143 Fajardo v. OMB
143 Fajardo v. OMB
143 Fajardo v. OMB
FAJARDO, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 173268 August 23, 2012
SUMMARY
Petitioner Fajardo was a Special Collecting Officer at the NAIA Customs House Collection Division. An audit found that he had
unremitted collections for the sale of accountable forms with money value and customs documentary and BIR stamps amounted to ₱
53,658,371.00. An information for plunder was filed before RTC. The OMB also conducted an administrative investigation and found
him guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, imposing the penalty of dismissal from the service. CA affirmed.
SC affirmed CA. It found that there was no evidence of irregularities in the proceedings before OMB, that there was substantial
evidence of petitioner’s guilt, and that the OMB has the power to dismiss erring public officials and employees.
Relevant to the topic is the claim that CA was acting in GAD for not considering the finding of the RTC that the evidence of guilt of
petitioner is not strong
- To begin with, the RTC Order, granting petitioner’s application for bail, was not attached to the Petition he filed with the CA,
nor was it submitted as evidence before the Ombudsman.
- The said Order merely resolved petitioner’s entitlement to bail.
- More important, the Ombudsman and the CA are not bound by the RTC’s finding because as a rule, administrative cases
are independent from criminal proceedings. In fact, the dismissal of one case does not necessarily merit the dismissal of the
other
DOCTRINE
Under the "threefold liability rule," any act or omission of any public official or employee can result in criminal, civil, or administrative
liability, each of which is independent of the other.1
The Ombudsman and the CA are not bound by the RTC’s finding because as a rule, administrative cases are independent from
criminal proceedings. In fact, the dismissal of one case does not necessarily merit the dismissal of the other
FACTS
1. Petitioner Ernesto A. Fajardo was designated as a Special Collecting Officer at the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA) Customs House, Collection Division, Pasay City.
2. Representatives from the COA-NAIA Customhouse discovered discrepancies in the collections and remittances of
respondent Fajardo during the period covering January 1, 2002 to October 30, 2002 amounting to ₱
20,118,355.00
3. A further investigation resulting to the analysis of Monthly Sales of Accountable Forms and Stamps prepared by
the COA State Auditors covering the period January 1, 2000 to October 30, 2002, showed that the total amount of
unremitted collections for the sale of accountable forms with money value and customs documentary and BIR
stamps amounted to ₱ 53,658,371.00.
4. Information for violation of RA 7080 (Plunder) was filed against Fajardo before RTC.
5. Finding sufficient basis to commence an administrative investigation, Mary Susan S. Guillermo, the
Director of the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman, directed Fajardo to
file his counter-affidavit
6. OMB Decision - GUILTY of dishonesty and grave misconduct. Penalty of dismissal from service was
imposed.
7. Fajardo filed MR. OMB denied
8. Fajardo appealed to CA. CA affirmed his dismissal.
a. It set aside petitioner’s allegation that the report on the results of the audit was not lawfully introduced into
the records of the case since no evidence was presented to substantiate such allegation.
b. It rejected petitioner’s contention that the Ombudsman only has recommendatory powers, and thus,
affirmed the power of the Ombudsman to remove erring public officials or employees
9. Hence this Rule 45 petition
ISSUES
1
The only time the case mentioned the “threefold liability rule” was in the first sentence of the case.
NO. No evidence was presented by petitioner to prove such allegation.
- Petitioner imputes irregularities in the proceedings before the Ombudsman. He claims that the CA and the
Ombudsman should not have relied on the report on the results of the audit because it was not lawfully introduced
or offered in evidence before the Office of the Ombudsman
- No evidence was presented by petitioner to prove such allegation. As we have often said, in the absence of clear
and convincing proof to the contrary, public officers or employees are presumed to have performed their official
duties regularly, properly and lawfully.
- The report on the results of the audit was not the sole basis for his dismissal from public service
- Affidavits and testimonies of witnesses taken during the bail hearing in the criminal case were also
submitted as evidence in the administrative case to prove the charges against him.
- The final report merely confirmed the contents of the audit report of State Auditor Marco
YES. There is substantial evidence to show that petitioner failed to remit the amount of ₱ 53,658,371.00 from the
sale of accountable forms with money value and documentary stamps for the period January 2000 up to October
2002.
- The audit report of State Auditor Marco revealed that petitioner’s remittance fell short of ₱ 53,658,371.00
- Contrary to the view of petitioner, the "audit sales" are not based on mere speculations but are based on CMO
No. 19-77.
- To disprove the correctness of the "audit sales," petitioner harps on the fact that the amount loaded on the
machine per month was less than the monthly "audit sales" of State Auditor Marco. He insists that this proves that
there was no under remittance on his part. We do not agree. The mere fact that the load in the machine is less
than the "audit sale" does not prove his innocence. Rather, it only means that either petitioner sold the
accountable forms without the corresponding documentary stamp, which is a clear violation of CMO No. 19-77, or
that he used another machine, not authorized by his office, as theorized by State Auditor Marco.
- To us, the discrepancy between the "audit sales" and the actual amount remitted by petitioner is sufficient
evidence of dishonesty and grave misconduct warranting his dismissal from public service. We need not belabor
the point that unlike in a criminal case where proof beyond reasonable doubt is required, administrative
proceedings only require substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion."
- [RELEVANT] Neither do we find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in not considering the
finding of the RTC "that the evidence of guilt of petitioner is not strong
- To begin with, the Order, granting petitioner’s application for bail, was not attached to the Petition he filed
with the CA, nor was it submitted as evidence before the Ombudsman.
- The said Order merely resolved petitioner’s entitlement to bail.
- More importantly, the Ombudsman and the CA are not bound by the RTC’s finding because as a
rule, administrative cases are independent from criminal proceedings. In fact, the dismissal of one
case does not necessarily merit the dismissal of the other
W/N the OMB has the power to dismiss erring public officials or employees?
YES. It is already well-settled that the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability
is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory.
- Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman in dismissing him from service disregarded Section 13, subparagraph 3,
Article XI of the Constitution as well as Section 15(3) of RA No. 6770 which only vests in the Ombudsman the
power to recommend the removal of a public official or employee.
- It is already well-settled that "the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative
liability is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory."
- As we have explained in Atty. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, the fact "that the refusal, without just cause, of any
officer to comply with the order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for
disciplinary action under Section 15(3) of RA No. 6770; is a strong indication that the Ombudsman's
'recommendation' is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law.”
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated April 27, 2006 and the Resolution dated June 28, 2006
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91021 are hereby AFFIRMED.