions of an UNFAIR impact are less severe than specified and the
performance requirements are not met (CP), this will be considered as an accepted impact,
and will constitute a target failure. If the performance requirements are met (PP) the UNFAIR
impact is considered as rejected.

Another situation may arise in multi-hit evaluation when an UNFAIR impact is accepted
because it led to a target success (PP) under more severe conditions. However, any
subsequent impact on the same target is considered UNFAIR by default even though the
firing conditions of the impact were within the given tolerances.

Nevertheless, the impact shall be accepted if it leads to success (PP) but rejected if it leads
to failure (CP). In this last case, all the previously accepted impacts are also rejected and
shall be repeated.

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If a certain number of impacts of a four-shots pattern are performed and are accepted PP and
then a subsequent impact is a rejected CP (more severe UNFAIR impact), all the previous
impacts are to be rejected and shall all be repeated.

5.7 Witness plate and armour examination

The level of damage on the aluminium witness plate is the performance criterion for the
evaluation of success or failure of a target against a particular projectile. Nevertheless,
armour target damage examination is also required since it contributes to the decision on
continuing or halting the test sequence for a component (see Table 3).

After each ballistic impact, the witness plate shall be visually examined for damage and
evidence of penetration by the projectile or target materials. A CP is recorded when light is
observed to pass through the damage in the witness plate. A PP is recorded when no light is
visible through the damage if present.

All observable damage on the witness plate should be appropriately marked and numbered to
allow traceability. The witness plate should be moved or replaced during the assessment to
ensure that observable damage areas from individual test impacts remain discrete from one
another.

5.8 Component performance determination

Following completion of the ballistic test sequence with the number of shots required by each
Phase of the assessment (see Table 3), the success or failure of a component is determined.
Component design failure is defined when one or more accepted impact results in CP of the
target.

Following the failure of a component design the National Authority may select one of the
following three options.

Option 1. A single re-test of the failed component design with the identical configuration is
allowed. The retest should comprise the full number of rounds stated within Table 3
with no reduction allowed.
Option 2. A full re-test using revised armour solutions (effectively a resubmission).
Option 3. The component is considered as comprising a VA for the purposes of the
Protected Area calculation.

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The process of testing and acceptance is summarized as a flow chart in Annex F.

An example is provided for a Level 1 target assessment, indicating the possibilities available
to the National Authority during the test process.

If shot #10 is achieved with no CP of the target, the National Authority may decide that the
test can be stopped if target damage is sufficiently low and the component is then accepted
as successful. Again, if testing continues to shot #22 without CP, the component is also
accepted as successful.

If a CP occurs between shots #11 to #22, the test could be stopped since this AEP allows no
CP within the series. At National Authority discretion the series could be continued to shot
#22, but this is not required by the AEP. However, if a second CP does occurs up to #22, the
component is declared failed and re-test of the same target recipe is not allowed.

If a CP occurs before shot #10, the test could be stopped, but the National Authority could still
ask to complete the series to shot #22. If no other CP occurs, the National Authority could
choose between declaring the component failed, allowing a re-test of the same recipe or
asking for a resubmission. If an additional CP occurs within the remainder of the 22 shot
series, a re-test of the same target recipe is not allowed.
5.9 Ballistic test report
In order to proceed with the VA assessment, the following information for every target
component ballistically tested shall be fully documented in a report.

a. Date and place of trial, Protection Levels tested.

b. Actual firing range used, distance from velocity measurement point to target, witness
plate material, thickness and standoff distance.

c. Photo or drawing of test set-up identifying components and defining positions /

distances.

d. Name of the testing personnel.

e. Target type (fully engineered or vehicle) and aim zone (MA with or without LWA in
Phase 2 or SWA with or without LWA in Phase 3).

f. Temperature and relative humidity at the test facility, and target pre-conditioned
temperature if different from test facility.

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g. For each shot, projectile nomenclature and description, along with any information on
manufacture and provenance.

h. For each test series, barrel calibre, length, and twist if applicable, test specimen-
mounting configuration.

i. For each shot, approximate location of impact, intended and actual striking velocities
obtained, angle of yaw, partial or complete penetration, FAIR or UNFAIR impact,
accepted or rejected impact and notes on target damage, e.g. bulge and cracks.

j. For each test series, indication of compliance with minimum specified ballistic
performance requirements.

k. When appropriate, justification of reduction of the number of test rounds according to

Table 3.

l. Any other information or remarks pertinent to the conduct of the test, or behaviour of
the material to demonstrate that the requirements of this AEP have been met.

m. Type, mass and dimensions of the projectile, calibre, core diameter, lot number, model
number, name of supplier, country of manufacture, and ballistic retardation if known.

Any other information relevant to the National Authority, particular requirements or conditions
of the target and threat should be documented, such as:

a. The level of classification (unclassified, confidential...) of the test results.

b. Sampling procedure, and full description of each armour target tested including: mass,
size, areal density, thickness (max., min., mean), hardness (max., min.) nominal areal
density, material type, manufacturer and lot number.

c. Photograph of targets before and after testing, penetration depth etc.

d. A table or graph of propellant charges versus muzzle velocity.

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Annex A KE PROTECTION LEVELS FOR OCCUPANTS OF ARMOURED VEHICLES;

TEST CONDITIONS AND PROJECTILES

Table A1 – KE PROTECTION LEVELS FOR OCCUPANTS OF ARMOURED VEHICLES

Level KE-Threat Reference – Artillery – Threat

6 Weapon: Automatic Cannon, 30 mm Artillery 155 mm

Ammunition: APFSDS and AP Estimated range of burst: 10
Distance: 500 m m
Angle: frontal arc to centreline: 30° sides Azimuth 360°
included; elevation 0° Elevation: 0° - 90°
5 Weapon: Automatic Cannon, 25 mm Artillery 155 mm
Ammunition: APDS and APFSDS Estimated range of burst: 25
Distance: 500 m m
Angle: frontal arc to centreline: 30° sides Azimuth 360°
included; elevation 0° Elevation: 0° - 90°
4 Weapon: Heavy Machine Gun, 14.5 mm Artillery 155 mm
Ammunition: AP Estimated range of burst: 25
Distance: 200 m m
Angle: azimuth 360°; elevation 0° Azimuth 360°
Elevation: 0° - 90°
3 Weapon: Machine Gun and Sniper rifles, Artillery 155 mm
7.62 mm Estimated range of burst: 60
Ammunition: AP tungsten carbide and AP m
hard steel core Azimuth 360°
Distance: 30 m Elevation: 0° - 30°
Angle: azimuth 360°; elevation 0° - 30°
2 Weapon: Assault rifles, 7.62 mm Artillery 155 mm
Ammunition: AP steel core Estimated range of burst: 80
Distance: 30 m m
Angle: azimuth 360°; elevation 0° - 30° Azimuth 360°
Elevation: 0° - 22°
1 Weapon: Assault rifles:7.62 and 5.56 mm Artillery 155 mm
Ammunition: Ball Estimated range of burst: 100

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Distance: 30 m m
Angle: azimuth 360°; elevation 0° - 30° Azimuth 360°
Elevation: 0° - 18°

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Table A2 – Test conditions and projectiles summary for KE and artillery threat

KE threat Artillery threat (FSP 20 mm)

Lev
Ammunitions Vproof* Azimuth Elev. Vproof* Azimuth Elev.
el
(m/s) (m/s)
30 mm x 173 APFSDS-T n.a.**
o o o 0o –
6 ±30 0 1250 0 – 360
90o***
30 mm x 165 AP-T 810
25 mm x 137 APFSDS-T
1336
PMB 090 0o –
5 ±30o 0o 960 0 – 360o
25 mm x 137 APDS-T, 90o***
1258
PMB 073
0o –
4 14.5 mm x 114 API/B32 911 0 – 360o 0o 960 0 – 360o
90o***
7.62 mm x 51 AP (WC
930
3 core) 0 – 360o 0o – 30o -- 0 – 360o 0o – 30o
7.62 mm x 54R B32 API 854
2 7.62 mm x 39 API BZ 695 0 – 360o 0o – 30o -- 0 – 360o 0o – 22o
7.62 mm x 51 NATO ball 833
5.56 mm x 45 NATO
1 900 0 – 360o 0o – 30o -- 0 – 360o 0o – 18o
SS109
5.56 mm x 45 M193 937
Testing with projectiles specified for the lower Protection Levels will be necessary whenever
there is reason to believe that the protection system may be vulnerable to such threats.

* Vproof = Figures are mean values: tolerance of striking velocity for individual shot is ±
20 m/s
** not available
*** See Annex C, paragraph 4 for test options

As notification of the protection level is advised to use the first character of the threat type followed by the
protection level (e.g. K2).

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Table A3 - Accepted test projectiles and characteristics

Projectil
Ammunitio e
Level Name Material Comment
ns weight(
g)
30 mm x
W alloy
173 NM225 227
core
6 APFSDS-T
30 mm x Russian 30 mm x Original ammunition
Steel core 400
165 API 165 API design
25 mm x
137 W alloy Unique supplier
Oerlikon-Contraves 130
APFSDS-T, core
PMB 090
5
25 mm x 121.5
137 APDS- W alloy (150 Unique supplier
Oerlikon-Contraves
T, core with
PMB 073 sabot)
Russian 14,5 mm Original ammunition
Steel core 64
API/B32 design
14.5 mm x Barnaul AP-I 57-BZ- Steel core 64 Specific manufacturer
4 114 561S
API/B32 Surrogate without
ARL Drawing
Steel core 63.4 incendiary.
number 32000
Figure A1.
W alloy Present day available
Nammo AP8 8.4
core product
7.62 mm x
Bofors Carl Gustav W alloy Designation under
51 AP 8.4
FFV AP core previous supplier
(WC core)
3 W alloy US designation of the
M993 8.4
core same round
7.62 mm x Steel core 10.4 / Original ammunition
Russian 7,62 x 54R
54R B32 10.04 design
B32 API
API
7.62 mm x Russian 7,62 x 39 Steel core 7.77 Original ammunition
2
39 API BZ API BZ design

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Lead core, US designation for
Ball M80 copper 9.65 the 7.62 x 51 NATO
jacket ball
7.62 mm x Lead core, Canadian designation
51 NATO C21 copper 9.5 for the 7.62 x 51
ball jacket NATO ball
Lead core, German designation
DM41 copper 9.45 for the 7.62 x 51
jacket NATO ball
Steel and
lead core, Original ammunition
SS109 4
copper design
1
jacket
Steel and
5.56 mm x US designation for
lead core,
45 NATO M855 4 the 5.56 x 45 NATO
copper
SS109 SS109
jacket
Steel and
German designation
lead core,
DM11 4 for the 5.56 x 45
copper
NATO SS109
jacket
Lead core,
5.56 mm x Original ammunition
M193 copper 3.56
45 M193 design
jacket
Testing with projectiles specified for the lower Protection Levels will be necessary whenever
there is reason to believe that the protection system may be vulnerable to such threats.

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Figure A1 - Drawing of Protection Level 4 threat (ARL Drawing 32000)

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Annex B MULTIPLE HIT TESTING

1. General

The capability of the armour system under evaluation to with stand multiple impacts (multi-hit
requirement) from the specified test projectiles is included as part of the Phase 2 Vproof ballistic
assessment process.

The application of multi-hit conditions to armour component ballistic testing require a number
of geometric parameters be defined in order to obtain a reproducible and fair evaluation.
These parameters and qualifying comments are as follows:

1. Distance between the centres of individual shot lines. The specified shot
patterns / separation distances have been determined from the results analysis of
realistic live fire test scenarios or ballistic trials experience. Alternative patterns are
allowed for transparent armour as described below.
2. The impact accuracy tolerance. The values for individual rounds are based on
National Authority technical expert experience of the weapons and projectiles
concerned. National Authorities may at their discretion demand tighter impact
accuracy tolerances than those stated herein.
3. The EZ. The minimum specified distance that the ballistic assessment impacts shall
be separated from component panel edges, to avoid testing within a SWA.
4. Component target size effects. To address cases where the target size is small
compared to the test multi-hit test pattern area, a shot pattern with reduced number
of shots is allowed.

This Annex specifies the multi-hit assessment requirements for opaque and transparent
armour components for Protection Levels 1 to 5.

In addition, alternative multi-hit assessment requirements are provided for transparent armour
in Protection Levels 1 to 3. Evaluations carried out under these test conditions will be
accorded a [PARTIAL] nomenclature.

It is a requirement for multi-hit testing that all ballistic impacts shall attempt to exploit the
Localized Weak Areas (LWA) of the armour target where present or suspected.

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2. Multi-hit requirements for Protection Levels 1 - 3

For Protection Levels 1 to 3, the multi-hit procedure is based on an ambush scenario where
an individual with personal weapon attacks an immobile vehicle for the equivalent of 4.5
seconds per occupant. The derived multi-hit pattern is two pairs of impacts repeated at a
prescribed distance.

The multi-hit parameters that shall be respected for ballistic assessments conducted with the
projectiles specified for Protection Levels 1, 2 and 3* are defined in Table B1, and illustrated in
Figure B1.

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Table B1 – Shot separation and impact tolerances for Protection Levels 1, 2 and 3

Dimension definition Value Size

(mm)
Distance (perpendicular) between shots pairs (#1 & #2, N 25
#3 & #4)
Distance (perpendicular) from midpoint of shots #1 and L 100
#2 to shot #3
Maximum tolerance on shot impact position T -0 / +20
EZ (Minimum distance to component target edge / E 25
boundary)

Figure B1 – Example of multi-hit shot pattern for Protection Levels 1 – 4

Any vehicle successfully assessed using the requirements specified above shall be classified
as compliant with “STANAG 4569 KE Level X”.

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3. Multi-hit procedure for Protection Levels 1 - 3

The detailed procedure for multi-hit assessment is described below with reference to the
drawings (a - h) within Figure B2.

Shot #1: The first projectile (#1) is fired at the chosen aim position, which should be LWA if
present (Figure B2 a); the actual impact should be within a ± 10 mm zone of this point.

Shot #2: The possible positions for the second shot (#2) are then determined by tracing
concentric circles of minimum radial distance N and maximum radial distance N+T onto the
target (Figure B2 b). Once shot #2 is completed of the defined zone (Figure B2 c), the
allowed area for the third shot (#3) can be defined.

Shot #3: Two concentric circles centred on the midpoint between shots #1 and #2, of
minimum radial distance L and maximum radial distance L+T can be traced on the target.
From the midpoint, an angle of ±60° is traced in the directions perpendicular to shot #1 and to
shot #2. The zone formed by the concentric circles and the angles is the allowed area for shot
#3 (Figure B2 d). (Figure B2 e).

Shot #4: The fourth shot shall be aimed in the zone formed by concentric circles at distances
of N and N+T from the impact point #3, but not closer to the midpoint of shots #1 and #2 than
the distance L, as illustrated in Figure B2 f.

On completion of shot #4 (Figure B2 g), the resultant four shot pattern is as illustrated in
Figure B2 h.

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E E

T
#1 #1 N

E E

a) b)

E
E

60o
T
60o
#1 N L
#1
#2
#2 T

E E

c) d)

Figure B2 – Multi-hit sequence for Protection Levels 1-4

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E E
T
60o N
#3 #3
60o
#1 L #1 L

#2 T #2

E E

e) f)

E
#3
E N
#4
T
N L
#3 #4
#1
#1 L N #2
#2

E
E

g) h)

Figure B2 – Multi-hit sequence for Protection Levels 1-4 (continued)

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4. Alternative multi-hit procedure for Protection Levels 1 - 3 (Transparent armour

only)

Achieving the specified Level 1 - 3 multi-hit ballistic resistance requirements for transparent
may be impractical due to weight, geometric or human factor constraints.

Accordingly, if a lower multi-hit ballistic resistance is acceptable to National Authorities, the

following alternative testing protocol may be used for transparent armour only. Any vehicle
successfully assessed using the alternative requirements specified shall be classified as
compliant with “STANAG 4569 KE Level X [PARTIAL]”.

The alternative multi-hit test protocol for transparent armour requires three impacts in an
equilateral triangle with a separation of 120 mm between impacts. The tolerance distances is
-0 + 20 mm. The distance from the edge (E) shall be at least 50 mm. The pattern is
illustrated in Figure B3.

Table B2 – Alternative shot separation tolerances for transparent armour (Protection Levels 1,
2 and 3)

Dimension definition Value Size

(mm)
Distance between shots (equilateral triangle) N 120
Tolerance on shot impact T -0 / +20
Minimum distance to component target edge / boundary E 50

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Figure B3 – Multi-hit pattern for Protection Levels 1 - 3 PARTIAL (transparent armour).

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5. Multi-hit procedure for Protection Level 4

For Protection Level 4, the multi-hit procedure is based on an ambush scenario where a fixed
heavy machine gun attacks an immobile vehicle with a five rounds burst. The derived multi-hit
pattern is two pairs of impacts repeated at a prescribed distance as described for Protection
Levels 1 to 3.

The assessment procedure is the same as for Protection Levels 1 to 3 as illustrated in Figure
B1 and B2, but with the shot spacing and impact tolerance parameters as presented in
Table B3.

Table B3 – Shot distance and tolerances for Protection Level 4

Dimension definition Value Size

(mm)
Distance between shots of pairs N 50
Distance from centre of shots #1 and #2 to shot #3 L 200
Maximum tolerance on shot impact position T -0 / + 50
Minimum distance to component target edge / boundary E 50

6. Multi-hit procedure for Protection Level 5 to 6

For the Protection Levels 5 to 6, the multi-hit procedure is based on a unique two shot pattern
per target sample as illustrated in Figure B4 and the shot spacing and impact tolerance
parameters as presented in Table B4.

Table B4 – Shot distance and tolerances for Protection Levels 5 to 6

Dimension definition Value Size

(mm)
Distance between shots of a pair N 150
Maximum tolerance on shot impact position T -0 / + 50
Minimum distance to component target edge / boundary E 50

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Figure B4 – Multi-hit pattern for Protection Level 5 to 6

7. Multi-hit tests – target numbers and size

Sufficient MA targets should be made available to perform the Vproof multi-hit ballistic
assessments required for each Protection Level.

The number of targets required will be dependent on several factors:

• The number of accepted shots required for the assessment as described in

Table 3.
• The multi-hit shot pattern demanded as described in Tables B1 - B4 above.
• The actual size of the target component.
• Allowance for contingency.

For Level 1 - 4 multi-hit assessments, testing shall be performed with the four-shot patterns
described. However, where the total number of rounds is not a multiple of four, testing may
conclude with a pair of shots to finish a series, and these can be on a separate target. For
example, after shooting five panels of four shots (twenty shots), the last two shots required by

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Table 3 to reach the twenty-two shot total could be fired in a single pair without completing
another four-shot pattern.

The influence of the size of the component on the multi-hit test procedure is described in
Para 5.3.

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Annex C ARTILLERY THREAT
1. The details of the artillery threat and protection requirements in terms of the HE shell
type, Protection Level, protection ranges and attack elevations were included in Annex A for
reference purposes mainly, to provide advisory information for military commanders on
vehicle spacing during operations.

2. The performance data presented is empirically based upon 155 mm shells attacking
Rolled Steel armour plate assessed in arena trials and encompasses the two following
important points:

• The attack elevation quoted for Levels 1 though 3 (Annex A) were derived
assuming shell detonation occurred at heights up to 30 m above ground level. For
Levels 4 and 5 in Annex A, the attack angle is all around and over the vehicle at a
distance of 25 m and for level 6 a distance of 10 m.
• Protection Levels take into account a 90% chance of surviving a single shell
detonation only. (It should be noted that if protection against multiple shell
detonations is desired then the probability of occurrence of a closer range
detonation and of being struck by a larger fragment both increase).

3. At the long ranges of artillery engagement appropriate to Protection Levels 1 - 3, the

low obliquity of attack achievable on a vehicle roof coupled with low fragment impact velocity
on account of their high drag coefficients leads to the KE projectile threats dominating the
armour demand. The chance of impact from a large fragment from a single shell detonation
at ranges of 60 - 100 m is also extremely low. Hence, no testing against Level 1 - 3 fragment
threats is required, but it is optional to the National Authority.

4. However, for Protection Level 4 to 6 different circumstances applies, as the detonation

range is close enough to allow high velocity fragment attack at 900 to the vehicle roof. As the
KE threats for Level 4 - 6 are disposed horizontally the artillery threat determines the roof
protection requirement, and thus fragment testing of vehicle armour is required. It is
mandatory to test at a 300 attack angle. Testing between attack angles of 300 and 900 is
optional to the National Authority.

5. The assessment of protection provided from artillery shell fragment threats is to be

achieved using gun launched fragment simulating projectiles (FSP) as defined in Figure 6 of
calibre 20 mm and at velocities in accordance with the Table C1 below. The data included for
Levels 4 - 6 is summarised from Table A1 of Annex A.

Table C1 – FSP Velocities for testing for Protection Levels 4 to 6 (Levels 1, 2 and 3 for
information only)

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Protection Level Range of burst (m) 20 mm FSP Vproof (m/s)

*
6 10 1250
5 25 960
4 25 960
3 60 (770)
2 80 (630)
1 100 (520)
*Vproof = Figures are mean values: tolerance of striking velocity for individual shot is
± 20 m/s for the levels 1 to 5 and ± 30 m/s for the levels 6.

6. A reduced amount of single impact FSP testing compared with the KE threats is
demanded as indicated in Table 3. No multi-hit testing is required reflecting the wide
dispersion of shell fragments in real situations even at 10 m range of detonation. Testing is
however required to assess both the Main and Weak armour Areas (LWA and SWA)

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Annex D SHATTER GAP TESTING

1. Shatter-gap is a phenomenon exhibited by a few projectile / armour material

interactions. The classical shatter-gap is exhibited when the projectile core is shattered and
thereby defeated by the armour when impacted at relatively high velocities (see Refs. 18, 21
and 22). At lower velocities, the projectile could however defeat the armour because the
impact energy is insufficient to break the projectile core. This usually results in projectile /
armour combinations having multiple ballistic limit values as shown in Figure D1. The
classical shatter gap phenomenon is most common with ceramic armour systems. Where a
shatter gap is suspected, an appropriate test procedure should be employed to explore the
possibility of low velocity penetration.

2. Comprehensive testing to explore the possibility of shatter gap vulnerability requires a

large number of tests at various reduced velocities. Such investigations are at the discretion
of the National Authority and do not fall within the test requirements of this AEP. Nonetheless
armours that are found to have vulnerability to the threat projectile listed in this AEP but at
lower velocities than is specified in this AEP are considered to fail to meet the requirement.

100
Penetration Probability (%)

75

50

25

Low V50 High V50

0
650 700 750 800 850 900 950
Projectile Velocity (m/s)

Figure D1 - Example of shatter gap penetration probability distribution with multiple V50.

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INTENTIONALLY BLANK

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Annex E TEST EQUIPMENT ISSUES

1. Velocity correction

No corrections for air drag effect are required for KE projectiles when the striking velocity is
measured at a distance of 2.5 m or less from the target (distance B in Figure 5). When
projectile velocity is measured at a distance greater than 2.5 m from the target, the striking
velocity Vs shall then be calculated from the point of measurement to the target. The drag
coefficients listed in Table E1 could be used with the formula provided below, but measured
values for the projectiles used are preferable.

Table E1 – Drag coefficients for KE threats

Protection Level Drag coefficient

1-4 0.33
5 (APDS) 0.165
5 (APFSDS) n.a. *
6 (AP) n.a.*
6 (APFSDS) n.a.*
20 mm FSP 1.500

A common method used for velocity correction is the exponential decay law based on a
constant drag coefficient Cd, and can be calculated using the following formula:

− XρCdπD2
Vs = Vi ⋅ exp( )
8m

where X is the distance from the measurement point to the target, ρ is the air density
(1.225 kg/m3 at sea level and standard conditions), D is the projectile calibre (excluding
sabot), m is the projectile mass, and Cd is the average drag coefficient for the effective
velocity range.

An alternative velocity correction method for air drag is by direct measurement of velocity at
multiple distances and extrapolation to the target strike face.

2. Yaw angle characterization

* Not available

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The measurement of projectile impact yaw angle is an important feature of ballistic testing as
the yaw value, or even rate of yaw, may determine the ultimate target response and may
influence whether a PP or CP results for a given threat / target geometry.

For the ballistic assessments with KE bullets and FSPs described within this AEP, it is
necessary to routinely measure indicated projectile yaw for each firing and also to determine
precise yaw within a test series as described below.

The use of a yaw “card” is a simple and effective method of assessing projectile yaw. The
card material utilised should be suitable in that on perforation a clean hole or signature is
produced faithfully recording the presented area of the projectile, but critically without in any
way disturbing the onward flight characteristics of the projectile.

Cards should be placed in a series perpendicular to the line of flight with the last card
positioned as close to the target surface as practicable (within 150 mm from the target is
desirable - closer distances may result in fragmentation damage). The perforation hole is
measured only if a visible observation of the projectile profile signature indicates that yaw is
present. When a series of yaw cards (e.g. 7) are positioned at regular measured distances
between the weapon and the target, the yaw cycle can be extrapolated to determine precisely
the projectile yaw at impact with the target.

When using FSPs, the dimensions D1, D2 and L (see Figure E2) should be measured and
recorded. Yaw is then computed by measuring, using an optical device with a magnification
factor of at least 5X, the largest dimension (A) of the hole caused during perforation of the
yaw card. For fragment simulator having no rear skirt, D1=D2. The yaw angle (θ ) is then
determined for cylindrical projectiles using the following formulas:

D1 + D2
DM =
2

T = L2 + DM 2

θ = α − β = sin −1 ( A / T ) − tan −1 ( DM / L )

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Figure E2 - Reference dimensions for yaw measurement with FSP

When the hole in the yaw card is a perfect circle no yaw is present in the projectile at the point
of measurement.

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Photography or flash radiography are alternative methods used for precise yaw measurement.
Measurement is required at least once per test series. When using photography or flash
radiography, two orthogonal measurement planes shall be used to allow visualisation of yaw
in both the horizontal “X” and vertical “Y” directions combined (Av and Ah). With photographic
systems, the use of a 45 degrees inclined mirror allows capture of two orthogonal images
(actual side view and reflected top view) on a single image. The mirror and camera jig system
should be aligned to the flight of the bullet with an in-bore laser using two pin hole screens to
ensure proper alignment with the launcher axis. The images taken should also include a
zero degree reference line from which each yaw component will be measured. The total
compound yaw (θ ) angle can then be computed by applying the following formula:

Θ = arctan tan 2 Αv + tan 2 Αh

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Annex F FLOW CHART SUMMARY OF THE TESTING AND ACCEPTANCE PROCESS

The sequence of the acceptance test of a component are illustrated in the flow chart
presented in Figure F1, referring to the following note and decision points:

Decision I: A decision by the National Authority is required:

A. To stop the component testing after reaching the allowed minimum number of
accepted shots (Table 3, numbers in parenthesis) when the back surface
damage is judged by the National Authority to give full confidence that further
testing will not lead to an accepted CP, or;
B. To continue the component testing.

Decision II: Following the occurrence of a single CP in the test series, the National Authority
may decide to:

A. Declare the component design as failed.

B. Continue testing the component has long as desired, until the maximum number
of accepted shots required, as shown in Table 3, is reached, in anticipation of
performing a retest. (Note that only one retest of a given component design is
permitted, and if an additional accepted complete penetration occurs in either
the remainder of the first test or the retest the component is declared
vulnerable.)

Decision III: The National Authority may decide to:

A. Accept to declare the component as failed and representing VA.

B. Accept to test another component of revised component design if proposed by
the manufacturer (re-submission).

Decision IV: Following the occurrence of a single accepted CP, when the maximum number
of accepted shots has been reached without subsequent accepted CP, The
National Authority may decide to:

A. Accept to retest the same component design.

B. Accept to declare the component design as failed.

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Shoot at B National Authority A

component target decision I

no no

Minimum Maximum
Accepted complete no yes
number of shots number of shots
penetration?
reached? * reached?

yes yes

Shoot at
National Authority B
component target
decision II

A no

yes Second Maximum

no
accepted complete number of shots
penetration? reached?

yes

Component design B National Authority

declare failed decision IV

National Authority B
decision III

Component rejected
Retest improved Retest same Component
(area declared
component design component design accepted
vulnerable)

* The minimum number of accepted shots required is shown in parenthesis in Table 3.

Figure F1 – Ballistic testing algorithm

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Annex G OPTIONS FOR BALLISTIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

1. The Vproof and V50 tests are only two of several types of test to determine the ballistic
performance or failure characteristics of armour materials against KE projectile. Other types
of tests that may be relevant include:

a. Behind-armour debris test (i.e., fragmentation) arising from penetration of the

armour by a KE projectile, or from damage such as back spall produced by a non-
perforating projectile.

b.. Critical angle tests where the striking velocity is kept constant throughout a test
series but target obliquity is progressively changed to determine the angle at which
the KE projectile will be stopped with a given probability level and confidence limit.

c. Critical velocity (Vc) tests based on projectile residual velocity or residual

momentum measurements (ballistic pendulum) to determine the armour energy
absorbing capability when penetrated (overmatched).

d. Depth of penetration (DOP) test where a homogeneous semi-infinite backing is

placed behind a tested component or material target and scoop depth measured.

2. The tests 1 - 4 may not be used in place of the ballistic tests prescribed in this
document but can be carried out in addition to provide supplementary information.

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Annex H DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of the test methods and procedures contained herein, the following
definitions apply:

Add-on armour (additional or appliqué armour): An armour system that can be easily
installed or removed from a vehicle without adversely affecting its structural integrity or
operation. It usually covers the identified vulnerable areas and provides.

Angle of azimuth: The angle in the horizontal plane between the vehicle longitudinal axis and
the line connecting the firing point and the rear of the vehicle occupant compartment (see
Figure 1).

Angle of elevation: The angle between the plane of the horizon and a line drawn from the
firing point to the point of impact on the target surface (see Figure 1).

Angle of impact: The angle between the projectile trajectory and the direction perpendicular
to the plane tangent to the point of impact on the target sample (see Figure H1 next page).
The angle of incidence and target obliquity may be used with the same meaning. Angle of
impact should not be confused with yaw angle nor the angle of azimuth or elevation.

Area of coverage: The area of an armour target that meets or exceeds the ballistic Protection
Level requirement to achieve a specified Protection Level.

Areal density (AD): The weight of armour material per unit area. It is usually expressed in
kg/m2 and is the ratio of the mass of the armour material over its area of coverage.

Armour: A shielding material provided for protection against ballistic threats.

Ballistic resistance: The measure of the potential of a protection system component to defeat
an impacting projectile or fragment.

Ballistic retardation: The velocity reduction of a projectile caused by air drag, per unit
distance (m/s/m).

Bulge height: The maximum permanent displacement of the back surface of an armour test
target caused by projectile impact on the front surface.

Cavity diameter or size: The diameter of the hole made in the armour material measured
from the undistorted front and back surface. For a non-symmetric cavity, both the smallest
diameter (width) and the largest diameter (length) should be measured and recorded.

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Complete penetration (CP): A complete penetration has occurred when an impacting

projectile cause the projectile, a piece of the projectile or target debris to pass through the
witness plate, i.e., there is at least one perforation through which light is visible through the
witness plate.

Component: A discrete part of a vehicle protection system that requires ballistic protection
assessment. For the purpose of this assessment, two kinds of components are used, those
representing Main Area and those representing Structural Weak Areas (Excluded Zone).
The definition of component as used in this document is not that commonly used in
Vulnerability Analysis, which includes non-protective parts of the vehicle to evaluate the full
vulnerability of a vehicle (e.g. mobility kill).

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Figure H1 - Angle of impact and yaw

Composite armour: An armour system consisting of two or more different armour materials
assembled together to form a protective unit. Not to be confused with composite materials
such as GFRP that may form one armour element.

Delamination: The separation of a panel into layers in the thickness direction.

Excluded zone (EZ): The zone allocated around the perimeter of an armour component that
is deemed to encompass any Structural Weak Areas present by virtue of the materials,
manufacture or joining process employed when fabricated into or attached to the vehicle
structure. The area that is not classified as Excluded Zone is the Main Area.

FAIR impact: An impact that meets the specified conditions of velocity, angle of impact, yaw
and impact position, within the tolerances defined for each condition (see Para 5.6).

Fragment simulating projectile (FSP): A specific fragment simulator type based on a

standardized cylindrical projectile with a chisel nose (see Figures 6 and E2). Available in a
homologous size series. Designed to be capable of gun firing to simplify armour testing.

Fully engineered target: An armour configuration fully representative of final vehicle

production configuration, i.e., having the same geometrical construction, materials and total
areal density. These targets could be panels or mock-ups of vehicle components containing
welds or overlaps, etc.

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Impact location: The impact location is defined to be at the centre point of the impact.

Main Area armour: A component of representative relatively uniform area of an armour that
may include Localized Weak Area.

Opaque armour: Any protection system through which vision is not possible (see
Transparent armour).

Partial penetration (PP): A projectile impact that does not result in light being visible through
the WP.

Protection capability or Expected protection capability (EPC): The potential of a protection

system to resist an attack. The protection capability may be expressed as the probability that
the occupants survive without injuries during a particular attack scenario. The protection
capability is related to the ballistic resistance of the protection components and the impact
probability of those components.

Protection Level: The degree of protection defined in AEP-55. The Protection Levels are
defined as threats with conditions specified in ANNEX A of AEP-55 To be declared
compliant to a certain STANAG 4569 Protection Level, the protection system of a armoured
vehicle shall demonstrate adequate protection capability when evaluated with the threats
under the conditions specified.

Relative Vulnerable Area (RVA): The ratio of unprotected (vulnerable) area (AU) over the
total threatened area (AO) of a protection system.

Shall: A statement that makes the associated requirement in this document fully mandatory.

Shatter gap: The reduction in velocity range over which a projectile may exhibit a distinct
change in its characteristics of interaction with a target, from projectile shatter to projectile
remaining intact. This may cause the armour to exhibit multiple V50 values. The significance
for armour testing is to ensure that complete penetration does not occur at lower velocities by
the intact projectile that is otherwise fractured and defeated by the target at higher impact
velocities.

Shot location witness: A suitable measurement technique to provide evidence of the exact
impact point in relation to the intended shot location (see Figure 5) of the projectile. It is
used to assess impact fairness for multiple hit testing (see Yaw card).

Should: A statement that makes the associated requirement in this document not fully
mandatory, but highly recommended.

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Spall: The material detached and ejected of a layer of armour material from the rear surface
of the armour. Spall can be produced by both perforating and non-perforating impact of a
projectile on an armour panel.

Strike face: The surface of a test target designed to face the attack of a ballistic threat.

Striking or impact velocity (Vs ): The velocity of the projectile upon impact with the target face.

System acceptance testing: The process, including ballistic testing of components (Phases 2
and 3) and Vulnerable Area assessment (Phase 4) performed on a vehicle armour system to
assess its capability to achieve a given Protection Level.

Target distance: The distance between the muzzle of the test launcher barrel and the strike
face of the target (see Figure 5).

Test series: All the impacts required to assess the ballistic performance of one component /
threat combination.

Transparent armour: Any protection system through which vision is possible (see Opaque
armour).

UNFAIR impact: A shot not conforming to one or more of the specified conditions (velocity,
angle of impact, yaw and impact position) (see Para 5.6).

V50 ballistic limit: The striking velocity at which 50% of the impacts of a projectile will result in
complete penetration of a given armour on specified attack conditions.

Vehicle target: An armour system that may be a fully functional vehicle, or a ballistic structure
(vehicle without non-armour related components such as power packs, fire control, etc.).

Vision Block: A narrow aperture made of a transparent material in an armoured vehicle to

allow the crew to see outside the vehicle. The small width of the aperture requires the crew
to position their eyes very near the block to effectively see outside. Vision blocks need to be
tested with thinner witness plates in closer proximity to the test target to reproduce typical
ocular conditions.

Vproof: The minimum nominal velocity specified for a particular projectile for a pass / fail or
acceptance test where a given number of rounds are fired at a test specimen and where no
complete penetration is allowed in the initial qualification test series. An increase in the
number of Vproof rounds fired will improve the statistical confidence in the result.

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Vulnerable Area (VA): The surface area of a component found not protective according to
the AEP-55 criteria. The Vulnerable Area is accounted in the calculation of the Relative
Vulnerable Area.

Weak Areas: The zones of an armour system that potentially reduce the expected ballistic
resistance of a protection system. Two types of Weak Areas, Structural and Localized, are
defined below:

• Structural Weak Areas (SWA) are armour zones inherent in the design that differ from
the uniform Main Areas and are usually associated with discontinuities in the armour
system. These include openings, holes, gaps, welds (including heat affected zones)
and joints between major armour panels, bolts and edges, overlaps, etc. Structural
Weak Areas are assumed for the purpose of the assessment to be located within the
Excluded Zone and are excluded from the armour Main Areas, and thus shall be
tested separately (Phase 3).

• Localized Weak Areas (LWA) are smaller potential weak areas included in the armour
Main Areas. They could be inherent in the design such as mosaic tile joint, small
holes or other geometric features uniformly distributed on armour panel main
surfaces. They could also be defects that are not visually detectable to eye
examination such as flaws, cracks, inclusions, voids, porosity, and limited
delamination

Witness plate: A material sheet placed behind a target impact area to indicate the effects of
debris caused by the projectile impact.

Yaw angle: The maximum resultant angle between the main axis of the projectile and its
trajectory (velocity vector) irrespective of plane (see Figure H1).

Yaw card: A material placed in the projectile's line of flight, whose perforation signature is
used to determine the projectile yaw. The yaw card can also be used as impact location
witness sheet (see Figure 5).

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Annex I REFERENCES – RELATED DOCUMENTS

1. Chang, A.L., and B.A. Bodt, “JTCG/AS Interlaboratory Ballistic Test Program –
Final Report”, Army Research Laboratory Report no. ARL-TR-1577, Dec.
1997.

2. Fortier, C., D. Bourget, and G. Pageau, “Comparative Study of Selected

Methods for Estimating Ballistic Limit Velocities of Armour Materials”, Proc.
17th Int. Symposium on Ballistics, Pretoria, South Africa, Mar. 98.

3. Kneubuehl, B.P., “Improved Test Procedure for Body Armour, Statistical Base
and Evaluation Program”, Proc. PASS96 Symp. Colchester, UK, Sept. 1996.

4. Tobin, L., “The Draft Revised Version of STANAG 2920”, Proc. Soldier
Modernisation Seminar, 24/25 Oct. 1996, Ottawa, Canada

5. NATO STANAG 2920, Ed. 2 "Ballistic Test Method for Personal Armour
Materials and Combat Clothing", July 2003.

6. STANAG 4164, “Test Procedures For Armour Perforation Tests Of Direct Fire
Armour Defeating Ammunition”, Apr. 97.

7. MIL-P-46593A, "Projectile, Calibers .22, .30, .50 and 20MM Fragment

Simulating", 12 Oct. 1964.

8. International Test Operating Procedures, USATECOM ITOP 2-2-713 "Ballistic

Tests of Armor Materials".

9. International Test Operating Procedures, USATECOM ITOP 4-2-805,

"Projectile Velocity and Time of Flight Measurements".

10. U.S. Army Test Operating Procedures, USATECOM TOP 10-2-506, "Ballistic
Testing of Personnel Armor Materials".

11. U.S. Government Printing Office, “V50 Ballistic Test for Armor”, MIL-STD-
662F, Feb. 1998.

12. MIL-STD-810F, Environmental Test Methods and Engineering Guidelines,

January 2000.

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13. STANAG 4370 JAIS (Edition 3), Environmental testing, NATO 15 February
2008.
AECTP-200 (Edition 4), Environmental conditions, NATO, May 2009.

14. ASTM E94, Guides for Radiographic Testing

15. ASTM E142, Method for Controlling Quality of Radiographic Testing.

16. Gander, T.J., and Hogg, I.V., (eds), Jane’s Ammunition Handbook, 4th edition,
Jane’s Information Group, 1995.

17. Security Classification Guide for Armor Materials, ARL Program No. 0183009.

18. Bosik, A. J., Bosik, T. A., Pageau, G., Development of Test Procedures for
Multi Hit Testing of Body Armour, Proceedings of the Personal Armour System
Symposium 2000 (PASS 2000), 5-8 Sept. 2000, DCTA Colchester, UK, 7 p.

19. Bourget, D., and Pageau, G., Armour Data Recording and Analysis Software:
Capability Overview, Proceedings of the Personal Armour System Symposium
2000 (PASS 2000), 5-8 Sept. 2000, DCTA Colchester, UK, 8 p.

20. International Test Operating Procedures, USATECOM ITOP 2-2-716,

Measurement of Behind Armour Debris.

21. Gonzalez, R., Confounding Effects in Light Armor Ballistic Testing, Proc.
Aeroballistic Range Ass. Meeting, Madrid, Spain, 2000, 12 p.

22. Graves, J.H., Kolev, H. Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft

Survivability Interlaboratory Test Program, Rept no. ARL-TR-755, June 1995,
ADA 297279, 38 p.

23. U.S. Army Test Operating Procedures, USATECOM TOP 2-2-715, Protection
of Armored Vehicles Against Kinetic Energy Projectiles.

24. International Test Operating Procedures, USATECOM ITOP 2-2-617,

Vulnerability Testing of Combat Vehicles and Their Components

25. Mackiewicz, J., Ballistic Test Procedures and Protocol for Military Body
Armour, U.S. Army, Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, Natick, Draft
Report, Jan. 1999.

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26. Vaivads, R., Maillette, J., McKeown, M., Characterization of Shot Patterns
from Automatic Weapons in Support of the Development of a Multi-Hit
Ballistics Test Procedure, Phase 1: Task B, Experimental Assessment of Shot
Patterns, Royal Military College, Kingston, Mech. Eng. Report, no. 010101,
Jan. 2001.

27. Vaivads, R., Maillette, J., McKeown, M., Characterization of Shot Patterns
from Automatic Weapons in Support of the Development of a Multi-Hit
Ballistics Test Procedure, Phase 1: Task A, Threat Survey, Selection and
Acquisition, Royal Military College, Kingston, Mech. Eng. Report, no. 000601,
Jan. 2000.

28. NATO AC/225 Panel III Sub-Panel 5, Collaborative Research into Small Arms
Technology, (CRISAT) Technology Area 2: Terminal Effects, Final Report,
July 1993, NATO Unclassified, Appendix 4, Test Specification for Assessing
Target and Behind Target Effects of Small Arms Kinetic Energy Ammunition,
Addendum A V50 Test Method.

29. Lok, Tat-Seng, Performance of Laminated Glazing Subjected to Small Arms

Ballistics, Proc. Specialty Symposium on Structures Response to Impact and
Blast (SRIB), Oct. 1996, Tel-Aviv, Israel.

30. AS2343, Pt.1, 1983, Glazing panels: Bullet-resistant panels for interior use,
Standards Association of Australia, Sidney, Australia, 1983.

31. ASTM F1233-89, Standard Test Method for Security Glazing Materials and
Systems, American Society for Testing and Materials, USA, 1989.

32. BS5051, Pt. 2, Security Glazing: Specification for Bullet-Resistant Glazing for
External Use, British Standards Institution, London, 1979.

33. Strassburger, E., Test and Evaluation Procedures –Artillery Threat, document
for STANAG 4569, Ernst Mach Institute (EMI), 15 Mar. 2002.

34. Gonzalez, R., Ballistic Multi-hit Standard for STANAG 4569 Levels 1-3,
document for STANAG 4569, US Army Tank-automotive and Armament
Command, May 2002.

35. Hodak, A., Shot Spacing Discussion Paper, document for STANAG 4569,
Canadian Directorate for Land Requirements, 5 Jan. 2003.

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36. Underwriters Laboratories, Standard for Safety of Bullet-Resisting Equipment,

UL 752, 10th Ed., Mar. 10, 2000.

37. UNI EN 1063, Security Glazing – Testing and Classification of Resistance

Against Bullet Attack, 2001.

38. Vaivads, R., Characterization of Shot Patterns for a 14.5 mm HMG, Royal
Military College, Kingston, Mech. Eng. Report, no. 030301, Mar. 2003

39. Gonzalez, R., Multi-Hit Testing Procedure for the Ballistic Testing of Armor
Against 14.5mm Heavy Machine Gun, US Army Tank-automotive and
Armament Command, Mar. 2003.

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