Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union v. Confesor, June 16, 2004
Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union v. Confesor, June 16, 2004
Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union v. Confesor, June 16, 2004
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION (NUBE) , petitioner, vs. The Honorable MA. NIEVES R.
CONFESOR, in her capacity as SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT; and the STANDARD
CHARTERED BANK, respondents.
June 16, 2004 G.R. No. 114974 CALLEJO, SR., J:
DOCTRINE
BLUE-SKY BARGAINING : making exaggerated or unreasonable proposals.
SURFACE BARGAINING : “going through the motions of negotiating” without any legal intent to reach an
agreement.
ART. 243. COVERAGE AND EMPLOYEES RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION. All persons employed in
commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical or educational institutions
whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant
workers, self- employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor
organizations for their mutual aid and protection.
Article 248(a) of the Labor Code, considers it an unfair labor practice when an employer interferes, restrains or
coerces employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization or the right to form association. The right to self-
organization necessarily includes the right to collective bargaining.
FACTS
The Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union and the Standard Chartered failed to agree on the remaining
economic provisions of the CBA, hence to The Union declared a deadlock and filed a Notice of Strike before
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on June 21, 1993.
On the other hand, the Bank filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) and Damages before the Arbitration
Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Manila, against the Union on June 28, 1993.The
Bank alleged that the Union violated its duty to bargain , as it did not bargain in good faith. It contended that the
Union demanded sky high economic demands, indicative of blue-sky bargaining. Further, the Union violated
its no strike- no lockout clause by filing a notice of strike before the NCMB. Considering that the filing of notice of
strike was an illegal act, the Union officers should be dismissed.
On October 29, 1993 the DOLE ordered both parties to execute a collective bargaining agreement.
The DOLE dismissed also the charges of ULP of both the Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union and the
Standard Chartered, explaining that both parties failed to substantiate their claims. Citing National Labor Union v.
Insular- Yebana Tobacco Corporation, the SOLE stated that ULP charges would prosper only if shown to have
directly prejudiced the public interest.
On March 22, 1994, the Bank and the Union signed the CBA. Immediately thereafter, the wage increase was
effected and the signing bonuses based on the increased wage were distributed to the employees covered by the
CBA.
Dissatisfied with the SOLE’s ruling, Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union petition for certiorari while the Bank
prayed that the petition be dismissed as the Union was estopped, considering that it signed the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA).
ISSUE/S
1. Whether or not Standard Chartered Bank committed unfair labor practice (ULP)? NO
2. Whether or not Standard Chartered Bank violated its duty to bargain? NO
RULING
The SC denied the petition for bereft of merit
1. No. Article 248(a) of the Labor Code, considers it an unfair labor practice when an employer interferes,
restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization or the right to form
association. The right to self-organization necessarily includes the right to collective bargaining.
Parenthetically, if an employer interferes in the selection of its negotiators or coerces the Union to exclude
from its panel of negotiators a representative of the Union, and if it can be inferred that the employer
adopted the said act to yield adverse effects on the free exercise to right to self-organization or on the right
to collective bargaining of the employees, ULP under Article 248(a) in connection with Article 243 of the
Labor Code is committed. In order to show that the employer committed ULP under the Labor Code,
substantial evidence is required to support the claim. Substantial evidence has been defined as such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the case at
bar, the Union bases its claim of interference on the alleged suggestions of Diokno to exclude Umali from
the Union’s negotiating panel. But The records show that after the initiation of the collective bargaining
process, with the inclusion of Umali in the Unions negotiating panel, the negotiations pushed through. The
complaint was made only on August 16, 1993 after a deadlock was declared by the Union on June 15, 1993.
It is clear that such ULP charge was merely an afterthought.
2. No. Surface bargaining is defined as going through the motions of negotiating without any legal intent to
reach an agreement. The resolution of surface bargaining allegations never presents an easy issue. The
determination of whether a party has engaged in unlawful surface bargaining is usually a difficult one
because it involves, at bottom, a question of the intent of the party in question, and usually such intent can
only be inferred from the totality of the challenged party’s conduct both at and away from the bargaining
table. It involves the question of whether an employer’s conduct demonstrates an unwillingness to bargain in
good faith or is merely hard bargaining.
The Union has not been able to show that the Bank had done acts, both at and away from the bargaining
table, which tend to show that it did not want to reach an agreement with the Union or to settle the
differences between it and the Union. Admittedly, the parties were not able to agree and reached a
deadlock. However, it is herein emphasized that the duty to bargain does not compel either party to agree to
a proposal or require the making of a concession. Hence, the parties’ failure to agree did not amount to ULP
under Article 248(g) for violation of the duty to bargain.
DISPOSITIVE
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the October 29, 1993 Order and December 16, 1993 and February 10, 1994
Resolutions of then Secretary of Labor Nieves R. Confesor are AFFIRMED. The Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
ADDITIONAL NOTES
Until a new Collective Bargaining Agreement has been executed by and between the parties, they are duty-bound to
keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement.