SENTIENT INTELLIGENCE

Xavier Zubiri

translated with notes and introduction by

Thomas B. Fowler, Sc.D.

The Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America

SENTIENT INTELLIGENCE

Xavier Zubiri

translated with notes and introduction by

Thomas B. Fowler, Sc.D.

The Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America

Washington, DC

1999
 Xavier Zubiri, 1898-1983

Inteligencia sentiente was originally published in Spanish in three parts:

Inteligencia y realidad, First Edition: 1980

Inteligencia y logos, First Edition: 1982
Inteligencia y razon, First Edition: 1983

Entire contents © 1999 by the Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 99-90713
ISBN 0-9672805-0-8

Permission to reproduce the material in this volume for any noncommercial purpose is hereby granted, pro-
vided that source is acknowledged. Electronic versions of the text contained herein are available at the
Foundation’s web site, www.zubiri.org.
The Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America is incorporated as a non-profit, charitable educational or-
ganization under the laws of the District of Columbia. It is recognized as a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt founda-
tion by the Internal Revenue Service. The Foundation’s purpose is to promote the work of Xavier Zubiri
and expand awareness of his philosophy, especially in the English-speaking world.

The Xavier Zubiri Foundation of North America

1571 44th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20007

Phone 202-298-0495, Fax 202-338-9084

www.zubiri.org
ii
 CONTENTS
Translator's Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... vii
Schematic Outline of Sentient Intelligence ........................................................................................................... xx
Author’s Preface .................................................................................................................................................... 3

PART I. INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY ......................................................................................... 7

I. Intellection as Act: Apprehension ......................................................................................................... 9
II. Sensible Apprehension........................................................................................................................ 13
§1.Sensing.......................................................................................................................................... 13
§2.The Formal Structure of Sensing.................................................................................................... 14
§3.Structure of the Sentient Process .................................................................................................... 17
Appendix 1: Considerations on Formalization .................................................................................... 18
III. Modes of Sensible Apprehension ........................................................................................................ 21
§1.Apprehension of Pure Stimuli ........................................................................................................ 21
§2.Apprehension of Reality................................................................................................................. 23
Appendix 2: Formalization and Hyperformalization............................................................................ 28
IV. Structure of the Apprehension of Reality: Sentient Intellection............................................................ 31
§1.The Impression of Reality .............................................................................................................. 31
Appendix 3: Sentient Intellection as Faculty ....................................................................................... 36
§2.Structure of the Impression of Reality ............................................................................................ 39
1. Modal Structure of the Impression of Reality .............................................................................. 39
2. Transcendental Structure of the Impression of Reality ................................................................ 43
3. Structural Unity of the Impression of Reality .............................................................................. 47
Appendix 4: Transcendentality and Metaphysics................................................................................. 48
V. The Essential Nature of Sentient Intellection....................................................................................... 51
§1.What Actuality Is........................................................................................................................... 52
§2.Actuality as Intellection ................................................................................................................. 53
§3.Actuality as Impression.................................................................................................................. 56
§4.Formal Unity of Sentient Intellection ............................................................................................. 57
Appendix 5: Reality and Sensible Qualities......................................................................................... 63
VI. The Idea of Reality for What is Intellectively Known in Sentient Fashion ........................................... 69
§1.Reality ........................................................................................................................................... 69
Appendix 6: Some Considerations About the Formality of Reality ...................................................... 71
§2.The Real ........................................................................................................................................ 73
Appendix 7: On the Real and Its Reality ............................................................................................. 76
§3.The Being of the Real .................................................................................................................... 78
VII. Reality in Sentient Intellection: Real Truth ......................................................................................... 83
§1.Real Truth ..................................................................................................................................... 83
§2.The Dimensions of Real Truth ....................................................................................................... 86
Appendix 8: Some Considerations With Respect to the Dimensions of Real Truth............................... 88
VIII. The Primary Mode of Intellection: Primordial Apprehension of Reality .............................................. 91
§1.What is Intellective Knowing? ....................................................................................................... 91
§2.What is Modalization?................................................................................................................... 93
§3.The Primordial Apprehension of Reality ........................................................................................ 94
IX. The Ulterior Modes of Intellection ...................................................................................................... 97

iii
 §1.What is Ulteriority? ....................................................................................................................... 97
§2.The Ulterior Modes of Actualization.............................................................................................. 98
§3.The Ulterior Modes of Intellection ................................................................................................100
X. Sentient Intellection and Human Structures .......................................................................................103

PART II. INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS .........................................................................................105

I. Introduction .......................................................................................................................................107
Section I
Intellection of Things in the Field of Reality ............................................ 111
II. The Field of Reality ...........................................................................................................................113
§1.General Characteristics of the Field of Real Things.......................................................................113
§2.The Strict Concept of Field ..........................................................................................................114
§3.Structure of the Field of Reality ...................................................................................................116
III. The Real Intellectively Known Within a Field: The Sentient Logos....................................................121
§1.Field Intellection As Such.............................................................................................................121
§2.The Basic Structure of the Logos ..................................................................................................124
Section II
Formal Structure of the Sentient Logos: I. Dynamic Structure .............................133
IV. Distancing or Stepping Back From Things.........................................................................................135
§1.What is Distance? .........................................................................................................................135
§2.What Does “Stepping Back?”........................................................................................................136
§3.Structure of What is Apprehended “At A Distance” ......................................................................137
V. Intellection Through “Stepping Back” From What a Real Thing is in Reality ....................................145
§1.What is Affirming?.......................................................................................................................145
1. About What One Judges ............................................................................................................150
Appendix: The Reality of The Mathematical.................................................................................153
2. What is Judged..........................................................................................................................157
§2.Forms of Affirmation ....................................................................................................................158
§3.The Modes of Affirmation.............................................................................................................165
Section III
Formal Structure of the Sentient Logos: II. Mediated Structure ............................177
VI. The Determination of the Logos in Itself ...........................................................................................179
§1.What Determination As Such Is: Evidence....................................................................................179
§2.Intrinsic Characteristics of Evidence.............................................................................................184
§3.False Ideas About Evidence ..........................................................................................................186
§4.Evidence And Primordial Apprehension .......................................................................................188
VII. Sentient Logos and Truth...................................................................................................................193
§1.What is Truth?..............................................................................................................................193
§2.Truth and Reality..........................................................................................................................194
§3 Truth, Reality, and Being ..............................................................................................................219
Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................................239

iv
PART III. INTELLIGENCE AND REASON .....................................................................................241
I. Introduction .......................................................................................................................................243

Section I
The Progression of Intellective Knowing ................................................245
II. What is Progression? .........................................................................................................................247
III. Progression Qua Intellection ..............................................................................................................251
§1.Activity of Intellective Knowing Qua Activity: Thinking ..............................................................251
1. What is Activity?.......................................................................................................................251
2. What is “Thinking” Activity? ....................................................................................................252
§2.Thinking Activity Qua Intellective: Reason ..................................................................................255
I. What is Reason? ....................................................................................................................256
II The Rise of Reason ................................................................................................................269
III. Reason and Reality ................................................................................................................273
IV. The Formal Object of Rational Activity..............................................................................................289
§1.The Formal Character of the Object of Reason ..............................................................................290
§2.The Unity of Possibilities as Determinant of The Intellection of The Real .....................................291
§3.Determinant Function of the Real in Reason .................................................................................292
Section II
Structure of Rational Intellection: Knowing.............................................297
V. What is Knowledge? ..........................................................................................................................299
VI. Formal Structure of Knowing.............................................................................................................303
§1.Objectuality ..................................................................................................................................304
I. What is Objectuality? .............................................................................................................304
Appendix: The Problem of Categories .......................................................................................309
II. Transformation of a Field Thing Into a Real Object................................................................314
§2.The Method ..................................................................................................................................316
I. What is Method?....................................................................................................................316
II. Structure of the Method .........................................................................................................318
§3.Rational Truth ..............................................................................................................................335
I. The Truth of Reason ..............................................................................................................335
II.The Essence of Truth in Encounter .........................................................................................336
III.The Intrinsic Character of Rational Truth ...............................................................................346
General Conclusion: The Unity of Intellection ...........................................355
VII. The Problem of the Unity of Intellection ............................................................................................357
VIII. The Formal Structure of the Unity of Sentient Intellection .................................................................359
§1.The Modal Unity of the Act ..........................................................................................................359
§2.The Modal Unity of Intellective Knowing .....................................................................................363
§3.The Unity of Intellective Knowing as an Intellective State ............................................................364

Index ..................................................................................................................................................................369

v
 Translator’s Introduction

Zubiri’s Rethinking of Philosophy which absorbs their key insights and refines
The creation of a new philosophical system is and/or corrects them in a dynamic, rather than a
a staggeringly difficult task, fraught with myriad static synthesis such as that of Kant. This syn-
dangers, pitfalls, and problems. Only one of su- thesis must be equally capable of absorbing de-
preme genius can undertake this enterprise with velopments in science and mathematics.
any expectation of success, and then only when old
ways of thought have shown themselves inadequate It is important to understand at the outset just
to cope with the march of human knowledge. It is how radical Zubiri’s rethinking of philosophy had
fortunate that these conditions have been fulfilled to be in order to achieve his goal. Though in con-
in our day and in the person of Xavier Zubiri stant dialogue with the history of philosophy, and
(1898-1983). No one can say now if this or any recognizing that this history must be the starting
future philosophical system will be the definitive point for his (or any effort), Zubiri
one; but Zubiri’s effort is surely the grandest, most • rejects the traditional view of reality as a zone of
boldly and most radically conceived effort to inte- things, whether “out there” beyond perception,
grate the Western (and to a considerable extent, within the mind, in the realm of ideas, or any-
Eastern) philosophical tradition, the explosive where else, replacing it with a more fundamental
growth of scientific knowledge, and the rich artis- and general notion, that of formality, which re-
tic, literary, and cultural traditions of European and fers to the nature of what is present to the intelli-
world civilization. gence;
Of course the history of philosophy is littered • rejects the traditional four-part division of phi-
with corpses of failed systems. Many are the phi- losophy into metaphysics, epistemology, logic,
losophers who, contemplating this situation, saw in and ethics as the primary basis for its organiza-
it nothing but an inconvenient fact arising from tion, instead recognizing that no such strict divi-
some fault in the assumptions, reasoning, or scope sion has ever been achieved or is even possible,
of their predecessors’ work. Each expected to put and that a new approach to human intellection is
paid to this situation once and for all with his own necessary;
new and improved philosophy, only to see it fall to
the same fate.1 Zubiri is determined to avoid such a • rejects the traditional notion of God as a reality
fate, and to accomplish that goal, he needs to do object, instead conceiving of Him as a reality
three things: fundament or ground;
• rejects the traditional idea of reality as “closed”
• Determine what went wrong with all past phi- and static, as implied in most conceptions of essence, in
losophies, not individually but in common. To favor of a new view of reality and essence as “open”;
do this he must penetrate to a much deeper level
than any of these philosophies, and determine • rejects the traditional notion of a person as another type
the unspoken and unrecognized assumptions that of “thing,” arguing that personhood is a sepa-
lie there. rate, distinct kind of reality.
• Develop a new way of doing philosophy not • rejects the agreement of thought and things as
subject to the vicissitudes of history and changes the fundamental notion of truth; rather this dual
in the scientific worldview. This will require a truth is founded on a more fundamental truth,
totally new conception of reality as something real truth, the impressive actuality of the real in
open at multiple levels, rather than closed, fixed, sentient intellection.
and exhaustible, and a corresponding new theory • rejects the traditional notion of sensible intelli-
of intelligence, knowledge, and truth. gence founded on opposition between sensing
• Demonstrate that there is genuine progress in and intelligence, replacing it with a fully inte-
philosophy by creating a new synthesis which is grated conception, sentient intelligence.
not a drop-in replacement for and rejection of all The first major work of his grand synthesis
the old erroneous systems, but rather something was Sobre la esencia (1963; English edition On
Essence, 1980). It dealt primarily with the object
1
A. Pintor Ramos, Zubiri, Madrid: Ediciones del Orto, 1996, p. 18. of knowing. The present work deals primarily with

vii
viii TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION

the process of knowing, which is founded upon an ern civilization; the task is, indeed, ongoing, but
analysis of intelligence. These two subjects—object one which is absolutely necessary to give meaning
and process of knowing—should not be identified to the whole enterprise of civilization. At the time
with “metaphysics” and “epistemology”, respec- of his death in 1983, Zubiri was at work on several
tively, for two reasons: (1) the latter two topics are books which are based on Sentient Intelligence and
theoretical and of more restricted scope than the On Essence, but which delve deeper into certain
problems Zubiri addresses; and (2) Zubiri explicitly key topics. These books, and numerous earlier
rejects the modern notion that the problems of ob- studies, are being edited and published posthu-
ject of knowing and process of knowing can be or mously by the Fundación Xavier Zubiri in Madrid,
indeed ever have been rigorously separated, as the headed by Professor Diego Gracia of the Royal
distinction between epistemology and metaphysics Spanish Academy and the University of Madrid.
in post-Kantian thought generally suggests.1 The The purpose of this introduction is not to
two are completely intertwined, and any compre- summarize the contents of Sentient Intelligence,
hensive philosophy must address and encompass but to orient the English-speaking reader with re-
both together in its vision. At the outset, this re- spect to Zubiri’s intellectual heritage, his point of
quires not an epistemology, but rather an analysis departure, his goals, the organization of the work,
of intelligence—something which must logically the main currents of thought in it, and the innova-
precede any type of rigorous epistemology or Kan- tions which Zubiri brings to the subject. This is not
tian critique. As Robert Caponigri, translator of to suggest that his work can be pigeonholed in any
Sobre la esencia put it, academic sense. Zubiri was deeply and passion-
ately committed to the intellectual quest for truth;
The theory of “sentient intelligence” must be
and the seriousness and dispassionateness with
distinguished from the “epistemological ques-
which he viewed this quest is manifest on every
tion” or the theory of knowledge. The theory
page of his writing—the same seriousness which is
of intelligence is logically antecedent to the
so evident in Aristotle and the major philosophers
epistemological question and every epistemo-
in the Aristotelian tradition: Averoës, Avicenna, St.
logical theory eventually reveals that it pre-
Thomas, and Suarez. To further this goal, Zubiri
supposes a theory of the intelligence in its ac-
always seeks as Olympian a perspective as possible,
count of what and how man can know.2
encompassing all relevant knowledge when dis-
Only when this foundation has been laid can cussing any subject. The result, in terms of scope,
work on a comprehensive epistemology be com- profundity, and originality, speaks for itself.
pleted and securely grounded. Zubiri frequently
criticizes previous philosophers for confusing epis- Life and Times
temology and the theory of intelligence, and conse- Xavier Zubiri y Apalategui was born in San
quently advocating erroneous and often absurd Sebastián, on December 4, 1898. After preparatory
theories. He also believes that understanding this studies in Guipúzcoa he attended the University of
distinction is the key to unraveling some of the Madrid where some of his mentors were Angel
paradoxes and puzzles from the history of philoso- Amor Ruibal, García Morente, Juan Zaragüeta,
phy, many of which turn out to be pseudo- José Ortega y Gasset, Julio Rey-Pastor, and Julio
problems, such as Hume’s famous analysis of cau- Palacios. He also included periods of residence at
sality. Finally, this analysis of intelligence under- the University of Louvain, then under Cardinal
girds Zubiri’s analysis of truth and the stages of Mercier, and the Gregorian University at Rome, the
intellective knowledge. successor of the Collegio Romano. At the Gregor-
Together, On Essence and Sentient Intelli- ian, in 1920, he received the doctorate in theology.
gence establish the basis for Zubiri’s new philo- In 1921 he received a doctorate in philosophy from
sophical synthesis. Yet Zubiri was aware that the University of Madrid. He refers to the period
much more needs to be done to establish a new, 1921-1928, when he worked extensively on phe-
comprehensive philosophical foundation for West- nomenology, as the “phenomenological-objectivist”
1
epoch.
See Author’s Preface, p. 3.
2
In 1926 he won the competition for the chair
Xavier Zubiri, On Essence, translated by A. R. Caponigri, Wash-
of history of philosophy at the University of Ma-
ington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1980, p. 1.
 TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION ix

drid. Between 1928 and 1931 he included trips ers, but which also shows how each of their systems
throughout Europe to study under the masters of went astray. The scope, depth, clarity, and profun-
various disciplines: classical philology with Werner dity of Zubiri’s philosophy suggest that it is both
Jaeger; philosophy with Husserl and Heidegger; the culmination of 2500 years of intensive intellec-
theoretical physics with De Broglie and tual struggle and the solid basis on which knowl-
Schrödinger; biology with von Geluchten, edge can build in the future. Zubiri died on Sep-
Spemann, and Goldschmidt; mathematics with tember 21, 1983, in the midst of editing a new book
Rey-Pastor, La Vallée-Poussin, and Zermelo. As a for publication.
result of these extended study trips, and his contin-
ual rethinking of philosophical problems, he em- Key Elements in Zubiri’s Thought
barked upon a second epoch, what he terms the
“ontological” epoch (1931-1944), in which philo- Zubiri’s philosophical thought integrates
sophical problems were radicalized, and he devel- twelve major elements:
oped the concept of relegation, which became a • The panorama of the entire Western philosophi-
cornerstone of his theological writings. Zubiri’s cal tradition from the Presocratics through Hei-
Madrid University lectures, Metaphysics of Aris- degger, Logical Positivism, and to some extent,
totle (1931-1932) and Pre-Socratics (1933-1934), the 20th century English schools of thought.
acquired special resonance. During the course of Like Aristotle, Zubiri is constantly in dialogue
the Spanish Civil War (1936 to 1939), he was in with his predecessors.
Paris teaching courses at the Institut Catholique • Aristotle and the tradition of classical philosophy
and studying oriental languages with Deimel, Ben- (though subject to relentless critical analysis and
veniste, Labat, Dhorme, and others at the Sor- rethinking). The gravity of Aristotle, as well as
bonne. In 1939 he married Carmen Castro who had his encyclopedic vision and his understanding of
been one of his students, and was the daughter of the position of philosophy in the context of hu-
the Spanish writer Américo Castro. From 1940 to man knowledge, are particularly important in
1942 he occupied the chair of history of philosophy Zubiri’s thought.
at the University of Barcelona.
In 1943 Zubiri left the university to strike out • Insights from the work of the Phenomenologists
on his own program of research and teaching in in the 20th century. Though ultimately super-
Madrid. This also marks the beginning of his final, seding them, Zubiri believes that there is a ker-
mature period, the “metaphysical” epoch, whose nel of truth in their analysis of human experi-
main theme is reality. He created his own model, ence which is essential to formulating a philoso-
the cursos (seminars), and through them he contin- phy which takes account both of our undeniable
ued to present and involve others with his philo- perception of the world as real (see below), our
sophical insights. His seminars were well attended, understanding of it through science, and the
and he gathered a group of devoted followers with limitations of our intelligence.
backgrounds in many disciplines who worked with • The overwhelming force of our direct perception
him on the development of his thought. This group of reality. For Zubiri, this is the salient charac-
met weekly with Zubiri to discuss philosophical teristic of human intelligence and must be the
matters and review his texts as they were being starting point for any firmly grounded theory of
written. The first major book of his mature period, the intelligence, any epistemology, and ulti-
On Essence, was published in 1963. It represents a mately any philosophy. Though not specifically
complete rethinking of the concept of essence in discussed by Zubiri, the tradition of the great
light of the entire history of philosophy and the Spanish mystics and the characteristics of their
development of science during the 20th century. knowledge, in some ways akin to direct experi-
His principal systematic work, Sentient Intelli- ence of the world, must have been in the back of
gence, appeared in three volumes in the early his mind.1
1980s. In this work, Zubiri builds upon the entire
history of philosophy and science to create a new
philosophical vision which incorporates key ele- 1
In another work, El hombre y Dios (1973-75, published posthu-
ments and insights from virtually all major think- mously in Madrid by Alianza Editorial/Sociedad de Estudios y
Publicaciones, 1984), Zubiri emphasizes this aspect of his thought,
x TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION

• Scientific knowledge, and especially the insight • The Christian theological tradition, with equal
science has given us into the structure of the emphasis on Eastern (Greek) and Western Fa-
natural world and our ability to know that world. thers and theologians. Zubiri wrote extensively
Zubiri evinces a particularly keen interest in on this subject and related topics, including a
quantum mechanics and the revolution in phys- book published posthumously.3
ics which occurred in the early decades of this
century. His interest extends to all the sciences, Poles of Zubiri’s Thought
and he believes that the cracking of the genetic Roughly speaking, the two poles of Zubiri’s
code has provided insights into the biological thought are (1) that which is most radical in Aris-
realm which are in some ways analogous to totle, his conception of essence as the tØ tˆ Çn
those achieved in physics. e•nai, what makes a thing be what it is; and (2) the
• Modern logic and mathematics, especially phenomenological concept of reality. His own
Gödel’s theorem, and the new insights about radical innovation was to weave these two into a
mathematical truths and mathematical realities unified whole via the new concept of sentient in-
these developments have yielded. tellection. But Zubiri radically rethinks both Aris-
totle’s and the phenomenologists’ legacies; so his
• Nonscientific knowledge, specifically, the need concept of essence, his concept of reality, and his
to establish a foundation for it in a comprehen- concept of intelligence differ in many respects from
sive philosophical system, and recognize its the originals.
great and continuing contribution to the totality (1) Zubiri points out that Aristotle begins by
of knowledge. In what sense is a novel, a poem, conceiving of essence as that which makes a thing
or a painting about reality? Why do we say that what it is, in the most radical sense. Later, how-
an artist has “perceived essential truths”? Why ever, Aristotle links his metaphysics with his epis-
does an artist create his works rather than just temology by claiming that essence is the physical
discourse about his subject? correlate of the definition (of a thing). Knowledge
• The relation of God to the physical world and to is then of essences via definition in terms of genus
science and scientific knowledge, especially and species; the most famous example is of course
physics; dealt with at length in earlier works.1 “man is a rational animal”. Zubiri comments:
• Insights from Eastern philosophical/religious When the essence is taken as the real correlate
traditions, especially the Vedanta. Zubiri regards of the definition, the least that must be said is
this as particularly important for understanding that it is a question of a very indirect way of
how philosophy began and why it emerged as arriving at things. For…instead of going di-
different in the Western tradition. rectly to reality and asking what in it may be
• The fundamentally different reality of the person, its essence, one takes the roundabout way of
as compared to ordinary physical realities. passing through the definition. 4
• Results and insights from philology, especially For Zubiri, this is not merely a roundabout way, but
Indo-European philology. Zubiri believes that something worse:
those who first created our language and our
words had a freshness and clarity of vision with …it is a roundabout way which rests on an
respect to certain basic human experiences that enormously problematic presupposition,
later generations could not replicate.2 namely, that the essential element of every

saying that we are dominated by reality, and that “Reality is the

power of the real” which in effect seizes us. (p. 88).
1
Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, Madrid: Alianza Editorial/Sociedad Finno-Urgric, etc.) into superfamilies such as Nostratic or Eurasi-
de Estudios y Publicaciones, ninth edition, 1987; English edition, atic; but this would have come as no surprise to him, especially in
1981. view of his own etymological work on philosophical terms in the
2 Semitic and Indo-European languages.
Zubiri studied Indo-European philology (nowadays usually 3
termed “historical linguistics”) with Benveniste, one of the early El hombre y Dios, [Man and God], op. cit.
4
pioneers. He was of course unaware of the work done in the late Sobre la esencia, Madrid: Alianza Editorial/Sociedad de Estu-
1980s by Ruhlen, Shevoroshkin, Greenberg and others linking dios y Publicaciones, 1985, p. 89-90 [English translation by A. R.
together major language families (Indo-European, Afro-Asiatic, Caponigri cited above, p. 113.]
 TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION xi

thing is necessarily definable; and this is more rather the “apprehension of reality”. He believes
than problematical.1 that philosophy must start from the fundamental
fact of experience, that we are installed in reality,
In fact, Zubiri believes, the essence in general
however modestly, and that our most basic experi-
cannot be defined in genus-species form, and may
ences, what we perceive of the world (colors,
not be expressible in ordinary language at all. He
sounds, people, etc.) are real. Without this basis—
believes that essences—in the radical sense of de-
and despite the fact that knowledge built upon it
termining what a thing is, and thus how it will be-
can at times be in error—there would be no other
have, what its characteristics are, and so forth—can
knowledge either, including science. However, at
be determined only with great difficulty; and much
the most fundamental level, that of direct appre-
of science is dedicated to this task. Specifically,
hension of reality, there is no possibility of error;
Zubiri believes that it is necessary to go back to
only knowledge built upon this foundation, involv-
Aristotle’s original idea of essence as the funda-
ing as it does logos and reason, can be in error.
mental determinant of a thing’s nature, what makes
Zubiri points out that it makes sense to speak of
it to be what it is, and expand on this concept in the
error only because we can—and do—achieve
light of modern science.
truth.3
But this critique indicates that there is a deep
But because the world discovered to us by sci-
realist strain to Zubiri’s thought, a belief that we
ence is quite different from our ordinary experience
can, in some ultimate sense, grasp reality. The
(electromagnetic waves and photons instead of col-
problem arises in connection with our belief that
ors, quarks and other strange particles instead of
what we perceive is also real—a belief upon which
solid matter, and so forth), a critical problem arises
we act in living out our lives. This compels Zubiri
which thrusts Zubiri towards a radical rethinking of
to make an extremely important distinction with
the notion of reality. This is one of the main
respect to reality: between reality in apprehension
themes of Sentient Intelligence.
(which he terms ‘reity’), and reality of what things
The third idea—perhaps ‘inspiration’ is a
are beyond sensing (true reality, realidad verda-
better term—which Zubiri draws from phenome-
dera). Zubiri believes that the failure of past phi-
nology has to do with his radically changed concept
losophers to distinguish these, and consequently,
of reality. For Zubiri, reality is a formality, not a
their failure to recognize that they refer to different
zone of things, as in classical philosophy:
stages of intellection, is at the root of many grave
errors and paradoxes. This leads directly to the In the first place, the idea of reality does not
second pole of Zubiri’s thought: Phenomenology. formally designate a zone or class of things,
(2) Zubiri takes three critical ideas from phe- but only a formality, reity or “thingness”. It is
nomenology (Husserl, Ortega y Gasset, and Hei- that formality by which what is sentiently ap-
degger). First is a certain way or “idea” of philoso- prehended is presented to me not as the effect
phy. In particular, he accepts that phenomenology of something beyond what is apprehended, but
has opened a new path and deepened our under- as being in itself something “in its own right”,
standing of things by recognizing that it is neces- something de suyo; for example, not only
sary to position philosophy at a new and more radi- “warming” but “being” warm. This formality
cal level than that of classical realism or of modern is the physical and real character of the other-
idealism (primarily Hegel).2 ness of what is sentiently apprehended in my
Secondly, he accepts that philosophy must sentient intellection.4
start with its own territory, that of “mere immediate This conception of reality is, so to speak, a
description of the act of thinking”. But for him, radical “paradigm shift”, because it means that
the radical philosophical problem is not that pro- there are multiple types of reality and that many of
claimed by the phenomenologists: not Husserl’s the old problems associated with reality are in fact
“phenomenological consciousness”, not Heidegger’s pseudo-problems. Zubiri notes that
“comprehension of being”, not Ortega’s “life”, but
The reality of a material thing is not identical
1
Ibid.
3
2
Diego Gracia, Voluntad de Verdad, Barcelona: Labor Universi- Part I, chapter VII, p. 83ff.
4
taria, 1986, p. 89. p. 63.
xii TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION

with the reality of a person, the reality of soci- hension of the real which has its own charac-
ety, the reality of the moral, etc.; nor is the re- teristics....Intellection is formally direct ap-
ality of my own inner life identical to that of prehension of the real—not via representa-
other realities. But on the other hand, how- tions nor images. It is an immediate appre-
ever different these modes of reality may be, hension of the real, not founded in inferences,
they are always reity, i.e., formality de suyo. reasoning processes, or anything of that na-
Much of the work is devoted to analyzing the ture. It is a unitary apprehension. The unity
process of intelligence, and explaining how its of these three moments is what makes what is
three stages (primordial apprehension, logos, and apprehended to be apprehended in and by it-
reason) unfold and yield knowledge, including sci- self.1
entific knowledge. Thus what we have is a fully integrated proc-
ess with no distinction between sensing and appre-
Sentient Intellection not Sensible Intellection hension which Zubiri terms sensible apprehension
Zubiri seeks to reestablish radically the basis of reality. The fundamental nature of human in-
for human knowledge as the principal step in his tellection can be stated quite simply: “actualization
restructuring of philosophy. This task goes far be- of the real in sentient intellection”.2 There are
yond any type of Kantian critique—something three moments of this actualization:
which Zubiri believes can only come after we have • affection of the sentient being by what is sensed
analyzed what human knowledge is, and how we (the noetic).
apprehend. For Zubiri, perception of reality begins
• otherness which is presentation of something
with the sensing process, but he rejects the para-
other, a “note”, nota (from Latin nosco, related
digm of classical philosophy, which starts from
to Greek gignosco, “to know”, and noein, “to
opposition between sensing and intelligence. Ac-
think”; hence the noematic)
cording to this paradigm, the senses deliver con-
fused content to the intelligence, which then figures • force of imposition of the note upon the sentient
out or reconstructs reality. The Scholastics said, being (the noergic).
nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu Otherness consists of two moments, only the first of
nisi ipse intellectus. This is sensible intelligence, which has received any attention heretofore: con-
and according to Zubiri, the entire paradigm is tent (what the apprehension is of) and formality
radically false. (how it is delivered to us). Formality may be either
Zubiri’s point of departure for his rethinking formality of stimulation, in the case of animals, or
of this problem is the immediacy and sense of di- formality of reality, in the case of man.
rect contact with reality that we experience in our The union of content and formality of reality
perception of the world; the things we perceive: gives rise to the process of knowing which unfolds
colors, sounds, sights, are real in some extremely logically if not chronologically in three modes or
fundamental sense that cannot be overridden by phases:
subsequent reasoning or analysis. That is, there is
• Primordial apprehension of reality (or basic,
associated with perception an overwhelming im-
direct installation in reality, giving us pure and
pression of its veracity, a type of “guarantee” which
simple reality)
accompanies it, that says to us, “What you appre-
hend is reality, not a cinema, not a dream.” Im- • Logos (explanation of what something is vis à vis
plied here are two separate aspects of perception: other things, or what the real of primordial ap-
first, what the apprehension is of, e.g. a tree or a prehension is in reality)
piece of green paper, and second, its self- • Reason (or ratio, methodological explanation of
guaranteeing characteristic of reality. This link to what things are and why they are, as in done in
reality must be the cornerstone of any theory of the science, for example)
intelligence:
By virtue of its formal nature, intellection is
apprehension of reality in and by itself. This 1
p. 94.
intellection...is in a radical sense an appre- 2
p. 4, 84, 100, 243.
 TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION xiii

This process, shown schematically in Figure has an individual moment and a field moment. The
1, is mediated by what Zubiri calls the ‘field’ of individual moment Zubiri refers to as the thing
reality. The reality field concept is loosely based on existing “by itself” or “of itself”; de suyo is the
the field concept from physics, such as the gravita- technical term he employs. The “field moment” is
tional field, where a body exists “by itself”, so to called as such and implies that things cannot be
speak; but also by virtue of its existence, creates a fully understood in isolation. This is in stark con-
field around itself through which it interacts with trast to the notion of essence in classical philoso-
other bodies. Thus in the field of reality, a thing phy.

Arousal Tonic Response

modification

Impressive apprehension
of reality

Real Otherness Force of imposition

affection of reality of reality
(Through this, (Through this, (Through this,
human intel- what is appre- reality is ratified as
lection is hended is real) truth, imposed on us
sentient) by reality itself

Content Formality

Reality (man) Stimulation (animals)

Primoridial
apprehension

(Modes of
sentient Logos
intelligence)

Reason
Reason

Figure 1
Sentient Intelligence in Zubiri’s Philosophy

Roughly speaking, primordial apprehension may serve to illustrate the basic ideas. A piece of
installs us in reality and delivers things to us in green paper is perceived. It is apprehended as
their individual and field moments; logos deals something real in primordial apprehension; both
with things in the field, how they relate to each the paper and the greenness are apprehended as
other; and reason tells us what they are in the sense real, in accordance with our normal beliefs about
of methodological explanation. A simple example what we apprehend. (This point about the reality of
xiv TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION

the color green is extremely important, because in primordial apprehension in order to organize
Zubiri believes that the implicit denial of the reality it. The logos is what enables us to know what a
of, say, colors, and the systematic ignoring of them thing, apprehended as real in sentient intellec-
by modern science is a great scandal.) tion, is in reality (a technical term, meaning
As yet, however, we may not know how to what something is in relation to one’s other
name the color, for example, or what the material knowledge). It utilizes the notion of the “field of
is, or what to call its shape. That task is the func- reality”. The reality field is a concept loosely
tion of the logos, which relates what has been ap- based on field concept of physics: a body exists
prehended to other things known and named from “by itself” but by virtue of its existence, creates
previous experience; for example, other colors or field around itself through which it interacts with
shades of colors associated with greenness. Like- other bodies.
wise, with respect to the material in which the • Reason (or ratio, methodological explanation of
green inheres, we would associate it with paper, what things are and why they are, as is done in
wood, or other things known from previous experi- science, for example). This is the highest level
ence. In turn, reason via science explains the green of understanding; it encompasses all of our ways
as electromagnetic energy of a certain wavelength, of understanding our environment. One natu-
or photons of a certain energy in accordance with rally thinks of science, of course; but long before
Einstein’s relation. That is, the color green is the science as we know it existed, people sought ex-
photons as sensed; there are not two realities. The planations of things. And they found them in
characteristics of the three phases may be explained myths, legends, plays, poetry, art, and music—
as follows: which are indeed examples of reason in the most
• Primordial apprehension of reality is the basic, general sense: they all seek to tell us something
direct installation in reality, giving us pure and about reality. Later, of course, came philosophy
simple reality. This is what one gets first, and is and science; but no single way of access to real-
the basis on which all subsequent understanding ity, in this sense, is exhaustive: all have a role.
is based. Perhaps it can most be easily under- Reason, for Zubiri, does not consist in going to
stood if one thinks of a baby, which has only this reality, but in going from field reality toward
apprehension: the baby perceives the real world worldly reality, toward field reality in depth. If
around it, but as a congeries of sounds, colors, one likes, the field is the system of the sensed
etc., which are real, but as yet undifferentiated real, and the world, the object of reason, is the
into chairs, walls, spoken words, etc. It is richest system of the real as a form of reality. That is,
with respect to the real, poorest with respect to the whole world of the rationally intellectively
specific determination (ulterior modes augment known is the unique and true explanation of field
determination, but diminish richness). In it, re- reality.
ality is not exhausted with respect to its content, In Zubiri’s word’s, reason is “measuring in-
but given in an unspecific ambient transcending tellection of the real in depth”.1 There are two
the content. This transcendence is strictly moments of reason to be distinguished (1) intellec-
sensed, not inferred, even for the baby. Primor- tion in depth, e.g., electromagnetic theory is intel-
dial apprehension is the basis for the ulterior or lection in depth of color;2 (2) its character as meas-
logically subsequent modes. uring, in the most general sense, akin to the notion
• Logos (explanation of what something is vis à vis of measure in advanced mathematics (functional
other things, or as Zubiri expresses it, what the analysis). For example, prior to the twentieth cen-
real of primordial apprehension is in reality). tury, material things were assimilated to the notion
This is the second step: differentiate things, give of “body”; that was the measure of all material
them names, and understand them in relation to things. But with the development of quantum me-
each other. As a baby gets older, this is what he chanics, a new conception of material things was
does: he learns to make out things in his envi- forced upon science, one which is different from the
ronment, and he learns what their names are, traditional notion of “body”. The canon of real
eventually learning to speak and communicate
1
with others verbally. This stage involves a p. 257.
2
“stepping back” from direct contact with reality p. 256-257.
 TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION xv

things was thus enlarged, so that the measure of When a thing is known sentiently, at the same
something is no longer necessarily that of “body”. time it is known to be a reality. The impression of
(Zubiri himself will go on to enlarge it further, reality puts us in contact with reality, but not with
pointing out that personhood is another type of re- all reality. Rather, it leaves us open to all reality.
ality distinct from “body” or other material things). This is openness to the world. All things have a
Measuring, in this sense, and the corresponding unity with respect to each other which is what con-
canon of reality, are both dynamic and are a key stitutes the world. Zubiri believes that reality is
element in Zubiri’s quest to avoid the problems and fundamentally open, and therefore not capturable in
failures of past philosophies based on static and any human formula. This openness is intimately
unchanging conceptions of reality. related to transcendentality:
...reality as reality is constitutively open, is
Reality
transcendentally open. By virtue of this open-
Given Zubiri’s radically new approach to ness, reality is a formality in accordance with
philosophy, and his analysis of intelligence as sen- which nothing is real except as open to other
tient, it is not surprising that his concept of reality realities and even to the reality of itself. That
is quite different from that of previous philosophy is, every reality is constitutively respective qua
as well. As mentioned above, he rejects the idea of reality. 1
reality as a “zone of things”, usually conceived as
“out there” beyond the mind, and replaces it with a Reality must not be considered as some transcen-
more general notion, that of formality. “Reality is dental concept, or even as a concept which is
formality”, he says over and over, and by this he somehow realized in all real things:
means that reality is the de suyo, the “in its own …rather, it is a real and physical moment, i.e.,
right”; it is not the content of some impression. transcendentality is just the openness of the
Anything which is “in its own right” is real. This real qua real....The world is open not only be-
de suyo, the formality of reality, is how the content cause we do not know what things there are or
is delivered to us. Our brains—Zubiri refers to can be in it; it is open above all because no
them as organs of formalization—are wired to per- thing, however precise and detailed its con-
ceive reality, to perceive directly the “in its own stitution, is reality itself as such.2
right” character. It does not emerge as the result of
some reasoning process working on the content; it Sentient intellection is transcendental impres-
is delivered together with the content in primordial sion, in which the trans does not draw us out of
apprehension. what is apprehended, toward some other reality (as
This includes reality in apprehension, as well Plato thought), but submerges us in reality itself.
as reality beyond apprehension. But always, the The impression of reality transcends all its content.
character of reality is the same: de suyo. It is This is the object of philosophy, whereas the world
therefore something physical as opposed to some- as such-and-such is the object of science.
thing conceptual. And this is true whether one is For Zubiri, the fundamental or constitutive
speaking of things perceived at the level of primor- openness of reality means that the search for it is a
dial apprehension, such as colors, or things per- never-ending quest; he believes that the develop-
ceived in ulterior modes of apprehension such as ment of quantum mechanics in the twentieth cen-
reason, where examples might be historical realities tury has been an example of how our concept of
such as the Ottoman Empire, or mathematical ob- reality has broadened. In particular, it has been
jects such as circles and lines: both are real in the broadened to include the concept of person as a
same sense, though they differ in other respects fundamentally different kind of reality:
(mathematical objects are real by postulation, That was the measure of reality: progress be-
whereas historical entities are not). Moreover, re- yond the field was brought about by thinking
ality is independent of the subject, not a subjective that reality as measuring is “thing”. An in-
projection, but something imposed upon the subject, tellection much more difficult than that of
something which is here-and-now before the sub-
ject. Logos and reason do not have to go to reality 1
p. 248.
or create it; they are born in it and remain in it. 2
Ibid..
xvi TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION

quantum physics was needed in order to un- through our own efforts. Real truth must be sought
derstand that the real can be real and still not in primordial apprehension:
be a thing. Such, for example, is the case of
…the real is “in” the intellection, and this
person. Then not only was the field of real
“in” is ratification. In sentient intellection
things broadened, but that which we might
truth is found in that primary form which is
term ‘the modes of reality’ were also broad-
the impression of reality. The truth of this
ened. Being a thing is only one of those
impressive actuality of the real in and by itself
modes; being a person is another.1
is precisely real truth….Classical philosophy
Now of course, not everything which we per- has gone astray on this matter and always
ceive in impression has reality beyond impression; thought that truth is constituted in the refer-
but the fact that something is real only in impres- ence to a real thing with respect to what is
sion does not mean that it isn’t real. It is, because conceived or asserted about that thing.2
it is de suyo. And what is real in impression forms
Now truth and reality are not identical in
the basis for all subsequent knowing, including
Zubiri’s philosophy, because there are many reali-
science. Still, we are quite interested in what is
ties which are not actualized in sentient intellec-
real beyond impression, which may be something
tion, nor do they have any reason to be so. Thus
else, or the same thing understood in a deeper
not every reality is true in this sense. Though it
manner. For example, electromagnetic theory tells
does not add any notes, actualization does add truth
us that colors are the result of photons of a particu-
to the real. Hence truth and reality are different;
lar energy affecting us. But, according to Zubiri—
nor are they mere correlates, because reality is not
and this is extremely important—there are not two
simply the correlate of truth but its foundation on
realities (the photons and the colors), but the colors
account of the fact that “all actualization is actuali-
are the photons as perceived. Reason is the effort
zation of reality.” 3
to know what things are “in reality” which are
known in primordial apprehension.
Knowledge and Understanding
Truth Zubiri believes that one of the principal errors
of past philosophers was their excessively static
Truth, like reality, is much different in
view of knowledge—a conquer it “once and for all”
Zubiri’s approach. The traditional view has always
approach. Typical of this mentality are the re-
been that truth is some sort of agreement of thought
peated attempts to devise a definitive list of “cate-
and things. Zubiri rejects this view because it is
gories”, such as those of Aristotle and Kant, and
incomplete and not sufficiently radical for two rea-
Kant’s integration of Newtonian physics and
sons: (a) “things” as understood in this definition
Euclidean geometry into the fabric of his philoso-
are the product of ulterior modes of intellection,
phy. Rather, knowledge as a human enterprise is
and (b) “thought” is not univocal, being different in
both dynamic and limited. It is limited because the
the three modes. The notion of truth as agreement
canon of reality, like reality itself, can never be
of two things, dual truth, is a derivative notion,
completely fathomed. It is limited because as hu-
which must be grounded upon something more
man beings we are limited and must constantly
fundamental. For Zubiri, the priority of reality is
search for knowledge. The phrase “exhaustive
always paramount, and hence the primary meaning
knowledge” is an oxymoron:
of truth, real truth, is impressive actuality of the
real in sentient intellection. It is a quality of actu- The limitation of knowledge is certainly real,
alization, not agreement of two disparate things, but this limitation is something derived from
which as the ground of truth would pose insuper- the intrinsic and formal nature of rational in-
able verification problems. All other truth is ulti- tellection, from knowing as such, since it is
mately based on this real truth, this actualization. inquiring intellection. Only because rational
As such, real truth is imposed on us, not conquered; intellection is formally inquiring, only because
dual truth, a derivative form of truth, we conquer of this must one always seek more and, find-

2
p. 84.
1 3
p. 261. p. 193.
 TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION xvii

ing what was sought, have it become the prin- poetry, music, or religious experience. All human
ciple of the next search. Knowledge is limited knowing is of the real, because reality is the for-
by being knowledge. An exhaustive knowl- mality under which man apprehends anything. In
edge of the real would not be knowledge; it man’s quest for understanding, the utilization of
would be intellection of the real without ne- scientific concepts, amplified and interpreted, only
cessity of knowledge. Knowledge is only in- supposes that the sciences are an appropriate way of
tellection in search. Not having recognized access to reality. Philosophy, in turn, reflects on
the intrinsic and formal character of rational the data offered by the sciences as “data of reality”.
intellection as inquiry is what led But philosophy is not looking to duplicate the ef-
to…subsuming all truth under the truth of af- forts of science. Both philosophy and science ex-
firmation.1 [Italics added] amine the “world”, that to which the field of reality
directs us. But science is concerned with what
Understanding is also a richer and more com-
Zubiri terms the “talitative” order, the “such-and-
plex process than heretofore assumed. Indeed, suchness” of the world, how such-and-such thing
oversimplification of the process of understanding behaves; whereas philosophy is concerned with the
has led to major philosophical errors in the past. respective unity of the real qua real, with its tran-
Understanding requires both apprehension of scendental character, what makes it real.3
something as real, and knowing what that thing is
with respect to other things (logos stage) and what Human Reality
it is in reality itself (reason stage). Traditionally For centuries it was believed that what is real
only the latter is considered. Zubiri comments: “beyond” impression comprises “material bodies”,
envisaged as made up of some sort of billiard-ball
Understanding is, then, the intellective
type particles. The development of quantum me-
knowing which understands what something,
chanics forced a change in this picture, though not
already apprehended as real, really is; i.e.,
without considerable controversy. A much more
what a thing is in reality (logos) and in reality
difficult effort was required to recognize that
itself (reason), the real thing understood in
something can be real and yet not be a thing, viz.
both the field manner and considered in the
the human person. The human person is a funda-
worldly sense.2
mentally different kind of reality, one whose es-
Understanding, then, requires sentient intel- sence is open, as opposed to the closed essences of
lection and cannot exist, even for subjects such a animals and other living things. An open essence
mathematics, without it. This insight reveals is defined not by the notes that it naturally has, but
clearly Zubiri’s radical departure from all previous by its system of possibilities; and hence it makes
thought. itself, so to speak, with the possibilities. “Its-own-
ness” is what makes an essence to be open. This
Zubiri and Science open essence of man is the ground of his freedom,
in turn the ground of his moral nature. Zubiri
The scientific and the metaphysical are closely
terms the set of notes defining the essence of what
connected, because both are forms of knowledge
it means to be a person personeity, and personality
emerging from the reason or third mode of human
the realization of these notes by means of actions.
intellection. Articulating the relationship between
A person, for Zubiri, is a relative absolute: “rela-
them has been a difficult problem for at least three
tive” because his actions are not entirely uncon-
centuries of Western philosophy. For Zubiri, the
strained, but are what make him the kind of person
relationship is as follows: reality unfolds in events
that he is; “absolute” because he enjoys the ability
observed by the sciences, which indeed allow us to
to make himself, i.e., he has freedom and is not an
observe aspects of it which would otherwise remain
automaton, fully deterministic.
hidden. But this unfolding of reality is no different
As a consequence, man’s role in the universe
from its unfolding through personal experience,
is different; and between persons (and only between
them) there is a strict causality, which in turn im-
1
pp. 261-262.
2 3
p. 363. pp. 48-49, 197, 219.
xviii TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION

plies a moral obligation. This causality is not a two readers of Zubiri or any philosopher will agree
simple application of classical notions of causality on all points, and so the translator is responsible for
to persons, but something irreducible to the causal- any errors that remain in the text.
ity of classical metaphysics, and still less reducible
to the concept of a scientific law. This is what A Note on Terminology
Zubiri refers to as personal causality: “And how- Translation of a major philosophical work
ever repugnant it may be to natural science, there such as this inevitably requires many difficult deci-
is...a causality between persons which is not given sions on terminology. Zubiri’s philosophical
in the realm of nature.” method and approach leads him to use existing
words in new ways, and to devise many neolo-
God and Theology gisms. Great effort was made to find the most
The person is, in his very constitution, turned natural way of rendering these in English, but for
toward a reality which is more than he is, and on reference, listed here are the principal technical
which he is based. This reality is that from which terms for which something other than a fairly lit-
emerge the resources he needs to make his person- eral translation has been employed, or for which
ality, and which supplies him with the force neces- there are possible misunderstandings. More exten-
sary to carry out this process of realizing himself. sive treatment of Zubiri’s terminology than it is
This turning of a person to reality is relegation. It possible to include in a book such as this may be
is a turning toward some ground not found among found in the glossary section of the Xavier Zubiri
things immediately given, something which must Foundation of North America’s Website, whose
be sought beyond what is given. The theist calls address is: www.zubiri.org/general/glossary.htm.
this ground ‘God’. With respect to religions, De suyo. Zubiri’s most famous technical term,
nearly all offer a vision or explanation of this and one which is therefore left untranslated. Its
ground, and therefore there is some truth in all. literal meaning is “in its own right”.
But Christianity is unique because of the compene-
En propio. Meaning depends somewhat on
tration of the relegated person and the personal
context, but generally translated as “of its own” and
reality of God.
on occasion as “in its own right”.
Fundamentar. The word and its derivatives,
Concluding remarks such as fundamento and fundar, are closely related
Zubiri’s philosophy is a boldly conceived and to the English “to found”. However, English does
superbly executed rethinking and recasting of the not have the infinitive “to fundament”; rather,
great philosophical questions, unique in many ex- English (like German) uses “to ground” for this
tremely significant respects. It represents a new purpose. However, some of the Spanish forms such
conception of philosophy as well as a new way of as fundar, “to found”, do exist in English. This
viewing and absorbing the history of philosophy. complicates the translation problem. Here the most
At the same time, it presents satisfying answers to natural English rendering is made in each case, but
the great philosophical questions, and reveals how the reader should be aware that “to ground” and “to
many of the problems of the past were in fact found” and their derivative forms are essentially
pseudo-problems arising from deep-seated misun- synonymous and have been used interchangeably.
derstandings, especially of the nature of human Inteligir. Translated as ‘to know intellec-
intellection as sentient. tively’ or ‘intellective knowing’. This translation is
based on Zubiri’s own use of the terms intelección
and intelleción sentiente to refer to the action of
Acknowledgement inteligir. The Spanish word inteligir is not in
Special thanks is owed to Professor Gary common usage and does not appear in the diction-
Gurtler of Boston College, who graciously read the ary of the Real Academia (1992 edition). It derives
entire translation and suggested innumerable from the Latin intelligere, and is related to the
changes in terminology, phraseology, and sense of English ‘intelligence’. Inteligir in its various forms
passages. But for his skills and great labor, this is a technical term in this book, which Zubiri uses
translation would be much poorer. Of course, no to refer to all three of the modes of human intelli-
 TRANSLATOR’S INTRODUCTION xix

gence: primordial apprehension, logos, and reason. not synonymous with ‘transcendental’. It does not
His usage, therefore, is broader than what is nor- mean “commonness”, or that in which all things
mally referred to by ‘intelligence’ and this should coincide, as in Medieval philosophy. This notion
be borne in mind when reading the book. Note that implicitly grounded transcendence in content.
English has no verb ‘to intelligence’, and a further Rather, transcendentality refers to formality of oth-
problem is that ‘intelligence’ in modern-day Eng- erness, not content, and describes the open respec-
lish tends to be associated with “intelligence quo- tivity of things in the world.2
tient”. There is a temptation to translate inteligir
as ‘to understand’; however, a very important rea- Veridictar. This is a term with an obvious lit-
son militates against this translation: Zubiri himself eral meaning, “to speak truth”. Though it does not
does not use the Spanish verb entender, ‘to under- exist in English, the form “veridictance”, meaning
stand’, to do the work of inteligir, though he could “speaking the truth”, was created to avoid unnatu-
have done so. He reserves this word for its normal ral complex phraseology.
use, and indeed he carefully distinguishes intellec- Verificar. Literally, “to truthify”. The term is
tive knowing and understanding in the General rendered here as “to make truth”.
Conclusion of the book, where he points out that
Latin has only one word, intellectus, to do the job
of both, which has led to a great deal of confusion.1
Schematic Outline of Sentient Intelligence
“La” realidad. Translated as “reality itself”,
as distinguished from simple “reality”. It usually As an aid to reading and navigating this ex-
occurs as en “la” realidad, ”in reality itself”, con- tensive and difficult work, the schematic outline on
trasted with en realidad, “in reality”. These terms the following pages is offered. Readers may also
refer to two different levels of knowing reality. find the index, which begins on page 369, to be
helpful as well. In the translated text, page num-
Talitativo. Literally, the term means “such- bers from the original Spanish edition are given in
ness” or “such-making”, and with the idea of the curly braces, e.g., {221}. Note that Inteligencia
English “such-and-such”. These expressions, Sentiente was originally issued in three separate
rather than the literal “talitative”, are used here. volumes, so these curly brace page numbers start
Transcendentalidad. A neologism which is over at the beginning of each of the three parts.

1 2
p. 363. Refer to the discussion on pp. 43-46.
 Schematic Outline of Sentient Intelligence

xx
Intelligence and Reality (Part 1)

Intellection as Act: Apprehension (I)

Sensible Apprehension (II)

Apprehension of Apprehension of Reality (III,2)

Stimulation (III,1)

Structure of Apprehension of Reality:

Sentient Intellection (IV)

Impression of Essential Nature of Idea of

Reality (IV,1) Sentient Intel- Reality
lection (V) (VI)

Structure of Impression
of Reality (IV,2)

Reality in Sentient Intellection:

Real Truth (VII)

Primary Mode of Intellection:

Primordial Apprehension of Reality (VIII)

Ulterior Modes of Sentient Intellection and

Intellection (IX) Human Structures (X)

Logos (Part 2) Reason (Part 3)

 Introduction (I) Introduction (I)

Sec. 1 Intellection of Things in Field of Reality

Sec. 1 Progression of Intellective Sec. 2 Structure of Rational

Field of Knowing Intellection: Knowing
Real Intellectively Known in Field
Reality (II) Manner: Sentient Logos (III)
What is
Knowing?
General Strict Structure Field of Basic Structure (V)
Char. Concept of Field of Intellection of Logos (III.2) What is Progression as Formal Object of
(II.1) of Field Reality (III.1) Progression? Intellection Rational Activity
(II.2) (II.3) (II) (III) (IV) Formal Structure of
Knowing
(VI)

Intellective Knowing Thinking Qua

Qua Activity: Intellective:
Sec. 2, 3 Formal Structure of Sentient Logos Thinking Reason Objectuality Method Rational
(III.1) (III.2) (VI.1) (VI.2) Truth
(VI.3)
2. Dynamic 3. Medial

I. What it is I. What is a I. Truth in

Stepping Back Intellection by Determination Sentient method? reason
(IV) Stepping Back of Logos in Logos and
(V) Itself (VI) Truth (VII)
II. Transformation of a II. Structure of II. Essence of
field thing into a real the method truth in finding
object
What is Forms of Modes of What is Truth, III. Intrinsic
Affirming? Affirmation Affirmation Truth? Reality, character of
(V.1) (V.2) (V.3) (VII.1) Being (VII.2) rational truth

General Conclusion: Unity of Intellection

Problem of Unity of Intellection

(Part 3, VII)

Formal Structure of Unity of Sentient Intellection

(Part 3, VIII)

Modal Unity of the act Modal Unity of Unity of Intellective

xxi
(VIII.1) Intellective Knowing Knowing as
(VIII.2) Intellective State
(VI.2) (VIII.3)
Sentient Intelligence
{9}

AUTHOR’S PREFACE

I publish this book on the subject of intelligence to this formality. I will return shortly to these ideas. For
many years after having published a work on the topic of this reason, the presumed critical priority of knowing with
essence. This sequence is not merely chronological; respect to reality, i.e., with respect to the known, is in the
rather, it has an intrinsic meaning the clarification of final analysis nothing but a type of timid stammering in
which is by no means superfluous. What does ‘after’ sig- the enterprise of philosophizing. It is akin to the case of
nify here? someone who wishes to open a door and spends hours
studying the movement of the muscles of the hand; most
For many readers, my book On Essence lacked a
likely he would never manage to open the door. Ulti-
foundation because they felt that the task of knowing what
mately, this critical idea of the priority of knowing has
reality is cannot be brought to its conclusion without a
never led to a knowledge of the real by itself, and when it
previous study of what it is possible for us to know. This
did lead there, it was only at the expense of being un-
is true with respect to certain concrete problems. But to
faithful to its own critical principles. Nor could matters
affirm it in the most general way with respect to all
be otherwise, because knowing and reality stem from the
knowing of reality as such is something quite different.
same root. For this reason, the fact that I publish a study
This latter affirmation is an idea which, in various forms,
on the subject of intelligence after having published a
constitutes the thesis animating almost all of philosophy
study on the subject of essence does not mean that I am
from Descartes to Kant: it is the notion of “critical phi-
filling some unsatisfied necessity. Rather, it manifests that
losophy”. The foundation of all philosophy would be
the study of knowing is not prior to the study of reality.
“critique”, the discerning of what can be known. None-
The ‘after’ to which {11} I alluded earlier is thus not
theless, I think that this is incorrect. Certainly the investi-
simply chronological but is the active rejection of any cri-
gation of reality requires us to lay hold of some conception
tique of knowledge as the preliminary ground for the
of what knowing is. But is this necessarily prior? I do not
study of reality.
believe so, because it is no less certain that an investiga-
tion about the possibilities of knowing cannot be brought But this is not all. I intentionally employ the expres-
to a conclusion, and in fact {10} never has been brought sion ‘to know’ in a somewhat indeterminate fashion, be-
to a conclusion, without appeal to some conception of re- cause modern philosophy does not begin with knowing as
ality. The study On Essence contains many affirmations such, but with the mode of knowing which is called
about the possibility of knowing. But at the same time it ‘knowledge.’ Critical philosophy is thus the Critique of
is certain that the study of knowing and its possibilities Knowledge, of episteme, or as it is usually called, ‘episte-
includes many concepts about reality. The fact is that an mology’, the science of knowledge. Now, I think that this
intrinsic priority of knowing over reality or reality over is an exceedingly serious problem, because knowledge is
knowing is impossible. Knowing and reality, in a strictly not something which rests upon itself. And by that I am
and rigorous sense, stem from the same root; neither has not referring to the determining psychological, sociologi-
priority over the other. And this is true not simply be- cal, and historical factors of knowing. To be sure, a psy-
cause of the de facto conditions of our investigations, but chology of knowledge, a sociology of knowing, and a his-
because of an intrinsic and formal condition of the very toricity of knowing are quite essential. Nonetheless, they
idea of reality and of knowing. Reality is the formal char- are not primary, because what is primary in knowledge is
acter—the formality—according to which what is appre- being a mode of intellection. Hence every epistemology
hended is something “in its own right,” something de presupposes an investigation of what, structurally and
suyo.1 And to know is to apprehend something according formally, the intelligence, the Nous, is; i.e., it presupposes
a study of ‘noology’. The vague idea of ‘knowing’ is not
1
[The Spanish de suyo is an extremely important technical term in Zubiri’s made concrete first in the sense of knowledge, but in in-
writings. It traces to the Latin ex se, and denotes that the impression of
reality “comes from” and “out of” the reality of the encounted other. It
therefore connotes a certain independence and self-sufficiency. The Eng- ing Zubiri intends; therefore the original Spanish expression is left
lish ‘from itself,’ a literal translation, does not capture the range of mean- throughout the text.—Trans.]

3
4 AUTHOR’S PREFACE

tellection as such. This does not refer to a logic or psy- only not opposed, but indeed constitute in their intrinsic
chology of intelligence, but to the formal structure of un- and formal unity a single and unitary act of apprehension.
derstanding. This act qua sentient is impression; qua intellective it is
apprehension of reality. Therefore the unitary and unique
What then is understanding, knowing? Throughout
act of sentient intellection is the impression of reality.
the course of its history, philosophy has attended most
Intellection is a mode of sensing, and sensing in man is a
carefully to the acts of intellection (conceiving, judging,
mode of intellection.
etc.) as opposed to the distinct real data which the senses
submit to us. Sensing is one thing, we are told, and un- What is the formal nature of this act? It is what I
derstanding another. This manner of focusing on the call the mere actuality of the real. Actuality is not, as the
problem of intelligence contains at bottom an affirmation: Latins thought, something’s character of being in act. To
understanding is posterior to sensing, and this posteriority be a dog in act is to be the formal plenitude of that in
is an opposition. Such has been the initial thesis of phi- which being a dog consists. For that reason I refer to this
losophy {12} since Parmenides, and it has hovered im- character rather as actuity. Actuality on the other hand is
perturbably, with a thousand variants, over all of Euro- not the character of something in act but rather of some-
pean philosophy. thing which is actual—two very distinct things. Viruses
But there is something quite vague about all of this, have had actuity for many millions of years, but only to-
because we have not been told in what the understanding day have acquired an actuality which previously they did
as such consists formally. We have only been told that the not possess. But actuality is not always something extrin-
senses give to the intelligence real sensed things so that sic to the actuity of the real, as it was in the case of the
the understanding may conceptualize and judge them. viruses; it can be something intrinsic to real things.
But despite this we are told neither what sensing is for- When a man is present because it is he who makes him-
mally nor, most importantly, what intellection or under- self present, we say that this man is actual in that in
standing is formally. I believe that understanding consists which he makes himself present. Actuality is a temporary
formally in apprehending the real as real, and that sensing being, but a being present through oneself, through one’s
is apprehending the real in impression. Here ‘real’ signi- own proper reality. Therefore actuality pertains to the
fies that the characters which the apprehended thing has very reality of the actual, but neither adds to it, subtracts
in the apprehension also pertain to it as its own, de suyo, from it, nor modifies any of its real notae or notes. So,
and not just as a function of some vital response. This human intellection is formally the mere actualization of
does not refer to a real thing in the acceptation of some- the real in the sentient intelligence. {14}
thing beyond apprehension, but rather inasmuch as it is Here we have the idea, the only idea which there is
apprehended as something which is its own. It is what I in this book throughout its hundreds of pages. These
call “formality of reality.” It is because of this that the pages are nothing but an explication of that one idea.
study of intellection and the study of reality have the same This explication is not a question of conceptual reasoning,
root. And this is decisive, because the senses give us, in but of a analysis of the facts of intellection. To be sure, it
human sensing, real things—albeit with all their limita- is a complicated analysis and one which is not easy; for
tions—but real things nonetheless. Consequently the ap- this reason there have been inevitable repetitions which at
prehension of real things as sensed is a sentient apprehen- times may become monotonous. But it is mere analysis.
sion; but insofar as it is an apprehension of realities, it is
an intellective apprehension. Whence human sensing and Intellection has distinct modes, that is, there are dis-
intellection are not two numerically distinct acts, each tinct modes of the mere actualization of the real. There is
complete in its order; but rather they constitute two mo- a primary and radical mode, the apprehension of the real
ments of a single act of sentient apprehension of the real: actualized in and through itself: this is what I call the
this is sentient intelligence. And this does not refer to the primordial apprehension of the real. Its study is therefore
fact that our intellection is primarily directed to the sen- a rigorous analysis of the ideas of reality and of intellec-
sible, but rather to intellection and {13} sensing in their tion. But there are other modes of actualization. They are
proper formal structure. Nor does it refer to understand- the modes according to which the real is actualized not
ing the sensible and sensing the intelligible, but rather to only in and through itself, but also among other things
the fact that understanding and sensing structurally con- and in the world. This does not refer to some other actu-
stitute—if one desires to employ an expression and con- alization but to a development of the primordial actuali-
cept improper in this context—a single faculty, the sen- zation: it is therefore a reactualization. As the primordial
tient intelligence. Human sensing and intellection are not intellection is sentient, it follows that these reactualiza-
 AUTHOR’S PREFACE 5

tions are also sentient. They are two: logos and reason, Today the world is undeniably engulfed by a perva-
sentient logos and sentient reason. Knowledge is nothing sive atmosphere of sophistry. As in the time of Plato and
but a culmination of logos and reason. It would not be Aristotle, we are inundated by discourse and propaganda.
profitable to say here what logos and reason are; I will do But the truth is that we are installed modestly, but irrefu-
so in the course of this study. tably, in reality. Therefore it is more necessary now than
ever to bring to conclusion the effort to submerge our-
The study thus comprises three parts:
selves in the real in which we already are, in order to ex-
First Part: Intelligence and Reality. tract its reality with rigor, even though that may be only a
Second Part: Logos. few poor snatches of its intrinsic intelligibility.
Third Part: Reason.
Through intellection, we are unmistakably installed
in reality. Logos and reason do not need to come to reality
but rather are born of reality and in it. {15} Fuenterrabia. August, 1980. {16}
 Part I

Intelligence and Reality

 {19}

CHAPTER I
INTELLECTION AS ACT: APPREHENSION

In this first part of the book I propose to study what of the internal structure of the act of intellective knowing.
we call ‘intellective knowing.’1 From the very origins of Every metaphysics of the intelligence presupposes an
philosophy the opposition of intellection to what we term analysis of intellection. To be sure, at various points I
‘sensing’ has been taken as the point of departure. Intel- have seen myself moved to metaphysical conceptualiza-
lection and sensation would thus be two forms, for the tions, which I have deemed important. But when doing
most part opposed. . . , of what? Greek and Medieval so, I have taken great care to indicate that in these points I
philosophy understood intellection and sensing as acts of am dealing with metaphysics and not mere intellection as
two essentially distinct faculties. The opposition of intel- act. That is, I am dealing with an analysis of acts them-
lection and sensing would thus be the opposition of two selves. They are salient facts, and we ought to take them
faculties. In order to simplify the discussion I shall call in and for themselves and not in terms of any theory, of
‘thing’ that which is sensed and understood. This has whatever order it may be.
nothing to do with ‘thing’ in the sense of what that word
But here a second aberration appears. In Greek and
means today when one speaks of “thing-ism,” wherein the
medieval philosophy, philosophy drifted from act to fac-
thing is opposed to something which has a mode of being
ulty. But in modern philosophy, since the time of Des-
“not-thinglike,” so to speak, for example human life.
cartes, the drift has been in the other direction. This false
Rather, I here employ the term ‘thing’ in its most trivial
step is within the very act of intellection. Intellection and
sense as merely synonymous with ‘something’. Now,
sensing are considered as distinct ways of becoming aware
Greek and Medieval philosophy considered intellection
of things. So in modern philosophy, intellection and
and sensing as acts of two faculties, each determined by
sensing are two modes of {21} such becoming aware, i.e.
the action of things. But whether or not this is true, it is a
two modes of consciousness. Leaving aside sensing for
conception which cannot serve us as {20} a positive base
the moment, we are told that intellection is consciousness,
precisely because it treats of faculties. A faculty is discov-
so that intellection as act is an act of consciousness. This
ered in its acts. Hence it is to the very mode of intellective
is the idea which has run through all of modern philoso-
knowing and sensing, and not to the faculties, which we
phy and which culminates in the phenomenology of
must basically attend. In other words, my study is going
Husserl. Husserl’s philosophy seeks to be an analysis of
to fall back upon the acts of intellective knowing and
consciousness and of its acts.
sensing inasmuch as they are acts (kath’ energeian), and
not inasmuch as they are faculties (kata dynamin). So Nonetheless, this conception falls back upon the es-
these acts will not be considered as acts of a faculty, but as sence of intellection as act. When it rejects the idea of the
acts in and for themselves. Throughout this book, then, I act of a faculty, what philosophy has done is substantify
shall refer to “intellection” itself, and not to the faculty of the ‘becoming aware of’, thus making of intellection an
intellection, that is, to the intelligence. If at times I speak act of consciousness. But this implies two ideas: (1) that
of ‘intelligence’, the expression does not mean a faculty consciousness is something which carries out acts; and (2)
but the abstract character of intellection itself. Therefore I that what is formally constitutive of the act of intellection
do not refer to a metaphysics of the intelligence, but rather is the ‘becoming aware of.’ But, neither of these two af-
firmations is true because neither corresponds to the facts.
1
[‘Intellective knowing’ is used to translate Zubiri’s expression inteligir, a In the first place, consciousness has no substantiality
verb derived from the Latin intelligere; it cannot be rendered literally, but whatever and, therefore, it is not something which can
means the act of knowing in which one’s intelligence, in the most general
sense, is involved. Inteligir is broader than the English understanding,
execute acts. Consciousness is just making awareness
though at times it has that meaning.—Trans.] itself into a substance. But the only thing we have as fact

9
10 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

is not “the” becoming aware of or “the” consciousness, but ness is “awareness-of”, and this moment of the ‘of’ is pre-
conscious acts of quite diverse nature. Under the pretext cisely what constitutes intentionality. The “being here-
of not appealing to a “faculty”, the character of some of and-now present” in which the intellective act consists
our acts is substantified and then these acts are converted physically is a “being here-and-now present” in which
into acts of a type of “super-faculty,” which would be con- {23} I am “with” the thing and “in” the thing (not “of”
sciousness. And this is not fact, but only a grand theory. the thing), and in which the thing is “remaining” in my
intellection. Intellection as act is not formally intentional.
In the second place, it is untrue that what constitutes
It is a physical “being here-and-now present”. The unity
intellection is awareness, because that is always a becom-
of this act of “being” as act is what constitutes apprehen-
ing aware “of” something which is here-and-now present2
sion. Intellection is not the act of a faculty or of con-
to conciousness. And this being here-and-now present is
sciousness, but rather is in itself an act of apprehension.
not determined by the being aware. A thing is not present
Apprehension is not a theory but a fact: the fact that I am
because I am aware of it, but rather I am aware of it be-
now aware of something which is present to me. Appre-
cause it is already {22} present. To be sure, this concerns
hension is, insofar as it refers to the moment of the “being
a being here-and-now present in the intellection, where I
here-and-now present”, an act of grasping the present, a
am aware of what is present; but the being here-and-now
grasping in which I am aware of what is grasped. It is an
present of the thing is not a moment formally identical to
act in which what is present to me has been apprehended
the being aware itself, nor is it grounded there. Hence,
precisely and formally because it is present to me. Appre-
within the act of intellection, modern philosophy has gone
hension is the conscious and “presenting” act. And this
astray over the question of being here-and-now present,
‘and’ is precisely the unitary and physical essence itself of
and has attended only to the realizing. But this awareness
apprehension. To understand something is to apprehend
is not in and through itself an act; it is only a moment of
this something intellectively.
the act of intellection. This is the great aberration of
modern philosophy with respect to the analysis of intel- We must, then, analyze intellection as apprehension.
lection. This analysis sets out to determine the essential nature of
intellection as such, in the sense of its constitutive nature,
We ask ourselves then, what is the proper nature of
and it must fall back upon intellection as apprehension, as
intellective knowng as act? Intellection is certainly a be-
I have just said. But since man has many forms of intel-
coming aware of, but it is an awareness of something
lection, the analysis which I now set myself can be carried
which is already present. It is in the indivisible unity of
out along quite different paths. One path consists of
these two moments that intellection consists. Greek and
making a survey of the various types of intellection, trying
medieval philosophy sought to explain the presentation of
to obtain by comparison what these types of intellection
something as an actuation of the thing on the faculty of
are in and through themselves. This is the path of induc-
intellective knowing. Modern philosophy ascribes intel-
tion, but it is not relevant to our problem because what it
lection to awareness. Now, it is necessary to take the act
would give us is a general concept of intellection. But
of intellection in the intrinsic unity of its two moments,
this not what we seek. We seek rather the constitutive
but only as moments of it and not as determinations of
nature, i.e. the essential nature of {24} intellection in and
things or of consciousness. In intellection, I “am” aware
through itself. Induction would give us only a concept,
of something at that moment which “is” present to me.
but what we seek is the “physical” nature of intellection,
The indivisible unity of these two moments consists, then,
that is the nature of the apprehensive act which constitutes
in “being here-and-now present”. This being here-and-
intellection as such. A general concept does not give us
now present is of “physical” character and not merely an
the physical reality of intellection. And this is especially
intentional aspect of intellection. ‘Physical’ is the origi-
true because it would be necessary for any survey of acts
nal and ancient expression for designating something
of intellection to be exhaustive, and that we could never
which is not merely conceptual, but real. It is therefore
guarantee. So it is necessary to embark upon another
opposed to what is merely intentional, that is, to what
road. The diverse types of intellection are not merely dis-
consists only in being the terminus of awareness. Aware-
tinct “types”. As we shall see at the proper time, in them
we treat of “modes” of intellective apprehension. Hence
2
[Zubiri is here using one of the two Spanish forms of the verb “to be”, the analysis must bring us to the primary mode of intel-
estar, which refers to temporary or actual being at the moment, as op-
lective apprehension and enable us to determine the so-
posed to ser, which means being in a more permanent, long-term sense.
The sense of estar in this context is “to be present here-and-now”, and that called ‘types of intellection’ as modalizations of this pri-
expression is used here and throughout the text as necessary to clarify the mary apprehension. What we will thus achieve is not a
meaning.—Trans.]
 INTELLECTION AS ACT 11

general concept of intellection, but a determination of the analyzing the nature of sensible and intellective apprehen-
constitutive nature of the diverse modes of intellective sion in and through themselves. And this is possible be-
apprehension. Now, “constitutive nature” is just the es- cause sensible apprehension and intellective apprehen-
sential physical nature of intellection; i.e., the problem of sion—as has been observed on many occasions—fre-
what intellective knowing is, is but the problem of the quently have the same object. I sense color and under-
determination of the primary mode of intellection. That is stand what this color is, too. In this case, the two aspects
what I intend to deal with in the first part of this book. are distinguished not as types, but as distinct modes of
To begin, let us take up an idea that was suggested at apprehension. In order, then, to determine the constitu-
the beginning of this chapter, but which I deliberately left tive nature of intellective knowing it is necessary to ana-
aside at the time. Ever since its origins, philosophy has lyze above all the difference between intellective knowing
begun by setting what we call ‘intellective knowing’ and sensing as a modal difference within the apprehension
against what we call ‘sensing’. But however strange it of the same object; for example, of color. {26}
may seem, philosophy has never addressed the question of To determine the constitutive structure of the act of
what intellective knowing is, in the formal sense. It has intellective apprehension, it is unnecessary but very useful
limited itself to studying diverse intellective acts, but has to begin by saying what sensible apprehension is as such.
not told us what intellective knowing is. And what is This, of course, can be done in many ways. One, by ana-
particularly strange is that the same has occurred {25} lyzing the modal difference of these apprehensions in the
with sensing. The diverse sensings have been studied apprehension of the same object. But in order to facilitate
according to the diverse “senses” which man possesses. the work it is more useful to put sensible apprehension in
But if one asks in what the formal nature of sensing con- and of itself before our eyes; that is, to say what sensing
sists, i.e., what sensing as such is, we find that ultimately is. As sensible apprehension is common to man and ani-
the question has not been posed. And there follows a con- mals, it seems that to determine intellective apprehension
sequence which, to my way of thinking, is an extremely starting from sensible apprehension would be to start from
important matter. Since what intellective knowing and the animal as the foundation of human intellection. But
sensing as such are has not been determined, it follows rather than starting from the animal in this sense, we seek
that their presumed opposition is left hanging. To what only to clarify human intellection by contrasting it with
and in what sense can intellective knowing and sensing be “pure” animal sensing.
opposed if we are not told beforehand in what each for-
mally consists? Finally, intellection as act is an act of apprehension
and this apprehension is a mode of sensible apprehension
I am not going to enter into any type of dialectical itself. Therefore we must ask ourselves:
discussion of concepts, but rather limit myself to the basic
facts. They are what will lead us in our treatment of the Chapter II: What is sensible apprehension?
question. Chapter III: What are the modes of sensible appre-
Intellection, I said, is an act of apprehension. Now hension?
this act of apprehensive character pertains as well to
Chapter IV: In what does intellective apprehension
sensing. Hence it is in apprehension as such where we
consist formally?
must anchor both the difference between and essential
nature of intellective knowing and sensing. This does not Only after answering these questions can we pene-
mean achieving a general concept of apprehension, but of trate further into the analysis of intellection itself.
 {27}

CHAPTER II
SENSIBLE APPREHENSION

We ask ourselves what sensible apprehension is. As function and action in an animal. Muscular contraction,
I have just said, sensible apprehension is common to man for example, is a function. The subject, let us call it that,
and animal. Hence, when I refer to sensible apprehension of the function is an anatomic-physiological structure; for
in this chapter, I will be speaking indifferently of man and example, a striated muscle fiber. But action is something
animal, according to which is most convenient in the par- whose {29} subject is not a structure, but the animal as a
ticular case. whole. For example, fleeing, attacking, etc., are actions.
With the same functions the animal carries out the most
Sensible apprehension is what constitutes sensing.
diverse actions of its life. So, excitation is a moment of a
Therefore our first task must be to clarify what sensing is.
function; arousal is a moment of an action. This does not
Only then will we be able to ask ourselves what consti-
preclude an action from initiating a functional act in some
tutes sensible apprehension as a moment of sensing. {28}
cases. But then it is clear that the excitation is only a spe-
cial mode of arousal. Arousal is the prelude to an animal
action process, whatever may be the mode in which it
takes place.
§1
2. This arousal rests upon the state in which the
SENSING animal finds itself. The animal has at every instant a state
of vital tone. Arousal modifies that vital tone, and this
constitutes the second moment of the sentient process:
Sensing is, first of all, a process; it is a sentient proc- tonic modification. Modification is determined by arousal.
ess. As a process, sensing has three essential moments. But this does not mean that modification is a second mo-
ment in the sense of a temporal succession. This would be
1. In an animal (whether human or non-human), the
to again confuse arousal and excitation. Arousal can de-
sentient process is aroused by something which at times is
pend on an endogenic factor which can be in a certain
exogenic and at times endogenic. This is the moment of
mode connatural to the animal. In such a case, it is the
arousal. I call it thus so as not to limit myself to what is
tonic state of the animal which, in one or another form,
usually termed ‘excitation’. Excitation is a standard con-
has chronologically preceeded the arousal. This is what
cept in animal psychophysiology. It therefore has a char-
occurs, for example, with some instinctive acts. But even
acter which is almost exclusively biochemical. Roughly
in this case, the moment of arousal is one thing, and the
speaking, it comprises that which initiates a physiological
moment of tonic modification another.
process. But here I am not referring exactly to physio-
logical activity. Sensing as a process is not just a physio- 3. The animal responds to the tonic modification
logical activity, but is the process which constitutes the thus aroused. This is the moment of response. Let us not
life—in a certain sense the entire life—of an animal. confuse response with a reaction of the so-called motor
With the same excitations, the animal carries out actions impulses. The action of the impulses is always just a
which are extremely diverse. And these actions are de- functional moment; but response is an actional moment.
termined not only by physiological activity, but by every- With the same motor impulses, the responses can be quite
thing the animal apprehends sentiently; for example, its diverse. The apprehension {30} of a prey, for example,
prey. And this moment of apprehension is what consti- determines the attack response. This does not refer sim-
tutes arousal. Arousal is everything that initiates animal ply to a play of the motor impulses. The response can be
action. In my courses I am accustomed to distinguish quite varied. It can even include doing nothing. But qui-

13
14 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

escence is not quietude, that is, an act of the motor im- We may ask ourselves, then, in what the structure of
pulses, but a mode of response. sensible apprehension consists, considered precisely and
formally as sentient apprehension. It consists formally in
Consequently, sensing is a process. This sentient
being impressive apprehension. Here we have what is
process is strictly unitary: it consists in the intrinsic and
formally constitutive of sensing: impression. Ancient as
radical unity, in the indissoluble unity, of the three mo-
well as modern philosophy has either paid little attention
ments: arousal, tonic modification, and response. It
{32} to the nature of this impression, or more commonly
would be an error to think that sensing consists only in
has paid attention to it but without making an analysis of
arousal, and that the other two moments are only conse-
its formal structure. Philosophers have typically limited
quent upon sensing. On the contrary: the three moments,
themselves to describing distinct impressions. But, it is
in their essential in indissoluble unity, are what strictly
absolutely necessary to rigorously conceptualize what an
constitute sensing. As we shall see in a later chapter, this
impression is, that is, in what its nature as an impression
unity is of decisive importance for our problem. It con-
consists. Only thus will we be able to speak of sensing in
stitutes what is specific about animality.
a creative way.
Here I do not intend to study the course of this proc-
Structurally, an impression has three constitutive
ess, but its structure as a process. This processive struc-
moments:
ture depends upon the formally constitutive moment of
sensing as such. And sensing, in virtue of its very formal 1. Impression is above all affection of the sentient by
structure, is what in a certain fashion determines the what is sensed. Colors, sounds, an animal’s internal tem-
structure of the sentient process. Let us, then, consider perature, etc., affect the sentient being. Here ‘affection’
these two points. {31} does not refer to the usual moment of sentiment; that
would be an affect. Impression is an affection, but it is not
an affect. In virtue of this affective moment, we say that
the sentient being “suffers” the impression. Since its ori-
§2 gins in Greece, philosophy has for this reason character-
ized impressions as pathemata. They would thus be op-
THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF SENSING posed to thoughts, which are proper to a thinking intel-
lection without pathos; so thinking intellection would thus
be apathes, impassive. Here these unmodified characteri-
The processive unity of sensing is determined by the zations comprise a description (inaccurate to be sure) but
formal structure of arousal. That which arouses the sen- not a formal determination of what impression is. It can
tient process is the apprehension of the “arousing agent”. be said that the totality of modern as well as ancient phi-
And since what this apprehension determines is a sentient losophy has scarcely conceptualized impression other than
process, it follows that the apprehension itself which as affection. But this is insufficient.
arouses it should be called, strictly speaking, ‘sensible 2. Impression is not mere affection, it is not mere
apprehension.’ Sensible apprehension, then, has two pathos of the sentient being; rather, this affection has,
aspects. First, there is that of determining the sentient essentially and constitutively, the character of making that
process in its moment of modification and response; this which “impresses” present to us. This is the moment of
is sensible apprehension as arousing. In its second aspect, otherness. Impression is the presentation of something
sensible apprehension has a formal structure of its own, other in affection. It is otherness in affection. This
and in virtue of that sets the sensing process in motion. “other” I have called and will continue {33} to call the
Our problem at the moment is centered on the formal note. Here ‘note’ does not designate any type of indica-
structure of sensible apprehension. In the following para- tive sign as does, etymologically, the Latin noun nota;
graph we shall see how this formal structure determines rather, it is a participle, that which is “noted” (gnoto) as
the processive structure of sensing. opposed to that which is unnoticed—provided that we
Since what determines the sentient process is the eliminate any allusion to cognition (that would be rather
formal structure of apprehension, it is proper to call this the cognitum) as well as to knowing (which is what gave
apprehension “sensing as such.” Hence, when I speak of rise to notion and notice). It is necessary to attend only to
sensing without further qualification I shall be referring to what is simply “noted”. This could also be called “qual-
sensing as the formal structure of the sentient apprehen- ity”; but a note is not always of qualitative nature. If I see
sion. three points, “three” is not a quality, but it is a note.
 SENSIBLE APPREHENSION 15

Moreover, one must shun the thought that a note is neces- This “other”, i.e., this note, above all has a proper
sarily a note “of” something; for example, that a color is a content: such-and-such color, such-and-such hardness,
color of a thing. If I see a simple color, this color is not such-and-such temperature, etc. That is what Greek and
“of” a thing but “is” in itself the thing; the color is noted medieval philosophy always emphasized. But to my way
in itself. It is true that quite often I call notes ‘qualities’, of thinking, it is essentially {35} inadequate, because this
but only in a wide sense. In the strict sense, a note is not content, this note, is not just effectively other, but rather is
a quality, but something merely noted; it is purely and present as other. That is what I express by saying that the
simply what is present in my impression. Using different content is something which “is situated”1 before the sen-
words, the Greeks and Medievals suggested this, but did tient being as something other. And this is not a mere
not go beyond the suggestion. It is necessary to anchor conceptual subtlety, but is, as we shall see, an essential
reflection on otherness itself. But before doing so let us physical moment of otherness. According to this aspect of
point out a third characteristic of impression, one which to “other”, a note not only has a content, but also has a mode
my way of thinking is essential. of “being situated” in the impression.
3. I refer to the force of imposition with which the What is this mode? It is just the mode of being
note present in the affection imposes itself upon the sen- other: it is the aspect of independence which the content
tient being. It is this which arouses the process of sensing. has with respect to the sentient being. The content of a
In general, it is a conjunction of notes rather than an iso- note “is situated”, and insofar as it “is situated” it is inde-
lated one; thus, for example, we have the saying “a cat pendent of the sentient being in whose impression it “is
scalded with hot water flees”. The water sensed in im- situated”. Here, independence does not signify a thing
pression “imposes” itself upon the animal. This force of “apart” from my impression (that is what the Greeks and
imposition can be quite varied; i.e. the same impressive medievals believed), but rather is the content itself present
otherness can impose itself in very different manners. in the apprehension as something “autonomous” with re-
{34} But this force of imposition has nothing to do with spect to the sentient being. A color, a sound, have an
force in the sense of intensity of affection. A very power- autonomy proper to the visual and auditory affections,
ful affection can have a quite small force of imposition. respectively. “Being situated” is being present as autono-
And, conversely, a weak affection can have a great force mous. This character of autonomy is not identical to the
of imposition. content, because as we shall see in the following chapter
the same content can have different ways of being situ-
The intrinsic unity of these three moments is what
ated, different forms of independence, and different
constitutes impression. But ancient as well as modern
autonomies. To be autonomous is, then, a form of being
philosophy has largely restricted its attention to affection.
situated. In virtue of it I shall say that the “other”, the
It has pointed out (though rather vaguely) what I have
note present in impression, has a proper form of autonomy
termed “otherness”, but without centering its attention on
in addition to a content. For that reason I call this mo-
otherness as such. Furthermore, it has scarcely examined
ment formality. Formality does not refer to a metaphysi-
the force of imposition at all. These three moments are
cal concept as in the Middle Ages, but to something com-
essential and, as we shall see in the following chapter,
pletely different, to a sentient moment of descriptive char-
their unity is decisive. It is necessary, then, to keep our
acter.
attention focussed longer on otherness and on the force of
imposition. This is especially true in virtue of the fact Both content and formality depend in large measure
that what renders the distinct modes of apprehension spe- upon the nature of the animal. The note sensed {36} is
cific is precisely the distinct modes of otherness. always “other” than the animal; but what its content may
be depends in each case on the animal itself, because the
Analysis of otherness. This analysis will reveal to us content depends on the system of receptors which the
first the proper structure of otherness, and second the animal possesses. A mole does not have color impres-
unity of this structure. sions, for example. But, even with the same receptors,
A) Otherness is not just the abstract character of be- and therefore with the same content, this content can “be
ing other. This is because otherness does not consist in an situated” in different forms. The “being situated” does not
affection making something present to us merely as
“other”; for example, this sound or this green color.
1
Rather, it makes this “other” present to us in a precise [This is a rendering of the Spanish verb quedar, a technical term difficult to
translate in this context but which can mean “to remain”, “to be situated”,
form: the other, but “other as such”. or just “to be” in the sense of place.—trans.]
16 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

depend on the receptors themselves, but rather on the Formalization precisely constitutes the “unity” of the
mode in which the sentient being has them in its sensing. sensed content. Thus, these distinct notes can have an
To this mode of “having them [to or in] itself”2 the word outline, a type of closure. These unities thus closed can
‘habitude’ should be applied. I will explain myself a bit have the character of autonomous unities; they are then
later. Habitude is neither custom nor habit, but the mode autonomous constellations. Their apprehension thus is not
of having-them-itself. Customs and habits are habitude simple sensation; it is “perception”. The elemental notes
precisely because they are modes of having-them-itself. are sensed, the constellations of notes are perceived, etc.
But the converse is not true: not every mode of having- An animal not only apprehends sounds, colors, etc., but
them-itself is a custom or habit. Now, the terminus of a also apprehends, for example, its “prey”. The same ele-
receptor is the content; the terminus of a habitude is for- mental notes can comprise different perceptive constella-
mality. Therefore, insofar as formality is determined by tions, i.e., diverse types of unitary content, according to
habitude I shall say that the form of independence, the the nature of the animal. Thus, {38} for example, a crab
form of autonomy as determined by the mode of having- in general perceives the constellation “rock-prey”. But
them-itself of the sentient being, should be termed for- many times it does not perceive the prey by itself (Katz’
malization. Formalization is the modulation of formality, experience), because if the prey is suspended from a
i.e. the modulation of independence, the modulation of string, the crab does not perceive it until it has habituated
autonomy. Otherness does not just make present to us itself to the new constellation “string-prey”. The prey, the
something we call a note, but a note which in one or an- rock, and the string do not have a formal independence in
other way “is situated”. the crab by themselves. For a dog, on the other hand,
there are always three separate and independent constel-
Philosophy has never attended to more than the
lations: prey, rock, string. The fact is that the dog and the
content of an impression; it has always erred with respect
crab have different modes of formalization. The formal-
to formality. And this is very serious, because as we shall
ization, the autonomization of content, now consists in
see in the following chapter, that which renders specific
that the unity of independence concerns the constellation
the distinct modes of apprehension, i.e., the distinct
itself, and not just one or a few notes arbitrarily selected.
modes of impression, is formality. Sensible apprehensions
Formalization has thus modulated the content: from the
are distinguished essentially by the mode according to
elemental it passes to be a totality which may be closed in
which {37} their content is present and is autonomized,
diverse ways. As we shall see in another chapter, this is
i.e., is independent of the sentient being.
decisive.
B) Structural Unity of Otherness. Content and for-
b) But at the same time, content modulates formality
mality are not two moments which are foreign to each
itself. Formalization is, as I said, independence of auto-
other; indeed, they have an essential unity: formalization
nomization. This does not mean an abstract independence,
concerns content, and in turn content concerns the mode
but something very concrete. Independence, stated in a
of being formalized. The two moments of content and
crude way, means that the content is more or less “de-
formality have, then, an intrinsic and radical unity: the
tached” from the apprehending animal. And content
modalization of otherness.
modulates the mode of being detached. Now, the detach-
a) Formality modulates content. An animal, in ef- ment of a color is not the same that of heat. Considering
fect, apprehends notes which we could call elemental; for luminosity, for example, its mode of being “detached” in
example, a color, a sound, an odor, a taste, etc. Certainly an insect is not the same as it is in a higher order meta-
they are not rigorously elemental, because every note has zoan. Nor is the mode of being “detached” of a constella-
at least a quality and an intensity. But for now we shall tion of notes the same as the mode of being detached of an
not discuss that; for the purposes of our question these elemental note. Speaking somewhat coarsely, a tree or a
notes are elemental. The term ‘sensation’ should be ap- ravine is much richer in independence for a chimpanzee
plied to the apprehension of these notes. But, precisely than for a dog.
because these notes are autonomous, i.e., formalized, they
All of this comprises the structural unity of otherness
are independent. And they are so not just with respect to
{39} and this unity, as we see from the examples alluded
the sentient being, but also with respect to other notes.
to, depends on the nature of the animal. There is no doubt
that a color is apprehended in a different way as inde-
2
[A rendering of the compound Spanish participle haberselas which cannot pendent by the retina of a chimpanzee than by that of an
be exactly translated into English because it has several possible mean- insect. Otherness, then, in its intrinsic unity, admits de-
ings, all conflated here.—trans.] grees which are manifested above all in the degree of for-
 SENSIBLE APPREHENSION 17

malization. To the greater degree of formalization corre- structure of motor formalization. A spectacular case is the
sponds the greater independence of content. capacity of a cat hurled into the air to recover its equilib-
rium while falling.
In summary, sensible impression is an impression
which affects the sentient being by making present to it Vital tone itself acquires nuances through formaliza-
that which “impresses”, i.e., a note, in formality of inde- tion. A general feeling of well-being or malaise acquires
pendence with a content which is either elemental (a sin- nuances through mere formalization: a mode of feeling
gle note) or complex (a constellation of notes). In their spiritless or full of life, spiritless in one direction but {41}
otherness, these independent notes impose themselves not in others, a tonality of happiness, etc.—and all of this
with a variable force upon the sentient being. And thus according to qualities and in degrees or diverse forms.
imposed, the impression determines the sensing process:
Formalization, then, concerns sensing as a whole as
arousal, tonic modification, and response. That is what
arousal, as modification of vital tone, and as response.
we must now consider. {40}
B) This demonstrates that some impressions which
are the same by reason of their content, through formal-
ization open up all of the richness of the sentient process
§3 comprising the richness of the life of the animal. The
amplitude of the apprehensive formalization opens up to
STRUCTURE OF THE SENTIENT PROCESS the animal the amplitude of possible responses. This
means that the radical effect of formalization considered
as a process consists in autonomizing relatively among
Sensible apprehension does not only apprehend themselves each of the three moments of the sentient pro-
something impressively; rather, the nature of the sentient cess: the moment of apprehension, the moment of tone,
process, which apprehension determines, will vary ac- and the moment of response. This is what allows us to
cording to the nature of what is apprehended considered speak of each of these three moments by itself. But this
as independent of the apprehendor. autonomization is only relative: it never breaks the struc-
tural unity of the sensing process. In the next chapter we
A) To see this, let us begin with an essential obser-
shall see the very important consequences of this observa-
vation: formalization does not concern just the moment of
tion. Within each of these moments thus autonomized,
apprehension, but the entire sentient process as such, in
formalization continues to determine nuances and indi-
the sense that each one of its three moments is modalized
vidually different aspects. If I have limited myself to the
by formalization.
formalizing aspect of apprehension, it has been on ac-
Above all it is clear that there is formalization in the count of the theme of this book.
moment of response. This is manifested in some altera-
We have thus analyzed, first, the moments of the
tions of the sentient process. Inability to coordinate
sentient process; and second, the formal structure of
movements is not the same as inability to move oneself.
sensing. Finally we have indicated the structural determi-
The capacity of coordination of movement is a formaliza-
nation of the sentient process through formalization.
tion. A lesion of whatever nature which, in a higher ani-
mal such as man, produces changes in coordination, does This formalization is that which renders specific the
not produce paralysis. Not all animals have the same different modes of sensible apprehension. {42}
18 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

{43}

APPENDIX 1
CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT FORMALIZATION

So as not to interrupt the thread of my exposition of produces “informing”; formalization, however, is not pro-
the analysis of sensible apprehension, I have relegated to duction, but just the reverse, a mere “being situated”.
this appendix some considerations which I deem impor-
On the other hand, formalization is not what one
tant, but which in many respects perhaps go beyond the
understands in psychology when speaking of form (Ge-
mere analysis of sensible apprehension.
stalt). In this psychology, form is the total configuration
To begin, it is fitting to explicate the use of the ex- of what is perceived as opposed to what the elemental
pression ‘formalization’. Formalization can mean the sensations of 19th century psychology might have been.
cerebral structure through which we apprehend some But formalization is not Gestalt. In the first place, the
content in accordance with its proper formality. In this elemental sensations themselves are something formal-
sense, formalization is a psycho-biological action. But ized: their content, the note, is apprehended as independ-
formalization can also mean the fact that a content re- ent and, therefore, is formalized. And, in the second
mains in its proper formality. Then formalization is not place, even in the case of a constellation of notes, {45}
an action but a mere “being situated”: it is the unity of formalization does not primarily concern configuration
content and formality. And it is to this sense I refer when but rather autonomization. Configuration is only the re-
speaking here of formalization. I do not refer to structures sult of autonomization. Only because there is independ-
of the brain except when dealing expressly with formal- ence can there be and is there configuration. Formaliza-
ization as action. tion is the independence of, and what is constitutive of,
1. Given the foregoing, it is necessary to delimit this the unity of content as independent, be it elemental con-
concept of formalization with respect to two current ideas, tent or a constellation.
one in philosophy and the other in psychology. Formalization is not, then, either information or
In the first place, formalization should not be con- configuration, but autonomization: it is how the content
fused with the Kantian idea of “form of sensibility”. For “is situated”. Formality is not produced by the sentient
Kant, sensible content is something unformed in the sense being (Kant), nor is it primary configuration (Gestalt). It
that it lacks spatio-temporal structure. The proper {44} is purely and simply the mode of “being situated”.
part of the form of sensibility would consist in “inform-
2. In another direction, formalization can have
ing” (in the Aristotelian sense of the word, i.e., giving
pathological alterations in apprehension. There are cases
form to) sensible matter, i.e. the content. This giving of
of human perception in which there is a regressive disin-
form is produced by the subjective form (space and time)
tegration, a decaying (Abbau) of the perception. This
which sensibility imposes on the content. Now, formal-
disintegration consists in a dislocation or disconnection of
ization is not giving of form. Whether Kant’s idea about
the perception; for example, some volumes may seem to
space and time was correct or not (that is not our present
be situated behind a curtain of colors and at a certain dis-
question), the essential point is that formalization is prior
tance from it, etc. But I believe that the sense of the inde-
to all spatio-temporal giving of form. Formalization is
pendence of the reality of what is perceived is being lost
independence, that is, however the animal deals with its
all at once. I think that the degradation of perception is at
impressions, they still remain in a certain formality. Only
once loss of the outline of perceptive content and loss of
insofar as there is formality, in which there is independ-
independence. The loss itself consists of a greater or
ence, can one speak of spatio-temporal arrangement.
lesser regression of both aspects. It is a regression of for-
Formalization concerns this independence, this otherness.
malization. Formalization is, I repeat, at once autonomi-
Independence is the formality in which content “is situ-
zation of content and autonomization of what is perceived
ated” before the apprehensor. Formalization is the mode
with respect to the animal which is apprehending.
of “being situated” and not the mode of “informing” in the
Aristotelian-Kantian sense. Only because it is independ- 3. Finally, I have an interest in stressing that for-
ent can one speak about whether content has, or does not malization is not primarily a type of speculative concept,
have, or should have, this informing. The Kantian form but to my way of thinking is a {46} moment of apprehen-
 SENSIBLE APPREHENSION 19

sion anchored in a structural moment of the animal or- The anatomical-physiological organization of the
ganism itself. In the immediately foregoing pages I al- nervous system has a plan or scheme which has been
luded to alterations in the coordination of movements of relatively homogeneous and common since very remote
the human animal. It is well known that the lesion which philogenetic epochs. Thus, for example, this scheme is
produces them is localized in the extrapiramidal paths. already in the brain of the salamander. To me, this scheme
Among other functions, these paths have that of formal- has two directions: one of specification, predominantly
izing movement. regional so to speak, and another of a finer structure, that
But this is not all. As an hypothesis I think that the of formalization.
brain is not primarily an organ of integration (Sherring-
ton) nor an organ of meaning (Brickner), but that in our But while none of this concerns our philosophical
problem is the organ of formalization, a formalization problem here, I did not wish to refrain from expounding
which culminates in corticalization. It suffices for me to these ideas, which I have already published elsewhere.
allude to the servo-mechanisms or to certain special corti- However, I have relegated them to an appendix because as
cal areas, for example to some of the frontal areas of the I stated earlier, what matters to me in this book is the rig-
brain. Formalization is a structure which is rigorously orous and precise analysis of sensible apprehension as
anatomico-physiological. fact.
 {47}

CHAPTER III

MODES OF SENSIBLE APPREHENSION

As I said at the end of the last chapter, the modes of the response. But this is not sufficient because if it were,
sensible apprehension are distinguished by the modes of one would be able to apprehend this character of arousal
formalization. This refers to distinct “modes” of appre- by itself; one would be able to apprehend the stimulus by
hension and not simple “types.” And in order to see that itself, in which case what is apprehended will not be a
it is necessary and sufficient to analyze how the same stimulus of the apprehendor. Let us consider an example.
notes can be apprehended as independent in a different One can apprehend a toothache without feeling the pain;
way. Sensible apprehensions are distinguished among that is, one can apprehend a stimulus without it affecting
themselves above all modally. These modes are essen- him (i.e., the apprehendor). Being actively stimulated,
tially two. Reserving the right to explain myself immedi- being actually affected by the stimulus, is the second es-
ately below, I will say that there is a mode of sentient ap- sential moment of stimulus. Only then is there stimulus
prehension which—for reasons I will explain later—I call formally and properly. Now, when this {49} stimulative
sensing mere or pure stimulation. But there is another affection is “merely” stimulative, that is, when it consists
mode of apprehending sentiently which I call sensing re- only in arousing, it then constitutes what I shall call ‘af-
ality. It is necessary to embark rigorously upon this mo- fection of the mere stimulus as such’. This is what I call
dal analysis. {48} ‘apprehending the stimulus stimulatedly’. Heat appre-
hended in a thermal affection, and apprehended only as an
affection determining a response (flight, welcome, etc.), is
what we humanly express by saying heat warms. When
§1
heat is apprehended only as something warming, we say
that the heat has been apprehended as a mere stimulus,
APPREHENSION OF PURE STIMULI
that is, as something which is only a thermic determinant
of a response. The diverse qualities of the different stim-
uli are nothing but so many qualitative modalities of the
Sensible apprehension, that is, impression, deter-
mere arousing of responses in affection. This “mere” is
mines the nature of the sentient process. When an im-
not a simple circumscription which fixes the concept of
pression is of such character that it consists in nothing
stimulation, but rather constitutes its positive physical
more than determining the process, then we have a first
outline: being “only” stimulation.
mode of sensible apprehension. As every impression has
three moments (affection, otherness, force of imposition), 2) However impression is not just affection, but also
we must ask ourselves in what the structural nature of otherness. In what does the otherness of impression con-
impression consists, according to these three moments. sist as mere stimulus? In affection which is merely
That is, we must say: 1. What is this impression qua af- stimulative the apprehended note is made present but as
fectant? 2. What is its proper formality? and 3. What is its “other” than the affection itself; its proper formality is
force of imposition? made present. Now, what is essential is to correctly con-
ceptualize this formality of otherness of the stimulus as
1) Impression always has a moment of affection. mere stimulus. That is what I shall call the formality of
Now, the impression which consists in determining, by pure stimulus. In what does it consist? The note appre-
affection, the responsive process is what we call a stimu- hended as “other” (but only insofar as its otherness con-
lus. There are two essential moments in the concept of sists just in arousing a determined response) constitutes
the stimulus: first, the most obvious, is that of arousing what I call sign. The formality of pure stimulus consists

21
22 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

precisely in the formality of sign-ness. quite vague, because the question is not whether a sign
leads to knowledge of something different; what is essen-
What is a sign? A sign is not a “signal”. A signal is
tial is in how it so leads. It could do so through mere sig-
something whose content is apprehended by itself and
nalization (such is the case with the smoke) or through
{50} besides this—and therefore extrinsically to it—“sig-
meaning; and in neither of these cases would it be a sign.
nals”. Thus, for example, we have the so-called “traffic
It will be a sign only if it leads by “signing”.
signals”. On the other hand, a sign is the note itself ap-
prehended. Sign-ness pertains to it intrinsically and for- What is a sign and what is signing? In order to an-
mally, not by extrinsic attribution. It is not a note in the swer this question it is necessary first to stress the distinc-
form of a signal, but intrinsically and formally a “note- tion between sign and signal. Something is formally a
sign”. One does not apprehend heat by itself and later sign and not a simple signal when that to which the sign
also as a response signal; rather, the very form of heat as points or leads is an animal response. A sign consists in
apprehended is to be formally “signative heat”, or if one being a mode of formality of the content: the formality of
wishes, “thermic sign”. determining a response. And “signing” consists in the
mere signitive determination of that response. But sec-
This intrinsic pertaining is not “signification.” Sig-
ondly, and in addition, we are not dealing with “knowl-
nification in the strict sense is proper only to language. In
edge,” but with “sensing,” with apprehending in an im-
it, the signification is added (in whatever form—this is
pressive way; that is, sensing something as “signing”.
not the time to discuss the problem) to certain sounds (not
to all). But the sign is not added to anything; rather it is A sign is, then, the formality of otherness of the
the note in the mode of presenting itself as that note. mere stimulus of a response. It is the mode in which what
is sentiently {52} apprehended is situated as something
What is proper to a sign is not, then, signaling or
merely arousing; this is signitivity. Formalization is, as
signifying. Rather, it is purely and simply “to sign”. Ever
we have seen, independence, autonomization. And that
since its origin, classical philosophy has failed to distin-
which is apprehended in a merely stimulative manner is
guish these three concepts, and generally speaking has
independent of the animal but only as a sign. This inde-
limited itself almost always to the signal, therefore mak-
pendence and, therefore, formalization, is merely stimula-
ing of the sign a semeion. As I see it, this is insufficient.
tive. The distinct sensed qualities as mere stimuli are
I believe that sign and signing comprise a proper concept
distinct response signs. Every sign is a “sign-of”. The
which ought to be delimited formally with respect to both
“of” is a response, and this “of” itself pertains formally to
signal and signification. These three concepts are not
the manner of being situated and sensed signitively. Thus
only distinct, but quite separable. Only animals have
heat is a thermic response sign, light a luminous response
signs, and only man has significations or meanings. On
sign, etc.
the other hand, animals and men both have signals, but of
distinct character. The animal has signitive signals, i.e., it Now, to sign is to determine a response sentiently in
can use “note-signs” as signals. This is the foundation of an intrinsic and formal way. And to apprehend something
all possible learning, for example. When the signals are in a mere signing or signitive otherness is that in which
in the form of sounds they may constitute at times what apprehension of pure stimulation consists.
(very falsely) has been called ‘animal language’. {51} The 3) But every impression has a third moment, the
so-called “animal language” is not language, because the force of imposition of what is apprehended on the appre-
animal lacks meanings; it only possesses, or can possess, hendor. As the sign has a form of independence, a form
sonorous signitive signals. In man, the notes utilized as of signitive autonomy, it follows that its merely signitive
signals have, as I shall explain later, quite a different independence is what should be called, in the strict sense,
character: they are signalizing realities. But in both cases an objective sign. ‘Objective’ here means the mere signi-
the notes are signals due to a function extrinsically added tive otherness with respect to the apprehendor qua im-
to them: they are notes in function of being signals. posed upon him. Hence I say that the determination of the
Therefore we may once again ask, What is a sign? response always has the character of an objective imposi-
Medieval philosophy did not distinguish among sig- tion. The sign reposes signitively upon itself (it is for-
nal, meaning, and sign. It called everything “sign”, and malization of a stimulus), and therefore it is imposed on
so defined it: that the knowledge of which leads to the the animal as an objective sign. It is from this objectivity
knowledge of something different. Whence the classical that the sign receives its force of imposition.
distinction between natural signs (smoke as a sign of fire) The impressions of an animal are mere objective
and artificial signs. But this is inadequate, and moreover signs of response. Apprehending them as such is what I
 MODES OF SENSIBLE APPREHENSION 23

call pure sensing. Pure sensing consists in apprehending sonal experience: there is a warming. The formality of
something as a mere objective arousal of the sentient pro- heat consists in {55} heat being only what I sense in the
cess. In pure sensing, {53} the sensible impression is, personal experience of heat. Therefore it does not refer to
then, impression of pure stimulus. In it, though the note something merely “subjective”, but to something “objec-
may be an alter, it is an alter whose otherness consists in tive” whose objectivity consists in determining the living
pertaining in a signing way to the sentient process and, experience of the animal. We shall see this later. Hence,
therefore, in exhausting itself there. It is unnecessary to heat thus apprehended is clearly distinct from the appre-
stress that tonic changes are also signitively determined. hendor; but in the distinction itself this warming heat
And it is in this that the structural character of the entire pertains formally to the apprehendor: the distinction is in
life of an animal consists: life in objective signs. Natu- and for the sentient process. The heat “is situated” then
rally, this signitivity admits of grades; but that is not our as a moment which is “other”, but with an otherness
immediate problem. {54} which formally pertains to the sentient process itself. On
the other hand, in the new mode of apprehension the heat
is apprehended as a note whose thermic characteristics
pertain to it in its own right.
§2 This does not mean that the characteristics are
“properties” of the heat, but that those characteristics
APPREHENSION OF REALITY pertain to it in its own right, and not that they are charac-
teristics of a subject called “heat” (which is in any case
not something primitively given). Rather, they are the
Besides the sensible apprehension of mere or pure “heat’s own”. Every property is something’s own, per-
stimulus, proper to animals, man possesses another mode taining to it as its own; but not everything which pertains
of apprehension in his so-called “senses.” Man appre- to something as its own is a property of it. To be sure, the
hends the sensed in a particular way, one that is exclu- word ‘property’ is not always taken in this strict sense of a
sively his. That is to say, the same notes apprehended in a property which emerges from the thing, as for example
stimulative way by an animal present a formality to man weight, which by emerging from something is a property
quite distinct from stimulation. To be sure, we are dealing of it. The word ‘property’ can also be taken in a wide
with a sensible apprehension; hence we are always dealing sense, and then it signifies rather the pertaining as its own
with an apprehension in an impression. But it is a dis- to something, for example the pertaining as its own of the
tinct mode of impression, and the distinction is strictly thermic characteristics to the heat. Here when speaking
modal and one which modally affects the three moments about the “in its own right” I do not refer to property ex-
of impression. Hence, in order to rigorously conceptualize cept in its widest sense: the pertaining to something. But
this new mode of impression, we must successively ex- with this clarification, there is no difficulty in speaking
amine three points: about “in its own right” as a property just as I can call
every note a quality, as a I said a few pages ago. ‘Note’,
‘quality’, and ‘property’ {56} can be used as synonymous
1. The new formality of that which is appre- terms in the wide sense, and thus I shall use them. But
hended. rigorously speaking, they designate three distinct aspects
2. The modification of the three moments of an of the real, of the “in its own right”: the “note” is what is
impression. noted as its own; the quality is always and only a quality
“of” the real; and ‘property’ is the note insofar as it
3. The unitary nature of this mode of apprehen-
emerges (in whatever form) from the nature of the thing.
sion.
Now, in the apprehension of reality the note is “in its
own right” what it is. In pure stimulation, on the other
1. The new formality of that which is apprehended. hand, heat and all of its thermic characteristics are noth-
The content—this color, this sound, this taste, etc.—is ing but signs of response. This is what I expressed by
apprehended by an animal only as a determinant of the saying that “heat warms”. In the apprehension of reality,
tonic modification and of the response. Thus, the animal on the other hand, they are characteristics which pertain
apprehends heat as warming, and only as warming. This to the heat itself which, without ceasing to warm (just as it
is what we express by saying, “Heat warms”. Here warmed in the previous mode of apprehension), nonethe-
“warms” is not an action verb, but a verb of objective per- less now is situated in a distinct mode. It does not “re-
24 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

main” only as pertaining to the sentient process, but “is realism”. But here we do not refer to that. We do not
situated” by itself as heat “in its own right”. This is what refer to going beyond what is apprehended in apprehen-
we express by saying, “The heat is warming.” Here “is” sion, but rather to the mode in which what is apprehended
does not mean “being” in an entitative sense, especially “is situated” in the apprehension itself. It is for this rea-
since reality does not always consist in being. The fact is son that at times I think that this formality should be re-
that one cannot prescind from language already created, ferred to as “reity” rather than “reality”. It is the de suyo
and thus it is inevitable at times to recur to the “is” in of what is present in the apprehension, the mode of the
order to signify what pertains to something as its own. thing presenting itself in a real and physical presentation.
The same thing happened when, in Parmenides’ philoso- Reality is not here something inferred. Just as mere
phy, “is” was spoken of meaning that “being” is one, im- stimulus is the mode of what is immediately present in
mobile, uncreated, etc. The verb “to be” appears twice in apprehension, i.e., of what is present only in stimulative
these phrases, first as an expression of what is understood fashion, so reality is here a formality of what is immedi-
and then as the thing understood itself. The second ac- ately present, the very mode of the note “being situated”
ceptation is the essential one: when we say that heat “is as present. In accordance with this mode, heat, without
warming” the verb “is” does nothing but indicate that need to go outside of it, presents itself to me as warming
what is understood, the heat, has the characteristics which de suyo, i.e., as being warming. This is the formality of
pertain to it “in its own right”. (That this “in its own reality.
right” consists in being is a false and obsolete conception). In order to stave off confusion, let us stipulate the
Nor do we refer to heat as mere otherness pertaining sig- following:
nitively {57} to the sensing process, but rather to an oth-
erness which as such only pertains to the heat by itself. a) Primordially, reality is formality.
The heat apprehended now does not consist formally in b) This formality belongs to the thing apprehended
being a sign of response, but in being warm de suyo. of itself. I repeat: the formality of reality is something in
Now, this is what constitutes reality; and thus we have a virtue of which the content is what it is prior to its appre-
the new formality: formality of reity or reality. I shall hension. The thing is that which, by being real, is present
shortly explain this neologism ‘reity’, which I have been as real. Reality is de suyo.
obliged to introduce into the description of the formality
c) This formality is not formally “beyond” or “out-
of human apprehension. Given the totally different char-
side of” apprehension. But just as forcefully it must be
acter which the term ‘reality’ can have in ordinary lan-
said that it is not something purely immanent, to use an
guage and even in philosophy, viz., reality which goes
old and literally inadequate terminology. Formality is on
beyond any apprehension, the term ‘reity’ can help us to
one hand the mode of being situated in the apprehension,
avoid confusion. But having made this clarification, I
but on the other it is that of being situated “in its own
shall employ the two terms indiscriminately: ‘reity’ means
right”, of being de suyo. This structure is precisely what
simple reality, simple being de suyo. The characteristics
forces us to speak not only of my apprehension of the real,
of heat are apprehended impresively as being “its own”,
but {59} of the reality of what is apprehended in my ap-
i.e. of the heat itself and insofar as they are “its own”. As
prehension. It does not refer to some jump from the per-
opposed to the pure animal sensing which apprehends the
ceived to the real, but of reality in its dual role of being
notes stimulatively, and only stimulatively, these same
apprehended and of “being in its own right”. In due time
characteristics are apprehended in human sensing, but as
we shall see in what the unity of these two moments con-
characteristics of the heat de suyo: the heat is appre-
sists formally.
hended really. Signitive independence has become the
independence of reality. Reality is formally the de suyo of d) This formality of reality is, then, as we shall see,
what is sensed: it is the formality of reality, or if one what leads from apprehended reality to reality “beyond”
wishes, reality as formality. apprehension. This “leading” is not, as I have just said, a
It is necessary to delimit this general concept of re- leading from what is not real and purely immanent to
ality, although only initially. Above all, it is necessary to what is real beyond perception, but rather is a leading
delimit it with respect to an idea of reality which consists from apprehended reality to a reality which is not appre-
in thinking that reality is reality “in itself” in the sense of hended. It is a movement within the very reality of the
a real thing in the world independent of my perception. real.
Then reality would be what was understood by “reality” in In the second place, it is necessary to fix the de suyo
the old realism, which was later called {58} “ingenuous in another direction. What is it, in fact, that we men ap-
 MODES OF SENSIBLE APPREHENSION 25

prehend formally in sensing? We are told (by Husserl, apprehended reality is necessarily a stimulus. For exam-
Heidegger, and others) that what we formally apprehend ple, a bit of scenery is not necessarily a {61} stimulus, nor
in perception are, for example, walls, tables, doors, etc. is an elemental sound. Affected thus by something which
Now, this is radically false. In an impressive apprehen- is “in its own right”, affection itself is real affection. A
sion I never intellectually apprehend a table, nor do I ever man not only senses cold, but moreover really feels him-
sentiently apprehend it either. What I apprehend is a con- self cold. This “feeling himself”—apart from other dimen-
stellation of notes which in my life functions as a table. sions of the problem which it involves—expresses here
What I apprehend is not a table but a constellation of precisely the character of reality of the affection. This
such-and-such dimension, form, weight, color, etc., which affection is impressively sensed as a real affection and not
has in my life the function or meaning of a table. Upon just as an affection of mere stimulus. We do not sense
apprehending what we call a “table”, what is apprehended only affectant notes (heat, light, sound, odor, etc.) but
as de suyo or “in its own right” is not, then, the table as rather we feel ourselves affected by them in reality. This
table. The table is not de suyo a table. The table is a is real affection.
table only insofar as the real thing thus named forms part
of daily life. Things as moments or parts of my life are b) In this real affection something “other” is present
what I have termed “meaning-things”. But nothing is a to us; this is the otherness. This otherness has a proper
meaning-thing de suyo. The real thing apprehended as content, ultimately common to animal apprehension. But
something de suyo is not a “meaning-thing”, but what I what is essentially distinct is the mode in which its for-
have called {60} a “real-thing”. It is what in another or- mality “is situated” in the impression. We have just ex-
der of problems I have usually expressed by saying that plained that. The content “is situated” as something “in
the real thing is that which acts on other things or on it- its own right” and not as “signing”. This “in its own
self in virtue, formally, of the notes which it possesses de right” has an essential and absolutely decisive character.
suyo.1 And a table does not act on other things as a table, Heat is warming; this is not a verbal tautology. “Is
but as having weight, etc. The table is not a reality-thing, warming” means that the heat and all of its thermic char-
but a meaning-thing. acteristics are sensed as “its own.” Heat is thus heat in
and for itself. And precisely for this reason the heat is a
Therefore, formality of reity or reality is formality of note so very much “in its own right” that not even its in-
the de suyo as a mode of being situated in the apprehen- clusion in the sentient process pertains to it. The heat is
sion. in a way included in the sentient process, but only because
2. Modification of the moments of this apprehension. it already is heat. Heat as something de suyo is, then,
This de suyo is a formality, a formality of the sentient im- prior to its being present in sensing. And this does not
pression. And this formality shapes the three moments of refer to a temporal priority; it is not the priority of what is
the impression. apprehended with respect to the response which it is going
to elicit, for example. That priority is given in every ap-
a) Above all, it shapes the moment of affection. In prehension, including that of animals. In an animal, the
an animal, affection is mere stimulus: it senses the stimu- sign is apprehended as objective before the response
lus merely as a stimulus to itself. We say, for example, which the animal is to make. The difference is on another
that when cold is a mere stimulus apprehended by a dog, point and is essential. {62} In animal apprehension, the
the dog “feels cold.” The affection is a mere stimulus; it sign is certainly objective, but it is so only as a sign; i.e.,
is a stimulus relative to a response of warming or some- with respect to the animal itself. The animal never appre-
thing of that nature. In man, on the other hand, an affec- hends the sign as something which “is” signitive; rather,
tion triggers a sentient process of a different sort: a man the sign is present “signing” and nothing more. It is a
“is cold.” His affection is not mere stimulus; but rather pure signitive fact, so to speak. And precisely by being so
the man feels that he is affected in reality, that he is af- it can automatize itself in the apprehension: its objectivity
fected really. And this is because what affects him is not is to sign. In the example cited, the objectivity of the
apprehended as a mere stimulus but rather as reality: it is heat—sign is to warm. On the other hand, the note is
stimulating reality. And not only is this apprehended re- present to a man as real; what is present is something
ality not apprehended as a mere stimulus, but its reality which is apprehended as being prior to its being present.
may fail to have the character of a stimulus at all. Every It is not a priority with respect to a response, but a priority
stimulus is apprehended by man as reality, but not every with respect to the apprehension itself. In the objective
sign, its objectivity is not objective except with respect to
1
the response which it determines. In contrast, the note is
Sobre la esencia, p. 104.
26 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

real in itself, and herein consists being formally prior to that another impression is added to that of red or heat,
its being present. This is not a temporal priority, but one viz., the impression of {64} reality. But this is absurd.
of mere formality. Sensible impression is exclusively contained in formality.
The sensible impression of reality is a single impression
We are dealing, then, with a priority which is very
with content and formality of reality. There are not two
elemental but at the same time decisive: heat warms be-
impressions, one of content and another of reality, but a
cause it is “already” warm. This moment of the “already”
single impression, that of sensed reality, i.e., reality in
is precisely the priority of which I speak, and this moment
impression. But as the essential part of our problem is in
of priority is that which I am accustomed to call the mo-
formality, I shall more generally refer to the moment of
ment of prius. It is a prius not in the order of process but
formality as sensed as the impression of reality. I do so in
in the order of apprehension: it warms “being” warm. “To
order to simplify the expressions, but above all to empha-
be warming” is not the same thing as “to warm”. The
size the contrast between this conceptualization and the
“is”, in the apprehended heat itself, is a prius with respect
common notions of impression in philosophy. Strictly
to its “warming”: it is “its” heat, the heat is “its own”.
understood it is, then, a denomination which is technically
And this “its own” is just what I call prius. The note “is
incorrect.
situated” as being a note in such a form that its content “is
situated” reposing like reality upon itself and formally 3. The Unitary Nature of this Apprehension of Real-
grounding its apprehension. Thus, in accordance with ity. The intrinsic unity of real affection, otherness of re-
this character, what is sensed in impression has installed ality, and force of reality is what constitutes the unity of
me in the very reality of what is apprehended. With this, the apprehension of reality. This is a unity of the act of
{63} the road to reality in and of itself lies open before apprehending. It is not, as I shall explain later, a mere
man. We are in what is apprehended in the formality of noetic—noematic unity of consciousness, but a primary
reality. Formalization is autonomization. And in man we and radical unity of apprehension. In this apprehension,
are present at what I call hyperformalization: the auto- precisely in virtue of being an apprehension, we are in
nomized note is so autonomous that it is more than a sign; what is apprehended. It is, therefore, an “actual being”
it is autonomous reality. This is not autonomy of signitiv- [estar]. The apprehension is therefore an ergon which
ity, but autonomy of reality; it is alterity of reality, it is could perhaps be called noergia. Later I shall explain
altera realitas. how the “being present” as “actual being” is the essence of
“actuality”. In an apprehension what is apprehended ac-
c) This alterity has a force of imposition of its own. tualizes itself to us. Actuality is opposed here, as we shall
Alterity is not just mere objectivity, nor mere objective see, to “actuity”. Noema and noesis are not primitive in-
independence as in the case of the animal. The more tellective moments. The radical moment is rather a be-
perfect it is, the more perfectly objective is the animal. coming of “actuality”, a becoming which is not noetic or
But this is not reality. Reality is not objective independ- noematic, but noergic. This theme will reappear in
ence but being de suyo. Thus what is apprehended is im- Chapter V.
posed upon me with a new force: not the force of mere
In this apprehension, then, we apprehend the reality
stimulus but the force of reality. The richness of animal
of the real impressively. For this reason I call it the {65}
life is a richness of objective signs. The richness of hu-
primordial apprehension of reality. In it the formality of
man life is a richness of realities.
reality is apprehended directly, and not by way of repre-
The three moments of affection, otherness, and force sentations or the like. It is apprehended immediately, not
of imposition are three moments of an impression. And in virtue of other apprehensive acts or reasoning processes
therefore this impression is always a sensible impression of whatever sort. It is apprehended unitarily; that is, the
because in it something is apprehended impressively. real, which can and does have a great richness and vari-
Now, when what is apprehended is reality, then sensible ability of content (in general), is in its content appre-
impression is precisely and formally what I have termed hended unitarily as formality of reality pro indiviso, so to
impression of reality. The impression of the animal is speak. Later I shall speak of this content; for now I refer
impression of mere stimulus. But man, in impression, only to the formality itself of reality. It is in the unity of
apprehends the very formality of reality. these three aspects (directly, immediately, and unitarily)
Since philosophy to date has not distinguished be- that the fact that the formality of the real is apprehended
tween content and formality, I have termed the sensible in and through itself consists.
qualities (or rather their content) impressions. But then to In the primordial apprehension of reality, the real is
speak of an impression of reality might lead one to think apprehended in and through itself. By virtue of being an
 MODES OF SENSIBLE APPREHENSION 27

apprehension, in it we “are actually” in reality itself. And moment of force of imposition.

this apprehension is primordial because every other ap- If in the impression of reality one takes only the
prehension of reality is constitutively grounded on this moment of otherness by itself, then one will think that the
primordial apprehension and involves it formally. It is the primordial apprehension of reality is nothing but a simple
impression which primarily and constitutively installs us apprehension. And this is because in the simple apprehen-
in the real. And this is essential. One does not have a sion, “simple” classically means that one does not yet af-
primordial impression and besides it another apprehen- firm the reality of what is apprehended, but that what is
sion; rather, what we have is a primordial modalized ap- apprehended is reduced to mere otherness. In the simple
prehension which is, at the same time, in distinct forms. apprehension we would have otherness as something
The real, apprehended in and through itself, is always the which reposes upon itself without being inscribed in the
primordial thing and the essential nucleus of every appre- affection and with the force of imposition of reality. On
hension of reality. This is what the expression “primor- the contrary, it is necessary {67} to inscribe the moment
dial apprehension of reality” signifies. of otherness within the impression of reality as affection
The three moments of impression (affection, other- and as force of imposition. And then it is no longer sim-
ness, and force of imposition) have become dislocated in ple apprehension but is rather what I have so many times
modern philosophy. And this dislocation falsifies {66} called simple apprehension of reality, and which I now
the nature of the impression of reality and the nature of call primordial apprehension of reality. I have replaced
the primordial apprehension of reality. the former expression in order to avoid confusion with
simple apprehension.
Considering impression only as mere affection, pri-
mordial apprehension would be merely my representation The idea that the primordial apprehension of reality
of the real. Now, this is not the case because impression is my representation, affirmation, or simple apprehension,
does not consist only in being affection of the sentient is the result of the dislocation of the primary unity of im-
being, but rather has an intrinsic moment of otherness (of pression. Impression, on the contrary, intrinsically and
content as well as of formality.) Hence, that which is usu- formally involves the unity of the three moments of affec-
ally called “representation” is nothing but the moment of tion, otherness, and force of imposition.
affection of the impression from which the moment of
otherness has been subtracted, so to speak. It is in this way Finally, we repeat that if one takes primordial appre-
that the impression of reality has been deformed into a hension as a mere conscious act, then the primordial ap-
mere impression of mine. It is necessary to return to the prehension of reality is the immediate and direct con-
impression its moment of otherness. sciousness of something, i.e., intuition. But this is impos-
sible. As we saw in the first chapter, we are dealing with
If one eliminates from the impression of reality the apprehension and not mere consciousness. Impression, as
moment of force of imposition of the content according to I have said, is not primarily noetic—noematic unity of
its formality, one ends up conceiving the primordial ap- consciousness, but is an act of apprehension, a noergia, an
prehension of reality to be a judgement, however elemen- ergon.
tal it may be, but still only a judgement. Now, this is not
the case. A judgement but affirms what, in the primary This primordial apprehension is so, then, in the im-
force of imposition of reality, is impressively imposed pression of reality. Hence, if we wish to analyze the na-
upon me, and which compels me to make a judgement. It ture of this apprehension what we must do is analyze the
is necessary to restore to the impression its impressive structure of the impression of reality. {68}
28 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

{69}

APPENDIX 2

FORMALIZATION AND HYPERFORMALIZATION

I have already said that it is formalization which istic of the “hyper” of hyperformalization: the independ-
unlocks the richness in the life of an animal. The more ence which extends to complete detachment, to complete
formalized is its impression of a mere stimulus, the richer distancing. Man is the animal of “distancing” or “step-
its internal unity of stimulus. For a crab, “color” is a sign ping back”.2 His hyperformalization determines him to be
of its prey; but this same color apprehended in richer con- actually sensing, and therefore to be in a certain way in
stellations constitutes a great variety of objective signs. what is sensed, but to be so as “distanced”. This distanc-
The chimpanzee apprehends “things” which are much ing is the essential moment of hyperformalization. Dis-
more varied and rich than those apprehended by a star- tancing is not a physical removal; that would be impossi-
fish. Whence the chain of responses to a more formalized ble. It is not a going away “from” things, but a distancing
arousal can be much more varied than in the case of a less “among” or “in” them. “Distancing” is a mode of being
formalized animal. For this reason, the animal must “se- among things. In virtue of it something can happen to
lect” its responses. Nonetheless, the unity of arousal, to- man which could never happen to an animal: he can feel
nicity, and response, despite its richness and variety, is in himself lost among things. In signitivity, an animal can
principle fixed by the structures of the animal in question remain lost among many {71} responses. Indeed, this
within, of course, the animal’s limits of viability. Moreo- “being lost” can be cultivated in order to experimentally
ver, all of this has rigorous phylogenetic limits, and it is induce a neurosis in an animal. But this “being lost” is
just these limits which are the frontier between the human not a being lost among things but rather a disorientation
animal and all other animals. in responses; that is, it is not strictly speaking a being lost
but a responsive disorder. Only man can remain without a
As one progresses through the animal kingdom,
disorder, but lost among things, lost therefore not with
from lower to higher forms, the various species sense their
respect to a disorder of his responses, but in the distancing
stimuli as “note-signs” which are increasingly {70} more
of what is sensed.
independently of themselves. That is, the animal senses
the stimulus as something which is more and more de- b) In the second place, the stimulus itself thus de-
tached from the apprehendor. But this formalization tached no longer has its unitary outline. It has ceased to
reaches an extreme point, so to speak. At that point, the have it with respect to what concerns content: it no longer
stimulus presents itself as so independent of the animal, so has the proper unity of being “a” sign. But in addition it
set off from it, that it ends up “being situated” completely has ceased to have its formal unity of independence.
detached from the animal; formalization has thus been Upon making itself so independent, so hyperformalized,
changed into hyper-formalization. Man is this hyperfor- the stimulus no longer has the proper unity of mere
malized animal. “Hyper” here has a very precise mean- stimulus which before it had, because it no longer has the
ing: it signifies, as I have just said, that independence has signate independence of a response. From the point of
reached the point where it presents the stimulus as some- view of mere stimulus, then, the unity of the stimulus has
thing totally detached from the human animal. Thus the been broken. It has become something open: the “hyper”.
animal situation of man has completely changed. Hyperformalization has opened the closed world of the
a) In the first place, it is apparent that the detach- stimuli to a formality which is not mere stimulus.
ment has gone so far that the stimulus has lost its merely c) In the third place, this means that the stimulus,
signitive character. The content of the stimulus is no when it ceases to be apprehended as a mere stimulus,
longer formally a sign of response. It was so while it was when it becomes totally independent and thus completely
signing: to be a sign consists in being something signi- distanced from the apprehendor, when it ceases to be a
tively joined to the animal. Therefore when it is detached,
the stimulus is no longer formally a sign. The content no 2
[‘Stepping back’ is the most natural English rendering of Zubiri’s technical
longer has mere stimulus for its proper formality; it is no
term tomar distancia, meaning literally “to take distance”. It is discussed
longer a “note-sign”. This is the fundamental character- at length later in the book. — trans.]
 MODES OF SENSIBLE APPREHENSION 29

sign, is present in a new and different formality: the rup- is, if one wishes, a selection which is not “signitive” but
ture of sign-ness is the presence of something “in its own “real”. {73}
right”. This is what I have called “reity”. The new for-
Hyperformalization is not a phenomenon of adaptive
mality is no longer objective independence but reity. The
conduct, but rather a structural principle. It has to do
stimulus itself is no longer “sign-note”, but “real-note”.
with structures which pertain formally to the animals in
This is not a gradual but an essential difference. Hyper-
question. In other words, what we are doing here is a
formalization is the step from objective independence to
structural analysis of reality as formalized in some cases
reity. It is the “hyper” {72} of sensible impression, this
and hyperformalized in others, not an analysis of evolu-
impression being constituted with it in the impression of
tionary mechanisms. Animal structures are found to be
reality. The “unity of sign”, then, has been lost and the
“adapted” by their capacity of formalization. The question
“unity of reality” substituted for it.
remains, and we shall not discuss it, of whether this ad-
d) In virtue of the foregoing, the human animal no aptation is what determines the course of evolution
longer has its suitable responses fixed precisely because it (Lamarkism) or is a consequence of it (Darwinism).
does not have “signs”. It is a “hyper-signitive” animal.
Therefore, if it is to be viable, it must apprehend stimuli And we do not refer here to mere concepts, but to the
not as objective signs but as realities. A hyperformalized “physical” structure of reality apprehension. It is a hu-
animal is not viable without apprehension of reality. To man structure, and as such has its organic aspect. As we
be sure, this does not mean that the animal “necessarily” saw, the formalization of the animal is a structure of it
requires that apprehension. What I want to say is that the which is determined anatomically and physiologically.
animal requires it “if” it is going to be viable. It could So, too, hyperformalization is a structure of the human
have not had that apprehension, but in that case the hy- animal as a whole, and therefore one with an organic as-
performalized animal would have only been one of many pect. For example, the form of structural regression of the
biological “essays” of individuals not capable of speciation brain causes the ambit of hyperformalization to regress to
and in which the biological phylum terminated. What I being a mere formalization. Cajal observed that the hu-
mean is that a species whose sensory apparatus had the man brain is much richer in neurons with short axons
hyperformalization of human sensory apparatus, but than the brain of any other animal. Could it perhaps be
which did not have apprehension of reality, would not be that a brain thus structured is precisely a hyperformalized
viable. brain?

e) Thus, in order to give suitable responses, the hu- Hyperformalization is, then, a structural character.
man animal cannot limit itself (as do the rest of the ani- Certainly it is the result of a process. But this process is
mals) to biologically “selecting” these responses, but must not the process of sensing, but something completely dif-
“elect” them, or even invent them, in function of reality. ferent and prior to sensing: it is a morphogenetic process.
In an animal, the signs point to one or many responses, This process does not constitute apprehension of re-
and in this chain of signed responses the animal biologi- ality, but is what intrinsically and formally opens up {74}
cally selects the response which it is going to give. But the ambit of this apprehension. Apprehension thus hy-
man lacks these selection signs. Thus he must determine performalized is precisely the impression of reality.
his response as a function of the reality of the stimulus, of
what he has apprehended, and of his own real apprehen- (Since these ideas go beyond the limits of a mere
sion. Man intellectually elects his response. To elect is to analysis of the apprehension of reality, I have grouped
determine a response in reality and according to reality; it them in the form of an appendix.)
 {75}

CHAPTER IV

STRUCTURE OF THE APPREHENSION OF REALITY:

SENTIENT INTELLECTION

In the previous chapter, we have seen what sensible 1. Moments of the impression of reality. We have al-
apprehension is and what its modes are: apprehension of a ready carefully explained what an impression is: it is the
mere stimulus and apprehension of reality. The first con- moment of sensing. What we are missing, then, is an
stitutes pure sensing, proper to animals. The second is analysis of the other moment, the moment of sensed real-
what constitutes human sensing. Human sensing is essen- ity. Now, just as the first moment, the moment of impres-
tially and formally the impression of reality. Now, it is sion, qualifies the apprehending act as an act of sensing,
necessary to inquire diligently about the formal structure so also the moment of reality qualifies that same act in a
of the apprehension of reality. This is the third of the special way: as apprehension of reality, this act is formally
questions which I enunciated at the end of Chapter I. the act which we call intellective knowing.* That is what
we must now clarify.
Since human sensing has as its essential nature the
impression of reality, to analyze the apprehension of real- Classical philosophy never set itself this question,
ity is but to analyze the impression of reality. We shall viz. In what, formally, does the act of intellective knowing
accomplish this in two steps: consist? It described some intellective acts, but did not
tell us in what intellective knowing consists as such.
Now, I believe that {77} intellective knowing consists
1. What is the impression of reality? formally in apprehending something as real.
2. What is the structure of the impression of reality? In fact, apprehension of the real is in the first place
{76} an exclusive act of the intelligence.† The stimuli appre-
hended by the intelligence are not apprehended as mere
stimuli, but are apprehended really. Now, mere stimulus
§1 and reality are two different formalities, and the distinc-
tion between them is not gradual, but rather essential. A
THE IMPRESSION OF REALITY complex of stimuli, however formalized they may be, is
always but a response-sign. It will never be something “in
its own right,” or de suyo; i.e., it will never be formally
The impression of reality is always and only proper reality. Reality is, then, essentially distinct from sign-
to an act of apprehension. This apprehension qua impres- ness. To apprehend reality is, therefore, an act essentially
sive apprehension is an act of sensing. In fact sensing is, exclusive to the intelligence.
formally, apprehending something in impression. This we
have already seen. It is the first moment of the impression
of reality. But this impression is of reality in addition to
being an impression. That is the second moment. Hence, *
[English rendering of the Spanish verb inteligir, which corresponds to the
the following are necessary: Latin intelligere.—trans.]
†
[‘Intelligence’ renders the Spanish inteligencia, which has the same root as
1. Clarify each of the two moments in and of itself.
inteligir (translated as ‘intellective knowing’). It is used in the broad
2. Analyze the unity of the two moments, i.e., the sense of total human capability of the mind to confront and deal with re-
ality, and should not be narrowly construed as referring to what “IQ” tests
formal nature of the impression of reality. measure.—trans.]

31
32 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

But, in the second place, to apprehend something as 2. Unity of the impression of reality. Above all it is
real is the elemental act of the intelligence. Every other necessary to describe this unity of the impression of real-
intellective act is constitutively and essentially grounded ity. That will give us an idea of intelligence, to wit, sen-
upon the act of apprehension of the real as real. Every tient intelligence. Then it will only be necessary to repeat
other intellective act, such as forming ideas, conceiving, what we have obtained in order to better confront the
judging, etc., is a manner of apprehending reality. Thus, usual idea of intelligence.
conceiving is conceiving how the real is going to be;
A) Formal unity of the impression of reality: sentient
judging is affirming how a thing is in reality, etc. In all
intellection. Sensing is not the same thing as intellective
intellectual acts this moment of turning to the real ap-
knowing. But is this difference an opposition? Classical
pears. The apprehension of reality is therefore the ele-
philosophy has always set intellectual knowing over
mental act of the intelligence. Classical philosophy has
against sensing. Even the one time when Kant sought to
described well or poorly (we will not pursue the matter)
unify them, it was always a “unification”, but not a formal
some of these intellective acts; but it has gone astray on
structural “unity” which was in question. The fact is that
this matter of the apprehension of a thing as reality, on
classical philosophy, just as it failed to conceptualize what
this elemental act.
intellective knowing is in a formal sense, never conceptu-
Finally, in the third place, apprehending reality is alized what sensing is in a formal sense either. Given
not merely an exclusive and elemental act of the intelli- this situation, the foregoing presumed opposition re-
gence, but is its radical act. Man is a {78} hyperformal- mained, as I said before, as part of the intellectual atmos-
ized animal. The autonomization in which formalization phere. We have already seen what intellective knowing is:
consists has become changed into hyperautonomization in it is apprehending something as real, i.e., in the formality
man, i.e., it has been changed from sign into reality. With of reality. What is sensing? Here there lurks a hidden
this, the catalog of possible suitable responses to a stimu- confusion which it is necessary to dispel. Indeed, failure
lus becomes practically indeterminate. This means that in to realize this confusion has had grievous consequences
man, his sentient structures no longer assure his suitable for philosophy. Sensing, in fact, consists in apprehending
response. That is to say, the unity of arousal, tonic modi- something impressively. But “sensing” can denote “only
fication, and response would be broken if man were not sensing”, where the “only” is not merely a negative con-
able to apprehend stimuli in a new way. When the stimuli ceptual precision, but a proper positive mode of sensing as
do not suffice for a suitable response, man suspends, so to impression; this is what I have called “pure sensing”.
speak, his response and, without abandoning the stimulus, Sensing apprehends something impressively. Pure sens-
but rather conserving it, apprehends it according as it is in ing apprehends this something which is impressing in the
itself, as something de suyo, as stimulating reality. That formality of mere stimulation. Therefore, sensing is not
is, he apprehends the stimulus, but not as mere stimulus: formally identical to pure sensing. Pure sensing is only a
this is the radical dawn of intellection. Intellection arises mode of sensing as such. Whence the necessity to care-
precisely and formally at the moment of transcending or fully distinguish these two aspects in that which we desig-
going beyond mere stimulus, at the moment of appre- nate with the single word ‘sensing’: sensing as sensing
hending something real as real when pure sensing is sus- and pure sensing. {80}
pended.
The failure to recognize this difference has had seri-
Hence, the apprehension of reality is the exclusive ous repercussions, the first and most radical of which is
act, the elemental act, and the radical and primary act of the opposition between intellective knowing and sensing.
intellective knowing; i.e., apprehension of reality is what But there really isn’t any opposition; intellective knowing
formally constitutes the proper part of intellective know- and sensing are not opposed. Pure sensing senses what is
ing. apprehended in the formality of mere stimulation; intel-
Now, the impression of reality is the formality of an lective knowing apprehends what is known in the formal-
apprehending act which is “one”. This impression qua ity of reality. If one wishes to speak of faculties, it will be
impression is an act of sensing. But insofar as it is of re- necessary to say that pure sensing is the faculty of mere
ality, it is an act of intellective knowing. And this signi- stimulation, and that intellective knowing is the faculty of
fies that sensing and intellective knowing are precisely the reality. To be sure, as we shall soon see, this expression
two moments of something which is one and unitary; two “faculty of reality” is here absolutely incorrect, but for the
moments of the impression of reality. And that is what we time being it is useful to us. In any case, it is clear that
must examine now: the unity of the impression of reality. pure sensing and intellective knowing are only modes of
{79} sensible apprehension. For this reason, they are both in-
 STRUCTURE OF THE APPREHENSION OF REALITY: SENTIENT INTELLECTION 33

scribed within the ambit of sensing. To pure sensing there It is not a synthesis, as Kant thought, because we are
corresponds another mode of sensing which is (as I shall not dealing with a case where the acts conform to a single
explain forthwith) intellective sensing. And therein lies object. The unity in question is not an objective synthesis,
the strict opposition: pure sensing and intellective sensing. but a unity which is formally structural. It is necessary to
But both are modes of sensing. emphasize this: it is sensing which senses reality, and it is
the intellective knowing which intellectively knows the
Classical philosophy confounded sensing with pure
real impressively. {82}
sensing, and hence thought that there is opposition be-
tween sensing and intellective knowing. This is not true, The impression of reality in its structural unity is a
and the proof is that there is an impression of reality. An fact. And this fact is, as I said, the overcoming of the clas-
impression of reality as impression is sensing; but, be- sical dualism between sensing and intellective knowing
cause it is of reality, it is intellective knowing. Impression which has so imperturbably cast its shadow across the
of reality is formally sensing and intellective knowing. In long history of philosophy. Thus, in order to overcome or
the impression of reality sensing and intellective knowing go beyond this dualism, one does not have to engage in
are but two of its moments. This is a radical and essential difficult reasoning processes, but to pay careful attention
overcoming of the dualism between sensing and intellec- to the act itself of the impression of reality.
tive knowing. From Parmenides through Plato and Aris- In the conception of the two acts, an act of sensing
totle, philosophy was based on the dualism according to and the other of intellective knowing, one might think
which a thing is something “sensed”, and which at the that what is apprehended by sensing is given “to” the in-
same time “is”. In the midst of all of the discussions telligence so that the latter might intellectively know it.
about the dualism or non-dualism of things, the duality of Intellective knowing would thus be apprehending in a new
the two acts has been left intact: the act of sensing and the way what is given by the senses to the intelligence. Thus
act of {81} intellective knowing. But, I believe that in the primary object of the intelligence would be the sensi-
man, sensing and intellective knowing are not two acts, ble, and hence that intelligence would be what I term sen-
each complete in its order; rather, they are two moments sible intelligence. But this is not correct: the impression
of a single act, of one unique impression, of the impres- of reality is a single and unique act, the primordial act of
sion of reality. Now it is necessary to determine this in- the apprehension of reality. In what does it formally con-
trinsic and formal unity. sist?
In the impression of reality we are dealing with a This act can be described in two ways, the two ways
single complete act. To think that there are two acts in which one can describe the impression of reality. In the
would be the same as thinking that in pure sensing there impression of reality we can start from the impression
are two acts, one of sensing and another of apprehending itself. Then “in” this impression is the moment of reality.
the stimulation. But there is nothing more than one act: As impression is what formally constitutes sensing, and
the act of pure sensing. The moment of “pureness” of reality is what formally constitutes intellective knowing, it
sensing is nothing but this: the moment of the unique act follows that saying that the moment of reality is “in” the
of pure sensing. Analogously, there is but one act of real- impression is the same as saying that intellection is
ity-impression. Intellective knowing and sensing are only structurally “in” the sensing; i.e., the impression of reality
two moments of a single act. To be sure, these two mo- is intellective sensing. For this reason, when we appre-
ments can be separated phylogenetically; but this does not hend heat, for example, we are apprehending it as real
mean that the separation consists in sensing and intellec- heat. An animal apprehends heat only as a thermic re-
tive knowing. Separated from intellective knowing, the sponse sign; this is pure sensing. In contrast, man senses
terminus which remains to us is not “sensing”, but rather heat as something “in its own right”, as something {83}
“pure sensing”. We could never have a separate sensing de suyo: the heat is real heat. But we can describe the
without its own proper formality. When it does not have impression of reality starting from the moment of reality.
the formality of reality (given that we have separated In that case the moment of impression is structurally “in”
sensing from intelligence), sensing has the formality of the moment of reality. For the above example, we appre-
mere stimulus. There are not two acts, then, but two mo- hend the real as being warm. Sensing is thus “in” the
ments of a single act. The sentient moment is “impres- intellective knowing. In virtue of this, that intellection is
sion”, the intellective moment is “of reality”. The unity of sentient intellection. In the impression of reality I sense
the two moments is the impression of reality. What is this real heat (intellective sensing), I sense warm reality (sen-
unity? tient intellection). The impression of reality is thus intel-
34 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

lective sensing or sentient intellection. The two formulae call ‘intellective knowing’ and ‘sensing’, I repeat, are but
are identical, and so I shall use them indiscriminately. two moments of the single act of sentiently apprehending
But in order to better contrast my views with the usual the real. As it is not possible to have content without for-
idea of the intelligence, I prefer to speak of sentient intel- mality nor formality without content, there is but a single
ligence, embracing in this denomination both intellective act, viz. intellective sensing or sentient intellection: the
sensing and sentient intellection. Hence I shall say that sentient apprehension of the real. This act is, then, intrin-
the impressive apprehension of reality is an act of the sically and structurally “one”: it is, I emphasize, the im-
sentient intelligence. pression of reality. Sentient intellection is, then, purely
The apprehension of reality is, then, an act which is and simply impression of reality. In this apprehension
structurally one and unitary. This structural unity is what intellective knowing is the very mode of sensing. {85}
the “in” expresses. Classical philosophy, on the other Classical philosophy has erred with respect to the
hand, believed that there are two acts: the act of sensing impression of reality. It is this impression, nonetheless,
gives “to” the intelligence what it is going to work on, i.e., which comprises the primordial intellective knowing, and
to know intellectively. But this is not the case. The dif- not the combinations, however selective, of what is usu-
ference between “to” and “in” is essential. That difference ally called “animal intelligence”. Still less can one
expresses the difference between the two concepts of the speak—as is commonly done today—of artificial intelli-
intelligence. To say that the senses give “to” the intelli- gence. In both cases what is carried out, whether by the
gence what it is going to work on is to suppose that the animal or some electronic apparatus, is not intelligence
intelligence has as its primary and suitable object that because what they operate on and are concerned with is
which the senses present “to” it. If this were true, the just the content of an impression, but not its formality of
intelligence would be what I call a sensible intelligence. reality. What these animals or machines have are impres-
A sensible intelligence is an intelligence “of” the sensible. sions of content, but without the formality of reality. It is
On the other hand, to say that the senses sense what is for this reason that they do not have intelligence.
sensed “in” the intelligence does not mean that the pri-
Intellection is, then, constitutively and structurally
mary and suitable object of intellective knowing is the
sentient in itself qua intellection. Conversely, sensing in
sensible, but rather something more than that, viz. that the
man is constitutively and structurally intellective in itself
very mode of intellective knowing is to sense reality. {84}
qua sensing. Thus it is that sensibility is not a type of
Hence, it is a sensing which is intellective qua sensing. In
residual “hyletic” of consciousness, as Husserl says, nor a
this case the intelligence is sentient. Sentient intelligence
factum brutum as Heidegger and Sartre call it, but rather
consists in intellective knowing being only a moment of
is an intrinsic and formal moment of intellection itself.
impression: the moment of the formality of its otherness.
To sense something real is, formally, to be actually sens- The impression of reality is a fact which it is neces-
ing intellectively. Intellection is not intellection “of” the sary to emphasize as against the classical dualism. Sen-
sensible, but rather intellection “in” the sensing itself. It tient intellection is a fact. On the other hand, the dualism
is clear, then, that sensing is intellective knowing: it is between intellective knowing and sensing is a metaphysi-
intellective sensing. Intellective knowing is thus nothing cal conceptualization which distorts the facts.
but another mode of sensing (different from pure sensing). It is only necessary to repeat what has been said
This “other mode” concerns the formality of what is above in order to confront the idea of the concipient intel-
sensed. The unity of intelligence and sensing is the unity ligence.
of the content and formality of reality. Sentient intellec-
tion is impressive apprehension of a content in the for- B) Sentient intelligence and concipient intelligence
mality of reality; it is precisely the impression of reality.
The formal act of sentient intellection is, I repeat, impres- 1. The sentient intelligence:
sive apprehension of reality. The senses do not give what a) Has an object which is not only primary and
is sensed “to” the intelligence, but rather are actually suitable, but a normal proper object: reality.
sensing intellectively. There is no object given “to” the {86}
intelligence, but rather an object given “in” the intelli-
b) This formal object is not given by the senses
gence itself. Sensing is in itself a mode of intellective
“to” the intelligence, but is given by the
knowing, and intellective knowing is in itself a mode of
senses “in” the intelligence.
sensing. Reality is apprehended, then, in the impression
of reality. This is sentient intelligence. That which we c) The proper formal act of knowing intellection
 STRUCTURE OF THE APPREHENSION OF REALITY: SENTIENT INTELLECTION 35

is not conceiving or judging, but “appre- a) Is that whose primary object is the sensible.
hending” its object, viz. reality. {87}
d) What is apprehended in impression, i.e., what b) This object is given by the senses “to” the in-
is apprehended sentiently, is so in the impres- telligence.
sion of reality. In virtue of this, there is but c) The proper act of this intellection is conceiv-
one single act: the sentient apprehension of ing and judging that which is given to it.
the real as real. This intelligence is concipient not because it
2. In contrast, classical philosophy has always be- conceives and judges, but because it concep-
lieved something quite different. Classically, intellective tualizes concipiently, i.e., it conceptualizes
knowing would be, as I have repeatedly said, newly ap- what is given by the senses “to” the intelli-
prehending what is given by the senses “to” the intelli- gence.
gence. The primary and suitable object of the intelligence Abandoning the concipient intelligence does not
would be, therefore, the sensible. Thus, by reason of its mean that the real is not conceptualized. That would be
suitable object, this intelligence would be what I call sen- simply absurd. What it means is that the conceptualiza-
sible intelligence. We are not told in what intellective tion—even though it is an inexorable intellectual function,
knowing consists; the only thing we are told is that when as we shall later see—is not what is primary and radical
intellective knowing takes place, there is a conceiving and about intellective knowing, because intellection is primar-
judging of what is given by the senses. In this way intel- ily and radically sentient apprehension of the real as real.
lection is progressively converted into being a declaration Conceptualizing is just an intellective unfolding of the
of what a thing is, i.e., there is an identification of intel- impression of reality; hence, we are not talking about not
lection and predicative logos. This was the great discov- conceptualizing, but rather about the fact that concepts are
ery of Plato in the Sophist which culminated in the work adequate not primarily to things given by the senses “to”
of Aristotle, for whom the logos itself is the apophanesis the intelligence, but to the modes of intellectively sensing
of what a thing is. That is what I term the logification of the real given “in” the intelligence. Concepts are neces-
the intelligence. sary, but they must be concepts of the sentient intelligence
Absorbing, as is justified, conception and judgement and not concepts of the concipient intelligence.
under one rubric, I shall say that this intellection, which is
Here we have, then the unity of the impression of re-
sensible by reason of its proper object, would by reason of
ality: sentient intellection. What is the structure of that
its act be concipient intelligence.
unity? Or what comes to the same thing, what is the
The concipient intelligence: structure of the impression of reality? {88}
36 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

{89}

APPENDIX 3

SENTIENT INTELLIGENCE AS A FACULTY

The dualism between acts of sensing and acts of in- cies acts by itself to carry out with its actuation part of the
tellective knowing led to conception of dualism of facul- total act; i.e., the two potencies do not each produce a
ties: the faculty of sensing and the faculty of intellective partial act of the total act. On the contrary, the two poten-
knowing. But this conceptualization, besides not being a cies act only in structural unity; they do not act by them-
fact, distorts the facts. If one wishes to achieve a concep- selves either totally or partially, but only unitarily. The
tualization which does justice to the facts, I believe that it two potencies are “co-determined” as a faculty. The po-
is necessary to follow a different route. I shall indicate it tencies are not concurrent, but co-determinate, and only in
in the spirit of not evading the question, but I shall do no this and through this codetermination do they produce a
more than indicate it because our present problem is the single act. The real act is only in the “co” of the co-
analysis of the facts and not theoretical conceptualiza- determination. In the act itself the two potencies are
tions, be they metaphysical or even scientific. structurally “one”. The two potencies constitute the two
This conceptualization has two essential points: what moments of a single faculty and a single act.
is sentient intellection as a faculty, and what is this faculty
Now, such is the case with sentient intellection. To
within the structures of human reality.
be sure, there are two potencies, the potency of sensing
1. The sentient intelligence as a faculty. Man can and {91} the potency of intellective knowing. As poten-
sense and can know intellectively. This idea of “being cies they are essentially distinct. In as much as it is a po-
able to” is what the Greek word dynamis expresses. But tency, the intelligence is essentially irreducible to pure
dynamis is something very rich, and its diverse aspects sensing, because a formality of reality will never emerge
have not been outlined with conceptual rigor. from a sign-based formality. But this intellective potency
a) On one hand, since Aristotle’s time, dynamis has is not by itself facultized for producing its act. Nor can it
signified potency, that according to which something can produce other than as intrinsically and formally united
receive actuations or actuate itself, and this acting is not with the potency of sensing—the unity in virtue of which,
just on something apart from the agent, but also on the and only in virtue of which, the intellective potency ac-
agent itself (though insofar as this is distinct from its own quires the character of a faculty. By the same token,
actuation). {90} sensing cannot be human sensing, i.e., cannot produce the
act of impression of reality unless it is intrinsically and
b) On the other hand, the Latins rendered the word formally “one” with the intellective potency. This unity is
dynamis by potentia seu facultas, potency or faculty. the sentient intelligence. On the other hand, pure sensing
Now, to my way of thinking, this equivalence cannot is already facultized: it is a “potency-faculty”. The sen-
be admitted. Not every potency is a faculty by the mere tient intelligence is not a potency but a faculty. It is a fac-
fact of being a potency. In order to be able to realize its ulty composed not only intrinsically but also—and this is
acts, it is not enough for the potency to be a potency; the essential point—structurally by two potencies, that of
rather, it must be “facultized” to realize them. To be sure, sensing and that of intellective knowing. Hence, it is not
there are potencies which by themselves are facultized to the case that these two potencies concur in the same object
produce their acts. Thus these potencies are also faculties. (the classical idea until Kant’s time), nor that they concur
But there are cases in which this does not occur, and then partially in a total act (Kant’s objective synthesis); there is
the potency cannot produce its acts unless it is intrinsi- no concurrence, but rather codetermination. They are
cally and structurally “united” to another potency, unless codetermined in a single act of sentient intellection, in the
it is “one” with it. That is to say, the potency is not now act of impressive or sentient apprehension, in the impres-
facultized by itself to produce its own acts; it is only so in sion of reality. The intelligence as a faculty is sentient,
its structural unity with another. In that case the two po- and human sensing as a faculty is intellective. Hence the
tencies structurally comprise a single faculty, and that unity of the impression of reality is the unity of the act of
faculty realizes one single act. Neither of the two poten- a single faculty.
 STRUCTURE OF THE APPREHENSION OF REALITY: SENTIENT INTELLECTION 37

This conceptualization is not a fact—that I have al- the living organism. They are not identical, but neither
ready noted—but it is to my way of thinking the unique are they independent: a single positioning gives rise to
conceptualization which permits us to realize the fact of quite diverse situations. Thus positioned and situated
the impression of reality. The impression of reality is a among things, the living organism lives by its vital proc-
fact, and therefore {92} so is intellective sensing or sen- esses. This stratum, nonetheless, is the most superficial.
tient intellection. The conceptualization of a faculty
structurally composed of sentient and intellective potency B) The living organism never remains univocally
is, I repeat, the only scientific conceptualization of the fact characterized by the web of its vital processes. In the vital
of the impression of reality. processes of a mole and a blind dog we shall never en-
counter a situation of luminous character. But the differ-
It should also suffice to note that potency and faculty ence is essential: the mole does not visually cope visually
do not exhaust the nature of the “being able to”. There is with things “before him”, but the dog does. Therefore,
at least a third sense of being able to, different from po- beneath the vital processes there is in every living organ-
tency and faculty, and that is capacity. But this is not ism a primary mode of dealing with things and with itself:
relevant to the present question. the habit. Habit is the foundation of the possibility of
Here, then, we have what sentient intelligence is as a every possible vital process. In fact, through its habit,
faculty. Now, this faculty is the faculty of the structures through its mode of dealing with things, these latter “are
which comprise human reality. Thus it is necessary to situated” for the living organism in a certain formal re-
explain (though rather summarily) in what this faculty spect; this is the formality. In Aristotle’s philosphy and in
consists when considered as a structural moment of hu- all of medieval philosophy one sees this category com-
man reality. pletely shipwrecked. But to my way of thinking, this owes
to the fact that Aristotle considered the habitus as a high-
2) Human reality and the faculty of sentient intelli-
est category of being, ultimately reducible to a {94} qual-
gence. The question is very appropriate since up to now
ity. Nonetheless, I think that we are dealing with a radical
we have spoken of sentient intelligence as a habit, as a
metaphysical category of the living organism. In contrast
mode of having to do with things. Thus, if we wish to
to both Aristotle and the medievals (for whom the habitus
conceptualize the faculty of sentient intelligence with
is a disposition encrusted more or less permanently in the
what we have termed ‘habit’, we shall be compelled to
subject), I formally conceive of what I call ‘habit’ as a
return to the idea itself of a habit.
“mode of dealing” with things. For this reason, it is a
In every living being there are, ultimately, three dis- category exclusive to living organisms since non-living
tinct strata which must be considered. organisms do not have a mode of dealing with things.
A) First, there is the most visible stratum: the execu- And as a category of living organisms it is radical in
tion of the vital acts. This is the “arousal–tonic–modifi- them.
cation–response” structure of which we spoke some pages Situs and habitus are the two supreme categories of
back. A living organism carries out these actions while the living organism in its life. The habits can be quite
finding itself “among” things, some external, others inter- diverse in the same living organism. But there is in every
nal to itself. This “among” in which the living organism living organism a radical habit upon which ultimately
finds itself has two characteristics. First, there is that ac- depends its entire life. The biography of every dog is dif-
cording to which the living organism finds itself placed ferent, but they are all canine biographies because they are
among things: it has its fixed locus among them. {93} inscribed in the same habit. Now, if we compare all living
This is a characteristic essential to the living organism, organisms among themselves, we shall discover three
though one which it shares with all other non-living re- radical habits: the habit of growth to sustain itself (this is
alities. But the living organism has a proper modal char- the etymological meaning of trepho, to favor the develop-
acteristic exclusive to it: when it is thus placed among ment of what is subject to a growth process), the habit of
things, it is situated in a determinate form among them; sensing, and the habit of sentient intellective knowing. In
i.e., it has its situs among them. The category of situs had accordance with this, things fall into three different for-
no role in Aristotle’s philosophy because he considered it malities: as trophic, as stimuli, and as realities.
as a highest category of being. Nonetheless, to my way of
“Habit—in its formal respect”: here we have the sec-
thinking this is not true. It is an essential metaphysical
ond stratum of the life of every living organism.
category, but only of the living organism. Position and
situation, taken in the widest sense and not just in the Now, habit has two faces. On one hand, the habit
spatial sense, are two radical concepts of this stratum of determines the type of vital process. On the other, it is
38 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

something determined by the very nature of the structures c) All of this happens in man, but there is in him
of the living organism. Whence the mode of dealing with something different as well. In addition to the biological
things is always something intermediate, so to speak, be- autonomization of the stimuli, he has the potency to know
tween action and structures. Thus, sentient intellection is intellectively in a way determined by the hyperformaliza-
a habit which determines every human process, but is tion of his sentient structures. This potency is not by itself
{95} at the same time determined by the human struc- a faculty. The structural unity of intelligence and sensing
tures. Analysis of the facts moves among actions and is determinant of the habit of sentient intellection whose
among the habits taken in and by themselves; but these formal act is the impression of reality. Now, qua determi-
habits conduce to something which is not a fact but a ter- nant of that habit, the unitary structure “sensing-
minus of a structural conceptualization. This is the third intelligence” is the faculty of sentient intelligence. It is
stratum of the life of every living organism. because of this that man impressively senses reality. We
C) Every animal has its own structures. This system are dealing, then, not just with habit but with structures.
of structural notes determines the habit. Now, the struc- It is for this reason, I repeat, that intellection is an act of
tures qua determinants of the habit to my way of thinking sentient apprehension of the real. It is an intellection
comprise what we call potencies and faculties. which in a certain way (although not exclusively) we
could term “cerebral”. The brain is the sentient organ
a) In every living organism things determine its vital which by its hyperformalization determines in an exact
processes as stimuli. Every cell, whether plant or animal, way the need for intellection to assure man’s ability to
is stimulable (irritable) and is stimulated (irritated). Un- respond suitably. {97} In addition, the brain has an even
der this aspect, every living organism, plant or animal, deeper function: that of keeping intellection in a state of
has what I call susceptibility. suspense. This is what gives rise to its state of vigilance.
b) But there are living organisms whose susceptibil- Finally, by virtue of being sentient, the activity of the
ity has a special character, viz. the animal. Although brain formally and intrinsically modulates the intellection
every living organism is stimulable, the animal is the liv- itself, i.e., the impression of reality. In the unity of these
ing organism which has made stimulation into an three moments (the exacting nature of hyperformalization,
autonomous biological function. It is this autonomization vigilance, and intrinsic modulation) consists the structural
of stimulation which to my way of thinking comprises sentient moment of the sentient intelligence.
sensing. Sensing is not a creation of animals; it is only
Through its structures, an animal determines the
the autonomization of a function proper to every living
habit of mere stimulation. In it there lies open a medium.
organism, viz. susceptibility. Sensing is a structural mo-
Medium is the environment in which this habit is formal-
ment of the living animal. This structure consists in the
ized in the animal sensing. Man through his structures
stimuli stimulating by an impression. This impressive
determines the habit of reality. In it he is open not only to
structure qua determinant of the habit of mere stimulation
a medium but is open to a field and to a world; this is the
is the “potency-faculty” of pure sensing.
field of the real and the world of the real. To be sure, man
The somatic structure and, therefore, its potencies has a medium, and this medium qua humanly appre-
and faculties of sensing, assume diverse forms. In the hended is the field of reality. But the field of reality is
first animals, it was a type of diffuse sensing which I term transcendentally open to the world. Whence the field of
sentiscence. In the more developed animals {96} we find reality, as we shall see, is the world qua intellectively
a systematization of the structures of stimulus-based im- sensed. This is the work of the sentient intelligence as a
pression. This systematization is to my way of thinking faculty.
the proper formal nature of what quite appropriately we
call the nervous “system”. The nervous system is the sys- In contrast, as a structural note, intelligence:
tematization of impressivity. This impressivity makes a) Is not a note of mere stimulation that is com-
sentiscence into a strict sensibility. The systematization pletely elaborated. In contrast to all such notes, the intel-
has for its part a unique character, viz. centralization, by ligence is essentially removed from all merely sign-based
which the nervous system is the transmitter of the stimu- stimulation.
lus. This systematization grows in complexity from the
first nerve centers to the brain and within the brain to the b) Nor is it a systematic note. Rather, it represents a
cortex wherein formalization culminates. Susceptibility, new element, but one which is elemental though necessi-
sentiscence, and sensibility are the three different forms of tated by the hyperformalized material structures and for-
the structure of stimulation. mally and intrinsically modulated by them. {98}
 STRUCTURE OF THE APPREHENSION OF REALITY: SENTIENT INTELLECTION 39

Nonetheless, as I see it, this is not the radical differ-

{99} §2 ence among the senses in the case of human sensing.
The organs of the human senses sense with a sensing in
STRUCTURE OF THE which what is sensed is apprehended as reality. As each
IMPRESSION OF REALITY sense presents reality to me in a different form, if follows
that there are different modes of the impression of reality.
Now, the radical difference between the senses is not in
The structure of the impression of reality is but the the qualities which they present to us, nor in the content
structure of the sentient intelligence. It consists in the of the impression, but rather in the form in which they
structure which has the otherness of the impression of present reality to us. On this point, philosophy has gone
reality, i.e., its formality of reality. This structure has two astray. It has simply assumed that the thing sensed is al-
aspects. Above all, the otherness of reality has different ways something which is “in front” of me. But besides
modes of being impressively given. Secondly, the other- being quite vague, this obscures a great falsehood, because
ness of reality has a unique characteristic: it is a transcen- being in front of me is only one of the different ways of a
dental structure. The intrinsic unity of these two moments real thing being present to me. Since the fact that an ap-
is the structure of the impression of reality. prehension is of reality is what formally constitutes intel-
lection, it follows that the modes of reality’s being present
1 to us in the human senses are eo ipso diverse modes of
intellection. {101} For the sake of greater clarity I shall
Modal Structure of the Impression of Reality successively examine the modes of presentation of the real
in sensing as modes of intellective sensing and as modes
Sentient intellection, as I have just said, consists in of sentient intellection.
apprehending things in an impression of reality. Now, A) The modes of presentation of reality: intellective
this impression of reality comes to us given by distinct sensing. In what follows, I shall limit myself to a brief
senses. Each of these senses is distinct, and all of them sketch. Sight apprehends a real thing as something which
together comprise one and the same sentient intellection is “in front”; we say that it is “before me”. The thing it-
of reality. Whence there are two questions for us to ex- self is before me according to its proper configuration,
amine: according to its eidos. But this does not apply in the case
of hearing. To be sure, a sound is just as immediately
1. In what does the diversity of the senses con- apprehended in the sense of hearing as a color can be in
sist? the sense of sight. But in the sound, the thing sounding is
not included in the audition; rather, the sound directs us to
2. In what does their unity as modes of intellec-
it. This “direction” or “sending back” is what, following
tion of the real consist?
the etymological meaning of the word, I shall call “no-
tice”. What is real of the sound is a mode of presentation
1) The diversity of the senses. At first glance the an- proper to it: notifying presentation. In smelling, an odor
swer seems to be obvious. The diversity of {100} the is apprehended immediately as in the case of a sound or a
senses consists in the diversity of the qualities which the color. But the thing is neither present as in the case of
senses offer to us: color, shape, sound, temperature, etc. sight, nor merely made known by notification, as in the
In this respect the senses differ among themselves by vir- case of hearing. In smelling, reality is presented to us
tue of the distinct richness of the sensed qualities. Aris- apprehended in a different form: as a scent. Smell is the
totle already noted that sight is the sense which manifests sense of scenting. In the case of taste on the other hand, a
to us the greatest diversity of information: pollas deloi thing is present, but as a possessed reality, “savored”.
diaphoras. Today, the senses are specified by a distinction Taste is more than notice, or scent; it is reality itself pres-
in the receptive organs. They are some eleven in number: ent as enjoyable. It is reality itself which, as such-and-
vision, hearing, smell, taste, equilibrium, contact- such reality, has a formal moment of enjoyment. In the
pressure, heat, cold, pain, kinesthesia (including muscu- case of touch (contact and pressure) a thing is present but
lar, tendon, and articular sense), and visceral sensibility. I without eidos or taste; this is the naked presentation of
prescind from the fact that the specificity of some of these reality. But the senses also present reality to me in an-
receptors is in dispute; that is a psycho-physiological other form. In kinesthesia I no longer have reality pres-
question. ent, nor any notice of it, etc. I only have reality as some-
40 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

thing “towards”. This is not a “towards” reality, but real- and intimacy are first line modes of presentation of the
ity {102} itself as a “towards”. It is thus a mode of direc- real; they are therefore modes of the impression of reality.
tional presentation. It is not the case that “the” mode of reality’s presence is
I have spoken in these last lines of sensed qualities vision, and that the other modes are nothing but replace-
and of the thing which possesses them. Clearly, this dis- ments for vision when it fails us. Indeed, exactly the oppo-
tinction between things and qualities is not primary but site. To be sure, the modes are not all equivalent; but all
derived from the organization of our perceptions. How- are in and by themselves proper modes of the presentation
ever, I have utilized it not to fix therein the difference of reality. The preponderant rank of some modes over
between quality and thing, but so that the essential idea others does not proceed from the fact that they are re-
becomes clearer, viz. that qualities are formally real and placements for vision, but from the very nature of reality.
that their mode of being present to me in impression has There are, for example, realities which cannot have any
the enunciated modalities. They are not modalities of other mode of presentation than naked reality appre-
reference to some problematic thing, but rather modalities hended tactilly. And in these cases it could be that reality
which are intrinsically constitutive of each of the qualities thus sensed is of a rank much superior to any reality ei-
themselves in its proper and formal reality. Thus, for ex- detically sensed. In all modes of presentation of reality,
ample, sound is a quality whose modality of reality is to be then, there is always an intellective sensing. {104}
directional. Directional in relation to what? That is an- Now we must expound this same unitary structure
other question which for the moment is of no concern to starting from intellection; all human intellection is pri-
us. It could be that there is no sonorous thing, but the marily and radically sentient intellection.
sound would not therefore cease to be directional, whether
to another sonorous quality or simply a directional in re- B) The modes of presentation of reality: sentient in-
lation to empty space. In addition, I should note that each tellection. In this respect, classical philosophy has erred
one of these qualities has a possible negative mode. Thus, in two fundamental directions.
for example, taste has as a counterposed quality distaste, In the first place, it has erred in a direction which is
etc. The denominations of the qualities are for this reason so to speak global, proceeding from the dualism of op-
simply denominations which are purely a potiori. posing intellective thinking and sensing. Thus we have
But neither reality nor my sensing are exhausted in the celebrated aphorism: nihil est in intellectu quod prius
these types of sentient apprehension. Above all, we must non fuerit in sensu nisi ipse intellectus (there is nothing in
consider heat and cold; they are the primary presentation the intelligence which was not previously in the senses,
of reality as temperant. There is in addition the appre- with the exception of the intelligence itself). This is radi-
hension of reality not simply as temperant but also as af- cally false, because it expresses precisely the character of
fectant: sorrow and pleasure are the primary expression of sensible intelligence. All intellection, however, is not just
that affection. Reality is temperant and affectant. But the sensible, but sentient. Intellection is in sensing as a de-
{103} apprehension of reality has still another moment, terminant moment of the formality apprehended therein.
viz. reality as position. This is what is proper to the sense Inasmuch as we apprehend sensed reality, the intelligence
of equilibrium. According to it, I apprehend reality as not only apprehends what is sensed, but is in the sensing
something centered. itself as a structural moment of it. And this, as we shall
immediately see, is true with respect to the intelligence
But I apprehend reality in still another form. When itself. The intelligence as intellection of itself is primarily
we apprehend our own reality, we have an internal or vis- and radically sentient intellection; the intelligence is not
ceral sensibility which can be quite diversified, but which in itself except sentiently.
globally I shall call ‘coenesthesia’. Thanks to this sens-
In the second place, such a preponderance has been
ing, man is in himself. That is what we call ‘intimacy’.
given to the presentation of the real in vision that what is
‘Intimacy’ means purely and simply “my reality”; it is a
not seen is declared eo ipso to be unintelligible. And this
mode of presentation of the real. The visceral sense is in a
is absurd not only philosophically, but also scientifically.
certain way the sense of the “me” properly speaking. The
Indeed, elementary particles are realities, since they are
other senses do not give the “me” as such unless they are
given a splendid mathematical description in quantum
encompassed by coenesthesia, as we shall immediately
mechanics. Nonetheless, they are not visualizable {105}
see.
as if they were waves or particles. Their real structure is
Eidetic presence, notice, scent, taste, naked reality, such that they are emitted and absorbed as if they were
towards, temperature accommodation, affection, position, corpuscles and they propagate as if they were waves. But
 STRUCTURE OF THE APPREHENSION OF REALITY: SENTIENT INTELLECTION 41

they are neither. And it is not just that in fact we do not sion of reality. Impression of reality is not an empty con-
see these particles, but that they are in themselves realities cept, but something perfectly and precisely structured. Yet
which are “non-visualizable”. And as we shall immedi- all of these modes are but aspects of a structural unity.
ately see, the identification of the visible and the intelligi- Whence the question which inexorably arises: What of the
ble is philosophically false: every intellection is sentient unity of the senses and intellection?
and, therefore, every mode of apprehension of the real— 2) The unity of the senses and intellection. Since the
even if that reality be neither visual nor visualizable—is essential difference of the senses rests upon the modes of
true intellection, and what is apprehended therein has its presentation of reality and not in the specific qualitative
proper intelligibility. content of the sensed note, it follows that the unity of the
There are in fact different modes of intellection and senses has special characteristics.
of intelligibility. With respect to vision, intellection has A) Above all, the diverse senses are not merely jux-
that character of apprehension of the eidos which we taposed with each other, but, on the contrary, overlap each
could call vidence.* In the sense of hearing or audition, other totally or partially. If we were dealing with the
intellection has a peculiar and unique mode: to know in- qualitative content of each sense, this overlap would be
tellectively is to auscultate (in the etymological meaning impossible. For example, it would be absurd to pretend to
of the word); this is intellection as auscultation. In the have a taste of fire or of the pole star. But we are dealing
sense of taste, the intellection is apprehension as enjoy- with modes of {107} presentation of the real. And these
able (whether pleasurable or not). The enjoyment is not modes, and not the qualities, are what overlap. I can have
consequent upon intellection, but is the enjoyment itself as a perfectly enjoyable intellection of the pole star. Although
a mode of intellection, as a mode of apprehension of real- we may not apprehend the quality proper to a sense in a
ity. Let us not forget that sapere [to know] and sapientia particular thing, nonetheless we apprehend the mode of
[wisdom] are etymologically sapor [taste]; the Latins, presentation proper to this sense when we apprehend the
indeed, translated the Greek sophia as sapientia. In the real by other senses. To clarify this I shall discuss a few
sense of touch, intellection has a special form, viz. grop- typical cases which are of special importance.
ing or what we could perhaps better call roughly estimat-
ing. In the sense of smell we have another special mode Sight gives me the reality “before” me; touch gives
of intellection, the scent. I lump together in this concept me the “naked” reality. The overlap of the two modes of
both the scent properly so-called and the trace or vestige. presence is obvious: I have “before me the naked reality”.
In the sense of kinesthesia intellection is a dynamic ten- This does not mean a vision of the eidos plus a touching
sion. It is not a tension towards reality, but reality itself as of that same eidos; that is generally absurd. Rather, it
a “towards” which has us tense. It is a mode of intellec- means that the real is present “before” me as “naked” re-
tive apprehension in the “towards”. {106} ality. The “before” me is the proper mode of presentation
of the real in the sense of sight, and the “naked” reality is
With respect to other forms of presentation of reality, the mode of presentation in the sense of touch. These two
intellection has modes proper to each. Man intellectively modes of presentation are those which overlap. All the
knows the real through accomodating himself to reality modes can also overlap with the mode of presentation of
and being affected by it. Accommodation and affection taste. Reality, indeed, is not just something present before
are modes of strict apprehension of reality, of strict intel- me, in its naked reality, but something also in principle
lection. And when reality is presented as centered, intel- “enjoyable” as reality and by being reality. This enjoy-
lection is an orientation in reality. Finally, there is a ableness is grounded in the mode through which reality is
mode of intellection proper to the presentation of reality in present to me in the sense of taste. Sight and touch give
visceral sensing: it is intellection as intimation of the real, us, as I said, the naked reality before me, and I add now
as intimate penetration into the real. This does not refer that it is enjoyable by being reality. Sight and touch,
to some intimation which is consequent upon the appre- when they overlap with hearing, present to me the reality
hension of reality, but rather the intimation itself is the to which this latter sense points: the sonorous thing is
mode of apprehending reality. apprehended as something which sounds before me and in
Thus, all of the senses qua intellective and all intel- its naked reality. A similar thing occurs in the case of
lections qua sentient are structural modes of the impres- heat and cold: I can sense myself acclimated or adjusted to
every reality qua reality. In another aspect, orientation
and equilibrium overlap with the other modes of sentient
*
[English rendering of the Spanish videncia, etymologically related to the
intellection of the real. In every intellection there is an
verb ver, to see.—trans.] orientation, {108} and every orientation is oriented in
42 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

reality by being reality, even if it be merely reported. On All of these forms of overlapping are authentic
the other hand, every intellection of the external real, overlapping, that is, each mode is intrinsically and for-
overlapped by the intellection of intimacy, makes of each mally in the rest as a structural moment of the rest of
intellection, including external intellection, an effort to them. No mode has any prerogative, not even the visual
achieve intimacy with what is apprehended. mode. It is in the diversity of overlapped modes that the
But there is a mode of presence of the real which is immense richness of the apprehension of reality consists.
of the greatest importance, viz. the mode of apprehending To be sure, not every real thing is apprehended according
reality in “towards”, the directional presence of the real. to all of its modes; but this does not mean that they do not
Overlapping the other senses, the “towards” determines all overlap, because those modes according to which a
specific modes of intellection. Thus, overlapping the ei- reality is not present to us are modes of which we are
detic presence of reality in the sense of sight, it determines positively “deprived”. Indeed, if we were radically de-
therein an effort towards the “inside”. Overlapping the prived of a sense, independently of the fact that we were
listening to the notice of something, the “towards” deter- deprived of the qualities which that sense can apprehend,
mines therein a notification through the notice, toward we would not have the mode of presentation of the real
what is noticeable. Overlapping everything which is ap- proper to that sense. A man blind from birth not only
prehended in all of its other forms, the intellection in “to- does not see black and white or colors, he cannot have the
wards” propels us to what is real beyond what is appre- presentation of the real of the other senses as something
hended. which is here-and-now {110} “before him”. He not only
doesn’t see qualities, but is deprived of apprehending the
Overlapping the visceral sensibility, the “towards” real as something which is “before”. Such a man appre-
determines therein an intellection of the greatest impor- hends the “naked” reality of something tactically, but
tance. The visceral sense gives me reality as intimacy; never apprehends it as something which is “before” him.
i.e., I apprehend myself as actually being in myself. But Quite different is the situation of the blind man who at
with the overlapping of the “towards”, this actually being one time was able to see. In this blind man there is not an
in me propels me inside of myself to be present to myself. actual seeing of black and white or colors, but the act of
And this intellection of my own intimacy in its “inside” is apprehending the real from the other senses as something
an intellection of the “me” through the “actually being”; real “before him” still exists. Thus, a blindness to black
viz. it is reflection. Reflection has always been regarded and white or colors is not the same as a blindness to the
in philosophy as being the primary act of the intellection mode of presentation of the real “before me”. Hence, in
(every intellection would be a reflection); reflection would every primordial apprehension of the real there is a strict
also be an immediate act (every act of intellection would unity not of sensible qualities, but of modes of presenta-
already be by itself a reflection); finally it would be an tion of the real, although at times it may be in that special
exclusive act of the intelligence and foreign to sensing form which we term “privative”. Each of these modes
(the senses, we are told, do not turn back upon them- taken by itself is nothing but a reduced and deficient mode
selves). But this triple conceptualization is strictly false. of the primary impression of reality, whose plenitude is
In the first place, not every act of intellection is a reflec- the primary unity of all eleven modes. But then, what is
tion. Every reflection presupposes a previous “being this unity?
here-and-now in {109} myself”; only because I am al-
ready in myself is there reflection. But since being in my- B) One might think that the various senses constitute
self is an act of sentient intellection, i.e., of strict intellec- a primary diversity such that what we call “impressive
tion, it follows that reflection is not a primary intellective apprehension of reality” would be a “synthesis”; the intel-
act. In the second place, reflection is not an immediate ligence would thus be what synthesizes the senses. In my
act; i.e., intellection is not an act which is formally an view, this is false because it does not correspond to the
entering into myself. The entering of the intellection into facts. The unity of these senses is already constituted by
itself is an entering grounded on a “towards” of my own the mere fact of being senses “of reality”, by being modes
intimacy. Reflection is not an immediate act. Finally, it is of apprehension of reality. The unity of the senses is not,
not an act which is foreign to sensing, because it is an act then, a synthesis, but a primary unity, the physical unity of
of sentient intellection. One does not enter into himself being apprehensors of reality. And since apprehending
except by sensing himself. I apprehend myself, and I turn reality is intelligence, it follows that the unity of the
“towards” myself, and I sense myself as a reality which senses is in being moments of the same “sentient intellec-
turns towards itself. And these three moments unitarily tion”. Hence, the apprehension of reality is not a synthe-
comprise reflection. sis of senses, but on the contrary “the” senses {111} are
 STRUCTURE OF THE APPREHENSION OF REALITY: SENTIENT INTELLECTION 43

“analyzers” of the apprehension of reality. From the point presentation of the real, which in its primary and radical
of view of the qualities—the only one adopted up to now unity comprises the modal moments of a single structure
by philosophy—one easily arrives at the idea of a synthe- and, therefore, of a single act: the impression of reality.
sis. Scholastic philosophy conceived this synthesis as a This primary unity is sentient intelligence. And
“common sense”. The distinct qualities which comprise thanks to this primary unity, it is possible and indeed nec-
the perceived thing in each case would be submitted to a essary for there to be an overlap of some modes by others.
synthesis of qualities. But this is false: that synthesis is Overlap is grounded in the primary unity of the sentient
not what is primary; rather, it is the unity of reality. And intelligence. Sentient intelligence, therefore, is not some
it is this primary unity of reality which constitutes the vague concept, but, as I said before, something endowed
foundation of the synthesis of the qualities. The qualities with its own structure. Thus, the diverse modes of sen-
are in fact qualities of a reality. Pure animal sensing also tient intelligence emerge from its structural unity. {113}
has a unity which is prior to any possible synthesis of
qualities. The senses of an animal are also analyzers of its This means that the modes of sentient presentation
pure sensing. And in the animal, the unity prior to the of reality constitute an intrinsic and formal limitation of
senses is a unity of stimulation in which the animal’s our intellection due to the fact that this intellection is sen-
senses are the differentiation of the stimulation. There is, tient. Sentient intellection installs us in reality, but its
then, a unity of being in stimulation prior to the diversity limitations are the root of all effort, all possibilities, and
of the senses. In man, the unity of sensing is also given, the whole problematic of the subsequent intellection of
but not in the form of a unity of being in stimulation, but a reality. But I do not wish to anticipate ideas which I will
unity of reality. The unity of being in stimulation does not develop at length further in the book. The only thing
coexist in man with the unity of reality. Indeed, it is the which I now wish to emphasize is that reality is appre-
replacement of the unity of being in stimulation by the hended as reality and is present to us as such, and that our
unity of reality which is the constitution and origin of limitations are not a type of cut-out within reality, but are
sentient intelligence. If the two unities were to coexist, in their very limitation the positive principle of the pres-
man would have senses “and” intelligence, but he would entation and apprehension of reality.
not have sentient intelligence. Sentient intelligence is the Thus, sentient intellection is intellection of reality
structuralization of the diversity of the senses in the intel- which is modally structured.
lective unity of reality. If man could have only the mere
unity of being in stimulation, it would signify a complete
regression to the state of animality. 2
Transcendental Structure of the
The impression of reality, then, has its own very pre-
Impression of Reality
cise structure. To impressively apprehend the real as
{112} real is to apprehend the thing as actually being
“before me” and in its “naked reality”, and in its “enjoy- Each of the modal moments of the impression of re-
ability”, and in its “direction”, etc. ality has its own qualitative content which is always very
specific: this color, this sound, this weight, that tempera-
This does not mean that one successively apprehends ture, etc. But sensing is constituted not indeed by that
the same real thing in these modes of presentation, be- qualitative diversity, but by the unity of the presentation of
cause they constitute structural moments of every unitary the real; i.e., by the unity of the moment of formality, by
act of apprehension of something as real. Therefore, ex- the unity of the impression of reality. Now, from this
cept in cases of congenital privation of a sense, all of these point of view, the impression of reality is always constitu-
moments function pro indiviso in the act of sentiently ap- tively non-specific, in contrast to its content. Formality is
prehending any reality whatsoever, independently of the not just one {114} more quality. But this is a conceptuali-
one or more senses by which its qualities are apprehended. zation that is purely negative; positively, the impression of
It is for this reason that, when one loses some particular reality is non-specific because it transcends all of those
sense, he does not lose the structural moment proper to specific contents. It has, therefore, a transcendental
that sense’s presentation of the real—except, I repeat, in structure. Transcendentality* is the positive face of the
the case of a congenital absence of that sense. Conversely,
in the exercise of the sentient apprehension of reality, that
*
which each sense delivers is not just the sensible quality, [‘Transcendentality’ is a neologism of Zubiri. It is the noun corresponding
to ‘transcendental’, and must be distinguished from that used in previous
but also its own mode of apprehending that quality as re- philosophy, generally ‘transcendence’. For Zubiri, ‘transcendence’ refers
ality. And all of these modes are just that, “modes” of to the content of reality, whereas ‘transcendentality’ refers to the formal-
44 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

negative non-specificity. It is the structure of the de suyo does not withdraw us from what is apprehended, but sub-
as such, i.e., a structure which concerns reality qua im- merges us in its reality; it is the characteristic of the “in its
pressively apprehended. own right”, of the de suyo. And it is this reality which, in
Transcendentality is a central concept both in an- a way to be made more precise forthwith, goes beyond the
cient and modern philosophy. But modern philosophy content, but within the formality of otherness. This intra-
conceived of transcendentality (as it could scarcely other- apprehensive “going beyond” is precisely transcendental-
wise do) from the standpoint of the conceiving intelli- ity. The impression of reality is not impression of what is
gence. The sentient intelligence leads us to a different transcendent, but rather transcendental impression.
concept of transcendentality. To reach it we must first of Therefore “trans” does not mean being outside of or be-
all clarify what transcendentality is. Then we shall be yond apprehension itself but being “in the apprehension”,
able to rigorously conceptualize its constitutive moments. yet “going beyond” its fixed content. In other words, that
which is apprehended in the impression of reality is, by
1. What is transcendentality? Transcendentality is
being real, and inasmuch as it is reality, “more” than what
the structural moment by which something transcends
is it as colored, {116} sonorous, warm, etc. What is this
itself.
“more”? That is the question.
What is this something? What is the transcendental?
That which is transcendental is that which constitutes the For classical philosophy this “more”, i.e., transcen-
formal terminus of the intelligence, to wit, reality. And dentality, consists in that moment in which all things co-
this reality is present to us in impression. Hence, that incide. Transcendentality would be commonness. Al-
which is transcendental is reality in an impression. though the notion of transcendentality is not Greek but
In what does its transcendentality itself consist? medieval, that which it designates is Greek. In what do
What is transcendental depends on how one conceives the all things coincide? They coincide in being. Parmenides
“trans”. “Trans” does not here mean “being beyond” ap- told us that to intellectively know something is to intel-
prehension. If that were true, the impression of reality lectively know that it “is” (such, at least, is my interpreta-
would be impression of the transcendent—which would tion). The “is” is that in which all things coincide. And
mean that the sentient apprehension of the real would be, Plato called this coincidence commonness, koinonia. This
formally, (i.e., qua apprehension) apprehension of some- commonness is participation. Nothing, for example, is
thing which in and through itself were real beyond appre- “the” being, but everything participates in being. In turn,
hension; it would be {115} to think that the moment of this participation is a progressive differentiation of a su-
otherness meant that the content of the impression of re- preme genus which is “the” being. Things are like
ality were transcendent. Now, it may or may not be true branches of a common trans, of a supreme genus, which is
that that content is transcendent; that would have to be “the” being. Unity, participation, genus: here we have the
investigated in each case. But it is false that, formally, the three moments of what I believe constitutes in Plato the
otherness of reality is transcendent. That would mean that first sketch of what we are calling ‘transcendentality’. I
in the mere act of apprehending something we are appre- leave aside the fact that these three moments are not, for
hending a real thing which is and continues to be real Plato, the only ones to characterize being; four other
even though we do not apprehend it. And this, I repeat, is equally supreme genera apply: movement, rest, sameness
formally false. In apprehension we have something real and otherness. Together with being they are the five su-
“in its own right”. But that “in its own right” should preme genera of things. They have a commonness among
mean real beyond apprehension is, in the first place, themselves, at least a partial one, and participation is
something which must be justified. And in the second grounded on this community. Aristotle profoundly modi-
place, this justification must be based precisely upon tran- fied this scheme but remained in the same general con-
scendentality. The possible transcending is based, then on ceptual line. For Aristotle, being is not a genus, but a
transcendentality, and not the other way around. supreme trans-generic universal concept. Whence com-
munity is not participation; it is only a conceptual com-
‘Trans’ means something completely different here. munity of things. Transcendentality is what is proper to a
Provisionally, it means that we are dealing with a charac- concept in which what is conceived is in all things. Being
teristic of the formality of otherness and not with a char- is the most universal concept, {117} common to every-
acteristic, transcendent or no, of the content itself. It is a thing. Other concepts are not transcendental, except pos-
characteristic which is internal to what is apprehended. It sibly generic concepts. And this line of thought was fol-
lowed throughout the middle ages. Transcendentality con-
ity of reality. Transcendentality is a physical, not sensible, moment of sists in being a trans-generic concept.
things given in the impression of reality.—trans.]
 STRUCTURE OF THE APPREHENSION OF REALITY: SENTIENT INTELLECTION 45

In Kant, modern philosophy conceptualized that now consider.

what is intelligible is the “object” of intellection. There-
2. The Formal Nature of Transcendentality. We
fore, everything known intellectually consists in “being-
shall not construct concepts of the nature of transcenden-
object”. Transcendentality as such is not the character of
tality. Reality is the formality of impression, and tran-
all things conceived in the most universal concept, but
scendentality is the moment of the “ex” of this formality.
rather is the character of all things qua objectually pro-
The analysis of the “ex” is, then, an analysis of the im-
posed to the intellection. Transcendentality is thus objec-
pression of reality. It is not a theory. There in the impres-
tual community. And this idea lived on in all idealist
sion of reality do we immediately discover transcenden-
philosophy.
tality as an “ex”. This analysis shows us that transcen-
In both of the two conceptions, viz. the Greco- dentality has four constitutive moments. {119}
medieval and the Kantian, transcendentality is clearly a
radical and formally conceptive moment. The transcen- a) Reality is the formality of the de suyo. Now, if for
dental is that in which everything conceived (object or any reason the content of a real thing is modified, the real
being) coincides. And its transcendentality consists in thing does not therefore necessarily become another real-
universal community of what is conceived. This is tran- ity. It can continue to be the same real thing, although
scendentality conceptualized by a concipient intelligence. modified. What is this sameness? To be sure, it is not a
But more radical than this latter is sentient intelligence. simple phenomenon of perceptive constancy but a strict
Therefore it is necessary to conceptualize transcendental- numerical sameness of the moment of reality. The content
ity from the standpoint of sentient intelligence; i.e., with of the de suyo, i.e., what is de suyo, has changed but has
respect to the impression of reality. In that case, tran- not changed the de suyo itself as such. The same formality
scendentality is not community or commonness, but of reality, with numerical sameness, “reifies” whatever
something quite different. comes into its content. The thing is the same although
not the same. The sameness in question is not a concep-
Above all, the transcendental is, first of all, some- tual identity; it is not mere community. It is communica-
thing proper to what constitutes the formal terminus of tion, reification. This does not mean that the concept of
intellection. And this is not “being” but “reality”. I shall reality is equal in the two distinct realities, but that there
consider the idea of being at length in another chapter. In is a numerical sameness. Each new apprehension of real-
the second place, this intellection is sentient. Hence, the ity is inscribed in the formality of reality numerically the
real is transcendental by virtue of its reality as its own same. This is what constitutes the first moment of tran-
formality; reality is formality. In what does the transcen- scendentality: openness. The formality of reality is in
dentality of this formality of reality consist? {118} itself, qua “of reality”, something open, at least with re-
Being the characteristic of a formality, “trans- spect to its content. The formality of reality is, then, an
cendentality” does not mean being transcendental “to” “ex”. By being open this formality is that by which a real
reality, but being transcendental “in” realities. It is the thing qua real is “more” than its actual content. Reality is
formality of reality which is transcendental in itself. And not, then, a characteristic of the content already com-
this “transcendental” should not be conceptualized as a pleted, but is open formality. To say “reality” is always to
function of that toward which we have transcending, but leave in abeyance a phrase which by itself is begging to be
rather as a function of that from which we have it. It is completed by “reality of something”. The real qua real is
like a drop of oil which expands out from itself. Tran- open not in the sense that each real thing acts on all the
scendentality is something which, in this sense, extends others by virtue of its properties. We are not dealing with
from the formality of reality of a thing to the formality of actuation but with openness of formality. The formality of
reality of every other thing. Thus transcendentality is not reality {120} as such is openness itself. It is not openness
community, but communication. But this communication of the real, but openness of reality.
is not causal; there is no question of the reality of one Being open is why the formality of reality can be the
thing producing or generating the reality of another; that same in different real things. It may be said that in our
would be absurd. Rather, we are dealing with a commu- apprehensions, we apprehend multiple real things. This is
nication which is merely formal. The formality of reality true; but in the first place, that multiplicity refers above all
is constitutively and formally “ex-tension”. Hence, it does to content. And, in the second place, although we are
not refer to mere conceptual universality, but to real ex- treating of other realities, these realities are not “others”
tensive communication. The trans of transcendentality is conceptually but are formally sensed as others. Concep-
an “ex”, the “ex” of the formality of the real. In what does tually, the multiple realities would be particular cases of a
this “ex” consist? This is the question which we must single concept of reality. But sentiently the other realities
46 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

are not particular cases; rather, they are formally sensed as conjoins real things is not some common concept with
others. And, therefore, when we sense them as others, we respect to which the real things are simply special cases.
are expressing precisely the inscription of different real That which conjoins is a physical moment of the real
things in the numerical sameness of the formality of real- things themselves. And this moment is the moment of
ity. Hence we are not talking about “a second reality”, but pure and simple reality of each one of them. The charac-
“another reality”. Openness: here we have the first mo- ter of being purely and simply real is what—because it is
ment of the “ex” of transcendentality. an open character—formally constitutes that physical
b) Since reality is formally “open”, it is not reality unity which is the world. It is the formality of reality qua
except respectively to that to which it is open. This re- open, qua transcendent, of the real thing, and what con-
spectivity is not a relation, because every relation is a re- stitutes it in a moment of reality itself. It is an openness,
lation of one thing or of a form of reality to another thing then, which radically and formally concerns each real
or other form of reality. In contrast, respectivity is a con- thing by the fact of being purely and simply real. There-
stitutive moment of the very formality of reality as such. fore, were there but one single real thing, it would be con-
Reality is de suyo and therefore to be real is to be so re- stitutively and formally “worldly”. Everything is de suyo
spectively to that which is de suyo. By its openness, the worldly. In this respect, each real thing is more than it-
formality of reality is respectively transcendental. Re- self: it is precisely transcendental; it has the transcenden-
spectivity transcends itself. The “ex” is now respectivity. tal unity of being a moment of the world. The formality
It is reality itself, the formality of reality, which qua real- of reality is thus “world-making”. This is the fourth mo-
ity is formally respective openness. {121} To be real is ment of transcendentality, of the “ex”.
more than to be this or that; but it is to be real only re- Thus there is a transcendental structure in every real
spectively to this or that. Respective openness is tran- thing which is apprehended in an impression of reality.
scendental. This is the second moment of transcendental- The formality of reality is respective openness, and
ity. therefore is reifying. This respectivity has two moments: it
c) To what is the formality of reality open, to what is is own-making and world-making. That is, each thing is
this respectivity open? Above all, it is open to the content. “this” real thing; in a further sense it is “its own” reality
And thus this content has a precise character. It is not (own-making); in a still more ulterior aspect it is pure and
“the” content, taken abstractly, but is a content which is simple worldly reality (world-making). This does not
de suyo, which is “in its own right”. Therefore, the con- mean a “contraction” of the idea of reality to each real
tent is really “its own” [suyo], of the thing. The content is thing, but just the reverse: an “expansion”, a physical
“its” [su] content. The grammatical subject of this “its” “extension” of the formality of reality from each real
[su] is the formality of reality. Upon being respectively thing. This is the transcendental structure of the “ex”:
open, the formality of reality not only “reifies” the content being de suyo is extended to being “its own” [suyo], and
but moreover makes it formally “its own” [suyo]. For this thereby is extended to being “worldly”. {123}
reason it may be called ‘suificating’ or ‘own-making’. This is not a conceptual conception. It is an analysis
Prior to being a moment of the content, the “its-own-ness” of the very impression of reality. We sense the openness,
[suidad] is a moment of the formality of reality. That we sense the respectivity, we sense the its-own-ness, we
formality of reality is, then, what constitutes its-own-ness sense the worldliness. This is the complete sensing of the
as such. As a moment of the formality of reality, the its- thing in the formality of reality. The sensing itself is then
own-ness is a moment of the “ex”, it is transcendental. transcendental.
This is the third moment of transcendentality.
Thus we have transcendentality conceptualized in
d) But openness is not respective just to content. The the sentient intelligence:
fact is that real content, thus reified and suified by being
real, is not only its own [suya] reality, but precisely by a) The transcendental is not “being”, but “reality”.
being real is, so to speak, purely and simply real in reality b) Transcendentality is precisely and formally re-
itself. The formality of reality is open to being a moment spective openness to worldly its-own-ness.
of the world; it is a formality which, upon making the c) The “trans” itself is not a conceptual characteristic
thing be reality purely and simply, makes of “its” [su] re- of real things. It is not, I reiterate, the concept of maxi-
ality a moment of reality itself; i.e., of the world. mum universality. What this latter concept may be is
What is the world? It is not the conjunction of real something extremely problematic and may even depend
things, because this conjunction presupposes something upon the language which one employs. Moreover, it is
which “conjoins” {122} these things. Now, that which truly problematic that a concept of total universality even
 STRUCTURE OF THE APPREHENSION OF REALITY: SENTIENT INTELLECTION 47

exists. But be that as it may, transcendentality is not of teriori. That is, it is not a type of property which things
conceptual character, but of physical character. It is a have. Transcendentality is neither a priori nor a posteriori;
physical moment of real things qua sensed in the impres- it is something grounded by things in the formality in
sion of reality. It is not something physical in the same which they “are situated”. It is the content of real things
way as its content, but is, nonetheless, something physi- which determines their transcendental character; it is the
cal; it is the physical part of formality, i.e., the “trans- mode in which things “are situated”. It is not a property
physics” as such. but a function: the transcendental function.
The such-making function and the transcendental
3 function are not two functions but two moments which are
Structural Unity of the Impression of Reality constitutive of the unity of the impression of reality.
Hence the difference between suchness and transcenden-
tality is not formally the same as the difference between
We have examined the structure of the impression of content and reality, because suchness as well as reality
reality in its two-fold modal and transcendental moment. both involve the two moments of content and formality.
As modal, the structure of the impression of reality is Content involves the moment of reality in a very precise
{124} the structure of sentient intellection. As transcen- way, viz. as “making-it-such”.
dental, the structure of the impression of reality is the re-
spective openness to worldly its-own-ness. Now, these Green is not suchness qua mere content; suchness is
two structural moments are not independent. Indeed, they the mode by which green consists in real green. At the
are but moments of a single structure and they are mutu- same time reality involves content in a very precise way.
ally determined in constituting the unity of the impression It is not true that content is simply a particular case of
of reality. This is what we must now clarify. reality, but rather that reality involves content in a very
precise way: as transcending it. Transcendentality could
On the one hand, real notes, as I said, have a great not be given without that of which it is transcendental.
specificity in virtue of their content. On the other, the Such-making and transcendentalization are the two in-
formality of reality is formally not just non-specific, but separable aspects of the real. They constitute the struc-
constitutively transcendental. Now, its content, qua ap- tural unity of the impression of reality. {126}
prehended as something de suyo, is no longer mere con-
tent but “such-and-such” a reality. This is what I call To summarize, sentient intelligence intellectively
“suchness”. Suchness is not mere content. In mere knows reality in all its modes, and transcends them in
stimulation a dog apprehends the same stimuli as a man, their total unity. Sentient intelligence is impressive ap-
but it does not apprehend “suchnesses”. Reality is for- prehension of the real. And this impression of the real is
mality and, therefore, on account of being respectively constitutively modal and transcendental. That is, it is
open to its content it involves this content transcenden- precisely impression of “reality”.
tally. In this process, the content is determined as such- In this chapter, we have studied the structure of the
ness; it is the suchness of the real. Suchness is a tran- apprehension of reality. It is apprehension by the sentient
scendental determination: it is the such-making function. intelligence. But now three important new problems
In contrast, content is that which constitutes the fact come to mind:
that the formality of reality is “reality” in all of its con-
creteness. The real is not only “such-and-such” a reality 1. In what does intellective knowing as such con-
but also “reality” as such. The content is the determina- sist?
tion of the reality itself. This is the transcendental func- 2. What is the character of the reality thus
tion. It too involves content, and not just in an abstract known?
way, but also as making of it a form and a mode of reality.
3. What does it mean to say that reality is in the
Reality is not something insubstantial, but a formality
intellection?
which is very concretely determined. There are not only
many real things, but also many forms of being real. The three ideas of intellection, intellectively known
{125} Each real thing is a form of being real; we shall see reality, and the being of reality in intellection, are distinct
this in a later chapter. Thus it is clear that transcenden- and comprise the three themes which I shall study in the
tality does not conceptually repose upon itself, but de- next three chapters: the idea of the essential nature of in-
pends upon the content of things. Transcendentality is tellection, the idea of reality as known intellectively, and
not something a priori. But neither is it something a pos- the idea of reality in intellection.
48 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

{127}

APPENDIX 4

TRANSCENDENTALITY AND METAPHYSICS

It is necessary to stress a bit more what transcen- himself on his master’s conceptualization. In the first
dentality is. Following the thread of the impression of place, his “first philosophy” (later termed ‘metaphysics’)
reality we see ourselves led to something which is not does not deal with separated Ideas, but does deal with a
mere analysis, but to a theoretical conceptualization of “separated” substance: the Theos. And, in the second
reality itself. Since this conceptualization does not strictly place, among physical substances Aristotle (after an initial
pertain to the analysis of the impression of reality, I have disclaimer) in fact occupied himself more with primary
grouped these considerations in an appendix. I do not do substance (prote ousia) than with secondary substance
so capriciously, but rather because these considerations (deutera ousia), whose link to primary substance he never
comprise the frontier between a philosophy of the intelli- saw very clearly. And the fact is that ultimately, even af-
gence and a philosophy of reality. And they are not a ter he converted the Idea into the substantial form of a
frontier which is, so to speak, geographical, but are con- thing, Aristotle always remained in an enormous dualism,
siderations which originate from the analysis of the im- the dualism between sensing and intellective knowing
pression of reality and therefore mark out for us the path which led him to a metaphysical dualism in the theory of
of a philosophy of reality. substance. In this way the idea of the “meta-physical” as
“beyond-physical” lives on.
1) To say that one treats of the physical in “trans” al-
ready permits us to glimpse that we are dealing with a Though with somewhat varying interpretations, me-
characteristic which is “meta-physical”. And indeed this dieval thinkers understood that {129} metaphysics is
is the case. But since the idea of meta comes to us already “trans-physics”; the term even briefly appeared at one
loaded with meanings, it is necessary to here fix precisely time. But here is the great error which must be avoided.
the meaning of ‘metaphysics’. In medieval thought, “transphysical” always means
something beyond the physical. And what I am here say-
Naturally, it does not mean what it originally meant
ing is just the opposite: it is not something beyond the
for Andronicus of Rhodes, viz. “post-Physics” or “what
physical, but the physical itself, though in a dimension
comes after the Physics”. Very soon after this editor of
which is formally distinct. It is not a “trans” of the physi-
Aristotle, ‘metaphysics’ came to signify not what is “after”
cal, but is the “physical itself as trans”. For this it was
physics, but what {128} is “beyond” the physical. Meta-
necessary to overcome the dualism between intellective
physics is then “beyond-physics”. This is what I have just
knowing and sensing which in Greek and medieval phi-
called the ‘transcendent’. Without employing the term, its
losophy always led to the dualism of reality. The terminus
greatest exponent was Plato: beyond sensible things are
of sensing would be sensible things, changeable and mul-
those things which Plato calls ‘intelligible things’, the
tiple as the Greeks were wont to call them. Thus, for the
things he termed ‘Ideas’. The Idea is “separated” from
Greeks, transcendental means what “always is”. The
sensible things. Hence, what later was called meta came
“trans” is, therefore, the necessary jump from one zone of
to mean what for Plato is “separation”, khorismos. Plato
reality to another. It is a necessary jump if one starts from
boldly debated how to conceptualize this separation in
the concipient intellection. But there is no jump if one
such a way that the intellection of the Ideas would permit
starts from sentient intellection.
intellective knowing of sensible things. From the stand-
point of the sensible things, they are a “participation” In modern philosophy, Kant always moved within
(methexis) in the Ideas. But from the standpoint of the this dualism between what Leibnitz called the ‘sensible
Ideas, these Ideas are “present” (parousia) in things, and world’ and the ‘intelligible world’. To be sure, Kant saw
are their “paradigm” (paradeigma). Methexis, parousia, the problem of this duality and the intellective necessity of
and paradeigma are the three aspects of a single structure: a unitary conceptualization of what is known. For Kant,
the conceptive structure of the separation. Aristotle indeed, intellection is knowledge. And Kant tried to re-
seemingly rejected this Platonic conceptualization with his establish the unity, but along very precise lines, those of
theory of substance. But ultimately, Aristotle nurtured objectivity. The sensible and the intelligible are for Kant
 STRUCTURE OF THE APPREHENSION OF REALITY: SENTIENT INTELLECTION 49

the two elements (a posteriori and a priori) of a primary For this reason, when it came to consider the novelty
unity: the unity of the object. There are not two objects of personal reality qua subsistent reality, philosophy found
known, one sensible and the other intelligible, but a single itself compelled to remake the idea of reality qua reality
sensible-intelligible object: the phenomenon. What is from a viewpoint not substantial but subsistential. To be
outside of this unity of the phenomenal object is the ultra- sure, in classical metaphysics—unfortunately—subsis-
physical, noumenon. And that which is beyond the phe- tence has been considered as a substantial mode, which to
nomenon is therefore transcendent; it is the metaphysical. my way of thinking has corrupted the notion of subsis-
Hence, the Kantian unity of the object is constituted in tence. But this does not affect what we are here saying,
sensible intelligence: {130} it is the intrinsic unity of viz. that the character of reality qua reality is something
being an object of knowledge. open and not fixed once and for all.
In one form or another, then, whether we consider Now, transcendentality not only is not a priori, and
the Greek and medieval or the Kantian conception, meta- not only is it open, but in fact this openness is dynamic.
physics has always been something “transphysical” in the To be sure, it could have been otherwise; but in fact we are
sense of beyond the physical, in the sense of the transcen- dealing with a dynamic openness. This means not only
dent. Only a radical critique of the duality of intellective that new types of reality can continue to appear, and with
knowing and sensing, i.e., only a sentient intelligence, them new types of reality qua reality; but also to the fact
can lead to a unitary conception of the real. We are not that this apparition is dynamic. It is reality as reality
dealing, I repeat, with the unity of the object as an object which, from the reality of a thing, goes on opening itself
of knowledge; but of the unity of the real itself unitarily to other types of reality qua reality. This is the dynamic
apprehended. That is to say, we are not dealing with a transcendentality, the transcendental dynamism of the
sensible intelligence, but a sentient intelligence: the im- real.
pression of reality. In it, the moment of reality and its One might think that I am here alluding to evolu-
transcendentality are strictly and formally physical. In tion. In a certain respect that is true; but it is secondary,
this sense of “trans-physics”, and only in this sense, the because evolution would have to discharge here not a
transcendentality of the impression of reality is a charac- cosmic function, i.e., “in such a way”, but would have to
teristic which is formally metaphysical; it is metaphysical, be a {132} characteristic of reality itself qua reality.
not as intellection of the transcendent, but as sentient ap- Suchness, I said, has a transcendental function. Now, the
prehension of the physical transcendentality of the real. transcendental function of evolution would be, as I have
already indicated, dynamic transcendentality. But evolu-
2) With regard to the concipient intelligence, it was
tion in the strict sense is a scientific question, and as such
thought that the transcendental is something which is not
is a question merely of fact—a fact however well
just beyond physical reality, but indeed is a type of canon
grounded, but by virtue of being a scientific fact, always
of everything real. The transcendental would thus be a
disputable. For this reason, when I speak here of evolu-
priori, and moreover something conclusive. We have
tion I do not refer to evolution in the strict and scientific
already seen that the transcendental is not a priori. I
sense, i.e., to the evolution of real things, but to evolution
might add now that it is not something conclusive, either;
in a more radical sense, which can even be given without
i.e., transcendentality is not a group of characteristics of
scientific evolution. It is that the different modes of real-
the real fixed once and for all for everything. On the
ity as such go on appearing not just successively but
contrary, it is a characteristic which is constitutively open,
grounded transcendentally and dynamically one in an-
as I have already said. To be real qua real is something
other. And this is not a scientific fact, but something pri-
which depends on what the real things are and, therefore,
mary and radical. It is dynamic transcendentality.
is something open, because we do not know nor can we
know whether the catalogue of types of real things (i.e., of For a sentient intelligence, reality is being de suyo.
what is reality qua reality) is fixed. {131} This does not There are different ways of being de suyo, ways which
refer to whether the type of real things is open, but rather continue to appear, grounded in things because reality is
to the question of what reality is as such. For example, formality, it is the de suyo, and this is a formality
the Greeks thought that the character of substance ex- grounded and constitutively open and dynamic. To be real
pressed the real as such. But personal subsistence is an- as such is an open dynamism. Reality as such is not a
other type of reality as such about which the Greeks did concept of concipient intelligence; it is a concept of sen-
not think. tient intelligence.
 {133}

CHAPTER V

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF SENTIENT INTELLECTION

We have seen that the apprehension of reality is sen- for Plato and Aristotle the intelligence would be a tabula
tient intellection. We have concentrated on the question rasa, or as they said an ekmageion, a wax tablet on which
of what it is to be sentient; the answer is, to apprehend there is nothing written. What is written is written by
something in an impression. Later we shall examine what things, and this writing would be intellection. Such is the
intellection is: briefly, it is the apprehension of something idea running through almost all of philosophy until Kant.
as real. The sentient intelligence is, then, impressive ap- But that is not intellection; it is at best the mechanism of
prehension of the real, i.e. the impression of reality. But intellection, the explanation of the production of the act of
in this way, we have conceptualized sentient intelligence intellection. That things act upon the intelligence is quite
only in virtue of its intrinsic structure. Now we must ask undeniable; but it is not in the way that the Greeks and
ourselves what sentient intellection is, not in virtue of its Medievals thought. Rather, it is by way of “intellective
structure, but with respect to the formal essence of its act. impression”. But that is not the question with which we
What is sentient intellection as such, and what is its for- are now concerned. We are only asking about the result,
mal nature? It is to this formal nature that I here give the so to speak, of that actuation: the formal essence of the
name ‘essence’ in an unqualified way. What, then, is the act. The communication of substances is a theory, but not
essence of sentient intellection? the analysis of a {135} fact. The only fact we have is the
Upon formulating this question, we immediately impression of reality.
sense that we have in some ways returned to Chapter I. Modern philosophy, as I said, has attended more to
There we were asking about the act of intellection. The the act of intellection in itself than to its production. To
reply was: it is an act of apprehension. Apprehension, I be sure, it has done so with a radical limitation: it has
said, is the moment in which the thing intellectively thought that intellection is formally knowledge. But for
known is present in {134} the intelligence. And this be- now, we leave this point aside and concentrate on knowl-
ing sentiently present is what constitutes human appre- edge qua intellection. It is obvious that in intellection, the
hension of reality. Now let us take one more step: For- object understood is present. Now, this general idea can
mally, what is this being present in sentient intellection? be understood in different ways. One could think that the
To be sure, these questions overlap somewhat; hence, being present consists in what is present being put there
some repetition is inevitable. But it is not simply repeti- by the intelligence in order to be known intellectively.
tion, because now we have a different point of view. Being present would be “actually being put there”. Of
We consider sentient intellection as an act of being course, this does not mean that the intelligence produces
present. What is this act? That is the question. what is known intellectively. Here, position in the sense
of “being put” means that what is known intellectively, in
Let us proceed first in a negative fashion, i.e., let us
order to be so, must be “put before” the intelligence. And
say what this act is not. In this endeavor, let us ignore for
it is the intelligence which does this “putting before” or
the time being the sentient aspects of the act and limit
“proposition”. That was the idea of Kant. The formal
ourselves to its intellective aspects.
essence of intellection would then consist in positionality.
Above all, intellection is not an act which intellec- But it is also possible to think that the essence of being
tively known things produce in the intelligence. Such an present is not being “put”, but in being the intentional
act would be an actuation. It is what, in a very graphic terminus of consciousness. That was the idea of Husserl.
way, Leibniz called communication of substances. Thus, Intellection would be only a “referring myself” to what is

51
52 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

known intellectively, i.e., it would be something formally been called “actuality” (actualitas by the Medieval phi-
intentional; the object itself of intellection would be the losophers) is the character of the real as act. And they
mere correlate of this intention. Strictly speaking, for understood by act what Aristotle called energeia, i.e., the
Husserl intellection is only a mode of intentionality, a fullness of the reality of something. Thus, to say that
mode of consciousness, one among others. Taking this something is a dog in act means that this something is the
idea one step further, one could think that the being pres- fullness of that in which being a dog consists. To be sure,
ent is formally neither position nor intention, but unveil- for this general way of thinking, ‘act’ can mean “action”
ing. That was the idea of Heidegger. But intellection is because action derives from something which is in act. To
not formally position, intention, or unveiling, because in everything real, in virtue of having the fullness of that in
any of these forms what is known intellectively “is here- which it consists in reality, and consequently, in virtue of
and-now present” in the intellection. Now, whether it be its capacity to act, the expression “being real in act” was
present by position, by {136} intention, or by unveiling, applied—a quite improper denomination. This charac-
the being here-and-now present of what is “put there”, of teristic should rather be called actuity: Actuity is the char-
what is “intended”, and of what is “unveiled” is not for- acter of act of a real thing.
mally identical to its position, its intention, or its unveil- To my way of thinking, actuality is something quite
ing. None of these tells us in what the “being here-and- distinct. Actuality is not the character of the act, but the
now present” consists. Position, intention, and unveiling character of the actual. Thus we speak of something
are, in the majority of cases, ways of being here-and-now which has much or little actuality or of what acquires and
present. But they are not the being here-and-now present loses actuality. In these expressions we are not referring to
as such. What is put there, “is” put there, what is in- act in the sense of Aristotle, but rather we allude to a type
tended, “is” intended; what is unveiled, “is” unveiled. of physical presence of the real. Classical philosophy has
What is this “being here-and-now”? Being here-and-now not distinguished these two characteristics, viz. actuity
present does not consist in being the terminus of an intel- and actuality. {138}
lective act, regardless of its type. Rather, “being here-and-
now present” is a proper moment of the thing itself; it is But as I see it, the difference is essential and of
the thing which is. And the formal essence of intellection philosophic importance. Actuality is a physical moment
consists in the essence of this being here-and-now present. of the real, but not in the sense of a physical note. The
moment of act of a physical note is actuity. Its other mo-
Let us correctly pose the question. Sentient intellec-
ment is also physical, but is actuality. What is actuality?
tion is impressive apprehension of something as real.
That is the question.
Thus the proper part of the real as known intellectively is
to be present in the impression of reality. Now, this being Let us proceed step-by-step.
present consists formally in a being present as mere actu- 1. Actuality has as its salient characteristic, so to
ality in the sentient intelligence. The formal essence of speak, the being-here-and-now-present of something in
sentient intellection is this mere actuality. something. Thus, when we say that viruses are something
Such is the idea which it is now necessary to clarify having much actuality, we mean that they are something
in a positive way. In order to do so we shall ask: which is today present to everyone. Here one can already
1. What is actuality? perceive the essential difference between actuality and
actuity. Something is real in act when it has the fullness
2. What is actuality as intellective? of its reality. Viruses are always realities in act; nonethe-
3. What is actuality as sentient? less, their being present to everyone is not this actuity.
4. Synoptically, what is actuality in sentient in- Only a few years ago, the viruses did not have this here-
tellection? {137} and-now presence; they did not have actuality.
2. One might perhaps think that actuality is a mere
extrinsic relation of one real thing to another; in the fore-
§1 going example, the relation of the viruses to the men who
study them. But this is not necessarily always the case.
WHAT ACTUALITY IS There are times when the real is “making itself present”.
Thus we say that a person made himself present among
The expression ‘actuality’ and what is conceptual- others or even among inanimate things (thus man has
ized by it tend to obscure an ambiguous point which it is made himself present on the Moon). This “making one-
necessary to bring out and clarify. What traditionally has self” is already not mere extrinsic relation as the actuality
 ESSENTIAL NATURE OF SENTIENT INTELLECTION 53

of the viruses might be; it is something which carries us the following chapter. In the impression of reality, the
beyond pure presentiality. It is undeniably an intrinsic formality of reality is, as we saw, a prius of apprehension
moment of a real thing; the person in question, in fact, is itself. What is apprehended is “of its own”, i.e., is de suyo
what makes himself present. In what does this intrinsic in the apprehension but before the apprehension. It is
moment consist? It clearly consists in that his presence is apprehended though precisely as something anterior to the
something determined by the person {139} “from within apprehension—which means, therefore, that the appre-
himself”. Thus, being a person is indifferent for our hension (as the actuality that is, as we shall forthwith see)
question, because every real thing has (or can have, we is always and only of what is “of its own”, i.e. actuality of
will not pursue the question) the character of being pres- reality, of actuity. Hence, every actuality is always and
ent from within itself. This “from within itself” is the only actuality of the real, actuality of an actuity, a “being
second moment of actuality. Then we should say that ac- here and now in actuality”. Whence actuality, despite
tuality is the being present of the real from within itself. being a distinct character of actuity, is nonetheless a char-
Through this moment, actuality carries us beyond pure acter which is physical in its way. There is a becoming of
presentness. Because in this “being present here-and- the real itself according to its actuality which is distinct
now” what confers its radical character upon actuality is from its becoming according to its actuity. This does not
not its presentness, nor the being here-and-now “present”, mean that in this unfolding of actuality, formally consid-
but the “being here-and-now” of the present inasmuch as ered, the thing acquires, loses, or modifies its notes; real-
it is now present here. Let us make a comparison. A ity does not unfold as an act, but does unfold formally as
piece of wax on my table is dry. If I put it into a container actuality. It is true that things, in order to be actual, may
of cold water, it continues to be dry; the water does not have to act, i.e. acquire, lose, or modify notes. But such
act by moistening it. But the immersion has established an actuation is not that in which the actuality formally con-
actuality: dry is now formally the character of “not- sists. {141} The unfolding of actuality is not formally an
moistened”. Dryness has not been produced (actuity), but unfolding of actuity.
the actuality of the dryness has. I take this example only
We can now discern the importance of what I just
in a descriptive sense, with no reference to any physical
said. Among the thousand actualities which a real thing
explanation of moistening and non-moistening. Actuality
can have, there is one which is essentially important to us
is only the presence in this “being here-and-now”. Actu-
here: the actuality of the real in intellection. Thus we can
ality is not mere presentness, but what is present inas-
understand at the outset the serious confusion of ancient
much as something “is now”.
philosophy: because having actuality is a physical char-
3. But this is not sufficient. A few lines above I said acter of the real, they thought that intellection was a
that any real thing has or can have the character of being physical action, a communication of substances. Those
present from within itself. The fact is that a real thing can philosophers went astray on the matter of actuality. And
be present or not be so according to its notes. But what is this has been the source of all manner of difficulties.
inexorable is that everything real in its formality of reality What is intellective actuality?
(and not just by its notes) is here-and-now present from
within itself. This is a constitutive character of everything
real. {142} §2
Thus we have: being here-and-now present from it-
self by being real. This is the essence of actuality. When ACTUALITY AS INTELLECTION
we impressively {140} sense a real thing as real we are
sensing that it is present from within itself in its proper
character of reality. Intellection is actuality: this is what we must clarify.
Intellection is formally and strictly sentient. Hence, it is
Classical philosophy has been a philosophy only of fitting to analyze intellection as actuality in its two mo-
act and actuity; but a philosophy of actuality is urgently ments: the properly intellective and the sentient. Only
needed. after that will it be possible to clarify in a unified manner
4. Actuality and actuity are not identical, but this what sentient intellection is as actuality. In this section,
does not mean that they are independent, because actuality then, we shall occupy ourselves with intellection as intel-
is a character of the “being here-and-now”. But, “to be lective actuality.
here-and-now” is the very character of the real. The real For this task it is necessary to clarify first what in-
“is” in the sense of “is here-and-now”; we shall see this in tellective actuality is as actuality, and second the proper
54 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

nature of intellective actuality. formality. {144} The intellective actuality, then, is in the
1. Intellection as Actuality. That what is known in- primary sense grounded upon the openness not of intel-
tellectively is present in the intellection is perfectly clear. lection, but of the formality of reality. The openness of
This “in” is just “actuality”, but it does not refer to things intellection as such is grounded in the openness of its
acting on the intellection. I am as yet ignorant of whether proper formal object, in the openness of reality.
and how they act. But that things act is something which Reality, I repeat, is something formally open. Intel-
we can only describe basing ourselves on the analysis of lection is not, then, a relation, but is respectivity, and it is
the actuality of those things present in the intellection. so because it is actuality; actuality is nothing but the re-
The intellection of the actuation of things is only conse- spectivity of something which is formally open. Every
quent upon the intellection of the real in actuality. The formality is a mode of actuality, a mode of “remaining” or
proper intellective moment comes into play by extremely “staying”. Hence, even in stimulation the stimulus “re-
complex structures and, therefore, by extremely complex mains”, but only as a sign. The stimulus has that actuality
actuations. But this just means that such actuation delim- of being an objective sign; it is signitive actuality. But in
its and constitutes the real content of the intelligence as the formality of reality what is apprehended has the actu-
known intellectively. On the other hand, in the intellec- ality of the “of its own”. It is actuality of reality and not
tion itself this content is merely actualized. Actuation just of signitivity. Nonetheless, there is an essential differ-
concerns the {143} production of the intellection; it does ence. In signitive actuality the sign, precisely by being a
not concern the formal aspects of this intellection. Intel- sign, pertains formally and exclusively to the response.
lection is “being present here-and-now” in the intellec- On the other hand, in the actuality of reality this actuality
tion, i.e. it is actuality. And this is not a theory, but a fact. has the character of a prius. Hence, in both cases we start
In order to manifest it I need only situate myself in the from a conceptualization of what is apprehended accord-
midst of any intellective act. Here we deal with an intel- ing as it is apprehended. What happens is that in the sec-
lection, and therefore what is known intellectively is al- ond case what is apprehended, by being a prius, is the
ways apprehended in the formality of the de suyo, as actuality of sensing by being already the actuality of real-
something which is “of its own”. This formality is, as I ity. They are two modes of impressive otherness. They
have just pointed out, a prius with respect to apprehen- both are equally immediate, but only the second has the
sion. Whence it follows that the apprehended real is real moment of priority of the de suyo, and only the de suyo is
before being apprehended; i.e., the real, upon being now respective in transcendental openness. Hence, despite the
known intellectively, is present, is here-and-now in actu- equal immediateness of both types of otherness, their dif-
ality. ference is essential.
Thus, in every intellection there are three structural b) In the second place, consider actuality and pre-
moments that are important to our problem: actuality, sentness. Intellective actuality, like all actuality, is that
presentness, and reality. It is necessary to dwell a bit on moment of reality according to which the real thing is
this structure in order to preclude false interpretations. here-and-now present {145} as real from within itself.
Nonetheless, intellective actuality is not presentness; it is
a) In the first place, actuality is not a relation or a not a being “present” here-and-now, but a “being here-
correlation. Intellection is not a relation of the intelligent and-now” present. Presentness is something grounded on
being with the things known intellectively. If “I see this actuality. This is essential, because what I have been
wall”, that vision is not a relation of mine with the wall. saying about reality could be interpreted in a completely
On the contrary: the relation is something which is estab- false way. Indeed, one might think that to say that what is
lished between me and the wall which is seen; but the perceived is present as real means only that what is per-
vision itself of the wall is not a relation, but something ceived is present as if it were real. Reality would be then
anterior to any relation. It is an actuality, I repeat, in the mere presentness. This, basically, is the celebrated thesis
vision itself, given that it is in the vision “in” which I am of Berkeley: esse est percipi. Obviously, that is not what I
here-and-now seeing the wall. And this vision as such is mean. For Berkeley, to be perceived is to have an esse
actualization. Actuality is more than a relation; it is the which consists in pure presentness. We leave aside the
establishment of the things related. Actualization, in fact, question of whether Berkeley speaks of being and not of
is a type of respectivity. Nothing is intellectively actual reality; for the present discussion it does not matter. Nor
except with respect to an intellection. And this actuality does it matter that Berkeley refers to perception, because
is respectivity, because the formality is of reality and, as perception is a mode of sentient intellection. Now, what
we have seen, this formality is constitutively open qua Berkeley said is not a fact, because while the presentness
 ESSENTIAL NATURE OF SENTIENT INTELLECTION 55

of what is perceived is certainly one of its moments, it is a expressly affirmed in Greek and Medieval philosophy, but
moment grounded in turn upon another moment belong- is rigorously untenable and formally absurd. The things
ing equally to it, viz., actuality. It is not the case that what of the world have no reason to be present as such in the
is perceived “is present as if it were” real, but as “being intellection. With this question we now find ourselves
present here-and-now”. facing another question, viz. that of transcendentality.
And I have said categorically that trancendental character
In perception itself, if we stay within its confines, its
does not formally mean transcendent character. What I
moment of presentness is seen to be grounded upon its
affirm in the phrase we are discussing is exactly the con-
primary mode of actuality. To be perceived is nothing but
trary of what is affirmed in this conception of the tran-
the moment of presentness of actuality, of the “being now
scendent, a conception which I reject as a formal moment
in actuality”. Having confounded actuality with mere
of intellection. The phrase in question does not affirm
presentness, having reduced the former to the latter, is as I
anything about real things in the world, but rather says
see it, Berkeley’s great initial error. What is present is so
something which concerns only the formal content of
by being actual in perception; but only “being here-and-
what is intellectively apprehended. It deals, then, with the
now actual” is it “perceived”. {146}
formality of reality and not with transcendent reality.
c) In the third place, consider actuality and reality. Thus, I say of this content that the only thing intellection
Actuality and reality are two intrinsic moments of every “does” or “makes” is to “make it actual” in its proper for-
intellection, but they are not of equal rank. Although I mality of reality, and nothing more. I shall immediately
have already explained this before, it deserves repetition return to this point; but for now, one more step.
here. Actuality is actuality of reality itself, and therefore is
b) Through this formality of reality, the apprehended
grounded upon reality when apprehended intellectively.
content remains as something “of its own”. What is im-
And this is so because the formality of reality is a prius of
portant to us here is that we are dealing with a “remain-
the thing apprehended with respect to its apprehension;
ing”. To remain is not just to be the terminus of an ap-
whence its actuality in intellection is grounded as that
prehension, but to be remain with this content present and
actuality in reality. Intellective apprehension is always
such as it presents itself. I said this from another point of
and only actuality “of” reality. Reality is not grounded
view at the beginning of the book: what is apprehended
upon actuality, i.e., reality is not reality of actuality, but
has a content and also a formality, which is the mode ac-
rather actuality is actuality of reality.
cording to which what is apprehended is here-and-now
To summarize, in every intellection we have reality present through the mode of the apprehendor “having to
which is actual, and which in its actuality is here-and- deal with it”; i.e. {148} by reason of habitude. This mode
now present to us. Such is the structure of intellection as is what I called ‘remaining’ or ‘staying’. In every appre-
actuality. hension the thing “remains” in the apprehension. And
this remaining is either a “remaining” of a stimulus or a
Now, not every actuality is intellective. Hence, we
“remaining” of reality. Thus, qua real the content does
must pose the following question: In what, formally, does
nothing but “remain”. The content is actualized, and is
intellective actuality qua intellective consist?
only actualized: it “remains”. What the mutual actuation
2. Intellective Actuality. By being actuality, intel- of the apprehendor and the apprehended might have been
lection is a being here-and-now present of the real in it by is something which does not affect the proper formality of
virtue of being real. Thus, this actuality is intellective the latter. With regard to what does affect this formality,
formally because in it the real not only actualizes itself but the content does not act; it does nothing but “remain” in
does nothing other than actualize itself. This is what I its reality. Mere actuality is, then, actuality which for-
call being “mere actuality”. What is it to be mere actual- mally consists in a “remaining”.
ity?
c) Yet one more step. The real “remains” in the in-
a) Above all it refers to a character of the real in ap- tellection. This means that its formality of reality “rests”
prehension itself. Although I have already said so many upon itself. Here, ‘to rest’ clearly does not mean that the
times, it is useful to emphasize this again, because to say real is quiescent, but, even when mobile and changeable,
that intellection is mere actualization of the real can lead this change is apprehended as real, and thus its reality (as
to a serious error, one that I might even term ‘fatal’. {147} formality) rests upon itself. This does nothing but de-
It consists in interpreting that phrase in the sense that the scribe the “remaining” from another point of view. Nev-
real things of the world make themselves present to the ertheless, to do so is not useless, because one might think
intelligence in their very worldly reality. This idea was that I am referring to intellection as action. And that is
56 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

untrue; I refer to intellection according to its formal es- of reality. And not only the formality of reality, but its
sence, i.e., to actuality. That intellection as action is sensed content as well pertains to this intellection; it is,
“rest”, in the sense of having its end in itself, is Aristotle’s indeed, precisely this content which has the formality of
old idea of energeia which dominated all of the ancient reality. Therefore this content as such is real, that is to say,
and Medieval worlds, and in large measure the modern just reality actualized. Apprehension of the so-called sen-
world as well, for example in Hegel. For Aristotle there sible qualities: color, sound, taste, etc. is therefore an ap-
are actions like intellective knowing and loving which prehension of a real quality. That is, sensible qualities are
have their ergon in themselves; they are done only for the real. But it is necessary to explain this assertion.
sake of doing them. Thus, intellective knowing has no
1. Sensible qualities are above all our impressions.
other ergon than intellective knowing, and love no other
And it is now that we must point out that an impression
ergon than to be now loving. For this reason these actions
has a moment of affection of the sentient being and a
are {149} energeiai. But be that as it may, whether these
moment of otherness of what is sensed. We saw this in
actions have no other end than themselves, our problem is
chapter III (let us leave aside for now the third moment of
not the nature of the intellective action, but the formal
force of imposition of what is sensed upon the sentient
nature of its actuality, the formal nature of intellection
being). Those two moments cannot be separated. Impres-
itself. Thus, reality qua “remaining”, rests upon itself: it
sion is not only affection, but the presentation of some-
is reality and nothing more than reality.
thing “other” in the affection, viz., color, sound, taste, etc.
To summarize, the formally proper part of intellec- The fact that sensible qualities are our impressions means
tive actuality qua intellective is to be “mere” actuality, i.e. that in the impressive moment something other is present
to have as terminus the formality of reality such as it “re- to us. This other has a content (which we also saw), for
mains resting” upon itself. example, green, and a formality which can be of stimula-
tion (in the case of an animal) or of reality (in the case of
In intellection, then:
man). In the formality of stimulation a quality is {151}
1. What is known intellectively “is here-and-now” apprehended only as a sign of response. On the other
present as real; it is something apprehended as real. hand, being the formality of reality consists in the content
being “of its own” what it is; it is something de suyo.
2. What is known intellectively “is just here-and-
Reality is, then, the formality of the de suyo. This, then,
now” present; it is not something elaborated or inter-
is what happens in our apprehension of sensible qualities.
preted, or anything of that nature.
They are sensible because they are apprehended in an im-
3. What is known intellectively is only present “in pression; but they are real because they are something de
and for itself”; hence, the real is an intrinsic and formal suyo. The green is such-and-such a shade, intensity, etc.;
moment of what is present as such. It is not something it is all of this de suyo, it is green de suyo. It would be a
beyond what is apprehended; it is its “remaining” in itself. mistake to think that the color is green because of some
structures proper to my sensory receptors. Be as it may the
It is in the unity of these three moments that the fact
psycho-organic structure of my sensations and percep-
of the intellection being mere actuality of the real as real
tions, that which is present to me in them is present de
consists.
suyo. Reality, I repeat, is the formality of the de suyo.
But intellection is formally sentient. And here a Hence, the qualities are something strictly and rigorously
great problem arises: Is it true that what is intellectively real. That they are our impressions does not mean that
and sentiently known is qua impressively apprehended they are not real, but that their reality is present impres-
mere actuality? sively.
2. This reality of the de suyo is just actuality. The
process of sensing a quality involves an extremely com-
{150} §3 plex system of structures and actuations, both on the part
of things and on the part of my sensory receptors. But
ACTUALITY AS IMPRESSION what is formally sensed in this process is not these actua-
tions, but rather what is present to me in them: the green
itself. Sensed green is not an actuation, but an actuality.
Intellection is just actualization of the reality of what That the green is seen does not consist in my sentient pro-
is known intellectively. This intellection is sentient; i.e., I cess being green, but in the green which is seen being
intellectively know the real impressively, in an impression something de suyo. Being sensed only consists in being
 ESSENTIAL NATURE OF SENTIENT INTELLECTION 57

here-and-now present in my vision. And this is reality in But in any case this emptiness would be known intellec-
the strictest sense of the word. It is not as if the green tively in the moment of reality in the “toward”, which is
which is sensed were present with some pretension of re- constitutive of the impression of reality. In point of fact,
ality, i.e. as if it were real; rather, it is present in accor- we know today that sensible qualities are not real beyond
dance with what it is in itself, with what it is de suyo. one’s perception, but we must emphasize that they are real
This means that not only is the {152} perception real, but in the perception. This is a distinction within the real
so is its formal qualitative content; this green is a content itself. And what of reality beyond the perceived might
which is de suyo green. correspond to these qualities which are real in perception
is something which can only be known intellectively by
3. This reality, I affirm, is formality. Consequently,
basing ourselves on the reality of those qualities “in” per-
reality is not a special “zone” of things, so to speak. That
ception.
is, we are not referring to a zone of real things which is
“beyond” the zone of our impressions. Reality is not to be To summarize, sentient intellection, with respect to
there “beyond” an impression, but rather, reality is just what it has of the sentient, is just actualization of reality.
formality. In virtue of this it is necessary to distinguish
For modern science and philosophy, sensible quali-
not reality and our impressions, but rather what is real
ties are only impressions of ours, and as such are consid-
“in” an impression and what is real “beyond” the impres-
ered as merely affections of the sentient being. Thus, to
sion. Thus we are not contrasting realities with my im-
say that qualities are impressions of ours would mean that
pressions, but two ways of being real, or if one wishes,
they are nothing but affections of our sensing; they would
two zones which both possess the formality of reality.
be at most “my” representations, but their content would
What is real “in” an impression may not be real other
have no reality at all. But this, as we have just seen, is
than in the impression, but this does not mean that it is
unacceptable. {154} The moment of affection and the
not real there. Today we know that if all animals with
moment of otherness in an impression cannot be split
sight were to disappear, real colors would also disappear;
apart (as we have already seen). Being impressions of
so not just some impressive affections, but realities as
ours does not mean being unreal, but rather being a reality
well, would disappear. What happens is that these realities
which is impressively present. The determination of what
are not real other than “in” the impression. But the real
these qualities are in the world beyond what is formally
“beyond” the impression would continue unperturbed.
sensed is precisely the task of science.
Now, this is not some trivial verbal distinction, because
what is real is always and only what it is de suyo. What is
real “beyond” is not so by virtue of being “beyond”, but is
real through being de suyo something “beyond”. Beyond {155} §4
is nothing but a mode of reality. Reality, I repeat, is the
formality of the de suyo whether “in” an impression or THE FORMAL UNITY OF SENTIENT
“beyond” it. The impressively real and the real beyond INTELLECTION
coincide, then, in being the formality of the de suyo; i.e.,
they coincide in being real.
In both its intellective and sentient aspects, sentient
4. This is not mere coincidence; rather it is a real
intellection is formally just the actuality of what is appre-
unity of these two modes of reality. We do not refer to
hended as real. It is this actuality, then, which constitutes
these two {153} modes as being only two particular cases
the formal unity of the act of sentient intellection. In what
of the same concept, the concept of the de suyo. Rather,
does this unity of actuality consist? That is what we must
we refer to a physical unity of reality. In fact, the impres-
now clarify.
sion of reality actualizes the formality of reality, as we
saw, in different modes, and among them is the mode 1. Above all, the reality of what is known intellec-
“toward”. This means that it is the real itself in an im- tively is actual, i.e., is here-and-now present, in sentient
pression of reality which is really bearing us toward a “be- intellection. But not only this, since when the intellec-
yond” the perceived. Hence, it is not a going to the reality tively known thing is present (for example, when this rock
beyond perception, but is a going from the real perceived is present), I not only see the rock but I sense that I am
to the real “beyond”. That leaves open the question of now seeing the rock. The rock not only “is seen”, but “I
what the terminus of the “toward” might be. It is a termi- am now seeing” the rock. This is the unity of the rock
nus that is essentially problematic; it could even be an being here-and-now present and of my vision being here-
absence of reality, but further investigation is necessary. and-now present. It is a single “being here-and-now”, a
58 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

single actuality. The actuality of the intellection is the intellection as an act of mine. My own act of sentient
actuality of what is known intellectively. There are not intellection is a real act, a reality. And this reality is actu-
two actualities, one of the rock and the other of my intel- alized with the reality of the thing in the same actuality as
lective vision, but one single actuality. Actuality in the the thing. Let us dwell a bit on this point.
sentient intelligence is, then, at one and the same time,
a) Above all, through being a common actuality, the
actuality of what is intellectively known and of the intel-
reality itself of my act of sentient intellection is actualized
lection itself. It is the same actuality. What is this same-
in it. When I see this “real rock” I am now “really seeing”
ness? That is the question.
this rock. The reality of my own act of sentient intellec-
One might think that we are dealing with two actu- tion is actualized in the same actuality as the rock; this is
alities, so to speak equal; i.e., of the character of actuality how I am here-and-now in myself.
in two points of application: in the thing and in the intel-
lection. But this is not true. We are not dealing with two b) This being now in myself is sentient. And it is so
equal actualities, {156} but a single common actuality of not only because the “me” is sensed as reality (for exam-
the intellectively known thing and the intellection. Let us ple, the kinesthesia, as we saw), but because the “being
explain how. now” itself is sentient—the only point which is now im-
portant to us. By sensing the real, I am there as really
A) Commonness means here a numerical sameness. sensing. If this were not so, what we would have is
The actuality of what is known intellectively and of the something like an idea of my intellective act, but not
intellection is numerically the same and identically the “really being there” knowing myself in my reality. I am
same. That which is actual is clearly distinct: what is now in myself sentiently.
known intellectively is distinct from the intellection itself.
But qua actuality it is numerically identical. If one c) We are talking about a “being here-and-now”.
wishes, there are two distinct actual things in one single Consequently, being here-and-now in myself is not the
actuality. This numerical sameness is of the essence of result, so to speak, of a returning upon my act; i.e., we do
intellection. We are not dealing with some theoretical not refer to having an intellection of my act after having
construct, but making an analysis of any intellective act. had the act of intellection of the rock. I am not here-and-
This rock being now present in one’s vision is the same as now in myself because I return, but rather (if one wishes
now seeing the rock. to speak of returning) I return because I am here-and-now
already in myself. There is no returning upon the act, but
B) But I must stress that it is a commonness of mere an already being in it really. I am now in myself by being
actuality. We are not referring to some common action now intellectively and sentiently knowing the thing. Con-
produced by the thing and my intelligence; that would be versely, I can never be here-and-now in myself otherwise
a commonness of actuity, a communication of substances. than by being here-and-now in the thing. Whence being
That commonness is above all a metaphysical construct here-and-now in myself has the same actuality {158} as
and not a fact. Moreover, even as a construct it is very the being here-and-now in the thing; it is the common
problematic and debatable. On the other hand, in the actuality of reality. To intellectively know something sen-
formal nature of sentient intellection we do not have a tiently is to be here-and-now intellectively knowing sen-
common act, but a common actuality. Thus it is common- tiently the proper reality of my act.
ness of actuality. In the very act of seeing this rock, the
actuality as rock-seen is the same as the actuality of seeing It was necessary to conceptualize it thus in order to
the rock. It is precisely in this identity that the difference avoid the fundamental error of thinking that being here-
between the rock and my vision is actualized. It is an and-now in myself consists in returning from things upon
actuality which actualizes at one and the same time these myself. That was the conception of reflection in medieval
two terms. philosophy (reditio in seipsum), and is what in modern
philosophy is called introspection. It would be necessary
Thus we have here the complete essence of sentient to enter into myself, in my proper reality, and this reality
intellection: in the actuality of the thing and of the intel- would be a “return”. But this is false. In the first place,
lective knowing, the intellection and what is known intel- that return upon the act itself would be an infinite regress:
lectively are actualized—through the numerical identity of when I return upon myself I would have to return upon
their actuality—as two distinct realities. {157} my own return, and so on indefinitely. If the turning in
When I say, then, that sentient intellection is just the upon myself were a “return”, I would never have suc-
common actualization of the real in it, I do not only refer ceeded in doing so. But in the second place, what is radi-
to real things but also to the reality of my own sentient cally false is the idea that it is necessary to turn in upon
 ESSENTIAL NATURE OF SENTIENT INTELLECTION 59

myself. It is not necessary to “enter” or “turn in”, since I same actualization as the sun. Through being common
am now already there in myself. And this is so by the actuality, {160} then, we have a single “in”. Common
mere fact of being here-and-now sensing the reality of actuality has the character of “with” and the character of
some thing. I am now in myself because my being is ac- “in”.
tualized in the same actuality as the real thing. Every In the third place, this common actuality is actuality
introspection is grounded on this prior common actuality. of reality. This actualization of the reality of a thing and
For this reason, the possibility of introspection, like of the sentient act as a real act is, then, actualization of
the possibility of extro-spection, is grounded upon the the same formality of reality. Now, the formality of reality
common actuality of the thing and of my sentient intellec- has, as we saw, the character of being a prius. Reality is
tive act. Thus there is no infinite regress. Extrospection the formality of the “in itself”, of the de suyo, and in vir-
is the entrance into the reality of a thing. Its possibility is tue of it what is actualized, what is real, is something
in the sentient actualization of the reality of a thing. And prior to its actualization in sentient intellection; every
the possibility of entering into myself in the same act of actuality is “of” the real. In virtue of this, the common
mine is based on the fact that this real act has numerically intellective actuality is the actuality “of” the thing, and the
identical actuality as the sentient actuality of the real thing is the actualizer “of” the intellection. It is the same
thing. Both “enterings” are grounded on the fact that “of”. The common actuality has, then, the character of an
every actuality is of reality, and the common actuality is so “of”. This moment of the “of” pertains to the intellection
of the reality of the thing and {159} of my own act. Intro- precisely and formally by being actuality, and only by be-
spection therefore has the same problematic character as ing actuality. It is not an immediate characteristic.
extrospection. It is no less problematic to be intellectively These three characteristics of “with”, “in”, and “of”
knowing the reality of my intellection than to be intellec- are but three aspects of a single common actuality; moreo-
tively knowing the reality of a thing. What is not a prob- ver, they are what formally comprises the commonness of
lem, but a fact, is that sentient intellection is common actualization. And as aspects, each is based on the fol-
actuality. lowing. The “with” is the “with” of an “in”, and the “in”
2. This commonness of actuality has its precise is an “in” being “of”. Conversely, each aspect is grounded
structure, because in the numerical identity of the actuality upon the previous one. Actuality as an “of” is so precisely
two realities are actualized. And these two realities qua through being actuality “in”; and it is “in” precisely
actualized are not simply two. To be sure, their actuality through being “with”. The unity of these three aspects is,
is numerically the same; but it intrinsically involves a I repeat, what formally constitutes the commonness of
duality of actualized realities, and this duality has a pre- actualization, i.e., the formal unity of sentient intellection.
cise structure. 3. This unitary structure in turn reveals to us some
In the first place, when a thing is actualized in sen- essential aspects which it is necessary to point out explic-
tient intellection, as I said, the reality of the intellection itly. {161}
itself remains actualized. That is, the intellection remains A) We are dealing with a common intellective actu-
“co-actualized” in the same actuality as the thing. When I ality, with sentient intellection. This common actuality is
sense the real rock, I repeat, I am here-and-now sensing co-actuality.
it. The common actuality of what is intellectively known
Co-actuality is a character of common actuality qua
and of the intellection has above all this character of “co-”
actuality. Now, this aspect reflects, so to speak, on the
or “with”.
intellective character of the actuality: when a real thing is
In the second place, in that common actuality the intellectively known in sentient fashion, sentient intellec-
thing is now present “in” sentient intellection; but also tion itself is sentiently “co-intellectively” known—not, to
sentient intellection is present “in” the thing. I believe it be sure, like one more thing, but in that form which is
essential to thematically emphasis this point. To describe expressed by the gerund “I am here-and-now sensing”. If
intellection as the presence of a thing in the intelligence is as is commonly done (though very inappropriately) one
to make a unilateral description. The intelligence is just calls intellective knowing scientia, science, it will be nec-
as present “in” the thing as the thing “in” the intelligence. essary to say that in virtue of the common actuality of the
Naturally this does not refer to sentient intellection as intellection as actuality, that common intellection as “in-
action somehow acting on the thing known, for example, tellective” actuality will not be just science but cum-
on the sun. That would be absurd. What I maintain is scientia: con-science, i.e., consciousness. Consciousness
that sentient intellection as actualization is now “in” the is intellective co-actuality of intellection itself in its proper
60 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

intellection. This is the radical concept of consciousness. tellective is then “consciousness of”, it is “taking-
Intellection is not consciousness, but every intellection is cognizance-of”, the thing and of my own sentient intel-
necessarily conscious precisely and formally because the lection. The actuality in “of” is “intellection-of”, i.e.,
intellection is “co-actuality”; intellective but co-actual. “consciousness-of”. This “consciousness-of” is a charac-
And since intellection is sentient, i.e., since reality is in- ter grounded in the common intellective actuality. Fur-
tellectively known in impression, it follows that con- thermore, the “consciousness-of” is grounded in the “con-
sciousness is radically and formally sentient. sciousness-in”. Only being here-and-now “in” a thing am
I taking cognizance “of” it. And since I am now in it
But it is necessary to make two observations here.
sentiently, the primary and radical taking cognizance is
In the first place, this consciousness is not, formally, always and essentially sentient.
introspection. Introspection is only a mode of conscious-
ness: it is the consciousness of the act of turning in upon In summary, consciousness is not intellection but
oneself, as we have already seen. But the act of turning in pertains essentially to sentient intellection. Sentient in-
upon oneself is grounded upon the act of being here-and- tellection is common actuality, and this common actuality
now in oneself (kinesthetic intellection), and therefore the qua actuality of intellective knowing makes it conscious-
introspective consciousness is grounded in the direct con- ness. And consciousness is not primarily and radically
sciousness of co-actuality. {162} “consciousness-of”, but rather the “consciousness-of” is
grounded on the “consciousness-in”, and the “conscious-
In the second place, modern philosophy has not only ness-in” is grounded on the radical “cum”, on the impres-
made intellection an act of consciousness, but has ex- sive “cum” of sentient intellection.
tended this idea to all human acts. But, this is false.
Consciousness, as we saw in Chapter I, does not have any When modern philosophy took leave of the “con-
substantivity; acts of consciousness do not exist, only con- sciousness-of” (Bewusstsein-von), it committed a double
scious acts. And among these latter, some like intellection error. In the first place, it essentially identified “con-
are of course fully conscious; but are not intellective by sciousness” and “consciousness-of”. But essentially and
being conscious. Rather, just the reverse is true: they are radically consciousness is “con-scious”; and only through
conscious by being intellective. Other acts are not neces- “consciousness-in” is the “consciousness-of” constituted.
sarily conscious. But in addition, as I have repeatedly said, modern phi-
losophy has committed an even more serious error: it has
Now let us proceed to examine the area of common identified intellection and consciousness. In such case,
actuality. Common actuality is actuality in the character of intellection would be a “taking-cognizance-of”. And this
the “in”. Hence, when I have sentient co-intellection, i.e., is false since there is only “consciousness” because there
when I have sentient consciousness, I have consciousness is common actuality, that actuality which is the formal
of sentient intellection “in” the thing. In common actual- constitutive character of sentient intellection.
ity I am now sensing myself “in” the thing, and sensing
that the thing is now “in” me. Because this is intellective With respect to stimulation, this same thing happens
actuality, I then have not only sentient consciousness, but in animals. The impression constituting pure sensing,
moreover I am here-and-now consciously “in” the thing {164} by reason of its moment of otherness, makes what
and “in” my own intellection. That is what we mean is sensed to be sensed as a stimulus. But at one and the
when we say of someone who is very perplexed about a same time it makes the animal “co-sense” its own affec-
subject or not enthused about it that he is “not into it”. tion as a stimulus; i.e., it makes the sentient animal “co-
Because of the common actuality in the character of the sense”.
“in”, when I intellectively know in sentient fashion my In an animal, what is present to it is so as stimulus,
being here-and-now in a thing, I have sentient conscious- and in this presentation the signed presence of the animal
ness of being now “in” it. This is another aspect of the itself qua responsive animal is co-present, co-sensed.
distinct consciousness of the “cum”, and how it is Now, this stimulus-based co-sensing is what constitutes
grounded in the common actuality. what ought to be called the animal’s sensitive conscious-
Moreover, common actuality has the character of an ness. This is frequently spoken of, but never explained.
“of”: a thing is an actualizer “of” sentient intellection, and At most we are given to understand that an animal “rec-
sentient intellection is intellection “of” the thing. This is ognizes” what is sensed just as does a man, the difference
an aspect which corresponds to the common intellective being only that the animal “recognizes” many fewer
actuality qua actuality. Now, the character of the “of” as a things than does a man. But this difference, though great,
moment of common intellective actuality qua {163} in- is absolutely secondary. The radical difference turns upon
 ESSENTIAL NATURE OF SENTIENT INTELLECTION 61

the fact that the animal’s “recognizing” is essentially dif- grounds the commonness. To be sure, without intellection
ferent than that of a man, even with respect to those im- there would be no actuality; but if there is to be actuality
pressions whose content might be the same for both. Hu- of the real, it is something determined by the real itself.
man sensing is co-actualization of reality; in this “co-” of Now, reality is the formality given in an impression of
reality human consciousness is grounded. Animal sensing reality. And this impression, as we saw, is open actuality,
is signitive co-stimulation; this “co-” of sign is the sensi- a respective openness; it is transcendentality. Hence, the
tive consciousness of the animal. And only because this real qua determinant of the actuality of sentient intellec-
sensitive consciousness is thus essentially different from tion determines it as something structurally open. Com-
human consciousness does the animal necessarily have to mon actuality is thus transcendental, and its transcenden-
“recognize” far fewer things than man. Human con- tality is determined by the transcendentality of the reality
sciousness as well as animal consciousness is sentient; of the real. Common actuality is formally transcendental
what distinguishes them is that human consciousness is of actuality because such is the impression of reality, i.e.,
reality, while that of the animal is of stimulus. {165} because the impression is sentient. Kant told us that the
B) Common actuality is not only fundamental to structure of the understanding conferred transcendental
consciousness, but also to something different though content (transzendentaler Inhalt) upon what is under-
quite essential. Since this actuality is common, one might stood. But this is not true. In the first place, transcen-
think that it is constituted by the integration of two things dentality is not a proper character of the understanding
which, in the usual terminology, are subject and object. but of the sentient understanding. In the second place, an
Seeing this rock would be an act in which the seeing sub- intellection is transcendental through finding itself deter-
ject and the object seen were integrated. But that is not mined by the real in a common actuality with that intel-
the case. On the contrary: it is through being common lection. This actuality is, then, not only common but tran-
actuality that sentient intellection is actuality of what is scendental. The commonness of the actuality is a com-
intellectively known in intellection, and of intellection in monness in which sentient intellection is respectively
what is intellectively known. With respect to the actuality open to the real when intellectively known in impression.
of what is intellectively known, that actuality leads to a And it is because of this that sentient intellection itself is
conceptualization and a discovery much fuller than what transcendental. It is not transcendental as a conceptual
is commonly but improperly called ‘object’. Qua actuality moment, nor by being constitutive of the real as object. It
of intellection, it is this actuality which will later lead to is transcendental because, {167} by being common actu-
discovery and conceptualization of the intelligence itself, ality, the sentient intelligence remains open to reality in
and in general to everything which, with the same impro- the same openness in which the real itself is open qua
priety, is usually termed ‘subject’. Common actuality is reality. It is the openness of reality which determines the
not the result, but the root of subjectivity. The essence of openness of sentient intellection. And it is because of this,
subjectivity consists not in being a subject of properties, I repeat, that sentient intellection itself is transcendental.
but in “being me”. It does not consist in dependence upon Moreover, it is because of this that sentient intellec-
me, but rather is the character of something which is tion is transcendentally open to other intellections. Di-
“me”, be it something like a property of mine, or some- verse intellections, indeed, do not constitute an edifice by
thing of the thing qua thing, something which is “me” some sort of mutual coupling or joining together, i.e., be-
just by being of the thing and, therefore, by depending not cause one intellection is “added” to others which outline,
on me but on it. Sentient intellection is not given in sub- organize, or amplify it. On the contrary: all of this takes
jectivity, but on the contrary sentient intellection as just place, and must necessarily take place, through the tran-
actualization of the real is the very constitution of subjec- scendentally open nature of each intellection. Transcen-
tivity; it is the opening to the realm of the “me”. Hence dentality as respective openness of sentient intellection is
the two terms ‘subject’ and ‘object’ are not “integrated” in the radical foundation of any possible “edifice”, of any
sentient intellection, but rather it is this which in a certain possible “logic” of intellection. But this requires further
way “dis-integrates” itself into subject and object. Subject explanation.
and object are grounded in the common actuality of sen- D) One might think that the openness of an intellec-
tient intellection, and not the other way around. {166} tion to others is referred to the content of the intellections.
C) The common actuality has a special character This is not the case. The openness concerns something
which should be expressly pointed out. We said, in effect, much more radical: the very mode of the common actual-
that the real itself is the actualizer of sentient intellection. ity. This common actuality can adopt diverse modes; i.e.,
This means that it is the real which determines and there are diverse modes of actualization. Each of them is
62 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

open to the others, and this openness of the modes of ac- beginning of the book the primordial apprehension of re-
tualization as such is what formally constitutes the tran- ality. But, I repeat, this is just a preview. We shall return
scendental foundation of every logic, or rather, of all the to this subject at some length in chapters VIII and IX, and
intellections whose articulation the logic studies. We shall above all in the other two parts of the work.
study this at length in other parts of the book.
We have seen what the formal essence of the act of
Jumping ahead a bit, it is fitting even now to empha- intellective knowing is: it is just actuality of what is
size what I regard as an error of ancient philosophy, ac- known intellectively in sentient intellection. It is a simple
cording to which intellection is logos. In this view, eve- “remaining” of what is apprehended in an impression of
rything the intellection has would be only moments of the reality, and a “remaining” of sentient intellection in what
logos; hence, intellection {168} would be formally logos. is impressively known intellectively. It is just a common
But as I indicated a few pages back, I think that this is and transcendental actuality in which two things are made
false. Instead of “logifying” intellection it is necessary to actual: what is impressively known intellectively and sen-
“intelligize” the logos. Now, to intelligize the logos is to tient intellection itself. This actuality has {169} the char-
consider it as a mode of “common” intellective actualiza- acter of consciousness and is what constitutes the realm of
tion. Under conditions which we shall study in other subjectivity. And precisely by being common actuality,
parts of the book, the primordial apprehension of the real, sentient intellection is transcendentally open to other
by being transcendentally open, determines that mode of modes of actualization, and with that to other intellec-
common intellective actualization which is logos. Logos tions. This transcendental openness of sentient intellec-
is intellection only because it is a mode of actualizing tion is the radical and intrinsic foundation of all intellec-
what is already intellectively known in intellection, a tive construction, of every logos.
mode which is transcendentally determined by actualiza-
tion in the primordial apprehension of reality. Intellection This is the first of the three questions which I pro-
has other modes which are not that of logos. But all these pounded at the end of chapter IV. It was, “In what does
modes are just that: “modes”. And they are not modes the character of sentient intellection as such consist?”
which are simply diverse, but modes which are transcen- That is what we have just examined; now we must pro-
dentally grounded upon each other. Hence the modes are ceed to the other two questions. First of all, What is the
essentially “modalizations” of an actuality which is pri- character of what is intellectively known in sentient fash-
marily and radically transcendental. As I said, this pri- ion; i.e., what is the character of reality (the second ques-
mary and radical intellective actuality is the primary and tion)? After that, we shall go on to the third question: In
radical sentient intellection, what I have called since the what does reality “in” sentient intellection consist? {170}
 ESSENTIAL NATURE OF SENTIENT INTELLECTION 63

{171}

APPENDIX 5

REALITY AND SENSIBLE QUALITIES

Given the importance of the problem of sensible That is the question upon which depends the meaning of
qualities, it is useful to examine this question by itself our affirmation of the reality of sensible qualities.
even at the risk of some repetition of what has already 1) Explanation of this idea. Let us first recall two
been said. The exposition will perhaps contain boring ideas which have been developed throughout this book.
repetitions, but I deem them necessary to clarify the idea
of what I understand by the reality of sensible qualities. In the first place, the idea of reality does not formally
designate a zone or class of things, but only a formality,
The reality of sensible qualities above all seems to be reity or “thingness”. It is that formality by which what is
in contradiction with modern science. These qualities, we sentiently apprehended is presented to me not as the effect
are told, are nothing but our subjective impressions. In- of something beyond what is apprehended, but as being in
deed, if all animals endowed with visual sense were to itself something “of its own”, something de suyo; for ex-
disappear from the universe, all colors would eo ipso dis- ample, not only {173} “warming” but “being” warm. This
appear as well. The reality of things is not colored. To formality is the physical and real character of the other-
affirm the contrary would be, we are told, an inadmissible ness of what is sentiently apprehended in my sentient in-
ingenuous realism. In turn, by accepting this scientific tellection. And according to this formality, heat not only
conception, philosophy has thought that these subjective warms, but does so by being warm. That is, the formality
impressions of ours are referred to reality only through a of reality in what is perceived itself is something prior
causal reasoning process. The real would thus be the with respect to its effective perception. And this is not an
cause of our subjective impressions. This was the idea inference but a fact. For this reason one should speak, as I
expressly propounded by Kant himself, later termed criti- said a few pages back, of reity (thingness) and reism
cal realism. Nonetheless, I believe that neither the subjec- (thing-ism), rather than of reality and realism (be it criti-
tivism of science on this point nor critical realism are ac- cal or ingenuous). ‘Reity’, because we are not dealing
ceptable. with a zone of things, but a formality; ‘reism’, because
Naturally, to reject what science says about the real- this concept of reity or reality now leaves open the possi-
ity of things would be to reject something which nowadays bility of many types of reality. The reality of a material
{172} is justifiably admitted to be a definitive conquest. thing is not identical with the reality of a person, the real-
This cannot be stressed too much, but it does not touch the ity of society, the reality of the moral, etc.; nor is the real-
problem with which we are concerned. Indeed, one could ity of my own inner life identical to that of other realities.
say that science has not even addressed our problem. For But on the other hand, however different these modes of
what is understood by ‘reality’ when science labels our reality may be, they are always reity, i.e., formality de
impressions and hence sensible qualities as ‘subjective’? suyo. And here we have the first idea which I wanted to
One understands by ‘reality’ that these qualities are for- set forth: reality is the formality of reity impressively ap-
eign to sensible perception and, therefore, are real inde- prehended in sentient intellection. It is not what all the
pendently of it. But when we affirm here that sensible “realisms”, from the ingenuous to the critical, have under-
qualities are not our subjective impressions, but rather are stood by “reality”, viz., a determinate zone of things.
real, do we affirm something akin to the idea that these In the second place, it is necessary to propound the
qualities are real with an independence going beyond per- idea that intellection is just actualization. Actualization is
ception, i.e., beyond sentient intellection? Clearly not; never formally actuation. Hence, it is not a question of
reality does not consist in things (in our case, qualities) what is apprehended pretending to be real or seeming to
being something beyond perception and independent of it. be so, but of its being already something de suyo and
Hence, the radical and crucial problem is found in the therefore real. Reality, in which what is apprehended
concept of reality itself. What is understood by ‘reality’? consists de suyo, is impressively apprehended in its very
64 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

character of reity. Intellection is just actualization of the effectively what they are. But for science they are not real
real in its proper and formal reity or reality. {174} beyond perception. Considered from the standpoint of the
presumed real things beyond perception, i.e. arguing not
Granting this, I maintain that sensible qualities ap-
formally but from the scientific viewpoint, we would say
prehended in sentient intellection are real, i.e., what is
that sensible qualities are the real way in which these
present in them is real since they are de suyo this or that
things beyond perception are reality “in” it. It is not that
quality; moreover, this reality of theirs does nothing but be
colors seem to be real or pretend to be so; but that they are
actualized in our sentient intellection. This is the thesis
present in their own reity in perception. Continuing this
which requires further explanation.
line of argument from science, we should say that per-
First of all, it is necessary to insist once again that ceived qualities are real because the sense organ is real
reity or reality does not designate a zone of things, but is and likewise the actuation of real things upon it. Hence,
only a formality. In virtue of this, reality is to be real be- from the viewpoint of science, what is perceived by this
yond what is perceived. When one asserts that the quali- actuation is also real; i.e. the qualities are real in percep-
ties of the physical world are not really the qualities which tion. The sensible qualities thus produced, according to
we perceive, one understands by ‘reality’ what these science, in the actuation {176} of things upon the sense
qualities are outside of perception, what they are beyond organs, and of the latter upon the former, are apprehended
perception. And thus it is clear that, according to science, as realities de suyo in an act of sentient intellection which
if all animals endowed with visual sense disappeared from is mere actualization. That these qualities may be the
the universe, the colors would also disappear; the reality result of an actuation is something totally indifferent for
of the universe is not colored. But such an affirmation the purposes of intellection as such. Intellection is just
clearly shows that, by ‘reality’, one understands some- actualization, though what is actualized follows an actua-
thing real beyond perception, a zone of things, viz. the tion. Thus it is clear that if the visual sense organ disap-
zone of the “beyond”. But, this concept is neither primary peared, so likewise would the actuation and hence the
nor sufficient because the things “beyond” are real not by colors. That is, these colors are real in perception but not
being “beyond” but by being in this “beyond” what they beyond perception.
de suyo are. That is, what is primary is not reality as a
zone, but as formality, reity. This concept of the real “in” perception is necessary.
What is apprehended does not cease to be real because it
Now, in this line of formality we say that that for- is real only in perception. Considered from the standpoint
mality is given not only in the zone “beyond” what is per- of things beyond perception, qualities are the real way in
ceived, but also in the zone of what is perceived, a zone which real things are really present in perception. It is the
not any the less real than the zone “beyond” what is per- real quality which is present as formality in perception.
ceived. “Reality” means not only what is real “beyond” Actuation does not mean that qualities do not pertain
the perceived, but also what is real “in” the perceived it- really to a thing, but that they pertain to it only in this
self. This distinction must be emphasized. In perception, phenomenon which we call ‘perception’. Therefore, to
what is perceived—for example, {175} colors, sounds, affirm that sensible qualities are real is not ingenuous
etc.—are de suyo, just as much de suyo as the things be- realism—that would be to assert that sensible qualities are
yond perception. Naturally I am here referring only to real beyond perception and outside of it. The fact of the
sensible qualities sensed in perception. And to be sure we matter is that science has feigned ignorance of the sensi-
are clear on this point it is essential to recur to the dis- ble qualities, and this is unacceptable. Science must ex-
tinction between actualization and actuation. In order to plain not only what, cosmically, color, sound, odor, etc.
be perceived, the things of the world act upon the sense are in perception; but also the color qua real perceived
organs, and in this actuation the physical notes of these quality. But neither physics, chemistry, physiology, nor
sense organs as well as of the things themselves are psychology tell us a word about what perceived sensible
modified. It suffices to note that, for example, the sense of qualities are, nor how physico-chemical and {177} psy-
smell takes place by means of an actuation (let us call it cho-physical processes give rise to color and sound, nor
that) of the olfactory receptors upon the reality “beyond”. what these qualities are in their formal reality. Phenome-
In this actuation what we call the sensible qualities are nology only describes them. This is a situation which I
produced. But, this scientific theory notwithstanding, I have often characterized as scandalous—that the question
affirm that as actualizations, (1) the qualities are real, and which, when all is said and done, is the foundation of all
(2) they are not subjective. real knowledge should be thus sidestepped. This situation
a) They are real. That is, they are de suyo really and is a scandal to be laid at the feet of science; let us not bur-
 ESSENTIAL NATURE OF SENTIENT INTELLECTION 65

den ourselves with it. For us it suffices to point out, with- by themselves real and effective concepts of reality. Real-
out eliminating it, the fact that sensible qualities are real ity is not the same as objectivity; it is something toto
moments of what is perceived, but they are real only in caelo different from all objectivity. Thus science would be
perception. purely and simply a coherent system of objective concepts,
but not an apprehension of reality. In order for concepts
We might note in passing that the reality of sensible
to be concepts of reality, they must be based formally and
qualities does not coincide with the assertion that these
intrinsically upon sensed reality. {179} The concepts are
qualities are proper to “things”. What we call “things” is
indispensable; but what is conceived in them is real only if
something genetically elaborated in our perceptions over
the real is already given as real, i.e, if the reality is sensed.
the course of years; thus for a child of two, things do not
Only then does a concept acquire the scope of reality; only
have the same aspect as they do for an adult. This is the
then can the concept of the sun tell me what the sun is.
result of formalization. For the time being, we are not
To bu sure, with only perception of the sun there would be
concerning ourselves with what these things are qua
no science of astronomy; but without the solar reality be-
things, but rather what qualities are in them and not qua
ing given in some way in my perception, there would
qualities of things. And it is in this sense that I say that
likewise be no science of astronomy because what there
qualities are real in perception prior to being qualities of
would not be is the “sun”. And astronomy is not the sci-
things. Formally each sensible quality is real in itself “in”
ence of the concepts of the sun, but a science of the sun.
perception.
Granting this, the correspondence between concepts
b) These qualities are not subjective. For science, and what is sensed would be impossible if what is sensed
we are told, sensible qualities are something merely sub- is subjective. There would in that case be no possible cor-
jective. The theory is that up to a certain point a “corre- respondence between a perception, qualified as subjective,
spondence” is established, more or less bi-univocal, be- and any reality beyond the perception, despite the fact that
tween these presumably subjective qualities and the things to achieve this goal one calls upon a great richness of con-
which are real beyond perception. But thus to admit cepts. If one insists that reason inquires about the exis-
without further ado that sensible qualities are subjective tence of something real based upon the principle of cau-
by virtue of not pertaining to real things beyond {178} sality applied to our subjective impressions, then he would
perception is an ingenuous subjectivism. If it is an in- have to say that this already presumes that these impres-
genuous realism—and it is—to make sensible qualities sions are real; i.e., it presupposes the reality of the impres-
into properties of things outside of perception, it is an sion. But as reality, these impressions are not subjective
ingenuous subjectivism to declare them simply subjective. either inasmuch as they involve something perceived or in
Real things are set off in some zone beyond perception, their percipient aspect. Not the latter because they are not
and everything else is put into the zone of the subjective. subjective acts, but subjectual acts—something quite dif-
“The subjective” is the repository for everything which ferent. And not the former because the qualities are not
science does not understand about this problem. Scien- “subjective” realities, i.e., they are not qualities of me as
tism and critical realism are ingenuous subjectivism, and subject, because that would be equivalent to affirming that
this is unacceptable for many reasons. my intellection is warm, sonorous, etc., which is absurd.
In the first place, there is no possibility whatsoever Hence, if they are not reality of the subject, and one denies
of establishing that presumed correspondence between that they are real in themselves, where will the causality
sensible qualities and “real things” if one begins by as- be grounded? Causal reasoning will bear us from the
serting that the former are subjective qualities. Because if subjectively colored thing to the concept of a colored sub-
the entire sensory order is subjective, where and how can ject distinct from {180} mine, but never from a subject to
the intelligence take leave of the sensory and jump to re- a reality. Causality does not start only from subjective
ality? Rationalism in all its forms understands that this impressions of reality, but must be based in the perceived
jump is given in the concept: the concept tells me what a itself. And if what is perceived is formally subjective,
thing is. The reality of the sun, we are told, is not what I then the causality collapses. There is no causality whatso-
perceive of it, but what the concepts of astronomy tell me ever which can lead from the purely subjective, i.e. from
about it. But if one takes this assertion rigorously, it is not subjective impressions, to the real. This critical realism
just that the astronomical concepts do not in fact concep- is, in all its forms, a pseudo-realistic conception.
tualize the sun’s reality, by themselves they are incapable But in the second place, even leaving aside this ex-
of doing so. And this is because concepts by themselves tremely serious difficulty, there is the fact that science has
do not go beyond being objective concepts; they are never not posed for itself the problem of that mode of reality
66 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

which it fleetingly calls ‘subjective’. We saw this a few In conclusion, sentient intellection is just an actuali-
pages back: it labels as ‘subjective’ everything which is zation of the real as much in its formality as in its quali-
relative to a subject. Thus it terms sensible qualities ‘sub- tative content. With this I have said what is essential
jective’ because it deems that they are necessarily relative {182} to this question; but for greater clarity it will be
to the sensory organs and dependent upon them. But this useful to insist upon it at some length, pointing out prob-
does not have the least thing to do with subjectivity. Sub- lems which go beyond the character of plain sentient in-
jectivity is not being a property of a subject, but simply tellection and concern rather the task and scope of scien-
being “mine”, even though it may be mine by being of a tific knowledge in this order of sensible qualities. That is
real quality, i.e., by being this reality de suyo. Now, what I shall call the articulation of the problem of quali-
something can be de suyo even if fleeting, variable, and ties.
relative in a certain way, without ceasing to be real in its
2) Articulation of the problem of sensible qualities.
fleetingness, variability, and relativity. Fleetingness, vari-
For this we shall give a precis of what has already been
ability, and relativity are characteristics of “unicity” but
explained.
not of “subjectivity”. This unicity is a characteristic of a
reality which is de suyo unique. Why? Because it con- A) It is clear that the two things to be contrasted are
cerns the actuation of things upon the sense organs. It is not what is “objective-real” and what is “subjective-
an actuation which is respective to the organ and the state irreal”. Rather, they are two zones of real things: things
in which it is encountered, and which is variable not only real “in” perception, and things real “beyond” perception.
from some individuals to others, but also within the same But the reality of these latter does not consist just in being
individual, even in the course of the same perception. But beyond perception, but in being so de suyo, because reality
this organ and its interaction with things {181} are both is nothing but the formality of the de suyo. Not having
something real. All the physiological states of an organ- conceptualized reality other than from the point of view of
ism, however individual they may be, do not for that rea- what things are beyond perception has been a great con-
son cease to be real states. And these states, when they quest of science, but a limited one, because such a con-
concern the receptive organs, individualize that very thing quest does not authorize a reduction of reality to the “be-
which they apprehend. But what is apprehended itself, yond”. There is reality “in” perception, and reality “be-
despite its relativity and organic individuality, does not yond” perception. We may note in passing that the thing
therefore cease to be real. What happens is that this real- beyond what is immediately perceived has nothing to do
ity is “unique”. The zone of the real in perception has this with the Kantian thing-in-itself. What is real beyond per-
character of unicity. But it does not have the character of ception is a reality which, from the Kantian point of view,
subjectivity. The impression of the reality which is proper would pertain to the phenomenon. Phenomenon is for
to the qualities is just an impressive actualization that is Kant simply object. Reality beyond is not a metaphysical
“unique” but not “subjective” in the acceptation which entity.
this word has in science. To assert that the unique, by be- B) In both zones, then, one deals with reality,
ing fleeting and relative, is subjective, is just as false as to authentic and strict reality. Reality or reity is the bound-
assert that the only thing which is real is what is beyond ary within which the two zones are inscribed. What is
perception. In the final analysis, science has not posed for this reality which “is” divided into reality in perception
itself the question of what subjectivity is. In science, any and {183} reality beyond perception? The answer we have
call upon subjectivity does not go beyond a commodius already seen and repeated time and again: it is being de
expedient to sidestep a scientific explanation of sensible suyo what it is, being what it is “of itself”, i.e., being reity.
qualities as well as subjectivity itself. The two zones of real things are really de suyo; they are
But in the third place there is something still more equally reity. Things beyond perception are real not by
serious, and which is the root of this idea we are presently virtue of being “beyond”, but by being de suyo what they
discussing. It is that one starts from the supposition that are in this beyond. Qualities are real in perception because
sensing, what I call ‘sentient intellection’, is a relation they are de suyo what is present in them. Reality is nei-
between a subject and an object. And this is radically ther thing nor property, nor a zone of things; rather, real-
false. Intellection is neither relation nor correlation; it is ity is just formality, the de suyo, reity.
purely and simply respective actuality. Whence all this C) The two zones of reality are, then, identical qua
scaffolding of subjectivity and of reality is a construction reality. In being de suyo the realities in perception and
based upon something radically and formally false, and the realities beyond perception are identical. What is dif-
hence erroneous at each of its steps. ferent is the content, what is de suyo. The content beyond
 ESSENTIAL NATURE OF SENTIENT INTELLECTION 67

perception can be different from the content in perception. profundity. I shall immediately return to this point.
This does not mean that the content of a perception is not
From this internal articulation of the two zones of
real, but that its reality is insufficient in the line of reali-
real things, the zone of things real “in perception” and the
ties. The insufficiency of reality in perception is what
zone of things real “beyond perception” three important
distinguishes the two zones of reality, and what bears us
consequences follow.
from perceived reality to the reality beyond perception.
For this reason, the zone beyond perception is always a) To go to the real beyond perception is something
problematic. inexorable, an intrinsic moment of the very perception of
sensible qualities. Every quality, indeed, is perceived not
D) These two zones, then, have an intrinsic articula- only in and by itself as such-and-such a quality, but also in
tion in reality itself, in the reality apprehended in sentient a “toward”. The reality of qualities “only” in perception
intellection. Reality is not apprehended sentiently in only is precisely what constitutes their radical insufficiency as
one way, but many; and especially important for our moments of the real; they are real, but they are really in-
problem is that mode which is sensing reality “toward”. sufficient. In their insufficiency, these already real quali-
Reality is apprehended by the sentient intelligence, as we ties are pointing in and by themselves in their proper re-
saw, in all of the diverse ways of being sensed; and one of ality “toward” what is real beyond perception; this is the
them is sensing it in a directional way. It is not, as we onset of science. What science says of this “toward”, i.e.,
have already seen, a “toward” extrinsic to reality, nor a of that beyond perception to which the sensible qualities
direction toward reality, {184} but is rather reality itself as point, can be owing to a reasoning process which may be
direction, or if one wishes, direction as a mode of sensed causal. But this causal remission (1) is grounded in the
reality. Hence the terminus of this direction is always “toward” itself and not vice versa; (2) is based upon reali-
something problematic in principle; it is just reality be- ties, not upon the reality of my subjective impressions but
yond perception. Now, these two different modes of pres- upon the reality of the perceived quality which, being in-
entation of reality are, as we saw, overlapping and com- sufficient, points toward something which causally is dis-
prise one single perception of reality. The “toward” over- covered by science; (3) is something that can be con-
lapping the other sensings is now the “toward” overlap- quered by means of a causal reasoning process and be,
ping the sensible qualities in themselves and, therefore, nonetheless, a formal moment of the foundation of that
propelling us “toward” what is real beyond the perceived. about which one reasons. Thus science is not a capricious
Since the “toward” is directional, and this direction occurrence, nor an arbitrary collection of concepts, but
can be quite diverse depending upon the senses in which it something inexorable whatever may be its modes. {186}
is articulated, it follows that the terminus of this “toward”, The modes of the “toward” of the most primitive man just
i.e., the “beyond” itself, can have different characteristics, as much as our own are modes of “science”, i.e., modes of
as we said. It can be “another thing”, but it can also be an inexorable march from perceived reality toward what is
the same thing present but toward what is within itself. real beyond perception.
We shall not pursue that problem here; I only point it out b) The point of departure and the entire raison d’etre
to show that the “beyond” is not necessarily another thing, of the affirmation of the real beyond perception is, then,
and that what is immediately perceived and what is be- precisely the real which is perceived. Everything that
yond the perceived are not necessarily two numerically science affirms of the physical world is only justified as an
different realities. Moreover, these different modes of the explication of what is perceived qua real “in” perception.
“beyond” have among themselves and with what is imme- Electromagnetic waves or photons, for example, are nec-
diately perceived an internal articulation. It is possible, essary for perceived color. However they are necessary
indeed, that something which is discovered as being not only as productive causes of the perceived quality, but,
“other” beyond the immediate ends up being the very as I see it, they are necessary in a deeper and more radical
foundation of the immediate, but exceeding it in profun- sense: those waves and photons do not remain “outside” of
dity. Whence, the “beyond” is simultaneously the same the perceived quality, but are the reality of this quality
thing as the immediate, i.e., its formal foundation, and “inside” of it; they are a formal moment of its reality in
nonetheless cosmically another thing which is merely profundity. Color is not produced by the wave (as critical
immediate by reason of cosmically exceeding it. A reality realism affirms), but, I believe, color “is” the wave per-
which is part of the foundation of the formal reality of ceived, is the perceptive visual reality “of” the wave itself.
something, but which exceeds it precisely by being its Hence, the visual perception of color “is” the electromag-
{185} formal foundation, is not just a reality added to the netic wave “in” perception. Similarly, sound carries us
first, purely and simply. It is rather the same reality in beyond its sonority to elastic longitudinal waves. Again,
68 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

these waves are not only the causes of sound in percep- present-day knowledge.
tion, but ultimately are formally constitutive of sound it-
self in its proper sonority. The electromagnetic as well as The perceived real, then, is what bears us inexorably
the elastic waves exceed color and sound respectively; in to the real beyond perception; the real beyond perception
this respect they are “something other” than these quali- has no more justification than the real perceived.
ties, since their cosmic reality lacks color or sound. But c) This means that in directionally apprehended re-
because “in addition” they comprise the formal foundation ality what is de suyo is converted into a problem for us.
of color and sound, it follows that those waves and these Not the problem that something is de suyo, but the prob-
qualities are not {187} purely and simply two things. lem of what the structure is of what is de suyo. Sensible
Because if indeed outside the realm of this perception the qualities, despite being real in perception, and despite
waves are something else, nonetheless within it (and only {188} inexorably leading us beyond what is perceived,
within it) the qualities and the waves are numerically one can be abolished beyond the perceived precisely to be able
single thing and not two—as they would be if the waves to be an explanation of what is perceived. Elementary
were the cause of the qualities. Sensible qualities are real particles, atoms, waves, etc. not only are not perceived by
in perception; they are the perceptive reality of what cos- themselves in fact, but are by nature not sentiently appre-
mically exceeds them. If the sensible qualities had no hendable or visualizable, as the physicists have been say-
reality, or if this reality were numerically distinct from ing for some years now. But they are, nonetheless, neces-
that of the cosmos, then science would be a mere system sary for what we formally do perceive. This necessity is
of concepts but not a knowledge of the real. If one main- described in contemporary physics through rigorous uni-
tains that sensible qualities are produced with respect to fied mathematical structures which overcome the visual
their content by the receptors themselves, they would not dualism of wave and particle. According to these unified
stop being thereby just an actualization of that real prod- structures, elementary particles can behave as particles in
uct. But in fact this conceptualization is a pure meta- their creation and absorption, and as waves in their
physical construct and not a fact. propagation. Quantum mechanics is the unified mathe-
One will then ask how waves, for example—that is, matical formulation of this non-visualizable reality of the
reality beyond perception—can give rise to a real immedi- particles. And thus science is not just an explanation of
ately perceived quality in perception. To which I respond what is perceived, but an explanation of the whole reality
that this a problem for science, and that science, as I indi- of the cosmos; that is the enormous task of the concepts,
cated, has sidestepped it. And this is the scandal of our laws, and theories of science.
 {189}

CHAPTER VI

THE IDEA OF REALITY FOR WHAT IS INTELLECTIVELY KNOWN IN

SENTIENT FASHION

In contrast to the classical idea of intellection, we metaphysics. The boundary between the two aspects is
have staked out a new and different one: sentient intellec- precisely the common actuality; this actuality is the
tion. It is just the impressive actualization of the real as boundary between the philosophy of the intelligence and
real. But this entails an idea of reality which is quite dif- metaphysics.1 Since what I am here propounding is a
ferent than what is understood by reality in a conceptual- philosophy of the intelligence, I shall say only what is
izing or concept-producing intellection. Up to now we necessary for my task about these three ideas.
have studied reality as a mode of otherness. But now we
I shall examine, then,
must study it in and for itself. This will involve inevitable
repetitions. 1. Reality.
Sentient intellection apprehends the real impres- 2. The real.
sively. What is thus apprehended has, as we saw, a for- 3. Being
mality and a content. Neither of these moments is inde-
pendent. The formality of “reality” as a proper moment of
what is apprehended makes of this latter what we call a
‘real thing’. And we express this character by saying that {191} §1
heat not only warms, but “is” warming. In this way three
terms appear here: ‘reality’, ‘the real’, and ‘being’. This is REALITY
just what we now must analyze. {190}
The foregoing terms refer to three ideas apprehended
in sentient intellection. They are three ideas different As we have been saying over and over, reality is first
from the usual ones which are intellectively known in a and foremost a formality of otherness of what is sentiently
conceptualizing intellection. For this reason I shall, in apprehended. And this moment consists in what is ap-
each case, indicate that contraposition, but only with the prehended being situated in the apprehension as some-
motive of outlining the ideas. Moreover, our analysis will thing “of its own”, something de suyo. Reity (thingness)
be cursory. These three ideas are intrinsic and formal or reality is the formality of the de suyo.
moments of what is apprehended; i.e., they are three This de suyo is the moment in which what is appre-
boundary ideas. In fact, the actuality of what is intellec- hended is “already” what is apprehended. This “already”
tively known in sentient fashion is an actuality which is expresses the formal anteriority of what is apprehended
common to what is thus known and to the intellection with respect to its being here-and-now apprehended; it is
itself; that we have already seen. So, these three ideas the prius. In virtue of it, the formality of reality installs us
anchored in that common actuality pertain on one hand to
the reality of intellection itself, and on the other to the
reality of what is intellectively known. With respect to the 1
[Zubiri’s “philosophy of intelligence” corresponds in some respects to
first, these ideas are a constitutive part of intellection and, what, in the British tradition, is called ‘philosophy of mind’; but Zubiri
therefore, of any philosophy of the intelligence. With re- goes far beyond that encompassed by the usual discussions of the philoso-
phy of mind because he believes that his philosophy of intelligence is one
spect to the second, they are the constituting thing itself of of the cornerstones of philosophy, of deeper significance that the usual di-
reality and, therefore, part of any philosophy of reality, of vision into metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and ethics.—trans.]

69
70 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

in what is apprehended as reality in and through itself. that it is an existence which pertains de suyo to the thing.
That is, for a sentient intelligence: Were this not so we would have not reality but a spectre of
reality. And that is, I think, the key to interpret the meta-
1. Reality is something sensed; it is a formality of
physics of the Vedanta: existence is only a moment of re-
otherness.
ality {193} and not the other way around—as if some-
2. This formality is the de suyo. thing were formally real by being existent. What formally
3. It is the most radical part of a thing; it is the thing constitutes reality is not existing, but the mode of existing,
itself as de suyo. viz. existing de suyo. For that, it does not matter to me
how one conceptualizes existence, whether like St. Tho-
What is now important to us is this radicality of the mas, for whom existence is an act of essence; or like Su-
thing itself. What is reality as a moment of a thing? arez, for whom existence is really identified with the es-
The question is justified because we are not now sence. That is, it is not at all clear that there is this thing
dealing with a mode of being here-and-now present, but of which we call ‘existence’. There are “existent things”,
pertaining to a thing in its radical “of itself”. The de suyo but it is not clear that existence is a moment which is
constitutes, then, the radicality of the thing itself as real somehow really distinct from the notes. The nature of the
and not only as otherness. And this is essential. {192} relation between notes and existence in content is the
subject of metaphysics, but not our present problem. The
It is essential because one might think that reality
only important thing here is that existence always and
coincides with existence. Something would be real if it
only concerns the content of what is apprehended in the
were existent, and if it did not exist, it would not be real.
same way that it concerns its notes, despite the fact that,
But the matter is not quite as simple as it seems. To be
as we have said, existence rigorously speaking might not
sure, what doesn’t exist isn’t real, and what exists is real.
be a note. What is formally apprehended as real in the
But that is not the question, because what must be asked
sentient intelligence is what is de suyo, not what is “exis-
here is if a thing is real because it is existent or rather if it
tent”. De suyo is a radical and formal moment of the real-
is existent because it is real. The question is justified be-
ity of something. It is a moment common to sentient in-
cause not only is a thing not real if not existent, but nei-
tellection and to the real thing: as a moment of intellec-
ther is it real if it does not have determinate notes. Now,
tion, it is the formality of otherness; and as a moment of
existence and notes concern the content of the real. To be
the real thing, it is its own de suyo. Every metaphysics of
sure, existence is not just another note of the content. But
reality as existent and as possessor of its own notes must
that isn’t the question, because though it may not be a
inexorably ground itself in the formality of reality, in the
note, existence is a moment which formally concerns the
de suyo. The relation of these two aspects of the common
content of what is apprehended but is not formally a mo-
actuality is the prius of the de suyo. That is, the de suyo
ment of its reality. For this same reason, the fact that this
is not only the mode in which an apprehended thing is
content is real is something “anterior” to its existence and
present to us, but is thereby the constitutive moment of the
to its notes. Only in being real does a thing have exis-
reality of the thing in and through itself.
tence and notes. Permit me to explain.
This is an idea of reality grounded upon the sentient
We are not dealing with a temporal anteriority, nor
intelligence. The conceptualizing intelligence erred with
saying that a thing may be real before being existent; that
respect to this moment of the {194} de suyo, and headed
would be absurd. Nor are we referring to some order of
in the direction of a metaphysics of reality as existence.
temporal succession, but rather to an order of formal fun-
But reality is something intellectively sensed in things: it
damentation. And then it is clear that reality is formally
is “sensed” and is so “in” a thing. What is thus sensed
anterior to existence. Existence pertains to a thing de
“in” a thing is an “in” which is prius; hence, this intrinsic
suyo; a real thing is de suyo existent, which means that in
priority is the radical moment of the thing itself.
a real thing its moment of existence is grounded in its
moment of reality. We said on several occasions and quite A thing qua determined in the formality of reality is
properly that a thing has real existence. ‘Real’ means constitutively a real thing; it is the real.
 IDEA OF REALITY FOR WHAT IS INTELLECTIVELY KNOWN IN SENTIENT FASHION 71

{195} APPENDIX 6

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE FORMALITY OF REALITY

We have already explained that reality consists in the Transcendentality is real; by being real, a thing is
formality of the de suyo. It is this formality which (par- “more” than what it is by being warm or sonorous. But at
don the redundancy) formally constitutes reality. But it the same time this “more” is a “more” of reality; it is,
would be a serious error to saddle this idea with all of the therefore, something which is inscribed in the de suyo as
conceptual elaboration subsequently brought to pass by the such. Transcendentality is the openness of the formality
intellection of reality. It is not our purpose here to exam- of reality as such; hence, it is “more” than the reality of
ine, even summarily, the content of this elaboration. The each thing. It is thus grounded in the de suyo and is a
essential point is that this elaboration has not been arbi- moment of the de suyo itself but without being an extrin-
trary, but determined by the moment of the impression of sic addition to it.
the formality of reality. Thus it is necessary for us to ap- Let us now see more concretely what this structure
prehend with precision the moment or moments of the means.
impression of reality which are in themselves determi-
Reality is open formality. Hence reality is constitu-
nants of that elaboration. This does not go beyond an
tively respective. In virtue of this each thing, {197} by
analysis of the impression of reality; however, it carries
being real, is from within itself open to other real things—
this analysis not by way of intellection but by way of real-
whence the possible connection of some real things with
ity. It is for this reason that I here only point out the sub-
others. That this connection exists is a fact, and nothing
ject.
more than a fact. But what is not a fact, but an intrinsic
Now, the moment of the impression of reality which metaphysical necessity, is that if such a connection exists
determines the elaborations to which I am referring is the it is grounded on respectivity. According to this line of
moment of transcendentality. As we already saw in transcendental openness, the moment of reality acquires a
Chapter IV, transcendentality is the openness of the for- special character, what in ordinary discourse we call ‘the
mality of reality as such. Reality is the de suyo, and this force of things’, which consists in the force of imposition
de suyo is open as de suyo as much to what a thing is in of the real. To be sure, it is not a force in the sense of
its-own-ness as to other things. This refers not {196} to a Newton’s or Leibnitz’ physical science; but rather a force
conceptual openness, but to an openness which in its own sui generis, “forceness” or necessity. We say that some-
way is physical. In virtue of it, a real thing is real by be- thing has to occur by the force of things. Here we can see
ing “more” than what it is by being colored, having mass, clearly that this force of reality is grounded on what real-
etc. This “more” is, then, a moment which intrinsically ity formally is with respect to its force of imposition, in
and constitutively pertains to the very structure of the de the de suyo. But it is not a moment added to reality; it is a
suyo. As I shall say forthwith, there are two serious errors moment which expresses the respectivity of things; it is
about this matter which must be avoided. The first con- just their transcendentality. This idea of the force of
sists in thinking that the “more” is the formal mode of things has given rise to many different conceptual elabo-
reality. In that case the de suyo would be something rations. It is not important to analyze them here; rather, it
grounded on the “more”. But that is impossible; the will suffice to cite some examples so as to show that all of
“more” is always and only a moment of the de suyo, and these conceptual elaborations are grounded on the tran-
hence is only a grounded moment. The other error is in scendental moment of the force of reality. One of the most
the opposite direction. It consists in thinking that the ancient (and problematic) of them is, for example, the
“more” is some type of thing more or less imaginary idea of destiny, the moira in Greek tragedy. Together with
which is added to reality, to the de suyo. This is also im- it one could interpret the force of reality as nature; nature
possible; the “more” pertains structurally and constitu- would thus be the intrinsic moment of the force of reality.
tively to the de suyo itself. Both errors are the conse- But the force can be conceptualized in still another form.
quence of not having apprehended the articulation be- It can be conceptualized as law; that is what is proper to
tween the de suyo and the “more”. And this articulation modern science. But in any case, whether law as nature
is the transcendentality of the formality of reality. or destiny, we have elaborations of something {198} in
72 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

which the formality of reality itself is found to be in- tency, and in conceptualizing the reality of things as the
scribed, viz. the force of reality. This force is a transcen- seat of potencies. This idea is elaborated in turn accord-
dental characteristic of the openness of reality as such. ing to various interpretations, one of which consists in
Reality is not force, but this force is always and only a interpreting potency as animity; that is animism. Ani-
transcendental moment of reality as reality, a transcen- mism is not the conceptualization of things as power nor
dental moment of the de suyo. even as potency, but just the opposite, viz. potency as what
But there is still another line of transcendental open- makes animism possible. And then we clearly see that in
ness. It is that the formality of reality is in itself a moment the same way as animism presupposes potency (without
which has primacy over the content of each real thing. As being identified with it), so potency presupposes the power
I said, this moment of reality is, for example, a reifying of the real as a dimension of things qua real. Power has
moment; it is in addition a “such-ifying” moment, a mo- nothing to do with potency nor animation; power is a
ment through which what is de suyo [of its own] is for- transcendental moment of the real as real. It is grounded
mally suyo [its own] and makes suyo [its own] everything in reality, in the de suyo. Otherwise, we should fall into an
which happens to the thing; it is “own-ness”. This pri- absurd mythism. But neither is it a mere addition to real-
macy has a very precise name: power. Philosophy has ity; rather, it is a moment which is transcendentally con-
continued to blot out of its realm the idea of power. It stitutive of reality.
returns in a pointed way in Hegel, but even there just with Force of reality and power of the real are the two
respect to the philosophy of the objective spirit. “Power”, points of the transcendental impression of reality upon
as I see it, is not “force”; it is mere dominance. Now, which a whole gamut of subsequent conceptualizations
metaphysical power is the dominance of the real qua real. has been based. But in themselves, those two points are
The real through being real has its own power, the power formally given in the impression of reality. These three
of the real. This is the dominance of the moment of real- moments—de suyo, force, and power—pertain to every
ity over all of its content. Real things do not consist only impression of reality and, therefore, to every conceptuali-
in the intrinsic necessity of the structure of their content zation of reality in whatever historical period it may be
and the force with which this content is imposed upon us found. I shall only add that to affirm that force and power
according to its formality; they consist as well in tran- are anterior to the de suyo is just to forget the moment of
scendentally conveying the power of the real, the domi- the de suyo. Within reality we do not deal with the pre-
nance of formality over content. Force and power are thus ponderance which some {200} moments can have over
two different dimensions of the impression of reality in its others, but with inscribing them congenerically in the de
character of respectivity, of transcendental openness. suyo. Is not this precisely what, at the dawn of philoso-
Here, then, we are not dealing with a mythical concept; phy, Anaximander’s celebrated arhke expressed?
the salient characteristic of a myth is not “power”, but that
determinate conceptualization {199} of power which we The impression of the formality of reality is the im-
might better term ‘powerfulness’ or ‘potency’. A myth pression of the de suyo transcendentally open as force and
consists in conceptualizing the power of the real as po- as power.
 IDEA OF REALITY FOR WHAT IS INTELLECTIVELY KNOWN IN SENTIENT FASHION 73

{201} §2 pendence of a single note. It is the primary and radical

substantivity, because each note which is provisionally
THE REAL apprehended in and by itself is what gives us the impres-
sion of reality, i.e. the formality of reality.
But it is not the only case nor the most general, be-
Reality is the formality of the de suyo determined in
cause what in fact happens is almost always that the ap-
the apprehension by a mode of formalization of content
prehended content does not have a single note but many;
which is different from the formalization of stimulation.
it is a constellation of notes. In that case all of these notes
Formalization is, as we saw, what constitutes the mode of
have the same formality of reality, which is numerically
otherness of apprehended content; it is the autonomization
the same and which “reifies” the total conjunction of
of this content. Such autonomization has two moments: it
notes. Each note by itself is no longer a reality. What is
is independence, or autonomy of the content with respect
real, what is de suyo, is then not each note but only the
to the apprehendor; and it is independence of what is ap-
{203} whole ensemble. By itself, no note has the capacity
prehended with respect to other apprehended things—
or sufficiency to constitute the real, but this capacity, this
what I have called the moment of closure, or better, the mo-
sufficiency, is proper only to the whole ensemble. There-
ment of the closed unity of what is apprehended. Now,
fore only this ensemble is what has substantivity. But, this
when these two moments are moments of the formaliza-
ensemble is more than a mere ensemble. In what is thus
tion of reality, i.e., when they are moments of the de suyo,
apprehended, each note has a determinate “position” in
then autonomization as independence of content and as
the ensemble. Hence, each note is not an element “in” an
closed unity of notes takes on its own character, viz. the
ensemble, but an element “of” an ensemble; it is a “note-
character by which the apprehended is the real. What the
of”. Every note qua note is then formally “of”. That is
real is, then, is something which can only be conceptual-
what I call the constructed state, in which each note is a
ized based on formalization, i.e., on the sentient intelli-
constructed moment “of” the ensemble; it is a “note-of”
gence; it is something which must be conceptualized as
the ensemble. This does not refer to some type of myste-
being de suyo independent and one. What is this being
rious adhesion of the content of some notes of the sub-
independent and one de suyo?
stantivity to others, but to the fact that each note is real
1) Apprehended notes, by being de suyo independ- qua note only in the unity with other real notes as notes.
ent, have their own formal character: they are constitu- Thus the ensemble itself is not just a mere ensemble but
tion, the constitution of the real. Constitution is the mo- the positional and constructed unity of its notes; it is what
ment in which the notes determine the form and the mode I formally term a system. The formalization of what is
of the real in each case. And here we have the first char- sensed in sensing is the impressive moment of sentient
acteristic of the real: {202} to be constitutional. This is intellection; in this case the formalization consists in a
not a theoretical concept, but a moment of the impressive constellation of notes, and what is thus impressively
apprehension of the real. Content has the capacity to be known intellectually is a system. That is, when it has the
de suyo. And this capacity is, therefore, the capacity for formality of the the de suyo, the formalization of the the
constitutionality. It is what I call sufficiency in the order notes as constellations acquires the character of substan-
of independence or of the de suyo; it is constitutional suf- tive system; it is the unity of the system. This system
ficiency. And the real as constitutionally sufficient is unity is constructed unity. Only the system now has con-
what I call substantive reality, substantivity. Substantivity stitutional sufficiency. Formalization sentiently grounds
is, formally, constitutional sufficiency, sufficiency for be- this intellective apprehension of what we call real things
ing de suyo. not as “things” (as we shall see immediately) but as uni-
This capacity in the order of constitutional suffi- ties of systematic substantivity. This does not refer to a
ciency, i.e., in the order of substantivity, can be quite var- conceptual elaboration, but to a close analysis of the ap-
ied. A real color green apprehended in and by itself is prehension of the real. {204}
something de suyo. Each note which is apprehended in Although every note which is provisionally appre-
and by itself as reality (even though provisionally) has hended in and by itself (for example, extension and intel-
constitutional sufficiency. Being green is a mode of con- lection, each in and by itself) may provisionally have con-
stitution of the real; it is the verdeal or green form of real- stitutional sufficiency, it is quite possible that if one tries
ity. And in turn, the real green has, taken in and by itself, to form a system with only these two notes, it may not
that constitutional sufficiency which is substantivity. It is have constititional sufficiency. Thus, the constitutional
what I call elemental substantivity, because it is the inde- sufficiency of a note and a system of notes are not the
74 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

same. For greater clarity I concentrated almost exclu- I appealed to systematic substantivity for greater
sively on the constitutional sufficiency of systems in my clarity. But what was said applies equally to elemental
book On Essence. In them, constitution is clearly the substantivity. A note apprehended in and by itself as real
mode of unity of a system. The moment of sufficiency is has a “numerical unity” of reality. The actualization of
constituted through being a closed totality. But this con- this unity in the note is just its dimension. {206} I use the
cept of constitution is based upon the more radical concept term ‘dimension’ because in each dimension the substan-
of constitution as determination of form and mode of re- tivity is measured. What are these dimensions?
ality. The substantivity of a system is not comprised by Let us assume that we apprehend any real thing
the substantivity of its notes; on the contrary, the substan- whatsoever, for example a rock, a dog, or a star. When we
tivity of these notes does not go beyond being provisional do so the thing is situated in the apprehension first of all
for the effects of their intellective actuality. But this same as a whole, a totum. Upon apprehending one or several
thing applies to all substantivities—all of them are merely notes, I apprehend, for example, a dog. The whole actu-
provisional. There is only one strict systematic substan- alized in each note or in any group of notes is the primary
tivity, that of the cosmos. Constitution, I repeat, is the dimension of substantivity. In the second place, this whole
determination of the mode and form of reality through is not a mere ensemble of notes, as I have already ob-
notes. And this constitution can be elemental or system- served. Precisely because each note, qua note, is a “note-
atic. Constitutional sufficiency is thus a substantivity of”, the presumed ensemble of notes has a coherence in its
which is either elemental or systematic. own “of”. The system is actualized in each note or in any
2. The real, then, has a moment of reality (the de group of notes, as a coherent whole. Finally, in the third
suyo) and another moment of autonomized content. Now, place, this coherent whole has a type of steadiness or so-
these two moments are not independent. To see this is lidity on account of which we say that it is durable. To
suffices to look closely at systematic substantivity. Again I endure is here “to be here-and-now being”. Substantivity
repeat that we are not talking about constructing theoreti- has this triple dimension of totality, coherence, and dura-
cal concepts, but carrying out a careful analysis of any bility. The real is de suyo total, coherent, and durable.
{205} apprehension of the real whatsoever. In systematic This is not some conceptual construction, but just an
substantivity, the unity of the system constitutes its in, its analysis of any apprehension of the real. Totality, coher-
intus, its interiority. Here, ‘interiority’ does not mean ence, and durability are three moments of what is appre-
something hidden, lying beneath the notes, but just the hended in its primordial apprehension.
unity of their system. This unity is what makes them a Thus in dimensional substantivity we have the real
construct, viz. being “notes-of” the system. The notes by from the standpoint of a sentient intelligence.
themselves are the projection of the unity; they are its
“ex”, its “extra-”, its exteriority. Every reality is thus an Classical philosophy, both ancient and modern, con-
in and an ex, an interiority and an exteriority. It is inte- fronted the problem of the real with a conceptualizing
rior because it is a system; exterior because it is a projec- intelligence. Thus it thought that the real has a very pre-
tion in its notes. As a system, every reality is internal; as a cise character. Parmenides believed that what is known
projection in its notes, every reality is external. These are intellectively is given as a jectum (keimenon); that was the
not two conceptual moments, but two physical moments, origin of idea of the “atom” (Democritus). Aristotle went
described apprehensibly, of the sensed construct. The a step further: what is known intellectively is not the jec-
projection of the unity in its notes has two aspects. On the tum, but {207} the sub-jectum (hypo-keimenon), sub-
one hand, it is a molding of the unity in its notes, a mold- stance. Its notes are “accidents”, something which super-
ing of the interiority; in this aspect the notes are the ex- venes on the subject and which cannot be conceived ex-
structure of the construct, the structure of the in. But on cept as being inherent in it. Modern philosophy took yet
the other hand, this interiority, this in, is actualized in the another step along this line. What is known intellectively
notes in which it is molded. Molding and actualization are is jectum, not sub-jectum but ob-jectum. Its notes would
not the same. Now, the formal respects according to be objective predicates. Jectum, subjectum, and objectum
which the in, the unity of the system, is actualized in all or are, for a conceptualizing intelligence, the three charac-
some groups of its structural notes is what I call dimen- teristics of the intellectively known real.
sion; it is the actuality of the interiority, of the in of the But for a sentient intelligence, reality is not jectum
system, in the exteriority of its structure. The real is, (nor subjectum nor objectum), but what has the formality
then, structural and dimensional substantivity. of the de suyo, whether it be a note or a system of notes
 IDEA OF REALITY FOR WHAT IS INTELLECTIVELY KNOWN IN SENTIENT FASHION 75

sensed in their reality. The real is not a “thing” but Thus we have what, from the standpoint of the sen-
something “of its own”, thing or not. In contrast to what tient intelligence, is the real. But the problem does not
was thought in the conceptualizing intelligence, viz. that end here. When I contrasted stimulus and reality, I said
the real is substantiality and objectuality, in the sentient that heat not only warms but “is warming”. Thus we have
intelligence the real is substantivity. Hence, the notes are not only reality as a de suyo, and not only the real given
not accidents “in-herent” to some substantial subject, nor as substance de suyo; but moreover there appears here this
are they predicates of an object, but rather moments which subtle term “is”. That is the idea of being itself. The real
are constitutionally “co-herent” in a constructed substan- de suyo is. That is what we must now elucidate. {208}
tive system.
76 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

{209} APPENDIX 7

ON THE REAL AND ITS REALITY

Since they deal with concepts and problems on the In the first place, by reason of its constitution, each
frontier between the study of intelligence and the study of note or system of notes constitutes a form of reality.
reality, the following considerations at times go beyond Green is the verdeal form of reality. Constitution is thus
mere analysis of the act of sentient apprehension of the the concrete form of the unity of the real; i.e., of the “of its
real. own”.
The real has its constitutional notes. These notes, by But in the second place, there is something more.
being real, almost always comprise constellations, i.e., Content does not comprise only the form of reality, but
unities which are closed and indepedent of the apprehen- also the mode of reality. A star, piece of iron or copper, a
dor by virtue of that formality of reality, “of itself”, de holm oak, a dog, a man, etc., are distinguished from each
suyo. other as forms of reality only by their respective constitu-
As closed, systematic unities, the notes have a type tions, that is, by the character of their notes, by their con-
of closure which is common to all men, for whom real stitution. But there is a much more profound difference
systems all present the same aspect, viz., they are things between these realities. The real is the de suyo. Now, in
which are relatively independent of each other by reason the examples cited, one sees immediately that these real
of their notes. That is owing to the sentient structure. If it things differ not only {211} by virtue of their notes, but
were not so, the systematic unities would be radically dif- more importantly by the way in which these notes are
ferent from those which we now perceive. If we were to “theirs”, are of substantivity. That is, they differ by the
see the colors and forms of this tree with a different type mode of reality, by the mode of substantivity. Thus, de-
of retina, we would perceive streams of photons or elec- spite their constitutional difference and, therefore, despite
tromagnetic fields, for example; and that which we call a their different forms of reality, iron and copper nonethe-
tree would not have, as a system, the character which it less have the same mode of substantivity; it consists “just
has in our sensible apprehension. This is what I term the in having as its own” its notes. This “as its own” is what
homogenization of systems; it is determined by the struc- is then conceptualized as a “property”. In sentient intel-
tures of formalization. It is thanks to them that we appre- lection the “of its own” does not formally consist in being
hend independent “things” instead of fragments of a cos- a “property”, as was thought in the conceptualizing intel-
mos. {210} ligence; but on the contrary being a “property” is
grounded upon the sentient apprehension of the “of its
In the second place, these systems come demarcated own”. With respect to animals, each has its own constitu-
with a certain coefficient of invariance. Not that the notes tion and, therefore, its own form of reality. Nonetheless,
are completely invariant, but the system of them has they all have the same mode of reality which is different
nonetheless a relative invariance in virtue of which we say from mere “having as its own”. An animal has an inde-
that we have apprehended the same thing. That is, we are pendence and a specific control over its environment
not dealing with the mere constancy of what is perceived, based in large measure upon sensing. In sensing, a living
i.e., the invariance of notes—a phenomenon which, as is animal in a more or less rudimentary fashion is an autos,
well known, is also common to animals. But what the a self. An animal always has at least a primordium of
animal does not apprehend is that type of “real constancy” autos which is richer as one ascends the zoological scale.
which we call sameness; sameness is formally the identity It is a mode of reality different from merely having notes
of reality of a system apprehended sentiently in the invari- as its own; it is indeed a new mode of reality which we
ant structure of its system of notes. call ‘life’. Life is not “auto-motion”, as it has usually
Homogeneity and sameness are two characteristics of been described since the time of the Greeks; but a kind of
a system of notes qua closed. But much more important “auto-possession”, i.e. being in reality and sensing itself
and profound are the diverse types of independence of the as an autos. Here we are not dealing with the constitution
real as determined by the type of system of its notes, i.e., as a form of reality, but with the fact that the system as
inasmuch as they are independent systems “of their own”. such in its independence is that which constitutes the
 IDEA OF REALITY FOR WHAT IS INTELLECTIVELY KNOWN IN SENTIENT FASHION 77

radically formal part of an animal. And man has a mode but is so formally and precisely not as an organism or a
of reality yet more profound; he is not only something unified system, but as principle of actuality. On the other
which possesses itself, something autos, but an autos of a hand, that absolute character is grounded in a transcen-
{212} different kind: viz., being not only his own sub- dence, in something which, though starting from the
stantivity, but also his own reality qua reality. The simple world (as an organism), nonetheless is in it transcending
autos consists in pertaining to oneself by reason of the it, i.e., having a relatively absolute character. But this
systematism of one’s notes. But in man we are dealing relativity as a moment of the absolute is not integrable, or
with an autos in which self-pertaining is not by virtue of rather, is only relatively integrable. Whence the possible
notes, but formally and reduplicatively by the very char- unity of men has a character which is completely different
acter of reality. Man pertains to himself as reality; he is a from that of an integration. Men can be directed to others
person. A person is formally and reduplicatively a real in a way which pertains only to men, viz., in an “im-
its-own-ness. personal” way. Other realities are not impersonal, but “a-
Many forms of reality can, then, have the same mode personal”. Only persons can be impersonal. And there-
of reality. And these modes, as we have just seen, are fore, {214} while the unity of other things (because they
three: mere having “as its own”, self-possessing, and be- are apersonal) is integration, the unity of men is primarily
ing a person. They are not independent; each involves the “society”, a unity with other men taken impersonally, i.e.,
previous one. Thus only by having determinate notes can taken just as others. Moreover, by maintaining themselves
the real be an autos, a living being. And only by being as persons, i.e. as realities which are relatively absolute,
alive and by having determinate properties such as intelli- men have a type of unity superior to mere society; this is
gence can the human animal be a person. But this in no “personal communion” with others as persons. All of this
way keeps the mode of reality from being something dif- I say by way of illustration because in itself, the subject
ferent from the form of reality. pertains to the study of man as established in reality.
But there is still more. The real is not only some- Establishment in reality is radically given in the im-
thing independent by virtue of its notes and their mode of pression of reality. Whence it follows that reality qua
being real to it; rather, each real thing is a moment of pure reality is not a mere concept, but is physical establishment
and simple reality; i.e., it is real in the world, it is real in a in reality. To be sure, I have a concept of reality qua real-
wordly fashion. Worldliness is the respective openness of ity; but this concept is never primary. What is primary
the impression of reality qua impression of pure and sim- and radical is the de suyo as a moment of reality qua real-
ple reality. Through it we sentiently know the real as es- ity. And this moment is “establishment” in reality, in the
tablished in the world. Now, there are various figures of de suyo; it is apprehended in the sentient intelligence, and
establishment in reality. Living as well as non-living precisely because of that is not primarily a concept, but
things are part of the world. Their establishment in real- something anterior to any concept. For a conceptualizing
ity consists, then, in that figure which I call integration. intelligence, the fact that something is purely and simply
Man partakes of this condition, but is not reduced to it real means only that it is a particular case of reality. But
because as a personal reality man is not only formally and for a sentient intelligence, being purely and simply reality
reduplicatively “his own” as reality, {213} but is his own means “being now restored” in reality. Reality qua reality
“facing” everything real. This is a type of withdrawal in is, then, a physical moment of the real, that moment
the world but “facing” the world; a type of confrontation which I have called ‘establishment’. And the reality in
with the world. Hence he senses himself in reality as which every real thing is established is not the objective
relatively independent of everything else; i.e., as relatively field of the concept of reality, but the physical formality of
“absolute”. He is not part of the world, but is in it yet reality apprehended in every sentient intellection. And
falling back upon himself in his own reality. The estab- since this formality is constitutively {215} open, as we
lishment of man as a personal reality in the world is thus saw, the establishment itself admits various manifesta-
not integration but absolutization, so to speak. In contrast tions. In other words, reality qua reality is a moment
to what Hegel thought, viz. that the individual spirit is but which is physically open to different establishments. And
a moment of the absolute spirit, we must affirm that in fact this openness is dynamic. There has indeed been
through his personal reality, and inasmuch as he is per- dynamic progress in the real qua real, because there has
sonal, man is not integrated into anything, either as a been progress in the establishment in reality. We do not
physical part or as a dialectical moment. To be sure, a know if this dynamic progress will always march forward;
person is integrated into the world by some moments of that is a problem which is outside the scope of our con-
his reality; for example, his body. But qua personal, this cerns here. But in principle, reality as such is something
same body transcends all integration; the body is personal which continues to be open. {216}
78 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

{217} §3 Being is something much more radical and complex

than the empty “is” about which we are usually told.
THE BEING OF THE REAL A) In the first place, being is above all actuality. We
have already seen that actuality is something different
than actuity. Actual and actuality is a “being here-and-
When I contrasted reality and stimulation, I stressed now present” not qua present, but qua being here-and-
that in both cases we are dealing with formality of other- now. It is being here-and-now present “from within it-
ness. For clarification, I presented a trivial example. As self”, and not as some extrinsic denomination. It is, fi-
otherness of stimulation, heat is what is explained by nally, being present from itself “by being real” and inas-
saying “heat warms”. On the other hand, as otherness of much as it is real. The radical actuality of the real con-
reality, we say that “the heat is warming, is warm”. In sists in the unity of these three moments (being here-and-
this example, what I wished to draw attention to is the now, from within itself, inasmuch as it is real). I say
difference between the two formalities of otherness. In ‘radical’, because the real has many actualities; but there
stimulation, heat pertains formally to the sentient process is one which is primary and radical, viz. that which I just
of the animal; it is its sign. It is, then, a type of signate {219} explained. How is the real actually present from
pertaining or property. But heat as reality is something to within itself by being real? Clearly, by being real and
which its thermic qualities pertain de suyo; it is warming. inasmuch as it is real, that wherein the real is actual is
These two phrases reveal the contrast between the two precisely in the pure and simple worldly respectivity. The
modes of presentation of what is apprehended. The sec- real is open as reality, is open to the world. And to be
ond (heat “is warming”) shows a mode of presentation here-and-now present in the world is to have actuality in
which transcends mere presentation: to say that the heat it. That is the primary and radical actuality of the real.
“is warm” or is warming is a mode of presentation in Now, the actuality of the real in the world is just its being.
which the reality that is present is a prior moment of what Being is worldly actuality. Thus the real is not only real,
is presented, i.e., a moment of what is presented as real in so to speak, not only the worldly, but the real which is
and by itself and not as a moment of its presentation. To present in the world and inasmuch as it is present therein.
this reality its thermic qualities pertain de suyo: prior to This is being. Let us now consider a couple of examples
its presentation, the heat is warm. But then we find our- which do not formally pertain to our analysis of the pri-
selves in a situation where what is apprehended, the heat, modial apprehension of reality but which illustrate what
is described not with one term but with two. Insofar as we have been saying.
the thermic qualities pertain to it of itself, de suyo, we say
that the heat has reality in and by itself. But {218} on the An oak tree is an oak tree and nothing more; that is
other hand we utilize a second term: we say that the heat its reality. We see that this reality, in its form and in its
“is” warming. And here it is not just the reality of the mode, has its figure of establishment in the world. All of
heat which intervenes, but also what the “is” designates, that, as I said, pertains to the reality of the oak. But the
viz. the being of the heat. And this poses the problem of being of the oak is in another direction. Its establishment
the difference between a warm reality and a warm being; in the world “makes” (if I may be permitted the expres-
i.e., the difference between reality and being. We have sion) the oak be purely and simply real. But this estab-
already seen in what reality consists, viz. the de suyo. lishment of the oak in the world reflows, so to speak, upon
Hence, we must now clarify in what this which we call the established oak as a whole (with its suchness, its form,
‘being’ consists. and its mode) in a very precise way. It does so not by
making it tree-reality (that it already was), but by making
The idea of being has always been fashioned with re- the oak which is established in the world to be here-and-
spect to the understanding, which is to say with respect to now present in the world just by being here-and-now es-
the conceptualizing intelligence. However, the conceptu- tablished in it. And this being now present is just being.
alizing intelligence is essentially grounded on the sentient Reflowing here consists in determination of actuality; it
intelligence, which turns the ideas of reality and being reaches all moments of the oak—its suchness, its form,
upside down. Reality is not something understood, but and its mode of reality. The “such-and-such reality”
something sensed, viz. the formality of the de suyo as {220} is converted into “such-and-such being”. The same
proper to what is intellectively known in and by itself, thing happens with the form and mode of reality: they are
prior to its actually being impressively present. Now, converted into “being form and being mode”. This “be-
prior to being understood in a real thing, being is sen- ing” is not, then, a conceptual moment, but a physical
tiently apprehended in it. In what does this being consist, one. But it is a physical moment of actuality. It is what I
which is sentiently aprehended? have expressed in the idea of reflowing. If the oak tree
 IDEA OF REALITY FOR WHAT IS INTELLECTIVELY KNOWN IN SENTIENT FASHION 79

could speak it would say, “I am now established in reality With this, two errors which I would like to explicitly
as an oak.” This is what a man does when he says, “I am state have been eliminated. One consists in thinking that
established as a personal reality in the world.” Through ulteriority is chronological posteriority. This is false be-
reflowing, in the case of man his personal reality is con- cause ulteriority is not chronological posteriority, but
verted into an “I”. The “I” is not the reality of the person, purely formal posteriority; i.e., just temporality. And
but his being. This phrase does not only say “I am this or temporality does not have the structure of the three phases
that”, but also “this or that is what I am.” Here the “I” but rather the modal unity of three facets. The other error
fulfills a task strictly of emphasis: it is I who is this or consists in thinking that due to its ulteriority, being is ac-
that. And this occurs not because man is capable of say- cidental to the real, something adventitious to reality. But
ing so; on the contrary, he is capable of saying so because this {222} is absurd, because being is actuality in the
ultimately he is so. The “I” is the reflowing of the pure world, and this actuality pertains de suyo to the real. Ul-
and simple reality in a personal reality established therein. teriority then simply means that reality is not formally
So, while the oak clearly cannot say it, it unquestionably being, but that, nonetheless, reality is de suyo ulteriorly
has an “is thus”. The “is thus” is just actuality; it consti- being. Ulteriority pertains to the real de suyo. “Worldli-
tutes the reality of the oak qua present in the world. And ness”, in fact, is a constitutive, transcendental dimension
therein being formally consists. Thus, being is clearly of the impression of reality, as we saw; and because of it
something very rudimentary in the case of rocks, of the actuality in the world is not adventitious to reality. This
oak, and of dogs, for example. Where it is not rudimen- actuality the real has—indeed, has to have—de suyo; it
tary is in the case of man, whose personal reality is actual “is” because it is “real”. If one wishes, reality is not be-
in the world as “being I”. In the other realities, being is ing; but reality “really is”. That is what I express by say-
the most rudimentary of worldy actualities; but it always ing that reality is not esse reale, but realitas in essendo.
pertains to a real thing.
Since the real is substantivity, it follows that it is
Hence being is something independent of any intel- substantivity which has being; being is the being of sub-
lection; even if there were no intellection there would stantivity. This does not refer to what is usually called
be—and there is—being. “substantive being”. There is no substantive being be-
cause being itself lacks any substantivity; only the real has
B) In the second place, since every actuality is “pos- substantivity. I shall immediately return to this point.
terior” to actuity, if follows that “being” is something Thus, there is no “substantive being”, only the “being of
posterior to {221} reality. In other words, being as actu- the substantive”; this is substantivity in essendo, “being”
ality is ulterior to the real; it is the ulteriority of being. (as participle). The “being” (as participle) of reality is
This ulteriority has its own formal structure, viz. tempo- just the being of substantivity.
rality. To be sure, not every ulteriority is temporal; but the This ulteriority of being is essential; because of it re-
ulteriority about which we are here speaking, the ulterior- ality is not a mode of being. Just the opposite: being is the
ity of being, is so. Temporality is not a structure grounded ulterior actuality of the real. Being is something
in ulteriority, nor is ulteriority something grounded in grounded on reality, in the actuity of the real; and this
temporality. Rather, the structure of this ulteriority is being grounded is just ulteriority. Let us return to the
formally temporality. In other words, the essential char- example which we have been considering for the last sev-
acter of the ulteriority of being is temporality; the real eral pages: heat is warming. This “warming” has two
“is”. This actuality consists first of all in that a thing “al- meanings. First of all it means that heat has warming
ready-is” in the world; and secondly, in that the thing reality. “Warming” then means that heat is a form of re-
“still-is” in the world. Hence, “being” is always “already- ality, viz. warming reality. To warm is thus to warm
is-still”: this is temporality. We are not referring to three {223} things. But it can also mean something different.
phases of some chronological occurance, but three struc- To be here-and-now warming can mean that warming is a
tural facets of the ulteriority of being. The intrinsic unity way of being here-and-now in the world. This does not
of these three facets is what the expression “to be here- refer to warming things, but to being here-and-now in the
and-now being” expresses. Etymologically it is a present world warming. So, the actuality of the heat in the mun-
participle, being here-and-now actually present in the dane sense of being here-and-now warming is being.
world. Its adverbial expression is “while”. Being is al- Thus we are not dealing with a form of reality, but a form
ways and only being “while”. I have explained this at of being. This is the whole difference and the whole unity
greater length in “El concepto descriptivo del tiempo” of reality and being: everything real inexorably “is”, but
(Realitas II, 7-41). “is” by being already “real”.
80 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

Our return to the foregoing case is not a simple ex- lection under logos; that is what several pages back I
emplification of what we have been expounding; it is called the logification of intellection. But this is not all; it
something more. It is a return to the essential point: be- is furthermore the case that, for this theory, what is intel-
ing is not something understood, but something sensed. lectively known consists in “being”. Whence it follows
This is the heart of the matter. that reality is but a mode of being—to be sure, the funda-
mental mode, but nonetheless only a mode: the esse reale.
C) What is the sensed being? Being is ulterior actu-
That is to say, the real is formally ens; reality would thus
ality of the real. And since the real itself is sensed, the
be entity. This is what I call {225} the entification of
foregoing question is but to ask ourselves how it is that
reality. Logification of intellection and entification of the
when we sense the real, we are already sensing its being.
real thus converge intrinsically: the “is” of intellection
The formal end of sentient intellection is always and only
would consist in an affirmative “is”, and the “is” known
reality. In virtue of this, reality is intellectively known in
intellectively would be of entitative character. This con-
sentient fashion directly in and by itself, as impression of
vergence has in large measure etched the path of Euro-
reality. Now, this reality thus apprehended in impression
pean philosophy. However, the problem does not exhibit
“is” ulteriorly. This ulteriority is, then, “co-sensed” when
the same character from the standpoint of a sentient intel-
reality is sensed. The way of intellectively sensing ulteri-
ligence. The logos is grounded upon sentient apprehen-
ority is to “co-sense” it. It is not sensed directly, but only
sion of the real; i.e., on sentient intellection. Therefore,
indirectly. If one wishes, reality is sensed modo recto;
instead of “logifying” intellection, what must be done is,
whereas ulteriority is sensed modo obliquo. This oblique-
as I said, to “intelligize” the logos; i.e., make the logos an
ness is just what I have called “co-sensing”. When I sense
ulterior mode of the primordial apprehension of the real.
the real in and by itself modo recto, I am co-sensing modo
The formal terminus of intellective knowing is not the
obliquo its physical and real ulteriority. What is co-
“is”, but “reality”. And thus it follows that reality is not a
sensed is being. Hence, being is co-impressively sensed
mode of being; indeed, being is something ulterior to re-
when reality is sensed. This does not refer to an acciden-
ality itself. In virtue of this, as I said a few pages back,
tal co-sensing, but to an inexorably physical and real co-
there is no esse reale, but rather realitas in essendo. Re-
sensing, {224} because it is just reality which “is” de
ality cannot be entified, but must be given an entitative
suyo. Therefore, when we sense what is apprehended de
ulteriority. The ulteriority of the logos goes “along with”
suyo we impressively co-sense its being here-and-now
the ulteriority of being itself.
“being” (participle). The impression of reality is tran-
scendental openness to the world. Hence, it is quite in- b) A precise idea of ens was never reached from the
exorable that when we impressively sense the real we standpoint of the conceptualizing intelligence. (I must of
should be sensing that it is being in the world; this is necessity repeat some things already said in order to clar-
sensed being. The apprehension of being pertains, then, ify this point.) It can indeed already be seen in Aristotle,
physically but obliquely to the apprehension of the real; who tells us that ens (Ôn) has many meanings. They are
this is the obliqueness of being. essentially eighteen: being true and false, being act and
Actuality, ulteriority, and obliqueness are the three potency, being essentially and accidentally, being accident
structural moments of being. Being is thus primarily and (nine modes of being accident) and being a subject or sub-
radically sensed. Such is the idea of being from the stance, where this subject is at the same time matter or
standpoint of the sentient intelligence. form or composed of both. This naturally permitted Ar-
istotle to treat the problems of first philosophy with some
Classical philosophy has addressed the problem of rigor, from his point of view. Nonetheless, it would be
being from the standpoint of what I have termed the ‘con- fruitless to inquire {226} as to what, definitively, he un-
ceptualizing intelligence’. To know intellectively would be derstands by ens. He would always reply with his eight-
to “understand”; and understanding would be intellec- een senses, linked only by a vague and imprecise analogy,
tively knowing that something “is”. That was the thesis and based upon Parmenides’ idea that ens (Ôn ) is a
of Parmenides and Plato, and it has stamped European keimenon, a jectum. But by his logification of intellec-
philosophy with its peculiar character. But the conceptu- tion, Aristotle conceptualized this jectum as a sub-jectum
alizing intelligence is constitutively grounded upon the (hypo-keimenon)—something which did not much clarify
sentient intelligence; whence follow essential differences the question. Aristotle remained trapped in this net of
in the problem which we are discussing. concepts. Given the situation, some Medieval philoso-
a) Above all, there is a profound difference in the phers thought that no precise and unitary concept of ens
very mode of confronting the problem. Basing themselves exists. But in general they thought that reality is exis-
on Parmenides, both Plato and Aristotle subsumed intel- tence; and then either understood existence as act of the
 IDEA OF REALITY FOR WHAT IS INTELLECTIVELY KNOWN IN SENTIENT FASHION 81

existing thing (St. Thomas) or as a mode of the existing of being now put there, of being now intended, of being
thing (Duns Scotus). But in both cases the ens would be now unveiled.
an existent thing which is either effectively existent or
Hence the very idea of ens is vitiated at its root in the
aptitudinally existent. But this is not so from the stand-
conceptualizing intelligence. Reality is not ens, but for-
point of a sentient intelligence; because as we have al-
mality of the de suyo. And the real is ens only as actuality
ready seen, reality is not existence, but rather being de
in a world.
suyo. That is to say, it does not have to do with either a de
facto act of existing, nor an aptitude for existing, but c) Finally, the being of which we speak is the being
rather something prior to any act and any aptitude, viz. of the conceptualizing intelligence; it is being which is
the de suyo. The real is de suyo existent, de suyo apt for understood. But, primarily and radically being is not
existing. Reality is formality, and existence concerns only something understood, but is sensed being; this is the
the content of the real. And thus the real is not ens, but is obliquity of the sentient apprehension of being. The old
the de suyo as such. Only by being real does the real have thesis of Parmenides canonized the opposition between
an ulterior actuality in the world. This actuality is being, intellective knowing and sensing which has been sus-
and the real in this actuality is ens. Reality is not ens; tained throughout all of Western philosophy. Nonetheless,
reality has its entity de suyo, but only ulteriorly. Reality is this opposition, as we have seen, does not exist. To know
not formally entity. intellectively is to apprehend the real, and this apprehen-
sion is sentient. Being is nothing but the oblique moment
Modern philosophy modified the medieval concep- of what is apprehended in an impression of reality. From
tion somewhat; this was the objectualization of the ens, of the standpoint of a conceptualizing intelligence, what is
the esse reale. In various forms this is the basic idea of known intellectively modo recto is “being”; whence it
modern philosophy. {227} Originating from the esse ob- follows that what is oblique would be the apprehension of
jectivum, from the objective being of Henry of Ghent the real. It would be what we could call {228} the
(14th c.), it became the central idea of Descartes’ philoso- obliqueness of the real. And as I see it, that constitutes
phy in which what is conceived, as he tells us quite liter- the radical flaw of European philosophy on this point
ally, is not formaliter reale, but is realitas objectiva (only on this point, naturally). Being understood, taken in
(Meditation III and Primae et Secundae Responsiones). and by itself, is always and only the human expression of
For Kant and Fichte to be is to be an object, to be now put being obliquely sensed in an impression of reality.
there as an object, so that reality is not entity, but objectu-
ality. But this is inadmissible, because even granting that With this we have now studied two of the three
impossible identification of being and objectuality, what is points which I set forth. The first concerned the character
proper to an object is not its “positionality”, but its “actu- of sentient intelligence as such; the second was the char-
ality” in the intellection. And the same must be said for acter of what is sentiently known. Now we must address
being as intentional position or as unveiling: intentional the third and final point: in what does reality “in” sentient
position and unveiling are only modes of actuality, modes intellection consist.
 {229}

CHAPTER VII

REALITY IN SENTIENT INTELLECTION: REAL TRUTH

In chapter V we saw that intellection is mere actuali- lection is neither exclusively nor primarily judgmental.
zation of the real as real, and we have analyzed what it is Rather, it consists formally in apprehending something as
to be mere actuality. It is not actuity, i.e., it is not an act, real, and this intellection also has its truth. As I just said,
because it neither adds, subtracts, nor modifies in any way truth is intellection qua apprehending what is real and
the physical notes which constitute the real. But while it present as real. Truth adds nothing to reality in terms of
is not an act, actuality is a physical moment of the real. notes; but does add to it its intellective actualization.
And at this juncture the question inevitably arises as to Hence, the question of what truth is, is a question which
what this moment adds to the real. Actuality, in fact, is concerns intellection as such, and not just the judgmental
not some empty moment, so to speak; but has its own intellection.
structure determined by that in which the real is just real.
Reality and truth are not identical. Intellection, and
What actuality adds to the real is precisely this being “in”
therefore truth, are aspects of actualization. And actuality,
the intellection. We saw what intellection is and what
I repeat, adds no physical note to the real. Nonetheless, it
reality is in the two previous chapters. So now we must
does add the actuality of truth to it. And since not every
see what reality is “in” intellection, and we shall proceed
reality is actualized nor has to be, if follows that not every
in two stages:
reality has truth. {231}
1. What, formally, is this intellective “in”? That is,
What, formally, does it mean that the real is just actual- For the same reason, reality and truth are not cor-
ized “in” intellection? That is what I term real truth. relative, either; i.e., reality does not consist in being a
correlate of truth. Every truth involves reality; but not
2. What are the structural moments of this “in”? every reality involves truth.
They are the dimensions of real truth.
Reality grounds truth. Reality is what gives truth to
intellection when it is just actualized therein. And this
{230} §1 actualization is true because it involves reality. Reality,
then, is what gives truth, and I generally refer to this
REAL TRUTH “truth giving” with the expression ‘to truthify’. Reality
truthifies in intellection. Thus, the “in” in which intel-
lective actuality consists is nothing but truthifying. For
A real thing is apprehended as real in and by itself; this reason, not only is truth not something correlative to
it is de suyo what it is. Since this moment of formality is reality; they are not even related. It is, rather, respectivity,
a prius of things, it follows that reality does not consist a moment of pure actualization, pure truthifying. Truth is
formally nor is it necessarily exhausted in being known purely and simply the moment of the real intellective
intellectively. Hence, on account of its intellectively presence of reality.
knowing what a thing is, we say that intellection is true.
What the mere actualization of the real adds to reality is, Bearing this in mind it is necessary to purge two
then, its truth. conceptions of truth which, by dint of continual repetition,
What is understood by truth? At first glance truth are acceded to without examination, but which in my
seems to be a quality of a judgment. But this is not so opinion are false.
because a judgment is only a mode of intellection. Intel- The first is the conception according to which truth

83
84 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

is objective consciousness. This is the conception upon nature of the sentient actualization of the real. Thus we
which all of Kant's philosophy is erected; though in fact it are not dealing with just any intellective actualization. As
goes back several centuries before him. The problem with we have already seen, sentient intellection in its primary
this view is not just that it is false, but something much and radical form is that in which what is apprehended is
more serious: it is an incorrect analysis of the fact of in- in and for itself, that is, what is apprehended is there di-
tellection. The ideas of consciousness and object resound rectly, immediately, and unitarily apprehended. Now, in
in this conception. Yet intellection is not an act of con- this sentient actualization what is apprehended is so de
sciousness, but an act of apprehension; and what is intel- suyo. And this moment of formality of the de suyo is a
lectively known does not just have objective independ- moment of a thing anterior (prius) to its own being here-
ence, but real independence. The conception of truth as and-now apprehended—and precisely therein does its
objective consciousness is, then, flawed at its heart. reality consist. But to be sure, this de suyo which is prior
The second conception consists in an appeal to the to the apprehension is nonetheless apprehended in its own
fact of error: there are intellections which are not true. anteriority; i.e., is present in sentient intellection. Hence,
And from here one goes on {232} to say that truth and this de suyo as anterior to the apprehension is reality. And
error are two qualities which function ex aequo, and that this de suyo, this reality, qua present in the apprehension
intellection as such is “neutral” with respect to this differ- is just truth. Truth is reality present in intellection qua
ence. Intellection would thus be something neutral in really present therein. Thus the primary and radical truth
itself and, therefore, its proper nature would not be to of sentient intellection is not identified with reality; nor
have truth, but to be an aspiration for truth. Deep down, does it add to the real anything different from its own re-
this was Descartes’ conception, associated immediately ality. What it does add is a kind of ratification by which
with the idealistic analysis of intellection. Nonetheless it what is apprehended as real is present in its apprehension;
involves a string of serious errors. In the first place, the and this is just ratification of the de suyo, ratification of
truth and error of which it speaks are the truth and error the reality proper. Ratification is the primary and radical
of judgment. Now, as we have repeatedly said, judgment form of the truth of sentient intellection; it is what I call
is never the primary form of intellection; there is an ante- real truth. {234}
rior mode. And so it must at least be said that whether It is truth because it is a moment which is not for-
this primary mode of intellection includes truth and error mally identical to reality. Reality is a formality of a thing,
is debatable. It is necessary for us to examine that ques- but truth is a quality of intellection insofar as the real is
tion, and we shall do so immediately. But, in the second present in it. This and nothing else is the difference be-
place, even with respect to judgmental intellection, the tween reality and truth: real truth is ratification of reality.
indisputable fact of erroneous judgments is in no way It is real because it is reality itself which is in this
equivalent to putting truth and error on an equal footing. truth; it is the real itself which truthifies. To be sure, we
Errors of judgment are possible only because truth are dealing with reality as formality of the de suyo, and
grounds the possibility of error. An error of judgment not with reality as beyond apprehension; it is the reality of
does not, therefore, consist in a mere “lack” of truth; but what is apprehended just as it is apprehended in its appre-
is formally and rigorously a “privation” of truth. The hension. I shall immediately return to this idea.
judgmental intellection, therefore, is not something neu-
tral. It is not the case that judgmental intellection “can Here we have the essential nature of real truth: the
be” true “and” false, but that in fact it “has to be” of ne- real is “in” the intellection, and this “in” is ratification.
cessity either true or false because the judgmental intel- In sentient intellection truth is found in that primary form
lection has to be true de suyo. Hence, truth and error can- which is the impression of reality. The truth of this im-
not be put on the same footing as qualities which super- pressive actuality of the real in and by itself is precisely
vene upon an intellection which is in itself neutral. Intel- real truth.
lection, even judgmental intellection, is something more Three observations may serve to bring this idea into
than aspiration. Therefore, truth is neither objective con- sharper focus.
sciousness {233} nor one quality of intellection that is Above all, we are dealing only with ratification; and
opposed to another which is error. Truth is the moment of this is essential. Classically philosophy has gone astray
actualization of the real in sentient intellection as such. on this matter and always thought that truth is constituted
How exactly does this work? in the reference to a real thing with respect to what is con-
I reiterate that we are dealing with the truth of sen- ceived or asserted about that thing. It is because of this
tient intellection as such, i.e., with the primary and radical that I believe that the classical idea of truth is always what
 REALITY AND SENTIENT INTELLECTION: REAL TRUTH 85

I term dual truth. But in real truth we do not leave the therefore what is apprehended is not the same as what the
real thing at all; the intelligence of this truth is not con- thing is outside of perception. But this does not prevent
ceptualized but sentient. And in this intellection nothing what is apprehended from being real “in” the apprehen-
is primarily conceived or judged; rather, there is simply sion itself, whether or not it is real outside of the appre-
the real actualized as real and therefore ratified in its re- hension. In the case of any error whatsoever, for example,
ality. Real truth is ratification, and {235} therefore is that of illusion, one leaves the realm of what is appre-
simple truth. For greater clarity, and though anticipating hended and goes beyond it. Illusion is therefore a phe-
some ideas which will appear in the other two parts of the nomenon of duality. But the mere actuality of what is ap-
book, I will say that truth can adopt diverse forms. In the prehended “in” the apprehension itself is not dual; it is a
first place, there is simple truth, i.e., real truth in which series of notes which pertain to what is apprehended “of
we do not leave the order of the real; it is truth as ratifi- its own”, i.e., de suyo. Hence, error consists in identify-
cation. In it, not only do we not leave the order of the ing the real which is apprehended with the real beyond or
real, but moreover there is a positive and difficult act of outside of the apprehension; in no way does it consist in
not doing so; this is the very essence of the ratification. what is apprehended being unreal “in” the apprehension
In the second place, there is dual truth, wherein we have and yet being taken as real. In an apprehension the ap-
left the real thing and gone toward its concept, toward a prehended content is real in and by itself; when ratified as
judgment, or toward an explanation of the thing. If we such it constitutes real truth. There is no possibility of
return to the thing from its concept, that is truth as error. The same can be said about errors owing to things
authenticity. If we return to the thing from a judgement, such as malformations of the sensory organs themselves,
that is truth as conformity. And if we return to the thing e.g. Daltonism. In one type of Daltonism, the subject sees
from some explanation of it, that is truth as fulfillment. a dark grey color where a normal person sees red. But in
As we shall see, this third form has never been considered both cases, and within each perception, the grey {237}
by classical philosophy. Authenticity, conformity, and which the afflicted person sees is no less real than the red
fulfillment are the three forms of dual truth. But in con- which the normal person sees; nor is that red any more
trast to the case of dual truth, in real truth there are not real outside of perception than the grey. Every sentient
two terms which are primarily foreign to each other, such intellection in which something is seen in and by itself is
as the real thing on one hand, and its concept on the always and constitutively real truth. Reality is nothing but
other; or similarly its judgement on one hand and its ex- the formality of the de suyo, and real truth is this de suyo
planation on the other. There is but a single term, the real ratified as de suyo in the apprehension. Error is only pos-
thing in its two internal moments: its own actuality and its sible when we leave this intellection and venture out to a
own ratification. It is because of this that every dual truth dual intellection which goes beyond the apprehension.
is grounded upon real truth. In real truth, the real is rati-
Finally, a third observation. Real truth, as I have just
fying. In the truth of authenticity, the real is authenticat-
said, is simple truth. But it is necessary to conceptualize
ing. In the truth of conformity, the real is truth-stating,
this simplicity in the correct manner. For Aristotle, to be
i.e. the real is stating its truth. In the truth of reason, the
simple consists in not having any multiplicity whatsoever,
real is verifying. Authenticating, truth-stating, and veri-
in being “purely simple” so to speak; thus sensible quali-
fying are three forms of dually modalizing real truth, i.e.,
ties as the proper formal object of each sense would be ta
ratification. Therefore this real truth is, as we shall see at
hapla. But this is not correct. What is apprehended in
the appropriate time, the foundation of dual truth. {236}
sentient intellection has, in general, a great variety of
The second observation concerns what I pointed out notes; indeed, it is a substantive system of notes. The
earlier: real truth is not the opposite of error for the simple simplicity of this apprehension does not consist, then, in
reason that the primary intellection of the real does not the “pure simplicity” of what is apprehended; but in the
admit of the possibility of error. Every primary apprehen- fact that all of its internal variety is apprehended in and by
sion of reality is ratifying of what is apprehended and, itself in a unitary fashion. Thus we are not dealing with a
therefore, is always constitutively and formally real truth. simplicity of content (something which in fact is never
There is no possibility whatsoever of error. Truth is ratifi- given), but rather with the simplicity of the mode of ap-
cation of the real in its actuality. This has nothing to do prehension, viz. the mode of apprehending something
with the question of whether there is or is not an actuation directly, immediately, and unitarily; i.e., per modum
of a real thing in order for it to be apprehended. If we unius. To see a landscape, or to see a book en bloc, so to
situate ourselves in the real outside of apprehension, it is speak, without stopping to apprehend each of its notes or
possible that this actuation deforms the thing and that any combinations of them, is a simple apprehension in the
86 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

unitary sense. This unitary vision of a system, ratified in here-and-now established is just what constitutes the rati-
the intellection of what is thus presented, is its simple real fication of the presenting being here-and-now. The reader
truth. It could also be called its elemental truth. {238} can observe that this idea of stability is conceptualized
Thus we have the essential nature of real truth: rati- here in this problem in a different way than in other pub-
fication. And this truth has some extremely concrete di- lications of mine.
mensions. Reality, then, has three dimensions: totality, coher-
ence, and duration. These dimensions are ratified in real
truth and constitute the three dimensions of this truth:
{239} §2 totality is ratified in richness; coherence is ratified in
“what”; and duration is ratified in stability. Richness,
THE DIMENSIONS OF REAL TRUTH “what”, and stability are, then, the three dimensions of
real truth. But ratification itself is not some amorphous
character, so to speak; rather, in each case there is a
In real truth, it is reality which in and by itself is proper mode of ratification. Totality is ratified in richness
truthifying in the intelligence; i.e., it is reality which di- according to its own mode of ratification, viz. manifesta-
rectly, immediately, and unitarily is giving its truth to the tion. Manifestation is not the same as making evident,
intellection. As we have seen, this reality has structurally because what is evident is certainly manifest, but it is evi-
speaking three dimensions: totality, coherence, and dura- dent because it is manifested. Manifesting is the mode of
tion. Now, the ratification of each of these dimensions is a ratification of the totality in richness; a thing manifests
dimension of real truth. These dimensions are formal the richness of all its notes. Reality is coherent, and is
respects; they are the ratification of the different moments ratified in a “what” according to a proper mode of ratifi-
of the respectivity in which the real consists. When I dis- cation, viz. {241} firmness. What we call the “what” of a
cussed the dimensions of the real I explained that what thing is just that in which it consists and therefore which
was said with respect to systems of notes is applicable to gives it its own firmness: it is iron, it is a dog, etc. The
each of them by itself; thus I may excuse myself here from mode in which this coherence is ratified is, then, just
referring to anything but systems. firmness; the real has the firmness of being a “what”.
Finally, durable reality is ratified in stability according to
A) Everything real as a system of notes has that its own mode, viz., corroboration or steadiness. Steadi-
dimension of being a systematic whole; this is the dimen- ness is not apprehension of some mere fact; it is a mode of
sion of totality. When a real thing is actualized in its for- ratification, the apprehension of presenting being here-
mal respect of totality, its reality is ratified in a very pre- and-now.
cise way, viz. as the richness of what is apprehended.
Richness is not the totality of notes of the real, but that To summarize, the three dimensions of the real (to-
totality qua ratified in sentient intellection. It is a dimen- tality, coherence, duration) are ratified in the three dimen-
sion of real truth, the dimension of totality of the real as sions of real truth (richness, “what”, stability) via three
ratified in intellection. modes of ratification (manifestation, firmness, steadiness).
B) Everything real is a coherent system of notes. The intrinsic unity of these three dimensions of ratifica-
Formal coherence is a dimension of the real. But this tion and its corresponding modes constitutes the radical
coherence ratified in intellection constitutes {240} real part of real truth, the radical part of the ratification of
truth as truth of the coherence; this is what we call the reality in intellection.
what of something. It is a dimension of real truth. To be This idea of ratification is not just a conceptual
“what” is the ratification of the real coherence of the sys- clarification, but something which touches the most es-
tem in intellection. sential part of sentient apprehension of the real. By being
C) Everything real is a durable system in the sentient, this apprehension is impressive; and every im-
sense of enduring. If it did not have the quality of dura- pression, as we saw in Chapter II, has three moments:
bility, a thing would not have reality. Now, the ratification affection, otherness (content and formality), and force of
of durability in intellection constitutes the truth of this imposition. The sentient intelligence is essentially con-
durability, viz. stability. ‘Stability’ means here the char- stituted by the impression of reality. As impressive, this
acter of being something established. Being here-and- intellection is sentient. Inasmuch as it senses the other as
now established is the dimension of duration, of present- otherness “of itself”, de suyo, this sensing is intellective.
ing the being of the real, ratified in intellection. Being Inasmuch as apprehended reality is ratified in the impres-
 REALITY AND SENTIENT INTELLECTION: REAL TRUTH 87

sion itself, it is real truth. Ratification is the force of im- clude this first part with a modal consideration. Permit
position of the impression of reality; it is the force of real- me to explain.
ity in intellection. And since this impressive intellection
is just actualization, {242} it follows that it is not we who What has been done up to now is analysis of the
go to real truth, but that real truth has us so to speak in its formal structure of intellection as such; this is sentient
hands. We do not possess real truth; rather, real truth has intellection. But in many passages I have pointed out that
possessed us by the force of reality. This possession is not we were dealing with the primary and radical intellection.
just some mental state or anything of that sort; rather, it is This indicates that there are intellections which are not
the formal structure of our very intellection. Every form primary and radical but which, nonetheless, are intellec-
of intellection subsequent to the primary and radical in- tions; that is, they have the formal structure of intellec-
tellection is determined by the real itself; the determina- tion. This means that in our analysis we have simultane-
tion is thus a “dragging along”. We are possessed by real ously treated the questions of what is intellection and what
truth and dragged along by it to subsequent intellections. is its primary mode. Now it is necessary to delineate these
How? That is the problem of the subsequent modes of two formal and modal moments of intellection with
intellection; it will be the theme of the other two parts of greater precision. That will be the theme of the following
the book. But before going on to them it is fitting to con- chapter.
88 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

{243}

APPENDIX 8

SOME CONSIDERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO

THE DIMENSIONS OF REAL TRUTH

Once again I prefer to group in an appendix those Germanic languages all express the idea of
concepts which go beyond the limits of pure analysis of truth based on the root *uero, whose original
the apprehension of reality. Here I would like to do two meaning is difficult to pin down; it is found
things: (1) by way of illustration, to share certain linguis- as the second term in a Latin compound se-
tic facts which are very well known; (2) to point out the verus (se[d]-verus), “strict”, “serious”, which
possible dimensions of real truth in subsequent intellec- would lead one to suppose that *uero must
tion. mean to happily trust in; whence heorte, fes-
I. As is well known, the Greeks called truth a- tival. Truth is the property of something
letheia, discovery, patentization or revealing. But this is which merits confidence, security. The same
not the only term by which truth is designated in our semantic process appears in Semitic lan-
modern languages. I here reproduce a page which I wrote guages. In Hebrew, ’aman, “to be trustwor-
and published on this subject in 1944: thy”; in Hiph., “to trust in,” which gave
’emunah, “fidelity”, “steadfastness”; ’amen,
For the sake of accuracy, it is important to “truly, thus it is”; ’emeth, “fidelity, truth”; in
point out that the primary meaning of the Akhadian, ammatu, “firm foundation”; per-
word aletheia is not “discovery,” or “reveal- haps emtu [Amarna], “truth”. On the other
ing”. Although the word contains the root hand, Greek and Indoiranian start from the
*la-dh, “to be hidden,” with the -dh- suffix of root *es-, “to be”. Thus Vedic satya-, Awadhi
state (Latin lateo form *la-t [Benveniste]; ai, haithya-, “that which truly, really is.” The
rahu-, the demon who eclipses the sun and Greek derives from the same root the adjec-
the moon; perhaps the Greek alastos, he who tive etos, eteos, from *s-e-to, “that which is
does not forget his feelings, his resentments, in reality”; eta=alethe [Hesych.]. Truth is the
the violent one, etc.), the word aletheia has property of being real. The same root gives
its origin in the adjective alethes, of which it rise to the verb etazo, “to verify”, and esto,
is the abstract form. In turn, alethes derives “substance”, ousia.
from lethos, lathos, which means “forgetful-
From the linguistic viewpoint, then, there are
ness” (the only passage is Theocritus 23, 24).1
three inseparable dimensions articulated in
In its primary meaning, aletheia connotes,
the idea of truth, whose clarification should
then, something which is not forgotten;
be one of the central themes of philosophy:
something which has not fallen into “com-
reality (*es-), security (*uer), and revealing
plete” oblivion [Kretschmer, Debrunner].
(*la-dh-).
{244} The only revealing to which aletheia
alludes then is simply that of remembrance. The radical unity of these three dimensions is
Whence aletheia later came to mean simple just real truth. For this reason I have alled
revealing, the discovery of something, truth. upon these linguistic data {245} as an illus-
tration of a philosophical problem.”2
But the idea of truth itself has its primary ex-
pression in other words. Latin, Celtic, and II. Real truth, i.e., the ratification of reality in intel-
lection, then, has three modes: manifestation, firmness,
1
[oÜkžti g§r se, kñre, qžlw lupeŽn poc' Órëmenoj, ¦llª badˆzw
™nqa tÕ meu katžkrinaj, ÖpV lÕgoj Æmen ¦terpžwn xunØn toŽsin 2
Naturaleza, Historia, Dios, 1st ed., p. 29, 1944 [English edition, p. 14-
•rñsi tØ f§rmakon, ™nqa tØ l-qoj. Idyllia 23, lines 21-24—trans.] 15—trans.].
 REALITY AND SENTIENT INTELLECTION: REAL TRUTH 89

and steadiness. As I wrote in my book On Essence,3 every sible that, proceeding in this fashion, he may
real truth essentially and indissolubly possesses these let fall by the way great riches in things; but
three dimensions. None of them has any preferential rank this, however, is the price of reaching what is
or perogative over the other two. The three are congen- secure in them, their “what”. He pursues the
eric as structural moments of the primary intellective ac- firm as “the true”; {246} the rest, no matter
tualization of a real thing. Nonetheless, they are formally how rich it may be, is no more than the shade
different; so much so that their deployment in subsequent of reality and truth, the “verisimilar.” It is
intellection fundamentally modifies man’s attitude toward intellection as achievement of the reasonable.
the problem of the truth of the real. On other occasions, finally, he precisely re-
stricts the range and the figure or pattern of
Man, in a word, can move about intellectually
his intellectual movements amid reality. He
according to his preference amid the “unfa-
seeks the clear constatation [steadiness] of his
thomable” richness of the thing. He sees in
own reality, the aristate [finely edged] profile
its notes something like its richness in erup-
of what he effectively is. In principle, noth-
tion. He is in a state of insecurity with re-
ing remains excluded from this pretension;
spect to every and all things. He does not
however, even when it is necessary to carry
know whether he will reach any part, nor
out painful amputations, he accepts them; he
does the paucity of clarity and security which
prefers that everything in which he does not
he may encounter on his path disturb him
achieve the ideal of clarity should remain out-
overmuch. What interests him is to stir up
side the range of intellection. It is intellection
reality, to make manifest and to unearth its
as science, in the widest sense of that term.4
riches; to conceive them and to classify them
with precision. It is a perfectly defined kind Every subsequent true intellection has something of
of intellection: intellection as adventure. an adventure in reality, something of a certain firmness,
Other times, moving cautiously and, as it and something of a science (in the wide sense), because
were, in the twilight, as he must in order not manifestation, firmness, and steadiness are three dimen-
to stumble or to become disoriented in his sions constitutive of real truth, and hence cannot be re-
movements, man seeks in things securities on nounced. But the predominance of some of these qualities
which to base himself intellectually with over others in the development of intellection modifies the
firmness. [He seeks certainties, certainties intellectual attitude. Because of that predominance, they
about the things that are in reality.] It is pos- constitute three types of intellectual attitude.

4
On Essence, p. 131 [English edition., p. 152, with bracketed material
3
1962, p. 131 [English edition., p. 151—trans.]. added—trans.].
 {247}

CHAPTER VIII

THE PRIMARY MODE OF INTELLECTION:

PRIMORDIAL APPREHENSION OF REALITY

If now we collect the threads of our exposition, we that intellective knowing is something more than sensing.
will readily discover that they are tied together at three Intellective knowing would be something like under-
points which it behoves us clearly to spell out. In the first standing what that which is intellectively known is. And
place, we should emphasize that what we have analyzed is this capacity to understand would be in turn a type of
strict and rigorous intellection. The second is that there mental effort; there are some people who have more of it
are different modes of intellection. But these different than others, and we tend to think that this means they
modes are not only different, but—and this is the third have a greater capacity to understand things. To be sure,
point—they are modalizations of a primary and radical there is much truth in this. But just as in other problems,
mode. This fact obliges us to say what that primary and there is more to the question of what intellective knowing
radical mode of intellection is. is than meets the eye. And I am not referring to the dif-
It is, then, necessary to pull our discussion together ference between conceptualizing intelligence and sentient
around three essential points: intelligence, but to what is usually thought of as intelli-
gence. Let us ask, then, what this is.
1. What is intellective knowing?
A) Let us pause for a moment and consider what we
2. What is the modalization of intellective
term ‘understanding’. Certainly hearing a sound is not
knowing?
the same as understanding it. For the first, it suffices not
3. What is the primary and radical mode of in- to be deaf; the second on the other hand requires a science
tellective knowing? called ‘acoustics’. But this leaves the question unan-
All of this has already been discussed in the forego- swered. What is it that the understanding understands?
ing chapters; but I now emphasize it for the following How and why the sound is really as it is. When the sound
reason. When one speaks of sentient intelligence, it is has been understood, what we have before our mind is the
easy to leave the reader with the idea that sensing is defi- real sound itself unfolded, so to speak, in all of its struc-
nitely a moment of intellection, but to let him forget that tures. And thus it is clear {249} that if, upon hearing a
this sensing is in itself intellective, that intellection is sound, we had before our mind all of these structures,
sensing, and therefore that when we have conceptualized there would be neither the possibility nor the necessity of
sentient intellection, we have already conceptualized in- what we call ‘understanding’. Nonetheless, no one will
tellective knowing itself. deny that we have intellectively known the sound; rather,
it is just the opposite. Hence, this having the real before
our mind is that in which intellective knowing consists.
{248} §1 And this shows us the following:
a) That understanding consists in filling a gap in our
WHAT IS INTELLECTIVE KNOWING? apprehension of reality (in our example, the reality of
sound).
When we speak of intellective knowing and intelli- b) That the essence of understanding is in intellec-
gence we do not only think about whether sensing is a tive knowing, and not the other way around, as if the es-
distinct moment of intellection; rather, we ordinarily think sence of intellective knowing were understanding.

91
92 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

To know something intellectively consists in having ity. Intellective knowing is being here-and-now apprehen-
its reality before our intelligence. The effort of intellective sively in reality, in what things are de suyo.
knowing does not primarily consist in the effort to under- This installation has a dual character. Upon intel-
stand, but in the effort to apprehend reality. A great intel- lectively knowing a real thing, we remain installed in it.
ligence is a great capacity to have the real unfolded before But this installation is, in one aspect, ultimately very
it, a great capacity to apprehend the real. To intellectively fleeting; {251} another real thing may immediately su-
know something is to apprehend its reality; intellection is pervene, and upon intellectively knowing this new thing
apprehension of reality. I indicated in chapter IV that we are in it. According to this first characteristic, instal-
apprehension of reality is the elemental act of intellection. lation is being here-and-now installed in a real thing. But
That does not mean that it is some sort of rudimentary act, this does not completely exhaust the nature of installation,
but rather is the basic formal structure of every intellec- because as we have seen, the impression of reality in
tion as such. Intellective knowing is always and only ap- which we intellectively know each real thing is identically
prehending reality. Understanding is only a special act of and numerically the same in all apprehensions. Reality
intellection, i.e., one act among others of apprehension of reifies whatever comes to the real. The content of each
reality. The rest of the special acts of intelligence are to real thing remains thus inscribed, so to speak, in the same
apprehend reality more and better; i.e., to know intellec- impression of reality given to us by the previous real
tively better. thing. That is to say, as we saw in chapter IV, the impres-
B) Intellective knowing, I said, is apprehending the sion of reality is transcendentally open. And this means
real as real. And for this reason the word ‘real’ (and that when we intellectively know a real thing, that in
hence the word ‘reality’) has a double function in this which we are installed is not only this real thing, but also
sentence. On one hand, {250} ‘reality’ designates the pure and simple reality. A real thing thus has two func-
proper formal object of intellective knowing. An animal tions: that of being something real, and that of being pure
does not apprehend reality because the proper formal ob- and simple reality. There is an essential linkage between
ject of his apprehensions is not reality but stimulation. But these two moments. This linkage does not consist in be-
on the other hand, ‘reality’ also designates the structural ing a juxtaposition or an adding together of the real thing
nature of the act of intellective knowing, viz. that type of and reality, because pure and simple reality is not a type of
turning of the apprehension to the real. That is to say, sea in which real things float around. No, reality is
reality is not only the formal object of intellection; intel- nothing outside of real things. Nonetheless, it is not
lection itself consists formally in being apprehension of something identical to all of them nor to their sum.
the real as real. Rather, it is just the moment of transcendentality of each
C) Whence the unity between intelligence and reality real thing. This is the linkage between the two moments
is not a “relation” but merely “respectivity”; it is “being of the real thing and reality: transcendentality. In virtue
here-and-now” apprehensively in reality. This apprehen- of it, we are in pure and simple reality by being here-and-
sive being is described through its three moments: now, and only by being here-and-now, in each real thing.
When we apprehend a real thing, its force of imposition is
a) We are actually, in reality, sensing what is sensed as we saw a ratification. Now, this ratification, this force
as de suyo, i.e., we are actually in reality sentiently. of imposition, is not only the force with which this real
Hence, to say that I am actually sensing something real is thing is imposed upon us, but also the force with which, in
to express that I am intellectively knowing, that I am it, pure and simple reality is transcendentally imposed
here-and-now apprehensively in reality. From this point of upon us. Ultimately, {252} to know intellectively is, I
view, reality could better be termed sentible than sensible. repeat, constitutively and formally to be here-and-now
b) This “being here-and-now” has a very precise apprehending pure and simple reality, i.e. what things are
character. It is to be here-and-now merely actualizing de suyo as such. Therefore this installation in pure and
what is apprehended, in which we are here-and-now. “To simple reality is physical and real, because the transcen-
be here-and-now” is here mere actualization. dentality of the impression of reality is physical and real.
c) In this actualization we are here-and-now in- When we sentiently apprehend a thing as real, we are ac-
stalled in reality. Reality is not something to which one tually with the real thing, but we are with that thing in
must go, but primarily something in which one already is reality.
here-and-now, and in which, as we shall see, we never Thus, reality is not something which needs to be jus-
cease to be here-and-now. When we sentiently apprehend tified for the intelligence; rather, it is something which is
a real thing we are already intellectively installed in real- not only immediately apprehended, but also—and above
 PRIMORDIAL APPREHENSION OF REALITY 93

all—constitutively apprehended. We are thus not dealing in and through themselves, but they are also given respec-
with conceptual constructions and chains of reasoning, but tively to other real things by the transcendental openness
merely with an analysis of any act of intellection whatso- in which the formality of reality consists. Now, the intel-
ever. lection of one real thing respective to others constitutes
The intrinsic and formal unity of the three moments the intellection of what that real thing is “in reality”.
(sensing the real, mere actualization, and installation) is What is apprehended in and by itself is always real; but
what constitutes sentient intelligence. Sentible reality is how it is apprehended with respect to other real things
apprehended in sentient intelligence, and its apprehension determines the question of what that real thing is “in real-
is just an actualization which apprehensively installs us in ity”. To apprehend what something is in reality already
reality. We are installed in reality by sensing, and for this implies the apprehension that this something is real, and
reason to sense the real is to be here-and-now intellec- that its reality is determined with respect to other realities.
tively knowing. If it were not for this respectivity, the apprehension of the
real would not give rise to the question of what a real
But this apprehension of the real is modalized, be- thing is in reality because we would already have an ex-
cause the impression of reality is transcendentally open. haustive apprehension of the real thing qua real. This
Whence apprehension itself is trancendentally modalized. “qua real” is just its respectivity to every other reality; but
This is the second point that we must examine. then it is this respectivity which, in a single act of appre-
hension of the real, will actualize reality for us in and by
itself, as well as what the thing is in reality. But this does
not prevent the two dimensions “reality” and “in reality”
{253} §2
from being formally different. Let us not forget, indeed,
that we are not dealing with two actualizations but with
WHAT IS MODALIZATION?
two modes of the same actualization. Including them in a
single act does not imply abolishing their essential differ-
To know intellectively, I said, is just to actualize the ence.
real as real. But there are different modes of actualiza- Now, the respectivity to other real things is not
tion. I am not referring to the different modes in which something univocal, because the openness of the formality
the senses present to us what is apprehended “of its own”. of reality has, as we saw, different lines so to speak.
Here by ‘mode’ I understand not these different modes of Hence, real things are actually transcendentally open in
sensing the real, but the different modes of actualization different formal respects. In each of them we intellec-
in sentient intellection qua intellection, determined by the tively know what the thing is in reality. They are different
different modes of reality itself. modes of intellection. And since there are two respects,
Every intellection is, I repeat, just actualization of {255} it follows that there are two different modes of in-
the real; but the real is respective. Now, each real thing is tellection of what something is in reality. We shall see
not only respective to intellective knowing, but as real is this in great detail in the two following parts of the book.
de suyo something respective to other real things. Reality, These two modes are not only different, but in their
in fact, is a transcendentally “open” formality. The real diversity intrinsically and formally involve a basic struc-
has, then, different real respectivities. And all of them are ture with respect to which each mode is not just a diversity
anchored in the structure of each real thing. Thus when a but a modalization. What is this basic structure? To see
real thing is actualized in intellection, it can be actualized it, it suffices to attend to what I just said. Intellectively
in its different formal respects. And because of this the knowing what a thing is in reality is another mode of in-
intellective actualization itself can be affected by the di- tellectively knowing what is already so known in and by
versity of formal respects of each thing. The diversity of itself as reality. This is, then, the basic formal structure,
the actualization of the real according to its different for- the apprehension of something “as reality”. The “in real-
mal respects constitutes what I here call modes of intel- ity” is a modalization of the “as reality”.
lection. Permit me to explain. The foundation of this modalization is clear. The
For the effects of our problem, let us recall that real- real is sensed in an impression of reality, and this impres-
ity is transcendentally open formality. This openness is sion is the unity of all of the modes by which the real is
primordially the openness of each real thing to its own present to us in what is sensed. One of these modes is
content; but it is also and at one and the same time open- reality in the sense of “toward”. Now, the real which is
ness {254} to the reality of other things. Things are real transcendentally open in the “toward” is what inexorably
94 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

determines the modes of intellection. A real thing as tran- hension of reality in and by itself. This intellection, as we
scendentally open toward another thing is just what de- saw in chapter III, is in a radical sense an apprehension of
termines the intellection of what that former thing is in the real which has its own characteristics. It is fitting to
reality. The “toward” in itself is only a mode of reality's repeat this in order to focus better upon our present ques-
being here-and-now present. But when the “toward” is tion. Intellection is formally direct apprehension of the
considered as a transcendentally open moment, then it real—not via representations or images. It is an immedi-
determines the intellection of what the real thing is in ate apprehension of the real, not grounded on inferences,
reality. reasoning processes, or anything of that nature. It is a
But this reveals to us that that basic structure of in- unitary apprehension. The unity of these three moments
tellection, of the mere actualization of the reality of is what makes what is apprehended to be apprehended in
something, has a precise character; because in order to be and by itself. And we have also observed that this unity
able to talk about what something is “in reality”, the thing does not mean that what is apprehended in and by itself is
must be already apprehended “as real” in and by itself. something simple. Just the opposite: apprehension can
{256} And this means that the apprehension of the real have and indeed always has—except in a few cases—a
thing as something, prior to its subsequent modalization, great variety of notes. For example, when we apprehend a
constitutes at one and the same time a proper and primary landscape, what is apprehended has an immense variety of
mode of intellection. This is just what I call the primor- notes. If I apprehend them unitarily and not as notes and
dial apprehension of reality. The intellection of what things related to each other, then the landscape, despite its
something is “in reality” is, then, a modalization of the enormous variety of notes, is apprehended in and by itself,
intellection of what this something is “as reality”. With i.e., unitarily. Moreover, what is apprehended not only can
respect to this primordial apprehension, the other modes have a great variety of notes, but these notes can also be
of intellection are not primordial but ulterior or subse- variable. And this is essential, as we shall see. The land-
quent. `Ulterior' comes from a very old Latin word uls scape, in fact, may have flowing water, or undergo
which means trans. It only survives in the positive form changes in lighting, etc. Though varied and variable in
ultra, the comparative form ulterior, and the superlative its notes, if the content is apprehended directly, immedi-
form ultimus. So we are not dealing, then, with “another” ately, and unitarily, {258} it is apprehended in and by
intellection but with a different mode of the same intellec- itself. To be the apprehension of something in and by
tion. This is the first intellection itself, but “ulteriorized” itself is not, then, the same as having simplicity of notes.
so to speak. I will shortly explain this more rigorously. And as we shall see below, this observation is essential.

The primordial apprehension of reality coincides Every intellection is mounted in one or another way
with the mere intellection of a real thing in and by itself, on this intellection of the real in and by itself. Nonethe-
and therefore, with the impression of reality. It is for this less, that intellection is modalized. This means that the
reason that I have indiscriminately used the expressions intellection of the real in and by itself, besides being what
for the impression of reality, “intellection of the real in is “formally” intellective, has its own “modal” character, a
and by itself”, and “primordial apprehension of reality”. primordial modality; the apprehension of something in
But now it is fitting to distinguish them. In this primary and by itself is, modally, the primordial apprehension of
intellection there is the “formal” aspect of being an intel- reality. What does this mean?
lection, viz. the mere impressive actualization of the real As I just said, every intellection is based on appre-
in and by itself. And there is the “modal” aspect of pri- hension of the real in and by itself. But I can have this
mordiality. Now, that about which we are now asking apprehension in two ways. I can take it as the basis of
ourselves is intellection qua primordial mode of appre- other intellections, e.g., as the basis for judging what is
hension of the real. This is the third point. apprehended. But I can have the apprehension of some-
thing in and by itself “only” as something in and by itself.
Then this moment of the “only” constitutes the modal
character of the apprehension; the intellection of some-
{257} §3
thing “only” as real in and by itself is modalized by the
“only” in the primordial apprehension of reality. This is
THE PRIMORDIAL APPREHENSION OF
the primary mode of intellection.
REALITY
Nor is this a subtle point. It might seem so if I con-
sider that what is apprehended is a system of notes. But if
By virtue of its formal nature, intellection is appre- I consider the apprehension of a real note, just in and by
 PRIMORDIAL APPREHENSION OF REALITY 95

itself, then it is clear that the concept of primordial appre- a proper intellective mode, that mode by which I concen-
hension has a great simplicity both in the first and second trate “only” on that which I apprehend in and by itself.
cases. Let us take, for example, the color green. Appre- Strictly speaking, it is not an act of attention but an atten-
hending it in and by itself would signify that there is an tive intellection. As concentration, attention has two
apprehension of this color as the unique real terminus of moments. One is the moment in which I center myself on
apprehension. This would be what has {259} usually what is apprehended; this is the moment of centering.
been called the sensation of green. Experimental psychol- The other is the moment which I shall call the moment of
ogy debated this problem of sensation: Does pure sensa- precision; it is the moment in which what is not appre-
tion really exist in this sense? The experimental discus- hended as center remains on the periphery of the appre-
sions have been numerous, but they do not affect our hension. This does not mean that it is not apprehended,
problem, because the fact that something is real in and by but that what is apprehended outside of the center is not
itself does not mean that it is separated from everything the subject of attentive concentration. Thus it is not exci-
else. If I perceive a tree with all of its notes, I may direct sion but simple marginalization. Nor are we referring to
my attention to but a single one of them, e.g., the color mere abstraction, because what is not centered is none-
green. This note is given in the system with the others, theless actually apprehended, but in a special form, viz. it
but I can fix my attention on it alone. Then that note is is co-apprehended, it is apprehended but “imprecisely”.
apprehended in a primordial apprehension of reality even ‘Imprecision’ does not mean here that it is apprehended
though it may not be in itself an elemental sensation, i.e. a incorrectly, confusedly, or anything of that nature. Rather,
terminus separated from everything else. The problem of im-precision regains its etymological sense of not having
the primordial apprehension of reality is not a problem of to do with precisely what I am here-and-now doing, with
the psychology of sensation. The problem of the appre- what I am now {261} intellectively knowing.
hension of a note just in and by itself is thus not identified
And similarly, ‘precise’ does not mean the correctly
with the classic problem of that note's sensation. In sen-
and distinctly apprehended, but to be something which I
sation one tries to isolate a note perceptively. In the pri-
am singling out without singling out everything else. The
mordial apprehension of reality there is no dividing up of
“precise” in the ordinary sense of the word, viz. what is
anything; rather one perceptively fixes upon a single note
distinct, clear, etc., is always something grounded on the
even though it may be part of a system.
“precise” as that which I am singling out. Only because I
Hence—independently of this question—a system as look in a precise sense at something, and not at something
complex as a landscape, if apprehended only in and by else, only for this reason can I see or not see with preci-
itself, is as a primordial apprehension of reality some- sion what this something is. Now, what is not the center
thing as simple as the apprehension of a single note. Mo- of attention is imprecisely relegated to the margin or pe-
dality is essential to the intellection; and as modality, pri- riphery. And it is then that what is the center of attention
mordial apprehension encompasses everything from the is apprehended in and by itself, and only in and by itself,
apprehension of a single note to the apprehension of a i.e., it is precisely here-and-now or is precisely appre-
system as enormously complicated as a landscape. hended.
And now two questions inevitable arise: What is the The intellection of something in this way is what I
constitutive act of the primordial apprehension of {260} call “primordial apprehension of reality”. The primordial
reality? And, What is the proper intellective nature of apprehension of reality is not what formally constitutes
what is apprehended in this act? intellection, but is the primary modality of the intellection
In the first place, let us consider the constitutive act of the real in and by itself. This modality consists in what
of the primordial apprehension of reality. I speak of “con- is apprehended being so precisely in attentive intellection.
stitutive act” in a loose sense, because it is not an act but a In the second place, what in the positive sense is the
mode of the act of intellection. This mode, as I have al- nature of the actuality of what is intellectively known in
ready said, is fixation or concentration; I concentrate on this mode? Actuality is above all something which con-
one or several notes, or even the whole system considered cerns the real itself; it is its proper actuality. But, as we
unitarily. Now, this concentration qua intellective modal have already said, the real has different formal respectivi-
act, or rather as primary modality of the intellective act, is ties. And the different modes of actualization depend
attention. Attention is not just one psychological phe- upon the different modes of the actuality of the real. The
nomenon among others; it is a modal moment of intellec- modes of intellection correspond to these modes of actual-
tion, because attention is not “simple” concentration. It is ity of the real in respectivity. The modes of intellection
96 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

are essentially and formally grounded on the different thing. Both of these cases are equally degrees in the mo-
modes of actuality of the real; it is these modes which dal line of attentive intellection. There is finally a very
determine those intellections. The modes of intellectively important mode, “absorption”. {263} We are and remain-
knowing what a thing is in reality correspond to these situated in a real thing as if there were nothing but this
modes of actuality. {262} Now, a mode of actualization in thing. The intellection is then as if completely emptied
the attentive intellection pertains to the intellection of into what is apprehended, so much so that it does not even
something real in and by itself, but “only” as real in and recognize that it is intellectively knowing.
by itself. This mode of intellectively knowing depends Indifference, fixation, and absorption are three rig-
upon the mode of actuality of the real, upon the “only” in orously and formally intellective qualities of the primor-
which we apprehend the real in and by itself. This mode dial apprehension of reality. They are not psychological
of actuality is formally “retention”; it is what the “only” states but modal qualities of intellection. For this reason
expresses in a positive sense. A real thing, in and by it- they do not constitute degrees of primordial apprehension;
self, only as real in and by itself, is something whose actu- they are only degrees of the exercise of the act of intellec-
ality rests “only” on the real thing in and by itself. And tion, but not degrees of its formal structure, in the same
this mode of actuality is just what I call retention of its way as vision, for example, has its own formal structure,
own reality. Actuality in the mode of “only” is an actual- always the same, independently of the fact that in the ex-
ity which retains its own reality and which, therefore, re- ercise of the faculty of vision there may be differences due
tains us in its apprehension. When we are actually appre- to better or worse vision.
hending something attentively we are retained by the real
in its proper actuality. Retention is the positive and pri-
mary mode of actuality. In the primordial apprehension of * * *
reality we are, then, attentively retained by the real in its
In summary, to know intellectively is to apprehend
proper reality; this is the complete essence of the primor-
something formally real; it is just impressive actuality of
dial apprehension of reality.
the real in and by itself. When we thus apprehend the real
This retention in which we are on the part of the real “only” as real in and by itself, then the intellective appre-
admits various degrees. Retention as a modal moment of hension has the modal character of attentive and retaining
the apprehension of reality is only a line of actuality of the intellection of the real. This is the essence of the primor-
real. In this line different degrees can fit. The attentive dial apprehension of reality; it is the primary mode of in-
intellection can make us concentrate at times on the real tellection. The other modes are modalizations of this
in a mode which is more or less “indifferent”; reality is primary mode, subsequent modalizations of it. Its more
intellectively known only in and by itself, step by step. At rigorous albeit simply programmatic conceptualization is
other times the attention more or less stays fixed upon a the theme of the next chapter. {264}
 {265}

CHAPTER IX

THE ULTERIOR MODES OF INTELLECTION

It is most important to explain the relationship be- essentially and inescapably involves a great determination
tween the modes of intellection and the primordial appre- of content. But despite this there is a certain insufficiency
hension of reality. And when this is done, we must pose in that primordial apprehension. This insufficiency af-
two questions. First, the radical question: what are the fects the content of the apprehension, specifically, the
ulterior1 modes of actualization of the real? Second, in notes of the content. In ulterior modes of intellection, the
broad outline what are the ulterior modes of ulterior in- content becomes immensely richer; but it is a content
tellection qua intellection? which is intellective only by virtue of being inscribed
Thus we shall examine the following: within the moment of formality of reality of the primor-
dial apprehension. It is not the content which constitutes
the formal essence of intellection. To know intellectively
1. What ulteriority is. is formally to apprehend reality, and to apprehend it just
in its actuality of reality with all of its content. And in
2. The modes of ulterior actualization. this respect the primordial apprehension of reality is not
3. The modes of ulterior intellection. only much richer than the intellection of the ulterior
modes, but is intellection par excellence, since {267} it is
therein that we have actualized the real in its reality in
and by itself. It is therein that all of the enrichments of
{266} §1
the intellection of what something is in reality have to be
inscribed. Hence, despite its enormous volume and rich-
WHAT IS ULTERIORITY? ness, the intellection of the ulterior modes is unutterably
poor with respect to the way in which the primordial ap-
prehension apprehends reality. The intellection of the
Ulteriority consists very concretely in intellectively
most poor reality intellectively known in the primordial
knowing what that which has already been apprehended
apprehension is immensely richer as intellection than the
“as real” is “in reality”.
intellection of reality in its ulterior modes. It is only as
It might seem as though it is in these modes that in- referred to the primordial apprehension of reality that the
tellection par excellence consists, while the primordial ulterior modes are what they are, viz. intellections of the
apprehension of reality is something quite poor. But this real. It is because of this that these ulterior modes are just
is not true. Though necessary, of the greatest richness, succedaneous.
and of incalculable perspective, the ulterior modes of in-
tellection are but succedaneous. It is only because the On the other hand, precisely because the ulterior ac-
apprehension of something as real is insufficient that we tuality consists in respectivity it follows that its intellec-
have to intellectively know what that real thing is in real- tion has a fuller content than that of the primordial appre-
ity. To be sure, the primordial apprehension of reality hension. Of course, there is no more reality; but the real-
ity is actualized more richly. If this were not so, the whole
system —for example of the sciences—would be constitu-
1
tively futile. Ulterior apprehension is the expansion of
[Readers should bear in mind that Zubiri employs the word ‘ulterior’ as a
technical term, with its primary meaning that listed as first in the Oxford
what is already apprehended as real in the primordial ap-
English Dictionary, “lying beyond that which is immediate or present, prehension. And thus it is clear that what something is
coming at a subsequent point or stage”—trans.]

97
98 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

“in reality” is an enrichment of what it is “as reality”. hended. This is the openness of the “its-ownness” of each
The unity of these moments is ulterior intellection. real thing, apprehended as real, to the “its-ownness” of
other things, also apprehended as real. It is the openness
of each thing apprehended with respect to apprehended
{268} §2 “its-ownness” of other things. When a real thing is actu-
alized respectively to other real things in the direction of
THE ULTERIOR MODES OF ACTUALIZATION openness, we say that the thing is found in a field of real-
ity. To intellectively know what a real thing is in reality is
now to intellectively know it as a moment of the field of
We have already seen that intellection formally con- reality, as being respective to other things of the field.
sists just in the impressive actuality of the real as real. To
But the formality of reality is respectively open in
reach this idea we have analyzed the intellection of a real
another direction as well. By being pure and simple real-
thing in and by itself, and only in and by itself. But in
ity, it is transcendentally open to being a moment of real-
general the impressive apprehension of the real appre-
ity itself. It is, then, open to what we have called the
hends the real in and by itself, to be sure, yet not “only” in
world. Thus to intellectively know what a real thing is in
and by itself, because several things are given in that ap-
reality is to intellectively know it as a moment of the
prehension at the same time; and each of them can be a
world.
terminus of intellection. There are several reasons for
this. The first has to do with the nature of the attentive These are two different modes of intellection because
intellection. One’s attention can be directed more to some we intellectively know different modes of ulterior actuali-
aspects than to others; thus what is perceived is so to zation of the real. {270} To intellectively know what a
speak fragmented into distinct things. What was unitarily color, which we see, is in reality is to intellectively know
“a landscape” in and by itself becomes a tree, a brook, a what it is in the field-sense with respect to other notes,
house, etc. Or it can be the case that one has an apprehen- e.g. sound. But to intellectively know what that color is in
sion of things which are distinct not through fragmenta- reality as a moment of the world is something different; it
tion but because they are independent of each other. In is to intellectively know it, for example, as a light wave or
every case, the intellective apprehension is profoundly a photon.
modified because we are not referring to the fact that these
Respectivity in a field and worldly respectivity are
various things, each in and by itself, might be the termi-
not, to be sure, two respectivities; but they are two differ-
nus of a particular apprehension. If that were the case, we
ent dimensions of the respectivity of the real as such. We
would have a multiplicity of apprehensions. We are not
shall dwell a bit on these points.
now referring to that but to the fact that there is a single
apprehension whose terminus is formally multiple: I have The field of reality is not an order of things which is
different and distinct things within the same apprehen- extrinsic to their reality. On the contrary, it is an intrinsic
sion. moment of each thing, a field-sense moment of it. Even if
Thus things are apprehended distinctly, but not by there were but a single real thing, this thing would still be
virtue of being undivided. It thus happens that {269} in a field, i.e., of field-nature. As we know, each real
apprehension itself as act has its own formal unity, differ- thing has a moment of content and one of formality. It is
ent from the unity of each of the various apprehended only by the second moment that things constitute a field of
things. So we can say that things apprehended as multi- real things. Since things themselves in our impression of
ple in this case nonetheless constitute a particular unity. reality give us their moment of reality, it follows that the
A thing is real in and by itself; but reality is formally and field of reality is determined by real things themselves and
constitutively respective. Whence it follows that the real not just by the unity of my act of perception. This reality
is not just real but is diversely respective reality. The ac- is in fact formally and constitutively open, as we saw.
tualization of the real is intrinsically and formally modal- And only because each thing is intrinsically and formally
ized qua actualization. open to a field, only because of this can many things be in
a field. In virtue of it, there is a rigorously cyclic respec-
The foundation of this modalization is clear, as we tivity between a real thing and the field of reality. Each
have seen; it is the “towards” as transcendental openness. real thing grounds the field, but the field reworks, so to
This openness has different directions, so to speak. speak, the real things which have determined it. This is
Above all there is the openness of the thing appre- also what happens in physical nature. The charges on
hended as real to other real things which are also appre- bodies generate the electromagnetic field, just as masses
 ULTERIOR MODES OF INTELLECTION 99

generate the {271} gravitational field; but these fields reality which is in a field and in the world. These two
affect the charges and masses of the bodies, so that the latter moments are, then, two dimensions of transcenden-
field itself acquires a certain autonomy with respect to the tality. But they are not independent. Each thing is purely
bodies. For a trivial analogy, we might say that a real and simply real, i.e. worldly, because “its-ownness” is
thing is a source of light which spreads light everywhere, what constitutes it as real. And because this respective
i.e. generates the field of clarity. And in this clarity, i.e., reality is above all in a field, it follows that worldly tran-
in this light, we not only see the other things but also the scendence affects the field itself. Conversely, a field is
source of light itself. Whence the field of clarity acquires nothing but the world qua sensed moment of “its-
a certain autonomy with respect to the sources of light. ownness”. And since this “its-ownness” is sensed in the
The field moment does not withdraw us from real things, manner of a field, it follows that the field is the world qua
but draws us more deeply into them because it is a con- sensed; it is the field which is constitutively open to the
stitutive moment of the formality of reality qua transcen- world. The world is the sensed transcendentality of the
dentally open. field.
As a concept, the field forms an essential part of sci- And this is not just some conceptual subtlety. The
entific knowledge. Given a certain quantity, if at each thrust of this distinction can be seen most clearly in hu-
point in space this quantity has a fixed value only by vir- man reality. For purposes of clarity, {273} when one
tue of its position, physicists say that this space constitutes speaks of realities, one always thinks of a real thing as
a field. Thus Einstein was able to say that a field is noth- something distinct from oneself. But this is essentially
ing but the physical state of space. Space as a kind of false; real things are not just the rest of the real things, but
empty recipient of every structure is a chimera; that which also include me as a reality. Now, my reality (i.e. every
we might call ‘empty space’ is purely and simply noth- human reality) has actualization in a field. This is what
ing—a splendid definition.2 In other sciences as well, for ultimately constitutes what we term the ‘personality’ of
example biology, one speaks at times of phyletic fields. each individual. Personality is a mode of actuality of my
own reality in the field of all other realities and of my own
The field of reality does not coincide with this
reality. And for this reason, personality is inexorably
physical field nor with the phyletic field, because both
subject to the inevitable vicissitudes of the field of reality.
space and the phyletic directions are but moments of real-
So on account of my personality I am never the same. My
ity, moments of the field of reality. Thus, for example,
own personal life is of a character defined by a field. But
every distance is a moment of the field of reality and not
what I am as reality is not exhausted in what I am in con-
the other way around. Whatever space may turn out to be,
tradistinction to all other things and my reality among
it must always be understood from the standpoint of the
them; rather, my reality in a field, my personality, also
field of reality, rather than the field being understood from
includes other things as moments of my personal life.
the standpoint of space. Every real thing {272} qua real
Thus, meaning-things, which are not pure and simple
is constitutively open, and this openness toward other
reality, are nonetheless constructed moments of each thing
things is above all transcendentally that of a field.
with my personal life. Every meaning-thing is a con-
But the real is not open only to the “its-ownness” of structed moment of the field-sense actuality in which my
each real thing; that which is really its own is, by the mere personality consists. But my reality also has a worldly
fact of being so, reality. In virtue of this, the real is a actuality. I am a person, i.e. I have personhood, and as
moment of pure and simple reality and, therefore, every- pure and simple reality, my reality is not personality; it is
thing real in its immense multiplicity has a certain proper something more elemental and radical, viz. personhood.
unity as worldly reality. This unity does not consist in the As a worldly moment, I am a person, i.e. personhood, and
unification of real things qua real, but is unity itself as an as a field-sense moment, I am personality. And thus we
intrinsic and constitutive moment of each real thing qua can see what is of a field-nature, i.e. the personality, is the
real. This unity of moments is what constitutes the world. personhood actualized in a field. Personality is the field-
Even if there were only a single real thing, it would be sense qualification of personhood. For this reason I am
formally worldly. always the same (personhood) although never the same
In summary, each thing is real in and by itself, and is thing (personality). {274}
Actuality in a field and worldly actuality are, then,
2
[Zubiri’s meaning here is obscure; even empty space is teeming with vir-
different modalities of the respective actualization of the
tual particles which pass in and out of existence in accordance with the real. And each of these actualizations determines a proper
Uncertainty Principle, ∆t ⋅ ∆E ≥ h —trans.] mode of intellection.
100 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

{275} §3 mos, but also to be an intellection grounded on other

logoi, i.e. syllogismos, what is usually termed ‘reasoning’.
THE ULTERIOR MODES OF INTELLECTION Logos is not only judgment; it can also be co-legere or
inference in a field. This inferring has been called ‘rea-
soning’. But the word is incorrect; it might seem to indi-
Intellection is always just the actualization of the real cate that reason consists formally in reasoning, in
in the sentient intelligence. This intellection is precisely mounting one logos upon one or more others. But this is
the primordial apprehension of the real in and by itself. doubly false, because in the first place reasoning does not
But the real as sensed is ulteriorly actualized as in a field by itself constitute an intellection of the real; indeed it
and as in the world. Thus it is that what is intellectively does not go beyond being a mode of the logos itself as
known as real can be ulteriorly known intellectively ac- mere intellection. And in the second place, reason, as I am
cording as it is “in reality”. This “in reality” has the two about to discuss, does not aim at the logos but at the real
dimensions of being in a field and being in the world. itself; and this is not a constituent of reasoning. {277}
To intellectively know what something real is in re- And here once again the greatest amplitude, the
ality is above all to intellectively know the already appre- greatest enrichment proper to ulterior intellection reap-
hended real as real, according as it is what it is in a field pears. The real in and by itself is reality apprehended in a
with respect to other things. This intellection is no longer primordial apprehension; and conversely, reality as real is
primordial. I intellectively know what a real thing is in not actualized as real except in primordial apprehension.
reality as “its-ownness”; I intellectively know what the But not everything excluded from this primordial appre-
real thing is in function of other realities. And this intel- hension is also excluded from its intellection in the logos.
lection is what constitutes the logos. Logos is the intel- Thus, what we call a table is not something actualized in
lection of what the real is in its reality in a field. So I the primordial apprehension of reality, because the real as
intellectively know a real thing from the standpoint of such is not the table as table, but as a “thing” with prop-
other real things; I intellectively know it therefore in the erties; and it is only a table in a constructed function with
field-sense. Hence the logos is an enrichment of the con- the reality of my life. I do not apprehend tables, but I
tent of the primordial apprehension; the enrichment have a logos of tables, and in general of every meaning-
which “proceeds from”, and is “grounded in” the other thing. This is the enrichment of the reality of my life as
things of the field “toward” which what the logos intel- constructed with the real. Logos does not amplify reality,
lectively knows is open in the field sense. The openness but constitutes an undeniable enrichment of its content.
of a field is the foundation of the logos and of the enrich- Logos, then, is a dynamic intellection in a field of
ment of the content of primordial apprehension. Here what something is in reality. But there is another mode of
‘logos’ means not only a proposition or a judgment, pri- intellection, the intellection of the real as a moment of the
marily because simple apprehension as judicatory appre- world. Now, the world is the transcendental part of the
hension pertains so essentially to it, {276} and the logos field, because the field is nothing but the world as sensed.
itself consists in its constitutive unity. Simple apprehen- Hence, intellection of the real as in the world is formally
sion is not just something to which a judgment is added; based on intellection of the real as in a field, i.e. on the
rather, it is nothing by itself and is what it is only in its logos. It is for this reason that the former intellection is
intrinsic unity with judgment. Conversely, no judgment not a simple mode of the logos, viz. it is an intellection of
can be a judgment if what is affirmed is not firmly part of the world. And this intellection is what formally and rig-
what is simply apprehended. This is the logos. What is orously constitutes what we call reason. It is not an ar-
the intrinsic nature of this unity? We shall see it subse- gument nor the result of arguments or other chains of rea-
quently: it is a dynamic unity. Why? Because every in- soning, but a progression from reality in a field to worldly
tellection is sentient. The ulterior intellection which the reality. This progression cannot be reduced to the logos.
logos is, is a modalization of sentient intellection. And To be sure, it is dynamic; but not every dynamism is a
this modalization is grounded upon the dynamism of the progression. The logos does not progress toward any-
logos. The logos is formally sentient logos, and for this thing, but is already in a field and moves in the real al-
reason, and only for this reason, it is a dynamic logos. ready {278} apprehended in the field. On the other hand,
But there is another reason not to confuse logos with the dynamism of reason consists in being here-and-now in
judgment. Logos does not always rest upon itself qua progress. It is not a dynamism within a field but a dyna-
judgment, but can rest upon other logoi. Thus it pertains mism which leads from the field to the world. Reason is
to the logos not just to be a judgmental intellection, logis- not argument but transcendental progress toward the
 ULTERIOR MODES OF INTELLECTION 101

world, toward pure and simple reality. Since the “toward” actualization in which the actuality of a thing is intellec-
is a sensed moment of the real, it follows that not only is tively known as actualized with respect to another reality.
the logos sentient, but reason itself is too; it is sentient
Since primordial apprehension is sentient and takes
reason. In virtue of this the expression “toward” reality
place in impression, ulterior intellection is impressive
can lead to a mistake, that of confounding “towards” other
ulteriority; hence logos is sentient and reason is sentient.
things with “towards” the world. Both reason and logos
Ulteriority is grounded in the very structure of the impres-
are grounded upon the “towards” of the transcendental
sion of reality. The intellection of a real thing as respec-
openness of the real as such. The “towards” is therefore a
tively open, as re-actualized, is what I call ‘intellectively
“towards” within the real. Thus we are not referring to a
knowing what the real is “in reality”.’ What is primordi-
dynamism or progression “toward” reality; on the con-
ally apprehended is always real; but if we ask what it is in
trary, we have a dynamism and a progress which is al-
reality, this “in reality” consists in an actual determination
ready within reality itself. Reason does not have to
of the real thing with respect to other real things. If this
“achieve” reality because it is born and progresses in it.
were not so, the apprehension of the real would not give
In other words, the field-nature moment and the rise to the question of what this real thing is in reality.
worldly moment are modes of actualization which are All that is possible only because intellection is sentient.
determined intrinsically and formally by the real itself. Hence, neither logos nor reason has to get to reality; on
And as every intellection is actualization of the real, it the contrary, reality is actualized in sentient intellection.
follows that the real known intellectively and respectively It is because of this, and only because of it, that logos and
to another real thing has two moments of actuality. The reason arise, and that both of these intellections take place
first is the moment of reality in and by itself; it is the pri- already within reality. It is, I repeat, why logos is sentient
mary and radical actuality, what rather vaguely and im- and reason likewise is sentient.
precisely I have called ‘the individual moment of reality’.
How this ulterior modalization occurs, and what the
But the real in respectivity does not have a new actuality;
structure of its link to primordial apprehension of reality
rather, what it acquires is the actuality of its own reality
is, will be the respective themes of the other two parts of
respectively to other things. So we are not dealing with
the book. They are the themes of the dynamic sentient
another actualization but a re-actualization of what the
logos, and the progress of the sentient reason.
real is in and by itself. The intellection of the real in this
aspect is, then, constitutively “re-actuality”. This “re” is But before embarking on that task, it will not be out
what {279} formally expresses the fact that we are dealing of place to return to the point of departure of this first part
with an ulterior intellection. Ulterior intellection is a re- in order to see better the unity of our analysis. {280}
 {281}

CHAPTER X

SENTIENT INTELLECTION AND HUMAN STRUCTURES

This study has been an analysis of intellection as ap- apprehension of reality, impression of reality, is formally
prehension of the real and of its primary mode, the pri- sentient intellection.
mordial apprehension of reality. To facilitate the task, I
have contrasted the analysis of intellective apprehension This sentient intellection constitutes the proper and
with apprehension which is just sensible, with pure sens- formal structure of intellective knowing. It is what we
ing. have studied throughout the course of this first part of the
book. By way of complement to it—and only as comple-
Sensible apprehension is what constitutes sensing.
ment—let us now direct our attention to the other aspect
And sensing is a process having three essential moments:
of intellection, viz. sentient intellection as a determinant
arousal, tonic modification, and response. Now, arousal
moment of the human process. I have already said some-
as a moment of sensing takes place in impression. An
thing about this subject in Chapter IV. It leads us to two
impression thus has two quite different aspects. One is
questions: the determination of the other two moments of
the aspect in which the impression is an arousing func-
tonic modification and response, and the moment of the
tion. But there is another aspect which is prior and more
unity of the process of sentient intellection qua process.
radical, viz. what the impression is in its own formal
structure. Arousal and impression must not be confused: A) Above all there is the determination of the other
arousal is a function of an impression, and is grounded on two specifically human structures. Intellection {283} de-
the latter's formal structure. Arousal is of a process char- termines the affects or tonic modifications. I speak of
acter; impression of a structural character. They are, thus, “affects” in order to distinguish them from the affections
two different problems. proper to every impression. The modification of the ani-
I began by studying the formal structure of impres- mal affects by the impression of reality is what constitutes
sion. An impression is an apprehensive act; hence {282} feeling or sentiment. Feeling is an affect of the real; it is
it is necessary to speak of impressive apprehension. not something merely “subjective”, as is usually claimed.
Sensing is apprehending impressively, and this apprehen- Every feeling presents reality qua tonically modifying as
sion is what formally constitutes sensing. An impression reality. Feeling is in itself a mode of turning toward real-
has three essential moments: affection of the sentient be- ity. In turn, response is a determination in reality; it is
ing, presentation of what is sensed, i.e., otherness (in its volition. When the sentient tendencies describe reality to
dual moment of content and formality), and the force with us as determinable, determining, and determined, then the
which the sensed is imposed upon the sentient being. response is will. Feeling is the sentient affect of the real;
This sensing has two different natures which depend upon volition is a determining tendency in the real. Thus, just
the formality of otherness. Otherness as stimulation is as intellection is formally sentient intellection, so also
what constitutes the pure sensing proper to animals. feeling is an affecting feeling and volition is a tending
Stimulation consists in that formality by which what is will. The essential part of sensing in its three moments of
sensed is formally just a sign of tonic modification and of arousal, tonic modification, and response is formally
response. But otherness can be of a different nature, if the structured in intellective apprehension, in feeling, and in
formality of what is sensed consists in what is sensed be- volition. Only because there is sentient apprehension of
ing something de suyo, something “of its own”; this is the the real, i.e., only because there is impression of reality, is
formality of reity or reality. Now, to apprehend reality is there feeling and volition. Intellection is thus the deter-
the formally proper role of intellection; hence, impressive minant of the specifically human structures.

103
104 INTELLIGENCE AND REALITY

To be sure, we are dealing with intellection in its When it determines these specifically human struc-
function of sentiently installing us in the real. We are not tures, intellection inexorably determines the proper char-
dealing with what is usually called intellectualism. Intel- acter of life in its unfolding. Human life is life in “real-
lectualism is not given other than in the conceptualizing ity”; hence, it is something determined by intellection
intelligence; it consists, in fact, in assigning to concepts {285} itself. If we employ the word ‘thinking’, not in a
the radical and primary function. But here we are not rigorous and strict sense (that we shall do in other parts of
talking about a concept being the determinant of the other the book), but in its everyday sense, we shall have to say
structures; that would be totally false. Here we are talking that it is intellection, the sentient apprehension of the real,
about sentient intelligence; and what this intelligence which determines the thinking character which life has.
makes {284} is not concepts but the apprehension of what It would be false to say that it is life which forces us to
is sensed as real. It is not, then, an intellectualism; it is, think; it is not life which forces us to think, but intellec-
rather, something different toto caelo, what I might call tion which forces us to live as thinking.
an intellectionism. We are dealing with intellection as
sentient apprehension of the real; and without this intel- But this processive function of intellection as life is
lection there would not be, nor could there be, feeling or something which does not intervene in any way whatso-
volition. ever in the structural nature or in the formal nature of
sentient intellection as such. The conceptualization of the
B) Now, the unity of arousal, tonic modification, and act of sentient intellection is the only thing which is in-
effective response is the intrinsic and formal unity of the volved in the response to the question “What is intellec-
structure of sensing as sensing. Sensing is not something tive knowing?”. I have explained this structure in the
which only concerns arousal; rather it is the intrinsic and previous chapters; and it is fitting to emphasize that what
indivisible unity of the three moments of arousal, tonic is expressed in them is not a theoretical construct, but a
modification, and effective response. This unity of sens- simple analysis—to be sure prolix and complicated—but
ing is primary and radical; hence, the formal structure of just a simple analysis of the act of sentient intellection,
sentient intellection, when it determines the openness of a i.e., of the impression of reality.
formality distinct from the merely sentient, does not break
the unity of arousal, tonic modification, and response of
animal sensing. Not only does it not break it, but indeed it * * *
enters into play precisely by the structure of hyperformali-
zation, which is a structural moment that is properly sen-
tient. Whence it follows that the unity of what is intellec- With this we have responded to the question of what
tively known as real is a unity which does not eliminate intellective knowing is; it is just impressive actuality of
sentient unity, nor is superimposed upon it (as has been the real, just actuality of the real in the sentient intelli-
said from the standpoint of the conceptualizing intelli- gence. The primary mode of this intellection is the pri-
gence throughout the course of philosophy), but is a unity mordial apprehension of reality. Now we come face to
which absorbs and formally contains the structure of ani- face with the problem of the ulterior modes of intellection;
mal sensing. Directed to reality, man is thus the animal of that will be the object of the following two parts of the
realities; his intellection is sentient, his feeling is affect- book. The second will treat of the sentient logos, and the
ing, his volition is tending. third of sentient reason.
 Part II

Intelligence and Logos

 {11}

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the first part of this book, we investigated intel- mality; this is what I have called actuality. Actuality is
lective knowing and its primary and radical mode. This is not presence, but a being actually in presence. It is
the problem which I propounded under the title Intelli- therefore a physical moment of what is apprehended.
gence and Reality. But intellection admits of two ulterior Now, this actuality, this being situated or being actu-
modes of intellection; these will be the subject of the sec- ally present can have two modes. Something can be actu-
ond and third parts of the book. ally present as a mere response sign; this is the actuality
In order to commence this study it will not be out of which I have called ‘arousal’. It is the formality of
place to set down some of the essential ideas expounded in arousal or stimulation. The characteristics of what is ap-
Part I; I hope that they will facilitate correct comprehen- prehended, for example its luminous intensity or its
sion of Part II. sound, are thus determining moments of a response. For
this reason what is apprehended has an actuality but only
Above all, intellective knowing is not an act of con- as forming part of the response in itself. This is what
sciousness, nor an act of realizing something, because to constitutes pure animal sensing.
realize what is intellectively known, it has to be present in
the intellection. And this act of capturing something and But there are apprehensions in which the character-
making it present is what we call apprehension. This is istics of what is sensed in an impression are characteris-
the radical act of intellective knowing, an act of apprehen- tics which are formally apprehended as pertaining to what
sion. is apprehended as its own: the intensity of a color or a
sound is a moment apprehended as a character of its own
What is this apprehension? Every intellection is an of the color or the sound. This is what I call formality of
act of apprehension, but not every act of apprehension is reality. Reality is the mode of being “of its own”, within
intellection. Sensing is also apprehension. These two the apprehension {13} itself. “Of its own” signifies that it
apprehensions can be directed to the same object, for ex- pertains to what is apprehended even before the apprehen-
ample a color, a rock, etc. Hence, in order to conceptualize sion itself (prius). As this mode of being situated in the
what intellective apprehension is, the {12} most direct apprehension is a mode of being situated in impression, it
road consists in studying the modes of apprehension of follows that the apprehension is an act of impression of
this terminus which is common to both of them. reality. In it, its content is actual in the impression, but
In the apprehension of this common terminus, for with no reference whatsoever to a response. This is what I
example color, the apprehension has its own radical char- call mere actuality: what is apprehended is present and is
acter: it is sentient apprehension. Sentient apprehension just present. Now, these three moments (impression, of its
consists in apprehension in impression. Impression is not own, and mere actuality) unitarily constitute what I call
just an affection of the apprehendor; rather, in this affec- being de suyo. This is the formality of reality: a mode of
tion the impression presents to us something other than otherness which consists in the de suyo. It does not refer
the apprehendor and his affection. This other thing has to reality in the sense of the real as something “outside” of
three constitutive moments: a content, a mode of being the impression, but to a formality present “in” the appre-
other (which I have called the ‘formality of otherness’), hension itself. And as such this formality is a physical
and a force of imposition. For our problem what is essen- moment of what is apprehended.
tial is found in the moment of formality. What is appre- This apprehension of something in the formality of
hended remains in the apprehension according to its for- reality is just sentient intellection, or if one wishes intel-

107
108 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

lective sensing. To apprehend the real as real is precisely Above all, there is the primary and radical mode,
the formal character of intellection. Being an impression what I have termed the primordial apprehension of real-
is the formal character of sensing. Hence the impression ity. This primordiality comprises two characteristics.
of reality is the only act constituted by two moments: im- First, what is apprehended is actualized directly, immedi-
pression (sensing) and reality (intellective knowing). This ately, and unitarily (despite its possible complexity of
apprehension is a sensing, but not a pure sensing as in the content, for example in the case of a landscape). This is
animal, but an intellective sensing, a sensing in which the apprehension of the real in and by itself. The reality
reality is sensed as reality. Man has this human sensing thus actualized has twin moments, individual and in a
which the animal lacks, but also has a sensing which is field; but they are apprehended indivisibly as moments of
purely on an animal level of stimulation in certain zones a real thing itself. This is what I term the compact appre-
of his reality. Animal sensing is certainly a sensing “of hension of reality. But primordial apprehension has a
man”, but is not a “human” sensing. In human sensing, second characteristic: it not only apprehends the real
the sensing is already a mode of intellective knowing, and compactly in and by itself, but moreover apprehends it
intellective knowing is already a mode of sensing reality. “only” in and by itself. The “only” is the modal charac-
Sensing and intellective knowing are thus not two acts, teristic of the primordial apprehension of reality.
either successive {14} or concurrent; nor are they partial But there are other modes which are ulterior modali-
acts. Rather, they are two structural moments of a single zations of this primordial apprehension. The real, in fact,
act. This unique structure is therefore sentient intelli- can be apprehended not only as something which has the
gence, a formal structural unity whose only act is just the characteristic of being in a field, but also as something
impressive actualization of the real. which, by opening up a field, is included in it. Thus the
Since it pertains of its own to what is apprehended, it real is not only apprehended as being in a field, but the
follows that this formality of reality has two aspects, one field itself is apprehended in the same way, i.e. by means
opening onto what is apprehended, the other onto the of the field which the real has determined. The moment
sentient intelligence. The first aspect submerges us in and of being in a field which in the primordial apprehension is
makes us penetrate into the real itself. The second, on the actualized compactly together with the individual mo-
other hand, leads us to submerge ourselves in the intellec- ment, is now autonomized so to speak with respect to the
tion itself. This is what is important to us here, although individual moment. The field is no longer just a compact
the two aspects neither are nor can be independent. moment of the real thing, but is the ambit of reality, an
ambit which encompasses many real things. Thus each
The formality of reality is open qua reality; a single real thing should be intellectively known therein not just
impression of reality encompasses the most diverse con- in and by itself but also with respect to the other {16}
tents. This openness is transcendentality; it is not a con- realities of the field. In this way we intellectively know
cept of maximal universality, but a physical commonness not just that the thing is real but moreover what the real
of reality and therefore a moment of communication. In thing is in reality. This “in reality” is an ulterior modali-
virtue of this openness, each thing is de suyo real only zation of the intellection of the thing as real.
with respect to others; i.e., every real thing opens onto a
field of reality. This does not refer to an extrinsic relation Now, the actualization of a thing (i.e. one already
among things but to the moment formally constitutive of intellectively known as real) within the ambit of reality of
the openness of each real thing as real. Each real thing other things is the intellection which we call logos. It is
has, then, two moments. One, the individual moment (so the intellection of what a real thing is in reality, i.e. with
to speak) of its own reality; the other, the moment of respect to other real things. This logos is a mode of sen-
opening up or onto a field, the moment of field nature. tient intellection. It is above all a mode of intellection by
They are two moments of a single reality; everything real being a mere actualization of the real in the sentient intel-
is individually and in this field-sense real, and is always ligence; this mode is a “re-actualization”. As such, the
apprehended in these two moments. logos is an intellective moment. But this real thing is
reactualized in a movement which bears it to others, and
Thus we have here what intellective knowing is, viz. in function of them; only thus is a real thing reactualized.
the mere actualization of the real in sentient intelligence. In accordance with this moment the logos is an impressive
This intellection has diverse modes, i.e. diverse movement; it is the sentient moment. In it is where what
manners of actualization in the sentient intelligence {15} the real thing is in reality is re-actualized. Hence it fol-
qua intellection, determined, as I said in Part I, by the lows that the logos is sentient intellection; it is a sentient
respectivity of reality itself, by the modes of actualization. logos. The sentient logos is intellection within a field; it
 INTRODUCTION 109

is a modalization of the impression of reality. To intellec- the real which necessarily determines us to understand
tively know what something is in reality is to restore the what something is in reality.
unity of the field nature moment and the individual mo- To be sure, the real is not respective only to other
ment of the real. things which are real within a field; it is at one and the
It is essential to observe that we are not dealing with same time respective to other real things qua real, i.e. qua
a process but with a structure. When one intellectively of the world. World is the respective unity of everything
knows what something is in reality after having intellec- real qua real. But I shall deal with the world and its re-
tively known it as real, this ‘after’ does not mean that spectivity to the field in Part III of the book. The second
what one does is to “set oneself” to the task of intellec- part is devoted to the sentient intelligence as logos: Intel-
tively knowing what that thing is in reality. The intelli- ligence and Logos.
gence does not “set itself” the task of understanding what
This study will be conducted in three sections:
something is in reality; rather that task is already thrust
upon it by reality itself, by the unity of its individual and Section 1. The intellection of things in the field of
field aspects. It is reality itself which, upon being appre- reality.
hended as real, determines its {17} intellection “in” the
Section 2. The formal structure of sentient logos I:
unity of the field-nature moment and the individual mo-
logos as movement, as dynamic structure.
ment. This is not an act which starts from me, but rather
is a mode of actualization which starts from reality itself Section 3. The formal structure of sentient logos II:
qua formally sensed reality. It is the sensed character of logos as mediated intellection. {18}
 {19}

SECTION I

INTELLECTION OF THINGS IN THE FIELD OF REALITY

In order to study the intellection of things in the field to see this thing as illuminating, as spreading its light
of reality, we must start from a conceptualization of that over everything else. In this comparison, the light is the
field. Every real thing has two moments in its formality field. And through its being determined by each thing,
of reality: the moment of individual reality and the mo- when I apprehend something in primordial apprehension,
ment of reality within a field. Hence, the field is a dimen- I do so not just in its moment of individual formality, but
sional moment of a real thing. This field-nature moment also in the moment of its formality within a field. This is
can be considered in different ways. The field is some- true both with respect to it being a note of the illuminator,
thing determined by each real thing, and this determina- as in its being an illuminating source of reality. The field
tion has two aspects. One, the most obvious, is that of is the compact unity of these two aspects.
being actually determined by the real thing itself; the
Granting this, if we apprehend things in the field of
other, that of being something which, determined by each
reality we can in turn apprehend them in two ways. One,
thing, is a field which encompasses all sensed real things.
as things which are included in the field; this is to intel-
According to the first aspect, reality is something open in
lectively know them as of field-nature. But we can also
itself, and according to the second aspect it is something
apprehend them as a function of the field in which they
which includes all things, it is the ambit of reality. Com-
are included; this is to intellectively know them in the
paring the field to light, we might say that a real thing is
field sense, i.e., from within the field. Apprehending a
above all a source of light, it is luminous, it is what bathes
thing in a field is proper to the primordial apprehension of
the field in light. But seeing that a thing is luminous is
reality. Apprehending it from within the field is proper to
not the same thing as seeing that all other things, and the
the logos.
illuminator itself, are illuminated by the light which ema-
nates from this real thing. The light from the illuminator Hence there are two steps in our problem:
insofar as it is such is a note determined by this luminous
thing. But if we consider the light as something which 1. The field of reality.
illuminates real things, then this light is no longer just a 2. The real as intellectively known from within the
note of each thing, but an ambit which encompasses eve- field.
rything {20} in the ambit of illumination, including the
source of light itself. It is indeed not the same thing to see They will be the themes of the next two chapters, re-
how the light shines forth from the luminous thing as it is spectively.

111
 {21}

CHAPTER II

THE FIELD OF REALITY

The field is first and foremost a moment of the for- these things insofar as all of them are actually in it, and
mality of each real thing. Therefore understanding the therefore the field encompasses them. Even when we
field is something proper to the primordial apprehension employ visual language, what is designated by that lan-
of reality. The field is not just something privative with guage is much broader than just the visual. Thus we are
respect to the logos; indeed, it is not a primary moment of treating the field as the ambit of reality.
the logos. It is a moment of the logos, but one which is
consequent, i.e., derived from immediate apprehension. It The field has a general structure which is very im-
is necessary to insist upon this point: everything we may portant. Above all there is in the field one or several
say about the field is already given in the primordial ap- things which are directly apprehended; they constitute the
prehension of reality of each real thing. Hence, this study first level of the field. And when this first level is reduced
should have been included in the first part of the book; but to a single thing, that thing then acquires the characteris-
nonetheless I have reserved it for the second part because tic of the center of the field. With respect to this first
it is here that the field discharges its most important func- level, other things constitute the domain of the rest. And
tion. the rest of the things have a precise relation to the first
level. In the first place, some of them constitute the back-
We shall study the field in three successive phases: ground against which the things of the first level are ap-
prehended. This dimension is what constitutes standing
1. General characteristics of the field of real things. out: the things {23} of the first level stand out against the
2. Strict concept of the field. background of the others. But in the second place there
are other things which are not part of the background, but
3. Internal structure of the field itself. simply something which is in the periphery of the field.
Thanks to this, the rest of the things of the field acquire a
dimension of proximity or distance. The periphery is not
{22} strictly speaking a line but a variable zone. As one ex-
tends the things of the periphery, they recede further and
§1 further until they are lost. For this reason the periphery is
the zone of the indefinite, both because it can remain in-
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIELD determinate in itself, and because even when it is deter-
OF REAL THINGS mined it can remain unnoticed by me. First level, back-
ground, and periphery are the triple dimension, so to
speak, of the field. To be sure, these structures are not
In general, language has only terms taken from vis- fixed. For example, I can vary the first level—which
ual apprehension to describe the field. And so, it might automatically changes the background and the periphery.
seem that the field is only a visual one. But this is a sim-
ple limitation of our language. Thus, recall that there are The field thus constituted is so, if I may be permitted
such things as background music, layers of footprints, etc., the expression, in a private way, because the totality of
and that there is a field of displacement as much of things this field in its three zones (first level, background, pe-
as of my own body. So taking the problem in all of its riphery) is surrounded at the same time by a line which
generality, we may say that the field is the unity of all positively determines what the field encompasses; this is

113
114 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

precisely its horizon. The horizon is not merely a line cir- §2

cumscribing it, but an intrinsic moment of the field itself.
To be sure, it does not pertain directly to the things appre- THE STRICT CONCEPT OF FIELD
hended; but it does pertain to them insofar as they are
encompassed in my apprehension of them. This circum-
Let us proceed step-by-step.
scribing has two aspects. One determines the things
which constitute the field as a totality, with its own char- 1) Above all, we are here posing a very fundamental
acter; every field has this kind of total character which we problem. The panoramic constitution of the field in its
call, in visual terminology, a panorama. The intrinsic two aspects of apprehensive synopsis and positional syn-
pertaining of the horizon to the field makes of the latter a taxis might lead one to think that the field is always
panorama. The mode of apprehension of this panorama is something extrinsic to things. But this, as we are going to
syn-opsis. The placement of things within the synoptic see, is not the case. The field is nothing beyond real
panorama {24} is syn-taxis. Synopsis and syntaxis are the things; I shall repeat that over and over. And even when
aspects of the panoramic unity of apprehension. describing the field I spoke of what is “beyond” the hori-
zon, this “beyond” pertains to the things of the field them-
But the horizon also has another aspect. An horizon selves. Without these things it would not make sense to
is what marks that which is outside the field. This is not speak of “beyond them”. The field, then, is something in
“other” things but the pure “outside”. It can be other the things themselves. We shall see this immediately.
things outside the field, or something which is outside of
The field of which we have been speaking can be de-
everything, viz. the “undefined”. It is necessary to stress
scribed first of all through its content, by the things that
that “indefinite” is not the same as “undefined”. The in-
are in it: rocks, trees, the sea, etc. But the field can and
definite is a mode of definition; the “undefined” is not
ought to be described according to its own unity. This
defined even in the sense of indefinite. This difference is
unity, from the viewpoint of the things it contains, con-
essential. The things outside of the field are the unde-
stitutes what can be called the perceptive field. But this
fined.
denomination is quite inappropriate as we shall see forth-
To be sure, as I have already indicated the structure with. Clearly, in this sense the field does not concern the
of the field is not fixed but variable. That dimension of it things themselves. That some of them may be near or far,
by which the field is variable is what we call amplitude. that some may be in the center or the periphery of my ap-
The amplitude is variable as much by amplification as by prehension, has nothing to do with the things themselves
retraction. And by this I do not just refer to the quantity of (at least formally). It is only my perceptive act which en-
things which the field encompasses, but to the mode of its compasses them in a single field. {26} The character of
unity as a field. This variation depends not only on me, the field is constituted in this case only by my perceptive
but also on things. Above all, new things modify the ho- act. The field is thus extrinsic to the things. To be sure,
rizon; this is the displacement of the horizon. Moreover, the things themselves are not completely detached from
every new thing which is introduced into the field, re- their position in the field; their size, for example, is not
moved from it, or moved inside of it, determines a change indifferent to their position in the field. But even so, these
in the first level, in the background, and in the periphery; things which the perceptive act encompasses in unity, are
this is a very profound reorganization of the field. Dis- things by reason of their specific content.
placement of the horizon and internal reorganization are Nonetheless, these same things can and ought to be
the two aspects of variability of the field. They are not described not only by their content but also by their for-
always independent of each other, but we cannot get into mality; they are things which are formally real in appre-
this question or other problems concerning the field be- hension. Therefore it is necessary to speak of a field of
cause it would take us away from the central question. Let reality. That which, as I said, we improperly call a ‘per-
what has been said suffice for now. ceptive field’ is nothing but the apprehended content of
the field of reality. Strictly speaking, one ought to speak
Next we shall try to conceptualize with some rigor
only of a field of real things. The field of reality, in con-
what this field is.
trast to what up to now we have called the perceptive
{25} field, is open in and by itself; in and by itself it is unlim-
ited. On the other hand, described from the point of view
of the content of things, the field is closed by the things
which constitute and limit it. The merely perceptive field
 THE FIELD OF REALITY 115

offers a panorama of things; the field of reality offers a more than a single thing, this thing would be de suyo of
panorama of realities. In fact, let us suppose that in this field nature. That is, every real thing, besides having
perceptive field there is a light which is turned off, and all what we might loosely call ‘individual respectivity’, for-
of a sudden it is turned on. From the point of view of the mally and constitutively has field-nature respectivity.
content, i.e., with respect to what we have called the per- Every real thing, then, has the two moments of individual
ceptive field, there is something new: a new light in the “thingness” and field-nature thingness. Only because
meadow or on the mountain. But from the point of view each real thing is intrinsically and formally of field-
of the field of reality there is a real thing which comes nature, only for this reason can the field be constituted by
from beyond the reality that was apprehended before. many things.
And it comes not only to the meadow or the mountain but
also to the reality of my field; it is something new in real- If we wish to express in a single word the nature of
ity. With it the horizon of reality has been pushed back, the field such as we have just described it, we can say that
although not so for the {27} horizon of the things seen. the field “exceeds” or “goes beyond” a real thing inas-
With the entrance of the light in the merely perceptive much as it is an opening toward others. The field-nature
field, this field has been additively enriched; viz., another moment is a moment of “excedence” of each real thing.
thing has been added to those that were there before. But And because this moment is at the same time constitutive
from the point of view of reality, there is not properly of the real thing, it follows that the field is both excedent
speaking an addition; rather, what has happened is that and constitutive; it is a “constitutive excedent”. So more
the character of the field of reality has encompassed, so to concretely, What is this field-nature moment of the real,
speak, a real thing which previously was not in it. i.e., what is this excedence, this going beyond?
Therefore, this amplification of the field of reality is 2. The field, we said, is “something more” than each
not properly speaking “addition” but rather “expansion”; real thing and therefore something more than their simple
what constitutes the formality of the new thing is numeri- sum. It is a proper unity of real things, a unity which ex-
cally the same character of reality which constituted the ceeds what each thing is individually, so to speak. Since
rest of the things of the field. The real as “thing” is now thing and field have, as we saw in Part I, a cyclic charac-
distinct; but this thing as “real”, i.e. its formality of real- ter, i.e., each thing is a “field-thing”, that excedence can
ity, is physically and respectively the same in number. be seen from two points of view: the field as determined
Whence it follows that what has happened is that the field from real things, and real things qua included in the field.
of reality has been expanded in order to encompass a new
thing. The amplification or contraction of the field of A) Viewed from real things, the field-nature exce-
reality, i.e. the changes of the field of real things percep- dence is a mode of what in Part I we called ‘trans-
tively apprehended as real is not additive but expansion- cendence’. Transcendentality is a moment of {29} the
ary. Thus, in contrast to the perceptive field (in the sense impression of reality, that moment in virtue of which re-
of a thing contained in the field), which is extrinsic to ality is open both to what each thing really is, to its “its-
things, the field of reality is intrinsic to them; it is given own-ness”, and to what each thing is qua moment of the
to me in the impression of reality. This reality is, as we world. It is, in a synthetic formula, “openness to the its-
saw, formally and constitutively open. And this openness own-ness of the world”. And because this openness is
concerns the impression of reality as such, and therefore constitutive of the impression of reality as such, it follows
all the modes of presentation of the real. Among them that the openness is what makes each real thing, by being
there is one, the mode of the “toward”. What is now im- real, to be more than what it is by being green, sonorous,
portant about this “toward” is that the other realities are in heavy, etc. Every real thing is in itself, qua real, some-
this case, as we have already said, other real things with thing which is itself and only itself; but by being real it is
respect to which each is what it is. Now, this respectivity more than what it is by its simple content. This is a tran-
is formally what constitutes the moment of each real thing scendental excedence, and it is proper to every real thing
in virtue of which each thing is in a field. This field is in and by itself. But when there are many real things in
thus determined by each real thing with {28} respect to the same impression of reality, then transcendentality is
itself, from which it follows that each real thing is intrin- what makes it possible for these things to comprise a su-
sically and formally of a field nature.* Even were there no pra-individual unity; this is the field-sense unity. “Field”
is not formally transcendentality, but a field is a sentient
mode (though not the only one) of transcendentality. The
*
[‘Field nature’ translates Zubiri’s campal. It means being within a field,
respectivity of the many sensed things becomes field-
and furthermore that this is an essential characteristic of the thing.-trans.] nature respectivity in virtue of transcendentality. Tran-
116 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

scendentality is what sentiently constitutes the field of In summary, the field of reality has two important
reality; it is the very sentient constitution of the field of characteristics which express its excendence with respect
reality. The field as exceeding real things is the field of to real things. The field is “more” than each real thing,
their transcendental respectivity. In this way, the field is a but is more “in” them. The field is, in fact, the respectiv-
moment of physical character. ity of the real qua given in the impression of reality. And
this respectivity is at one and the same time transcenden-
B) But it is also necessary to see things from the
tality and ambit. They are the two characteristics which
standpoint of the field. In this sense, the field is some-
give to respectivity its full meaning. Like transcendental-
thing more than the real things because it “encompasses”
ity, the respectivity of the real leads in a certain respect
them. Upon apprehending the formality of reality, we
from each real thing to other realities. As ambit it is the
apprehend it as something which, to be sure, is in a thing
ambient which encompasses each real thing. Ambit and
and only there, but which exceeds it as well. And thus
transcendentality are but two aspects of a single charac-
this formality acquires a function which in a certain way
teristic: the field-nature of the sensed real. This charac-
is autonomous. It is not only the formality of each real
teristic is what we shall always call transcendental ambit.
thing, but {30} that “in which” all things are going to be
The formality of the real thus has two aspects. On one
apprehended as real. It is the formality of reality as ambit
hand, it is the formality of each thing in and by itself,
of reality. The field is excedent not only as transcenden-
what loosely speaking might be termed “individual for-
tal, but also as the ambit of reality. It is the same structure
mality”. But on the other hand it is an excedent formality
but seen now not from the standpoint of things but vice
in the thing, i.e., it is a field-nature formality. And this
versa, so that things are seen from the standpoint of the
field-natureness is transcendental ambit.
field.
Anticipating some ideas I may say that according to
The ambit is a physical characteristic of the field of
the moment which I have termed ‘individual’, the intel-
reality the same as its transcendentality; it is the ambit of
lection of a real thing consists in intellectively knowing it
a real thing itself.
as real: “this thing is real”. According to the moment
The ambit is not some sort of material covering or which I have termed ‘field-nature’, the intellection of the
wrapping, like some atmosphere which envelopes the real real thing intellectively knows reality as being this thing
things. In particular, I stress that the ambit is not space. in this way in reality: “reality is this thing”. They are not
In the first place, space is not a radical part of things, but two different apprehensions but two moments of a single
something determined by something radical in them, viz. apprehension; but as moments they are distinct.
spaceness. Things are spacious, and only because of this
In the transcendental ambit we have the general
is there space. Spaceness is neither relative nor absolute
character, {32} or the global character, so to speak, of
space. But neither is the ambit spaceness. What
what we call the ‘field of reality’. But it is necessary to
spaceness and space are is something which has to be un-
take one more step; it is necessary to ask ourselves, in
derstood with respect to the ambit, and not the other way
fact, What is the intrinsic structure of the field of reality,
around—as if the ambit were either space or spaceness.
of the transcendental ambit of reality? This is the subject
The ambit is rather something like the ambience which
of the next section.
things generate. Therefore it is nothing which goes be-
yond them. The ambience is ambient “in” things them- {33}
selves just as transcendentality is transcendentality “in”
them. Nonetheless, things and their ambience of reality
are not formally identical. The ambit is the ambience “in” §3
things; it is a physical characteristic of them, consisting
above all in being the ambient of real things. The ambi- THE STRUCTURE OF THE FIELD OF REALITY
ence is not the atmosphere which surrounds things but the
ambience which they themselves determine. This is re-
spectivity as ambit. And for the same reason this ambi- In virtue of being a transcendental ambit, the field of
ence is not a void of reality—that would be for us to leave reality can contain many real things. But it does not con-
real things altogether and is impossible. The ambit is the tain them in just any form, i.e., as some mere multitude;
ambit of the proper formality of reality, which is {31} on the contrary, this multitude has very precise structural
perfectly physical. Encompassing is just a physical mo- characteristics. They are the very structure of the field of
ment of the formality of reality; it is respectivity qua con- reality. It is a structure which, as I will state, is given in
stitutive of the field. the primordial apprehension of reality.
 THE FIELD OF REALITY 117

1 thing to all the others. And it is so because that openness

is in turn determined by the reality of each thing. By be-
Some Things “Among” Others ing determined by the reality of each thing, the “toward”
is a {35} real “toward”; it is reality in “toward”. And it is
in this that the field as “among” consists. Because of this
In order to discover the structures of the field of re- things are not only some among others, so to speak mate-
ality, let us start from the fact that reality, such as it is rially, i.e. in actuity; but moreover they have a position
given to us in impression, has different forms, one of with respect to others, they are among others by reason of
which is the “toward” by which reality inexorably leads us their actuality. The field as the first plane, as the periph-
to other realities. This does not refer to an inference or ery, as the horizon, is just the structure of positionality;
anything of that nature, nor is it a going toward reality; i.e., the structure of the “among” as a “toward”. The field
rather, it is an apprehending of reality itself in the mode of is not only something which encompasses things, but
“toward”, in a directional mode as a moment of reality. prior to doing so is something in which they are included,
This “toward” is not just a mode of reality’s presenting each and every one. Prior to encompassing things, and in
itself, but is, like the other modes, a mode of presentation order to be able to encompass them, the field includes the
which is transcendentally open. This means that every things in itself. And this inclusion is grounded in the
thing by virtue of being real is in itself of field nature; field-nature characteristic of each real thing qua real.
every real thing constitutes a form of reality “toward” an- Hence: 1) the real thing determines the field; 2) the field
other. To be sure, the “toward” is formally {34}a form of determines the inclusion of the real in it; and 3) the field
reality; but the “toward” in transcendental openness encompasses what is included in it. Such is the first
(proper to the impression of reality) is formally of field structural moment of the field, viz., the position in the
nature. And since this impression is numerically identical “among”. Etymologically ‘among’ means the interior
in all real things apprehended in an impression, it follows determined by two things. But each one represents the
that in the field determined by the reality of each thing all possibility of this determination because each thing is real
the others are there as well. This is a structural and for- in the “toward”. In this way the “among” is a moment of
mal moment of the field; the field determines the reality of the transcendental ambit.
each thing as a reality “among” others. The “among” is But this is not the only structural moment of the
grounded in the field nature and not the other way around; field, because things are not only various but variable.
it is not the case that there is a field because there are
some things situated among others, but rather some things
are situated among others only because each and every 2
one of them is in the field. And there is a field precisely
and formally because the reality of each thing is formally Some Things as a “Function” of Others*
of field nature. The “among” is not just a conglomera-
tion; nor is it the mere relation of some things with others.
Rather, it is a very precise structure, that of the actualiza- All things are variable in the field of reality. Above
tion of one thing among others. all, they can enter and leave it, or change their position
with respect to other things. But in addition, each note,
To be sure, the “among” is a moment of the actuity for example {36} color, size, etc., taken in and by itself, is
of the real: a real thing as such is among others. But the something which can change and does change. Now,
“among” also has a characteristic of actuality: the thing when we apprehend various things in a field, none of
is actualized “among” others. Clearly these two aspects of them is apprehended monolithically, so to speak, as if the
“among” do not coincide, because there can be many unity of the field were merely additive. On the contrary,
things situated among others which are not intellectively each thing is actualized together with others, or after
present in actuality. What is important to us here is the them, or outside of them, or on the periphery of the field,
“among” of actuality. It is a positive characteristic proper etc. Each real thing in a field is actualized not just
to each real thing qua of field nature. The “toward” of “among” other things but also as a function of them. Po-
field-natureness is above all a “toward” in “among”, or in
other words, an “among” which positively has the char-
*
acteristic of a “toward” of reality. If this were not the [Zubiri is here adopting language from mathematics, e.g. variable x is a
case, the “among” would be pure emptiness. But it is a function of y and z. The sense is that each thing is connected in an es-
sential way to others, and changes in terms of (or as a “function” of) their
field because it is reality open in a “toward” from each actions.-trans.]
118 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

sition, so to speak, is proper to a thing “among” others, example, and under this latter there are different metrics,
but this is an “among” in which each thing has the posi- viz. Euclidean and non-Euclidean. Succession, coexis-
tion it does as a function of the others, and changes as a tence, position, spaciocity and spatiality, etc., and types of
function of them. A real thing can disappear from the functionality. I do not claim to have made anything like a
field; but this is never a type of volatilization of the thing, complete enumeration; I have only mentioned these cases
but a ceasing to be “among” the other things. Hence, it to exemplify functional dependence. {38}
always (and only) disappears as a function of them. The This functionality is, I said, an intrinsic and formal
unity of the field-nature moment and the individual mo- characteristic of the field; i.e., it is not the case, for exam-
ment is a functional “among”; it is what I term the func- ple, only that B depends upon A; rather, there is an in-
tionality of the real. Here ‘functionality’ is taken in its verse function as well. In the case of temporal sucession,
broadest sense, and hence without any allusion to the di- B may certainly succeed A, i.e., be dependent upon A.
verse types of functionality which can be present. The But in turn, A preceeds B; it is the antecendent. Func-
fact that a thing is of field nature implies a character of tionality, then, is not a relation of some things with others,
functionality that is radical. Conversely, real things are but is a structural characteristic of the field itself qua
not primarily encompassed by the field, but rather each is field; some things depend upon others because all are in-
included in it, as we say; encompassing is grounded upon cluded in a field which is intrinsically and formally a
inclusion. Now, the mode of field-nature inclusion of functional field. This means that every real thing, by vir-
each real thing has the intrinsic and formal characteristic tue of its moment of field nature-ness, is functional reality.
of functionality. Moreover, the functionality is an intrinsic field-nature
What is this functionality? I have already described characteristic because it pertains to each real thing by the
it: it is dependence in the broadest sense of the word. mere fact of being of field-nature: each thing determines
This functional dependence can assume diverse forms. the field-nature-ness, and therefore its own functionality.
We may cite some which are of special importance. Thus, Field-nature reality itself is, qua reality, of a functional
a real thing can change as a function of another real thing character. That each real thing depends upon another is
which has preceded it; this is pure {37} succession. Suc- owing to the proper reality of both of them, to the intrinsic
cession is a type of functionality. The same must be said functional character of the field itself. The field is in itself
of something which is not successive but rather coexistent, a field of functionality. Only on account of this can each
namely when one real thing coexists with another. Coex- thing depend upon others. But it can also be independent
istence is now functionality. From this point of view, of some of them. Independence is a mode of functionality.
every real thing in the field occupies a position by virtue I repeat, functionality is a moment of the reality of
of a field-nature function, in the field; it is next to other each field-nature thing. And each thing is a “toward”
things, it is in the first plane or on the periphery, etc. But which is transcendentally open to other real things. Each
there are still other forms of functionality. Real material thing is formally real by being de suyo. Now, each real
things are constituted by points. Each point is “outside” thing is de suyo transcendentally open, and this openness
of the others; it is an ex. But it is not something which is has a dimension which is formally functional. This field-
simply outside; rather, the ex is a unity constructed with nature functional actualization is proper to the unity of all
respect to the other ex’s as points of the thing. We express the modes of sensed reality, one of which is the “toward”.
this by saying that every ex is an “ex-of”. In virtue of this What is of field-nature is functional in the “toward”.
every point has a necessary position with respect to other
points by reason of its “ex-of” or “out-of”. This quality of Whence arises an essential characteristic of func-
position in the “ex-of” is what I call spaciocity. It is a tionality. It is not {39} a functionality which primarily
property of each material reality. Now, the functionality concerns the content of the notes of the real, but rather
of real spacious things qua spacious is space; this is concerns their actualization as real. It is not that a body,
spaciality. Space is grounded in spaciocity. And this for example, is of functional character qua body; i.e., it is
functionality depends upon the other notes of the things. not that a body depends upon some other body or some
That is to say, it is things which determine the structure of other content. That will always be problematic. What is
the functionality, i.e. the structure of space. As I see it, not problematic is that by being real, the body is in func-
this determination is movement; the structure of space is tional dependence with respect to other reality qua reality.
thus the geometric cast of movement. (Naturally, I do not Hence we are dealing with the functionality of the real as
refer to geometric space but to physical space.) It can be real. This is the essential point, as we shall see forthwith.
quite varied: topological, affine, and metric structures, for Now, this functionality is what is expressed by the
 THE FIELD OF REALITY 119

preposition “by”. Everything real “by” being field-nature place, the succession is not the succession of two impres-
real is functionally real, “by” some reality. This “by” is sions, but the same impression of reality, one which is of
something sensed and not something conceived. Human successive nature—which means that what is essential
sensing is an intellective sensing that is radically an im- about functionality does not concern the content of the
pression of reality; it is something given “physically”. impressions {41} but their formality of reality. In Hume’s
Hence any subsequent intellection physically moves in this example, the ringing of the bell just follows upon the
already physically given reality. Intellection does not need pulling of the cord. Now, it is not the case that the bell’s
to get to reality because it is formally already there. Now, ringing is qua ringing a function of the pulling of a cord
because this reality is actualized in a field-nature way, the qua cord; rather, the fact is that it is the reality of the
field-nature-ness is a moment of the impression of reality; ringing qua real which is a function of the reality of the
and therefore the functionality itself is a moment which is pulling of the cord qua reality. And this is something
given in the impression of reality. It is given as one of perfectly given, even supposing that the ringing were not
reality’s formal moments. Thus we are not dealing with a function of the pulling of the cord. Functionality is
inference or anything of that nature, but rather with a da- functionality of the real inasmuch as it is real. In this
tum which is immediately and formally given in the im- sense it is a concept which encompasses many possible
pression of reality. types. This formality, this “by” as such is given in the
Conversely, the datum is a datum of simple function- impression of reality. Hume’s whole critique is based
ality. It is essential to insist upon this point in order to upon the content of sensing, but he erred on the matter of
preclude serious errors. formality. Content is always problematic. There isn’t
sensing “and” intellective knowing, but only sentient in-
Above all, ‘functionality’ is not synonymous with tellection, impressive intellection of the real qua real.
‘causality’. Causality is but one type of functionality
among others. In classical philosophy a cause is that from In the third place, let us observe that the exordium of
which something {40} proceeds by means of a real influ- Kant’s Critique is Hume. Since causality is not given, for
ence upon the being of the effect. Now, causality is not Kant it is an a priori synthesis, a synthetic a priori
something given. We never perceive the productive influ- judgement as the possibility of objective knowledge. Now,
ence of a real thing upon another. Thus, as I see it, the this is unacceptable. Above all, functionality is neither an
experimental studies (otherwise of the first rank) dealing analytic judgement (Leibniz) nor a synthetic judgement
with the presumed immediate perception of causality are (Kant). Functionality is given in impression, not in its
radically incorrect. Our perception never perceives cau- content but in its formality of reality, because it is a mo-
sality, but always does perceive the functionality; in the ment of the “toward”. And the “toward” is not a judge-
field of reality we sense reality in its functional moment as ment. As such it is not something a priori to the logical
a field-nature moment of the impression of reality. We apprehension of objects, but a datum of the impression of
perceive that a thing is real as a function of others, and reality. Whence the formal object of knowledge is not
functionality which can be and is quite varied. Causality causality but functionality. The science of which Kant
is only a type of functionality, and moreover very prob- speaks (Newtonian physics) is not a science of causes but
lematic. For example, with respect to efficient causality a science of functions of the real qua real.
no refutation of metaphysical occasionalism is possible in
the intramundane order. But for now I leave aside human
actions; they will be taken up again in Part III. The “by” * * *
is functional, but this does not mean that it is causal. The
“by” is something which we always perceive. {42}

In the second place, this functionality is formally In summary, the field of reality has a structure which
sensed, i.e., not only is it something accessible, it is is determined by two moments: the moment of the
something for which access is already physically given in “among”, and the moment of the “by”. Each thing is real
sentient intellection, in the transcendental “toward”. in the field among other real things and as a function of
Whence the error of Hume’s critique. For Hume, causal- them. These two moments are not independent. Func-
ity is not given, but only temporal succession. Now, I tionality, the “by”, is rigorously speaking the form of the
have just said myself that causality is not given. But “among” itself. The form of being “among” is functional.
Hume did not notice that there are two different aspects of With this we have set forth in broad outline the
the question. First of all, he did not see that temporal structure of the field of reality. In order to preclude false
succession is just a form of functionality. In the second interpretations it is not out of place to stress again the
120 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

concept of the field. Above all, the field of reality is a qua reality. This actuality is merely actual-ity, and as
moment which concerns things, but in their formality of such constitutes an intellection. As actuality, it is always
otherness; i.e., it concerns things when they are intellec- and only actuality of reality itself. Therefore the field as a
tively known. The field is not a moment of these real dimension of the actuality of the real is not a moment of
things qua real beyond impression. The field is a dimen- the real beyond apprehension; but neither is it a subjective
sion of the real such as it is given in apprehension itself. moment. It is a moment of actuality of the real as real in
But on the other hand the field is not something which sentient intellection. {43}
depends upon sentient intellection as an act of mine; it is
not therefore something so to speak “subjective”. The
field is a dimensional moment of the real given in sentient In this field thus determined in and by each real
intellection, but only as actualized therein. It is a moment thing we apprehend in subsequent intellection what the
of actuality, not of actuity. To be sure, this actuality is things already apprehended as real are in reality. This is a
only given in apprehension, in sentient intellection; but it modal intellection of its primordial apprehension.
is a physical moment of the real which is apprehended Which? That is the subject of the next chapter.
 {45}

CHAPTER III

THE REAL INTELLECTIVELY KNOWN WITHIN A FIELD:

THE SENTIENT LOGOS

In primordial apprehension one apprehends each §1

real thing in its twin dimensions as individual and in a
field. But to intellectively know something in this latter FIELD INTELLECTION AS SUCH
way is not necessarily to intellectively know it in the field
manner, i.e., as in a field. Being in a field concerns the
notae of the real thing; the field is a dimension of these This intellection has two distinct aspects and mo-
notae. But intellectively knowing something as in a field ments. In order to encompass them in a single denomina-
is something different: it is intellectively knowing the real tion I shall employ the classical word logos.
thing inasmuch as it is included in the field which it itself
This word has many meanings in Greek. But here I
has previously determined by its notae; it is to intellec-
refer only to that meaning in which the logos consists in
tively know not the field-thing but to intellectively know it
declaratively saying something about something. Now, as
“in” the field.
I see it, this logos was not conceived by the Greeks in a
The intellection of a real thing in the field of reality sufficiently radical way. To do this, I need to rigorously
is, as I have already said, an ulterior intellection or mo- pin down how I understand the logos.
dalization of the primordial intellection of something real.
1) Logos stems from the verb legein which means
To be sure, this modalization is not only about being in a
“reunite”, “gather together”. This is the meaning which
field; every intellection of a real thing has the modaliza-
still survives in words such as “anthology”. In the prob-
tion of being intellectively known as a moment of the
lem with which we are concerned, the Greeks anchored
world. In both cases we not only intellectively know
their idea of legein in this idea of reunion. Now as I see
something as “real”*, we also intellectively know what
it, this is inadequate. To be sure, legein means “reunite”,
this real thing is “in reality”. But in field-type* intellec-
“gather together”; but reunite what? This is what one
tion we intellectively know what something is in reality
must begin by explaining. The Greeks did not attend to
with respect to other real sensed or sensible things; while
this problem. In fact, one reunites and gathers together
in the worldly intellection we intellectively know what
what is in the field of reality. Whence legein, rather than
something is in reality in the world. {46} In this second
denoting the reunion itself, should serve to designate an
part of the book I refer only to what something is in re-
act of reunion qua “field”: it is a field legein, i.e., a legein
spect to other things within a field.
within a field. Beneath the reunion one must go to the
In order to see what this intellection is, we must ex- fieldness of the legein.
plicate two great problems: (1) In what does field intellec-
2) From legein the Greeks derived both the word lo-
tion as such consist? And (2) What is the basic structure
gos and its corresponding idea. From its meaning of “to
of this intellection? {47}
reunite”, legein came to mean “to enumerate”, “to count”,
etc., whence it acquired the meaning of “to say”. And this
is what the word logos means. Logos has the {48} two
*
meanings of “to say” (legon) and “that which is said” (le-
[“field-type”, “being in a field”, “in the field manner”, and “as within a
gomenon). And there the Greeks anchored their reflec-
field” all translate the Spanish adverb campalmente, which literally
means “field-ly”.-trans.] tion. When that which is said is a declaration of what a

121
122 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

thing is, the Greeks claim that one deals with the logos in lem of negation: one says of something that it “is not”.
an autonomous sense: declarative logos (logos apophan- Hence the “parricide” which Plato believes he is commit-
tikos). This declarative logos consists in “declaring ting against Parmenides is but an act of supreme fidelity:
something about something” (legein ti kata tinos). The to intellectively know that something “is not” is always to
logos always involves a certain duality of “somethings”. intellectively know that what “is not”, “is”. That was the
But the Greeks did not concern themselves with the first idea of the being of non-being in Plato. Aristotle con-
“something”; they thought that that which is said can be fronted the problem of Parmenides not from this identity
in itself just an idea. But as I see it this is untenable be- of the legomenon with the on, but from the presumed
cause the so-called ‘ideas’ always come from things, and unity of being itself. For Aristotle “being” is expressed in
only from them. Whence the declaration of what some- many ways; the unity of being is not destroyed but rather
thing is cannot be fully carried out except as based on being is endowed with diverse types of unity. His logos is
something else in the field. What something is in reality a copulative “one” which possesses different modes of
cannot be understood except by referring it to some other unity.
thing within the field. Therefore logos, prior to being a In the final analysis the Greeks saw the radical
declaration, is intellection of one thing in the field based problem of logos in the formal plane of being and unity,
upon another. And this means that the logos itself is a i.e. in the plane of what is said or expressed. But as I see
mode of intellection and hence is not a structure which it the discussion should not have been carried to this for-
rests upon itself. The tendency of the Greeks was always mal plane; {50} rather it should have descended to a more
in the opposite direction, a tendency which I have termed fundamental plane.
logification of intellection. At the dawn of philosophy, in
Parmenides, there is a growing intervention of phrazein, In the first place, is it true that logos formally falls
of expressing; a tendency which culminates in a “dis- back upon an “is” (including also the “is not”)? The truth
cerning with logos”, krinein logoi. And this was not just is that the Greeks never tell us in what, formally, intellec-
a manner of speaking: the proof is that Parmenides’ disci- tive knowing consists. Nonetheless they believe that in-
ple Zeno is presented to us by Plato as a theoretician of tellective knowing and therefore logos is always intellec-
dialectical discussion. Even in theology, logos has been tion of the “is”. Now as I see it the formal act of intellec-
attributed to God, in the philosophical sense of judgement. tive knowing is not intellectively knowing the “is”, but
But this is impossible. Intelligence is not logos; rather, rather consists in apprehending reality; the formal termi-
logos is a human mode of intellection. God has intelli- nus of intellective knowing is not being but reality. I have
gence but does not have logos. One cannot logify intellec- explicated this already in the first part of the book. One
tion but on the contrary must intelligize the logos. {49} cannot entify reality, but on the contrary must reify being.
3) For the Greeks, logos was a problem of the first Hence intellective knowing is something previous to
magnitude. But they always understood this problem see- any logos, because the real is proposed to the logos in or-
ing in the logos the supreme form of nous, of intelligence; der to be declared. In virtue of this, intellective knowing is
i.e., the nous as expressed or expressible. After Par- not formally judgement, nor saying what the real “is”.
menides, only this logos type of intellection is intellection One cannot logify intellection, but must do the reverse,
in the strict sense; the rest is mere doxa, opinion. Re- viz. intelligize the logos; i.e., conceptualize the logos as a
gardless of what Parmenides himself understood by doxa, mode, as a modalization of intellective knowing, which is
it is certain that Plato and Aristotle understood that doxa to say of the apprehension of the real as real.
is aisthesis, sensing. And so with Parmenides thus en- Entification of reality and logification of intellective
sconced in nous, he tells us that to intellectively know knowing are the two great presuppositions of Greek phi-
something is the same (tauton) as to intellectively know losophy. For my part I think that it is necessary to reify
that this something “is”: that which is intellectively being and intelligize the logos. And with that, one
known is on, being. The logification of intellection thus reaches the fundamental plane of the logos. What is the
brought along with it the entification of reality. And as nature of this plane?
the logos always involves a certain duality, Parmenides
For the Greeks, intelligence (nous) and sensing
therefore insists that the on, being, is one, hen.
(aisthesis) were always opposites. Be as it may the doxa
To the Greeks the force of all this was overwhelm- of Parmenides, there is no doubt that Greek philosophy
ing. And the proof is the manner in which Plato and Ar- always ascribed the doxa to sensing. But what is sensing?
istotle disputed with Parmenides. To Plato, the identity of It is of course the presentation of something which in one
what is intellectively known with being leads to the prob- or another way has a moment of reality. But if this is so,
 THE SENTIENT LOGOS 123

there is never a {51} structural opposition in man between consists in being a “re-actualization” within a field of
intellective knowing and sensing. As intellective knowing what has already been actualized in the primordial appre-
is apprehending the real, it follows that if the real is al- hension of reality. Underlying every act of logos is the
ready presented in and through the senses as real, then reactualization of the real within a field. This is what
intellection itself already has a radically sentient charac- makes of the logos a mode of intellection, a mode of actu-
ter. There is then no opposition between intellective alization of the real. Logos is to be understood with re-
knowing and sensing, but rather a structural unity. Intel- spect to intellection; we thus have an intelligization of the
lective knowing and sensing are just two moments of a logos.
single act, the act of impressively apprehending reality. It
is the sentient intelligence whose act is impression of re- In the second place, this actualization is imposed by
ality. Logos is a modalization of this impression of reality. the impression of reality; it is what bears us from the im-
Logos is not intellection of being but of reality sensed in mediately real to what that real is in reality. What is in-
impression; the “is” of the logos is but the human expres- tellectively known in the logos is what is real in its field
sion of the impression of reality. Hence ultimately the moment, i.e., within a field, because every impression of
logos is intrinsically and formally a mode of sentient in- reality is of field-type. Nonetheless the real thus appre-
tellection; it is sentient logos. What does this mean in hended is not necessarily sensed as within a field. Every
more concrete terms? We shall answer that question in impression of reality is, in fact, of field-type; it has a mo-
detail throughout the course of this book; but to orient the ment of transcendental openness to other sensed things.
reader I shall anticipate some ideas which will be devel- The sensed real has thus a formality of reality with two
oped later. moments: an individual moment, so to speak, and a field-
type moment, a moment within a field. But apprehending
Most importantly, I do not refer only to the fact that the real in the field manner is something different; it is
the logos is based on an impression of reality; in such case not apprehending that the individual reality opens up a
it would be only a sensible logos. Rather, I mean that the determinate field, but is {53} apprehending the individual
impression of reality is itself what has need of the logos. reality based on the reality field itself. And it is not nec-
And this necessity is what confers upon the logos its sen- essary that this always occur; it is not necessary that the
tient character. Logos in effect tells us what something is individual formality be apprehended in the field manner.
in reality. And the difference between “real” and “in re- But on the other hand, apprehending the individuality in
ality” is determined by the impression of reality in its field the field manner, i.e. based on the field, is necessarily a
moment. mode of sensing. And in this mode of sensing I sense not
Furthermore, I do not mean that what is intellec- just that what is apprehended is real, but also what the
tively known in the logos is sensed the same as a color or apprehended thing is in reality. Now, apprehending what
a sound; I can intellectively know, in my logos, irrational something is in reality is nothing but logos. Hence the
numbers, for example. But the fact is that both the color logos is the field-type mode of sensing reality, and con-
and the irrational numbers pertain to the content of what versely sensing the real in the field manner is already an
is intellectively known, whereas the intellection itself in incipient logos. The logos is, then, a mode of sensing,
its sentient mode concerns not the content but the mode in and sensing is incipiently a mode of logos; it is sentient
which this content shows up in the apprehension. {52} logos. It is the mode of sensing the real in a field, i.e., the
We shall investigate this at some length below. The irra- mode of intellectively knowing the real based on the field
tional numbers are not apprehended like a color, but just of sensed reality.
as color they are apprehended in the same formality of
reality, in the same impression of reality in which color is In the third place, the impression of reality sentiently
apprehended. An irrational number is not the same as a “bears” us to the logos. Hence sensing in the field manner
color, but it is real in the same formality of reality in is formally movement. It is not a movement which bears
which the color is real. In both cases the formality of re- us from one intellection to another; but rather the move-
ality is numerically the same. Lgos is sentient not by vir- ment itself is that in which reality is formally reactualized.
tue of what is intellectively known, but by virtue of the What is this movement? It is not a simple intentionality,
mode of its intellection; it is an intellection within the nor a directing of oneself to one terminus from the other.
formality of sensed reality. Beneath the intention there lies something more radical:
attention. Attention is not merely a psychic phenomenon,
What is the structure of this logos? but a properly intellective moment, yet not the most radi-
In the first place, logos as mode of intellection is an cal one. Attention, in fact, is borne from one terminus to
ulterior mode of mere actualization of the real. This mode the other. And that which attentionally bears us is there-
124 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

fore prior to attention itself. And this is precisely the what does this duality consist? Secondly, the logos moves
movement in which the logos formally consists: only be- in this duality. In what does this movement consist?
cause we are moving ourselves do we attend to different Thirdly, the logos declares what something is in reality,
termini; and only by attending to different termini do we and how it is installed in a reality field as a reality con-
also have different intentions. Now, that movement is stitutive of the medium of intellection itself. The basic
{54} strictly and formally sentient. In order to apprehend structure of the logos has these three moments: duality,
something real based on the field we need, within the field dynamicity, mediality. Only upon this base can there be a
itself, to distance ourselves or to step back* from the real declarative logos about something. Let us examine these
thing in question. This is not a stepping back with respect moments in turn.
to space, but in the ambit of reality, of a reality sensed as
I. The duality of intellection in which the sentient
formality. That stepping back is thus sentient; it is struc-
logos consists. We shall repeat what has already been said
turally found to be based on the moment of the “towards”
in order to explain it in a coherent fashion. The logos
of sentient intellection. It is therefore a stepping back in
tells us something about a real thing, and what it tells us
sentient intellection. And with the thing thus appre-
is what this thing is in reality. And what it tells us of the
hended by stepping back, in the field manner, from the
thing is in turn based on the prior intellection of another
field “toward” it, affirming what it is in reality. Affirma-
real thing, because what it tells us, the so-called ‘ideas’—
tion is the reversion of sentient intellect to the real. Dis-
as I have already indicated—do not exist on their own but
tance is a stepping back in sentient intellection, and the
are the intellection of things. The fact that the logos tells
reversion to the thing in sentient intellection is the very
us something about a real thing means that we do not in-
essence of affirmation, is the logos. It is a sentient intel-
tellectively know what this thing is in reality except by
lection in stepping back within a field. Dynamism, for-
intellection of something prior. Now, these two things—
mally constitutive of logos, is being an intellective move-
that of which we seek to know what it is in reality, and
ment in which we have stepped back in the sensed field of
that prior thing by which we intellectivly know it—are
reality.
each {56} a terminus of a primordial intellection. And
Reactualization of the real, movement within a field, the result is that in the intellection of what something is in
is what logos essentially is, viz., sentient logos. An intel- reality two apprehensions intervene. First, this thing is
ligence which was not sentient would not be able to have, apprehended as real in a primordial apprehension; for
nor would it need to have, any logos whatsoever. In con- example, I apprehend something as a reality in a land-
trast to classical philosophy, it is necessary to think, then, scape. But there is another apprehension, the apprehen-
that logos is formally and constitutively sentient logos. sion of this same real thing already apprehended, and in-
Granting this, it is necessary to explain at greater asmuch as it is what it is in reality: from what was appre-
length this structure. It will be done in two steps: What hended in the primordial apprehension we now say that it
is the basic structure of any logos? And What is the for- consists in being a tree. For this, I recur to the previous
mal structure of the logos? As this second step is quite apprehension of something that was a tree. And it is
involved, it will constitute by itself a separate section, based on the intellection of this tree that we intellectively
Section 2, of this volume. know that the real thing in the landscape consists in real-
ity in being a tree. This second apprehension is not a
{55} primordial apprehension of reality; it is something differ-
ent: an apprehension which I shall term dual. For it is
§2 certainly true that a real thing is apprehended, but it is so
with reference to something previously apprehended.
THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE LOGOS
That which is apprehended, instead of being appre-
hended directly, is apprehended as a function of a previous
This basic structure has, as I have already pointed apprehension. One has, so to speak, one foot on the thing
out, three moments. First, the logos says something about which is being intellectively known, and the other on
something. Therefore there are two somethings; this is the something which has already been so known. For this
dual structure of the logos as a mode of intellection. In reason, the apprehension is dual. It is thus intellectively
known that the thing (of which we seek to know what it is
*
in reality) is the same, similar to, or different from that
[The English to step back is used as the most natural translation of the first and previously known. The apprehension of the real
Spanish distanciar, a word which expresses a concept Zubiri has derived
from Heidegger. - trans.] as “real-among” is constitutively dual because this appre-
 THE SENTIENT LOGOS 125

hension involves the apprehension of the real thing and us in sentient intellection. This does not mean that the
the apprehension of that “among” which the thing is. If content of the differential actualization is multiple, but
there were no “among”, the apprehension would never be that it is positively actual differentially. Now, upon being
dual. But having an “among”, the apprehension is neces- differentiated, the apprehension of the real thing becomes
sarily dual. And as the “among” is sensed, so also is the converted into something of which we say what it is in
duality. reality.
What is this duality? Dual apprehension is a mode This brings us to a stricter conception of what dual-
of actualization of the real. It is not constituted by the fact ity is. To intellectively know what a thing is in reality
{57}that some notae of its content are complete. That has among others is to go from something priorly appre-
nothing to do with the matter, because even the most sim- hended toward something of which I desire to intellec-
ple part of its content can be intellectively known in a dual tively know what it is in reality. If one were to think that
apprehension; the simplicity of content would be a dero- the duality consisted in two apprehensions, the apprehen-
gation or absorption of all complexity. It is therefore not sion of the thing of which I desire to intellectively know
this which constitutes the dual apprehension. Dual ap- what it is in reality, and the apprehension of the prior
prehension is a mode of actualization of this content, sim- thing to which I recur, then what I would have would be
ple or complex, a mode of being present to me. Hence, “two” primordial apprehensions of reality; but not “one”
dual apprehension is contrasted with the primordial ap- dual apprehension. Two “ones” do not make a “two”.
prehension of reality, which is constituted as a mere actu- Duality does not consist in two primordial apprehensions
alization of reality. They are then two structurally differ- but is a dual apprehension.
ent modes of actualization. The primordial apprehension
is the actualization of the real in and by itself; the dual In the second place, one might think that this prior
apprehension is its mode of actualization based on another presence of the thing, on the basis of which one intellec-
thing. I repeat, this is a structural difference, and there- tively knows what another thing is in reality, consists in
fore not a difference which is psychic or vital in character. an internal fusion (the name does not matter), a type of
radical reminiscence, so that the apprehension of what the
It is clear that this apprehension is not rigorously thing is in reality would in large measure be a composite
dual, but rather plural, because I can and in general do of apprehension and reminiscence. But this is not what
start not from one single thing but several. But in order to constitutes the duality of which we are here speaking. For
simplify matters I shall lump them together under the whatever this fusion may be, {59} the presence of one
rubric ‘dual’. apprehension in the other is not a fusion; i.e., the duality
In primordial apprehension every possible type of is not a composition.
thing is apprehended in a unitary mode; for example, a The duality in question is thus neither duplicity nor a
landscape with trees. But now we do not apprehend these composition of primordial apprehensions. And this is
things unitarily; we do not apprehend, as we did before, because duplicity as well as composition affect only the
the landscape with many things. Rather, we apprehend content of intellection, the content of what is dual; but the
each thing that there is in the landscape. We do not ap- duality itself is something much simpler and decisive.
prehend a “varied landscape”, but “various things in a And this in turn is because the dual apprehension is the
landscape”. These diverse things are certainly in the apprehension of a “real” thing which I want to apprehend
same field, and therefore in “one” actualization; but this as it is in reality; and in this reality, and not in its content,
“one” actualization is not “unitary”. It is rather what I is where the duality is formally found: to be in reality
term differential (or ‘differentiated’) actualization. We what is real. Reality has intervened twice, and in this
are dealing, then, with a unity, but one which is “differen- identical formality consists the unity of the two apprehen-
tial”, and not simply “varied”. In differential actualiza- sions. The dual apprehension consists in something like
tion there is a strict unity; otherwise it would not be {58} apprehending the reality of a thing in light of the reality
“one” actualization. But with respect to this unity, things of something else priorly apprehended. The prior appre-
are not merely notae of the landscape; rather each of them hension is present in the thing which we wish to intellec-
is in and by itself a thing. Hence the unity of actualization tively know like a light by which this thing is appre-
is differentiated in things, which are differently moments hended as it is “in reality”. The “based upon” is the light
of the unity of actuality. generated by the apprehension of the thing priorly known.
The differential actualization is a mode of intellec- And this is the essential point. But it is necessary to fix
tive actualization, a mode of a real thing being present to more precisely just what this light is.
126 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

One might think that it is just a type of “compari- 3. This duality is the intrinsic and formal foundation
son” between the second apprehension and the first. But of the apprehension of the two somethings, of the some-
this is not so, because any comparison presupposes an thing which is said (ti), and of the something of which it
“appearing together” of what is compared and is based on is said (kata tinos). Only because we are referred to
that appearing. And it is precisely in this appearing something prior can it be intellectively known what this
where the dual impression is found. The real thing ap- something is. The ambit of the intellective duality is what
pears in the light which constitutes the reality of the prior makes the two apprehensions possible. Only because
thing. And this light or clarity of appearing is just the there is an intellective referral can there be apprehension
dual apprehension. This apprehension is “an” apprehen- of an prior thing which illuminates us. With this, the
sion, but is an apprehension in the light of something pri- something of this prior thing is constituted in a principle
orly apprehended. What we here term “light” {60} is but of intelligibility of the real thing.
the moment of each real thing in a field which constitutes
4. Finally, these two apprehensions are the intrinsic
reality itself. We are dealing with the fact that it is in the
and formal foundation which permits one to say, to intel-
light of the reality in a field of the thing previously appre-
lectively know, a “something” based upon another “de-
hended that one apprehends what a real thing is in reality,
terminate something”; i.e., this is the foundation of the
be it the same, similar, or completely different from the
logos itself, of the intellection of what something real is in
prior thing. And precisely because of this the entire proc-
reality. It is the formally dual constitution of the logos.
ess of intellection along these lines is always saddled with
The logos is then radically based upon a modalization of
the weight of the old, because the old makes it possible to
the primordial apprehension of reality. For this reason it
apprehend what the new is in reality; but it tends to exces-
is a mode of sentient intellection which in turn has to be
sively assimilate the new to the old.
conceptualized from within intellection and not the two
In order to prevent misunderstandings, let us sum- apprehensions which intervene in saying what something
marize what has been said. The primordial apprehension is.
of a real thing, and the apprehension of what this real
And here we have the first basic structural moment
thing is in reality, are two apprehensions; but only the
of the logos: duality. But there is a second essential mo-
second is in turn dual. Let us not confuse the two acts of
ment, that moment by which one goes from a real thing to
apprehension (primordial apprehension and apprehension
another prior one, and inversely from the latter to the
of what something is in reality) with the internal duality
former. This “going” is {62} manifestly of dynamic char-
of the second of the two apprehensions.
acter. The logos “says” something about something, and
Now, this brings us to the possibility of a logos. this saying is a “going”, a dynamic intellection. The mo-
dalization in which the sentient logos consists is a dy-
1. Every real thing, besides being individual, is de
namic modalization; and we must now proceed to exam-
suyo of field nature, i.e., within a field. And this field
ine it.
nature is what determines the field of reality in which the
thing is included and which encompasses all the others. II. The dynamism of intellection in which the sen-
This field, then, has been generated by the reality of each tient logos consists. As we have just said, in the logos
thing; which means in turn that the unity of being in a there are two “somethings”. And of these two some-
field and being individual is a unity which constitutes things, the logos in dual intellection “says” or “speaks”
within the thing itself a type of unfolding of the two mo- about one based upon the other. This saying or speaking
ments in the thing: its “reality”, and its “in reality”. The has its own essential, basic, structure. The logos involves
logos is intrinsically and formally based on the fact that a a duality, but not static duality; rather, one in which sen-
real thing refers, within a field, in transcendental open- tient intellection apprehends one real thing while going,
ness, to another real thing. The logos is referring intel- so to speak, from another. The logos, then, consists in a
lection, a mode of actuality {61} which refers from the duality in which the two termini are two moments of a
reality of something to what this something is in reality. unitary movement. This is a dynamic duality, and is the
2. This unfolding is in turn the intrinsic and formal second basic structural moment of the logos. In what does
foundation of the ambit of its actualization in intellective it consist?
duality. When we refer to a prior thing, the ambit takes 1. Above all, this movement starts from the thing al-
shape in which the logos is going to be constituted in a ready apprehended as real in primordial apprehension.
dual intellection. This is the ambit of the proper intelligi- This apprehension as a point of departure is an apprehen-
bility of the logos. sion in which we already are here-and-now present in the
 THE SENTIENT LOGOS 127

real. What is this “being here-and-now present”? It is ness, has a third moment which I have called the force of
just what constitutes a state [estado]. This is an essential imposition of the real. Now, as point of departure of in-
concept. Modern philosophy in general has erred re- tellective movement, this imposition force of what is in-
garding the reality of the state. To my way of thinking, tellectively known in primordial intellection, consists in
this reality must be recovered. In our problem, a state is this: the real thing apprehended, in moving us toward
not a mode of affection counterposed, for example, to acts. {64} what is in reality, retains us insofar as it is real. This
If that were so, the state thus understood would be, to- is the retention of the real. We are in the real, we remain
gether with all of its indispensible nuances, a psychologi- in the real, and we remain retained by the real. We con-
cal state. Here we are not referring to that at all, but to tinue to be retained not in this red color qua red, but in
the state in another sense: “being here-and-now” is a this red qua real. By the expression “remain in the real as
“being situated in” something. Every impression has, as real”, we are referring to a state; by “being retained in it”
we have already seen in the Part I, a moment of affection. we mean a formally initial state. Retention is not a cer-
But every impression has another moment, the moment of tainty or anything like that; because every certainty and
otherness, which consists in that what is present in an even every intellective intention is grounded in a previous
impression doing nothing but remain in accordance with retention. The real retains us. But how?
its own formality, be it of {63} stimulus or reality. Here
2. We are retained by the real according to all the
we are interested only in the formality of reality, the “re-
modes of reality, one of which is the “towards”. The “to-
maining”* of what is presented as something on its own.
wards” is a mode of the real presenting itself. Insofar as it
And this remaining is here the essential point; it is the
determines intellection it has a particular character. On
very essence of the “being here-and-now”. A state is
the one hand we go “towards” that which is presented as
above all a “remaining”. And this “remaining”, that in
real in the “towards”. But we do not go outside of the
which we have remained, is the point of departure of the
real; just the opposite: continuing to be retained in the
movement of the logos.
reality which we left, we go to more reality. And therein
But it is necessary to forestall certain misunder- consists the intellective movement as movement: it is by
standings. First, this is not a “relation” but a “respectiv- being in the process of moving in reality that we are re-
ity”, and moreover a respectivity common to the impres- tained and sent forth by it. Toward what? Toward the
sive intellection of the real and to the real itself. This diverse real things “among” which the real, which we
“remaining” is not something static; i.e., “remaining” is seek to intellectively know, is. This is a concrete move-
not opposed to “not quiescient”, because remaining is ment by reason of retention of the point of departure, and
neither quiescent nor not quiescent. These two character- by reason of the field-nature “among” towards which we
istics do not have to do with remaining but with the con- go. It is a movement in reality. Hence it is a movement of
tent of reality as mine, as much as with things. But “re- sentient character, a movement of sentient intellection.
maining” is something which concerns the mode in which The logos is sentient logos not only by virtue of being
reality, be it quiescent or not, is situated in my impression. dual, but in virtue of being movement in reality as a field.
In the final analysis, a state is above all a “remaining The logos is not simply “to go” by moving oneself; but
in” as a mode of being here-and-now, and a “being here- rather “points” to a terminus which can be unknown, or
and-now” as a mode of “remaining”; it is a “to be re- even empty. This is proper to a sentient movement. If it
maining”. And this state is therefore a physical and real were not sentient, there would not be movement in the
moment. But primordial apprehension as a point of de- logos. {65}
parture of sentient intellection, in which the logos con- 3. This movement goes from what we seek to intel-
sists, is not any type of remaining. lectively know toward something else priorly apprehended
From what has been said it might seem that state is in the real itself, a second something based on which we,
nothing more than another name for actualization. But moving ourselves, seek to intellectively know the first
this is not the case, because as the point of departure of thing. In virtue of this, that based on which we are going
movement, remaining has a precise formal character to intellectively know the new thing, is something distinct
which is essential and decisive. Impression, in fact, be- from it. This is distancing or stepping back in the reality
sides the moment of affection and the moment of other- field. It does not refer to a merely verbal distinction, but
to a stepping back in the field. The two moments of the
formality of reality, the individual moment and the mo-
*
[The Spanish quedar means to remain or to stay, as in Tennyson’s poem ment within a field, are in a certain way autonomized in
The Lady of Shalott: “She stayed to look down to Camelot.”-trans.] the real thing itself. In the field, things are included, and
128 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

the field encompasses them; so that the field itself, as we not mean that this intellection is an arbitrary act of the
said, acquires a certain autonomy of its own. And this will, but that the intellective movement toward the thing,
field “exceeding” with respect to each thing, actualizes and toward what it will determine in the intellection, is a
each of them in a very precise way, viz. through its step- movement which is not univocally determined other than
ping back. This is a rigorous distance; not simply longi- by a free act. {67}
tude or distinction. Longitude is distance only when it is
This intellective movement, as we saw, is not some-
or is supposed to be traversed. Intellective movement
thing primarily of the intelligence, as Hegel thought. In-
traverses the “among”, and hence the position of some
tellective movement (‘dialectic’, Hegel called it) is not the
things “among” others acquires the character of distance.
formal structure of “the” intelligence, but “a” determina-
Intellective movement is distancial, so to speak; distance
tion of the intelligence according to the differential mode
is the traversed distinction.
of presentation of the real. Moreover, as this differential-
4. This distance is traversed in a very precise man- ity is constituted by the character of reality impressively
ner. The point of departure in the “towards” points to its given, it follows that intellective movement is a determi-
terminus, toward that based on which it is intellectively nation not of “the” intelligence but of the “sentient intelli-
known. With this terminus the movement itself is not gence”, and of this intelligence qua ulterior and field-
univocally fixed, but it needs to be. Whence the intellec- nature actualization of reality. For these two reasons, I
tive movement in stepping back is essentially an oriented say, the idea of the Logic of Hegel is false in its very root.
movement. The orientation is not a type of extrinsic col- No dialectic is mounted upon itself.
location of the intelligence so that it can let fly its move-
ment; but rather is the character of the intellection itself as 6. What is the character of this intellective move-
intellection. Every apprehension of things in a field bears ment? The real retains us not so much by its content as by
the imprint of the orientation in which they have been its formality of reality, as I have pointed out above. Now,
{66} primordially known intellectively. The orientation we have already seen that we intellectively sense the for-
does not consist so much in that the “from” and “towards” mality of reality as being “more” than the reality of each
of the movement are fixed, but rather that even within this thing. I have already said this, and repeat it for greater
fixing, different trajectories of intellection will fit. These clarity in this other context. The “more” is not exterior to
trajectories express what I here understand by ‘orienta- the real thing, but is an intrinsic and formal characteristic
tion’. With the same “from” and with the same “toward” of its reality; it is precisely the moment of the thing’s re-
there can be and there are different orientations for going ality within a field. The real has the two moments of for-
from one thing to another. This diversity of orientations mality: individual and within a field, and this formality in
is ultimately arbitrary; it is the result of an intellective its two moments is what has us retained.
choice. Whence the optative character of concrete intel- This rententivity or retention in turn has two of its
lection in movement. Here, naturally, the problem of this own moments in reality. First, the real, by being in a
option qua option does not interest us; we are only con- field, retains us in a very concrete form, viz., by thrusting
cerned with its foundation in the reality of what is intel- us to the field of reality. This is the impelling moment of
lectively known. This foundation is just the sentient char- the retentivity of the real, the impellence of the real.
acter of intellection; it is by being sentient that this intel- What is real about a thing is something which impels us
lection is oriented. to this “more”, this “beyond”, which is proper to reality.
5. Finally, intellection in distance or stepping back is {68}
not defined only by reason of the trajectory, but also by But it does not pull us out of reality; rather, it keeps
reason of the terminus to which it points the “towards” us there. In thrusting us impellently to that “more”, it
from which it is started. I can, indeed, choose somewhat does not make us abandon the thing, but just the opposite;
arbitrarily that on which I am going to base myself in or- all impelling involves a constitutive reversion toward the
der to intellectively know a thing; I can go toward differ- thing. It is not a strict reversion because we have not left
ent things, things which are more or less arbitrarily se- the reality of the thing; it is a reversion in the sense of a
lected. The movement which constitutes intellection of constitutive avoidance of such leaving. And it is this
what something is in reality is not univocally determined avoidance which I call reversion; it is the reversion of the
in that from which one starts. And this lack of univocity field-nature moment to the individual moment. This re-
actualizes the field of reality precisely as a field of liberty. version is what is expressed by the phrase “This thing is
In large measure, the intellection that differentiates what this in reality”. While the impelling retains us by opening
something is in reality is a free intellection. By this I do up for us, by going from a thing to its field, being in the
 THE SENTIENT LOGOS 129

field retains us by carrying us from the field to the thing. But intentum is not that, because such an intentional
This moment of going from the field to the thing is what I glance presupposes that by its own nature we have to go
call intentum. Permit me to explain, because as I see it “toward” reality, so that reality would be something to-
this is an essential concept. ward which one must go. Ultimately, one would be deal-
The intentum is what, etymologically, the word ing with a correlation. And this is false. {70} We do not
means, viz. a “tending to”. It is not primarily an inten- go toward reality; rather, we are already in it and retained
tion—as we shall see forthwith—but a tending. But this by it. The intentum is not a “going” but a “being here-
tending is not a “tendency” in the psychological sense; and-now” tensively in the real thing, retained by it. There
rather, it is a structural tension, the tension by which real- can only be intentionality because there is basically an
ity retains us in the thing from which we have stepped intentum. This we shall see in another chapter.
back. Every apprehension of the real is on this side a ten- Whence the intentum does not have an intentional
sion. Let us discuss this concept. but a “physical” character. In the first place, intentional-
ity itself is not something purely intentional, but some-
The intentum as tension is, as the word itself ex- thing physical. It is, as I see it, a physical act of the intel-
presses, an intent. But this intent as a tension is not an ligence, the physical reference to what is intellectively
intent to reach the reality of the thing, since we have known; and it is also and above all the strictly physical
never left it; it is the retentivity itself of the thing which character of the act of intellection. It is the very physics of
tensely retains us in it. Hence, the intent in question is not intellection—something like virtue. Virtue is not just a
an intentum of reality, but reality in intentum. If one de- value at which I decide to aim, but is the physical charac-
sires to employ the metaphor of light, it is the reversion of ter of being now in this value, or of having incorporated it
clarity upon the illuminating sources themselves. {69} into my physical reality. It is not an act of will which ac-
Nor is intentum a type of effort to apprehend the real cepts some value as an object; but rather a physical char-
thing. In our language, “intent” is something like “at- acter of this act of accepting itself, a valuable affecting in
tempt”; but with respect to its origins, intentum is not at- itself qua acceptance. Virtue is “moral physics”. Now,
tempt, nor an attempt to go to reality, because we already intentionality is just the physical character of the intellec-
are in the reality of the thing and cannot abandon it. It tive act. It is a mode of the intentum. It is because of this
does not make sense, then, to speak of an attempt. It is in that I have said, and will go on saying, that there is no
order not to confuse intent with attempt that I recur to the intentionality except as a mode of the intentum. We shall
Latin word intentum. see forthwith what this mode is. Moreover, the intentum is
in itself something physical. As we are already in the
Neither is intentum formally intentionality. ‘In- real, the reversion is not a “going toward” but a “being-
tentionality’ is a word and a concept which uses philoso- now-tense-in”. Both noesis as well as noema are
phy from the past centuries. In general terms, it is an act, grounded upon the intentum. But the Nous is an ergon.
or at least the character of the act in which we look at And this ergon is the intentum. The primary structure of
something, at what is intellectively known. This is the intellection is not noetic but noergic. Strictly speaking,
acceptation of willful intention translated into the act of noergia is not a character exclusive to the intentum be-
intellection. This intentionality has at least two senses. cause the intentum is an ulterior moment of the primordial
In the scholastic sense, intentionality is the character apprehension of reality. And it is this apprehension which
which what is intellectively known has, considered only as formally and constitutively is noergic. Retained by reality,
intellectively known. As so known, it is the terminus of we are {71} physically impelled to what is in the field,
an intellective glance. And if something has no entity and are also physically tense in the real thing. The physi-
other than being intellectively known in intention, a cal actuality of the real is physically retentive in its two
scholastic would say that it has only intentional existence. moments of being impelled and reversion.
In contemporary philosophy the idea of intentionality is
not exactly that. For phenomenology, intentionality is not Ultimately, the real in impression retains us in its
a character of an entity intellectively known, but a char- two aspects, individual and within a field, not as aspects
acter of the act of consciousness; consciousness is a “refer- juxtaposed, but in the radical unity of the impression of
ring oneself to” something, a noesis which as such is re- reality. This structure has the double moment of being
ferred to something which is therefore its noema. Now, impelled and of intentum. They are not something added
the intentum of which I am speaking is not intentionality to the impression of reality, but rather constitute the very
in either of those two senses. Both, indeed, are based upon structure of the impression of reality qua of field nature.
the idea of intellection being a glance toward something. As intrinsically and formally of field nature, the impres-
130 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

sion of reality is impelling and is intentum. Conversely, only to the fact that my act of intellection is dynamic, but
being impelled and intentum are what they are only as moreover to the fact that the real sentiently actualized is
structural moments of the impression of reality insofar as actualized in a dynamic duality. {73} This is, I repeat, an
we are, in the field manner, retained in it. intrinsic moment of the sentient actuality of the real. And
as we have already seen, this actualization is what makes
7. This intellective movement, precisely on account
the “saying” possible. The dynamism of the intrinsic du-
of its moment of being impelled, is a movement in dis-
ality of each real thing is what makes possible the move-
tance. And qua intentum, it has a very definite character.
ment of saying something about something else.
Starting “from” a prior real thing and going “toward”
another in a movement oriented across the field of reality: But there is more. The logos with which we here oc-
this is how we apprehend what reality this real thing is. cupy ourselves not only has two “somethings”, and not
Now, as we have still not yet apprehended it, we do not yet only says something about something else: this “saying”
have dual apprehension, but only dual movement toward has a supremely precise character: declaring. And this
it; this is expectation in the most etymological sense of the declaration is a time period in a medium of intellection. It
word, a “looking at from afar” (from which has been de- is the third structural moment of the logos.
rived the meaning of “to expect”). Intellective movement
is formally and constitutively expectant. Expectation is III. The Mediality of Intellection in which the sen-
not a psychological state of general tension in waiting, but tient logos consists. The “saying” of the logos can and in
an intrinsic and constitutive character of intellective fact does adopt many different forms. But for the pur-
movement qua intellective. Expectation is the intellection poses of intellection there is only a declarative “saying”,
of the other in its first presentation of itself as other. It is apophantikos. This is a movement in which something is
a mode of {72} intellection; we intellectively know what a intellectively known from something else by declaring
thing is in reality in a movement from afar, and therefore what the first thing is in reality. What is the basic radical
expectant. One might tend to think that this means that structure of declarative intellection?
we are surreptitiously asking ourselves what the thing is The intellection of the logos moves in the duality of
in reality. But this is not the case: asking is but the pro- a field of reality. But let us recall what this field of reality
positional form of expectation, and not the other way is. Every real thing qua real is open to other real things;
around. We ask because we are intellectively expectant. this is the “towards” as transcendental openness. In virtue
Moreover, we are generally expectant without asking or of this, every real thing is among other real things. This
asking ourselves anything; we simply “are”. The question “towards” of the “among” is what formally constitutes the
is always something intentional; expectation on the other field of reality. As this field is the same in all the things
hand is something noergic. Expectation is intellection as included in it, It follows, as I have said many times, that
distanced in via as intellection. What we expect is what this field takes on a certain autonomy of its own. The
the thing already apprehended as reality is in reality. field is neither a concept nor a relation; it is a physical
This intellective movement is that in which the lo- moment of the real in its actuality. Hence we say that “we
gos’ own “saying” consists. Naturally I am not referring are here-and-now present” in the field of reality. And it is
to “saying” as such but rather to what is said qua said in in this field, in which we now are through {74} primor-
this saying. Logos is sentient intellection in which we are dial apprehension, that we intellectively know, in the field
retained by the real in its field moment, i.e. in the “to- sense, what something is in reality.
wards” of reality. The terminus of this “towards” is The field as reality is that “in” which the logos, “in”
something distanced from the particular real thing which which the differentiating intellection, moves. That is, the
we wish to intellectively know. To this terminus we are field of reality is a field of movement. But of what move-
impelled by the real, but retained by this real to which we ment? Not, to be sure, some kind of movement through
see ourselves turned by this thing itself. Logos is not sim- an empty space—that would be a throwback to the idea of
ply a dual intellection, but one in which this duality is the field as space, and the field is not a spatial field but
intellectively known over some time period, in a move- the field of reality. As the field of reality, the “among”
ment. Intellection is not just dual, but traverses this dis- has many different characteristics, for example that of
tance of the dual. And over this time period, from one physical or vital surroundings. But we are not concerned
terminus to the other, intellection is a movement which with that here; rather, we are concerned with the unity of
consists in saying (or explaining) what one thing is in the “among” as a “towards” of reality. In virtue of it, the
reality from or based on another. The basic radical struc- field is neither a place nor some other thing which con-
ture of the “saying” is movement. Hence I do not refer tains things; it is rather something essentially different: a
 THE SENTIENT LOGOS 131

field which upon being traversed, and in the very act of tain way by itself, is not the same as to intellectively know
traversing, constitutes the intellection; it is the field of it in a social medium. In this aspect society is a medium
intellection. of intellection. It is not something which pertains to what
This field is intellectively known in a dynamic sense. is intellectively known, but it is nonetheless something
But what is thus known is not known only as one more which makes what is so known to be seen in a particular
thing; as we have just said, the field is not a “thing”. Yet way. Moreover, in different media the same intellections
it is something which is intellectively known. How? Not can have different modalities. And I do not refer only to
like an ordinary thing or object, but like something whose the social medium in general, but also to particular ones,
function is not to be seen itself but to make things seen in {76} for example a guild or corporation, whose particular
themselves; it is the “medium” of intellection. What is a medium makes things to be seen in a special way. It is not
medium? And in what does its intellective character con- the same to intellectively know something in a social me-
sist? dium (general or particular) as to intellectively know
something in a religious medium. Society in its diverse
1. ‘Medium’ here is not that by means of which we forms, such as religion, etc., are from this point of view
go from one thing to another; i.e., it is not that by which not what we intellectively know, but something which
we intellectively know one thing starting from another. makes us to intellectively know things. In different media
Were that true, every intellection of the logos would be things are seen in different ways. For this reason I say
mediated or made into a medium by that by means of that the medium is something essential to intellection in
which we know intellectively. That this could occur is all orders.
undeniable; but as the formal character of the logos it is
false because there is also the immediate logos. If I say 2. But if this is true, if the nature of the medium
that this paper I see is in reality white, my logos is imme- profoundly affects the intellection of things, how can one
diate. {75} The “medium” which we are here examining speak of the intellection of a real thing, as we have done
is something different. In making the medium into a me- up to now, viz. as something determined in the field of
dium, or “mediatizing”, there are two apprehensions: (1) reality solely by the thing itself? This is the essential
the apprehension of that by means of which I know intel- problem.
lectively, and (2) the apprehension of its mediatization To answer this question it suffices to consider more
function in virtue of which the apprehension of that to carefully what we have just said about the social, relig-
which this medium mediately leads us is united to the ious, and other media of intellection. These media are
vision of the “thing-in-medium”. But in the medium media because we see things in them, but we see them in
which is of interest here we are not referring to something different ways. But what things? Real things as real.
which is apprehended in some act distinct from its medial Then it is clear that these different media are but different
function; rather, we refer to the fact that what is appre- modalities of what makes me see things as real. To see
hended is only this function itself. The function is not real things in an individual or social medium presupposes
something which is seen but something in which one sees, seeing them medially as real. Thus all the different media
something which allows seeing. Thus light (leaving aside point to a primary medium, a basic medium which makes
psychological questions) and a mirror are not things seen me to know intellectively what things, as real things, are
but things which make other things seen. In reality, this in reality. What is this primary medium?
medium is not seen in a separate, different act from that in To intellectively know real things in a movement
which we see the things which it makes us see. Indeed, in from one to another is to intellectively know them, as we
order to intellectively know the medium as if it were the have seen, in the field of reality. And this means that the
terminus of intellection, it would be necessary to bring field of reality—or rather, reality as field—is just that in
about a type of retortion upon the thing seen; in order to which we intellectively know one thing from others. That
see a perfect mirror a special effort of retortion is neces- is, reality {77} within a field qua reality is the very me-
sary so as to convert it into something seen. Every logos is dium of intellection of the logos. This is what we were
mediated, even if it be immediate. seeking; all the other media are qualifications of this pri-
This concept of a medium is essential in all orders of mary and basic medium, reality within a field qua reality.
intellection. Modern philosophy has considered intellec- Why is this so? The answer is clear: intellectively know-
tion of things to be the result of two factors, so to speak: of ing is the mere actualization of the real as real. In the
intelligence and of the thing itself. But this is inadequate, primordial apprehension of reality we intellectively know
because it is essential to consider the medium of intellec- a thing as real. But the intellection in the field manner is
tion. To intellectively know a thing individually, in a cer- a modalization of the primordial intellection of the real:
132 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

we intellectively know what something is in reality in a foundation of declaration. Such is the structure of the
mediated, not a direct way. Therefore this intellection is declarative logos. Only the mediality of reality as field
just a reactualization. Whence it follows that the field of makes the logos qua declarative possible.
reality, insofar as it concerns our problem, is a field of In summary, the logos as such has a primary, basic struc-
actuality, or better, a field of reactuality. Reality within a ture: it is an intellection within a field, of dual character,
field makes us see the actuality of a real thing from an- dynamic and medial. Logos is a {78} sentient in-
other and in the process reactualizes the real. It is as a tellection in which one declares dynamically, in the me-
field of actualization that reality in the field sense consti- dium of reality within a field, what one thing is in reality,
tutes the primary and basic medium of the intellection of based on another. This is its basic structure. Logos is
the logos; it is reality as medium. sentient logos precisely because it is occurs within a field.
Logos, then, is not only dual and dynamic; it is also Granting that, we now ask about the formal struc-
medial. To see a thing from another while moving in the ture, rather than the radical structure, of this intellection.
field of reality is to actualize the real as physically real in This formal structure has two moments: the dynamic and
the medium of reality. And this reactualization of the real the medial, because duality is ultimately a characteristic of
as real is precisely its “declaration”, the logos apophan- the other two moments. The study of this formal structure
tikos. Medial intellection is declarative intellection. The in its two moments constitutes the subject of the following
field of reality as medium of actualization is the medial two sections.
 {79}

SECTION 2

FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE SENTIENT LOGOS:

I. DYNAMIC STRUCTURE

Even at the risk of monotonous repitition, let us once the real thing to a field, to the field of reality itself.
again take up the thread of our problem. The primordial {80}Impelling is stepping back from what the thing is in
apprehension of reality has as we know the two moments reality. And in fact, in order to intellectively know what a
of individual formality and formality within a field—two thing is in reality, with respect to (i.e., among) others, one
moments of a single, same formality of reality of a thing. must first “stop to consider” the thing. And this stopping
The unity of these two moments, apprehended explicitly to consider is above all a type of intellective suspension, a
and formally, is what constitutes the intellection of what a “stepping back” from the thing but in it and from it itself.
thing is “in reality”. In the primordial apprehension of
On the other hand, in this stepping back the real
reality, the unity of the individual and the field moments
thing keeps us tensively in it, and therefore turned toward
is immediate; and on account of this it is an apprehension
it in an intentum by virtue of the very tension of the dis-
which we might term ‘compact’. In differential actuali-
tance we have taken. It is a movement of the intentum in
zation, the unity in question changes profoundly in char-
order to intellectively know from the field what the thing
acter, because then one intellectively knows one thing
is in reality. Therefore it is a refering of ourselves from
“among” others. And this means that the intellectively
the field to the thing; it is intellective intention. The in-
known thing is so known in the distance that there is be-
tentum has become intention. In the “stepping back” and
tween it and all the others. Whence it follows that the
the intellective intention we have the two moments of in-
field of reality itself is the field of taking distance or
tellective movement.
“stepping back” of the “in reality”. In differential actuali-
zation, the intellection of what a thing is in reality is, In order to study the dynamic structure of this appre-
then, a distanced unfolding by virtue of the presentation hension we must examine:
of one thing “among” others.
In virtue of this, the intellection of what something is Chapter 4: What is “stepping back” from a thing?
in reality is an intellective movement in two phases. Chapter 5: What is intellectively knowing by step-
First, there is the phase of the impelling movement of ping back what a thing is in reality?

133
 {81}

CHAPTER IV

DISTANCING OR STEPPING BACK FROM THINGS

In this intellection, a thing sends us to a field of re- which is impossible. A real thing is the terminus of a
ality in order to intellectively know therein what that primoridial apprehension of its reality; and this very ap-
thing is in reality. In other words, as we have just said, it prehension is what, because it is of reality (but without our
is above all necessary to position oneself at a certain dis- leaving the formality of reality), situates us in the field of
tance from the thing, or to “step back” from it. reality itself as something expressly distinct from individ-
There are then three points to examine: ual reality. This installation in reality itself is the work of
the primordial apprehension of reality, from which it is
impossible to prescind.
1. What is distance? B) But reality itself is not an ocean in which all real
2. What is “stepping back”?* things are submerged; it is only a moment of each real
thing. It is a moment through which each real thing, in
3. What is the structure of that which is apprehended
being real in and by itself, is nonetheless in and by itself
in this act of stepping back?
something “more”. This character of “more” is not a “be-
{82} yond {83} the thing” but rather a “more in the thing”.
Hence distance is only a moment within the thing itself.
§1 We do not go outside of the thing but rather we are “in it”.
Not only do we not go outside of reality, we do not even go
WHAT IS DISTANCE? out of the thing itself; distance is a moment intrinsic to
the thing, something in the thing itself. What is this mo-
ment?
We have seen that every real thing has an individual
moment and a moment within a field; this is the structure C) In this distancing its two moments are not dis-
of its unfolding. When this thing is apprehended in pri- tanced correlatively from one another. What a real indi-
mordial apprehension, the difference between the two vidual thing is in reality is distanced from this reality as
moments is in a way abolished; that is what I have termed individual reality. That is, the reality of an individual
‘compaction’. But when a thing is apprehended “among” thing is maintained as much in its formality of reality as
others, then the unity is just dual. Now, this unity, in un- in its content; but we distance ourselves with respect to
folding, is what formally constitutes distance. Thus ‘dis- what it is “in reality”. That is, we make the field some-
tance’ does not mean a spatial distance, but something thing autonomous, a field which has to be traversed. In
essentially different. Let us make this concept more pre- this distancing the real individual thing is installed in the
cise. field of reality. Therefore, I repeat, we do not go outside
of either the real thing or the field of reality; we remain in
A) First, unfolding is not distance from reality. Were its field moment in order to intellectively know from it
that the case we would be situated “outside” of reality, what, in reality, is its individual moment. Thus we go in
the real thing from its field moment towards its individual
*
[As discussed on p. 124, ‘stepping back’ is used to translate the Spanish moment; we intellectively know it in the field manner, as
tomar distancia, which would literally be rendered in this context as ‘po- being in a field. That is, we traverse the distance as an
sitioning oneself at a distance’. The reader should always bear in mind
that the ‘stepping back’ process is related to the concept of distance which
internal moment of the thing; we traverse the duality as a
Zubiri develops here and elsewhere. - Trans.] unity in unfolding.

135
136 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

This being the case, it is clear that a real thing ap- have seen that what the intellective movement knows in-
prehended among other other real things propels us to the tellectively is not the real qua real, but what the real, al-
field in a very precise manner: it compels us to “position ready understood as real, is “in reality”. I reiterate that it
ourselves at a distance” or to “step back” from the thing. is for this reason that every intellective movement is only
What is this “stepping back”? a modalization of the primoridial apprehension of reality.
{84} 4) That is to say, in retraction we intellectively know
reality itself as something open to what things could be in
it. Hence, to be in this form in reality itself is to be liber-
§2
ated, so to speak, from what the things are in reality. But
this, in accordance with what we said above, is not to
WHAT IS “STEPPING BACK”? abandon them. What we are doing is intellectively
knowing what they may be in reality only as a free termi-
nal point of what reality itself is, i.e., intellectively know-
Naturally, it is to be carried by the thing itself in its
ing that reality itself is this thing. When what the thing is
formality of individual reality to its moment within a field
in reality is thus known, the firm base of this new intel-
differentially autonomized. This motion has several im-
lection is reality itself, and what the real might be in each
portant characteristics.
case is nothing but a mere terminal point of reality itself.
1) First, with respect to what does one step back? In retraction, therefore, we bring about a liberation from
One steps back from the thing in the field of reality pre- the “in reality”, basing ourselves on reality itself. Seeing
cisely as that real thing is in reality. In what way? By what things are in reality is understanding them freely. A
removing ourselves from its unity within the field moment thing as a mere free terminus {86}“isn’t” what the thing
of reality. is in reality, but only what it “might be” in reality.* The
2) The real thing is not thereby eliminated. Quite “might be” is the proper and formal mode by which the
the contrary, since it is the real thing which impels us thing is maintained in retraction. The reality of the ter-
from its individual reality to the field of reality itself. minal qua merely terminal is reality as it “might be”. Real
Hence, this impelling does not consist in abandoning the things, present now only as the terminus of a retractive
real thing, but in maintaining us in it, but only as a point apprehension, have an intrinsic ambivalence. On one
of departure for an intellective unfolding which leaves in hand they pertain to reality, and in virtue of that they are
suspense what that thing is “in reality”. This suspension real in their primordial reality. But on the other hand,
is a particular kind of movement; it is an effort which I what they may be in reality is a merely terminal moment
term retraction. Retraction is intellection of a real thing, of intellection; it is simply what they “might be” in reality.
leaving in suspense what it is in reality. Stepping back, I shall explain this forthwith.
then, is a “movement of retraction”. To be thrust by a 5) In what, more precisely, do these things in retrac-
formally real thing to the field of reality itself is to leave tion consist? In being impelled, intellection is no longer
retractively in suspense what the thing is in reality. primoridial apprehension of reality, but simple apprehen-
3) Thus it is clear that the intelligence, without sion, the mere terminus of intellection. What a thing is
ceasing to be in reality and without abandoning real “in reality” is now simple apprehension. ‘Simple’ here
things, is surely situated in them but in a certain way means being just the terminus of apprehension. Let us
“above” them. {85}In “retraction”, the intelligence is explain in more detail.
situated “above” what things are in reality. The articula- Classical philosophy has always conceived a) that
tion of those two moments, between the moment of re- simple apprehension is apprehension of something which
traction and the moment of being above things, is essen- formally has no character of reality, but on the contrary
tial. Ignorance of it has been the source of a dual error. prescinds from this character; b) that this apprehension is
First, the intelligence “is” not above things through it- the first proper act of any possible intellection; and c) that
self—that was the mistake of all of idealism from Des- the intellection of something formally real is always an
cartes to Schelling, and ultimately Husserl and Heidegger ulterior intellection, viz. judgement. Judgement is thus the
as well. Rather, the intelligence “comes to be” above unique intellection which formally involves the moment
things through a movement of retraction in confronting
them. The “above” is grounded on “retraction”. Sec- *
[‘Might be’ is used in this context to translate the Spanish sería, which as
ondly, that on which intellection “is” is not pure and sim- the conditional literally means ‘would be’, but here has the sense of the
ple reality, but only what real things are “in reality”. We future of probability. - trans.].
 STEPPING BACK FROM THINGS 137

of reality. But these three affirmations are, as I see, it in-

correct. §3

In the first place, simple apprehension does not for- STRUCTURE OF WHAT IS APPREHENDED “AT
mally prescind from the character of reality, but rather A DISTANCE”
formally perseveres in it; the fact is that the apprehended
real is in reality a terminal moment and only a terminal
moment of reality {87} itself. In any simple apprehension This structure poses three serious problems. I have
whatever we apprehend a thing formally as if it were a already spoken of them but they should be set forth clearly
moment of something which really and effectively is a here: What is the origin of a simple apprehension? What
reality. We do not prescind from reality; that would be is the condition of what is simply apprehended? And,
impossible. It is apprehension alone of what the thing What are the modes of simple apprehension?
might be “in reality”. Thus we are not dealing with a
1) The origin of simple apprehension. Consider
retraction from the real qua real, but a retraction from
simple apprehension as such. We are not dealing with
what this thing, formally persevering as real, is “in real-
what, classically, is called the origin of ideas, because not
ity”. And this unity of reality and retraction is what con-
every simple apprehension is an idea. We must confront
stitutes the “might be”. It is not the “might be” of “real-
the problem of the origin of simple apprehension not
ity” but the “might be” of the “in reality”. Hence simple
along the lines of ideas but at its primary root. This ori-
apprehension formally involves the character of reality.
gin, as we have already seen, is an act of retraction im-
Classical philosophy has made of simple apprehension
posed by the real itself primordially apprehended; its field
something which reposes upon itself as the material from
dimension is what imposes that act.
which judgement is composed. That is, it has considered
simple apprehension only as a “material” moment of the A) This retraction does not consist in a simple “pre-
logos as judgement. This conception is the result of the scinding”, because prescinding is always something which
logification of intellection. But simple apprehension for- affects the content of what is apprehended, a content
mally involves reality. Therefore simple apprehension which comprises -- as we shall see forthwith -- both what
cannot be understood as a moment of the logification of is classically called ‘essence’ and what is called ‘exis-
intelligence; on the contrary, the logical moment of simple tence’. But retraction conserves the entire content of a
apprehension should be understood as a mode of actuali- thing as reality; and what it leaves in suspense is not “the
zation, i.e. as a mode of intelligizing of the logos. reality”, but what the thing is “in reality”. Reality contin-
ues to be de suyo, but we do not know what this de suyo is
In the second place, simple apprehension is not the in reality. And this is not an unimportant subtlety. {90}
first proper act of every intellection; rather, each simple
apprehension is but a simple apprehension by “retrac- B) By the field moment of what is primordially ap-
tion”. It is an apprehension “retracted” from a primordial prehended we are thrust toward other things in the field.
apprehension. Hence the first proper act of intellection is These latter are certainly real and are apprehended in a
not simple apprehension but primordial apprehension of primordial apprehension; but through the moment of re-
reality. traction the content of these things ceases to be the con-
tent “of them”, and is reduced to being the principle of
Finally, and in the third place, formal and effective intelligibility of the thing which directed us to them. To
reality is not the patrimony of judgement, but of the pri- be a principle of intelligibility consists in being that with
mordial apprehension of reality. We have already seen respect to which a real thing becomes re-actualized. And
this: the primoridial apprehension {88} of reality is what this is simple apprehension: intellection of a real principle
formally involves the character of reality prior to judge- of intelligibility. The content of these things, then, is not
ment. Considering only simple apprehension, the adjec- the content of a thing but just the principle of intelligibil-
tive ‘simple’ denotes that what a thing is “in reality” is ity of one or more other things.
apprehended only as a terminal moment of reality itself:
C) This movement, and consequently simple appre-
reality itself is here and now, this or that, “in reality”.
hension, takes place within the physical field of reality.
What is the structure of what is apprehended in this But the content of what is simply apprehended in this
act of stepping back which is simple apprehension? movement is in the field only as a principle of intelligibil-
ity. As such, this content “is” not in itself other than the
{89} content of the thing I wish to intellectively know “might
138 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

be”. The “might be” is the character of the content of suyo. And being de suyo is a formality beyond classical
things reduced to a principle of intelligibility. These essence and existence. The existent is real only when
things are not left outside of the field of reality, nor are existence belongs de suyo to it. Otherwise the presumed
they in it as a content which “is”; rather, they are there as existence would not make the thing something real (this is
a principle of what the thing in question “might be”. The what I have termed spectre; it is a subject we cannot get
principle of intelligibility pertains to the field of reality; it into here). To be real is thus structurally prior to existing.
is there that the movement of retraction takes place and Likewise, the unreal is not an essence in the classical
the principle of intelligibility is constituted. If, in primor- sense, because classical essence is formally the essence of
dial apprehension, I see a bulky form, and I do not know what the thing is de suyo. In virtue of this the “dis” of
what it is in reality, I am therefore impelled to things disrealization includes the real thing in toto with respect
which are in the surrounding landscape, for example, to to both its classical existence and essence. The unreal has
the trees. These trees are apprehended in a primordial unreal existence and unreal essence. The character of the
apprehension the same as the bulky form; but considered “dis”, then, leaves intact from this discussion. And the
as what the form “might be” {91} in reality, they have fact is that reality should not be understood as existence
become converted into a merely terminal moment of the nor as essence, but as being “de suyo”. And then unreality
apprehension of what the form is “in reality”. I repeat, consists in a “dis” of the “de suyo”. What does this
this does not mean any type of renunciation of their con- mean?
tent, but rather its reduction to a real principle of intelligi-
In each real thing, in each de suyo, we have distin-
bility. It is a new condition of what, before, was that con-
guished an aspect of individual reality and an aspect of
tent. What is this condition?
field reality which, autonomized, we call “reality itself”.
2) The condition of what is apprehended in simple This is the unfolding; these two moments are first and
apprehension. What is apprehended remains, as we have foremost physical and not just conceptual moments. As
said, as the condition of mere terminus of apprehension as moments, they are different. In the primoridial apprehen-
a principle of intelligibility. Being thus a mere terminus sion of a real thing, we apprehend them unitarily. Since,
is having the content of reality qua content stay sus- however, reality is open in its mode as “towards”, we un-
pended, so that this content is no longer properly speaking derstand being in a field as a distinct moment, in which
real, but unreal. In retraction, what things are in reality the real thing is set apart from other real things in reality
constitutes, so to speak, the sphere of the unreal. Thus itself. This means that it is {93} possible to remain in the
everything depends on what one says is unreality. field even when suspending its unity with a specific indi-
vidual formality. Then we have reality itself as the ambit
Unreality is not just not having reality. If something
but without its own proper individual reality. This “with-
unreal had nothing to do with reality, if would not be “un-
out” is just the negative outline of the positive “dis” of
real” but “a-real”. To be unreal is thus a way of having to
disrealization. Disrealization does not affect what per-
do with the real. This is obvious, indeed, since as we have
tains to the field, to reality itself, but to the real thing in
said, simple apprehension is formally constituted in the
the moment of what it is “in reality”. That is, reality itself
very field of reality as reality. What is this way, then?
is no longer necessarily here and now this real determi-
That is the question. The structure of the unreal is com-
nate thing. Disrealizing is not suspending reality itself,
prised of three moments.
but suspending the content which is real here and now,
a) First, the unreal does not rest upon itself, but upon suspending that in which reality itself is realized. Now,
the real. Everything unreal is constituted by “dis- reality is the de suyo. Hence reality itself is a “de suyo”
realization”. And the “dis” is not a purely negative mo- which de suyo can be realized in this or that thing. The
ment; if it were, I repeat, the thing would not be unreal real thing is no longer de suyo that in which reality itself
but areal. Therefore it is a positive “dis”; it is, so to is realized “in reality”. Thence arises unreality. Unreality
speak, a realization in the form of “dis”. What is this is the dis-realized mode of being in reality itself. It is the
“dis” as a form of realization? To understand that we first moment of unreality. Through this moment the un-
must recall {92} what reality is. One might think, in fact, real involves reality itself. First, it involves it formally,
that to be real is to be existing; from which it would fol- because it can only be unreal by being in reality itself dis-
low that the unreal is what does not have existence and realizedly, i.e. without it necessarily having a determinate
might be only what used to be classically termed ‘es- content. And secondly, the unreal involves reality physi-
sence’. The “dis” would be nullity of existence. But this cally, because in the unreal reality is reality itself which
is impossible, because reality is not existence but being de we apprehend physically in the primordial apprehension
 STEPPING BACK FROM THINGS 139

of any real thing. Reality itself is not a concept or idea or actualized in intellection without content. In virtue of this
anything of that nature; it is the physical field dimen- first moment, that which is apprehended, i.e. the unreal, is
sion—that of being in a field—of real things. It is the really unreal; in virtue of the second moment the unreal is
“physical reality” itself of this landscape, of this rock, or unreally real. The unity of these two moments is what
of this meadow; it is, I repeat, this very physical reality constitutes the unreal, which we express in “might be”.
which is constituted within a field in every simple appre- “Might be” is the unity of an actualization disrealized and
hension of whatever type. In a centaur the reality itself of a free realization. With it the domain of the unreal is
apprehended is the same as in this rock. What is not the characterized. The unreal is thus a free thing, and there-
same is the content. Simple apprehension does not pre- fore a created thing. Creation is creation not of reality but
scind from reality itself {94} as is usually claimed, but of the content in it; correctly understood, a free realiza-
rather involves it formally and physically as reality with- tion. If one desires to speak of ideas (an odious expres-
out its own content. sion, but quite common as I have said), I would say that to
create is not to give reality to my ideas, but just the oppo-
b) This ambit of disrealization is a physical ambit of
site: to give my ideas to reality. Hence the seriousness of
apprehension. And it is in this reality as something
this intellection: physical reality itself comes into play in
physical that the content of every intellective apprehen-
virtue of its content; i.e. what real things are in reality. To
sion lies actualized. Intellection, in which reality itself is
actualize disrealized physical reality in a free content—
actualized, is not an empty intellection but one in which
this is the essence of creation.
the ambit is actualized at the same time that various sim-
ple apprehensions are being elaborated in it. Reality itself To summarize, the apprehension of the real in re-
disrealized in every individual real thing lies actualized in traction from content, i.e. in simple apprehension, has the
the simple apprehensions of my intellection. This is the formal character of unreality. Unreality is the intrinsic
second moment of the unreal: the moment of actualization and formal unity of actualization of physical reality itself
of reality itself in simple apprehensions. and free realization of its content; it is the “might be”.
The “might be” is an unreal mode, not in the grammatical
c) But then, simple apprehension remains in reality
sense but in the sense of reality itself in the mode of its
itself, though freely realized and reduced to an intellective
free content. {96}
principle of what the content of reality itself “might be”.
Realization is actualization of something as content of Granting this, we may ask what are the modes of
reality itself. It is therefore a liberated realization, and is simple apprehension, i.e., what are the structural modes of
like the inverse of that actualization of reality itself. It is intellection of the unreal. That is the third point we
also the third moment of unreality. In virtue of being a wanted to examine.
realization that “might be”, it is a realization which is 3) The structural modes of simple apprehension.
constitutively free. The unreal is not some mental object Reality itself is preserved physically and formally as the
treated as if it were real, nor is it a physical thing; rather it ambit of free creation of the unreal. But neither disreali-
is a free thing. This does not mean that I freely consider zation nor creation are absolute. They are a movement
this content to be real, but rather just the opposite: I con- which is always based upon a real thing, but which can be
sider freely that the physical reality in a field “is thus”, based on different dimensional moments of it. In that
i.e., that it has this determinate content. For example, the movement, these moments are actualized. As moments
real in fictional writing does not consist in being a fiction they pertain to every real thing, but the movement of dis-
of reality, nor in feigning reality, but as we shall see realization actualizes them explicitly and formally in in-
forthwith consists in being reality in fiction. What we tellection. And in accordance with these moments, the
feign is the content of the reality. Reality itself remains movement of disrealization confers different characters of
freely actualized in something which is realized {95} in unreality upon simple apprehension. There are different
it. That from which it is free is not reality itself but its types of simple apprehension which are not numerically
determinate content. distinct, but are distinct structural moments of reality it-
Actualization of reality itself, and the free realization self as the ambit of free creation. Those dimensions are
in it of what is intellectively known, are the two moments three, and they constitute in a positive way, and in their
which intrinsically and jointly comprise the character of radical unity, the definition of what I have called being “in
disrealization in a positive way. Of these two positive reality”. These dimensions of a real thing are, as I said,
moments, the second is grounded upon the first: the con- three.
tent is realized because physical reality itself has been A) Most importantly, the first thing which can be
140 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

disrealized in a freeing retraction is the content of the pect of a percept is a creation. This creation clearly does
complete real thing. It is not the thing prescinds from not concern the content of the thing itself qua real, but
reality itself, but reality itself terminates freely in this does concern its “thisness” reduced to a percept. When
thing as that which this thing “might be” in reality. In “this” content is reduced to a percept, the “this” is a strict
virtue of this, the real thing is actualized in a dimension aspectual creation; it is the perceptual creation of the
proper to itself: being “this”. Here “this” is not an adjec- “this”.
tive, i.e. “this” thing, but a noun (i.e., “this” insofar as it
To summarize, when apprehended at a distance by
is a “this-ness”). Apprehending “this” thing is what con-
stepping back, a thing is in reality the terminus of a sim-
stitutes the primordial apprehension of reality, {97} for
ple apprehension which actualizes it to us as a “this” in a
example, perception. Now, the “this-ness” pointed to of
free and creative movement of reduction of this thing to
“this” thing, when disrealized, is the “this” no longer
its “thisness”, a mere percept. That is what “this” might
“qua real” but “qua perceived”; it is the “this” of the thing
be in reality.
qua mere terminus of perception. It is the “this” qua mere
terminus of perception that I shall call percept. The first B) But in the liberating retraction, a thing is in real-
form of simple apprehension reduces the content of the ity disrealized in another dimension. Every “this” is a
thing to a percept. It is not a percept of reality, but reality unitary system of real notes. In accordance with this uni-
itself in percept. It is reality itself terminating freely in tary system, the thing is not a mere complex of random
“this”. The point must be emphasized, because classical notes, but of those notes systematized in a certain “man-
philosophy, regardless of its notion of simple apprehen- ner”, so that if they were systematized in a different man-
sion, never included percept among its simple apprehen- ner it would no longer be the same thing but something
sions. As I see it, not only ought percept to be included else. That is, a real thing in its “thisness” has in addition
among simple apprehensions, but it is in fact the primary to its notes the “how” of its systematization. When the
form of them and the very possibility of every other simple “this” is reduced to a percept, it retains its “perceptual
apprehension. how”. Now, I can withdraw so to speak, liberating myself
in the “thisness” itself from its own “how”. Simple ap-
This percept as such is a free creation. To be sure, prehension is then free to create the “how”. To be sure, I
its content is given to me. But reducing this content to am not limited to creating the “how” by leaving the notes
just a percept is my act of liberation. I have liberated the intact; rather, the notes deriving from perceptions can
“this”, I have liberated it from the real thing qua real. then be freely created in order to make a {99}new “how”
Moreover, it is a very concrete liberation. from them. The terminus of this creative intellective
This is because the liberating reduction is not an ar- movement of the “how” is a feigned “how”, something
bitrary act carried out in a vacuum, but a liberation fictitious, a fictum. The fictitious is formally fictitious of a
brought about “in” the apprehension of a primary real “how”; the simple apprehension of a thing as a fictitious
thing as real from another thing to which I have with- “how” is fiction.
drawn. Only when seen from this latter thing is the con- Let us clarify a point. Fiction is above all something
tent disrealized. Liberation and therefore disrealization unreal in the sense that it is disrealized. Therefore fiction
are only possible in a differential actualization; and in is a fictitious thing but still “in” reality. It formally in-
virtue of that are only possible as a function of some volves the physical moment of reality, that moment appre-
things determined within the actualization as a field. It is hended in impression of reality. The fiction, as I have
only possible when one thing is referred to the rest. And already said, is not a “fiction of reality” but “reality in
this reference always has an aura of liberty, because if I fiction”. Reality itself is not feigned, but only that reality
had moved toward a different thing, the aspect might have itself is “thus”. It is the “how” reality itself “might be”,
been different as well. The simple apprehension of a real i.e., how the thing might be in reality.
thing {98}as a mere percept is (1) an act which I freely
In the second place, the fictional work is something
execute, and (2) that which is actualized in it has an in-
freely created, but it is doubly free. The work has its own
trinsic character of liberty of “ad-spection”, or if one
“this” which is also something unreal, something disreal-
wishes, of inspection.
ized, as in the case of the percept. But its “thisness” is
This movement is not only “free”, it is a free “crea- only the notes which constitute it. These notes are given,
tion”, because a real thing is certainly a “this”, but re- but reduced to a mere perceptual “this”. So we have the
ducing the “this” to a mere percept is a creation in the first side of the unreality of a fictional work, namely the
rigorous sense. All free “ad-spection”, i.e. every free as- unreality of its notes. Therein the unreality comes to-
 STEPPING BACK FROM THINGS 141

gether with the percept; but only with respect to the notes mensions of what—without making any special assump-
considered each by itself: they are unreal “this-notes”. tions whatever —I would call the configuration of a thing.
Moreover, the fictional work has freely created the “how”, But this configuration refers to a more precise dimension,
something not done by the percept. The percept is the to what is the thing thus configured. The “what” is the
whole thing given and reduced to a percept. In the fic- third dimension of things actualized when apprehended at
tional work the “how” itself is reduced. That is the sec- a distance, by stepping back. In retraction the “what” as
ond side of the unreality of the fictional work; it is a crea- such is now actualized. In the primordial apprehension of
tion of the second degree, so to speak. The notes are reality there is a “what”, certainly, just as there is a “this”
made unreal separately and recomposed in a free “how”; and a “how”. But these three dimensions are unitarily
this is free recombination. But it is not a recombination compact in a thing which is directly apprehended as real.
in a vacuum; rather, the most free of the fictional crea- Only in simple apprehension at a distance can they actu-
tions is always oriented by the “how” of real things {100} ally be discriminated: this, how, and what. Now, when a
in order to feign them in some way, whether being like thing is disrealized by free retraction, its “what” is made
them, different from them, or even opposite to them. unreal and reduced to a mere “what” qua apprehended; it
What does not happen and cannot happen is a fictional is exactly what we term concept. A concept is not some-
work which has nothing to do with something previously thing primarily logical but something primarily real; it is
apprehended as real. the “what-concept”. A concept formally and physically
involves reality; it is physical reality itself as if it were
In the third place, this fictional work is not—as one
this “what”: we conceive what a thing might be in reality.
might think and as is often stated—an image produced by
Reality itself, I repeat, is not an intentional but a physical
the creative imagination. Creative imagination is some-
moment, the moment of reality apprehended in primordial
thing animals also possess. An animal has imaginary
apprehension. A concept is, then, reality terminated in a
creations based on stimuli. What the animal does not
free “what”. Hence it is not “concept of reality” but “re-
possess is intellective apprehension of the creation of what
ality in concept”. Then the simple apprehension in re-
was imaginatively created. The animal lacks the moment
spect to intellection at a distance is conception. The con-
of reality. The fictional work is “reality in fiction”; it is
cept is what is conceived in the conception. This is not
“how” a thing might be in reality. Therefore I term this
tautological: the concept is the “what” of a thing reduced
intellective apprehension fantasy; it is a fantastic intellec-
to a mere terminus of conception. {102}
tion. Animals do not have fantasies in this sense. Man
does with his imagination what the animal cannot do: This concept is an unreal terminus (in the sense al-
fantasize. The essence of “human” imagination is fantasy. ready explained). It is reality itself in its mere “might be”
To contrast the fictional work in this sense to what is terminal. And the movement which disrealizes the “what”
imagined, I reserve for the fictional work the word phan- and reduces it to a mere concept is a free and creative
tasm in its etymological sense. movement. Let us examine this more closely.
And in the fourth place, simple apprehension of a a) It is above all a liberating movement of the “what”
real thing as fictional is an act of strict sentient intellec- as made unreal. It does not tell us what a real thing is,
tion. It is intellection, because it is the intellective appre- because our intellection is still taking a step back. And in
hension of “how” the thing might be in reality. It is sen- this distance we have the inexorable freedom of conceiv-
tient because the imagination is the sentient moment of ing the “whats” in and by themselves. This does not refer
this intellection. In its unity, this sentient intellection is to any effort to ascertain which of those “whats” the real
the simple sentient apprehension of a thing in accordance thing is as dually apprehended. That will come later.
with how it might be in reality; it is the fictional thing, the Now we are in the simple apprehension conceiving of
phantasm. those “whats” qua termini of apprehension. In the ambit
of stepping back we freely conceive the “whats”. These
Simple apprehension at a distance actualizes for us,
“whats” are, in fact, what reality itself “might be”. This is
then, two dimensions of a real thing: the “this” and the
a free movement. But its freedom is bounded by the pri-
“how”. Free expectant intellection has respectively the
mordial apprehension of reality from which we have
two forms of percept and fictional work. They are the first
started in the dual apprehension. We always conceive
two forms of simple apprehension. {101}
“what” a thing, apprehended “from” one or more others
C) But there is still more. In the liberating retraction previously apprehended, might be. It is the first real thing
it is not just the “this” and the “how” which are actualized which orients us “toward” the conception of what “might
in a stepping back, because “this” and “how” are two di- be”, because despite being free, no conception is an act of
142 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

freedom in vacuo. It is a freedom which gives us things sion here not to designate the “construct state”* but as an
apprehended in the primordial apprehension of reality in everyday synonym for something constructed. Tradition-
order to conceive the rest. And therefore it is a freedom ally philosophy has thought that concepts are abstract,
circumscribed both with respect to its point of departure that they are abstracted from real things. That is correct.
and the goal to which it is directed. But the truth is that the majority of concepts, especially
scientific concepts, are not just abstracted but are con-
b) This liberating movement is creative. What it
structed by the intelligence itself. Intellection of concepts
creates is the form in which the field of reality is actual-
is in itself constructive intellection. The “what-concept”
ized and the form in which real things in it are. The
is reality in construction. In a fictional work we are al-
“what” reduced to a mere concept is the “might be”, and
ready present at a first manner of construction, viz. the
is so in two forms. {103}
combination of notes in the work. But here the construc-
In the first place, it is an abstract “what”. In this as- tion has another aspect, because it does not operate on
pect, the disrealization of a conception is abstraction. separate notes but only on “prescinded” notes, on abstract
Abstraction should not be confused with any sort of ex- notes. Hence the outcome is no longer a fictional work
traction. Extraction is a “division” into parts; its outcome but a concept, a “what”. To be sure, these two ways of
is a “thing-extract”. Abstraction does not divide one part construction are not necessarily independent. I can cer-
from another but, upon intellectively knowing one or more tainly construct a fictional work following the thread of a
of them, “prescinds” from the others. It is a “precision” contructed concept; this, for example, is what happens in
in the etymological sense of prescinding. The outcome is physico-mathematical construction. I can for now but
then an “abstract”. This precisive movement qua move- allude to the problem without stopping to treat it in detail.
ment is what is essential to abstraction. Generally, when
In the movement of retraction, in which the real is
speaking of abstraction, one pays attention only to the
reduced to a mere concept, we have the third form of sim-
outcome, to what is “abstracted”, thus emphasizing the
ple apprehension in reality itself.
negative aspect of the process, viz. prescinding. No at-
tention is paid to the “abstraction” itself. Qua abstraction, This movement is a free and creative movement. We
it is a movement, essentially positive and creative; it is the are habituated to seeing concepts organized, as if their
creation of the very ambit of the “abs” as ambit of unreal- organization were already logically preordained—once
ity. The form as reality itself terminates in a “what” re- again the logification of intellection. To understand this
duced to a concept; this becomes the ambit of the “abs”. it suffices to consider the organization of {105} concepts
The abstract is the outcome of this abstraction. This ab- according to genera, differences, and species. Its expres-
stractive movement is freely creative, because every ab- sion is the definition. To say that man is animal “and”
straction requires a direction and is brought to completion rational is not a definition. In order to be so, it is neces-
in that direction. Moreover, this direction is never univo- sary that the concept of “animal” be the genus, that the
cally determined. For example, if we abstract what we difference be “rational”, and that the “species” then be
conceptualize to be the “what” of a man, we can do it in man. But this is a free construction. To achieve it, a man
several different ways: with respect to his animal-like fig- whom we apprehend in primordial apprehension of reality
ure, his psycho-animal functions (language, etc.), his per- has directed us to other things also apprehended in pri-
sonal nature, the character of his collectivity, etc. Along mordial apprehension of reality, and it is from these other
each of these lines the “what” created by abstraction turns things that we go on to form the generic concept. Now,
out to be formally distinct from the others. Abstraction these other things are freely chosen. If I choose “animal”
involves a precise intellective direction. What this direc- as the thing toward which I refer the man apprehended in
tion does is to create, in a qualitative sense, the ambit of primordial apprehension, then clearly “animal” can dis-
the “abs”. It is not sufficient to consider the abstract char- charge the function of genus. “Animal” might be a genus
acter of the result. This abstractive movement prescinds which is differentiated into “rational” and “irrational”.
from notes, but does not prescind from {104} the formal- But this choice of “animal” is perfectly free. I could
ity of reality within a field. Therefore the abstract is not choose as genus simply “rational”. Then “rational” might
an “abstracted from reality” but “reality in abstraction”. be the genus, while “animal” might be a simple differ-
But, in the second place, the “what-concept” is not ence. “Rational” might be divided into “animal” and
only abstract; it is also a construct. I employ this expres- “spiritual”. This was basically the conception of Origen,

*
[A linguistic term referring to the grammar of the Semitic languages.-
trans.]
 STEPPING BACK FROM THINGS 143

that man might be a soul, purely spiritual, which has apprehended in simple apprehension as “concept”. These
fallen into a material animal. The strict conceptualizaion are the three forms of intellection of simple apprehension
of what is apprehended in primordial apprehension is, at a distance, the three forms of impelling actualization of
then, the outcome of a free and creative movement. the intellection of the real as differentiating.
To summarize, we have inquired about the mode of Now, what we insist on calling ‘being “in reality”’
intellection of a real thing in reality itself, in the field of formally consists in the unity of the “this”, the “how”, and
reality. This intellection has the character of a dual ap- the “what”. Here we have what a thing is “in reality”; or
prehension, and hence a character grounded in the un- rather, what the thing “might be” in reality. The real is
folding, within each real thing, of its “reality” and its “in apprehended in primordial apprehension. What reality
reality”. We have then posed the problem of the internal might be is this same reality intellectively known as “this,
structure of an intellection in this unfolding. And the first how, what”. This intellection can be just a retraction; that
thing which must be said is that we are dealing with a is what the “might be” expresses.
{106}movement of retraction in which we step back from
what each thing, apprehended in primordial apprehen- But in this stepping back, and with this utilization of
sion, is in reality. In this retraction we intellectively know percepts, fictions, and concepts, the intelligence turns
in a simple apprehension what the thing might be. What expectantly from its free creation to real things from
the real thing is in which reality itself terminates is which it has stepped back, intent on intellectively know-
therefore the apprehension of the real in unreality. This ing them not merely as a terminus of apprehension, i.e.,
“stepping back” actualizes expressly three dimensions of not merely as terminus of what a real thing “might be”,
each real thing: its “this”, its “how”, and its “what”. but as it “is” in reality. The intentum is thus something
These three dimensions, reduced from the real thing to the different from a simple apprehension. {107} It is no
terminus of simple apprehension, give rise to three forms longer creation, but affirmation. The expectation leads,
of simple apprehension: the percept, the fiction or fictum, by stepping back, in the roundabout way of simple appre-
and the concept. The “this” is apprehended in a simple hension, to an affirmation. This is the intellection of what
apprehension as “percept”; the “how” is apprehended in a real thing is in reality, an intellection in stepping back.
simple apprehension as “fictitious”, and the “what” is The intentum in now an affirmative intellection.
 {109}

CHAPTER V

INTELLECTION THROUGH “STEPPING BACK” FROM WHAT A REAL

THING IS IN REALITY

The intellective movement, as I remarked above, has just a material “within”, so to speak. We are not talking
two phases. First is the movement that impels from a real about the fact that we are within the real; rather the
thing to a field, to the field of reality, in which what the “within” is a “within” which is formally such, i.e., this
thing is in reality is left at a distance through a disrealiz- intellection is expressly and formally intellectively know-
ing retraction. It is the movement in whose intellection ing the real in a movement of intellective return to what
we intellectively know by simple apprehension what the the real is in reality, that is, in a formal movement of real-
real thing “might be” in reality (percept, fictum, concept). ity. Simple apprehension is a retractive intellection from
The intellective movement has a second phase. The real what a thing “might be” to what it “is” in reality. But
thing which has impelled us from itself to reality itself in always “in reality”.
a field constrains us tensely there; it is the phase of the
What is this intellection? The question is more
movement of return to the real thing, the intentum for
complicated than one might think, because intellection
intellectively knowing, from the field, what this thing “is”
can take on a variety of forms. Moreover, in each of them
in reality out of the sphere of what it “might be”. This
affirmation can have different modes as well. Therefore
intellection is then a discernment, a krinein, a judging.
we must address three groups of questions:
Dual apprehension has lead us to intellectively know what
a real thing is in reality in a movement of retraction to-
ward what this thing “might be” in reality, and in a re- 1. What is affirming?
verse movement which leads us by stepping back (i.e.,
“distanced”) and with discernment to intellectively know 2. What are the forms of affirmation?
what the thing in fact “is” {110} in reality, i.e., to a 3. What are the modes of affirmation?
judgement. It is this which we must now study.
{111}
A judgement is an “affirmation”. The intentum ac-
quires from the field the character of affirmative intention
§1
of what the thing is or is not in reality. This “in reality” is
the unity of the “this, how, and what” which generally
(though not always or primarily) is expressed in the “is”.
WHAT IS AFFIRMING?
Therefore our problem is the study of the structure of af-
firmation as such.
‘Affirmation’ here means a “firm” intellection as
Affirmation, as I said, is an intellection which re- opposed to the “retracted” intellection constituting simple
turns, distanced from (stepping back from) what the real apprehension. Stepping back distends or relaxes, so to
thing is in reality. It is not just a return to the real thing, speak, the intellection of what the real is. Affirmation is
as if the thing had been left abandoned; rather, it is a non- affirming to ourselves intellectually what is the real in that
abandonment of the real, and therefore concerns an intel- stepping back, in that distension. It is always and only
lective return within the real itself. This “within” is not that which is intellectively known that is affirmed “at a

145
146 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

distance” or by stepping back in the process of return. Here we meet up with a second conception much
What is this affirmation? more general than the previous one: to affirm is to say “A
is B”. B is the predicate, but as is well known, I can and I
Two concepts of affirmation have been put forth,
should include B in the “is”, and then the predicate is “is
both of which are false, in my opinion, though for differ-
B”. {113} Judging would then be predicating of A “being
ent reasons.
B”. This is the venerable conception of Aristotle which,
In the first place it has been thought, especially since with more or less important variants, has run throughout
Descartes, that to affirm something is “to believe” that the course of history. It is, as I see it, a conception which
what is affirmed is so. Affirmation would thus be belief. is also inadmissible for two reasons. In the first place, it
This conception can assume various shades of meaning is assumed that affirming is “saying”. But what is under-
depending upon one’s understanding of belief. It can be stood by “saying”? Certainly no one, not even Aristotle
understood as a mere sentiment, so that affirming would himself, thinks that here “saying” can be expressed in
be the expression of an intellectual sentiment. Or it can some language. But the question remains: what is the
be understood not as a sentiment but as a decision of the intellective nature of the saying as saying? There is no
will; thus affirming would be the expression of a volition. alternative but to appeal to affirmation qua affirmative
This was above all the idea of Descartes, for whom, as a intention: saying would be having “affirmative intention”.
consequence, the problem of truth is but the problem of And this is conceptualized as something irreducible. But,
the good of the intelligence, and falsehood would be its is it really something irreducible? And above all, in what
sin. Finally, one can understand that belief, without be- would its irreducibility consist? That this question has not
coming a strict act of volition, is at least an act of admis- been rigorously posed constitutes a serious defect of the
sion: to affirm would be to admit something. But in any whole conception, as I see it. Indeed, it has been admitted
one of these forms, the conception seems to me incorrect, without further ado that judging is affirming; without
because on a different level, all of them {112} and any questioning formally what the affirming is. Secondly,
related ones minimize the intellective aspect of affirma- affirmation is identified with the predication “A is B”.
tion. And the fact is that upon saying that A “is” for ex- And this, as we shall soon see, is formally false regardless
ample B, the questions inevitably arise what is it that is of what conception one has of the predicate (whether “B”
believed, what is it that is decided, what is it that is ad- or “is B”). Not every affirmation is predicative. But that
mitted. Strictly speaking, what is believed or decided or is a subject which concerns not affirmation in itself but
admitted is that “something A is B”. In virtue of this, what I have called forms of affirmation, which I shall treat
prior to the whole gamut of modes of belief, there is that subsequently.
which is believed, decided, or admitted: “something is B”.
With this we are at the point of being able to formu-
And in this “something is B” in itself is what the affirma-
late our problem precisely. In the first place, we are not
tion consists. Affirmation does not consist in believing.
concerned with what assertion might be, but with what
This “something is B” is a formally intellective act.
affirmation is. In the second place, we are not concerned
There is always a serious ambiguity when one speaks of
with the various kinds of concrete affirmations, but with
judgement. On one hand, judging can mean the psychical
the function of affirming itself—just as in previous chap-
act, that mental act which, so to speak, we may term as-
ters, when treating of intellection, I did not refer to vari-
sertion. In this sense, judging is asserting. But there is a
ous kinds of intellections but only to what intellective
more radical and deeper meaning of judging, namely
knowing consists in, {114} to the function of intellective
judgement as affirmative intention, affirmation. Assertion
knowing itself. Hence we shall now ask not about the
and affirmation are not the same. Assertion is a mental
various kinds of concrete affirmations but about the func-
act of mine, whereas affirmation is the intellective inten-
tion of affirming as such.
tion independently of whether or not it be asserted by me.
Moreover, the affirmative intention forms the possibility Affirming, as we have said, is intellective knowing
for assertion; only because there is an affirmation, only in a movement of return; i.e., the intellection itself is now
because there is an affirmative intention, can there be an formally dynamic. To understand that we must clarify two
assertion. In fact the same affirmation can be the terminus points: (1) in what the movement of affirmation qua
of different modes of assertion. Now, here we are refer- movement consists, and (2) in what the intellection itself
ring only to affirmation as affirmative intention. I shall in this movement consists. They comprise the two essen-
employ the word ‘affirmation’ in this sense, in absolute tial questions —affirmation qua intellective movement,
contradistinction to ‘assertion’. In what does this af- and intellective movement qua affirmation. Affirmation
firmation consist? only is necessary and possible in a field-based intellection,
 INTELLECTION AT A DISTANCE THROUGH S
“ TEPPING BACK” 147

i.e. in sentient intellection. A non-sentient intelligence the intentum of each thing. It is not intention of intellec-
would apprehend the truth of our judgement, but would tion, but intellective intention. Judgement therefore {116}
not apprehend it in the form of an affirmation. The logos is of formally dynamic nature qua intention. The inten-
qua affirmation is constitutively and essentially sentient; it tion itself is formally dynamic.
is sentient logos. In what follows I shall speak in general As I see it, failure to consider formally the dynamic
about affirmation as sentient logos, prescinding from the character of judgement is one of the most serious errors in
fact that simple apprehension pertains to it; i.e., I shall the philosophy of human intelligence from Kant to the
speak of the logos only as judgement. present. Intellectual dynamism has not been a subject
1) First of all, then, what is affirmation qua move- other than in that dynamism called ‘dialectic’, i.e., rea-
ment? Even at the risk of monotonously repeating the soning. Dialectic, as usually understood, is that move-
same idea, let me state that affirmation is an intentum. ment constituting the reasoning process. It has been em-
This intentum is not in itself noetic but noergic; it is the phasized that the intelligence can go from some intellec-
dynamic tension of returning to the real, formally already tions to others by combining them suitably; and the first
within reality, within this particular real thing. With it dialectical laws of this process have been rigorously es-
the intentum has been converted from a movement at a tablished. But no one has asked why this happens. Is it
distance within reality, to a movement “toward” the thing; just a simple fact? I do not think so. I believe that the
it is intention. This intention is, then, an internal moment intellective movement of reasoning is founded in some-
of the intentum. It is no longer a mere “being tense” but a thing constitutive of a mode of intellection, the intellec-
“movement towards” what the real thing is in reality. tion qua stepping back and returning, i.e., the affirmative
{115} The intention is a moment of the reversive intentum intellection. Therefore this movement is not a mere fact,
at a distance, i.e. from reality itself to what, through step- but something anchored in a structural moment of af-
ping back (i.e., at a distance), it is “in reality”. Intention firmation, namely, in stepping back. This stepping back is
then is not something purely noetic because it is a moment not something peculiar to dialectical reasoning, but a
of the intentum, which is noergic. Intentionality is thus structural moment of every affirmation. Dialectical
the physical ergon of intellection in stepping back, i.e., at movement of reasoning should have been founded upon
a distance. The moment of returning is a formally con- the structure of affirmation as stepping back. Aristotelian
stitutive moment of affirmation. Intellection, in stepping philosophy has never asked about this structure; it went
back, must fill up that stepping back, and do so in a very astray on the matter of distance and stepping back, i.e., on
precise way, viz. by movement. Every stepping back, in the basic radical structure of the logos. What is dynamic
fact, should be gone through. Otherwise the distinction in dialectical reasoning is founded in, and is a conse-
between what a thing is as real and what it is in reality quence of, the dynamic character of affirmation. It was
would not be a “distance”; it would be at best mere sepa- necessary to have started from this latter, because not only
ration. And that is wrong. dialectic but affirmation itself is structurally dynamic. To
be sure, Kant saw in dialectic something more than a
To be gone through is formally constitutive of dis-
mere combination of affirmations; {117} but he opted to
tance, of stepping back. Therefore intellective going
make a simple logical system out of that combination.
through of distance is formally constitutive of affirmation.
With regard to our present question, the position of Kant
To affirm is to “go” from one thing to another “among”
concerning affirmation as such is, strictly speaking, the
the rest. The “among” of differential actualization of the
same as that of Aristotle.
real is a distantial “among”. To affirm is to come to in-
tellectively know what a thing is in reality, but based upon For other philosophies, e.g. that of Hegel, dialetical
others. It is a “coming to” and not a merely “being in” it. movement is more than a fact; it is the formal structure of
But let us avoid a possible mistake which would be very intellection. Hegelian dialectic is not the movement of
serious. The “coming to” is not a movement which con- some affirmations to others, but the dynamic structure of
sists in going from one intellection to another, but rather a intellection as such. But this view, as I see it, is just as
movement which consists in the very mode of actually unacceptable as that of Aristotle, and is so for the same
intellectively knowing each thing. It is not a “coming to reason but with a different emphasis. Clearly, movement
affirm” but an “affirming by coming” or “coming by af- is a structural character of intellection, not a mere fact.
firming”, a movement which constitutes intellection in the But it is a structural character not of intellection as such
coming itself. In other words, the movement constituting but only of distanced intellection. Just as in Aristotle,
intention is not the intention of directing me to one thing there is absent in Hegel the moment of stepping back.
after another, but the intentional intellective movement of This stepping back, this taking of distance, in fact is not a
148 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

moment of intellection in the abstract, but something ping back in the field of the real. Affirmation formally
which only applies to a sentient intellection. Now, sen- but also constitutively involves the impression of reality.
tient intellection can apprehend the real in and by itself It is sentient logos in virtue of being basically and for-
without any stepping back, and therefore without move- mally constituted by the impression of reality. Hence,
ment. Only when sentient intellection intellectively affirmation not only does not add anything to the primor-
knows at a distance do we have movement. The dialecti- dial apprehension of reality, but in fact is an “indebted”
cal dynamism is, then, a structural moment of intellection; mode (because it is “grounded”) of being intellectively in
but only of affirmative intellection, because this, and only what has been already intellectively known as real. It is a
this, is distanced intellection, intellection by stepping distended mode of being already in the real. It is a mo-
back. Intellection in itself is not dynamic. dalization of the primordial apprehension. Therefore af-
For Aristotle, then, dynamism is just a characteristic firmation, which in certain respects is an unfolding, an
of reasoning and not a structural moment of affirmative expansion, of the primordial apprehension of the real, is
intellection. For Hegel, dynamism is a structural moment nonetheless something founded in a “reduction” of the
of intellection, but of intellection as such. In both con- primordial apprehension of the real, because it is a disten-
ceptions {118} the idea of distance and stepping back is sive mode of intellective actualization of the real. It is
absent and therefore I believe that they are unacceptable. essential, in my view, to stress this reductive, distensive
Stepping back is a structural moment, but only with re- character of affirming as a mode of being intellectively in
spect to affirmative intellection. the real. Affirming is intellective actualization in which
something is intellectively known which is real, but
In what does this affirmative intention consist, not as through returning from a stepping back. It is because of
movement but as affirmation? this, ultimately, that the conceptions of judgement as a
2) Intellective movement qua affirmation. This “relation” are wrong. A relation adds, but affirmation
movement is the logos. I repeat: we do not deal with par- adds nothing; on the contrary, it moves distendedly in
ticular affirmations but with affirmation in the sense of what already is intellectively. Affirmation not only adds
function of affirming as such. One usually considers af- nothing, but in a certain way it subtracts, in that mode of
firming as something “added”, so to speak, to the appre- subtraction which is distension. All of those attempts to
hension of things, an addition which consists in a type of characterize affirming as something added to apprehen-
internal intellectual “attack” in which the intelligence sion, and as something irreducible to it, are in my view
“decides” to affirm something as real. Now, neither of vitiated at their root. Simple apprehension is already a
these two characteristics (being added and being the out- retraction, not of the real, but in the real; and affirming is
come of an “attack”) describes in a rigorous way what a being in the real but intellectively known {120} in this
affirming is, what intellective movement as affirmation is. stepping back, i.e., in a reduced form, a being distended.
Affirmation is not reducible to simple apprehension. And
A) In the first place, consider affirming as “added” not only is it irreducible to primordial apprehension;
to the apprehension of things. What apprehension is rather, one intellectively knows in it distendedly; distend-
meant? If one means simple apprehensions, then affirm- edly, but in it. It is a reduced and distended mode in the
ing is certainly something “more”; it is much “more” than primordial apprehension of reality, i.e., in something al-
simple apprehension. But the fact is that judgement is not ready intellectively known in its reality. Affirmation, to
based primarily upon simple apprehension, but upon the be sure, is formally in reality, but is not the reason why
primordial apprehension of the real. Now, affirming is affirming is the primary and radical mode of being intel-
“more” than simple apprehension, but it is “less”, much lectively in reality; that, rather, is because affirming is a
“less”, than the primordial apprehension of reality. Every reduced and distended mode within a prior intellectively
intellection is an intellective actualization of the real, and being “existing” in reality. By this I do not mean that a
as we saw in Chapter I, in primordial intellection we ap- determinate judgement is a type of “contraction” of what
prehend something not only as if it were real, but as “the” judging would be; rather, I refer to the function of
something which is formally and truly real and which is judging as such. It is not only “a judgement” but “the
apprehended as real. And in this being “real” of what is judging” as such, affirming as such, which is a reduced
intellectively known in a primordial apprehension, in an form of intellection, a reduction and a modalization of
apprehension prior to any affirmation, in this “real”—I that radical and primary form of intellection which is the
repeat—is where affirmation as such intellectually moves. primordial apprehension of reality.
{119} Affirmation, in fact, does not arise except when
what is already apprehended as real is distended by step- B) Moreover, this intellection is neither added nor
 INTELLECTION AT A DISTANCE THROUGH “STEPPING BACK” 149

does it consist in a type of “intellective attack” which “de- said, there are many ways of asserting the same affirma-
cides” what is real; nor is it a “diving in” as it were, in tion. Moreover, assertion as such is made possible by af-
order to pledge oneself to what one takes to be real. Just firmation as such. Affirmative intention is, in fact, at a
the opposite. Let us recall, once again, that we are not distance by stepping back, and distended; and it is on ac-
referring to concrete affirmations but to the function of count of that that it opens the mental ambit of assertion,
affirming as such. Now, intelligence is already formally the ambit of “maneuvering room”, so to speak, of asser-
in reality; therefore it does not have to “go forth” to real- tion. Assertion is a spontaneous attitude of mine; but this
ity. Rather, it is already moving intellectively in reality. spontaneity is possible through the “maneuvering room”
Affirmation does not consist in installing ourselves in of affirmation and only through it. What has led to confu-
reality, affirming that something is real, but in being al- sion between asserting and affirming is the dynamic char-
ready anchored in reality and intellectively knowing if this acter of affirming. The fact is that affirmative movement,
reality is “thus” in reality. It is actually being in reality affirmative dynamism, has a precise character, viz. a
{121} discernedly in sentient intellection. If I must af- movement in reality, but a movement in outline or sketchy
firm, it is because the real in which I am is intellectively form, an outline in reality and in what the thing is in re-
known by returning from a stepping back, and only be- ality. Therefore this movement is anything but an “at-
cause of that. This necessity is the intellective moment tack”, because it is not a spontaneous activity of mine. To
which I have termed “retention”. Distended in the real, I be sure, as an outline this movement pertains to me and in
am nonetheless always retained in the real by the real it- this sense it can be said that it is I who affirm. But this
self. It is for this reason that affirming the real is not outline, even though a dynamism of mine, is a dynamism
some decision or “attack” of mine, but on the contrary a which is just as receptive as looking, feeling, hearing, etc.
trip within the real already known intellectively as real in can also be. This movement of my intellection is a dyna-
the formal sense. This is just the opposite of an “attack”: mism of it, but not an action whose intentionality results
it is the actualization of the real in a retained form. It is from any action of mine; rather, it results from a dynamic
not a “going” to intellectively know the real, but “intel- intention in which my intelligence is found, and precisely
lectively knowing the real while going” from one point to in this order—I stress the phrase—my mind. It is in this
another in the field. It is not, as I have already pointed sense that I say that it is not so much that I affirm as that I
out, a going from one intellection to another; nor is it an find myself in affirmative intention.
intention of intellection. Rather, it is a mode of this in-
tellection, an intellective intention. As such, what an af- C) This outline in reality has a definite character and
firmation possesses of affirmation; i.e., affirming as such name: {123} it is discernment. The discerning outline is
should be understood from the actuality of the real, and an intellection which is determined in my intelligence by
not the opposite, viz. the actuality of the real from the the actuality of the real as stepped back from. Stepping
affirmation. It is not so much “I affirm” as the opposite back determines distention, and distention determines
“the real is affirmed” in my intellection. Permit me to discernment; it is purely and simply the retentivity of the
explain. real. Discernment is not the mode of actually knowing
intellectively, nor the mode of going to be present intel-
To be sure, affirming is a movement of mine. But lectively in reality, but on the contrary is a way of moving
movement does not mean spontaneous activity. Every about in reality, in which one already is intellectively.
intellection, even the primordial apprehension of reality, is Discernment, krinein, is something founded in primordial
an intellection of mine; and in this sense affirmation is apprehension, i.e. in the radical intellection of the real as
mine also by the mere fact of being intellection. But this real. To be sure, on many occasions the intelligence af-
does not mean that intellective movement, in virtue of firms without sufficient discernment. But this is a differ-
being movement, is a spontaneous movement of mine, ent question; when speaking of the adequacy of discern-
because intellection is primarily act and not activity. As- ment I refer to what in a subsequent part I shall call ‘evi-
sertion, true, is a spontaneous activity. But affirmative dential demand of the real’, a demand or requirement
intention as such, affirming as such, is not. It is move- which admits many degrees. Often one affirms without
ment, but a movement imposed on the intelligence by the discernment just because primarily discerning is given to
stepping back from the real in differential actualization. I us by the real only sketchily; it is a moment of sentient
am really {122} led by the real to affirm. To conceive intellection.
affirmation as an “attack”, i.e., as a spontaneous activity,
is to thrust upon affirmation what is proper only to asser- Thus, affirmation has four constitutive moments,
tion. And the two are very different things. As I have moments which are formally constitutive of it.
150 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

1) In the first place, affirming is actually being in- the mode of intellective actualization of the real qua real.
tellectively in the real, intellectively knowing it both for- Ultimately, affirming is a modulation of the impression of
mally and precisely as real. It is not just conceiving or reality.
anything like that. This moment forms part of affirmation 4) This intentionality is constituted in discernment;
owing to the primordial apprehension of reality, to the but discernment is not formally constitutive of affirmation.
impression of reality. Affirming is not an autonomous Affirmation is that in which discernment is given, and
function of the intelligence but a modalization of the in- must be given; but affirming qua affirming is not dis-
tellective function as such. It is a mode of intellection of cerning.
the real in its physical and formal actuality of real, a for-
mality already known intellectively in primordial appre-
hension. Affirmation does not innovate; nor is it the mo- To summarize, then, affirmation has four constitu-
ment which immerses us in reality. Rather, it is only a tive moments:
modalization of the intellection of {124} reality, a reality
in which we are already immersed in primordial appre- a) It has a moment of effective reality of what is af-
hension. firmed as being real. It is a moment which impinges upon
the judgement of the impression of reality, something
2) This modalization is intellection by returning given in the impression of reality.
from stepping back. One intellectively knows by stepping
back in intentum what something is in reality. By thus b) It has the affirmative moment as such. It is the
taking distance, by thus stepping back, the intellection is mode of intellectively knowing reality by stepping back in
returning to the thing; by so returning, it knows intellec- a movement of return “toward” the real, in intentional
tively what the thing is in reality. It is a modalization, intellection.
then, of the intellective function as such; the intentum c) It has the moment of being a differential actuali-
remains modalized in intentionality. This is intellection zation of reality within reality. It has never been formally
in intentum. The intentum is a “going towards”, and its outside of the real. Therefore affirming is not going to the
intellective knowing is intentionality. Only this concep- real from the not real, but is going from “the real” to what
tion of affirmative intention as a moment of a noergic in- is “in reality” but via unreality; it is actually reducing the
tentum, as I see it, can constitute an adequate concept of retroactive reduction itself by a return. This reduction of
the essence of affirmative movement qua affirmative. the reduction formally consists, as we shall see, in what I
This is the modalization of primordial apprehension in term ‘realization’. It is the essence of affirming.
affirmative intellection.
d) It has the moment of discernment of what is af-
3) This modalization is not determined by me but firmed, the discernment of the many “might be’s” of that
rather by the formally sentient nature of my intellection. which “is”. {126}
Only because my intellection is sentient do I apprehend
the real in two modes of actualization: unitary and differ- Now, in contrast to the primordial apprehension of
ential. Only the latter gives rise to affirming. That de- reality, every affirmation, in virtue of being “at a dis-
termination does not consist in any type of impulse to af- tance”, i.e., by stepping back, is dual intellection. It
firm, but rather in the actuality of the real in differential therefore involves first something which is judged or af-
actualization. We do not have to hurl ourselves at reality; firmed, and second what is formally judged in the judge-
in our own primordial apprehension of the unitary actu- ment. Let us quickly review these two points: About what
alization we are already intellectively knowing the real in one judges, and What one judges.
its physical and formal actuality of the real. In differential {127}
actualization, then, I am already actually in reality and
have only changed the mode in which the real thing is 1
made actual to me in sentient intelligence. This mode of
actuality is actuality a reverse actuality of stepping back, About What One Judges
i.e., a return after stepping back. And such actualization
of what the real is in reality is what formally constitutes
{125} affirming. Affirming is not an act of mine but a At first glance one might think that he is judging
mode of actually being now in reality. What is mine is something to be real which has been apprehended in sim-
discerning what is affirmed. It is not a function carried ple apprehension as unreal; i.e., he would think that what
out as process; rather it is something acquired but through “might be” real is judged as something which “is” real.
 INTELLECTION AT A DISTANCE THROUGH “STEPPING BACK” 151

Therefore that of which he judges would be the content of postulates postulate? That is the question. As I see it, the
a simple apprehension, something unreal. Nonetheless, postulates do not postulate “truth”, i.e., they do not ask
this is incorrect. That of which one judges is something that we admit their truth. If they did, mathematics would
previously apprehended as real. And for just this reason be purely and simply a combination of truths, {129} ulti-
affirmative intellection is constitutively dual. It presup- mately just a phase of logic. Many have thought this, in-
poses and bears in its breast the intellection of something cluding mathematical thinkers of genius. But that does
as already real. What is then affirmed if the thing is real? not prevent it from being false. Mathematics is not a sys-
We shall see that forthwith. But although philosophy is tem of necessary truths, merely coherent among them-
not accustomed to inquire about it, one must understand selves with respect to the “principles” of logic; rather, it is
that that of which affirmation is made is not something a system of necessary truths about an object which, in its
possible or unreal, but something perfectly real. way, has reality before the intelligence. What the postu-
This is evident in affirmations which refer to real lates postulate is not “truth” but “reality”; what is postu-
things. For example, when one says that this water is lated is the reality of that about which one postulates. If
warm or is freezing, he presupposes that that thing about one wishes to go on speaking about truths, it will be nec-
which he judges, the water, is real. And this is true even essary to say that the postulates enuntiate the “real truth”
when meaning-things are intellectively known. A mean- about what is postulated. That is, the postulates are not
ing-thing is not formally a real-thing, but every meaning- mere logical statements but statements of the characteris-
thing bears within it a real-thing. A table is not a real tics which the “content” of the “reality” of what is postu-
thing qua table, but rather a meaning-thing. But the table lated has. “Postulation” is founded upon the “might be”
would not be a table were it not a table by virtue of being a and formally consists in its transformation into “is”,
real-thing. Now, I can make affirmations about the table, thanks to the postulation of reality. This transformation,
but only thanks to the fact that “table” is the meaning of a as we shall see in the Appendix following this section, is
real-thing, for example, of a thing which has {128} a formally construction.
certain size, shape, etc. One might say that there are b) Let us consider the other case, the things which go
many judgements which are not of this type because they on in a work of fiction. Such a work, as we have already
refer to things which are not real; this is the case with all seen, is how the real “would be” or “might be” in reality.
mathematical statements, and also of the innumerable But a novel, for example, does not tell us what “might be
judgements which play a part in a work of fiction, e.g., in reality” but, in its way, what “is reality”. Therefore a
a novel. Every such work contains judgements, even novel is full of characteristics or notes which are very dif-
though that about which affirmations are made is fic- ferent from those initially attributed to its characters or
tional. It is thus not evident that that about which one situations. The fact is that the story told in the novel, by
judges is necessarily a reality apprehended in primordial virtue of being told as a real story, has other properties
apprehension. Nonetheless, this does not invalidate what than those formally enuntiated in a principle. Thus one
I just said. It is certain that neither a geometric space nor can justifiably discuss whether this fictional character, say
Don Juan are real things in the same form as a glass of Don Juan, is or is not an effeminate person. In general
water. But, do they act, so to speak, as something purely terms, a novelist feels that his characters force themselves
and simply not-real? Not at all. Let us examine the two upon him, that they bear him along, that they compel his
cases separately. writing, etc., in virtue of {130} properties which they
have through having been realized initially in concrete
a) Consider first geometric space. No geometric
situations. And this indicates to us that that about which
space, starting with Euclidean space, is qua geometric a
judgements in fictional works are made is clearly not a
physical space. Nonetheless, a geometric space is not just
concrete person, e.g. some citizen of Seville; but is some-
a concept or synthesis of concepts. If it were, such a space
thing more than a “how it would be”, namely “it is thus”.
would not go beyond what space “might be”. Now,
That “is” expresses a reality not like that of a stone, but
mathematics does not deal with spaces which “might be”,
indeed a reality. All the judgements of the fictional work
but only with those that “are”; and it studies them very
refer to this reality, which is that given in the impression
fastidiously. This means that concepts, simple apprehen-
of reality by the stone. The novelist constructs by creation
sions of what spaces “might be”, become concepts of what
in this reality “according to definite items of fiction”.
“is”. How? Concepts become concepts of something
This is the difference between a novel and mathematics.
which “is” thanks to a system of postulates.
Both are constructions of reality, but in mathematics one
What are these postulates? I.e., what is it that the constructs “according to concepts” (as we shall see forth-
152 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

with), whereas in a novel one constructs “according to something “realized” by the intelligence before itself. To
items of fiction and percepts”.* To be sure, the novel has be sure, one can realize without constructing; this is the
many concepts; but it is not constructed along those lines. case with the majority of judgements whose content is
The novel as such is not formally constituted in the crea- realized in the real but without construction. What one
tion of the reality of the fictions, but in the construction of cannot do is to construct without realizing. Whence the
the content in reality itself according to those fictions. inevitable consequence that the real, when realized by
The novel does not refer to fiction but to the reality con- postulation—despite being so according to concepts or
structed according to the items of fiction. fictions or concrete percepts—may then have, as we are
c) If we take the judgements of mathematics and going to see, more notes of its own than those formally
those of fictional literature one by one, we shall see that in included in the concepts, in the fictions, and in the per-
each of them that of which one judges is “something real”. cepts. It is from this reality realized by constructive pos-
The concepts, the fictions, and the percepts are simple tulation that mathematics and fictional literature take
apprehensions; they express what the real “might be”, i.e., their point of departure for their judgements.
they are formally and explicitly inscribed within reality Thus every judgement, every affirmation, is about
itself. But in reality itself not qua terminus of a concrete something real presupposed as such. When things are
content but qua it “might terminate” therein; that is, they real in and by themselves, that presupposition {132} is
express not what it “is” but what it “might be”. Therefore formally the primordial apprehension of reality. When the
we say that this simple apprehension expresses something things are real, but realized constructively, then the pre-
unreal. I need not emphasize it more since it was dis- supposition is formally postulation. Postulation is possible
cussed above. Now, the {131} judgements of mathematics only by being intrinsically and formally founded in the
or fictional literature do not concern something formally primordial apprehension of reality. Therefore the primary
“unreal”, but something unreal though “realized”; they and radical structure of judgement is to be an affirmation
consider that the reality terminates in fact in this or that of a thing already apprehended as real (in primordial ap-
thing. I use a word from mathematics to refer in a unitary prehension) but according to its formal moment of being
sense to this “concrete” termination, namely ‘postulating’. in a field. In virtue of this, a judgement is not an immedi-
The unreal, without ceasing to be unreal, acquires a pos- ate intellection of something real, but an intellection mo-
tulated reality. When the mode of realization or “making dalized from that apprehension, that direct and immediate
real” is construction, then we have the reality both of intellection; it is intellection in returning from a stepping
mathematics and of fiction. The affirmations of mathe- back. What is judged in this intellection?
matics and fictional literature thus refer to something un-
real which is realized (made real) by constructive postula- Before tackling this question it is advantageous to
tion, whether in the form of construction according to clarify just what this reality of mathematics is as postu-
concepts (mathematics) or construction according to per- lated. Judgement presupposes the primordial apprehen-
cepts and fictions (fictional literature). The intelligence is sion of reality. But, I must emphasize, it does not deal
thus not limited to apprehending what “is already” in it, with any presupposition of process type; i.e., one does not
but also realizes (makes real) its concepts, its fictions, and apprehend reality prior to judging. Rather, this reality
its percepts in it, or rather, before it. What is intellec- apprehended prior to judging is maintained as a formally
tively known “is” not then before the intelligence but is constitutive moment of judgement as such.

*
[The phrase “items of fiction” is used here to translate Zubiri's
fictos; etymologically, both derive from the Latin fictum, from
facere, to make. The English plural ‘fictions’ should be un-
derstood here in this sense.—trans.]
{133}

APPENDIX

THE REALITY OF THE MATHEMATICAL

We have seen that the mathematical is composed of expressed in the “might be”. Now, when one postulates
judgements which refer to something real by postulation. that the object “is thus”, then one has passed by postula-
But then the inevitable question arises: What is this pos- tion from the “might be” to the “is”. We have reality itself
tulating of the mathematical real? I said above that the actualized in intellection, and the realization of what is
postulating is a postulation of reality; now let us ask our- conceived, but realized as a free thing. A free thing is the
selves in what this postulation consists. The type of real- physical reality with a freely postulated content. Such are
ity which the mathematical possesses depends on that the objects of mathematics, for they are real objects con-
answer. stituted in the physical moment of reality itself in a field,
the same reality according to which things like this stone
Stated negatively, the reality of the mathematical is
are real. The moment of reality is identical in both cases;
not like that of a stone, for example, because the stone is
what is not the same is their content and their mode of
something real in and by itself. On the other hand, a
reality. The stone has reality in and by itself, whereas the
mathematical space is not real in and by itself, but it does
circle has reality only by postulation. Nonetheless the
not therefore become not-real. The fact is that, as we have
moment of reality is identical. The reality of mathematical
seen at length, reality and content are not the same. In
objects is the “more”, that same “more” of every real thing
the differential actualization of the real, the moment of
in and by itself. And precisely by being a “more” it is
formality of reality in a field is formally distinct from the
extended to have a free content by postulation. How
moment of content. Nonetheless, that formality is always
mathematical objects are constituted in their postulation I
physical; the same formality of reality can encompass
shall explain forthwith.
different contents, not just simultaneously but also succes-
sively. Thus, if the color of this stone changes, the content For now I should like to recall what I explained in
of its apprehension will also change; but its moment of Part One, {135} viz. that reality is not synonymous with
reality has been conserved as numerically the same. existence. Existence and notes pertain only to the content
Whence it is revealed to us that in these conditions physi- of the real; on the other hand, the formality of reality con-
cal reality itself is a moment which perhaps does not have sists in this existential content and these notes being such
such concrete content. Reality within a field is in fact, as de suyo. An existence which did not de suyo concern
we saw, the autonomized “de suyo”. It is not a kind of what is existent would not make of it something real, but
ocean in which things are immersed; {134} rather, it is rather something which is a phantom. Existence and
purely and simply the field moment proper to the formal- notes, I repeat, pertain only to the content of the real.
ity of reality of each real thing. And we have just seen Now, the moment of reality in a field is the moment of
that according to this moment, each real thing is more formality of the “de suyo” autonomized when things are
than it is by virtue of its content. This moment of the apprehended some among others; i.e., the moment of re-
“more” is reality itself. Reality itself is therefore a physi- ality is the ambit of reality, an ambit strictly and rigor-
cal moment and not just a conceptive one. And precisely ously physical. Reality itself in a field is “physical” but
because it is “more” it is possible for it not to have such- not formally existent. Certainly if the content were not
and-such a concrete content, i.e., it can have some other. existent what was apprehended would not be real; but
Under these circumstances (1) the “more” is actualized in neither would it be real if it did not have such-and-such
concepts, in simple apprehensions; and (2) these concepts determinate notes. That is, there is no reality without
are then realized as content of the “more”. The unity of content (existential and notes). What happens is that
the these two moments is, as we saw, the unreal object there is “field reality”, i.e., reality in a field, a field which

153
154 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

is de suyo, but without this particular determinate con- this idea of construction: construction in the sense of
tent, i.e. without such-and-such determinate notes and Gödel and construction in the sense of Brouwer.
their determinate existence. The field moment is the de Gödel calls ‘constructing a group’ the operation of
suyo, but in a form such that the “suyo” [itself] of this “de generating it via the iterated application of certain opera-
suyo” remains free. Both the notes and their existence tions axiomatically defined in the Zermelo-Fraenkel axi-
remain free, but the de suyo persists as the formal moment oms. One must emphasize this: we are dealing with op-
of reality. The impossibility that if there is no existence erations “defined” as such and not with the procedure to
there is no reality does not mean that reality is existence; bring them about. These groups are what Gödel called
it only means, as I just said, that while reality is a formal- constructables. His disciple Cohen (1963) based himself
ity, there cannot be a de suyo without a content of notes upon non-constructable groups in this sense. The ele-
and existence. These notes and this existence are what a ments of every group in fact have two classes of proper-
postulate postulates for reality: they are notes and exis- ties. Some, the specific ones, correspond to the postulates
tence realized only by being postulated in reality itself. In and operational axioms to which I have just referred.
virtue of this, the notes or properties, like their existence, Others are generic, in virtue of which they form a group
are notes and existence as postulated; but these notes and leaving indeterminate the specific properties, which would
this existence are real only {136} by free postulation in “force” the generic properties to be specific. The groups
reality itself, in the de suyo. For greater clarity let me add thus obtained having only generic characters are by defi-
that when, in mathematics, an existence theorem is for- nition non-constructed. Cohen bases himself (for his sen-
mulated (e.g. the existence of a root of every algebraic sational discovery of the falsity of Cantor’s continuum
equation, or of an integral in an ordinary differential hypothesis) on these non-constructable groups. This
equation, or the non-existence of an algebraic equation seems to contradict what I just said about all of mathe-
having e as a root), existence means the naked realization matics being constructed. Nonetheless, the contradiction
of a note in virtue of the realization of other notes. Since is only apparent, because what I here call construction is
the naked realization of these notes involves a postulated something different. In the first place, this is so because
existence, the naked realization of the content is what, what Gödel and Cohen construct is ultimately the objec-
with full justification, one calls mathematical existence. It tive concept both specific as well as generic. But in con-
is always a question of realization, but not in the sense of trast the construction to which I refer consists in realizing
identifying reality and physical existence in and by itself. before my intelligence a concept {138} already objectively
In conclusion, actualization of reality itself in intel- constructed (whether constructable or not). And in this
lection leaves its content free. And then what the postu- sense the realization itself can and ought to be called con-
late postulates is that such-and-such determinate content struction. It is then something very different from con-
(for example, Euclidean parallelism or non-Archimedean struction in the sense of Gödel and Cohen. Both the con-
topology), both in its notes and in its existence, is what is structable groups and the non-constructable ones are con-
realized in reality itself, in the “more”, in that same structed in the sense of things realized before my intelli-
physical reality by which this stone is real. This content gence. Secondly, this realization is the construction of a
thus realized is, as we have said, a “free thing”. Geometric content in physical reality; it is an intellectively free reali-
space is real with the same reality as has this stone. It is zation in physical reality itself. It is, precisely, postulat-
not just a concept, but is reality freely realized; free, but ing. And this construction thus postulated is construction
real, real but free. This postulation therefore postulates of the content in physical reality. The groups of Gödel
that reality itself is realized in such-and-such content; it is and Cohen are constructed (in my concept of construction)
this realization which is postulated. in physical reality. So the construction itself does not
formally concern concepts, nor is it a “conceptive” con-
The mathematical mode of this postulation is what I struction; rather, it is a realization in physical reality it-
here term ‘construction’. Geometric space is not a system self, but “according to concepts”—two completely differ-
of objective concepts; rather, the construction realizes, by ent things. And in this sense every mathematical object is
postulation, these objective concepts. Constructing is not constructed by being postulated. It is for this reason that
only making something an intentional and unreal termi- the object thus constructed is a strict reality which can
nus (that would be a question of simple content); rather, it have properties or notes “of its own”, or “proper”, and not
consists in projecting this {137} unreal part of the concept just properties “deduced” from the axioms and postulates.
onto reality itself “according to concepts”. Therefore con- This does not refer to deduced properties but to properties
struction is a mode of realization; it is realizing according which are already formally in the object. Mathematical
to concepts. objects have their properties de suyo, i.e., they are real.
One must avoid two possible errors with regard to The fact is that the real object made real by being postu-
 INTELLECTION AT A DISTANCE THROUGH “STEPPING BACK” 155

lated according to concepts has, by being realized, more an enormous part of the mathematical edifice. Brouwer,
notes or properties than those defined in its postulation. they tell us, if forced to be consistent with himself, would
On account of this and only on account of it are problems be compelled to abandon as invalid an enormous portion
posed which may not be solvable with the finite system of of infinitesimal analysis [calculus]. But let us not be con-
axioms and postulates which defined its realization. What cerned with this aspect of the question because in our
is constructed in reality itself is, by being realized, some- problem the essential part is that intuitionism claims to be
thing more than what was postulated when realized. This, opposed to formalistic axiomism or formalism by putting
as I see it, is the thrust of Gödel’s theorem. It does not forth actually carried out operations as opposed to axio-
refer to a limitation intrinsic {139} to affirmations based matic definitions. At bottom it is an idea of Kronecker in
on axioms and postulates qua affirmations—that is the action: God created the whole numbers and man created
usual interpretation of the theorem—; rather, it leaves the the rest. The whole numbers would be a datum of intui-
character of reality of what is constructed according to the tion, and therefore constructing would be reduced finally
axioms and postulates in question to be revealed before to counting what is given. Defining does not suffice.
the intelligence. It is not, then, the intrinsic inadequacy of
But this conception cannot be maintained because
a system of postulates, but the radical originality of what
the groups—even if finite—are not formally intuitive nor
is constructed by being real, a reality which is not ex-
do the operations carried out on them constitute the radi-
hausted in what has been postulated about it. This object
cal part of what I understand by mathematical construc-
is not a real thing in and by itself as is this stone. But
tion.
neither is it only what “might be real”; rather, it is what
“is real” by being postulated and constructed. That, in my In the first place, Brouwer’s finite group is not in-
judgement, is the interpretation of Gödel’s theorem. The tuitive. Leaving aside for now the problems posed by in-
judgements of mathematics are then judgements of some- tuition, let us say that intuition is the “vision” of some-
thing real, judgements of the “postulated real”. They are thing given immediately, directly, and unitarily. {141} In
not judgements about the “possible real” but judgements inituition I have the qualitative and quantitative diversity
about “postulated reality”. of the given, but never do I have a group. There are no
strict intuitive groups, because in order to have a group I
This conceptualization of mathematical reality by
must consider, separately so to speak, the moments of the
construction is not, then, a type of formalism, but neither
intuitive diversity as “elements”. Only then does their
is it in any sense what has been set forth in rigorous oppo-
unity constitute a group. A mathematical group is always
sition to such formalism, viz. intuitionism, especially that
a group of elements, and only that. But then it is clear
of Brouwer. That is the other concept of construction
that no group, not even a finite one, is intuitive, because
which it is necessary to eliminate in this problem. For
intuition gives only “diversity of moments”, never a
intuitionism, mathematical construction is not the same as
“group of elements”. In order to have a group it is neces-
defining and constructing concepts. Intuitionism rejects
sary to have a subsequent act of intellection which makes
the idea that mathematics is founded upon logic; a dem-
the moments to be elements. It is then necessary to have
onstration which appeals to the logical principle of the
excluded middle is not, for Brouwer, a mathematical dem- a construction. The so-called finite construction, pre-
onstration. Mathematics is not a system of defined con- sumably given in intuition, is nothing but the application
cepts and operations. An operation, if it is to be mathe- of the group already intellectively constructed to the diver-
matical, has to be an operation actually carried out, i.e., sity of the given. This application is just a postulation:
one comprised of a finite number of steps. To be sure, one postulates that the given is resolved in a group.
mathematics is not interested only in finite groups; for Therefore rigorously speaking one cannot call Brouwer’s
example, it concerns itself with the infinite digit strings mathematics intuitionism. Brouwer’s group is not intui-
making up real numbers. It is true that {140} mathemat- tive; it is the objective content of a concept of group which
ics cannot actually carry out all the operations necessary is “applied” to the intuitive.
to obtain an irrational number, because the number of In the second place, the very construction of the
steps would be infinite. But they can be given, and are group is not, ultimately, a system of operations actually
given, in a rule or algorithm in which the operations are carried out. I say “ultimately”, because the carrying out of
continued “indefinitely”. The object of mathematics, operations is not the primary component of what I have
then, would be finite groups as the terminus of operations termed “construction”. The finite group is the content of
carried out on them. Intuitionism is a radical finitism. objective concepts. Therefore the operations carried out
The majority of mathematicians therefore reject Brou- on this content are operations, however much executed
wer’s ideas despite its applications to topology, because to one may like, but always executed on objective contents of
amputate the infinite series would be for them to nullify concepts. Finite or not, the groups with which Brouwer’s
156 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

mathematics is concerned and the operations carried out of concepts. Now, constructing is something else; it is
on them are conceptive groups and operations. And creating, freely projecting into physical reality itself a
therefore they are inadequate, {142} as I see it, to ground content according to concepts. Postulating is postulating
mathematics: mathematics does not deal with “objective reality. Without this construction and primary and radical
concepts” but with “things which are thus”. What I un- postulation, the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms, Cohen’s
derstand by ‘construction’ is something different. To be groups, and Brouwer’s intuitionism would all be impossi-
sure, it is not a construction of objective concepts by mere ble.
definition; but neither is it a series of operations carried Mathematical construction is thus always an act of
out in Brouwer’s sense, because his operations are opera- sentient intelligence. And therefore the mathematical
tions on objective concepts. And on this point Brouwer’s object has postulated reality. It is not an objective concept
mathematics does not differ from that of Gödel and of reality but rather is reality in concept. It is, I repeat,
Cohen. What I am referring to is that constructing is not the reality itself of any real thing sentiently apprehended,
carrying out objective operations but projecting before my but with a content freely constructed in that reality, ac-
intelligence that objective content in physical reality itself. cording to concepts. What is postulated, I repeat, is not
And this reality is not given in intuition but in the pri- logical truths nor operations actually carried out, but the
mordial apprehension of reality; it is given impressively. content of the real (already defined or carried out) {144}
As this reality does not have determinate content, I can in and by postulated construction. The mathematical ob-
freely project upon it the content of what is objectively ject is not constituted by the postulates; rather, what the
constructed operationally. This projection and not the postulates define is the “construction” before the intelli-
operation is mathematical construction. The mathemati- gence of that whose realization is postulated, and which
cal object, even if it is finite, and even if the operation acquires reality by this postulation.
which objectively produces its content is carried out,
nonetheless has a radical proper reality, the physical real- The objects of mathematics are “real objects”, objects
ity impressively sensed in primordial apprehension. And in reality, in this same reality with rocks and stars; the
this is construction. Brouwer’s finite group not only is not difference is that mathematical objects are constructed by
intuitive, it is the result of a double postulation: the pos- being postulated in their content. A rock is a reality in
tulate that groups are applicable to what is intuitively and by itself; a geometric space or irrational number is a
given, and the postulate of conferring upon reality itself reality freely postulated. It is common to refer to mathe-
the content of the objective concept (operationally con- matical objects as “ideal objects”. But there are no ideal
structed) of group. A mathematical object is not intuited objects; mathematical objects are real. This does not
but apprehended in a primordial apprehension—two com- mean —and I must reiterate it—that mathematical objects
pletely different things, as we shall see. Free creation, exist like rocks exist; but the difference between the for-
projected in this double postulation, is intrinsically and mer and the latter concerns only content, a content given
formally sentient. Only a sentient intelligence can, for in the one case, freely postulated in reality in the second.
example, {143} not sense the content of a continuous Therefore mathematical objects do not have ideal exis-
group, i.e. the group of irrational numbers, and nonethe- tence but only postulated existence, postulated but in real-
less freely realize this content (conceptualized either by ity itself. What happens is that their content (1) is con-
mere definitions, or by operations actually carried out) in structed, and (2) is constructed according to concepts.
a sentient way. A mathematical object, even though finite, What is so inappropriately labeled “ideal” is the real con-
and even though the operation which produces it is actu- structed according to concepts. Both existence and prop-
ally carried out, has, I repeat, its own reality, the physical erties are constructed by postulation in reality itself.
reality impressively sensed in primordial apprehension. Therefore a mathematical object is not real just because of
And this is its construction. its definition or because it is carried out; but neither is it a
real object in and by itself like things apprehended in sen-
Thus in summary, we may say about being con-
sible impression. It is something real by a postulate which
structed: (1) it is not being defined in the sense of Gödel
realizes a content (notes and existence) freely determined
and Cohen, and (2) it is not being carried out in the sense
thanks to the postulation.
of Brouwer. The opposition between formalism and in-
tuitionism is a problem internal to mathematics, and as As the moment of reality is just the “more” of {145}
such does not concern philosophy. For philosophy, the each real sensed thing, it follows that every mathematical
problem centers on conceptualizing the reality of the object is inscribed in the formality of reality given in im-
mathematical. And from this point of view formalism and pression. That is, it is the terminus of a sentient intellec-
intuitionism are not opposed to each other, because both tion. This does not mean that a geometric space or irra-
consist only in the determination of the objective content tional number is sensed like color is sensed; the former
 INTELLECTION AT A DISTANCE THROUGH “STEPPING BACK” 157

objects are clearly not sensible. Rather, it means that the things, two theorems whose essence, as I see it, is what I
mode of intellection of an irrational number or a geomet- said previously, viz. the anteriority of reality over truth.
ric space is sentient. And this is so (1) because they are Gödel’s theorem, according to which that constructed by
intellectively known by being postulated in a field of real- postulation has de suyo more properties than those for-
ity, i.e. in the formality given in the impression of reality, mally postulated, in my view expresses that what is pos-
and (2) because their construction itself is not just con- tulated is reality before it is truth. And Cohen’s theorem
ceptuation but realization, i.e. something brought about (let us call the non-Cantorian theory of groups that):
sentiently. Without sensing the mathematical, one could groups are not just systems of elements determined by
not construct mathematics. Here we put our finger on the postulation; rather, prior to this, there are groups which he
difference between sensible intelligence and sentient in- terms “generic” and which as I see it {146} are not ge-
telligence about which I spoke at length in Part I of this neric but the simple realization of the group, without the
work. Sensible intelligence is based on the senses; sen- specific properties determined by postulation. The postu-
tient intelligence intellectively knows everything sen- lated properties themselves are then real prior to being
tiently, both the sensible and the non-sensible. A mathe- true. The specification here is not a logical difference but
matical object is real with a content which is freely con- a real determination. It is the reality of the group prior to
structed in the physical reality given in impression, and its the axiomatic truth postulated. In my view, this is the
construction is postulation. essential meaning of the theorems of Gödel and Cohen:
the priority of the real over the true in mathematics.
Mathematics itself has produced, among other {147}

* * * *

already intellectively in reality itself. The function of re-

2 ality itself is not to be a constutitive part of the judgement
itself, because reality itself is also, as we have seen, a
What is Judged moment of simple apprehension. Reality itself is prior to
every {148} intellective movement, both simple apprehen-
sion as well as affirmation. Reality itself is not, then, a
In every judgement, as we have seen, one judges correlate of affirmation, but the formality of every intel-
about something real, and does so in reality itself. I said lective apprehension whether it is judgmental or not.
that affirmation is a dual intellection because the same Judgmental intellection is an intellective movement, and
real thing is intellectively known twice: once, as that of this intellective movement in reality itself is a “realiza-
which one judges, and another, as that which is affirmed tion”. Upon judging one realizes reality itself in a real
about it. This duality of affirmative intellection is based thing already apprehended, i.e. one judges about the ter-
upon a deeper dimension. Since every real thing has a mination of reality itself in this thing; he judges that
moment of individual reality, and a moment of reality in a which is the real. Now, with this reality itself is reinte-
field, when a real thing is intellectively known “among” grated, in a certain way against every stepping back, to the
others, these two moments are differentiated and in a cer- real thing, to its individual formality of reality. Therefore
tain way “distanced”, i.e., stepped back from; this is a this reintegration is the formal establishment of the unity
dimension of the duality of what is intellectively known of being in a field and being individual. And this formal
itself. What impels us and puts us into the field of reality unity is just what a thing already apprehended as real is
itself is just the primordial apprehension of reality of that “in reality”, viz. its “this, how, and what”. Therefore that
about which one judges. And it is in this field that intel- which is judged is what a real thing, already apprehended
lective movement takes place. That about which one af- as real, is in reality. Judging is affirming what a thing
firms in this movement is the real thing already appre- already apprehended as real is in reality.
hended in the primordial apprehension of reality. That in Granting that, let us once again direct our attention
which the affirmation moves is reality itself (it is the me- to this affirmative intention of judgement. What is af-
dium of affirmation). So in contrast to what is usually firmed, I repeat, is the realization (of something simply
said—or rather repeated monotonously—judging is not apprehended) in this real thing as real; i.e., one turns to a
affirming reality itself but rather affirming “in” the reality. real thing in reality itself. Now, reality itself is that to
Prior to judging and in order to be able to judge, we are which, impelled by a real thing already apprehended in
158 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

primordial apprehension, we have gone in retraction, mordial apprehensions of reality, the system given in
elaborating a simple apprehension. Therefore reality itself them. Reality is always prior to affirmation. And the
has all of its unreal content from what is simply appre- second point is that affirming as such is an intellection
hended. In virtue of this, realization in a real thing is that expands the return to the real (from stepping back),
realization in it of what is simply apprehended as unreal. with respect to the field of reality.
What a real thing is “in reality” is expressed by the reali-
This structure makes of judgement something essen-
zation of simple apprehension in a real thing.
tially dependent upon the way in which primordial appre-
The poorly named “subject” of judgement is that real hension becomes the terminus of affirmation. The way in
thing {149} about which one judges. It is not properly which primordial apprehension is constituted as terminus
“subject” but “object” of judgement. What one judges is of affirmation is what I call the form of affirmation. After
the realization of a simple apprehension in an object, i.e. having seen what affirming is, let us now ask what the
in the real. Judging is not then attributing one concept to forms of affirmation as such are.
another but realizing a concept, a work of fiction, or a
{151}
percept in a real thing already apprehended as real in
primordial apprehension. Affirmation is the phase of in- §2
tellective movement opposed to retraction. In retraction
one goes inside the real which is given toward the unreal
FORMS OF AFFIRMATION
apprehended in simple apprehension, toward what the real
thing “might be” to what it “is”. Now one is not dealing
with a realization in constructive postulation but with a When speaking about judgement, I am not referring
realization in simple apprehension as such in primordial to the classical division of judgements into quality, quan-
apprehension. This realization is the judgement. Judging tity, relation or modality, which is the division canonized
is not, for example, apprehending that this thing which by Kant. And this is because all these kinds of judgement
we call a man is real; nor is it apprehending what this are but forms of a single kind, viz. judgement as predica-
man is (which is but apprehending what this thing “might tion. Now, affirmation as such is not predication. There
be”). Judging is affirming that what it “might be” to be a are, as we shall see, forms of judgement strictly pre-
man is realized in this real thing which we call a man, predicative. In predicative judgement, that about which
i.e., that this real thing which we call “man” is in reality one judges has a clear function: to be subject of the
what we understand by man. And this is not a tautology, judgement. But that is not the only nor even the primary
because the concept of man is not univocal but depends function of the reality about which one judges. Here I use
upon that aspect, freely selected, from which one starts in the term ‘forms of judgement’ to refer to the diversity of
order to conceive it. Starting from the zoological ladder is judgements according to the function carried out by that
not the same as starting from the capacity to make tools which is judged; i.e., the diverse forms according to which
(for example, from homo australopithecus or from homo a thing already apprehended is the terminus of affirmative
habilis). Similarly, starting from social organization is intellection. The predicative function is just one of them.
different than starting from the modes and general forms There are others, for example judgements in which the
of the real. Thus, what this thing is in reality which we thing judged is proposed to the affirmation but not as a
call a man, by being the realization of a concept, is once subject of it; these are propositional judgements but are
again known intellectively with respect to the primordial pre-predicative. There are also judgements in which the
apprehension of reality in each case. thing judged is not proposed but only placed before the
Every affirmation is a dynamic intellection, by re- judgement. In these judgements the affirmation is not just
turning {150} from stepping back, of something already pre-predicative but also pre-propositional; they are merely
apprehended in a primordial apprehension, a dynamism positional judgements. Each of these forms is based upon
which cuts accross reality itself, and whose terminus con- the previous one: propositional affirmation is based upon
sists in intellectively knowing what that which we have positional affirmation, and in turn predicative affirmation
intellectively known as real is in reality. {152} upon propositional affirmation. What is the struc-
ture of these three forms of affirmation?
This clarifies two points for us. First that the real
world, i.e. the system of things qua real, does not consist 1. Above all, judgement is what I call a positional
in being the system of what the sum total of true judge- affirmation. Let us begin by posing some examples. I
ments affirms. The system of real things qua real does open the window and shout, “Fire!”, or perhaps, “rain,
not consist in being the correlate of what is affirmed. sun”, etc. Here there is something apprehended in the
Rather, it is the system intellectively known in my pri- primordial apprehension of reality, viz. what I apprehend
 INTELLECTION AT A DISTANCE THROUGH “STEPPING BACK” 159

upon opening the window. And I apprehend it in all its way, not the denomination but the denominative affirma-
notes, in primordial apprehension, as something real and tion of the real apprehended in its totality. When I say
in all of its richness and variety of notes. But I do not in- “Fire!” I clearly have a simple apprehension, that of fire.
tellectively know what it is “in reality”. Intelletively Otherwise I could not say “Fire!”. But that which I see
knowing it as fire, rain, etc. is just the proper affirmation upon opening the window is posed directly as global reali-
of the judgement, viz. what I have apprehended is in real- zation of this simple apprehension, without it having been
ity. These names, as mere names, are simple apprehen- {154} previously qualified by another simple apprehen-
sions (percepts, fictional items, or concepts). But in af- sion. Here the function of the real thing of which one
firmative connotation they express that what is simply judges is to be “posed” for my denomination or identifica-
apprehended is realized in what I have apprehended pri- tion as real.
mordially, and is what this latter is in reality. If I did not
have these simple apprehensions there would be no I maintain that this is an affirmation and not a pri-
judgement and I could not say, “Fire!”; I would have only moridial apprehension of reality. In primordial apprehen-
the primordial apprehension of this igneous reality which, sion of reality we have only the real thing apprehended,
without knowing what it is in reality, I apprehend primor- and this real thing immediately fills the field of reality
dially upon opening the window. In this sense I say that itself. But in positional judgement this real thing is in-
that affirmation is positional, because the thing which I tellectively known as realization of something already
judge is not previously apprehended in turn in a simple apprehended in simple apprehension, as a realization of
apprehension which qualifies it, as is the case in other fire. We intellectively know what is apprehended via the
forms of judgement. If I say that the fire is burning, the route of identifying it with what is, for example, fire sim-
subject is already qualified as fire in a previous simple ply apprehended. The primordial apprehension of reality
apprehension. But when I shout, “Fire!”, what I appre- is immediate, and therefore is more than a judgement: it is
hend is not intellectively known previously as fire. Pre- the apprehension of the real thing in and by itself as real,
cisely on account of this, what I see upon opening the without the necessity of affirming or judging. On the
window is not designated by any previous denomination other hand, in positional judgement, the real is intellec-
because every denomination is a denomination of some- tively known as a realization of fire or rain, etc. In this
thing already simply apprehended. Here what is appre- intellection what is affirmed is just what in reality is that
hended upon opening the window is the terminus of a which we have apprehended as real upon opening the
primordial apprehension {153} of reality, but without window. In this “position” the real apprehended as a
qualification, without previous denomination. In every whole is “placed” as realization. It is for this reason that I
judgement the primordial apprehension of that of which term it “positional judgement”. The affirmative moment
one judges is anterior to the judging itself. But this does of this judgement is not expressed with a new name but
not mean that a real thing was already previously quali- with a single substantive name (noun) having an affirma-
fied in some previous simple apprehension. In positional tive connotation. And this connotation is expressed in the
judgement the real is not already qualified by a simple intonation; for example, by shouting. On the other hand,
apprehension; rather, there is a single simple apprehen- in primordial apprehension of reality, there is no name
sion, say that of fire, which forms a part not of the subject whatsoever: it is the mere apprehension of the reality of
but of the predicate, and whose realization is affirmed so the real. Positional judgement, then, is pre-predicative;
to speak globally. It is for this reason a positional judge- but it is also pre-propositional: the real thing apprehended
ment. On one side I have the primordial apprehension of is not a subject of judgement, nor is it proposed for
reality; on the other, the denomination. Its identification judgement; it is simply “posed”.
in what is in reality what I have primordially apprehended
is just positional judgement. It is because of this that 2. There is a second form of judgement, viz. propo-
there are not two denominations as in other types of sitional judgement. {155} In it the real already appre-
judgement, one of what I see and another of what I affirm hended is not apprehended only as real, but is also appre-
as realized in what I see. There is here but a single de- hended as something which for its part is already qualified
nomination, and what is denominated is posed as reality. from a simple apprehension. Let that of which one judges
There is but the total, global realization, of this unique be A. A is not just something which I apprehend as real,
single apprehension in the primordial apprehension of but as something which is already A. And therefore,
reality. It is, to speak a bit loosely, the identity or identifi- when it becomes the terminus of an affirmation, this A is
cation of with simple apprehension; or from the stand- not simply “posed” for the judgement but “proposed” to it,
point of simple apprehension, the integral realization of it i.e., posed “as reality” for a subsequent position of what it
in the real. I repeat that I am not saying “this is fire” but is “in reality”. A proposition is a special form of position;
simply “Fire!”. The positional judgement is, in a certain it is the propositional judgement. Permit me to explain.
160 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

Consider some common examples in order to estab- b) This foundation is formal; it is the very “nature”
lish a frame of reference. “Corruption of the best, worst” of A, its constitutional nature, so to speak, that which
(corruptio optimi pessima);* “Everything excellent, rare” founds B. I am not simply affirming that a woman is al-
(omnia praeclara, rara); “All men, equal”; “A woman, ways changeable, but that she is so by virtue of her nature
always changeable and fickle” (varium et mutabile semper qua woman. Here “nature” has a connotation which is
femina†); “What’s bred in the bone will out in the flesh” deliberately vague. It does not concern reality in itself, as
(genio y figura, hasta la sepultura);‡ “This, my vocation”; if it were the essence of reality; rather, it refers to reality
“Thou, the one Holy One, the one Lord”; “Thou, my qua apprehended in primordial apprehension.
God”; “Thou, Lord”. c) This B is not only determined intrinsically by the
In all these affirmations there is something, A, which reality of A; rather, the determination itself, i.e. B, has
is posed as already real; and not simply as real but as reality but “in the reality of A”. That does not just refer to
something real already qualified in a previous simple ap- the fact that a woman by her own nature determines
prehension: the corruption of the best, the excellent, the changeability, but to the fact that what is {157} deter-
woman, Thou, etc. But the affirmation is constituted in B, mined—this changeability—is a moment of feminine re-
or if one prefers in the A not as merely real but as realiza- ality itself: B is a moment of the reality of A.
tion of the simple apprehension B; the worst, my God, The reality of A involves, then, by virtue of its own
changeable, all equal, etc. nature, the reality of B in A. This is what I affirm in a
In this affirmation what is affirmed clearly has two propositional judgement. Now, the unity of these three
moments. One, the moment pro-posed A. This moment moments: being grounded on A, being grounded on the
is not only real, but moreover its reality is already quali- nature of A, and being a moment of the reality of A, is
fied and proposed as terminus of a subsequent position. what I call unity of constitution: “AB”.§ It is not u.nity of
There is, in addition, that of which this real thing is af- attribution but unity of constitution. And this unity is that
firmed B. In itself B is not something real, but rather which A is “in reality”.
{156} a simple unreal apprehension. But upon becoming Whence arise the two parts of this affirmation. First
the determination of the thing already real, of A, B is re- of all, there is that which is affirmed. What is affirmed
alized in and by A. That is, the reality of B has been here is not a thing, i.e., neither A nor B (A is not affirmed
posed qua that of A, or what is the same thing, the reality but rather presumed qualificatively); what is affirmed is
of A has been posed not in itself (since it has been pro- the constitutive unity “AB”. The second part is the af-
posed as something already real), but qua B. For this rea- firmation itself. As affirmation, it consists in putting into
son it is, I repeat, a position which is pro-positional. reality itself the constitutive unity. It is this unity which is
What is this position of B in A? That is the essential affirmed to be real, or rather, it is this unity which is that
question. in which A consists in reality: A is in reality not just “A”
First of all, it is not a “positional” position in the but “AB”. The intentum has thus been changed in a two-
sense explained earlier; if it were, what is affirmed would fold way. In the first place, it is modified by being an af-
be two realities, the reality of A “and” the reality of B, but firmation, an intention; it is an intentum of intellection of
not “one” reality, to wit, the reality of A as B. But neither a reality stepped back from, i.e., from simple apprehen-
is it an “attributive” position: I do not affirm that A “is” B. sion; it is a judgement. But in the second place, the pro-
Propositional judgement is pre-predicative. The force of positional affirmation is a modification of positional af-
the affirmation does not fall upon something attributed to firmation. When what is posed is formally a constitution
A. To be sure, A and B are not identical. But: and not a thing, then the position is constitutive. Propo-
sitional affirmation is, then, constitutive position, an af-
a) B “is founded” on A; it is not attributed to A from
firmation of what a thing constitutively is in reality.
outside but pertains to A in a way, so to speak, intrinsic to
A. The expression of a propositional or constitutive
judgement is a nominal phrase. It suffices to return to the
(Latin) examples given earlier to discover in them two
*
essential aspects. The nominative phrase, {158} above all,
[English does not normally use the construction to which
lacks a verb; it is an a-verbal affirmation, having only
Zubiri here makes reference in Spanish and Latin, in which
the verb to be is omitted, so the translated sentences may nouns. This does not refer to a verbal ellipsis but to a
sound rather peculiar—trans.] particular and originary mode of “averbal” phrase. But in
†
[Vergil, Aeneid, Book 4, verses 569-570. —trans.]
§
‡ [Zubiri’s word is complexión, which means constitution in the
[This is an idomatic expression—trans.]
physiological sense.—trans.]
 INTELLECTION AT A DISTANCE THROUGH “STEPPING BACK” 161

contrast to positional affirmation which only has a noun, firmation puts the reality of B qua B as a moment of A.
the nominal phrase always has at least two nouns. These And this B is in itself the terminus of a simple apprehen-
two nouns do not designate a subject and predicate, but a sion (percept, item of fiction, or concept), whose reality is
single constitutive reality. The nominal phrase is propo- affirmed upon being posited in a real A. Hence, in every
sitional, but it is pre-predicative. On the other hand, this propositional affirmation, the intellective movement is, on
phrase expresses the affirmative moment of a mode which one hand, the position of A qua B, and on the other, the
is proper to it, in the “pause” between the two nouns. The position of B in the reality of A. They are two aspects of
pause is the expression of the constitutive affirmation as the same movement.
such. It is not merely a position, nor is it copulative attri-
Up to now, the predicative affirmation has only been
bution; this aspect is what the pause expresses. The
a propositional affirmation. But the role of the predicative
nominal phrase is generally used in invocations, but not
affirmation {160} is in the mode of position of A as B, or
exclusively there. The problem which interests me here is
what comes to the same thing, of B in A. With which
not the when and where—something that varies from lan-
position are we dealing?
guage to language—but the nature of the affirmation
enunciated in such sentences; this is a propositional af- To be sure, it is not a positional position of either A
firmation. or B. That would not be “one” affirmation but “two”. But
neither is it a constitutive position, because B is certainly
This propositional judgement is not the only form of grounded on A, but not necessarily in the nature of the
non-positional judgement. There is another form, which I reality of A. And here is the difference between predica-
shall provisionally term predicative judgement. In this tive or copulative affirmation and merely propositional
way we have the three forms of judgement: positional af- affirmation. For now, one thing is clear: predicative af-
firmation, propositional affirmation, and predicative af- firmation is a modification of propositional affirmation,
firmation. In what does this last consist? just like this latter is a modification of positional affirma-
3. The third form of judgement, I repeat, is predica- tion. What is this predicative modification?
tive judgement. For the moment, borrowing some termi- Modification of predication consists in B being
nology from classical logic, let us say that it is the judge- grounded on A, but in such a way that this foundation of
ment whose scheme is A is B. It is because I have referred the reality of B in A is not necessarily—as in the case of
to classical logic that I have termed the two previous propositional affirmation—the very “nature” of the reality
forms of judgement pre-predicative. The linguists call of A. Rather, it consists in that B, though being in A, is so
everything said of something a ‘predicate’; the predicate only in the sense of “merely being”. Here “being” is used
here {159} would be is B, and A would be the subject. in the sense of “realizing” something, independently of
But this, while it may be true, nonetheless cloaks the the character of of this realization. In propositional
proper character of what is affirmed in a judgement. For judgement what is affirmed is that this realization is what
one of the essential moments for this judgement is that the is in the “nature” of something. But here we are dealing
affirmation be made using a verb, which in the foregoing with a realization in which we disregard its mode,
scheme is the verb “is”. And there is another moment whether necessary or not necessary. A and B each have
which must be pointed out. Ultimately we are dealing their own entity, and their unity consists in B being real-
more with a copulative affirmation than a predicative af- ized in A. In this fashion the reality of B in A, or the re-
firmation; the verb to be, in fact, discharges the function ality of A as B, involves two moments. On one hand, B is
of a copulative. Whence there is some justification in in fact in A. But on the other, B is something which, al-
calling only B the predicate, in respect of which A would though it takes its reality from being put in A, nonetheless
be the subject. Given this initial clarification, to which we its reality is maintained in a certain way as its own reality
shall shortly return, and without making the notions more inside the reality of A; and therefore {161} even though it
precise at the moment, let us speak somewhat loosely is in A, it is, in a certain way, different from A. Therefore
about predicative judgement in the sense of copulative between A and B there is a unity to be sure, but a unity
affirmation. which, within A, maintains a certain distinction between
This affirmation is, above all, pro-positional, in the the reality of A and the reality of B. Hence it is not a sim-
sense explained above. The intentum, in fact, refers to an ple constitution. The constitution not only puts B in A but
A previously posited as real. And this reality already pos- puts this B in the very “nature” of the reality of A,
ited, A, is posited in turn for a subsequent determination whereas now B is put in A though as something formally
B. Therefore A is a reality pro-posed in order to be af- distinct from A. A is certainly B, but does not consist in
firmed qua B. In this aspect, the copulative affirmation is being B, nor does B consist in being A. This is no longer
strictly pro-positional. By being so, the copulative af- constitution; it is what I shall term connection. There is a
162 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

great difference between constitution and connection. merely functional: A carries out the function of subject,
Connection is union as well as distinction; union and and B that of predicate. For just this reason it is possible
separation are the two aspects of the unity of connection. to switch their functional positions, making B the subject
This connection can have various characteristics; it can be and A the predicate. This is the so called “conversion” of
either necessary or de facto. But one is always dealing propositions in formal logic: “All men are mortal”, {163}
with a connection “derived” from the reality of A. On the and by conversion, “Some mortals are men”. Apart from
other hand, in the unity of constitution, rather than a “ne- the quantifiers, A and B do not differ in the two cases
cessity of A”, one deals with the very “nature” of A. The other than by their functional position. But this is actually
constitution is thus more than necessary; it is in a certain not correct. Strictly speaking, A is not a part of what is
way constituting. When one says, “femina, variabile”, affirmed; rather it is simply “what” is proposed to what is
one affirms that a woman is changeable by virtue of being affirmed. Hence, rather than being a part of the judge-
a woman. Similarly, when one says “this paper, white”, ment, it is assumed by it. This assumption is usually
that about which one is thinking, to wit, “this paper”, is called the “subject”; but strictly speaking it is not the sub-
white precisely because it is “this”, i.e. one thinks in a ject but rather the “object” (sit venia verbo) about which
certain way about the nature of “this”. But when one says one judges. The function of that which is already appre-
“this woman is changeable” or “this paper is white”, one hended is now being pro-posed as “subject”. This inter-
does not affirm that “this” woman consists in being pretation of what is proposed to the judgement as its sub-
changeable nor that “this” paper consists in its whiteness. ject is certainly a very debatable one. It depends upon the
In propositional judgement one thinks more about the concept one has of the structure of the unity of things and
nature of A than in the reality of the “other thing”, B. In their notes. Conceptualizing a thing as the subject of its
predicative judgement there is the reality of A and the inherent accidents is nothing but a theory. In my view,
realization of B in A, but in an A which as such has its this theory is unacceptable. But that is not what interests
nature independent of B; it is for that reason that there is us at the moment. Rather we are concerned not with the
connection. It is no longer AB but rather A-B. This is the ulterior concept of connection, but the connective charac-
connective or copulative affirmation. {162} ter of B with A, whether or not it has the character of a
We see immediately that this affirmation is a modifi- subject. And only in order to clarify the expression will I
cation of propositional affirmation. Propositional af- call A the subject; it is in fact the reality already appre-
firmation puts the reality of B as a moment of the nature hended as something which is not the “subject of” B, but
of the reality of A. Now, however, B is in a way less the “subject to” a connection.
pegged to the reality of A. In place of constitution, we On the other hand, B is not something which is on a
have connection; and in place of propositional affirma- par with A, so to speak, because in itself B is a term pro-
tion, we have predicative affirmation. posed not as real, but as something unreal, as terminus of
This connection is not properly speaking a “rela- a simple apprehension (percept, fictional item, or con-
tion”, because every relation presupposes the two things cept). Hence its connection with A has all the character of
related. In a connection one does not presuppose the re- “realization” of B in A. To identify A and B with two in-
ality of B, but rather puts B in the reality of A; hence it is terchangeable magnitudes, as if they were homogeneous
B which receives the reality of A. In this fashion the pre- terms, is to speak nonsense. The subject is reality and the
sumed relation is consequent upon the connection. And predicate realization. They do not function on the same
this brings us to the question of the parts which make up level. Even when I carry out the so-called “conversion” of
this predicative affirmation. a judgement, the essential difference is not in the quantifi-
cation of A and B, {164} but in the fact that in the second
On the surface, this affirmation comprises three
judgement A is by itself now a simple apprehension real-
“parts”: A, B, and is. Whence it follows that function of
ized in B, which is the reverse of what happened before.
the copula “is” is to express the relation between B and A.
Thus A and B are not, formally, on the same footing. The
But this really doesn’t say much of importance. A correct
difference between them is not a difference in location in
analysis of copulative affirmation strictly requires that the
the judgement, but an essential difference. A and B can be
affirmation have only two parts: what is affirmed and the
interchanged so that A is sometimes the subject and other
affirmation itself.
times the predicate. But their formal difference is always
In the first place, what is affirmed? The connective essential not interchangeable. The subject is always a
unity of B and A. That is, in what is affirmed A and B proposed reality and the predicate is always something
enter, and what is affirmed of them is their connection. unreal which is realized. It is the same thing which hap-
We have, above all, A and B. Some think that A and B are pens in the case of all propositional judgements: it doesn’t
two variables of the same type and that their difference is make sense to convert the nominal propostion, “all
 INTELLECTION AT A DISTANCE THROUGH “STEPPING BACK” 163

women, changeable” into “something changeable, in predicative intention.

woman”. The grammatical expression of this predicative af-
What is affirmed of A and B is their “connection”. firmation requires some special consideration. It is the
We have already seen that this conection is not a relation; expression by the “is”. This “is” discharges, as I see it,
rather, the “relation” is something consequent upon the not two but three functions: {166}
“connection” and founded upon it. The connection estab- a) It expresses an affirmation; as such it means the
lishes A in B. The relation between B and A exists, but “reality” of the connection A-B. This connection is given
only after B is established in A, i.e., after the connection. in reality itself.
The relation—if one desires to speak of relations—is what
results from the realization of B in A, i.e., it is the result of b) It expresses the connection of B with A, i.e., it ex-
the connection. The formal conceptualization of A and B presses the “connective unity” A-B, and what A is “in re-
refers to this relation, which presupposes its essential ality”.
connective difference. Therefore the so-called formal c) It expresses the relation which is established be-
logic is based upon the relation resulting from the con- tween A and B in this connection and by it. In this aspect,
nective affirmation. Now we see that this logic is not the function of the “is” is to be a copula. It is the “copu-
what is primary, because the formal relation between A lative relation”.
and B is grounded on the affirmative connection of reali- These are the three functions of the verb is: “reality”,
zation of B in A. That is, every formal logic is founded “connective unity”, and “copulative relation”. Now, these
upon a more radical logic, the logic of affirmation. “For- three functions have a precise order of foundation, to wit,
mal logic” is the play of two homogeneous variables, the copulative relation is founded in the connective unity,
whereas the “logic of affirmation” is the intellection of the and that in turn is founded in the affirmation of reality.
realization of something unreal (B) in something already This order is essential; it cannot be inverted, and so one
real (A). And this is the essential point: the logic of the cannot think that the primary function of the “is” is to be
affirmative intellection of the real. As our subject is not a copula and that the connection is merely a relation, and
logic, {165} it suffices to have pointed out this idea which that this relation constitutes judgement. Such a concep-
I deem essential; we are not seeking to invalidate modern tion is absolutely untenable. To see why, it suffices to re-
formal logic, only to found it in the logic of affirmation. fer to linguistic considerations. They show us quite
That which affirmed is, then, the realization of B in clearly the fact that the verb to be (est, esti, asti, etc. does
A in connective form. Thus, A is reality proposed, and B not in any respect constitute a special verb. In the first
is something unreal realized in A; and this realization is place, every verb—and not just to be—has the two pri-
of connective character. What is the affirmation? mary functions. If I say “the bird sings, the horse runs,
the man talks”, etc., the verbs ‘sings’, ‘runs’, ‘talks’ have
The affirmation itself does not consist in connecting
the two functions of expressing an affirmation, i.e., the
B with A but in putting the connective unity A-B into re-
position of something in reality itself, and also of ex-
ality itself. If one desires to continue talking about rela-
pressing a connection between the horse, the bird, and the
tions, he must say that affirmation does not consist in af-
man with some states or actions or qualities (the exact
firming the relation of B with A, nor that of A with B;
expression does not matter here). Whence the serious
rather, it consists in putting this relation into reality itself.
error of thinking that predicative affirmation is necessarily
The unity of B in A moves along a line of relation. On the
in the form “A is B”. The judgement “the bird sings” is
other hand, affirmation moves along a line which in a way
just as predicative as the judgement “A is B”, not because
is orthogonal to this latter. That is, in affirmation one
“sings” {167} is equivalent to “is a singer”—which is
does not go from B to A nor from A to B but from A-B to
absurd, just as absurd as saying that in the nominal phrase
the reality of what is primordially apprehended. In propo-
there is an ellipsis of the verb to be. The judgement af-
sitional judgement affirmation is orthogonal to constitu-
firms the connective unity of the bird and its singing. It is
tion. In predicative judgement affirmation is orthogonal to
on account of this that I said at the beginning that I was
connection.
only provisionally expressing predicative judgement in the
With this we see that predicative judgement is a form “A is B”. Now, in this very case the verb to be is
modification of the intentum, but a modification which is present. Originally it was a substantive verb like all the
threefold. The intentum modified has become an intentum rest; and like them, it expresses the affirmation of the
of judgement, i.e. an affirmative intention. Secondly, the connective unity of A and B. However, not all verbs—but
predicative judgement involves a propositional intention, many old verbs, e.g. in Greek or Latin—have, in addition
which is a second modification of the absolute intention. to their verbal meaning stemming from their etymological
And thirdly, the propositional judgement has been taken root, a copulative character which they have gradually
164 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

acquired. Consider the verbs meno, auxanomai, hyparkho, itself but upon reality. That is, reality is not a mode of
pelo, gignesthai, phyo, etc., etc., etc... Among them is being; rather, being is founded in reality. We saw this
one which merits special attention. From the Indo- already in Part I, and we shall return to it in more detail
European root *sta derives the Greek verb histemi, which in a subsequent section.
as an intransitive verb means to be firmly on one’s feet. To summarize, affirmation is a moment of intellec-
Its compound kathistemi has, in the primitive aorist tense tive movement which intellectively knows what a thing,
katesten, the sense of being established, constituted, in- already apprehended {169} as real, is “in reality”. Mov-
stalled, etc. And this aorist acquired—as one can readily ing in the field of reality itself, the intelligence steps back
understand—a copulative meaning as well. From “being from a real thing in a retraction in which it intellectively
established” the verb took on the meaning “is”. From the knows what the thing “would be” in reality. This is sim-
same root derives the Latin stare. Already in the classical ple apprehension (percept, fictional item, concept). Now,
period it sometimes had the meaning of a copula as a following in the field of reality itself, the intelligence
strong synonym of esse. It passed into the Romance lan- turns therein to a real thing in order to intellectively
guages, and in particular into Spanish as estar,* which know, in this stepping back, what the thing is in reality.
unites to its “substantive” sense a copulative sense And that intellection is, as we have seen, affirmation. Af-
founded upon it. Later I will examine in detail what in firmation is the “distanced” intentum of a thing, i.e., in a
my opinion constitutes the difference between the two stepping back. That about which one judges is something
Spanish verbs for “to be”: ser and estar. In all of these already apprehended as reality, and that which one judges
verbs the “connection” fades into “relation”. Now, the of the thing is what it is “in reality”. For it, the thing of
verb to be also passed from being a substantive verb to which one judges can have three functions: mere position,
being a copula. The copulative meaning of these verbs pro-position, and subject of predication. And each of
was, then, acquired, and its acquisition was founded in the these functions constitutes a form of affirmation.
previous substantive meaning, so to speak. {168} Moreo-
ver, the copulative meaning not only was acquired, but This difference among the three functions of the real
was always secondary. So we can say that the three func- in affirmation has a formally sentient character. Only
tions are founded in the above-mentioned form, and none because there is an impression of reality is there a field of
is exclusive to the verb to be, especially if one remembers reality, a field of the de suyo. The three functions are
that there are very many languages which do not even founded in and established by the impression of reality. It
have this verb. is sentiently as if I see myself having stepped back from
what something, already apprehended as real, is in reality;
If, for greater simplicity, we return to the predicative
and it is sentiently I find myself retained by the real as
judgement such as it is generally used in formal logic, we
apprehended and returned to it: this is sentient logos. In
shall have to distinguish in every such judgement—as I
this reversion, the logos intellectively knows the realiza-
wrote some sixty years ago—its grammatical structure and
tion of the simple unreal apprehension, and intellectively
its intellective structure. Grammatically, the subject is the
knows it by a determination of what has already, previ-
object expressed in only one of its aspects (A, this table,
ously, been apprehended. This determination is, to be
etc.). The predicate is another aspect of the same object,
sure, anchored in the fact that it is my intellection which,
the aspect designated as B. The copula is the verb to be
by being sentient, is distanced or stepped back from, and
which designates the unity, both connective and relational,
which by being so returns to the real in three different
of these two aspects. But from the point of view of its
forms: positional, propositional, and predicative. But it is
intellective structure, the subject is the real object pro-
because the real, when impelling me impressively to step
posed, with all of its real properties (the property of being
back, opens to me {170} the three possibilities of deter-
A and all the remaining properties). The predicate is a
mination: positional, constitutive, and connective. They
simple unreal intentional apprehension of one or several
are thus three ways of traversing the distance from the
notes of the object, realized in it in connective form. The
unreal to what the real is in reality (through stepping back
copula is the affirmation that this connective unity per-
and returning). They are three forms of intentum. A non-
tains to reality, or rather, to what A is “in reality”.
sentient intellection cannot step back, and therefore it
This structure is essential for two reasons. First, be- cannot have the three functions: positional, constitutive,
cause it shows us the structure of predicative affirmation; and connective; nor can it intellectively know in the corre-
and second, because it places before our eyes something sponding triple intentionality: positional, constitutive, and
decisive, viz. that the “is”, the “to be”, does not rest upon connective. The logos is born from the impression of re-
ality and returns to it in these three forms, founded upon
*
[As noted earlier, estar has the meaning of “is” in the strong sense of “is
the three forms determined by the real as apprehended
actually” or “is here-and-now”.—trans.] primoridially. Now, in what, formally, lies the difference
 INTELLECTION AT A DISTANCE THROUGH “STEPPING BACK” 165

between these three functions? To intellectively know movement is above all an absence of intellection of what
what something is in reality is to intellective know the the thing is in reality. But it is not just a movement char-
unity of the field moment and the individual moment of acterized by this absence, because it is the movement of a
the real. These two moments are moments of the formal- dual intellection, in which the movement is directed to-
ity of reality impressively given in it. Whence it follows wards a fixed point, toward what the already real thing is
that the three functions are three forms of the unity of in reality. The duality thus stamps the movement with its
what is of the field and the individual, i.e., three forms of own character, in the sense that what is not intellectively
unity of the formality of reality. In this unity something known is going to be so, or at least is intended to be so.
which we may call “the force of reality” is made patent; Whence it follows that this movement is not just an ab-
not in the sense of force of imposition of the real, but in sence but something essentially different, a privation.
the sense of force of unity of the moment in a field and the {173} Privation is the character which duality stamps on
individual moment, i.e., force of realization. The strong- intellective movement qua movement. This intrinsic
est unity is positional form; it is the supreme form of in- unity of movement and duality is what constitutes expec-
tellectively knowing with the logos what something is in tation. The movement of privation as such is what con-
reality. Less strong is the propositional or constitutive stitutes expectation. Conversely, expectation formally
form; it affirms unity as constitution. Weakest, finally, is consists in privational intellective movement. Expectation
predicative affirmation, which affirms the unity of the real is the intellection of the other in its first presentation as
as connection. Altogether, then, there are three degrees of “other”. This concept already greeted us some pages back
force of realization, three degrees of intellectively know- when we spoke of the concept of intellective movement.
ing what something is in reality.
Now it is important to repeat that expectation is
But in each of these three forms of affirmation there what, in its etymological sense, corresponds to “looking at
can be distinct modes. The problem of the forms of af- from afar”. But this does not refer to some psychological
firmation {171} thus leads to the third problem. After state of anticipation; rather, it refers to an intrinsic char-
having examined what affirming is, and after examining acter of the intellective movement as such. What is this
what the forms of affirmation are, we now have to con- character? One might think that it consists in that intel-
front the problem of the modes of affirmation. lective movement which is “questioning”. But we have
already seen that this is not the case: questions are
{172}
founded upon expectation, and in most cases we are in
§3 intellective expectation without asking ourselves anything.
What is it that we expect in this expectation? We
THE MODES OF AFFIRMATION have already answered many times: not pure and simple
reality (because that is given to us already in primordial
apprehension, prior to any judgements, and only on ac-
I said earlier that the forms of affirmation are distin- count of it is judgement possible); rather, what we expect
guished according to the function carried out in an af- is not “reality” but what the real is “in reality”.
firmation by the thing about which one judges. On the
other hand, what I call the modes of affirmation concern This “expectant” movement takes place in stepping
the affirmative intention itself qua affirmative. This is our back. And in this being moved back a step, the intellec-
present problem. tion has, as we saw, its own character: intellective inten-
tion. It must be stressed that every intention—in order to
Let us begin again to clarify the ideas. Affirmative
be such—is in itself formally and constitutively expectant.
intention or judgement is an intellection at a distance, i.e.,
I deem this concept essential. It does not refer to the fact
by stepping back, of what a thing, already apprehended as
that one must expect an {174} affirmation, but to the fact
real, is in reality. This intellection has its own character-
that the intention itself is the proper and formally intel-
istics.
lective moment of expectation. If it is necessary to intel-
Above all it is, as I said, an intellection in move- lectively know that A is B, not only do I have the inten-
ment, a movement which consists in intellectively trav- tionality of B in A, but precisely because I start from A
ersing the distance in which we are with respect to what a this point of departure constitutes an expectation of what
thing is in reality, i.e., in stepping back from it. This in- the intentionality of A is going to be. Every intention is,
tellective movement is, then, dual. By being so, the intel- then, formally and constitutively expectant. Conversely,
lective movement which is intellectively knowing that a every expectation, as the character of intellective move-
thing is real, is not intellectively knowing yet what this ment, is formally and constitutively intentional. Intellec-
real thing is in reality. In this sense, the intellective tive movement is a movement “from-toward”. In this
166 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

movement I can consider only that “toward” which one is simple apprehension? The second is that of ascertaining
going. That is the only thing which up to now has gener- in what the determining itself consists, in what the real
ally been considered; in the classical concept of intention, qua determining principle of this reactualization in all its
one considers only the fact that the intention “intends” its modes consists. We shall concern ourselves with the latter
end, an end which therefore is usually termed “inten- question in Part Three. For now let us fix our attention on
tional”. But I believe that this is inadequate. The fact is the first, {176} in the diverse modes through which the
that one can and should consider the intention itself not real determines its reactualization, i.e. the diverse modes
only as “going toward” but also as “departing from”. And through which the given traits of the real determine the
then the intention is expectation. Expectation and inten- realization or non-realization of what is simply appre-
tionality, then, are but two intrinsically unified aspects of hended. And it is because of this that I speak about the
a single intellective movement, which is therefore “ex- fact that the traits are given in reactualization. To sim-
pectant intention” or “intentional expectation”. Whence it plify the terms, in place of reactualization I shall speak
follows that the intellective movement in which we intel- simply about the actualization of traits given in the reali-
lectively know what a thing already apprehended as real is zation of simple apprehensions. Do not confuse the actu-
in reality is, I repeat, intentional expectation or expectant alization and the realization of traits of what is simply
intention. apprehended in reality itself with this actualization of a
real thing in simple apprehensions and with the realiza-
Granting this, we must ask ourselves how this inten-
tion of these simple apprehensions in the given thing.
tional expectation is resolved. Resolution is the affirma-
Now, the simple apprehensions are realized in different
tion in which expectation is molded; it is intellection itself
ways depending upon the nature of the actualization of the
as affirmation. But let us not get confused. There is on
real.
one hand the intellective intention itself qua intention;
and this intention is intrinsically expectant. But on the b) Now, this actualization is an intrinsic determinant
other hand, there is the affirmation in which this intention of the modes of resolution of intentional expectation.
is molded. {175} Since it is molded intention, I have Thus, if the traits of the real with respect to what it is in
called it and will continue to call it affirmative intention. reality are intellectively known in a confused or ambigu-
Let us not confuse, then, the intellective intention with the ous way, the resolution of the intentional expectation takes
affirmative intention. This latter is the resolution of the on different characteristics. And in virtue of this, these
first, the resolution of the expectant intention. So how is modes of resolution are those expressed in the modes of
intentional expectation resolved into affirmative inten- intellection itself qua affirmative intention. Thus the am-
tion? biguity, as we shall see, is a proper mode of actualization
Affirmative intellection, as the intellection that it is, of the traits of the real with respect to simple apprehen-
is an intellective actuality of the real. Now, this actuality sions; and according to this mode of actualization, af-
of the real has different modes; and these different modes firmative intention, affirmation, has that mode which con-
of actuality of the real determine different modes of af- stitutes doubt. To preclude any confusion I shall system-
firmation. Each mode of affirmation thus depends essen- atically develop the two ideas just outlined.
tially and constitutively upon the mode by which the actu- First, all these modes of affirming depend essentially
alization of the real determines or resolves the intentional and constitutively upon the modes of reactualization of the
expectation. Permit me to explain. real in the order of simple apprehensions. {177} Ambigu-
ity, for example, is a mode of this actualization. It is the
a) Above all, it is an intellective actualization of the
real itself insofar as it actualizes its traits in an ambiguous
real, but of the real as already apprehended as real; it is
way with respect to simple apprehensions, with respect
therefore reactualization. And this reactualization is such
therefore to what the real is in reality. It is a characteris-
with respect to the simple apprehensions with which we
tic prior to any affirmation; it is, let us repeat, the mode of
seek to intellectively know what the real is in reality. We
actualizing the traits of the real with respect to what this
are dealing, then, with the realization of a simple appre-
particular thing is in reality, with respect to the simple
hension in what has already been actualized as real. Now,
apprehensions at my disposal.
this realization depends first of all upon the characteris-
tics, the traits, which are already given in the primordial In the second place, these different modes of actuali-
actualization of the thing as real. I speak of the traits as zation define different modes of affirmation and of af-
“given”. This phrase is chosen for now to be deliberately firmative intention; for example, ambiguous actualization
neutral, because the real qua reactualization poses two of the real determines dubitative affirmation or dubitative
questions. The first is, What is the mode by which such- affirmative intention—doubt properly so-called. In these
and-such real thing determines the realization in it of modes, for example the doubt-mode, we are not primarily
 INTELLECTION AT A DISTANCE THROUGH “STEPPING BACK” 167

dealing with a state of insecurity in which we are as- tively know with a certain firmness. That is, there is force
saulted by ambiguity, in contrast to other states, such as and there is firmness. The firmness is the very mode of
that of security. We are not talking about states, but for- affirmation. Now, the differences of firmness are the dif-
mal modes of affirmative intention. We do not mean that ferent modes of affirmation. {179}
when one affirms that something is ambiguous he finds
himself in a state of doubt; rather, we mean that doubt is Granting this, the modalization of affirmation has a
the ambiguous affirmation of the ambiguous qua ambigu- clearly defined structure. Above all, we have the real ac-
ous. It is the affirmative intention itself which is intrinsi- tualized with its traits in primordial apprehension. These
cally and formally doubting. The ambiguous is not just traits are notes of the real of quite diverse character, both
that to which affirmative intention refers, nor it is only a with respect to quality and intensity as well as position.
characteristic of what is intellectively known; rather it is But the real we now make the terminus of a second intel-
at one and the same time a characteristic of intellection lection, the intellection of what it is in reality. Then in-
and the affirmation itself. Doubt is not just an “affirmative tellection qua act acquires its own character; it becomes
intention about the ambiguous” but an “affirmative am- intentional expectation of what that which we have al-
biguous intention in itself, determined by the ambiguity of ready apprehended as real is in reality. The resolution of
the actualization of some real thing. Doubt is then a mode this expectation has three moments:
of affirmation, not a state consequent upon affirmation; a) Above all it is the moment of contribution of our
and the proof is that both moments can be quite disparate. simple apprehensions , or to use common parlance (but to
I can be in a state of insecurity with respect to a doubting speak much less precisely), it is the contribution of our
affirmation. In such a case, I am sure that the affirmation ideas. Only as a function of our simple apprehensions can
{178} is of doubt; I am sure that the thing is in reality we intellectively know what the real is in reality.
doubtful. The same applies mutatis mutandis for certitude
b) With respect to these simple apprehensions, the
and all other modes of affirmation, as we shall see forth-
traits of the real are actualized in different ways; this is
with.
the moment of reactualization. These traits, as moments
Therefore what we call ‘modes of affirmation’ for- of the real and simply real, are what they are in and by
mally consist in the modes such as the diverse actualiza- themselves, and nothing more. But with respect to simple
tions of the traits of the real which determine the resolu- apprehensions, they can take on a different mode of actu-
tion of intentional expectation. alization. A far-off figure is apprehended in the primor-
dial apprehension of reality as a far-off figure, and noth-
In what does this modality as such consist? We have ing more; in itself it is something actualized as real and
already seen that affirmation is a sentient intellection at a nothing more. But if I am to intellectively know what this
distance, the result of “stepping back”. And its sentient figure is in reality, I draw upon my simple apprehensions,
nature reveals that the return to the real has the character for example that of shrub, man, dog, etc. Is this figure a
of a force, the force of realization. This force has three shrub, a man, a dog, or what? With respect to these sim-
different degrees depending upon whether one is dealing ple apprehensions, and only with respect to them, do the
with positional, propositional, or predicative affirmation. traits of the far-off figure acquire a reactualization, be-
And this force not only has degrees, but also a quality cause the fact is that I seek to intellectively know if this
which we might term firmness. It is just what the term figure realizes the characteristics of the simple apprehen-
and concept ‘a-ffirmation’ refer to. “Grade of realization” sion of a man, {180} a shrub, a dog, etc. It is then a sec-
and “firmness” are not the same thing. Each of the three ond actualization but—I must again insist—only with
degrees of force of realization can be exercised with dif- respect to the realization of simple apprehensions. Reac-
ferent firmness. For example, the difference between tualization is intellection brought to fullness in the light of
doubt and certainty has nothing to do with the force of simple apprehensions. Reactualization is a second intel-
realization, but rather with the firmness with which this lection; and this second intellection is distinguished from
force operates. I can doubt or be certain that “every the first by being intellection in the light of simple appre-
woman, fickle”, or that “A is B”. The first phrase is hensions. Herein consists the “secondarity” of second
nominal (a constitution), the second predicative (a con- intellection: in being an intellection qualified by simple
nection); they are two degrees of the force of realization. apprehensions. Simple apprehensions are not merely the
But doubt and certainty are in the firmness with which the terminus of an intellection, but are also and formally an
constitution or connection is realized. Every logos is sen- intrinsic qualification of intellection. Simple apprehen-
tient, and is so in two moments. First, because I sentiently sion is the “quali-ficating” moment of second intellection
intellectively know what something is in reality as a force itself. Second intellection is intellection at a distance,
of realization; and second because I sentiently intellec- from stepping back, and in virtue of that one knows intel-
168 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

lectively only in the qualified light of simple apprehen- upon the structure of what doubt is. What we are here
sions. A perfectly determined trait in primordial appre- trying to conceptualize is not a psychogenesis {182} of
hension can be, as we shall see, only slightly determined our affirmations, but the intellective spectrum, so to speak,
with respect to the realization of a simple apprehension, of its diverse structures. And it is only to this dependence
because reactualization is actualization of the real as re- of structural nature that I refer when I speak of the fact
alization of a simple apprehension. And this reactualiza- that some modes of affirmation are dependent upon oth-
tion is what has different modes: the unknown shape can ers.
reactualize the characteristics of a shrub, of a man, of a What are these modes? That is the problem we must
dog, etc. and actualize them in a more or less vague way, now address.
and so forth.
1. In the lower part of the spectrum of affirmative
c) I intellectively know these diverse modes of reac- structures we find a peculiar mode of affirmation. We
tualization, and I affirm them with respect to realization have apprehended something as real and we seek to know
itself; this is the moment of affirmative intention, the mo- intellectively what it is in reality. It can happen that we
ment of affirmation. Depending on what the modes of do not succeed in this effort. In that case we say that the
reactualization have been in the second moment, affirma- affirmation is an affirmation of our ignorance; we do not
tion takes on different modalities because every affirma- know what the thing is in reality.
tion is in itself modal. To be sure, this modality has
nothing to do with what in classical logic is referred to as But this description is radically wrong and com-
modality, viz. the difference in connection {181} of sub- pletely inadequate. In the first place, the verb “to know”
ject with predicate according to whether it is contingent, [saber] is used.* True, up to now we have not spoken at
necessary, etc. Here we are not talking about the connec- all about what “knowing” is; that subject will occupy us
tion between subject and predicate, but about the mode in elsewhere. Up to now I have spoken only of intellective
which the actualization of the notes of the real are af- knowing [inteligir] and of intellection. But disregarding
firmed. that for the time being—however essential it is, as we
shall see—let us employ the verb to know as synonymous
Such is the structure of the modes of intellection at a with intellection. But even so, the previous description is
distance. radically wrong. In fact, what is this business of not
knowing what something is in reality? The Pithecan-
The study of this structure can be made from differ-
thropic man from Java, for example, did not know what a
ent points of view. These modes, in fact, are mutually
rock is in reality. Do we then say that he was ignorant of
dependent. And this dependence is of the greatest impor-
what a rock is in reality? As I see it, No, because being
tance in our analysis. But it is essential to delineate
ignorant of what something is in reality is a mode of in-
carefully the ideas involved, because this dependence can
tellection of something already apprehended in the pri-
be of different types. “Dependence” can mean the mode in
mordial apprehension of reality. All ignorance is there-
which an affirmation depends upon others with respect to
fore always ignorance of something already apprehended
its production in the mind. The dependence is then a psy-
as real. We intellectively know the reality of the “rock-
cho-genetic fact. But it is not this connection which is of
thing”, but we are ignorant of what it is in reality. Now,
concern to us here. The only decisive thing is the internal
the Pithecanthropic man did not have {183} primordial
structure of each mode of affirmation. And it is this
apprehension of the “rock-reality”. Therefore his not
structure which is found to be dependent, qua structure,
knowing what the rock is in reality is not ignorance; it is
upon other affirmations. Thus it is possible that an af-
nescience. The Pithecanthropic man did not have any
firmation might be doubtful as compared with a certain
intellective actuality of the thing we call a rock. His “not
affirmation, for example. But this can mean two things.
knowing” here is “non-intellection”; it is an “absence” of
It can mean that the affirmation began as something
intellection. On the other hand, in the case of ignorance
doubtful and that doubt has given way to a certain af-
firmation. This is the psycho-genetic connection. But it
can also mean that as a mode of affirmation the structure
* [Zubiri employs several Spanish verbs which have the English
of the doubtful affirmation occupies a well-defined place translation, ‘to know’: saber, from the Latin sapere; conocer,
with respect to a certain affirmation. This is a structural from the Latin cognoscere; and inteligir, from the Latin intel-
nexus or dependence. The two types of dependence are ligere. The first refers to knowing in the sense of intellectual
quite different. Our certain affirmation almost never or practical knowledge; the second generally means ‘to know’
comes preceded by a doubt, but is generated in other ways. in the sense of ‘to be familiar with’ or ‘to know someone’; the
Nonetheless, in every case the structure of certainty, the third is what is translated throughout this book as, ‘to intel-
structure of what certainty is, is dependent constitutionally lectively know’.—trans.]
 INTELLECTION AT A DISTANCE THROUGH “STEPPING BACK” 169

one has intellection of the real, but not yet intellection of not a “lack” of actualization, but a positive “privation” of
what that real thing is in reality. Therefore it is not an the “understood” actualization. In what does this priva-
“absence” of intellection, but a “privation” of it. Igno- tion consist?
rance is privation of intellection of what something which
has already been apprehended as real is in reality; it is not Let us recall what it is to intellectively know what
merely an absence of intellection. Strictly speaking, something is “in reality”. Every real thing apprehended
when one is ignorant of something one knows what the in its formality of reality has two moments, that of indi-
ignorance is of. The formal terminus of ignorance is the vidual reality and that of reality in a field. And it is pre-
“in reality” of something already apprehended as real. To cisely their intrinsic unity which formally constitutes what
be sure, there are types of ignorance which refer to the the real thing is “in reality”. Now, as I have already said,
mere reality of something. But no reality is intellectively when one intellectively knows something real “among”
known as merely real; rather, it is founded (in whatever others, these two moments are {185} in a certain way
way; that does not concern us here) upon something al- functionally differentiated, since the field encompasses not
ready intellectively known as real, where intellection of one but many things. Whence the unity of being in a field
what it “in reality” demands the mere reality of something and being an individual is not apparent. It is rather medi-
else. And it can happen that we are ignorant of this real- ated by simple apprehensions in the field of reality itself.
ity. But then it is clear that in its ultimate root, ignorance It is the realization of these simple apprehensions which
concerns the “in reality” of something already appre- fills the field moment and its unity with individual reality;
hended as “real”. Otherwise we would be in the situation mediation is the actualization of a real individual thing in
described before: our non-intellection of mere reality simple apprehensions. Now it can happen that individual
would not be ignorance but nescience. It would be a case reality is not actualized in any of the simple apprehen-
of not having the vaguest idea of that reality. But this is sions we have had. In that case there is a unique actuali-
not ignorance; it is more than ignorance, it is nescience. zation, viz. the actualization of the real thing as in a field,
Ignorance then is not nescience but a positive characteris- but an empty field. The real thing thus is inscribed in the
tic of affirmative intellection. Which characteristic? “hollowness” of the field. Whence it follows that the unity
of the individual thing and the field remains in suspense.
Let us return once again to our modest point of de- That is, what this thing is in reality remains in suspense.
parture. We have an intellection of a certain real thing and This suspension is not just an absence, nor some lack of
we seek to know intellectively what it is in reality. Intel- determination; rather, it is a positive mode of actualiza-
lection is {184} then a movement of intentional expecta- tion, viz. privational determination. It is the positive ac-
tion, which has to be resolved. And the resolution of this tualization of the “in reality”, but in a privative mode. It
expectation has three moments. is then the privative actuality of a hollowness; and this
a) Above all we make use of our simple apprehen- privational actuality is precisely the “indetermination”.
sions, and with them try to intellectively know their possi- Indeterminate, then, does not here mean indefinite, be-
ble actualization in what is already intellectively known as cause being indefinite is a mode of determination. Inde-
real. Does the figure actualize the simple apprehension of termination means rather “un-defined”. “Un-defined” is
a man, of a shrub, or of something else? At this point the not the same as “indefinite”. In virtue of that, the ambit of
two other essential moments of intellection arise in the the indeterminate is constitutively open without limits; it
intellection. is open to everything else. “Everything else” does not
refer to other things, but to what the “un-defined” thing
b) Intellection of the realization of simple apprehen- might be in reality. It is the “everything else” of the “in
sions (which we have at our disposal) in the real already reality”. What is un-defined is the mode of unity of the
apprehended as such, is the second essential moment. individual and of the being in a field, i.e., what the thing
This realization can have different modes which are, so to is in reality. As it is the {186} un-definition of something
speak, different degrees of sufficiency. already definite as real in primordial apprehension, it fol-
There is a lowest degree. With respect to the simple lows that this un-definition is privation. Privation is the
apprehensions which we have at our disposal, it can be the actuality of the “hollowness” of the individual in the field;
case that the real realizes none of them. The thing is real it is the “in reality” in suspense. Simple apprehensions
but it has not been actualized with respect to any simple are what determine the actuality of the indeterminate.
apprehension; it is what I term indeterminate actualiza- And here one sees the difference between the traits of
tion. And this type of modal actualization constitutes a a thing in and of itself, and its traits with respect to a sec-
mode of realization of the order of the simple apprehen- ond actualization. The traits of a real thing in and of
sions in the real thing. And this realization is also inde- themselves can be perfectly determinate in their individual
terminate. What is this indetermination? Of course, it is reality, and yet their intrinsic unity with respect to the
170 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

field can be indeterminate. The real thing is determinate, {188} not a simple task. Insofar as this realization pro-
but what it is in reality is indeterminate. gresses, real things actualize their traits in a more definite
c) This actuality of the indeterminate, this actuality way; this is the structural emergence of other modes of
of the “hollowness” of the field of individual reality, in affirmative intellection.
turn defines its own mode of intellective affirmation be- 2. What a thing is in reality can begin to actualize
cause it defines its own mode of realizing something in and realize more of its traits with respect to simple appre-
simple apprehension. Every intellective movement is, as hensions.
we have seen, intentional expectation. And therefore, qua
a) Actualization of a real thing in these simple ap-
mere intellection, that movement is a privational inten-
prehensions is not purely and simply indeterminate. The
tion; it is in just this respect that its expectant character
actualization, in fact, is sometimes a more or less vague,
consists. This intentional privational expectation is re-
even fleeting, moment; sometimes it is extremely con-
solved in an affirmation whose mode is determined by the
crete. It is the moment in which the announcement of a
mode of the actualization. When the actualization is a
determination begins to emerge, however vaguely. It is a
privational “hollowness”, the affirmation takes on a spe-
purely dawning or inchoative moment. But it is an indi-
cial mode. Every expectant intention is in itself priva-
cation which is no more than an indication, since scarcely
tional; when the actuality of the expected is indetermina-
has the actualization been indicated when the emerging
tion (in the sense explained), it follows that intentional
traits once again dissolve and become invalid. It is what I
privation becomes the character of the affirmation; it is
shall term a “revoked indication”. Now, this revoked in-
the privational aspect of intention molded into a mode of
dication formally constitutes that mode of actualization
affirmation. It is not privation of intention; that would be
which is the hint. It is not mere indetermination, but
just an intellective deficiency. Nor is it intention {187}
neither is it determination; it is the dawning of revoked
itself as deprived of a positive terminus, because that
determination, the mere suggesting of a possible determi-
would be just some manifestation. It is an intention which
nation, its first indication. The hint is a mode of actual-
consists in the very mode of affirming; it is the affirmation
izing a real thing with respect to what it is in reality, i.e.,
itself as privational. Privationality of the act of affirmation
with respect to the simple apprehensions with which we
is vacuous affirmation. Now, this mode of affirming is
seek to intellectively know it. The traits of the real thing
precisely what constitutes ignorance. Ignorance is af-
are never hints; they are what they are and nothing more.
firming “privationally” the “in reality”. It is an affirma-
On the other hand the hint is always and only a hint or
tion suspended in itself as affirmation. It is a positive
evidence of something, and this something is what is ap-
mode of affirmation. A mode of affirmation such that the
prehended in simple apprehension. It is then only a hint
affirmative intention is as if folded back upon itself is a
of what the real thing is in reality.
proper intentional hollowness; the empty affirmative in-
tention as a mode of affirming is what ignorance consists b) This mode of actualization and realization moulds
in. It is like a shot in the dark. It is, then, in the first the affirmation in accordance with a particular mode of
place a hollowness, but in the second a hollowness of what intention, viz. the affirmative intention of the hint as
the real is in reality. Hollowness is then a positive af- guess. {189} A guess is a mode of affirmation. This does
firmative ambit; a positive affirmation in hollowness, an not refer to guessing an affirmation, but to affirm by
indeterminate affirmation. The expectant privational in- guessing, so to speak. The emptiness of intention, i.e., of
tention is folded back upon itself, molded into a suspended ignorance, now gives way to that of guessing the inten-
affirmation. It is being suspended as a mode of affirma- tion. This is the intellection of the first pointer to the de-
tion itself, not merely a suspension of what is affirmed. termination of what a real thing is in reality. One guesses
Such is the essence of ignorance: a suspended vacuous only what the thing is in reality, because it is actualized
affirmation, of the indeterminate as such. for us as a hint.
This intellection naturally admits of various degrees.
Precisely because ignorance is a mode of affirmative
Merely pointing to a determination can be a pointing
intellection, man not only has to go on learning what
which tends to make itself clear. But it is a pointing
things are in reality, he also has to learn to be ignorant.
quickly revoked. This mode of hint is what I call clares-
Only thus can he create new simple apprehensions which
cence, the breaking of the dawn of clarity. Guessing the
in time can lead from ignorance to other modes of af-
affirmative intention of the clarescent is glimpsing, the
firmative intellection. The access to ignorance, on the
glimpsing of the clarescent. The hint can be more than
periphery and above nescience, is a firm intellective
just clarescence. In the revoked pointing of the hint, not
movement.
only may the light which is dawning be actualized, but
The realization of simple apprehensions is therefore some traits of the thing as well. But these things, now
 INTELLECTION AT A DISTANCE THROUGH “STEPPING BACK” 171

revoked, actualize the thing as something which is in re- just manifested; they are on the contrary sustained. Be-
ality poorly drawn or sketched. This actualization of the fore, even though manifested, they did not go beyond be-
hint can be called blurred. Something blurred consists in ing indices, since they were going to be revoked immedi-
traits being actualized sketchily with respect to what the ately. But now, what is manifested is not revoked. Thus
thing is in reality. It does not refer to a type of mix of the manifested traits become sustained. What are these
traits, but to a rigorous sketching. Sketching is not the sustained traits? They form a multiplicity of a very defi-
privation of figure, but neither is it a precise figure. nite character. Above all it is a multiplicity of traits which
“Sketching” here refers to the revoking, which actualizes is quite fixed: something real has this or that set of traits;
the traits as not being determinately of the thing such as it for example, the traits of a shrub or a dog, but not those of
is simply apprehended. And this “not” actualizes the a man. The thing in question is in reality only a dog or a
thing not as indeterminate but as sketched. The revoking shrub. It is in this that sustaining formally consists.
sketches the traits of the thing actualized in simple appre- When they are not revoked, the traits comprise a multi-
hension. Nothing is blurry in itself but only is so with plicity which is not open but closed, a bounded multiplic-
respect to {190} simple apprehensions. And the blurred ity. To be sure, the traits are not determined, but neither
formally consists in this sketching. Now, affirmative in- are they random; the scope of their non-determination is
tention, the realization of the blurred qua blurred is confu- one which is bounded. Moreover, this multiplicity not
sion. This does not refer to some confusion of “ideas” or only is bounded, it is a defined multiplicity; the traits are
anything of that sort; rather, it is a mode of affirming, of a dog, a shrub, etc. The indetermination is not just
affirming confusedly that something is in reality blurred. bounded but also defined. The bounding of the area of
We dimly perceive what that thing is in reality. Finally, in indetermination, and the definition of the traits constitutes
the repeated appearance and disappearance of actualized a decisive step beyond mere indetermination.
traits, there are some which do not point to something
Here we have the traits of a real thing actualized
else, which remain as definitively revoked; whereas others
now with respect to simple apprehensions. But it remains
continue to point insistently. The blurred thus continues
to go {192} one step further. These traits are sustained,
to manifest vaguely its traits. So the hint is more than
but by whom? By the real thing itself. It isn’t enough to
what is sketched of the blurry; it is realization as indica-
say that traits comprise a bounded and definite multiplic-
tion. It is a “pointing manifestation”, but one which is
ity; rather it is necessary to say in what the sustaining
revoked as soon as it points. Therefore we say that its
itself consists. The sustaining is thus the mode of actuali-
traits are only indicated. There is only an indication of
zation of a real thing with respect to the simple apprehen-
what the thing is in reality. Now, affirmative intention of
sions of dog and shrub. Hence what must be said is in
something indicated, realized as such, is what we call
what the sustaining consists as actualization. When
suspicion. It is a mode of affirmative intention: one sus-
something actualizes its traits in a sustained manner, we
pects something which is only indicated. It is a suspicion
do not say that the thing could be one thing or another
of what the thing is in reality.
indifferently, but that it could be one thing as well as an-
To summarize, hint can present three qualities: other. Sustaining is not mere insistence, but that mode of
clarescence, blurredness, and indication. The intellective actualization of the “either one”. Now, these traits pertain
intention of the hint as such, the guess, thus possesses to the real thing. It is the real thing which sustains the
three qualities determined by the hint: the glimpse of the traits of the dog or of the shrub. And then this thing is no
clarescent, the confusion of the blurry, and the suspicion longer either indeterminate nor a hint. It is no longer one
of the indicated. or the other, but as much one as the other: it is ambiguous.
But this last quality, suspicion, is already the incho- The mode of actualization of what a real thing is in reality
ate transition to a different mode of affirmation. now has the mode of ambiguity. In the sustaining of mul-
tiple traits of a bounded and defined multiplicity, a thing
3. In fact the peak of the indication conduces to fix- is in reality ambiguous. What is bounded and defined of
ing a set of traits with respect to simple apprehensions. the multiplicity concerns the traits; the ambiguity con-
{191} In them a real thing is actualized in a way different cerns its sustaining, its actualization; it is an intrinsic
from and superior to the hint, and this actualization de- mode of actualization. Together with the mode of actuali-
termines an affirmative intention superior to the guess. zation of indetermination and hint, we now have a third
a) What is this actualization? Recall first that in the mode of actualization: ambiguity. It is a real thing itself
actualization of indetermination and hint, the multiplicity which in reality is actualized ambiguously with respect to
of traits is always an open multiplicity: the hollowness simple apprehensions.
and revocation leave open the multiplicity of actualizable b) Now, actualization of a real thing as ambiguous is
traits. But now, the traits do not remain revoked or even molded into its own form of realization of affirmative in-
172 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

tention; this is doubt. Doubt is formally the affirmation of which is bounded and limited. But now a new character-
the ambiguous real qua ambiguous. Doubt is etymologi- istic appears, that of “weight”, pondus. Actualization has
cally a mode of duplicity. But here we are not dealing a certain weight; it is not just a metaphor introduced ad
{193} with the duality of intellection by stepping back, at hoc. It is something extremely precise which is expressed
a distance, but the dual character of the actualization of in a term, pre-ponderance. The intrinsic character of ac-
the real. It is this special mode of duality which consti- tuality is more than simple ambiguity; it is preponderance.
tutes ambiguity. Let us remark in passing that when What is preponderant is the actualization of the traits with
speaking of doubt and ambiguity, it is not necessary that respect to a simple apprehension. Approximation pertains
there be only two terms (dog, shrub); there could be a intrinsically to the actualization of a thing; and this in-
greater number. But for the sake of clarity I limit myself to trinsic approximation is what constitutes preponderance.
those cases where there are two. And this is the essential In virtue of that, the actuality of a thing includes, just as
point. Doubt is not founded in disjunction; it is not in the case of ambiguity, two terms ‘bounded’ and ‘de-
founded in the fact that a real thing is in reality either a fined’; but it sustains one more than the other. Therefore
dog or a shrub. Doubt is founded, on the contrary, upon a the thing is no longer “one as much as the other” but
conjunction, namely that something can be as much dog “rather more one than the other”. The “rather one than”
as shrub, i.e., upon an ambiguity. And as a mode of af- is the preponderance. In ambiguity this character of pre-
firmation, doubt is not a type of oscillation or vacillation ponderance is cloaked, so to speak. From such a point of
between two affirmations. It is on the contrary a mode of view, {195} ambiguity would be an equi-ponderance. But
affirming what a real thing is ambiguously in reality. We the converse is not true: ambiguity is a mode of actuality
vacillate because there is a doubtful affirmation; but there which is intrinsically distinct from and independent of all
is no doubtful affirmation because we vacillate. Doubt is a ponderance. The continuity of the transition is a mode of
mode of affirmation, not a conflict between two affirma- actuality to the other; its intrinsic irreducibility cannot be
tions. We affirm yet with doubt the ambiguity of what reduced.
something real is in reality. It is not a not-knowing where
b) Now, actualization of the preponderant as such
to turn, but knowing that the thing is in reality ambigu-
determines its own mode of realization, of affirmative
ous. It is of course understood that the thing is really am-
intention, viz. opinion. Opinion is formally a mode of
biguous with respect to my simple apprehensions; nothing
affirmation; it is affirming not vacuously, nor by guessing,
is ambiguous in itself.
nor in a doubting fashion, but as opinion. This does not
Here we have the third mode of affirmation: doubt. refer to an opinion one may have about a possible af-
It constitutes a structure erected upon the structure of ig- firmation; rather, it is a mode of affirmation. What the
norance and of conjecture. The emptiness of indetermi- thing is in reality, preponderantly, is for example a dog;
nation is molded into the conjecture of the hint. And this and the mode of affirmation of the preponderant as such is
conjecture or guessing grows: the glimpse of the clares- formally opinion. Nothing is preponderant nor therefore
cent becomes the confusion of the blurred; and this confu- subject to opinion in itself; rather being preponderant, to
sion is pinned down in the suspicion of the indicated. be subject to opinion is to be so only as an actuality with
Now, the suspicion of the indicated is pinned down in the respect to simple apprehensions. In and by itself, the dis-
doubt of the ambiguous. In the reduction of {194} inde- tant dim figure has all the features of a distant dim figure,
termination to hint and hint to ambiguity, one is so to and nothing more. But with respect to my simple appre-
speak stretching the circle of what the real thing is in re- hensions, this distant dim figure has the traits of a dog
ality. One more step, and this circle takes on a qualita- rather than a shrub. Affirmation as an intentional mode of
tively different mode, which in turn determines a different the “rather than” is an affirmation which is intrinsically
mode of affirmative intellection. subjectable to opinion. Only as the terminus of this af-
firmation can preponderant be called subject to opinion.
4. In fact, it can happen that something which is pre-
sent, while still ambiguous, is found to be closer to one of As a mode of affirmation, opinion can have different
the two poles of the ambiguity than the other. This ap- characteristics depending upon the weight of the traits
proximation is not just gradual but the expression of a actualized. Preponderance, preponderant actuality, can at
new mode of actualization of what a thing is in reality, a time be only a light tilting or attraction. It is a kind of
mode which in turn determines a new mode of affirma- inchoate gravitation. The affirmative intention {196} of
tion, of realization. the actual as tilting or attraction is that intention we call
inclination. This is an expression which is most definitely
a) As actualization with respect to simple apprehen- ambiguous. It can suggest, indeed, the idea of a tendency
sions, a real thing is closer to one than the other. What is or something like it, as happens when one speaks of good
this proximity? In ambiguity one deals with a multiplicity or bad inclinations. But here it means only inclination as
 INTELLECTION AT A DISTANCE THROUGH “STEPPING BACK” 173

an intrinsic mode of affirming. The same thing happens reality. Rather, they constitute only, so the speak, the out-
with this expression as with the word ‘intention’. From ward appearance of what it is in reality. This determines
meaning the intention of an act of will it came to mean its own mode of affirmative intention.
the intentionality proper to intellection. I believe that it is a) What is this mode of actuality? A dim figure in
necessary to bring about the same thing with respect to the distance has all the traits proper to a dog. Here, then,
this expression as happened centuries ago with the word we are not involved with any ambiguity at all, nor with
‘intention’. Inclination is a modalization of this intention; any preponderance. The traits are neither ambiguous nor
it is the mode of affirming, of realizing actuality as tilting preponderant; they are on the contrary univocally deter-
or attracting. mined. We say, then, and with reason, that we see a dog.
Just one more step and the form in which the pre- {198} But is this the same thing which occurs when I see
ponderant traits are actualized will no longer be merely a dog in my house? I also see the dog in my house; but
tilting or attracting; rather, those traits will “carry” more there is an essential difference between these two appre-
on one side than the other. We may term this mode of hensions. In my house, I see something which in fact “is”
actuality gravity, a gravitation not merely inchoate but in a dog, whereas that which I see in the distance, although
a certain way macroscopic. The affirmative intention of it has all the canine characteristics perfectly defined and
the preponderant with gravity is probability. Here I refer delineated, nonetheless only “has” them. This “having”
to probability as a mode of affirmation, not of probability indicates precisely the difference in actualization of the
as a characteristic of physical reality. What physics un- real with respect to the traits of simple apprehension of
derstands by probability is as I see it what we might call the dog. What is this having, in what does it consist, and
the measure of possibility. All physical states of the elec- what is the mode of actualization of a real thing with re-
tron described by its wave function are possible. But all spect to it? These are the important questions.
are not equally possible. The quantitative structure of this In the first place, the “having” designates a certain
of this possibility is what as I see it constitutes real prob- difference between what a real thing is in reality and its
ability. But here we are not dealing with that. We are not traits. Otherwise the verb “to have” would lack meaning.
dealing with the measure of the real but with modes of This does not refer to ambiguity or preponderance, be-
affirmation; I affirm probably that a thing is such or such cause ambiguity and preponderance concern the traits of a
in reality. The modalization of the preponderance {197} thing and here these traits are univocally determined.
according to gravity constitutes a probable intention as a The difference marking off “having” has to do with a dif-
mode of intention. ferent dimension, the effective volume of a thing. Permit
Finally, it can happen that certain traits have so me to explain. Actualized traits are univocally deter-
much “weight” that their load is clearly to one side. This mined, but only constitute what is superficial—the super-
is the actuality of the preponderant as conquest. The facies—or the surface of the thing’s real volume. Now, the
mode of affirmation, of realization, of conquest is convic- volume qua circumscribed by these “facies” or faces has
tion. We say that traits drag us along toward an affirma- that mode of actuality termed aspect. Here, ‘aspect’ does
tion. Being in a dragged-along intention is that mode of not mean something which is only more or less precise,
affirmative intention constituting conviction. The “con- variable, or ephemeral and circumstantial. On the con-
quering” [vincere] within a thing is “at the same time” the trary, aspect is here something perfectly precise; and in its
“con-vincing” of the intention. precision it pertains intrinsically, really, and determinately
to the thing. But it does so in a special way. Aspect is
In summary, weight, preponderance, has three
only a mode of actualization of what a thing is in reality.
qualities of actuality: tilting (or attraction), gravity, and
It does not refer, I repeat, either to ambiguity or prepon-
conquest. And these qualities determine three qualities of
derance of traits; rather, it refers to the fact that, in its own
affirmation: inclination, probability, and conviction. They
precision, this group of traits {199} comprises the aspect
are the three modes of opinion.
of what the thing is in reality. What the dim distant figure
But however much the traits drag along and deter- has is precisely the aspect of a dog.
mine the conviction of intellective knowing, they are but
In the second place, What is this ‘having’ itself?
pointed out or indicated. One more constriction in this
The aspect is not formally what the real thing is in reality,
structure might lead us to a different mode of affirmative
but an aspect “of” the thing. This “of” is a genitive of
intention.
intrinsic pertaining. In virtue of it the aspect is something
5. It can happen, in fact, that a thing is actualized in like an envelopment or external projection of what a thing
traits which are perfectly and univocally determinate, but is in reality. This envelopment is not a type of encap-
which nonetheless are not necessarily what the thing is in suling, because then the aspect would not be intrinsic to
174 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

the real thing but would contend with it. Now, having affirmation of the obvious. It is a mode of affirming, viz.
[tener] is not containing [contener]. The dimly perceived affirming plausibly that a thing is in reality such as its
figure in the distance has the traits of a dog; nonetheless, aspect manifests it. Plausibility is a mode of affirming,
it is but the dog’s aspect. The pertaining of the aspect to a and that which is affirmed in this mode is the obvious.
real thing is a type of pressure, by which the aspect is But since {201} the obvious is what strikes us, it follows
more or less “attached” to what the thing is in reality. that plausibility is the form in which intentional expecta-
What the thing is in reality is projected, so to so speak, in tion of intellection at a distance is molded. Simple appre-
its traits, which are thus its “ex-pression”. The unity of hension is plausibly affirmed as realized in a thing. The
the aspect with what a thing is in reality is the unity of plausible, just by virtue of being so, is what a thing is in
“ex-pression”. And this expression is a manifestation, reality, as long as the contrary is not evident. This “as
therefore, of the thing. Having is, as such, manifesting. long as” expresses at once the character of the obvious
Aspect is the ambit of manifestation of what a thing is in reality from the aspect and the plausible character of its
reality. Here we see clearly the difference between am- affirmation.
biguous manifestation and preponderance. The ambiguous This idea of the obvious and the plausible is, as I see
and the preponderant are constituted in what “is now” it, what constitutes Parmenides’ doxa. The mind is borne
manifested. On the other hand, with regard to aspect, one to what strikes it when it apprehends things in accordance
does not deal with what is now manifest, but with mani- with their form and their names. Onoma and morphé are
festing itself. the mode in which things strike us; náma-rupa say some
In the third place, “What is the mode of actualization of the Upanishads. Forms and names are the obvious
in aspect and manifestation of what a thing is in reality? aspect of a thing. And affirming that things are thus in
When I apprehend a dog in my house, I apprehend the reality is just the plausible, the doxa. It is not a question
dog and in it the manifestation of its traits, its aspect; I of mere phenomenological appearances, nor of sensible
therefore say that it is in fact a dog. But when I see at a perceptions, much less of concrete entities as opposed to
distance a figure which has the aspect of a dog, I do {200} being as such. As I see it, the question is one of obvious-
the inverse operation: I apprehend the aspect and intellec- ness and plausibility. All affirming of the concrete multi-
tively know in it the actualization of what the thing is in plicity of things is simply affirming the obvious, affirming
reality; I go from the aspect to the dog. The first thing that things are in accordance with the aspect which strikes
which strikes me about this actualization is the dog’s as- us. Therefore that affirmation is only plausible. For Par-
pect. And this “striking me” is what, etymologically, menides, the philosopher goes beyond the obvious and the
comprises obviousness. In the obvious a real thing is ac- plausible, to the true being of things. For Parmenides and
tualized, but merely as aspect. And upon going from as- the most important philosophers of the Vedanta, our sci-
pect to thing, it is obvious that the latter has been mani- ence and our philosophy could only be science and phi-
fested in aspect: a thing is obviously what is manifested in losophy of the aspectual. This mutual implication be-
its aspect. Precisely on account of this it never occurred to tween aspect, obviousness, and plausibility is, as I see it,
anyone to say without further ado that what is appre- the interpretation both of Eleatic philosophy as well as
hended is a dog. But it is a dog only obviously. The obvi- some Vedantic thought. {202}
ous is on one hand the aspect as being “of” a thing; on the What a real thing is in reality is thus univocally de-
other hand this “of” admits of degrees of pressure. And in termined, but in a lax sense. A thing “has” this or that
virtue of this the aspect is, in a certain way, “attached” to aspect in reality, and therefore is obviously the way it is.
the a thing but with laxity. Laxitude is the formal char- Affirmation of the obvious as such is plausibility. The
acter of merely “having”. Laxitude of determination is plausible is the mode of affirming the “real-manifest-
univocal, but the “of” itself is lax; strictly speaking a thing thing”, but nothing more.
could be in reality different than its aspect. Actualization
has, then, a precise mode: it is the aspect which manifests But we are not yet finished.
as obvious what a real thing is in reality. Obviousness is 6. Let us suppose, in fact, that the thing in question I
the new mode of actualization. Like all the rest, this do not apprehend off in the distance but nearby, for exam-
mode is so only with respect to simple apprehension. ple in my house. I apprehend that the thing is a dog.
Nothing is obvious in itself, but only with respect to a Then I do not say that the thing has the aspect of dog, but
simple apprehension. The realization of the simple ap- that it is a dog. What is this mode of actualization of the
prehension as aspect is only now obvious. thing and what is the mode of its affirmation?
b) Now, the actualization of a thing as something a) Above all, the difference between a dog and a ca-
obvious determines a proper mode of affirmative intention nine aspect is not primary. Rather, it is always posterior
of realization; it is plausibility. Plausibility is formally to the intellective apprehension of the dog itself, and
 INTELLECTION AT A DISTANCE THROUGH “STEPPING BACK” 175

therefore is founded in the intellection of dog. The nature Corporeity, constitution, and effectivity are three
of aspect is thus founded upon the actualization of what a concepts which, {204} upon reflection, if not perfectly
thing is in reality, and not the other way around, as previ- identical in this problem, at least are three concepts for
ously occurred. In this actualization what we previously which the words expressing them are ultimately synony-
called “aspect” is not, properly speaking, an aspect but a mous. For better understanding, I shall call this mode of
moment incorporated into the thing. Aspect is now what being actualized ‘effectivity’.
gives body to the thing. A thing is not just volume but Here we must pause briefly. These ideas of constitu-
body. Incorporation is the primary character of the new tion and corporeity may seem to be the same as those
mode of actualization. What we previously called “as- characterizing the primordial apprehension of reality. A
pect” is only the form of actuality of what the real thing is real thing apprehended in and by itself is compact; it
in reality. And as such it should be called corporeity. I seems, then, that what we call the actualization of a real
am not referring only to the body as an organism or any- thing in intellective movement is only a new designation
thing of that nature; rather to the body as merely the mo- for compaction. But this is not at all the case, because
ment of actuality of a real thing itself. It is the moment of affirmative intellection is an intellection at a distance (by
actuality of a simple apprehension in the real thing itself. stepping back) of mediate character; it is not intellection
In the second place, precisely on account of this, the of a thing in and by itself. In intellective movement we
actualization {203} means that it is the thing itself and have distanced ourselves from a thing and we return to it
not only its manifestation which realizes my simple ap- in order to intellectively know it in a reactualization. This
prehension. This simple apprehension is not actualized reactualization, however much it may be actualization, is
only in the aspect; it is not an aspectual actualization but only “re-”. What does this “re-” mean? To be sure, it is
an actualization of what a thing is in reality. That is, what not compaction in any primary sense. What we have
is realized from a simple apprehension constitutes a mo- called ‘constitution’ is not compaction but something
ment of the real thing itself in its reality. That is the con- similar to this; it is rather a re-constitution. When we
stitutional character of this new actualization. Here, con- step back from a real thing, not only my intellection of
stitution is not a character of the reality of a thing, but reality, but also my intellection of what the real thing is in
only of the intellective actualization of what that thing is reality, is distanced. The compaction is broken into in-
in reality. ‘Constitutive’ here means what pertains to compaction. Now, in effectivity, in the constitution of
what the thing is in reality; it is not a character inside of actuality, what a thing is in reality is actualized not in a
the real thing by which one distinguishes other character- compact mode, but in a reconstituted mode. Seeing this
istics of it, for example those which are adventitious. A white paper is a primordial apprehension of reality. Actu-
trait which belongs to what a thing is in reality is a trait alizing it as a piece of paper which “is white” is a recon-
which constitutes this “in reality” of the thing. Here the stitution. In virtue of being so, the constitution is subse-
genitive “of” does not mean “having” but “constituting”. quent to the compaction. It is, if one wishes, the mode in
The simple apprehension of the dog is not “had” by this which the non-compact becomes in a certain way com-
thing; rather, it constitutes what the thing is in reality: a pact. This becoming is reactualization. {205}
dog. Laxity has given way to constitution. Effectivity is constitutive of the actuality of what a
Then what is the mode of actualizing of a thing’s thing is in reality. It is a new mode of actuality: not inde-
traits univocally determined as constitutive moments of its termination, not hint, not ambiguity, not preponderance,
actualization? The answer is simple: the traits which not obviousness; rather, it is effectivity univocally deter-
form a body with what the thing is in reality, and which mined.
therefore pertain to the constitution of its actuality, are b) This mode of actualization determines a mode of
traits of what the thing in fact or effectively is in reality.* affirmative intention, viz. certainty. The in fact-ness of
Indeed, effectivity is the new mode of actualization. This constitution determines the certain firmness of affirma-
does not refer to these traits manifesting what a thing is in tion. Certainty, radically considered, is not a mental state
reality, but rather that they are traits which in effect are of of mine. We are not talking about being sure but rather
it. Of interest is not the aspect which a thing has, but that the thing apprehended is thus with total firmness.
something constitutive of what it is in reality. The word ‘certainty’ [certeza], then, is taken in its ety-
mological sense. That is certain which is already fixed; it
is the fixedness of a thing. ‘Certain’ [cierto] is an adjec-
* tive derived from the verb cernir which means to choose
[The Spanish word Zubiri uses is ‘effectivamente’, which is stronger than
the English ‘effectively’, although the idea is similar. It is closer to the with firmness, to screen. In Spanish we have the deriva-
English ‘in fact’, though to avoid very awkward expressions, ‘effective’, tive acertar which does not mean “to be sure” but “to hit
‘effectively’, and ‘effectivness’ will be used.—trans.]
176 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

upon precisely that which one aimed at”; “to be now sure it is to be a dog, a shrub, etc., but also to the most modest
of” something is not a type of security but a goal reached. and elemental trait of the real. Thus, if we seek to intel-
Whence the verb acquired the meaning of encountering. lectively know the color which a thing possesses in reality,
Certainty is thus the supreme degree of firmness of inten- it can happen that a thing has, in the intellective move-
tion. By the same token, we can say that it is unqualified ment of my apprehension, an indeterminate color. For
firmness, as opposed to other modes of affirmation such as example, I have a hint that the color is blue, green, or a
doubt or probability. Certainty is not the maximum prob- lilac hue; it can be that it is moreblue than green, that it
ability, as is often said; rather, it is another mode of af- has a blue aspect, or that it is in fact blue.
firming with a different firmness. In certainty we have
firmness par excellence. Here I again emphasize the dif- All of these modes constitute the spectral gamut of
ference between a judgement which is certainly firm and affirmation modes. The actualization can be indetermi-
the primordial apprehension of reality. In the primordial nate, a hint (clarescent, blurry, indicating), ambiguous,
apprehension of reality there is, if one wishes, a primary preponderant (tilting or attracting, gravity, conquer-
firmness of an intellection of the real in and by itself; this ing),obvious, effectively. Correlatively, the modes of af-
is the mode of intellection of the compact. But strictly firmation, of realization, are determined: ignorance, con-
speaking primordial apprehension does not have firmness; jecture (guess, confusion, suspicion), doubt, opinion (in-
that rather is the exclusive province of certain judgements. clination, probability, conviction), plausibility, certainty.
In certainty, one deals, so to speak, with {206} a “con-
All these modes are so many modes of resolution of
firmation” of what was the firmness of the primordial
the intentional expectation in affirmation. They are {207}
apprehension.
modes of firmness. And these modes depend upon the
The two characteristics of re-constitution and con- diverse modes in which the real is actualized differentially
firmation, taken together, i.e. taking together the “re-” in intellective movement.
and the “con-”, are the two moments of certain affirmative
intellection in contrast to the compact apprehension of But this poses a decisive question for us, because all
reality; they are the two moments of certain firmness, of these modes of affirmation—as we have just seen at great
certainty. For this reason we can say that certain judge- length—are modes in which the real determines affirma-
ment recovers a real thing, but at a different level. And tion in its dimension of firmness. But now we have to ask
this different level is the “in reality”. ourselves not what they are nor in what the modes of de-
termination consist, but rather what is the determining
With this we have structurally analyzed the most im- itself. The study of what affirmation is, of what its forms
portant zones of the spectrum of affirmation modes. For are (force of realization), and what its modes are (modali-
this purpose I have had recourse to examples which make ties of firmness), has been the study of the structure of
the point clearly, e.g. the dim figure at a distance. But in affirmation. Now we have to delve into this other impor-
order to preclude incorrect interpretations it is important tant question: the real determinant of affirmation, the me-
to point out that these modes are applied not only to what dial structure of the sentient logos. {208}
{209}

SECTION 3

FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE SENTIENT LOGOS

II. MEDIATED STRUCTURE

We saw in Section I of this Second Part what the in- it “is” in reality; it is affirmation. {210} The study of in-
tellection of a real thing is with respect to other things, tellective movement in its two phases has been carried out
i.e., what the intellection of a real thing in the field of in Section 2.
reality is. This intellection is what we call ‘logos’. This Now, the step from the “might be” to the “is” is de-
logos as intellection has three basic, fundamental charac- termined in the field of reality itself. The field, we said, is
teristics. In the first place, the logos intellectively knows not something which is seen but something that makes us
what a real thing is in reality; but does so based upon an- see; it is the medium of intellection. Here the duality does
other thing simply apprehended through stepping back, not constitute a structural moment of the dynamism, but a
i.e., at a distance. To be in reality is to be a this, a how, moment of the “mediality”. The medium is what makes
and a what. This intellective knowing based upon another us discern, from among the many “might be’s” of the
thing is the moment of duality. In the second place, in thing, that particular “might be” which is more than
this duality one intellectively knows what the real is in “might be”: it is the “is”. And this poses a new problem
reality going from a real thing to the other things of the for us. In Section 2 we studied the formal dynamic struc-
field. This is the dynamic moment of intellection. This ture of the logos, but now we must study the determina-
movement has, as we saw, two phases. In the first we are tion by which the medium of intellection, reality, makes us
impelled from the thing which we seek to know intellec- “discern” what a real thing is among the various “might
tively toward that based on which we are going to intel- be’s”. That is, what is it that determines the realization of
lectively know the former. This phase is a movement of a determinate simple apprehension of the real thing. This
retraction. In it one intellectively knows in simple appre- is the theme of Section 3, the formal medial structure of
hension what a thing “might be” in reality. But as we are the logos. We shall center this study on two questions:
restrained by the real thing, the movement of being im-
1. What is that determination in itself.
pelled or retraction is going to be followed by a second
phase, one which in a certain fashion is contrary to the 2. What is the character of the logos qua determi-
first. This is the movement of return or intentum from nate; truth and logos
reality itself in a field toward the thing. In this return one The study will be carried out in the following two
intellectively knows not what a thing “might be” but what chapters.

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 {211}

CHAPTER VI

DETERMINATION OF THE LOGOS IN ITSELF

First of all we may ask, What is the determination of Therefore it is this intellective actuality of the real thing
the logos in itself? The medium of reality is what permits which, by being actuality in difference, brings us closer
us to see this determination. And since the medium of while we step back.
reality proceeds, ultimately, from things themselves, it How does this take place? We have already seen that
follows that the determination proceeds likewise from this every real thing has two intrinsic and formally constitutive
or that real thing. Thus we may pose four problems: moments of its intellective actuality: the individual mo-
1. What is this determination of the logos? The evi- ment and the field moment. They are two moments of
dence. each real thing in and by itself. But in a thing put at a
distance, its intellection is an apprehension which is cer-
2. What are the intrinsic characteristics of evidence?
tainly “one”, but also “dual”. This duality concerns not
3. Based on this we shall discuss some ideas about only the movement in which the intellection of the logos
evidence accepted without discussion in philosophy, but consists, but also and above all the real thing itself qua
which I believe are false. actualized; the thing itself is intellectively known as a
4. We shall make our thought more precise with re- temporary duality. In virtue of this, the actualization of a
spect to two classical conceptions which, under another real thing has, as a formal moment belonging to it, what
name, can correspond to our problem: intuitionism and we might term an internal “gap”. The unfolding that oc-
rationalism. curs {213} in the real actualized thing between its indi-
vidual and its field moment constitutes, in this actualiza-
{212} tion, an hiatus or a gap between what it is “as reality” and
what it is “in reality”. This does not refer, let me repeat,
§1 to a gap in the content of the thing apprehended, but to a
gap in its intellective actuality. When it becomes present
“among” other things, every real thing has a gap in the
WHAT DETERMINATION AS SUCH IS:
constitutive actualization. It is on account of this gap that
EVIDENCE a thing impels us to step back from it, in a retractive
movement, whose terminus is simple apprehension. But
this gap is a gap which is filled by the affirmative mo-
In the phase of being impelled, we step back within
ment, by affirmative intention. Affirmation fills in the
the field from the thing which we seek to know intellec-
distance between a real thing as real and what it is in re-
tively. But the retaining of its reality makes us return to
ality. Both moments, retraction and affirmation are, as we
that real thing; the stepping back is thus an operation of
have said, only different phases of a single unique move-
approximation. We have not stepped back from the real
ment: the movement by which a thing not only impels us
except to see it better.
to the field, but keeps us in its reality as well. Therefore
How is it possible that a real thing gets closer to us this retaining is in the very root of the actuality of the
when we step back from it? This does not refer to intel- thing which is intellectively known, in the root therefore
lection of a real thing in and by itself; rather it refers to of its own gap. This means that the gap itself has a
the intellection of what this real thing is in reality. Now, structure of its own by virtue of being a “retaining gap”.
intellection is mere actualization of the real as real. Whence it follows that the gap is not here (as it was

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nonetheless in the case of ignorance) a mere emptiness or insofar as the thing is present in the intelligence by virtue
hiatus, but rather is something having a positive structure. of the fact of being real. Because of this, the action with
The real thing itself, in fact, is what opens its own gap in which a real thing moves is, to intellection, an action
its intellective actuality. In its power to open a gap, the which stems from the reality of the thing; it is the real
real thing confers the structure of the gap by retaining us thing itself which, in its actualization, moves us ab intrin-
intellectively in it. In other words, the gap is opened on sico, from its interior so to speak. And it is just this in-
the real thing itself and by the real thing itself, whose trinsic motion that in Latin has been called agere as op-
unity of reality underlies the gap and confers upon it its posed to ducere. The actuality of a real thing does not
structure. Therefore the gap is created and structured by guide us but rather has us ab intrinsico in movement from
the primary and original unity of reality. “Filling” the gap itself; it “makes us see”. If one desires to use the fre-
{214} consists in overcoming the duality; therefore in quentative of agere, i.e. agitare, one might say that a real
making what the thing “could be” to be determined as the thing, by its naked actuality in a differential actualization,
thing which it “is”. This determination makes the thing agitates us, has us agitated. For what reason? In order to
real. In being retained the thing itself qua foundation is intellectively know what the thing is in reality. Indeed, a
what determines the form in which the gap has to be compound of agere expresses the actuality as an intrinsic
filled. In its power of overcoming the gap, the function of motion of the real thing, viz. the verb cogito (from co-
the real thing as determinant consists in being the func- agito), to agitate intellections. The action of the intelli-
tion in accordance with which that thing determines the gence and the agere of a thing are identical; this is what
positive structure of the gap. What is this structure? the cum expresses. We should not be surprised, because in
intellection the actuality of a thing and the intellective
1. Above all, this gap is structured by the real thing actuality of intellection are identically the same, as we
qua actualized. Now, actuality is a physical moment of a saw; they are a “co-actuality”. This agere proper to a real
real thing. To be sure, it is the intelligence which, in its thing actualized in differential actualization has the dou-
intellection, confers intellective actuality upon a thing. ble moment of being impelled and being retained. I said
But what the intelligence qua intelligence confers upon it before that they are not two movements but two phases of
is only the intellective character of its actuality; it does not a single movement. Now, this “one” movement is the
confer the actuality qua actuality. And what is important agere. {216}
to us here is the thing qua actual, which moves the intelli-
gence. How does it move the intelligence? Not, to be Thus we have the first structural moment of the gap:
sure, by any of its own actions, because a real thing does it is being retained in agere.
not “act” upon the intelligence but is only “actual” in it. 2. But this agere has a characteristic moment here.
But our languages do not have all of the words we would That has already been indicated, in a certain way, in what
like to mean just ‘actuality’; rather, our words almost al- we have just said; but it must be pointed out expressly.
ways refer to some action. Therefore we have no choice The agere is, as I said, a motion ab intrinsico. But of this
but to go back to the word ‘action’, knowing that with it motion, the agere does not express anything more than its
we are referring not to action properly speaking but only being a movement proper to the actuality of a thing. It is
actuality. Granting this, what is the nature of the “action” now necessary to express more thematically the intrinsic
such that its actuality moves the intelligence? This action character of this movement of the agere. It is, in fact,
is not a governing or directing one, so to speak. It does what one expresses in the strict sense with the preposition
not consist in the real thing guiding us in the intellective ex. This preposition has two meanings: it can mean “to
movement. This guiding action, i.e. the movement going expel” (in Greek ex-ago); but it can also mean to make to
to one’s head from something is what in Latin was termed leave “from the inside”. This second meaning is more
ducere, to lead or conduct. If one wishes to continue us- important to us here. The two meanings are not neces-
ing the compound “to conduct”, it will be necessary to say sarily independent. In the first, a real thing pushes “to-
that the action of a thing in the {215} intelligence does ward the outside” of itself, i.e., to what we have called the
not consist in bearing us or conducting us or guiding us in field moment; this is to be impelled. Strictly speaking, if
intellective movement. That is the false idea that intel- it were not an abuse of etymological formations, one could
lection, by being our action, consists in things being ulti- say that being impelled is being “ex-pelled”. The “ex” is
mately what guides or conducts us to such-and-such in- in this aspect not an “outside” but an exteriorization. But
tellection. This cannot be because that type of action is the fundamental meaning is the second: a real thing
definitely something ab extrinsico. But actuality is not makes us go out from inside of itself by an action in which
what moves us by itself; it is the very reality of a thing the given thing does not remain left behind, because that
 DETERMINATION OF THE LOGOS IN ITSELF 181

movement belongs to the very actuality of the thing. pelled, i.e., from what we have apprehended in simple
Therefore being expelled formally bears in its breast what apprehension as what the thing “could be”. The return to
I have called being retained: a real thing makes us move the thing not only does not leave behind the being im-
ourselves to the outside of it from the inside and by the pelled which thrust us towards the simple apprehensions;
inside itself; it is a movement grounded upon interioriza- rather, it is a return to the thing from these same simple
tion. The unity of both moments (being impelled and apprehensions. Therefore the intellection in this return is
being retained) in the agere is the unity of the ex. The ex essentially dual. The intellection of the thing in this dif-
as moment of the agere thus has a very precise meaning: ferential actualization is not an immediate apprehension
it is ex-agere, exigir [in Spanish], “to demand”. The of what the thing is in reality, but the mediated apprehen-
structure of the gap makes a demand. The gap is not sion of which one or many of the simple apprehensions
something {217} vacuous; it is the ambit of what makes a are those realized “in reality”. Without this duality of
demand, a gap stuffed with the demand of realization. It primordial apprehension of reality and of simple appre-
is the reality of a thing qua actualized which demands the hension, there would not be affirmative intellection of
intellection of what it is “in reality”. The gap is an actu- what a thing is in reality. The unity of this duality is “re-
ality that makes a demand. The function of a real thing in alization”. It is of intellective character, and it is an intel-
the differential intellection then consists in making a de- lection that makes a demand. This unity, qua dual, has
mand: it demands that determinate form of realization two aspects. On one hand it is a “contribution” so to
which we call “being in reality”. The “in” of the “in real- speak, of many simple apprehensions; but on the other
ity” only is intellectively known in the “actuality” in ex. hand it is a “selection” that makes a demand of the simple
The demand of actuality in differential actualization, i.e. apprehensions, whether they are excluded or included in
in stepping back, is the demand for “realization” as such. the intellection. The realization of these latter is deter-
It is easy to understand now that this moment of mined by the real thing in what it demands; it is an intel-
making a demand is one of the forms which, in Part One lective determination that makes a demand, which hap-
of this study, I termed force of imposition of the impres- pens in selection.
sion of reality. In the differential actualization of the real, In what does it consist? Here we see ourselves
sensed intellectively as real, the field of reality is imposed forced, once again, to bend the lexicon of our languages.
as making a demand. In the differential actualization the Almost all expressions referring to intellection—if not
two moments of individual formality and field formality indeed all—are taken {219} from the verb “to see” [Latin,
are different, but both are “reality” sensed impressively. videre]; they express intellection as a “vision”. This is a
Now the moment of field reality has, by virtue of being a great oversimplification; intellection is intellection in all
sensed reality, a force of imposition of its own, viz. It of the sentient modes of presentation of the real, and not
makes a demand. To make a demand is a modulation of just the visual one. Therefore throughout this entire book
the force of imposition of the impression of reality. I express intellection not as vision but as apprehension.
But there are moments of intellection which our languages
3. But this is not enough, because in virtue of that
do not permit to be expressed except with “visual” verbs.
demand a real thing impels us to an intellection in step-
There is no problem in utilizing them provided that we
ping back from itself: one intellectively knows in simple
firmly maintain the idea that here “vision” means all in-
apprehension what a thing “might be” in reality. But the
tellective apprehension, i.e., intellection in the fullest
demanding itself is compelling us to return to the field of
sense. Granting this, we shall say that the nature of
reality to intellectively know what a real thing is “in real-
making a demand which determines which simple appre-
ity”. This intellection is the affirmative intention. These
hensions are excluded, and which are realized, is the na-
two moments (simple apprehension and affirmation) are
ture of making a demand of a vision; we see, in fact,
but two moments of a unique intellection: where it dis-
which are realized and which not. But the essential point
tends and steps back from what a {218} real thing is in
is that we tell what vision we are dealing with. It is not a
reality “among” others. The unity of both moments is
primoridial intellective vision, i.e. it is not a seeing [vi-
what constitutes the intellection in ex. What is the struc-
dencia], because we are dealing with a very precise vision,
ture of this unity?
namely mediated vision. We see, mediately, that a real
The idea of this demanding has led us above all to an thing realizes B and not C. But neither is this the strict
innumerable group of simple apprehensions. And this nature of the vision proper to affirmative intellection, be-
same demanding is what makes us return to a thing, but cause there we deal with a determinant vision. The de-
from what we have intellectively known in being im- terminate vision of the affirmation of realization is not
182 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

only a mediated vision “of” a thing, but is a mediated vi- seven plus five is twelve is not evidence but “vidence”,
sion “from” the real thing itself, i.e., it is a vision de- seeing, i.e., mere “making plain” or “making evident”.
manded by it. It is a vision in the ex. It is just what we Only seeing that in seven plus five one has not the number
call e-vidence. The quality of a vision determined by a 14 but 12, because the actualization of 12 is demanded by
demand [“ex-igence”] is “e-vidence”. The vision of the the actualization of the sum of 7 plus 5, only this vision as
evident has, as its principle, a demand [exigencia]. This demanded, I repeat, makes the affirmation evident. In
demand is the intrinsic and formal arkhe of “e-vident” passing, it is from this point that, as I see it, one must
vision. Evidence is vision based on demand, or what is begin to discuss the Kant’s celebrated thesis that the
the same, a visual demand, and visual demand of a dual judgement “7 plus 5 is 12” is synthetic.
character, i.e. of the realization of simple apprehensions.
The real thing A is not just evident, it is {220} more than Evidence is then a demanding vision of the realiza-
evident. We shall explain forthwith. What is evident is tion of simple apprehensions in a thing already appre-
that it is B and not C. And this vision is demanded by the hended primordially as real. In its mediating structure,
vision of A in the medium of reality. Therefore the deter- the logos is evidential.
minant function of a real thing in affirmative intellection This idea of evidence requires some further elabora-
is the demand of vision, evidence. The realization intel- tion:
lectively known in evidence based on demand is the in- a) Above all, evidence in this strict sense is exclu-
tellection of what a real thing is in reality. A thing has sively a moment of judgement, of affirmation; only in
opened the gap as ambit of the idea making a demand, judgement is there evidence. Evidence is the principal
and has filled this gap with the vision demanded by the determinant of mediated intellection, of the logos. This
medium of reality itself, with evidence. The function of presupposes that it is an intellection which lacks that de-
reality itself in differential intellection is thus intrinsically terminant. This determination is about the simple appre-
demand, evidencial. And here we have what we sought: hension made real in a thing already apprehended as real.
the determination of the affirmation is in itself evidence of And that intellection is formally judgement and only
realization. Reality itself is what makes us see; it is the judgement. What is evident is that the thing is this or
medium. And this medium which makes us see has an that, i.e., the evidence is evidence of realization. But it is
evidential structure: it makes us see what a thing is in evident, I repeat, by {222} being demanded by the real
reality. Whence it follows that evidence is proper only to thing. If there were not this duality between simple ap-
a subsequent act of sentient intellection. Only because prehension and real thing, there would not be evidence.
there is sentient intellection is there dynamic duality; and
only because there is dynamic duality is there evidence. A real thing in primordial apprehension is never
An intelligence which was not sentient would not intel- evident; it is more than evident. In primordial apprehen-
lectively know with evidence. Evidence is the character of sion the purely and simply real is or is not actualized in
“some” acts of a sentient intelligence. intellection, and nothing more. Primordial apprehension
is not and does not need to be determined by anything.
And it is here that the insufficiency of purely visual Primordial apprehension is the very actualization of the
language is palpable. First, because as we have just seen, real. It is not determination but actualization. And actu-
all modes of intellection—not just the visual—have their alization is always more than determination, because de-
own demands; all modes of sentient intellection have their termination is grounded upon actualization and receives
own proper evidences in differential actualization. Sec- from it all of its force. It is for this reason that the logos
ond, because the conceptualization of intellection as vision is, as I said, a mode of actualization, the “determinate”
carries with it the idea that intellection has a noetic mode. In virtue of that, to make primordial apprehension
structure. Now, vision, just like every other intellection, is something evident is to make actualization a mode of de-
not formally noetic, but rather formally apprehensive: termination, which is impossible. Primordial apprehen-
noesis is only a {221} dimension of apprehension. Ap- sion is thus more than evident; it is the pure and simple
prehension as such is formally noergic; it involves the actualization of the real in and by itself. In primordial
imposition force of the impression of reality. And there- apprehension the vision of a thing does not “leave from”
fore evidence, which is a vision determined by the “physi- (ex) the thing, but rather “is” the thing itself “in” its actu-
cal” demand of differential actualization of a real thing, is ality. Only the realization in it of a simple apprehension is
not of noetic but of noergic character. It is a mode of evident, qua realization demanded by that real thing al-
capturing what things are in reality. And it does so in ready actualized. Evidence, I repeat, is determination
virtue of the radical demand of its actuality. To see that needed or demanded by a real thing. On the other hand,
 DETERMINATION OF THE LOGOS IN ITSELF 183

in primordial apprehension a real thing is not determinant and are going to be affirmed with evidence. Finally, that
but rather purely and simply actualized. Evidence is sub- trajectory is free which, in different orientations, is going
sequent to primordial apprehension. Evidence is determi- to lead to intellection. Hence evidence is traced essen-
nation; primordial apprehension is actualization. In evi- tially in a domain of intellective freedom. Evidence is
dence a real thing already apprehended determines the only possible in freedom; it is something proper to our
intellection; in primordial apprehension we have in actu- sentient intellection. Evidence is the demand of the im-
ality a real thing itself in its own reality. To say that pri- pression of reality stepped back from, i.e., at a distance; it
mordial apprehension is evident is the same as saying that is the imposition force of the impression of reality, as we
primordial apprehension is judgement. This, as I see it, have said. In virtue of this force, the evidence acquired
{223} is absurd. So in summary, evidence is a structural starting from other things, according to other percepts,
moment, but only of judgement. fictional items, or concepts, and following other routes, is
b) In the second place, evidence is a moment of an evidence qualified by a border of freedom. One might
every judgement, because every judgement has as one of then think that evidence does not pertain to judgement
its moments an evidential determinant. This could seem even along the line of demand. If I say, “God has a dis-
false, since there are, as one might observe, innumerable ease”, this is an absolutely free affirmation, indeed, it is
non-evident affirmations. For example, consider all the an arbitrary affirmation; but it does not thereby cease to be
affirmations having to do with a faith, be it religious or an affirmation. An arbitrary affirmation would never be
secular. Now, this is true, but does not contradict what we along lines of demand; it is precisely for this reason that it
have been saying, because—let us not forget it—the vision is arbitrary. Nonetheless, let us think for a minute why
which evidence claims is justly claimed, i.e., it is de- this is so. In an arbitrary affirmation, if that which is af-
manded. In virtue of that, evidence is not so much a vi- firmed (let us call it the ‘subject’) is a reality (whether by
sion as a demand for vision. Strictly speaking, judgement itself or by postulation), then the judgement is not arbi-
does not have evidence but judges in evidence; evidence is trary in the order of evidence, but is simply a false judge-
vidential demand. This means that evidence is a “line of ment—something quite different. We shall concern our-
demand”, a line of determination within which the two selves with truth later. The false judgement {225} is also
opposites—what one sees and what one doesn’t see—both along the lines of a determination which is demanded:
fit, together with all the intermediaries (which are only precisely for this reason I can describe what is false. But
half seen). That is, judgement is an intellection which, by if the subject is not real, nor is posed as real, then neither
virtue of its own nature, is contained in a line of evidence. is there arbitrariness in the order of evidence, but rather in
A non-evident judgement is a judgement “deprived” of the order of the affirmation itself. Its arbitrariness con-
evidence and not simply a judgement “lacking” evidence. sists in being just a combination of ideas (God, disease,
Every judgement is necessarily evident or non-evident; in having). But a combination of ideas is not a judgement.
virtue of this, it is formally in the line of evidence. But in To judge is to affirm the realization of a simple apprehen-
addition there are other considerations which I shall im- sion in a real thing; it is not to forge the idea of an af-
mediately explain and which help fix the nature of this firmation freely. The idea of an affirmation is not an af-
presumed non-evidence. firmation; it is at best an “affirmation schema”. And this
affirmation schema also has an evidence schema. There-
c) But first, there is another essential aspect of evi- fore, no judgement is outside the lines of evidence.
dence. Evidence is a necessary line of demand, but one
which is traced within the domain of freedom. It cannot d) This evidential line is necessary, but it can be and
be otherwise, because intellection in movement is consti- is of very different types, in accordance with the nature of
tutively free. What is this freedom in evidence? It does the real thing about which one judges. Each type of real-
not mean that evidence is in itself formally free. That ity has its own modes of demand. It would be not only
would be absurd. {224} What I mean to say is something unjust but in fact false to measure all demands with a sin-
quite essential and which is often forgotten, namely that gle canon of demand, for example the canon of conceptual
evidence is a line traced in the space of freedom. In fact, analysis. Personal reality, moral reality, esthetic reality,
intellective movement goes toward something, but starting historical reality, etc., not only have distinct demands, but
from something else. Now, this other thing is freely cho- also and more importantly, demands of a different nature.
sen, because in order to intellectively know what a man is And precisely for this reason the evidence of one order
in reality I can start from a living thing, from a grouping, cannot be confused with that of another; nor can one call
from a form, etc. Moreover it is a free creation in the field ‘non-evident’ everything which does not figure in the evi-
of simple apprehensions, which are made real in a thing dence of an order canonically established. In the concrete
184 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

case of faith, to which I earlier alluded, faith cannot be about it. And in this sense, not all evidence is mediated.
confounded with judgement. Faith is not a judgement; it But the fact is that two distinct concepts are confused
is firm confidence or firm personal adherence. When I here: the concept of the intermediary term and the concept
pronounce this adherence in a judgement, I do it deter- of medium. Now, not all evidence has an “intermediary”
mined by the demands which the reality of the person in term, but all evidence is based constitutively in a “me-
question {226} imposes upon my affirmation. They do dium”, i.e., in the medium of reality itself. Whence it
not cease being demands because they are personal. follows that if indeed not all evidence is {228} mediated
in the sense of bringing into play an intermediary term,
e) Finally judgement affirms the realization of the
nonetheless all evidence is mediated. The confusion of
simple apprehensions in a real thing (i.e., that they are
these two senses of mediation is what has led to the theory
made real in a real thing), and this realization admits dif-
of immediate evidence. In virtue of it, evidence is always
ferent modes. That is, not only are there different types or
and only something mediated, and therefore something
forms of evidence, but also different modes of evidence.
“achieved”, never something given. Only real things are
In summary, we have asked ourselves what the de- given, and they are given in primordial apprehension.
termination of an affirmation is in itself, and the answer is Evidence is never given, but only “achieved” in mediated
that demand which I call ‘evidence’. It is a quality which fashion based upon things apprehended primordially. In-
is only given in a judgement in the form such that every tellection achieved via mediation is, in a certain way, an
judgement is necessarily in the line of evidentiation. This “effort”, an effort of mediated intellection. Evidence is a
line is crossed in a free intellective field, and possesses demand of the real, a visual mediated demand of a real
different types and different modes. thing actualized by stepping back, i.e., at a distance. And
With this we have outlined in a way what evidence therefore evidence is never a given, but something
is. Granting this, we now have to ask ourselves what are achieved. This characteristic of not being given but
the essential characteristics of the determination of intel- achieved and mediated is essential to evidence.
lection, i.e., what are the essential characteristics of evi- 2. This evidence is not something quiescent, i.e., is
dence. not something which one has or does not have; rather, by
virtue of being achieved, it is formally something dy-
{227}
namic. This does not refer to the fact that I make an effort
to gain evidence, but rather to the fact that the effort is an
§2 intrinsic and formal dynamism of the evidence itself; evi-
dence is a mediated vision in dynamism. Of what dyna-
INTRINSIC CHARACTERISTICS OF EVIDENCE mism do we speak? Not of a dynamism which consists in
a type of movement from the “predicate” to the “subject”
and back again, because even leaving aside the fact that
This evidential moment of affirmation has some as- not every judgement is of subject-predicate form (for the
pects which ultimately are linked by mutual implication, present purpose, as every judgement involves a duality,
but which it is convenient to stress as distinct in order there is no reason not to simplify the discussion by
more rigorously to outline what evidence is, as I see it. speaking of subject and predicate), that presumed move-
1. Evidence is never something immediately given. ment is expressed in the verb “is”, and therefore would be
To be sure, there is no doubt that the majority of our evi- always—and only—a movement in the plane of being; it
dent affirmations are grounded upon others, for example would be a dialectic of being. But evidence is dynamic in
by reasoning. And in this sense, these examples of evi- a much deeper and more radical sense, namely the very
dence are never immediate but mediated. But one always demand of the real which determines the dynamism of
thinks that in one form or another, all mediated evidence being. {229} We shall see this upon treating Reality and
refers back to certain fundamental evidence, which is in Being. That demand is formally a dynamism consisting
this sense primary. And we are told that this latter is im- in demand. The dialectic of being moves in the plane in
mediate evidence. But I do not think this is the case, be- which things and simple apprehensions “are”. But the
cause strictly speaking there is no immediate evidence. dynamism of demand moves in a third dimension or-
What happens is that upon separating evidence into im- thogonal to the previous plane; it is the dynamism of real-
mediate and mediated, one gives to the mediated evidence ity which “demands”, and not the dynamism of the reality
the sense of the presence of an “intermediary” between a which “is”. Therefore every dialectic, every dynamism of
real thing and what, by means of evidence, one affirms being takes place on the surface of the real. Evidence, on
 DETERMINATION OF THE LOGOS IN ITSELF 185

the other hand, takes place in the volume and body of the Evidence is always necessitating. However much it
real. The danger is always in taking the surface of the may be a matter of fact that this book is found upon this
real for the real itself. There is never evidence of being— table, it is absolutely necessary to intellectively know that
we shall see this in a few pages—rather, there is always it is on this table, just as necessary as intellectively
and only demanding evidence of the real. All logical and knowing that two plus two are four. The demand with
ontological dynamism is possible only as something which the intellection of two plus two constitutes the in-
grounded in the demanding dynamism of evidence. This tellection of the realization of four is not a demand which
dynamism is a “selective” dynamism, because among the is formally different from the demand with which this
many simple apprehensions, the demand discerns through book which is on the table demands that it be so affirmed.
its own dynamism that or those which are realized in a {231} This is the necessitating. All evidencial demand is
real thing. To be sure, this does not mean that the simple constituting; and while the constitution itself is not always
apprehensions which we have are in any sense the most necessary, it is always necessitating. This does not refer
adequate. This demanding dynamism is but the dyna- to the necessity with which a predicate is linked to a sub-
mism that makes a simple apprehension real in the actu- ject, or the necessity with which a subject is tied to a
ality of a real thing. It is a dynamism of the real in actu- predicate; rather, it concerns the necessity with which a
ality. Intellection in differential actualization is, then, in real concrete thing (necessary or contingent) actualized
itself formally dynamic; it is the dynamism of intellective mediately in my intellection, determines my affirmations
realization. Therefore this dynamism of actuality is noer- about it.
gic, because it concerns the actuality of a thing, actuality 4. Thus we have the formal character of evident in-
which is a physical moment of it. And this dynamism, as tellection. As a result of a “demand”, intellection in dif-
I said and as we shall see again in another paragraph, is ferential actualization has, as its own characteristic, to be
prior to the dynamism of being and is the foundation of it. “exact”; this is exactitude or correctness. Exactitude is
the quality of being demanded. It is what does not have
3. The classical conceptualization of evidence is
the primordial apprehension of reality. If I may be per-
based upon what is seen in evidence. But evidence is not
mitted a Latin mode of expression, I should say that the
{230} vidence (seeing), nor in-vidence, but e-vidence.
primordial apprehension of reality is not “ex-acta”; only
Therefore the quality of what is seen, of what is intellec-
differential intellection is “ex-acta”. In the incompact
tively known, is rather what I would call constituted evi-
emptiness of its exigencies, a real thing determines the
dence. It is grounded in the dynamic and demanding
exactitude [correctness] of its intellection. This intellec-
moment of radical evidence, which, therefore, is a char-
tion is therefore strictly speaking an “exaction”. As it is a
acteristic that is not constituted but constituting. And it is
dynamic demand, exaction involves a moment of rigor.
so precisely because it is a sentient dynamism.
Whence the demand itself is similar in this respect to one
Constituted evidence is always—and only—a result. of the meanings which exigere has in Latin, viz. to weigh
Therefore it comes too late. What is first is the constitut- with exactitude. Now, this is what is proper to evidence:
ing and demanding dynamism: evidence is formally evi- the exactitude of the weight of intellection. Therefore
dentiation or making evident. This constituting character evidence is contained within the strict bounds of what is
is never arbitrary; it is intrinsically necessitating, because demanded. And this being contained within the bounda-
the constitution does not concern the order of reality in ries of demand is exactitude. To this being contained we
and by itself, i.e. the order of “actuity”, but the order of give the name “strict”, and it is what I shall call constric-
intellective “actuality”. Let us not confuse necessary be- tion. All evidence is exact [correct], i.e., is determined by
ing and necessitating being. Necessary is a mode of actu- a constrictive demand.
ity which is opposed to the contingent. It is necessary that Exactitude [correctness] thus understood is not mod-
fire burns; it is not necessary that this book be on this ta- elled upon any special type of intellection which might
ble. The difference has to do with the reality of the fire serve as a canon for the rest. For example, what is exact
and the book. But necessitating is a mode of actuality. or correct in mathematics {232} does not acquire its
Evidence has a necessitating character; it is the necessity power from the fact that it is mathematical, but from the
that given a real thing in determinate dual actuality, it is fact that the evidence is always exact or correct, i.e., from
necessary to affirm it as such with evidence. Qua evi- being a knowledge in which what is known is strictly de-
dence, there is no difference whatsoever between asserto- termined by what is demanded or “exacted”. This ex-
ric and apodictic evidence. The difference is not found in actitude or correctness does not mean “logical rigor”, even
the evidence but in the reality of a thing. in mathematics; rather it means “a construction which
186 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

demands”. The logical is simply a procedure for con- perceptio, but rather, if I may be permitted the expression,
straining the demand, and not the other way around—as if exigentia clarificans; it is reality already apprehended as
to be exact or correct were to be logical. Therefore all real, which is unfolded by demand in clarity.
knowledge, whether mathematical or not, has its own ex-
actitude or correctness. History itself has its type of ex- b) But in addition, by being a demand, evidence is
actitude. Moreover, it is not just science which is correct, not just a moment of vision but something noergic, just as
but all differential intellection, however elemental it may perceptio itself is apprehension and not simply conscious-
be. And it is precisely on account of this that science can ness. This does not refer to consciousness of mere “being
be and is correct: it is so by being differential intellection. thus”, {234} but to an apprehension of the “to be here-
Naturally, correctness, just like evidence itself, is only a and-now being” [estar siendo]. As we know, since classi-
line, the line of correctness. The intellection of the reality cal times, to be here-and-now or actually, stare, has ex-
“between” is formally and constitutively in the line of cor- pressed the copula, but in a strong sense, a sense which
rectness. grew in the Romance languages, especially in Spanish.
And its “strong” sense consists, as I see it, in thematically
Let us summarize. Evidence is an intellection which connoting the physical character of that in which it is and
demands. And as such it is not given to us, but is of which it is. It is true that ser as opposed to estar tends
achieved mediately in a dynamism which is necessitating, to connote the profound and permanent dimension of
evidencing, and constituting that sentient intellection, something, in contrast to more or less transient determi-
which has as its own formal character as correctness and nations, as when we say that so-and-so “is” [es] a sick
demanding constriction. Evidence, then, is something person versus saying the so-and-so “is currently” [está]
achieved, something dynamic, constituting, and accurate. sick. However, this does not contradict what I just said,
because estar as a designation of a more or less transitory
Whence those conceptions of evidence which are ac- “state” [estado] connotes this state precisely because every
cepted uncritically in modern philosophy are radically state, in its very transitoriness, makes its character of
false. Let us examine them. physical actuality more prominent. And the result of this
{233} is that the distinction between ser and estar is not primar-
ily that between the permanent and the transitory, but the
difference between ser without allusion to physical char-
§3
acteristics, and estar as physical reality. We shall see this
later at the appropriate time. For now, with respect to “to
FALSE IDEAS ABOUT EVIDENCE be here-and-now being” [estar siendo], the force of evi-
dence is found in the noergic demand of this being.
These ideas have been propounded since the time of Descartes himself offers us a good proof of this when
Descartes and reach their highest degree of development he talks about what, for him, is the evidence of all evi-
in Husserl. dence, to wit, the evidence of the cogito, of thinking or
cogitation. It is for him an incontrovertible and indubita-
1) For Descartes, evidence is clarity: clara ac dis-
ble evidence. But in this evidence of the cogito, such as
tincta perceptio. But this, as I see it, is radically inade-
Descartes describes it to us, there is not just clarity but a
quate for two reasons.
demand which is anterior to all clarity, the demand of
a) It is undeniable that in evidence there is clear and being here-and-now [estar]. What is clear is that what I
distinct vision. But this does not exhaust the question, am doing is “thinking”, and furthermore that “I am here-
because the fact that in evidence there is clear and distinct and-now [estar]” thinking. Descartes’ expression there-
vision is not the same thing as evidence consisting in clear fore should not be translated “I think, therefore I am”, but
and distinction vision. Indeed, that which is clear to me rather {235} “I am here-and-now [estar] thinking, there-
in evidence is that I see with clarity the fact that the thing fore I am”. This expression is an incontrovertible judge-
has to be seen thus as necessitated. My clarity is intrinsi- ment, but is so by the noergic force of the estar. This and
cally determined by the demand of what I am seeing. It is not its conscious clarity is what makes the cogito a per-
a clarity which does not rest upon itself, but upon a real ceptio evidens, and what confers upon it its exceptional
demand; otherwise it would be vision or non-vision but rank. The force of the cogito does not come to it from
not evidence. In intellective movement only that vision is “thinking” but from the “I am here-and-now [estar]”. But
clear in which clarity is constituted by the constrictive Descartes, immediately thereafter, goes astray on the
demand of the thing. Evidence is not clara ac distincta matter of this demand moment and once again tells us
 DETERMINATION OF THE LOGOS IN ITSELF 187

that the evidence of the cogito is clarity—as if what the Therefore the evidence is always noergic, and is a
cogito gave us were supreme clarity. That is false. The demand imposed by the real, by the force of imposition of
supreme evidence from the cogito is based upon an im- the impression of reality. Whence the Cartesian idea of
mediate apprehension of thinking as a being here-and- evidence is false from its very roots.
now, i.e., that supreme evidence is grounded in reality. In 2) A second conception seems to bring us closer to
the evidence of all evidence there is, then, the nature of the essence of evidence. Everything evident has a mo-
the demand of the real as the foundation of clarity. Evi- ment which we might call that of plenitude or fullness, by
dence is here eminently noergic; only because “I am here- which what we intellectively know of the thing is seen in
and-now” [estoy] apprehending myself as thinking in a full measure in the thing. One might then think that the
primordial apprehension of reality, only for this reason do essence of evidence {237} consists in this fullness. That
I see myself constrained by this apprehension to pro- is the conception which culminates in Husserl. For
nounce the most evident of the judgements of Descartes, Husserl, my intentional acts have a meaning which can be
the cogito. either merely mentioned, so to speak, in a way actually
By straying on the problem with respect to clarity, empty of the vision of a thing, or else they can be made
i.e., by asking if clarity leads to reality, Descartes has side- present in it. In this last case we have an intention which
stepped the noergic moment and with it has opened an is not empty but full. Fullness is for Husserl the “fulfill-
unfathomable abyss between evidence and reality for all ment” (Erfüllung) of an empty intention by a full vision.
evidence other than that of the cogito. Indeed, the abyss When this happens, Husserl will tell us that the intention
is so unfathomable that in order to bridge it Descartes is evident. Every intentional act, for Husserl, has its own
must appeal to nothing less than Divine veracity. But in proper evidence, and the essence of this evidence is “ful-
fact there is no such abyss, because evidence is always fillment”. But despite the fact that this idea has been ac-
noergic, and therefore formally involves the moment of cepted without further discussion, it seems to be untenable
reality. To be sure, there are errors and illusions, and for the same reason that the concept of evidence à la Des-
what is worse, evidence which is taken as evidence of cartes is untenable. Evidence is not fulfillment; that
something which is not true. But this is owing to the fact would be seeing but not evidence. What Husserl calls
that clarity does not lead to reality in any case, not even in ‘vision’ in the full sense is a noergic vision already con-
that of the cogito itself; rather, it is reality which {236} in stituted. But its demand moment is constitutive of ful-
a demanding way determines clarity. Therefore the pre- fillment. Husserl situates himself in evidence already
sumed abyss is not opened between reality itself and the constituted; but evidence has a more radical moment, the
evidence, but between reality apprehended primordially as constituting moment. Its dynamic constitutionality is just
real in an immediate intellection and what this reality is the unfolding of a demand: this is making evident or evi-
in reality: “something apprehended in a mediated intel- dentiation. Because of this, evidence is not a question of
lection”. This is a difference not between intellection and fulfillment. We are not dealing with the question of how a
reality, but between two intellections, i.e., between two simple empty apprehension is made evident by fulfillment,
intellective actualizations of the real, already within real- but rather how an intellection of the real becomes evident
ity. Of these two actualizations, the second is demanded by demand, i.e., how a real thing demands the realization
by the first. This is the essence and problematic of all of a simple apprehension. We are not dealing with a vi-
evidence, including that of the cogito. From Descartes’ sion which is only noetic. Evidence is always and only
time until Kant, philosophy took a stand on the problem evidence of realization. Therefore when Husserl tells us
of the cogito, but followed different paths than that which that the principle of all principles is the reduction of every
I just proposed. As I see it, we are dealing with the fact intentional noesis to originary intuition, i.e., to the ful-
that the cogito as a judgement is the mediated intellection fillment of the intentional by the intuited, he is making a
of the reality of my being here-and-now thinking, a reality totally false statement as I see it. Just as with Descartes,
apprehended in the primordial apprehension of my being {238} Husserl has taken the road from clarity to a thing,
here-and-now myself. In all other evidence there is also a when what should be taken is the road from the thing to-
duality between a primordial apprehension of reality and wards its clarity. The principle of all principles is not in-
its mediated intellection; because of this all evidence is in tuitive fulfillment, but something more radical: the real
itself problematic. But this problem does not consist in demand of fulfillment. Neither clarity, nor fullness, nor
whether evidence does or does not lead to reality, but in full clarity are the essence of evidence. In evidence there
whether the real part of reality does or does not lead to the is a full clarity, but it is like the expansion in the present
evidence, whether things are or not thus “in reality”. of a demand of reality. What is specific about evidence
188 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

isn’t “full clarity”, but the “force of vision”; evidence is a whole idea is completely false for two reasons. First, the
“forceful vision”, i.e. a vision which is demanded. Con- concept is not the only thing which is opposed to what is
stituted evidence is always and only the result of the con- called “intuition” in this philosophy. There are also per-
stituted nature of evidence. cepts and fictional works which are modes of simple ap-
prehension. Therefore the first incorrect thing about clas-
Husserl always moves on a conscious plane. There-
sical rationalism is that it speaks of concepts when it
fore all of his philosophy has a single theme: “conscious-
should speak of simple apprehensions. But while this
ness and being”, and a single problem: absolute knowl-
error is serious, it is not the most serious one. That,
edge in a “vision”. But consciousness and being are
rather, lies in the fact that rationalism refers to conceptual
grounded in intellection and reality. Intellection and real-
knowledge, {240} which at the same time is of the real.
ity are the radical and basic facts. Their intrinsic unity is
And here, in my view, is the second and most serious error
not the intentional correlation expressed in the preposition
of this presumed rationalism, because concepts do not
“of”. We are not dealing with consciousness “of” being,
intellectively know a real thing by conceiving it, but by
nor with an act of intellection “of” reality, but with the
affirming it according to a concept. The formal act of
mere “actualization” of reality “in” intellection, and of the
knowing (what is usually termed here “reason”) is not
actualization of intellection “in” reality. The intrinsic
then either a concept or conceptualizing, but rather af-
unity is “actualization”. Actualization is in fact actuality
firming and affirmation. Now, the radical character of
numerically identical with intelligence and reality. And
affirmation is evidence. Therefore it is necessary to say
only in differential actualization does this actualization
that the formally specific part of rationalism is not in the
acquire the character of a demand of reality, of evidence.
“concept” but in the “evidence”; a thing is what is desig-
To be sure, this puts us on the borders of a very seri- nated by the concept because of the evidence.
ous question, the problem of “apprehension and evi-
To this evidence, intuitionism is set opposite to
dence”. Although what I think about this is implied in
knowledge of the real by “intuition”. Intuition can mean
what has already been said, it is still appropriate to ad-
the instantaneous intellection of something just as if it
dress the question directly.
were present before the eyes. But this is a derived mean-
{239} ing. The primary meaning is precisely this “being present
before the eyes”. It is a direct and immediate mode, be-
sides being instantaneous, i.e., unitary. The immediate,
§4
direct, and unitary presence of something to the intellec-
tion—this is intuition. The opposite of intuition would be
EVIDENCE AND PRIMORDIAL a concept and discourse. Intuition is supposed to be de-
APPREHENSION termined not by its object but by the mode of intellection.
As what is conceived is abstract and universal, one often
says that the object of intuition is always something sin-
If not always, then almost always classical philoso- gular, a singulum; thus spoke Ockham and Kant. Only a
phy has contraposed apprehension and evidence. This singulum, it is thought, can be immediately, directly, and
contraposition is usually designated with the terms intui- unitarily present. But for Plato, Leibniz, and Husserl
tionism and rationalism, meaning that one is dealing with there is intuition of what is not singular (the Idea, the
an opposition between two forms of knowledge of the real: categorical, etc.). We have no reason to explore this
intuition and concept. problem, but its existence shows us clearly that intuition
Of this opposition I should say at the outset that its has to be conceptualized not by its object but by the mode
two terms are not correctly defined, nor for that matter of presence of its object. And this is especially true since
even correctly expressed. while it may be the case that only the singular is intui-
table, this {241} does not mean that everthing singular is
Let us begin with the second point. One speaks of a
necessarily intuitable. Intuition is a mode of presence of
concept as a knowledge of things. And given that con-
the object. Intuition is the immediate, direct, and unitary
ceptualizing them is in this philosophy an act of “reason”,
presence of something real to intellection.
this form of knowledge has been called “rationalism”.
Let us leave aside the reference to reason; it is a subject of But our problem lies in calling this intuition. That is
which I will treat in Part III of this work. What is impor- wrong for two reasons. In the first place, this knowledge
tant to me here, whether or not it is an act of reason, is is not formally an act of “vision” except in a loose way,
knowing if that act consists in a “concept”. Now, this which is what the verb to intuit, and its Latin original,
 DETERMINATION OF THE LOGOS IN ITSELF 189

intueor, means. But all the modes of sentient intellection, designated by the words. And thus the question touches
and not just the visual, directly, immediately, and unitarily upon something essential.
apprehend the real. Therefore if one wishes to continue In order to see this, let us accept for the moment the
using the word ‘intuition’, it will be necessary to say that usual words. And then let us ask ourselves above all in
intuition is not just visual intuition, but that every intui- what, formally and precisely, does the opposition between
tion, be it tactile, auditory, olfactory, etc., is a direct, im- intuition and concept consist? For beneath this duality
mediate, and unitary presence of the real to the intellec- lies a unity which is the line along which the contraposi-
tion. If there is agreement on this point, there will be no tion itself is grounded. What is this unity? Here we have
inconvenience in continuing to speak of intuition as if it the two points which must be considered. {243} I shall do
were vision. it very briefly, given that the ideas which come into play
The major and more serious problem is something in this problem have already been explained at length.
else, viz. the second error of so-called ‘intuitionism’. And 1. The difference between intuition and reason: ra-
the fact is that even with amplification of the expression tionalism and intuitionism. This difference is presented to
which we just pointed out, intuition always but expresses a us as a “contraposition” or “opposition”. In what does it
“mode of seeing” a real thing; it is then something which consist?
is formally noetic. That is, intuition would be a direct,
immediate, and unitary mode of recognizing what things For rationalism, the supreme knowledge is the ra-
are, i.e., a mode of consciousness. Now, the formal part of tional. I have already indicated that here I am not going
what has been called ‘intuition’ is not this recognizing, to delve into problem of what should be understood by
but the fact that a thing is present to the intellection; it is ‘reason’; I am employing the word so as to conform to the
not the “presence” of the thing but is “being here-and- standard language of discussion of these matters. What is
now” present. Therefore the act is not an act of recog- designated here by ‘reason’ is conceptual evidence (the
nizing what it is, but an act of apprehending the real. It is reduction of the rational to the conceptual is also conceded
what, throughout the course of this work, I have been without discussion). Rationalism understands that intel-
calling primordial apprehension of reality. Primordial lective knowing [inteligir] is knowing [conocer], and that
apprehension is apprehension of the real in and {242} by the knowledge [conocimiento] has to be rigorous, i.e.,
itself, i.e., immediate apprehension, direct and unitary. It grounded upon strict evidence. From this point of view,
is to the act of apprehension that, formally and primarily, what is called ‘intuition’ is not in the fullest sense either
these three characteristics are applied. And only for this intellection or knowledge; because intuition would be
reason, in a derivative way, can it be applied to the noetic confused intellection, confused knowledge [conoci-
moment. Intuition is but the noetic dimension of the pri- miento]. It is on account of this that intuition would not
mordial apprehension of reality. The primordial appre- be knowledge; it would be a problem, viz. that of con-
hension of reality is then in itself much more than intui- verting into rational evidence what we intuit turbulently
tion; it is a noergic apprehension. It is not a seeing but an and confusedly. Intuition is rich, to be sure, but not in
apprehending in the impression of reality. knowledge; rather, in problems. Therefore it would be
reason, and only reason, which must resolve the problems
In summary, the opposition between rationalism and posed by intuition. The apparent richness of intuition
intuitionism does not lie in an opposition of concept and would therefore be an internal poverty. This is the idea
intuition, but in being an opposition between evidence and culminating in Leibniz and Hegel. But is that the case? It
primoridial apprehension of reality. is possible (we shall not now delve into the question) that
But there is more. Because in this opposition, what what is intuited is what leads intrinsically and formally to
is actually opposed, indeed, what is divided between in- evident intellection. But apart from this it is necessary to
tuition and concept? We are told that we are dealing with affirm that there are intuitive qualities and subtleties
two forms of knowledge. But this is unacceptable, be- which intellection can never exhaust by dint of evidence.
cause knowing [conocer] is but a very special mode of The richness of intuition always escapes strict rational
intellectively knowing [inteligir]. Not every intellection is evidence. Moreover, even when this evidence {244}
knowledge. We shall see that elsewhere in this work. seems to be totally given over to what is intuited and in-
Therefore we are not dealing with a contraposition be- deed absorbed into it, yet strictly speaking the irreducible
tween two forms of “knowledge” but with a difference individuality of the intuited is a limit inaccessible to any
between two forms of “intellection”: primordial apprehen- evidence. The intellection of the intuited real will never
sion and affirmation. This is not just a change of words, be exhausted in evidence. Evidence can be as exhaustive
but a change which concerns the formal nature of what is as one desires, but it will always be but evidence: a vision
190 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

of what reality demands; but it will never be the original to my way of thinking, is the essential point but which has
vision of reality. This is an unbridgeable difference. In- not yet been introduced. And that is that if one considers
tuition has an inexhaustible richness. In this dimension, the matter at all, one sees that the discussion we have had
intuition is not confused knowledge but primordial intel- concerns the richness or poverty both of rational intellec-
lection of the real. Intuition can only be called confused if tion and of intuition according to its content. Now, is the
one takes rational evidence as the canon of intellection. exact line along which the distinction between intuition
But this is the very thing in dispute. A mathematical cir- and evidence is drawn? Not at all. Intuition and ration-
cle, we are told, is “perfect”. Real circles, on the other ality, prior to being two fonts of intelligible known con-
hand, are “imperfect”. But imperfect with respect to tent, are two modes of intellection, i.e. two modes of ap-
what? Naturally, with respect to the mathematical circle. prehension of the real, {246} and therefore two modes of
But with respect to reality the situation is inverted. With actualization of the real. The difference between the con-
respect to the real, what is imperfect is the geometric cir- tents apprehended by these two modes is totally irrelevant
cle. Only the concept of the configuration of the real to the problem at hand. The discussion, then, must fall
would be perfect (if we could achieve it), a concept which back not on the richness or poverty of the content but on
may only approximate the geometric one; but that is to- the formality of reality, i.e. on the modes of intellection,
tally irrelevant to the problem. This is the richness of the on the modes of actualization of the real. Is there an op-
intuited. To think that despite evident conceptual determi- position of modes? If so, what is its nature?
nations we could manage to apprehend totally the intuited
real via infinite predicates—this is the great illusion of all The presumed opposition falls back formally on the
rationalism, especially that of Leibniz. two modes of intellection: intellection that something is
“real”, and intellection of what this something is “in real-
This is point on which intuitionism has chosen to ity”. Now, these two modes of intellection are therefore
stand and fight. The intuited real is individual and inex- two modes of actualization. One is the intellection of the
haustible in all its aspects. All rational evidence moves in real in and by itself; this is primordial apprehension. The
approximations to intuition. Intuition is not confused other is the apprehension of a real thing “among” others:
intellection; rather, evident intellection is but clipped or this is differential apprehension, i.e. apprehension as dif-
reduced intuition. Only from intuition does rational evi- ferentiated (essentially mediated). When the question is
dence receive its value. {245} Let us consider the intuition posed in these terms one sees above all that primordial
of a color. Reason must conceptualize it making use of a apprehension is the supreme form of intellectively know-
system of colors previously conceived. None of these is ing, because it is the supreme form of actualization of the
the intuited color. But then, we are told, reason combines real in intellection. What happens is that this apprehen-
the colors it conceives, and by dint of these combinations sion is inadequate with respect to the differentiation; it
it is believed that the cited color is apprehended. Impossi- does not make us intellectively know what a real thing is
ble. Rational evidence is only impoverished intuition. I in reality, what it is among others, i.e. with respect to oth-
do not need to insist further on these well-known differ- ers. Differential apprehension gives us this intellection,
ences; it suffices to recall the example of Bergson. But is but only insofar as it is inscribed within primordial appre-
intuition purely and simply richer than evidence? I do not hension. And this inscription does not concern the con-
think so, because what is essential to evidence is not the tent but the formality of reality, something which is given
tracing of boundaries, that tracing which has been called to us in primordial apprehension and only there. Now,
‘precision’. Rigor is not precision; rather, precision is this inscription is demanded by the primordial apprehen-
ultimately a form of rigor. The rigor proper to evidence is sion itself. The richest intuition in the world will never
not precision but accuracy, viz. intellection constricta- give to us men everything that the intuited is in reality.
tively demanded by the real. Evidence would be and is For that differential apprehension is necessary, because
poorer than the content of the intuited. But it is immeas- differential apprehension is not only grounded in upon
urably superior in accuracy. The richest intuition will primordial apprehension, {247} but also formally de-
never constitute even the minimal accuracy required by manded by it. A real thing, intellectively known, is not
the intellection of one thing “among” others. Therefore just a system of notes but also a system of demands. And
intellection should be rich but also true. Rational evi- the formal terminus of evidence is discrimination of de-
dence is not a reduced or clipped intuition nor an impov- mands, not distinction of notes. Every thing and every
erished one, but an expanded intuition, which is not the aspect of it has its own demands articulated in the most
same. precise way. As a discriminant of demands, evidence re-
This discussion also reveals to us something which, mains within the strict limits of what is demanded. And it
 DETERMINATION OF THE LOGOS IN ITSELF 191

is in this constriction that accuracy consists: it is the rigor would be “blind”; intuition fills the referential concept
demanded by reality. which by itself is empty. The unity of intuition and con-
cept is thus “synthetic unity” in the object of knowledge.
Here one sees that this undeniable difference be-
tween primordial apprehension and evidence is not some But is this true? I do not think so, for what blindness
opposition or contraposition. It is something different, and emptiness are we talking about? Naturally, the blind-
viz. a gap. And this gap will never disappear. The clear- ness and emptiness of the “object”. On this point Kant
est intellection on earth will never succeed in eradicating has done nothing but repeat Aristotle, whose idea has al-
the gap. A “filled in” gap is still a “gap”, albeit filled in. ways seemed to be rather debatable because a thing is not
In summary, there is no opposition between intuition the “object” of qualities but {249} of their “structural
and evidence, but only a gap of actualization demanded by system”. Kant believes that the object is something in
the primordial apprehension which is constitutive of evi- some way distinct from its qualities. And for Kant, only
dence. As we are dealing with two modes of actualization insofar as intuition does not give an object to the qualities
of a single real thing, it is clear that the difference be- can it be called “blind”; only because the concept does
tween those two modes is inscribed within a unity, the not contain the determinate object but just an indetermi-
unity of actualization, i.e. the unity of intellection. In nate reference to it, can it be called “empty”. Now, this
virtue of this, man does not just have intuition “and” ra- orientation of the problem toward the object is not, as I see
tional intellection, but this “and” is the harbinger of a it, what is primary and essential to either intuition or con-
more radical problem, that of the unity between intuition cept. It is possible that intuition may not formally contain
and reason in sentient logos. objects (I have just indicated what is debatable in this as-
sertion). But intuition always has a radical vision, the
2. The unity of intuition and reason. What is the vision not only of the quality, but above all of the formal-
unity between intuition and reason? ity of reality. Like all previous philosophy, Kant assumed
A) Following along the lines of intuitionism and ra- without question the idea of sensible impression as a mere
tionalism, one might think that intuition and reason are subjective affection; but he does not have the moment of
two “fonts of knowledge”. In virtue of that their unity impression of reality. The Critique should not have been
would constitute a single knowledge. This is the philoso- first and foremost a critique of knowledge, but a critique
phy of Kant. The unity of intuition and concept would be of impression itself. Intuition, although not a vision of the
the “unity of knowledge”. {248} Neither of the two fonts “object”, is vision of the “reality”. On the other hand,
by itself, in fact, constitutes a knowledge. Now, knowl- ‘concept’ is not a reference to an object, absent from the
edge is knowledge of an object. In virtue of that, “unity of concept itself, but simple apprehension of what reality
knowledge” would be “unity of object”. Therefore intui- “might be”; the “might be” is not absence of reality, but a
tion and concept would be the two fonts of a single knowl- mode of its realization. Whence it follows that neither is
edge by being two fonts of the representation of a single intuition primarily blind, nor the concept primarily empty,
object. What is this fountainhead? Intuition gives us a because the formal terminus of these two presumed
multitude of qualities of an object, ordered in a spatio- “fonts” is not an “object” but “reality”. Now, reality is the
temporal picture. But all these qualities are qualities “of” formal terminus of intellection; therefore every human
the object; they are not “the” object itself. To reach the intuition is intellective, and every human intellection is
object, we must go back to the concept. The concept is a sentient. The unity of intuition and concept is not unity of
reference to the object. But it is no more than a reference; object and quality, but the unity of formality, the unity of
and this means that when the two fonts are taken sepa- reality. And therefore its apprehension does not primarily
rately, i.e. intuition and concept, neither of the two offers constitute a knowledge but an intellection, viz. sentient
us the representation of an object. Recall Kant’s famous intellection. {250} Here we have the essential point: not
phrase: intuition without concept is “blind”; concept with- knowledge of an object but sentient intellection of a real-
out intuition is “empty”. Blindness of intuition in unity ity. And here is where the difference and the radical unity
with the emptiness of concept: this is what, for Kant, con- of intuition and concept is found. Kant’s very point of
stitutes the unity of the object and therefore of knowledge. departure is already untenable.
The object is that to which the concept refers; but not just
B) The unity in question is not, then, unity of objec-
any object, only the object determined by the qualities
tive knowledge but a unity which is rigorously structural.
given by intuition. The object is therefore the unity of
intuition and concept. The concept would be “empty”, but a) By virtue of being structural, it is above all a unity
in its emptiness it illuminates intuition, which by itself which is not noetic but noergic, i.e., a unity of apprehen-
192 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

sion. There are neither two apprehensions nor two fonts of firmation. It is found determined by the evidence as a
knowledge, nor for that matter two principles of knowl- moment that demands. The concept is accurate intuition,
edge; there are only two moments (content and formality) and intuition is demand of a concept, i.e., of its unfolding.
of a single apprehension, of a single sentient intellection.
Thus we have examined the two questions which we
b) This unity unfolds in two intellections only when posed to ourselves about what it is to intellectively know a
what is intellectively known is a real thing “among” oth- real thing at a distance, i.e., by stepping back. To do so is
ers. Then intuition is just primordial apprehension of to affirm, to judge. And we asked ourselves about the
reality, and concept is also a mode of intellection, the me- structure of affirmation, i.e., what it is to affirm, and what
diated intellection of reality. They are but two modes of are the forms and modes of affirmation. As affirmation is
actualization of the same reality. not, in any obvious way, univocally determined, we had to
c) There is a unity between these two modes, not the ask after studying its structure what it is in a real thing
“unity of synthesis” but the “unity of unfolding”. This which determines the intellective intention of affirmation.
unfolding is what comprises the ex in evidence. In virtue This determination is evidential demand. With that we
of that, there is an unquestionable supremacy of intuition have finished our examination of what it means to intel-
over evidence, not because of its qualitative content but by lectively know a thing at a distance, by stepping back.
virtue of the primary mode of apprehending reality. All This intellective knowing of a thing by stepping back is
evidence, however rich and rigorous it may be, is always the second phase of a “single” intellective moment. It is a
intuition unfolded in the ex. Let me repeat once again movement in whose first phase one steps back from what
that I am not referring to the content of what is appre- the thing is in {252} reality; being impelled thus acquires
hended but to the primary mode of apprehending reality. the character of stepping back. But in this stepping back,
In contrast to what Kant maintains, it is not the concept at this distance, the real thing holds us fast and then the
which illuminates {251} intuition, but intuition which intentum acquires the character of affirmative intention.
illuminates the concept. And in turn, the concept is not a In both of its phases alike, this intellection is an intellec-
mere reference to the object, but to the reality appre- tive movement in the middle of reality itself in which we
hended in intuition, retrieved and unfolded in the form of intellectively know what a thing is in reality with respect
“might be”. to other things. It is a mode of intellection determined in
the intelligence by a differential actualization in which the
d) All knowledge is an elaboration of this primary
real thing is actualized “among” others. But prior to this,
sentient intellection. We shall see this in another chapter.
the real is already actualized in the intelligence unitarily,
In summary, intuition and concept refer back to pri- i.e., the real has been actualized in it in and by itself.
mordial apprehension and to evidence. Their difference
does not lie in their being two fonts of knowledge, but in Now, mediated intellection of what a thing is in re-
being two modes of actualization of the real in a single act ality is an intellection determined by evidence, which
of noergic apprehension. In this apprehension, evidence confers upon affirmative intellection, upon the logos, its
and therefore the concept is not found in a synthetic unity own character, viz. truth. Here the problem springs upon
with intuition—as Kant thought—but in unity of unfold- us: affirmation and truth. This is the theme of the next
ing. The intellection of the real in this unfolding is af- chapter.
 {253}

CHAPTER VII

SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH

When a thing is apprehended as real and intellec- §1

tively known affirmatively as what it is in reality, when
this intellection intellectively knows “really” what the WHAT IS TRUTH?
thing is in reality, such as we affirm, then we say that the
intellection is true. What is meant by ‘truth’? In order to
focus correctly on the question, it will be useful to review In precise and formal terms, intellection as such is
in summary form what was said about this subject in Part just actualization of a real thing qua real. We have al-
I of the book. ready seen that this actualization has two aspects. First is
At first glance truth seems to be a quality belonging the aspect which concerns the real as real: reality is a
exclusively to affirmation. But truth is a quality of all formality which consists in being de suyo what it is, prior
intellection and not every intellection is affirmation. Prior to being present in apprehension. To study the real in this
to affirmation there is primordial apprehension of reality, aspect is the immense problem of reality. But intellective
which also has its truth. Let us ask ourselves, then, what actualization has another aspect which concerns not the
is truth as such, as a quality of intellection. real thing but the intellection itself. Mere intellective ac-
tualization of the real qua intellective is just what we call
Truth involves a host of problems, because a real truth: a thing is really that in accordance with which it is
thing is actualized in intellection in at least two different actualized.
ways, as we have seen: in primordial apprehension and in
dual apprehension. Hence the different possible types of Reality and truth are not identical because there are
truth. The set of these questions is the problem of “truth or can be realities which are not actualized nor have any
and reality”. But as affirmation {254} has always been reason to be so. In this sense, not every reality is true.
understood in a predicative form, it has been thought that Truth is a quality of actualization, and actualization is a
truth would therefore only be a quality of predication; and physical moment of the real. Without adding a single
that what constitutes truth is the “is” of the predication “A note, actualization nonetheless adds truth to the real.
is B”. Now, since truth concerns intellection as such, and Therefore truth and reality are not identical, but neither
there are intellections of reality which are not intellections are they mere correlatives; reality is not just the correlate
of the “is”, it follows that reality and being are not identi- of truth but its foundation, because all actualization is
cal. This is a third serious problem. So here we have actualization of reality. Reality is then what gives truth to
formulated the three questions which we must examine: intellection, what makes the truth or “truthifies” in it.
This excludes from the outset two conceptions of
§1. What is truth. {256} truthful intellection. The first is to understand that
§2. Truth and reality reality is a simple correlate of truth—this is basically
Kant’s thought about the question. But it is impossible, as
§3. Reality and being. I have just explained. The other is the most common con-
Let us now take up these problems from the stand- ception of all, according to which truth and its opposite,
point of affirmation. error, are two qualities which function ex aequo in intel-
lection. That was Descartes’ idea. But this involves seri-
{255} ous mistakes, because error is precisely and formally pos-

193
194 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

sible only by virtue of truth. Error, in fact, is not a mere alizing. In virtue of it this real truth is simple. It is not
“lack” of truth but “privation” of truth. Intellection can- simple in the sense of not being comprised of many notes;
not possess error just the same as truth; rather, because it on the contrary, real truth, for example the primordial
always involves a moment of reality, intellection is always apprehension of a landscape, possesses a great multitude
radically truthful even though in some dimensions it can of notes. Real truth is simple because in this actualization
see itself deprived of this truth. How is that possible? these many notes constitute a single reality, and the intel-
This is the problem of truth and reality, with which we lection does not go outside of them; it does not, for exam-
shall now occupy ourselves. ple, go from the real to its concept.

{257} Here one sees that every primordial apprehension of

the real is always true, is real truth. Error is not possible
in what is apprehended primordially as such. What is
§2
thus apprehended is always real even though it may not be
so otherwise than in the apprehension itself; but there it is
TRUTH AND REALITY
in fact real. Hence it is false to say that what is thus ap-
prehended is a representation of mine. It is not a repre-
sentation but primarily and primordially a presentation.
The real is intellectively actualized in different ways,
And this presentation does not formally consist in being
in virtue of which there are different modes of truth.
presentness but in its being here-and-now present; it is an
There is above all a simple actualization. Its truth is also
actuality of the real. Primordial apprehension is therefore
simple. But the real can be actualized in field “among”
an actual presentation of reality. It is of reality, i.e., of
other realities. It is an intellection which I have called
what the apprehended is in itself, de suyo. This “being
‘dual’. Its truth is also dual. They are two types of truth
here-and-now” in presence is just actuality, the actuality of
which are very different—something which I already
pure being here-and-now in presence. This actuality is
hinted at in Part One. Now I shall repeat that discussion
ratification.
in summary fashion for the reader’s benefit.
In summary, the primary mode of actualization of
We shall examine the following:
the real is to actualize it in and by itself. And this actuali-
zation is {259} its real truth. This reality of what is really
1. Simple or real truth. true is open in the field sense, and thus can be actualized
2. Dual truth. in two intellections: the actuality of the real in and by it-
self, and the actuality in the field of this real thing
3. The unity of truth. “among” other realities. This second actualization of the
real is thus real, but its truth is not yet real truth but what
I term ‘dual truth’. It is the truth proper to the logos, to
affirmation. After this summary of what real truth is, we
1 must delve into the analysis of dual truth.

Simple or real truth

2
The radical mode of presentation of the real in in-
tellection is primordial apprehension of reality. In it the Dual Truth
real is just actualized in and by itself. Its formality of re-
ality has two moments, individual and field, but pro indi- The intellection of a real thing “among” others is, as
viso, i.e., in a form which I have called ‘compact’, which we have seen and analyzed at length, an intellection at a
means that a thing is real and the reality in it is “thus”. distance, by stepping back. Each real thing in fact is in-
This actualization is truth; it is the primary mode of truth. tellectively known in the field of reality as a function of
{258} It is primary because this truth makes no reference others. Through its field moment, each real thing is in-
to anything outside of what is apprehended. Therefore cluded in the field by its own reality, and then the field
what this truth “adds” to reality is but its mere actuality; takes on a functional character and encompasses the rest
this is what I have termed ratification. As what is ratified of the things. Therefore each of them is, with respect to
is the real itself, it follows that its truth should be called the field, at a distance from the others. Hence, as we have
real truth. It is real because in this ratification we have said, to intellectively know a thing among others is to
the real itself. It is truth because this ratification is actu- intellectively know it as a function of those others and
 SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH 195

therefore to intellectively know it at a distance, by step- lection in movement. The realm of the thing is its actual-
ping back. ity intellectively known in this movement. As the thing is
already actualized in primordial apprehension of reality, it
But let us not confuse the field aspect of each real
follows that this new actualization is “re-actualization”.
thing and the field of reality which it determines. Each
And since dual truth is constituted in this re-actualization,
real thing refers to others; this is the field aspect of each
it follows that this dual truth has by the same token its
thing, its own field moment. The field itself is the ambit
own character: it is an actualization “in coincidence” of
constituted by this referring; it is the field of referral. The
two realms which are formally distinct. Here ‘coinci-
field is thus {260} determined by the real thing. Each
dence’ does not mean chance or anything like it; rather, it
real thing refers to another, and in this field of referral
has its etymological meaning, “to be incident with”. Dual
what a referring thing is as a function of others is intel-
truth then has the character of intellective coincidence
lectively known. Only then has one intellectively known
“between” the realms of intelligence (i.e. among the
the concrete nature of the field aspect of each thing, i.e.,
realms of intellective movement) and the realms of reality.
the concrete nature of the unity of the field aspect and the
The “between” intellectively actualizes the real thing
individual aspect in the reality of each thing. This unity is
(with respect to what it is in reality) as a “coincidence” of
what the thing is “in reality”.
intellection and reality; it is the actuality of the real in
The intellection of each thing thus takes place in the coincidence. Such is the character of dual truth, coinci-
field as a medium in which each one of the things is in- denciality, if I may be permitted the expression. It is the
tellectively known as a function of the rest. This intellec- “between” which determines this character of coinciden-
tion at a distance, by stepping back, is thus a mediated ciality.
intellection; in the field of reality it is the medium of in-
This requires some clarification in order to avoid
tellection. This mediated intellection is just affirmation.
possible confusion. A coinciding actuality is not, for-
Affirmation formally refers back to the unity of the field
mally, truth, but rather the ambit of dual truth. There-
and the individual, a unity intellectively known in the
fore—to get a little ahead of ourselves—I should say that
field of reality; i.e., it falls back upon what a real thing is
in this coinciding actuality, in this {262} ambit, error is
“in reality”. Actualization, then, is not actualization of
also constituted. Hence the duality of dual truth does not
something real in and by itself, but actualization of what
formally concern truth as opposed to error, but rather the
something already apprehended as real is “in reality”, i.e.,
coinciding actuality itself which is the ambit of truth.
among other things. Its intellection is affirmation.
What is radically and formally dual is the coinciding ac-
This intellection has its own truth. What is it? Let tuality. We shall see this at greater length later. So for
us repeat what we have been saying: truth is the mere in- now I will cautiously say the following: (1) Dual truth is
tellective actualization of the real qua intellective. When constituted in coinciding actuality, and (2) this constitu-
the actualization is not mediated, its intellection has what tion is an event; in coinciding actuality dual truth hap-
we have termed real truth, the formal ratification of the pens. And this expression has a very precise meaning,
real in and by itself. And this truth, as I said, is simple. viz. that coinciding actuality is a formally dynamic actu-
But when the actualization is mediated, then the real is ality, as I shall frequently repeat. Here “to happen” is not
made true in affirmation, not as pure and simple reality something opposed to that already done or intellectively
but rather as being in reality such-and-such among others. known, but the formal and dynamic character of affirma-
It is in this making true of the truth of the real in this tion itself.
mode of differentiating that the other type of truth con- This dual truth has not only its own character but
sists, viz. dual truth. This is mediated truth. also its own structure, the structure of coincidence itself.
Dual truth has its own character and structure. {261} This structure is extremely complex because coincidence
Above all it has its own character. This intellection, in is the character of an intellection which “comes” to coin-
fact, is intellection at a distance, by stepping back. To cide just because it “fills up” the distance between the two
intellectively know a thing “among others” is to intellec- coincident terms, between affirmative intellection and
tively know it from these others, and therefore to intellec- what the thing already apprehended as real is in reality.
tively know it at a distance, by stepping back. In virtue of Since affirmative intellection is, as we have seen, of a
that, by being intellection “at a distance”, the intellection formally dynamic character, it follows that the coinci-
itself is an intellection that steps back. Therefore there is, dence itself also has a dynamic structure, as we have just
so to speak, a duality and not just a distinction between indicated. The coincidental actuality of the real, then, has
the realm of intelligence and the realm of what is intel- a formally dynamic structure. It is for this reason that
lectively known in a thing. The realm of intelligence con- truth “happens” in this actuality without thereby being
sists in being of dynamic character, i.e. in being an intel- formally identical with it. And this is the essential point.
196 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

Real truth either is had or is not had. But one reaches or dation” the structure of that which intrinsically constitutes
does not reach dual truth in coincidence. And this the fact that intellection “between” is coincidence. I say
“reaching” is just intellective dynamism. Therefore, I “intrinsically”, i.e. I do not refer to what originates the
stress, dual truth is {263} essentially and constitutively coincidence, but to that moment which intrinsically and
dynamic. What is that dynamic structure? This is key formally pertains to coincidence itself, i.e. to the consti-
problem. tuting moment of its own character. This intrinsic and
In the first place, intellective movement takes place formal foundation is the medium. The fundamental na-
in a medium. Dual truth, by virtue of being truth in coin- ture of the medium is thus, at one and the same time what
cidence, is a mediated truth. Its foundation is, therefore, is affirmed qua affirmed and the formal character of the
the medium. In this aspect the medium is “mediation” for affirmation itself as intellection. This “at one and the
the coincidence, and therefore is a dynamic mediator (not same time” is just coincidence. The medium is therefore a
an intermediary) of dual truth. In what does the essence medium of dynamic coincidence. It is in this that its me-
of this mediation consist? This is the problem of the dy- diation consists. How?
namic mediating structure of coincidence, and therefore of A) Some pages ago we saw how the medium is con-
dual truth. The total structure of dual truth is “mediating stituted: it is constituted in and by the primordial appre-
dynamic”. hension of reality. Let us repeat the ideas already ex-
pounded in order to improve rigor and clarity. The real
In the second place, this movement takes place in the
qua real is something which, in itself, is open to all other
medium, but is not univocally determined in it. It is not
reality qua reality. This “in” is, as we already have seen
certainly in its point of departure; but that is not what is
in Part I, an intrinsic and formal moment of reality qua
important to us here. What is now important to us is that
reality; it is its transcendental character, which here takes
this movement does not have a univocally determined
on more concretely the character of being in a field. The
direction in the medium. Therefore the fact that the
real in and by itself is {265} real in a way which is tran-
movement goes toward a determinate thing which is going
scendentally in a field. The actuality of the real then
to be intellectively known does not necessarily mean that
autonomously actualizes the field as transcendental ambit.
the direction of this movement automatically leads to a
Being is a field is a moment of the primordial apprehen-
dual truth. As we shall see it may not lead there. How is
sion of reality; that it can function with autonomy with
this possible? That is the problem of the dynamic direc-
respect to the individual moment does not mean that it is
tional structure of coincidence, of dual truth.
independent of primordial apprehension. This moment is
In the third place, the movement has not only me- given to us there where the real itself is given to us: in the
dium and direction, but also, as we have seen, different impression of reality. The impression of reality is, then,
phases. Hence it follows that coincidence is not the same primordial sentient apprehension of the real in its individ-
with respect to all phases of the movement which bridges ual formality and in a field; it is transcendental impres-
the gap between the real and what the thing is in reality. sion. Now, this impression has the structural unity of all
In virtue of that, dual truth, by being truth in coincidence, the modes of reality impressively given. One of them, as I
has different forms. What are these forms? This is the have been stressing throughout this book, is the “toward”.
problem of the formal dynamic structure of dual truth. The “toward” is a mode of giving ourselves reality in im-
In summary, the problem of the structure of dual pression. When one considers it as transcendentally open,
truth is the problem of the structurally mediating dynamic then the “toward” is “toward the rest of the realities”; it is
{264} and directional character of the coincidence be- not only a mode of reality but the very mode of the differ-
tween affirmative intellection and what a thing is in real- ential actuality of reality. In virtue of this, the transcen-
ity. dental nature of the field moment takes on the character of
a field which encompasses concrete real things. The field
The conceptualization of this structure unfolds in
is thus constituted in a “medium”. So it is then clear that
three questions:
the medium is precisely and formally a medium because
A) The mediated dynamic structure of coincidence. there are real things apprehended in the impression of
B) The directional dynamic structure of coincidence reality. The real things, naturally, do not remain “outside”
in the medium. the medium, but neither are they merely “inside” it even
though it encompasses them; rather, they “are” the con-
C) The formal dynamic structure of truth in mediat- crete reality of the field moment itself of every real thing.
edl coincidence. Conversely, the medium as such is the field of every real
1. Mediating dynamic structure of coincidence. This thing insofar as it is in mediated fashion constituting, in
is a “fundamental” structure. Here I understand by “foun- each thing, the intellective unity of some things with oth-
 SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH 197

ers. The medium is the foundation of the intellective unity but stepping back in reality. Hence coincidence is not
of things, but it is a foundation which is only mediated, recomposition, but only an overcoming of of distance “in”
{266} i.e., by being intrinsically the actuality which is reality itself.
intellectively in the field of every real thing. To be sure,
In fact, what judgement affirms is not reality pure
the medium, insofar as it is within the field, is not purely
and simple, but what a thing already apprehended as real
and simply identified with the individual part of each
is in reality. And in turn, what a thing is in reality is just
thing’s formality of reality; but this reality is actualized in
the unity of its individual and field moments, i.e., the con-
the field manner in the medium. Hence it follows that the
crete unity of each thing with all others in reality itself.
medium is, I repeat, but a moment of the actuality itself
Stepping back, then, in reality itself is how the intelli-
of the real qua real. The medium is but the real truth of
gence is situated with respect to a thing. That is, the me-
the field. The medium, then, has on one side a founded
dium is just the moment of reality itself. Conversely, co-
character; it is founded on the individual realities; but it is
incidence is the unity of intelligence and the thing in that
on the other hand the foundation of that differentiating
medium which is reality itself. Truth as coincidence is
unity which we call “between”. The “transcendental am-
above all coincidence of affirmation and of a thing “in”
bit”, the field, thus acquires the character of “medium”.
reality. And this reality is then the “in” itself, i.e., it is the
Now, the medium is founding just because it has in itself,
medium; therefore it is something which is intrinsic to
formally, the actuality of each real thing. This cyclic unity
intelligence and the thing.
is characteristic of the medium.
B) The medium thus constituted has the function of b) Nonetheless we are not dealing with just any coin-
mediation of coincidence between affirmation and what a cidence, {268} because it has to be a coincidence along
thing is in reality. In fact, affirmation is an intellection at the lines of intellection itself, i.e., along the lines of intel-
a distance, by stepping back. Therefore the confidence of lective actuality of the real at a distance. For this it is
both terms has to be founded in something in which it is necessary that the medium be not only an intrinsic mo-
established. But, What is the nature of this something? ment of affirmative intellection and of the real, but that it
also be something whose mediated truth as truth consti-
a) We are not dealing with some third term which
tutes the coincidence between affirmation and the real.
“produces” coincidence. That was the absurd idea nour-
Only then will the medium have the function of media-
ished in large part by the subjectivist philosophy of the
tion, of intellective mediation. The medium has to be a
late 19th century; it was the celebrated idea of the
true mediator of coincidence, i.e., of truth. And so it is in
“bridge” between consciousness and reality. We leave
fact.
aside that fact that we are not dealing with consciousness
but with intellection. The idea in question started from Let us recall that the real apprehended in primary
the supposition that one had to encounter a third term actualization, in the primordial apprehension of reality,
which would reestablish the unity of the intelligence and has in this actualization what I have called real truth.
reality, the two terms which were thought to be found And to this real truth corresponds the truth of a thing in
“outside” of each other. Yet all this is simply absurd, in a its field moment. In virtue of this, we say, real truth is a
very radical way. It is not absurd because of what the na- truth which is incipiently open, open to intellection within
ture of this “bridge” might be (e.g., {267} some type of a field in coincidence, an intellection in which we affirm
causal reasoning); rather, what is absurd is thinking about what a thing is in reality. The same thing, then, as I have
the necessity of the bridge, because what does not exist is already said, is apprehended twice: once, in and by itself
the “exteriority”, so to speak, of intelligence and the real. as real; secondly, as affirmed of what that thing is in real-
The difference between the two terms is a “stepping ity. Now, the primordial apprehension of the real pertains
back”, but not a “separation”, which means that what es- formally to affirmation itself; it is precisely that of which
tablishes the coincidence is not a third thing different than one judges. In turn, the medium itself is the physical ac-
the other two, but a moment which is intrinsic to them. tuality of the field moment of that real thing, of the pri-
This moment is just the medium. The medium is not mordial apprehension; i.e., it has its own real truth. This
some “bridge”, i.e., it is not an “intermediary”, but rather real truth of the medium is but the expansion of the real
is that in which the two terms “already are”. There is no truth of the field moment of a thing apprehended as real,
bridge but only a medium. And this medium is easy to in order to be able to judge its reality. Hence it follows, as
describe: it is just the medium in which stepping back I have already said, that the medium is real truth; it is the
(i.e., distance) itself has been established, to wit, reality real truth of reality itself of the field of reality itself. And
itself. It is therein that stepping back has been estab- it is in this real truth where, in mediated fashion, that
lished, a stepping back, but not a rupture. It is already in coincidence between affirmation and the real thing is es-
the real; stepping back is not stepping back from reality tablished. The real truth {269} of the medium is the in-
198 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

trinsic and formal mediator of what is actualized in af- is incipiently open to being actualization of the real in
firmation. In contrast to what is so often said, one must coincidence, i.e., in reality of truth, and constitutes the
realize that affirming does not consist in affirming reality, intrinsic and formal medium of this last actualization.
nor for that matter in affirming truth, but in affirming
something “in reality”, in affirming something “in truth”. But this coincidental dynamism does not have only
Reality and truth are the mediated and intrinsic supposi- mediated character. It also has a directional character.
tion of all affirmation as such. The coincidence between That is what we are going to see.
intelligence and the real is a coincidence which is estab- 2) Dynamic directional structure of coincidence in
lished in reality itself in which both terms are true reality, the medium. Intellective movement takes place in the
in the real truth of the medium. The real truth of the me- medium, but is not univocally determined there. This
dium is thus the medium of coincidence. movement is a movement in which we are going to intel-
This is a moment which formally and intrinsically lectively know what a thing is in reality as a function of
pertains to affirmation in order to be able to be what af- others. That is, we are going “toward” that thing, but
firmation seeks to be. A judgement does not affirm either “from” the rest. The dynamism of intellection not only
reality or truth but presupposes them; it affirms what a takes place in a medium, {271} but is “from-toward”.
real thing is in “reality of truth”. And this truth is just the This is the dynamic directional structure of coincidence.
real truth. Mediation consists formally in being the real Intellection in movement is affirmation. Therefore af-
truth as a medium of judgement. firmation itself is dynamic not only in mediated fashion
c) But this is not all, because coincidence, which the but also directionally. This direction of affirmation has a
medium as real truth establishes, has a precise structure, complex structure, because both the “toward” and the
viz. movement. There is a profound difference between “from” are fixed: the “toward” is what a thing which one
intellectively knowing something with truth and intellec- desires to intellectively know is in reality, and the “from”
tively knowing it in mediated fashion in truth. When all is things as a function of which one is going to intellec-
is said and done, in primordial apprehension of reality we tively know the thing in an affirmative way. I shall lump
already have reality with truth. But there is an essential all things in a single term, viz. that thing from which one
difference with affirmative intellection, because the reality affirms what something is in reality. Now, even with these
of primordial apprehension of reality is actuality of a terms fixed, affirmative movement does not have a univo-
thing in and by itself in its direct immediateness. But cally determined direction. Given the same “toward” and
now, affirmative intellection of reality is intellection of “from”, the intellective movement can and does follow
reality in truth by stepping back. And distance is some- quite different trajectories. That is, the direction and ori-
thing to which real truth is incipiently open, and which entation of the movement can vary. And with that vari-
has to be gone through. Therefore real truth is not just ance, coincidence itself arises within the power of the in-
something in which intellective coincidence “is”, {270} telligence, i.e., of the intellective movement of what the
nor is it only something which makes that possible; rather real thing is in reality, and the real has a directional char-
it is something which pertains to affirmation itself because acter. This obliges us to linger on some essential points,
the medium is not something in which real things are especially these three: A) what is, more precisely, the “di-
submerged. It is indeed the actuality of the field moment rection” of affirmation; B) what is the directional part of
of each real thing. Hence stepping back is only the mode coincidence as such; and C) in what does this bundle of
of intellectively knowing in the medium. That is, the me- directions consist which we may term the “polivalence” of
dium is a dynamic mediator. It is the mediated dynamism affirmation with respect to the nature of coincidence.
of the real truth of the medium. The medium is not only
A) Above all, what is the “direction” of affirma-
something which “permits” coinciding with the real, but
tion?. Let us recall that affirmation is a dual intellection
also is constitutively something which pertains to the co-
which consists in the thing “toward” which one goes be-
incidence with the real.
ing intellectively known “from” the light emanating from
Here we have the mediated structure of coincidence. something else. The thing “from” which one goes is pres-
It is coincidence in the medium of reality itself, intellec- ent in the thing “toward”, in a certain way as the light of
tive coincidence in its real truth, and dynamic coincidence the intellective affirmation of this latter. The first thing
in stepping back. this light {272} determines is a “stopping” to consider
In summary, the mediated structure of affirmative what the thing can be which is going to be intellectively
intellection consists in the intellective movement in which known in this light. This stopping is a stepping back, i.e.,
we intellectively know what a real thing is “in reality of what I have called “retraction”. It is not a retraction
truth”, i.e., in the medium of the real truth. The real truth “from” reality but retraction “in” reality.
 SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH 199

It is a retraction which is formally intellective. What This intellection is a movement which takes place in
one intellectively knows in this retraction is what a thing mediated fashion. And in this taking place, what the in-
would be as a function of the light of another. This intel- tellection, so to speak, does is to “go” to that unity. This
lection is what constitutes simple apprehension in its tri- “going” is but a returning from the retraction to the thing
ple form of percept, fictional item, and concept. But sim- itself, i.e., going “in” the field “toward” the thing. Hence
ple apprehension, as we saw, does not consist in pre- it follows that, qua intellectively known affirmatively, the
scinding from the moment of reality. On the contrary, unity in question is intellectively known as “unification”.
every simple apprehension is formally constituted in the The direction, then, is direction toward unification; it is
medium of reality. And the way in which reality corre- the “might be” of the unification. In this direction the
sponds to what is simply apprehended is that mode of re- intellection seeks to reach the thing. But not as something
ality which we call “might be”. What is simply appre- which just is there, quiescent, {274} but as intellectively
hended is what a thing “might be” in reality. The “might known already as real in primordial apprehension. In
be” is not something which concerns the content of a sim- virtue of this, the thing which directionally we seek to
ple apprehension as something possible in it; rather, it is reach is the thing which already has real truth, but which
the unreal mode by which the content of a simple appre- is incipiently open, and which therefore is dynamically
hension concerns the real thing. unfolded as making a demand; it is the real thing as
“making a demand” or “making a claim”. We have al-
Even when simple apprehensions are freely created,
ready met the concept of demand when treating the sub-
the thing which “might be” in the form of a percept, fic-
ject of evidence, where it was a vision called forth by a
tional item, or concept is always mentally denoted.
thing from itself, from its own reality. In the present
Now, direction is the formality of the “might be” of problem this same demand has the directional function of
simple apprehension. Therefore simple apprehension intellection. Making a demand is always one of the as-
consists formally in direction. Here we have the concept pects of the force of imposition of the real apprehended in
of direction, which we were seeking. Intellection through the impression of reality.
stepping back is above all, as we have seen, retraction; but
The “might be” is direction; and what a thing “is” in
it is an intellective retraction in reality. This “in reality” is
reality is present to us as making a demand. Therefore
the “might be”, i.e., the direction. Therefore direction, I
the coincidence between intellective movement and a
repeat, is but the intellective formality of retraction.
thing is a coincidence of formally dynamic character; it is
In virtue of this, simple apprehension is not just a the coincidence between a direction and a demand. And
{273} representation of some content, but a directional this coincidence between a direction and a demand is the
focus of what a real thing “might be” in reality. Further- step from “might be” to the “is” in which affirmation con-
more, as I just said, this directional formality is what for- sists. It is, I repeat, a formally dynamic and directional
mally constitutes simple apprehension. In primordial moment of the mediated actuality of the real in affirma-
apprehension there is no direction but rather immediate tion. It is the coincidence between a simple apprehension
actuality. On the other hand, simple apprehension is a freely created by me, and the positive or negative demand
moment of distanced intellection, and its formal character which the real has before it.
is “direction”. Simple apprehension, I repeat, is formally
intellective direction toward what the thing intellectively This actualization, by virtue of being dynamically di-
known by stepping back “might be” in reality. rectional, confers a precise structure upon affirmation.
This coincidence, in fact, is not something which consists
To summarize, in this intellective movement which in “carrying” us to the actualization but rather is a mo-
is affirmation, one comes to intellectively know what a ment of the actualization itself in its intrinsic and formal
thing is in reality as a function of others which reveal the dynamic nature. This intrinsic and formal character of
possibilities of what it directionally might be. actuality in directional coincidence has that moment
Granting this, In what does the directional structure which is rectitude. Coincidence as “coincidence of direc-
of the coincidence consist? tion and of demand” has the {275} formal moment of
rectitude. This is, as I see it, the strict concept of recti-
B) Directionality of coincidence. Every affirmation tude.
is a movement, and as such has direction. Toward what?
We have already given the answer on several occasions: This coincidence, then, is not a quiescent but a dy-
toward what a thing, intellectively known affirmatively, is namic one. It is above all a mediated dynamic coinci-
in reality. This “in reality”, as we also saw, is the unity of dence, viz. a thing actualized in the medium of reality, i.e.
the individual moment and the field moment of the real actualized in the reality of truth; but it is also a directional
thing which is intellectively known. dynamic coincidence, viz. a thing actualized in the recti-
200 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

tude of affirmative movement. The medium and the di- a speaking animal, in the second a bipedal animal (the
rection are not just conditions of affirmation, but intrinsic one par excellence), and in the third a social animal, etc.
and formally constitutive moments of it, not just as an act Within this bundle of directions, I move in one of them
of intellection but as actualization of the thing which is according to an option of mine, anchored securely in the
intellectively known. Qua actualized in intellective richness of what is intellectively known, but in a direction
movement, a thing has a mediated and directional actual- determined only by an {277} option of mine. This plu-
ity; it is actuality in reality and actuality in rectitude. rality of directions is, nonetheless, not what I term direc-
Rectitude is perhaps what most clearly delineates the tional polyvalence. Valence is the quality of coincidence
dynamic structure of affirmation. When all is said and in the order of truth. Polyvalence consists in those quali-
done, one might think that the “medium” is just that in ties, those valences, being able to be diverse within each
which affirmation resides, not affirmation itself. Rather, direction. It does not then refer to various directions, but
“rectitude” would clearly denote that one is dealing with a to various valences within each direction with respect to
formally dynamic moment. Nonetheless, this dynamic the truth intended to be in them.
character is not unique to rectitude but also applies to the And this is because, as we have said repeatedly, in
medium itself, because we are not dealing with a medium contrast to real truth which one “has” or does not have,
in which one affirms, but rather with the mediated char- dual truth is “arrived at” or not arrived at, or is arrived at
acter of affirmation. It is the affirming itself which is me- by different means in the intellective movement of af-
diated. Affirmation is a happening and its mediality is an firmation. Now, in each case we have a strict coincidence
intrinsic and formal moment of what is affirmed qua af- between the direction and the demand of the real thing.
firmed. A thing is intellectively known in affirmation; Since in this coincidence the real is actualized, and
and as this intellection is at a distance, mediality is the therefore its intellective valences are diversified, it follows
intrinsic and formal character of the reality itself qua in- that directional valence has two aspects which must be
tellectively known. The medium is dynamic mediation conceptualized successively, viz. the aspect which con-
and rectitude is—to speak pleonastically—dynamic recti- cerns the very root of all valence, i.e. the aspect which
tude. As I see it, one can never sufficiently insist on truth concerns the actuality of the real in affirmation, and the
as a {276} dynamic coincidence, i.e., upon affirmation as aspect which concerns the polyvalence of this affirmation
intellective movement. in the order of its truth.
But this only puts us face-to-face with a serious
a) Above all, there is the root of all valence, which
problem. It is necessary, in fact, to conceptualize in what,
ultimately is the root of all polyvalence. A real thing is,
“formally”, this coincidence between direction and de-
as we saw, the terminus of two apprehensions. One, its
mand consists. Because the directionality of affirmation is
primordial apprehension as a real thing about which one
polivalent, and therefore its coincidence also is so. In
judges. But this same thing, without ceasing to be appre-
what does this polivalence consist?
hended as real, is the terminus of what, provisionally, we
C) Directional polyvalence. Naturally there is in shall call second actuality: actuality in affirmation. Of
every affirmation a plurality of directions for going “to- these two actualizations, the second presupposes the first:
ward” what is affirmed starting “from” something else. affirmation presupposes the primary actuality of a thing
What is affirmed, in fact, has many notes and many as- and returns to actualize it in affirmation. Therefore, we
pects, which means that starting “from” some thing I can said, affirmation is formally “re-actualization”. What is
go “toward” what is affirmed in many ways. “Really” the this “re”? That is the question. {278}
thing “from” which one intellectively knows opens to us
not a direction but a bundle of directions “toward” the The “re” is not some repetition or reiteration of the
thing intellectively known. Once the “from” and “to- first actualization. In the first place, this is because of the
ward” are fixed, there is still a plurality of possible direc- formal explanation of the term ‘to actualize’: in the first
tions. I can go toward a thing intellectively known in actualization we have a “real” thing, but in the second we
order to intellectively know the color it has in reality, but I have the thing “in reality”. We have reality, then, twice,
can also direct myself toward the thing itself in order to but with different aspects. In the reactualization we have
intellectively know any other of its notes. In order to in- the real, but actualized “in reality”. The same reality is
tellectively know what a man is in reality, I can start from thus actualized in two different aspects. Insofar as the
his zoological relatives; but here is where the multitude of second aspect is founded in the first, we shall say that that
directions opens up: I can go in the direction of speech, second contribution is “re-actualization”. Here, “to reac-
but I can also go in the direction of upright walking, or of tualize” is to actualize what something, already real, is in
forming groups. In the first case the man will be in reality reality.
 SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH 201

But this is not the most fundamental characteristic of Now, what is actualized in intellective movement has
the “re”, because upon actualizing what an already real its own exclusive content; it is not the purely and simply
thing is “in reality”, this actualization is not an actualiza- real, but what a real thing is “in reality”, i.e., the unifica-
tion only of a second aspect of the same thing, but is an- tion of the individual and the {280} field moment of the
other mode of actualization or of actuality of the thing. thing. Therefore this actuality, which is seeming, is for-
Upon being intellectively known according to what it is mally actuality of what a thing is “in reality”. The content
“in reality”, a real thing is actualized at a distance, i.e., by of seeming is always and only that which the real thing is
stepping back, and in the direction of demand. Therefore, in reality. In other words, seeming is always and only
in affirmative intellection the real acquires not only an- seeming what something real is in reality. The actuality of
other actuality, but above all a new mode of actuality. the “in reality” is seeming, and conversely seeming is
The primary actuality is “reality” pure and simple. The intellective actuality qua intellective of what the thing is
actuality in affirmation is an actuality through stepping “in reality”.
back, and demanded with respect to a fixed direction. We
are, then, dealing not with a repetition but with a new It is precisely on account of this that seeming con-
mode of strict and rigorous actuality. Now, the demand- stitutes a proper and exclusive mode of actuality of a thing
ing actuality of the real in a fixed direction is what for- in affirmative intellection. Primordial apprehension of
mally constitutes seeming. Affirmation is affirmation of reality is not and cannot be seeming; it is purely and sim-
actuality in coincidence, and the actual in this coincidence ply reality. All idealisms, whether empiricist or rational-
is seeming. This is, as I see it, the formal concept of ist, take for granted that what is apprehended (i.e., what I
seeming. The “re” of reactualization is, then, actualiza- call primordial apprehension of reality), is merely seem-
tion of the real in seeming. Here we have the essential ing, and that only to reason does it fall to determine what
point. It was necessary to give a strict and rigorous con- reality is. But this is absurd, because the immediate and
cept of what seeming is. {279} It is not enough to make direct part of the real, apprehended primordially, excludes
use of the term as something which does not require con- a limine the very possibility of all seeming. Every ideal-
ceptualization. ism speaks of seeming, but none has taken care to give a
strict concept of this mode of actuality. What is appre-
Let us explain this concept at greater length. Above hended in primordial apprehension of reality has that in-
all, seeming is an actuality of a real thing; it is the real trinsic compaction in virtue of which it is but real. The
thing in its own reality, which is actualized as seeming. It compaction consists in not having, nor being able to have,
is not to seem reality, but reality in seeming. But in the the moment of seeming. It is real and only is real.
second place, it is actuality in “direction”; otherwise the Therein consists, as we saw, all of its inexhaustible great-
real thing would not have any seeming. Something seems ness and its possible poverty. On the other hand, in the
to be or not to be only if it seems to be or not be what it real apprehended not primordially but differentially, there
“might be”. That is, seeming is an actuality but in a cer- is always a radical uncompacting; uncompacting is the
tain direction, since as we have seen, “might be” is for- difference between reality and seeming.
mally direction. But this is not yet sufficient, because the
“might be” is always and only a determined “might be”. It is fitting now to explain the concept of seeming
Something seems to be or not to be not what it might be not just saying what it is, but also saying—and very
without further ado, but what such and such a determinate forcefully—what it is not. {281} When we say that
thing might be. The determination of the “might be” is something “seems”, we do not intend to say more than
essential to seeming. Seeming, then, is not directional that it “only seems”. But this is absurd. Seeming is not
actuality but actuality in a “determinate” direction. In the being an “appearance”; it is a mode of actuality of the real
third place, it is an actuality of a real thing insofar as this itself, and therefore the real actualized in an affirmation—
thing calls forth, in its actuality, inclusively as well as as we shall see forthwith—is real and at the same time
exclusively, determinate “might be’s”. Only then is there seems to be so. Seeming is not the opposite either for-
seeming. Without this third moment the “might be” mally or in fact, of being real. The real intellectively
would certainly be determined but would not go beyond known by stepping back is real and seems to be so; at least
being a directional moment of a simple apprehension. it is not excluded that it may be so. Seeming as such is
There is only seeming when this determinate “might be” not something the opposite of the real, but a mode of actu-
is determined by a real thing in making a demand. Unit- ality of the real itself. If one wishes, it is “appearing”.
ing these three moments into a single formula, I say that And in fact, what is purely and simply real has its own
seeming is the demanding actuality of the real in a deter- real truth, which as we saw is incipiently open. To what?
minate direction. It is the actuality of the coincident qua We said that it is open to another actualization. Now, we
coincident. should say that that to which the real truth, i.e. what is
202 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

purely and simply real, is primarily open is to seeming to proper only to the “in reality” of the first unfolding.
be so in an intellection in movement. As this actualization is the very essence of judge-
Now, this actualization in movement is just affirma- ment, it follows that the duality of being real and of
tion, judgement. From this arises the most strict and for- seeming (in the actuality of each real thing thus intellec-
mal concept of judgement. Judgement, I said, is intellec- tively known) confers upon affirmation an essential qual-
tion through stepping backing from what a real thing is in ity in the order of truth: a valence. Valence, we may now
reality; it is then intellection in coincidence. Now, in this say, is the quality of coincidence between seeming and
stepping back and coinciding, intellection is the actuality being. A valence can be diverse; this is polyvalence. It is
of a thing as “seeming”; so it follows that the formal ter- a polyvalence with respect to dual truth. This is what must
minus of judgement is seeming. Judgement is, so to now be considered in greater detail.
speak, the formal organon of seeming. And here we have
the essential point: judging is always and only intellec- b) Affirmation as affirmation, is in fact an intellec-
tively knowing the real in its seeming. Correctly under- tive movement in which a simple apprehension of mine
stood, “seeming” here has the meaning explained above. freely forged confronts the reality of something already
A mind of the kind we usually call “purely intuitive” (let apprehended as real. In order for there to be affirmation
us not again discuss the concept of intuition as a moment there must be an intention of coincidence between the
of the primordial apprehension of reality) would not have direction constituting the “might be” of my simple appre-
“seeming” but only reality. And therefore it would not hension and the demand for rejection or admission—let us
have judgements {282} but only primordial apprehensions call it that—of a real thing with respect to that simple
of reality. The absence of judgement would be founded apprehension. To be sure, we are not dealing with a re-
upon the absence of seeming, and in turn the absence of jection or admission as an actuating moment of the real
seeming would be founded upon the compaction of the thing, but only of that physical moment of it which is its
apprehended real in and by itself. physical actuality. It is this actuality which, when we
confront it in the direction in which my simple apprehen-
And this brings us not only to conceptualize judge- sion consists, is actualized in the form of a demand. But
ment but also to give precise formal rigor to a concept this is something which is exceedingly complex.
which has been appearing throughout our study, viz. the
concept of stepping back or distance. Negatively, as I have Above all, I can freely elect simple apprehension,
said on numerous occasions, ‘distance’ in this context and the direction in which I am going to confront a real
does not mean spatial distance. Distance, I said, is that thing. This option of mine is what is responsible for the
stepping back in which each thing is situated with respect fact that among the many directions which a thing opens
to others when it is apprehended “among” them; it is the to me when I apprehend it, only one of them acquires the
distance of the “reality-among”, the “between two” of the character of being the direction embarked upon. The di-
real. I said in chapter IV that this distance is the unity of rection then turns into a path instead of an option, {284}
the unfolding between the individual moment and the the path of affirmation. Affirmation is not only a direc-
field moment of each real thing, i.e. the unity of the un- tion but a path, the path upon which I embark in order to
folding between being “real” and being “in reality”. This intellectively know the real affirmatively. This option is
unfolding is distance because one must review the dis- discernment, the krinein, and therefore is that by which
tinction, and because the reviewing is a dynamic form of every affirmation is constitutively a krisis, i.e., judgement.
the unity itself. But there is besides another unfolding. Affirmation is judgement precisely and formally by taking
When surveyed, in fact, this unity is in turn a unity be- place in a path with choices.
tween reality and seeming. By stepping back, and so be-
ing at a distance, being “in reality” is thus unfolded in But this necessary discernment is not sufficient for
turn into its “in reality” and into its “seeming”. Then the intellective movement to be affirmation. Affirmation is
distance which formally is unity of unfolding between the not just an utterance, but a positive intellection of the real.
individual moment and the field moment inexorably For this not only is the discernment of a path necessary,
grounds the unity of unfolding of the field moment itself, but it is also necessary that this path lead to a coincidence,
the unity of unfolding between “being in reality” and i.e. that the affirmation possess rectitude and lead to the
“seeming”. It is a modality of stepping back or distance, real. Now this second moment is not at all obvious, be-
affirmative distance; it is a distance proper to every differ- cause with what has been said, rather than an affirmation
ential actualization and only to it, proper only to move- we would have only an intent of affirmation. In order for
ment within a field as such. Let us not confuse the un- there to be an affirmation it is necessary for there to be
folding of “real” and “in reality” with the unfolding of coincidence, convergence, and rectitude between simple
reality and seeming. {283} This second unfolding is apprehension and the real thing.
 SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH 203

This affirmative intellection in its own coincidence sions. We shall see later the problem of the categories in
has different valences, different qualities in the order of all of its fullness. Returning to parity, we see that parity is
truth. Every affirmation has in some way this diversity of parity of categorial line. Disparity is categorial disparity.
valences. I say, “in some way”, because this is just what So here we have the first qualitative moment, the first
we have to examine now. valence in the order of truth: parity. Its opposite is dis-
aa) Every affirmation has in the order of truth an parity. The opposition between “with-parity” and “dis-
essential radical quality; it is what I call parity. In every parity” is the first directional polyvalence of affirmation.
affirmation there is the actualization of that about which bb) But there is a second quality with a valence. It
one affirms and the simple apprehension on which is is not enough that an affirmation be not a disparate one; it
based what one affirms. In every affirmation there are, is necessary that, even if not so, it make sense. “Making
then, two poles. But it is necessary that each of them not sense” or “being meaningful” is the second moment of
go off “on its own”, so to speak. This quality is parity. valence. Making sense is not parity. Within something
Permit me to explain. If I ask myself how many wings which is not disparate or absurd one can pronounce an
this canary has in reality, and if I answer “yellow”, that affirmation whose direction does not fall back upon the
response is not an affirmative coincidence but just the possible demands of the object about which one is affirm-
opposite, because what is real about {285} the question ing. In such a case the direction of the simple apprehen-
asked is along the lines of quantity (number of wings), sion veers toward emptiness. Direction toward emptiness
and the given response expressed the real along the lines is not the same thing as disparate.
of quality. There is no coincidence and therefore no rec- This emptiness can occur in at least two ways. It can
titude. The two directions are “disparate”; this is the dis- be that the sense of my simple apprehension remains out-
parity, disparity or absurdity [in Spanish]. To say that the side of the demands of the real object about which af-
number of wings of this canary is yellow is not a false- firmation is made. Then the affirmation is nonsense or
hood, but something more radical, viz. the incongruence meaningless. But it can happen that in the affirmation the
or disparity between two lines of intellection. In order for sense of the simple apprehension destroys the positive
there to be affirmation there must be “parity” between the demands of that about which one affirms; this is counter-
direction of simple apprehension and the demands of the sense or contra-meaning. And this is not some subtlety
real. Only when there is parity is there coincidence and but something which has come to carry out an essential
therefore rectitude. The disparity is formally and consti- role in science and philosophy.
tutively “uttered without parity”. Rectitude therefore is
not synonymous with truth in even the slightest way, but is For example, if I consider an electron situated ex-
essentially pure and simple parity. What is parity? Every actly at a precise point in space, and wish to intellectively
simple apprehension is a “might be”. Hence every simple know what its dynamic state is in reality, i.e. its momen-
apprehension directs us to the real not only by the mere tum, there is not and cannot be any answer. To attribute
fact of being a “might be”, but moreover in this direction to it {287} a momentum is, in itself, not something dispa-
a directional line of the actuality of the real qua real is rate but meaningless (because of Heisenberg’s Uncertainty
pointed out. What is pointed out is a mode of directing Principle). An electron precisely localized in space can-
myself to the real as quality (please excuse the expression) not have any precise momentum. The “might be” of the
of a line of the might be is acknowledged, in which the momentum is a determinate direction, but it does not
real as real is actualized. Yellow points out the line of make sense to realize it in a localized electron. In virtue
that mode of being directed to the real which is its actuali- of this there is no directional coincidence, nor for that
zation; it is actualization as quality. Number points out in matter the actuality which is seeming. To fall into the
its mode of directing itself to reality another aspect of ac- void is just “not-seeming”. All the variables which phys-
tualization of the real, viz. as quantity. Along these lines, ics calls ‘dynamically conjugate’ are found in this exam-
then, the real as real is directionally actualized. Pointing ple from atomic physics. I have not cited them except by
out, in Greek, is called kategoria. Every “might be” points way of example. That is a problem of atomic physics
out a line of actualization of the real qua real, and it is in which we cannot discuss further here.
this the category consists, viz. directional actualization of The counter-sense or contra-meaning is, if one
the real qua real. It is in this directional focus that, in my wishes, the more serious problem. It is not a falsehood,
opinion, the problem of the categories of the real must be nor even a contradiction, but a destroyer of the possibility
conceptualized. The categories are not supreme genera of of any meaning. Thus Husserl thinks that to say that a
“being” (cf. Aristotle); they are not forms of judgement priori truths are founded upon contingent facts is not
(cf. Kant); {286} but rather they are the directional lines something which is just false or contradictory, but is con-
of actualization of the real qua real along various dimen- tra-meaning. The meaning of the demands of the concept
204 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

of “a priori” truth are annulled by the meaning of “em- error. Each one of the two possibilities of actuality in co-
pirical fact”. For Husserl the contra-meaning is the su- incidence is what constitutes that which we have previ-
preme form of not being true. But personally I think that ously termed ‘path’. Path is not only a direction upon
there is something more serious than the contra-meaning, which one embarks, but a direction along the lines of one
and that is disparity or absurdity. In disparity or absurd- or the other of the two possibilities. The first is the path
ity, I repeat, the demands of that about which one judges of truth. The second is the path of error. The path or way
have nothing to do with the direction of the simple appre- of truth is that in which it is the real which founds the
hension. To intellectively know them unitarily in an ob- seeming or appearance. The way of error is that in which
ject is the disparity or absurdity. On the other hand in it is seeming or appearance which founds reality; reality
contra-meaning there is no disparity or absurdity; what would be what appears to us. Here we have the radical
happens is that the direction of the simple apprehension complexity of every affirmation in its directional structure;
does not find where to realize itself in the object. it is the third valence of coincidence.
The second valence in the order of truth is meaning. To understand it better, we must first of all clarify
Polyvalence adopts the form of “with meaning” and what each of the two paths is. So let us begin with the
“without meaning” and “contra-meaning”. {288} path of truth. Judgement, I have stated, is the formal or-
gan of seeming or appearance as such. Now, its truth con-
cc) But there is a third quality of the coincidence in sists formally in that appearance is founded upon what a
the order of truth. thing is in reality. It consists, then, in what determines
Coincidence, I repeat, is dynamic coincidence be- the actuality in coincidence of an appearance being what
tween intellective direction and the direction of the de- the thing is in reality. This is the path of truth. It is not
mands of the actuality of the real. In this direction one is something extrinsic to truth, nor is it the path to arrive at
going to intellectively know not the real as real (that truth; rather it is an intrinsic and formal moment of truth
would be primordial apprehension of reality), but what itself as such; it is “truth-path”. It is the “path-like” char-
this real is in reality. That is, a real thing in dynamic co- acter of affirmation about the real. Only in a derivative
incidence acquires a new actuality, a reactualization of the sense can one speak of a truth as a quality of what is af-
real in the order of what it is in reality. This actuality of firmed. Primarily truth is a dynamic directional charac-
the real in directional coincidence is, we said, what con- teristic of affirmation; it is the direction by which “ap-
stitutes seeming, viz. the demanding actuality of the real pearance” is determined by “real” being. Truth itself is
in a determinate direction. Therefore affirmative intellec- this directional determination. It is the path in which one
tion, what a thing already apprehended as real is in real- is intellectively knowing what something seems to be in
ity, is the coincidence of what it seems to be and what the reality {290} by making the intellection converge toward
real thing is in reality. Or stated more succinctly, it is the what the thing really is. This convergence of the path is
coincidence between seeming and being real (where it is truth itself. Only in and by this dynamic and directional
understood that we are dealing with being “in reality”). truth is it that we can have truth in what is affirmed. We
This coincidental actuality is exceedingly complex. How shall see this below.
are they “one”, i.e., in what are the two terms coincident? But there is another path, the path of error. Error is
The coincidence is actuality as coinciding; therefore that also primarily a path. It is the path by which the actuality
in which real being and “seeming” are “one” is in being in coincidence of appearance is what grounds and consti-
actuality. But these two terms are not independent, i.e., tutes what a thing is in reality. Error is above all a path,
are not juxtaposed; rather, seeming and being real are the erroneous path. It is possible that what is affirmed by
mutually grounded the one upon the other. There is al- this path turns out to be truthful, but it would be so only
ways actuality in coincidence, but the coincidence can accidentally, just as the conclusion of a chain of reasoning
have two different foundations; i.e., there are two possi- can be accidentally true even though the premises were
bilities of coincidence. First, what a real thing is in reality false. This does not prevent the way from being an erro-
founds what it seems to be; and second, what it seems to neous one, of course. This path is an error, but with re-
be founds what the real thing is in reality. In both cases— spect to what? With respect to the path which leads to an
and I repeat this over and over because it is essential— actuality in coincidence in which appearance is bounded
there is coinciding actuality. But the quality of this in real being. To follow the contrary path—it is in this
intellective coincidence is in the two cases essentially that error consists. Every error, and therefore all error, is
different. {289} In the first, we say that affirmative a constitutive deviation, deviation from the path [via] of
intellection, in its actuality in coincidence, has that quality truth. In error there can also be actuality in coincidence—
which we call truth. In the second case, there is also this must be emphasized—but it is an actuality in a devi-
actuality in coincidence, but its quality is what we call ate path. Therefore this actuality has in its very actuali-
 SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH 205

zation its own character, viz. falsehood. Falsehood is ac- of logic but of the philosophy of intelligence. And from
tuality in coincidence along a deviate path. Even when this point of view the question changes its aspect. And
accidentally its content turns out to be truthful, nonethe- this is what dispels the confusion surrounding the concept
less this presumed truth would be a falsehood with respect of truth to which I earlier alluded.
to its intellective quality. Falsehood consists formally only
In fact, as possibilities truth and error in affirmation
in being a characteristic of actuality. It is a false actuality
are co-possible just because they are paths of actuality in
insofar as it is actuality. It is truly actuality but a not true
coincidence grounded in real truth. This does not mean
actuality. The path of error is the path of a falsified actu-
that truth and error can apply to an affirmation indis-
ality; it is the falsification which consists in taking my
criminately, because error is always deviation. Hence er-
appearance (in its being appearance) as reality. Only de-
ror is not just an absence of truth; if it were—and in fact it
rivatively {291} can one speak of falsity in what is af-
has been assumed to be in most of modern philosophy—
firmed. What is radical and primary is falsehood in the
truth would be just the absence of error. It would be as if
affirmation itself. Falsehood, I claim, is actuality in de-
would say that having sight is the absence of blindness.
viation, in error. Error is a dynamic and directional char-
And this is not true because error, falsehood, is “devia-
acteristic of affirmation itself prior to being a characteris-
tion”; therefore it is not an absence but a privation of
tic of what is affirmed.
truth. Only with respect to dual truth is error possible.
Truth and error—here we have the two valences of Both are co-possible, but this copossibility does not mean
coincidence in the order of truth. This statement may equality; rather it means the copossibility of effective pos-
come across as confused because in it the word ‘truth’ and session and privation. Therefore the Hegelian idea that
the concept of truth appear twice: truth as valence opposed error is finite truth is unacceptable. Error certainly can be
to error, and truth as that in the order of which valence is given in finitude, but the fact is that dual truth also can
constituted. But there is no such confusion; we shall see only be given in finitude. Dual truth is not less finite than
this forthwith. Before though let us speak of truth and error because both are grounded in the dual stepping back
error as valences. Truth is the coincidence between from reality primordially apprehended as compact. But
seeming and reality when it is reality which determines error is finite also by virtue of being privation. {293} Er-
seeming, and error in the opposite case. ror is then doubly finite: by being, like truth, grounded in
a stepping back based upon real truth, and also because
In contemporary philosophy there has been an effort this basis or foundation is privational. Truth is in some
to introduce other valences besides truth and error; there form (as we shall see) prior to error.
might be in fact an infinite number of them. Classical
logic has always been bivalent (truth and error), but in the If we consider the presumed third valence, indeter-
logics to which I allude there would be a polyvalence in mination or uncertainty, we find ourselves again with a
the order of truth which is different from these two; this is priority of truth with respect to it. Because with respect to
polyvalent logic. I shall allude only to a trivalent logic what would a given affirmation be uncertain or indeter-
because of its special importance. Besides the valences of minate? Clearly it is an uncertainty in the order of truth.
truth and error, an affirmation can have a third valence, Without being in some way in the truth, there is no un-
uncertainty or indeterminism. This does not refer to my certainty or indetermination. Truth is, as in the case of
not knowing what is real in a determinate way, but to error, prior in some form to uncertainty or indetermina-
whether an affirmation about the real is, in the order of tion. And this is essential in any philosophy of intelli-
truth, something formally uncertain or indeterminate. We gence.
shall return to the example I explained when speaking of
And this makes plain to us the confusion in the con-
the “meaning” of affirmation. We saw that in virtue of
cept of truth to which I have alluded on several occasions.
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle the statement that an
Valence is, let us reiterate, the quality of coincidence in
electron which is precisely localized in space has a precise
the order of truth. What is this order of truth? Here
momentum would be one which makes no sense physi-
“truth” is coincidence between seeming and being, prior
cally. Now, in trivalent logic {292} we are not dealing
to which this coincidence is grounded in one or the other
with the fact that such a statement has no meaning, be-
of the two terms. This coincidence is constituted in the
cause it does. The fact is that it would be a statement
medium of intellection through stepping back, that is, in
which is neither true nor false, but indeterminate in the
the field. The field is a real moment. Now, the real truth
order of truth. Thus we have three valences: truth, error,
of the field is truth as ambit, as ambit of coincidence. It is
uncertainty or indetermination.
the mediated truth of every affirmation. The valence of
I am not going to delve into this problem; it is a every affirmation is the quality of this affirmation in the
topic of the logic of physics. Here I am not doing a study order of truth as ambit: truth as coincidence is the foun-
206 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

dation of valence. Error is also grounded in this truth as insofar as it is that toward which an affirmation moves.
ambit; error is not truthful affirmation, but is truly af- But now it is necessary to consider the real itself precisely
firmation. The valence of every affirmation is so in the and formally “qua affirmed”. In our problem, what is
order of truth as ambit; mediated truth is the foundation of affirmed does not float on its own, but is real though only
truth itself as valence. There is then {294} a difference “qua affirmed”. In this sense we can say that what is af-
between truth as ambit and truth as valence. As valence it firmed qua affirmed is the precipitate of the real in af-
is opposed to error, but as ambit it is the mediated foun- firmation. This precipitate is the valence truth-error.
dation of truth and of error insofar as they are valences. Truth and error as formal structure of what is affirmed
Thus a true judgement is doubly true: it is truly a judge- qua affirmed are the precipitate of the real along the path
ment and also it is a true judgement. A true judgement of truth or of error. That is what I indicated earlier when I
involves truth as ambit and as valence. said that truth and error as moments of the real qua af-
It is in this truth as ambit where every valence is firmed are structures which are only derivative with re-
constituted, not just the valence of truth. Affirmation has, spect to the paths of truth and error. Therefore truth and
in the order of mediated truth as ambit, different valences. error as structural moments, as formal moments of what is
The parity is clearly a valence apprehended in the ambit affirmed qua affirmed, also have a formally dynamic
of mediated truth. Only because we move intellectively in structure.
mediated truth can we affirm with parity or with disparity. In virtue of this, dual truth and error are of a for-
There could not be parity except as modality of truth as mally dynamic nature in three respects:
ambit. The same should be said of meaning: we appre-
hend it in mediated truth. Finally, the valence “truth” is 1. Because they are characteristics or moments of an
apprehended in mediated truth. It is in the light of truth {296} act of affirmation, which is an intellective move-
modally known intellectively that we intellectively know ment which takes place in a medium.
the light of each of the three valences: parity, meaning, 2. Because the affirmation is affirmation along some
and truth, and of all their respective polyvalences. direction, along a path of coincidence of seeming and real
being: the path of truth or of error of what is affirmed.
* * *
3. Because what is affirmed “qua affirmed” has a
formal dynamic structure according to which what is af-
With this we have seen the dynamic directional firmed is truth or error as dynamic precipitate.
structure of affirmation in its different valences. Each of
What is this formal dynamic structure of truth and
them is a quality of a movement in which we go from
error? That is the problem.
something simply apprehended toward a real thing about
which we seek to intellectively know what it might be in To judge, I have indicated, is to intellectively know
reality. Now this movement “from-toward” takes place in at a distance what a thing, already apprehended as real, is
the medium, but is a movement having different phases. in reality. Insofar as it is distanced, i.e, through stepping
In each of them the actuality in coincidence is not only back, this affirmative intellection is directed toward the
mediated and characterized by valence, but also has its real thing from a simple apprehension. To judge is ulti-
own formal character: the dynamic structure of affirma- mately the intellection of the actuality of the realization of
tion. This is what we must now examine. {295} a simple apprehension in the thing about which one is
3) Formal dynamic structure of mediated coinci- judging.
dence. Let us repeat some ideas. Affirmation is an intel- What is this realization? Naturally we are not deal-
lection at a distance which is going to the real in the me- ing with a physical realization in the sense of a real proc-
dium of and by the mediation of reality itself. This ess of notes, but of a realization along the lines of intel-
movement has a precise direction, viz. the direction to- lective actuality; it is the affirmation of realization as a
ward the real as actualized in a coincidence. The actuality moment of actuality. This realization is then known intel-
in coincidence of the real in a determinate direction is lectively and formally as dynamic. A real thing, qua in-
appearance. Therefore judgement is the formal organ of tellectively known, is intellectively known as “realizing”
the appearance of the real. Coincidence is thus the actu- therein a simple apprehension. This gerund expresses the
ality of the real in appearance, regardless of the determi- dynamic moment of what is affirmed qua affirmed, viz.
nant of this coincidence. Judgement is thus of a direc- the actuality of what is intellectively known is realizing
tional dynamic nature. actuality along the lines of actuality as such.
But this does not suffice, because in that intellective This dynamic respectivity has a very precise dynamic
movement we have considered the real up to now only character. Affirmative intellection is a movement in dif-
 SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH 207

ferent phases; it is a phased dynamism, because the two thing is in reality; it is the happening of the actuality in
moments of intellection through stepping back are a re- coincidence that this paper is really white. The “is” ex-
traction with respect to what a real thing is in reality, and presses the actuality as a happening. To be sure, I do not
an affirmative intention of what it is. And these two mo- here take the verb ‘to happen’ as something completely
ments are {297} only phases of a single movement, the distinct from ‘fact’ (this distinction is the subject of an-
movement of intellection at a distance. It is therein where other discussion, that of the difference between happening
the intellective actuality of what a thing is in reality hap- and fact). ‘To happen’ expresses the dynamic character of
pens. As I have said, we are not dealing just with the fact every realization as actualization. Truth is given in the
that there are two phases of a movement which “drives” to actuality in coincidence of the real in intellective move-
an affirmation, but that they are two phases of a move- ment. In this coincidence the real, upon being actualized,
ment in which the intellective actualization of what a gives its truth to intellection. This “giving of truth” is
thing is in reality “goes on happening”. Hence this actu- what I shall call ‘making true’ or ‘truthing’. Formally,
alization itself is of a phased character. The realization what is thereby constituted in actuality in coincidence is
which a judgement intentionally affirms is then phased. appearance. And dual truth consists in what the real is
In this actualization the coincidence between seeming and making true as appearance. Now, the making true is, in
real being happens, and likewise truth and error as struc- dual intellection, the happening of truth qua truth of what
tures of what is actualized also happen. Truth and error, is affirmed; and conversely, happening is the making true
then, are not just paths but are also as a consequence dy- of the real. This happening is, then, the happening of the
namic moments that are structurally phases of what is actuality of the real as appearance. {299}
affirmed qua affirmed.
Now, this happening is much more complex than
To clarify this thesis, we must understand this one might think, because it has its own different phases.
structure in three stages: a) In what, more precisely, does These phases are not just “aspects” which are intellec-
the character of the phases of dual truth consist? b) What tively known in accordance with the point of view one
is the nature of each of these phases? c) What is the unity adopts, but rather are constituent “phases” of the actuality
of these phases of dual truth? of what is affirmed as such; i.e., they are phases of the
dual truth itself. In fact, when affirming “this paper is
a) The character of the phases of truth. If I speak
white”, I do not make one affirmation but two, because
only of truth it is for two reasons. First, so that I do not
that affirmation consists in the intellection of the real re-
have to repeat monotonously the phrase “and error” when
alization of the white in this paper. And this involves two
referring to truth. And second, because error is a priva-
moments. One, that the quality by which this paper is
tion of truth; therefore the explication of what error itself
intellectively actualized to me is that quality which con-
is can only brought to fruition by explaining what truth is.
sists in “white”. The other, that this quality is realized in
In order to understand precisely the character of the this paper, and therefore is real in it. When affirming
phases of truth, let us take the most trivial of examples: “this paper is white”, I have uttered not one affirmation
“This paper is white”. The classical conceptualization of but two: the realization of the white, and the realization
truth is as a phase. For philosophy in general, the content that this paper is white. One might then think that in this
affirmed is “this white paper”, and as an affirmation it judgement there are not two affirmations but three, given
means that in this paper is found “the white” which is that besides saying that the quality is “white”, and that
affirmed in the predicate, {298} or that “the white” is in this quality is realized in the paper, I also say that this of
this paper. Now, all that is correct but is not sufficient, which I am judging is “paper”. True, but there are still
because we are not here speaking of the white paper. If we not three affirmations. First, because this does not happen
were speaking, in fact, only of the fact that the white is in in every judgement but only in propositional judgment
this paper, the usual interpretation would be correct. How- and predicative judgement; it does not happen in
ever, we are not dealing with this, but with the affirmative positional judgment. When I open the window and yell,
intellection that this paper is white. And then the ques- “Fire!”, I make two affirmations: that I see fire, and that I
tion does not concern the fact that physically this paper see it in the street or wherever. Moreover, even in the
“has” whiteness, but how it becomes true, i.e., how the positional or propositional judgements, the subject is not
intellective actuality of the whiteness in this paper comes affirmed but is purely and simply that of which one
to “happen”. Therefore the truth “isn’t here”, but is judges, and as such is not affirmed but presupposed and
something which constitutively “happens”. The white is only indicated. In every affirmation there are then two
had by this paper, but truth is not so had; rather it is the moments, and only two moments. These moments are in
intellective happening itself of the white in this paper. phases; they are the phases of the intellective realization
Truth happens in the intellective actuality of what a real of the predicate in the real thing, for example the realiza-
208 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

tion of the white in this paper. In fact, “the white” {300} its intellective actuality can be authentic. In the second
intellectively known in itself in retraction is only a simple place, this characteristic of the intellective actuality is
apprehension of what this paper or some other thing constitutively and essentially respective. The actuality of
“might be”. Intellectively knowing that this “might be” is the wine can only be authentic if its actuality corresponds
now real is an affirmation; intellectively knowing that this to the simple apprehension of the wine, or stated more
reality is established as real in this piece of paper is an- crudely, to the idea which we have of wine. Without this
other affirmation. Only by virtue of the first affirmation is respectivity to simple apprehension, the intellective actu-
the second possible. There is then a rigorous ordering ality of the wine would not be authenticity; it would be a
which grounds these two moments in intellective move- quality apprehended as real in and by itself, for example
ment. The intellective movement and the truth actualized in the primordial apprehension of reality. In the third
in it structurally involve two “phases”. We are not dealing place, it is not necessary that this simple apprehension,
with two “aspects” but with two moments which are with respect to which I affirm that this wine is authenti-
strictly “phases” of what is affirmed qua affirmed. In this cally wine, be a “concept” of the wine. A few lines back I
two-phased movement is where the truth of an affirmation employed the common expression ‘idea’ just to leave open
happens. The affirmation then has two phases, each of the {302} character of the simple apprehension with re-
which is true for each phase. We shall see later what the spect to which this is wine. It can be, certainly, a concept;
unity of these phases is. Now we must clarify each of the liquid which realizes the concept of wine will be
these phases in and by itself. authentic. But this is not necessary; simple apprehension
can be not a strict concept but a fictional item or even a
b) The phases of truth. The phases of dual truth, i.e.
percept. Thus one can speak rigorously of an authentic or
of the coinciding unity, are of intrinsically different char-
non-authentic character in a literary work. One might
acter. Dual truth, as I said, happens in the actuality in
even speak of authenticity with respect to a percept when
coincidence of the real in the intelligence. Actuality in
one understands that this percept presents reality to us
coincidence means not the coincidence of two actualities,
completely and without distortion. That wine—and only
but an actuality which is strictly “one” in coincidence.
that wine—will be authentic which realizes fixed charac-
This actuality consists, on the one hand, in being so along
teristics which my simple apprehension of the wine intel-
a fixed direction, in accordance with a fixed simple ap-
lectively knows.
prehension; here actuality in coincidence is “seeming”.
But this same actuality is, on the other hand, intellective Classical philosophy grazed—no more than
actuality of the real as real; it is what we call being “in grazed—this entire problem when it referred created
reality”. The coinciding unity of seeming and of being things to God, to the Divine Intelligence. For this phi-
real in the field is that in which truth, in phases, happens, losophy, the respectivity to the intelligence of the creator
and there are two phases. is what comprises what is called ‘metaphysical truth’. But
The first phase of this happening consists in that this is wrong on three counts. First, because every truth is
which is affirmed of a subject being in itself what {301} metaphysical. What classical philosophy calls metaphysi-
realizes in it a fixed simple apprehension, for example cal truth should have been called “theological truth”. In
“white”. White is a simple apprehension; its actuality in the second place, this is not authenticity, because every
this role, independently of what the role might be, is the created reality is conformable to the Divine Intelligence,
realization of this simple apprehension. Therefore when I including that reality which is non-authentic wine. For
affirm that this paper is white, the white itself is really God there is no authenticity; authenticity is not theologi-
actual, corresponding to the simple apprehension of the cal truth but human intellective truth. And in the third
white. Here there is an actuality in coincidence which place, this truth does not refer to the naked reality of
consists in the actual corresponding to my simple appre- things but only to their intellective actuality; it is not a
hension. And when this coincidence of the actual real characteristic of naked reality but of the actuality of the
with my simple apprehension conforms to it, the coinci- real. It is just on account of this that I call it authenticity.
dence comprises authenticity. This is the first phase of Only in a human intelligence can authenticity happen.
truth. And as such, authenticity is “truth” in a certain And even so, it does not necessarily happen there. The
phase. Authenticity is the actuality in coincidence as wine in question may not be authentic but false. That is,
conformity of the real with my simple apprehension. truth as authenticity can happen {303} in the actuality in
This requires some clarification. To accomplish this coincidence of what I call “wine”, but it may also not
let us change examples and say, “This liquid is wine”. happen. The privation of actuality is falsity; we could be
The authenticity of the “wine” is above all a characteris- dealing with false wine. This obliges us to state with
tic, not of the wine as reality, but of its intellective actual- greater rigor what authenticity is as truth, and what the
ity. The liquid as real is what it is and nothing more; only false is as error.
 SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH 209

We say of something that it is authentic wine when, different stripe. In both phases there is a conformity of
in its intellective actuality, it realizes all the characteristics intellection and reality. But in authenticity one deals with
bundled in the simple apprehension of wine, in the “idea” a conformity of a real thing with the simple apprehension
of the wine. The actuality in coincidence is then a con- by which we intellectively know the thing. On the other
formity of what is actualized with its simple apprehension. hand, in affirmation (this paper is white, this liquid is
And in this consists formally that mode of truth which is wine) what formally is known intellectively is the confor-
authenticity. In authenticity there is a “seeming”, but it is mity of affirmative intellection with a real thing. They
a seeming grounded in the reality of what is actualized; are, then, two conformities of different stripe. In authen-
this seems to be wine and it is so; it seems to be wine be- ticity one deals with a realization in what is intellectively
cause it is. It is in this coincidence of seeming and of real known measured by the intellection itself; on account of
being, grounded in actual reality, that the “conformity” of this, what is authentic is the wine or the white. On the
wine with its simple apprehension consists. It is in this other hand, if I affirm that {305} this liquid is wine or
that authenticity consists. It is not simple actuality in co- that this paper is white, I am dealing with a realization
incidence but an actuality in coincidence which consists in measured not by intellection but by the real itself. It is
conformity. affirmative judgement which is conformable with reality.
But something different can occur, because there is In authenticity it is the wine or the white which is meas-
the possibility that we might take as wine something ured by the idea of the wine or the white, i.e., the real in
which only seems to be so. And because in this seeming its “seeming” is measured by the idea; whereas in af-
as such I can consider only some characteristics of simple firmative intellection the “seeming” is supposed to be
apprehension which are determinant of seeming, it may measured by reality. In order not to generate neologisms,
occur that the actuality of the real is not just seeming, but I shall call affirmations of the type, “This paper is white,”
“seeming” only. To take as wine what is only so in ap- or “This liquid is wine,” affirmative intention or judge-
pearance is exactly what constitutes the falsum of the ment. To be sure, authenticity is also affirmation, judge-
wine. Correctly understood—and I must emphasize ment. But as there is no expression which is the homo-
this—it is a falsum only along the lines of respective actu- logue of authenticity, for the time being I shall refer to this
ality. This which we call wine is not, in its naked reality, the second type of conformity as conformity of affirmative
either true or false. Only the false is the opposite of the intention or conformity of judgement. I shall forthwith
authentic. The authentic is what is conformable with return to put things in strict order. This conformity of
{304} what seems to be in the actuality of the real; the affirmative intention, this conformity of judgement with
false is what only has the appearance of conformity and the real, is what is called truth in contrast to authenticity.
does not in fact have conformity with respect to simple I insist that authenticity is also truth, but we shall now
apprehension. It is not just a lack, but a privation of hold to the common use of language.
authenticity. This requires some further clarification. In the first
Here, then, truth is authenticity and error is false- place, What is that real thing with which truth is con-
hood. I have given the example of wine. Now it should formable? Certainly it is the real itself; there is not the
be clear that the same must be said of any predicate what- slightest doubt. But equally certain is the fact that it is not
ever, for example, of “white”. If white were not authenti- the real in its naked reality, so to speak, but the real actu-
cally white, my judgement (that this paper is white) would alized in coincidence in intellection. We are not dealing,
be erroneous by virtue of the inauthenticity or falsity of then, with a conformity between an intellection “of mine”
the predicate. and a thing which “on its own account” wanders through
the cosmos. That would be to give rise to a “material”
However, this is but a phase of the truth of my af- coincidence, one which is extremely random. Rather, the
firmation. Although it is necessary that white be authenti- conformity with which we are here occupying ourselves is
cally white, it is also necessary that this authentic white, a constitutive and formal coincidence. Now, a thing in its
that this authentic wine, be that which authentically is naked reality is foreign to this intellective coincidence;
realized “in” this paper or “in” this liquid. For that, con- {306} and the same is true of intellection itself. Coinci-
formity of the predicate with simple apprehension is not dence is not given formally other than in the intellective
enough. actuality of the real. And this actuality not only is not
Second phase. In it we intellectively know, as I just foreign to the real, but includes it. Intellective actuality is
said, that a real thing (this liquid, this paper) is authenti- of no importance to the real, but intellective actuality for-
cally what we apprehend the predicate to be (authentic mally includes the real. It is for this reason that there can
white, authentic wine). Here the coincidence is, as in the be a conformity with the real.
case of authenticity, a “conformity”, but a conformity of a In the second place, With what conformity are we
210 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

dealing? It is not a conformity such as the coincidence of site to authenticity, the error judges seeming according to
physical notes or properties. The intelligence has no note “appearances”. On the other hand, as opposed to the truth
in common with white paper or with this specimen of of judgement, error is a lack of conformity, or rather a
wine. As physical notes, the two things, intelligence and “deformity”. Appearance and deformation are both pri-
reality in actuality, are formally irreducible. We are deal- vations. They do not rest upon themselves but upon the
ing with a conformity of a kind which is merely inten- presumed truth of authenticity and conformity. In truth,
tional; that which intellection knows intellectively in its whether of authenticity or conformity, seeming {308} is
affirmative intention it knows as realized in the real actu- grounded in the real; in error of appearance and deform-
alized thing. This is a conformity between what is actu- ity, the real is grounded in mere seeming. Correctly un-
alized as actualized and the very actuality of the real. But derstood, this refers to intentional foundations. But
it is still necessary to correctly understand this realization, seeming is always and only an seeming of the real. And it
because we are not dealing with the case of affirming, is precisely on account of this that there can be error.
“This paper is white” and that in fact the paper is white. Therefore, to take seeming as real in and by itself is to
Rather we are dealing with something more, the fact that falsify the seeming at its root, to deprive it of what con-
formally and expressly what I affirm is the realization stitutes its raison d’etre as seeming of the real. Now,
itself. If we were dealing with only the former, truth as judgement is the formal organ of seeming. Therefore the
conformity would be merely the conformity of a statement falsification of seeming is eo ipso a falsity of judgement; it
and a real thing (even though just actualized). But in the is error, a privation. This also requires more detailed con-
latter case, we are not dealing with the conformity of a sideration.
statement but with the conformity of the affirmation itself
Above all, truth and error are not forms of objectivity
as affirming a realization, with the realization itself as
but forms of reality.
actualized in that affirmation.
Affirmative intentionality is not objective, but is
Every judgement, then, affirms the realization of the
much more than objective, because it falls back upon real-
predicate in the thing which is judged. This realization is
ity itself. Ultimately, an objective error doesn’t cease to be
in the first place a realization along the lines of actuality.
an error because it is objective, and it is always called to
And in the second place, {307} it is a formally affirmed
be rectified at the proper time not in its objectivity but in
realization, the affirmation of a realization. When the
the reality of what is affirmed. But as truth and error are
realization affirmed as such is intentionally conformable
forms of intellection, they inevitably pose two questions.
with the realization of the real in its actuality, then and
First, How can we intellectively examine what truth and
only then is there truth in the sense of truth of a judge-
error of intellection are? Andnd second, On what can we
ment.
base ourselves to discern the error of truth?
Anticipating some ideas which belong to Part Three
First, let us consider the possibility of examining if
of this study, I may say that this intentional conformity
something is true or erroneous. If it were a question of
can have different modalities. One is the conformity as
examining what I affirm of “external” reality, so to speak,
something which in fact is given. That is what I just ex-
with an affirmation of mine, I should be trapped in a cir-
plained. But it can happen that that conformity is some-
cle from which there is no escape. And this is because
thing more than what is just “given”; it can be that it is
such an examination would examine a judgement about
something which has been intellectively “sought”. In this
another judgement, which would not further us in any way
case the conformity is not just conformity but fulfillment,
with respect to truth or error, because these two are what
conformable to what has been sought and how it has been
they are not as conformity of some judgements with oth-
sought. Truth is not only authenticity and judgmental
ers, but as conformity of a judgement with the real. If the
conformity; it is also conformity with fulfillment. It is a
real were not in a {309} judgement there would be no
different type of truth, truth as fulfillment, the third phase
possibility of speaking of truth and error. But the fact is
of truth. But let us leave aside this essential problem for
that the reality which judgement affirms is, as we have
now, and limit ourselves to the first two phases.
seen, not a naked reality but a reality which is intellec-
When there is this intentional conformity of judge- tively actualized. Now, this intellective actuality has two
ment with the actualized real, we say that the judgement moments. One, which I have already mentioned, is the
is truthful. Truth is a conformity of seeming with a real real “being here-and-now” [estar] from itself by the mere
thing. When there is a lack of conformity, the judgment is fact of being real. But this intellective actuality—let us
erroneous; this is lack of conformity between seeming and not forget—has another decisive moment. I have already
real being. That form of error is quite different than the indicated it in the Part I of the book. It is that being real
form of error which is opposite to authenticity. As oppo- in intellection consists in a real thing being present to us
 SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH 211

as being de suyo what is presented; this is the moment tal actuality of the prius as such.
which I called the moment of prius, which is formally Since this demand is precisely evidence, it follows
constitutive of all intellection as such from its first, radical that in the coinciding actuality of the prius as such {311}
intellective act, the impression of reality. This moment is the intrinsic unity of evidence and truth is constituted. It
what “in the intellection” submerges it in reality. We shall is a dynamic unity, because this unity is a unitary founda-
see forthwith what this prius or prior thing concretely is in tion, but one which is only of a principle. The intellective
affirmative intellection. But for now let us note that the unfolding of this unity is therefore somewhat problemati-
actuality which a judgement intellectively knows in coin- cal; it comprises the whole problem of intellectual work,
ciding is the actuality of the real in its two moments of as we shall see in Part Three. This unity does not rest
being here-and-now present and of prius. Now, the actu- upon the unity of some first judgements which are self-
alized “real” and the “intellective” actualization of the evident with a first “immediate” truth in them. This,
real are the same actuality. Seeming and being real are which has been so monotonously repeated in philosophy
given in the same intellective actuality. Hence the possi- during the course of the last several centuries, is in reality
bility of comparing not just one judgement with another, once again to denaturalize the unity of evidence and truth.
but of comparing a judgement with the real. This is but We are not dealing with a unity of judgements among
the possibility of comparing seeming and being real in the themselves or of their constituent parts among themselves,
same coinciding actuality. but of the unity of every judgement as such with the real
But this does not go beyond being a possibility. Let as such actualized in accordance with a coinciding prius
us then ask ourselves in the second place in what does the in a single actuality. The so-called first judgements re-
foundation consist upon which this possible discernment ceive their truth from the same thing where all others re-
between seeming and being rests? It is a discernment ceive it, viz. the coincidental actuality of the prius, from
which ultimately is between truth and error. To be sure it the priority of the real with respect to seeming in a single
is a moment of actuality itself. But in an actuality, as I intellective actuality. To be sure, this does not mean that
just said, the real is there {310} like a prius with respect that unity of evidence and of truth does not have different
to that actuality itself. Therefore in the “coinciding” actu- modalities. But as I see it, that modalization of evident
ality the real is present precisely in that very moment of truth has nothing to do with what, traditionally, has been
prius. Now, the actuality in coincidence of the real is a understood by types of truth. Let us briefly examine the
coincidence between seeming and being real in the same matter.
actuality. Insofar as this actuality is coinciding actuality of Traditionally, the types of truth have usually been
the prius as such, the actual in this actuality has that for- conceptualized as a function of the connection of the
mal moment of being remitted in coincidence from the predicate with the subject. There are, we are told, truths
seeming to what is real in that actuality. Now, this mo- which are immediately evident, those in which the predi-
ment of remission, this moment of coincidental actuality cate pertains to the subject with an evidence which is
in which the prius consists, is just what formally consti- grounded in simple inspection by the mind, simplex men-
tutes that which, a few pages back, I called demand. De- tis inspectio. In the other cases one deals with truths of
mand is, precisely and formally, the coinciding actuality mediated evidence, where the connection of the predicate
of the prius as such; it is coinciding actuality of the de with the subject is grounded in a third, different term.
suyo as suyo; it is the coinciding prius of the suyo. It is in This third term could be rational unity; {312} and evident
this that, intellectively, demand consists. In virtue of this, mediated truth is then what is usually called a truth of
demand appearing formally and expressly, leads to the reason. There are cases in which the third term is not rea-
real which “seems” in it. There is a seeming and a being son but experience; these are the truths of fact or matters
real in the same actuality. And in it the real is being a of fact. But I think that this whole conceptualization is
prius of the seeming. This formal nature of the demand of completely wrong, because while it is true that every
the real with respect to seeming, this prius of the real with judgement has a predicate and what may be termed a
respect to seeming in the same intellective actuality is subject, not every judgement is a “connection” of these
what not only permits but inexorably compels examina- two. But even leaving this serious problem aside, the con-
tion of the foundation of the coinciding of seeming and of ceptualization which is proposed is still unacceptable.
being real. This does not refer to the fact that the seeming
leads by itself to the real as something beyond the seeming Beginning with the last point, the division of medi-
itself; rather, it refers to the fact that seeming leads to the ated truths into two types (truths of reason and truths of
real as something real which is now actualized in the fact) is inadequate. Their difference is supposed to be
same actuality as the seeming. Here we have the founda- grounded in the necessity of the mediated connection of
tion of the discernibility of error and truth: the coinciden- the predicate and the subject. Furthermore, these two
212 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

terms and their connection are conceptualized as moments necessary to intellectively know that this paper is white as
of reality. It is reality itself which is either necessary or to intellectively know that every effect has a cause, or that
merely matter-of-fact. But to me, this difference is not every fact has to be given in a cosmos and every event in a
adequate, even along the lines of the moments of reality. history. The difference between these three types, then, is
There are truths which are not of reason but which nev- not a difference of truth but of reality. And therefore to
ertheless are more than truths of fact. For example, if one appeal to it is, with respect to the problem at hand, simply
says that the necessity for every effect to have a cause is a to step outside the question, because what we are here
truth of reason (we won’t discuss the propriety of this ex- seeking is a difference of truths qua truths. The truth of
ample; it is just one which is commonly adduced), then it fact is as truth just as necessary as the truth of reason qua
will be a truth of fact, for example, that this paper is truth. Nonetheless, there are different types of truth qua
white. Nonetheless I think that there are truths which are truth.
not necessarily of reason (let us call them truths of abso- And from this very point of view, the conception
lute necessity), and which are still more than truths of fact which we are criticizing has even more serious effects. In
because they are truths which deal with that structural the first place, it speaks to us of truths of immediate evi-
moment of the real by which it is necessary that the real dence and mediated evidence. But this difference is unac-
have notes of fact. Thus, for example, we have the prop- ceptable. Usually one understands by “immediate evi-
erties of the cosmos and the properties of history. The dence” that whose truth is grounded in the simple inspec-
cosmos and history are not absolute necessities of the real, tion of the predicate and the subject. But this is not the
{313} but nonetheless are more than just facts; they are case. From the moment that intellection is a stepping
that in which every factual reality is a fact. Every fact is back, its presumed connection is essentially and constitu-
necessarily produced in the cosmos and in history. The tively a connection which is given in a medium of intel-
cosmos and history are thus like the necessary fact of all lection. The presumed simple inspection, however simple
facts. Therefore, if I call the truths of fact factical truths, it may be, is always inspection in a medium, the medium
I may term these other truths—in order to give them some of reality itself. The fact that there is no intermediary
name—factual truths. The proper constitutive essence of does not mean that the connection is not evident in a me-
every reality is a factual moment of it. Therefore, from dium. The immediateness refers to the lack of a third
this point of view there are not just two types of truths, but term which establishes the connection; but there is a me-
three. There are truths of reason (I retain the name, dium and a mediation in which this connection is estab-
though it is inadequate); they are necessary truths of the lished. Having confused immediateness with immediacy
real qua real, which does not in any sense mean that this is a cardinal error.
necessity is a priori, nor strictly speaking absolute either.
There are factical truths; they are truths of fact. I include But in the second place, the usual conceptualization
among them every factical reality, with its laws; the laws understands {315} that evident truth consists in a mode of
are necessities “in” the factical. But there are factual connection, wherein the content of the predicate is linked
truths which concern the necessity that in the real there be to the content of the subject. But in fact, nothing could be
facticity. They are therefore truths which are prior to further from the truth, because affirmation as such, as we
every factical truth. I just said that the factical comprises have seen, does not fall back upon these two contents and
laws. But these laws are, as I said, necessities “in” the their connection, but upon the reality of the content of the
factical. On the other hand, the necessity “of” the factical subject and the realization in it of the content of the predi-
is prior to every fact and to every law; it is just the factual, cate. Therefore evident truth is not a conformity between
the necessity of the factical. The truths about the cosmos two objective representations, but something essentially
and history as such pertain to this type of truth. different, viz. the intentional conformity of my affirmation
with the realization of the real. The constitutive prius of
But with all of the foregoing, the difference between
evidential demand is the prius of the real with respect to
these three types of truths (truths of reason, factual truths,
its coincidental actuality as real. That is, those instances
factical truths) as truths is completely wrong if we deal
of presumed immediate evidence are not immediate nor
with them formally as truths. And the reason is that this
even evidences (they lack the moment of demand), which
difference does not concern truth, but only the reality
once again leaves the problem of the different types of
which is truthful. Now, truth is formally a moment, not of
evident truth qua truth as posed but not answered.
naked reality, but of the intellective actuality of the real.
And as such, truth has an evidence {314} which is always In the intellective actuality of the real, it is the real
necessary. It may be that this paper is white only in fact, itself which “gives truth”, which makes truth or
and that it might not be so. But supposing that I have this “truthifies”. Now, the real has different modes of making
white paper in my apprehension, it is just as evident and truth, and these different modes are just the different types
 SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH 213

of truth qua truth. The forms of reality (of reason, factual, this movement the real thing already apprehended in pri-
factical) are truths which differ according to their different mordial apprehension acquires a second actuality, viz.
form of coinciding actualization as such. There is a mode coinciding actuality. It is an actuality which happens in a
by which the real gives authenticity to what is affirmed in movement. In this coinciding actuality the real acquires
affirmation. In virtue of that I would say that the real the character of seeming. As this movement is given
makes truth as authentification. There is another mode within the primordial apprehension of reality, i.e., within
according to which the real itself is what, so to speak, the radical intellective actuality of the real in and by itself,
dictates to us what we must affirm of it. Let us recall the it follows that seeming and being real, forged in the coin-
as early as Heraclitus the logos was something which the cident actuality, are given in the same actuality of the real
sophos, the wise man, had to “listen to”. In this regard it already apprehended as such. Actuality in coincidence, as
has for many, many years been the custom to interpret coincidence of seeming grounded in real being, is dual
Heraclitus’ logos as the voice of things. Affirmation is a truth. Therefore dual truth is something which “is not
“verdict”, just what the word ‘judgement’ expresses. present” in a statement but which “happens” in an af-
There is no word which is adequate {316} to express what firmative coincidental movement, because it is there that
I call “speaking [dictar] the truth”. If, for the sake of the coincidental actualization of the real happens. Hence
symmetry, and without any motive of employing the word it is that dual truth “happens”. The predicative verb “is”,
outside of this context, I may be permitted to coin a new when it exists, expresses the happening not of the real as
word, it should be the verb “to veridict”, to mean that the such (that is a different problem), but the happening of the
real has that mode of making truth in the judgement real actualized in coincidental actuality. There, then,
which I call veridictant. Finally, in truth as fulfillment— seeming and being real coincide. And the possibility of
and I shall deal with it at length in Part Three—the real intellectively knowing this unity is the moment of the
verifies the search for truth. The real then has that mode prius of every intellective actuality. In coincidental actu-
of making truth which is verification. In summary, ality this prius acquires that formal character which is
authentication, veridictance, and verification are the demand. Demand, as I said, is coincidental actuality of
three types of truth qua truth, i.e., the three modes by the prius as such.
which the real is a prius in coincidental actuality.
This actuality, and therefore this truth, is formally
Prescinding for the time being from the third mode, dynamic. They happen—let us repeat—in a movement
we may say that authenticity and what I have called con- which begins when we step back within a real thing in
formity (which is veridictance) are two phases of truth, order to {318} know intellectively by retraction what it
two forms of making truth. And for this very reason they “might be” in reality, and then return intentionally to what
are phases of a single movement in which, dynamically, it “is”. In this return, what the real is in reality is actual-
the truth is formally constituted on an on-going basis. ized as seeming. And its coincidence with the real al-
Therefore after having summarily examined each one of ready apprehended as such is the formal character of coin-
the phases in and by itself, it is necessary to confront the cidental actuality, and therefore of the dual intellection of
question of their unity; this is the problem of the unity of what the thing is in reality; the coincidence between
the phases of dual truth. seeming and being real is grounded on this. Such is the
structurally dynamic character of dual truth.
c) Unity of the phases of dual truth. Let us return to
repeat some ideas. Every intellection is just intellective The happening of this coinciding actuality has an es-
actuality of the real. When this actuality is the actuality of sential character, and that is the “conformity” between
something real in and by itself, the intellection is primor- what is intellectively known and the real. And this con-
dial apprehension of the real. As such that intellection formity is a dynamic conformation of the intellection, for
has its real truth. When a thing is intellectively known the same reason that the coincidental actuality of the real
which has already been apprehended as real, but “among” is dynamic. This dynamism has, as we have seen, two
others, then the intellection is an intellection at a distance phases. Above all, it is a conformity of what the real is in
through stepping back; it is affirmative intellection or reality with what, in simple apprehension, we have intel-
judgement. There one does not apprehend the real as real lectively known that it “might be”; it is conformity as
(that was already apprehended in the primordial appre- authenticity. But it has a second phase, which I shall pro-
hension of reality); rather, one intellectively knows what visionally term ‘affirmative conformity’. As noted, this
this real thing is {317} in reality. In that intellection we phrase is not strictly correct, because authenticity also is
do not leave aside the intellectively known actuality of affirmative conformity. What I am calling ‘affirmative
primordial apprehension; on the contrary, the intellection conformity’ we have already seen as veridictance
through stepping back takes place formally within this (“speaking the truth”). Veridictance is affirmative con-
apprehension, but with its own character, movement. In formity just as is authenticity. Therefore the unitary es-
214 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

sence of the two phases is in being conformity. In the mity with the paper. But this does not mean that the
actuality of conformity, the real is actualized according to whiteness of the paper consists in pure and perfect white-
the simple apprehension of what it might be; this is ness. There is conformity, but not adequation. In order
authenticity. It is the conformity of the real with respect for there to be adequation, it is necessary to say not just
to simple apprehension of what might be. In veridictance, “white” but “white in such-and-such degree”, specified
it is conformity of what is intellectively known with the with infinite precision. To say “white” without further
real. The two are both conformity, even if of different commentary does not adequately express the whiteness of
character. The first is the realization of a property in it- the paper. Conformity is not just adequation. The differ-
self; the second is realization of this property in the {319} ence between these two aspects of judgement is well
subject of the judgement. This is the dynamism of con- known. Although in philosophy it is commonly said that
formity of the phases: one goes from the authenticity of the difference exists, the problem of its origin has not been
the predicate to its realization in the already-real subject. posed, and this is especially true of the articulation of
It is in this passing that the happening of dual truth as these two moments.
conformity consists. In its two phases it in fact deals with b) Whence arises the difference between conformity
conformity. Therefore it is conformity itself which is es- and adequation? A little reflection on what I have just
sential and constitutively dynamic. Each moment of it is said will disclose that the difference does not stem from
one of its phases. Conversely, the formal dynamic unity of the connection between the content of the predicate and
authenticity and veridictance consists in being the hap- the content of the subject. On the contrary, it stems from
pening of conformity. Conformity is what happens in a the fact that the subject is the real thing about which one
movement of conformation. judges, and that the predicate is the realization of simple
This is not all, however. On the basis of only what apprehension in this real thing. Now, the real thing of
has been said, one might think that conformation is a which one judges has already been given in a primordial
movement, to be sure, but that the conformity itself, which apprehension of reality. Therefore the difference stems
the conformation conforms, is not. Nonetheless I say that from the nature of dual truth as such. The real thing, in
the conformity is intrinsically and formally dynamic. fact, is already there to be intellectively known with re-
How can this be, and why is it so? gard to what it is in reality. For this the intelligence takes
that retractive stepping back which is simple apprehen-
In order to understand this it is necessary to make an sion; these simple apprehensions {321} of every order are
essential distinction between two moments of dual truth: innumerable. Now from among them, oriented by the
conformity and adequacy. The promiscuity with which other things from which I start in the process of simple
these two words have traditionally been employed must apprehension, I select one by a free choice. Hence there is
not obscure the fundamental difference of what is desig- a double origin for inadequation.
nated by them; they are two very different moments of
truthful judgements. In what does this difference consist? Above all, the approximation to adequation is grad-
Hence does it arise? And above all, What is its intrinsic ual; the conformity can go on becoming itself more and
articulation? Here we have the three points which need to more adequate. But in addition to the gradual becoming,
be elucidated; that will be the clarification of the structur- there is a moment which it is much more important to me
ally dynamic character of dual truth. to emphasize in a systematic way. It is that the movement
of truth, let us not forget, has a directional character. And
a) In the first place, in what does the difference con- this means only that we intellectively know by going to-
sist? It is something well known. Conformity means that ward the real in a determinate direction; but it also means
that which is affirmed of a real thing in the judgement is something essentially new. In the direction toward the
realized in it. And that happens both in what I have real, in fact, the truths conformable with the real, but not
called ‘authenticity’ as well as in what I have called adequate to it, constitute in their own conformity not so
‘veridictance’ (speaking the truth). But to be sure, this much a representation of the thing as a focus toward ade-
does not mean that what is affirmed will be realized in a quation. This means not that reality is such as I affirm it
real thing {320} in such form that there is a total recovery to be, but that even if it is so, the conformity itself is like
between simple apprehension, whose realization is effec- the map of a road, whose truth consists in the fact that if I
tively given in the thing, and what this thing is in reality. follow the road completely I will have found the adequa-
Only if there were this recovery would there be a strict tion which I sought. Conformities are ultimately justified
“equation”; this is “ad-equacy”. Conformity would then focuses. Taking each focus of these conformities, it turns
be more than mere conformity, it would be adequation. out that they constitute an intentional scheme of adequate
Conformity is always given in dual truth, but not adequa- truth. Gradual becoming and directional focus are two
tion. If I say that this paper is white, I speak in confor- characteristics of the dynamic unity of dual truth.
 SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH 215

For these two reasons, which ultimately are one, tion there are, then, two intentions, or rather two different
simple apprehension and therefore the affirmation of its intentional phases. Therefore the “conformable” inten-
realization are not necessarily adequate to the real even if tions are but the system of phases in which the final in-
they are conformable to it. There is no “equation”; such is tention of the “toward” progressively becomes more ade-
the origin of the difference which we study. It is not ow- quate. This unity of the two intentional moments is, then,
ing to the connection between the {322} content of the formally and structurally dynamic: the conformity in the
predicate and the content of the subject but to the charac- intentional phase of the final intention that is adequate to
ter of an intellection that steps back from what the thing, the thing, which has been placed for the affirmative intel-
already real, is in reality. Only the difference between lection. Each phase of conformity is the inadequate coin-
primordial apprehension of reality and intellection in cidental actuality of seeming and of being real (the foun-
stepping back from what it is in reality, is the origin of the dation of seeming); therefore this coincidence is but an
difference between conformity and adequation. intentional moment toward the coincidental actuality
which is adequate to the real thing in its fullness, given in
c) With this we have taken a decisive step in our the primordial apprehension of reality. Here we have the
problem: we have struck upon the very point and mode in precise articulation between conformity and adequation.
which conformity and adequation are articulated. If phi-
losophy has not in the past made an issue of the origin of This articulation is, then, essentially dynamic. The
the difference of these two moments of truth, we should conformity is in itself the unity as phases of the two
not be surprised that it has not made an issue of the ar- phases themselves, the phase of authenticity and the phase
ticulation between them. The primordial apprehension of of veridictance; and this conformity is in turn a phase to-
reality actualizes the real to us as that which we are sup- ward adequation, which is formally the final terminus
posed to intellectively know in an intellective movement {324} of the intellective movement. Each conformity is a
that steps back. A real thing is “placed”, but placed direction toward adequation; such is the dynamic structure
“among” other realities in order to intellectively know by of dual truth qua truth. Heraclitus even told us (fragment
stepping back what it is in reality. This intellection is 93) that the Delphic Oracle does not declare or hide, but
therefore a movement which goes “from” other things indicates, signifies (semainei) what is going to happen.
“toward” what the real thing is in reality as terminus of This is the nature of dual truth, that each conformity
intellection. As terminus of the “toward”, the real thing is points toward the same adequation.
the “goal” of intellective movement. Now, in this move- The foregoing is proper to every dual truth. To say
ment the proper intentum of simple apprehension of real- that this paper is white is a conformity which gradually
ity remains, as we have seen, distended in intention. And points more and more to the white which is adequate to
in this distention the intention is not just an intentum, that of this paper. All judgements, as conformity, point
distended by stepping back, but is an intention in a pecu- towards a remote adequation, off in the distance. This
liar “toward”. The “toward” points to the real thing al- cannot be achieved by any intellective movement. The
ready placed. In this regard the formal terminus of the adequate color is given as such-and-such a color in the
“toward” is adequation. This is the radical structurally impression of reality of primordial apprehension; but it is
dynamic moment of dual truth, adequation as terminus of not there given to us as formally adequate. In order to
the direction of the intellection in the “toward”. But, how apprehend it adequately we need an intellective movement
does this intentional movement take place? It does so step which continues to make more and more precise the real
by step. And each of these steps is a terminus of a phase whiteness of the paper. When we move towards this goal
of the {323} intentional movement toward adequation. in an intellective movement, we continue actualizing mo-
Each phase is therefore also intentional. But the terminus ments of richness in conformity with what is the real
of this intention of phases isn’t the real thing “placed” by whiteness of the paper. But to reach the goal adequately
primordial apprehension, but what at each step we intel- in this dynamic intellection is a never-ending and there-
lectively know of the thing in conformity with it. We go fore unrealizable task. For the intellection in movement,
on intellectively knowing what the thing is in reality in the adequation will always be a far-off goal. Hence every
diverse simple apprehensions, each realized in the real truthful judgement, every dual truth, is structurally an
thing. But none is realized adequately. The fact that each approximation; it is the gradual approximation to the real,
of these is realized in the real thing is just what comprises an approximation each of whose moments is a conformity.
conformity. The intention of affirmative movement has Every dual truth is therefore intrinsically and structurally
thus unfolded into two intentional moments: the intention approximate within reality, approximate to what an ade-
directed toward the real thing placed by primordial appre- quate truth should be. This approximation is a movement
hension, and the intention conformable (in each of its which slides over the real as given in primordial appre-
phases) with what the thing is. In the affirmative inten- hension. {325} This is what makes it difficult to concep-
216 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

tualize that its dual actuality is formally dynamic. those which we have defined and postulated. And here
What is this approximation? The approximation is the difficulty arises, because these “things” are not what
always something gradual. But this does not mean that they are through being defined and postulated in an iso-
each degree of it is a type of falsity or deficiency. There lated way, each independent of the others; rather, it is by
are different types of approximation. In the example cited each of them being what it is within the definition and
of the white paper, clearly “white” is inadequate because it postulate which structures the whole group to which they
only more or less approximates the real color of the paper, belong. This is essential. No mathematical “entity” is
and this approximation consists in each degree being only what it is except within a complete defined and postulated
a type of degree of accuracy, i.e., each degree is in itself a group, and only in reference to it does the apprehension of
falsehood, a deficiency. But it is not necessary that things any one of the mathematical entities in question make
always be this way. Every inaccuracy is an approxima- sense. Each thing is but an “aspect” of this totality, an
tion, but not every approximation is an inaccuracy. And aspectual realization of what is defined and postulated.
this is essential in order to understand other types of The mathematical world {327} is not a juxtaposition of
judgements, for example those of mathematics and mathematical entities each defined and postulated by it-
mathematical truth. self; rather, each of those entities only is an entity within
the complete group and as a moment of it. Thus, each
I am not referring to the so-called “mathematics of figure is the figure from a space, etc.; each number be-
approximation”, but to the “mathematics of precision” as longs to a field of numbers, etc. Each mathematical
it were which yields properties which are strictly true of “thing” receives its reality only from this aspectual char-
mathematical reality: numbers, figures, etc. Are these acter. Now, if that group had no structural properties
true judgements approximations? Clearly they are not in other than those defined and postulated, every mathemati-
the sense of a degrees of inaccuracy. But there is an ap- cal judgement would be true in the sense of being just an
proximation of a different type than degree. What is it? aspect, and therefore everything defined and postulated
In perceptive realities that reality is “placed” into primor- would be adequately apprehended in each thing. But this
dial apprehension of reality as the terminus of a move- is not the case. Gödel’s theorem shows that the whole
ment which adequately recovers it. Indeed, reality and thus postulated and defined necessarily has properties
adequate truth are not the same thing because adequate which go beyond what was defined and postulated. This
truth is only reality as terminus of an intellective move- definition and these postulates in fact pose questions
ment which achieves and recovers reality which has al- which are not resolvable with them alone. And therefore
ready been primordially apprehended. With respect to these solutions are just the discovery of properties which
mathematical realities, these realities are something go beyond what was defined and postulated. Then the
“placed” by a double act: a “definition” of what that real- adequate intellection of each thing in this whole is left, at
ity is, and a “postulate” of its reality. Now, {326} each step, outside of what was defined and postulated,
mathematical intellection renders judgements of these properties which intellective movement does not achieve.
realities thus defined and postulated which are strictly These properties are not just “more” definitions and pos-
true. Are they approximations? In order to respond to tulates, but rather are necessary properties of the thing
this question we must agree on the terminus of that pre- and confer upon its reality a distinct structure in the com-
sumed approximation. That terminus is just what is de- plete whole. As each thing is not intelligible except as an
fined and postulated. The intellective movement here aspect of this whole, it follows that each thing is a mode
pronounces judgements which are strictly necessary and of reality, which is in some way distinct, on the basis of
therefore true. But that is not the question at hand, be- which it could be apprehended in a fully adequate move-
cause that strict necessity concerns only conformity. And ment. In virtue of that, each necessary conformity is an
our question is in knowing if these properties themselves, inexorable approximation to an adequation which goes
which are strictly conformable to the thing, adequately beyond the thing defined and postulated. There is no ap-
recover that to which they refer, for example a number or proximation of inaccuracy, but there is approximation of
a figure. For this it is necessary to know what that figure the aspects. Were mathematics no more than a {328}
or that number “is”. But the question already has a dis- system of theorems and demonstrations linked together
concerting air. What does this “is” mean here? Because logically, the difference between conformity and adequa-
apart from the fact that these “things” can be understood tion would be nothing but a conceptual subtlety. But
in different ways, and therefore “be” in a way which is not mathematics isn’t that; it is the intellection of mathemati-
univocal (a straight line can be understood either as the cal realities, endowed with their own structure. It is for
shortest path or as the line which has all of its points in this reason that, as I see it, Gödel’s theorem does not refer
the same direction, etc.), the strangeness of the question only to postulated “reality”, but shows that with respect to
lies in the fact that all of these things are at the outset it, every mathematical truth is an aspectual approxima-
 SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH 217

tion, because that reality has a proper translogical “struc- true confers upon them: they are true, and hence are mere
ture”. intellective actuality of the real. Insofar as what is actu-
alized is real, it constitutes what we may, without further
We cannot investigate this question further here.
ceremony, call reality; insofar as this real is intellectively
There are types of approximation which are different than
actualized it constitutes truth. These two moments of the
the approximation of inaccuracy and approximation of the
real are not identical; but as we have seen, neither are they
aspects. That depends on the different types of reality,
independent. Nor are they simply correlative; rather, they
which is the problem we are not going to discuss here.
are seen to be intrinsically and formally {330} grounded
In summary, every real truth without exception is, in each other. Truth is always and only truth of the real;
like conformity, the happening of the dynamic approxi- but it is not possible to think that reality is just the corre-
mation to adequation. late of truth. The real, by being what it is de suyo, gives
Now, this does not only happen with every dual its truth to intellection, and is what makes truth therein.
truth. The fact is that it happens with intellective move- The real is then truthful reality (in the sense of “truthify-
ment as such. The intellection of the real “among” other ing” or making truth), or reality “in truth”.
realities is by its own structure a dynamism of approxi- This intellective actualization of the real has in turn
mation to real truth. That is, “the truth” as such is a gi- two moments: it is actuality of the real thing, and it is
gantic intellective movement toward what “the real” is “in actuality of the field of reality which that thing deter-
reality” in a directional focus, schematic and gradual. mines. Truth is thus constitutively truth of a thing and
And not just every dual truth, but also “the” dual truth is truth within a field.
an approximation to “the” real truth. This is the whole of
This “and” of the two moments can in turn be actu-
work human knowledge, viz. intellective approximation to
alized in two modes, and therefore truth also has those
reality.
two modes. One is that mode in accordance with which
With this we have completed our summary analysis the real is intellectively actual in and by itself. This
of dual truth. Dual truth is the quality of an affirmative means that its two moments, individual and field, are ac-
intention in which what a thing is in reality is coincid- tualized unitarily; it is a direct apprehension of the real
ingly actualized in the intellection {329} “among” others. thing, immediate and compact. The intellective actuali-
When, in this coinciding, seeming is grounded in real zation is then what I have called real or simple truth, in
being, then the affirmation is truthful. This affirmation the sense that the real is actualized in and by itself. But
and its truth have a formally dynamic structure: the actu- there is another mode, that in accordance with which a
alization takes place in a medium, in accordance with a real thing is actualized, not in and by itself, but “among”
determined direction and a dynamic structure. Dual truth others. The thing is, to be sure, actualized as a “real”
is, then, constitutively dynamic precisely because it con- individual, but its field moment encompasses the other
cerns coincidental actuality. On the other hand real truth, things. Hence this actualization of the real has two as-
as we saw, is intellective actualization of the real in and by pects. On one hand we have the thing as intellectively
itself. They are, then, two types of truth. But these two known, but on the other its unity with individual formality
types are not merely juxtaposed. Various times I have is problematic. As this unity is what the real thing is “in
alluded to their internal articulation. Now it is necessary reality”, it follows that what is problematic in this actuali-
to expand this allusion into a summary conceptualization zation is found in what the real thing is “in reality”. I
of the intrinsic and formal unity of real truth and dual leave aside the attentive intellection for obvious reasons.
truth. {331} The intellection of the real is then dual; it is an
intellective movement of affirmation that comes from
stepping back, in which the real is actualized in coinci-
3 dental actuality. This coincidental actuality is just dual
truth.
The Unity of Truth Therefore truth is always and only intellective actu-
alization of the real. The two modes of truth, simple truth
and dual truth, have above all the unity which being true
In what sense do I speak of the unity of truth? Let us confers upon them, i.e., being intellective actualization of
briefly review the basic ideas. We are not dealing with the the real qua intellective. But this is not enough to speak
unity of phases of dual truth but with the unity of the two of the unity of truth, because it could be treating of two
modes of truth, viz. simple truth and dual truth. Both types of truth, i.e., of two types of actualization. And this
truths have first and foremost the unity which just being is not the case; there is an intrinsic unity, even a formal
218 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

one, of the two modes of truth, in virtue of which those real is actualized not just in and by itself, but also
two modes of actualization are not just “species” but in “among” other real things. Hence it follows that the pri-
fact “modes” of actualizing. The actualization itself is mary intellective apprehension of the real makes the
intrinsically modalized. And this modalization is ex- turning toward other intellective apprehensions necessary.
pressed in a second character of unity. The first was the And this turning is precisely the openness, or rather, the
unity which consists in the fact that both are intellective expression of the openness; every intellection is a turning,
actualization. The second is that these two actualizations and is a turning because it is constitutively open, and is
are not independent. Coinciding actualization of dual constitutively open because it is constitutively sentient.
truth bears intrinsically and formally in its bosom the And as the intellective actuality of the real is truth, it fol-
simple truth of the real. It is necessary to stress the formal lows that the openness of intellection is openness of truth
presence of real or simple truth in every dual truth. This and to truth. Because the intellection is sentient, truth is
presence is twofold: in the first place, because the real constitutively open. Each truth implies the others and is
truth of that of which one judges is intrinsically present to inchoatively turned to them. The openness is the radical
dual truth; and in the second, because dual truth is found condition in accordance with which all the real is appre-
to be based on the medium of intellection and the medium hended, either actually or inchoatively, among other reali-
of intellection is the real truth of the field. Affirmative ties.
intellection is in fact possible only by virtue of primordial
b) In what does this openness consist? In the sen-
apprehension of reality, and takes place in a medium
tient actuality of the real, the real is actualized in the unity
which is also real truth. Hence every dual truth is always
of its two moments, the individual and the field. Now, the
and only modulation of the simple truth of {332} the real.
openness of the real which is of interest to us here is found
But this simple truth is not just a foundation which is in-
formally in its moment of being in a field. Everything
trisically present to the dual truth, but in that duality the
real is actually or incipiently open to what is within a
real acquires, so to speak, its internal unfolding, the un-
field. Therefore its intellective actuality, its truth, also is
folding which consists in actualizing what the real thing
so. Every actuality is either actually or incipiently open.
is in reality. Simple truth is then inchoatively a dual
And this diversity is apprehended intellectively in two
truth. But the modulation of the simple truth, and the
modes: the unitary mode and the differential mode. As we
inchoate character of the dual truth, still point to a third
already know, in the unitary mode the apprehension of
unity more profound than mere actuality and simple de-
reality involves the field moment in a compact unity with
pendence. What is this unity?
the individual moment, whereas in the differential mode
The fact is that the actualization of the real qua ac- the field moment is autonomized by an intellective move-
tualization is constitutively open. The openness is the ment that unpacks it. In both cases we are dealing with
intrinsic and formal unity of the two modes of truth; the same formal structure, viz. the structure of “fieldness”,
moreover, it is a character of all truth, both simple and i.e., of the nature of the field. But it is necessary carefully
dual. Modulating and being inchoate are the expression to avoid a possible point of confusion. {334} Since intel-
of openness. This is the third and radical character of the lection “in” the field of reality, as we have seen, is dy-
unity of truth. On what is the openness grounded? In namic, it might seem that every intellection is formally
what does the openness, as a moment of actualization in dynamic. And this is completely false, because the dyna-
itself, consist? What is the ambit of this openness? Here mism is not proper to the structure of every intellection,
we have the three points to which we must briefly attend. but only that of intellection that steps back in a field, i.e.
a) On what is the openness grounded? The openness of the intellection of the real “among” other realities. To
of which we are here dealing is a mode of actuality, and as be sure, in every intellection there is or can be dynamism.
such formally affects intellection as such. If our intellec- But this does not contradict what I just said, because in
tions were no more than a simultaneous addition or a suc- the primordial apprehension of reality there can be dyna-
cession of various acts of intellectively knowing, there mism because there is actualization, i.e. because it is al-
would be no reason to speak of openness. But this is not ready intellection. Such is the case, for example, with the
the case, because the formal and radical terminus of in- effort to be attentive; while it takes place in differential
tellective actuality is the impression of reality; i.e., the intellective movement, an actualization is produced be-
intellection in which the real is actualized is constitutively cause there is dynamism. In this case it is intellective
sentient. And the very impression of reality is formally movement which determines the intellective actualization
open; it is, as we have already seen in Part I, the transcen- of the real. That is, intellection is not formally dynamic;
dentality of the impression of reality. Thus the diversity of only dual intellection is formally dynamic. The primor-
intellections can at times be the unfolding of the same dial apprehension of reality is not formally dynamic be-
impression of reality. It is in this {333} unfolding that the cause it is not formally apprehension of the real “among”
 SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH 219

other realities. What happens is that the real, in and by the animal open to every form of reality. But as the ani-
itself, is incipiently open to being actualized among other mal of realities, man not only is an animal whose life is
realities. Therefore its intellection isn’t formally dynamic, open, but above all the animal intellectively actualizing
but only so consequent upon the primary actualization of the openness itself of the real as real. Only on account of
the real; but it is incipiently open to being actualized in this is his life open. Sentient intelligence, that modest
intellective movement, in dynamism, a dynamism of re- faculty of impression of reality, thus actualizes in the hu-
actualization. The reason is clear: all of the real is incipi- man animal the entire openness of the real as real. Intel-
ently intellectively known according to what it is in real- ligence actualizes the openness of the real. In turn—but
ity. And since this intellection, when it is an intellective this is not our subject—when it arises from a sentient in-
movement, is already formally dynamic by being so, it telligence, the real itself is open, but it is another type of
follows that the intellection of the real, even though not reality qua reality.
always formally dynamic, is nonetheless always incipi- What is this openness to the real? One might think
ently open to a dynamic intellection. that it is the openness to being. If that were the case, man
Having said this, it is clear that the openness of would be the comprehendor of being. But he isn’t. Man
which we are here speaking {335} formally consists in is the sentient apprehendor of the real. Truth is not the
“fieldness”, i.e., the nature of being in a field. Dual truth truth of being nor of the real as it is, but the truth of the
is formally and constitutively open by being actuality of real as real. Therefore, the problems posed to us include
the real in its moment of fieldness, in the ambit of reality. not only that of “truth and reality” but the serious problem
This is the third point to which we must attend. of “truth, reality and being”. After having examined what
truth is, and what the truth of the real is (in its diverse
c) The ambit of openness is the ambit of truth as a
forms and in its primary unity) we must pose to ourselves
whole. In fact, every simple truth is incipiently open to a
the third problem: truth, reality, and being.
dynamic truth, and each moment of this dynamic truth is
a moment of conformity which is structurally open to ade- {337}
quation with reality itself, open to “the” truth. But this
openness to “the” truth has various aspects, because the §3
openness of truth is but the openness of the actualization
of the real, and therefore is but the openness of the field
TRUTH, REALITY, AND BEING
aspect of the real itself as real. There is an aspect of the
real which is of cosmic character; every truth is in this
aspect a truth open to all of the other cosmic truths. But
Every truth, we said, is intellective actuality of the
there is in the real another moment, the transcendental
real qua intellective. Now, this actuality assumes two
moment, that moment which concerns the real qua real.
forms: the truth of the primordial apprehension of reality
Now, as we saw in Part I, this transcendental character is
and the truth of affirmation. These two forms are unitar-
formally and constitutively open. The real qua real is not
ily the two forms of openness of the intellection to a real
something already and necessarily concluded. It is, on the
thing. But philosophy up to now has not understood mat-
contrary, a characteristic which is not a priori, but really
ters in this way. It has rather been thought that that to
grounded in the real characteristic of the type of reality.
which intellection is firmly open is being. This conceptu-
This transcendental order is, then, constitutively open.
alization is determined by an analysis only of dual truth.
Therefore, if we call the truth of the cosmic unity of the
All of intellection is thus centered in affirmation, and in
real ‘science’, and we call the truth of the transcendental
addition affirmation is identified with predicative af-
unity of the real ‘philosophy’, it will be necessary to say
firmation of the type, “A is B”; every other possible form
that this difference of types of knowing depends essen-
of intellection would be a latent type of predication. See-
tially on the nature of the known real. Science and phi-
ing this white color would be a latent way of affirming
losophy are open truth. Human knowing is the enormous
that this color “is” white. This predicative judgement has
actualization of this constitutive cosmic-transcendental
been the guiding thread of the accepted analysis of intel-
openness of the real.
lection. Nonetheless, I do not think that this conceptuali-
Naturally, not every truth is scientific or philosophi- zation is viable. Above all, because judgement itself, not
cal in the foregoing sense. {336} But every truth involves only in its predicative form but also as affirmation, does
actuality of the real within a field. Therefore man is an not fall back upon the “is” designated as a copulative but
animal open not only to thousands of modes of knowing, upon the “real”. The truth of an affirmation is not pri-
but to something more profound. In contrast to a pure marily and formally truth of what “is” but of the “real”.
animal, which is an animal of “closed” life, man is rather Moreover, the fact is that there is an intellection of reality
220 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

which is not affirmative, and which despite its undeniable the “relation” in which A and B are. That is properly
originality and priority contemporary philosophy has what has given rise to the word ‘copula’; this is copulative
passed over. This of course is the primordial apprehen- being. But the “is” has another more profound function,
sion of reality. And the primordial apprehension of reality one which is prior to the foregoing; this is the function of
is not a type of latent intellective affirmation. {338} First, expressing the very connection between A and B, i.e.,
because this primordial apprehension isn’t affirmation, their “connective unity”. But besides this and prior to
and second because this apprehension does not fall back expressing this connective unity, the “is” expresses af-
upon being. Its formal terminus is not substantive being, firmation as such. And these three functions have a pre-
the so-called substantive being is not the formal terminus cise order of foundation, as we have also seen. The copula
of primordial apprehension; its terminus is rather the real is grounded in a connection: only because A and B are in
in and by itself. Therefore the truth of primordial appre- connective unity do they acquire sufficient functional
hension of reality is not truth about substantive being but autonomy to give rise to the relation of B and A. But in
about substantive reality. Reality, then, is not being, and turn, this connective unity does not constitute predicative
the truth about reality is not the truth about being. None- judgement; what constitutes predicative judgement is the
theless, despite the fact that being is not formally and affirmation of said connective unity, and therefore of the
primarily included in the intellection of the real, it has an copulation. Predicative judgement consists in affirming
internal articulation with the real in the structure of every that the unity A-B is in the terminus of the judgement.
intellection. Therefore if we seek to analyze the nature of Therefore our whole problem centers on this primary
truth, we must proceed step-by-step. We must first of all function, to wit, on the “is” as affirmation. What is this
see that affirmation, and therefore its truth, are not af- affirmation?
firmation and truth of being but of reality. Then we must
We are not asking about the structure of the act of
see that primary intellection, i.e., the primordial appre-
predicative intention but rather about what {340} is predi-
hension of the real, does not apprehend substantive being
cated itself as such, i.e., we are asking ourselves about the
but reality. Its truth is what I have called ‘real truth’. But
“is” to which the copula alludes. What does this copula
since being, despite not constituting the formal terminus
fall back upon?
of intellection can be included in some way in every in-
tellection, we must determine the positive structure of To be sure, it does not fall back upon some objectiv-
every truth as such according to the internal articulation ity; the “is” does not consist in “objectively it is thus”.
of its two moments of reality and being. Being is more than objectivity. There has been a tendency
to think that the “is” of affirmation falls back upon the
Thus, three questions are posed for us:
“being” of what is affirmed. Predicative affirmation would
A) Affirmation as affirmation of reality. This is the then fall back upon the being of A, of B, and of their con-
problem of “truth and copulative being”. nection. Only later would it be able to express the rela-
B) Primordial apprehension as intellection of reality. tion. Leaving aside for the moment this “relational” as-
This is the problem “truth and substantive being”. pect of the copula, we may ask ourselves: Does predicative
affirmation fall back upon being? Certainly not. That
C) Internal structure of the truth of intellection in its upon which the predicative affirmation falls back is the
two moments of reality and being. This is in all its gener- reality of A, of B, and of their connective unity. On the
ality the problem of “truth, reality, and being”. other hand, according to the generally accepted interpre-
tation, affirmation would fall back upon the being of A,
{339} and upon the being of B. Formally, these two beings have
nothing to do with each other, because being A isn’t being
1 B, nor conversely. Therefore the being to which the copula
‘is’ would allude would be the unity of those two beings.
Truth and Copulative Being In this unity the being of A and the being of B would be
modified by their connective unity. Thus it is understood
that the being of A-B would be a rigorously copulative
Judgement, as we have seen, has three different being. Affirmation would consist in affirming copula-
forms: predicative, propositional, and positional. tively the unity of the two beings, A and B. But this is not
a) Let us begin by analysis of the predicative judge- correct. Affirmation and its “is” do not fall back directly
ment “A is B”, which is the guiding thread of the entire and formally upon the being of A, of B, and of their con-
classic conceptualization of truth in its unity with being. nection, but rather upon the reality of A, of B, and of their
Upon what does this judgement rest? We have already connection. In predicative affirmation there is certainly a
seen that the “is” has three different functions. It signifies connection, however, it is not a connection of beings, but a
 SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH 221

real connection or constitution; it is B being realized in But affirmation through gathering together affirms
the reality of A. That A, B, and their unity are presented the connective real in the copula “is”. What is this “is”?
to us as “being” does not mean that my affirmation falls The “is” does not constitute affirmation. As affirmation,
back upon this “being”, upon being itself, nor is it affirmation is constituted only as affirmation of the real.
grounded on being. But it falls back upon the real—with But the “is” nonetheless has its own meaning; it expresses
however much “being” one may like—but {341} only the affirmed real qua affirmed. This expressing does not
insofar as it is real. We are not dealing with a thing, the mean either the real or its truth, but what is affirmed qua
res as res essente qua essente, as res essente qua res. We affirmed. Affirmation, we have seen, is intellection by
saw this in the analysis of affirmation. That of which one stepping back in intellective movement. Therefore af-
affirms is always the real already apprehended in primor- firmation is a coincidental actuality between the realm of
dial apprehension of reality. This real is “re-intellegized” intelligence and the realm of the real. So when affirma-
among other real things. And the unity of this intellection tion is connective, the coinciding is actualization in a
is in the field moment of reality. The medium of intellec- gathering together. Then the copulation is not just gath-
tion at a distance (by stepping back) is not being but real- ering together or reuniting B and A, but above all reunit-
ity within a field. And affirmation itself consists in af- ing or gathering together the intellection and the connec-
firming the realization of the simple apprehension B in tive reality itself. The terms of the copulation are intelli-
the reality A already primordially apprehended. When this gence and what is affirmed. The copulative “is” expresses
affirmation is predicative the intellective movement has this unity of intelligence and the real through gathering
its own character—it is a gathering together. Permit me together. This unity is what is affirmed “qua affirmed”.
to explain. Predicative affirmation, like all affirmation, is Then one thing is clear: as the “is” expresses the real
a dual intellection; it intellectively knows a real thing thing affirmed qua affirmed, it follows that the “is” is
among others and from others. But it is dual in a second based upon reality and not the other way around. This is
aspect proper only to predicative affirmation, because that the ulteriority of being with respect to reality. Now, in
thing which one intellectively knows is present in what is affirmation we intellectively know the real as distanced,
intellectively known, but only “in connection” with it. {343} as given in by stepping back in the form of an im-
Every judgement is affirmation of a realization of the sim- pression of reality. Therefore “being” is the expression of
ple apprehension in that about which one judges. And a primary impression of reality. Affirmation does not in-
when this realization has a connective character, there are tellectively know in a direct mode the being of the real,
two dualities: the duality proper to affirmation as intellec- but rather the reality itself; but it intellectively knows in
tion at a distance, by stepping back, and the duality of the an indirect mode the being of the real. The obliquity is
connective unity of B and A. This second duality is what precisely what the idea of expression designates. Af-
is peculiar about predicative judgement. Predicative af- firmation affirms reality in a direct mode and in an indi-
firmation consists in affirming the unity of this duality. In rect mode the expression of what is affirmed qua affirmed,
virtue of it, the intellective movement of affirming B in A i.e., being. How? That is the essential question. We shall
(or what comes to the same, the realization of B in A) is, see how subsequently; but in any case we can already see
qua act, an act of connection; and it is this connective act clearly what I said many pages back: the dialectic of being
qua act which I term ‘gathering together’ [Sp. colegir] in is grounded in a dialectic of reality. And this grounding is
the etymological sense of “reuniting with” [Lat. col- what, in this case, the verb ‘to express’ designates. Being
legere], and not in the usual sense of inferring or some- and its dialectic are but the expression of the real and of
thing similar. Intellective movement through stepping its connective dialectic. The element of predicative
back is now a movement that gathers together. In this judgement is not being but reality. Therefore its truth is
gathering together one intellectively knows the connective not the truth of being but the truth of the real.
real itself. The real is now {342} actualized intellectively
But this is not the only problem with the conceptu-
in the collecting. The real is intellectively known in the
alization we are discussing. We are trying to see if, in
connective structure of its actuality, it is intellectively ac-
fact, judgement is formally the place of being and of its
tualized, in the movement of gathering together. If one
truth. I have sought to make it clear that this is not the
wishes, every judgement affirms a realization, and when
case for predicative judgement. But there is another more
the reality itself is connective, this realization is intellec-
fundamental problem conjoined with this one, and that is
tively known in being gathered together. This gathering
that not every judgement is predicative. What happens
together is not just another form of movement, but con-
with the other two forms of judgement, propositional
stitutes in movement itself a moment which is proper to
judgement and positional judgement?
intellection. What is known intellectively through gath-
ering together is the real in its connective unity; this real b) Contemporary philosophy has not occupied itself
is what is affirmed in the “direct mode”. as it should have with these forms of judgement; rather it
222 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

has simply taken for granted that they are but incipient which is affirmed in the direct mode; rather what is af-
forms of intellection of what the affirmed “is”. Now, that firmed in direct mode is the real apprehended in primor-
is not true, and indeed therein one can see quite clearly dial apprehension, as primary and complete realization of
the non-universality of “copulative-being” as the character a simple apprehension. That of which one judges is the
of every intellective act. There are intellections, in fact, in real in and by itself, but without previous denominative
which the copulative “is” does not intervene even in an qualification. Therefore there is only a single noun. And
incipient way. This is what we must now summarily dis- this is even more true than may at first glance be sup-
cuss. {344} posed, because the copulative “is” is not limited to being
absent as in the nominal phrase and the propositional
What I have called ‘propositional judgement’ is what
judgement; rather there are facts which are much more
constitutes the meaning of a nominal phrase. This type of
important to our problem. Indeed, there are languages
phrase lacks a verb. Classical philosophy, as we have
which lack the copula “is”, or if they have it, it never has
already said, did not consider this type of proposition. At
the copulative function in them. But despite this affirma-
most, when any thought was given to it, people considered
tions about the real are made in them. They are not Indo-
such propositions as incipient predicative judgements. To
European languages. The theory of affirmation has been
say, “woman, variable” would be an ellipsis for “a woman
grounded exclusively upon Indo-European languages, and
is something variable”. But this is completely untenable.
within that group, upon the Hellenic logos, Aristotle’s
No linguist would today agree that a nominal sentence
celebrated logos apophantikos. And this has led to a false
carries in some elliptical sense an understood copula. The
generalization, to thinking that the “is” is the formally
linguist thinks, and with reason, that a nominal phrase is
constitutive moment of all affirmation. To be sure, since
an original and irreducible type of a-verbal sentence.
we express ourselves in languages which derive from the
There are two types of phrases: verbal and a-verbal; both
Indo-European trunk, it is not possible for us to eliminate
are ways of affirmation essentially irreducible. In the sec-
the verb “is” from our sentences, {346} and we necessar-
ond there is no verbal ellipsis. This is clearer when sen-
ily have to say that this or that thing “is” real, etc. In the
tences with verbal ellipsis are most frequent, for example
same way Greek philosophy itself, from Parmenides to
in classical Sanskrit. But together with them there are
Aristotle, had to use sentences in which one says “being is
strictly nominal phrases without verbal ellipsis; for exam-
immobile”, etc. Here the “is” appears twice, once as that
ple in the Veda and the Avesta nominal phrases are rarely
of which some predicates are affirmed, and once as the
elliptical. And this is essential for two reasons. First,
copula itself which affirms them. These two meanings
because of what I just said: a nominal phrase is in itself
have nothing to do with each other —something which
and by itself a non-verbal sentence. It lacks, then, copu-
clearly manifests the great limitation of the Indo-
lative being. But it is not therefore incipient predication.
European sentence in this type of problem. Since the
Philosophy has traditionally reflected upon judgements
world’s languages have already been created, the essential
which lack a subject (the so-called ‘impersonal’ judge-
point is not to confuse this historical and structural neces-
ments) or upon judgements which lack a predicate (the so-
sity of the Indo-European family with the conceptualiza-
called ‘existential’ judgements), though with poor results.
tion of affirmation itself. So leaving aside being as that
But it has never occurred to anyone to think that there
which is affirmed, what is important to us here is that very
might be judgements without a copula. Now, the nominal
act of its affirmation, the copulative “is”, is not constituted
phrase lacks a copula, and nonetheless is a judgement in
by affirmation about being. To be sure, affirmation falls
the strictest sense of the term. And this discloses to us the
back upon the real as something “being”, but “reality” is
second reason why the theory of incipient judgement is
being; it is not the case that “being” is reality. It is the
untenable. A nominal phrase, in fact, not only lacks a
real given as realization of a simple apprehension, but it is
copula; but just on account of that, as we have seen, {345}
not the real given as such-and-such reality, qualified and
affirms reality with much more force than if the verb “is”
proposed for some ulterior act of another simple appre-
were employed. To say, “Woman, variable” is to affirm
hension. It would be absurd to pretend that when I ex-
the reality of variability in a way that is much stronger
claim, “Fire!”, I am saying, “This is fire”. That would be
than saying “a woman is variable”. The nominal phrase
just a translation of my exclamation, and a poor one to
is an explicit affirmation of reality without any copula.
boot. The exclamatory affirmation does not fall back upon
And this shows once again that the formal part of judge-
being, but upon the real. And once again, this affirmation
ment is not the copulative affirmation of the “is”, but the
affirms reality with much more force than its translation
affirmation of the real as reality.
into a copulative sentence. It could be translated better by
This is even clearer if we consider positional judge- saying, “It is on fire”. But the affirmation of reality is
ment, which is the real intellectively known as “being”, clearly much weaker than in the exclamation without the
for example “fire”, “rain”, etc. But it is not this being “is”.
 SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH 223

Nonetheless, both positional affirmation and propo- enormous entification of reality. To see this more clearly,
sitional affirmation affirm the real in a direct mode, {347} let us summarize briefly what the real is which we appre-
but at one and the same time affirm, in an indirect mode, hend primordially, what being is, what substantive being
their expression as “being”. The exclamation is in itself is, and why the intellection of reality is at one and the
the expression of the real qua affirmed; it involves being same time intellection of the real and of its substantive
as an expression of the impression of reality. That is to being, i.e., what being real truth is.
say, in copulative judgement as well as in propositional a) We need not directly treat of the real qua real; that
and positional judgement, there is a properly and formally is a metaphysical problem. We are asking about the real
constitutive moment, to wit, reality; but there is also a in and by itself, but only insofar as it is apprehended in
congeneric moment so to speak, which is the expression of primordial apprehension of reality. In this primordial
what is intellectively known as being. How is this possi- apprehension what is apprehended has the formality of
ble? One might think that it stems from the fact that reality; it is not a stimulus but rather something real, i.e.,
while affirmation does not consist either expressly or in- it is apprehended not as a sign for response but as some-
cipiently in a copulatively known “is”, that of which one thing de suyo. This de suyo is not some logical necessity,
judges, the real, consists in being a “substantive being”, as so to speak, but rather means only that the moments of
opposed to the copulative being which is only given in what is apprehended pertain to it not by virtue of the re-
judgement. Truth would then be the truth of substantive sponse {349} which it can elicit, but as something “of its
being affirmed in copulative being. Now, that is impossi- own”. Because of language constraints, we express this by
ble. We have seen that judgement does not formally con- saying that what is apprehended “is” of itself what it is
sist in the copulative “is”. Let us now examine if the real and how it is. But here the “is” does not designate the
of which one judges consists, qua judged, in substantive formal and proper character of what is apprehended, as
being. we have already seen. What is apprehended is reality, and
not being, in the strict sense of the word.
This difference between reality and being we have
2 considered up to now only in a negative way: reality is not
being. Subsequently we shall view the nature of this dif-
Truth and Being of the Substantive ference in a positive way.
Let us consider a piece of iron. We repeat once
I dealt with this problem in Part I, following along again: it has such-and-such properties. But these proper-
the lines of the discussion I devoted to it in On Essence. ties are not the being of the iron, but the iron itself, the
But for greater clarity I shall repeat what has already been ferric reality; not “being iron” but “ferric reality”. And
said. the same happens if what one desires to say is that the
iron exists. Reality is the de suyo, and therefore is beyond
That of which one judges is the real apprehended in
the difference between essence and existence in the classi-
primordial apprehension of reality. It is the primary and
cal sense. Essence and existence concern only the content
radical form of intellection, anterior therefore to all possi-
of what is apprehended; but the de suyo is neither content
ble {348} judgement, and something that falls back upon
nor formality. Regardless of the nature of the difference
the real in and by itself. Therefore its truth is not the
between essence and existence, classical essence as well as
truth of either conformity or adequation as in a judge-
classical existence are what they are only because that
ment; rather, it is purely and simply real truth. What we
essence and that existence belong de suyo to a thing. The
now ask ourselves is if this apprehension and its real truth
“being” of iron is not the “iron”. What, negatively, does
fall back formally upon a thing insofar as it has being. As
this difference mean? Let us recall that we are speaking
a real thing is substantive, the stated question is identical
about the reality and the being of a real thing qua appre-
to asking whether the terminus of primordial apprehen-
hended in primordial apprehension. Now, one might
sion and its real truth is a thing as substantive being.
think that in contrast to “‘being’ iron”, he could lay hold
That was the idea of all of philosophy after Parmenides:
of another verb to express the ferric reality. It would be
affirmation states what the real is as substantive being.
the verb “there being”.1 One would say “there is” iron as
But to me, this is untenable. Intellection, primarily and
opposed to “is iron”. The “there is” always and only
radically, simply apprehends the real in and by itself as
means something which there is in my life, in my situa-
reality. The so-called ‘substantive being’ is, to be sure, in
this intellection, but only as a moment grounded inn the
formality of reality. To think that reality is a mode other 1
[Zubiri here employs the Spanish haber, the infinitive form of “there is”,
than being substantive is, as I shall explain forthwith, an which does not exist in English since this verb is defective.—trans.]
224 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

tion, etc. But it does not, simply speaking, designate “re- understand by ‘world’. This respectivity is constitutive of
ality”. {350} Reality is a formality of a thing in and by the real qua real; i.e., everything real is formally worldly.
itself; there is no question of “there is” or “there is not”. Now, a real respective thing qua reality is the physical
The verb which, as I see it at least with respect to Spanish, reality of it and the world intrinsically and formally con-
serves our need is being here-and-now [estar] as opposed stituted by it. But I can consider a real thing not as con-
to being [ser]. The difference between them has been stitutively and formally real (in its twin dimensions indi-
stressed many times by saying that estar means something vidual and worldly) but as an “actual” reality in the world.
circumstantial, for example “being here-and-now sick”. The world is “respectivity”; actuality in this respectivity of
On the other hand, ser means permanent reality, as when the real qua “is” here-and-now [está] in the world consti-
we say of someone that he “is an invalid”. Nonetheless, I tutes the actuality of the real in the world. Reality, then, is
do not believe that this is the radical meaning of the verb not only something which constitutes the world, but
estar. Estar designates the physical character of that in moreover is actual in the world constituted by it. Now, the
which is in actu exercito, so to speak; on the other hand, actuality of the real in the world is just “being”. “Iron is”
ser designates the “habitual” state, without any allusion to means that that which physically constitutes real iron is
the physical character of reality. The tuberculosis patient ferricly actual in the world. This being in the world as
“is” an invalid. But on the other hand, when we say that actuality of the real being here-and-now (estar) in respec-
he is [está] coughing, he is [está] feverish, etc., we for- tivity (to the world) is what constitutes being. If iron were
mally designate the character of the coughing and of the able to sense its reality, it would sense it as ferric reality,
fever in a physical way: he “is” here-and-now [está] ferricly actual in the world. This and nothing more {352}
coughing, he “is” here-and-now [está] feverish, etc. It is is what “iron is” means. Everything else isn’t being but
true that very frequently the circumstantial is expressed by reality. Thus, it is one thing to describe man as a reality
means of the verb estar; but it is just there that we are born of some progenitors and among other realities; and
seeing in the circumstantial the formally physical charac- something else to describe him by saying that “he saw the
ter of its reality. The contraposition between ser and estar light”. This last is the actuality of what was generated
is not primarily one between the permanent and the cir- (reality) in the world (light). Being does not pertain to
cumstantial, but between a “mode of being”, habitual or reality as a formal moment; being is not a proper and
otherwise, and the “physical character” of reality. On formal moment of reality. What then is the real insofar as
account of this, at times one uses the verb estar to desig- it is? That being does not pertain formally to the reality of
nate the physical character of the habitual, for example the real does not mean that being does not pertain to the
when saying of someone that he “is [está] tubercular”. real. And this is what we must now ask ourselves, viz. In
Now, the verb estar designates physical reality as opposed what does this pertaining consist?
to the verb ser which has another meaning which we shall
c) The real is not the subject of notes, but rather is a
explain forthwith. In the primordial apprehension of re-
system constructed of constituent and constitutive notes.
ality, a thing “is” [está] physically and really apprehended
That is, the real is not a substantial subject, but a substan-
in and by itself in my apprehension. Referring back to the
tivity. Of this substantivity we say, and with reason, that it
concept of actuality which we have been explaining “is”. This means that being, although not identified with
throughout the course of this work, let us recall that ‘actu- reality, is still completely poured into it, so to speak. And
ality’ does not mean “presence” but the “being here-and- it is poured into it as substantive reality. Being is then
now” [estar] {351} present insofar as it is here-and-now being of substantivity. And one might term this ‘substan-
[estar]; it is the real “being here-and-now [estando] pres- tive being’. But that would be an incorrect denomination,
ent in and by itself as real. Reality is not, then, being. So because we are not dealing with the fact that being is sub-
what then is being? stantive, nor the fact that substantivity is being, but rather
b) When we speak of iron, we may allude not to its that the substantivity of the real “is”. It is not a substan-
properties, nor to its existence, but to what the iron might tive being, but the being of the substantive. This is the
“be” [sea]. Properly speaking, it is this “being” [ser] most radical form of “being”, not because substantive re-
which is opposed to “being here-and-now” [estar]. But it ality is a mode of being, but because the being of the sub-
immediately springs to mind that this “being” [ser] is not stantive is the being of what is most radical in a real
a formal moment of ferric reality, because it is the iron, it, thing, the being of its own substantivity. Let us not, then,
the ferric reality itself, which “is” [es]. It isn’t “being confuse the being of the substantive and substantive being.
iron” (we have already seen that it isn’t) but rather that If at times I speak of substantive being it should always be
the “iron is”. What is this being? Everything real is, qua understood that I refer to the being of the substantive.
real, respective (let us not confuse respectivity and rela- And this brings us to essential consequences in the order
tion). And this respectivity of the real qua real is what I of intellection.
 SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH 225

d) Reality and being in fact are not identical, {353} is a physical moment of the real, but consequent upon its
but neither are they independent. When taken together, formal reality.
substantive reality and its being in primary intellection, Hence being is not primarily something understood,
i.e. in the primordial apprehension of reality, confront us as has been assumed since Parmenides’ time; rather, being
with three essential characteristics. is something sensed when a real thing is sentiently appre-
In the first place, we meet with not only the distinc- hended in and by itself. Being is sensed, but not directly,
tion between but also with the anteriority of reality with i.e., it is not the formal terminus of that apprehension;
respect to being. Reality is not the supreme mode of being, rather, being is co-sensed, sensed in an indirect mode as
but on the contrary being is a mode of reality. For this ulterior actuality. The real “is” here-and-now [está] being
reason there is no esse reale, real being, but only, as I say, by virtue of being already real. What is apprehended in
realitas in essendo, reality in being. A real thing “is”; it the direct mode is the being here-and-now [estar]; the
is that, the real thing, which “is”, but it is not true that being [siendo] is not apprehended except indirectly. I
being is the reality of a real thing. Reality is not ens. shall return to this subject later.
And all the rest is an unacceptable entification of reality. In the third place, intellection is mere actualization
Greek philosophy and subsequent European philosophy in the sentient intelligence, and the real in this actualiza-
have always identified reality and ens. Both in philosophy tion is truth, real truth. Real truth does not make the “is”
as well as theology, real things have been considered for- intervene as a formal terminus of it. Upon intellectively
mally as real entia (entities), and God Himself as the su- knowing the real {355} in and by itself, we intellectively
preme reality would be subsistent being, the supreme ens know that the real is being by being real. Real truth is the
(being or entity). But this seems to me totally unaccept- unity of the real as something which “is” here-and-now
able. Reality is not entity, nor is the real ens. Ens is only [está] actualized in intellection, and as something which
the real insofar as it is. But prior to being ens, the real is therefore is “being” [siendo]. Real truth does not require
real. Only insofar as the real is encountered in the ulte- intervention by being but only by the real. Only because
rior actuality of its being, only then can and should it re- the real “is” here-and-now [está] being, is the “being”
ceive the denomination of ens, a denomination which is [siendo] co-intellectively known when the real is intellec-
posterior to its condition as real. Therefore the entifica- tively known. If the “being” [siendo] is found in this in-
tion of reality is ultimately only a gigantic conceptual hy- tellection, it is not to constitute it formally, but as an indi-
pothesis. Even when treating of God, it is necessary to rectly intellectively known moment in the real. Being is
say that God is not the subsistent being nor the supreme in the primordial apprehension, not as formally constitu-
ens, but an absolute reality in the line of reality. It is not tive of it, but as an ulterior moment of that apprehension,
the case that God “is”; one can only be called ens based on even though in it. Let us not confuse being in the appre-
created things which are. But in and by Himself God is hension with constituting it formally. Real truth is not the
not ens. A real thing is not real because it “is”, but rather truth of the being of the substantive, but it inexorably if
it “is” because it is real. So reality and ens are not identi- indirectly encompasses this being of the substantive.
cal. {354} Being is ulterior to the formality of reality. How? That is the question of the internal articulation of
In the second place, this ulteriority does not mean truth, reality, and being in the intellection.
that being is something like an ontological accident of the
real. That would be absurd. Everything real “is”, and “is”
inexorably, because everything real is formally respective, 3
and therefore is actual in this respectivity, i.e., “is”. Since
“reality” is a physical formality of what is apprehended in Articulation of Truth, Reality, and Being
sentient intellection, it follows that while the “is” and its
ulteriority are not a physical moment of its formal reality,
nonetheless this ulteriority of its actuality in the world as In the two previous subsections the essential aspects
such, i.e., being, is an ulteriority which is certainly ulte- of this articulation have been gradually emerging, above
rior, but also physical in its way, just as physical is the all their negative burden, which reveals what is unaccept-
actuality of the real. The real is not a mode of being, but able about the conceptualization we have been discussing.
the real is (at least is present) in the world, i.e., “is here- It was a conceptualization according to which truth falls
and-now [está] being”. To say that the real is here-and- back upon being, both copulative as well as substantive, in
now [está] in being means more concretely that the real is such a way that reality would consist only in a mode of
here-and-now [está] being. Although being is not a for- being, albeit a radical one. As this view customarily says,
mal moment of the real, to be here-and-now [estar] being “being” means “being real”. It was when criticizing this
226 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

conceptualization that the essentially negative aspects of reality impressively apprehended has in its very formality
the problem appeared. {356} Now we must gather those a worldly dimension. And the actuality of what is appre-
aspects in a positive way. This will make clear the rigor- hended in this worldly dimension is what I have called
ous nature of the articulation which we seek. ‘the being of the substantive’. That every primordial ap-
prehension is worldly is clear because that apprehension
This is an articulation in the intellection. Reality, I apprehends formality in its two moments, individual and
repeat, is de suyo intrinsically and formally respective qua field. Now, the field of reality is but the worldly respec-
real; that is, it is “worldly” in the precise sense of world as tivity qua apprehended in impression. Hence to perceive
the unity of respectivity of the real as real. But its world- a real thing in its field moment is to perceive it in some
liness is grounded precisely and formally in reality. It is way in its worldly respectivity itself. Thus the actuality of
reality which, by being real, grounds the world and is something real in impressive intellection is also the actu-
worldly. Hence reality, by being worldly, has its own ac- ality in the field of reality and therefore in the world. And
tuality in this world qua world constituted by it; it is be- the actuality of the real in the field and in the world is the
ing. Therefore, upon intellectively knowing the real, we being of the substantive. Only because the real is in and
co-intellectively know, we co-sense, the real as being. by itself within the field and in the world, only because of
And then the problem we face is what and how this co- this does the real have actuality within the field and
intellection is possible; this is precisely the internal ar- worldly; i.e., only because of this “is” it the real. That
ticulation of reality and being in intellection. actuality, that being given in impression of reality, is
We have seen that the two moments cannot be iden- therefore, {358} as I said, an ulterior and physical mo-
tified nor are they independent. Being is always an inexo- ment of the real. But that the ulteriority is physical does
rable real “necessity” of reality; therefore it is always “ul- not mean that the terminus of the ulteriority is also
terior” to the real as real. Co-intellection is grounded in something formally physical; that is another question.
this ulteriority, which has different aspects in intellection Indeed we are going to see shortly that ulteriority is a
depending on whether one deals with the primordial in- physical moment of the real, but that being is not physical
tellection of reality or affirmative intellection. It is on one in the same sense in which the notes of a thing are. The
hand the ulteriority of what I call the “being of the sub- real is real and has in itself an “is” in physical ulteriority;
stantive”, co-intellectively known in the primordial ap- but being is, formally, only just ulteriority of physical re-
prehension of reality. On the other hand, it is the ulteri- ality: it is not “something”, it is not a note. Therefore the
ority of being in affirmative intellection, what I call the real apprehended in impression is sending us, in impres-
“being of the affirmed”. The two ulteriorities are not in- sion, on to what is ulterior to it, to its being. This sending
dependent, but possess an intrinsic and radical unity. The is not, then, a type of logical movement but a physically
co-intellective articulation of reality and being is what apprehended movement in reality given in impression;
integrally constitutes truth. The problem of the articula- reality in impression is physically apprehended and im-
tion thus breaks down into four questions: pressively sends from the formality of reality to what is
ulterior to it, to its worldly actuality, because the ulterior-
a) The intellection of reality in its being of the sub- ity itself is a physical moment of the impression of reality.
stantive. {357} In this way being itself is formally something “sensed”.
b) The intellection of reality in its being of the af- Thus this ulteriority has, in apprehension, a precise
firmed. character to which I did not explicitly allude in the Part I,
but which it is important to emphasize here. The real is
c) The unity of being in intellection.
not a simple otherness passively received, but is the real
d) Reality and being in truth. itself sending, by its own formality, from this individual
formality to its actuality within the field and the world, to
its being. This physical sending is a sending “from” what
a) The intellection of the real in its being of the sub-
is present to us in an impression; therefore, this “from” is
stantive. We have already seen this in part I, but it is nec-
strictly an ex. The primary apprehension of the being of
essary to recall it specifically. When we intellectively
the substantive is therefore “ex-pression”; it is what is
know the real in primordial apprehension, we co-
expressed in the “im-pression” of reality. The formal
intellectively know the moment of being, as we have seen.
character of the ulteriority apprehended in primordial
How and why? This is the question.
apprehension is expression. In the impression itself one
In primordial apprehension, reality is the formality apprehends in ex what is here-and-now present to us;
of what is impressively apprehended. In this impression of {359} one apprehends what is impressively present in its
reality the real is apprehended in and by itself. But this physical ulteriority. It is, if one wishes, a type of physical
 SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH 227

push of the impression from itself toward its being. The act of reality, has also a simple character, i.e., the immedi-
ex presupposes the impression, and is only apprehended in ate dimension of the primordial apprehension of reality. It
it; however, its apprehension is not a second act, but is because it is immediate that it is not a type of latent
rather the same act in its dimension of indirect or indirect affirmation (or anything like that) of some “is”. It is not
ulteriority. It is but the ex of the apprehension in impres- latent predication but an intrinsic dimension of the pri-
sion itself. Impression and expression are two dimensions mordial apprehension of reality. What there is, is a dimen-
of one and the same primordial apprehension of reality: sion of this apprehension grounded on the dimension of
the dimension of in (direct) and the dimension of ex (indi- the “in”; and just like the “ex”, the apprehension of the
rect). These two dimensions are generated together but “ex” is indirect. Apprehension apprehends the real in a
not as coordinated; rather, the expression is an expression direct way, but also apprehends it in its being; therefore
only of and in the impression itself. In this expression the being is indirectly apprehended. Now, this indirect-
what is expressed is the being of the substantive. Expres- ness is expression. We directly apprehend the real, and in
sion is a physical character of the primordial apprehen- an indirect mode its worldly actuality. Precisely on ac-
sion of reality. Its character of “being here and now pres- count of this it is very difficult to distinguish being and
ent” is being here and now expressed physically. Being reality. History amply manifests this difficulty.
concerns real things by themselves, even if there were
In the third place, one might think that this character
never any intellection of any of them; but in their intellec-
of expression proper to being {361} does not consist in
tion, the being of the real is expression. In the primordial
that of which it is an expression, viz. the real, but rather
apprehension of reality, we intellectively know reality in
something formally meant by the expression itself. Yet
and by itself impressively; we intellectively know, expres-
that is not the case. Being is neither meaning nor sense,
sively, the substantive being in it. And since ulteriority is
but the expressed nature “of” reality. That something may
a physical moment of the real—it “is here-and-now be-
be expressed in one of its dimensions does not mean that
ing” real—it follows that not only do we express reality in
being expressed is “meaning something”. We are not
impression, but we inexorably have to express it. That is
dealing with an act of meaning something, but with an
to say, to the primordial apprehension of reality in impres-
expressed actuality. Strictly speaking, it is not so much
sion corresponds in an essential way its expression.
expression as an expressed character. Therefore reality is
Therefore upon intellectively knowing the real, we neces-
not the meaning of being, but on the contrary, being is
sarily co-intellectively know its being, its worldly actual-
what is expressed of reality in its being here-and-now
ity.
[estar] present, however much “being” [siendo] one
It is unnecessary to stress that we are dealing with an wishes, but being in being here-and-now present [estar].
intellective expression. The expression in all of its full- Being is grounded in reality as what is express in what is
ness is not something which is limited only to intellective impressed. Reality, as real, is being here-and-now pres-
expression of the real. But here we are dealing with ex- ent; it is thus reality which “is”, and not the case that be-
pression just as intellective expression; it is the formal ing is reality. Therefore reality is not the radical form of
structure of the physical ulteriority of {360} what is ap- being. On the contrary, what is indeed true is that the
prehended in the impression of reality. It will therefore be radical form of being is the being of the substantive.
useful to clarify the character of this expression, in which Now, ratification of the real in its intellective actual-
the intellection of the being of the substantive consists. ity is real truth. Therefore to real truth corresponds es-
In the first place, this expression, as already noted, is sentially not just the being “here-and-now present” of the
not a second act, as if grounded in the apprehension of the real, i.e. the impressive ratification of the real as real, but
real and carried out “after” the act of expression that ap- also the “being” [siendo] here and present, i.e., the ratifi-
prehension. We are not talking about that. It is not a sec- cation of its worldly actuality. The real truth of intellec-
ond act but a second dimension, the ex dimension of the tion is at once truth of the real which “is here-and-now”
same apprehensive act. Therefore what we have in the and of the being here-and-now of the real. They are two
expression is not something that was expressed, but aspects of real truth both grounded in a precise order: the
something which is strictly speaking expressed now. The truth of being [siendo] is indirectly of the truth of being
expressed nature of reality in its “being here-and-now” here-and-now. Only the truth of the real qua real makes
present is the apprehension of reality in being. Therefore the truth of the real in its being of the substantive possible.
the “expressed reality” as “expressed” is its being. Ex- But the being of the substantive, which is the radical
pression is, then, ulterior expressed actuality. form of being, is not the unique form of being in the in-
In the second place, this ex-pression, by virtue of tellection. What is that other form, and why and how does
being the second dimension of the unique apprehensive it necessarily concern human intellection of the real?
228 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

{362} being here-and-now is what affirmatively constitutes the

b) The intellection of reality in its being of the af- “is”. The “is” is the being of what is affirmed of the real
firmed. When I intellectively know a real thing not only in qua affirmed. This being is not, to be sure, the being of
and by itself as real, but also among other real things, that the substantive, because the being of the substantive con-
real thing, as we have repeatedly said, is actualized in cerns the real by being “real”, whereas the being of what
intellection at a distance, i.e., by stepping back. The unity is affirmed does not concern the “real”, but what the real
of the real as individual and within a field in reality is is “in reality”. I shall return later to this point, because
then unpacked; in a certain way it is distended. As the first it is necessary to clarify further what this being of the
unity of both moments is formally what a thing is “in re- affirmed is.
ality”, it follows that in the stepping back, what the thing In the first place, the being of what is affirmed ex-
is in reality remains problematic. Thus the field of reality presses in an indirect mode, as I have been saying, what a
becomes the medium of intellection in which what a thing thing is “in reality”. In this aspect the being of what is
is in reality is going to be intellectively known. This in- affirmed is expression. And it is so in the sense previ-
tellection—as we have already seen—is an intentional ously explained: the being of what is affirmed qua af-
decrease of distance. When we assume a distance or “step firmed is {364} now expressed in the affirmation itself.
back”, we have created simple apprehensions, and in the But, in what does this being express consist? This is what
intentional decreasing we return to the real thing from must be clarified.
within reality, which is then newly actualized, i.e., reactu-
In the second place, there is the nature of this ex-
alized, but now in the order of simple apprehensions.
pression, of this “being expressed”. Only by seeing it will
This intellection, by virtue of being an intellection in-
we have seen what the being of the affirmed is. When one
stalled formally in the real as real, is therefore an affirma-
intellectively knows a real thing, not in and by itself, but
tion. The formal moment of affirmation is, then, the re-
“among” others, it is necessary to recall that the “among”
alization of a simple apprehension in a real thing, a reali-
has at least three functions. It has a constitutive function
zation along the lines of intellective actuality. This is
(ratio essendi) in the thing, one which constitutes its dis-
what constitutes what a real thing is in reality; i.e., the
tinction from others. It also has an intellective function
formal terminus of the affirmation is the “in reality”.
(ratio cognoscendi) which constitutes not its distinction,
This is not all there is in affirmation, because what is but the intellective stepping back from others. And finally
affirmed in it is definitely a realization; and this realiza- it has an actualizing function (ratio actualitatis), the
tion, as the reactualization it is, concerns actualized thing mode of actualizing a thing “among” others when the
itself as a real moment. But then I must consider not just thing is intellectively known at a distance. The first func-
what is affirmed as a moment of the real, but also what is tion concerns reality, the second affirmation, and the third
affirmed qua affirmed, just because it is a distanced intel- the intellective actuality of the real in intellection. For the
lection, through stepping back. {363} There is not only problem at hand, only the second and third functions are
the realization of a simple apprehension qua realization; of interest. These two functions have a precise articula-
there is also the realization itself qua affirmed. What is tion. Stepping back is an act of retraction in which we
affirmed is intellectively known, but upon intellectively elaborate simple apprehensions. Their actualization in
knowing it, what is affirmed qua affirmed is co- the real, the third function, thus has two aspects. Above
intellectively known. For greater clarity, if we take the all there is the most visible one, the relationship of a thing
example of predicative judgement, the affirmation “A is to what is simply apprehended. This is what constitutes
B” consists first of all, in direct mode, in affirming the what is affirmed, because what is affirmed is the realiza-
realization of B in A; but it also consists in affirming, al- tion of what is simply apprehended. But in order for this
beit in an indirect way, that this realization is intellec- to happen, it is necessary to presuppose that intellection
tively known, i.e., that this realization “is” in the real. The has carried out the stepping back. Then the respectivity to
affirmation co-intellectively knows that what is affirmed is simple apprehension (the third function) rests upon re-
something formally intellectively known qua affirmed. spectivity to stepping back itself (the second function).
Affirmation always takes place as a unity of powers of That respectivity is not reactualization, because reactuali-
intelligence and of what a thing is “in reality”. And this zation concerns the real with respect to simple apprehen-
unity is on one hand affirmation of what a thing is “in sion. It is something previous, the respectivity to stepped-
reality”, but on the other affirmation of what this unity back intellection qua stepped back, {365} respectivity to
“is”. The “is” of the realization expresses the intellective the intellection of what a thing is “in reality”. If intellec-
actuality in its unity. Besides the direct mode realization, tion were not distanced, a stepping back, i.e., sentient,
affirmation intellectively knows in an indirect mode that there would be no opportunity to speak of what something
this realization is intellectively known in the real; and this is “in reality”; there would be nothing but “reality”.
 SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH 229

Therefore everything real intellectively known at a dis- its actualization. And this radical respectivity of the “in
tance, in stepping back, is constitutively respective qua reality” to stepping back is what formally constitutes the
intellectively known this way. And this respectivity to intellective world—something which has absolutely
intellection at a distance, in stepping back (of what nothing to do with the intelligible world of classical phi-
something is “in reality”) is what constitutes what I term losophy.
the intellective world. It is a world by homology with the
But it is necessary to attend to a second point. The
real world which is respectivity of the real qua real. But
real world pertains to the real qua real; and this respec-
the intellective world is not the world of the real, but only
tivity makes the real be a world. But the intellective
the world of the “in reality”. Now, what is affirmed is
world does not pertain to the real as such. It pertains only
what a real thing is in reality; and the “affirmed” qua af-
to the real primarily qua really known intellectively;
firmed is the actuality of the “in reality” in respectivity to
{367} moreover it pertains only to the real intellectively
the intellective world; it is a mode of being. And this ac-
known qua really intellectively known at a distance, in
tuality is what constitutes the “being of the affirmed”.
stepping back. And since this stepping back is a formal
Being affirmed is the actuality in the intellective world of
and exclusive moment of human intelligence, by virtue of
what a thing is in reality. And since, in affirmation, this
being sentient intelligence, it follows that only with re-
actuality goes out of (ex) the realization itself, it follows
spect to a human intelligence, i.e. a sentient one, is there
that the being of what is affirmed consists in being what is
an intellective world. For an intelligence that intellec-
“expressed” of what a thing is in reality as actuality in the
tively knew the real in and by itself exhaustively, there
intellective world.
would be neither affirmations nor an intellective world.
To preclude erroneous interpretations it is important This does not comprise any kind of subjectivity, because
to emphasize two points. intelligence is always actualization of the real. And this
Above all, intellective world has nothing to do with actualization has two dimensions: the dimension of the
what, classically, was termed intelligible world, a notion “real” and the dimension of the “in reality”. That this
coined by Plato (topos noetos) and which is an essential duality is only given with respect to human intelligence
part of the thought of Leibniz and Kant. The intelligible does not mean that each one of its two terms is but a mere
world is a world of strict necessities of what is conceived, actualization of the real. The intellective world is an ac-
and in this sense it is a world of absolutely necessary tualization of the real in an intelligence which intellec-
truths. It is a second world juxtaposed to the sensible tively knows in intellective movement, in a sentient intel-
world, and is above it as something a priori with respect ligence. The intellective world is a world of the “in real-
to it. {366} But I doubt that such a world exists. Only a ity” proper to the “real” world. This duality is a duality
single world exists, the real world. And since the real is along the lines of intellective actualization, and therefore
actualized in the formality of the impression of reality in a has nothing to do with subjectivism.
sentient intellection, it follows that the real world is at In summary, the actuality of the real in the intellec-
once and radically something intellectively known and tive world is the being of what is affirmed. And it is nec-
sensed. But that is not all. The fact is that the intellective essary to point out now in a consistent way the character-
world is not constituted only by the objective content of istics constitutive of the being of what is affirmed.
simple apprehensions (be they concepts, fictional items, or
percepts). This content is at most but a part of the intel- aa) The being of the affirmed is not, to be sure, the
lective world. But what formally constitutes the intellec- being of the substantive. But neither is it merely copula-
tive world is the respectivity of the “in reality”. In this tive being. First, because the being of what is affirmed
respectivity, simple apprehension does not enter by reason pertains to every affirmation and not just to predicative
of its content, but ultimately by its formal moment of re- affirmation, the only one which has copulative being.
ality, i.e., by being what the real “might be”. “Might be” Second, because the being of what is affirmed does not
does not mean that what we apprehend is reality only ap- concern intellection itself qua intellection but only what is
proximatively. It means something else. Even if a con- affirmed qua affirmed in it. Therefore, as I see it, it deals
cept were formally and exhaustively realized in the real, with a particular division of being, {368} one which is
its character of concept would always consist in being different from the classical division. Classically, being
formally a “might be” of the real, because the “might be” was divided into substantive being and copulative being.
is the direction to the real. Now, the “might be” is This division is unacceptable, because substantive being
grounded in stepping back, as the foundation, as the prin- does not consist, as was thought classically, in real being
ciple of the intellection of what things are “in reality”. (substantive being is only the ulterior actuality of the real
This “in reality” concerns not just simple apprehension in the world), and because copulative being does not en-
(either as content or as “might be”), but also and above all compass all forms of affirmation. The division should be
230 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

established between these two forms of being: the being of aspect which are completely different from what consti-
the substantive and the being of the affirmed. Both are tutes what I call “being of the affirmed”. This is because
“what is expressed”: the first is what is indirectly ex- for Parmenides, sameness refers to the sameness of both
pressed in primordial apprehension of reality; the second intellection and the “is” (something which we already saw
is what is indirectly expressed about what the thing is in is impossible). But Plato interprets the sameness as
reality. And since this duality is grounded in the actual- sameness of both predicative affirmation and the “is”. To
izing characteristic of a sentient intellection, the question simplify the terminology, I shall speak only of affirmation
inexorably arises of what might be the unity of these two simpliciter in lieu of predicative affirmation; but under-
modes of being, i.e., the question of why they are “being”. stand that I refer only to predicative affirmation. Simi-
But in order to be able to delve into this topic, we larly, in place of the “is” one should speak of “is in real-
must first attend to a second characteristic unique to the ity”; but for the foregoing reason I shall speak only of the
being of what is affirmed, which is extremely important, “is”. Granting this, for Parmenides {370} one could
and which more clearly outlines the problem of the unity never either know or express in a statement the “not be-
of being. ing”. Being, and only being, “is”.
But despite that, Parmenides’ own Poem continually
bb) The being of the affirmed is the actuality of the uses—as it scarcely could avoid doing—negative sen-
real in the intellective world, in the world of the “in real- tences and judgements, affirmations that being “is not”
ity”. And this being is what is expressed in an affirma- this or that.
tion. Now, there is a serious problem involved, that of
negative judgement, because affirmation and the affirmed Despite this, I still think that affirmation is an intel-
are the opposite of negation and what is negated. Hence it lection at a distance, in stepping back, in which we intel-
might seem to follow, first, that it is not true that intellec- lectively know what something “is” in reality. To affirm is
tion at a distance, in stepping back, consists in being an always and only to affirm the “is”. But affirming is one
affirmation—it could be a negation—and second, that thing and the character of what is affirmed qua affirmed
what is expressed “isn’t” always—it could “not be”. This another. Now, while affirming is always and only affirm-
is the whole problem of negation and of the negative. It is ing the “is”, what is affirmed can consist in an “is” or in
not some useless subtlety, but as we are going to see, is an “is not”. This “is not” is what is usually termed the
something which affects the most essential part of some negative. It is clear that if I affirm the negative I affirm
great philosophical systems. {369} that something “is” just negative. What happens is that
then the opposite of negation and the negative cannot be
There is, in fact, a serious ambiguity in the idea of called “affirmation”, as if the negative were the opposite
“affirmation”. To be sure, affirmation can be the opposite of the affirmative. This is unacceptable unless one is
of negation. In this sense, it would be absurd to pretend willing to maintain indefinitely something which is a se-
that intellection at a distance, in stepping back, is consti- rious ambiguity. The opposite of the negative (not-being)
tutive affirmation. But this is not the radical idea of af- is the positive (being) and not the affirmative. Therefore
firmation. In the radical sense, affirming consists only in every affirmation consists in affirming the “is”, but this
intellectively knowing at a distance, by stepping back into being affirmed can have a positive character (“is”) or a
the reality of something, what this something is in reality. negative one (“is not”). As I see it, all the negations in
In this second meaning, affirmation is not the opposite of Parmenides’ Poem are negations only in the character of
anything; it is only distinguished from primordial appre- the thing affirmed, but not in the affirmation itself.
hension of reality. The primordial apprehension of reality
is compact intellection of the real in and by itself, an ap- Affirmation, then, has two completely different
prehension which bears in an expressed way the being of meanings in our language. On the one hand, it means the
the substantive. On the other hand, affirmation is un- intellection of the real at a distance, in stepping back; and
packed and bears in an expressed way the being of what is on the other, the positive part of certain affirmations.
affirmed. Here we are speaking of affirmation only in the Confusion of the two meanings has been the root of some
second sense. And it is essential to keep this foremost in serious consequences in the history of philosophy. Every-
one’s mind. Even when one predicatively affirms “A is thing we have been saying throughout this book concerns
not B”, the affirmation itself is the affirmation that that only affirmation but not this positive part. {371} Thus we
“is” so. Therefore the “is not” does not concern the af- have the following schema: 1. being of the substantive; 2.
firmation itself in the second sense. It is the same to af- affirmed being which in turn can be being, (a) positive or
firm something in the first sense as to affirm that this (b) negative.
something “is”. This sameness (tauton) was the cele- But this by itself poses serious questions. In the first
brated thesis of Parmenides, albeit in a dimension and an place, there is the question of in what the duality “being
 SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH 231

and not being” formally consists as a duality between the but keeping ourselves there. Hence every affirmative in-
positive and the negative in what is affirmed. This is the tellection is an intellection in reality. Since the negative is
problem of what is negated. And since what is affirmed, a mode of this intellection, it follows that the “is not” does
i.e. the “being affirmed”, consists only in the “is”, there not consist in unreality. The “is not” does not consist in
arises the second question, viz. What is the internal either otherness or unreality. What the stepping back does
structure of the being affirmed in its double dimension of is to “unfold” a real thing; it is the unfolding of “reality”
being and not-being? and “in reality”. This unfolding therefore opens, as I said
before, a type of gap in the real; it is the gap of the “in
First question: In what, formally, does the duality
reality”. To be sure, this gap is just intellective; it does
“positive-negative” consist, i.e., the duality “being and
not concern the physical reality of a thing, only its actu-
not-being”, in what is affirmed. Although for greater fa-
alization in stepping back. The affirmative intentionality
cility of expression I may set forth examples of predicative
is an intellective movement in this gap. {373} With this,
judgement, as I have said, the problem refers to all of af-
our problem is now fully addressed, because affirmative
firmative intellection, whether predicative or not. What
intellection is first of all an intellection at a distance, in
do we understand by not-being?
stepping back; second it is the opening of a gap, the gap of
At first glance one might think that not being con- the “in reality”; and lastly it is an actualization of the real
sists in affirming of A, instead of what it is, namely B, in this gap by means of an intellective movement.
something which it is not, for example C. When I affirm, Therefore to ask ourselves, What is the “is not”? is to ask
“A is C”, I affirm something which is not. In this aspect ourselves for a mode of actualization in movement of a
not being consists in error, and the error itself would be real thing in the gap of the “in reality”.
“not being” by being otherness. This is what Plato
In order to conceptualize this actualization, it is nec-
thought: to affirm what is not is to affirm of a thing
essary to bear in mind that we are dealing constitutively
“something other” than what it is. Not being is to het-
with an actualization with respect to simple apprehen-
eron. The head of the Vedantists, Sankara, thought the
sions, elaborated in the stepping back. What are these
same thing. Error would then consist in “super-
simple apprehensions? Their content, as we have already
imposition” (adhyasa), i.e., in transferring to one thing a
seen, can be quite varied: percept, fictional item, concept.
notion which only fits another. But this does not suffice,
But it is not this content which formally constitutes simple
because negative judgement itself, when affirming of
apprehension; rather, it is their intrinsic and unique di-
something that it “is not”, can be perfectly truthful; it can
mension of reality: the “might be”. The “might be” is not
be true that “A is not B”. And in this case the negation is
the reality which is; but rather is, in reality, the distanced
not otherness. Moreover we are not dealing with the fact
version of what a real thing is “in reality”. As I said, the
that a thing is (or is not) the same as what is attributed to
stepping back opens a gap in reality, and this gap is the
it, {372} or something else; rather we are dealing with the
gap of the “might be” with respect to what a thing is. The
affirmation itself according to which a thing “is not”, in-
gap of the “might be” is therefore the actualization of a
dependently of whether this affirmation is or is not erro-
thing in accordance with a twin possibility: the possibility
neous. Not being is not otherness but a dimension of the
affirmed itself qua affirmed; it is affirming “is not”. of being or the possibility of not being the actualization of
a determinate simple apprehension. The stepping back,
Nonetheless, this is not sufficient, because affirming and therefore the gap, is the foundation of this duplicity of
“is not” can mean that we deny that “A is B”. In such actualization of the real in intellective movement. If we
case the negation would be negation of an affirmation, a make use of a common though inaccurate expression, and
negated copula; one denies that A “is” B. But neither is call all simple apprehensions “ideas”, we may say that for
this correct. Not every negation is negation of an af- Plato the realm of Ideas is the realm of full reality (ontos
firmation; rather, negation or denial is always in itself on, he called the ousia of the Idea). For Aristotle on the
negative. It is not a negated copula but a negative copula. other hand, the realm of ideas is the realm of the abstract.
Put in the most general terms, we are dealing not with a I do not share either of these conceptualizations. {374} To
negated affirmation but a negative affirmation. What, begin with, an idea is not in and by itself reality, but nei-
formally, this negative, this “is not”, is —that is the ques- ther is an abstraction. First because the idea, in this sense
tion. of simple apprehension, is not always abstract; it can have
Let us recall what has been said many times in these the concrete nature of a fictional item, and above all the
pages. Affirmative intellection is intellection at a distance, radical concrete nature of the percept—a point over which
in stepping back of what a thing, already known intellec- classical philosophy has constantly stumbled. But moreo-
tively as real, is “in reality”. We are not talking about ver and above all, it is because the idea is neither the
distancing ourselves from reality, or stepping back from it, realm of reality nor the realm of the abstract, but the
232 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

realm of the “might be”. Every idea is formally and con- actualization” has become aversive intellection, i.e., “ac-
stitutively directed toward the reality of which it is an tualization of the non”. The non-actualization is now
idea, and this direction is the “might be”. Therefore the negative actualization. It is intentional actualization in
realm of ideas, in its “might be”, constitutes a twin possi- apo. But this which is absolutely necessary is nonetheless
bility of actualization: either the real actualizes the simple not yet sufficient for there to be negation in the formal
apprehension (the idea), or it does not do so. This is sense.
positive or negative actualization. They are two possibili- cc) And this is because intellective movement is con-
ties generated together precisely because they constitute stitutively an intentional movement, i.e., intellection of an
the twin dimension of the “might be”, its twin structural “is”. Now, given what has been said, we would at most
dimension. The negative is not grounded in the positive have “not being” as such. But this is not a negation. Ne-
nor the positive upon the negative; rather, both are gation is the affirmation that this not-being “is”. That is,
grounded in the “might be” of simple apprehension as negation and the negative in it do not consist in {376}
such. “not-being” but in “being not”. The negative actualiza-
Granting this we may ask ourselves what this actu- tion is the actualization of the not-being “qua affirmed”.
alizations is which we call negative. It has different mo- The negativity in question is at one and the same time
ments which must be carefully distinguished. “non-actualization” and the actualization of the “not” and
the “being not” of this actualization; and here we have the
aa) Let us take this piece of paper. Let us suppose it difference between the negative and negation. The “is
is not green. That means above all that the green, the not” is not just otherness, nor is it unreality nor mere ac-
greenness, is not actualized in the paper. But that is not tualization of a “no”; rather, it is the “being-not” of a
sufficient for the “is not”, because we are not concerned thing qua actualized with respect to a determinate simple
with whether this piece of paper does or does not have apprehension. Affirmation falls back in a direct mode
greenness, but with whether this “not-having”, this not upon the actualization of the “no” in the intellectively
being actualized, becomes a mode of intellective actuali- known real, but for this very reason expresses in an indi-
zation. We are not dealing with the fact that the green is rect mode what is affirmed qua affirmed, i.e. is the “being
not actual, but with the actualization of this “not” as not” of the affirmed. But then, the “no” is inscribed in
such. “being” just like “yes”. In what does this inscribing con-
bb) We are dealing, then, not with actual being but sist? That is the second question.
with the intellection of the actuality of this “not”. To un- Question Two: The internal structure of the being of
derstand it, {375} let us think about the fact that affirma- the affirmed. This “being” in which the “not” is inscribed
tive intellection is a stepping back, and that therefore is the being of the affirmed, not the being of the substan-
there is above all the moment of contribution of the simple tive. Therefore we are not talking about admitting, with-
apprehensions for the intellection of what a thing is in out further ado, the being of not-being, as Plato thought
reality. In our case, I contribute the simple apprehension with his celebrated ‘parricide’ (patraloia) of Parmenides.
of green. I see that it is not actualized in this paper. But For Plato, the Idea is full reality, ontos on, and therefore to
this seeing is not a negation; it is merely the intellective admit the idea of not-being is for him to admit the being
manifestation of the non-actualization. The negation is of not-being, the very reality of not-being. But the “not-
only a quality of intellective movement. Prior to the non- being” is a “being-not” of the affirmed as such, and
actualization of the green, the intelligence carries out a therefore the being of the not-being in question corre-
type of “turning away” from the green in the thing. We sponds only to the being of the affirmed and not to being
are not talking about a movement of the intelligence as simpliciter. Now, “being-not” is one of the two possibili-
carrying out some act, i.e., we are not talking about a ties generated together of the “might be”, together with
“physical” movement. We are talking about an intellec- that of “being-yes” so to speak (kataphasis). Hence it fol-
tive movement qua intellective, qua intellectively know- lows that everything we have said about negation can be
ing actuality of what is intellectively known in movement. applied, mutatis mutandis, to intellection which is not a
The turning away is an intentional turning away; it is a turning away or aversive, i.e., which is conversive, to the
positive act of turning away or aversive intellection. It is positive “yes it is”. The positive is not what is affirmed as
what the Greeks expressed with the preposition ¦pÕ, apo, such, but what is affirmed conversively, just as the nega-
which in Latin is ab. Therefore the intellection in this tive is what is affirmed aversively. To say that this paper
apo is apo-phasis, negation. In it not only is the actuali- {377} is white does not consist only in intellectively
zation manifest, but moreover the aversion itself consists knowing it as having that quality, but in affirming that it
in the positive intellection of the “non” of “non- is “positively” the white of my simple apprehension. The
actualization”. With that the mere manifestation of “non- positive is what is intellectively known in the conversive
 SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH 233

moment of the affirmed. Hence, it is the being of the af- already seen, is wrong. The being of the substantive is not
firmed itself which has the two moments of the “no” and substantive reality, but the being of real substantivity; be-
the “yes”. ing is “of” the real, but is not the real itself. Therefore
The being of the affirmed is the being of the “in re- real substantivity and the being of the substantive are not
ality”. This “in reality” is just the gap which the unfolding identical. On the other hand, the being of the affirmed is
of one thing among others opens therein when it is actu- not formally identical with the copulative “is”, because
alized. This gap is not a gap “of” reality, but a gap “in” not every affirmation is predicative. But starting from
reality. The gap consists in the “in reality” of individual these two identifications, i.e., starting from the entifica-
reality. Therefore when we intellectively know something tion of reality and the logification of intellection, which
in a stepping back, we already intellectively know the gap, have run throughout the course of the history of philoso-
not as something which is not real, but as something in phy, some great philosophical systems have conceived that
the real. And just on account of this, intellection in the the unity of the two forms of being is in turn a unity of
gap intellectively knows, in an indirect mode, the gap identity. This is the identity of the entification of reality
itself as actuality in the real. And this is the being of the and the logification {379} of intellection. It is the third
affirmed. The being of the affirmed is the being of the and most radical identification in these systems. To the
gap of the “in reality”. Now, the gap as such, I repeat, is identity of the being of the substantive with reality, and
not an absence of reality but just the opposite; it is a mo- the identity of the being of the affirmed with copulative
ment of the actualized real. The gap is, then, the field of being, the philosophical systems in question add the iden-
the “in reality” open to what the real “might be”. The gap tity of these two identities, which would be the identity
is therefore the openness of the being of the affirmed in its between the being of the substantive and the being of the
twin dimensions, positive and negative. Gap is opening, copulative. That formal, complete identity would consti-
and therefore the actuality of the real in it is openness of tute the unity of “being”. Both substantive being as well
the being of the affirmed. It is for this reason that the as copulative being are identically beings. “Being” would
being of the affirmed inexorably has the two possibilities: then constitute the domain of the identity. And this has
being-not and being-yes. The gap is the ambit of intellec- been a conceptualization fraught with enormous conse-
tive movement, and therefore is the ambit of the co- quences, because when one conceptually identifies the
intellection of affirmed being. And the intellection of the being of the substantive and substantive reality on the one
real in this gap is therefore co-intellection of its being in hand, and on the other identically conceptualizes the be-
its twin dimension, positive or negative. To be “in reality” ing of the affirmed and copulative being, the identity of
is to be open to the “being yes” and to the “being not”. both forms of being becomes decisive for the conceptuali-
{378} The intellective world is the world of the “yes and zation of intellection itself and of reality. To be sure, this
no” of what the real is in reality. It is, at bottom, the identity is not necessary; but we must note that it is very
world of the problem of the real. And here we have the difficult to avoid in the milieu of the entification of reality
internal articulation of the positive and the negative in the and the logification of intellection.
being of the affirmed. Plato did not thematically conceive this identity.
With the foregoing, we have covered the essentials of When he dealt with being, he considered the being of the
the being of the affirmed as contrasted with the being of real and copulative being indiscriminantly. For him it
the substantive. was sufficient that in both cases he was dealing with einai,
esse, being. In Plato we are not talking about an express
But we are not dealing with a difference in contrapo-
identification, but only with a serious lack of discrimina-
sition because both are “being”. Thus, as I said a few
tion. And this lack of discrimination is what we may
lines above, a question inexorably springs to mind con-
qualify with the expression utilized by Simplicius to ex-
cerning the intellection of the unity of the being of the
pound Parmenides’ philosophy. For Simplicius the on is
substantive and the being of the affirmed.
understood by Parmenides monakhos, in only one way.
c) The unity of being in intellection. In order to see This non-discriminating, and therefore this conceptualiz-
this unity it will suffice for us to review systematically ing as the same, with respect to “being” when one speaks
what has already been said in the last few pages. of real being and copulative being, leads to the best-
Classical philosophy identified substantive being known concepts of Plato’s philosophy. His failure to dis-
with reality itself; it would be the esse reale. That is what criminate between “is” and “reality” in turn led to a the-
I call the entification of reality. On the other hand it ory of intellection (intellection is {380} “vision” of the
identified what we here call ‘being of the affirmed’ with real, is Idea), and to a theory of the real itself (reality is
the being of predication, with the copulative “is”. That is what is “seen”, the Idea itself). The lack of discrimination
what I call logification of intellection. This, as we have between real being and copulative being led him to two
234 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

main thoughts which are, at one and the same time, a the- Hegel, the being of the affirmed (intellectively known or
ory of intellection and a theory of the real centered upon thought, the expression used is immaterial) dialectically
two concepts: the reality of non-being, and the community constitutes the being of the real. Dialectically, because the
(koinonia) of the different ideas among themselves and movement of thinking consists in starting from the “posi-
with intellection. This is the unitary structure of the real tion” of being, and this position is ultimately a “judge-
(the real “is” and “is not”) and of affirmation (community ment”. In Hegel thinking thus constitutes the logical
among predicates and a real subject). This is the philoso- genesis of being in all its forms. Dialectic, for Hegel, is
phy stemming from a lack of discrimination between the an internal movement of intellectively knowing as such.
two types of being, real being and copulative being. But And by virtue of being intellection of “being”, this dialec-
as I see it, this lack of discrimination takes place in the tic is a dialectic of being itself. This, as we shall see
deepest stratum of the entification of reality and the logifi- forthwith, is impossible, because dialectical movement
cation of intellection. And that is impossible. Being is does not rest upon itself. In the first place, it does not fall
not reality, and affirmation is not predication. Neither the back upon being but upon the real; and secondly, {382}
real nor the affirmed being are comprised by community because the real itself is not primarily known intellectively
of notes or of genera, as Plato said. in movement nor as position in movement.
Plato’s lack of discrimination becomes a positive Plato, Leibniz, and Hegel represent the identity of
identification of real being and copulative being in mod- being real and copulative being. The entification of the
ern philosophy. In this identity, one can start from real real and the logification of intellection are the two foun-
being, and then the copulative being has the structure dations of classical philosophy; and it is not by chance
which the structure of real being imposes upon it. That that they have led to ontologist rationalism, even to ideal-
was Leibniz’ philosophy. The real is a “single” substance ism. But none of this is tenable. Being has forms which
(monad), whose identity consists in the vis of unity of un- are quite different but which nonetheless have the unity of
ion and separation of the “details” which comprise that that by which all are forms of “being”. It is necessary
monadic unity of the real. Predicative judgement is the then to confront, in a positive way, the problem of this
intellective form of this monadic structure of the real; it is difference and its unity.
because of this that the judgement is a constitution or
aa) The difference between the being of the substan-
copulation. The copulative “is” is the adequate intellec-
tive and the being of the affirmed. The being of the sub-
tion of what reality is in itself. Seen from the point of
stantive, let us repeat, is not substantive reality. The sub-
view of intellection, both conceptive as well as affirmative
stantive “is here-and-now being”, an expression in which
intellection is intellection of what reality is in itself. This
reality is designated in the ‘is here-and-now’, and being in
is what is called “rationalism”. {381} But it is impossible.
the ‘being’. Thus being is not something accidental, be-
Affirmation is not a constitution, as even Aristotle thought
cause the real is being de suyo. Therefore there is no “real
and which was repeated constantly by Leibniz. But even
being” but instead “reality in being”, as I have been say-
in the case of predicative affirmation, its constitution does
ing throughout the hundreds of pages of this work. On the
not consist in a bonding activity, but in actuality of reali-
other hand, every real thing is so among other things with
zation. It is not the structure of the real which determines
respect to which this thing is what it is “in reality”. And
the predicative structure of intellection. The first is a
here we have the radical difference: being as being of “re-
question of actuity, the second of actuality. Once again,
ality”, and being as being of what it is “in reality”. The
the radical mistake of this identification follows from the
first is the being of the substantive, the second is affirmed
entification of reality and the logification of intellection.
being. And both are “to be here-and-now being”, either as
Rationalism consists in affirming the identification of
pure and simple reality, or as being affirmed in accor-
entification and of logification, the latter grounded in the
dance with what is one [se es] in reality.
former.
This difference is then a difference in the “to be
This identity can be brought about by another route: here-and-now being”. Therefore it is in the unity of the
real being is primarily and radically a moment of affirmed “being here-and-now” where the unity of being is consti-
being. “Being” is the element of thinking, and the move- tutively found. In what is this difference grounded, and in
ment of thinking is at once structuring movement of the what then does the unity of being in this foundation con-
real and something “put” by thinking itself. That was sist? {383}
Hegel’s philosophy. Being real is “a” determination of
being as such, as thought being; this is idealism. Idealism bb) Foundation of the difference. The difference
consists, as I see it, in the identification of being real with between the being of the substantive and the being of the
the being of the affirmed, with the latter grounded in the affirmed is, as we have just said, a difference which con-
former. In Leibniz, real being models intellection; in cerns the real but which does so in a different mode in
 SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH 235

each case. The being of the substantive concerns the real cc) Unity of being of the substantive as such and of
only by virtue of being real. And even were there no in- the being of the affirmed. The unity in question is in the
tellection, there would be and is in all the real a being of fact that both are “being”. The whole problem is then
the substantive. But the being “as such” of the substantive referred to the unity of “reality” and of “in reality”.
does not consist only in the “being of the substantive”, but Clearly this unity is the very formality of reality, “of”
in the “as such” of this being. And this “as such” is not which and only “of” which being is the being; it is the
given except in the intellection of the real. This intellec- being of the real. The unity of being is therefore unity of
tion is the impression of reality. On the other hand, the the “of”. Now, this unity of the being “of” the intellec-
being of the affirmed certainly concerns the real, but does tively known real has its own structure, which it is fitting
so according to its “in reality” among other real things. to set forth.
Now, this “among” is here an intellective function of what
The formal character of being has three moments.
the real is in reality. And in this aspect the “among” con-
In the first place, being is actuality. It is not, therefore, a
cerns the real which is intellectively known in a move-
formal or constitutive moment of the real as real, {385}
ment which intellectively knows a thing among others.
but the worldly actuality of the real. This actuality is re-
Hence it follows that being, both the substantive being as
actualized in sentient intellection, because the world is
well as the being of the affirmed, lead back (albeit in dif-
apprehended sentiently as field.
ferent ways) to intellection itself, to an intellection which
constitutively involves that double possibility of appre- This actuality opens the way to a second moment:
hending the real in and by itself and of apprehending the being [noun] is ulterior actuality. Ulteriority is the sec-
real as something which is “in reality” among other real ond formal moment of being [noun]. By virtue of being a
things. This double possibility only concerns sentient worldly actuality, being [noun] presupposes the worldly
intellection. The impression of reality has, in fact, the two respectivity of the real. This respectivity is, on the one
moments of individual formality and field formality, hand, the respectivity of the real qua real (world); and on
whose unity in the formality of reality constitutes what a the other, the respectivity toward other real things which,
thing is “in reality”. Therefore, in the unity of the for- impressively understood, comprise the intellective world.
mality of reality in impression is where, in its foundation, They are not two worlds. This is only one world, the real
the unity of the being of the substantive and of the being world, but this world has its own dimensions according as
of the affirmed is constituted. An intellection which was one looks at the real world of what is “real” or at the real
not sentient, when it apprehended the real, would not have world of what is “in reality”. The ulteriority of being con-
the duality of being as such of the substantive and of the sists in the actuality of the real in that respectivity which
being of the affirmed. And that means that {384} this constitutes the world. And being [noun] is “to be here-
difference and hence this unity are not given within the and-now in the world”, whether in the sense of real sim-
being of the substantive. This being has no differentiation pliciter, or of “in reality” what the real is. Now, this actu-
whatsoever along those lines. It is a difference which is ality, because it is ulterior, is not formally identical with
given only in the “to be here-and-now being”, between the the real, but the real is really in the world, i.e., “is being”
being of the substantive “as such”, and the being of the de suyo.
affirmed “in reality”. It is a difference which is thus given In the order of intellection, the real is what is appre-
within sentient intellection and which pertains to the real hended “directly”; and its ulteriority is apprehended, as
in the order of actuality. The real is situated and actual- we have seen, “indirectly”. When we impressively appre-
ized in sentient intellection as “real”, and as what it is “in hend reality, we co-apprehend its actuality in that respec-
reality”. Having identified these two actualities with each tivity. When we apprehend the real in im-pression, we
other, after having identified actuality with actuity, is also then have indirectly apprehended its very ulteriority; i.e.,
what has led to rationalism and to idealism. The internal we have this ulteriority in the express sense. This is the
root of the identification of these two actualizations is third moment of being, indirectness or expression. Being
found in the fact that being is considered as something is the expression of the impression of reality. Only be-
understood. But this, as we have seen, is not the case. cause the expressed is co-intellectively known in impres-
Being is not formally understood but is something for- sion can we and ought we to say that the expressed is indi-
mally sensed in the impression of reality. And this being rectly known intellectively; indirectness is expression.
sensed, this being in impression, is what is divided into {386} Both the being of the substantive and the affirmed
being of the substantive as such and being affirmed. being have that formal unity of the ex which is grounded
in the ulteriority of actuality. The “in” and the “ex” are
Granting this, In what does the unity of the being of the two dimensions of the formality of reality apprehended
the substantive and of affirmed being consist? in sentient intellection. The first is the direct dimension;
236 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

the second, the indirect dimension. That being is “of” notion of passing fit.
reality means, then, that the “of” consists in express ulte- This dynamic unity which is prior to any passing,
rior actuality. And here we have the formal characteristic and which constitutes the unity of being of the affirmed
of being. and of the being of the substantive as such, also has differ-
But the unity of being is not just formal. That is, we ent moments.
are not dealing with the fact that there are two species of Above all, the actuality of the real in worldly respec-
being, viz. being of the substantive “and” being of the tivity acquires its own character. Without abandoning the
affirmed, but rather with the fact that these two presumed real, and therefore without abandoning either the being of
species are more than species because the unity of the the substantive as such, intellection goes from one real
“and” does not have a formally additive character. The thing to another; the respectivity (of the real) as such,
“and” is dynamic unity. The fact is that the two forms of without ceasing to be what it is, is distended, so to speak,
being are not just coordinated, but moreover the affirmed in respectivity to other real things among which the real is
being is grounded in the being of the substantive as such. actualized in intellection; this is the primordial world as
The being of the substantive “as such” is the radical form the field of reality. With it the actuality of the real in re-
of being. This does not mean, I repeat, that reality con- spectivity has {388} also become distended; the being of
sists in being esse reale, but that the being of the substan- the substantive as such has been distended into the being
tive “as such” is the radical form of being in intellective of the affirmed. Distention is not a passing, but at most
actuality. Nor does it mean that affirmation falls back in a the structural condition so that there where the distention
formal way upon the being of the substantive: affirmation is manifested there may be a passing. Distention is the
falls back formally upon reality. Only because in that ac- first moment of the dynamic unity of the being of the af-
tual reality the being of the substantive is indirectly ex- firmed and the being of the substantive as such.
pressed, do we co-express the being of the affirmed when
judging about the real. To say that the radical form of This distention is not bilateral, because the being of
being is the being “as such” of the substantive means that the substantive as such is the radical form of intellectively
inside the lines of intellectively known being, the radical known being. Whence it follows that the being of the
type of being is the being of the substantive “as such”. It affirmed as distention of the being of the substantive is an
is in this that the being of the affirmed is grounded. And unfolding of this latter, but an unfolding of actuality. The
as the intellection of the real among other things of the actuality of the real in worldly respectivity is unfolded in
field is a movement by which we are going from one thing its actuality among other real things. Being affirmed is
to another, the unity of both forms of being is a formally thus an ex of the being of the substantive. The being of
dynamic unity. {387} the substantive as such is what is ex-pressed in the im-
pression of reality; and in the distended im-pression in
But it is necessary to purge a false idea about this affirmative intellection there is ex-pressed affirmatively its
dynamic unity, namely the idea that this dynamism is being as being “in reality”. Each of the two beings is an
dialectical. Dynamic unity is not dialectical. The dialec- ex-pression of reality. But in turn the real of the primor-
tic, regardless of the structure assigned to it, is always and dial apprehension of reality is the determinant of affirma-
only a “step” from one intellective position to another, not tion; this determination is evidence, an ex. Evidence is
dialectic of actuality as such. When Hegel speaks to us of formally a moment of the real actualized in intellective
the dialectic of reality it is because he understands that movement. But since this actualization bears in an ex-
reality is a moment of being and that being is a position of pressed way being, it follows that evidence is indirectly—
thought. But the dynamic unity of the forms of being in and only indirectly—a moment of being. Evidence is not
intellection is not the unity of “passing from one thing to evidence of being, but evidence of the real. And just on
another”. To be sure, in the affirmed itself there can be a account of that, indeed only on account of it, evidence of
“passage” from one affirmation to another. But the dy- the real is indirect co-evidence of being. Therefore the
namism which leads from the being of the substantive as expression in which the being of the affirmed consists,
such to the being of the affirmed is not a “passing” in the and the expression in which the being of the substantive
intellection; rather it is the very constitution of the foun- as such consists, have the unity of being a distention un-
dation of being affirmed in the prior structure of the being folding itself, whose radical dynamic character is the ex of
of the substantive as such. The “passing” is grounded in being. Only by means of this prior ex has the ex proper to
the being of the substantive; but this foundation is not, in the being of the affirmed been able to be constituted.
turn, a passing. Reality is present in the primordial ap- {389} Being is being as such of the substantive “and”
prehension of reality, and is affirmed, in what it is in real- being of the affirmed. I said that this “and” is not addi-
ity, in the affirmative intellection. Only there does the tive. Now we can explain precisely: the “and” itself is the
 SENTIENT LOGOS AND TRUTH 237

character of an ex; the being of the substantive determines lection of reality in its being of the substantive and in its
in ex the being of the affirmed. The dynamic unity of being of the affirmed. We then examined the unity of
being is, then, unity of distension and of unfolding. being in sentient intellection. With this we are now able
to consider the articulation of reality and being in what
But this unfolding, this ex, in turn has its own char-
constitutes the truth of intellection. This is the fourth of
acter. Ex is the distended unity of the real which is here-
the questions we posed about truth, reality, and being.
and-now being. And so this gerundive takes on a modal
characteristic: being [noun] is an ulterior actuality and d) Truth of intellection: reality and being in truth.
hence gerundive actuality; it is a gerundive present. This Allow me to repeat carefully what has already been ex-
“being” which is neither process nor a moment of a proc- pounded. Intellective actuality of the real has, as we know,
ess, is rather a structure of the very being of the real, what two aspects. On one hand, there is the formality of the
I call temporality. Being [noun] does not happen tempo- reality of a real apprehended thing. On the other, there is
rally but rather is temporal. Temporality pertains to the the intellective actuality of this formality, but qua “intel-
substantive being of the real, and therefore also pertains, lective” actuality. {391} And this comprises the radical
although in an indirect way, to substantive being in its truth of a thing, its real truth. This truth is constituted in
impression of reality; this is the temporality of the being the impression of reality, and as such the real truth has the
of the substantive. In what does it consist? Being, as I dimension of an in. But as the real in impression has,
said, is ulterior actuality of the real in worldly respectivity. ulteriorly, being, the being of the substantive, it follows
And this actuality is first of all a “being already”; but it is that intellection expressly bears being as such, and there-
also a “yet to be”. The “is” of the being of the substantive fore the impression itself has a dimension of the “ex”,
is thus radically the unity of an “is already” and of an “is grounded in the dimension of the “in”. To real truth there
yet to be” in the “is now”. None of these three expressions pertains, then, in direct mode the “in” of the formality of
is by itself actuality; only their intrinsic unity is actuality. the real, and in indirect mode the “ex” of the express, of
Only that unitary actuality constitutes the actuality of the its being; the being express comprises the being of the
“is”. Already, now, and yet-to-be are not three phases of substantive as such. This being as such is express only in
the happening of being, but three faces of its own unitary intellection. Therefore the being of the substantive per-
actuality. Its unity is the structure of the “being” [verb]. tains, to be sure, to a thing; but the being of the substan-
Temporality is the dynamic unity of the formal ulteriority tive “as such” pertains only to the real intellectively
of being with respect to reality. Time is grounded there- known qua actual in intellection. In virtue of this, the
fore in being and not the other way around. This tempo- primordial apprehension of the real constitutes real truth,
rality pertains to the real by itself and by the mere fact of but at one and the same time constitutes the formal truth
being, independently {390} of any intellection, because of what apprehension itself is; intellection constitutes not
independently of intellection the real has being of the sub- only the truth of the real, not only apprehends the real, but
stantive. But the being of the substantive “as such” is also constitutes that moment in accordance with which
only given in sentient intellection; and therefore only apprehension itself is co-apprehending that which in it
there, albeit indirectly, is temporality apprehended as “truthifies” the real. The unity of “truth” of the real (in its
such. Its distention in the ex is expressed in a form proper reality and in its being) with the “being truth” of intellec-
to the being of the affirmed, viz. its temporal connotation. tion itself, is the formal structure of real truth as such.
This temporal connotation, in accordance with whether it Intellection not only intellectively knows the real, but also
is a now, a before, or an after, is in its affirmation the un- co-intellectively knows that this intellection “is” true.
folding of the temporality of the real apprehended in the And of these two moments, the second, “being” truth is
impression of reality. The “being” [verb] of the being the ex itself, and is grounded in the truth of impression.
[noun] of the substantive is what determines the temporal Here we have the radical structure of intellection, of the
connotation of the being [verb] of affirmed being [noun]. actualization of the real: intellection actualizes the real
The temporal connotation of the “is” is an unfolding of “truthfully”, and actualizes so that this intellective actu-
the temporal unity of the being of the substantive. alization “is” truth. The second moment is grounded in
In summary, being has the formal characteristic of the first. This grounding is not {392} a foundation or
actuality, ulteriority, and indirectness in expression; this is logical inference or anything like that; rather, it is the
the formal unity of being. And this unity is constitutively intrinsic and formal grounding character of the very im-
dynamic: distension, unfolding, and temporeity are the pression of reality as actualization.
structure of the dynamic unity of being affirmed and of
Truth, to be sure, is not only truth of the “real”; it is
substantive being as such.
also truth of what a real thing is “in reality”. But this “in
We have thus seen the difference between the intel- reality” is the distention of the field moment of the real,
238 INTELLIGENCE AND LOGOS

already apprehended in primordial apprehension; and its then at one and the same time truthful intellection and
intellection is an affirmative movement based on what a intellection of the fact that the intellection itself is true.
thing is “in reality”, and bears along with it, as co- This is the unity of reality, being, and being true.
intellectively known, the being of the affirmed as such.
The being of the affirmed is the real being affirmed in this I do not deem it necessary to insist once again that
intellective movement of mine, and therefore the actuality here ‘truth’ does not mean anything more than the ambit
of the being of the affirmed is at one and the same time of truth, because if we take truth in the sense of the truth
the affirming intellection in its merely actualizing char- of a determinate thing, then that ambit gives rise to two
acter; it is intellectively knowing that the intellection “is different possibilities: the possibility of truth and the pos-
true”. It is an actualization of the “real” and of the fact sibility of error. Here we are dealing simply with the am-
that it is mere actualization, i.e., of the fact that the af- bit of truth as mere actualization. And this ambit is not a
firmation “is” true. The characteristic of the mere intel- mere “element” of intellectively knowing but is also an
lective actualization of the real which constitutes reality is intellective, “physical actuality” of the real.
{393}

CONCLUSION

Let us review the general line of argument in this essential character: truth. Truth is the actualization of the
study. I asked about the structure of intellectively know- real in sentient intellection. It can be simple; then it is the
ing what the real is in reality, i.e., as unity of its individ- truth of the real purely and simply known intellectively in
ual and field moments. This intellection is the intellection and by itself. That is real truth. But this actualization can
of the real among other real things. This “among” dis- also be actualization of a real thing among others of the
tends the two moments, individual and field, impressively sensed field. Then one intellectively knows, in affirma-
sensed in the sentient intellection of reality. And then the tion, a real thing based on these other things; this is dual
intellection is converted into movement, into the unfold- truth, the coinciding and demanding actuality of intellec-
ing of the impression of reality. It is a movement which tion and of the real. With respect to affirmation this coin-
starts from the real already apprehended in primordial cidence is “seeming”; seeming is demanding actuality of
apprehension, in the impression of reality; a movement the real in a determinate direction. With respect to the
which begins by stepping back from the real but within thing, the coincidence is the “real”. Truth is coincidence
the field of reality. With that, the field of reality becomes of seeming and of the real, such that the seeming is
a medium of intellection of the real; it is the “mediated” grounded in the real. All of this is an intellective move-
intellection of the impression of reality. That stepping ment of formally sentient character, a movement of the
back is a movement of retraction, in which the intellection impression of reality and in the impression of reality.
elaborates the complex group of simple apprehensions Dual truth has the three forms of authenticity, speaking
(percepts, fictional items, concepts) whose formal charac- the truth or veridictance, and fulfillment. In all of them
teristic is what the thing “might be” in reality. This there is a moment of conformity with {395} the actualized
“might be” is the directional foundation of the contribu- real, and a moment of possible adequation, but one which
tion of the simple apprehensions, in accordance with is imperfect and fragmentary with respect to the real.
which intellection is moved toward the individual real and Conformity is no more than a step toward adequation.
in stepping back knows intellectively what that real thing Both moments have between them that unity which we
is in reality. This intellection is the affirmation, the call “approximation” to the real. Every conformity is ap-
judgement; {394} it is the logos. To judge is to intellec- proximation to an adequation in an impression of reality.
tively know what the real, apprehended as real in an im- Truth has the dynamic unity of approximated being. In
pression of reality, is “in reality”; and this sentient intel- this truth and in all of its forms there is above all the real
lection consists in actualizing the real of which one judges itself in a direct mode; but there is in an indirect mode its
in the order of simple apprehension; that is sentient logos. being, the being of the substantive as such and the being
In other words, to judge is to judge of a realization; to of the affirmed. Being is formally worldly actuality, ulte-
affirm is sentient intellection of the realization of what rior and express, of the real impressively apprehended.
“might be” in what “is”. It assumes different forms Being is something sensed in an impressive actuality, of
(positional, propositional, predicative), and different dynamic character, which culminates in temporeity. In-
modes (ignorance, guessing, doubt, opinion, probability, tellection is at one and the same time truth of the real and
plausibility, firmness). These affirmations are determined of its being, but truth of its being grounded in truth of the
by the real itself in the order of its actualization with re- real. This actuality is not only actuality of the real and of
spect to simple apprehensions; this determination is evi- its being, but is also at the same time an actuality of what
dence. It is a radical moment of the impression of reality; is intellectively known qua intellectively known, and
it is the force of imposition, the demanding force, of the therefore an actuality of intellection itself; it is at one and
real as given in impression. This intellection has its own the same time truth and being-truth. Intellection is not

239
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just intellection of the real, but also co-intellection that radical point of departure, and the very structure of intel-
this intellectively knowing of the real is true. And in this lective movement. It is not just an intentional terminus.
radical unity consists the internal articulation of reality, of The logos is essentially and formally a modalization of
being, and of truth in intellection. sentient intelligence.
This is the structure of the intellection of what With this we have put the finishing touches on what
something is in reality. In order to understand it, the I proposed at the beginning of this second part of my
analysis of all the moments of intellection in the order of study, viz. the examination of the field structure of intel-
reality was necessary. It was necessary to see step by step lective knowing, i.e., the structure of the sentient logos. It
how every intellection consists formally in an unfolding of is a structure determined by the real as merely actualized
the impression of the reality of the real. We are not talk- in sentient intellection. But as we shall see, this structure
ing about coming to a kind of realism, as it was called is the commencement of a progress within reality and di-
classically, but rather of showing that all the moments of rected toward the real qua moment of the world, under-
intellective knowing are radically and formally immersed standing by ‘world’ the respective unity of the real purely
in the real, and determined by the real itself {396} as real and simply as real. The logos is a movement but not a
impressively apprehended. The aspects of this determi- progression. We are dealing with an enormous effort of
nation therefore comprise the structure of intellective intellection of what the real is, vaster at each iteration.
knowing of the logos. The real is not a point of arrival of This progression is what, as I see it, comprises reason.
the logos but rather the intrinsic and formal moment Reason is a progression from the field to the world. And
given in the primordial apprehension of sentient intellec- as the field is the sensed world, reason is constitutively
tion. Therefore not only is it not a point of arrival which is and formally sentient reason. What is this progression?
more or less problematic, but rather it is the precise and That is the theme of Part III of this study.
 PART THREE

INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

 {11}

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In Part I of this book we have analyzed what intel- example, to other colors or other qualities, to wit, red
lective knowing is. Intellective knowing is just the actu- (Part II). But we also apprehend that this red color is real
alization of the real in the sentient intelligence. Reality is with respect to pure and simple reality itself, for example
a formality of what is impressively apprehended, i.e., is a that it is a photon or an electromagnetic wave. The im-
formality given in the impression of reality. What we pression of reality is thus an impression of pure and sim-
intellectively know in it is thus that what is apprehended ple reality itself. That is to say, we apprehend in impres-
is real. sion not only that a thing is real, and not only that this
real thing is in reality, but also that this thing is purely
The impression of reality is transcendentally open.
and simply real in reality itself. It is not the same thing to
Reality is open in itself qua reality. And in virtue of this
intellectively know what something is in reality as to in-
everything real is so respectively.
tellectively know what something is in reality itself.* So
Reality is impressively open above all to the reality much so, indeed, that as we shall see, what something is
proper to each thing. Each real thing is its own reality. in reality itself may not resemble at all what it is in reality
When we apprehend something real just insofar as it is its in impression. Here we have the third mode of intellec-
own reality, this intellective apprehension is the primor- tion: the intellection of what a thing is in reality itself.
dial apprehension of the real. In order not to encumber That will be the subject of Part III. This intellection goes
the expression I shall simply call “its own reality” by the beyond logos. It is reason.
term ‘real’; this has all been analyzed in Part I of the Reason is founded in primordial apprehension and in
book. all the affirmative intellections which the logos has intel-
The real is, moreover, impressively open to the real- lectively known in sentient fashion. That might cause one
ity of other real things sensed in the same impression of to think that {13} reason is a combination of affirmations,
reality; each real thing is sensed with respect to other real a reasoning process. But nothing could be farther from
things that are also sensed, or at least are capable of being the truth. Reason is not a reasoning process. The differ-
sensed. The sentient intellection of some real things ence between logos and reason is, in fact, an essential one.
sensed among {12} others so sensed is the logos. It is an To be sure, both are movements starting from a real thing.
intellection of what the real, apprehended as real in pri- But in the logos, this movement is from one real thing to
mordial apprehension, is in reality. It is not the same another, whereas in reason, we are dealing with a move-
thing to intellectively know that something is real as to ment from a real thing toward pure and simple reality
intellectively know what this real thing is in reality. We itself. The two movements, then, are essentially distinct.
have analyzed the structure of this intellection in Part II of I shall term this movement of reason a progression [mar-
the book. cha]. It is a progression from a real thing to pure and
simple reality itself. Every progression is movement, but
However, the impression of reality is transcenden- not every movement is a progression.
tally open not only to each real thing, and not only to
other real things sensed in the same impression, but to any
*
other reality whatsoever, whether sensed or not. In the [Roughly speaking, Zubiri is drawing a distinction between the truth about
impression of reality, in fact, we apprehend not only that something and the whole truth about it. For the former, we say, “In real-
ity, the situation is…”; Zubiri uses en la realidad to express the whole
this color is real, that this color is its own reality (Part I). truth about something, in-depth knowledge of it. There is no correspond-
And not only what this color is in reality with respect, for ing English idiomatic expression, so “in reality itself” is used.-trans.]

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This progression is not a process, but a structural {14} (logos), only granting these two intellective mo-
moment of intellective knowing. It is not a type of “put- ments is that moment of intellective progression into real-
ting into action”, nor is it progress toward an intellection ity determined, that progression which is reason. Intel-
of the real as such. No one, so to speak, “starts” to intel- lective knowing, by virtue of its structural nature, must of
lectively know reality by means of reason. We are, rather, necessity progress, or rather, is already progressing since
dealing with a structural moment. To be sure, it is not a it is already reason through the very structure of the im-
structural moment of intellective knowing as such; i.e., it pression of reality given in primordial apprehension and
is not a structural moment of intellection considered for- in logos.
mally. Neither primordial apprehension nor logos are the This is just what we must now study. The structural
progression in question, despite being intellections. But moment poses two groups of problems. In the first place,
this does not mean that the progression is a type of sum- there are the problems concerning the nature of the pro-
mation of these previous structures, as if they were “uses” gression of reason as such. In the second place, there are
(arbitrary or necessary) of intellection; rather, it is just a the problems concerning the formal structure of this new
modalization of intellection, a modalization of determi- mode of intellection: that it is knowing. We shall exam-
nate structural character in the intelligence by the impres- ine these problems in two sections:
sion of reality. This modal determination is based struc-
turally upon the two modalities of pure primordial appre-
Section 1: The progression of intellective knowing.
hension and of logos. Only granting that we have impres-
sively known intellectively that something is real (primor- Section 2: The formal structure of this intellection
dial apprehension), and what this real thing is in reality through reason: the formal structure of knowing.
 {15}

SECTION I

THE PROGESSION OF INTELLECTIVE KNOWING

As we have just indicated, the progression of intel- As intellective, it is a mode of actualizing the real. And
lective knowing is not a process but a structural progres- this is decisive.
sion founded upon the other structural moments of intel-
It is thus necessary to examine three problems: What
lective knowing. But this does not go beyond being a
is the intellective progression of intellective knowing qua
vague indication, and moreover a negative one; it does not
progress? What is the progression of intellective knowing
say what the progression is, only what it is not. We must
qua intellective? And, What is the formal object of this
delve into this problem of the progression in a positive
intellective progression? That is to say, we have:
way. Clearly, it is an intellective progression, i.e., this
progression is a moment of intellective knowing itself. In Chapter 2. What is Progression?
progression one intellectively knows by progressing and
Chapter 3. Progression as Intellection
one progresses by intellectively knowing. It is not, then,
just a “progression of intellective knowing”, but a “mode Chapter 4. The Formal Object of Intellective Pro-
of intellection”; it is what I call ‘intellective progression’. gression {16}

245
{17}

CHAPTER II

WHAT IS PROGRESSION?

Since we are dealing with a structural moment of primarily to other aspects of apprehension.
intellective knowing, it is necessary to return to the root of
The first is the field aspect. Reality is open in itself
the question even at the risk of repeating some ideas al-
and from itself towards other real things sensed or sensi-
ready studied. Intellection sentiently apprehends things in
ble in the same impression of reality. That is, openness
their formality of reality. And this formality, impressively
determines, in respective excedence, a field of reality. The
sensed, is intrinsically and constitutively open as reality.
field is not a type of ocean in which things are submerged;
Each real thing consists not merely in “being here”, cir-
nor is it primarily something which encompasses all real
cumscribed and limited to its own notes; rather, qua real-
things. Rather, it is something which each real thing,
ity, it consists formally and precisely in a positive open-
through its own reality, opens up from itself. Only
ness to something which is not, formally, the thing itself.
through this openness is the field something excedent and
This openness—let it be said in passing—does not consist
respective. Only because “there is” a field can this field
in what, with regard to another order of problems, I am
“encompass” sensed things. But this field that there is, or
accustomed to call ‘open essence’ as opposed to ‘closed
rather that there is this field, is owing to the openness of
essence’. The difference there touches upon the structure
each real thing from its own reality. Indeed, even were
of what is real, whereas in our problem the openness con-
there no more than a single thing, this thing would yet
cerns the very character of reality. In this sense, the
open the field. It is fitting to repeat this idea, already
closed essences themselves are, as reality, open essences.
studied {19} in Part II, to bring the problem of Part III
In virtue of this, the formality of reality has, besides into focus.
its individual moment, a moment of openness toward
But the formality of reality is also open insofar as it
something beyond the reality considered individually.
is the formality of reality pure and simple. This aspect, in
That is to say, a thing, by being real, exceeds or goes be-
which each real thing opens up the arena of pure and sim-
yond itself in a certain way. {18} This moment of going
ple reality, is what constitutes the world. The world is not
beyond or excendence is grounded in the openness of the
the conjunction of all real things (that would be the cos-
formality of reality. Every thing, by virtue of being real, is
mos), nor is it what the word means when we say that
what it is; and considered according to its own reality, is
everyone lives in his own world; rather, it is the mere
in some way being more than itself.
character of reality pure and simple. I repeat what we just
Now, just on account of this character of excedence, said about the field: were there but one single thing, there
the reality of each real thing is formally respective qua would still be a world. What happens is that with there
reality. The respectivity of reality is founded upon exce- being perhaps many—one would have to investigate—the
dence. Everything real qua real is constitutively respective world is the unity of all real things in their character of
in its own, formal character of reality. Openness grounds pure and simple reality.
excedence, and excedence grounds respectivity. Here I
Real things intellectively known in primordial ap-
shall use the terms ‘excedence’ and ‘respectivity’ indis-
prehension and in field intellection are not just such-and-
criminately, and I shall also speak of respective excedence
such real things. Upon intellectively knowing them, I do
and of excedent respectivity.
not intellectively know only that they are such-and-such;
Although what I am going to say of this respective rather, upon knowing that, I also intellectively know, at
excedence also concerns each real thing in its reality, one and the same time, that they are mere realities, that
nonetheless as it affects our present problem I shall refer they are pure and simple reality. Now, reality as reality is

247
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constitutively open, is transcendentally open. In virtue of Our present question is to conceptualize what this
this openness, reality is a formality in accordance with progress is.
which nothing is real except as open to other realities and
a) Above all, I repeat, it is a progression “from” the
even to the reality of itself. That is, every reality is con-
real, i.e., from an effective intellection. This intellection
stitutively respective qua reality.
is not necessarily just the primordial apprehension of
Thus all real things have, qua purely and simply something; but it is always an intellection in which we
real, a unity of respectivity. And this unity of respectivity have already intellectively known—or at least have sought
of the real qua real is what constitutes the world. Reality to intellectively know—what that real thing is in reality.
is not a transcendental concept, nor is it a concept real- The point of departure is the entire primordial apprehen-
ized transcendentally in each real thing; rather, it is a real sion of the real, and of what this real is in reality with all
and physical moment, i.e., transcendentality is {20} just the affirmations which constitute this intellection. The
the openness of the real qua real. And qua unity of re- progression is then always progression from the great in-
spectivity, reality is the world. tellective richness of the real.
Let us not, then, confuse world and cosmos. There b) The real opens reality from itself in the impres-
may be many cosmoi in the world, but there is only one sion of reality; it is the openness of the moment of reality.
single world. World is the transcendental function of the With that, this moment of reality is made autonomous in a
field and of the whole cosmos. dimension other than that of individuality. And being
made autonomous has two aspects. One is the aspect of
Field and world are not, then, identical; but neither
this reality by which real things constitute a field; it is the
are they independent. Upon knowing intellectively and
constitutive moment in which the logos moves. In this
sentiently this real thing, I intellectively know, sentiently,
movement of the logos, the moment of reality has a very
at one and the same time, that this thing is a moment of
precise function: it is the medium of intellection. But the
the pure and simply real. In the field we already know the
moment of reality is autonomous in another respect. The
world intellectively. Conversely, pure and simple reality,
impression of reality apprehends not only real things, but
the world, is as I just said, the transcendental function of
also that each real thing is pure and simple reality; it is
the field. And in this respect—and only in this one—can
openness not only to the field but to the world. A real
one say that the field is the world as sensed. Therefore
thing is apprehended not according to what it is “in real-
strictly speaking one should say that in an impressive way
ity” but according to what it is “in reality itself”. One
the world is also sensed qua world. But its impression of
goes from real things and their field to the world: {22}
reality is the same as that of this real thing sensed in and
this is the progression we are speaking of. In this open-
by itself or sensed within a field. Nonetheless the two are
ness, reality has been made autonomous: not only is it the
not identical because the field is always limited to the
medium, but it is also something intellectively known by
things that are in it. If the group of things in the field is
itself. Reality, then, has another function which is very
augmented or diminished, the field expands or contracts.
precise: it is the measure of what, in the world, the reality
On the other hand the world is, always and essentially,
is which is going to be intellectively known. In fact, as
open. Whence it is not susceptible to expansion or con-
one’s point of departure is real things and what these
traction, but to distinct realizations of respectivity, i.e., to
things are in reality, one progresses from these intellec-
distinct transcendental richness. This transcendental
tions while gathering in them another intellection, more
richness is what we shall call “world making” or “mundi-
or less explicit, of what real being is. To be sure, it is a
fication”. The field dilates or contracts, the world mundi-
being-real which concerns the things included in the field
fies. The world is open not only because we do not know
and therefore encompassed by it. But this being-real goes
what things there are or can be in it; it is open above all
beyond those real things qua “real”. Hence it follows that
because no thing, however precise and detailed its consti-
in the previous intellection of these things, we have al-
tution, is reality “itself” as such.
ready intellectively known in some form what it is to be
Now, in this respect, intellectively knowing a real real. And then reality is no longer just the medium of
thing is {21} intellectively knowing it open to ... what we intellection but is the measure of what is going to be in-
do not intellectively know, and perhaps shall never know, tellectively known as purely and simply real in openness.
what might be in reality itself. Therefore intellection of a As this openness of the real qua real is the world, it fol-
thing qua worldly is not just a mere movement among lows that ultimately the field itself has been provisionally
things, but a progression toward the unknown and per- converted into the measure of what is going to be intellec-
haps even toward meaninglessness or nothingness. tively known in the open world, into the measure of what
 WHAT IS PROGRESSION? 249

is going to be intellectively known in the open world, viz. of the logos is a movement quite well defined: it is move-
what a thing is in reality itself. To progress in this open ment of retraction and affirmative reversion within the
world is to move ourselves into a “formal” intellection, things of the field. But progression is another type of
rather than a “provisional” one, of what it is to be real. movement. It is not movement within the field of reality
As the world is formally a world open from reality, real but movement toward the real beyond any field at all.
things intellectively known in the field seek to determine a Therefore progress is a search for reality. It is intellectus
progression of what things are in reality. quaerens. And because of this, though every progression
is a movement, not every movement is progression, be-
c) Thus progression is the movement which leads not
cause not every intellective movement is a search for real-
from some real things to others, but from the field of all
ity. To be sure, no movement is haphazard and chaotic.
real things toward the world of pure and simple reality.
The movement of retraction and affirmation is grounded
The terminus of this “toward” in its new function has a
upon the actualization of what something already real is
complex character, as we shall see shortly. On one hand, it
in reality among other things of the field, and is necessar-
is {23} a “toward” other real things outside the field; and
ily determined by said actualization. In progression,
thus progression on one hand will be an effort to expand
movement is grounded and determined in measured fash-
the field of reality. But on the other hand, when we intel-
ion by the previous intellection of pure and simple reality.
lectively know, in the field of reality, what real things are
One “affirms” what is, in the reality of the world, some-
encompassed by it, we have intellectively known—per-
thing already actualized in an apprehension that is pri-
haps without realizing it—what it is to be purely and sim-
mordial and in the field. One seeks reality {24} within
ply real. Then progression is a progression in a world
reality itself, beyond real sensed things, according to a
which is open not only to other real things as signs, but
measure of reality. It is a radical search in a world open
also to other possible forms and modes of reality qua real-
in itself. Progression is being opened to the unfathomable
ity. And this is very important as well as decisive.
richness and problematic nature of reality, not only in its
In summary, progression is not just a movement. own notes but also in its forms and modes of reality.
Nonetheless movement and progress have an intrinsic
Here, then, we have what progress is: the search for
unity: this unity is formally in the “toward” of the impres-
reality. But this progression is intellective. And then we
sion of reality.
may ask ourselves not only what intellective progression is
This difference between movement and progression in itself, but what is the properly intellective part of this
has a very precise character. The intellective movement progression.
{25}

CHAPTER III

PROGRESSION QUA INTELLECTION

What is intellective knowing as search? Here we {27} §1

have the key question. Intellective knowing as search is
not being in search of an intellection, but a search in ACTIVITY OF INTELLECTIVE KNOWING QUA
which one intellectively knows while searching and by the ACTIVITY: THINKING
search itself. This brings up a multitude of problems,
because searching is clearly an activity of intellective Seeking, I said, is an activity of intellective knowing.
knowing which should be considered from two points of And in order to understand it one must begin by concep-
view. Above all it is an activity, but not just any activity; tualizing what activity is. Only then can we say in what,
it is an activity of intellective knowing. As I see it, this properly, the thinking character of this activity consists.
activity of intellective knowing qua activity is what should These are the two points with which we must occupy our-
be termed thinking. But one ought to consider as well the selves.
activity of intellective knowing in the structure of its in-
tellection. This act of intellection has its own intrinsic 1
structure and constitutes a mode of intellection determined
by the activity of thinking. Thus intellective knowing not What is Activity?
only has the character of activity, but is also a mode of
I am referring now to the concept of activity in gen-
intellection as such. The activity determines intellection
eral. To reach the goal it is necessary to refer to notions
as such, and intellection in turn determines the activity.
about which we have been speaking since the beginning of
As a mode of intellection, thinking activity is no longer
the book.
mere thinking but something different; it is reason. Rea-
son is the intellective character of thinking. Thinking and Activity is a mode of action. But not every action is
reason are not the same, but {26} neither are they inde- the action of an activity. Why? Action is always some-
pendent. Rather, they are two aspects of a single act of thing carried out, and only that, regardless of the connec-
intellective knowing as search. The activity of intellective tion between the action and the one doing it; this itself is a
knowing qua determined by a mode of intellection has, we problem with which we have no reason to become in-
may say, intellective character. But qua act which pro- volved here. The carrying out of an act can take on at
ceeds from an activity qua activity, this I shall term the least two different forms, because action has, qua action
activity of intellective knowing. That is what I expressed carried out, two different aspects. On one hand it is,
a few lines back when I said that reason is the intellective purely and simply, an action carried out which has “its”
character of the activity of intellective knowing, i.e., of corresponding act. And then we say that the doer is sim-
thinking. ply in action; this is “being here-and-now in action”.
Thus in the actions of seeing, hearing, walking, eating,
In this manner we have before us two groups of
intellectively knowing, etc., the corresponding “act” is
problems which we must confront:
produced in a formal way. By the fact of producing {28}
this action, the doer (animal or man) is acting in the sense
of being in action. But something different can happen.
§1. The activity of intellective knowing as search,
It can happen that the doer is in action, but not in any
as activity: thinking.
action which yet has its full act or formal content; rather,
§2. The intellective character of thinking activity: the doer is in a type of continuing action and continues an
reason. action which unfolds in different stages. Then we say not

251
252 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

only that “he is here-and-now in action”, but that “he is 2

here-and-now in activity”. Permit me to explain. Activity
is not the carrying out of an action, it is not being in ac- What Is “thinking” activity?
tion, but being in the process of carrying out actions; ac-
tivity is taking action, it is to be here-and-now in the pro-
cess of action. Activity is not simply an action but an ac- Activity is not pure and simple action, but is taking
tion which, I repeat, consists in being here-and-now tak- action in relation to a formal content of its own. And here
ing action in a way more or less continual and continued. this content is intellective knowing. The activity of intel-
Taking action here does not refer to what is carried out— lective knowing is what we formally term thinking. {30}
as if taking action meant that the corresponding act is be- Thinking, to be sure, is not just about what things
ing sustained, etc. Taking action does not refer to what is are from a point of view which is, so to speak, theoretical.
carried out, but only to the doer of the action. Someone One does not think only about the reality of what we call
can be acting in a dragged-out manner in a single action. “things”; rather, one also thinks for example about what
This is not activity. Activity certain has something of one must do, about what one is going to say, etc. This is
action, but such action does not even its act without true. But even in this order, that about which one thinks
something more, something which leads to the act, be- is what it might be that he is going to realize, what might
cause activity consists in being here-and-now in action. that be that he is really going to say. In thinking there is
Activity which has something of action is, nonetheless, always a moment of reality and therefore a formal mo-
not by itself action with its act. This taking action, which ment of intellective knowing. Conversely, this intellective
is at one and the same time more than action from a cer- knowing is an intellective knowing in activity, not simple
tain point of view, and less than action from another actualization of the real. In order to have simple actuali-
(since by itself it does not have its complete act), this zation it is not necessary to have thinking, because the
strange taking action, I say, is precisely activity. In activ- actualization is already, without further ado, intellection.
ity one is involved in that action which is not only pro- But one thinks just in order to have actualization. This
ducing actions but producing them by taking action. All intellective knowing, which by virtue of being so is al-
activity involves action (since it leads to actions), although ready actualization, but actualization in progression, in
not every action is carried out by a doer in activity. {29} the form of taking, this intellective knowing, I say, is just
It is necessary to forcefully reject the idea that the the activity which we call thinking. In thinking one goes
superior form of taking action is activity. On the contrary, on intellectively knowing, one goes on actualizing the
activity is only a modality of action, and ultimately is the real, but in a thinking manner.
successor of a full action. The fullness consists, in fact, of The character of thinking activity is determined by
having its “act”. And activity is activity in the order of the real which is open in itself qua real. Only because the
achieving this act. Thus, to be living or to be in move- real is open is it possible and necessary to intellectively
ment is not activity, but simply action, because in them the know it openly, i.e., in thinking activity. In virtue of this,
doer is only in action. But on the other hand, looking thinking activity has some moments proper to it which it
from side to side or being in physical agitation are activi- is essential to point out and conceptualize rigorously.
ties. Thus, being in action and being in activity are not
a) Above all, thinking is an intellective knowing
the same. Activity is thus taking action; it is something
which is open through the real itself, i.e., it is the search
on the order of that action which is the only thing which
for something beyond what I already intellectively know.
the “act” has, act in the double sense of being “the act”
Thinking is always thinking beyond. If this were not so,
and of being its full, formal content. It is this which I
there would be neither the possibility nor the necessity of
term ‘act’ in the strict sense; and therefore I call this
thinking. But it is necessary to stress that this beyond is a
character ‘actuity’. Actuity is not the same thing as actu-
beyond in relation to the very character of reality. We are
ality. I call ‘actuality’ the character of act, whereas actuity
not dealing only with the search for other things—that
consists, as I see it, in the real being present in itself qua
animals do as well—but with searching for real things.
real. To know intellectively is not formally actuity but
{31} What the animal does not do is to investigate, so to
actualization.
speak, the reality of the real. But we investigate not just
Now, searching is the activity of intellective know- to find real things, but also to find in these same real
ing. It is what we term ‘thinking activity’. Let us then things, already known intellectively before thinking, what
ask ourselves, In what does the thinking character of this they are in reality. And this is a form of the “beyond”.
activity consist? Thinking is above all “thinking toward” the “real which
 PROGRESSION QUA INTELLECTION 253

lies beyond”. Now, three directions for the “toward” this happen? Intellective knowing is just actualizing the
spring into view, determined by the progress toward the real. Therefore the real intellectively known is something
beyond. The beyond is, in the first place, what is outside which is given as reality; it is a datum. What is this da-
the field of reality. Thinking is above all to go on intel- tum? The datum is above all a “datum of” reality. This
lectively knowing, according to this direction, what is does not mean that the datum is something which some
outside the things we apprehend. Thinking is, in this di- reality beyond the given vouchsafes to us; rather, it means
rection, an activity “toward the outside”. In the second that the datum is the reality itself as given. To be a “da-
place, one could be talking about going to the real as a tum of” reality is to be the “given reality” qua reality.
simple noticing, and go from it toward that which is noted Rationalism in all its forms (and on this point Kant ac-
in the real; the beyond is now a “toward what is noted”. cepted Leibniz’ ideas) always conceived that to be given is
In the third place, it can go from what is already appre- to be “given for” some problem, and therefore a datum
hended as real toward what that real is from the inside as given for thinking. This is Cohen’s idea: what is given
reality; it is a progression from the eidos toward the Idea, (das Gegebene) is the subject matter (das Aufgegebene).
as Plato would say. Beyond is here a “toward the inside”. {33} Intellection would be formally a thinking, and as
The “inside” itself is a mode of the “beyond” along the such just a task. But this is impossible. To be sure, what
lines of reality. This is not in any sense a complete cata- we intellectively know of the real is a datum for a problem
log of the primary forms of beyond, if for no other reason which is posed to us for thinking. But this is not the es-
than that we do not always know toward which “beyond” sential point of the question, either with respect to the idea
the real may point and direct us. I have only sought to of the “given” or the idea of the “datum for”. Above all,
emphasize certain particular lines of special immediate this is because in order to be a “datum for”, the given has
importance. to start by being a “datum of” reality. The real is, then, a
“datum of” reality and a “datum for” thinking. What is
b) Thinking, we said, intellectively knows, in activ-
this “and”, i.e., what is the intrinsic unity of these two
ity, the real “beyond”. Therefore, in virtue of intellec-
forms of datum? It is not a unity which is merely addi-
tively knowing in openness, thinking is an inchoate intel-
tive; nor is it that the datum is a “datum of” and also a
lection. This is the inchoative character of intellective
“datum for”. Rather, it is a “datum for” precisely and
knowing as thinking. It is not something merely concep-
formally because it is a “datum of”. Why? Because the
tive, but something which concerns the progress of intel-
datum of reality gives us reality in its intrinsic and formal
lective knowing in a very important way. Every case of
open character qua real. Therefore it follows that the
intellective knowing through thinking, by virtue of being
“datum of” is eo ipso a “datum for” what is beyond the
inchoate, opens a path. I shall return to this point and
given. And then it is clear that rationalism not only has
discuss it at length later. For now it {32} suffices to em-
not taken account of the “datum of”, but moreover has a
phasize that there are paths which in fact deviate from the
false idea of the “datum for”, because it believes that the
reality of things. And this is because there are paths
reference to thinking is that for which the datum is given,
which do not seem to differ among themselves except very
and which constitutes it as a “datum for”. Now, this is
subtly, almost infinitesimally; it would be enough to just
wrong. The “datum for” is a moment of the actuality of
lean a bit to one side or the other to go onto one or the
the real in its openness “beyond”. There is therefore a
other of the paths. And this is just what thinking does.
double error in rationalism: in the first place, it stumbles
Nonetheless, these diverse paths, which inchoatively are
over the “datum of”; and in the second, in having inter-
so close, and which therefore can seem equivalent, may
preted the “datum for” as a datum for a problem, whereas
lead to quite disparate intellections when extended, intel-
in fact the “datum for” is first and foremost a form of ac-
lections which may be absolutely incompatible. That ini-
tualizing the field in its openness beyond and not the form
tially slight oscillation can lead to realities and modes of
of intellectively knowing the real. Because the “datum
reality which are essentially diverse. And the fact is that
for” is a moment of field reality “beyond”, and only be-
thinking is constitutively inchoate. A thought is never
cause of this, can it be a {34} datum for a problem. The
just a point at which one arrives, but also intrinsically and
openness of reality qua merely actualized in intellective
constitutively a new point of departure. What is intellec-
knowing is the intrinsic and radical unity of the two forms
tively known through thinking manner is something in-
of datum, datum-of and datum-for. Ordinary language
tellectively known, but inchoatively open beyond itself.
expresses this intrinsic unity of being a datum with an
c) Thinking is not only open beyond what is intel- expression which is not only fortunate but which, taken
lectively known and in an inchoate form, but is an intel- rigorously, manifests the unitary structure of the two
lective knowing activated by reality qua open. How does forms of datum: things give us pause to think. The real is
254 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

not only given in intellection, but it gives us pause to into activity, but also determine the active character itself
think. This “giving” is, then, the radical unity of the two of intellective knowing. We are intellectively active be-
forms of datum in the real.* And this giving us pause to cause things activate us to be so. This does not mean that
think is just intellectively knowing in thinking activity. that activity does not have in and by itself a specific char-
Thinking activity is not only open to the beyond in incho- acter (as we shall see below), which might easily lead to
ate form, but is constituted as such an activity by the real the error of believing that thinking is a spontaneous activ-
itself which was previously known intellectively. From ity. But the truth is that it is not spontaneous; rather, pri-
this point of view, thinking activity has some quite essen- mary intellection, and therefore the real itself, are what
tial aspects which it is necessary to stress. makes us, in a certain way, to be spontaneous. To give us
pause to think is, in fact, something given by real things;
c.1) Above all, regardless of what it is that things
but what the real things give us is just “to think”. In the
may give us pause to think, being an activity is not what is
first respect, thinking is not spontaneous; but it can seem
formally constitutive of intellection. In and by itself, in-
to be so in a certain way, albeit erroneously, by virtue of
tellective knowing is not activity. To be sure, intellective
the second respect. Without {36} things there would be no
knowing can be found in activity, but it “isn’t” activity,
thinking; but with those things already intellectively
and moreover the activity is subsequent to the intellective
known there is a specific activity, “to think”. Thought,
knowing. The primary intellection of the real in its dou-
one might say, proceeds from real things by the “having to
ble aspect of being “real” and of being “in reality” is not
think” which these things “give” us pause to think about.
activity. Affirming is not activity but just movement; and
This is the radical point which has led to the error of
not every movement is movement in activity. Affirming is
spontaneity.
not activity but movement. Movement will only be activ-
ity when the primary intellection, in virtue of what is al- c.3) Thinking activity is an intellective knowing ac-
ready intellectively known as real, is activated by what is tivated by the things which give us pause to think. And
intellectively known itself. And it will be so precisely this, as I already indicated, is an intrinsic necessity of our
because what is intellectively known is open reality qua intellection in a field, because the openness of their reality
reality. To be in the action or process of intellectively is that by which things give us pause to think. Nonethe-
knowing by means of sight is not to be in activity, but it less, this is inadequate. It is necessary to add that this
can turn into activity. {35} Thinking, then, is not some- openness is not simply the openness of respectivity in the
thing primary but is consequent upon the primary intel- world; rather, it is this same openness qua apprehended in
lection. What is primary, and indeed chronologically the field manner. If this were not true, there would not be
primary, is the intellection. thinking activity. Simple respectivity in the world is the
open character of reality itself. If intellective knowing
c.2) In virtue of this, thinking activity is not only not
were not sentient, this openness would be intellectively
primary but does not even arise from itself. It has been
known, as is usually said, by an intuitive intelligence, as
commonly said (as in Leibniz and Kant) that thinking is a
just a note of reality. In this case intellective knowing
spontaneous activity, in contrast to sensibility, which can
would not be of the thinking type. But the openness is
be merely receptive; thinking in that case would be spon-
given to us sentiently, i.e., within a field. Thus its intel-
taneity. But this is false for two reasons.
lection is “trans-field”, “beyond”, i.e., is a progression.
Above all, it is false because true human sensibility And this progression is thus thinking activity. The possi-
is not just receptive and not just a receiving of affections, bility and necessity of thinking activity are then intrinsi-
but is the physical presentation of what is impressing as cally and formally determined by sentient intellection.
real, i.e., otherness, intellective sensibility. But that is not
In summary, thinking activity is not just a particular
what is important to me now, which is rather to insist on
case of the activity of a living man; i.e., we are not saying
the fact that thinking is not an activity which spontane-
that human reality is activity, and that therefore every-
ously arises out of itself. And it does not do so because
thing human—including thinking—involves an activity.
the intelligence is constituted in activity only as a result of
This is false in two ways. First, not every action of a liv-
the datum of open reality. It is things which give us pause
ing man is the {37} result of an activity; as we have seen,
to think, and therefore it is they which not only put us
action and activity are not the same. Activity is taking
action, something different than doing an action. The life
* of a living man is de suyo action, that action in which the
[This is the closest translation of the Spanish idiomatic expression dan que
living being realizes and fulfills himself while being in
pensar; Zubiri is emphasizing the commonality of the word gives, da, in
the two cases.—trans.] possession of himself. But this action is not therefore ac-
 PROGRESSION QUA INTELLECTION 255

tivity. It will be so only when the action is activated. stitutes reason. Reason is the intellective character of
Now, this can take place in many different ways, and that thinking, and in this sense is the thinking intellection of
is the second reason why the conception of thinking ac- the real. Thinking and reason are but two aspects of a
tivity as just a particular case of a presumed general ac- single activity, but as aspects they are formally distinct:
tivity is false. With regard to what concerns the intelli- one thinks in accordance with reason, and one intellec-
gence, the activator of the activity is the real itself qua tively knows in thinking reason. The two aspects are not
real; the real is the what arouses the taking of action, by mutually opposed, as if we were dealing with the fact that
virtue of being actuality in sentient intellection, and some subjective mental activity (such as thinking) man-
therefore open. And this taking, this activity, is thinking. aged to reach the real (e.g. by reason) from which it was
As I said earlier, in Part I, it is not that life forces me to previously excluded. This is not the case. To be sure, I
intellectively know, but rather that intelligence, by virtue have a thinking activity which is merely psychical by
of being sentient intellection, forces me to live thinking. which I can, for example, turn over my thoughts. But
Whence thinking activity forms part of the intellection of turning over thoughts is not thinking. Thinking is always
reality, not just intrinsically but also formally. As intellec- (and only) thinking in the real and indeed already inside
tion is actualization of reality, it follows that thinking is a the real. One thinks and one knows intellectively while
mode of actualization of reality. One does not think thinking in accordance with reason. It is this thinking
“about” reality but “in” reality, i.e., as already inside it intellection of the real, then, which should be called ‘rea-
and based upon what, positively, has already been intel- son’.
lectively known of it. Thinking is an intellective knowing
The real as previously known intellectively propels
which not only intellectively knows the real, but does so
us, then, to know intellectively in another way, viz. to
searching based on a previous intellection of reality and
know intellectively while thinking. But that real from
progressing in and from it. Thinking, as the activity of
which we start is not just a point of departure which we
intellective knowing that it is, formally involves that
leave behind; rather, it is the positive support for our pro-
which activates it, viz. reality. And it is not just that real-
gression in its search. Thinking intellection, in its {40}
ity activates the intelligence in that form of activity which
intellective character, is reason; it is essentially and con-
comprises thinking; but that intellectively knowing reality
stitutively a progression based upon an intrinsic support.
qua activating is an intrinsic and formal moment of
It is a support in which we have already intellectively
thinking activity itself. {38} In virtue of this, thinking
known the real. And in its intellective progress, reason
already possesses in itself, actually and physically, the
must go on by newly actualizing the real in a cautious
reality in which and in accordance with which one thinks.
manner, i.e., by going over its steps again and again. And
This is what we are going to see.
it is precisely on account of this that that the activity is
called ‘thinking’ or pensare [in Latin], a word closely
{39} related etymologically to ‘weighing’ or pesare. Thinking
has the intellective character of a repeated weighing of the
§2 real “in” reality itself in order to go “toward” the real
which is inside of that reality. Thinking is weighing in-
THINKING ACTIVITY QUA INTELLECTIVE: tellectively. One weighs reality; one weighs it over and
REASON* over. And this intellective weighing of reality is just rea-
soning, explanation. Thus we speak of “weighty reasons”.
The reality which reason must achieve is not, then, naked
reality—that was already done in primordial apprehension
Thinking activity, thinking, has intellective charac-
and also in the subsequent field affirmations. The reality
ter. I have already said that I call the internal structure of
which reason must achieve is reality weighed over and
thinking intellection its ‘intellective character’. Through
over. What then is that previous installation in the real?
thinking, thinking activity acquires an intellective char-
In order to answer this question, we must confront three
acter which is determined in its intellection. Now, by
serious issues:
virtue of its formally intellective character, thinking con-

1. What is reason?
*
[Readers should bear in mind that the Spanish word for reason, razón, like
its Latin root ratio, has a broader meaning than just the reasoning process; 2. The scope of reason.
it also encompasses what we in English would call ‘explanation’. This
should be borne in mind throughout the remainder of the book.—trans.] 3. Reason and reality.
256 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

I field are the very same things which “give us pause to

think”. And this giving us pause to think is, on one hand,
WHAT IS REASON? a being led to intellectively know what is “beyond”, but on
the other consists in being led to the beyond by the inexo-
We have just answered the question: it is the think- rable force of the intellection of what is on this side, so to
ing intellection of the real. But this is just a generality. speak. And it is in this that the “giving us pause to think”
To make it precise, it is necessary to clarify that intellec- consists. To give pause to think is a sensed intellective
tion in two of its essential aspects. This intellection, in necessity, by virtue of which the things in the field direct
fact, is mine above all. Of that there is not the slightest us to what is beyond. The beyond is above all the “to-
doubt. Reason is {41} above all my reason. But on the ward” itself as a moment of the impression of reality. But
other hand, it is undeniably a reason about real things this “toward” is not just an additional moment. The “to-
themselves. Therefore if we wish to clarify what reason ward” is, in fact, a mode of sensed reality qua reality.
is, we see ourselves constrained to examine successively Whence it follows that the real not only directs us to
what is reason as my intellection, and what is reason as something other, but does so by virtue of being already
the reason or explanation of things; only in this manner real in that “toward” which it directs us. That is, the “to-
will we understand, in a unitary way, just what reason is. ward”, as a mode of reality acquires, as we saw in Part II,
the character of a “through” or “by”. Therefore the “be-
1 yond” is not something which is just other, but is other
“through” being “on this side” what it is. It is not a “de-
Reason as Mine duction” but the very impression of reality in the “toward”
as a moment of what is on this side. And this character is
Naturally, “mine” does not here refer to something
the “through” as sensed physically. What is not in the
subjective. Nor does it mean that reason is just a simple
field is intellectively known in order to be able to better
activity of mine, that activity which we call ‘thinking’,
know intellectively what is in it. And the “beyond” con-
because thinking is formally the activity of intellective
sists in a positive way in this: in being something to which
knowing, whereas reason (including my reason) is an in-
that “on this side” precisely and formally leads us in order
tellective character of intellection itself. It is the formal
to be able to better know intellectively the “on this side”
character of an intellection brought about in thinking in-
itself. Thus we have here just the opposite of a simple
tellection. This means, then, that we are referring only to
additional item. And in virtue of that, intellectively
a mode of intellection, and therefore to something which
knowing the beyond is intellectively knowing what, {43}
concerns intellection itself as such. To speak of my reason
ultimately, is on this side. That which gives us pause to
means only that reason is something which modally con-
think is what, ultimately, is intellectively known in the
cerns intellection.
field. This “ultimately” can be the interior of each thing,
Reason as a mode of intellection has three essential but it can also be other things external to the field.
moments: it is in-depth intellection; it is intellection as Nonetheless, in both cases what is intellectively known
measuring; and it is intellection as or while searching. beyond is always intellectively known precisely and for-
mally as that without which the content of what is “on this
First moment. Thinking intellection is an intellec-
side” would not be the reality that it is. This is intellective
tion of something “beyond” the field of reality. I have
knowing in the “through”. And it is in this “through”
already pointed out that “beyond” does not formally des-
that the “in-depth” consists. To go to the beyond is to get
ignate only other things which are “outside” of the field.
to the bottom of real things, to understand them “in
“Beyond” is also that or those aspects of things within the
depth”. And this “in depth” or ultimate nature, intellec-
field, but aspects which are not themselves formally in it.
tively known, is just my explanation of them. Only by
What, specifically, is this “beyond”? That is the essential
intellectively knowing this ultimate nature will I intellec-
point. One does not think about the {42} “beyond” in
tively know the real things of the field. In-depth is thus
some capricious way, because it is not the case that one
not a type of indiscernible profundity, but only the intel-
intellectively knows things or aspects which are outside of
lection of what, ultimately, real things are. Thus, an elec-
the field “besides” having intellectively known field
tromagnetic wave or a photon is what, ultimately, color is.
things. It is not, then, that there is an intellection on this
Their intellection is thus intellection in profundity.
side of the field and “besides” that another “beyond” the
field. On the contrary, one thinks about the reality beyond Now, reason or explanation is above all the intellec-
precisely and formally because the things which are in the tion of the real in depth. Only as an explanation of color
 PROGRESSION QUA INTELLECTION 257

is there intellection of electromagnetic waves or photons. son is not just {45} intellection of the real in depth, but
The color which gives us pause to think is what leads us rather measuring intellection of the real in depth.
to the electromagnetic wave or to the photon. If it were
This requires somewhat more detailed analysis.
not for this giving us pause to think, there would be no
Every measuring is based upon a measurement standard
intellection of a beyond whatsoever; there would be at
or “metric” with which one measures. What is this met-
most a succession of intellections “on this side”. And I
ric? What is the intellective measure of the real according
am not referring only to the type of “beyond” discussed
to this metric? To answer these questions, it is necessary
above, because the beyond is not just a theoretical concept,
to recall that thinking intellection, my reason, is an intel-
as are the wave and the photon. The beyond can also be
lection which is based upon what we have previously
what forges a novel; we would not create the novel if the
known intellectively in the field. Only by returning to this
real did not give us pause to think. The same could be
point of previous intellection will we be able to investigate
said of poetry: the poet poetizes because things give him
the questions A) What is the metric? And B) What is the
pause to think. And that which he thus thinks of them is
intellective measure of the real in depth?
his poetry. That what is intellectively known in this man-
ner is a reality which is theoretically conceptualized, a A) My thinking intellection, my reason, does not in-
reality in fictional form, or a poetic reality, does not tellectively know reality as a medium but as something
change the essence of intellection as reason. {44} A already known intellectively, in a positive way, in a prior
metaphor is one type of reasoning about things, among field intellection. This is an essential difference. If one
others. What is intellectively known of the beyond is wishes, reason intellectively knows reality itself not as
purely and simply the intellection of what things “on this light (that would be reality as a medium) but as a source
side”, in being intellectively known, give us pause to of light (i.e., reality as measure). And this is a peculiar
think. Therefore the intellection of the beyond is reason intellection, because in it one intellectively knows reality
or explanation; it is intellection of the real in depth. But by itself, to be sure, but not as some additional thing.
reason, explanation, has still other essential constitutive Rather, one knows it as something which I shall term “re-
moments. ality ground”; reality is the grounding of thinking intel-
lection qua grounding. That is what I term a principle.
Second moment. Reason, as I said, is intellection of
The intellection of formality is reality as a source of light,
the real in depth; but this reason is brought to fulfillment
as a measure; this is the intellection of reality as a princi-
in the reality “on this side” which has already been intel-
ple. Under this aspect reason is intellection as a measur-
lectively known. This reality previously known is not a
ing principle of reality in depth. We shall continue to take
simple “medium” of intellection, but something different.
a firmer grasp of the concept of reason as a mode of in-
It is the “measure” of intellection. The fact is that every
tellection. To clarify it, let us state first of all what it is to
reality is a reality which is constitutively measured qua
be a principle; and secondly, investigate what the princi-
real. What does this mean?
ple of thinking intellection or reason is; and thirdly, clar-
Everything real is constitutively respective qua real. ify in a rigorous way the nature of this intellection as
This respectivity is the world. World is the unity of re- principle. {46}
spectivity of the real as real. Everything real is, then, the
a) What is it to be a principal, and how is the princi-
world precisely and formally by being real, i.e., by its
ple given to us? Reality as a principle is clearly reality as
formality of reality. In virtue of this, that worldly respec-
ground; and as such, the ground is a “by” or a “through”.
tivity turns back upon each real thing, so to speak, in a
Now, to be a ground is always and only to be the ground
very precise way: each thing is presented to us as a form
of something else, of the field; it is, I repeat, a “by”. This
and a mode of reality determined according to formality in
other thing, qua grounded, is something to which the so-
respectivity. This determination is just the measure. Thus
called ground is open; it is a “by” as open. And con-
reality is not just the constitutive formality of the “in it-
versely, the ground then has the formal and intrinsic mo-
self”, of the de suyo; but rather the measure in accordance
ment of openness. It is on account of this that it grounds;
with which each real thing is real, is “in its own right”, de
ground is above all foundation.* But that is not all, be-
suyo. Measure is not the unity of relation of real things;
on the contrary, measure is, in each thing, consequent
*
upon its respectivity as sich. Only because reality as real- [The Spanish word fundar is here translated as “to ground”, in accordance
ity is respective, and only because of this, is its formality a with normal English usage; however, this makes it impossible to track all
derivatives of the word in Spanish, since some of them must be translated
measure of its own reality. The real is reality but meas- differently into English, such as fundación, “foundation”, which does not
ured in its reality by its own formality of reality. So, rea- derive from “to ground”.—trans.]
258 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

cause being a ground is a very precise and determinate or against, “ob” something other. Therefore I call it
mode of grounding; a grounding principle is only one ground-reality. This is not, I repeat, a relation added to
mode of ground-ability. Now, what grounds does so when its character of real, but its intrinsic and formal mode of
it grants to what is grounded its own character of reality: being real. In the object, the real is actualized in {48} the
a) from itself (i.e., from what is grounding), and b) when form of being “against” (ob)—as we shall see forthwith—,
upon granting it the grounded reality is realizing itself whereas here reality is actualized in its own way, that of
precisely and formally by and in the reality of the thing really grounding. It is, if one wishes, a presenting of the
doing the grounding. The ground passes fundamentally real not as something which “just is there”, but as “being
into the grounded. That which is grounding has not only there as grounding”. This is the reality apprehended pre-
grounded the real but is doing so intrinsically and for- cisely as a principle, i.e., principle-reality. Its mode of
mally. That which is grounded is then real in a funda- actualization is to be actualized in the form of a “by”, as
mental way. It is in this that being principle formally grounding.
consists, as I see it. A principle is not just a beginning, b) Granting this, is reality the fundamental principle
nor is it the mere “from where” (the hothen) as Aristotle of thinking intellection? Definitely it is. Reality, in fact,
thought; rather, it is that which is doing the grounding is apprehended as reality constitutively open qua reality.
making itself real from itself, in and by itself, in the real If reality were not open there would be no thinking intel-
qua real. The principle is so only inasmuch as it is intrin- lection because there would be no “beyond”. Reality itself
sically “being a principle”, i.e., making itself real as a would be only real things. But since reality itself is open,
principle. it is reality itself, previously known intellectively in sen-
How is the principle of intellection given to us? tient fashion, which thrusts us from itself “toward” the
When that which is the ground is the very character of beyond in an intellective search; i.e., reality is grounding.
reality, i.e., when the ground is in-depth reality, then its But it is grounding which creates a foundation precisely
intellection is, as I already indicated, {47} very peculiar. because it is reality already actualized in a previous intel-
Reality is no longer naked formality of reality; that naked lection; and it is in this reality that, formally, the real
formality we have intellectively known in every intellec- thing is being newly actualized. Through openness, then,
tion since the primordial apprehension of reality. Reality reality is grounding and foundation of thinking intellec-
is not now naked reality but reality qua grounding. How tion; it is its principle. Reality qua open is what gives us
is this reality qua grounding given? To be sure, it is not pause to think, and this giving is what constitutes reality
reality “itself” as if it were an “object” (let me be permit- as the principle of thinking intellection. The “datum-of” is
ted to use this word for the sake of clarity). A principle is the principle of the “datum-for”. This principle is there-
not some “hidden” thing in what has the principle. If that fore reality. But that must be clarified.
were the case one would intellectively know this “object” In the first place, we are dealing with reality not as
and would “later” add to it a relation, which would there- naked reality but as ground-reality. In the second place,
fore be something extrinsic to the object, viz. the relation reality itself, which comprises this ground-reality, is not
of grounding another object. But such is not the case, the moment of individual reality (qua individual) of each
because if one considers just reality “itself”, its being thing. We have already seen in Parts I and II {49} that
grounded is an intrinsic moment, not an added one. Re- naked reality is the formality of reality. Formality is the
ality “itself”, in fact, is here actualized, is here present to mode of otherness of the de suyo, which has nothing to do
us, not like “the” realities, i.e., like an object-reality, but with what Scholasticism called a “formal” object or Duns
is actualized and present to us in itself and formally as Scotus called ‘formality’. Formality is here the mode of
ground-reality, or if one wishes, as the real ground. This otherness of mere stimulus. This de suyo—let us reiterate
is an essential difference. The ground is reality, but real- even at the risk of being repetitive—does not mean only
ity whose character of reality consists only in really the fact of existence. Rather, it means that both essence
grounding. In the object, the real is “put”, but as and existence, as in classical philosophy, pertain de suyo
“against” (ob): opposite or contraposed to the apprehendor to the thing. Reality is not formally synonymous with
himself and to his apprehension. Here, however, the real- either essence or existence, although nothing is real with-
ity is not “put”, but is here and now “grounding”. Reality out being existent and having essence. This formality of
is not now actualized either as naked reality or as object- reality has two moments. Above all, it has a moment
reality, but precisely as grounding. Reality is actualized which, for lack of a better word, I call ‘individual’; this is
now as real, but the mode of its actuality is as “ground- the formality of reality of each real determinate thing.
ing”, not as “being here-and-now present”, either in itself But when various real things are apprehended, we intel-
 PROGRESSION QUA INTELLECTION 259

lectively know that each of them determines that moment tellection qua intellection, but with what is intellectively
of reality, in accordance with which we say that each thing known or actualized in it, to wit, reality itself. {51} What
is in the field of reality. This is the field moment of the Kant claims is false, viz. that reason is reason or explana-
formality of reality. The formality of reality is thus not tion not of things but only of my knowledge of them.
only individual formality but the ambit or scope of reality.
This principle which is not judgement, I assert, is re-
It is a transcendental scope which encompasses all sensed
ality in its field moment: the de suyo of things within the
or sensible things.
field is what, in them, gives us pause to think. Thus the
This field, qua physically real, is a medium in the reality which reason intellectively knows is not naked
intellection, a medium of intellection. The field of reality reality, i.e., not reality such as it is intellectively known
as medium is that in which something is intellectively merely as formality of what is apprehended in sentient
known. This happens, for example, in the case of every intellection, but is this same sentient formality in its field
affirmation. But it can happen that the reality is what or ambient moment, apprehended in itself as ground-
leads to what is grounding, to the reality beyond, to the reality.
world of reality itself. Then reality is not a medium but
Therefore, though the content of the reality beyond is
ground-reality; this is the measuring principle of reality in
grounded upon the content of the reality on this side (per-
the beyond. The field reality thus intellectively known is
haps as distinct from it), with respect to what concerns the
now more than a medium of intellection; it does not stop
character of reality, this character is physically identical
{50} being a medium for the intellection of the beyond,
on this side and in the beyond. Consequently the charac-
but it is more than a medium because it leads to the meas-
ter of the reality of the beyond is not founded in re (as a
uring principle. It is unnecessary to repeat that this
Scholastic would say) in the thing on this side, but is
ground-reality is not an object-reality. This reality is that
physically the same thing as that res on this side. The
in accordance with which I intellectively know, in a
world of reality is the same as that of field reality qua re-
thinking manner, the measure: in this consists its being a
ality. It is not the sameness of an objective concept but the
principle. Now, it is on account of this that reality as in-
physical and numerical identity of the scope or ambient of
tellectively known as fundament reality is the principle of
the real. The only thing founded in re is perhaps its own
reason.
content, but not its character as reality. The possible
This principle is not a judgement. The conversion of ground in re does not concern reality itself, only its con-
the principle into a fundamental judgement is one of the tent.
most seriously flawed reincarnations in the history of
Field reality is reality “itself” in the field, reality it-
philosophy. Aristotle called the intellectively known thing
self in its structure on this side; reality “itself” of the
the principle of noein; thus, he tell us, the principle of
world is that same reality in its structure beyond. The two
trigonometry is the triangle. But shortly thereafter this
structures are not independent. Their dependence is
principle is transformed into a primary judgement, in
manifested in their same character. Field respectivity is
large measure by Aristotle himself, who made the judge-
the same as respectivity in the world, but, in a certain way,
ment called the ‘principle of contradiction’ the principle
it is so qua sensed. And by virtue of this sameness field
or the arkhe of his metaphysics. And thus we find it in
reality qua reality propels us to worldly reality. {52} Then
modern philosophy, above all in Leibniz and Kant, who
reality in the world is formally the ground of field reality;
take for ‘principles’ one or several primary judgements.
it is ground-reality. We shall see this in greater detail
They are primary because they announce something upon
below. These structures are always extremely concrete;
which every subsequent intellection is founded. In place
therefore they consist not only in an empty respectivity,
of the triangle we now have a fundamental judgement.
but also in a content, however problematic it may be,
With this, the function of the principle becomes that of a
which intrinsically pertains to the respectivity itself.
primary rule or norm of every intellection. This is what
has sent philosophy along the paths of mere logic. But it c) Let us clarify this idea a bit more. The ground-
is unacceptable. A principle is reality itself previously reality is that in accordance with which the thinking in-
known intellectively in field actuality, but now intellec- tellection measures; it is just what constitutes the being of
tively known as the ground-reality of every subsequent a “principle”. In this respect, reason is intellection as a
intellection. It is necessary to return to the original principle. To be sure, the principle which constitutes rea-
meaning of ‘principle’: it is not a judgement but a prior son as a principle is what we can call the ultimate princi-
intellection of reality itself. Naturally—and I shall return ple. Permit me to explain. Every thinking intellection is
to this shortly—we are not concerned with this prior in- based upon something, and this something is by itself a
260 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

principle of intellection. Thus, returning to the example intellectively know, physically, “the” reality in reason.
of Aristotle, the triangle is the principle of trigonometric And this is the principle of reason. Therefore reality as
intellection. But this does not mean that in its turn, the {54} principle is in reason not only objectively, but really.
triangle cannot be something whose own intellection is It is not something which needs to be achieved by reason,
based upon the intellection of, for example, perpendicu- as if we were dealing with some passing from a concept of
lars and angles. Then these latter are the principles of reality to the real part of things; rather, the fact is that
intellection of the triangle. This means that a principle reality as physical field is that which intrinsically and
can have its being as a principle only provisionally. But formally pertains to the intellection of the real in reason.
what is it that constitutes the being of the principle of rea- This intellection, this reason, is already physically in that
son itself qua reason? We are not dealing only with trigo- field. Whence a principle is not that concept into which
nometric or some other type of reason, but rather with all others are resolved; rather it is already physical reality
reason qua reason. Now, the principle of all the limited itself in its field moment. This reality as grounding prin-
principles of reason is “reality”, reality in its physical and ciple of reason can also be called ‘reason’, but not by vir-
identical character. And in this sense, I say that reality is tue of being a mode of intellection, only in virtue of being
the ultimate principle, ultimate in the sense that its intel- a real principle of this mode of intellection. In place of an
lection is what constitutes the principle of reason as such. objective concept we have, then, the physical reality of
This is the ultimate nature of being a principle. It does what pertains to the field. Reality qua field reality is, in a
not refer to an ultimate nature which is recurrent in the certain way, the explanation or reason of reason itself.
sense of a causal series or to anything of that nature. Therefore this intellection, I repeat, does not consist in
What then is reality itself as the principle of reason? {53} intellectively knowing how something realizes the objec-
To be sure, the principle is not “being” nor therefore tive concept of reality, but rather in intellectively knowing
“entity”, because reality is something in principle prior to how the physically real field is, qua reality, something
being and all entity. And this is not some triviality, as if determinate in each real physical thing; it is the intellec-
we were dealing only with a change of words. Being, as I tion of the real itself measured by physical reality in its
see it, is always and only actuality of the real it its respec- own nature as a field. Each real thing, as real, is a mode
tivity qua real, i.e., actuality of the real in the world. On and form of reality as in the world, i.e., it is real as a for-
the other hand, reality is formality of the real as real, i.e., mal individual moment in the field of reality. Therefore
the real as something de suyo. Reality and being are not to intellectively know something as real in the field sense
the same. The proof is in the fact that being has its own is not to intellectively know it “under” the objective con-
modes, which are not formally modes of reality; an exam- cept of reality, but to intellectively know something
ple, as I see it, is temporality. Moreover, being is founded “within” the physical ambit of reality, within the field
upon reality and has its explanation there. There is no moment qua formality of reality. Reality is thus a princi-
esse reale but only realitas in essendo. The principle of ple not only of the intellection of everything real in the
reason as such is, then, not being but reality. Therefore it most profound sense, but the principle of reason itself; it
is strictly false to think that being is the ultimate instance is the reality of what pertains to the field, not as such but
of things—that rather is “reality”. I shall return to this as being the principle measuring of the real. In this re-
problem at greater length. spect—which is {55} certainly the most radical—reason
is intellection precisely as the principle of the real. Hence
This principle is not an objective, analogical, or uni- the usual concept of reason, to wit, “faculty of principles”,
vocal concept. And this is because we are not dealing is for me false because the plural “principles” has no
with the case of reason finding itself compelled to intel- meaning unless one understands by ‘principle’ something
lectively know the real as something which the objective like “fundamental judgement”. And this, as we saw, is
concept of reality makes effective, a concept which would wrong. A principle is not a fundamental judgement, and
be found to be at variance with the diverse categories of therefore there is only a single principle: reality. And
things or predicated univocally of them. Reality is not an because of this, reason is not the faculty of principles but
objective concept, but the intellective actuality of a physi- in-depth intellection of the real through principles.
cal moment of the real, of its own formality of field real-
ity. The field moment of reality is physically real. Insofar The real, I said, is constitutively measured qua real.
as it pertains to the field, it is a sensed moment; but qua And it is because of this that reality has the character of
real it is already an intellectively known moment. Reason principle, viz. that of being its own measure. The real is
is not thrust upon real things by the concept of reality; that which is measured in the field sense in its own for-
rather, physical apprehension of reality itself makes one mality of reality.
 PROGRESSION QUA INTELLECTION 261

With what is this measuring brought about? With a because a person is something different from a stone or a
canon. The intellection of the real in reason is not only via tree not just by virtue of his {57} properties, but by his
principles but also constitutively canonic, i.e., possessing mode of reality; the mode of reality of a person is different
a canon. from the mode of reality of a stone or a tree: the measure
B) Canonic character of intellection via principles. of reality is not that of being a thing.
We have intellectively known the principle, we have ob- I have adduced these examples because they clearly
tained it, in a prior field intellection of the real as real. show that progression is a search not just for new things
This might seem poor, because the reality which we have but also for new forms and new modes of reality. Upon
intellectively known in the field manner is itself appar- intellectively knowing the real in the field sense, we have
ently poor and provisional. This is a question to which I not just intellectively known this or that thing, but also
shall immediately return. But it is in light of what we just what it is that we call ‘real’. These two dimensions
have learned about the principle that we are going to are not independent. Their intrinsic unity is that with
measure the real in the most profound sense, both in re- which the real is measured in thinking activity. The intel-
spect of its content as well as its mode of reality. lective part of this activity consists first and foremost of
Consider some examples to clarify what I just said. thinking in accordance with an intellective measure. That
In the most elemental field of reality we have intellec- reality which is already known intellectively is not a me-
tively apprehended that the material things in it are what dium but a measure, both with respect to what concerns
we term ‘bodies’. In the progression beyond the field it what is real and what concerns that which we call form
has been thought for many centuries that the things “be- and mode of reality. Now, that which is measuring is al-
yond” are also bodies—of another class, {56} to be sure, ways reality in the profound sense. But the measurement
but still bodies. It required the commotion generated by is always brought about by some particular metric. Real-
quantum physics to introduce in a difficult but undeniably ity as the measuring principle is what I term canon of
successful way the idea that the real beyond is not always reality. Here I take the word ‘canon’ in its etymological
a body. Elementary particles, in fact, are not corpuscles sense. The Greek word kanon is formed from another
(neither are they waves in the classical sense, be we leave Greek word kanna which is of Semitic origin (Akhadian
aside this aspect of them) but another class of material qana, Hebrew qaneh) meaning a cane, which served
things. Borne along by the field intellection of things, we among other things as a standard of measure. Reason, the
were disposed to intellectively know the things beyond the intellectus quaerens, bears this canon in its intellection,
field as bodies, different perhaps, but when all was said and with it measures the reality which it seeks, at one and
and done, still bodies. The measure of the real was un- the same time as real thing and as mode of reality.
dertaken with a determinate metric: “body”. Now, the This canon is not a system of norms for measuring
progress toward reality has opened up to us other real the intellection of the real. The concept of canon entered
material things which are not bodies. philosophy with Epicurus and was revived by Kant. For
But this is not all. In the process of intellection of all of this philosophy, the canon was a group of norms
real things within the field there has been decanted into (logical or of some other order). The canon would thus be
intellection not just the intellection that the real things are a system of judgements which regulate {58} the intellec-
bodies, but also and above all the intellection that to be tive measurement of the real. But this, as I see it, is unac-
real is to be a “thing”, in the sense that this word has ceptable, because it makes affirmative predication the very
when one speaks, for example, of “thingness”. That was essence of intellection. And that is wrong. A canon is not
the measure of reality: progression beyond the field was a system of normative judgements but is, as the etymology
brought about by thinking that the measuring reality is a of the word expresses precisely, a “metric”; it is not a
“thing”. An intellection much more difficult than that of judgement nor a system of judgements which regulate
quantum physics was needed in order to understand that affirmative measurement. This “metric” is just what was
the real can be real and still not be a thing. Such, for ex- previously known intellectively as real in its form and in
ample, is the case of person. Then not only was the field its mode of reality. The thinking intellection goes off in
of the real broadened, but that which we might term ‘the search of the real beyond what was previously intellec-
modes of reality’ was also broadened. Being a thing is tively known, based upon the canon of reality already
only one of those modes; being a person is another. Thus known. It is essential to reiterate the main point: a canon
not only has the catalog of real things been changed, i.e., is not the canonic of Epicurus and Kant, but what the
not only has a reality beyond the field been discovered, but word meant when spoken in Greece, for example the
the character of reality itself as a measure has changed, canon of Polycletus.
262 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

This canon, in my opinion, has very precise charac- principle. Whence the canon itself remains open not just
teristics which it is necessary to point out. on account of real things, but also by virtue of the charac-
ter of reality. {60}
Above all, the canon is always concrete; it has the
character of concretness in an essential way. We have In summary, the measure of the real in the intellec-
intellectively known the canon previously upon intellec- tion of reason has an open character which is rooted in
tively knowing the real in the field of reality. And already principles and canonic. It is rooted in principles because
in that case, as I have said, we have intellectively known it deals with reality as a principle; it is canonic because it
not just what each real thing is among others, but also— deals with reality as a canon. The two aspects are insepa-
perhaps without realizing it—what it is to be real. Now to rable: the principle is such for a canon, and the canon is
be sure, I intellectively know, in real things of the field, always a canon according to a principle. Their intrinsic
what in them is their being real. That is, this is an intel- unity is a measuring moment of reason. In order to sim-
lection which is essentially concrete. And this is just the plify, I shall call it a ‘canonic principle’. Reason has a
canon of reality. We are not, then, dealing with the fact first moment, that of being intellection in depth. It has a
that in the field we have intellectively known in what be- second moment, that of being the canonic intellection of
ing real consists in the abstract and in all of its generality; this depth. But it has in addition a third moment, since
rather, we are dealing with the concrete mode in which reason is formally and constitutively reason, by virtue of
what we intellectively know in the field is real. The being intellection in its quest mode.
canon of reality is what, through reality, we have intellec-
Third moment. Reason progresses in measured
tively known within the field. And this is an essential
fashion towards an in-depth intellection. Therefore it has
character of the canon. But it has still others.
this moment of being a quest for that which is going to be
In the second place, in fact, the canon does not have intellectively known. This moment of quest can lead to a
{59} a definite form of being a canon. On the contrary, mistake which it is necessary to root out. I have already
there are many different modes of being a canon; there are hinted at it before. The fact is that we are not dealing
different modes of measuring. When speaking of a canon, with the quest for an intellection which we still do not
we tend to think that it consists formally in being con- possess; we are rather dealing with a proper mode of in-
ceptualized reality, perhaps concrete and limited, but al- tellection, viz. the quest itself, quest or search as a mode
ways conceptualized. But this is not the case. The canon of intellection. Reason is formally intellectus quaerens,
can be conceptualized reality, but it is not necessary for it i.e., inquiring intellection. It is inquiring itself as a mode
to be so. It can be, in fact, an emotional measure, for ex- of intellection. Reason is only a mode of intellection; it is
ample, or a metaphorical measure, etc. The metaphor is not intellection pure and simple. Reason is formally and
not only so in its content, but above all concerns its own structurally a quest or search, because reason is intellec-
mode—metaphorical—of measuring the real. The canon tion of the real insofar as the real gives us pause to think.
is not formally any of these natures; it is canon qua meas- Now, to intellectively know what gives us pause to think
ure, regardless of the mode of measuring. and is giving us pause to think, is the very essence of the
search. Reason, then, is formally and structurally a
But this is not all. In the third place, the canon is
“search”. Thus to reason there pertains essentially not
essentially an open canon. Inasmuch as we continue to
just the moment of depth and the moment of measuring,
intellectively know more real things, the canon measuring
but also {61} its inquiring character. On this point phi-
reality continues to change as well. And this happens in
losophers have usually gone astray. What is this formal
two ways. The canon continues to change above all be-
mode of intellectively knowing in the inquiring sense? I
cause what constitutes the field measure of reality has
shall begin responding to this question by pointing out
been changing. For example, what the canon is after
some essential aspects of the intellective search.
having intellectively known “persons” is not the same as it
was when we intellectively knew only “things”. The A) Above all, reason is dynamic. The matter is
measuring reality, in its concrete condition and within a clear: reason is progression, and while not all movement
determinate mode of measure, continues to expand or is progression, nonetheless all progression is movement.
contract, but always goes on changing. But there is an- Therefore reason has a formally dynamic structure. And
other sense to this variation, because the canon does not it is essential to emphasize this. Reason is not just a sys-
only consist in being a concrete metric of measurement; tem which is articulated in the nature of a principle and a
rather, things, when they are measured, turn out to be of canon, as for example in the demonstration of a theorem.
greater or lesser reality with respect to reality itself as This type of demonstrative system is, as we shall see, the
 PROGRESSION QUA INTELLECTION 263

result of reason, but not what formally comprises reason. of being so it is constitutively provisional. This is the
Reason is a progression; and the principle and canon of provisionality of reason. Reason is always subject to pos-
reason are the principle and canon of searching, of the sible canonic “readjustments” or “renovations”, which by
search for reality in depth. If reality were totally and virtue of being so {63} are rational readjustments or reno-
completely apprehended in primordial apprehension, there vations. Such readjustment clearly concerns the content
would be no need to speak of reason. Intellection is not of what is presented in the canon, regardless of the nature
inquiring reason because reality is intrinsically articulated of this presentation, which may not necessarily be a visual
in a fundamental form, but because this fundamental ar- image. But when all is said and done, the essential part of
ticulation, precisely by virtue of finding itself only in the matter is that the readjustment not only remakes the
depth, must be an articulation which is sought after. It is content of what is presented as real, but also the very di-
not enough for us to move within the field of reality; rection of all subsequent search, of all subsequent reason;
rather, we must progress in depth beyond the field. The hence it is that the direction of reason is always provi-
difference between what is on this side of the field and its sional. Provisional does not mean that it is false; that is
ultimate nature is the difference which makes the dynamic another question with which we shall deal later. Rather, it
moment a progression of reason. It is this progression means that even if true, it is a truth which by its very na-
which has a canonic principle. ture will be not necessarily derogated, but superceded.
The nature of this superceding depends upon the individ-
B) This canonic principle is not proper to just any
ual case. But it will always be the case that what is super-
progression, but only to one which is formally intellective;
ceded, precisely because of its nature, is formally provi-
it is an inquiring progress, and the canonic principle is the
sional.
principle of inquiry. The canonic principle is {62} for-
mally a canonic principle of intellective search. Therefore Dynamic, directional, and provisional is how reason
this principle is not the canonic representation of the real. is formally inquiring. This inquiring character, as I have
The canon does not measure the real in such a way that already said, is a moment of the proper mode of the intel-
anything falling outside the scope of what the canon pres- lection of reason.
ents is declared non-real. The canon does not measure the Now, intellection is actualization of the real.
real as representation, but on the contrary as a “direction” Therefore if reason is inquiring, this inquiring is deter-
of search. Therefore it can happen, and in fact does hap- mined by the mode of actualization of the real. What is
pen—perhaps most of the time, as in the examples previ- this mode by which it affects the inquiry? That is the
ously cited—that the real actually encountered is not like question upon which it is necessary to focus after having
real things intellectively known in the field sense and pre- analyzed some characteristics of inquiry.
sented in the canon. Nonetheless, the canon does not
We have already seen that reason is intellection
cease to function as a canon, since it is precisely by being
thrust “toward” what is beyond the field, i.e., in depth.
directed by that representation that the thinking intellec-
This thrusting does not happen in a negative way; i.e., we
tion is able to find diverse realities in it. The canon is
are not dealing with a case of the field expelling us to
directional. Only by going to seek bodies is it that reason
some realm outside the field. On the contrary, the field
has been able to intellectively know something “material”
thrusts us from the field, to be sure, but within and not
which is not “corpuscular”. Reason is the directionality of
outside of the real itself qua real. That is, {64} the
a progression. To be sure, there would be no direction
thrusting “toward” is a positive actualization of the reality
without representation; without intellection of bodies there
beyond the field aspect of reality. The essential point of
would be no direction for searching beyond the field. But
the question is this positive actualization. The field
this representation does not consist in being the norm or
throws the intelligence in front of a real, but outside-the-
measure of what, in fact, is real; but rather in being the
field, reality. And this thrusting before itself, actualizing
direction of an in-depth search. All searching has a pre-
that toward which we are thrust, is just what the word pro-
cise direction determined by a previous representation. To
blem (from the Greek, pro-ballo, to throw something “in
search is to go while opening for oneself a path in the
front of”) means in its etymological sense. In a problem
light of the direction which has been marked out for us by
there is already an actualization, i.e., there is an intellec-
what has already been presented. Reason is not a quies-
tion of reality; but this actualization is at the same time
cent system of articulated strata, but a system of inquiry; it
still not fully actual. This being-now-actual in a certain
is directional reason. Reason is above all the direction of
way without being so, or rather without being so fully, is
an in-depth search.
the nature of the problematic. The problematic is not
C) Reason as search is not just directional; by virtue primarily the character of my progression, but is primarily
264 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

the character of the actualization of the real. The real D) Philosophy has customarily limited itself to a
gives one pause to think. And this giving is precisely the conceptualization of intelligence as affirmation: to know
problematic, something given by the real. Reality in the intellectively would be to affirm something of some-
“toward” hurls me to a peculiar actuality of the real, to a thing—what many pages ago I termed {66} the logifica-
problematic actuality. And this actuality of the real as a tion of intellection. This idea runs parallel to another
mode of actualization is what formally constitutes a prob- according to which reality and entity are identified, viz.
lem. It is on account of this that problems are not created, the entification of reality. Both identifications are unac-
but discovered or found. Only because the real is prob- ceptable; but what is now important to us, to clarify the
lematically actualized, and only because of this, intellec- problem of reason, is to concentrate on the logification of
tion is—and must be—inquiring by intrinsic necessity. intellection. This logification has led to some concepts of
Inquiring is the mode of intellectively knowing problem- reason which are vitiated at their very root. As we have
atic reality qua problematic. And this is inexorable. It is already seen, according to these concepts, one understands
quite possible that, hurled by the real as problematic, we by ‘reason’ the “faculty of principles”, i.e., the faculty of
might retreat and not continue the intellection. There are fundamental judgements. And this is false because a
millions of problems to which everyone can give a wide principle is not a judgement based on principle, but mere
berth. But what is necessary is that we either stop before sentient actualization of reality as ground-reality. A prin-
the problem or we give it a wide berth. And this necessity ciple has to be understood not in a concipient intellection
is just inquiring. Giving it a wide berth is a form of in- but in a sentient intellection. Judgement is only one mode
quiring. The problematic determines an inquiring intel- among others of this actualization, and therefore is
lection as such. This {65} inquiring can have the nega- something derived from it. In virtue of this, a principle is
tive aspect of giving something a wide berth, or the posi- “reality” itself. And therefore reason is not the faculty of
tive aspect of our taking up the problematic. This taking principles but intellection as principle. And that logifica-
up can in turn have different modalities. Inquiry can be tion of intellection, I repeat, is what has led to certain
take up and resolve the problem. But this is not the gen- concepts of reason which are, as I see it, unacceptable.
eral case, because there are perhaps radical problems Without pretending to be exhaustive, we can reduce these
which the strict intellection of reason cannot resolve. concepts to three.
Then “taking up” means only treating the problem. The
Above all, there is the concept that reason is logical
“treatment” of the problematic is already an incipient so-
rigor. This concept, in a definitive way, has led to under-
lution. But this solution can be something toward which
standing reason as a reasoning process. Thus the process
the incipient treatment only directs us in a convergent
of reasoning would be the supreme form of logical rigor.
manner; it is a convergence which most of the time would
This logical rigor caused reason to be conceived as some-
be only “asymptotic”. In every case what is formally es-
thing absolute. The idea, in various forms, has been cir-
sential to inquiring reason is to be a “treatment” of the
culating since Parmenides, Plato, and even Aristotle, and
problem.
in modern philosophy culminates in Leibniz. The rigor of
In summary, reason is a mode of intellection which the reasoning process would be founded upon various
has three proper moments. It is above all an intellection kinds of rigorous evidence from the so-called principles of
in depth. In the second place, it is a measuring intellec- reason, i.e., in primary conceptual evidence, which for
tion, i.e., an intellection of the real precisely as principle Leibniz were reduced to identities. Reason would be the
and canonic. Finally, it is an intellection with an inquir- organ of absolute conceptual evidence. {67} Hence, over
ing character. The intrinsic unity of these three moments and above sensibility, the absolute conceptualization of
constitutes reason as a mode of intellection. If we wish to reason would float. Reason would be the canonic princi-
reduce it to a formula, we might say that reason is intel- ple of the real, because a canonic principle would be a
lection in which in-depth reality is actualized in a prob- judgement of absolute conceptual evidence. If we go be-
lematic way, and which therefore compels us to inquire yond what is apprehended sentiently, it would of necessity
through principles and a canon about the real in-depth. be by means of rigorous logic. Now, all of this is unac-
Let us not take this expression as a definition in the usual ceptable not only as an idea, but even as a description of
sense of the word, but as a descriptive expression of what the fact of intellection, because to know intellectively is
reason is, and it is something toto caelo different from not to conceive and judge, but to sentiently apprehend the
what is usually understood by ‘reason’. It would not be real as real; it is not “logical” but “sentient” intellection.
superfluous to pin down further the nature of this differ- And what carries us beyond the sentient apprehension of
ence. the real is not logical necessity, but the sentient actualiza-
 PROGRESSION QUA INTELLECTION 265

tion of the real in the “toward”; it is the real “toward”, would simply be organization of experience. This was
and not some logical necessity. The principle of reason is Kant’s idea. The primary judgements of reason are not
not concepts and primary judgements, but reality physi- judgements about reality, but judgements about my intel-
cally apprehended in the “toward”. Reason is not the or- lection of experience. Regardless of how one interprets
gan of absolute evidence, but the organ of the progression Kant’s philosophy (psychological, logical, or transcen-
of intellection in depth of the real already intellectively dental organization), reason must be the organization of
known sentiently. these intellections. Such organization would have a pre-
cise {69} character, viz. totalization. The content of rea-
According to a second concept, reason is not logical
son would not be the totality of the real but the logical
rigor but dialectical necessity; the logos logifies reason in
totality of my intellections. Kant called these totalities
the form of dialectic. This is Hegel’s idea. For Hegel,
(world, soul, God) Ideas. Reason is not the organ of ab-
logical rigor consists but in seeing the real in the mirror
solute evidence nor the dialectic of the internal inconsis-
or speculum of reason “itself”. Reality does not go beyond
tency of thinking; rather, it is purely and simply logical
the “mirrored” or “specular” image of reason. Hence rea-
totalization. But this is unacceptable. And it is so for at
son is speculative reason. The principles of reason are
least two reasons. In the first place, it is clear that reason
not a type of absolute conceptual evidence, but the un-
is based upon what I have termed ‘prior intellection’. But
folding of the speculative structure of reason. Reason is
these intellections upon which reason is based and to
the unfolding of concepts. And the principle of this un-
which I here refer are not intellections qua intellections,
folding is not evidence but the intrinsic inconsistency of
but the reality intellectively known in them. And since
the concept. Reason cannot stop at a concept without
this intellection is sentient, it follows that reason is not the
seeing it dissolve into its opposite; then the original con-
reason of intellections, but the reason of reality intellec-
cept is recuped by incorporating into it this opposite, syn-
tively known in sentient fashion. In the second place,
thesizing a new concept from both, and so on ad infini-
with regard to this sensed reality, reason does not organize
tum. {68} The only consistent thing is then reason in its
its totalization, but its measure as open and in-depth. The
movement. Reason is movement, this movement is dia-
presumed organization of experience is not the construc-
lectical, and it consists in the turning of reason in upon
tion of a logically closed totality, because reality is in itself
itself; such would be the principle of reason under this
open qua reality. Reason is not organization but simply
concept. Reason would be speculative conceptual dialec-
measuring as the principle and canon of the character of
tic, in itself the very concept of the concept, i.e., Idea in
reality in depth.
the Hegelian sense.
But this is impossible. Reason is not movement The logification of intellection has led to three
within a concept; nor is it movement “in itself”; rather, it ideas of reason: organ of absolute evidence of being, organ
is a progression “toward the other”, intellection of the of speculative dialectic, and organ of the total organiza-
beyond. Reason is not a movement of concepts but a tion of experience. These conceptions are unacceptable at
search within reality. Reason is inquiring, reason pro- their root, because intellective knowing is not judging but
gresses. And this progression is not, to be sure, the result sentiently actualizing the real. Whence it is that reason
of some evidence, as Leibniz maintained; but neither is it does not rest upon itself, but is always just a mode of in-
the internal mobility of concepts. Reality is not the mir- tellection. Reasoning, speculating, and organizing are
rored or specular image of reason. It is not the case that three ways—among the many possible—of intellectively
concepts are in themselves inconsistent; rather, it is reality progressing in depth toward the beyond. And this pro-
itself which is intellectively actualized in problematic gression is by its own formal nature grounded {70} upon
form. What moves reason is not the inconsistency of con- a previous intellection, a sentient intellection.
cepts, but the problematicism of reality. And it is on ac- With this we have examined with some care what
count of this that intellection, whether inconsistent or not, reason is as a mode of intellection, i.e., what is my reason.
is still of an inquiring nature. Inquiring is the intellection But this is not enough to conceptualize what reason is,
of the problematic as such. The progression of inquiring because the fact that the reason is mine is just an aspect of
is, then, nothing but the progressive actualization of the reason. In an essential way, reason has another aspect:
real. reason is reason or explanation of things. What is this
According to a third concept, reason is neither rigor reason or explanation of things? That is what we must
of absolute evidence nor dialectical necessity. Reason now examine.
266 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

2 that reason pertains to things themselves. The “of” is a

genitive of propriety or pertinence but whose subject is
Reason as Reason or Explanation of Things real things themselves. It is they which “give”; and since
what they give is “reason” or explanation, it pertains to
On this point I will be much briefer, because the things. Otherwise they would not give it. Reason or ex-
subject really belongs to the intellection of reality, to planation is something given. This is essential; reason is
metaphysics; and here we are only dealing with intelli- not something which one “has”, but something which is
gence. It is only with respect to intelligence that one can “given” to us. Reason is intellection measuring reality.
speak formally of reason, because reason is always a mode Now, things give us the measure of their reality; it is just
of intellection. But if this is true, what sense is there in in this that {72} reason or explanation consists. And this
speaking of the reason or explanation of things? We must “given” is at one and the same time my reason and the
address two questions: A) Reason as something about explanation of things. It is at one and the same time the
things, and B) the meaning of this reason or explanation. open character of the reality of the real. In this openness,
the real gives us pause to think and gives reason or expla-
A) Reason or explanation is about things. Let us nation, because only the open can “give”, and only in the
return to the point of departure for this investigation. open can one search and find. To be sure, the question
Intellection of the outside-the-field real is an intellection here arises as to what this finding is. But we shall speak
in progression toward reality itself as such, because reality of that later. Reason or explanation, in summary, is
as reality is formally open. This progression is an intel- something belonging to things.
lective activity. Qua activity, the progression constitutes
thinking. Qua intellective, this activity is reason. B) But, in what form is reality something which
Thinking is the activity of the intelligence, i.e., the activ- gives? Reality is the de suyo of things. And this de suyo
ity determined by the actuality of reality qua open. It is, sets limits for the “giving”. To give reasons or explana-
then, an activated activity; it is, in fact, {71} real things tion is then a moment of the de suyo; reality as canonic
which give us pause to think. Reason is the intellective principle of the in-depth inquiring intellection is a de
aspect of this thinking activity. That is, reason intellec- suyo. But this is not sufficient for the question at hand.
tively knows in things that by which they give us pause to Reality, in fact, is something which de suyo “gives”, and it
think. In this intellection, real things do not just give us gives because it is open. Now this openness of the real has
pause to think; they give something more: they give rea- different forms.
son or explanation. It is of minor importance that some- Above all, the real is open qua reality, and it is
times, perhaps most of the time, they deprive us of reason therefore constitutively and formally respective. But real-
or explanation. But we encompass both directions of ity is also open to real things qua grounding them. And
giving and depriving in that which a potiori we call we have previously explained what grounding is. Here
“giving a reason or explanation”. In intellective progres- openness is not just openness but an openness qualified as
sion, real things begin by giving us pause to think, and the ground itself, grounding openness.
end up by giving a reason or explanation. These are two
different senses of “to give”. But their unity is the “giv- But there is a third form of openness. Reality can be
ing” as such. And it is in this giving that the reason or open not only by being respective, and not only by being
explanation of things consists. To be sure, reason is only a grounded, but also by being intellective actuality. The
mode of intellection. But as this mode is determined by intellectively known real is, as real, something de suyo,
real things themselves, it follows that qua determined by open therefore to being in intellective actuality. This in-
things, reason or explanation is about them. Reason, tellective actuality can be at times just the primordial ac-
then, is given by them both in its initial moment as well as tuality of the real as real; this is primordial apprehension.
in its terminal moment. In virtue of this, a given reason But it can happen that intellective openness has the char-
or explanation qua given pertains to them; it is the reason acter of a principle, i.e., is an actuality in thinking intel-
or explanation of things themselves. The “of” does not lection. {73} Now, I repeat, the intellective openness of
mean that my reason is about things only in the sense that the real as a principle is just reasons or explanation. And
by being a mode of intellection it falls back upon them. this opennes is the basis for saying that reason or explan-
This characteristic applies to all intellection and not just tion is of things. Reality is not open to being reason or
to reason. Nor are we dealing with an “of” which is geni- explanation by virtue of being naked reality, nor by merely
tive in the sense of propriety or pertinence, whose subject being actualized in intellection; rather, it is open to being
would be intellection itself. We are dealing with the fact reason or explanation by being intellectively actualized in
 PROGRESSION QUA INTELLECTION 267

form as a principle, and therefore ultimately by being ac- ality is eo ipso intellectively known by searching. And
tualized in sentient intellection. It is important to elabo- this means that the actuality in “what-for” or “why” is
rate on this point, not just repeating it in different words, actuality which, by being a search, turns out to be ordered
by discussing it from the point of view of the explanation to being found. The actuality of the real in “what-for” or
of things. “why” is always and only something found.
a) In the first place, there is the very idea of the rea- The “what-for” or “why” is not just something to-
son or explanation of things. Philosophy has distin- ward which I am thrust in my inquiring; rather, as a mode
guished reason or explanation as explanation of being of actuality in the “toward”, it is something formally en-
from reason considered as the reason associated with countered in a search. This moment of the “being en-
knowing. But this distinction does not touch upon what, countered” is a moment of actuality having positive char-
as I see it, comprises the fundamental aspect of reason. acter. This positive moment of the “what-for” qua en-
Reason is always reason or explanation of real things. countered is what, precisely and formally, constitutes the
Therefore in order to be able to speak of reason associated “giving”. That things give us reason or explanation
with knowing, it is necessary that a real thing be already means that their actuality is actuality found in them them-
present in its own character of reality. Now, that which is selves, because we are not dealing with the case of finding
present is not naked reality but actualized reality. Be- by chance, by stumbling upon it, but with the formal char-
tween ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi there is, as I acter of something sought, i.e. of something found in a
see it, the ratio actualitatis. And it is from this that reason search. This positive character is therefore {75} formally
is formally extracted, i.e., reason is extracted from actual- constituent of the reason or explanation of things; it is just
ity. Naked reality is but a “what”; it is that in which the their “giving”. We shall see shortly with greater precision
real consists. This “what” can be actualized in different in what this giving and this finding consists. But we can
ways. When it is actualized in thinking intellection, the already say that they are moments of actuality.
“what”—that in which a thing consists—has actuality in a
c) But since it is actuality in that mode of “what-for”,
problematic mode; it is a “what” which problematically
there arises the question of what is the character of the
retains its full actuality, its full “what”, that full “what”
“what-for” qua encountered.
toward which the real thing itself qua real has directed us.
This full “what” is, then, its what “for”, its “because”.* Above all, the actuality in question is not an actuality
Reality actualized in the field manner, as reality, directs us of the real in the world, i.e., the actuality to which we now
as reality to {74} that which must be its full actuality, to refer is not being. The “what-for” is not a “why is it”
its “what-for” or “why”, as direction. The “toward” itself something or other. To be sure, it is impossible to refrain
is reality in the form of “for”. The “for” is the very open- from expressing ourselves in the language which has al-
ness of the “toward”. Reason is always intellection of a ready been created and therefore it is impossible to refrain
“what”, and therefore is intellection of a “what-for” or from saying that the “what-for” or “why” is always just a
“why”. Later I shall explain the structure of this which “why something is”. But this is an ambiguous mode of
we call “what-for”. It is not so easy to conceptualize. expression. It could mean that the real “is thus in its re-
ality”. And this is something which is extremely precise.
The “what-for” or “why” is not a question which I
But it might also mean that the real “is” thus in reality.
formulate more or less arbitrarily about the actualized
And this is false as an idea of reason. Reason qua reason
real; rather the question at hand is inexorably determined
or explanation is not reason or explanation of being. Rea-
by the mode in accordance with which a real thing is ac-
son or explanation is always so of reality. Reason deals
tualized. This mode of actuality of the real is reason or
with reality and not being. Reason as principle of things
explanation. As a question, the “what-for” or “why” is
is not “reason or explanation of being” but on the contrary
the intellection of a mode of actuality of the real; it is the
“reason or explanation of this being”. Being is something
concrete positive aspect of the problematic. To be prob-
which requires a principle and this principle is reality;
lematic is to be a “what” in the “what-for” or “why”.
reality is the reason or explanation of being. Reason is
b) But this is not all, because that problematic actu- not the unfolding of being, as Hegel conjectured, but in-
tellection of reality as a principle actualized in a thinking
manner as reality.
*
[The Spanish word for ‘what’ is qué, and the word for ‘for’ is por. The The actuality in “what-for” or “why” is not, then,
phrase por qué means ‘for what?’ or ‘why?’, but the compound porque actuality as being in the world, but intellective actuality of
means ‘because’. This and the following text makes use of the Spanish
word structure, which cannot be exactly reproduced in English.—trans.] reality. It is not just actuality of the real—that is proper to
268 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

all intellection. We are, rather, dealing with an actuality metaphysical explanation. The reason of intellection is
in its mode of “what-for” or “why”. And insofar as one thing, and the reason or explanation of real things
something is actualized as real in “what-for”, we say that quite another.
its reality is a ground. The actuality of the real in “what-
It was necessary to establish, then, some “discrimi-
for” is the grounding. {76} Reason or explanation is of
nation” where Leibniz has not discriminated. And ety-
things because it is their grounding actuality. Qua
mologically, ‘discrimination’ means “critique”. Hence the
searched for, actuality is found in “what-for” or “why”,
necessity for a critique of reason alone. That of course
and as such, this actuality is the ground.
was Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The reason to which
Reason is, then, reason or explanation of a thing qua Kant refers is reason as Leibniz’ indiscriminate reason.
actuality in the “what-for”, found as a ground. Therefore the title of Kant’s book Kritik der reinen Ver-
nunft should be translated not as Critique of Pure Reason
We have thus seen what reason is as a mode of
but Critique of Reason Only. It is the critique of the
my intellection and as explanation of things. But both
purely logical ground of metaphysics, the critique of Leib-
aspects of reason have an essential unity. It is necessary to
niz’ logico-real unity. Kant’s critique as discrimination is
attend to this unitary aspect of reason.
perfectly justified; intellective reason is not the same as
reason or explanation of reality. But does this mean that
3 we are dealing with two reasons, split apart and separated
as reason? That was Kant’s thesis. In contrast to the
The Unity of Reason unity of reason, Kant set forth the simple duality of two
reasons, incommunicado as reasons. But this, in turn, is
All reality known intellectively by thinking, i.e., all impossible, because it is to pose the problem of reason
reality intellectively known in reason, is reality whose along the lines of naked reality. Now, that is wrong. The
actuality is grounded on and by reality itself as principle reality upon which reason touches is not naked reality but
and canon. The essence of reason is to be thinking actu- actualized reality. And if it is indeed true that {78} rea-
ality of the real. It is by being thinking actuality that rea- son as a mode of intellection is not the reason of naked
son is “mine”. By being thinking actuality it is essen- reality (on this point, as I said, Kant is justified), still,
tially, like all actuality, actuality of the real, i.e., “of when dealing with actualized reality, the question changes
things”. The unity of reason as mine and as explanation its aspect. Actualized reality does not cease to be real
of things is, then, in the fact that reason is thinking actu- because it is actualized, even though its ambit of reality is
ality of the real. Let us clarify the nature of this unity. immensely smaller than the ambit of naked reality, i.e.,
than the world. And as it is actualized in my intellection,
In Leibniz this unity is a unity which we might say is it follows that the two reasons are not identical, as Leibniz
one of indiscrimination. For Leibniz, reason is always claimed; but neither are they radically separated, as Kant
reason or explanation of being. And this explanation of claimed. The unity of reason is unity as intellective actu-
being is indiscriminately explanation of what a thing is ality of the real. And it is this which is the subject of the
and that it is intellectively known. This unity is what the celebrated principle of sufficient reason. As I see it one
celebrated principle of sufficient reason expresses: every- should express the principle as: every reality, intellec-
thing which is has a reason why it is rather (potius quam) tively known in reason, is a reality whose actuality is
than is not. It is ultimately more than {77} indiscrimina- grounded in and by reality itself. Actuality is, ultimately,
tion; it is an identity. Whence every logical reason or ex- actuality in sentient intellection, and reason is what the
planation always has some metaphysical ramifications. actualization of the real in sentient intellection gives us in
Now, this is quite impossible. Ultimately, the principle of the form of “by”. It is sentient reason. Conversely, as this
sufficient reason is insufficient. First, because it concerns unity is a unity which is only radical, the two reasons,
a reason or explanation of being; but reason is not reason though not split, still follow separate paths. The real can
or explanation “of” being, but reason or explanation of be intellectively known as real, but this intellection will
“this” being. And Leibniz did not see the explanation of never be a mere logical unfolding of an intellection. We
this being: reality itself. Secondly, it is inadequate be- shall see this in the next chapter.
cause the presumed identity between reason or explana-
tion of being and reason or explanation of things is quite In summary, reason is the actuality of the real in a
capable of being rejected, not just as a theory but by the thinking search. As what is actualized is formally real, it
mere analysis of the facts of intellection. It virtue of this, follows that the real thus actualized is formally in actual-
logical explanation is not, purely and simply, real and ity of reason. In this sense one ought to say that every-
 PROGRESSION QUA INTELLECTION 269

thing real is rational. But it is necessary to understand this necessarily has a character which is transparent to reason.
statement correctly. Reason can intellectively know the real as opaque. In this
sense the real, though rational in the sense of being by
In the first place, we are dealing with the fact that
itself ensconced in the ambit of reason, can still have in its
the actualized real is inexorably found in the ambit of
own structure moments which are not transparently
reason. ‘Rational’ {79} means, first of all, to be in the
knowable intellectively by reason. That is, the real can be,
ambit of reason. In this sense everything real actualized
by itself, opaque. This is what, in common parlance, is
in intelligence is finally but ultimately incorporated into
termed irrational. The irrational is a characteristic of the
the ambit of reason. What happens is that not everything
real as intellectively known by reason itself. The irra-
real “has” a reason or explanation: it could be based upon
tional is not what “is not rational” but in a positive sense,
itself without being actualized.
what “is non-rational”. Irrationality is a positive charac-
In the second place, ‘rational’ does not mean that the teristic of what is intellectively known in reason. In this
actualized real has the internal structure of something sense, the irrational is eo ipso rational. The real, in itself,
conceptual. ‘Rational’ is not synonymous with ‘concep- as naked reality, is neither rational nor irrational; it is
tual’; that was Hegel’s mistake. For Hegel, everything purely and simply real. It is only one or the other when it
real is rational, and for him ‘rational’ means that every- falls into the ambit of reason, i.e., when it is reality actu-
thing has the structure of speculative reason, i.e., the alized in thinking. Now, as the real qua actualized falls in
structure of a concept. But that is chimerical, because the ambit of reason for itself, it follows that the real is real
‘rational’ does not mean ‘conceptual’ but rather to be in- in a “what-for” or “why”. And only then can the answer
tellectively known in thinking actuality. And this intel- to this question, the “for” or “because”, be irrational. Ir-
lection is not necessarily the logical intellection of the rationality is reason giving the actualized real in reason;
concept. Reason can actualize the real in a thinking man- or rather, it is one of the modes which things have of giv-
ner in forms which are not conceptive. Moreover, it can ing reason or explanation of themselves. It is a type of
actualize the real as being superior to every rational intel- reason or explanation given by things. The real is im-
lection. mersed by itself in reason, both by being about things
{81} as well as by being one of my modes of intellection.
In the third place, the rational is not just what is ac- And in this sense, and only in this one, everything real is
tualized in thinking intellection, but is rational because rational.
what is thus actualized enters by itself into the ambit of
reason. Here ‘by itself’ means that we are not dealing only I proposed to do a study of reason. And I have cen-
with an arbitrary operation of human intellection, but tered my reflections upon three questions: What is rea-
rather that the real is actualized as real in the form of son? What is the scope of reason? And in what, con-
“what-for” or “why”, i.e., it is already, by itself, actualized cretely, does the unity of reason and reality consist? We
in the ambit of reason. We are not dealing with the ques- have already seen what reason is (both as a mode of my
tion of whether reality in it is own internal structure, i.e., intellection and as a mode of reason or explanation of
as naked reality, can be intellectively known by reason. things, and in their essential unity, i.e., as actuality of the
And this is because we are not dealing with the nakedly real in thinking intellection). Reason is, in all its dimen-
real but with the actualized real. Moreover, within the sions, a mode of intellection. But not every intellection is,
realm of the actualized real itself, its content can be com- of itself, reason. Therefore it is necessary to inquire about
pletely opaque to rational intellection. It is one thing for the origin of this mode of intellection. That is what I have
the real to be actualized in a “what-for” or “why”, another termed the ‘rise of reason’.
for its content to be able to assume different forms in what
is actualized. And it does assume them. One is the {80}
form of transparency; the real in reason can be transpar- II
ent to reason. But it can also happen that the real is not
transparent but opaque. Opacity and transparency are two THE RISE OF REASON
modes in accordance with which the actualized is intel-
lectively known as a “for-what” or “why”. Now, ‘rational’ As was inevitable, when examining what reason is
here means only that the actualized real is by itself, i.e., by we spoke at length about the rise of reason, covering the
its very mode of actualization, the terminus of rational essential points. But it is fitting to recall in a systematic
intellection. It does not mean that by being the terminus way all the things said on this topic, while at the same
of rational intellection, that which is intellectively known time covering certain points in more detail.
270 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

Reason does not rest upon itself, but has an origin. rior to naked intellection; rather, reason is reason by vir-
Here I understand by ‘origin’ or ‘rise’ that structural mo- tue of being founded upon intellection and being a mode
ment of reason by which it is, qua reason, something of it. Reason, by being intellection of what things give us
originated. We are not dealing with the genetic origin of pause to think in mere intellection, is an intellective pro-
reason, either in an individual or the species; rather, we gression determined by the inadequacy of this mere intel-
are concerned only with the radically structural origin of lection. Only insofar as mere intellection does not intel-
it. Where does reason have its structural origin and what lectively know things adequately, only in this respect do
is its mode of origination? This is the question. In order things give us pause to think. And this thinking intellec-
to deal with it, let us proceed, as in so many other ques- tively knows the reason of this “giving”. Reason is always
tions, step-by-step. {82} subordinate to primary intellection. But its origination
has a yet deeper root.
1) Above all, reason is an activity, but an activity
which does not arise out of itself. Modern philosophy has 3) What is it in the naked intellectual apprehension
always conceptualized reason as an activity which arises of real things which gives us to think? To think is to in-
out of itself, i.e., spontaneously. But this is impossible. tellectively know reality beyond the field, in depth.
Reason, in fact, is the intellective moment of thinking Therefore it is because real things are intellectively known
activity. Now, thinking is not a spontaneous activity. in the field manner as real that they give us to think. Rea-
Thinking is certainly activity, but activity activated by son, by being a mode of intellection in depth, is formally
real things. It is they which give us pause to think. reason of the field, i.e., reason determined in the field
Therefore reason, by virtue of being an intellective mo- sense to be reason. The origin of reason does not lie only
ment of an activated activity, is reason founded upon in the fact that the real previously known intellectively
something given. And by this I am not referring to the gives us pause to think; it has an origin which in a certain
fact that reason intellectively knows what is given as an respect is still deeper: the field-nature of the previous in-
object about which to think; i.e., I am not dealing with the tellection of the real. The field is a physical moment of
fact that reason is an intellection which has an object that the real, the sensed moment of the world, of the respectiv-
it did not “put” there. Rather, I am referring to the fact ity of the real qua real. Therefore the field is eo ipso a
that reason, as a mode of intellection, is a mode deter- physical moment of the {84} intellectively known real in
mined by things and therefore is a mode of intellection its primordial apprehension, in its naked intellection. The
imposed by them. Things not only give us that about field is not just a concept but is, I repeat, a physical mo-
which we think, but also the very rational mode of intel- ment of the real; and it is so precisely because respectivity
lectively knowing them; the impose it, because upon giv- within the world is a moment of reality itself as reality.
ing us pause to think, they eo ipso determine this mode of That physical sense does not consist in being a “thing”—
intellective knowing which is reason. Reason, then, is not the field is not a thing which is intellectively known—but
a spontaneous activity but an intellective mode given by that in which and through which one intellectively knows
things. It has its rise, its origination, above all in real one thing among others. Finally, this physical moment is
things inasmuch as their reality is what gives us to think, not a “relation” but “respectivity”, formally constitutive of
and what determines intellection in the form of reason. the real qua real. In this “fieldness”, the real is appre-
But that is not all. The origination has a root which is hended in a “toward”, within the field and beyond the
still deeper. field. And this intellection of the real in the field manner
“toward” what is beyond is what constitutes reason as
2) What is it that gives us to think? Real things, in
intellection in search of something. Reason is reason that
their reality, give us pause to think. To do this, these real
is originally field reason. Reason has its origin not just by
things have to be already present to us as real. Now, the
being something given by real things and not just by being
mere intellective actuality of the real as real is intellection.
a mode of some previous intellection; rather, it has an
Things give us to think because previously they were al-
origin because it consists in being field intellection in
ready intellectively known as real. Therefore reason {83}
search of something. But its origin has a yet deeper root.
as a mode of intellection of what things give us pause to
think is a mode of previous intellection of the real. In 4) The field, in effect, is the sensed world as world,
virtue of this, reason formally arises precisely from this the sensed respectivity in the “toward”. Now, to sense
previous intellection. Reason has its origin in things, but something as real is just sentient intellection. Sentient
in things previously intellectively known as real. This is a intellection is the intellection of which field reason is a
deeper moment of the origin of reason. On account of it mode. Sentient does not mean (as we have already seen)
reason is not, as we shall see, a mode of intellection supe- that its own object, primary and adequate, is sensible. If it
 PROGRESSION QUA INTELLECTION 271

were no more than that, the unity of intellection and turn to the world is how every impression of reality is
sensing would be merely objective, and in such a case transcendentally open. This openness, as we have already
intellection would be “sensible”. We are concerned with seen, is dynamic in two ways. First, in the form of dyna-
something much more significant, that intellection prop- mism toward other sensed things (the field), and second in
erly so-called is “sentient”. We are not concerned then the form of a search (the world). Every impression of
with sensible intellection, but with sentient intellection. reality is qua formality an open impression, not only in
So, the intellection of the real within a field in {85} the the dynamism of distance but also in the dynamism of
“toward” as depth is reason; and as this intellection is searching. To see the color green as something de suyo is
sentient, it follows that reason is formally sentient reason. to be inchoatively seeing it toward other colors, and to-
Reason senses reality in the “toward”, reality itself giving ward other realities. To apprehend something sentiently
us pause to think. Its progression is a progression within de suyo is a first step toward the world, a first primordial
a “toward” sensed, a sentient progression in the nature of sketch of the search for the real in reality. As such, hu-
the field real. Only because intellection is sentient, only man sensing is already a primordial type of reason, and
because of that is it necessary to know intellectively, in the every form of reason is radically and primordially a mode
field manner, in reason; that is, reason is sentient. Reason of sensing reality. It is sentient reason.
has its origin not only by being something given by Therefore reason as a search for the world in the
things, not only by being a mode of previous understand- field is not a question of concepts, nor even one of being,
ing, not only by being reason or explanation of what is in but a question of the impression of reality not qua impres-
the field, but it has its origin primarily and radically by sion of such-and-such a reality, but qua impression of
being a mode of sentient intellection, that is by being sen- mere reality, of pure and simple reality. Reason is a
tient reason. But it is necessary to clarify more the char- search for the world, an inquiring impression of reality.
acter of this origin, asking ourselves in what the formally And now it is clear that the sentient part of reason does
sentient moment of reason consists. not refer to its own content, but to the impressive {87}
5) The question cannot be justified further, because character of that reality which reason intellectively knows
to say that reason is “sentient” seems to mean that what in a particular way by progressing impressively in it; it is
reason intellectively knows is something like the qualities an impression of reality in progression. A transfinite
sensed in a sensible perception. And that would be ab- number, an abstract concept, are not sensed qualities. But
surd. We are not dealing with anything like it at all. Rea- they are intellectively known as something real, and as
son is a mode of sentient intellection; therefore it is to such are constituted in the impression of reality as such.
sentient intellection itself that we must direct our attention That reason is sentient means, then, that reason qua in-
in order to understand the idea in question. In what, for- tellection is an intellective modulation of the very impres-
mally, does the fact that intellection is sentient consist? sion of reality. Intellection is mere actuality of the real in
What is the formally intellective part of sensing? To be sentient intelligence; it is formally the impression of real-
sure, it is not in the nature of the sensed quality, i.e., not ity. And reason as a mode of intellective actuality is a
in the content of sensing; but rather in the type of its for- mode of the impression of reality. Which mode?
mality of otherness, in the formality of reality. The for- In primordial apprehension or naked sentient intel-
mally intellective part of human sensing is not in its con- lection, sentient intelligence senses reality in itself and by
tent but in being an impression of reality. Intellection is itself in an impression as the formality of what is sensed.
one with sensing precisely and formally in the moment of In the field intellection of the real which culminates in
otherness, in the moment of formality of sensing. The affirmation, the intelligence has the impression of reality
formal unity of sentient intellection is found in that the of one thing among others, and the sensed formality then
formal part (not just of the {86} intellectively known but acquires the character of a field as the medium of intellec-
of intellective knowing itself) is identically and physically tion. But in reason, the intelligence has the impression of
the formal moment or formality itself of sensing, of im- reality, of formality, as a measure of the real beyond the
pression. Therefore intellective knowing is sentient in- field in depth. Therefore strictly speaking reason not only
tellective knowing, and human sensing is intellective moves “in” reality, but rationally “senses” the reality in
sensing. This unity is the impression of reality, which by which it moves, and senses rationally that it is moving
being of reality is intellective and by being impression is therein. Reason does not search for reality but really
sensed. The content of sensing is sensed reality only by searches for and dives into reality, precisely because it
being the content of an impression of reality. Now, reason senses this reality and its own motion therein. The reality
is the mode of sentient intellection. And sensing the re- constitutive of reason is just reality in impression.
272 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

Therefore reason is not primarily something merely logi- The moment of reality proper to affirmation and to reason
cal, but rather it intellectively knows reality with that co- is physically and numerically identical to the moment of
ercive force proper to the reality in which it is, i.e., with reality impressively apprehended in primordial apprehen-
the force of sensing reality. In its inquiring, reason senses sion. We are not, then, dealing with a conceptual identity
reality inquiringly. {88} In the primordial impression of of that which we call ‘reality’ in the three modes of intel-
reality, intelligence senses reality as naked formality; in lection, but with a moment which is formally physical and
affirmation, intelligence senses the impression of reality numerically the same in the three modes. The physical
as a medium of intellection of the real; in reason, the in- and formal unity of the moment of reality as impression is
telligence senses the impression of reality as a measure or not therefore sensualism. It is, rather, sensism. And that
ground of the reality beyond the field. They are three is something quite different; it is one and the same im-
modes or forms of the impression of reality. pression of reality which in its physical and numerical
sameness opens up the dimensions of affirmed reality and
Now, the impression of reality has a physical unity in
of reality in reason. Reason is sentient in this radical
accordance with which it is the impression of reality for-
mode—and only there—, that of being a mode of the im-
mally, medially, and by measuring. These are not three
pression of reality.
“uses” of the impression of reality, but three intrinsically
necessary “modes” by virtue of being modes of a single The radical rise of reason is in the physically
sentient intellection—by virtue of being, that is, three “unique” impression of reality. Reason is something
“dimensions” of the actualization of the real in sentient which has an origin precisely and formally by virtue of
intellection. These three modes are not constituted owing being sentient. In virtue of this, I repeat, reason, like af-
to the impression of reality, but “in” the impression of firmation, is but a mode of intellection of primordial ap-
reality; they are that in which the very impression of real- prehension. Reason is not {90} something which by itself
ity unitarily consists. They are not derived from the im- sits on top of everything sensed. On the contrary, reason
pression of reality, but are the three dimensions constitu- itself is sentient, and rational intellection is a determinate
tive of the primordial impression of reality. Conversely, mode of intellection of sentient intellection itself. Reason
these three dimensions of intellection (primodial appre- progresses in order to fill up insofar as possible the inade-
hension, affirmation, reason) are distinguished only in quacies of naked intellection. This progression, then,
being modes of sentient intellection. Of these three di- does not have supremacy over naked sentient intellection
mensions, the first, to wit, the impression of naked for- or primordial apprehension; it has, only in some respects,
mality, can be given without the other two, but the con- a certain superiority over it. This is superiority is only
verse is not true. And this is because the second, affirma- partial and within the narrow confines of reason. The pro-
tion, is something essentially founded upon the primordial gress of reason has a certain free and creative character
impression of reality, and in turn reason essentially in- with respect to the content of intellection. But it is, I re-
volves affirmative intellection. The unity of the impres- peat, a creation within very narrow confines. Nothing of
sion of reality in these latter two dimensions is, ultimately, what is intellectively known in reason is real without a
the “toward” of the naked impression of the formality of ground—a ground which is necessary in principle—of
reality. what is intellectively known in primordial apprehension.
But by virtue of being a ground, that which is intellec-
So when we say that reason is not only sensible but tively known in reason is something real within that
sentient, we are not talking about some sensualistic re- physical reality, something primary and unlikely to be lost
duction of {89} affirmation and of reason, because “sen- of the impression of reality. Only primordial apprehension
sualism” means that the contents of judgement and reason has radical supremacy in human intellection. The differ-
are formally reduced to the contents of sensible impres- ence between naked intellection and reason is then
sions. And this is simply absurd. The fact is that in sen- given—and can only be given—in an intelligence which
sible impressions, philosophy has seen nothing but their is sentient. It is what I call the ‘unprescriptive parsimony
content, and it has gone astray on the matter of their for- of reason’. And this is its power.
mal sensed moment of reality; i.e., it has not seen the im-
pression of reality. Now, to reduce the contents of af- In virtue of that, the origin of reason, its radical ori-
firmation and of reason to those sensible impressions is gin, is in its sentient character. Reason is an act which
absurd. But the formal moment of reality, the impression modally concerns the impression of reality.
of reality, remains. And then to reduce the moment of But this does not yet exhaust the problem of reason.
reality of an affirmation and of reason to reality sensed in The impression of reality, in fact, is but a moment, the
impression, to the impression of reality, is not sensualism. moment of otherness of what is apprehended, the moment
 PROGRESSION QUA INTELLECTION 273

in accordance with which what is apprehended is, de belongs to all intellection to be sure, but it does so because
suyo, what is present in apprehension. It is because of intellection is sentient. It is, then, to sensing that we must
this that the real thus actualized is not only real but indeed turn out attention, but very briefly so as to recap what has
has its own real content. The impression of reality is not been said in Part I. Sensing is sensing impressions of
a secondary {91} impression, but the formal moment of a things, or rather, impressively apprehending things. An
single, unique impression of the real, of the impressive impression has three moments which are not independent,
actuality of the real. Now, reason as a modulation of the but which are distinct from one another within their pri-
impression of reality has thereby its own intellectively mary and indestructible unity. An impression is above all
known contents, and does not leave them outside that im- affection of the sentient. But in this affection there is an
pression. Reason is formally sentient by virtue of being a essential second moment: presentation of something else
mode of the impression of reality; and on account of that, in and through the affection itself; this is the moment of
just like said impression, reason intellectively knows the otherness. But impression has still a third essential mo-
proper contents of the real. Together with its impression ment: the force, so to speak, with which the other of oth-
of reality, these contents comprise a mode which is proper erness is imposed on the sentient. This force of imposi-
not only to the impression of reality, but also eo ipso a tion is just being possessed by what is sensed. The unity
mode proper to intellectively knowing the real. Hence, of the three moments—affection, otherness, and force of
having shown that reason modally concerns the impres- imposition—is what comprises the intrinsic and formal
sion of reality not only does not exhaust the problem of unity of what we call impression. {93}
reason, but is the very point at which one poses the prob-
Impressions are quite varied. But this diversity has a
lem of what the rational intellection of the real consists.
very precise characteristic with regard to our problem.
This is the problem of “reason and reality”, the last of the
The other which is present in affection has above all a
three great problems which we posed to ourselves after
content of its own: color, sound, heat, taste, etc.; but it
having examined what reason is and what its origin is.
also has (as I have already said) its own formality. This is
the mode by which those kinds of content are present to
us, i.e., the mode by which they are “other”. This formal-
III ity is above all the formality of stimulation, the mode by
which the other is formally other by triggering a response.
REASON AND REALITY The other is then merely a “sign”. But the other can be
present as other not in relation to possible responses, but
in relation to what is present de suyo; this is the formality
1 of reality. What is present then is not a “sign” but “real-
ity”. In these two types of impression, the other is im-
The “Problem” of Reason posed upon the sentient according to two different types of
force of imposition. In the sign, the impression is im-
We have seen that reason is a mode of sentient in- posed with the force of stimulation. In the formality of
tellection, and that therefore it is intrinsically and for- reality, it is with the force of reality. In the first case we
mally sentient reason. This reason, like all sentient intel- have impression of a stimulus; in the second, impression
lection, is {92} constitutively a mere actualization of the of the real. Now, to apprehend something as real is what
real. Therefore reason is not something which has to formally constitutes intellection. Therefore impression of
“achieve” reality; rather, it is something which is already the real is formally impression of a sentient intelligence.
constituted as reason within reality. We have examined
Let us leave aside, for the moment, the content of
how reality functions, so to speak, in its three dimensions
this impression of the real, and attend only to the formal-
of formality, mediality, and measure. Now it remains only
ity of otherness, which is what I have called impression of
to clarify that structure from another essential direction,
reality. If we call the act of intellectively knowing noein,
something which we have sketched out in the last few
as has been done since the time of the Greeks, it will be
pages. Reality, in fact, is not only actualized in intellec-
necessary to say that even since then this noein has been
tion, but moreover by virtue of being so has possessed us.
inadequately conceptualized. To be sure, the act, the no-
We are possessed by reality. What is this possession? The
esis, has been distinguished from that which is present in
reader should excuse the monotonous repetition of ideas,
us, the noema. But nothing more; philosophy has gone
but it is convenient to summarize what has been said.
astray on the matter of the impressive character of the
Possession is not exclusive to intellection as such; it noein, i.e., {94} on its formal unity with the aisthesis,
274 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

with sensing. The Greeks, then, and with them all of evidence and later into the coercive form of reality. Af-
European philosophy, failed to realize that intelligence is firmation and reason are but modulations of the impres-
sentient. And this has repercussions with regard to the sion of reality. They are noergic modes.
very concept of noesis and noema. The noesis is not Reason, then, moves by its own force, by the force
just—as has been said—an act whose terminus is merely with which the real itself is impressed upon us as if it
intentional; rather, it is in itself a physical act of appre- were a voice. This force is not some impulse in a vacuum.
hension, i.e., an act whose intentionality is but a moment, Just the opposite: it is a force which moves us but which
the directional moment of the relational or apprehensive constrains us to keep within the real. It is, then, a coer-
aspect of what is intellectively known in impression. On cive force. What is proper to reason or explanation is not
the other hand, the noema is not just something which is evidence nor empirical or logical rigor; rather, it is above
present to the intentionality of the noesis, but something all the force of the impression of reality in accordance
which is imposed with its own force, the force of reality, with which reality in depth is imposed coercively in sen-
upon the apprehendor. tient intellection. The rigor of a reasoning process does
In virtue of this, the noein is an ergon and therefore not go beyond {96} the noetic expression of the force of
its formal structure is Noergia. ‘Noergia’ means at one reality, of the force with which reality is being impressed
and the same time that the noesis is relational, that it is upon us, that reality in which we already are by impres-
impressively apprehenhending, and that the noema has sion. Therefore the problem of reason does not consist in
the force of imposition proper to reality. This is the force investigating if it is possible for reason to reach reality,
of impression of reality. but just the opposite: how we are supposed to keep our-
selves in the reality in which we already are. So we are
Sentient intellection is possessed by the force of re- not speaking about arriving at the state of being in reality,
ality; i.e., the real is impressed upon us in three different but about not leaving it.
ways. In the first place there is the force with which the
real, as formality of what is apprehended in and by itself, This movement of reason is not just movement.
is imposed as real. This is the primordial form of the im- Movement is dynamism, and moreover affirmation as
pression of reality. Reality primordially sensed is not im- such is dynamic. Reason is a movement, but different
pressed upon us by any type of irrefutable evidence, but by than affirmative movement; it is a movement of searching,
something more than evidence: by the irrefragable force a progression. It is a progression which arises from and is
of being reality, by the primordial force of reality. The animated by the reality-ground, by reality in depth.
possible evidence—it is not, though, strictly speaking evi- The progression itself is thus a movement in which
dence—is but the expression of this primordial force. one does not seek to reach reality but to intellectively
However in the second place, it can happen that the real is know the real content of the voice of reality, i.e., the real.
not sensed in and by itself, but only among other realities, It is a search for what the real is in reality. The reality of
i.e., at a distance. Then the impression of reality {95} the real is not univocally determined; this is indeed just
adopts the form of an affirmation, and what is affirmed is the problematic of the real in the face of reason. In virtue
but the reality apprehended in the impression of reality at of it, the progression is a movement within reality itself in
a distance. What is apprehended is then imposed with its order to describe what the real is in worldly reality just
own force, which is demand or exigence, the exigent force through the coercive force of reality. This force consists
of the real. Its noetic expression is evidence. Evidence is in constraining us so that the real which reason seeks is
not constituted by the mere presence of the evident, but by intellectively known as a content which does not draw us
the force of reality, by its exigent force. But the real, in out of reality. What does this mean? We are not talking
the third place, can be sentiently apprehended in depth. about maintaining ourselves in reality “itself” in some
This is the impression of reality in depth. Then reality is general way, i.e., formally consubstantial with reason.
impressed upon us with its own force, the coercive force Even when what reason intellectively “knows” turns out
of reality in depth. Its noetic moment is just reason. Rea- not to be true, still, this not-truth is so within reality and
son, affirmation, and primordial apprehension are but through it. In this regard, the coercive force is a force
noergic modes of a single identical noergic impression of which is formally constitutive of reason. Therefore when
reality. Reason is modalization of affirmation, and af- I am speaking about maintaining ourselves in reality I do
firmation is modalization of primordial apprehension. In not refer {97} only to something like a pretension of rea-
turn, the otherness of the real in impression is imposed son, i.e., to the fact that reason consists in pretending to
upon us with its own force, first in the irrefragable force move itself intentionally in reality. Rather, I refer to
of immediate formality, which is then turned into exigent something much more important, to wit, that reason, ef-
 PROGRESSION QUA INTELLECTION 275

fectively and not just presumptively, is already moving ways true, and furthermore is never what is essential. The
itself in reality. And this is absolutely necessary, with a idea that the essence of reason is the reasoning process is
physical necessity of the intellectively known itself, not of unacceptable. The essential part of reason is not to be the
rational intellection qua intellection. What happens is combination of previous acts of intellection. The essential
that this is not enough. Without that formal and consub- part of previous intellection is not intellection as an act,
stantial immersion of reason in reality, there would be no but what is intellectively known in the act or in previous
rational intellection at all. But the problem lies in what acts. Reason, in fact, is not a composite intellection but a
reason can mean in its concrete form, because the voice of new mode of intellection determined by what was previous
reality is a voice which cries out in concrete terms, i.e., it intellectively known. It is in-depth inquiring intellection.
is the voice with which these real determinate things This new mode of intellection is not necessarily a compo-
within the field constrain one to seek their reality in sition of intellections. Each intellection is merely actual-
depth. Therefore they are a search and a coercive force ity of something real; but since {99} everything real is
which are both essentially concrete. One seeks the struc- respective qua real, it follows that every intellection of the
ture in depth of these concrete field realities, i.e., one tries real is inquiringly referred, in depth, to other possible
to maintain himself in the in-depth reality of some very intellections. Reason consists in this formal referring
determinate things. And then it is quite possible that the process. Reason is not a composition of intellections;
immersion in reality, despite being consubstantial with rather, there is composition of intellections because there
reason, nonetheless draws us out of what these concrete is reason. That is, the process of reasoning not only isn’t
things are in depth, and leaves us floating in a reality, reason, but moreover reason is the very possibility of all
physically real, but devoid of intellective content. It is not reason processes. This reason is the new mode of intel-
just a question of simply moving ourselves effectively in lection. It is in this modal aspect, and only in this, that I
reality, but of not remaining suspended in it with respect say that reason starts from what was intellectively known
to what concerns the determinate things in the field, in a previous intellection. What is this which was previ-
whose in-depth intellection is sought. ously intellectively known?
It is to this concrete progression that we must now The previously known is everything apprehended in
attend. The progression has a point of departure, viz. de- the field manner. It is above all the real intellectively
terminate realities within the field. In this progression known in primordial apprehension. But it is also each
reason has opened to its own ambit, one which is both thing which we have intellectively known at a distance in
distinct from {98} the previous field and in-depth. Fi- the field upon knowing what that thing is in reality. This
nally, in this ambit the intellection of reason in its own intellection has two moments: the moment of simple ap-
character takes place. Let us examine these three aspects prehension and the moment of affirmation. I shall lump
of the progression of reason. both moments together in the word ‘ideas’, in order to
simplify the expression. That which has been previously
known intellectively is, then, the field of the real and all
2 the ideas and affirmations of what that real is in reality.
These previous intellections do not have the character of
The Support for the Progression of Reason “premises”, first because rational intellection is not just
theoretic, and second because reason is not formally rati-
First, let us consider the point of departure of reason. ocination. Reason, when carrying out a reasoning proc-
Reason is not an intellection which only comes after other ess, is only a type—and not the most important type—of
pre-rational intellections. Reason is an intellection de- reason or explanation. But third and above all, they do
termined by the intellection of real field things. If this not have the character of “premises” because the intellec-
were not so, there would be no possibility of a human rea- tive set of the real, and of the ideas and affirmations about
son. The determinant of rational intellection is previous what the real is in reality, does not now function like a set
intellection of what is in the field. What is this previous of judgements, but like a set of intellections. Intellection
intellection? To be sure, it is not intellection qua intellec- is not formally judgement; just the opposite: judgement is
tive act. Classical philosophy has seen reason above all what it is only be being affirmative intellection. Now,
from the point of view of an intellection composed of prior affirmation does not {100} function here like judgement,
intellective acts. The typical rational intellection would but like intellection, i.e., like intellective actualization of
therefore be reasoning: the composition of the logoi, the the real and of what this real is in reality. Affirmation
syn-logismos or syllogism. But as I see it, this is not al- itself is for our problem only a form of intellection.
276 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

Whether or not it is affirmative, the intellection of what when we intellectively know this something as real, what
this real thing is in reality is an intellection. And it is as it is in reality is left open precisely and formally because
intellection that affirmations and ideas now intervene. Up the “among” of its reality is left open. This intellection
to now, “real” and “in reality” have been but two moments culminates in affirmation. Every affirmation, then, takes
of the field intellection of real things. Here this previous place in an open ambit. And its openness is just the
intellection has a new function, one which is modal. It openness of the “among”: only because something real is
does not intervene by virtue of its own intellective struc- apprehended “among” other real things, only on account
ture (primordial apprehension, ideas, affirmations), but in of this is this intellection open. This openness, then,
a new mode. This new mode consists in being the intel- {102} has a precise structure. It is an openness which is
lective support of the real in depth. Together with the real given only in the intellection of each thing, but with re-
and what it is in reality, we have here reality in depth, spect to other things actually apprehended already in the
what the real is in reality. Correlatively, the intellection of field in primordial apprehension. This “among” actual-
the real in primordial apprehension and in affirmation is izes reality for us in the “toward”. And just on account of
now the voice of reality in depth. This new function is, that, the intellection of what this real thing is in reality is
then, the function of being the voice of reality. That a movement which goes from the real toward other reali-
which was previously intellectively known then has the ties, and from them to the first reality. This is affirmative
modal function of being that in which this voice resounds. movement.
In what was intellectively known in the field resounds the
But in rational intellection the openness is different.
voice of what the real is in depth. This resounding has
Let us recall once again what was said earlier. To be sure,
two aspects. On one hand, it is the sound itself, i.e., the
the entire field reality (i.e., real being and what these real
notes of what the field reality, as reality and in reality, is
things are in reality) sends us beyond the field. But it is
in depth. And this is not some vague metaphor, because
beyond the whole field, not from one thing in the field to
to be resonant is in this sense to “notify” reality in depth.
something else in it. Therefore intellection is not a
And notification is a mode of intellection. But on the
movement from one real thing to another, but a progres-
other hand, the resonance has a second aspect. Things
sion from every field reality toward an in-depth beyond.
not only notify, but are also that in which what is notified
Thus intellection is a special mode of movement, viz. a
resounds. They are not just resonances of the real in
search in reality. And as such, it does not know if it is
depth, but also the {101} resonators themselves. And qua
going to find something in this in-depth beyond. This is
resonators, these real things take on that new modal func-
the openness not of the intellection of a thing with respect
tion which is to be principle and canon. Principle and
to others within a field, but the openness of all the field
canon are neither premises nor rules of reasoning. They
reality to a world, i.e., to reality. The openness of the
are the field reality as resonator of what reality is in depth.
world is not an “among” but the “respectivity” of the real
This is the full force—and also the limitation—of rational
qua real. Whence it is that the openness of the ambit of
intellection, of the intellection of the voice of reality in
rational intellection is in a certain way absolute. And
depth. This reality in depth is actualized in intellection in
precisely for this reason its intellection is not simple
its own way, in the form of the ambit of resonance.
movement but searching. Affirmative movement is
movement in a field, but the searching, the rational
3 movement, is a movement in the world, in reality. It is in
this that the in-depth or profound nature of the real for-
The Ambit of Rational Intellection mally consists.
This openness, precisely on account of being open-
Ambit is always, in one form or another, an open
ness in the world, is above all openness to other real
ambit with respect to the things in it. But the ambit of
things, but it is or can be {103} openness to other func-
rational intellection is open in a very special way. Let us
tions and modes of reality as well. This openness is ab-
see how.
solute, because no matter how much we find, the search-
Every field intellection is an open intellection: What ing never exhausts the openness of the world. And this is
a real thing is in reality is not fully actualized even in in- the essential point. In contrast to Leibniz and Kant, we
tellection or primordial apprehension, because this appre- must say that reason is neither total nor totalizing; rather,
hension apprehends the real in and by itself; whereas to it is constitutively open. And this is not on account of the
intellectively know what this something is in reality is to internal limits to reason but the very character of the real
intellectively know it “among” other real things. Hence, as impressively sensed. Reality is open qua reality, be-
 PROGRESSION QUA INTELLECTION 277

cause its openness is but its constitutive respectivity. The consubstantial with reason. Therefore reason cannot set
task of reason is indefinite not only in the sense that it will itself the task of reaching reality, because it is already in
never exhaust what concretely is proposed to it to intel- reality. And this means, above all, that what is intellec-
lectively know, but above all because what is intellectively tively known by reason is not, in this respect, ens rationis
known, viz. the real qua real, is formally and constitu- but realitas ipsa. The reality in which reason moves is not
tively open, and therefore never closed and exhausted. In based upon the reality of the field, but rather the reality
this open ambit, in this world, is where the intellective itself of the field, in its physical numerical identity, is that
search of reason takes place; it is searching in reality. in which reason moves. {105} To be sure, as I have al-
What is the character proper to this inquiring intellection? ready explained at length, the reality in which reason
moves is ground-reality. And its function in rational in-
4 tellection is “to be grounding”. But grounding what?
Why, just its content. The content of what is intellectively
The Character Proper to Intellective Search known rationally is based upon the content of what is in-
tellectively known in the field manner. We shall see this
We are dealing then with a search in a formally open forthwith. We earlier asked ourselves what a base or a
world. But this does not mean that either the openness of support is. Support is always something formally “other”
the world or the search itself is not defined, because we and also “prior” inasmuch as it conduces to the intellec-
are thrust into the search for real field things, and upon tion of something different, but something called forth by
them we support ourselves in our search. Reason opens the prior. The content of what is rationally intellectively
the ambit of intellection but only based upon real things. known is based upon “the” reality in which reason moves
And this openness with support is what constitutes the consubstantially, i.e., without formal support. This char-
character proper to intellective search. In what does this acter of support which the content has is therefore in-
support consist? And what is it that is thus intellectively scribed within the previous character of reality (when this
known? {104} These are the two points which we must character has as its function that of grounding). The char-
summarily analyze. The questions overlap partially, and acter of reality is identical to the formality of the impres-
hence some repetition is inevitable. But despite that, it is sion of reality. And therefore reason, even when it intel-
necessary to examine the questions separately. lectively knows what is most inaccessible to the senses, is
always and only sentient reason because it intellectively
A) In what does support consist? One might think knows its contents within the moment of reality of an im-
that it consists in the ground; then to say that reason is pression. The mode in which reality is grounding consists
supported in what was previously intellectively known in being referred to the content of real field things as sup-
would mean that what is intellectively known in reason is port of the content of what reason is going to intellectively
something which has its ground in what was previously know.
intellectively known in the field. If this were so, that
which is intellectively known by reason would be only What is this which reason intellectively knows?
something which de suyo does not have reality; it would B) That which is intellectively known in reason thus
only be real insofar as it is grounded in some reality in- has its own content, which is formally and identically in-
tellectively known in the field manner. To use a medieval scribed in the character of reality of the field. This char-
formula, this is the classical idea that what is intellectively acter or formality is just the open ambit of reality qua re-
known in reason is by itself only objectivity—ens ra- ality, an ambit already apprehended in the field manner.
tionis—; only insofar as it has a fundamentum in re can it On the other hand, the content of what is going to be in-
be said that what is rationally intellectively known is real. tellectively known in this ambit is what is based only upon
Now, said this way, and including all of its ramifications, the content of the field intellection. That content is not
this is not correct as I see it, because it is a conceptualiza- necessarily identical with nor is it {106} necessarily dis-
tion in which fundament and support are identified, and tinct from what is intellectively known in the field man-
that identification is wrong. Every rational intellection ner. What is different and new is the mode of intellection.
has, in fact, two moments. One, that which is intellec- Thus, for example, in ancient physics intellectively known
tively known; another, the character in accordance with elementary particles were corpuscles, i.e. something
which the intellectively known is intellectively known as whose nature is identical to what bodies intellectively
real. And these two moments are not formally distinct; known in the field manner are. But the fact that the cor-
rather, they have essentially different characters. puscle of field intellection was a support and also a mo-
The moment of reality, as we have already seen, is ment of intellection in-depth—this constituted a new
278 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

mode of intellection. That which was intellectively radically new, as we have said. On the other hand it can
known—the body—was the same, but it was different in happen that the content is like that of field things. If be-
its intellective function, i.e., the mode of intellection. The ing in reason is something imposed by reality, its rational
mode of rational intellection is just the mode by which content is never so; what the “grounding” structure of the
reality itself is grounding the real. The mode of intellec- real is, is not imposed. Whence it follows that the unity of
tively knowing a body is given. If one intellectively the two faces of the imposition of reality is the necessary
knows that what is in the world is a body, the content imposition of something which is what is not-necessary.
“body” is identical to the field content. But the fact that This paradoxical unity is just freedom. The essence of
this content is a ground of the field, that is something reason is freedom. Reality forces us to be free. This does
new. What is new is that the field body, despite being a not mean that I can intellectively know just as I please,
support of what is intellectively known rationally, might but that the determinant response of my intellection to the
not be a ground of what is intellectively known. The par- imposition of {108} the real in depth is to be necessarily
ticles (i.e. what is rationally intellectively known) are not free. I might not wish to intellectively determine the real
bodies, but it is upon the body in the field that I have in depth. That would be a negative act of reason, but still
based myself precisely in order to intellectively know a negative act which is only possible through the free
something which is not a body. Therefore in rational in- character of determining. The determination itself is not
tellection reality itself is an open ambit in itself, i.e., an free, since it lacked nothing more, but its determining
ambit which is open in the worldly sense, and moreover itself is free. Reality in depth is imposed upon us not in
an ambit which leaves its mode of grounding free, so to order to leave us in freedom, but to force us to be rightly
speak, in openness, and therefore also leaves free the free.
content of the grounded qua grounded. And this is what,
This does not happen in the same way in the case of
ultimately, confers upon what is intellectively known in
reason and affirmation. Intellection of one real thing
reason one of its own characters. Which one? Let us ex-
among others, the field intellection, intellectively
plain step by step.
knows—and I say it predicatively for greater clarity—that
a) Let us repeat: above all it is reality itself which A is B. And this intellection, as we saw, is a movement in
imposes rational intellection upon us. This is the coercive freedom. But the freedom is mediated by ideas (B) in
force with which the impression of reality in depth is im- order to apprehend the real thing (A). Affirmation is the
posed upon us. All real things, we said, give us pause to realization of these free ideas (B) in the thing (A). In
think. {107} And this ‘give’ is the coercive force with somewhat vague terms, we may say that B discharges a
which the intellectively real in depth is imposed upon us. representative function: affirmation intellectively knows
Since the intellective moment of thinking is reason, it in a thing the realization of what is represented, an intel-
then follows that this mode of intellective knowing, rea- lection which takes place in the medium of reality. On the
son, is something imposed by reality itself. Reality makes other hand, the question changes when we are dealing
us intellectively know in reason. with rational intellection, because then we are not talking
b) But this which the real imposes upon us in about a field of reality but about in-depth reality itself, i.e.,
depth—let us speak about it now from the opposite stand- about the world. Intellection then falls back not upon the
point—is reality as mere ambit. And this being “mere representative content of B but upon its grounding char-
ambit” has two faces. On one hand it has the most imme- acter. B now has a formally grounding function. There-
diate face: forcing us to intellectively know the field real fore the realization of B in A is now that of grounding A
within the ambit as principle and canonic measure for in B, whether realizing it or not. In virtue of this, the
grounding it. Under this aspect, what reality determines realization in depth is free in the sense that it freely cre-
in intellection consists in reality adopting a rational form. ates the idea of the grounding character of B. Reason is
That is, reality makes us to be in reason. The new mode not representation. In in-depth reality one deals with a
of intellection is to be in reason. But to be merely an am- realization but in the sense of grounding, and therefore
bit also has another face. And this is that upon being in something radically free. {109}
reality as mere ambit, its content as such remains inde- This unity (in freedom) of “the” open reality qua
terminate. Reality is imposed upon us with the force of fundamenting and of fundamented content, is a unity of
having to endow it with some content. Now, it can hap- radical indetermination which confers upon the rational
pen that this content as real is given by real things which its own character, viz. that of being creation.
have been previously known intellectively; but the fact
that this is a ground of the real in depth is something Rational creation does not mean arbitrary intellec-
 PROGRESSION QUA INTELLECTION 279

tion; just the opposite: it is always a creation based upon In affirmation, a real thing A is actualized in the
and directed by that which is intellectively known in the field B, and in turn the field B is realized in the real thing
field manner, in a progression from the field real toward A. Realization and actualization are two unitary aspects
in-depth reality, toward what a thing is in reality. There- of the intellection of something in a field. Of these as-
fore it is a creation within very strict limits. It is a crea- pects, realization is founded upon actualization. Now,
tion which has a principle and a canon, and in turn prin- when intellection of the real in depth takes place, it has
ciple and canon are but principle and canon of rational these same characteristics, but most probably in a much
creation. Things of the field are apprehended as they are; more complicated form since we are no longer dealing
in-depth reality is found through principle and canon. with the field but with the world. Rational intellection
And I am not limiting myself to apprehending what is has two moments, viz. the moment of intellection of real-
given to me; rather, I am compelled to forge reasons, i.e., ity itself {111} as grounding principle, and the moment of
the ground of what is given and affirmed, regardless of intellective knowing of a real determinate content as
what it is. Reason is creative intellection through princi- grounded upon that ground.
ple and canon. This does not mean that reason does not
contain truth and error; that is another question. I here The first is the intellection of in-depth physical real-
affirm that something intellectively known in creative ity as grounding principle. This physical reality is actu-
intellection is that in accordance with which or with re- alized in intellection and in its ideas; and its mode of be-
spect to which reason contains truth or error. And this ing actualized, I repeat, is “to be grounding”. In turn the
intellection, I repeat once again, is not necessarily a “rep- content of previous intellections (ideas) takes on the char-
resentative” creation, but it is always a creation, let us say acter of the content of the real in the world. This is the
functional, i.e., of the fundamental and grounding char- realization of the content of the idea. The unity of these
acter, of reality. I shall refer to this fundamental and two moments is just creation. The in-depth reality is ac-
grounding character, intellectively known concretely, as tualized in what was previously intellectively known, and
‘content’ in this book, and not representation as such. in this actualization reality acquires its free content; this
latter has been realized.
What is this creating? In what does creation by rea-
son consist? What are its modes? Let us review summa- Hence the importance of reason: it is physical reality
rily what was said about these three points in Part II of the itself, in its grounding free content, which is in play. We
book. have already found ourselves in an similar situation when
we were studying field intellection. Field intellection is
c) As the grounding character of content is not {110} an intellection of the real as realization of something ir-
univocally imposed by reality, one might think that what real. For just this reason the irreal inexorably has its
creative intellection does is to forge a “reason” or expla- “own” properties about which it is possible to debate. As I
nation in thought and attribute reality to it. Creation see it, this can only happen because the “created” is al-
would then fall back formally upon the character of real- ways and only the character of a content of physical real-
ity. As I see it this is not correct. Reality is physically ity itself. Physical reality actualized in a free system of
consubstantial with reason. We are not dealing with an ideas and previous affirmations can and does have more
intentional consubstantiality but a physical one, and it is properties than those determined by the logical content of
also formal and strict. To know intellectively and ration- said ideas and said affirmations. And this is inexorable.
ally is not to pretend that the content of this or that intel- Creation, then, radically and primarily concerns reason
lection is real, because reality is not a pretense of reality itself as intellection of the ground of something in depth.
and still less a free pretense about it. The reality which
reason intellectively knows is physically one and indenti- But then we see clearly that this intellection {112}
cal with the reality intellectively known in every intellec- has, as I said a bit earlier, a second moment: the attribu-
tion preceeding the rational intellection. Reason does not tion of this “reason” or “explanation” freely created to a
have a pretense of reality but rather is already in reality real thing. And this attribution is free. I can freely intel-
itself. What reason pretends is that this reality has this or lectively know that in-depth cosmic reality is the classical
that determinate content, and therefore that this content, Hamiltonian ground, or the quantum field ground. And
freely chosen, is a ground. We could call it grounding granting this, I intellectively know freely as well that a
content. What is created is then not reality but the real field thing has in fact one or the other of those two
grounding content of in depth reality. In virtue of this, grounding structures. This is the second moment of ra-
reason is not creation of reality but just the opposite: crea- tional intellection, viz. that from the various grounds
tion of the grounding content in reality. which I have freely created, I freely choose one as the
280 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

ground of what I am trying to intellectively know in the What is unique about this intellective unity qua structural
field. The creation of grounding reason is the actualiza- is being a “construct” unity. As intellective creation the
tion of in-depth physical reality in what has been previ- unity is above all just coherent intellective unity. And this
ously intellectively known. And this creation is prolonged unity, I repeat, is not necessarily an intellection through
in an intellective knowing of a concrete real thing with definition. And it is not in the first place because defini-
one or another ground: it is an actualization of the thing tion is not the exclusive way of constructing intellective
in one or another of them. This actualization constitutes unities. Second, and especially, because definition is al-
the root of realization, the realization of the ground in in- ways a predicative logos. Now, predication is not the pri-
depth reality, and the realization of this ground in the real mary and constitutive form of the logos; before it there is
thing which I want to intellectively know. Reason or ex- a propositional logos which is the nominal logos. I leave
planation, then, is first an intellection of the real ground, aside for {114} now the fact that there is a form of logos
and second an intellection of the fact that this ground is of prior to the propositional logos, viz. the positional logos.
a real thing which one is trying to ground, a ground real- Now, the coherent intellective unity of the in-depth real is
ized in it. And these two moments taken unitarily in the the intellective unity in a nominally constructed logos,
reality of this thing in the world constitute the free crea- i.e., in a nominal logos which affirms the notes in a con-
tion of reason. And here we have the essence of reason as struct state. When the logos falls back upon notes which
a free creation. In what, more concretely, does the ra- presumably are ultimate and irreducible, we have the
tional character of this creation consist? That is the sec- radical logos of in-depth reality. This unity is freely cre-
ond question. ated.
d) The free creation of content, whatever its nature, The actualization of in-depth physical reality in this
is supposed to have its own unity. It is not by chance that unity confers upon it the character of being the content of
the creation is conceptual. One can intellectively know that in-depth reality. And in turn the coherent intellective
that that content has the “unity”—only apprehended po- unity has been realized in the in-depth reality. In virtue of
etically—of the metaphorical. It is not by chance that the this, the coherent intellective unity has acquired the char-
content has a {113} type of unity which was fixed in ad- acter of primary coherent unity of the real: it is essence.
vance. The rational part of this creation consists in being Essence is the structural principle of the substantivity of
a creation in and of “grounding unity”, of whatever type. the real. I have explained my views on these subjects at
When it is realized, this unity created by me takes on the length in my book Sobre la esencia†. Essence is what
character of a real in-depth structure: the system of cen- reason has sought in this case. And in this search reason
tauric notes becomes a centaur, etc. And this structural has freely created the essence, in the sense explained
unity is just grounding reason. The rational part of the above. This is not the essence of reality itself, but reality
creation is, then, precisely in the structure. itself in essence. Therefore the fact that the real has es-
sence is an imposition of in-depth reality itself. But
There is a type of structural unity that discharges a
whether this essence has this or that content, however true
decisive function, viz. the structural unity which consists
my in-depth intellection is, will always be an open ques-
in being a “construct” system, i.e., a system in which none
tion. Every note, by being real, points to others in its
of its notes has its own reality as a note other than being
physical reality, so that rational intellection of essence is
intrinsically and formally “of” the others.* Being a con-
constitutively open both insofar as my intellection never
struct system is the very essence of the real qua real.
terminates, and insofar as the intellectively known itself,
Whence its radical function. And it is on account of this
i.e., each note, in principle points to another. And we
that we are going to concentrate our reflection upon this
shall never know the amplitude of this pointing. What, in
structural unity. That system of notes should have, intel-
fact, does this amplitude mean?
lectively, its own coherent unity. And this unity can be
established in many ways. The structural intellective Every real thing is a construct system of notes which
unity of the notes can consist, for example, in being a {115} constitute it, and which I therefore call ‘constitu-
definition. But it is not necessary that it be so. It can also ent’. But among these notes there are some which are not
be a system of axioms and postulates. This system of axi- grounded upon others of the system itself. And these
oms and postulates is not just a system of definitions. notes are then more than constituent; they are constitutive,
and what they constitute is the essence of the real thing.
*
[Zubiri is drawing an analogy with a grammatical feature of the Semitic
†
languages to which he frequently makes reference, the “construct state” English translation, On Essence, by A. R. Caponigri, Catholic University
that describes a type of unity similar to that discussed here.—trans.] of America Press, 1983.
 PROGRESSION QUA INTELLECTION 281

Their unity is, in fact, primary coherent unity. Now, am- “its own” has two aspects. For one, it is a pointing to other
plitude is the difference between the constituent notes and forms and modes of reality; but for the other, it is the
the constitutive notes in the order of grounding of the in- openness of that real thing towards its own reality. Only
depth real. And this is quite complex, because essence is by virtue of the first aspect is respectivity pointing; by
what constitutes, as reality, the real thing of which it is the virtue of the second, it is constituting. Respectivity as
essence. And here is where the complexity of the problem pointing is grounded upon constituting respectivity. Con-
begins. stitutive notes, i.e. essence, make each thing “its own”
reality, but within a prior unity which cannot be lost, viz.
The pointing, in fact, is grounded above all in the
the cosmos. What is cosmos? One might think, following
constitutive respectivity of the real qua real, i.e., is
Aristotle, that cosmos is just an ordering, a taxis of things,
grounded in the fact that the real is constitutively in the
the real. But one might also think that it is only the cos-
world. This respectivity is what makes each thing not
mos itself which has its own unity. Then {117} things
only real but constitutively a determinate form and mode
would be parts or fragments of the cosmos, and therefore
of reality. In virtue of this, the reality of each essential
would not have an essence; only the cosmos as such would
note points to that which in the real thing in question is
have it. Things would be only fragmentary essential mo-
the radical and ultimate determinant of that mode of real-
ments of the cosmos. The unity of the cosmos would not
ity. Then ‘amplitude’ means the major or minor differ-
be taxonomic but of a different character. In the case of
ence between some real notes and the ultimate and radical
the taxis the course of the cosmos would be a system of
determinant in them of the mode of being in question.
interactions of things. But if the structure of the cosmos is
For example, the mode of being a person is radically dif-
not taxonomic, then the course of the cosmos must be
ferent from the mode of being of any other apersonal real-
simply the variation of moments of a primary unity,
ity. And this amplitude is opened up within the richness of
something like the unity of the course of a melody. The
these constitutive notes. However ultimate they may be,
moments of a melody are not found in interaction with
the cells or cellular components of a human organism are
other moments of it, and yet there is a melodic course
not what determine that this organism have a ultimate
which has a perfectly determinate structure. In this case
mode of being personal.
the unity of the cosmos would not be taxonomic but me-
But this is a relatively exceptional amplitude, be- lodic, following deterministic and statistical laws. The
cause all other real things, and even people themselves, breakup of the cosmos into things which are really distinct
before being modes of reality, are moments in such-or- does not, then, go beyond being a provisional breakup.
such respectivity; they are forms of reality. Each thing is And therefore the essence of each presumed thing is af-
{116} respective not only to the world, to reality as such, fected with a provisionality par excellence, with a radical
but also to what other real things are in their physical openness.
suchness. This respectivity is no longer world but cosmos.
What we have here, then, is how the intellection of
And this cosmic respectivity determines a pointing not to
that real in-depth moment is a constitutively open intel-
modes of reality but to other real things, and to other
lection in a creative sense. It is drawn from the sentient
forms of reality, to their structural notes. Then ‘ampli-
character of reason. Sentient reason must create what it is
tude’ does not mean the difference between some constitu-
going to intellectively know by structural grounding and
ent notes and others which are ultimately determinant of
endow the real with this unity in order to convert it into
the mode of reality; rather, it means the difference be-
primary coherent unity, i.e., into essence. And this, which
tween some constituent notes and others which ultimately
culminates in the rational intellection of the essence of the
determine the cosmic respectivity of the thing and of its
real, completely characterizes all rational intellections:
form of reality. Here the notes do not determine the mode
they endow reality with a freely created structural content
of being of the real, but its formal inclusion in the cosmos.
by actualization of that reason in what is created.
Now, in both senses, the amplitude of the notes
How is this endowing brought about, i.e., how is the
makes intellection of essence something constitutively
creative intellection of the real brought about? This is the
open. This is not the place to investigate that question,
third and last of the points which we must examine. {118}
because it isn’t the subject of the present book. I shall
therefore limit myself to a summary indication of it.
e) Modes of rational creation. In its primary struc-
Essence determines each real thing with respect to ture, as we said, reason is in-depth intellection of the pre-
not only other real things but also to other forms and viously intellectively known field reality. It is clear that,
modes of reality. Each thing is “its own” reality. And this starting from what we might call ‘primary rational intel-
282 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

lections’, reason follows its line of progress in-depth be- consist?

yond the field. We shall see this below. But what is im-
First and most important, What is this free experi-
portant to us here about this moment is the constitutive
ence? Let us say what experience “is” here, what it “falls
origin of reason, and this origin is found in what was pre-
back” upon, “how” it does so, and in what this singular
viously intellectively known. In the previously known,
experience “consists”.
reason has not only its point of departure but its intrinsic
support. This support is ultimately the principle and What does “experience” mean here? Leaving aside
canon of intellection with which reason measures in-depth for later the strict and rigorous concept of what experience
reality. Reason is sentient. Its sentient part assures that is, it will suffice for now to appeal to the normal and
what I intellectively know is reality; but the fact that this common meaning of what is generally understood by ex-
reality is the ambit of in-depthness or profundity is what perience. ‘To experience’ sometimes means in a tentative
opens up and constitutes the creative freedom of reason. way to test or assay. In our case, this testing “falls back”
This freedom concerns the content of in-depth reality. upon the content which I have apprehended. And this is
Insofar as I rationally know this content intellectively, possible just because reality as ambit leaves {120} the
reason is not of representative character but of grounding content indeterminate, and therefore is the ambit of free
character; the content is created in order to endow reality creation. “How” experience falls back testing what was
with its concrete grounding character, because only from previously intellectively known is by testing in the form of
this latter does the content most proper to in-depth reality freedom. Finally, what is freely tested regarding the pre-
turn out to be “other” or even “opposite”. I have here viously intellectively known content “consists” in a modi-
given the name ‘representation’ to everything previously fication of it; we test or seek to modify its content freely,
intellectively known, not in the sense of being just simple not to be sure along the lines of its physical reality, but
apprehensions as opposed to affirmations, but in the sense along the lines of its intellective physical actuality. Thus,
that all these simple apprehensions and all these affirma- for example, one takes the intellection of something which
tions are what “re-present” real and true reality. This rep- in the field sense is a “body”, and freely modifies many of
resentation serves as principle and canon of rational in- its characteristics, stripping it of its color, reducing its
tellection, i.e., of the intellection of the grounded charac- size, changing its form, etc. With this modification the
ter of content. But then it is clear, as I have already said, body becomes a “corpuscle”. The effort of free modifica-
that although the grounding function is not formally the tion of the actuality of already apprehended content is
same as the representative function, {119} it is not com- wherein free experience formally consists. Free experi-
pletely independent of it. And this is because the fact that ence, then, moves in the actuality of physical reality itself.
what has been previously known intellectively, the repre- And the freedom of this movement concerns its content, a
sentative, can be the principle and canon of the ground free movement based upon the principle and canon of
indicates that this ground must have some support in that what has been previously intellectively known.
which is representative. The representative is the neces-
It is useful to position this concept of free experience
sary base and support for reason, even though it may not
with respect to other philosophical systems, above all with
be even close to adequate with respect to its grounding
respect to the idea of the experience of the fictitious. John
character.
Stuart Mill thought that together with what is commonly
Now, starting from this representation of what is ef- called ‘sensible experience’ or ‘perceptive experience’
fectively real in the field, rational creation tries to freely there is an experience of imagination, i.e., an experience
endow in-depth reality with its own grounding content. which is commonly called ‘image’ as opposed to percep-
The mode of endowing is the mode of being supported in tion. Mill tells us that this image is not reality. The idea
what was previously intellectively known for the free has been coopted by Husserl in what he calls ‘fantastic
creation of the content of in-depth reality, i.e., it is the experience’, which falls back upon the content of every
mode in which what was previously intellectively known perception when its character of reality has been neutral-
gives reason or explanation of the real. What are these ized. Now, what I call ‘free experience’ does not coincide
modes? As I see it, the endowing results in three princi- even remotely with either of these two conceptions. In the
ple modes. first place, that upon which the free {121} experience
First mode. In-depth reality can be endowed with a relies is formally reality. And this reality is the physical
content in what I shall call free experience. In what does reality of what has been previously intellectively known.
this free experience consist, and in what does the mode of Therefore this experience does not rely upon nor remake
endowing the in-depth reality in it with its own content the image in the sense of imaginary reality; nor does it
 PROGRESSION QUA INTELLECTION 283

rely upon the fantastic qua neutralized in its reality. Just turn, men as well as all things were taken as vital souls,
the opposite: free experience involves the moment of i.e., living things were taken as a model of in-depth real-
physical reality; it is not freedom from reality, but reality ity. The list could be extended indefinitely. The effort
in freedom. And in the second place, this experience does was always to endow in-depth reality with a content that
not rely only upon the fictitious, but also upon perceptions was the actualization in it of a model or formal image.
and concepts, all of which formally comprise the intellec-
Here we have the first mode of endowing in-depth
tive content of simple apprehensions. However experi-
reality with its own content, viz. free experience. To be
ence does not rely only upon these simple apprehensions,
sure, the total or partial collapse of those models and
but also upon all the affirmations of what has been intel-
above all the {123} rational profundization in them, led to
lectively known in the field manner.
other modes of explaining the real, to other modes of
Together with this conception of free experience as basing oneself upon what has been previously known in-
experience of a free jump from the empirical to the ficti- tellectively, modes different than taking it as an image or
tious, the idea of freedom as the liberty to jump from the model acquired in free experience. These other modes
empirical to the ideal has often run its course in philoso- are, as I have already said, primarily two.
phy. In this view, freedom would consist in creating
Second mode. That which has been previously
“ideal” objects. But that is impossible, because that upon
known intellectively has not only its own notes but in ad-
which freedom relies here is not an “object” but “reality”.
dition these notes have among themselves a more or less
And whatever may be the presumed “ideation”, its formal
precise structural unity. Here I take the word ‘structural’
principle and its outcome are always physical reality.
in its widest sense, viz. the mode of systematization of the
Hence the so-called ‘ideal creation’ is not the creation of
notes. This structure is something which has degrees of
ideal reality, but creation of reality in an idea.
depth, from the simple unity of a mere group of notes to
Free experience is neither experience of free fiction the primary coherent unity of essence, passing through all
nor experience of free ideation. Free experience is a free intermediate degrees. Here, then, ‘structure’ means the
modification of the content of what has been previously formal unity of notes. Now, in order to give explanation
intellectively known, but a modification conducted in the of the real I cannot rely upon the notes of field things
ambit of physical reality itself. themselves, but only upon their formal structure, in their
mode of systematization. The mode of endowing in-depth
Actualized in this free experience, i.e., in this modi-
reality with formal structure is what I call hypothesis.
fied representation, in-depth reality therein takes on
What is an hypothesis? What is the mode of endowing in-
{122} its content. How? What is the mode by which free
depth reality with content in this hypothesis?
experience endows in-depth reality with a content? The
mode by which the content of free experience gives reason ‘Hypothesis’ is an expression which comes from the
or explanation of the real consists in this content being a Greek hypotithemi, to collect, to establish something be-
formal image or model of in-depth reality. It is under- low something else. This “establishing below” has two
stood that with this “model-like” content, in-depth reality aspects. One is the aspect of what is thus established; the
gives reason or explanation of the real, and in many cases other, the aspect of the act of establishing it. In English
this is naturally true. But in many others we are witness we call the first aspect what is “supposed” about some-
to the historical unfolding of the collapse of this tendency thing, the other, ‘supposition’. These two are not the
to construct “models”. In physics it was thought for cen- same. Supposition is an act of mine, the supposed a mo-
turies that in order to give an explanation of reality, it was ment of the real. Things supposed about this or that ac-
necessary to rationally construct “models”, for example tuation, situation, or creation are not suppositions. The
Faraday’s lines of force, the mechanical model of the supposed is not primarily supposed by virtue of being the
aether, the astronomical model of the atom, etc. In or- terminus of a supposition; on the contrary, the supposition
ganic chemistry there is the celebrated model invented by is so {124} because that which is supposed in it is some-
Kekulé to explain organic molecules: the bonds between thing supposed. The supposed is always primary. The
atoms, e.g. in the case of benzene hexagonal single and Greeks called the supposed hypothema, and the supposi-
double bonds (Kekulé’s hexagon), etc. At one time it was tion hypothesis. In English and other modern languages,
thought by many that human embryology began from only the second survives. Therefore the word ‘hypothesis’
something like an invisible homunculus. Let us similarly is somewhat ambiguous: it commonly leads to believing
recall the effort to take people as a model of in-depth real- that an hypothesis is a supposition, but it can also be the
ity; that was the “personification” of natural realities. In supposed itself. In our problem, the supposed, that which
284 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

is “established below”, is the formal structure of some- homology does not mean generalization. Generalization
thing. I therefore call it the ‘basic structure’. Hypothesis is an extension. And dealing with basic structures, there
is the basic structure as something supposed of the real. is to be sure a generalization, but one which is the conse-
The mode of the notes of the real being “systematized” is quence of a homology. Only because the structures are
just basic structure, as opposed to a mere “diversity” of homologous can they be generalized. Therefore the equa-
notes. This is the primary and radical aspect of hypothe- tions of electrical potential are not a generalization of me-
sis. Hypothesis (in English or Spanish) is not, then, mere chanical or thermal potential, but rather express a basic
supposition. If by ‘supposition’ one understands every homologous structure, and only in this sense can one
conceptualization to be admitted more or less provision- speak of generalization.
ally, then everything rational would be an hypothesis. But
Let us take some more examples of homologies. A
hypothesis is first of all the supposed of something, its
{126} social entity does not seem at all like an organism if
radical structure. It is a moment of reality, what is estab-
we consider its notes; but since the beginning of the cen-
lished as the base of something, its basic structure.
tury it has been thought innumerable times in sociology
Now, in what was previously intellectively known, I that the basic structure of society, i.e., the mode of its
can freely attend to its basic structure and to its notes. In “elements” being systematized is the same as the mode of
this last sense of notes, modification is free experience. systematization of the organs of a higher animal; this was
But the hypothesis does not formally consist in free expe- the idea behind sociological organicism. Hence the idea
rience; rather it consists in being endowed with basic of social “organization”. This is the homology between
structure. Thus I intellectually knew what is supposed the basic structure of in-depth reality of society and the
about the real in question independently of its notes. And field reality of living beings. It was also thought that the
then I could rely upon them in order to endow the in- basic structure of the social is homologous not to that of
depth real with basic structure. And I can call this en- living beings but to that of solid bodies; this was the idea
dowing ‘hypothesis’, but now in the sense of supposition: of the in-depth reality of the social as “solidarity”. Society
it is the supposition that the supposed of the in-depth real is neither a dog (or other higher animal) nor a solid body;
consists in this or that thing supposed or basic structure. but it has been thought that the basic structure of in-depth
This endowing does not consist in supposing that my sup- social reality is homologous to the basic structure of a dog
position is real, but in supposing that the real in which I or of a solid body. Homology has intervened also in the
am already here and now present, prior to all {125} sup- physical sciences. Thus it is (or was) thought that ele-
position, has one determinate basic structure and not an- mentary particles in some respects have structures ho-
other. Repeating once again the formula, I shall say that mologous to that of bodies which rotate around an axis.
we are not dealing with a supposition or hypothesis of But in elementary particles we are dealing only with ho-
reality, but of reality in suppostion or hypothesis. We are mologous basic structures, because in these particles there
not dealing with hypothetical reality but with the hypo- is no rotation. Nonetheless, quantized angular momen-
thetical structure of the real in which I already really am. tum (without rotation) is attributed to these particles; this
And in this lies all of the weight of the hypothesis, viz. in is ‘spin’. It is precisely because we are not dealing with
being what is supposed of the basic structure. modeling but with what I here term ‘homologizing’ that,
in my view, it has been said for decades that elementary
What is this matter of endowing the in-depth real
particles are not “visualizable”. This does not mean the
with basic structure? What we are doing is to consider
triviality that they are not “visible”, but that they do not
that the basic structure of the in-depth real is of the same
have notes which are the same as those of field bodies.
nature as the basic structure of these or those field things.
This is clear in the case of spin, which represents purely
This is very different, as we shall see forthwith, from con-
and simply the homology of two structures, the {127}
sidering some field things as models of in-depth reality.
rotational structure of field bodies and the rotational
Here we are not trying to model. We are trying to do
structure without rotation of the elementary particles.
something quite different, to homologize or make equiva-
Descriptively, light does not at all seem like electricity or
lent. The mode of endowing content to in-depth reality
magnetism; but it is known that the basic structures of
does not consist in endowing it with some model-notes,
light are identical to those of electromagnetism as ex-
according to which the in-depth reality grounds some-
pressed in Maxwell’s equations; this is the electromag-
thing by being this or that model; rather, it consists in in-
netic theory of light.
depth reality structuring the thing in question. To ground
is here to structure. The structures of the in-depth real In summary, I can endow in-depth reality not with
and of the field real are assumed to be homologous. This the notes of field things considered as models, but with a
 PROGRESSION QUA INTELLECTION 285

basic structure (hypothesis) which is homologous to that (and therefore in the field, in field reality). What is free is
of something in the field. the realization of a content as content of the real. The
real, then, is not a thing like the things immediately
Still, this does not exhaust the modes of endowing
sensed, but neither is it just something mental; it is rather
in-depth reality with content.
a free thing. Upon being de suyo a free thing consists in
Third mode. Rational creation relies upon field real- reality, in being freely this or that. The construction, then,
ity in order to endow in-depth reality with its own struc- is not freedom of reality, but reality in freedom. {129}
ture, as we have seen. This field reality, by virtue of being
In this free action, I am to be sure relying upon the
an ambit, is something different from its content. And
content of the field real as previously intellectively known.
that requires the field ambit to be a field of freedom for
But it is a reliance which has a radically free character: I
the intelligence. This freedom can refer to the notes
rely upon the content of field things only in order to make
which constitute field things, i.e., the freedom to be able
the break of liberation from that content. Although my
to change them within their own lines. Freedom can also
free construction adopts models or basic structures taken
refer not to the notes themselves but to their mode of sys-
from the field, nonetheless the free construction is not
tematization, their basic structure, in order to take it inde-
formally constituted by what it adopts; if it does adopt it, it
pendently of the notes themselves. There is yet one fur-
does so freely.
ther and more radical step of freedom. It consists in the
ambit being the field of freedom in order to completely The free construction can be brought about in differ-
construct its content by constructing notes and basic ent ways. It should not be thought that to be rational is
structure at the same time. Then rational intellection can synonymous with “theoretical” construction, so to speak.
endow in-depth reality with this content which is freely Any free creation whatsoever, a novel for example, is free
constructed. construction. I do not call it ‘fiction’ because in every free
construction, however fictitious it is, percepts, concepts,
What is this construction? In what does the mode of
and affirmations come into play as well as fictional items.
endowing in-depth reality with grounding content by re-
Any novel is riddled with concepts and affirmations. But
lying upon free construction consist? {128}
I can also bring about a free theoretical construction. This
That this is free construction we have already seen construction is not a novel, but the difference—about
some pages back when speaking about the creational which I shall speak forthwith—concerns the construction
character of reason. Free construction is the maximum itself. Every free construction, whether theoretical or not,
degree of creative freedom, and therefore it would serve is qua construction of the same nature; it consists in con-
no purpose to repeat the details of what has already been structing, in reality, a content with full freedom regarding
said; it will suffice to review some ideas. I freely con- the whole content of the field.
struct on the basis of percepts, fictional items, concepts,
Granting this, How is the reality of this free content
and above all of affirmations. That which is thus con-
endowed? The mode in which the freely constructed in-
structed, is constructed in reality, in physical reality itself;
tellectively endows reality with its own content does not
this is field reality qua physical reality and identical to the
consist in modeling or in homologies; it is instead a radi-
formality of reality apprehended as impression of reality
cal postulation. In-depth reality is actualized in what has
in primordial apprehension. It is this reality which is ac-
been freely constructed by postulation. This I have al-
tualized in my free constructions. ‘Free’ does not here
ready explained in Part II. It is not truth which is postu-
mean that the act of realizing is free as an act, but that the
lated but real content. And this is so whether dealing with
realization itself is what, qua realization, is free. Here
theoretical or {130} non-theoretical construction. It is not
freedom does not concern only the constructing act, but
postulation of reality but reality in postulation. One pos-
also the formal nature of what is constructed itself. Free-
tulates what belongs to something [suyo] but not the de
dom in this context is not only freedom to modify notes or
suyo itself. Postulation is the mode by which in-depth
to homologize structures; it is freedom or liberation from
reality is endowed with a freely constructed content. Re-
everything to do with the field in order to construct the
ality is actualized in my free construction, which latter is
content of in-depth reality. This free realization is not
thus converted into the content of the real; a content how-
production, but a realization along the lines of actuality.
ever free one may wish, but always the content of the real.
Realization independent of the field and of production is
free construction. That from which one is free is not be- That which is freely constructed and realized by
ing real, since reality is primarily and ineluctably given in postulation can remain on its own; it is creation by crea-
every intellection since primordial apprehension itself tion. This is proper, for example, to a novel. But that
286 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

which is freely constructed can be realized in the “ground- In physics, at the beginning of the modern age, there
reality” as grounding the content of a field thing. Then were two great free creative efforts to intellectively know
that which is freely constructed is “grounded” content; it rationally the in-depth reality of the universe. One con-
is theoretical postulation. sisted in the idea that the universe is a great organism
whose diverse elements comprise systems by sympathy
It is not difficult to adduce examples of postulation
and antipathy. But this never had much success. The one
which are especially important and decisive. Above all,
which triumphed was the other conception. It was the
there is the rational intellection of the spatial reality of the
free creation which postulates for cosmic reality a mathe-
perceptive field in its in-depth reality; this is geometry.
matical structure. That was Galileo’s idea in his New Sci-
All geometry consists in a free system of postulates (in-
ence: the great book of the universe, he tells us, is written
cluding the so-called axioms). In geometry one freely
in geometric language, i.e., mathematics. For centuries
postulates that the in-depth reality of the space field has
this mathematicism took the form of mechanism, a free
fixed, precise characteristics; this is the geometric space.
creation according to which universal mathematics is the
The field space, i.e., perceptive space, is the pre-geometric
mathematics of deterministic movement. But for the last
space. Now, one postulates that this field space has, in its
century, physics has ceased to be mechanistic. The
in-depth reality, fixed instrinsic characteristics which are
mathematical structure of the universe subsists independ-
quite precise. The existence of geometries with different
ently of its earlier mechanistic form, which was too lim-
freely selected postulates shows that the possibility of dif-
iting. Mathematicism is not mechanism. And all of this
ferent contents applies to the in-depth reality of space, to
is, without any doubt, a free creation for rationally intel-
geometric space. This diversity is more than meets the
lectively knowing the foundation of all the cosmos. Its
eye, because in my view, it discloses two things. First,
fertility is quite apparent. Nonetheless, the fabulous suc-
{131} it shows that we are always dealing with “space”,
cess of the idea of a mathematical universe cannot hide its
i.e., that we are always trying to give rational foundation
character of free creation, of free postulation, which pre-
to that which is the perceptive spatial field. This latter is
cisely by being free leaves some unsuspected aspects of
not absolute space—that would be absurd—but neither is
nature in the dark.
it a geometric space. Therefore I call it ‘pre-geometric
space’. It is a space which does not possess strictly con- Let us summarize what has been said. We were
ceived characteristics, because when conceiving them it is asking ourselves about the modes of free rational creation.
necessary that this pre-geometric space become a geomet- We saw that there are three in particular. They rely upon
ric space. Geometric space is therefore an in-depth foun- three aspects of the field: the experience of notes, struc-
dation of pre-geometric space. The diversity of postulates ture, and constructing. In these three aspects the creation
discloses that, above all, both spaces are in fact space, but which is of free character unfolds: free experience, free
that the pre-geometric space is different than the geomet- systematization, and free construction. By free experience
ric space. In particular, it shows us in this way that in-depth reality is endowed {133} with a model-like con-
Euclidean space is not, as has so often be claimed, “intui- tent. By free systematization in-depth reality is endowed
tive”, i.e., it shows us that Euclidean space is a free crea- with a basic structure. By free construction in-depth real-
tion of geometric space. Second, the mutual independ- ity is endowed with a completely created content. The
ence of the diverse postulates shows the dissociation of mode of endowing in-depth reality with a consistent con-
structural aspects of geometric space. It shows us that, as tent by modifying certain field notes is what I call
the systems of postulates are distinct, essentially different “modelizing”; the mode of endowing in-depth reality with
and even separate aspects may apply to geometric space. a content of basic structure which relies upon the field is
These include conjunction, direction, and distance. This “homologizing”; and the mode of endowing in-depth re-
revelation occurs based on the simple fact that the systems ality with a completely constructed content is “postulat-
of postulates are mutually independent. Topology, affinity, ing”. These three are the three modes of rational creation.
and measure reveal, both in their total independence as They are but modes of moving ourselves intellectively in a
well as their possible conditional unity in some cases, that primary, identical, and ineluctable formality of reality.
the intrinsic rational intelligibility of the in-depth reality And as this formality is intrinsically and formally given in
of space comes about in a free construction. This is also the impression of reality, it follows that the three modes of
revealed by the independence of postulatable structures rational creation are three creative modes of sentient rea-
within each of those geometries. The geometries are son.
postulation; the intellection of in-depth reality of space is With that we have finished the second step of our in-
therefore free creation. {132} vestigation in this chapter. We set out to analyze the
 PROGRESSION QUA INTELLECTION 287

structure of the progression of intellection. For it we be- gin; and finally the unity of reason and reality. Now it
gan by studying intellective activity qua activity; this is remains for us to study the fourth essential point of our
thinking. We then asked about thinking activity qua in- investigation: What is the formal object of rational activ-
tellective: this is reason. And within reason we have seen, ity?
in the first place, what reason is; second, what is its ori {134}
{135}

CHAPTER IV

THE FORMAL OBJECT OF RATIONAL ACTIVITY

Let us summarily retrace the line of argument thus lection of in-depth reality, reality is not a “medium” of
far in this third part of our investigation, in order to be intellection, but a “measure” of field reality. The things of
able to better focus upon its subsequent development. the field, then, are not at the back of reason. Just the op-
We have seen that reason is the intellective moment posite: they constitute the canonic principle by which in-
of thinking activity. In other words, reason is not a simple tellection measures in principle the reality of the field
activity of intellective knowing but an intellective activity. itself.
We have, moreover, seen what this means. Activity is not This measurement has the formal characteristic of
simply action, but rather being in action along the lines of ground. In-depth reality is “ground-reality” or if one
that mode which consists in taking action. This activity, wishes, “fundamental reality”. Reason is thus intellection
qua activity of intellective knowing, is what constitutes of the real in depth through a principle. This principle is
thinking. Thinking is the mode of action of intellective not a system of truths or of rules, but reality itself in its
knowing determined by real things already intellectively physical character of reality. And as reality is constitu-
known in a prior intellection; it is, then, an activated ac- tively open, it follows that reason itself is open qua rea-
tivity. And that which activates us in these already intel- son. In this openness reason is going to intellectively
lectively known things is the constitutively open character know in-depth reality in a form which is dimensional,
of reality itself. Qua activity, thinking activity is being in directional, and {137} provisional. The moment of the
action, it is intellectively knowing that to which the things real which sends us to this intellection is, as I have al-
previously intellectively known are open. It is what we ready said, reality in its characteristic of “toward”. With
call “giving pause to think”. The real is giving us to think this, in-depth reality becomes physically present but in-
because it is really open and because thinking is constitu- trinsically indeterminate; it is indeed then a problem, not
tively open to {136} reality. Thinking, then, intrinsically of being or entity but of reality.
and formally involves the moment of reality, not just in-
Here is my explanation; it is an intellection of mine.
tentionally, but also physically and expressly. This reality
But qua determined by things, reason or explanation is a
is always the reality in which one actually is. The internal
moment of them; it is reason of things. It is they which
and formal structure of the act of this intellection is what
give or take away reason. Indeed, in the line of actuality,
we call its intellective character. The properly intellec-
it is the in-depth reality of things qua problematically ac-
tive moment of thinking activity, i.e., the intellective and
tualized. And this actuality is that which constitutes the
structural moment of the action of thinking activity is thus
unity of reason as my reason and as reason or explanation
reason. Reason is based upon the real which was previ-
of things.
ously intellectively known. This support is the reality of
what is intellectively known through the field in its char- Thus reason is a structural moment of the intelli-
acter of “toward”. It is, then, a mode of intellection de- gence as determined by the nature of the intellection of the
termined by the real itself. real itself. In it reason has its structural origin. And as
intellection is formally sentient, it follows that reason it-
This mode of intellection is inquiring intellection, a
self is sentient. It is the reality of things, in fact, which
searching. Reason relies upon what has been previously
sentiently apprehended gives us pause to think.
intellectively known for this search. It is a search which
goes beyond what is intellectively known in the field of This reality is, I repeat, the physical and explicit re-
the real, a “beyond” in all its aspects and dimensions; it is ality of things already known intellectively. Therefore the
what I call ‘profundity’ or ‘reality in-depth’. In the intel- problem of reason is not a problem of seeking reality, be-

289
290 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

cause reason is already in reality and it is in this being in ward”. This “toward” is, I repeat once again, a mode of
reason in which the very principle of reason consists. reality itself, reality in its mode of “toward”. And when
And this is not just the principle, but also the foundation, this “toward” is so in-depth, then the intellection is rea-
of all of reason’s intellective progress: reality is coercively son. The formal character of reason is then the formal
imposed upon reason. What is a problem is the intellec- character of the terminus of this “toward”.
tion of reality in its own fundamental content. This is To be sure, by virtue of being a mode of reality, the
what must be measured. And in order to deal with this “toward” itself has a terminus in reality itself, since we
problem reason actualizes reality itself in its previous in- never left it. But this does not mean that the “toward”
tellections, a mode of {138} actualization which consists terminates in some real thing. The terminus qua terminus
in considering them as foundation of the real. But as my is a terminus in reality, and therefore pertains to it, even
previous intellections are mine, it follows that rational though not real by itself. What is this pertaining? It is
intellection qua rational is a free creation. In this free not pertaining to reality as a determinate content. Strictly
creation the real takes on, in my previous intellections, its speaking, the terminus could be vacuous, i.e., the “to-
fundamental content. And in turn, this content is real- ward” might be toward nothing. Nonetheless, it will al-
ized. That realization can assume different forms. It can ways “really” be a nothing; it is therefore in reality like an
be the realization of a content achieved through free expe- echo, so to speak. The pertaining to reality does not, then,
rience, through basic structure or hypothesis, or in free mean that its content is determinate, but merely that it is a
construction; i.e., it can be modalization, homology, or “terminus”, something toward which one goes. This ter-
postulation, the three forms of fundamentality. minus is a terminus in reality, but not a determinate con-
Granting this, the structure of reason leaves a very tent of it. Being in reality without being formally a real
precise question open to our analysis. That which is in- content is just what comprises being something which is
tellectively known is in-depth reality in its fundamental possible. The terminus of the “toward” is something for-
content. This intellection is, as I said, a free creation mally possible. Here we have the formal character of the
which does not unfold from the field but relies upon the object {140} of reason, viz. possibility. That in which
field in order to determine that content in a search. In reason moves is the real, always and only as possible.
virtue of this, a question arises: With respect to this in- What, to be more precise, does this possibility mean?
depth reality, what is its content qua searched for? That
Taken from the negative side, the possible is that
is, What is the formal object of intellective activity, the
which lacks something in order to be fully real. But this
formal object of reason? Here we have the key question, a
not being real is limited to reality itself. And that limiting
question which is much more complex than it might seem
constitutes the positive aspect of the possible. Now, there
at first glance. A little reflection will reveal that this
are different modes in accordance with which the “not” is
question unfolds in three groups of problems:
limited to reality. Here two are of special interest to us.
1. What is the character of the formal object of rea-
The first came to our attention when we dealt with
son?
the intellection of what something real is in reality among
2. What is the formal unity of this object with the other things. The first thing that intellection does in these
real which has determined it? circumstances is not to abandon reality but to take within
3. What, formally, is the determinant function of the it a distance from the real. This is a movement of “step-
real in reason? ping back” within reality. Such intellection by stepping
back constitutes simple apprehension. Its formal charac-
These are the three points which we must quickly ter, the formal character of the terminus of simple appre-
examine. hension, is physical reality itself in its mode of “might
{139} be”. The real in the field is actualized in my understand-
ing after stepping back as a real that “might be”. “Might
§1 be” does not consist in being either a condition or even a
possibility in the strict sense. Percepts, fictional items,
THE FORMAL CHARACTER OF THE OBJECT and concepts are not formally possible because they are
OF REASON already the real in stepping back from content. This is
what I shall call the ‘unreal’. We have already seen what
Reason is an intellection determined in one of the di- it is. ‘Unreal’ does not mean not having to do with real-
rections of the “toward” of the real, viz. the in-depth “to- ity, but having to do with it by freeing its content. From
 THE FORMAL OBJECT OF RATIONAL ACTIVITY 291

the standpoint of reality, the unreal is really unreal; it is How is this “could be” inscribed in the real, i.e., how
reality itself actualized in simple apprehension. From the are possibilities intellectively known as possibilitating in
standpoint of content itself, the unreal is what is realized the real?
in reality in the mode of “might be”. In what, precisely, {143}
does this mode consist? A content is unreal in the “might
be” mode when the unreal content is intellectively known §2
as a property or note of the real. This paper might be red
considering the unreal content of the red as if it were THE UNITY OF POSSIBILITIES AS
{141} a chromatic note of the paper. But the unreal can be
DETERMINANT OF THE INTELLECTION OF
of a different character, because I can realize in reality the
unreal not as a note but as a ground. Then it is no longer
THE REAL
what reality “might be”, but something different, what
reality “could be”. This is the possibility of the real. The Naturally, we are only dealing with the order of in-
terminus of the “toward” is for now only a possible termi- tellection. We are not concerned with how the possibility
nus. As such it is in reality like a “could be” of reality is making possible reality in and by itself, but with how
itself. It is a real possibility. The “might be” is reality in the intellection of possibilities is determining the intellec-
retraction. The “could be” is reality in being grounded. tion of the real in-depth. Now, this unity which is deter-
The difference between the “might be” and “could be” is minant of the possibilities in the intellection of the real
not a difference between two modes of possible being, but has three essential aspects.
between two modes of realization. The “might be” is not A) In the “toward” I do not just go “beyond”, so to
intrinsic possibility; it is a mode of something being real- speak, but rather the “toward” is a “toward” already inter-
ized as a mode. As a mode, the “might be” is the unreal nally qualified by that which throws me beyond. That
mode (understanding ‘unreal’ here as reality in stepping which thus throws me is the intellection of field reality.
back from content, and not what is understood grammati- And this reality determines the “toward” itself as a “to-
cally by ‘unreal mode’). In contrast the “could be” is a ward” based on something intellectively known previ-
mode of making possible, a mode not of being a note, but ously. And it does so in a twofold sense. First, field real-
of being a ground. The difference between the unreal ity has its own content, and it is its notes which, upon
mode and the mode of making possible is not a difference throwing us “toward”, qualify the mode of going toward
between two possibilities, but the difference between unre- in-depth reality. The “toward”, in fact, as a mode of real-
ality realized as a note (unreal mode) and unreality real- ity, recovers all other modes, and these in turn recover the
ized as a ground (possibilitation). The unreal realized as “toward”. Whence it follows not only that each of the
ground is the truly possible part of reason, the “could be”. modes of field reality throws us “toward” the beyond, but
To preclude confusion between possibility and making also that this same “toward” is internally characterized by
possible I shall at times refer to cases of the latter as “the those other modes. Not only that, but there is in this
possibilities”, in plural. qualification a second aspect which is the “ground”, and
My previous intellections are a basis, and upon this that is that field reality not only throws us “toward” but
basis the intelligence actualizes what field reality could be also comprises the canonical principle {144} of intellec-
in its in-depth reality. This is the formal character of the tion in this throwing. These two aspects are but that: as-
object of reason. pects of the internal qualification of the “toward”. Now,
its formal terminus is what in-depth reality could be, i.e.,
Reason is the intellective moment of thinking. this formal terminus is possibility. And as the throwing
Therefore it is necessary to say that intellective activity, “toward” is intrinsically characterized, it follows that the
i.e., thinking, {142} always thinks about the real, but only possibility itself in question is already in some way intrin-
about the possibilities of the real. One always and only sically characterized. And this is not some empty possi-
thinks about possibilities. If I think about a stroll I am bility, but a possibility which is really characterized qua
going to take, or in the trip upon which I am going to em- possibility. Here ‘really’ means not only that this possi-
bark, or in what, in reality, is this thing which we call bility pertains to reality, but that the reality itself charac-
‘light’, that about which I am formally thinking is the terizes by making possible that possibility. In other
stroll I am going to take, or in the trip upon which I am words, making possible is inchoate possibility. The “to-
going to embark, or upon the real possibilities for this ward” is inchoate. And with inchoation we have the first
which we call ‘light’ to be produced. The formal object of respect in which making possible determines the intellec-
intellective activity is what the real could really be. tion of in-depth reality. Reason does not move in the in-
292 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

finity of possibles but in a chain of possibilities as yet in- aspect of the intellective determination {146} of in-depth
choate; i.e., it goes on pointing out intrinsically and ter- reality. To intellectively know in-depth reality in a ra-
minally toward what the possibility is going to make pos- tional manner is to intellectively know it in explication.
sible. Conversely, to explicate is to intellectively know in-depth
reality as a realization of a system of possibilities.
B) This “toward” has multiple routes precisely be-
cause it is recovering, as I just said, all of the content of In summary, rational intellection moves among real
the field things. As this content is multiple, so are the possibilities, which intellectively determine the in-depth
inchoate routes. That is, field intellection never goes “to- reality in a way which is inchoative, inferential, and ex-
ward” a single possibility, but “toward” multiple possi- plicative. But we must go one more step, and that is to
bilities. Each one of them is inchoate by nature. Hence it investigate how the real itself leads to possibility.
follows not only that reason moves in the realm of possi-
bility, but that it moves among multiple possibilities. Rea- {147}
son must take them together; it has to take each “with”
(cum) the rest. Therefore, the terminus of the “toward”, §3
more than a mere possibility, is co-possibility. And this
intellection of the possible as “with ” (cum) is just what DETERMINANT FUNCTION OF THE REAL IN
constitutes co-legere, “take with”, “take together”, to de- REASON
duce or infer. The multiplicity of possibilities {145} “to-
ward” which we are sent determines that mode of intel-
lection which is colegere, “taken together ” or inferred.
In its etymological sense, colegere is very close to the verb Reality previously intellectively known in the field
‘to collect’. And here we have the second aspect in accor- throws us toward in-depth reality. Of this throwing we
dance with which possibility determines the intellection of have studied the terminus toward which we are thrown
the real in-depth: taking together or inferring. The word and the mode in which we are thrown. Now, we ask our-
does not mean ‘to deduce’ in this context, but the deter- selves for the point of departure of the throwing. We are
mining of the mode of realizable possibilities, perhaps going to be thrown by field reality. This throwing “to-
inchoatively. Deduction is but one mode of inferring ward” possibility takes place, as we have seen, in a “to-
among others. Inferring designates but a mode of intel- ward” which is internally characterized. This characteri-
lection, viz. that of intellectively knowing one or more zation is the inchoate nature of possibility as the intellec-
possibilities when co-intellectively knowing the rest. It is tion of in-depth reality, of the intellection of what the re-
the cum as a mode of intellection. Reason intellectively ality could be. But then it is eo ipso a possibility which is
knows in-depth reality in a mode which is constitutively inchoatively present as such in the field intellection itself.
inferential. It infers diverse inchoate possibilities, diverse This field intellection is sentient, as is reason itself.
things that are inchoate. And by this inferential cum, the Therefore, that possibility is actually present—albeit in-
diverse possibilities can be intellectively known as more choatively—in the sentient intelligence. Now, this sen-
than merely inchoate; they can be intellectively known as tient being here-and-now present of the possibility qua
a real ground for making possible. What does this mean? possibility, i.e., the sentient presence of what in-depth
reality “is capable of being” qua “could be”, is formally
C) The cum of mere inferring has, as I pointed out, a what constitutes suggestion. The real ambit of co-
meaning quite close to that of collecting. But it is much possibility is the ambit of suggestion, the ambit of sugges-
more than just collecting. The fact is that one of the many tions which are co-suggested. The intelligence then has to
diverse possibilities is possibility of the real, and therefore opt for one of the different suggestions, and begin its in-
these possibilities are open because reality itself is consti- tellection progression. The “toward” of the throwing is,
tutively open. Hence the cum of the different possibilities then, a concrete suggestion. I shall forthwith explain this
constitutes an ambit in which each possibility, by being at greater length. Suggestion is not a psychical phenome-
open to others, can incorporate them. Then the cum non or anything of that nature; rather it is a {148} struc-
shows us its true nature, viz. mutual “im-plication”, or tural moment of reason itself qua reason. In field intel-
plication”. And on account of this implica- lection not only are things present which are intellectively
tion, the possibilities are not only multiple; they constitute known, but also in them the suggestion is present of what
a system. Now, the determination of in-depth reality as they could be in-depth.
realization of a system of possibilities mutually implied or
com-plicated is precisely explication. This is the third I said that reason can opt for one among many sug-
 THE FORMAL OBJECT OF RATIONAL ACTIVITY 293

gestions. But it can also opt for none of them. Then rea- European root men- which meant, among other things,
son invents new possibilities. But this invention, inas- impetus, ardor, passion, etc.; that is, it expressed animated
much as it is a rupture of the lines of suggestion, would movement. But as I see it, this is not all, because it is not
not have been possible other than by suggestion itself. If a movement, as for example the movement of passion; as
one wishes—and speaking a bit paradoxically—among simple movement this passion is not just something men-
the possible suggestions there is that of not attending to tal pure and simple. The movement itself is mental only
any of them. Field intellection gives us the canonical if it bears as its weight some type of intellection of the
principle of the intellection of in-depth reality, and the trajectory and the terminus of that movement. That is, the
suggestion in which it can be intellectively known. But movement which mens signifies is always movement in-
what reason intellectively knows can be opposite to its asmuch as it has an intrinsic intellective weight. The
canonical principle and to every positive suggestion. force of the mens {150} has as its own formal character
the intellective weight; it is the force by which movement
In virtue of this, a canonical principle and a system
itself is intellectively understood and determined. Con-
of suggestions is the concrete structural figure of that
versely, intellection is mens only when it is intellective
search qua search which is rational intellection.
motion. Now, this movement is just the throwing. There-
This concrete figure is essential to reason. Reason is fore mens is intelligence in throwing. To be sure, it is a
not a mode of intellection specified only by its formal ter- throwing as the very mode of intellection. We are not
minus in the abstract. The rational mode of intellection dealing with what moves us to intellectively know, but
has, on the contrary, a precise modal structure, viz. its with the intellective movement itself. And as the intellec-
concreteness. The concreteness is not individuation, so to tive movement in throwing is just reason, it follows that
speak, of a general structure; rather, it is a moment which there is an internal implication between reason and mens.
intrinsically and formally touches the very structure of Thus “mind” expresses the concrete character of reason.
reason. To be sure, it is not essential to reason to have
In the second place, this mens has a form or figure,
this or that concrete figure; but it is structurally essential
viz. forma mentis. In what does it consist? It does not
to reason to have concreteness. Reason is not something
consist only in the trajectory determined by intellection
which “makes itself concrete”, but something which “is
and its principle, i.e., it does not consist in the form of
concrete” in and by itself. And I am not referring to rea-
movement of intellection. It is something more. It is that
son as movement about one real note from each human
form but distilled to its essence, so to speak, in the intel-
reality; in {149} this sense reason does not make an ex-
lection qua “thrustable”. The form in question is not just
ception for any of their notes. Everything real is in this
the figure of an act, but the figure of a mode of our being
sense individual in and by itself. I am referring to reason
involved with the intelligible. Being involved is what
not as a structural note, but to its own mode of intellec-
“habitual mode of behavior” means in this context. The
tively knowing the real. This structural concreteness has
figure which we seek is but the habitual mode of behavior
a formal root in the two moments which constitute the
of intellection in its thrust. It is essential for reason to
search. One is the moment of being a principle: the ca-
have a figure or form as the intellective habitual mode of
nonical principle is not “the” field reality in abstract, but
behavior of being thrust.
what the field intellection in all of its concretion (reality
and canonical principle) has extracted in its being thrown In the third place, this habitual mode of behavior is
Another is the thrust into concreteness of the direction of supposed to be formally determined by the “toward” itself.
intellective search, viz. the suggestion. Canonical princi- Intellection, in fact, can have many habitual modes of
ple and suggestion are, in their intrinsic concreteness, behavior or modes of being involved with things. Here
structural moments of rational intellection. What is this two types are of interest to us. Some habitual modes of
concreteness? behavior or modes of being involved, for example, can be
due to individual as well as social differences. They are
This structural concreteness has a precise formal
determined by the mode of being of man, and constitute
character: it is what constitutes the forma mentis. Reason
the figure or form of the thrust by being the figure or form
has a strict and rigorous structural figure in its very mode
{151} of the man thrown. Hence it follows that the habit-
of intellective knowing. What is this forma mentis? Let
ual mode of behavior remains qualified, it has qualities,
us explain the expression.
but these qualities have an origin extrinsic to what reason
In the first place, we are dealing with “mind” or formally is; they have their origin, for example, in being
mens. What is this mens? Mind is not formally identical Greek or in being Semitic. But there are other types of
to intelligence. Etymologically it proceeds from an Indo- thrust, whose difference is founded upon the intrinsic na-
294 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

ture of the “toward” itself qua “toward”. Reason then is I see it, this is not correct. The Semitic and the feudal are
also qualified, but its qualities have their origin in the certainly things which qualify or characterize mentality,
intrinsic nature of reason itself; for example, the differ- but they confer a determinate quality upon something
ence in throwing “toward” the real in a poetic manner as which is already a mentality, i.e. the mentality as a mode
opposed to the scientific manner. These are not modes of our being intellectually involved with things. To be
which the intellection “has”, but modes of what the intel- Semitic is not a mentality but a quality which qualifies
lection “is”. The two types of habitude qualities (let us something which is already a mentality, for example, upon
call them ‘extrinsic’ and ‘intrinsic’) are not identical. “doing science”, etc. But the fact that it is scientific does
Within a single intrinsic mode of the “toward”, for exam- not “qualify” the mentality already given; rather it is the
ple within the poetic “toward”, many modes of creating moment which intrinsically {153} and formally “consti-
what we call ‘poetry’ fit; the primitive Sumerians under- tutes” it. But that everyday concept lacks a third aspect,
stood something different by ‘poetry’ than did the poets of the most radical part of the forma mentis, the aspect for-
classical Greece. And similarly within the intrinsic “to- mally constitutive of the habitual mode of behavior of go-
ward” proper to science, there are diverse modes; that ing to the real. The so-called ‘Semitic mentality’ is Se-
which a primitive Sumerian or Akkadian understood by mitic by virtue of being the mentality proper to “the”
explanation of the world, that which a Greek understood Semite; but it is not a mentality which is “in itself” Se-
by it, and that which we understand by it, are completely mitic—something which formally makes no sense, even
different things. Now, the forma mentis is constituted by though we all use the expression. The modes of conceiv-
the intrinsic and formal mode of the confronting or ing things which a Semite has are not formally Semitic
thrusting toward the real, by the mode of the “toward” qua conceptive moments. Being Semitic certainly affects
“toward”, and not by the modalities which this sending or one’s concepts and confers upon them qualities of their
searching can have as an extrinsic function of the modali- own; but these are not formally their qualities, because
ties of that which one seeks. This is the difference, to use these qualities do not depend upon the structure of the
an example, between a poetic figure or explanation of the conceiving itself, but rather upon the mode of being of the
real, and a theoretical figure or explanation of the real Semite. It is on account of this that the so-called mental-
(this does not go beyond being one example among ity of the Semite is not Semitic qua mentality; it is only
many). {152} It is a difference of a different order than the mentality of the Semite. On the other hand, the theo-
that which exists between the modes of creating science, retic mentality is theoretic “in itself” qua mentality; it is
and between the modes of creating poetry, according to not a mentality “of” a scientist but a mode of intellection
anthopological characteristics. The forma mentis consists of the real, a mode intrinsic to reason. The difference
in this case in the difference between doing science and between scientific and poetic intellection is significant;
doing poetry. they constitute two mentalities, the scientific and the po-
These three aspects, viz. being intellective action, etic. These two are strict mentalities. The Semite or the
being habitual mode of behavior of motion, and being Greek, on the other hand, qualify these two mentalities
intrinsic and formal habitual mode of behavior of this with qualities of extraintellective origin; their origin is in
motion, constitute together what I understand by forma the mode of being of the Semite and the Greek. It is for
mentis, the concrete figure which intellection adopts in its this reason that they do not constitute mentalities properly
formal mode of being thrown to the real, in the mode of so-called. That is the strict and formal concept of men-
sending as such. tality. But this does not mean that the everyday expres-
sions ‘Semitic mentality’, ‘Greek mentality’, etc., should
Now, this concept has a very precise name, mental- not continue to be used. The only important thing is to
ity. It is not primarily a psychological, social, or ethnic dispel the error of the concept of mentality latent in these
concept, but a structural one. I am referring, to be sure, to expressions. It is not the same to speak of mentality when
what mentality is formally. Mentality is the intrinsic and referring to Semitic mentality as to speak of it in connec-
formal aspect of the habitual mode of behavior of throw- tion with scientific mentality. The first is proper {154} to
ing toward real things; for example, the theoretic mental- a sociology of knowledge; the second pertains to a phi-
ity. So I am not referring to the qualities which mentality losophy of the intelligence.
can have, and in fact does have by virtue of determinate
external factors of psychological, social, etc. origin. And And it is of this mentality, strictly understood, that I
it is important to emphasize this because usually one uses say it is structurally essential to reason; it is reason’s in-
‘mentality’ in reference to theoretic mentality as well as to trinsic and formal concretion. Reason is concrete, and its
the “Semitic mentality” or the “feudal mentality”. And as concretion qua reason is mentality. There is not, nor can
 THE FORMAL OBJECT OF RATIONAL ACTIVITY 295

there be, reason without mentality; whatever there could should be understood in the light of this vast range,
be without mentality could not be reason. The same oc- which encompasses not only the content, but also the very
curs in the field intellection of the real. To see this piece lines of intellection. Different are the mentalities of the
of paper and affirm that it is green is not a question of scientist, the poet, the politician, the theologian, the phi-
mentality. The mentality appears only when one goes in losopher, etc. And this, I repeat, is true not just by virtue
depth beyond the field in order to know what the founda- of the “content” of their reason but above all by the “line”,
tion of greenness is. Only intellection in-depth has the by the habitual mode of behavior in which reason pro-
concreteness of mentality. To the concrete determination gresses, thrust out in its search. Mentality is just the for-
of the formal terminus of in-depth intellection, i.e., to the mal concrete habitual mode of behavior of rational search;
concrete determination of the formal reason or explana- it is the concreteness of the “toward” as such.
tion of what is intellectively known, there corresponds the
concrete determination of reason qua intelligent throwing,
* * *
i.e., mentality.
As mentality is the concretion of the sending as
In summary, we have already examined in this sec-
such, its intrinsic and radical roots are the canonic princi-
tion what progression is (Chapter I): progression is
ple and suggestion. Neither these moments nor for that
search. We saw next what its intellective structure is
matter the mentality itself, are limited to the dominion of
(Chapter II). Progression is a thinking activity, whose
the theoretic. I have been saying this all along. Sugges-
intellective moment comprises reason, i.e., the intellection
tion, for example, suggests not only what the theoretic
by principles of what the real is in depth. The formal ob-
nature of the intellectively known is in depth, but above
ject of this intellective activity is possibility, i.e., what in-
all recounts the very lines of intellection. It can suggest
depth reality could be. This possibility determines the
the creation of concepts; but it can also suggest meta-
intellection of in-depth reality in an inchoative form, one
phoric, poetic, or any other type of depth. And similar
which is collective and explicative. And that is possible
things should be said of the canonic principle. The
precisely because field reality, previously intellectively
unity—at times ineffable—of metaphor has as principle
known, gives us a canonic principle and a system of sug-
the qualities already apprehended in field intellection; but
gestions. It is the ultimate root of the structural concrete-
their roles as principles can be quite varied. This line of
ness of reason, of its constitutive mentality.
intellection {155} is just the line of the “toward” as such.
The differences are not only in that from which we are Granting this, rational intelligence intellectively
thrown and in that to which we are thrown, but also in the knows {156} in-depth reality. What is the structure of
very type of trajectory which we are going to follow, i.e., this intellection? Here we have the question which we
in the lines of the “toward” of intellection. Mentality must examine in Section 2.
{157}

SECTION 2

STRUCTURE OF RATIONAL INTELLECTION: KNOWING

The inquiring intellection, reason, is a special mode least a philosophy of intellection as such. Hence in the
of intellection. Intellection, as we already know, is the final analysis Kant’s Critique is inadequate. Kant under-
apprehension of something real as just actualized as real stands intellection {158} as knowing in the sense of “be-
in that apprehension. The inquiring intellection is a mode ing familiar with”. In the final analysis, however, he does
of intellection of the real actualized in a special way. This nothing but pull together an identification which had been
mode of intellection is what we call knowledge [conoci- in circulation for many centuries. But Kant also be-
miento].1 The structure of intellective progression, i.e., lieved—again, without calling it into question—that at
the structure of rational intellection, is knowing [cono- bottom knowledge in the sense we are discussing is syn-
cer]. Not every intellection is knowledge in this sense. onymous with science. This double equation (intellection
Moreover, it is not at all obvious that the highest form of = knowledge; and knowledge = science) determines the
our intellection is this kind of knowledge. The identifica- progression of thought in the Critique. But this double
tion of intellection and this sense of knowing might seem equation is incorrect. Intellection is not knowledge, nor is
obvious to modern philosophers; it was accepted without the structure of knowledge science. Therefore, in order to
discussion by Kant. But as we shall see, that identifica- conceptualize the nature of rational intellection rigorously,
tion is untenable. The difference between intellection and we must pose two questions to ourselves:
knowledge in this sense is a serious problem, one over
I. What is knowledge [conocer]?
which Kant himself stumbled. Therefore Kant’s Critique
suffers from a radical inadequacy. Prior to a critique of II. What is the formal structure of knowing [cono-
knowing, Kant should have elaborated a critique, or at cer]?

1
[Zubiri is drawing a distinction here between inteligir, ‘intellective know-
ing’, and conocer, ‘knowing’ in the more usual sense.—Trans.]

297
 {159}

CHAPTER V

WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE?

In the foregoing pages we have discussed what ra- field sense, something “in reality”. They are the two mo-
tional intellection is. Now, knowledge [conocimiento] is ments of pure and simple intellection.
what formally constitutes rational intellection. In order to But it can happen that a real thing, together with the
conceptualize knowledge it is worthwhile to briefly re- field which it determines, thrusts us beyond this field re-
count what has already been said in order to frame the ality toward reality “itself” as reality beyond the field, i.e.,
question adequately. to the world. This beyond is not the beyond of one thing
Above all it is necessary to eliminate a false but very toward others—that would be an intra-field beyond. We
current idea, that knowledge is substituting concepts of are dealing with a “beyond” of a real thing and of its
reality for sensible representations. According to this the- whole field toward reality itself as reality; i.e., we are
ory, sensible impressions are mere empty representations dealing with a beyond which is beyond the field and to-
of reality, and the intellection of reality is only in knowl- ward the world. This beyond is not a beyond the “subject”
edge, above all in scientific knowledge. But that is not (so to speak), because in this sense in field intellection we
true, because sensible impressions are not representations are already installed beyond what that interpretation
but presentations. That which is representation is scien- would take for the subject in field intellection, and we
tific knowledge; but representation not in the sense of continue being so in every intellection. This “beyond”,
substitution of impressions by other intellections (vor- the whole field, can be so in different directions: toward
stellen), but in the sense of re-explaining that which is the inside of things, toward other extra-field things, etc.
already present (dar-stellen). In this sense (and only in But we are always dealing with going toward the world as
this one) is knowledge re-presentation, i.e., rational re- the ground of what a real field thing is. Thus we are not
actualization. considering a thing with respect to others of the field, but
{161} rather we are considering each thing as a mode of
With this mistake eliminated, let us continue with
grounded reality. Qua ground, I have called extra-field
the problem.
reality ‘reality in depth’. Now, intellection of the real in
Rational intellection is intellection above all. As depth is certainly intellection, but not just intellection;
{160} such, it is the apprehension of something as real, rather, it is a special mode of intellection, the “grounding”
an apprehension in which the real itself is just actualized. mode. Reality is not actualized in this intellection as
This intellection has two moments. Everything real, in something more than is there; rather, it is actualized in a
fact, has an individual and a field moment. Upon appre- mode which consists formally in being actually ground-
hending something as real one apprehends its reality in ing. ‘The ground’—as I have already said—is here taken
accordance with both moments but in a different mode. If in its widest sense. It is not identical with ‘cause’. To be
one attends more to the individual moment, then intellec- a ground is not necessarily to be a cause; a cause is only a
tion is apprehension of the thing as real. But if one at- mode of grounding. There are others, for example, physi-
tends to what the real thing is in a field, it is then appre- cal law, i.e., the mode by which the real happens based on
hended as actualized in the field manner, among other reality, and is being so taken. The ground is all that
things similarly actualized. And then apprehension does which determines from itself, but in and by itself, that
not intellectively know only that a thing is real, but also which is grounded, so that this latter is the realization of
what this real thing is in reality. These are the two mo- the ground or foundation in what is grounded. Being
ments of intellection, viz. intellectively knowing some- grounded makes of in-depth reality the principle of this
thing as real, and intellectively knowing it as being, in the mode of intellection. It is the principle which measures

299
300 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

not what something is in reality with respect to other converse is impossible: one cannot have knowledge with-
things which are sensed in the field manner, but measures out intellection, without actualization of the real. There is
its ground or foundation in reality. The intellection of the only knowledge when the insufficiency of intellection re-
real in-depth is intellection as principle and measure; it is quires it. This insufficiency stems from the sentient mo-
rational intellection. Now, the intellection of something ment of intellection. Without sentient intellection there is
in its in-depth reality, i.e., rational intellection, is what not nor can there be knowledge.
formally constitutes knowledge [conocimiento]. In the second place, intellection and knowledge are
Knowledge is intellection in reason. To know what a different but not independent. In what sense? We have
thing is, is to intellectively know its in-depth reality, to already indicated it: intellection is what determines
intellectively know how it is actualized in its own ground knowledge. Sentient intellection calls forth knowledge.
or foundation, how it is constituted “in reality”, as a In order to make up for the insufficiency of intellection,
measuring principle. To know green does not only consist intellection needs to determine not another intellection,
in seeing it, or in intellectively knowing that it is in reality but another mode of the same intellection; i.e., what is
one determinate color among {162} others. Rather, it is determined is an expansion of intellection. Knowing is an
intellectively knowing the ground or foundation of green- expansion of intellection. It is intellection, i.e., actualiza-
ness in reality; intellectively knowing, for example, that it tion of the real as real, but an intellection which actualizes
is an electromagnetic wave or a photon of some determi- rather what that thing already actualized as real is really;
nate frequency. Only having intellectively known it thus it is actualization as search. And herein consists what an
do we really know what the real green is; we have intel- expansion is, viz. An inquiring actualization of what is
lection of the greenness, but in reason. The reason or already actual. Therefore, knowledge is not only different
explanation of green is its real ground or foundation. from mere intellection; it is an expansion of that intellec-
tion. But there is more.
Whence arises the radical difference between knowl-
edge and intellection. Knowledge is intellection by virtue In the third place, in fact, knowledge is not only ex-
of being apprehension of the real as real. But it is only a pansion of intellection and therefore something based
special mode of intellection because not every intellection upon it; in addition, knowledge consists, in principle, in
is knowledge. To intellectively know without intellec- bearing us to a greater intellection, to a greater actualiza-
tively knowing the reason or explanation—this is not tion of what is known. Intellection is actualization of the
knowledge. Intellection is always an actualization of the real, and therefore knowing is but a leading to actualiza-
real, but there is only knowledge when this actualization tion. Knowledge is not just an expanded actualization but
is a ground. That is intellection in reason. an expansion which leads to a new actualization of the
This might make one think that mere intellection is previously actual. Knowledge does not {164} rest upon
inferior to knowledge, so that it would be necessary to itself but upon the intellection of what preceded it and
inscribe intellection within knowledge; intellection would upon the intellection to which it leads us. The final ter-
then be, formally, a rudimentary knowledge. But, the minus of all knowledge is an actualizing of the very real-
truth is just the opposite: it is necessary to inscribe knowl- ity previously intellectively known, an actualizing of it in
edge within intellection. And with this, intellection does its in-depth reality. If it were not for this, knowledge
not formally consist in rudimentary knowledge; rather, would be but a mental game. Hence all knowledge is the
knowledge receives all of its richness and its value from transition from one intellection to another intellection. It
being an intellection. Knowledge is only a sketch of sub- is an intellection in progress. Knowledge is intellection
sequent intellection. And there are several reasons for seeking itself.
this. As anchored in intellection, as expansion of intel-
In the first place, intellection is not knowledge; it is lection, and as transition to a new intellection, knowledge
intellection which, through its sentient deficiency, deter- is an intellective mode which is formally inscribed in
mines knowledge. Intellection is an actualization of the mere intellection. To intellectively know is not a rudi-
real. But if the real, for example this color green, were ment of knowing. Intellection is not formally a rudimen-
exhaustively actualized in my intellection, there would be tary knowledge; rather, it is knowledge that is the sketch
no opportunity of speak of knowledge. Full intellection of of an inquiring intellection qua intellection. To know
the real, i.e., its full {163} actualization, would make [conocer] is not a primary intellective phenomenon, as if
knowledge radically unnecessary. We would then have the essence of intellective knowing [inteligir] were to
intellection without knowledge. On the other hand, the know [conocer]. On the contrary, the essence of knowing
 WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? 301

[conocer] is intellective knowing. Knowing is not the is almost (and only almost) synonymous with ‘science’.
status possidens of intellection; only intellection itself is {166}
that. Therefore every theory of knowledge must be Plato, in the Thaetetus, criticizes the last of the three
grounded upon some previous conceptualization of intel- definitions of strict knowledge (episteme) which the in-
lection, and not the other way around, as if to intellec- terlocutor proposes: true opinion with logos. Here ‘logos’
tively know were to know [conocer]. Some think that to means reason. Reason, then, would be that which, in this
know [conocer] is better than to intellectively know. But definition, formally constitutes the specific part of knowl-
this is not correct. That which is intellectively known in edge. Plato criticizes this definition, but he understands
knowing [conocer] is certainly more than what is just by ‘reason’ what in all likelihood his interlocutor under-
known in mere intellection; it has a richer content. But to stands, viz. the elements of which something is composed.
know [conocer] is not just elaborating an intellectively After his criticism, Plato left open and without express
known content; rather, to know [conocer] is intellectively solution what logos is in a more radical sense. Under-
knowing that this content is real, i.e., actualizing this standably Plato himself said that this dialogue is of the
content in the real. Only at this price do we have knowl- peirastikos type, i.e., an attempt or effort, as we would say
edge. And this reality is given to the knowledge by mere today. The fact is that ultimately Plato, in his critique,
intellection, and it is to that that all knowledge leads in wishes to point out another meaning of the logos, with
order to be knowledge. All knowledge is {165} always which he will be occupied in the Sophist: the logos which
and only an elaboration of an intellection. And this elabo- enuntiates not the “elemental” being but the “intelligible”
ration is just reason or explanation. Knowledge is, then, being. That is to say, the logos which Plato asks of
intellection in reason, i.e., intellection of the real in its in- knowledge is the intellection of intelligible being, of the
depth reality. Idea. The rest will be only “true opinion”. Now, it is not
On this point it is necessary to contrast this concept this which we have discovered as reason in our analysis.
of knowledge with others which I deem incorrect because Reason is not judgement of “intelligible being” but of “in-
they do not have an adequate concept of what it is to be a depth reality”. Above all, there are not two beings, the
fundament. being of the sensible and the being of the intelligible, but
a single being, the being of the real. Moreover, we are not
By ‘knowledge’, Kant understands every objectively dealing with being but with reality, and not with intelligi-
grounded judgement. And we have already seen that this ble reality but with in-depth reality. Therefore, whatever
is unacceptable because to intellectively know in the af- the meaning of that “true opinion” to which Plato alludes,
firmative sense is not by itself knowing. At the very least such true opinion cannot be counterposed to truth sim-
the ground is necessary. For Kant, this ground is deter- pliciter, to the truth of the intelligible, because there is no
mining the objectivity of affirmation (and it does not dualism of sensing and intellectively knowing; rather,
matter that this objectivity, for Kant, has transcendental there is only the formal and structural unity of sensing
ideality). But this is not what formally constitutes the and of intellectively knowing in sentient intellection.
fundament in knowledge. The ground is “ground-reality”, Whence it follows that reason itself is sentient; and that to
and not determining the objectivity of a judgement. Kant which it bears us sentiently is in-depth reality. {167}
has cast the problem of knowledge along the lines of
judgement and judging. And this is wrong, for at least This in-depth reality, this reality ground, is not what
two reasons. First, identifying knowledge with judgement Aristotle thought either, viz., the cause. At the beginning
is an extreme logification of reason. To know is not for- of his Physics, Aristotle tells us that we believe we know
mally to judge. And second, the ground in question is not something (gignoskein) when we know its cause. Know-
the determining objective of the judgement but the ing would thus be specified and constituted by the appre-
ground-reality. Knowledge naturally involves judgements, hension of causality. But this concept is, as I see it, too
but not every judgement is knowledge. It is only knowl- restrictive. Every cause is a ground, but not every ground
edge when the judgement is a judgement of in-depth real- is necessarily a cause. And I do not refer to knowledge
ity. Field judgement is not knowledge. such as mathematics, whose grounds are not causes in the
strict sense, but rather principles. I refer to something
The Greeks employed the inchoate verb gignoskein, deeper; I think that regardless of what a principle may be,
to know, with many meanings. That which is important it is necessary to conceive of it from the standpoint of the
to us here is the one which encompasses strict and rigor- ground, and not the other way around. I explained this
ous knowledge, and which in the Greeks culminates in above. Causes and principles do found; but on this ac-
what they called episteme, strict knowledge, a word which count are not grounds. To ground is a very precise mode
302 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

of founding. * To ground is certainly to be a principle, but solute, so that each reality would be but a moment of this
to be a principle is not just to be that “from which” ultimate closure. But that is unacceptable, because reality
(hothen) something comes, but that which from itself and is “constitutively” (and not just in fact) open. Moreover
by itself is realized in what is founded. Then and only intellection itself, as mere actualization of the real, is also
then is a principle a ground. To know is not to know constitutively open. One cannot assume, along with
causes, nor to know principles which found, but to know Hegel, that each level of consciousness is just a progres-
grounds, to know “fundamentally”. But Aristotle thought sive manifestation (phenomenon) of the absolute as spirit,
about strict knowledge, about episteme, about science. i.e., an unfolding toward absolute knowledge. The pro-
And for him, the object of science is what always is as it gression of the intellect is not, nor can it be, a “phenome-
is, without being able to be in any other way. Now, this nology of the spirit”.
concept is even more restrictive than that of causal knowl-
edge. And neither episteme nor causal knowledge are In summary, that which specifies intellection, mak-
knowing formally, because not every ground is causality. ing of it knowledge, is in-depth reality. And this {169}
To know a friend in depth is not a question of either cau- in-depth reality does not consist in either objective ground
sality or of scientific necessity. To know a friend well is (Kant), or in intelligible entity (Plato), or in causality, still
not to have a detailed account of his life, nor to know the less in necessary causality (Aristotle), or in the absolute
motives of his actions and reactions, but to intellectively (Hegel). In-depthness is the mere “beyond” as “ground-
know these motives as a manifestation {168} within his reality” in all the multiple modes and forms which this
form and mode of reality, of an in-depth reality. beyond can assume. Causality or the principles of a de-
ductive form of knowledge are not thereby excluded, nor
Let us add, finally, that ‘in depth’ is not synonymous are the possible steps toward an absolute reality. What is
with the ultimate. Everything ultimate naturally has excluded is the idea that something of sort formally con-
depth, but not everything with depth is ultimate. There stitutes the in-depth reality in which reason is installed by
are degrees of “in depth”, even an infinite number of the movement of intellection as thrown from from the
them; indeed, it has an unfathomable depth. To know field to the beyond.
something in depth is not to know it in its ultimate reality.
Moreover, intellection in depth is a fact; but the access to Let us summarize what has been said so many times.
the ultimate is constitutively a problem which is always Reason is (1) inquiring intellection of reality; (2) intellec-
open, even to infinity. It is because of this that intellection tion in depth, of worldly reality, i.e., intellection of reality
in depth is not synonymous with absolute intellection. “itself”; (3) intellection which is formally measuring as
Ground-reality is not absolute reality. That was Hegel’s principle and canon of the reality of the real, in accor-
great mistake. The progression toward what is in depth is dance with sensed suggestions. The three formulae are
not the unfolding of an absolute knowledge. In depth-ness identical; they expound the three moments whose intrinsic
is always an open dimension, and therefore reason is not and formal unity is the very essence of reason. To know is
absolute knowing but open intellection in depth. Thus, to intellectively know the real in accordance with these
just as the field of the real is constitutively open, in the three moments, i.e., knowledge is intellection in reason.
same way the in depth “toward” to which the field sends This reason is a modalization of sentient intellection, and
us is a “toward” which is also constitutively open. is therefore sentient reason. Knowing is, then, the work
Therefore Hegel started from a false premise, thinking of sentient reason. What is the formal structure of this
that the real (he said “the Idea”) is the closure of the ab- knowledge? {170}

*
[Zubiri is here drawing a distinction between “to found”, fundar, and “to
ground”, fundamentar. “To found” means “to establish”, whereas “to
ground” means to be the ultimate foundation of, the principle support of,
the in-depth explanation of something.—trans.]
{171}

CHAPTER VI

THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING

Knowledge is intellection in reason. Since the This structure is not identical to a scientific struc-
meaning of this formula has already been explained, we ture, because it is not necessary that the unity of the three
see immediately that knowledge not only is not identical moments of knowing have “scientific” character. Objec-
to intellection, it is not identical to science either. Science tuality is not necessarily identical to what a scientist un-
is but one mode of knowledge among others. Therefore, derstands by object, viz. a fact. A scientific fact is not the
when we ask about the formal structure of knowing, we same as objectuality; rather, being a scientific fact is but a
ask for something much more radical than if we were to mode of objectuality. In the second place, the method is a
ask what science is. We are asking, what is the formal way of access. It is not something identical to the scien-
structure of rational intellection of reality “itself”? tific method. The scientific method is “a” way of access
to in-depth reality, but not every way of access is a scien-
How does one know? This is the question which we
tific method. Finally, a true encounter is not the same
must now address, viz., the formal structure of knowing.
thing as scientific confirmation, for at least two reasons.
In the first place, what one wishes to know is some- First, it is not because it is necessary to understand this
thing already intellectively known in the field manner. presumed scientific confirmation with respect to the true
And what we wish to intellectively know is its in-depth encounter, and not the other way around. And in the sec-
reality. Therefore, based upon canonic principles, we ond place, it is not because there is no implication that we
situate, so to speak, the field real upon the base of in- will in fact actually reach this true encounter; it may per-
depth reality. This “upon the base” is what I shall call the haps not always be possible. Science is not, as Kant
‘moment of objectuality’. What an object is is not in- thought, a Faktum, but an {173} effort, not just with re-
depth reality but a field thing. A thing is converted from spect to its content, but above all with respect to the very
field reality into an object. In-depth reality is not an ob- possibilities of its existence—something completely dif-
ject but a ground. But this is {172} inadequate, because ferent from the conditions of possibility of a science al-
in the second place, based upon canonic principles, sug- ready achieved, such as the science about which Kant
gested by the field, we must fix the mode of possible ac- spoke. Science in accordance with the three constitutive
cess to the in-depth part of the field real. In depth reality moments of rational intellection is essentially a problem-
is a ground, but not in a vacuum; rather, it is a very con- atic knowledge, viz. a knowledge which seeks to take on
crete ground in each case. Therefore it is essential to fix the form of experimental facts, of a precise method of ex-
the mode in which we may have access to this ground, perimentation, or of the grounding of verifiable truths.
which is going to the be the ground of the determinate This tripartite intention is characteristic of science. And
field thing. This manner is just the way of access, i.e., the it is on account of this that science is, qua knowledge, a
method. But this too is inadequate, because in the third problematic knowledge. And this problem of science is
place, it is necessary that, having advanced by this path, inscribed in the formal structure of knowing as such. This
we try to find the ground for which we are searching. structure has then three moments: objectuality, method,
This is the moment of rational truth. Objectuality, and true encounter. But as stated, they do not go beyond
method, and true encounter: these are the three moments being vague expressions. In what, precisely, do they con-
whose unity constitutes the formal structure of knowing. sist?

303
304 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

is not formally an object. It becomes so only when it is

{174} §1 actualized upon the base of grounded reality. Being an
object is neither objectivity nor a real thing, but rather has
OBJECTUALITY its own structure. And then we may ask ourselves in what
this actualization consists, and in what being an object
As I have already indicated, the intellection of a real formally consists.
field thing in its in-depth reality situates that thing upon
this in-depth reality as its base. The expression ‘object’ has, like almost all impor-
tant expressions, different meanings which it is necessary
This in-depth reality is not what is by itself known in to carefully distinguish.
the intellection. We are sent “towards” it, and installed in
it by field reality itself as reality; in-depth reality, as such, In the first place, being an object does not consist in
is not what is known. What is known is the real field being something which we are going to intellectively
thing. In order to avoid monotonous repetition of the ad- know. That an object is synonymous with what we are
jective ‘field’, I shall speak of a real thing or simply of a going to intellectively know echoes the classical idea of
thing. The in-depth reality is not something intellectively the {176} formal and material object. And this is wrong.
known as if it were some great thing; rather, the mode of This classical conceptualization nourishes itself ultimately
this in-depth reality being actualized is, as we have seen, upon the identity of the real thing and of an object, adding
“to be grounding”; it is ground-reality. Therefore in- perhaps that the real thing is going to be the terminus of
depth reality is the real ambit of grounding. Now, the first an intellection. And this is not the case, because being an
thing that we do in order to know a real thing already object is not, formally, just being the terminus of an intel-
given to us is to situate it upon that ambit as base. That lection. One must add, at the least, in what mode the
which is “in-depth” is, in this case, a “base”. And before thing is the terminus of intellection.
this base, the real thing, which was among others in a Then one might be able to think, in the second place,
field, leaps out at us as grounded in its in-depth reality. that an object is that which we propose to ourselves to
The thing therefore suffers a type of transformation, from intellectively know. An object would then be “proposed”
being in the field to being upon the base, to being reality; it would be “pro-positum”. This has a very wide
grounded. In this new condition, the real thing qua meaning which would take us outside of intellection.
jumping out at us is what we call ‘object’. The real thing Restricting ourselves to intellective pro-posing, object
has been transformed into a real object. This is the first would be what is proposed as something to be intellec-
moment of rational intellection, viz. objectuality. It is tively known. It would be the real thing actualized in the
necessary to {175} conceptualize with great care what this form of pro, whose etymological sense is “in front of”. As
objectuality is and in what the transformation of the real a mode of actualization, object would consist in being
thing into real object consists. present, in being a positum. But put in front of me, i.e. in
the form of pro, the real thing would be before me, i.e., a
pro-positum. But this is not the case. Above all, because
I this concept does not conform to the object of rational
intellection. There are also, as we have seen, proposi-
WHAT IS OBJECTUALITY? tional judgements, and in addition predicative judge-
ments, in which a thing is proposed for subsequent deter-
To be sure, objectuality is not objectivity. Objectivity mination. Thus, when we affirm that A is B, the A is pro-
is something which concerns an affirmation. But objectu- posed to be affirmed as B. But it is not for that reason that
ality concerns not an affirmation but the very mode of it is formally an “object”. To be sure, every rational in-
actualization of a thing. Objectuality is “a” mode of actu- tellection involves, or at least can involve, affirmations.
alization of a thing. An object is not, then, objectivity. But then it is clear that to intellectively know A in its in-
But neither is it a mere actualized real thing. Object is depth reality is not the same as to intellectively know A as
not identical to real thing. Not every real thing intellec- subject of predication of a field note B. The A on the
tively known as real is by that alone the object of a possi- other hand is actualized in rational intellection not as a
ble knowledge. A real thing is an object only when it is pro, but in a different way. Every object is pro-positum,
actualized “upon the base” of grounded reality. A thing but not every pro-positum is an object. Therefore it is
intellectively known in accordance with grounded reality necessary to go one step further. {177}
is in reality in the field, and is certainly a real thing, but it In rational intellection a thing is not actualized
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 305

among others in the field, but rather is actualized over the ple, its supreme expression in Kant, who conceptualized
base of in-depth reality. There are, then, two moments: the object only in terms of natural science. Now, this is
being placed-before and being over a base (the base of the impossible. To be sure, there are—or at least it is not ex-
world). In these conditions a real thing is certainly cluded that there can be—objects lying about. But there
placed, is a positum, but is not so in the form of pro. are many realities which are actualized in the form of ob
and which are not “lying”, which are not a jectum. For
When a real thing is projected over the base of in-
example, persons as such, life, society, and history are not
depth reality, is as if jutting out from this base. Thus the
something jectum. Their mode of reality is different than
thing acquires something like its own bulk, which we have
being “lying” reality. They have or can have intellective
to intellectively know not as something complete in itself,
actuality in ob, but they are not jectum. In this sense,
but as something whose bulk we must keep in order to
then, object would be what we today call ‘thing’. But the
intellectively know it in-depth. When it so juts out, the
actuality in ob is not necessarily actuality of a jectum.
thing presents itself as a positum, but as a positum whose
Therefore, while the word ‘object’ may be linguistically
outline, so to speak, must be overcome in order to go to its
inevitable, it is fitting that a new word be employed {179}
base. This actualization is not actualization in pro, but
to preclude confusion of the two meanings of ‘object’.
actualization in ob. The thing is no longer something
This word must express the actuality in ob, but not as a
pro-posed, but something op-posed; it is an ob-positum.
jectum. For this it will be necessary to express simple
And this is to be an object, viz., to be actualized as ob. To
reality, simple real being, without jectum though possibly
be able to be proposed, the object starts by being op-posed.
using the verb ‘to be’. In Latin the verb esse has as parti-
Here ‘opposed’ does not refer to some obstacle; ‘object’ is
ciple sens, which does not survive except in compounds
not ‘objection’. The opposed is not like a mountain which
such as prae-sens, the present, ab-sens, the absent, etc.
separates and divides; rather, it is like the depth of a port
Now, it remains to create a word along similar lines,
which must be maintained in order to be able to go in the
something like ob-sens, the obsent. Neither in Latin, the
other direction to the beyond. The ob consists in a jutting
Romance languages, nor in English does such a word ex-
such that by its own nature, it is sending us to something
ist. German has the word Gegenstand, which means the
beyond, to in-depth reality. It is an ob formally sending us
same as our word ‘object’. Gegen expresses the ob, and
“toward”. Ob is not a simple being in front of, a being in
stand expresses the sens, object along the lines of opposi-
front as raised, a being opposed between its actualization
tion. This would be perfect if German did not understand
in a previous intellection and the actuality of grounding,
stehen as a mere being here, i.e., as a jectum. Thus the
but rather a being raised by sending us formally to this
Kantian tradition has identified Gegenstand with ob-
actualization The ground, which is in-depth reality, must
jectum. It would have been better to say Gegenseiend,
keep the presumed {178} sufficiency of the bulk of the
because reality can be ob and not be a jectum. Object
thing. In-depth reality is grounding in the form of keep-
would thus be not the ob-jectum but the ob-sent. And to
ing something which is opposed and is sending; it is actu-
lie would be only one mode among others of esse. This is
alization in ob.
not the time to emphasize the difference between being
But this does not yet suffice, because even if the ob is and reality; however very soon we shall see the impor-
correctly understood, one can still misunderstand what it tance of this distinction. Here we are only trying to pin
is to be an object. An object can, in fact, have two mean- down the notion of object a bit more. For this I have gone
ings. One is that which proceeds from the ob itself; this to the expression ob-sent, not in order to continue using it
we have already explained. Another meaning is that but only to clarify the ideas we have been discussing. I
which proceeds from the second part of the expression [- shall continue, then, using the word object but only in the
ject]. An object would be that which is actualized as ob, sense of obsent.
but as something which is (under) lying; it would be a
In summary, being an object formally involves the
jectum. Here the accent is not on the ob but on the jec-
real thing (whether “lying” or not) being actualized in the
tum. The object would be something which “is here”; it is
form of ob. This ob has two essential characteristics
a keimenon, something lying, as Parmenides said; a hypo-
which it is necessary to carefully point out.
keimenon, a sub- or under-lying, as Aristotle said. The
ob-jectum would be the correlate of a sub-jectum. The A) In the first place, ob is a categorial characteris-
difference would be between the ob and the sub, but the tic. What does this mean? ‘Category’ does not designate a
reality itself would in both cases be a jectum, something “class” of things. We are dealing not with a class of
lying. This conception of object has run throughout the things but with “modes” (or forms, {180} which here
history of philosophy since Parmenides. It has, for exam- comes to the same thing) of an intellectively known thing.
306 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

In every intellection one declares the mode in accordance here”. This is false. It would be once again to identify
with which the thing is present. To declare in Greek is just being present with a jectum. The ‘being’ to which we
expressed by kategoreo, and the declaration is called refer does not concern the presented but the presentation.
kategoria. Category is, then, as I see it, the mode of a What is present can be what is most opposed to the “being
thing’s being present qua declared in intellection. here”, what is most opposed to a jectum. The most radical
course of a person’s life, or a reality which consisted only
Now, to be an object, i.e., objectuality, is above all a
in happening, do not for that reason cease to be present,
category of actualization; it is the mode by which reality is
and only present, in an intellection. Positivity does not
actualized as “ob”, regardless of its real content. It is the
mean “staticness”—if I may be permitted the expression.
essentially categorial characteristic of the ob. This we
have already seen in Part I. But it is not just that being present does not mean
being a jectum—something which, when all is said and
But to be present as “ob” has still a second essential
done, is easy to comprehend; rather, there is another more
characteristic.
subtle dimension in the concept of positivity. One might
B) In the second place, “ob” has a characteristic of think, in fact, that being present, being only present, and
positivity. What does this mean? In intellection the real being so as presenting itself, is the same as saying that
is present as real regardless of its form of actualization. I what is actualized thus is just what we call a fact. Posi-
can describe this being present as the formal constitutive tivity would be a characteristic identical to “facticity”.
moment of the intelligible real; it is the actualization of But this is absolutely wrong.
the real. But I can describe the being present as a moment
To see that, let us ask what a fact is. {182} Certainly
proper to intellection itself. And then I shall say that what
the fact is a positum. But the converse is not true; not
is present is actualized in a form such that, by virtue of
every positum is a fact. And the proof is that, in order to
being mere actualization, its relationship to the intellec-
certify that something is a fact, one usually calls it a
tive act itself is to be “merely” actualized. The real in
“positive fact”, which indicates that the positivity cannot
intellection is actualized and is nothing more than actu-
be understood based upon the facticity, but rather that the
alized. What is present determines its intellective actuali-
facticity, i.e., being a fact, must be understood based upon
zation based on itself, and it is based on itself as it is actu-
the positivity. Insofar as it is a positum, the fact is some-
alized, and only actualized, in its mere presenting itself.
thing which is present, which only is present, and which
Now, to be “only actualized” in its being present is what
is so in the presenting itself. Although the word affects
comprises being a positum. It is the characteristic of
only the third moment of the positum, for greater clarity
positivity. Positum is what is present insofar as its actu-
we shall call the positum an observable. Therefore posi-
alization is, with respect to the presented itself, only a
tum is a characteristic of the real actualized as observable.
being actualized in its presenting itself. That is, being a
But not everything intellectively observable is necessarily
positum has three moments: being here-and-now present,
a fact. In order to be so it must fulfill a necessary condi-
being only here-and-now present, and being only here-
tion, viz., that the positum, besides being observable, must
and-now present in and {181} through its presenting it-
by virtue of its own nature be observable by anyone. And
self. Through the first moment, the positum is something
it must be so “by virtue of its own nature”. This requires
apprehended. By the second moment, the positum is op-
special attention. “Observable by anyone” does not mean
posed, if I may be permitted the expression, to what may
that there are various people who have observed it. Even
be its interpretation or intellectual elaboration, for exam-
if there were only one person who had done so, this ob-
ple, to the theoretical, to the speculative, etc. Through its
servable would be a fact if what is observed has the nature
third moment, the positum is a simple observable thing in
of being observable by anyone. Thus, it could be that an
the intellection. We are not trying to go beyond what is
historical fact might have had but one witness. If an
present to a thing which is manifested in what is present,
authentic document reaches us to the effect that this fact
but to take what is present in and by itself in its mere pre-
has occurred, and if what is thus witnessed is by its nature
senting itself. It is necessary to take these three moments
observable by anyone who could have understood it, then
in their formal and intrinsic purity. In order to compre-
what is witnessed by this single observer is a fact, in casu,
hend this, it will be useful to position this concept of posi-
an historical fact. On the other hand, if what is observed
tivity face to face with two other kindred ideas.
is something which, by virtue of its nature, is not observ-
Above all, the fact that the actualized does nothing able by more than one person, then what is observed is
but be here-and-now present might cause one to think that certainly something real, it is a positum, but this real
this being here-and-now present is, qua being, just “being thing, despite being real, is not properly speaking a fact.
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 307

This is the case with some moments of my intimate per- system of previous concepts. These concepts can be either
sonal life. It is not just that I observe them, but that {183} from natural science, historical documents, etc. Without
no one other than I can observe them. Thus these reali- this fixation, we would have a mere fact, to which the
ties are not, properly speaking, facts. It was just this, as I name brute fact was given at the beginning of the century,
see it, that was the true reason why Wundt’s nascent ex- as opposed to scientific fact, which as I see it is the con-
perimental psychology did not admit the purely introspec- ceptualized and fixed fact. If we take a bobbin, copper
tive as a fact. I leave aside the fact that expression, on the wire, an electrical cell, and an iron bar, we shall see that
part of the person, can be considered as a fact; that is a under certain conditions the bar oscillates and its oscilla-
different question, which Wundt’s successors resolved tion can be measured on a suitable scale. In this case the
affirmatively. Conversely, there can be positive realities scientific fact is the electrical impedance of the bobbin
which are perfectly observed by many persons, and yet and wire. But that is not the brute fact. The brute fact
these positive realities cannot be called ‘facts’ if, by virtue would be, for example, the observation of the oscillations
of their own nature, they are not observable by everyone. of the iron bar. Within an historical tradition it is quite
Thus, for example, we have the apparitions of Christ be- possible that the traditum may perfectly well be a fact, yet
fore the fifty, according to St. Paul’s testimony. Even there is no documentary fixation. It would not then {185}
though Christ may have been seen by the fifty, and even be a scientific fact. This is the sum total of the difference
though their testimony be true, these apparitions thus ob- that there is between what we might call a living tradition
served would not therefore be a fact, because the presumed and a tradition with documentary continuity. Strictly
reality could not be observed by all other persons who speaking, the scientific fact is the clarification of reality
happened to be there, but only by those select fifty. It apprehended as a function of previous concepts. But we
would be positum, but not a fact. These apparition of shall not now delve into this problem as it would distract
Christ, in fact, by virtue of their nature, could not have us from the matter we have been discussing.
been observed by just anyone, but only by those graced
To summarize, positum is the actualization of
with them. ‘Fact’, then, is not synonymous with present
something in its being present, in its being just present,
reality; rather, the real positum, I affirm, is only a fact if
and in being so in its being present itself. It is not a char-
by its own nature it can be observed by anyone. Every
acteristic of apprehended reality either as jectum, or fact,
fact, then, must be positum, but not every positum is a
or as scientific fact.
fact.
To be sure, from the very first pages of this book I Now, the “ob” has a characteristic which is not just
have repeatedly stated that I wish to attend to the facts, for categorial but also of a positum. To be “ob”, objectuality,
example the fact that we sentiently apprehend the real. is positivity. That something is an object, in the sense of
But this does not contradict what I just said, because what objectuality, is not something which is determined by me,
is a fact is sentient apprehension; what is apprehended in but is something determined by the real itself in its being
its real and positum character is not necessarily {184} a present. I have indeed said that the “ob” is constituted
fact. The color green sensed is a fact; this does not mean when a real thing is projected upon the base of reality.
that, without further ado, the color green is a fact. In or- But this projection does not have its roots in me, but in the
der to be so it is necessary to add that what is apprehended very mode of reality’s being presented, i.e., in its “to-
can be apprehended by anyone. And in this case that is ward”. It is not I who projects a real field thing upon the
so. The green apprehended is real; it is a positum, but if base of reality, but rather it is that reality itself which,
one says no more it is not a fact; it is only a fact if one when sentiently apprehended, has the moment of a “to-
says that by its nature it can be apprehended by anyone. ward” the in-depth. The real is projected from itself into
its own being presented; it is projected, I must stress, and
Moreover, not every fact is necessarily what we call a
it is not I who projects it. Therefore “ob” is a positum.
scientific fact. This is a problem which unleashed a spir-
Once again, the matter in question is not that objectuality
ited discussion at the beginning of this century. A fact is
is a fact, and still less a scientific fact, but that in its real
only a type of “posited” reality; the scientific fact is, in
character is the reality itself which sends us to the in-
turn, only a type of fact. In order for a fact to be a scien-
depth, regardless of the nature of its content.
tific fact, what is observable by anyone has to be, in a
certain way, “fixed”. A scientific fact, I believe, is a fixed But it is necessary to avoid another mistake. I have
fact. Fixation is always and only the characteristic of a said, in fact, that rational intellection intellectively knows
fact not just by virtue of being observable by anyone, but the real as {186} the object of a search, i.e., we are deal-
as a fact observed in a special form, viz. as referred to a ing with an inquiring intellection. And searching is not
308 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

searching for a positum but a quaesitum. This is true; tic of a real object in rational intellection. Its objectuality
nonetheless, let us think a bit longer about it. What is consists in what I called being ob-sent. And this objectu-
searched for in rational intellection is the ground of a real ality has two essential characteristics: categorial character,
field thing. For this reason it comes to that positive pro- viz. the “ob” is a category of actualization; and positive
jection which we call “ob”. But neither in-depth reality as character, viz. the “ob” is a positum for the real itself.
such, i.e., the ambit of grounding, nor the real as real ob- The categories of actualization are something positum,
ject are the sought-after goals. What is sought after is the and every positum is so above all categoriality. In the
ground of the real object in in-depth reality. The “ob” and “ob” the unity of both characteristics is formally given.
the “for” are just positum. What is sought is the funda-
But this is leading us to the second point, which is,
ment of the “real-ob” in the “for”.
in what precisely does the transformation of a real thing
Summarizing, the field real acquires the characteris- into a real object consist?
{187}

APPENDIX

THE PROBLEM OF CATEGORIES

‘Category’ does designate a “class” of things, as is medieval philosophers called predicamenta. And this was
usually assumed. The list of categories is not the supreme decisive: the categories, we are told, are founded upon the
classification of things. We are not dealing with “classes” structure of the logos; they constitute its formal (logical)
of things, but with “modes” of the intellectively known structure and are the base of all our grammar (noun, ad-
thing. Recalling what has been said already, let us repeat jective, preposition, etc.). This conception has run
that in every intellection one states the mode in accor- throughout European philosophy (Leibniz, Kant, Hegel,
dance with which a thing is actually present. In Greek, etc.).
‘to state’ in this sense is kategoreo, and therefore what is If one studies it carefully, however, this concept
stated is called a category. starts from two presuppositions: that intellection is af-
The problem of the categories goes back to Aristotle, firmation, is logos; and that what is intellectively known
who was in turn inspired by Plato. For Plato and Aris- is being. That is what I termed “logification of intellec-
totle, to intellectively know is to declare or affirm that tion”, and “entification of reality”. To intellectively know
what is intellectively known “is”. That is Parmenides’ old is to affirm, and what is intellectively known is entity.
thesis. Intellection is logos of being, logos ousias. In the The unitary convergence of these two presuppostions has
logos one states the modes in accordance with which what in large measure determined, as I said, the character of
is intellectively known “is”, i.e., one states the modes of European philosophy.
being. How? The logos is a complexion or weaving But these two presuppositions are, in my view, un-
(symploke) of the thing about which one is affirming (the tenable.
on), and of what one is affirming or predicating of it. The
A) It is thought that what is intellectively known is
characteristics of being, stated in this predicative weaving,
“being”. But that is not the case; what is intellectively
are the categories. For Aristotle, then, the categories are
known is not being but “reality”. We have already seen
the supreme modes of entity as such. (I need not stress
that before; being is an actuality of the real (in the world),
that here I take the word ‘mode’ in its most general
an ulterior actuality (to reality itself), an ulterior but
meaning and not as something different from a form of
oblique actuality. Being is ulterior and oblique actuality
reality). Thus, strictly speaking, it would be false to say
of the real as reality. It is necessary to repeat these ideas
that “green” is a quality. Green is a note just like sono-
at this time.
rous, heavy, warm, etc. But the manner in which green
determines this paper consists in making of it a “which”. B) The logos, affirmation, is but a mode of intellec-
Quality is not the green itself, but the way in which the tion, {189} not to be sure the only or most radical one.
green determines the being of this paper. {188} As this Indeed, the predicative logos itself is not the only type of
determination is declared in predication, i.e. in the predi- logos; first there is the positional logos and the proposi-
cate, it follows that the predication, this mode of being tional logos. Only then is there a predicative logos. Clas-
which we predicate as a quality of the modes of being, is sical philosophy has logified intellection, so that the the-
stated in the predication itself. Now, the different types of ory of intellection has been converted into Logic. But that
statements of the modes of being in predicates are just the leaves out the essence of the logos, which consists just in
categories. A quality is not a note but a category. To be being a mode of intellection, i.e., a mode of actualization.
sure, they are but supreme genera of what can be predi- One cannot “logify” intellection, but on the contrary must
cated of being. They are not predicates, in the sense of “intelligize” the logos. All of this has been previously
notes, nor are they predicable, nor would they be what the explained.

309
310 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

Hence the categories are neither predicates, nor pre- it follows that the real is not only intus but also an ektos,
dicables, nor predicamenta of being, but the modes of a an extra. This is a vision from inside to out. And then
real thing as merely actualized in intellection qua modes what has traditionally been called ‘categories’ is not the
stated about it. The categories are primarily and radically way in which a subject is determined {191} by the notes
modes of a real thing stated about its mere actualization, predicated of it, but the formal respects by which the “in”
in its mere intellection; they are not modes of real things is projected onto an “ex”. And it is this formal respect
qua affirmed in some logos. They are categories neither which I call dimension. The categories are not the pro-
of entity nor predication; rather they are categories of re- nouncement of the characteristics of being in the logos,
ality which is merely actualized in intellection. This is a but the pronouncement of the real in intellection. I call
concept of category which differs from the classical one. them ‘dimensions’ because in each one is, in a certain
way, the system in a proper formal respect, i.e., its reality
But the real actualized in intellection has two as-
qua reality is measured. These dimensions are not only
pects. One is the aspect given to the actualized real qua
numerically different (as happens, for instance, in geome-
real; the other is the aspect given to the actualized real
try), but also qualitatively different. Moreover, they mu-
qua actualized. Hence, what is stated in intellection is on
tually imply each other. This is an essential observation.
one hand the modes of reality, and on the other the very
By being formal respects of actualization, these dimen-
modes of actualization. By the first aspect, the categories
sions are inscribed, so to speak, in a formal, primary re-
will be modes of reality actualized qua reality. By the
spect, the respect by which things are de suyo in appre-
second aspect, the categories would be modes of reality
hension. The dimensions are thus inscribed in that pri-
actualized qua actualized. In contrast to classical phi-
mary formality which is “reality”.
losophy, it is necessary to introduce two systems of catego-
ries: {190} categories of reality and categories of actuali- But this actualization of the real takes place in in-
zation. These two systems of categories, naturally, are not tellection.
independent but have an intrinsic and radical unity. Let
II. The categories of actualization. There reality has
us quickly examine the following three points: 1. Catego-
modes of actualization which are not identified with the
ries of reality; 2. Categories of actualization; 3. The in-
characteristics of reality, i.e., with its dimensions.
trinsic and radical unity of the categories.
Therefore one ought to speak of categories of actualization
1. Categories of Reality. Following the thread of the or of intellection. The name matters little; the essential
logos, Aristotle views the categories as manners of deter- point is not to confuse these categories with those other
mination of the subject; ultimately this is therefore a vi- categories which are the dimensions of reality. Now, qua
sion which goes from outside to inside. The essence of intellective actualization the categories are neither predi-
what is not a subject would be in fact to inhere, or as Ar- cates nor predicables nor predicamenta; they are simply
istotle says, to be an accident. The same happens with modes of actualization of the real declaimed in intellec-
Kant and even Hegel. The only difference lies in the fact tion.
that for Aristotle the logos does nothing but declare an
What are these categories of actualization? They
already determined subject, whereas for Kant and Hegel
are, as we have been seeing, five, because there are five
(albeit in a different form, we prescind from the matter),
modes {192} by which reality is actualized in intellection.
what the logos does is to constitute the subject affirma-
tively. But always one deals with a vision from outside to A) Intellection is, above all, nothing but the mere
inside. Now, the real is not a subject but a system. It is a actualization of the real in the intelligence. It is the radi-
construct system: each note, by virtue of being a “note of”, cal category of actualization, the category of the “in”.
involves the system as a whole of which it is a note, and
B) There is another mode of being present, of the
therefore consists in the actuality of the system in said
real being actualized intellectively. It is not the case that
note. The essence of a note is not “to inhere” but to “co-
the real ceases to be actualized “in”, but that it is reactu-
here”. In virtue of this, the system is a unity which is ac-
alized in affirmative intellection. Something already in-
tually present in each note, making of it a “note of”. This
tellectively known as real is in addition intellectively
is the essential point.
known as real based on other things; this is affirmation. It
Now, this unity of the system is an “in”. The real is is therefore a reduplicative actualization. The A already
an intus. The notes are only that in which the system is actualized as real becomes intellectively known as being
projected from itself, from the intus. The intus thus also really B. This is the category of the “re”, of “re-
has a moment of “ex”; it is just the “from itself”. Whence duplication.” This category is, in a certain way, general
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 311

because there are different forms and modes of “re”. the categories of reality. The categories of reality consti-
tute a system. But it is less obvious that the categories of
a) A real thing is intellectively known based upon
actualization also constitute a system. Hence it must be
others “among” which it is. The real thing is then actu-
clearly stressed. Every “re” actualization is essentially
alized in the intellection of these other things. We have
based upon an “in” actualization; otherwise it would not
already seen this: the “among” has, among other aspects,
be re-actualization. Only as “in” can something be actu-
an aspect proper to a thing actualized as such. It is a “re”
alized among others. In turn, this unity of the “in” and of
but “among”. This is the category of “among”.
the “re” is what {194} points to reality as a “by”. Finally,
b) One intellectively knows in this “among” that the by just projecting the “in” and the “re” upon in-depth re-
thing is actualized, but as a function of other things. In ality, the real is actualized as “ob”. Here the systematic
this functionality, the real thing is actualized in that mode character of the categories of actualization is apparent.
which we call “by”. “By” is the functionality of the real
qua real. It is a “re” but “by”. This is the category of the B) But taken together, the categories of actualization
“by”. and the categories of reality reveal an intrinsic and radical
unity, the unity of actualization. We are not dealing with
c) Finally there is another mode of actualizing what actuity, but with actualization. This unity, by virtue of
is intellectively known as “among” and as “by”, and being of actuality, is determined by reality because every
which consists in the thing being present “among” and actuality is always and only actuality of reality. The
“by”, but now not with respect to other things, but as the modes of actualization, then, are determined intellectively
projection of the real only as a moment of the world. This by the real itself. To be sure, intelligence has its own na-
projection actualizes the real in the form of “ob”. The ture. But we have already seen that this nature is actual-
“ob” is a category. ized in and by the actuality of a real thing, intellectively
“In”, “re”, and in turn “re” as “among”, as “by”, actualized. Therefore this actuality is certainly common
{193} and as “ob”, gives us the five categories, the five to the real thing and to the intellection itself, but this
modes of intellective actualization of the real qua intel- commonality is modally determined by the real itself; in
lectively known. virtue of this, the actualization is not only a common ac-
tuality for the real and for intellection, but in addition this
Since these categories are modes of presentation, commonality has an intrinsic and formal character; it is a
they apply both to the field as well as to the world, al- commonality in which the real itself grounds it. It con-
though in different forms. But the “among” in the field is sists in being a commonality determined by the real of
not identical to the “among” in the world, nor is the “by” which it is the actuality. Intellection is certainly an actu-
in the field identical to the “by”in the world. But that is ality; but qua intellection it is just actuality “of” the real.
another question. And therefore the actuality common to a real thing and its
Each one of these categories comprises different intellection is determined by the mode in which the “of” is
categorial modifications. Thus, actualization as “in” present to the intelligence. And as the real qua real is
comprises all the modes by which what is sensed is pres- transcendental, it follows that the common actuality of
ent to us. We already saw, in Part I, that the essential intellection and of what is intellectively known is a com-
difference of the senses is not in the qualities which are monality of transcendental nature. Kant said that the very
sensed, but in the very mode by which the sensed qualities structure of the understanding confers transcendental
are present to us as real. Similarly, the “re”, as a mode of content (transzendental Inhalt) to what is understood.
“among”, comprises different forms: the modes of inten- {195} That is not true. Transcendentality is not a char-
tionality of the “re”, etc. Finally “by” and “ob” can as- acteristic of the understanding but of intellection as de-
sume different forms. These five categories of actualiza- termined by the real itself in common actuality by the real.
tion are not independent of the categories of reality; they This actuality is, then, not only common but transcen-
constitute the categorial unity of the intellection of the dental. It is, if one wishes, common transcendental actu-
real. ality. That is to say, the actuality is something common in
which intellection is respectively open to the intellectively
III. Unity of the categories of reality and of actuali-
known real. And it is for this reason that intellection it-
zation. This unity has two aspects.
self is transcendental. This commonality of actuality is
A) Above all, both the categories of reality as well as not transcendental as a conceptual moment, but neither is
the categories of actualization constitute a “system”, the it transcendental because it constitutes the real as object.
system of the categories. This is obvious with respect to It is transcendental, above all, because by being common,
312 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

the intellection is open to reality in the same openness by not representing. The radical function of reason is not to
which the real is open to its actuality in intellection. be representative but to be grounding. To be sure, this
Therefore there is transcendental commonality. In virtue intellection will involve representations, or at least can
of this, transcendentality as respective openness of the involve them in most cases; but the formal function {197}
reality of the real is determinant by virtue of the respective of reason is not to represent but to present. The categories
openness of intellection as such. And it is for this reason are not modes of representing but modes of presenting.
that intellection itself is transcendental. Intellection is And in the second place, it is clear that Kant’s idea of
transcendentally open to other intellections. The diverse what is represented would figure in the different catego-
intellections do not constitute an “edifice” by virtue of ries of the “re”. And this is not sufficient to constitute the
being lumped together, i.e., because to one intellection “ob”.
others are “added” which outline, organize, or amplify it;
Kant has posed for himself the problem of the con-
but on the contrary all of this takes place, and does so
stitution of objects, but he stumbled over the problem of
necessarily, by virtue of the transcendentally open nature
objectuality as such, over the “being-ob”. And the fact is
of each intellection. Transcendentality as respective open-
that by ‘object’ Kant understands the content of objects. It
ness of intellection is the radical foundation of every
doesn’t matter for this problem that such content is merely
“logic” of intellection.
formal; one is always dealing with a content. Now, ob-
The categories of reality and of actualization have, jectuality is not a content but a mode of actualization of a
then, an intrinsic unity with respect to two characteristics: content. One is not dealing with “an object” but with
systematic unity, and unity of transcendental commonality. “objectuality”.
IV. Special consideration of the category of the And on this point, Kant is in agreement with Aris-
“ob”. The “ob” has a formally categorial characteristic. totle; he takes the problem of the categories along the
To be object {196} is a categorial mode of actuality. Let lines of the categories of the content of reality. They have
us prolong our reflection on this idea of object which is a different meaning for categories of reality, but they agree
essential for the problem of knowing. upon some characteristics which for both of them consti-
tute the system of categories of reality, viz. Being a prior,
Above all it is necessary to avoid the mistake of
closed, and universal. For Aristotle and Kant—above all
confusing object and objectuality. The categorial aspect of
Kant—the categories of reality constitute the a priori
actualization is the being actualized “as object”; it is not
warp and weft of what is categorized. This is not the place
the character by which what is present as object can con-
to discuss that important problem in detail. But from here
stitute one or several objects. Object and objectuality are
on I want to let it be settled that the categories of content
not the same.
are not an a priori system, but the modes of what has usu-
Kant’s celebrated categories are modes of being of ally been called the ‘transcendental function of suchness’,
objects, the diverse moments which constitute that which of the real considered as suchness. Hence they depend
we call “an object”. Therefore they are, like Aristotle’s upon the real and are not a priori conditions of the real. In
categories, categories of content, very different than the the second place, the categories of reality are not closed
categories of actuality. Since Kant was, like Aristotle, systems, because the transcendental function is in itself an
oriented toward the predicative logos, he takes up the idea essentially open function. The real can be constituting not
of categories as modes of unity of predicate with subject. just other real things, {198} i.e., not only a diversity of
Kant’s novelty is in affirming that this unity is not an af- suchness, but can also go on constituting other modes of
firmative unity consequent upon the object, but on the reality qua reality. For this reason the transcendental or-
contrary the unity of predicate and subject is what makes der is an order which is open dynamically. And finally, in
the intelligible have its own unity in virtue of which it is the third place, the system of content categories is not
an object. The object is constituted as this or that object universal. Aristotle determined his categories as modes of
by a function identical to that by which affirmation itself substance, but above all along the lines of sensible sub-
is constituted, which is then the ground of objectual unity. stance. Kant molded his categories upon the things which
And it is in this that, for Kant, the categories consist: they constitute the object of Newton’s physics. And this is
are modes in which the diversity of intuition is unified as manifestly unilateral, both in the case of Aristotle and that
objects of intellection. The categories would thus be tran- of Kant. One cannot extend the content categories of
scendental modes of representation. But this is untenable physical things, whether substances or sensible objects, to
for a variety of reasons. In the first place, intellective all other types of reality. Therefore the universality of the
knowing, and especially rational intellective knowing, is content categories is not achieved by changing the concept
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 313

of reality, for example by saying that the reality of things, tent categories is not, as I see it, universal. Each type of
which are here, form the order of some cosmic movement. knowledge has its own content categories. It is impossible
The fact is that in any case whatsoever, and regardless of to reduce the categories of the historical and the personal
how rich our chain of concepts is, the system of the con- to the natural, etc.
314 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

II transformation concerns, at one and the same time, intel-

lection and the real thing. With respect to intellection, the
TRANSFORMATION OF A FIELD THING INTO transformation does not consist in a change in the act of
A REAL OBJECT intellection qua act. It is a transformation which deter-
mines, in intellection, something which is less than an act
but more than mere capacity. This modalization is just
In view of the foregoing, this point will be dealt with
what constitutes actuity. An object is not the terminus of
briefly. The object, i.e. the objectual reality, is not an in-
a representation but the terminus of anintellective attitude.
terpretation or anything of the sort; it is the terminus of
The transformation consists, then, intellectively, in the
apprehension. {199} A real thing is a positum, but upon
change of act into attitude. The “ob” is intellectively con-
the base of in-depth reality; therefore the real thing ac-
stituted as a terminus of an attitude.
quires a character of “ob”. That transformation is, then,
of categorial order, of categories of actualization. We are This transference also concerns the real. The “ob”
not trying to elaborate a representation but to actualize refers. The “ob” is a mode of actuality, and therefore, like
another mode of presentation. For this reason, I repeat, every actuality, it is always just actuality of the real. The
the transformation of a real thing into a real object is categorial “ob” presents us not “an” object, but a res ob-
categorial. The real field thing, actualized now as real jecta, a res in “ob”. In virtue of this, that which is actu-
“in” primordial apprehension, and “re”-actualized in the alized in this new attitude, i.e. what is going to be intel-
field manner “among” others and “by” others in the form lectively known rationally, is not the res objecta as ob-
of affirmation, is now projected upon the base of in-depth jecta, but the res objecta as res. The “ob” only has the
reality, upon an ambit actualized in turn as “by”, i.e., upon character of referring, and it refers to the reality of which
an ambit with the nature of a ground. The “field” of the it is actuality. In the intellective attitude the real itself is
real thing is open to a “world” in which it is grounded. actualized in “ob”; but it is always an actualization of the
Then and only then does the real field thing acquire the real. The transformation, then, falls back upon the actu-
character of real object. The “ob” is but the actualization alization in an attitude. Knowledge, I repeat, is not a rep-
of a field thing as a world thing. Only in this actualiza- resentation of things, but an actualization of them in that
tion is there an “object”, i.e., in the rational intellection, new attitude of the “toward”. {201}
in knowledge. That which is intellectively known in pri-
In this attitude, the real is objectually projected onto
mordial apprehension, and that which is intellectively
the in-depth base, i.e., it is actualized as worldly reality.
known affirmatively, are not, formally, objects. Only what
This projection, and therefore the knowledge itself, can be
is intellectively known rationally is an object. This open-
of quite varied nature. That I said before. Knowledge is
ness of field to world is an openness which leads not to
not just science, nor is it principally science. There are
what a field thing already intellectively known “toward”
other modes of knowledge, for example poetic knowledge,
others of the field is, but rather to whatever that intellec-
religious knowledge, etc., just as there are also other
tively known field thing now is “toward” grounding real-
known realities which are not things, for example one’s
ity itself.
own or someone else’s personal reality. Now, knowledge
In virtue of this, the transformation of a real thing is not principally theoretic; it is not because it is not radi-
into objectual reality has precise characteristics: cally theoretic. The radical aspect of knowledge is in the
attitude of the “toward” determined by the real itself, an
a) It is a transformation not in the mode of repre-
attitude in which the real is actualized in an “ob”. The rest
senting the real, but in its mode of being present. Objec-
is but modalizations of this radical structure.
tuality is the terminus of a transformation only of catego-
rial actuality. {200} Here then is what objectuality is, and what the atti-
tude which determines the transformation of the real thing
b) It is a transformation along the lines of the “to-
into real object is.
ward”; the field “toward” is transformed into a “toward”
the in-depth. This objectuality is only a categorial correlate of an
attitude, in which the real is actualized in an “ob” by pro-
c) This transformation is determined by the real it-
jecting it—and only projecting it—upon the world as an
self, because the “toward” is a mode of reality. The field
ambit of grounding. This real was previously actualized
real in its “toward” is what presents to us that real in its
as “in” and “re”. Therefore its projection upon the ambit
“toward” the in-depth.
of grounding leaves open the intellection of the ground of
What is the character of this transformation? The that objectual reality as a moment of the world. That is to
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 315

say, knowledge is always intrinsically and formally an depth nature. For that it is necessary that this nature be
open problem. It is not sufficient that the field real is ac- accessible to intellection. How? That is the second point
tualized for us as object. It is actualized for us as object of the formal structure of knowing: after the constitution
precisely in order for us to intellectively search for its in- of objectuality, the access to the ground of the real.
316 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

reality in the world. This problematic business is what

{202} §2 one seeks, viz. the ground of this determinate field thing.
THE METHOD In virtue of this a question arises: How does one seek
that which is sought, that is, the ground of the world?
It is by projecting the field real onto the base of in- This “how” is strictly and formally an intellective mode.
depth reality, onto the world, that we seek the rational Now, the “how” of the search for the fundament in the
intellection of field things, i.e., their knowledge. Knowl- world is what constitutes method. A method is how one
edge is search. Let me reiterate that we are not dealing forges a way, a way toward the ground. A method is
with the search for some intellection, but rather with an therefore the way of knowing as such. The necessity and
intellection which qua intellection is inquiring, which is nature of the method is not just a type of human necessity.
inquiring itself as a mode of intellection. Since to be an It is that, but this necessity is founded upon an essential
intellection is to be a mere actualization of the real, it fol- moment of reality, upon the constitutive openness of the
lows that the search is an actualization brought to com- real, merely in its respectivity. As ambit of respectivity,
pletion in that mode of actualizing which is inquiry. Even the world is open; {204} therefore, as a moment of re-
though I have said all this before, I repeat it here because spectivity of each real thing, reality is open in each thing.
it is something essential for the subject which we are And the “how” of the search for the ground is set in this
about to examine. very openness; it is that which transforms the intellective
Where does one search for that actualization? We movement into a progression among the real. Method is a
have already seen where: in the world. World is the re- way. Neither the world nor the real object is a problem, as
spectivity of the real qua real. And it is in this sense that I said; the problem is the way from the real object to its
it is something beyond the field. The field is respectivity, ground.
but it is just sensed respectivity, the sensed world. To go Thus it is necessary to ask ourselves: what, precisely,
beyond the field is to go from “field” to “world”. This is a method? And what is its intrinsic and formal struc-
world is not, formally, something sought, but something ture? These are the two points which we must examine.
given. The world is given not as something which is there
“facing” me; rather, it is given in that mode of reality Here we ask ourselves in what method consists. We
which is the “toward”. It is for this reason that the world are not interested in what a particular method is; that we
is formally something “beyond” the field. In the world shall see later. What we are now interested in is what
thus actualized is where one seeks that which we wish to comprises a method as a moment of rational intellection,
rationally know intellectively, that which we wish to i.e., what comprises the methodic moment of reason.
know.
What is it that one seeks in the world? One seeks the
real considered with respect to the world. Worldly reality I
is {203} actualized precisely as a “to be grounding”. The
world is thus the ambit of grounding. And it is just on WHAT IS METHOD?
account of this that the world, that which is beyond the
‘Method’ is not synonymous with what is usually
field, is in-depth reality. In-depthness does not consist in
called the ‘scientific method’. To be scientific is but a
any kind of mysterious root, but in being the “for” of the
possible modalization of what it is to be a method.
field itself qua worldly. Therefore that which one seeks in
Method is something more radical; it is the way of access.
this progression from the field toward the worldly is the
The concept of “way” or “path”, hodos, was probably in-
ground of the field. Ground, as I have already said many
troduced into philosophy by Parmenides. But for method,
times, is not necessarily a cause, but the mode in which
just being a way or a path is not sufficient. It is necessary
that which is grounding grounds, from itself, the
that the path be “among and through” the forms of reality.
grounded and formally passes into what is grounded.
The path must be a path which is meta [after]. Only then
Cause is only a mode of ground. The ground is therefore,
will we have that which constitutes the method. Method
ultimately, the world in a real thing. What one seeks is,
is a problem because it is not univocally determined. And
then, this ground. One does not seek the world, but the
not being so is precisely why there is a meta, i.e., a forg-
ground of the real in the world, transforming the field
ing of a way. {205}
reality into objectual reality. Neither does one seek an
object. World and object are not what is problematic. What is this method qua intellective? That is the es-
What is problematic is always just objectual reality qua sential question. The matter is not resolved just by saying
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 317

that method is a way of access. It is necessary to clarify this because the idea of method lends itself to serious
the intellective character of the method itself. confusion. Generally one understands by ‘method’ the
path which leads from one truth to another, understanding
For this let us recall, once more, that it is a forging
by ‘truth’ a true judgement; therefore the method would
of a way, that is how intelligence opens in order to go
be a reasoning process which goes from one true judge-
from a real field thing to its worldly ground. The path is
ment to another. But to me this is untenable for three
traced between two points: the real field thing and its
reasons.
worldly ground. Clearly one is dealing with the real thing
and with its real ground, real but intellectively known, a) In the first place, method is not the way from one
actualized, in intellection. Therefore the method is the truth to another but from an intellectively known, actual-
way of access from one actualization of the real to an- ized reality to another actualization of it. Method is not
other. As we said, knowledge is intellection seeking itself. the way of truth, but the way of reality. To be sure, we are
And what is sought is a new intellective actualization of dealing with actualized reality; but it is always reality.
the same real field thing. It is quite possible that the con- Therefore method as path is a path not in the truth of
tent of the ground may be something which in some way knowledge, but in reality. {207}
is numerically distinct from the field thing; but it is al-
b) In the second place, the intellection which comes
ways just intellectively known as a ground of the field
into play here is not a judgement. To be sure, actualized
thing. Therefore we are dealing, strictly speaking, with a
reality is a truth. But it is not the truth of a judgement.
new actualization of the field thing; it is actualized not as
The intellection in which method consists is the intellec-
in a field but as in the world. That it is actualized as
tion of the real as real truth, not as logical truth. In
worldly is not the same as that it is actualized as being
method there are judgements, clearly; but it is not judge-
here-and-now in the world. This last would be “being” in
ment but real truth which determines the methodic char-
the traditional sense. Here we are dealing just with reality
acter of intellection.
qua respective in that respectivity which constitutes the
world. And since all actualization is so of reality, it fol- c) In the third place, the way, the method itself, does
lows that ultimately what is done is to intellectively know not consist in being a reasoning process. It is not the ac-
the real more profoundly or more in-depth. That is, cess of a true judgement to another true judgement, be-
method is a way into reality. The moment of reality is cause what is sought is not another judgement but another
decisive. To be sure, we are dealing with actualized real- actualization. The identification of method with reason-
ity, but actualized as reality. Method is a forging of a way ing—which has run throughout the last centuries in all
into reality itself towards a more profound reality. Here, works on logic—is in my view untenable. People have
‘intellection’ is taken in its most radical sense, its primary fallen into this trap on account of what at various times in
sense, as the mere {206} actualization of the real. this study I have called the “logification of intellection”.
Therefore, we are not dealing with any special actualiza- But it is impossible. To be sure, method is a way, and
tion, as for example that of judgement, but of mere actu- moreover is a way which must be followed; it is some-
alization regardless of its mode. Mere actualization does thing to be pondered or reflected upon. But it is so in the
not exclude any special actualization, but neither can it be etymological sense; it is a “pondering” and not a logical
identified with any. Method is the way from an actualiza- “discourse”. Logical discourse, the discourse of reason-
tion of the real (the field actualization) to another actuali- ing, is but a type of “pondering”. Moreover, reasoning as
zation of it, actualization in the world; and it formally such is not method. Reason has its own laws, just as does
consists in going from one to the other by actualizing the the structure of judgement. But these structural laws are
real from its first actualization towards the second. And not method. Method, to be sure, must conform with the
this process is inquiring intellection qua intellection; it is structural laws of logical intellection. But this conformity
a going by intellective knowing. Anticipating an idea neither is nor can be a method which leads to knowledge,
which I shall expound forthwith, I will say that knowledge i.e., to a new actualization of the real. The laws of logic,
starts from an actualization of the real in primordial sen- logic as a whole, is the organon of knowledge, but it is not
tient apprehension, and terminates in an actualization in a a method. And in order to understand this, it suffices to
physical trial or test, i.e., a sentient trial or test of reality. cite two cases in which normal logic is accustomed to
The road which runs from the first to the second is just identify method and reasoning, viz. deduction and induc-
that of inquiring reason, and qua road, it is method. tion. {208}
Method, I repeat, is an inquiring actualization of reality.
Deduction, we are told, is the method of some sci-
Despite the inconvenience, it was essential to repeat ences, for example, mathematics. But in my view, this is
318 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

untenable, and not just because there is a special type of On the other hand, method is essentially—or at least pre-
reasoning called “mathematical induction”,1 but because tends to be so—the font of truth, given that it moves in
deduction concerns the logical structure of mathematical reality. Therefore a philosophy of intelligence is not a
thinking, but not the actualization of the mathematical logical tract. Only logic is occupied with reasoning. The
real. For this, rigorous deductions are not enough; rather, philosophy of intelligence is not, but is instead essentially
it is necessary “to make” the deduction by operating, occupied with method.
transforming, constructing, etc., “within mathematical
Method as a way is an intrinsic and formal moment
reality”. Only this is mathematical method; logical de-
of rational intellection. As such, it is always and only a
duction is not. Therefore deduction by itself is not method
way into reality, whether given reality or postulated real-
but logical structure, and furthermore is not the method of
ity.
the mathematical. There is no deductive method; there
are only deductive structures of judgements, in the present With this we have clarified in some fashion our first
case, of mathematical judgements. Mathematical rea- point, viz. to be method is to be inquiring actualization
soning, deduction, is a logical structure, but not a mathe- qua inquiring; it is actualization as a way, a way of the
matical method. ground of the field real. It is an intellective progression
into reality, not a logical progression into truth. What is
The other instance where there typically is confusion
the structure of this method? That is the second point
of method and reasoning is the reverse of the previous
which I set forth.
one. It consists in making induction into an inductive
reasoning process. And this is impossible, not just in prin-
ciple but also in fact. Never has construction of an induc-
{210}
tive reasoning process been carried out. To do so, the first
requirement is to devise what is usually called the ‘princi-
ple of induction’. And this, in fact, has never been done
II
satisfactorily, not even by invoking probability theory to
exclude random experimental errors. Therefore in fact no STRUCTURE OF THE METHOD
inductive reasoning process exists. On the other hand, We will not discuss a particular method but rather
induction exists as a strict and rigorous method. One study the structure of the methodic moment of rational
starts from the real as actualized in facts and goes by intellection. This methodic moment is comprised of three
repetition (in accordance with the Law of Large Numbers) essential steps.
from the experimental results to a general statement. This
statement pronounces {209} the actualization of the 1
ground. I leave aside whether the statement is or is not
true. We shall consider that problem later. The only System of Reference
thing I wish to stress here is that the inductive method is a
method, but not a reasoning process. Above all, in order for there to be knowledge it is not
enough that there be a real object which one is going to
In mathematics we have a deductive type of reason- know and someone to intellectively know it. No knowl-
ing which by itself is not a method; in induction we have a edge would be possible with just this. It is absolutely nec-
method which by itself is not a reasoning process. essary that the intellection be brought to fruition by intel-
This does not mean that in rational intellection there lectively knowing the real object as a function of other
are no reasoning processes. There are and there must be real things which were previously intellectively known in
necessarily, just as there are judgements. To pretend that the field, i.e., by referring that object to these real things.
the opposite is true would be, rather than an impossibility, It is absolutely essential to understand this because it is a
something just stupid. But neither judgements nor rea- point which is usually passed over. No knowledge exists
soning processes are what formally constitute method. A if one is not intellectively knowing through a system of
reasoning process is a logical structure which method has reference. And with this we have the first step of all
to respect. But that is a question of logic. And logic by method: the establishment of a system of reference. It is
itself is never, nor does it pretend to be, the font of truth. necessary not just in fact, but as being something formally
constitutive of method.
1 We already encountered something similar when we
[Mathematical induction is, in fact, a strictly deductive method of rea-
soning.—trans.]
studied field intellection. To intellectively know what a
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 319

real thing is in reality is something which cannot be done system of reference for the active intellection of the world.
except by intellectively knowing the real thing “from” Therefore all the “naivete” of reason always reduces to the
other things of the field. But the field “from” is not {211} same thing: to thinking that the world is formally identi-
identical to what I have here called ‘system of reference’. cal to what is sensed of it, to the field. The field would
In both cases one deals with a “toward”, to be sure. And then be the formal structure of the world. And it is on this
herein consists the similarity of the two “froms”. But that naivete depends. The field is not by itself the struc-
their respective characters are radically different. In field ture of the world, but merely a system of reference. And it
intellection the “toward” is a “toward” between the things is so because the field is real. What happens is that it is
of the field, and therefore we intellectively know what one only real in the field sense. And it is on account of its
of those real things is in reality from or with respect to moment of reality that this field reality constitutes a prin-
others in the field. In field intellection one intellectively ciple of rational intellection. This field, as a system of
knows what something “is in reality”; therefore it is ulti- reference, then has a moment upon which I wish to again
mately an intellection of verification or substantiation. insist. We are not dealing, in fact, with the field real giv-
The “from” is a chain of substantiations of what the real ing us just an “idea” of what reality is. It does give us
thing “could be”. And if there is construction, it is always that, to be sure; but that is secondary (because it is deriva-
a construction of what would be substantiatable. On the tive) for our problem. Nor are we dealing only with a
other hand, in rational intellection one does not intellec- “concept” of reality, because the field as a system of refer-
tively know what something “is in reality”, but that “by ence is not formally a concept of reality; rather it is the
which something is really in reality itself, in the world”. field “reality” itself in its own {213} physical nature of
Thus the things from which one intellectively knows this reality. It is the physical reality of the field which, qua
“by” are not a chain of substantiatable “could be’s” but physical, constitutes the system of reference for the intel-
just a system of reference from which one goes to what lection of that same reality, intellectively known in the
“could be”. The double meaning of the “toward” thus worldly sense. That intellection is therefore an activity
establishes a double mode of intellection: the intellection which intellectively moves in reality itself.
of what something is in field reality and the intellection of
that by which something is real in the world, of what Granting this, what is the character of this system of
something is in universal reality itself. The first we in- reference? To be sure, it does not have representative
tellectively know “from” a chain of substantiatable things; character. It certainly involves a system of representa-
the second “from a mere system of reference”. tions, because field things are already “present” and it is
based upon them that we seek to present the ground. In
What is this system of reference? And What is its this respect, and only in this one, they are a “re-
character? presentation” of this ground. But its formal function qua
Above all, the first question must be answered. We system of reference is not representative, because these
saw that rational intellection is based upon what was pre- representations do not present the ground by being repre-
viously intellectively known, and this support is just the sentation; rather, they present it only “by” grounding the
canonic principle of intellection. Now, this canonic prin- sensed thing, even if to do so they destroy all the content
ciple is what constitutes the system of reference. of the representation. The representation thus has a dou-
Naturally, this canonic principle is not, by itself, ble function: representative and directional. Only this
univocally determined. But it always has to {212} have latter makes it a system of representation. The system of
something, and something determined by the field. And reference supplies representations, but the reference itself
this is now the essential point. The principle can be and is not in the nature of a representative. This directional
is quite varied; that we shall see forthwith. But its being a function has a very precise nature. It is what I previously
principle has a precise formal character, that of being de- called ‘grounding function’. The grounding function, the
termined in accordance with the field. Therefore it is ul- function of the “by”, has directional character, and
timately the field itself, in its field totality, that constitutes moreover has nothing but directional character. The rep-
the system of reference for intellection of the world. Now, resentations in fact can lead to a “by” which revokes the
the field is a principle by virtue of its moment of reality. representation or even leaves all possible representative
The field reality is the system of reference for worldly content in suspense. Knowing is never representing.
reality insofar as that field reality is reality. And this is What is this directionality? And what is its cogni-
obvious, because field and world are not two strata nu- tive status?
merically independent—the field, as I said, is the sensed
world. Now the field, what is sensed of the world, is the a) Rational intellection is, as we saw, an {214} ac-
320 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

tivity, activated by the real, but nonetheless activity. its expression, we are not trying to make explicit the reali-
Therefore the “toward” of rational intellection is an active zation of representations, but to experience a direction, to
“toward”, which actively goes toward the in-depth. The know if the direction taken is or is not of suitable preci-
system of reference consists only in the tracing out of the sion. What the system of reference determines is not a
concrete direction of the “toward” of activity. Before I making something explicit, but an experience. If that
called what has been previously intellectively known were not true, knowledge would never have its most val-
‘support’; now we see that support consists in being di- ued characteristic: to be a discoverer, a creator.
rectional reference. Directionality is concreteness of the
worldly “toward” of activity. Hence the error which, as I see it, most radically vi-
tiates logical positivism.
And this is essential. Knowledge is, above all, preci-
sion and exactitude, but it is a directional line. We are not In the first place, knowledge, i.e., rational intellec-
dealing formally with precision and exactitude along the tion, is not a system of logically determined propositions.
lines of concepts and expressions. It is quite possible that That would be at most—and not always—the structure of
with concepts and expressions which are not univocally field intellection, but in no way the structure of rational
realized representatively, we still mark out a very precise intellection. Rational intellection, knowledge, is not for-
direction. In such a case, those concepts and expressions mally field intellection but {216} worldly intellection.
are only partial indications of the in-depth reality, but ac- Positivism is only a conceptualization—and an incomplete
cording to a direction which is very precise in itself. That one—of field intellection, but it is blind to worldly intel-
happens, for example, in quantum physics. The concepts lection, whose essential structural character is direction-
of particle and wave are but partial representations of ality. Knowledge is an intellection directed to the world
some aspect of the in-depth real. Their function lies in the from a system of reference. The formal structure of
fact that this partiality is inscribed in a precise direction knowledge does not reduce to the formal structure of the
which goes beyond it. Not just “complementarity”, as logoi, but involves the essential moment of a directional
Bohr thought, it is “superceeding”. The same could be reference. Statements with univocal meaning are not
said of other types of knowledge, for example the knowl- enough. Let us leave aside, for now, what logical positiv-
edge of personal realities and of living realities in general. ism understands by ‘verifiable’.
The concepts and expressions of which we make use are In the second place, this direction is the direction of
but aspects within a direction which is very precisely de- a progression. Inquiry pertains to the essence of knowl-
termined not just toward what we seek to intellectively edge. We are not dealing with a progression toward
know, but includes the direction of what we already intel- knowledge but with the fact that knowledge itself is intel-
lectively know. lective progression; the progression is just its own mode of
b) Whence the cognitive state, so to speak, of ra- intellection. Positivism limits itself to the logical state-
tional intellection. Knowledge is not a system of {215} ments of this intellection. But those statements are only its
concepts, propositions, and expressions. That would be logical expression; they do not constitute the formal
an absurd type of conceptualism, or rather logicism, structure of the knowledge which is intellective progres-
which is ultimately just formal. Moreover it would be sion.
field intellection but not knowledge. Knowledge is not
In the third place, this progression is creative. Logi-
just what we know and what we say, but also, and in the
cal positivism is blind to this third, creative dimension of
first place, what we want to say. Language itself is not,
knowledge, because creating is not stating new proposi-
for the effects of intellection, something merely represen-
tions but discovering new directions of intellective pro-
tative. And I am not referring to the fact that language
gression. It is for this reason that the cognitive status of
has another dimension than that by which it is the expres-
rational intellection is not to be a “univocal” manifesta-
sion of what is intellectively known. This is obvious, and
tion but a “fertile” direction toward the worldly real. This
a triviality. What I am now saying is that precisely as ex-
fertility is not a consequence of rational intellection but a
pression of rational intellection, and within this intellec-
formally structural moment of it.
tion, language has, besides a possible representative func-
tion, a function which differs from the merely representa- To be sure, I believe that today philosophy, perhaps
tive. Therefore the cognitive status of the system of refer- more than ever, must have conceptual precision and for-
ence is not to serve as an explicit intellection, but some- mal rigor. Modern philosophy is in this regard the source
thing different. Anticipating some ideas that will be ex- of a great deal of confusion which gives rise to erroneous
pounded below, I will say that in rational intellection and {217} interpretations. I have strongly emphasized this:
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 321

the reconquest of exactitude and precision in concepts and But this possibilitation also has another essential as-
expressions is necessary. But this does not in any sense pect. Every intellective actualization is so of reality, but at
mean that such analysis, which is the function of logic, is the same time is intellective. Now, with respect to a ra-
the structure of knowledge, because the world does not tional intellection, the intellection itself is activity. Hence
have a logical structure but rather a real respectivity. And it follows that the possibility of the “could be” is at one
only because of this is knowledge what it is: the progres- and the same time the possibility of the “could be” of the
sion toward the system of reality. real thing and the “could be” of the intellection. This
intellection is an inquiring activity. Therefore, in this
The inquiring activity of rational thinking makes its
second aspect, the possibilities take on the character of
second essential step within this system or reality.
what we call the ‘possibilities of my activity’, something
completely different from my potencies and faculties. The
system of reference, I said, is the concrete outline of the
2 “toward”. Activity provisionally appropriates to itself
some possibilities as possibilities of what a thing could be;
Formal Terminus of the Methodical Activity and upon doing so, accepts a {219} concrete outline of its
inquiring progression as a moment of its own activity. In
What is the formal terminus of this methodical ac- the course of history, man not only has discovered what
tivity? We have already seen the answer: it is what a field things are and could be in the worldly sense; but also the
thing “could be” in the world. The formal terminus of possibilities based upon which my intellection can take on
cognitive activity is the ground of the real as possibility. a new form of rational intellection. We have intellective
For the effects of rational intellection, the ambit of possibilities which the Greeks did not have. It is not just
grounding, the world, is in the first place the ambit of the that they did not know many of the things we know, but
possibilities of the ground. The world is certainly reality, that they were not able to know them as we can and in fact
the respectivity itself of the real as real. But this reality, do know them. The two moments are different. With
for the effects of knowledge, is only the ambit of intellec- some intellections we intellectively know different possi-
tion of the ground. And as intellection is actualization, it ble grounds of a real thing. Conversely, there are possible
follows that the actuality of the world in intellection is grounds which cannot be intellectively known other than
actualization of all the possibilities of the ground. But by illumination of new possibilities of intellection. The
this requires further clarification. possible, as a formal moment of rational intellection, of
knowledge, is at one and the same time what a thing could
Consider the matter of possibilities. They are real
be (what its own ground is), and what my possibility of
possibilities, i.e., possibilities which are comprised as such
knowing is, not in the sense of being the terminus of an
in the intellection of the real world (not a redundancy).
activity, but in the sense of being possibilities which this
What are these real possibilities? Above all, they are
action formally has in itself as action. Possible is unitarily
{218} possibilities in the sense that they are that which
“the possible” and “the possibilities”.
the real perhaps “could be” in the worldly sense. That we
have already seen. We are not dealing with a mere “might How is this possible actualized? The unity of the two
be” but with a “could be”, i.e., with a positive mode of the aspects is actualized in that structural moment of intellec-
making possible of the real. The real is not just what it is, tive activity which is the sketch or outline. Rational in-
but is something modally real constituted from its own tellection intellectively knows what is possible (in its two
ground, based on its own, intrinsic, and formally real pos- aspects), referred to the system of reference. And this
sibilities. As possibilities, they are in themselves some- reference is what constitutes the sketch. To put it more
thing unreal; but the unreal, realized as a ground of real- radically, ‘sketch’ is the conversion of the field into a sys-
ity, is the very possibility of the real, what intrinsically tem of reference for the intellection of the possibility of
and formally is making it possible. The real is something the ground. The sensed possibility, qua sensed, is, as we
essentially possibilitated. It is not that possibility is prior saw, suggestion. The sensed possibility as system of refer-
to reality, but that the mode of reality of the worldly is to ence is sketch. Naturally, every sketch is founded upon a
be possibilitated real; possibility is only a mode of reality. suggestion. Nonetheless, suggestion and sketch are not
Why? Because of its own insertion into the world. In this identical. {220} Sentient intellection as such suggests.
sense, possibility is not prior to the real, but a modal mo- But sketch is suggested only if sentient intellection is in a
ment of its worldly respectivity. It is because of this that I state of activity. It is the moment of activity which distin-
speak of possibilitation rather than possibility. guishes sketch from suggestion. Only a sentient intelli-
322 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

gence knows by sketch; the sketch is only for knowledge. mined. Therefore its constitution is a free construction.
Conversely, a sentient intelligence can only know by All of its intrinsic limitations follow from this, limitations
sketching. In our problem, sketching is an act which is with respect to its capacity to lead to the sought-after
purely and formally intellective, and this activity is a ground. That capacity is “fecundity”. The system of pos-
mode of intellection; it is intellection activated by the real sibilities, by virtue of being freely constructed, is of lim-
itself. Consequently, we are not here dealing with a hu- ited fecundity. But it has still another limitation: it is a
man activity “applied” to intellection, or anything like it. system selected from among others. In virtue of this, the
Activity is intellection activated by the real, and the system is of limited “amplitude”. When the ground for a
sketch, as an act of this activity, is something formally system of possibilities is known, this knowledge is limited
intellective—indeed, it is the very intellection of the pos- in fecundity and amplitude. Hence its constitutive open-
sible ground. The ground is only knowable to us by ness. {222} All knowledge, by virtue of being an intellec-
sketching, because the sketch is the concrete form of illu- tion with a system of possibilities freely constructed from
mination of possibilities (real ones and of intellection). a system of reference, is an open knowledge, not just in
An activity that sketches is the only place where one can fact and because of human, social, and historical limita-
actualize reality as a possibility both real and of intellec- tions. Rather, it is open qua knowledge through intrinsic
tion. Sketching is a form of intellective knowing. necessity, to wit, by being intellection as sketch. And this
is a moment which is formally constitutive of rational
How does one sketch the actuality of the real in its
intellection as such.
possibility? The possibilities are not sketched other than
by confronting the field real in intellective activity, i.e., The second step of the method is the sketch of this
intellectively knowing the field as real worldly object. system of possibilities from a system selected as the refer-
The confronting is what on the one hand converts the real ence. But the method as a way seeks to lead to an end,
into something that can be grounded, i.e., it is what con- viz. intellection of the ground of the real. This is the third
stitutes the real upon the base of its possibility. But there step of method, the final step. The first is the establish-
is something more. Possibility thus illuminated has its ment of a system of reference; the second is the sketching
own content. This content qua possibility is always of possibilities; and the third is the intellection of the pos-
something constructed; it is construction. (I am not sibilitating ground of the real.
speaking of construction in the sense of group theory).
The sketch of possibilities is always just a constructed
sketch. No intellective possibility {221} as such is purely
and simply given. It may be received if entrusted to us; 3
that is the problem of history as transmission. But that is
another question. What is here important to us is that Method As Experience
what is entrusted is a construction. It could likewise be
that the construction consists only in accepting as possi- How does one intellectively know the possibilitating
bility the real which is encountered. But even in this case, ground of the real as worldly reality? When one intellec-
clearly what is encountered is converted into a possibility, tively knows this ground, the knowledge has reached its
i.e., is something constructed; immediate construction if terminus. This is the problem of the access to what one
one wishes, but still construction. In this construction, seeks to know. Method is nothing if it does not lead to a
each of its moments is a possibility. Therefore the con- real and effective access. Now, with the proviso that I
struction is properly construction of a system of possibili- shall explain myself further below, let me say that access
ties. The system of reference is for the construction of a is, formally, experience. Knowing begins with a system of
system of possibilities. Each possibility is only making reference from which one sketches a system of possibili-
possible within a system together with the rest. We al- ties which permit one to experience what a thing is as
ready saw this when dealing with possibility as formal worldly reality. To clarify this we need to conceptualize
terminus of rational intellection. The possibilities are not what experience is, what {223} one finds in experience
added together but rather “co-possibilitate”. And this “co- (i.e., the experienced), and what is the mode of finding it.
” is the system. Therefore every alteration of a possibility That is, we seek the concept of experience, the object of
implies in principle, if not the alteration, then the recon- experience, and mode of experience.
sideration of the all the rest. The crisis of a possibility puts
A) What is experience? Experience is not a univocal
the entire system in crisis.
concept. When we speak of experience, generally we
This system of possibilities is not univocally deter- think in terms of what is called ‘sensible experience’.
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 323

And this is extremely ambiguous, because the expression But this is inadequate. Experience is not necessarily that
has different meanings, all completely acceptable for a which Aristotle called empeiría, because what is perceived
language, but not identical in conceptualization either to and retained is not only the quality but, as I keep repeat-
“sensible” or to “experience”, as we shall see. What do ing, the formality of reality. Aristotle definitively sepa-
we understand by ‘sensible’? And above all, What do we rated the sensible and the intelligible, and therefore never
understand by ‘experience’? conceptualized that intellective sensing whose formal
moment I have called ‘impression of reality’. Experience
A first meaning for ‘experience’, and one which is
is not just empirical sameness. The empeiría is only
very general, is perception, aísthesis, i.e., sensing, and
{225} a mode of experience. And the proof is the fact
hence the sensed qualities. In this sense experience is
that we speak of people who have much or little experi-
opposed to what would be intellective apprehension. The
ence of a thing or situation. The sameness in question is
so-called ‘sensualism’ thus philosophically understands
hence not a mere empirical retention of qualities nor of a
that experience is perception (external or internal, it mat-
real quality; rather, what is retained must be just a real
ters little). To have an experience of something would be
thing intellectively known (retentively if one wishes) as
to perceive it. But this is absolutely unacceptable. If I
real, not in each of its perceptive phases, but as real in the
may be permitted the expression, to experience is not to
worldly sense. The experiential moment is not, then, em-
sense. And this is true in a very radical sense. In the first
pirical retentiveness, but something different. What?
place, sensing does not only sense qualities but also that
That is the third concept of experience.
these qualities are real. We have not only an impression
of green (strictly speaking it is impossible to only have the When we speak of not having experience or of hav-
impression of green), but also the impression of green as ing much or little experience of something, we are not
real. Sensualism has seriously gone astray with respect to referring to the diversity of perceptive acts of a thing, even
this matter. What is sensed in experience is not only a if perceived as real; rather, we refer to that mode of ap-
quality but also its formality of reality. Therefore human prehending it (including perceptively) which consists in
sensing is intellective, since apprehending something as intellectively knowing it in depth. The achievement
real is the formally constitutive part of intellection. which constitutes experience is an achievement of reach-
Moreover, in the second place, not even understanding ing this depth, not the moment of retentive sameness. By
sensing as intellective sensing is it acceptable to identify reaching this depth, the thing is actualized as worldly
{224} experiencing and sensing. To be sure, without reality. Therefore, in order to know what experience is,
sensing there is no experience; but to sense is not formally we must say what reaching this depth is as a mode of in-
to experience. In sensing, what is sensed is something tellective actualization.
fundamentally given. Now, what is experienced is not So we are dealing with an actualization, but not as
something given but something achieved—achieved cer- mere actualization. That would be just sentient intellec-
tainly by sensing, but still achieved. The sensible is just tion, not experience. Something more than naked reality
the experienciable, but is not formally experienced. The is needed; it is the real which actualizes what “really” is.
moment of achievement is essential to experience. What Therefore, we actualize its reality as referred to other
does this moment mean? things which open an ambit within which the thing takes
on its possible respect to these other things. And in order
One might think that experience consists in the ex-
to intellectively know what we seek to intellectively know,
perience of “one thing”, and not simply of some quality.
the indicated things are those which outline, in intellec-
It might be that this thing is a quality, but be that as it
tion, the characteristics of that real thing. As such, this
may, it might be the terminus of an experience only inso-
outline is thus something unreal in itself. Now, this un-
far as that quality is considered as a thing. Now, anything
real thing has to be {226} intellectively known as inserted
real, considered as a thing, even in the most stable of
in the real thing; only thus will it be the outline of it. And
cases, is something variable and fleeting. Experience
this insertion can have two different modalities.
would not be just sensing, but that habitude of sensing
something as fixed and stable. Sensing senses quality (I a) The unreal can be inserted into the real by being
add, real quality), but experience might be a mode of actualized in the real as a realization. This is the realiza-
sensing something “itself”. This is the concept of experi- tion of the unreal in the real. Intellection then consists in
ence which Aristotle crafted and which he called em- intellectively knowing what the real thing is in reality. To
peiría. Aristotle thought that the constitutive moment of realize is to intellectively know the reality of the “could
experience is the mnéme, retention; thus the reiteration of be”. It is in this realization that being a manifestation
perception, the retained perception, would be experience. consists. It is the intellection of the real in the field sense.
324 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

b) But the unreal can be inserted and actualized in moments which we have described previously: the mo-
the real in a different way, by testing if it is inserted. This ment of resting upon the in-depth real, and the moment of
is not manifestation, i.e., it is not mere realization, but being something physical. In virtue of this I shall say that
testing. We then intellectively know by testing what the experience is physical testing of reality. Experience is not
real thing is in depth. What is this testing? It is not, for- just sensing the real but sensing the real toward the in-
mally, just an assay or experiment. It is something else. depth. Experience is not just empeiria, nor is it a mere
retentive fixing of sameness, but an outlining and physical
In the first place, it is testing of reality. This reality
fixing of in-depth reality. Experience as testing is the
is not naked reality nor a realization, but the reality of the
insertion of an outline or sketch into in-depth reality.
thing as a moment of the world. Reality here is not of the
field but of the world. It is not the realization of a “might Here we have the essence of the methodic encounter
be” but of a “could be”. Because of this, as we shall see, with real: experience. It is paradoxical result. We started,
such realization is testing. Testing rests upon the “be- {228} in fact, from the field which is the sensed world,
yond”. It is something essentially different from a mani- sensed respectivity. And now we end up with a physical
festation. What is in reality is manifested; what could be testing of reality, i.e., with an act of sentient reason. What
is tested. is sensed, is it world or field? The question constitutes the
paradox to which I earlier alluded. Now, as it deals with a
In the second place, this is a physical testing. We
discerning intellection, the question cannot be thus for-
are not dealing with a thought experiment, or anything of
mulated. The field is not the formal structure of the
that nature. We are dealing with a “physical” testing. It is
world; that would be “naivete”. In rational intellection
something not thought but carried out. It is “to do” the
the world takes on the character of grounding the formal
testing. And this exercise has an essential character. It is
structure of the field. And this is just the opposite of na-
something carried out, but the carrying out itself is a mode
ivete. The field is the world as sensed. Now, what we
of intellection of the real in its worldly character. Qua
have achieved thus far is the sensed as world. In this ini-
exercised, it is something physical, and qua intellective it
tial progression we have gone from the field to the world.
is intellection in a process of forging a way by carrying
In the final direction we have come back from the world
out the testing. This forging {227} of a way is that intel-
to the field once again. For this we have taken the round-
lective moment which we call discernment. Physical test-
about route via the unreal as sketch. This is the essence of
ing is, then, a discerning exercise.
experience: to intellectively know what is sensed as a
In the third place, physically and of reality, testing is moment of the world through the sketched “could be”.
just that: testing. The real thing has been converted into a
What is it that we formally experience in experi-
real object, has been actualized in an “ob”. That is, it is
ence?
something like an obstacle raised up along the road to-
ward the world. Method consists in traversing that road B) What is experienced as such. Experience is based
and going through the “ob”. And this is testing, viz. Go- upon a real thing in accordance with its “could be”, and
ing through the “ob” in order to open onto the world it- what is experienced is then what I have provisionally
self, upon the worldly reality of the real object. The “ob” called ‘insertion’ or ‘realization’ of the “could be”, i.e., of
is like a gate which must be cleared, and once cleared, something unreal, in the field real. This insertion has a
situates us in the proper worldly orientation. Going precise cognitive character, because we are not dealing
through in Greek is denoted by peirao, and in Latin perior only with experience as a testing activity of mine, but
(which exists only in compounds). Whence derives the above all—and in the first place—with the fact that in this
Spanish word puerto.2 This going through the gate, in insertion the real is actualized. Now, what is actualized of
which testing consists, is therefore ex-perior, or “ex- the real is just the “could be” as its ground. And the
perience”. As that which is gone through is the “ob” of “could be” as ground of the real is only a form of what we
something in the field, i.e. the “ob” of something origi- call ‘for’ or ‘by’. And this ‘for’ in the form of “what for”
nally sensed, it follows that the testing itself as such is is the formal object of knowledge. We already said that
radically a sentient discerning exercise. Only a sentient {229} this formal terminus is the “could be”. But to state
reason can do this testing. it now with greater precision, the formal object of knowl-
edge is the “could be” inserted or realized in the real, i.e.,
This moment of experience gathers together the two
the “could be” as inserted into a “for”. This is what, rig-
orously, constitutes the terminus of experience; it is the
2 experienced as such. In order to rigorously conceptualize
[Spanish for ‘gate’.— trans.]
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 325

it, we must clarify two points: what the “for” is in itself, versely, functionality is formally a mode of inclusion in
and how the “for” is experienced. I already expounded all fieldness. Now, it is not a functionality which is primarily
this at the beginning of Part II of the book; let us review concerned with the content of the notes of the real, but
some of those ideas. their proper actualization as real. It is the functionality of
the field real qua real. Functionality is fieldness itself as a
a) What is the “for”? To properly conceptualize it,
determining moment of the individual part of each reality.
let us recall once again that rational intellection is refer-
“Among” is the expression of fieldness. This fieldness, by
entially grounded in the real as intellectively known in the
virtue of its exceeding, encompasses various real things;
field manner. And the field real is what sends us beyond
but prior to this and for it the field includes each one of
itself. This sending is what, together certainly with cor-
them, {231} so that one has an aspect of constitutive
rectness, but with greater rigor, we call “giving us pause
functionality. For determining a field, the real determin-
to think”. We have already seen that the real not only is
ing thing itself, upon determining the field, is included in
“given” as real in sentient intellection, but that this “given
it. Functionality is then fieldness itself not as encom-
from” the real is given to us together with the “given for”
passing but as including.
thinking; the intrinsic unity of these two “givings” is just
the “giving us pause to think”. The real, by being real, is Therefore functionality does not consist in one thing
what gives us pause to think. And it gives us pause to depending upon others, but is rather the structure of the
think, as we said, because reality is intrinsically open, i.e., whole field precisely and formally because it is a struc-
it gives us pause to think, it sends us because it is open. tural moment of each of the things in it. In virtue of this,
Therefore it is necessary, above all, to conceptualize in functionality does not consist in A depending upon B;
what that moment of openness of the real consists, under- rather, what is functional is the field unity of A and B as
stood in the field manner, in accordance with which the reality. The field reality itself is with respect to A reality
real is inexorably giving us to think. What is it in the of functional character.
real, intellectively known in the field manner, which for-
This functional field actualization is given in the
mally gives us to think?
unity of all the modes of sensed reality. But said function-
When the real is apprehended sentiently in a field, it ality is only intellectively known in and by itself in that
is among other real things of this field. And in this ap- field moment which is the “toward”. Functionality by
prehension we apprehend what each of them is from oth- itself is actualized as a “toward”, i.e., is actualized in each
ers. To be “in reality”, we said, is the {230} intrinsic and thing in its “toward” reality. Field things are functional in
formal unity of the individual moment and of the field the “toward”. The actualization of this functional aspect
moment of the formality of the real. Now, this unity con- is what I call “for”.
stitutes what I have called functionality of the real. Its
b) This “for” is strictly experiential. To see this it
expression is the “for”. Fieldness is not some summation
suffices to recall some points from what has already been
of field things, but the fact that the field itself is formally
said.
functional rather than additive. A thing is certainly real
in and by itself, but it is “in reality” what it is only as a aa) Human sensing is an intellective sensing, and
function of others. Naturally I am not thereby referring to therefore what we men sense are all sensible qualities, but
the notes which the real has, but to its reality. The real, by in their formality of reality. Sensing, for the purposes of a
virtue of being field reality, is only real as a function of philosophy of intelligence, is above all impression of real-
the other field things. Here the term ‘functionality’ is ity. Reality, then, is not something conceived or inferred,
taken in its widest sense, and therefore with no allusion to etc., but something impressively given in strict formality;
the many diverse types of functionality which may it is the de suyo, the given. And it is given “physically”.
emerge. Every subsequent intellection which is physically given
moves physically in this physical reality. {232}
Every real thing actualizes its reality in the field
manner as a function of other real things. Nothing is ac- bb) Now, when this reality is actualized in the field
tualized in the field manner in a way which is so to speak manner, the real presents that moment which is function-
monolithic; it is actualized only together with other ality. Functionality, I repeat, does not consist in a real
things, after them, outside of them, on the periphery of the thing referencing another; it is rather an intrinsic moment
field, etc. And all of these determinations constitute so of the impression of reality. Functionality, in fact, is the
many modes of functionality. That the thing is in a field inclusion of the real in its field, impressively determined.
is, then, a radical characteristic of its functionality. Con- And this field is “its own” [suyo], i.e., it belongs to the
326 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

real de suyo in its own formality. Functionality is thus a the “for” is experientially accessible because it is formally
field moment given in the impression of reality. This da- the impressive way of the “toward”.
tum is given just as a formal moment of it. We are not,
ee) What happens is that sensing by itself is not ex-
then, dealing with an inference or anything of the sort (as
perience. What is sensed is by its own nature experien-
I already pointed out); rather, it is an immediate datum
tiable. In what does the experiential of the “for”, already
and one formally given in the very impression of reality.
sensed, consist? The “for” is sensed; in other words, it is
cc) To this impression of reality there corresponds not only accessible but is already physically accepted in
that mode of presence of the real which is the “toward”. intellection. But this “for” has a complex structure. {234}
The “toward” is not a relation but a mode of presenting That the “for” is formally sensed does not mean that its
the real as real. The impression of reality is an impres- diverse structural moments are sensed equally. The “for”,
sion of reality in all its modes, therefore including the in fact, is a determination of that which is real in the field
mode of the “toward”. Hence intellection of something in manner. The field real is a sensed “what” which sends us
the “toward” is not a judgement, be it analytical (Leibniz) beyond the field, i.e., beyond its own field “what”, toward
or synthetic (Hume, Kant), because the “toward” is not a a worldly “what”. There are, then, two “what”s: the
conceptual moment but a sensed “toward”. It is a struc- “what” of the real field thing, and the worldly “what” in
tural moment of the very impression of reality. Now, the itself. The first “what” is sensed in the field manner; but
“for” is the formal structure of fieldness and corresponds the second “what” is not sensed, so to speak, but is a
to the field (as I have already said), not by reason of the “what” created in a free construction, a “what”, therefore,
content of things which it encompasses, but precisely on which is sought in what “could be”. These two “what”s
account of the formality of reality, viz. the structure of the have an intrinsic unity: the unity of the “for”. The second
field of reality qua reality. Whence the “for” points not “what” is that by which the first is what it is, i.e., is its
only toward other field things, but toward reality itself qua “what for?” The expression “what for?” has an internal
reality, i.e., it points to the world. Its pointing to the ambiguity. It is on the one hand something toward which
world is thus something given in the impression of reality we are sent by the field “what”; it is on the other that by
in its mode of “toward”. {233} which the field “what” is what it is. It is owing to this
second aspect alone that the “what for?” should apply.
To preclude a possible erroneous interpretation I
Hence the “for” is something inexorably given in its “to-
should add a few words. I said that the “toward” is above
ward” form. On the other hand it is a “for” which inexo-
all a mode of the intra-field real, but that at the same time
rably moves in worldly reality. Born of reality qua field,
it is a mode of the whole field qua field. One might think
the rational “what for?” is determined, with respect to
that this second mode consists in every impression point-
“for”, by the coercive force of in-depth reality. Reality
ing to something which produces it. But this is quite far
coercively imposes that there be a “for”, whose worldly or
from what I have been saying, because that presumed
in-depth terminus, the worldly “what”, is freely intellec-
pointing is not a pointing toward something which pro-
tively known. The actualization of this force of imposi-
duces the impression, but is rather the formal moment of
tion in freedom is just what I have called so many times
otherness which is intrinsically constituent of the impres-
the ‘insertion of the unreal, of the “could be”, into the
sion itself as such. And it is this otherness which is in-
real. The “for” bears us from field reality to worldly real-
trinsically and formally an intra-field otherness and a
ity, and makes us revert toward field reality in a free
worldly otherness. The world is not sensed as the cause of
“what”; this is just “experience”. The “what” is sensed,
my impressions, but as worldliness of the impressive oth-
but not {235} by virtue of this is the “what” itself experi-
erness of the real as real.
ential; the worldly “what” is not sensed; but as it points us
dd) Now, the functionality in the “toward”, as I said, coercively toward the sensed, it is experienced. This
is precisely and formally the “for”. The “for” as such is pointing is the testing of the worldly “what for?” in the
something formally sensed. It is not, as I said immedi- field “what”. The testing consists in trying to make of the
ately and quickly returned to, a judgement, but something world something formally sensed, i.e., in intellectively
prior to any judgement. Moreover, every judgement about knowing the world as sensed. The necessity of a “what
the real in the “toward” is only possible by being inscribed for” or “why” is something sensed: it is the “for”. But the
in the “toward” itself. “what” is in that “what for” something created. The coer-
cive reversion from in-depth reality toward field reality is
This apprehension of the “for” is not a reasoning
experience, testing.
process, be it formal or transcendental. It is merely analy-
sis of sentient intellection itself. In virtue of that, we said, Hence it is that the “what for?” is strictly experien-
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 327

tiable. The worldly “what” arises from the sensed “for”, events. Therefore any attempt to achieve strict knowledge
and is inscribed in that sense along the lines of the “for”. moves in a vacuum. That, as Kant would say, is skepti-
What is not given is what this “what for?” is. That there cism. Kant accepts this critique, but contrasts it with the
should be a “what for?” is by no means a logical necessity; Faktum of science, which lives on causes. And as causal-
rather, it is something real, given sentiently. And in this ity is not given, it follows that for Kant, causality is only
given “for”, the free creation of rational intellection in the our mode of constituting an object as the terminus of uni-
form of experience, of physical testing of reality, comes versal and necessary judgements. {237} Causality is not
into play. It is, as I said, the experience of the insertion of something given, but something produced by the under-
the worldly “what” into the “for”. Testing is to test how standing in the order of knowing, in order for us to know.
the world fits into the field. It is testing of field reality Causality is not a mode of producing things, but a mode of
from the standpoint of in-depth or worldly reality. judging objectively about them. This is the dawn of all
transcendental idealism.
This experience of the “what for” has, then, a com-
plex structure in virtue of the distinction between its two But as I see it, this entire discussion rests upon two
moments: the moment of the “what” and the moment of fundamental ideas, to wit, that the “what for” or “why” is
the “for”. Therefore, when one affirms that the object of causality, and that causality is not given in our sentient
knowledge is the “what for”, one states something not apprehensions. Now, both of these ideas are ultimately
univocal but ambiguous. This has given rise to philo- false.
sophical conceptualizations which as I see it are inade- Above all, the “what for” or “why” is not causality; it
quate, if not completely false. That is what I now wish to is functionality. And functionality, as we have already
explain summarily. seen, is not dependence of one thing upon another, but the
B) The experienced “what for?” as object of knowl- very structure of the field of reality. The “what for” is not
edge. To know something, we said, is to have an intellec- an originating or productive influence; it is only the mode
tion of {236} what something is for, i.e., why it is what it by which something is really what it is. At most, causality
is and how it is. What is this “what for”? We answered would be a mode of functionality; that is not our problem.
the question some pages back. But if we return to formu- But it is not the only mode, nor even the primary one,
late the question again, it is because philosophy has con- because functionality is not causal dependence. If I say
ceptualized the “what for?”, the object of knowledge, in a that in a gas, the product of the volume and pressure
way which as I see it is incorrect, and which has had pro- equals the temperature multiplied by a constant, this does
found repercussions. In order to clarify what I think on not mean that volume, pressure, and temperature are
this subject, it will suffice to recall quickly what has been linked as causes. What, in this case, would the causes be?
explained here in order to contrast it with these other con- The question does not make sense. The only thing af-
ceptualizations. firmed here is the functionality of the three terms. And
this functionality includes the three at once. We are not
For Aristotle, the “what for?” or why of something is dealing with a case of one term dependent upon another,
its cause. To know something, he tells us, is to know its but functionality as field structure. And physical laws are
cause or causes. The “what for?” is, then, formally cau- primarily laws of functionality. In the example cited, we
sality. Cause is all that which exercises a productive or have Gay-Lussac’s law. Science does not have causes as
originating influence of the so-called ‘effect’, not only its object but functional “what for”s or “why”s. The
efficient but also material, formal, and final; or viewed “what for?” or “why?” is not, then, necessarily causality.
from the standpoint of the effect, it is a characteristic in {238} It is formally worldly functionality, i.e., the func-
accordance with which the effect is something really pro- tionality of the real qua real. As I see it, in this problem it
duced by its cause. Causality is, then, originating produc- is necessary to replace the notion of cause by the more
tion. This causal order is, for Aristotle, something given general notion of functionality of the real qua real.
in our sensorial apprehensions. The object of knowledge
This is all the more so given that the Aristotelian
would then consist in going back from given causes to
notion of cause is somewhat restricted. Permit me to ex-
higher causes via a reasoning process.
plain. Aristotle understood by ‘cause’ that which produces
With Hume, modern philosophy initiated a thor- a distinct entity. When he wishes to explain the causality
oughgoing critique of this conception. Causality, Hume of a cause he introduces the now classic distinction of the
tells us, is never given to us; neither is the influence by four causes: efficient, final, material, and formal. Now if,
which the pulling of the rope produces the ringing of the from this point of view, we consider as an example the
bell. Causality is not given; only mere succession of counsel which one person gives another, it is not clear into
328 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

which of these four types of cause this case falls. It seems virtue of this, the functionality of the field real is given in
clear to us that a shove, however modest, falls under effi- intellective sensing. The “succession” to which Hume
cient causality. But on the other hand, if we try to apply appeals is not {240} the succession of two impressions,
the idea of the four causes to an act of advising a friend, but an impression of successive reality. Therefore the
we are struck by grave doubts about the possible type of succession is already a mode of functionality. Now, func-
causality of the advice. This points up the fact that Aris- tionality in its worldly “toward” is just the “for”. The
totle’s celebrated theory of causality is strictly formed “for” is then something given. What is never given, and
around “natural” realities. Aristotle’s causality is a theory which must be sought—almost invariably with little suc-
of natural causality. As I see it, one must rigorously in- cess—is the “what” of that by which the field and its con-
troduce a theory of personal causality, next to Aristotle’s tents is as it is. But the “for” as such is given in human
natural causality. I emphasized this point most recently in sensing, in the impression of reality. All of Hume’s cri-
my course given at the Gregorian University in 1973. tique, I repeat, is based upon the idea of sensing as mere
Personal causality is of a very different kind than natural apprehension of qualities. And this is wrong: sensing is
causality. Thus the two type of causality are not univocal “also” impression of reality. In virtue of this, there is no
but at best analogous. In virtue of this it is necessary to sensing “and” intelligence, but only sentient intelligence.
introduce a theory of causality which is both natural and Therefore Hume’s critique is radically false, as false as
personal, within a broader conception, that of the func- Aristotle’s conception of the matter. Aristotelian causality
tionality of the real qua real. Because of this I pointed out is not given; neither is any originating influence. But
in {239} Part II that one cannot metaphysically refute what is given, and formally so, is the functionality of the
occasionalism, but I left aside the question of human ac- real qua real. To summarize: (1) The object of knowledge
tions. The fact of the matter is that the personal type of is not causes but “what for”s or “why”s; (2) They are
causality, even though very in-depth, does not enter into “what for”s insofar as they are “for”; and (3) this “for”
natural causality. The distinction between agent, actor, does not concern knowledge but sensed reality qua actu-
and author of human actions does not figure in the Aris- alized in sentient intellection.
totelian theory of causality. To be the author of an action
This same idea comprises the introduction to Kant’s
is not just to produce it, and no more. It is more, much,
Critique of Pure Reason. Causality, he tells us, is not
much more than some occasionalist functionality. But it is
given in any sensorial impression; in virtue of this, it is
not, on account of this, a strict cause in the Aristotelian
above all a synthesis of impressions. But it is a synthesis
sense; it is, strictly speaking, something quite above all
whose function is to make objective knowledge possible,
Aristotelian causality.
i.e., the universal and necessary judgement, and in this
Moreover, is it true that the “what for” or “why” is sense causality constitutes an a priori of knowing. It is, as
not given in this sensible apprehension? This is the sec- Kant says, a synthetic a priori judgement. Now, this is
ond of the two fundamental ideas which it is necessary to untenable for the same reason as Hume’s critique: at bot-
examine in this problem. Since Aristotle, philosophy has tom there is the absence of the idea of sentient intelli-
understood that sensing, as a mode of apprehension of gence. What is sensed is never a mere sensible quality,
things, is comprised of impressions in which what is ap- but the sensible quality {241} in its reality in impression;
prehended is only the so-called ‘sensible qualities’. Now, and to this impression of reality there pertains, intrinsi-
as I see it, this is not correct. The senses sense qualities, cally and formally, its functionality. One of those modes
but they sense them as real, and therefore as functional in of impression of reality is the “toward”. The “toward” is a
the impression of reality. sensed mode. This mode is not, therefore, a synthesis, but
rather pertains to the very structure of the formality of
Granting this, the conceptions of Hume and Kant
reality in impression. It is a moment of sensing itself, in
turn out to be false from the start.
each quality. In virtue of it functionality is a sensed mo-
Hume thinks that the “what for” or “why” is causal- ment and one given in each impression. Each real sensed
ity, and that causality is never given in sensible apprehen- quality is sensed in and by itself as something functional.
sion. But this is quite ambiguous, because sensible appre- Sensed functionality is not synthesis but the structural
hension is not just apprehension of quality but apprehen- respectivity of each quality by virtue of being real. Hence
sion of a mode of reality, of formality, i.e., it is an act of functionality is not something which primarily concerns
sentient intellection. And one of the modes given in im- objective judgement; rather, it pertains to sensing itself, to
pression is the mode of reality as “toward”. Now, in this the impression of reality. As such, it is not something a
mode we are given, as we have seen, functionality. In priori of the logical apprehension of objects, but a mo-
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 329

ment given in the sentient impression of reality. Causality intellective actualization. Field intellection not only in-
is not the formal object of knowledge, only functionality is tellectively knows reality actualized “in” sentient intellec-
so. And as such, it is not a synthetic a priori judgement, tion, but also the “re”-actualization in the form of a
because it is not a judgement at all (rather it is the sensed judgement. For its part, the actualized real in these two
“toward”); nor is it synthetic (the “toward” is not synthe- forms has its own categories of reality. As I said, the
sis but a mode of reality); nor is it a priori (but something categories of thing, person, life, societal living, historical
“given” in the impression of reality). It is the functional- unfolding, etc., are not the same. The categorial nature of
ity of the real, qua real, given in the impression of reality. the field of reality is quite rich. It is not constituted by a
unique category but by a great categorial diversity within
In summary, the object of knowledge is the “what
its actualization as well as its reality. And in accordance
for” or “why” experienced as “for”, i.e., worldly function-
with each category, things are present in all of their great
ality. And this “for” is something given sentiently in the
variety.
impression of reality qua “for”. What is sought is the
“what” of the “for”. And this is just the problem of sci- Reality, actualized categorially according to an “in”
ence. Science does not comprise a system of judgements and according to a “re-”, is projected upon the base of the
but is the experience of the worldly “what” as such. worldly ground, and then acquires the character of an
“ob”. The “ob” is not separation but rather a pointing to
We have then examined what experience is, and
the ground. And as the categories of reality of field things
what is the {242} corresponding experienced object. Let
are quite varied, it follows that the formal character of the
us now investigate the third question which I enuntiated:
“ob” is equally quite varied. The objectuality of a thing is
the modes of experience.
not the same as the objectuality of a person, of a life, etc.
C) Modes of experience. We have seen that experi- There are many modes of being an object because there
ence is not mere sensing, either as sensible perception or are many modes of actualization of the real in an “ob”.
as empeiria; rather, it is that same sensing but insofar as Hence, wherever one looks, the field of reality is multi-
in it the testing of the freely constructed “could be” is form. And as this field is just the system of reference of
brought about. It is ultimately the testing of a “could be” what is actualized in the “ob”, it follows that by its own
in a “for”. And this experience, thus conceived, is what nature the system of reference is not univocal but consti-
may have different modes; they are modes of testing. We tutively plural. The system of reference is determined
are not now trying to determine what these modes are, but ultimately by the nature of the “ob”, by the mode in which
to conceptualize in what this modalization as such con- the field real is object. And this mode is what makes of
sists. field reality a canonical principle. The determination of a
canonic principle is constitutively modal. Hence the
Now, experience is the terminal moment of method.
{244} establishment of the system of reference is inexora-
Method, as we saw, has three phases: establishment of a
bly modalized. Each type of reality and of actualization
system of reference, sketching of possibilities, and experi-
constitutes a possible mode of referential system. In its
ence. This experience has different modes, i.e., there are
very root, then, method is formally modalized. And these
different modes of physical testing of reality. And as
different modalities constitute an ambit of free choice.
testing is always a function of the system of reference and
Depending on whether one adopts one or another refer-
of the possibilities of the “could be” which we are sketch-
ence system, the road embarked upon, the meta of the
ing out, it follows that the modes of experience, as modes
methodos, will always be a “way”, an opening of a path,
of testing, comprise the diversity of methods as such.
but of a different “mode”. And this is essential. It is not
Therefore I shall treat of the modes of experience as mo-
the same to have “things” as a system of reference as to
dalizations of method, i.e., as modalizations of the way of
have “persons”, or other types of field reality. The knowl-
access from field reality qua reality to in-depth reality.
edge of the whole field as a worldly moment will be com-
The first moment of the method is the establishment pletely different in the two cases. Ultimately, each type of
of the system of reference. This system of reference is the knowledge, as we have already said, has its own catego-
field of reality. And this field, as we have already seen, is ries and its own ways. This diversity of modes of actuali-
not just a field of real perceived qualities, but of perceived zation, I say, is the terminus of free choice. Only by a free
realities in all of their fullness, whether or not they are choice do some field things take on the character of ca-
elemental qualities. These realities are of different catego- nonic principle. The modalization of objectuality
rial natures as much for what concerns the categories of grounds, by free choice, the modalization of the canonic
reality {243} as for what concerns the categories of their principle constituting the system of reference.
330 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

But modalization also affects the other two moments objectualization opens different modalities of sketching.
of method, the sketching of possibilities, and the physical And as the objectualization is in itself something modal, it
testing of reality. follows that the method acquires, in its second phase, a
modalization of second degree, so to speak.
The second moment of method, in fact, is the
sketching of possibilities. A sketch is, as we have already Hence it follows that the third moment of method,
seen, the conversion of the field of the real into a system the physical testing of reality, i.e., the experience of the
of reference in order to intellectively know sentiently and “for”, is essentially modal. It is a modalization of third
actively the “could be” of the ground of the field. Clearly, degree. We are not dealing with different ways of making
every sketch is based upon sentient intellection of possi- experiences within the categorial, but the different modes
bility, i.e., is based upon a suggestion. But a suggestion is of experiential intellection of the real in its sketch. These
a sketch only when it is the suggestion of activity of sen- modes depend upon the two modalities which we have
tient intellection. And this activity of sketching is the free examined: the modalization of objectuality (the different
construction of real possibilities, {245} of the “could be”. modes of the “ob”) and the modalization of the sketch
Only as a system of possibilities sketched out based upon a itself (the different modes of the “could be”).
system of reference can we intellectively know the field The physical testing of reality, i.e., experience, is
real as a moment of the world. Now, the system of refer- very different in the modal sense. There are sketches of
ence is just that: a system of reference. The sketch con- possibilities which in a certain way come to mind. And at
structed upon this reference, by being a free construction, that point, the physical testing of reality has a quite pre-
can therefore have quite different modal characteristics. cise modal character. Every method is the “way” [via]
Above all it can be a sketch of possibilities in conformity from the field in “ob” toward what, in the worldly sense,
with what is already determined in field intellection by its “could be”. Now, when we say that this “could be” comes
own representative content. For example, it may be a to mind, it is something which we encounter when we
system of bodies linked by the laws of Newtonian me- objectualize the field in “ob”; this is the ob-vious. Many
chanics, or a system of vital forces, or a system of personal of the great rational intellections have been accomplished
agents, etc. But it is not necessary that this always be the with this modal character of being obvious. Thus, it was
character of the sketch. I can, in fact, sketch a system of obvious that field reality was worldly and obeyed New-
possibilities not in conformity with field reality but in fact ton’s laws. {247} ‘Obvious’ means something that jumps
contrary to it, e.g. a system of particles which are me- out at us. Therefore it does not lose its character of obvi-
chanically indeterminate, or a system of persons that is ousness. It was so obvious that atoms were regulated by
“fatally” determined. Then the sketch has not the char- Newtonian mechanics that no one was able to think oth-
acter of conformity, but a character of contrariety with erwise about it. It would only have appeared as something
respect to the system of reference. Between the two modes ‘obvious’ had someone cast doubt upon it. And until the
one finds the extremely rich gamut of sketches which are third decade of this century, no one did. Only at that mo-
not contrary to field reality, but merely diverse with re- ment did it seem that this fact was obvious, but nothing
spect to it. This diversity in turn can have the character of more than obvious.
mere difference within the plane of possibilities offered in
Obviousness is a mode of experientiation. But there
the system of reference, as for example when it was ini-
are other quite different modalities. All of them have the
tially thought that in wave mechanics one was dealing
common characteristic of not being obvious. The “ob”
with a classical wave equation. But the diversity can also
does not always simply lead us to the terminus of the path
have the character of going beyond the possibilities of the
[vía]; rather, it generally only opens to us a difficult road
system of reference, for example when Einstein defined
toward it. The “ob” is presented as something succes-
his law by means of the proportionality of Ricci’s tensor
sively more difficult to pass; it is not the obvious but the
and of mass-energy, which went beyond the difference
difficult. The difficult is not obvious, it is just viable.
between classical gravity and inertia. Ultimately, this is
And precisely in order to probe this viability, we resort to
what takes place in {246} quantum mechanics, whose
an experience, a physical testing of a rich and complex
equations go beyond the difference between wave and
reality. The viability is, with respect to the obviousness,
particle. Whether one deals with conformity, contrarity,
the second great modal difference of experience.
or diversity (differential or a going beyond), the sketch has
thereby acquired an essentially modal character. The mo- This experience of the viable can assume different
dalization of objectualization inexorably implies this mo- modes in turn:
dalization of the sketch of possibilities. Each mode of a) Above all, the field real can be physically tested in
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 331

a way which consists in forcing it to show its in-depth doubt of it, but it is not totally independent of the experi-
nature to the one experiencing. The physical testing of ment itself; this is the case, for example, with the experi-
reality then consists in what we call an experiment. Not ments of quantum mechanics. We are not dealing with
every experience is an experiment, but experiment is al- intervention of a knowing subject (qua knowing) into
ways the first mode (first in my exposition) of experience. known reality, as Heisenberg thought, but with an inter-
What is an experiment? An experiment rests in principle vention of the experimental “manipulation” in the content
upon the whole of the field real. This field reality com- of what is experimented; it is a manipulating intervention.
prises not only “things” (in the inanimate sense), but also The fact is actualized in sentient intellection although it
living beings (regardless of their real nature), and even may not be independent of the manipulation. In any case,
men. I can experiment with {248} everything in the field, the experiment is an experience of reality as fact in the
i.e., I can force everything in the field to show me its re- sense already explained. And these facts can be not just
ality. The experiment has three essential moments. It is physical but also biological or human; I can experiment
in the first place a provocation of reality. In the second, it with men or with living beings.
is a provocation from a sketch of possibilities. And fi-
nally, it is a sketched out provocation, but as a mode of b) There is another mode of experience which con-
intellection. However natural this third moment seems, it sists, not in making a thing show us its own nature by
is necessary to stress it because the first two moments some provocation of ours, but in the attempt to be present,
might lead one to think that an experiment consists in a so to speak, at the vision of the real achieved based on its
manipulation of reality. This manipulation exists, but own interiority. To be sure, the merely material reality of
experiment does not consist in that. The experiment con- an atom or molecule is not viable in this form; but it is
sists in intellectively knowing, in a manipulative way, the something possible and real when dealing with living re-
real. This intellection is not added to the manipulation; alities and above all human realities. This being present is
rather, the manipulation itself is a mode of intellection. grounded upon an installation of the one experiencing in
Hence the concepts elaborated in this intellection are, as I {250} the experiential; it is what I call compenetration.
have already said, formally experimental concepts or for- Life in general, and above all human life, is subject to the
mally conceptual experiments. Therefore experimentation physical testing of reality, not just as an experimental fact,
does not formally consist in a manipulation, but in a mode but as reality in compenetration. Naturally we are not
of intellectively knowing the real in a manipulative way. dealing with some physical penetration, but of being com-
It is intellection in manipulation, not intellection of what penetrated with what makes one experience. It is what is
is manipulated. Hence the discontinuity between obser- expressed upon saying, for example, that someone sees
vation and experimentation, which is so often stressed, through the eyes of another. It is a type of perikhoresis,
disappears. To be sure, I cannot manipulate the stars, but not of reality but of the modes of actuating, and of con-
I can study them experientially from a sketch of intellec- ducting oneself. It is a difficult operation; one always
tion possibilities. And in this formally intellective sense, runs the risk of projecting the nature of the one experi-
every observation is an experiment. The observation is encing upon what is experienced. But be that as it may,
not a passive registering of events. Therefore—and in this is an authentic mode of rational intellection, an
this merely intellective sense—what is experimented upon authentic mode of physical testing of reality. Compene-
in an experiment is something “made intelligible”. It is a tration is a rigorous mode of experience. To be sure it is
thing “made” or factum in a double sense: in the parti- not experiment; but without excluding experiment, com-
cipial sense (of being something which is the terminus of penetration actualizes, in a worldly way, the real in the
a making or doing) and in the nominal sense (of being a intellection of the one experiencing. There is no better
fact as actuation of the real). The formal object of this knowledge of a person than that which is achieved by be-
element is therefore a “fact”. {249} There is no experi- ing compenetrated with him. And this extends to all of
mental fact which is disconnected from the intervention of the dimensions of human life. Moreover, it extends to
the experimenter; every experiment is a provocation of the merely animal life and up to a certain point, to vegetable
real. What happens is that this intervention can assume life as well. When all is said and done, we describe the
different modal characteristics in turn. It can be an inter- life of an animal by realizing with some difficulty the ex-
vention which forces reality to show itself such as it is perience of compenetrating with it given the limits of its
with complete independence from our intervention: this is biological constitution. I said that this extends to all di-
the “fact” of classical physics. But it can happen that the mensions of human life. Thus, for example, leaving aside
very intervention of the experimenter pertains to the con- the problem of its truth, there is, as a mode of physical
tent of the fact. In such case the fact is real, there is no testing of reality, a strict historical experience. For an
332 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

Israelite of the first century before Christ, everything only moment; there is another. And it is essential to point
which happened to his people was but a series of episodes out that other moment forcefully. When I say, in the con-
of an historical experience of Yahweh's alliance with Is- clusion of an argument, that A is B, I do not simply pro-
rael, to the point that, as is well known, it was the unique nounce the truth of my affirmation, but a real property of
way which led Israel to the idea of Yahweh as creator of the mathematical object. If one wishes to speak of “see-
the world. {251} This is the Pentateuch. Compenetration ing”, I see in the conclusion not only that I have to neces-
here adopts the form of a great historical experience. In sarily affirm that A is B, but that I see that A “is really” B
it, to be sure, one does not experience Yahweh in Himself, with necessity. This moment is not simply a moment of
but one knows what Yahweh is in His people by being truthful intellection, but of apprehensive intellection of
compenetrated with Him. Israel is not only the people in mathematical reality as such. What happens is that I see
whose history the prodigious actions of Yahweh have this reality as something which necessarily must be seen
taken place, but a people whose whole history, even in the as such. It is the physical necessity which leads me to see
commonest happenings and day-to-day events, formally reality in its logical necessity; but the logical necessity in
consists in being the historical experience of Yahweh. and by itself is not reality. If an intelligence were to in-
The same can be said, mutatis mutandis, of sociological tellectively know, in an exhaustive way, the law of gravi-
knowledge. tation, it would not be limited to seeing in the movement
of a body something which must occur thus in truth; be-
c) There is still another type of physical testing of
sides this necessity, and just on account of it, it would see
reality. There are, in fact, postulated realities. These re-
the real movement of the body. And this same thing hap-
alities have not been postulated by some simple occur-
pens with {253} mathematical reality. I do not just suc-
rence, but by the suggestion of field reality. Mathematical
ceed in deductively determining what is understood as A
reality is not a part or moment of field reality; it has
must be B, but also in seeing that the very reality of A is
nothing to do with this latter by virtue of its content. But
necessarily being B. If this were not the case, mathematics
this new reality, qua reality, would not be postulated if
would be a pure logic of truths. And that is impossible
reason did not already move in field reality qua reality. It
because mathematics is a science of reality. So much so,
is this physical reality qua reality which constitutes that
indeed, that Gödel demonstrated (as I have often re-
about which the content is postulated. Therefore what is
marked) that what is postulated has properties which are
postulated is not postulated about truth, but about the
not deducible from the postulates nor can they be logically
content of reality in postulation. Here, field reality qua
refuted by them. The fact is, as I see it, that they are real
reality is a system of reference by which reality itself has a
properties of mathematical reality, and their apprehension
content independent of its field content. And this inde-
independent of the postulates is a point in which the ap-
pendence is just a referential mode, the mode of my refer-
prehension of reality does not coincide with logical intel-
ring to field reality “independently”. This independence
lection. In every mathematical method there is, then, a
compels us to sketch a free system of postulates or axioms
double moment: the moment of necessary truth of an af-
(I need not now discuss the difference between them).
firmation, and the moment of apprehension of reality.
These postulates are then the postulated determination of
One’s necessarily affirming that reality is thus is not op-
the content of reality, a reality numerically identical with
posed to the fact that the moment of reality is formally
field reality qua reality. They constitute, by postulation,
distinct from the logical necessity of my affirmation. To
the {252} sketch of the content of the new reality. We are
be sure, they are two moments of a single, unique act; but
not talking about truths which I state freely, but of real
as moments they are different. And in them the moment
characteristics which I sketch freely. Postulation is a
of logical necessity is not primary because the postulates
mode of realization of content, not a mode of affirmation.
in turn do not consist in logical affirmations but in postu-
In virtue of this, when I logically deduce necessary conse-
lations of the content of reality. It is reality, then, which
quences (including necessary and sufficient consequences)
has the first and last word in all mathematical intellection.
from these postulates, the conclusion has two essentially
different moments. To be sure, they are inseparable up to These two moments, the moment of truth and the
a certain point (I shall forthwith tell what that point is), moment of apprehension of reality, nonetheless have an
but they are never formally identical. The first moment is intrinsic unity. It is what I call testing-together [com-
the only one which is generally designated clearly because probar] or verifying. As I see it, verification does not
it is of greater apparent relief; this is the moment by consist in verifying if my affirmation is verified; that does
which the affirmation is a necessary conclusion from the not need to be verified in mathematics. What is verified is
axioms, from what has been postulated. But it is not the not the truth of my affirmation but the very presence of
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 333

reality {254} apprehended through a way of logical de- as opposed to merely being a person, which I call ‘per-
duction. It is the testing or verifying of reality through the soneity’. Thus, for example, I can say that a person is a
“together” of truth. Truth is not verified, but rather reality good or bad person, because he really has this or that set
in its truth; we apprehend “reality in truth”. This might of qualities which modalize his personality. To intellec-
make it seem that the method has consisted of a reasoning tively know this it does not suffice to point out that now he
process. But this is not true because all reasoning proc- acted well, or that now he does not give in to temptations.
esses depend upon something prior to the reasoning itself, It is necessary to transcend the order of actions and even
upon the postulation of the content of reality. Method is a temptations, in order to go to the mode by which he is,
path into postulated reality, an oriented path in accordance ultimately, this person.
with logical rigor. But if this demonstrative rigor, by be-
This is something which I need to investigate. As
ing impossible, did not lead us to apprehend the reality of
St. Augustine said, quaestio mihi factus sum, I have be-
A as “being” B, we would not have mathematics. The
come a question for myself. For this knowledge I need a
unity of the two moments of the intellection of postulated
method, a way that in the reality in which I already am, I
reality is, then, what we call ‘verification’. The physical
am led to my own formal in-depth reality in a physical
testing [probación] of reality is now verification [com-
probing of my own reality. We are dealing with a way by
probación]. Here we have the essence of what, paradoxi-
which I achieve, in myself, the discernment of some
cally, but very exactly, should be called the ‘experience of
{256} modalities of reality as opposed to others. This is
the mathematical’. The mathematical is the terminus of a
achieved in the physical probing of my own reality, in an
physical testing of reality, of experience.
experience of myself. As the probing that it is, this expe-
To be sure, there are postulated realities which are rience consists in an insertion, into my own reality, of a
not mathematical; they constitute the ambit of the reality sketch of possibilities (perhaps of something unreal) of
of fiction. But I need not insist upon them because how- what I am. The experience of myself is a knowledge of
ever they are seen, they have the two moments of internal myself.
coherence of the feigned, and of apprehension of its reality
The idea that experience of myself as a mode of re-
in fiction. They are, in this sense, the terminus of verifi-
ality consists simply in a type of report or examination of
cation, in explicit form.
myself is chimerical. By intrinsic necessity, every exami-
Every postulated reality has, then, a mode of experi- nation of myself is oriented and inscribed in a system of
ence its own, verification. reference. When one speaks of a confession of himself,
the concept of confession is not necessarily univocal.
d) But there is still another mode of experience, the
What St. Augustine understood by confession is not the
mode which concerns the nature of my experiencing my
same as what Rousseau understood by it. For St.
own reality. It is the experience of myself.
Augustine, to confess to oneself is to know, to have an
Above all, What does ‘experience of myself’ mean experience of what I am in my in-depth reality with re-
here? To be sure, we are not dealing with the mere appre- spect to a very precise system of reference, viz. the refer-
hension of my reality; that happens, as we have already ence to what God has realized in me and I in God. On the
seen, due to sentient intellection {255} of a general sense other hand for Rousseau, confession is the knowledge of
of corporeal existence. Nor are we dealing with a mere what I am “naturally”; the system of reference is now na-
affirmation of what I am or am not in reality, i.e., with a ture. God and nature are here two systems of reference
mere judgement of field intellection. To say that what I among many others, without which there could never be
really am in the field of my violent reactions, perhaps be- any confession.
ing a timid person, is not a rational intellection of what I
This system of reference leads to a sketch of what I
am as wordly reality. We are dealing, then, not with a
ultimately am. For example, it might be the sketch of a
mere apprehension of my reality, nor with a judgement of
certain vocation: Do I or do I not have that vocation?
what I am in reality, but with an intellection of what my
reality is as a form of reality, i.e., with a rational intellec- For this I need to probe the insertion of this sketch
tion, with knowledge. This form of reality has the two (in the foregoing example, of this vocation) into my own
moments of being a mode of reality proper qua reality; it reality. Ultimately there is no more than a single physical
is the moment through which I intellectively know that I probing of this insertion, viz. trying to conduct myself by
am a person. But there is a second moment which con- intimately appropriating what has been sketched. That
stitutes not so much a mode of reality as a modulation, a insertion can be positive or {257} negative. The insertion
mode of that mode of reality; it is what I call ‘personality’, is then an attempt at appropriating to myself something
334 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

along the lines of the sketch of possibilities which I have “methods”; rather, they are modes of methodic intellec-
wrought. Self-appropriating is the radical mode of expe- tion, i.e. modes by which we intellectively know, by means
rience of oneself, the radical physical probing of my own of a way, the real, regardless of what the “methods” may
reality. To know oneself is to probe oneself in self- be in the usual sense of the word. Every “method” can
appropriation. There is no abstract “know thyself”; I can imply various of these “modes”. The unity of the modes is
only know myself along the lines of this or that sketch of not, then, the unity of “a” method, but something more
my own possibilities. Only the sketch of what I “might radical and fundamental, viz. the unity of experience. In
be” inserted into me as self-appropriation, only this con- virtue of it we say that men have much or little experi-
stitutes the form of knowing oneself. Clearly, it is a ap- ence, i.e., that they have realized, to a different degree, the
propriation in the order of actualization of my own reality. physical probing of what reality ultimately is.
This discernment of oneself is a difficult operation; it is
discernment in probing and self-appropriation.
With this we have examined the two primary mo-
In summary, then, there are four fundamental modes ments of the structure of knowing: objectualization and
of experience: experimentation, compenetration, verifi- method. It is now necessary to tackle the more important
cation, and appropriation. They are not methods like the theme relating to our problem: the truth of our knowledge
physical, psychological, sociological, historical, and other of the depths of the real.
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 335

called this giving of truth truth-making. And this truth-

{258}
making has, as we have seen, different modalities. Above
all, reality (unless otherwise indicated, I shall employ ‘re-
§3 ality’ and ‘real’ as equivalent in our problem) can be ac-
tualized in and by itself in its naked reality. The real
RATIONAL TRUTH makes truth in accordance with its own otherness of real-
ity. Throughout this study, I have called that mode of ac-
tualization real truth. It is the radical, primary, and es-
Rational intellection, i.e., knowledge, is a search sential form of truth as such, the mere being actually pre-
going beyond the field to its ground, that is, toward what sent of the real in intellection.
“could be” as worldly reality. In this search the field takes
on the character of object, and the search itself is a way, But there are other forms of truth-making. The real,
an opening of a way to discovering the ground, a method in fact, is not actualized only in and by itself; it is actual-
which is based upon the field reality as a system of refer- ized as real but with respect to other real things. The real,
ence with respect to which the intelligence sketches a then, makes truth, but it gives truth not only to the intel-
system of possibilities that ultimately one tries to subject lection of the real itself but to that intellection in which
to a physical probing of reality in that intellective moment one intellectively knows the real thing among other things
which constitutes experience. In this experience, rational of field reality. Real truth is a simple truth, not in the
intellection finds that reality coincides or does not coin- sense of uncomplicated or elemental, but in the sense that
cide with the sketch of possibilities. This encounter is the {260} there is simply “one” reality, however complicated
truth of rational intellection; the opposite is error. In what it may be, yet one which is intellectively known in and by
follows, unless the contrary is indicated, I shall only speak itself indivisibly. The other form of truth-making consti-
of truth; error can only be understood with respect to tutes dual truth, because there is the real thing and some
truth. And truth as encounter is the essential part of ra- other respect in which the real thing is intellectively
tional intellection. What is this truth, i.e., what is the known. The intellective actualization of the real thing is
truth of reason? We need to determine, then, the essence now dual. In it the two moments of the intellection of the
of the encounter. And that will lead us to discover the real should coincide unitarily in the unity of actualization
major characteristic of the intrinsic structure of knowing. of the thing. The real thing makes truth, but in coinci-
The problem of the truth of reason thus unfolds in three dental form. All dual truth is essentially a coincidental
successive steps: truth, a coincidence between real truth of a thing and the
intellection of this thing “from others”.
This coincidental truth can in turn have three essen-
1. What is the truth of reason as encounter? tial characteristics. In the first place, it can be a coinci-
2. What is its formal essence? dence of the real and of a simple apprehension. Then we
say that the real is authentically this or that; for example,
3. What is its intrinsic structural moment? that it is authentic wine, because there is a coincidence
between the liquid which I am really apprehending and
{259} the simple apprehension of the wine. The real makes truth
here in that form of giving dual truth which is authenti-
I cation.
But in the second place, it can deal with a coinci-
THE TRUTH OF REASON
dence between the real and the mode in which the real
must be understood with respect to the field, i.e., a coinci-
Let us take a few steps back, to the beginning of our
dence between the field real and its affirmative intellec-
investigation. Intellection, I said, is the mere actualiza-
tion. The real now makes truth like something which
tion of the real in intelligence. This reality can be consid-
dictates or pronounces its truth. Its truthifying is veridi-
ered under two aspects. I can consider reality as a for-
cal. Intellection is then a conformity more or less ade-
mality proper to a thing itself; this is the problem of real-
quate of what is affirmed and the field real.
ity. But I can also consider reality qua actualized in in-
tellection. Then the actualized real is just truth. Truth is, But there is still a third form of coincidental truth
then, the real itself qua actualized in intellection. It is the not usually distinguished from the previous ones. In it,
real itself which confers its truth upon intellection. I have the field real is formally actualized not in an act (either
336 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

apprehensive or affirmative, but in an activity of worldly exclusive form of the truth of rational intellection.
searching. The coincidence is then an {261} encounter or
Authentication, the veridical, and verification: these
finding in the field real of that which is sought in the
are the three forms of dual truth, of coincidental truth.
world, to wit, of its ground. Coincidental truth is now
The truth of reason, and only it, is verification.
truth in finding. The real is actualized and makes truth in
the form of a finding. To be sure, this truth contains He we have the first step of our investigation, that of
authenticity and veridictance, just as veridictance contains determining in what the truth of reason, the truth of en-
authenticity. But this intellection in finding is not just counter, consists: the truth of reason is verification. But
authenticity or veridictance; rather, it formally consists in this leads to a second step, i.e., to asking ourselves in
being authenticity and veridical in finding. And this more detail what the formal essence of encounter is, what
finding is an irreducible mode of truth because it is not a the formal essence of verification is. As this encounter
moment extrinsic to intellection; rather, it pertains to it takes place in experience, the formal essence of verifica-
intrinsically and formally. All truth of affirmation in fact tion is but the problem of the truth of experience.
has an intrinsically and formally dynamic character, as we
saw. But the third type of truth which we are studying is {263}
not simple dynamism; rather, this dynamism has its own
character, that of dynamism of inquiry, or in progression. II
The inquiry, and therefore the finding, then pertain intrin-
sically and formally to truth in encounter. St. Augustine
THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH IN ENCOUNTER
tells us (De Trin., IX,1): “Let us seek like those who have
not yet found, and we shall find like those who have yet to
The truth of reason consists, then, in the real making
seek, because when a man has finished something, he has
truth in the form of verification. The truth of reason is
but begun.” Now, this expresses not only a limitation
encounter, but not a haphazard type of encounter such as a
which in fact human knowledge possesses. It also ex-
collision with reality or a stumbling upon it. Rather, it is
presses something much more serious, viz. the formal
the encounter with something which is sought. This
character of knowing proper to it. The limitation of
search is not some flailing about in a vacuum, so to speak,
knowledge is certainly real, but this limitation is some-
but the search for something which has already been in-
thing derived from the intrinsic and formal nature of ra-
tellectively mapped out. The encounter as such is verifi-
tional intellection, from knowing as such, since it is in-
cation. In order to determine that in what, essentially,
quiring intellection. Only because rational intellection is
truth in encounter consists, we must pose three questions:
formally inquiring, only because of this must one always
What is verification? What is the formal structure of
seek more and, finding what was sought, have it become
verification? And In what does the order of rational truth
the principle of the next search. {262} Knowledge is lim-
consist?
ited by being knowledge. An exhaustive knowledge of the
real would not be knowledge; it would be intellection of 1st Question. What is verification? Verification is
the real without necessity of knowledge. Knowledge is clearly encountering or finding something which one is
only intellection in search. Not having recognized the already seeking. To understand what verification is, let us
intrinsic and formal character of rational intellection as proceed, as in so many other problems, step by step.
inquiry is what led to straying with respect to this third
Above all, let us recall what it is which is sought,
form of truth, and to subsuming all truth under the truth
and that is the ground of the field real as a moment of the
of affirmation. That is not the case; inquiry is a mode of
world, i.e., of the respectivity of the real qua real. This
intellection, the mode of rational intellection; and truth is
fundament is intellectively known in a sketch of possibili-
not only conformity but also encounter. It is not the same
ties of what the real “could be” in the worldly sense.
thing to affirm something about what is in the field as to
What one seeks is then, formally what has been sketched
encounter what this which is in the field is in the worldly
out as real.
sense. It is not the same to intellectively know what
something is “in reality” as to know what something is in This encounter takes place in the real by submitting
reality “itself”. The difference is that between conformity it to a physical testing of reality, to experience. As what is
and encounter. And as what is encountered is or is not sought is something sketched, it is clear that the encounter
what is sought, it follows that the real now has a mode of consists not in being a mere manifestation, but in being
making truth which is its own, its own mode of actualiza- the fulfillment of what was sketched out. Encounter is
tion; this is verification. Verification is the proper and fulfillment of a sketch. We are not dealing with some
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 337

mere conformity, {264} more or less adequate, with the In the fourth place, it is a coincidence determined by
real; rather, we are dealing with the intellection of the real the real itself. Coincidence is a mode of actuality, and as
as realization of a sketch. This is the fulfillment of what such is actuality of the real. The intellective aspect is,
“could be” in what “really is”. Fulfillment is the mode then, grounded upon the real formality of a thing itself.
proper to inquiring intellection. And this unity of actuality, grounded upon the real, is
what constitutes the fact that things give us ratio or ex-
Fulfillment is the mode in which the real makes
planation. The form in which the real makes truth is that
truth in intellection, viz. fulfilling what has been sketched
facere which consists in giving ratio or explanation. Ful-
out. And it is because of this that the fulfillment has veri-
fillment, verification, consists formally in giving ratio.
fication for its own essence. Verification is a “making
Whence knowledge consists in being the intellection of
true”, verum facere. And this requires a special reflec-
things insofar as they give us ratio. That formula ap-
tion.
peared early in this study of reason; but now we see in
In the first place, what is this facere, this making or what, radically, this giving of ratio consists. Knowledge,
doing? The facere is not, here, a poiesis, nor is it a and especially scientific knowledge, is not a system of
praxis, or an agere, because what the facere designates propositions, but an intellective activity in which the real
here is not an actuation but an actualization. We are makes truth in its ground; it consists in things giving us
dealing, in fact, with a facere proper to a ground. Now, a ratio or explanation. And {266} science itself as a system
ground, as we saw, is what grounds the real with respect is the more or less necessary system of the “giving ratio”
to itself, passing formally into what is grounded. We are of the things which it investigates. In experience, the real
not dealing with a temporal passing, but one of a merely is giving us (or taking away from us, which comes to the
actual nature. It therefore consists in constituting the real same thing) ratio. Experience has as an intrinsic and
thing itself, in actuality, i.e., it is the intrinsic and formal formal moment, that of making truth; and verification is
constitution of the actuality of the thing itself. It is a for- but the giving of ratio, i.e., is the intellective constitution
mally grounding passing. It is here a moment of intellec- of the ground as such.
tive actuality of the real. Intellectively knowing itself is How does the real verify the ratio? A difficult prob-
now activity, and ultimately, intellective activity is the lem. This is the second question which we have posed
actuality of the moment constitutive of the real qua actu- with respect to verification, viz. the structure of verifica-
alized from the depths of itself. tion.
In the second place, what is made in this making is 2nd Question: The formal structure of verification.
the verum in fulfillment. What is made is the intellective Verification has a complex character. To analyze it, let us
actuality of the fulfillment itself. It is not, I repeat, a recall what has already been explained.
making in the sense of producing or anything like that;
rather, it is a making of actuality. And this actuality has Above all, verification always has the character of
its own character—let us say so once again—, that of be- necessity. It is necessary that the real be or not be
ing actuality in fulfillment. If this were not so, we would grounded in something which “could be”. Necessity is a
have simple {265} conformity. And conformity is not, character of verification because it constitutes the charac-
formally, something sought after, but fulfillment is so by ter of its own emergence. Then one might be tempted to
virtue of its essence. The real not only “is” actualized, but think that this necessity is independent of experience, be-
is actualized as something “grounding”. cause experience only shows us facts. But this, as we have
already seen, is false. Experience is inscribed in the im-
In the third place, this facere of the verum not only pression of reality. And the impression of reality has as a
concerns what is intellectively known, but also the intel- structural moment that of the “toward”. Intellective
lection itself qua rational. The verum facere, verification, knowing as “toward” is, then, an intellective necessity, the
is a “co-happening” in actuality, a “co-happening” of the necessity in accordance with which the real is itself bear-
constitution of the grounded real and of intellection as the ing us from the field to the world. It is a datum of the real
ground. And this “co-” is just the modality of coincidence itself qua real. The necessity of grounding, then, takes
in rational intellection. Coincidentiality is now “co- place in the necessity of the intellectively known real; it is
happening” or “co-constitution”. Intellection itself is then not just a fact. And this surely leaves open the question of
grounded qua intellection, which is not only in conformity whether this necessity leads to a final positive terminus;
with the real but also is a conformity grounded qua intel- this we shall see soon see. But neither is that necessity a
lection. Rational intellection has grounded truth. merely logical one. We are not dealing with the stating of
338 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

{267} some proposition, for example, the principle of This is the third character, or rather, the third group of
causality or of sufficient reason, and trying to make clear characters of verification.
that these propositions are evident and hence “must be
applied” to the field real. This is, as I see it, untenable, Above all, one must make an essential distinction.
above all because no one has ever been able to state those We have already seen it, but now it is necessary to set it
presumed principles with a univocal formula. So it is not down because it is here that it acquires its full meaning.
surprising that no one adduces rigorous proofs that they The “for” is a “what for” or “why”. And the “what for” or
are evident. Hence we are not dealing with application of “why” has two moments. One is the moment of the “for”
these principles to field reality. The necessity of going to itself. And this is a datum of the impression of reality.
what is in the world is not a piece of evidence but is given The other is the moment of the “what”: that which we
in the intellection of the field real as real. And this func- force to be the worldly “what” of the field. The first mo-
tionality, projected upon that to which it impels us in the ment does not require verification; only the second does
“toward”, is the very actuality of the “for”; it is a datum so. How is it verified, how does one find, in the experi-
and not a necessary judgement. It is a moment of a sen- ence of the world, the worldly “what” which we have
tient reason. sketched out? This is the question exactly.

But verification does not just have that moment of Let us say at the outset that the question which we
radical necessity. Verification, by virtue of its nature, have just formulated does not have, nor can it have, a uni-
must be something possible in principle; this is its char- vocal answer. {269} Verification is a dynamic moment of
acter of possibility. This has at times seemed clear. rational intellection. Hence it is not a quality which the
Nonetheless, it is not something clear even with regard to sketch has or does not have, but the quality of a progres-
those conceptions for which grounding is a logical neces- sion which takes us to a verification. Verification is an
sity, because the fact that it may be necessary to go toward essentially dynamic quality; it is always and only to go
a ground does not mean that, without further ado, it must verifying. And this “to go verifying” is what constitutes
but possible to find it in either a positive or negative experience. It is not the manifestation of a fact. The dy-
sense. It is necessary, then, to determine the precise point namic character is, together with necessity and possibility,
in which the said principle takes place in the real. And the third great characteristic of verification.
that is the question. As I see it, this point is none other This characteristic has many of its own modes.
than one in which the field real has thrust us from the
field to the world; it is just the real and physical identity In the first place, what is sketched has to be suffi-
of the moment of reality in the field and in the world. In cient for grounding what in the field. This is the moment
virtue of this, if I intellectively know field reality, not as of sufficiency. It is what, from a merely logical point of
sensed in the field manner, but according to the formality view, was encapsulated in the idea of sufficient reason—
of reality of a field thing, then I am already in the moment something impossible, as we have seen.
of reality which constitutes the {268} world itself. The This sufficiency has in turn complex characteristics.
necessity with which the field real thrusts us “toward” the
world is just what makes it possible to find the world in a) Verification consists in what was sketched out
what is sensed; this is the possibility of verification. To having at least confirmable consequences in the field.
verify is to bring the world to the field. And this is possi- The sketched-out “what” is not verified in and by itself,
ble thanks to the fact that the moment of reality is nu- but only in its consequences. Immediate verification, if it
merically and physically identical in the field and in the exists, is quite exceptional. If the consequences are not
world. What makes the progression from the field to the verified in the field, the sketched-out “what” would not be
world is, then, what makes possible the return from the true. On the other hand, if the qualities of the field are
world to the field. And in this consists verification. The the same as those of what is sketched out, we may say that
world is not necessarily a zone of real things beyond the what is sketched out has verification. I shall forthwith
zone of the real things of the field; rather, it is only the pose a matter for reflection with respect this.
fullness of the formality of reality qua respectivity. Hence,
b) There are times when what is sketched out is not
verification not only has a moment of initial necessity, but
something whose consequences are strictly necessary in
also an intrinsic and formal character of possibility.
the field. It might happen that there is at least a concor-
As necessary and possible, in what does verification dance between the sketch and the field reality. This is a
consist in itself, i.e., in the intellection of the worldly in verification, but of another order than that of the conse-
the field? The “for” is an open ambit. How is it filled? quences.
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 339

c) It might happen that in the process of going to is adequacy. Provisionality consists in but partial inade-
verify, the “could {270} be” can show different aspects, quacy. The possible rejection or superceding or diversifi-
each of which taken by itself is not sufficient in any of the cation in verification is formally inscribed in the compass
two senses explained; but if there are many different as- of adequation. It is a characteristic which is intrinsically
pects, the unity of all of them is nonetheless convergent and necessarily inherent in verification, both with respect
with respect to the outcome. Then there is a verification to sufficiency and with respect to exceeding. Verification
by convergence. Although it may seem strange, almost all is a “going verifying”. It is not a quality which something
of our rational intellections, even those most solidly es- has or does not have; but a quality which consists in be-
tablished, have this character of verification by conver- coming more adequate to the real. It is the dialectic of
gence; the more the convergence, the better the verifica- adequation. Adequation as limit of dynamism has ap-
tion. This is an essential form of verification. The con- peared already in the problem of the truth of judgement.
vergence is not a type of substitute for verification; it is However here we are not dealing with mere dynamism,
verification in convergence. but with that special dynamism which consists in progres-
sion. And then the dynamic intellection takes on, in the
Consequence, concordance, and convergence are the
progression constituting reason or explanation, its own
three modalities of what I have called ‘sufficiency’. With-
characteristic: verification in scrutiny. This should not
out sufficiency there is no verification.
seem strange to us. {272} Human reason is sentient rea-
But in the second place, verification has another line son. It senses that its progression takes place in reality.
which is not simply identified with that of sufficiency. And here is the terra firme of that intellective progression.
The world, in fact, is the respectivity of the real qua real. But it senses the different states of this progression just
On the other hand, the field is just what is sensed of the like so many other scrutinies. And scrutiny, as we have
world. Hence reality qua worldly is something much already seen, is a mode of intellection of the real: the
richer than field reality; the world strictly exceeds with scrutiny of reality gives us reality itself qua “scrutinized-
respect to the field, and does not just exceed the field with reality”; i.e., reality in the mode of the scrutinizable.
respect to the real things sensed in it. Now, exceeding is a Sentient reason is, ultimately, reason which moves in
possible line of verification; it is the moment of exceeding scrutiny, and what it scrutinizes is, formally, the adequacy
of verification, because the sketch of the worldly “what”, of verification. The dialectic of adequation is progressive
in virtue of being worldly, exceeds what is of the field. scrutiny of verification.
This means that, in principle, the sketch contains more Having reached this point (sufficiency, excedence,
properties of the real in the field itself than those which scrutiny), it is necessary to focus our reflection upon these
are strictly sensed in its mere field intellection. Hence the three aspects of verification thus understood.
sketch contains “new” properties of the real. In general,
only a rational intellection which leads to the discovery of a) In the first place, the verification of reason has
{271} new verifiable properties has strict scientific value. two aspects which must be very carefully distinguished.
Thus the electromagnetic theory of light led to the discov- This is the point to which I alluded previously, and about
ery of new properties of light; the relativistic and ondula- which I said some reflection is needed. Because, what is
tory theory of the electron led to the discovery of the first it that is verified? What was sketched out is what is veri-
form of antimatter, the positron, etc. Rational intellection fied, something which bears us from the world to the
does not ground what is of the field except by exceeding field; it is precisely in this that verification consists. This
it. This is the line of exceeding proper to rational verifi- verification is experience, something quite different, as we
cation. said, from sensible perception as from experiment. But
then the fact that what has been sketched discharges two
To be sure, neither the line of sufficiency nor the line functions comes to our attention. On the one hand, reason
of excedence is absolute verification, but only a progres- leads to an affirmation about the field real, an affirmation
sion toward a verification off in the distance. No moment which can be verified both along the diverse lines of suffi-
of it, by itself, has absolute value; it is rather a provisional ciency as well as along the line of exceeding. Thus, I can
verification. Here ‘provisional’ does not mean that it is verify that the wave “reason” or “explanation” of light
going to be rejected or absorbed, because neither rejection leads to interference, which is to be sure verified in expe-
nor absorption are formal characteristics of the verifying rience; and I can verify that the gravitational “reason” or
progression. The strictly formal character of verification “explanation” of masses leads to certain movements of the
does not consist in being opposed to error. The formal stars, something also verified observationally. {273} But
character which is of interest to us here is quite precise: it what is it which is verified? What is verified is the reality
340 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

of the interference and the reality of the movements re- fication, as I said, is not necessarily adequate, but adding
corded in celestial mechanics. But the question does not now that verification is never totally excluded because
end here, because these same phenomena may be verification is not a quality which something has or does
grounded upon principles different than those of the wave not have; rather, there is only the ongoing process of veri-
theory of light, or the gravitational laws of Newton. And fication. Hence the inadequacy does not entail complete
this is, in fact, the case. The photonic theory of light also abolition of verification. What has been sketched out,
gives a complete explanation of interference, and the precisely because it is more or less adequate, can be more
relativistic theory of gravitation likewise gives a complete or less verified. This is expressed in a very precise dis-
explanation of celestial movements. Thus it follows that it tinction. Adequate verification is verification which in a
is one thing to verify, in experience, the fulfillment of certain way is total. There is no doubt that then the in-
what has been sketched, and something quite different to quiring intellection encounters the real as the complete
verify that the explanation or reason adduced is the unique fulfillment of what has been sketched out; the real then is,
and true one. One thing is the verification of what has with respect to what has been sketched out, something
been predicted or explained, something else the verifica- strictly rational. The way or path which has led us to the
tion of the explanation itself. Now, this latter is not veri- real is just the way of the rational. Experience is here
fiable. One can verify the truth of what is explained or experience of the real as rational. But when verification is
predicted, but one cannot verify the explanation itself inadequate, the sketch is not complete. Experience is
which is advanced. If it were possible to verify both in a {275} only the fulfillment of some aspects or moments of
single experiment, we would have some type of critical what has been sketched out. It is not that what has been
experiment, an experimentum crucis. But such experi- sketched out has parts, but that the totality of what has
ments practically do not exist. One can demonstrate that been sketched is more or less firm in the physical testing
quantum mechanics does not contain nor admit hidden of the real. And in this sense, what has been sketched is
parameters, but one cannot demonstrate that only quan- not composed of parts, but of partialities. Of them, some
tum mechanics can give a physical explanation of ele- are fulfilled and others not. This partiality is a mode of
mentary particles. It is one thing to verify the truth to verification; it is not full verification, but just partial. And
which reason leads, and something else to verify the ex- this partiality shows that what has been sketched is not the
planation itself which leads to these truths. And this lat- “way” or via of the real, but is something in some way
ter is not verifiable. There are only two possible excep- “viable”. Now, rational intellection of the viable, the in-
tions to what I have just said. The first is that the expla- adequate fulfillment of what has been sketched in the
nation chosen is such that by its own nature it is the only physical testing of reality, is just what constitutes the rea-
possible one; then the verification of the truth of the ex- sonable. The reasonable is a mode of the rational; it is
planation would be, at one and the same time, the verifi- not the strict rational, but the viable rational. The reason-
cation of the explanation of the truth. There is another able is strictly and formally the viable. There are verifi-
exception, in a certain way more attainable. It is the case cations which are more or less viable than others, more or
in which the sketch to be verified consists only in the af- less reasonable than others. The intellective progression
firmation of the reality of {274} something unknown. in worldly reality, which in its dynamic phases scrutinizes
That is what happens when reason sketches out, for ex- the real, is in general a progression or experience of the
ample, the existence of a nerve cell. The verification (mi- reasonable. Insofar as something is being verified rea-
croscopic image) of the reality of this cell verifies the two sonably, it tends constitutively to the strict rational. In the
directions of the explanation. But in general verifying the limit of this constitution the explanation or reason of truth
sketches of reason does not mean verifying the explana- and the truth of reason or explanation would coincide.
tion of their truth. When there is but approximation to this limit these two
are only reasonably coincident.
b) In the second place, the immense majority of ra-
tional intellections are not absolutely verifiable even in c) Finally, it is necessary to emphasize an essential
first of the two senses which I just described. Precisely possibility: that not every sketch is verifiable. To be sure,
because it is progressive, verification always admits of the progression of reason always takes place in physical
degrees. In what situation do these gradual verifications reality, whether field reality or worldly reality. But what
arise, i.e., what is the physical testing of reality in the has been sketched out in this progression may not be veri-
immense majority of cases, not to say in nearly all of our fiable. The “what” of the “what for?” is then like an
rational intellections? To understand this, it is necessary empty space. What is unverifiable shows reality as empty.
to point out a very precise character of verification. Veri- The unverifiable has two essentially different aspects. A
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 341

sketch can be {276} unverifiable in the sense that in the cal progression of “suggestion-sketch”.
physical testing of reality the real expressly excludes what
With this, we have summarily analyzed the formal
has been sketched. Then the unverifiable has the sense of
structure of verification. Verification has the character of
refutable. We are not dealing with a logical refutation,
necessity, of possibility, and of dynamism. In itself, verifi-
but with a negative experience. But there is a second de-
cation has a moment of sufficiency (consequence, concor-
gree of irrefutability, so to speak, and that is what is nei-
dance, convergence) and a moment of exceeding. In both
ther refutable nor irrefutable; this is a suspended experi-
moments it is a verifying process which is more or less
ence. What, then, more precisely, is unverifiability? To
adequate, recognizing that verifying the truth of reason or
be sure, negative experience fully enters into the line of
explanation is not the same as reason or explanation of
verification; it is a strict verification of non-truth. Nega-
truth, and that verification can adopt the form of the
tive experience is a crucial experience of falsehood. And
strictly rational or of the reasonable, or even of the un-
it is because of this, rigorously speaking that there are no
verifiable, as a dialectical moment of intellection. Ra-
strict negative experiences. The problem thus centers
tional intellection has the dialectical structure of sentient
around suspended experience: What is its unverifiability?
reason. Naturally, in this distinction, what has already
One might think that it is a suspension originating in the
been verified constitutes an essential moment, that of pro-
absence of verification. But this is not the case. It is nec-
gress. {278}
essary that there be not absence but impossibility of verifi-
cation. Mere absence would give us the sketch as unveri- Let us return to the point of departure for this analy-
fied, but not as unverifiable. The unverifiable is what, by sis. Verification is the mode by which the real makes truth
its own nature, is taken away from verification, i.e., from in the thinking intellection. The truth of this intellection
a physical testing of reality. For this the experience of the is rational truth. This truth is the truth of the field real as
unverifiability itself is necessary; that is, we need the worldly reality; rational truth is truth which is formally
verification of unverifiability, because the experience in worldly. Hence, rational truth not only is truthful but also
question is not the suspension of experience but a sus- constitutes the truth of a world; it is—please excuse the
pended experience. Now, the sketch which we are trying expression—an order. Here ‘order’ is not ordering but a
to deal with is not a simple occurrence; it is a sketch ar- zone or region. What is the order of rational truth? Here
ticulated in a suggestion. The sketch is born from mere we have the third of the three questions which we posed to
suggestion; it is not identified with mere suggestion but is ourselves in the study of the essence of truth in encounter.
always positively or negatively articulated in a suggestion. The first was, what is verification? The second was, what
Hence the suspended experience of a sketch means a re- is the formal structure of verification? Now we pose the
duction of the sketch to what has suggested it, a reduction third question: in what does the order of rational truth
of the sketch to suggestion. But then it is clear that the consist?
suspended experience cannot consist in {277} not
sketching what has been suggested, but in taking the sug- 3rd Question: The “order” of rational truth. Ra-
gestion itself as the source of a new sketch. Then the un- tional truths constitute an order, the order of reason, be-
verifiable does not close us off from intellection; rather, cause reason is the intellection which, in its progression,
what it does is to open up for us other possible types of intellectively knows the field real as a moment of the
verification, a new intellection, a progression of a new world. Now, the world is the real as such, and therefore
type. This is the most radical form of the dialectic of rea- its unity is essentially and formally respective; the world
son: the dialectic of verification as such. is the respectivity of the real as real. Therefore, every ra-
tional truth, by virtue of being worldly, is formally respec-
Verification is dialectic not only by virtue of its mo- tive. This is the order of reason. If we wish to conceptu-
ment of progressive adequacy, but also and more radically alize with some rigor what this order is, we must confront
by its intrinsic characteristic: it is a progression from the at least two serious problems: in the first place, what is the
verifiable and the unverifiable toward new sketches. This characteristic of this order as “rational”? And in the sec-
is the dialectic “suggestion-sketch”. Rational intellection ond, in what does this order as “order” consist?
is a process of sketching in and from a suggestion, and
returning from the sketch to the suggestion for new 1. The characteristic of truth qua “rational”. The
sketches. It is dialectic of sentient reason. It is not a psy- truth of rational intellection qua rational is distinguished,
chological process but an intrinsic and formal moment of as we have seen, from the truth of field intellection. {279}
rational intellection as such. Indeed it is the very mode of The latter concerns real things in the field of reality,
intellective knowing, intellective knowing in the dialecti- whereas rational truth concerns the very world of the real.
342 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

And it is necessary to carefully pin down the character of “reality”. Thus reality is intellectively sensed, and what is
this difference, especially since its mere mention can sug- sensed is so in the formality of reality. We are not, then,
gest the difference—classical since Leibniz’ time—be- dealing with truths of fact but truths of field reality. In
tween truths of fact and truths of reason. what is of the field, reality is given. It is not a question of
concepts but of reality. Reality, even if of fact, is not syn-
For Leibniz, a truth of reason is formally and con-
onymous with contingency; rather, it is the formality of
stitutively necessary; it cannot be other than it is, and it is
what is apprehended. In virtue of this, reality is not a
impossible to think the opposite of it. Therefore the truth
“mere” fact, but a constitutively necessary formality. In
of reason would be eternal truth. On the other hand, a
turn, the most necessary truth of the world is in some
truth of fact is a truth about something which can be oth-
mode and some form the truth of something sensed in the
erwise; its opposite is possible. Therefore it is contingent
field manner. Therefore what is sensed does not therefore
truth.
cease to be intellectively known in necessity.
But this conception is, as I see it, untenable, even
leaving aside the fact that an eternal truth requires an In the second place, are the presumed truths of rea-
eternal intelligence, which the human intelligence cer- son {281} eternal truths in Leibniz’ sense? Clearly not.
tainly is not. But I repeat, even leaving aside this point, Leibniz cites as truths of reason the supreme logical prin-
the radical difference is not that between fact and neces- ciples (identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle), and
sity, but between reality in a field and reality in the world, mathematical truths. But are these truths grounded in
which is something quite different. For Leibniz, truth is nothing other than our mind? No, they are not. They are
always a question of being objective, i.e., of objective con- grounded intrinsically in “given” reality. Mathematical
cepts; and its being is intellectively known in that form of truths are certainly necessary, but their necessity depends
affirmation which is identity. Truth is always mediated or upon postulates, and hence upon reality given in and by
immediate identity of concepts. Now, this is wrong. postulates. Ultimately mathematical truths are anchored
Truth is not a question of objective concepts but of reality. in something given. And therefore they could perfectly
And reality is always something primarily and radically well be another way. The postulates are, in fact, freely
given, something merely actualized in intellection. Hence chosen. It would suffice for me to change the postulates,
Leibniz’ distinction between truths of fact and truths of and mathematical truth would be different.
reason, between necessary truths and contingent truths, is The same thing happens with the supreme logical
false. principles. These principles, in fact, are structural princi-
In the first place, let us consider the so-called ‘truths ples of affirmation. And what logic does is to intellec-
of fact’. Above all, Leibniz (and on this point, all philo- tively know affirmation as such. But here a serious error
sophical tradition {280} before him) fails to distinguish comes up not just in Leibniz but in almost all of philoso-
the two types of truth in what he vaguely calls ‘truth of phy, culminating in Hegel. Indeed, How do I intellec-
fact’. And this is because there are truths of fact such as, tively know the principles of every affirmation? It is usu-
for example, the truth that this book occupies such-and- ally said, for example, that the principle of non-
such space on my table; but there are also truths of fact contradiction regulates the very intellection of every af-
which concern the structure of cosmic reality, for example, firmation; that is, that it is the principle not only of af-
the truth of gravitation. The first are factical truths; the firmation qua something affirmed, but also of intellection
second are what I call factual truths. The cosmos is not a itself as an act of affirmation. And this is, as I see it, in-
fact but rather a theater, the fact of facts, that in which correct. When I intellectively know affirmations as such-
every fact exists. Certainly it is not something absolutely and-such affirmations, these affirmations are the thing
necessary, but neither is it something properly contingent. intellectively known; and these things certainly have a
Moreover, without delving further into the subject, what is character of non-contradictory necessity, i.e., they have
decisive is that both the factic as well as the factual are, non-contradiction as their structural character. But the
for the effects of my intellection, something intellectively question does not end here, because these affirmations,
known sentiently in the field of reality. The essential with all their structures including non-contradiction, must
point is not that they are contingent (that would be a be intellectively known by me in a distinct act; otherwise
problem of reality), but that their intellection is of the we would have logos, {282} but not logic. Logic is
field. Now, field reality, regardless of how much it may be founded in the intellection of the logos as something in-
of the field, and of how much it is sensed, is “reality”. tellectively known. Now, it is easy to think that this in-
Therefore the so-called ‘truth of fact’ is the truth of field tellection of an affirmation is in turn an affirmative intel-
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 343

lection. If this were true, there would be an infinite re- this finding is rational truth. It has nothing to do with the
gress: the principle of non-contradiction of intellectively idea that the order of rational truths is an order of absolute
known affirmations would also be the structural principle necessity. My sketch is always a freely constructed sketch.
of their intellection, and so on ad infinitum. And here, as When I seek its verification, it might be that we find it to
I see it, is the mistake. The intellection of my affirmation be unverifiable, and not always because the sketch was
is not, in turn, an affirmative intellection; rather, it is a false, but because it is not necessarily true that everything
primordial apprehension, therefore anterior to all affirma- real is rationally verifiable. The real might rest upon it-
tion. In more general terms, intellective access to the lo- self. And then the real enters into the zone of reason but
gos is not in turn a logical access. Hence, for the effects in order not to constitute itself as real there in reason. But
of intellection, the necessity of the principles of affirma- this does not invalidate what {284} we have said, because
tion is not in the concepts but in the intellectual reality of the field real is what leads us to the worldly. And that is
my affirmations. This reality is, then, something given good enough. We are not dealing with the case that all of
and not something conceived. Logical truths are not ne- the real qua real is necessarily of rational structure; it suf-
cessities of concepts but characteristics of given reality. If fices that something real, to wit, the field real, has this
one cannot think the opposite of them, it is not because structure. To think that everything real necessarily has its
their truth is eternal, but because intellectively known “explanation” not only is an hypothesis, but moreover a
reality itself as reality, i.e., affirmation qua affirmed, is falsehood. Thinking about what Leibniz thought about, to
what cannot be any other way. wit, the reality of God, what must be said is that God is
above all reason and explanation; to affirm, as is usually
Granting this, the essence of the so-called “truth of done, that God is the explanation of Himself constitutes
reason” is not to be the truth “of reason” but “rational” an empty logification of divine reality. God is absolute
truth, which is something different. And it is rational reality; but even in the worldly sense, it is not certain that
truth because it concerns the world of reality (including every reality has a rational explanation. A free act does
therein affirmative intellections as acts). Every rational not; rather, freedom is what puts reason or explanation
truth is a truth of reality, because it is a truth of worldly into what is going to happen. But freedom itself is beyond
reality. And I am including in worldly reality the cosmic explanation. It is, if one wishes, the explanation of the
itself. To be sure, the world and the cosmos are not iden- unexplainable. The truth of rational intellection then es-
tical. The world is the respective unity of the real qua sentially overcomes the duality of fact and reason.
real; the cosmos is the particular respectivity of the
worldly real. But for the effects of intellection; cosmos One might say that metaphysical truths are neces-
and {283} world coincide; they are that “toward” which sary. We shall not here seek to define what the meta-
field reality directs us. In this “beyond” world and cosmos physical is; it suffices to indicate that the metaphysical is
coincide. Because of this I have here spoken simply of the order of the real qua real, i.e., the order of the tran-
“worldly reality”. One might say that the cosmos as such scendental. Now, the transcendental is not something
is not necessary. But that is just what I am saying, that conclusive and a priori; it is something given in impres-
rational truth does not consist in being truth of reason but sion (the impression of reality), and it is something open,
in being worldly and cosmic truth of the field real. The and dynamically open. Metaphysical truths are only
worldly is not just the cosmos, but the cosmic is formally stages of the intellective progression toward the truth of
worldly; it is a particular kind of world. And the field real reality.
as a simply worldly moment or as a cosmic moment (i.e., In summary, then, the duality of truths of fact and
as something factual) is always the terminus of rational truths of reason does not exist, only the duality of field
truth. Necessity and contingency are not characteristics of truths and worldly or rational truths. Both are true not of
truth, but of reality. concepts but of reality, i.e., of a formality actualized in
Therefore it is not the case that two types of truth {285} intellection. Rational truth is simply worldly truth.
exist, viz. truths of reason and truths of fact. Every truth But these rational truths constitute an “order”. It is
is always just a “truth of reality”. What happens is that not, to be sure, the order of absolute necessity of concep-
this reality is either reality sensed as of the field, or tive essences, in Leibniz’ sense; but it is a strict order. In
worldly and cosmic reality. But in both cases we are what does it consist?
dealing with one and the same reality qua reality. Field
reality impels us from itself, in its mode of “toward”, to 2. The order of rational truths qua “order”. Ra-
the worldly; and the worldly is intellectively known in the tional truths, I say, constitute an order. That I indicated
field real as the finding and fulfilling of a sketch. And earlier. Rational truth, in fact, is the truth of the real as a
344 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

form of reality. Each thing is not just real, but constitutes damental moments. Above all, it is an expansion of the
“a” form of being real, i.e., one form among others be- character of reality of each real thing as primordially ap-
cause reality is constitutively respective, and this respec- prehended; it is a character which befits everything real
tivity is the world. Therefore a real thing as a moment of thus apprehended. It is the exceeding by which each real
the world is “a form” of reality, it is “its” form of reality. thing determines a field, the field of the real. This is the
It does not matter, in this problem, that the respectivity in field exceeding. But there is a second moment, that by
question is cosmic in addition to worldly. The cosmic, as which the whole field of the real leads us toward the
we have already said, is the suchness of the world, a par- world; the field real is {287} now intellectively known as
ticular kind of world, the suchness or particularity of a form of reality in the world. This is worldly exceeding.
worldly respectivity; therefore, ultimately, what is decisive In turn, this worldly expansion, this expansion of the field
is the respectivity itself of the world. In virtue of this, all in the world, has two aspects. One is that aspect by which
worldly reality, when it is multiple, sends us back, in its intellection as a form of reality, i.e., rational intellection,
own character of reality, to other forms of reality, because upon being the explanation of a field thing, discovers (or
no form is self-contained, but only respectively to another. can discover) in the field real more properties than those
And therefore all truth about a worldly reality, i.e., all which, in the field manner, we have so far intellectively
rational truth, sends us back qua truth to other rational known. It is an exceeding with respect to properties. But
truths. Therefore rational truths constitute an order, the the worldly exceeding has, together with the first aspect, a
order of the rational. This order has two essential char- second one: the expansion of each explanation to other
acteristics. explanations. And this second aspect of worldly expan-
In the first place, the rational is not just the explana- sion is what is now of interest to us. Through the first
tion or reason of what is of the field. Explanation is pri- aspect, worldly exceeding is an exceeding of explanation
marily and radically explanation of field reality. Without with respect to the field; this exceeding is therefore en-
this, and without being for this, {286} there would be tirely contained in the respect which reason or explanation
neither reason nor explanation, nor rational truth. This shows to what is of the field. But the exceeding of which
has never been emphasized enough. The rational is con- we now speak is an exceeding within the rational itself,
stituted as the terminus of a progression in which, im- within the world of reality. It is impossible to discover the
pelled by the field real, we go in search “toward” the explanation of a real thing by itself, because if it is an
world, i.e., toward the form of reality which has that field explanation it is so of more than that one thing; it is an
thing as a moment of the world, in reality. Reason or ex- explanation within the worldly unity of other explana-
planation, then, is primarily and radically reason or ex- tions. By virtue of its own essence, explanation of the real
planation of what is of the field. It has a precise origin; it is exceeding in the worldly sense.
does not rest upon itself, and this origin is, as we have And here a second essential characteristic of the or-
seen, in what is of the field. But this means that the ra- der of rational truth shines through, because the afore-
tional has two faces: one, which opens onto the field mentioned exceeding is not simply a numerical addition to
thing of which it is the explanation. But since this reason reason or explanation, but an exceeding which is consti-
or explanation is worldly respectivity, it follows that rea- tutive of and essential to all reason. It is not that “one”
son has a second face: that which opens onto other forms explanation leads us to “others”, but that each explanation
of reality, i.e., other explanations. By being the reason or is so only “in and by” that which leads us to others. That
explanation of a field thing, reason is, in a certain way, is to say, explanation by its exceeding constitutes not an
going beyond itself. Therefore the order of reason has a additive order but a formal and constitutive one; it is a
characteristic of exceeding with respect to the field of system. Explanation is formally and constitutively sys-
which it is the reason or explanation. tematic. Rational truths as such constitute a system. This
This characteristic appeared before when we dealt means, {288} first of all, that every explanation is
with verification, and still earlier, when we dealt with the sketched based on others. In field intellection we see that
field of the real. Therefore in order to pin down our ideas, each thing is intellectively known based on others. Now,
let us once again quickly review what exceeding is. To in rational intellection, each explanation is intellectively
exceed does not mean that that to which it is applied is a known based on others. Conversely, every explanation
contraction of what is exceeding, but that, on the contrary, leads, in and by itself, to others, and is only an explana-
exceeding is an expansion of the characteristic of reality. tion in unity with them. Therefore every rational intellec-
It is an expansive constitution, and not a contractive one, tion leads intrinsically and formally to its own superced-
of the character of reality. This expansion has two fun- ing in others. And then, this makes something decisive
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 345

clear to us. Explanation, as we saw, is an intellective soning processes. And Wolf expresses the same thing
sketch of what a real thing “could” be as a form or mo- when he says that “the” reason is the faculty of perceiving
ment of the world. Each explanation is a “could”; if I the nexus of universal truths. Universality here expresses
may be permitted a risky expression (which I previously the character of a reasoning process. But as I see it, we
purged to preclude confusion) I can say that each expla- are not concerned with that. The system is the unity of
nation is a “possible”. Now, the systematic unity of ex- respectivity of the world. Therefore, the fact that every
planations is then a unity of “co-possibles”. The whole explanation is understood based upon others does not
world of the rationally intellectively known is the unique mean that it is deduced from them. It means rather that
and true explanation of field reality. The sketch, we say, every explanation refers to others, regardless of what the
is drawn based on a system of reference. This system of mode of referral may be. The referral itself is the system-
reference is the field of the real. Now, what is sketched, atic character of the world, and not the other way around.
the adequate explanation of the field real, is the unity of The reasoning process is founded upon {290} the respec-
the world. The field is the system of the sensed real, and tive character of the world, the respective character of
the world is the system of the real as a form of reality. reality rationally known intellectively. Only because the
The “could be” is the ground of the real. Therefore the world is systematic unity, and only because of this, can
system of the world is just the ground of the unity of what there be, in some cases, a reasoning process. The essen-
is of the field. tial unity of the world is not, then, reasoning; it is the real
unity of respectivity.
And here it is necessary to avoid four errors which
may readily come to mind. And this brings us to the third mistake. As each ra-
tional truth intrinsically and formally refers to another,
The first concerns the “could be”. The “could be” is one might think that the order of rational truth is the to-
something possible. But I have just indicated that this tality of rational truths. That was Kant’s idea: reason, for
latter is a risky expression because it is ambiguous. The Kant, is the organization of experience, but in and by it-
order of possibles can be understood as the order of the self it is the logical totality of the truths of the under-
essences which eternally rest upon each other. Reality standing, what he called ‘Idea’. The object of reason, for
would then be a derivative of these possibles; that was Kant, is not things but the truths which I have understood
Leibniz’ idea. But it is wrong. The possibility of the about things. But this is untenable. Reasoning is based
“could be” is not the essence of {289} the real, anterior to upon truths already known, and this is possible thanks to
the real itself, but the field reality itself which, as physi- the fact that truths have a unity which is conferred upon
cally real, is a “reality”, but “toward” the world. Be the them by being truths of the world. The unity of the world,
world as it may, it is always just a structure of reality as I just said, is the foundation of reasoning. And this
given in the field manner. Therefore the rational is not the unity is not, therefore, the total system of truths but the
possible, but the real in its intrinsic and physical emer- principial unity of respectivity. The order of rational
gence from itself; hence it is a moment within the real truths does not have the character of totality but of re-
itself. It is not a question of whether the possible is real, spectivity. And respectivity is not necessarily totality; a
but the real itself as realization of its form of reality. This constitutively open respectivity cannot be totality. The
is not something anterior to the real, but an intrinsic con- unity of respectivity is the intrinsic and formal principle of
stitutive moment of it. The possible is the real’s intrinsic all rational order. This order is not, then, totality even as
nature of being possible. Ultimately, the possible is a Idea.
moment reduced from the real itself. Only the real is a
This puts us face to face with a final mistake, the
ground of the possible. Having inverted these terms is the
fourth, which it is essential to dispel. One might think, in
first mistake which I have sought to avoid.
fact, that the order of rational truth is the unity of true
The second mistake concerns that moment of unity reality as such. Then the order of rational truth would not
of the rational through which every explanation is an ex- be “totality” as Kant thought, but the order of a primary
planation based upon others. It is here that the systemic unity of the real as such; it would be {291} the order of
character of the rational is most readily apparent. But this the “ab-solute”. And this order would be but the devel-
“based upon”, and therefore the system itself, isn’t that opment or unfolding of the absolute. The absolute would
“based upon” which from time immemorial has been then be reality unfolding or developing itself, i.e., the re-
called the “reasoning process”. The system of the rational ality which not only is in itself, but is in itself and for it-
is not, formally, a reasoning process. Leibniz said that self; the absolute would be spirit. That was Hegel’s idea.
pure reason is the “linking of truths”, the linking of rea- But such is not the case. Even leaving aside the subject of
346 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

the identity of reason and reality in Hegel—that is not our apprehended as real, gives its truth to the thinking activ-
topic at the moment—it is necessary to point out that the ity; i.e., it is a mode by which the real gives us reason or
unity of the rational order is not the unity of the absolute. explanation. We have seen what the formal essence of
A real thing, intellectively known rationally, is a thing as verification is. Verification is the truth-making of the real
a form of reality. Now, it is certain that the transcendental in an inquiring intellection, i.e., it is in a sketch. To ver-
order is an order which is open dynamically. But this ify is to find the real; it is a fulfillment of how we have
does not mean either that the constitution of each real sketched what the real could be. In this finding and in
thing in the world is a movement, or that the transcen- this fulfillment the real is made actual (facere) in intel-
dental dynamism is an unfolding. ‘Movement’ is not syn- lection (verum). And in this consists “veri-fication”. And
onymous with unfolding; there is only unfolding or devel- it is in this truth-making that rational truth consists. Now,
opment when the movement consists in actualizing that verification in a sketch intrinsically involves two as-
something which, previously, was virtually in what is pects: finding and fulfillment. Up to now we have been
moved. But in the constitution of forms of reality, we are made to see the character of rational truth {293} as a truth
not dealing with something which is being configured, but which has those two moments: finding and fulfillment.
with the fact that each thing is being configured as a form But those two moments are different, and each imposes its
of reality. It is not that the absolute is configured or con- own stamp upon truth. Hence their unity is what consti-
figures itself, but that what is configured is each real tutes the intrinsic nature of rational truth. What, ulti-
thing. Thus there is no unfolding. And furthermore, mately, is this intrinsic character of rational truth, i.e., the
there is no unity of the absolute. The different forms of intrinsic unity of finding and fulfillment? This is the
reality have no other unity than that of respectivity. question now facing us.
Therefore the order of the rational is not the order of the
To answer this question it is above all necessary to
absolute but the order of the world. Reality qua reality is
focus on each one of the two moments of verification, that
not the same thing as absolute reality. Each real thing is
of finding and that of fulfilling. Let us repeat, then, what
not a moment of a great thing, of the absolute, but only a
has already been said but in a more systematic way. Only
moment respective to other realities. The order of the
then will we be able to confront the question of the inter-
rational is neither a Kantian totality nor a Hegelian abso-
nal unity of these two moments, i.e., the intrinsic charac-
lute; it is simply a world.
ter of rational truth.
With this we have completed our second step to
To do this with some degree of clarity, it is necessary
{292} conceptualizing truth as an encounter or finding.
to repeat certain ideas expounded earlier at greater length.
The first step was analyzing what truth is as an encounter;
this was “verification”. The second has been to determine 1. Verification as finding. Truth consists, formally,
the formal essence of this mode of truth. That we have in the mere actualization of the real in intellection; and
done by confronting three questions: What is verification? this actualization is truth. The actualized real, then,
What is the formal structure of verification? And In what makes truth. We have seen that there are two essential
does the order of reason or explanation consist? We must forms of truth: real or simple truth, also referred to as
now take a third and final step: determining what we elemental truth, and dual truth, that which consists in the
might call the intrinsic character of truth as an encounter, coincidence of the aspects of dual actualization. There is
i.e., the intrinsic character of rational truth, of the truth of dual truth when those two moments coincide; it is what I
knowledge. have repeatedly called ‘coincidental truth’. And this coin-
cidental truth in turn assumes three forms: authentication,
veridictance, and verification. Now, we are not dealing
with a simple classification of truths, but with a unitary
III structure, i.e., each form of truth presupposes the previous
one and is founded upon it. Every coincidental truth of
THE INTRINSIC CHARACTER OF RATIONAL authentication is grounded upon real truth, and involves
TRUTH {294} in an authentication sense real truth itself. Every
truth of veridictance is founded upon the truth of authenti-
It is first of all necessary to pin down the meaning of cation, and involves in a veridictance sense the truth of
the question we wish to answer. We have seen that ra- authentication, and therefore real truth. Every truth of
tional truth is verification. It is a mode of truth-making verification is founded upon the truth of veridictance and
with a special character, a mode by which the real, already formally contains this truth in a veridictant way; hence it
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 347

involves veridictance in a verifying way, as well as Now, the real is actualized in confirmation. Simple
authentication and real truth. I shall later return to this “af-firmation” becomes “con-firmation”. Here we have
subject at length. But it was necessary to sketch it here rational truth as finding. Veridictance “is manifested” in
with regard to rational truth, since every rational truth is conformity; verification “confirms” in finding. Reason
founded upon a truth of veridictance, i.e., formally con- not only affirms but confirms in finding. Reason is not
tains one or several affirmations, and with them, a real formally reason because it affirms, but rather affirmation
truth. Now, here is where one finds the irreducible nov- is formally rational because it constitutes the truth of an
elty of rational truth with respect to the truth of veridic- encounter or finding in constitutive confirmation. The
tance. Since rational truth formally involves affirmations, sketch is the affirmation of what “could be”. Rational in-
one might think that rational truth consisted in that fact tellection is the confirmation of the “could {296} be” in
that when my affirmations about the real meet the real, and by what it is. The finding is a moment of inquiring
they conform to it. Rational truth would thus be simple intellection of what the real “could be” in the world. And
truth of veridictance. This is the idea behind all of classi- because of this it is intellection of a real thing in its
cal philosophy. But rational truth is not that. To be sure, ground; it is grounding intellection. This ground is what
rational truth formally involves affirmations, but does not constitutes in-depth reality, where in depth formally con-
consist in “being” in conformity with the real. Certainly sists in establishment in the world. Rational intellection
without that conformity, there would not be rational truth. is in-depth intellection of the real actualized in its ground.
But rational truth is not mere conformity. Rational truth All of these formulae are identical. And their intrinsic
is the “finding” of conformity; but the finding in itself is formal identity is just the essence of rational intellection
not conformity but something which involves conformity, as finding in constitutive confirmation.
albeit in a new way, viz. confirmation. The rational truth
This is verification as finding.
of affirmation does not consist in conformity of what is
affirmed with the real, but in the confirmation of what is It is not easy to choose an adequate designation for
affirmed by the real. Every rational truth is sought, and is this finding which is constitutive of rational truth. Nev-
the inquiry for something which has been sketched out. ertheless, it is necessary or at least extremely convenient
And the finding is not simple conformity with the af- to have one, for greater clarity in what I am now going to
firmation sketched with the real, but the “confirmation” of expound. For it, let us consider that every confirmation
the sketch by {295} the real. If there were no sketch, involves affirmations. And the affirmations have always
there would be no finding, nor for that matter rational been considered as proper to the logos. Then one might
intellection. It is on account of this that finding is some- be able to call rational truth ‘truth of a logos’, i.e., logical
thing different than simple agreement or simple confor- truth. This is extremely risky because it might easily lead
mity. one to maintain the idea that the rational part of truth is
the subject of logic; rational truth would then be a truth
But let us understand this correctly. The word ‘con- which is logically founded. And that would be a serious
firmation’ can have two meanings. It can mean a type of error, one which I have repeatedly pointed out in the
ratification of a true affirmation: one already has a secure course of this book. The fact is that the expression ‘logi-
truth, and seeks to ratify this truth by another route. Con- cal truth’ has two meanings. It can mean that the truth of
firmation would then be ratification of a truth already af- the logos is logical in the sense that the essence of the
firmed as true. But finding is not confirmation in this logos consists in predicative affirmation. Now in this
sense, for a very simple reason: prior to the finding, what sense, to say that rational truth is logical truth is a great
is affirmed is not affirmed as true, but as a simple sketch falsehood. It is what, since the very beginning of the
of truth. Then ‘confirmation’ means something more book, I have called logification of intelligence. Rather,
radical than ratification; it means giving the character of one must {297} follow the opposite path, viz. seeing in
secure truth to what has been sketched as true. What has the logos the mode of intellective actualization of the real.
been sketched out is secure “with” the found real. This is The logos must be understood with respect to intellection;
the “with” of confirmation. It is not ratification of a truth this is the intelligization of the logos. In such case, ‘logi-
but the very constitution of truth. Confirmation is finding cal truth’ means truth of the real actualized in the logos.
insofar as it gives security. Finding is not a chance stum- Then, clearly, rational truth is logical truth because verifi-
bling upon what is sought, but rather constitutive confir- cation is a mode of truth-making in a twofold way which
mation, constitution of the security of what has been involves the logos. Naked reality is not actualized in in-
sketched in and by the real. It is not ratifying confirma- tellection as logos. Rational truth, on the other hand, is
tion. not actualized formally as logos, but involves logos. Now,
348 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

it is in this sense, and only in this precise and exclusive inscribing can have two modes. One consists in the fact
sense —I insist upon these adjectives—that I say that by that the unreal is what the real “could be”. It is, as we
being dual actualization in confirmation, rational truth is saw, an intellection of the real in drawing back. The
logical truth in the sense of truth of a reality which in one “could be” is inscribed in reality in a very precise way, in
of its aspects makes truth in logos. This is not the best the unreal mode (not in the grammatical sense but in the
expression, but lacking a better one I shall employ it in sense which I just explained). But the unreal can be in-
the final pages of this chapter to designate not “the” ra- scribed in the real in another form, viz. the unreal as
tional intellection but only an aspect of it, that aspect by {299} reality of what the real “could be”. This “could be”
which rational intellection involves affirmations, i.e., in- is not a mere abstract possibility, but something different
volves logos. This is truth as finding. and much more positive: it is intellection in potential
mode (I repeat the same thing here I said with respect to
But here is where the second moment of verification the unreal mode). The “could be” is not, in itself, “possi-
appears. Truth is finding of something which is sought ble”, but “possibilant”, making possible. Therefore this
through sketching. Then verification is not just confirma- “could be” is not intellectively known in a movement of
tive finding but fulfillment of what has been sketched. drawing back, but in a sketching out of a progression to-
And this is the essential point. ward the ground of the real. What is formally sketched
2. Verification as fulfillment. Fulfillment of what? out is, then, the possibilitation of the real qua possibili-
Of what has been sketched out. But, what is it, formally, tant. And this possibilitant or making possible is an in-
that has been sketched out? In what does the fulfillment ternal system of fundamental moments, i.e. their intellec-
consist, and what is then the character of truth as fulfill- tion is a “construction” of possibilitation. To facilitate
ment? this expression, let us here employ the word ‘possibilities’,
in plural, as opposed to what is merely “possible”.
a) What the sketched out is formally. Although we
have already dealt with this question, let us here recall the Let us now ask ourselves what it is that these possi-
ideas that are essential for the subject at hand. Rational bilities possibilitate. The sketch, as I said, is above all a
intellection is {298} actuality of the real not in an act of construction of what the real “could be” in its in-depth
intellection but in intellective activity. It is intellective reality. Therefore the possibilities possibilitate, above all,
activity “toward” the grounding real, in a “toward” deter- the real in its worldly reality. The actualization of the
mined by the real itself apprehended as real already, and world in intellective activity is actualization of possibili-
which is what we now seek to understand in its ground. It ties of a ground. It is not that these possibilities come
is in this moment of the “toward” that one intellectively before the real, but that they are the very ground by which
knows the real in thinking actuality; and therefore reality the real is a moment of the world.
is intellectively known then as reality. But the real itself, But these possibilities are not limited to being possi-
intellectively known as worldly reality, is formally given bilities of the real, because this system of possibilities is
by that mode of the real that is the unreal. The unreal is freely sketched out, freely constructed. In virtue of this,
then entirely inscribed within reality. This inscribing has the sketching activity is appropriation of the possibilities
two moments, or if one wishes, two aspects. On one hand in a free option. This is the essence of the sketch as in-
we say that reality is actualized in an intellection, though tellection. With it, the possibilities are not only what pos-
not in an intellection which is necessarily empty, but in sibilitates the real, but also what possibilitates, at one and
one which concretely consists in what, without reserva- the same time, the real and my thinking intellection of the
tion, I have called (as we commonly say), “my ideas”. real. In this aspect they are my possibilities; what possi-
Through this actualization of reality in “my ideas”, their bilitates the real {300} is constituted in possibility from
content is intellectively realized as mere content of the my thinking. Upon being appropriated by me, the possi-
idea in reality. These two moments taken together con- bilities which possibilitate the real in the world possibili-
stitute the unreal. In themselves, the ideas are “a-real”. tate at one and the same time my rational intellection.
They are realized through the actualization of reality in Neither primordial apprehension of reality, authentication,
them. Therefore the unreal, by reason of the ideas, is a nor veridictance are the terminus of appropriation. Verifi-
free creation of mine; and in virtue of that, I say that cre- cation, on the other hand, is formally the terminus of ap-
ating does not consist in giving reality to my ideas but in propriation. One appropriates, I repeat, the possibilities of
giving my ideas to reality. The unreal is inscribed, then, the real in intellection. Now, just on account of this, ra-
entirely within reality by those two moments of actualiza- tional intellection is not just sketching; it is fulfillment of
tion and realization. For the purposes of our problem, this what is appropriated.
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 349

b) What is fulfillment? My rational intellection is, alization by a potency (let us call it that) of things, and by
then, first and foremost actualization of the real in accor- a potency of mine, the intellective potency. In this sense
dance with my sketched out possibilities. And this actu- that realization is a fact. But on the other hand, when the
alization is just the essence of fulfillment. Neither sketch of a possibilitant possibility mediates between a
authentication nor veridictance are, formally, fulfillment. simple potency and actualization, the realization is more
But verification is formally fulfillment, because we are not than a fact, it is a happening. {302} The realization is at
dealing with the fact that what is fulfilled may be the out- one and the same time fact and happening; but being a
come of an intellection which is sought. This search, qua happening is not formally the same as being a fact. While
search of an intellective act, can be common to every in- every happening is a fact, not every fact is a happening.
tellection whatsoever regardless of its formal nature. But The fact is actuation; the happening is actualization. The
verification, as I have already said, is not the search of fact is actuation of “potencies”; the happening is realized
intellection, but intellection which is formally inquiring, actualization of possibilities. As it is in the realization of
intellection in the process of searching. Inquiry pertains possibilities that the essence of the historical consists, it
to the formal content of the intellection itself. And this is follows that the character of rational truth qua happening
exclusive to rational intellection. Neither authentication is what formally constitutes the very essence of the his-
nor veridictance are intellection in inquiry. Neither of torical part of this truth.
these two intellections consists in appropriation of
Now, rational intellection, by being fulfillment, is
sketched out possibilities. But verification does. The ful-
formally historical, since fulfillment is realization of pos-
fillment of what has been appropriated is not a character-
sibilities. Rational truth has this character of historicity.
istic either of act or of activity, but the actuality of what
Historicity is an intrinsic character of rational intellection,
has been intellectively known in that activity qua possi-
of rational truth. But as we had to clarify in what the
bility of its own actualization. Intellection is actualization
character of rational truth consists as finding, to avoid
of the real in intelligence. And when the intellection is
serious errors, so we must now clarify the fact that ra-
rational, then the real is actualized in {301} the form of a
tional truth is historical.
fulfillment of a sketch. This fulfillment itself consists in
realizing the possibilities sketched out and appropriated. That rational truth is historical does not mean in any
Therefore this actualization is what, with complete se- way whatsoever that rational truth pertains to history.
mantic and etymological rigor, should be called fulfilled That is to say, it does not mean that rational truth has
actualization. history. Clearly it does so, and to affirm that is a triviality.
Now, intellective actuality is strictly common to what But “to be” history is not to be “historical”. Neither does
is intellectively known and to intellection itself. That we it mean that rational truth, besides having history, is his-
have already seen. Insofar as it is actuality of the real torically conditioned. It is obvious that this is so, as we
intellectively known in the fulfilled way, it comprises the see in science, for example. Not in just any epoch can the
very essence of rational truth. Therefore rational truth same experiments be sketched out, etc. But here we are
qua truth is the fulfillment in the real of what has been not dealing with that; we are not dealing with the fact that
appropriately sketched out by intellection itself. This is rational truth has history nor with the fact that it is his-
the essential difference between conformity and confirma- torically conditioned; rather, we are dealing with the fact
tion. The fulfillment, and only the fulfillment, is confir- that rational truth is formally historical in itself inasmuch
mation. And conversely, confirmation is fulfilled actual- as it is truth. That means, first of all, that its {303} his-
ity. And because of this rational truth qua fulfillment has toricity is an intrinsic and formal character of rational
its own intrinsic character. truth qua truth.

c) Character of truth as fulfillment. We have seen But even with all this, it is necessary to clarify con-
that as finding, rational truth has a logical character in a cepts still more. On the one hand, one must shun think-
very precise sense, which I have already explained, in the ing that rational truth qua truth is true of something his-
sense of actualization in a logos. In this respect rational torical. This, as is obvious, is radically false, because the
truth is logical truth. Now, as fulfillment, rational truth real qua real does not have to be historical. Some galax-
has a different character, inseparable from the former but ies, a star, or a mathematical object are not historical re-
different from it. In fact, rational truth as fulfillment is alities qua realities. Therefore when the real is historical,
the realization of possibilities. And every actualization of rational truth is doubly historical: it is historical because
possibilitant possibilities, whether intellective or not, has the real in this case is something historical; moreover, it is
a very precise character. On one hand, it is realized actu- historical by virtue of being a rational actualization. Only
350 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

this latter is what is proper to rational truth qua truth. character of finding; it is logical truth. On the other, it
That rational truth is historical does not, then, consist in has a character of fulfillment; it is fulfilled truth, {305}
its being true of something historical. But neither does it historical truth. What is the unity of these two character-
consist in being a truth which, qua truth, depends upon istics? That is the last question which I posed.
intellective knowing itself qua act of mine. And this is so
3. The unity of rational truth. This unity is essential.
for two reasons. In the first place, intellection is not nec-
To see that, we must recall once more that the truth of
essarily historical, and even if it were, this historicity of
rational intellection is a truth of inquiring intellection.
my act does not pertain to the formal content of the ra-
But this, while necessary, is not sufficient; we must pin
tional truth. In the second place, the historicity of intel-
down the intrinsically unitary nature of rational truth in
lection does not consist in the vital unity of intellective
this intellection. Only by occupying ourselves with these
action and of all the vital structures, regardless of the
two questions will the unity of rational truth be clarified.
mode in which this vital unity and its concretion may be
understood. However much one stresses this vital aspect A) Rational truth, truth of an inquiring intellection.
of the historicity of the intellective act, it is still an extrin- Rational truth is, as we have seen, logical and historical.
sic aspect to the truth of what is intellectively known as But this “and” can give rise to a fatal error, because one
true, since it is an historicity of intellective actions qua might think that rational truth is at once logical and his-
actions. All of this pertains to the order of activity. The torical. In such case, the “and” would be a copulative
historicity with which we are now dealing is on the other “and”. This is not completely wrong, but it is not correct,
hand a formal characteristic of rational truth qua truth, either, because rational truth is not at once logical and
and pertains to the order of actuality. And it does not con- historical; rather, it is indivisibly, i.e., at once logical truth
sist in thinking that what is {304} actualized is always and historical truth. Logicity and historicity are two as-
historical reality, nor in thinking that the very mode of pects which are not just indivisible, but mutually co-
intellective action is historical. That rational truth is his- determining of the unity of rational truth. The “and” then
torical qua truth consists in the actualization of the real in means intrinsic indivisible unity.
intellection being fulfilled actualization. Historicity is
a) To see what this means, let us recall the outcome
here a mode of actuality. It is not a mode of activity.
of our previous analysis. As truth of inquiring intellec-
But this is not all, because in turn this formal and tion, rational truth is truth as sketched out. And the truth
intrinsic historicity does not consist in being merely a of a sketch is verification, i.e., consists in the real truth-
dynamic characteristic. To be sure, every truth of making, in the real giving of truth, in a sketching intel-
veridictance is, as we saw, a dynamism of conformity to- lection. This verification is finding and fulfillment, not
ward adequation. But rational truth is not just a move- along the lines of a copulative “and”, but in a radical way
ment of a phase of conformity of truth to another phase; in each of those two moments. The real as sketched out is
rather, it is the fulfillment, in each of these phases, of its found in fulfilling, and is fulfilled by finding. Finding is
progression. Intellective progression is a sketch of possi- confirmation, and fulfillment is {306} making possible.
bilitant possibilities; its actualization is fulfilled intellec- Therefore something is confirmed by making possible and
tive actuality. And it is in this that rational truth formally is made possible by confirming. The real makes truth in a
consists. It is an actualization of possibilities, an actuali- possibilitant confirmation and in confirming possibilita-
zation of the “could be”. And the historicity of rational tion. The unity of rational truth consists in the identity of
truth does not, therefore, consist in movement, either tem- both of these formulae. Each of the two (historicity and
porary or temporal, of an actuality; rather, it consists in a logicity) intrinsically and formally involves the other indi-
mode of constitution of the actuality of the real, in being visibly. That is, rational truth is historically logical (ful-
actuality made possible, a fulfilled actuality. In this re- filling), and is logically historical (finding). Such is the
spect rational truth is formally and intrinsically historical intrinsic and formal unity of rational truth. The logical
truth. portion of rational truth consists in historical fulfillment;
and the historical portion of rational truth consists in logi-
Therefore: (1) Historicity here is a mode of actuali-
cal finding. This is the radical and formal identity of the
zation, not a mode of action or actuity; (2) this mode is
logical and the historical in every rational intellection. It
fulfillment, not dynamic conformity. That is the meaning
is an identity which shines through in the sketching char-
of the expression, “historicity is actualization, fulfilled
acter of rational intellection as such, i.e., in inquiring in-
actuality; rational truth is fulfilled truth”.
tellection as such. Sketching is the manner of intellective
In summary, rational truth has on the one hand a knowing in the inquiring sense. The unity of the logical
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 351

and of the historical in rational truth shines through, I problem. The unity of the logical and the historical in
repeat, in the inquiring character of this intellection. rational truth is then but the very unity of sentient reason.
Each form and mode of reality has its own rational truth. Only a sentient reason intellectively knows worldly reality
‘Rational’ does not mean something proper to conceptu- as a problem, because reality as a problem is but reality
alization or to some theory, but is purely and simply the sensed in a worldly “toward”. And it is because of this
found real as confirming its intrinsic possibilitation. that there is and must be inquiry and hence sketching. In
virtue of that, rational intellection is intrinsically logical
b) But, In what, positively, does this unity which thus
and historical, precisely and formally because it is intel-
“shines through” consist? We have already answered: in
lection of sentient reason, i.e. because it is the actuality of
being actuality. Verification is a mode of actualization,
worldly reality as a problem. The unity, I repeat, of the
i.e., a mode of truth-making. The unity of the logical and
logical and the historical in rational truth—and only
of the historical in rational intellection is found, then, in
there—is but the unity of sentient reason. And this unity
the moment of actuality. What actuality are we talking
consists in being sentient intellection activated by the real.
about? The actuality of the truth-making of the real in
This intellection is measuring. Reason is the intellection
thinking activity. Now, this is the formal definition of
of measure of the reality of things. And therefore sentient
reason. The identity of the logical and the historical
reason is a measuring intellection of the reality of what is
which shines through in the sketch is {307} the very es-
of the field in the world. And in this intrinsic and formal
sence of reason. The logical and the historical are “one”
unity of sentient intellection, activated in measuring in-
indivisibly because they are indivisible moments of that
tellection, consists intellection as sketching; and therefore
mode of intellection which is reason. It is reason itself
in it consists the intrinsic and formal unity of the logical
which, intrinsically and formally is logico-historical or
and of the historical in rational truth. Rational truth is
historico-logical. Now, reason is sentient intelligence
historical and logical, because it is the actuality of the real
activated by the real itself. In sentient intellection one
as a problem, a problem which activates sentient intelli-
senses reality in the field manner in its diverse modes;
gence, making of it sentient reason.
therefore one senses, in the field manner, the real in that
mode which is the “toward”. And this “toward” has an We asked ourselves what the actuality of the real in
“intra-field” aspect, through which the intellection takes rational intellection is. It is the thinking actuality of the
on a dynamic character. But this “toward” also has a real; it is actuality in sentient reason, i.e., it is formally
“trans-field” aspect; this is the “toward” of the whole field actuality of the real as “pro-blem”. It is in this moment of
of reality toward reality simpliciter, i.e., toward the world. thinking actuality of the real in sentient reason, in the
The field is the sensed world. There are not two inde- actuality of the real as “pro-blem”, {309} that the unity of
pendent “toward’s”. The worldly “toward” is the actuality rational truth consists. The identity of the logical and the
of the field real, but as “pro-blem”. Worldly reality is the historical consists in the actuality of reality as a problem.
problem of field reality. The actuality of the world has the An intellection of the real as problem is essentially and
concrete form of “pro-blem”. A problem is not a “ques- constitutively an inquiring sketch of the measure of the
tion” but a mode of actualization; it is the actuality of the real in the world of reality and is therefore logico-
real as hurled into the intellection (from the Greek ballo, historical.
to hurl). And this hurling has a very precise structure: it
is the trans-field “toward” of intra-field reality. A prob- c) But it is necessary to go one step further. Reason
lem is just the mode of actualization of the reality of the is an activity of sentient intellection activated by the real
world. It is not that worldly reality itself is a problem, but itself intellectively known in that intellection. And the
the mode in which this reality is given to us as real in actuality of the real in this intellective activity is just rea-
actuality. son, as I have said. Therefore, as I said, the actuality of
the real in reason, i.e., the actuality of reality as a prob-
In virtue of this, intellection takes on the character of lem, is a modulation of the actuality of the real in sentient
progression. This “toward” is what I have called “giving intelligence. And as the proper part of sentient intellec-
one pause to think”. Therefore inquiring intellection is tion is to give us an impression of reality, it follows that
sentient intellection in action. That is, reason is a modu- the actuality of the real in sentient reason is but a modu-
lation of sentient intellection and therefore is constitu- lation of the impression of reality. What is this modula-
tively sentient reason. By virtue of being so, reason is tion?
inquiring and sketching. And in virtue of this, it is a
logico-historical reason {308} (or historico-logical) be- In sentient intellection of primordial apprehension,
cause it is intellective actuality of reality in the form of a we formally apprehend the real, and we impressively have
352 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

the real itself as real. Therefore as this intellection is ac- sentiently in fulfillment of something found, also sen-
tivated by the sensed real in a “toward”, the thinking in- tiently. The sensed measure is therefore a sketched meas-
tellective activity, reason, is already in the real. The real ure, and hence is intrinsically logico-historical. Reason is
is not something which must be achieved by reason; rea- formally sentient; it is sentient intellection of the measure
son already moves, formally and radically, in reality. of the reality of things. And it is on account of this that
Therefore I say once again, reason does not consist in go- its truth is logico-historical and is verification of measure.
ing to reality, but in going from field reality toward The sentient facere of veri-fication makes verum some-
worldly reality, in going toward field reality in depth. thing formally logico-historical. Because of this, that
And this “in depth” consists in ground-reality. Reason is unity is but the precipitate of a sentient reason. Sentient
identically in-depth intellection and grounded intellection. reason is the measuring modulation of the impression of
This grounded “in depth” is apprehended in the form of a reality. And by being so, it is at once logical and histori-
“toward” from sensed reality itself in sentient intellection. cal, because it is at once inquiring intellection of the
Therefore sentient intellection, as we already saw when measure of reality in an impression of reality. The activa-
dealing with the origin {310} of reason, gives us the mo- tion of sentient intelligence by the real, in fact, is an in-
ment of reality in impression in three modes. The pri- quiring activity of the measure of the reality of things.
mary and radical mode is reality as mere otherness of Therefore the truth of this intellection, i.e., verification, is
what is sensed as something de suyo. It is reality as for- formally logico-historical. Sentient reason is a measuring
mality. But this reality has, intrinsically and formally, the (i.e., logico-historical) modulation of sentient intellection.
moment of the field “toward”. Thanks to it, reality is the
What is the nature of this rational intellection qua
medium in which dynamically we intellectively know
intellection?
what is of the field. It is the impression of reality not as
simple formality, but as mediality. But the “toward” sends B) The nature of rational intellection. Truth, as I
us toward what is trans-field, toward the worldly. And in have been constantly repeating, is the truth-making of the
this other aspect, reality is not just a medium of intellec- real in intellection. This truth-making takes place in di-
tion but the in-depth ground which mediates the simple verse ways, as we have seen. These diverse ways consti-
reality of the real. This is the impression of reality not as tute so many modes of sentient intellection. Each of them
formality and mediality, but as measure. That modulation is a modulation of the previous one, because each mode of
is just reason. In this intellection, things already appre- {312} truth is a modulation of the impression of reality.
hended as real give us the measure of their reality. Such When the real makes truth in a measuring sketch of real-
is the very essence of reason, viz. to intellectively know ity, i.e., in sentient reason, we have that modulation of the
the measure of the reality of real things. Reality given in impression of reality which is the measure. The mode of
impression of reality is formality, mediality, and measure. making the real true by this modulation is verification.
These are not, as I already said, three uses of the impres- Verification is truth as sketched. And the intellection of
sion of reality, but three modes of a single impression of the real as verification is what constitutes reason. But that
reality. Reason is a modulation of the impression of real- is a conception of rational truth along the lines of the in-
ity, and therefore it moves, radically, in reality and is de- tellectively known real. Now, just as the mode of making
termined by it not just by the demand for evidence (that the real true in sentient reason is a modulation of the im-
would be proper only to mediality), but by what I have pression of reality, so also this mode of making the real
called the coercive force of the real. true modulates intellection itself qua intellection. Intel-
lection, in fact, is mere actuality of the real. Therefore the
And here is the radical and formal unity of the logi-
modulation of actuality is eo ipso modulation of sentient
cal and the historical in rational truth: it is, I repeat, the
intellection. What is this modulation of intellection qua
actuality of the real as “pro-blem”. This unity is what
intellection? Here we have our last question in this prob-
constitutes sentient reason. In fact, reason consists in
lem.
measuring the reality of things; in it real things give us
the measure of their reality. But reason measures reality in Now, intellection of the real as sketched, in verifica-
accordance with {311} canonic principles which are tion, is just what constitutes knowledge. To know is to
sensed in the field manner. As canonic and measuring, intellectively know what something is in reality as a mo-
the principle is logical. In and of itself, the canonic prin- ment of the world. It is the mode of intellection of the
ciple is not just intellectively known, but also sensed. measure of reality of a real thing; it is to intellectively
Only a sentient reason is, formally, a measuring of the know what something is in reality. Knowledge is that
real. And because of this, measurement itself takes place modulation of sentient intellection which intellectively
 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF KNOWING 353

knows the measure of the reality of what is sensed, and is makes explicit the character of the ground and hence of
the intellection which consists in intellectively knowing profundity. The three formulae, then, are not three ex-
rationally. Now, as rational truth is intrinsically and for- pressions of a fundamental identity; each, in fact, just
mally logico-historical, it follows that every knowledge as makes the previous one explicit. Hence we can always use
such is intrinsically and formally logico-historical. the third as a summary of the first two: knowledge is in-
tellection in reason. And the identity of these three for-
It is so in the strict sense which we explained when
mulae is precisely knowledge, inquiring intellection.
dealing with rational truth. Therefore to affirm that all
knowledge is logico-historical intellection is not in any b) I say “intellection ‘in’ reason”, and not “intellec-
sense whatsoever that which is usually called historicism. tion ‘with’ reason” because reason is but a mode of intel-
Historicism consists {313} in conceptualizing knowledge lection, i.e., a mode of mere actuality of the real in sen-
and its truth as a more or less relative moment, as a truth tient intellection. Reason is not something added to in-
more or less relative to history understood as movement. tellection (that is what the “with” would express), but a
Therefore it consists in affirming that the truth of knowl- modulation of intellection (just what the “in” expresses).
edge is relative to a moment of history. And this is unac- Hence the essence of knowledge is found in the modula-
ceptable, because the historicity of knowledge is not a tion of making the real true. Consequently, knowledge is
movement but an intrinsic and formal characteristic of not a judgement or a system of judgements, but formally a
intellection itself qua logically true. That we have already mode of actuality of the real in intellection. The idea of
explained. Knowledge is truth as sketched and is there- knowledge must be conceptualized as a mode of truthify-
fore intellection fulfilled in finding. Hence, if indeed it is ing, as a mode of actuality, of that mode of actuality of the
true that knowledge “has” a history, it does so only be- real which is the “pro-blem”. {315} I repeat, a problem is
cause knowledge “is” formally true in fulfillment. not an intellectual question but a mode of actuality of the
Therefore the unity of the logical and the historical in real. Only because reality is actualized as a problem, only
rational intellection is what formally constitutes knowl- because of that can there be and must there be questions.
edge. It would be a serious error to conceptualize reason in the
mode of logos, and above all in the mode of predicative
a) This brings us to stress the very idea of knowl-
logos. That would be a logification of knowledge. On the
edge. Up to now we have arrived at three ideas of knowl-
contrary, the logos itself (in all of its forms, including the
edge; and these three I have employed indiscriminately.
predicative), is but a mode of the intellective actuality of
But to finish the discussion, it is now fitting to examine
the real. Therefore one must conceptualize knowledge as
the radical unity of these three ideas. We said that
a mode of truth-making, to wit, a truth-making of the real
knowledge is in-depth inquiring intellection; it is intellec-
in the actuality of a “pro-blem”, and not as a judgement or
tion of the ground, and it is intellection in reason. Now,
system of judgements, which has been the great error of
these three ideas are identical; each just makes the previ-
all of modern philosophy, above all Kant.
ous one explicit. Knowledge is in in-depth inquiring in-
tellection. This means that activity by the real itself— c) To know is then a mode of actuality of the real, a
apprehension in sentient intellection—goes from the field mode of truth-making. Therefore it is, as I said, a modu-
real to the worldly real. And herein consists profundity: it lation of sentient intellection. Hence all that knowledge
is the worldly base of the sensed real. This base is has of intellection, and therefore of truth, it owes to being
formally reality, since the world is reality simpliciter. But a modulation of a previous intellection, ultimately to being
it is not something which “is there”; rather, the mode of a modulation of the primordial apprehension of reality.
being there is to ground: reality qua worldly {314} is From this latter it receives all of its possibility and all of
“ground-reality”. The base is nothing but grounding its scope as truth. Primordial apprehension is not a rudi-
reality. Knowledge as in-depth intellection is grounding mentary knowledge; rather, knowledge is intellection sub-
intellection. Therefore to say that knowledge is grounding sequent to primordial apprehension. Knowledge is born
intellection is but to make explicit the formula by which from an insufficient intellection and terminates in an ulte-
knowledge is in-depth intellection. In-depthness is just rior intellection. Thus, from the point of view of the con-
the nature of the grounding. And what is this grounding? tent of what is intellectively known, the content of knowl-
It consists in the sensed real as a moment of the world, as edge can be at times—though not always—richer than the
a moment of reality simpliciter. And then ground-reality primary intellection, and richer than the primordial ap-
is just the measure of the reality of the real. And this prehension. But the entire scope of knowledge, what
measure is just what we call ‘reason’. Therefore knowl- makes knowledge be knowledge, is the moment of reality
edge is intellection in reason, in measure. And this just of what is known. Now, this moment is not produced by
354 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

knowledge itself, but is given to it {316} in and by pri- truth of logico-historical nature. This actualization is
mordial apprehension, by primary sentient intellection. It reason. Reason consists in the intellection of the sentient
then follows that knowledge is not only grounded in in- measure of {317} the reality of real things. And this
tellection, but is also subordinated to it. Knowledge is, mode of intellection is what constitutes knowledge. It is
then, as I just said, merely subsequent to the intellection because of this that rational truth is logico-historical truth.
of primordial apprehension. An intellection, a complete And as such it is a modulation subsequent to an intellec-
primordial apprehension, will never give rise to knowl- tion; hence the unity of truth. The primary form of truth
edge, nor will it require any knowledge whatsoever. is real truth. When it is distended in the field, reality is
Knowledge as a mode of intellection, i.e., of mere actual- actualized in a dual fashion. This dual actuality is actu-
ity of the real, is essentially inferior to primary intellec- alization in the form of authentication and veridictance.
tion, to the primordial apprehension of the real. Knowl- Authentication and veridictance are real truth itself actu-
edge is, as I said, a modulation of this intellection. And alized in the field manner, i.e., distended. Finally, as the
this intellection is, as I have just reiterated, mere actuality duality is also trans-field, real truth itself is actualized in
of the real; and therefore knowledge is a modulation in a the form of verification. Each form of truth formally in-
problem of the actuality of the real. And this actuality cludes the previous ones, and therefore always formally
thus modulated is unitarily, intrinsically, and formally, includes real truth.
logico-historical actuality. Hence it follows that far from
Intellection begins in primordial apprehension, and
being the supreme form of intellection, knowledge is (by
founded therein is activated in cognizant reason, whose
being rational actuality of the real, of a logico-historical
rational truth formally consists in reversion to that pri-
nature) an intellection which is inferior to the mere intel-
mordial apprehension, from which indeed it never left.
lection of primordial apprehension.
Reason is sentient reason; it is a modulation of constitu-
Knowledge is, I repeat, the successor to primordial tively sentient intellection. From this it is born, therein it
apprehension, and this character of successor consists moves, and therein it concludes.
precisely and formally in being a logico-historical actu-
In the same case it is, as we saw, logos by virtue of
alization of reality actualized as a problem.
being sentient. This already manifests how much inquir-
ing reason, like the field intellection of the logos and the
primordial apprehension of reality, despite their essential
intrinsic differences, still constitute a profound unity, the
* * * unity of sentient intellection. In this way, the analysis of
the modulation of intellection puts before our eyes the
profound unity of that intellection. From it we started.
Here, then, we have the intrinsic character of ra- Therefore at the end of our analysis it would be good to
tional truth. Rational truth is an intrinsic and formal return to the unity of intellection as the general conclusion
thinking actuality of the real as a problem. It is then a of the entire study. {318}
{319}

GENERAL CONCLUSION

THE UNITY OF INTELLECTION

Throughout the course of this study we have exam- In these three modes, each one of the last two is
ined what sentient intellection is and what its modulations based upon the previous one and formally includes it
are, viz. primordial apprehension of a real thing, intellec- without being identified with it. This means that intellec-
tion of a real thing among others in a field (field intellec- tion has a peculiar unity; and it will be necessary, then, to
tion, logos), intellection of each thing already appre- say in what this unity formally consists. {320} But that is
hended in the field but actualized now as a moment of the not enough, because this unity confers upon intellection a
reality of the world (reason). In the first modal form, a unitary quality, so to speak. We do not have intellection
real thing is actualized for us in and by itself as real; in on one hand and diverse modalities on the other; rather, in
the second, we move toward an actualization in logos, every case, we have intellection as a whole, because its
where the now-real thing is in reality; in the third modali- diverse modalizations are imposed by the real itself from
zation what the real thing is in reality is actualized for us its primordial apprehension. What does this unity mean?
as a moment of the world, i.e., we intellectively know the We must, then, examine two questions: the unity of intel-
measure of the reality of that thing qua real. Reality in lection as a problem, and the intrinsic structure of this
and by itself, what it is in reality, and the measure of its unity of intellection. Those are the themes of the two
reality: here we have the three modes of sentient intellec- chapters comprising this General Conclusion.
tion of each thing.

355
{321}

CHAPTER VII

THE PROBLEM OF THE UNITY OF INTELLECTION

It is necessary to pin down, with some rigor, what We would then be dealing with three successive modes of
the unity of intellection is in itself. intellection. As modes they would be modes of something
It is not some unity of stratification. Primordial ap- like an underlying subject, of the intelligence. First we
prehension, logos, and reason are not three strata of in- would apprehend something as real. Later, conserving
tellection, even if one adds that each is based upon the this apprehension, we would intellectively know what this
previous one. Nor are we dealing with the fact that we real thing is in reality, and finally, conserving the real and
apprehend something as real and then advance to a higher what it is in reality, we would intellectively know it as a
level, that of what sensed things are in reality, and then moment of the world. But this is not correct, because field
finally we ascend to pure and simple worldly reality. Pri- intellection does not come after primordial apprehension
mordial apprehension, field intellection, and rational in- but is determined by it. And this determination has two
tellection are not three levels or strata which comprise aspects. On one hand, there is the moment by which pri-
some type of geology of intellection. Such a conception is mordial apprehension determines the logos. However,
nourished upon the idea that each intellection, i.e. the primordial apprehension is not just prior to the logos but
primordial apprehension, the field intellection, and the is logos inchoatively, albeit only inchoatively. We are not
rational intellection each has its own complete unity, in- dealing with mere anteriority but with inchoateness. But
dependently of the unity of the other two modes of intel- there is another aspect. What is determined, logos, then
lection. Hence intellection would move in each of these involves {323} primordial apprehension as something in
planes without having anything to do with the other two. which this latter unfolds. So there is not just anteriority
The most that could be said is that each stratum rests upon but inchoation and unfolding. The same must be said,
the previous one, in a way which is ultimately extrinsic; mutatis mutandis, of reason: logos, and therefore primor-
each plane would have its own {322} exclusive structure. dial apprehension, determine rational intellection, which
Strictly speaking, we would then be dealing with three is then inchoatively determined by these two intellections
unities; the unity of intellection would then be purely ad- as an unfolding of them. The modes are not merely suc-
ditive. But this is incorrect; each one of those things we cessive but have a more radical unity.
called ‘strata’ not only presupposes the previous one as One might think, finally, that these three modes,
support, but includes its intrinsically. Primordial appre- thus mutually implicated, at least comprise a lineal unity.
hension is formally present and included in the logos, and That is, we would be dealing only with a trajectory of that
both intellections are formally present and included in which we could vaguely call ‘intellective knowing’. But
reason. They are not three unities but a single unity. And the fact that there is a trajectory is not the same as this
the fact is that we are not dealing with three planes of trajectory constituting the formal essence of the three
intellection but three modalities of a single intellection. modes of intellection. Each mode not only unfolds the
They are three modes and not three planes. To be sure, previous one and is inchoatively in the following one, but
each mode has its own irreducible structure. It would be is formally included in the following one as well. This
false to attribute to primordial apprehension the structure formal character I have been stating monotonously, but
of the logos or of reason. But by being modalities of a the without emphasizing it. Now we must occupy ourselves
same intellective function, they confer a precise structure with it, because if matters are this way, then it is clear that
upon this unity. What is it? in virtue of this inclusion, the prior mode is in some way
One might think that because there are three distinct qualified by the following one. Each mode has its own
modalities, they would at least be successive modalities. intrinsic structure, but by virtue of being formally in-

357
358 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

cluded in the following one, it is thereby affected by it. So inexorable growth is determined by the formal structure of
we are not dealing with just any type of trajectory of in- the first mode, of primordial apprehension of sentient in-
tellective knowing, but with a growing, a maturation. telligence. Sentient intellection, in its mode of primordial
There is a trajectory of intellective knowing, but it is apprehension, intellectively knows, in impression, reality
grounded upon something more refined, in a maturation. as formality of a thing in and of itself. This impression
The trajectory is only a derived and secondary aspect of has different moments. In its moment of “toward”, it ac-
maturation itself. The unity of the three modes is the tualizes the respectivity of each real thing to other sensible
unity of a maturation. things and to worldly reality. This respectivity is consti-
tutively essential to the impression of reality. Therefore,
This is a structural unity. Maturity enriches, but that although it is not formally constitutive of intellection, it is
is because it is necessary to mature. For what? To be nonetheless something structurally determinant of the
fully {324} what it already is. This need for maturity is other two modes. This structure is then something which
thus an insufficiency. In what way? Not, to be sure, with enriches the impression of reality, but does so not qua
regard to reality simpliciter—that has been grasped since reality but in its respective terminus. But then it does not
primordial apprehension, since the first mode. But the go beyond the impression of reality; rather, it determines
real thus apprehended is doubly insufficient; it does not that impression as logos and as reason. Logos and reason
actualize to us what a thing is in reality or what it is in are incremental fulfillment of something that cannot be
reality itself. Without primordial apprehension, there lost and is present as a font, the impression of formality of
would be no intellection whatsoever. Each mode receives reality. This is the radical unity of the three modes of
from primordial apprehension its essential scope. Logos intellection. But that is not enough, because we may ask,
and reason do no more than fill the insufficiency of pri- in what does {325} the formal unity of this impression of
mordial apprehension; but thanks to this apprehension— reality, in its modal determinations, in its maturation,
and to it alone—they move in reality. Modal maturation consist? Here is the question which we must treat as the
is not formally constitutive of intellective knowing, but its conclusion of this entire study. {326}
{327}

CHAPTER VIII

THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE UNITY OF SENTIENT INTELLECTION

Sentient intellection is, formally, a mere actualiza- primordial apprehension of reality and the intellection of
tion of the real in accordance with what the real is de what really is, have the unity of being actualization of the
suyo. This formal structure determines the actualization same real thing. But they are not merely two actualiza-
of what the real thing is in reality, and of what it is in re- tions; rather, the second is a re-actualization of the first.
ality itself. These two actualizations modalize the formal And this is the decisive point. Actualization determines
part of intellection. In this modalization, the act of intel- the re-actualization, but then this latter re-actualizes, and
lection and also intellective knowing itself are modalized, in turn determines the first actualization. The primordial
as well as the intellective state in which we are. What is intellection of the real is then on one hand determinant of
the nature of the modalized act? What is the nature of the reactualization. But in turn this re-actualization de-
modalized intellective knowing itself? What is the intel- termines in some way the first actualization. This is the
lective state in which we find ourselves, in this modalized very essence of the “re-”. It is a “re-” in which one ex-
fashion? We must then expound three essential questions: presses the formal structure of the unity of the two intel-
lections. What is this structure? {329}

§1. The unity of the act of intellection. To be sure, we are not dealing with an effort to do a
representation of a real thing, because intellective know-
§2. The unity of intellective knowing itself. ing is not representing but reactualizing. Intellective
§3. The state in which we find ourselves intel- knowing is always presenting, i.e., having what is intel-
lectively. lectively known present. Intellection is making something
“to be here-and-now present” insofar as it “is here-and-
now”. Therefore the second intellection, by being re-
{328} actualization, determines another mode of presentation.
Of what? Of the same real thing. This is re-actualization.
§1 How? In every reactualization we return from the second
actualization to the first. And in this reversion consists
the unity of the “re-”. How?
THE MODAL UNITY OF THE ACT
Reactualization is “re-turning". That is, with the
The formal structure of intellective knowing, I must second intellection in hand we return to the first. Given
reiterate, consists in mere actualization of a real thing as the photon, we return to the color green. And in this re-
real in sentient intellection. But ulteriorly, this same turning, the second intellection involves the first. We
thing gives rise to two intellections: the intellection of intellectively know the color green from the photon, re-
what the apprehended is in reality (logos), and the intel- turning to this real color green from what it really is.
lection of what that which is in reality, is in reality itself Therefore the first intellection is as if encapsulated or en-
(reason). So as not to make the expression unduly com- closed in the second. The apprehension of the green is
plicated, I shall forthwith designate both intellections with comprehended by virtue of the photon. Comprehending is
a single expression: the intellection of what a thing not merely apprehending, but encompassing something.
“really” is. ‘Really’ here encompasses both “in reality” Here, ‘to comprehend’ has the etymological sense of com-
and “in reality itself”. Therefore we shall deal with both prehendere. Comprehension is what is going to constitute
intellections as if they were a single one as distinct from the mode of a real thing being newly present. It is a pe-
primordial apprehension. These two intellections, the ripheral circumscription, so to speak, of the primordial

359
360 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

apprehension of the real. This comprehension of a real perience is not a meaning. In the idea of personal experi-
thing incorporates what it really is; the photon is incorpo- ence there is a possible ambiguity. The experience is re-
rated into the color green. And this incorporation has a ality. And what is comprehended is not the meaning of
precise name, viz. comprehension: we have comprehended that reality but the reality of that meaning. The meaning
and not just apprehended the real green. Here the word is but a moment of the reality of the personal experience.
‘comprehension’ does not have its etymological meaning What is comprehended is not the personal experience of
but rather its ordinary one, that of understanding some- reality but the reality of the personal experience. Meaning
thing. The “com-prehension” of a real thing, {330} from is but a moment of the reality of the personal experience.
the intellection of what it really is, makes us understand What is comprehended, I repeat, is not the personal expe-
or comprehend what that real thing is. The “re-” of reac- rience but the reality of the personal experience qua real-
tualization and its dependence on the real already actual- ity; it is, if one wishes, the personal experiential reality,
ized in primordial apprehension is what “comprehension” the fact that this reality has, and must have, a meaning.
is. The unitary act of this intellection is then comprehen- Then the ultimate difference, assumed by Dilthey, between
sion. explication and comprehension disappears. The problem
of comprehension as such remains intact only with the
What, to be more precise, is this comprehension? It
problem of interpretation. Moreover, it is not just per-
is fitting to address this question with some rigor.
sonal experiences—personal realities—which are com-
To do this, it is convenient to conceptualize compre- prehended; the same applies to all realities. Every reality
hension in this sense vis-à-vis other senses. To be sure, it intellectively known in primordial apprehension can be,
is not what medieval philosophy called a comprehensive and in principle must be, re-intellectively known in com-
science, viz. the intellection of all that is intelligible in an prehension.
intellectively known thing, because what we usually call
This limiting of comprehending, of Verstehen, to
‘comprehending’ is not this total comprehension. And
meaning can take on different characteristics, as seems to
the fact is that we are but dealing with a mode of intellec-
have happened in Heidegger. I say “seems to have hap-
tion according to which something really is.
pened” because the matter is not clear with respect to him.
Nor are we dealing with a logical moment of the so- On the one hand, for Heidegger, Verstehen is interpreting.
called comprehension of notes as opposed to the extension Despite all of the changes in it that one may wish to con-
of their possible subjects. sider, it is the same idea that one finds in Dilthey, and in
Rickert as well. On the other hand, Verstehen is at other
Nor does ‘to comprehend’ here mean what, in times employed by Heidegger as a simple translation of
Dilthey’s philosophy, has been called Verstehen of a per- intelligere, as for example in the beginning of his great
sonal experience as opposed to the explication of it and of work.* Now, this is untenable. Intellectus is not compre-
its content. For Dilthey, comprehension falls back upon hension but intellection. And {332} apart from any his-
personal experience and upon what is experienced in it. torical and translation problem, ‘to comprehend’ is not
For him, personal experiences, be they explained as they synonymous with ‘to intellectively know’; comprehending
may, are not thereby comprehended. Only will they be so is only a mode of intellective knowing. There are millions
when we have interpreted their meaning. To comprehend of things which I intellectively apprehend, i.e., which I
is, for Dilthey, to interpret the meaning, and conversely a apprehend as real, but which I do not comprehend. I such
meaning is interpretation of personal experience. With cases there is intellection without comprehension.
the law of gravity we do not comprehend the mortal fall of
a man, i.e., whether it is suicide, accident, homicide, etc. Comprehension, then, is not comprehensive science
Things are explained, experiences are comprehended and or notional comprehension, nor interpretation of meaning.
interpreted. It is a special mode of intellective knowing. And then we
must ask ourselves what comprehending is.
But this not adequate.
We have already given the answer: in comprehen-
To comprehend is not to interpret; rather, to interpret sion one turns to apprehending something already appre-
is only a mode of comprehending. Moreover, as a mode hended as real, in light of which we have apprehended
of {331} comprehending it does not encompass all real what it really is. There are, then, three intellective actu-
things, but just some, the personal experiences of which alizations of the same reality. In the first place, there is
Dilthey speaks. Now, even considering personal experi-
ences, comprehending is not interpreting their meaning.
The formal terminus of comprehension of a personal ex- *
[Being and Time—trans.]
 GENERAL CONCLUSION 361

the intellective actualization of a thing as real, viz. the tively knowing the individual, not just as determinant but
primordial apprehension of reality. In the second place, as determinant and determined, what we have intellec-
there is the intellective actualization of what a real thing tively known is not just the structured, but the very nature
is really, viz. modal intellection in logos and reason. Fi- of the structuring of {334} the real. This is structural
nally, in the third place, there is the intellective actualiza- unity considered “formally”. What is really determined is
tion of the same real thing (which was already appre- the real structure of a thing. Then we see the radical unity
hended in primordial apprehension), but modally incorpo- of the “really” and the “real”; it is the formal structural
rating into it what has been actualized in the intellection unity of the real and really. We see a real thing based on
(logos and reason) of what it really is. This third actuali- what it really is. Now, this intellection is just comprehen-
zation is comprehension. Comprehending is apprehend- sion. The formal terminus of comprehension is not what
ing the real based on what it really is; it is intellectively is structured, but the nature of the structuring itself. It is
knowing how the structure of a thing is determined based structure as formal (not just material) molding of the in.
on what it really is. It is just the act of intellection as uni- The nature of structure is the ex determined by the in. To
tary and modal. comprehend is to intellectively know the nature of the
structure of the real by which a thing really is. Naturally,
The question therefore consists in our saying pre-
the boundaries between intellectively knowing what
cisely what the formal object of comprehension is. This
something really is and comprehending what that some-
question turns into two others: what is it that comprehen-
thing is, are often almost imperceptible. Therefore it is at
sion incorporates, and in what does the incorporation con-
times quite difficult to differentiate the two modes of in-
sist?
tellection. Nonetheless these two modes are different.
1. What does comprehension incorporate into {333} Their difference is not just a de facto difference in my
primordial apprehension of the real? When a real thing is intellection, but a constitutive difference of human intel-
apprehended in primordial apprehension as real, it is in- lective knowing. To see that, let us take the simplest ex-
tellectively actualized in the formality of reality, both in its ample, one which will most clearly reveal the difference in
individual moment as well as in its field and worldly mo- question, viz. intellectively knowing that this piece of pa-
ments. The individual moment radically determines the per is green. I intellectively know, in primordial appre-
field and worldly moments; without individual real things, hension, this piece of paper with all of its notes, including
there would be neither field nor reality nor world. But in greenness. But if I affirm that “this piece of paper is
turn, what is of the field and what is of the world, once green”, I not only have intellectively known the piece of
determined, determine the individual. In virtue of this, paper with its note, but have intellectively known this
the individual, field, and worldly moments comprise a piece of paper “among” other colors, from which only one
unity which is not additive but rather is a structural unity was realized in the green piece of paper. That affirmation
of determination. In order to intellectively know this is therefore an intellection of what the paper, chromati-
unity one may follow two different paths. In the first path cally, is in reality. But I can also consider this piece of
what is individual determines what is of the field and paper by saying, for example, “what green really is, is the
what is of the world. The individual is not lost, but ab- color of this piece of paper”. This turn of phrase points
sorbed into the field and worldly moments, as a determi- up not just the mere realization of the green of this piece
nant of them. As we have seen, this intellection of the of paper, but the very nature of the structuring by which
individual as determinant of the field and of the world is this piece of paper is green. That goes beyond {335}
what constitutes the intellection of what, really, the indi- having intellectively known what the piece of paper is
vidual real thing is. To intellectively know what some- chromatically; it is to have comprehended the greenness
thing is really is to intellectively know what the individual of the paper. Every affirmation is the intellection of a
real thing is in the field of reality and in the world. realization; and when I intellectively know this realization
But this is not the only possible path for intellection. as the nature of its structuring, then the structural unity is
I can also intellectively know the individual thing as de- formally intellectively known—this is comprehension
termined in turn by that field and world moment which exactly. The triviality of the case shows that the differ-
the individual thing itself has already determined. Then ence between these modes of intellection is not a mere
the structural unity takes on a different intellective char- fact, but stems from the very nature of intellective know-
acter. Upon intellectively knowing what the individual ing, viz. from its double moment of “real” and “really”.
really is, the structural unity is intellectively known in the This triviality likewise shows that the difference between
real, but only “materially”: we have intellectively known intellectively knowing what something is really and com-
in what the real consists as structured. But upon intellec- prehending what this thing is can be almost impercepti-
362 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

ble. I shall return to this point forthwith. Because of this ual thing. This turning is the return in which I intellec-
imperceptibility, the point has generally remained unno- tively know what the thing was in its structuring nature,
ticed. But that this difference is only “almost” impercep- i.e., I intellectively know how what it really was consti-
tible expresses the fact that it is nonetheless a real differ- tutes the very nature of the structure of the real. But then
ence. it is clear that the return consists not in a mere “return-
In summary, the formal terminus of comprehension ing” to the real, but in intellectively recovering, from what
is the nature of structuring. To comprehend is to intellec- a thing really is, its structure and its notes. And therein
tively know the nature of the structuring of the real as consists the corporeity of actualization; it is {337} recov-
real, to intellectively know in the real as its own internal ery of the fullness of the real. This fullness consists just
moment, the manner in which what really is determines in nature of the structuring. Therefore the incorporation
the structural notes of a thing. The nature of structure is is neither addition nor application but recovery. In dis-
internal determination. The structural unity of what is tancing from the real, I have intellectively known its
comprehended is therefore the formal unity of “real” and structure; in the return, I have recovered what was left at a
“really”. The intellection of this formal unity is what is distance, viz. its nature as structuring. To comprehend a
incorporated into the real based on intellection of what thing is to recover its notes and its nature as structuring
this piece of paper is in reality. To comprehend is to “see” from what it really is. It is to intellectively know how the
how what something really is, is determining, or has de- photon determines these green notes.
termined, the structure of that real thing. But, in what Comprehension consists in this. Its formal object is
does this incorporation itself consist? That is the second the nature of structuring, and the mode of actualization of
question we must address. this nature is recovery. With this we have intellectively
known something more than before. It is not, strictly
2. In what does incorporation consist? Incorporation
speaking, “more”, but rather “better”—better actualiza-
is not, to be sure, some “addition”, because what the real
tion. And this is what was lacking in the primordial ap-
really is, is intellectively determined by the real itself;
prehension of reality, viz. comprehension. If we call pri-
therefore we are not dealing with an addition to the real
mordial apprehension ‘intuition’—though very inappro-
{336} of something from outside. Nor is this a mere “ap-
priately, as we saw—it will be necessary to say that intui-
plication”. We are not trying to intellectively know what
tion simpliciter is not comprehension. Bergson always
something really is and then apply that intellection to the
believed that intuition was comprehension. That was, in
concrete real which I have in my intellection. It is not a
my view, one of his two serious methodological errors.
case of application but intrinsic determination of the notes
Intuition is something which must be recovered for there
according to what they really are. To intellectively know
to be comprehension. Comprehension is not intuition, but
it I must intellectively know, in a thing, how its notes are
recovery of what was intuited based on what really is.
issuing forth, so to speak, from what a thing really is.
The richness of intuition, an undeniable moment of it,
This is just what I have called ‘the nature of structuring’.
tends to hide its poverty of comprehension.
The nature of structuring does not consist merely in pos-
sessing a structure, but in intellectively knowing this Intellection is apprehension of the real, and therefore
structure, possessed intrinsically, as a mode of reality. every intellection, even comprehensive intellection, is a
And here is the difficulty. Clearly, intellection of the na- maturation of primordial apprehension. And what ma-
ture of the structuring of the real stems from intellection tures in this maturation is ultimately comprehension itself.
of the real. And as intellection is actualization, it follows Therefore full intellection is comprehensive apprehension.
that that from which it stems, and that where the nature of
the structuring is intellectively known, is just that actuali- This is the unitary structure of modal intellection as
zation. To incorporate, then, means first of all to form a act; it is the actualization which goes from the “impres-
body, to constitute in a certain way the corporeity of the sion of reality”, by means of the intellection of what
actualization of the real. But this is not enough, because “really” is, to the {338} intellection of the recovery of the
in the second place, what corporalizes this actualization is real based on what really is.
just the nature of the structuring. And in order to reach This comprehension is not just a fact; it is a neces-
intellective knowledge of it, we have had to go to the field sity. And it is so because the real is always intellectively
and worldly moments of the real, distancing ourselves in a known in sentient intelligence. Comprehending is, in
certain way from its strictly individual moment. It is in man, comprehending sentiently, i.e., impressively. And
this distancing that we intellectively know what the real this is what is manifested in some of the characteristics of
really is. Now I turn from this distancing to the individ- comprehension, about which a few words are appropriate.
 GENERAL CONCLUSION 363

1. That comprehension is intrinsically and constitu- ter of our intellection. The necessity of comprehending
tively limited. Comprehension, as I said, is not the com- the real is determined by sentient intellection. Compre-
prehensive science of all that is intelligible, as Medieval hending is always and only recovery, in intellection, of a
philosophy thought. We only comprehend something real thing’s nature of structuring as sensed reality.
about something. And this is true in various senses. Here we have the unity of modal intellection as act:
Comprehension is limited insofar as it can only take it is the act of comprehension. And after having exam-
place in definite directions, because what something really ined the {340} unity of this act as a modal act, we must
is, is also directionally definite. Comprehending some- ask ourselves what intelligence modalized as a function of
thing as interiority, as manifesting, or as actuation of intellective knowing is, and what intellective knowing as
something, are all different. What comprehension is in modally constituted is.
one direction may not be, and in general is not, compre- {341}
hension in another. Even limited to one direction, com-
prehension is gradual. One can comprehend more or less, §2
better or worse. There is, then, a limitation not only by
reason of direction but also by reason of amplitude.
THE MODAL UNITY OF INTELLECTIVE
2. Moreover, there are differences by reason of the KNOWING
level to which one takes the intellection. Comprehending
a real thing such as a dog at the biochemical level is not This is the problem which concerns not the act of
the same as comprehending it at the phylogenetic level, or intellection but intellective knowing itself as such. To
at other levels. Comprehending man at the phylogenetic employ a common expression, we could say that we are
level is different than comprehending him socially, and so dealing with the modal unity of the intellective faculty.
forth. Comprehension is the proper act of this modalized intelli-
3. But above all, it is necessary to stress that there gence. Now, intelligence thus modalized is what should be
are different types of comprehension. One of them is called understanding. The act proper to understanding is
{339} causal explanation, or explanation by means of just comprehending, i.e., understanding what something
laws. Against Dilthey it must be said that explanation really is. As I see it, intellective knowing and under-
itself is a mode of comprehension. Another mode is in- standing are not the same. I call the capacity of appre-
terpretation, which is not limited to meaning but includes hending something as real ‘intellective knowing’. There
the reality of the personal experience, etc. But the most are thousands of things that we intellectively know, i.e.,
important thing is that there are types of comprehension which we apprehend as real but do not understand what
different from causal explanation and interpretation. As I they really are. Understanding is intellectively knowing
see the matter, it is essential that we introduce a type of something real such as it really is. In Spanish and in
what we might call ‘personal causality’. The classical some other languages (but not all) we have the two words
idea of causality (the four causes) is essentially molded ‘intellective knowing’ [inteligencia] and ‘understanding’
upon natural things; it is a natural causality. But nature is [entendimiento]. In contrast, Latin itself has only a single
just one mode of reality; there are also personal realities. word, intellectus, to designate intellective knowing and
And a metaphysical conceptualization of personal causal- understanding. Understanding is, then, the intellective
ity is necessary. The causality between persons qua per- knowing which understands what something, already ap-
sons cannot be fitted into the four classical causes. prehended as real, really is; i.e., what a thing is in reality
Nonetheless, it is strict causality. As I see it, causality is (logos) and in reality itself (reason), the real thing under-
the functionality of the real qua real. And personal func- stood in both the field manner and considered in the
tionality is not the same as “meaning”. Persons find worldly sense. This understanding is not, then, the same
themselves functionally linked as personal realities, and as intelligence. A posteriori we may designate logos and
this linking does not consist in “meaning”. I cannot here reason with the single word ‘reason’, given that field, and
delve into this great problem of causality; suffice it to state therefore the logos, are the world as sensed, i.e., sentient
the problem briefly so that we are able to see that compre- reason. Then in order to conceptualize {342} what un-
hension can assume different types. derstanding is, it will be necessary to trace it out with re-
spect to it what reason is and what intellective knowing is.
All of these differences of limitation, level, type, etc.
are not just differences of fact, but are radically constitu- I. Understanding and reason. By primordial appre-
tive; they have their roots in the formally sentient charac- hension, I apprehend a thing in its formality of reality.
364 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

And this formality, by being respective, brings us to un- of naked intellection. This is a conception which ignores
derstand the thing as a moment of the field and of the the problem of the modal unity of the intelligence in
world. We thus intellectively know what the thing is which the primordial apprehension of reality situates us.
really, and this intellection is reason. If I now intellec- In this way, ultimately, intellection has two sources.
tively know that same real thing based on what it really is, One, which is primary and supreme, is naked sentient
i.e., based on reason, I shall have a much richer intellec- intelligence; the other is modalized intelligence, under-
tion of the thing; I shall have understood it. Therefore standing. They are not two faculties, but rather under-
understanding is the modal outcome of reason. For clas- standing is the supreme modalization of intelligence. The
sical philosophy and for Kant, reason is the supreme form unity of the two dimensions is the respectivity of the real.
of intellection, because reason, in their view, must be the Understanding is but sentient intelligence modalized in
faculty of principles—assuming that a principle is a fun- the field direction (logos) and in the worldly direction
damental judgement—and that therefore reason would be (reason).
a synthesis of judgements of the understanding. On that
basis, reason would be something grounded in the under- {344}
standing. But such is not the case; understanding some-
thing is only to intellectively know it based on what it §3
really is, based on reason. Understanding is then the out-
come of reason and not a principle of it. Understanding is THE UNITY OF INTELLECTIVE KNOWING AS
the supreme form of intellection, but only along modal AN INTELLECTIVE STATE
lines, because a principle is not a fundamental judgement
but reality itself. This reality is not the patrimony of rea- Every act of intellection leaves us in an intellective
son, but comes to it from the primordial apprehension of state, i.e., in a state of intelligence itself. Which state?
naked reality. Therefore understanding is the outcome of That is the difficulty. To address it, we must examine
reason but only along modal lines. This brings us to the three points: What is a state? What is being in an intel-
question of staking out the boundaries of understanding lective state? And What are the diverse intellective types
vis-à-vis not just reason but also naked intellection. of this state?
II. Understanding and intelligence. We understand I. What is a state? A state is always a mode of being
what something really is, i.e., understanding presupposes and “staying” determined by something. It is necessary to
intelligence, because the apprehension of something as return the idea of a state; as a difficulty, it has been absent
real is just intelligence. The real thus apprehended, by from philosophy now for many centuries. Precisely on
being {343} respective, really leads to other real things account of this it is necessary to conceptualize carefully
both of the field and of the world. What is apprehended what we understand by ‘state’ in this problem. For psy-
itself has a content, but also has the formality of reality, of chology, a state is a quiescent mode in which the human
the de suyo. This formality is thus apprehended in sen- subject stays by virtue of an affection of things or the other
tient intelligence. But its content is insufficient. Whence moments of his psyche itself or other persons. A state is
the necessity to go to what the thing really is. We do not how he “is”. This is the concept of a psychological state.
go to reality, but to what the real really is. The root of this Here we are not dealing with that concept of state, for two
new intellection is, then, the insufficiency of the content. reasons. Above all, we are not dealing with it because
But with respect to the formality of reality, primordial what is in a state, in the problem of concern here, is not a
apprehension, naked intelligence has an essential and human subject but intelligence qua intelligence; this idea
ineluctable prerogative. From the point of view of its can only be extended to man as a whole insofar as he can
content, the intelligence is partially grounded in what the be in turn determined by intelligence. In this respect, the
understanding may have investigated. But from the point state to which I am referring is more restricted than the
of view of reality, understanding is grounded in the intel- psychological state. But that is not enough, since we are
ligence. Without naked intelligence there would be no not just dealing with a mere restriction of it. And that is
understanding. Neither would there be reason. For tradi- because—here we have the second of {345} the two rea-
tional philosophy as well as for Kant, understanding is the sons to which I just alluded—we are not dealing with in-
faculty of judging. But this is not the case. Understand- telligence as a structural note of human reality, but with
ing is the faculty of comprehending. For Hegel, on the intelligence in accordance with its formal structure, i.e.,
other hand, reason would be the principle of all intellec- intelligence qua intellectively knowing. And in this re-
tion, not just along modal lines, but also in the direction spect the state to which we are referring is not more re-
 GENERAL CONCLUSION 365

stricted than the psychological state, but is a state which Intellective activity is, then, an intellective retained
has nothing to do with it; it is merely an intellective state, staying by the real and in the real as such.
the state of intellection itself considered formally. What is Granting this, let us ask ourselves in what form we
this intellective state qua state? It is just a being or are retained in intellection. Staying intellectively retained
“staying” in what is intellectively known. It is not being by the real and in the real as such is just what, strictly
or staying psychologically affected as a subject, but a be- speaking, we call knowing [saber]. Knowing is staying
ing situated in what is intellectively known, a being situ- intellectively retained in what is intellectively known.
ated which in Spanish we express by saying, for example, Every apprehension has its own force of imposition, and
“We agree that ...”.* It is not a quiescent state but rather this imposition in the intellective state is knowing. Let us
an acquiescent one, so to speak. fix some of its characteristics.
In what does this being or standing in what is intel- Knowing is not an intellection simpliciter. That
lectively known consist? That is the question of what the would be a very vague notion. Knowing is not an act but
intellective state is, not just qua state but qua intellective. a state, a staying retained in the sensed explained above.
II. What is an intellective state? What an intellec- This must be stressed. And precisely for this reason, its
tive state is depends upon what is intellectively known. most exact linguistic expression is the perfect tense, the
Now, what is intellectively known as such is reality. per-fectum, something intellectively known in a terminal
Therefore an intellective state is a staying or being situ- way. In Latin novi, in Greek oida, and in Vedic† veda:
ated in accordance with the real insofar as the real Is, with these terms do not simply mean “I know”, but {347}
whatever desired degree of elementality and provisionality strictly speaking something more like “I have it known”,
one wishes, the “law of the real”. This staying or being “I already know it”, etc. They are present perfect expres-
situated is at one and the same time of the real and of in- sions, or perfect expressions in the sense of present.
tellection. These are not two different “staying’s” or “be- Thus, among the epithets of Agni in the Rig Veda is that
ing situated’s”, but a single one in which the real and the of being jata-vedas (456,7 and 13); Agni is he who knows
intelligence are together. By being a staying or situation of all that has been born (from the verb jan-). For the Veda,
the real, this staying or being situated is intellective. By things are not “entities” but “engendered things”, “prod-
being of intellection, it is a state. They are not two stay- ucts”, or “born things”, bhuta-, jata-. Differentiated in
ings or situations, but a single "being situated together”. the various Indo-European languages there appears the
And this unity is clear: the real is situated in intellection root gen-, to be born, to engender, which gave rise to the
and intellection itself is grasped in the real. This is what I Vedic jan-, the Greek egnon, and the Latin novi. Now, he
call retentivity. The real retains, and in this retention who has known the “engendered things” is he who has
{346} the real is constituted qua retinent, its intellective veda. Knowing comes designated in the perfect. As an
actuality as a retained state. infinitive, Latin expresses knowing with the verb scire. I
believe that its primary meaning is perhaps “to cut”, and I
This retentivity has precise characteristics. 1) It is
think that it is found in the verb scire as knowing in a
retention by the real. We are not dealing with the ques-
definitive or cutting way, i.e., as designation of a conclu-
tion of what, for example, retention by a stimulus sensed
sive state, of conclusivity. The idea of conclusivity is per-
as a stimulus is. Rather, we are concerned with retention
haps the meaning of scire, viz. finding oneself in a con-
by the real as real. 2) It is retention in the real, not a re-
clusive state (by cutting).
tention in this or that thing, according to its importance,
for example; rather it is a retention in the real qua real. This state as expressed in oida and veda is desig-
We stand in reality. 3) It is retention by the real and in the nated by a single root veid- which directly means ‘vision’.
real, but only in the actualized sense. We are not dealing Knowing would thus be a state of having already seen
with a retention along the lines of actuity, only actuality. something. But this is a great limitation; knowing is a
And for this reason the retention is formally intellective, state of intellection, and intellection is not just vision.
since mere actualization of the real qua real in intelli- Even in the case of vision, we do not refer to vision as an
gence is just intellection. act of the eyes but to intellective vision. Only because of
this has the root associated with seeing been able to mean
knowing. It is a vision which is not optical, but to my way
*
of thinking, a vision of sentient intellection. And as I
[In the original Spanish, the verb quedar can mean ‘to be’, ‘to stand’, ‘to
be situated’; it is here translated as the latter. The expression Zubiri refers
to in Spanish is quedamos en que..., which is an idiomatic one that
†
translates into English as “We agree that ...”.—trans.] [I.e., Sanskrit. -- trans.]
366 INTELLIGENCE AND REASON

have expounded at length, I believe that all of the senses Thus, in Greece, the first form of intellection of re-
are moments of a single sentient intellection. Therefore it spectivity was discerning. This was, ultimately, the direct
is not strange that the state of knowing comes designated idea of Parmenides. Knowing is not taking one thing for
in Latin, and above all in the Romance languages, with a another. In the final instance error would be confusing
root connected to {348} the root word for pleasure, sa- what a thing is with something which it is not, with
pere. Knowing [saber] is more tasting [sabor] than see- something else. As recognized by Plato this idea was
ing. Whence the word sapientia, wisdom [sabiduría]. philosophically elaborated by him in a distinct and richer
With various roots we thus have, in Latin, a single idea, form. Knowing is not determined only by discernment
the idea of an intellective state expressed in a gradual but as a distinct and richer form of respectivity, the defi-
progression from scire, knowing, through scientia, sci- nition. Now knowing is not only not confusing one thing
ence, to sapientia, wisdom. German expresses this same with another but is in turn defining. Finally Aristotle re-
progression with a single root taken from the visual: Wis- ceived this conceptualization and elaborated it further:
sen (knowing), Wissenschaft (science), Weisheit (wisdom). knowing is not only discerning and defining, but also—
Just as the root of scire can mean, as I see it, conclusivity, and above all—demonstrating, in the etymological sense
I think that scire is what most closely approximates that of “showing from where”, showing the internal necessity
conclusive intellectual state which consists in standing of the fact that things must be as they are. In Aristotle,
intellectively retained in the real by the real as such. this demonstrating has different moments: rigorous
Knowing is, then, a state and not an act. It is a state, a reasoning, the intellection of principles upon which one is
standing, and an intellective state: a standing, retained in based, and the sensible impression of that to which they
the actualized real. It admits of various types. are applied. What happens is that these three moments do
not have the same root. The first two are ascribed to nous,
III. Diverse types of knowing. We are dealing with
to intellective knowing, but the {350} third to sensing.
states, and so it is not a question of enumerating the dif-
This is the radical dualism of intellective knowing and
ferent forms of knowing, but of qualitatively differentiat-
sensing. Hence these three moments have run as
ing some modes of intellection.
dissociated throughout the course of the history of
1) Above all, there is naked intellection, the primor- philosophy, precisely because they are found radically
dial apprehension of reality. It is a sentient intellection, dislocated in the contraposition of intellective knowing
and for that very reason it leaves us in a certain state. Its and sensing. Now, it is, on the contrary, necessary to
content is more or less rich, but with respect to what con- conceptualize their radical unity, viz. sentient intellection.
cerns the formality of reality its richness is maximal. In It is from there that the three moments of discerning,
this intellection we stay, first of all, not in this or that defining, and demonstrating ought to be differentiated.
thing. That in which we formally and moreover inelucta- For this reason those three acts are clearly diverse, but
bly stay is in naked reality. By simple intellection, that in they are only three intellective modalities anchored in a
which we stay is in reality. This is a radical and primor- single formal structure of sentient intellective knowing.
dial knowing: the intelligence is retained in reality by Clearly they are not anchored directly in it in the same
reality itself. This is the impression of reality. All other way. Sentient intellective knowing thus determines two
intellections and everything in them which is actualized in types of intellection and therefore of knowing: the
them to us is owing to the fact that we are in reality. intellection and knowing that something is real, and the
{349} intellection and knowing of what this real thing is really.
2) Granting that, the real thus apprehended gives Only sentient intellection determines the duality between
rise to the intellection of what that real is really, viz. logos real and really. Now, discerning, defining, and
and reason. The intellection of a real thing, based on demonstrating are not, for the purposes of our problem,
what it really is, is the second type of knowing. It is three sufficiently distinct intellections, but only the three
staying in having intellectively known what a thing really modes of intellective knowing of what something really is.
is. Knowing is then not a staying in reality, but a staying 3) But there is yet a third type of knowing, that in
in what the real really is. This is the second type of which we stay comprehensively in reality. It is a type of
knowing, viz. knowing not as being in reality but knowing intimate penetration into a real thing from which we
as being in the respectivity of the real. In turn, this sec- know that it really is. The state of knowing is now the
ond type of knowing is diversified in accordance with state in which we stay retained in the real by the real itself
what each thing really is. And here the differences can as intellectively known in comprehension. It is properly
become enormous. the state in which we stand by virtue of the understanding.
 GENERAL CONCLUSION 367

Thus we have the three great types of knowing: be- formality of reality, as something de suyo. This is an in-
ing in reality, being in what the real is really, and being tellective sensing. Sentient intelligence is not a sensible
comprehensively in reality. intelligence, i.e., an intelligence directed to what the
senses offer to it; rather, it is an intelligence which is
Let us repeat once again: the object of knowing is
structurally one with sensing. Human intelligence senses
not objectivity or being; the object of knowing is reality.
reality. It is not an intelligence which begins by conceiv-
The {351} intelligence is not the faculty of the objective
ing and judging what is sensed. Philosophy has counter-
nor the faculty of being; it is the faculty of reality. This
posed sensing and intellective knowing, concentrating
reality is not something distinct from what impresses the
solely upon the content of certain acts. But it has gone
senses. Reality is a formality of the otherness of what is
astray with respect to formality. And here is where intel-
sensed; it is the de suyo. As the formality that it is, it is
lective knowing and sensing not only are not opposed, but
something impressively sensed; it is impression of reality.
despite their essential irreducibility, constitute a single
As the faculty of reality is the intelligence, it follows that
structure, one which, from wherever one looks, should be
the impression of reality is the act of an intelligence which
called ‘sentient intelligence’ or ‘intellective sensing’.
apprehends the real in impression; it is a sentient intelli-
Thanks to it, man stands unmistakably in and by reality;
gence. Human intelligence is sentient intelligence. It is
he stands in it, knowing it. Knowing what? Something,
not a conceiving intelligence or anything of that sort. To
very little, of what is real. But, nonetheless, he is retained
be sure, our intelligence conceives and judges; but that is
{352} constitutively in reality. How? This is the great
not its formal act. Its formal act consists in sensing real-
human problem: knowing how to be in the midst of real-
ity. Conversely, human sensing is not a sensing like that
ity.
of animals. An animal senses what is sensed in a formal-
ity which is merely a stimulus. Man, though he senses the The analysis of this structure has been the theme of
same thing as the animal, nonetheless senses it in the this prolix study of sentient intelligence.
 INDEX*

a posteriori, 47, 49 in St. Thomas, 80-81

a priori, 25, 26, 47, 49, 119, 203, 205, 212, 219, 229, 312, intellection as act of apprehension, 4, 9-11, 27, 31-32,
328, 343 43, 51, 83-84, 93, 107, 189
absolute, 116, 139, 146, 163, 188, 212, 225, 264, 265, 276, knowing not an act but a state, 365-366
286, 302, 339, 343, 345 of affirmation, 170, 206, 342
man as relative absolute, 77 of apprehending the real, 42, 189
necessity, 212, 343 of connection, 221
absolutization, 77 of consciousness, 129
abstract, 9, 15, 16, 46, 47, 88, 142, 148, 188, 231, 262, of impressively apprehending reality, 123
271, 293, 334, 348 of intellection in modern philosophy, 9-10, 51-52, 83-84
abstracted, 142 of intellection, 9, 10, 42, 51, 58-59, 92-93, 95-96, 122,
abstraction, 95, 142, 231 129, 130, 137, 141, 149, 155, 188, 200, 251, 314,
abstractive, 142 348, 359, 361, 363-364
abuse, 180 of intellectively knowing, 273
abyss, 187 of knowing, 9, 34, 188
accent, 305 of logos, 123
accept, 189 of reason, 188, 278
acceptation, 4, 24, 66, 129 of sentient intellection, 4, 36, 57, 58, 64, 104, 182, 328
access, 119, 170, 302, 303, 315, 316, 317, 322, 329, 343 of sentient intelligence, 156
accessible, 119, 315, 326 of stepping back, 135, 137, 228
accident, 74, 75, 80, 162, 225, 310, 360 of the will (volition), 128-129, 146, 173
account, 17, 47, 74, 83, 99, 118, 130, 133, 149, 155, 159, perceptive, 114
163, 165, 174-175, 179, 186, 189, 201, 208-210, 219, physical, 53, 129, 186, 197, 202, 238, 274, 282
222, 224, 227, 233, 236, 247, 253, 255, 257, 259, 262, radical intellective, 211
264-265, 270, 273, 276, 280, 292, 294, 301, 303, 316, unity of act of intellection, 359-363
317, 319, 326, 328, 332, 347, 348, 352, 364 action, 9, 13, 18, 23, 38, 52-53, 55-56, 58-59, 149, 155,
according to concepts, 151-152, 154, 156 180, 244, 251-252, 254-255, 285, 289, 294, 321, 328,
accuracy, 88, 190, 191, 216 350-351
accurate, 186, 192 activity and action not same, 252, 254-255, 289
acoustics, 91 activity is a mode of, 251-252, 254
act actuality and, 180
action and, 52 derives from act and is not actuality, 52, 55-56, 58
actuality and, 51-61 formalization as psycho-biological, 18
actuity and, 4, 52 free, 285
constitutive act of primordial apprehension of reality, inquiring intellection is sentient intellection in action,
95-96 351
degrees of act of intellection, 96 intellection is not formally, 53, 55-56, 59
elemental act of the intelligence, 31-32, 367 moves the intelligence, 180
free, 128, 141-142, 285, 343 not a strict cause in Aristotelian sense, 328
impression of reality and, 33, 108 of thinking activity is reason, 289
in Aristotle, 52, 55-56, 80 what it is, 13
in Hegel, 55-56 actional, 13

*
This index is based in part on the analytical index to Inteligencia y realidad compiled by Antonio González. Readers who
need more comprehensive searching capability for the text should download it from the Zubiri Foundation web site
(http://www.zubiri.org) and use any of the available search engines.

369
370 INDEX

activate, 255, 289, 351 retention and in primordial apprehension of reality, 95-
activator, 255 96
active, 3, 254, 319, 320 second, 200
activity, 13, 38, 149, 234, 251-256, 261, 266, 270, 287, seeming and, 201-204, 209
289-291, 295, 319-322, 324, 330, 336, 337, 346, 348- signitive, 54
353, 365 transcendental and, 196, 311
actu, 224 truth is intellective actuality of the real, 218-219
actual, 4, 10, 26, 42, 45, 52-55, 57, 58, 62, 78, 79, 101, “what for” and, 267-268
107, 125, 150, 172, 180, 194, 201, 208-209, 211, 217, what it is, 4, 52-53, 83, 107, 224, 252
224-225, 232, 236-237, 263, 300, 337, 346 free creation and, 279-281, 283
actualitas, 52 actualizable, 171
actualitatis, 228, 267 actualization
actuality affirmation and, 197, 201, 275
affirmative intellection and, 166 affirming is intellective affirmation, 148
among and, 117 aspect and, 175
as “being here-and-now present”, 4, 26, 52-56, 79, 132, categories and, 310-315
194, 210, 224 content and formality as modes of actualization of the
as impression, 56-57, 62 real, 190
as respectivity, 54 de suyo and, 359
aspect as mode of, 173, 175 determination and, 182
being as, 78-81, 235-237, 239, 260, 309 differential, 125, 133, 140, 143, 147, 149-150, 153, 180-
being of the affirmed and, 229, 238 182, 185, 188, 192, 202
being of the substantive and, 226 differs from mere actualization, 323
coincidence and, 195, 201, 205-217, 221, 337 directional, 203
common, 58-63, 70, 311 dual apprehension as mode of apprehension of the real,
conformity and, 209, 215 125
de suyo and, 56-57, 107 falsehood and, 205
effectivity and, 175 field, 317, 325
field and, 120, 194, 198, 219 full actualization of the real would make knowledge
gravity as mode of, 173 unncessary, 300
grounding is mode of actuality of reality, 252, 268 functionality and, 118
historicity as mode of, 350 gap and, 179, 191
human body as principle of, 77 historicity and, 350, 354
in affirmation, 200 indeterminate, 169
intellection and, 53-56, 270, 348 is a type of respectivity, 54
intellection is actuality of the real in sentient is physical moment of the real, 193
intellection, 270, 275, 352-354 knowledge and, 300
intellective knowing and, 104 logos and, 108, 123, 309, 348-349, 355
logos and, 126 method and, 317
necessity and, 185 modalization and, 93
not act or actuity, 4, 52-53, 58, 78, 83, 252 negative, 232
not action, 52, 55-56, 58 not actuation, 63-65
not actuation, 53-54 objectuality and, 304-308
of the indeterminate, 170, of reality itself, 154
openness and, 218 of the mathematical real, 318
personality and, 99 of the real in sentient intellection [is sentient
personeity and, 99-100 intelligence, intellective knowing], 4-5, 55, 63-64,
physical moment of the real, 120, 129, 180 66, 69, 92, 100-101, 108, 131, 188, 229, 243, 263,
premordial apprehension and, 183 268, 300, 316-317, 335, 349, 359, 361, 365
preponderance and, 170 of the unity of the real, 74
privation and, 169-170 openness and, 218-219, 302
ratification and, 194, 227 preponderant and, 172
re-actuality and, 100-101, 132 primordial apprehension and, 182-183
rectitude and, 199-200 privational determination and, 169
 INDEX 371

progression and, 252 necessary truth and, 309

rational intellection is, 349 negation and, 230-231
re-actualization and, 100-101, 200, 359 predication and, 193, 220-221, 230, 233-234
simple, 194 primordial apprehension is determinant of, 236, 272
stepping back and, 231 primordial apprehension is not, 220
thinking and, 252, 255 rational truth and, 347
truth and, 193-197, 217, 225, 237, 239, 335, 346 reason and, 274, 278-279
ulterior modes of, 98-99 relationship to primordial apprehension, 272, 274
unreality and, 139 reversion of sentient intellection to the real, 124
verification and, 351 theory of grounded in Indoeuropean languages, 222
actualize, see actualization, actuality. truth and, 197-198, 203, 217, 219-220
actuation, 10, 36, 45, 51, 53-56, 63-64, 66, 85, 283, 331, truth is not a quality of, 83-84, 193
337, 349, 363 what it is, 145-158
actuity, 4, 26, 52-53, 58, 78-79, 83, 117, 120, 185, 234- agere, 180, 337
235, 252, 311, 314, 350, 365 Agni, 365
being founded on, 79 aisthesis, 122, 273
adaptation, 29 Akkadian, 88, 261, 294
adapted, 29 aletheia, 88
adaptive, 29 alethes, 88
adequation, 214-217, 219, 223, 239, 339, 350 algebraic, 154
Aeneid, 160 algorithm, 155
aether, 283 Amarna, 88
affectant, 21, 25, 40 ambiguous, 52, 166, 171-174, 176, 267, 283, 323, 327-
affection, 14-15, 21, 25-27, 40-41, 56-57, 60, 86, 103, 107, 328, 345
127, 191, 273, 364 ambience, 116
affine, 118 ambient, 116, 259
affirmation amen, 88
actualization in movement is, 202 amorphous, 86
as path, 202 analogical, 260
authenticity and, 209 analogy, 80, 99, 280
copulative “is” and, 219-223 analytic, 119
direction of, 198 analytical, 326
distance between real thing as real and what it is in Anaximander, 72
reality and, 179 Andronicus of Rhodes, 48
dual truth and, 85 animal, 11, 13-19, 22-26, 28-29, 32-34, 38, 43, 56, 60-61,
error and, 205-206, 231 76-78, 92, 103, 107, 108, 141-142, 200, 251-252, 284,
evidence and, 182-192 331, 367
field and, 195, 279 does not apprehend reality, only stimulation, 22-23, 25,
formal moment of is, realization of simple apprehension 103
in real thing, 228 of realities, 104, 219
forms of, 158-165 antimatter, 339
free construction and, 285 antipathy, 286
has two completely different meanings, 230 aorist, 164
impression of reality is not, 27 apersonal, 77, 281
intellection is not, 83-84 apodictic, 185
intentum and, 143 apophanesis, 35
is in a direction, 206 apophantikos, 122, 130, 132, 222
is intellection at a distance, 197, 200, 206, 221, 230 apparition, 49, 307
is of reality, 220-222 apprehend, 3, 10, 17-18, 21-22, 24-26, 29, 31-33, 40-47,
judgement and, 145, 182, 202, 209, 219-222, 275 51, 66, 71, 74, 76, 81, 85, 92-97, 100, 103, 108, 111,
logification of intellection and, 264 116-117, 120, 124-126, 129-130, 137-138, 142, 147-
logos and, 100, 124, 194, 309 148, 150, 152, 158-159, 174, 189-190, 202, 206, 209,
mathematics and, 309 213, 215, 220, 223, 227, 229, 235, 243, 253, 264, 271,
modes of, 165-176 273, 278, 307, 325, 333, 351, 357, 360, 363
372 INDEX

apprehension aversive, 232

dual [apprehension of what something is in reality], Avesta, 222
124-126, 130, 141, 143, 145, 193 axiomatic, 155, 157
judicative, 100 axioms, 154, 156, 280, 286, 332
logical, 119, 328 axis, 284
of reality, 4, 23, 26-27, 29, 31-34, 40-43, 45, 47, 51, 62, behavior, 293, 294, 295
65, 78, 85, 88, 91-92, 94-97, 100, 103, 108, 124, 133, being, 4, 9, 14-16, 24, 37, 43-46, 54, 69, 75, 78-81, 83,
136-137, 142, 148, 152, 157-159, 175-176, 185, 187, 122-123, 174, 184-185, 188, 193, 203-204, 206, 239-
189, 196, 198, 201, 213, 215, 218, 220, 224, 227, 240, 248, 260, 265, 267-269, 271, 276, 289, 291, 301,
230, 260, 332, 359, 364 305, 309-310, 317, 367
of stimulation, 21-23 Aristotle and, 44-45
of things in a field, 128 being and not being, 231,
primordial, 4, 26-27, 42, 62, 74, 80, 94-97, 100-101, being situated, 15, 18, 22, 24, 25, 28, 63, 107, 127, 365
103-104, 108, 111-113, 116, 120, 121, 123-127, 129- Berkeley and, 54
133, 135, 137-143, 148-152, 156-160, 165, 167-169, Heidegger and, 233
175-176, 181-182, 184-185, 187, 189-202, 204, 208, Henry of Ghent and, 81
213-216, 218-219, 221-223, 225-227, 230, 236-240, in European philosophy, 81-82
243-244, 247-248, 255, 258, 263, 266, 270-272, 274- Leibniz and, 234
276, 285, 314, 343, 348, 351, 353-355, 357-364, 366 linguistic relationships, 88-89
real truth is already in, 85 living being, 37, 77, 254, 284, 331
retractive, 136-137 logos and, 123
sensation and, 16, 95 Medieval philosophy and, 44-45
sensible, 11, 13-14, 18-19, 21, 23, 31, 76, 328 not substantive, 224
simple, 27, 85, 100, 136, 137-143, 145, 147-148, 150- not the transcendental, 44-47
153, 157-162, 164, 166-167, 169-177, 179, 181-184, of the affirmed, 226, 228-230, 232-239
187-188, 191, 199, 201-204, 206, 208-209, 213-215, of the person, 79
221-222, 228-229, 231-232, 239, 275, 282-283, 290, of the real, 86, 221, 227, 233-235, 237, 281, 301
335 of the sensible, 301
what it is, 9-11 of the substantive, 79, 224-230, 232-237, 239
apprehensor, 18 Parmenides and, 24, 44, 230, 309
Aristotle, 5, 18, 33, 35-37, 39, 44, 48, 51-52, 56, 74, 80, Plato and, 44, 233
85, 122, 146-148, 191, 203, 222, 231, 234, 258-260, real being, 204, 206-207, 209-210, 213, 217, 224-225,
264, 281, 301-302, 305, 309-310, 312, 323, 327-328, 229, 233-234, 238, 248, 252, 276, 284, 305, 310
366 reality and, 23-24, 53, 74-75, 78-81
arkhe, 182, 259 reality and being not identical, 225
arousal, 13-14, 17, 21-23, 28, 32, 103-104, 107 reality, truth, and being, 219-238
assertoric, 185 sensed, not understood, 81, 225
astronomical, 65, 283 the Greeks and, 122
astronomy, 65 two species of [substantive, affirmed] , 236
asymptotic, 264 what it is, 78-81
atmosphere, 5, 32, 116 belief, 3-4, 18, 22, 31, 33, 36, 44, 59, 63, 67, 84, 122, 146-
atom, 74, 283, 331 148, 166, 173, 179, 224, 301, 307, 320, 365, 366
atomic, 203 bell, 119, 327
attention, 14-15, 33, 78, 95-96, 98, 103, 123, 142, 157, Benveniste, Émile, 88
164, 166, 271, 273, 290, 306, 339 benzene, 283
Augustine, Saint, 333, 336 Bergson, Henri, 190, 362
australopithecus, 158 Berkeley, George, 54, 55
authentic, 42, 66, 208-209, 306, 331, 335 beyond (w.r.t. the real), 4, 15, 18, 24, 29, 32-33, 42, 44,
authentically, 208-209, 335 48-49, 53, 56-57, 63-68, 71, 74, 76, 84-85, 88, 97, 100,
authenticating, 85 114-116, 120, 128, 135, 138, 151, 171, 174, 201, 211,
authentication, 213, 335, 346, 348-349, 354 216, 223, 243, 245, 247-249, 252-254, 256-259, 261,
authenticity, 85, 208-210, 213-215, 239, 336 263-265, 270-271, 274, 276, 281-282, 289, 291, 294,
autonomous, 15-16, 26, 38, 116, 122, 135, 150, 248 295, 299, 302-303, 305-306, 316, 320, 324-326, 330,
autonomy, 15-16, 22, 26, 73, 99, 128, 130, 196, 220 335, 338, 343-344, 358, 361
 INDEX 373

biology, 29, 38, 99, 331 philosophy, 22, 32, 35, 40, 44, 85, 119, 124, 140, 188,
blindness, 42, 191, 205 208, 229, 231, 234, 258, 310, 347, 364
blurred, blurry, 171, 172, 176 clear and distinct vision, 186
body, 77, 113, 118, 175, 185, 261, 278, 282, 284, 297, 332, closure, 16, 73, 76, 302
362 codetermination, 36
Bohr, Niels, 320 coercively, 274, 290, 326
bracket, 89 cogito, 180, 186, 187
brain, 18-19, 29, 38 cognition, 14
Brouwer, Luitzen E., 154-156 cognitive, 319-321, 324
caelo, 65, 104, 264 Cohen, 154, 156-157, 253
Cajal, 29 cohere, 310
calculus, 155 coherence, 74, 86, 333
campal, 115 coherent, 65, 74, 86, 124, 151, 280-281, 283
campalmente, 121 coincidence, 44, 57, 195, 196-213, 215, 217, 221, 239,
cane, 261 335-337, 346
canine, 37, 173, 174 cold (sense of), 25, 39-41, 53
canon, 49, 183, 185, 190, 261-265, 268, 276, 279, 282, colegere, 292
302 communication, 45, 51, 53, 58, 108
canonic, 183, 261-264, 266, 278, 289, 291, 293, 295, 303, communion, 77
319, 329, 352 community, 44-45, 234
Cantor, Georg, 154 compact, 108, 111, 133, 141, 175-176, 194, 205, 217-218,
capture, 3 230
Cartesian, 187 compenetration, 331, 334
catalog, 32, 49, 253, 261 complementarity, 320
categorical, 203, 305-308, 311-312, 314, 329, 330 complexion, 309
categorically, 55 comprehend, 306, 359-363
category, 37, 203, 260, 308-314, 329 comprehension, 107, 360-363, 366
Catholic, 280 conceiving, 4, 27, 32, 35, 44, 141, 150, 188, 286, 294, 367
causal, 45, 63, 67, 119, 197, 260, 302, 327, 363 conceptualize, 4, 14, 21-23, 32, 35, 37, 44-45, 48, 58, 63,
causality, 65, 119, 301-302, 327-328, 338, 363 65, 70, 72, 74-78, 80-81, 85, 91, 104, 107, 114, 122,
efficient, 119, 327-328 142, 156, 168, 188, 190, 200, 202, 231, 233, 248, 251-
formal, 327 252, 265, 267, 297, 299, 304, 322, 324-325, 329, 341,
final, 327 346, 353, 360, 363-364, 366
material, 327 concipient intellection, 48, 264
cause, 63, 66, 68, 119, 141, 212, 243, 258, 277, 290, 299, configuration, 18, 39, 141, 190
301, 306, 316, 326, 327 confirmation, 303, 347, 349, 350
four types of cause, 327 conformity, 85, 208-210, 212-217, 219, 223, 239, 317,
Celtic, 88 330, 335-337, 347, 349, 350
centaur, 139, 280 confusion, 24, 27, 32, 53, 149, 166, 171-172, 176, 184,
cerebral, 18, 38 195, 205, 218, 291, 305, 317-318, 320, 345
certainty, 127, 167-168, 175-176 conjecture, 172, 176
chemistry, 64, 283 connection (of real things), 71, 161-163, 165, 167-168,
child, 65 211-212, 214-215, 220, 251, 294
chimera, 99, 269, 333 conquering, 173, 176
chimpanzee, 16, 28 consciousness, 9-10, 26-27, 34, 51-52, 60-62, 84, 107,
choice, 128, 142, 180, 214, 329 129, 186, 188-189, 197, 302
Christ, 307, 332 constellation, 16-17, 18, 25, 73
clarescence, 170-171 constitution, 43, 61, 73-74, 76, 114, 116, 126, 160-163,
clarescent, 170-172, 176 165, 167, 175, 185, 195, 221, 234, 236, 248, 312, 315,
class, 63, 261, 305, 309 322, 331, 337, 340, 344, 346-347, 350
classical, 22, 32-36, 40, 44, 49, 63, 84, 119, 121, 124, 138, constitutional sufficiency (see also essence), 73
140, 158, 161, 164, 166, 168, 179, 185-186, 188, 207- construct state, 142, 280
208, 222-223, 229, 231, 234, 258, 261, 277, 279, 294, content, 15-18, 22-28, 34, 39, 41, 43-47, 54-57, 61-63, 66,
304, 310, 330-331, 342, 347, 363, 364 68, 70-74, 81, 85-86, 92-94, 100, 103, 107, 108, 114-
374 INDEX

115, 118-119, 123, 125, 127-128, 135, 137, 138-140, openness and, 45-46, 108, 118
179, 190, 192, 199, 201, 205, 207, 212, 214, 215, 223, postulation and, 154, 157, 285
229, 231, 251-252, 256, 259, 265, 269, 271-274, 277, power of the real and, 72
278-286, 290-292, 295, 301, 303, 306-307, 311-313, real truth and, 83-84, 217
317, 319, 322, 325, 326, 330, 331-333, 348-350, 353, reality is formality of the, 3-4, 24-25, 49, 56, 63, 66-67,
360, 364, 366, 367 69-71, 78, 80-81, 85-86, 92, 103, 118, 193, 260, 273,
canon of reality and, 261-263 325-326, 352, 364
creation in mathematics, works of fiction and, 151-158 reality is, 137-138, 194, 223, 266, 367
in formalization, 16-17 reality not existence but being de suyo, 138
not same as reality, 153 reason and, 257-260
openness of reality to content, 46-47, 72, 93 respectivity and, 45-46, 108, 226
sensible, 18 rise of science and, 68
sensing and, 15-16 sentient apprehension and, 271, 273
suchness and, 47 sentient intellection and, 359
transcendentality and, 43-47 signifies the rise of intellection, 32
ulterior modes of intellection and, 97-98 suchness and, 47
continuum, 154 the “in itself” and, 3, 23-24, 31-32, 44, 46, 53, 56-57,
contraction, 13, 46, 115, 148, 248, 344 63, 66, 69-70, 86-87, 103, 257
conviction, 173, 176 the real beyond and, 57
copula, 122, 161-164, 186, 219-223, 225, 229, 231, 233- transcendentality is structure of, 44-46
234, 350 world and, 46
corporeal, 333 Debrunner, 88
corporeity, 175, 362 declarative, 122, 124, 130, 132
corpuscle, 277, 282 deductive, 302, 318
cortical, 19 definition, 99, 114, 139, 142, 154, 156, 171, 216, 264, 280,
cosmic, 49, 68, 219, 279, 281, 286, 313, 342-344 301, 351, 366
cosmos, 68, 74, 76, 209, 212, 247-248, 281, 286, 342, 343 Delphic, 215
crab, 16, 28 Democritus, 74
creation, 38, 68, 139-143, 151, 156, 183, 272, 278-283, Descartes, René, 3, 9, 81, 84, 136, 146, 186-187, 193
285-286, 290, 295, 327, 348 destiny, 71
critique, 3, 49, 119, 191, 268, 297, 301, 327-328 determinant, 21, 23, 38, 40, 61, 103-104, 166, 176, 180-
cyclic, 98, 115, 197 183, 206, 209, 236, 275, 278, 281, 290-291, 312, 358-
Darwinism, 29 359, 361
de facto, 3, 81, 162, 361 dialectic, 11, 77, 122, 128, 147, 184, 221, 234, 236, 265,
de suyo 339, 341
actuality and, 53-54 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 360, 363
apprehension at a distance and, 137-138 differential apprehension, 190
arkhe and, 72 dimension, 25, 48, 72, 74, 79, 86, 113-114, 118, 120, 121,
being and, 79-80, 234-235 137, 139, 140-141, 157, 173, 176, 182, 184, 186, 189,
content and, 47 190, 226-227, 229-231, 233, 235, 237, 248, 302, 306,
essence and existence pertain de suyo to a thing, 258 310, 320
field nature of things is, 108, 115, 126, 153-154, 164 directional, 40, 42, 67, 117, 196, 198-201, 203-206, 214,
force of reality and, 71-72 217, 239, 263, 274, 289, 319, 320
formality is mode of otherness of, 258 discern, 3, 53, 122, 149, 150, 177, 210, 324, 366
free construction and, 285 discernment, 145, 149, 150, 202, 211, 324, 333-334, 366
grounds metaphysics, 69-70 discovery, 35, 61, 88, 154, 216, 339
has character of prius, 53-54, 69-70, 78, 83-84 discriminate, 233
in the constitution of the real, 73-75 disrealizing, 145
is not a concept, 57, 77 distance
is not mere complexion of stimuli, 31-32 distancing, 28, 127, 135, 231, 362
is beyond classical existence and essence, 138, 223, 258 to take, 18, 28, 99, 113, 124, 128, 130, 133, 135-136,
“its-own-ness” and, 46 140-141, 143, 145-150, 164-165, 167-168, 172-177,
life of living person is de suyo action, 254 179, 183-184, 192, 194-195, 197-198, 200-202, 206-
not content or formality, 223
 INDEX 375

207, 213, 215, 221, 228-231, 271, 274-275, 286, 290, evolution, 29, 49
339, 362 excedence, 115-116, 247, 339
dominance (see also power), 72 exceeding, 67, 116, 127, 325, 339, 341, 344
dualism, 33-34, 36, 40, 48, 68, 301, 366 excitation, 13
doubt, 16, 122, 166-168, 172, 176, 184, 209, 229, 239, experience, 16, 23, 211, 265, 282-284, 286, 290, 320, 322-
256, 286, 330-331, 340 345, 360, 363
dual truth, 85, 194-196, 200, 202, 205-208, 213-215, 217, as testing of reality, 324-327, 329-332
219, 239, 335, 336, 346 experiential, 323, 325-326, 330-331, 360
durable, 74, 86 negative, 341
dynamic, 41, 49, 77, 100-101, 109, 126, 130-133, 146- experiment, 28, 303, 324, 331, 334, 339
147, 149, 158, 177, 182, 184-187, 195-196, 198-200, explanation (reason), 51, 53, 61, 64, 66, 68, 85, 200, 255-
202-207, 211, 213-215, 217-219, 236-237, 239, 262, 256, 259-260, 265-269, 271, 274-275, 279, 282-283,
271, 274, 336, 338-340, 350-351 289, 294-295, 300-302, 337, 339-341, 343-346, 363
dynamic tension, 41, 147 primarily of field reality, 344
dynamis, 36 exteriority, 74, 197
dynamism, 49, 100, 126, 130, 147-149, 158, 177, 184-186, face, 43, 104, 226, 274, 278, 306, 344, 345
196, 198, 207, 213, 217-218, 236, 271, 274, 336, 339, fact
341, 346, 350 acts are, 9
eidos, 39, 41, 253 actuality is a, 54
Einstein, Albert, 99, 330 apprehended real is in reality a terminal moment is a,
Eleatic, 174 137
elemental note, 16 brute, 307
empeiria, 324, 329 communication of substances is not a, 58
encounter, 37, 89, 197, 303, 324, 330, 335-336, 341, 346, conceptualization in faculties and potencies is not a, 36-
347 37
English, 3, 9, 16, 28, 31, 41, 88-89, 97, 124, 152, 160, 168, connection of real things is a, 71
175, 223, 243, 255, 257, 267, 280, 283, 297, 305, 365 distinction between truths of fact and truths of reason,
enjoyment, 39, 41 342
entification of reality, 80, 122, 223, 225, 233-234, 264, every fact necessarily produced in the cosmos and in
309 history, 212
entitative, 24, 80 experimental, 303
entity, 66, 80-81, 129, 161, 216, 225, 260, 264, 284, 289, formalization is a, 18
302, 309, 310, 327 happening and, 349
episteme, 3, 301-302 Husserl and, 203-204
epistemology, 3, 63 impression of reality is a, 33-34, 51
equilibrium, 17, 39-41 in-fact-ness, 175
ergon, 26-27, 56, 129, 147, 274 intention and reality are radical and basic, 188
error, 14, 48, 55, 58, 60, 62, 71, 79, 84-85, 119, 136, 163, matters of, 211-212
188-189, 193-195, 204-212, 231, 238, 253, 254, 279, necessity and, 212
294, 320, 335, 339, 342, 347, 350, 353, 366 positum and, 306-307
esse reale, 79-81, 225, 233, 236, 260 real sentiently actualized is actualized in a dynamic du-
essence, 3, 9, 10, 26, 51-53, 56, 58, 61-62, 85, 91, 96, 97, ality, 130
124, 127, 137-139, 141, 150, 157, 160, 170, 187, 196, real thing refers in transcendental openness to another
202, 212, 223, 247, 257-258, 261-262, 268, 275, 278, thing is a, 126
280-281, 283, 293, 300, 302, 309-310, 320, 324, 333, scientific, 303, 307
335-337, 341, 357, 359 “to happen” and, 207
de suyo and, 138, 223, 258 truths of, 211-212, 342
existence and in St. Thomas and Suárez, 70 what a scientist understands by object is a, 303
reason and, 343-349, 351-353 what it is, 306-307
Euclidean, 118, 151, 154, 286 factical truth, 212-213, 342
European, 4, 80, 81, 225, 274, 309 factual truth, 212-213, 342
evidence, 170, 179, 182-192, 199, 211-212, 236, 239, 264- faculty, 4, 9, 10, 32, 36-38, 96, 219, 260, 264, 345, 363-
265, 274, 338, 352 364, 367
evidential, 149, 182-184, 192, 212 faith, 183, 184
376 INDEX

Faktum, 303, 327 reality is, 24-25, 45, 49, 260, 352
false, 9, 24-25, 40-42, 44, 54, 58-59, 60, 62, 66, 79, 80, 83, formality of otherness, 21, 22, 44, 63, 70, 78, 103, 107,
84, 99, 100, 104, 119, 128-129, 131, 146, 151, 179, 180, 120, 271, 273
183, 186, 187, 188, 194, 203-205, 208-209, 218, 222, formality of reality
236, 253, 254-255, 259-260, 263-264, 267, 299, 302, actuality and, 54-57
306, 309, 327-328, 337, 342-343, 349, 357 always physical, 153
falsification, 205, 210 as ambit of reality, 116
falsify, 210 as measure of reality, 257
falsity, 154, 205, 208-210, 216 being is ulterior to, 225
falsehood, 39, 146, 203, 205, 209, 216, 341, 343, 347 constitutes the real, 69-70
Faraday, Michael, 283 de suyo and, 107, 153, 258, 273, 364, 367
feign, 139, 141 establishment in reality and, 77
Fichte, Johann Gotlieb, 81 field and, 98
fiction, 139-141, 143, 151-152, 158, 161, 283, 285, 333 force and, 71-72, 273
fictional, 139-142, 151-152, 159, 162, 164, 183, 188, functionality and, 119
199, 208, 229, 231, 239, 257, 285, 290 grounds metaphysics, 69-70
field habitude and, 55
as moment of a real thing, 98 has character of prius, 25-26, 53-55, 63, 69-70, 83-84
is the world sensed intellectively, 38, 99-100 has two aspects (individual and field), 108, 111, 123,
electromagnetic, 76, 98 127, 133, 165, 169, 194, 235, 247, 258, 361, 364
field nature, 108, 109, 115, 117-118, 126, 129 Hume’s error and, 119
field sense, 100, 111, 130, 132, 194, 260, 261, 263, 270, “in” and “ex” as two dimensions of, 235
282, 299, 319, 323 in primordial apprehension of reity, 26-27
fieldness, 121, 218-219, 270, 325, 326 in the formality of reality what is apprehended remains
gravitational, 98 as something “of its own” [en propio], 3-4, 23-25,
of reality, 38, 98-99, 108-109, 111, 114-117, 119, 121, 54-57, 63, 66-67, 69-70, 76, 103, 107, 127
123-124, 126-128, 130-132, 135-138, 142-143, 145, intuition and, 191
157-158, 164, 177, 181, 194-195, 217-218, 226, 228, its-own-ness and, 46, 71-72
236, 239, 247, 249, 253, 256, 259-263, 278, 326-327, mathematical objects and, 123, 156
329, 341-342, 351, 361 power and, 71-72
personality and, 99 primordial apprehension and, 194, 223, 285, 363-364
what the field of reality is, 98-99 reality sensed in 342
firmness (mode of ratification), 86, 88, 89, 167, 175, 176, reifies content, 45-46, 72-73
239 respectivity and, 45-46, 54, 338
force of imposition, 15, 21-22, 26-27, 56, 71, 86, 92, 107, rests upon itself, 55-56
127, 165, 181, 187, 199, 239, 273-274, 326, 365 sensed as “more” than reality of each thing, 128
force of reality, 26, 71, 87, 165, 273-274 sensed in experience, 323, 325
form sentient intellection is apprehension of something in,
each real thing is a form of being real, 47 107
forma mentis, 293 substantive being grounded in, 223, 235
formalization not giving of, 18 suchness and, 47
of being, 79, 224, 227, 236 things apprehended in their, 247
of sensibility (Kant), 18 transcendental function and, 47
of the real, of reality, 46, 73-74, 76-78, 117, 219, 257, transcendental openness and, 45-46, 54, 71-72, 93, 247
260-261, 274, 281, 302, 309, 333, 344-346 transcendentality and, 43-47, 71-72, 108
substantial, 18, 48, 80 what it is, 3-4, 23-25,
formality, 3-4, 15-18, 21-29, 32-34, 36-37, 39-40, 43-47, world and, 46, 98, 247, 257, 338
49, 53-57, 59, 61, 63, 64, 66, 70-74, 76-78, 81, 83-86, formality of stimulation, 21, 22, 23, 24, 56, 273
93, 97-98, 103-104, 107-108, 111-116, 119-120, 123- formalization, 16-19, 21-22, 28-29, 32, 38, 65, 73, 76
125, 127-128, 133, 135-136, 138, 142, 150, 153-154, foundation, 3, 11, 22, 37, 43, 61-62, 64, 67-68, 85, 88, 93,
156-157, 165, 169, 181, 190-194, 196, 199, 217, 223, 98, 100, 126, 128, 132, 160-161, 163, 180, 185, 187,
225-226, 229, 235, 237, 243, 247-248, 257-260, 271- 193, 196-197, 205-206, 211, 215, 218, 220, 229, 231,
274, 277, 285-286, 310, 323, 325-326, 328, 335, 337- 234-237, 239, 257-258, 286, 290, 295, 299-300, 302,
338, 342-343, 352, 358, 361, 363-364, 366-367 312, 345
 INDEX 377

see also ground hearing (sense of), 39, 41, 91, 149, 251
freedom, 141, 183, 278, 282-283, 285, 326, 343 heat (sense of), 16, 21-26, 33, 39-41, 63, 75, 78-79, 273
Fuenterrabia, 5 Hebrew, 88, 261
fulfillment (truth as), 85, 187, 210, 213, 239, 257, 336- Hegel, G. W. F., 56, 72, 77, 128, 147-148, 189, 234, 236,
337, 340, 346, 348-350, 352-353, 358 265, 267, 269, 302, 309, 310, 342, 345, 364
function, 4, 13, 22, 25, 29, 35, 38, 43, 45, 47, 49, 84, 92, Heidegger, Martin, 25, 34, 52, 124, 136, 360
100, 103-104, 108, 111-113, 116-119, 124, 131, 140, Heisenberg, Werner, 203, 205, 331
142, 146, 148-150, 157-159, 161-163, 165, 167, 173, Hellenic, 222
180-182, 193-199, 211, 220, 222, 228, 235, 248, 249, Henry of Ghent, 81
259, 263, 275, 277-278, 280, 282, 290, 294, 307, 311- Heraclitus, 213, 215
312, 318-321, 325, 328-329, 357, 363 historicity, 3, 349, 350, 353
functionality, 118-119, 311, 325-329, 338, 363 historical, 3, 72, 183, 222, 283, 306-307, 313, 322, 329,
fundament, 259, 277, 301, 308, 316, 336 332, 334, 349-353, 360
Galileo, 286 historical reality, 183, 350
gap, 91, 179, 180-182, 191, 196, 231, 233 history, 4, 33, 146, 212, 230, 233, 259, 305, 321-322, 332,
Gegen, 305 349, 353, 366
Gegenseiend, 305 human, 4, 9, 11, 13, 18-19, 24, 26, 28-29, 31, 36-40, 51,
Gegenstand, 305 60-61, 77, 81, 99, 103-104, 108, 119, 122-123, 141,
genetic, 270 147, 191, 208, 217, 219, 227, 229, 254, 269, 271-272,
geometry, 118, 151, 156, 190, 286, 310 275, 281, 283, 293, 316, 322-323, 328, 331, 336, 342,
German, 305, 366 361, 364, 367
gerundive, 237 human reality, 36, 37, 99, 254, 293, 364
Gestalt, 18 Hume, David, 119, 326-328
gignoskein, 301 Husserl, Edmund, 9, 25, 34, 51-52, 136, 186-188, 203, 282
give pause to think [dar que pensar], 253-259, 262, 266, hyperformalization, 26, 28-29, 38, 104
270, 278, 289, 325 hypothesis, 19, 154, 225, 283-285, 290, 343
God, 122, 155, 160, 183, 208, 225, 265, 333, 343 idea, 3, 4, 9, 11, 18, 24, 27, 32, 34, 36-37, 40, 43, 45-49,
Gödel, Kurt, 154, 156-157, 216, 332 51-52, 55-56, 58-60, 63, 66, 70-72, 74-75, 78, 80-81,
Gödel’s theorem, 155, 157, 216 84, 86, 88, 91, 98, 121-122, 128-130, 137, 139, 146-
grammar, 142, 309 148, 154-155, 163, 169, 172, 174-175, 180-183, 187-
gravitation, 172-173, 332, 340, 342 189, 191, 193, 197, 205, 208-209, 221, 223, 230-232,
gravity, 173, 176, 330, 360 236, 247, 252-253, 259, 261, 264-265, 267, 271, 275,
Greece, 14, 261, 294, 366 277-279, 282-284, 286, 299, 302, 304, 312, 317, 319,
green, 15, 47, 56-57, 73, 95, 115, 176, 232, 271, 295, 300, 328, 332-333, 338, 343, 345, 347-348, 353, 357, 360,
307, 309, 323, 359, 361-362 363-366
Gregorian, 328 idealism, 136, 201, 234, 235, 327
ground ignorance, 64, 168-170, 172, 176, 180, 239
grounded, 10, 27, 32, 41-44, 47, 49, 54-55, 59, 60-62, illusion, 85, 190
65, 67, 70-72, 76-80, 85, 94-96, 100-101, 103, 117- imagination, 141, 282
118, 127, 129, 136, 139, 143, 148, 160-161, 163, immanent, 24
181-182, 184-185, 187-189, 190, 204-205, 209-213, immaterial, 234
217-223, 226-227, 229-230, 232, 234-237, 239, 247, impression, 3-4, 14-17, 21-23, 25-29, 31-49, 51-53, 56-57,
249, 257-259, 265-266, 268, 277-282, 286, 291, 299, 60-62, 65-66, 71-73, 77, 79-81, 84, 86, 92-94, 98, 101,
301, 304, 314, 316, 322, 325, 331, 337, 340, 342, 103-104, 107-109, 115-117, 119-120, 123, 126-127,
346, 352, 354, 358, 364 129, 140, 148, 150-151, 156, 164, 181-183, 187, 189,
grounding, 26, 221, 237, 257-260, 266, 268, 277-282, 191, 196, 199, 211, 215, 218-219, 221, 223, 226-227,
285-286, 299, 303-305, 308, 312, 314, 316, 319, 321, 229, 235, 237, 239-240, 243-244, 247-249, 256, 271-
324, 337-338, 347, 348, 353 274, 277-278, 285-286, 323, 325-326, 328-329, 337-
ground-reality, 258-259, 264, 277, 286, 289, 301-302, 338, 343, 351-352, 358, 362, 366, 367
304, 352-353 of reality, 3, 4, 26-27, 29, 31-49, 51-53, 56-57, 61-62,
guess, 170-171, 176 71-73, 77, 79-81, 84, 86, 92-94, 98, 101, 103, 104,
habitude, 16, 55, 294, 323 107, 108-109, 115-117, 119, 123, 129, 140, 148, 150-
Hamiltonian, 279 151, 157, 164, 181-183, 187, 189, 191, 196, 199, 211,
happiness, 17 215, 218-219, 221, 223, 226-227, 229, 235, 237, 239,
378 INDEX

243-244, 247-249, 256, 271-274, 277-278, 285-286, knowing, 3, 4, 9-11, 14, 31-37, 47-49, 56, 58-60, 62, 80-
323, 325-326, 328-329, 337-338, 343, 351-352, 358, 83, 91-93, 95-97, 101, 103-104, 107-109, 116, 119,
362, 366-367 121-123, 131, 133, 136, 142-143, 145-147, 149-150,
sensible 17, 23, 26, 29, 156, 191, 272, 299, 366 158-159, 165, 168, 172-173, 177, 180, 185, 188-190,
in depth, 256-257, 262-265, 270-271, 274-276, 278-279, 192, 198, 202, 204-205, 208, 213, 215-216, 218-219,
289, 295, 299, 302, 323-324, 347, 352 225-228, 230, 232, 234, 238-240, 243-245, 247-248,
in its own right, 3, 23-25, 29, 31, 33, 44, 46, 257 251-256, 260-262, 264-265, 267, 270-271, 273, 275,
in reality, 5, 25, 27, 29, 32, 41, 43, 52, 55, 67, 72, 76-77, 278-280, 286, 289, 292-293, 297, 299-303, 312, 315-
79, 88-89, 92-94, 96-98, 100-101, 103, 108-109, 115- 319, 321-323, 326-328, 331, 334-337, 341, 350, 353,
116, 120, 121-128, 130-133, 135-141, 143, 145, 147- 357-367
151, 156-160, 163-177, 179-183, 187, 190, 192-193, knowledge, 3, 22, 48-49, 51, 64, 66, 68, 99, 119, 168, 185,
195-208, 211, 213-215, 217-219, 226-237, 239-240, 188-189, 191-192, 217, 243, 259, 294, 297, 299-304,
243-244, 248-249, 252, 254, 267, 271, 274-279, 285, 313-318, 320-322, 324, 327-329, 331, 333-337, 346,
290-291, 299-300, 304, 317-319, 323-325, 333, 336, 352-354, 362
339, 344, 348, 352, 355, 357-359, 361-363, 365-367 not substituting concepts of reality for sensible
in reality itself, 27, 46, 67, 135-136, 138-139, 142-143, representations, 299
152, 154-157, 163, 166, 197-198, 243, 248, 279, 290, not the radical mode of grounding philosophy of intelli-
319, 358-359, 363 gence, 3-4, 51-52
inclination, 172-173, 176 signs and, 22
indeterminism, 205 intellection as, 89
indicating, 176 Lamarkism, 29
Indoiranian, 88 Latin, 3, 9, 14, 31, 88, 94, 129, 152, 160, 163, 168, 180-
induction, 10, 317-318 181, 185, 188, 232, 255, 305, 324, 363, 365-366
infinite, 58-59, 155, 190, 205, 214, 302, 343 law (scientific), 71, 212, 299, 327, 330, 332, 360, 365
infinitesimal, 155 Leibniz, 48, 51, 71, 119, 188-189, 229, 234, 253-254, 259,
information, 18, 39 264-265, 268, 276, 309, 326, 342-343, 345
intellective knowing, 9-11, 31-37, 47-49, 56, 58-60, 62, life, 9, 13, 17, 23, 25-26, 28, 37-38, 63, 76, 99-100, 104,
80-81, 91-93, 103-104, 107-108, 119, 122, 146, 150, 219, 223, 254-255, 302, 305-307, 329, 331
168, 173, 177, 189, 192, 240, 243-245, 247, 251-256, likelihood, 301
265, 270-271, 278-280, 289, 293, 300, 312, 317, 322, linguistic, 88, 142, 163, 365
341, 350, 357-361, 363, 366-367 literature, 152
intelligible, 4, 41, 45, 48-49, 190, 216, 229, 293, 301-302, logic, 4, 61-63, 151, 155, 161-164, 168, 205, 259, 264,
306, 312, 323, 331, 360, 363 312, 317-318, 321, 332, 342, 347
intelligize the logos, 62, 122 logical positivism, 320
intentionality, 10, 52, 123, 129, 149-150, 164-165, 173, logical truth, 156, 317, 343, 347, 349, 350
210, 231, 274, 311 logification of intelligence, 80, 122, 137, 142, 233-234,
intentum, 129, 130, 133, 143, 145, 147, 150, 160-161, 264-265, 309, 317, 347
163-164, 177, 192, 215 logico-historical, 351-354
introspection, 58-60 logos
intuition, 27, 155-156, 187-192, 202, 312, 362 affirmation and, 148, 194, 222, 239, 309-310, 347
invariant, 76 Aristotle and, 310
its-own-ness [suidad], 46-47, 71, 77, 115 as ulterior mode of intellection, 4-5, 62, 80, 100-101
jectum, 74, 80, 305, 306, 307 categories and, 309-310
judge, 137, 157, 183, 192, 197, 239, 301 difference between logos and reason is essential, 243
judgement, 27, 35, 83-85, 100, 119, 122, 136-137, 145- dynamic structure, 133-176
148, 150, 152, 155, 157-165, 176, 182-184, 186-187, dynamism of, 100
197-198, 202-203, 206-207, 209-211, 213-216, 219- errors of classical philosophy with respect to, 137
223, 228, 230-231, 234, 239, 259-261, 264, 272, 275, etymology of, 121
301, 317, 326, 328-329, 333, 338-339, 353, 364 evidence and, 182
Kant, Immanuel, 3, 18, 32, 33, 36, 45, 48-49, 51, 61, 63, field as moment of, 113, 121-132
66, 81, 84, 119, 147, 158, 182, 187-188, 191-193, 203, fills insufficiency of primordial apprehension, 358
229, 253-254, 259, 261, 265, 268, 276, 297, 301-303, Hegel’s error with respect to, 265
305, 309-312, 326-328, 345, 353, 364 Heraclitus and, 213
kinesthesia, 39, 41, 58 Indoeuropean languages and, 222
 INDEX 379

intellection as, see logification of intelligence no structural opposition between sensing and
intellective movement is, 148 intellective knowing in, 123
intelligize the, 62, 122, 137, 309, 347 person and, 77-78
is reactualization, 108 Pithecanthopic, 158
judgement and, 100, 239 primitive man and science, 67
Kant’s errors and, 312 rational animal definition of, 142
logic and, 342-343 sentient apprehendor of the real, 219
meaning thing and, 100 unity of sensing and, 42
mediated structure, 177-239 “what” of a, 142-143, 200, 363
modalization of impression of reality, 123 mathematics, 40, 68, 117, 151-157, 185, 190, 216, 286,
modalization of sentient intelligence, 240 297, 301, 317, 318, 332-333, 342, 349
movement but not a progression, 240, 249 matter, 18, 80, 339
not conceived by Greeks in sufficiently radical way, Maxwell, James Clerk, 284
121-122 measure, 74, 173, 183, 187, 209, 218, 248-249, 256-257,
not sensible, 123 259-266, 271-273, 278, 282, 286, 289-290, 299-300,
Parmenides and, 309 302, 307, 310, 351-355
Plato and, 301, see also metric
positional, 280, 309 of reality, 249, 261, 262, 351, 352, 353, 355
predicative, 35, 280, 309, 312, 353 medial, 131-132, 176-177
predication not primary form of, 280, 309 medieval, 9, 10, 15, 37, 44, 48-49, 58, 81, 277, 309, 360
primordial apprehension present in, 357 mentality, 294-295
propositional, 280, 309 metaphysics, 9, 48-49, 63, 70, 259, 266, 268
positional logos prior to propositional logos, 280 metazoan, 16
rational truth and, 347 method, 303, 316-318, 322, 329-330, 332-335
reason and, 243, 353, 363 and reality, 316-318
sentient, 5, 100-101, 104, 108-109, 123-124, 126-127, methodological, 362
130, 132, 147-148, 164, 167, 176, 191, 239, 240 metric, 118, 257, 261-262
structure of, 123-132 see also measure
tells what something is in reality, 123 modal, 11, 16, 21, 23, 37, 40, 43, 47, 79, 87, 91, 93-96, 98-
three basic characteristics of, 177, 101, 108-109, 120, 121-123, 126, 131, 136, 148, 150,
truth and, 193-238 167-169, 173, 176, 210-211, 218, 237, 240, 244, 264,
what it is, 108, 124, 243 274-276, 290, 293-294, 302, 314, 316, 321, 323, 329-
love, 56 331, 333, 335, 339, 355, 357-359, 361-364, 366
magnetism, 284 modes
man of actualization, 4, 62, 93, 95, 97, 101, 108, 125, 150,
accomodating himself to reality, 41 166, 190-192, 218, 310-311, 329
animal of realities, 104, 219 of consciousness, 9
animal open to every form of reality, 219, of intellection, 39, 41-42, 87, 91, 93-95, 97-98, 104,
concept of not univocal, 158, 363 107, 139, 166, 168, 182, 190, 269, 272, 357-358,
consciousness and, 60-61 361, 366
has sensible impression in common with animals, 11-12 of presentation of reality, 39-43, 67, 78, 115, 181, 311
human structures and, 103-104 of ratification, 86
hyperformalization and, 26, 28-29, 31-32, 38 of reality, 39, 49, 57, 63, 93, 127, 196, 249, 253, 260-
imagination and, 141 261, 276, 281, 310, 312
“I” and, 78-79 of sensible apprehension, 11, 17, 21, 32
in Hegel, 77 modulation, 16, 38, 150, 181, 218, 271, 273, 333, 351-354
intellectual attitudes and, 88-89 moment, 4, 9-10, 13-19, 21-28, 31-34, 36-40, 42-47, 49,
intimateness and, 40 51-57, 59-63, 65, 67, 70-75, 77-78, 80-81, 83-87, 89,
life of is de suyo action, 254 91-101, 103-104, 107-109, 111-120, 121-130, 132-133,
meaning and language exclusive to, 22 135-141, 147-150, 152-157, 159-162, 164-165, 167-
meaning thing and, 24-25 170, 175-177, 179-187, 189, 191-207, 210-220, 222-
mode of apprehension different than that of animals, 23, 229, 232-237, 239-240, 244-245, 247-248, 252-253,
25-26, 108, 367 255-260, 262-264, 266-267, 269-275, 277-279, 281-
283, 289, 291-295, 299-300, 302-307, 310-312, 314,
380 INDEX

316-341, 343-348, 350-353, 355, 357-358, 360-362, ontological, 185, 225

364-366 open, 3, 17, 26, 28, 38, 45-47, 49, 54, 57, 61-63, 71-72,
moon, 88 77-78, 92-93, 98-101, 108, 111, 114-115, 117-118, 130,
motor, 13-14, 17 136, 138, 158, 169, 171, 180, 194, 196-199, 201, 207-
movement, 3, 17, 19, 24, 44, 108, 109, 118, 123-124, 126- 208, 218-219, 233, 243, 247-249, 252-255, 257-258,
128, 130-131, 133, 136-137, 139-143, 145-150, 157- 262, 265-266, 271, 276-278, 280-281, 289-290, 292,
158, 161, 164-165, 169-170, 175-177, 179-180, 183- 301-302, 311-312, 314, 316, 322-325, 337-338, 341,
184, 186, 192, 195-196, 198-202, 206-208, 213-218, 343, 345-346
221, 226, 229, 231-236, 238-240, 243, 248-249, 252, openness, 45, 46, 47, 49, 54, 61, 62, 71, 72, 77, 80, 93, 98,
254, 262, 265, 274, 276, 278, 282, 286, 290, 293, 302, 99, 100, 101, 104, 108, 115, 117, 118, 123, 126, 130,
313, 316, 332, 346, 348, 350, 353 218, 219, 233, 247, 248, 253, 254, 257, 258, 266, 267,
myth, 72 271, 276, 277, 278, 281, 289, 312, 314, 316, 322, 325
naked reality, 40-41, 43, 208-210, 212, 255, 258-259, 266- and transcendentality, 45-47, 49, 61-62, 71-72, 80, 93,
269, 323-324, 335, 364, 366 98, 101, 108, 117-118, 123, 130, 219, 312
nature [naturaleza], 71, 98, 286, 333, 363 and formality of reality, 45-46, 54, 93, 247-248,
necessary truth, 151, 212, 229, 332, 342 and impression of reality, 115
mathematics and, 151 and its-ownness [suidad], 98, 115
necessity, 3, 32, 48, 68, 71-72, 80, 84, 91, 123, 149, 159, and unity of modes of truth, 218-219
162, 185, 197, 211, 216, 222-223, 226, 244, 252, 254, and world, 77
256, 264-265, 268, 275, 302, 316, 322, 326-327, 332- as ground of thinking intellection (as principle), 248,
333, 336-338, 341-343, 362-364, 366 266
absolute, 212, 343 dynamic, 49, 271
necessity and contingency characteristics of reality not not exhausted by searching, 276
truth, 343 of a field, 100
Newton, Issac, 71, 312, 330, 340 of the being of the affirmed, 233
noema, 129, 273-274 of reality, 45-46
noematic, 26-27 sensed, 46
noergia, 26-27, 129 opinion, 83, 122, 146, 164, 172-173, 176, 203, 239, 262,
noology, 3 301
notes, 4, 15-18, 21-25, 38, 47, 53, 64, 70, 73-74, 76-77, organism, 19, 37, 38, 66, 77, 175, 281, 284, 286
83, 85-86, 89, 94-95, 97-98, 118, 140, 142, 151-154, Origen, 142
156, 159, 162, 164, 167-168, 190, 194, 200, 206, 210, orthogonal, 163, 184
212, 224, 226, 234, 247, 249, 276, 280-281, 283-286, otherness (moment of), 14-18, 21-27, 34, 39, 44, 54, 56-
291, 293, 309, 310, 325, 360-362 57, 60, 63, 70, 73, 78, 86, 103, 107, 120, 127, 226, 231-
noumenon, 49 232, 254, 258, 271-274, 326, 335, 352, 367
nous, 122, 366 ousia, 48, 88, 231
novel [work of literature], 151-152, 257, 285 paradigm, 48
oak [tree], 76, 78 paradox, 324
object, 11, 33-36, 45, 49, 51-52, 54, 61, 66, 75, 81, 84-85, parity, 203, 206
92, 104, 107, 119, 129, 131, 139, 151, 153-156, 158, Parmenides, 4, 24, 33, 44, 74, 80-81, 122, 174, 222-223,
162, 164, 188, 191-192, 203-204, 245, 258, 270, 283, 225, 230, 232-233, 264, 305, 309, 316, 366
287, 290-291, 295, 302-308, 311, 312, 314-316, 318, participation, 44, 48
322, 324, 327-329, 331-332, 335, 345, 349, 361-362, particle (elementary), 40, 68, 277, 284, 320, 330, 340
367 patency, 88
objectivity, 22-23, 25-26, 48, 65, 210, 220, 277, 301, 304, pathos, 14
367 Pentateuch, 332
objectuality, 75, 81, 303-304, 306-308, 312, 314-315, 329- percept, 140-141, 143, 145, 158, 161-162, 164, 199, 208,
330 231
objectualization, 81, 330, 334 perception, 16, 18, 24-25, 54-55, 57, 63-68, 85, 98, 119,
oblique, 80-81, 221, 309 140, 271, 282, 323, 329, 339
observable, 306-307 perikhoresis, 331
occasionalism, 119, 328 person, 52, 63, 77, 79, 85, 99, 151, 184, 186, 261, 281,
Ockham, William of, 188 297, 306, 327, 329, 331, 333
olfactory, 64, 189 personal reality, 49, 77, 79, 314
 INDEX 381

personality, 99, 333 medieval, 9, 10, 15, 37, 48, 58, 360. See also individual
personeity, 333 philosophers
personhood, 99 modern, 3, 9, 10, 14, 15, 27, 44, 45, 48, 58, 60, 81, 186,
phantasm, 141 205, 234, 259, 264, 327, 353. See also individual
phenomenology, 9, 129, 174, 302 philosophers
phenomenon, 29, 45, 49, 64, 66, 76, 85, 95, 123, 292, 300, of intelligence and metaphysics, 2-3, 48, 69
302, 340 only attended to affection [of senses], 14-15
philosophy only noticed qualities, 42
affirmation states what the real is as substantive being, only vaguely indicated otherness, 15
223 principles and, 259
believes sensible impression is mere subjective rationalism, 188
affection, 191 reality of the mathematical and, 156,
categories and logos, 309 reduced sign to semeion, 22
causality and, 327 science and are open truth, 219
classical, 22, 32, 35, 40, 44, 85, 119, 124, 140, 188, 208, seeks to reach reality through a reasoning process, 63
229, 231, 234, 258, 310, 347, 364 thought that concepts are abstracted, 142
conception of object, 305 understanding not the faculty of judging, 364
conceptualized intelligence as sensible, 33-35, 40 photon, 98, 243, 256, 257, 300, 359, 362
confronted reality with concipient intelligence, 44-45, phylum, 29
74-75, 80, 104 physical
confusion of two meanings of affirmation, 230 actuality is physical moment, 52-53, 83, 107, 120, 129,
counterposed sensing and intellective knowing, 3-4, 9, 185, 202, 225-226, 238
11, 32-33, 40, 366-367 being as a physical moment, 78-79, 226
customarily limited itself to conceptualization of intelli- “being here-and-now” [estar] of intellection is, 10, 127,
gence as affirmation, 264 186, 224
dualism of intellection-sensing in Greek and Medieval, character of act of intellection, 129
9, 48 experience is physical testing of reality, 324, 327, 329-
Eleatic, 174 333, 336, 340-341
entification of reality and, 80-81, 122, 233-234, 309 explanation, 340
erred with respect to modes of presentation of reality, 39 fiction involves physical moment of reality, 140
erred with respect to noein, 273 field is a physical moment, 108, 130, 137-138, 260,
erred with respect to reason, 267 270, 319
erroneously understood transcendentality, 44-45 formality is physical moment, 107, 116, 153, 225
error regarding freedom and ideal objects, 283 free construction, 285
failed to distinguish actuality from actuity, 52-53 free experience and, 283
failed to realize that intelligence is sentient, 274 free thing is physical reality with freely postulated con-
first, 48 tent, 153-154
Greek, 9-10, 15, 44, 48-49, 51, 55, 76, 88, 121-122, hyperformalization is physical structure, 29
203, 222, 225, 273-274, 301. See also individual intentum has physical character, 129
philosophers law, 299, 327
has confused sensing with pure sensing, 32-33 mathematical objects and physical reality, 154, 156
has not recognized formal structure of impression, 14, mathematics and physical testing of reality, 333
34 metaphysical and, 48-49
has not recognized formality, 16, 26, 272 notes, 210
has not said what intellective knowing is, 4, 10-11, 31- openness of the real is, 71
32 physical necessity leads to logical necessity, 332
has not said what sensing is, 4, 10-11, 31 physical outline of stimulus, 21
identified intellection with reflection, 41 probing of my own reality, 334
identified reality and ens, 225 reality itself is physical field dimension, 139
judgements and, 222 reality itself is physical moment, 153
lack of discrimination between real being and copula- reality not an objective concept but intellective actuality
tive being, 234 of a physical moment of real 248, 260
logification of intellection and, 122, 233-234, 309 “remaining” or “staying” is, 15, 127
382 INDEX

sciences, 284 predicate, 146, 159, 161-162, 164, 168, 184-185, 207,
space, 151 209-212, 214-215, 222, 309, 312
states, 173 preponderant, 40, 172-174, 176
transcendentality is physical moment, 46, 108 presence, 29, 40-42, 52-53, 59-60, 83, 107, 125, 184, 188-
ulteriority is physical moment, 226-227 189, 194, 218, 224, 274, 292, 326, 333
unreal not, 139 privation, 43, 84, 165, 169-171, 194, 205, 207-210
we seek the physical nature of intellection, 10 probability, 136, 173, 176, 239, 318
what it means, 10 progression, 100, 240, 243-245, 248-249, 252-255, 261-
world, 67 263, 265-266, 270-272, 274-276, 279, 287, 292, 295,
physical reality, 10, 49, 129, 139, 141, 153, 154, 156-157, 297, 302, 316, 318, 320-321, 324, 336, 338-, 343-344,
173, 186, 224, 226, 231, 260, 272, 279-280, 282-283, 348, 350-351, 366
285, 290, 319, 325, 332, 340 provisional, 74, 249, 261, 263, 281, 289, 339
probability as characteristic of, 173 psychology, 3, 18, 64, 95, 307, 364
given in primordial apprehension, 156 pure sensing, 23, 31-34, 36, 38, 43, 60, 103, 108
physics, 48, 64, 68, 119, 129, 173, 203, 205, 261, 277, qualities, 15, 17, 21-22, 26, 39-43, 56-57, 63-68, 78, 84-
283, 286, 312, 320, 331 85, 89, 96, 163, 171, 173, 189, 191, 193, 200, 203, 243,
affirmations about physical world, 67-68 271, 293-295, 311, 323, 325, 328-329, 333, 338
ancient, 277 quality, 14-16, 23, 37, 40-41, 43, 56, 64-68, 83-84, 86,
atomic, 203 118, 158, 167, 171, 182, 184-185, 191, 193, 200, 202-
causality and, 301 208, 217, 232, 271, 294, 309, 323, 328, 338-340, 355
ceased to be mechanistic, 286 quantum mechanics, 40, 330-331, 340
classical, 331, quiescence, 13
conjugate variables in, 203 ratification, 84-86, 88, 92, 194-195, 227, 347
field in, 98-99 rational, 142, 189-191, 211, 263, 269-270, 272-273, 275-
force in physics of Leibniz and Newton, 71 287, 290, 292-293, 295, 297, 299-300, 303-304, 307-
has not explained sensible qualities, 64-65 308, 312, 314, 316, 318-322, 324-327, 330-331, 333,
models and, 283 335-341, 343-354, 357
Newtonian, 119, 330 rationalism, 179, 188-189, 191, 234-235, 253
particle-wave dualism, 68 reactualization, 4, 101, 108, 123, 132, 166-168, 175, 200-
probability in, 173 201, 204, 219, 228, 299, 311, 359, 360
quantum, 261, 320 real by postulation, 153
physiology, 64 real thing, 4, 24-25, 39, 42-47, 49, 52-55, 57-59, 63-67,
Plato, 5, 33, 35, 44, 48, 51, 80, 122, 188, 229, 230-234, 70-74, 76-79, 83-86, 89, 92-94, 96-101, 108-109, 111-
253, 264, 301-302, 309, 366 120, 121, 124-131, 133, 135-145, 147, 150-151, 153,
plausible, plausibility, 174, 176, 239 155-160, 164-167, 169-177, 179-185, 187-202, 204,
plenitude, 4, 42, 187 206, 207, 209-210, 213-215, 217-219, 221, 223-228,
poem, 127 231, 234-236, 237, 239, 243-244, 247-249, 252, 254,
poet, 257, 295 256-258, 260, 261-263, 266-268, 270, 276-281, 289-
poetry, 257, 294 290, 294, 299, 304-308, 310-312, 314, 316-319, 321,
poiesis, 337 323-325, 335, 337-339, 341, 344-347, 352, 354-355,
point out, 15, 56, 59, 65, 71, 88, 176, 229, 252, 262, 301, 357-364, 366
305, 332-333, 340, 346 real truth, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 151, 194, 195, 197,
Polycletus, 261 198, 199, 200, 201, 205, 213, 217, 218, 220, 223, 225,
polyvalence, 200, 202-203, 205 227, 237, 239, 317, 335, 346, 350, 354
position, 40, 51-52, 73, 81, 99, 114, 117-118, 128, 135- realism
136, 147, 159, 160-164, 167, 234, 236, 282, 306 critical, 63, 65, 67
positivism, 320 ingenuous, 24, 63-65
positron, 339 realitas, 26, 81, 277
positum, 304-308, 314 realitas in essendo, 79-80, 225, 260
possibilitant, 348-350 reality,
postulation, 151-158, 183, 285-286, 290, 332-333 actuality and, 55-56
potency, 36-38, 72, 80, 349 affirmation and, 158-165, 168-177
power, 72, 180, 185, 198, 272 as a moment of a thing itself, 69-70, 185
predicamenta, 309, 310 as direction, 39-40, 66-67
 INDEX 383

as measure, 248 substantive, 73-75

as medium, 132 suchness and, 47
as open formality, 45, 49, 54, 71, 93, 243 “toward” and, 117, 119, 129-130, 290-291, 314, 328-
as the transcendental, 43-46, 49, 61, 92 329
being and, 23, 74, 78-81, 184, 188, 219-238, 309 transcendental function and, 47
categories of, 310-312, 329 truth and, 83-87, 194-219
causality, 301 two moments of (individual and field), 111
consciousness and being grounded in, 188 types of, 49, 63
dynamism of, 184 unreality and reality, 291
equivalent to reity, 24-25, 28, 63, 66, 103 reality in truth, 198, 333
evidence and, 179-184 reason
evolution and, 49 as explanation of things, 265-268
existence and, 70 as mine, 256-265
experience as testing of, 324-327, 329-334, 336, 341 determining function of the real in, 292-295
field of, see field dialectic and, 147
formality of the de suyo, 3, 24-25, 45, 49, 56-57, 63-64, difference between logos and reason, 243
66-67, 69-71, 73, 85, 93, 103, 367. See also does not have to arrive at reality, is already in it, 4-5,
formality of reality 100-101
forms of, 76, 78-79 dynamism of, 147-148
functionality and, 118-119 evidence and, 184
in depth, 67-68, 258, 264, 275, 278-280, 282-286, 289- grounded in primordial apprehension, 243
293, 295, 299-305, 308, 311, 314, 316, 320, 324, 326, intuition and reason, 189-191
329, 333, 347-348 is not synonymous with reasoning process, 100-101,
in fiction, 139-141, 257, 333 243
in intentum, 129 is sentient, 4-5, 100-101, 240
in reality, 121-165 method and, 316-334
installation in, 92 not a composite, 275
insufficiency of, 66-68 object of, 290-291
intelligence is faculty of, 367 points to the real not the logos, 100
judgement and, 157-158 progression from field to world, 100-101, 240, 243-244
knowledge and, 299 rationalism and, 188-189
logical truth and, 343 reality and, 273-287
logos declares what something is in reality, 124 rise of, 269-273
logos is intellection of sensed reality, 123 thinking and, 251, 255
mathematics and, 153-157, 190, 318, 332, 342 truth and, 85, 335-354
modes of presentation of, 39-43 truths of, 211-212
modes of, 49, 76-79, 329 ulterior mode of intellection, 4-5, 100-101, 241-367
necessity and contingency as characteristics of, 343 unity of, 268-269
not a concept, 49, 153 what it is, 256-269
not a zone of things beyond apprehension, 24, 57, 63- receptors, 15-16, 39, 56, 64, 68
64, 66-68 recovery (of modes of presentation of reality), 214, 362,
not objectivity, 65 363
not something immanent, 24 rectitude, 199-200, 202-203
object and, 304-309 reference, 40, 53, 84, 107, 124, 129, 140, 160, 188, 191-
of God, 343 192, 194, 216, 253, 280, 294, 318-322, 329, 330, 332-
openness of, 243, 247, 253-254, 289, 291, 325, 343 333, 335, 345
opposed to sign-ness, 28-29 refutable, 341
personal, 49, 77, 79, 314 reification, 45
progression as seach for, 249 reify, 122
qua respective, 317 reity, 24-25, 29, 63-64, 66, 103
reason and, 273-286 relativity, 66, 77, 339, 340
science and, 63-68, 286, 303, 330, 339-340 religion, 131
sensed, 118-119, 342-343, 367 representation, 27, 191, 194, 199, 214, 263, 278-279, 282-
sensible qualities and, 63-68 283, 299, 312, 314, 319, 359
384 INDEX

resonance, 276 one mode of knowledge among others, 303

respectivity, 46, 54, 71-72, 78, 83, 86, 92-93, 95, 97-98, open, 219
101, 108-109, 115-116, 127, 206, 208, 224-226, 228- Parmenides and, 174
229, 235-237, 247-248, 254, 257, 259-260, 270, 276- poetry and, 294
277, 281, 316-317, 321, 324, 328, 336, 338-339, 341, scandal of its failure to say what sensible qualities are,
343-346, 358, 364, 366 64
retain, 212 task of, 57, 67-68
retention, 96, 127-128, 149, 323, 365 the “towards” and science, 67, 294
retraction, 114, 136-145, 148, 158, 164, 177, 179, 198- understanding and, 91
199, 207-208, 213-214, 228, 239, 249, 291 utilizes notion of field, 98-99
richness, 17, 26, 28, 39, 42, 65, 86, 89, 97, 159, 189, 190, Vedanta and, 174
200, 215, 248-249, 281, 300, 362, 366 scientist, 294-295, 303
rock, 16, 57-59, 61, 74, 107, 139, 156, 168 Scotus, Duns, 81, 258
rock-prey, 16 scrutiny, 339
rotate, 284 security, 88-89, 167, 176, 347
Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 333 seeming, 63, 201-213, 215, 217, 239
sameness, 44-46, 58, 76, 230, 259, 272, 323-324 semeion, 22
Sanskrit, 222, 365 Semitic, 88, 142, 261, 280, 293, 294
sapere, 41, 168, 366 sensation, 9, 16, 95
sapientia, 41, 366 sensibility, 18, 34, 38-40, 42, 254, 264
Sartre, Jean Paul, 34 sensible intelligence, 33-35, 40, 49, 157, 367
satya, 88 sensing
scandal, 64, 68 and reflection, 41-42
Schelling, 136 animal sensing and consciousness, 60
scholastic, 129 as potency, 36
Scholasticism, 258 being and, 79-80
science, 3, 36-37, 40, 49, 57, 59-60, 63-68, 71, 89, 91, 99, constitutive of intellective knowing, 33-34, 91-93
119, 142, 174, 186, 203, 219, 294, 297, 299, 301-303, content and, 119
305, 307, 314, 316, 327, 329, 332, 337, 339, 349, 360, content of, 271
363, 366 difference between sensing and intellective knowing
already present in primitive man, 67 only modal, 11, 123
Aristotle and, 302 dualism of sensing and intellective knowing, 3, 11, 32-
as a system, 337 33, 40, 48, 81, 91, 119, 301, 329
as explication of the reality in perception, 67-68 experience and, 323-324, 329
based on ulterior modes of intellection, 97 field and, 123
comprehensive science (Medieval), 360, 363 formal character of, 108
definitive conquest, 63, 67 human sensing, 108, 119, 281, 323, 325, 328
episteme and, 301 human structures and, 103-104
Galileo and, 286 impression of reality, 325
has not explained sensible qualities, 64 in Greek and Medieval philosophy, 9, 48, 122-123, 273-
interprets force of reality as law, 71 274
is about functionality not causes, 119, 327 in Heidegger and Sartre, 34
is an effort, not a Faktum, 303 in Modern philosophy, 9, 273-274
is differential intellection, 186 in the structure of the living thing, 37-38
is experience of wordly “what”, 329 intellective part of not content but impression of reality,
is problematic knowledge, 303 271
is truth of the cosmic unity of the real, 219 intellective, 33-34, 39, 91, 108, 119
its erroneous idea of sensible qualities, 57, 63-65 intrinsic unity of three moments, 104
its idea of reality, 63-64 is apprehension, 107
Kant’s error with regard to, 297, 303, 305, 327 logos is a mode of, 123
knowledge is not science or principally science, 314 mathematics and, 157
mathematics is a science of reality, 332 not sensing “and” intelligence, only sentient
not a system of concepts, but a science of reality, 65 intellection, 328
not a system of judgements, 329 not subject-object relation, 66
 INDEX 385

philosophy has not analyzed, 4, 10-11 being and, 80

pure animal sensing, 107-108 conceptualizing of the real and, 49, 73-75
reality, 21, 31, 108, 272, 323, 367 evidence and, 182
sensible qualities and, 328 formality apprehended in, 364
sensing and intellection and sentient intelligence, 108 human reality and, 37-38, 219
stimulation and, 21-22 human intelligence is, 367
unity of intellection and, 271 intellectualism and, 103-104
what it is, 13-17 intellective knowing as actualization of the real in, 108,
sensualism, 272, 323 225, 243, 271, 351
sentient being, 14-18, 27, 56-57, 103, 292 intellective world exists only with respect to, 229
sentient intellection logos and, 108, 240
affirmation and, 146-147, 167, 239 logos as modalization of, 240
as actuality, 52-53, 56-57 mathematics and, 156
as human habitude, 38 metaphysical dualisms and, 48-49
as intellective sensing, 33-34 no sensing “and” intelligence only sentient intelligence,
being and, 79-80 328
being of the substantive only given in, 237 non-sentient intelligence, 147
common actuality and, 57-62, 69 openness and, 219
difference with sensible intellection, 271 opposed to concipient intelligence, 33-35, 43-45, 48-50,
essential for knowledge, 300 70-71, 74-75, 77-78, 84-85, 103
evidence and, 183 opposed to sensible intelligence, 33-35, 40, 49, 157, 271
experience and, 323 primordial apprehension and reason, 271
fictional items and, 141 primordial apprehension as basis of, 358
field given in, 120 real truth and, 84-85
formal structure of the unity of, 359-367 sketching and, 322-323
human structures and, 103-104 sensing and intellective knowing two structural
is transcendental, 61-62 moments of, 108
its essence, 51-62 sensing and intellection and sentient intelligence, 108
Kant’s error and, 191 transcendentality and, 44-47, 61-62
knowledge and, 352, 354 understanding and, 364
logos and, 130, 243 unity of the modes of sentient intellection, 43
mathematical objects as terminus of a, 156 what it is, 4, 34-35, 39, 42-43, 92-93
modes of, 10, 39-43, 61-62, 93-94, 271, 352 Seville, 151
not sensing “and” intellective knowing, but only Sherrington, 19
sentient intellection, 119 sign, 14, 21-22, 24-26, 28-29, 32-33, 54, 56, 61, 78, 103,
not subject-object relation, 61, 66 107, 223, 273
possessed by the force of reality, 274 signal, 22
principles understood in, 264 signitive, 22, 25, 28, 29, 54, 61
progression grounded in, 265 similarity, 319
real truth and, 83-87 simplex, 211
reality and, 229, 270-271, 325, 351 skepticism, 327
reason is a mode of, 271, 273 sketch, 39, 44, 171, 271, 300, 321-322, 324, 329, 330-333,
sentient logos as mode of, 100, 108, 123, 126 335-336, 338-341, 343, 345-352
sketching and, 321, 330 sketch out, 273, 330, 331, 336-340, 347-350
stepping back and, 124 smell, 39, 41, 64
stepping back and, 124, 164 social, 131, 158, 200, 284, 293-294, 322
thinking and, 255 society, 63, 77, 131, 284, 305
three dimensions of intellection as modes of, 272 sociological, 3, 284, 332, 334
“toward” as mode of, 124, 352 sociology, 3, 284, 294
what it is, 31-35, 103, 359 solar, 65
sentient intelligence, 108-109, 123, 128, 150, 156-157, solvable, 155
182, 219, 225, 229, 240, 243, 271, 273, 292, 322, 328, somatic, 38
351-352, 358, 362, 364, 367 sonority, 67
as a faculty, 36-37 sophia, 41
386 INDEX

Sophist, 35, 301 of the apprehension of reality, 31-35, 39-47, 227

sophistry, 5 of the cosmos, 281
sophos, 213 of the de suyo as the problem of science, 68
sorrow, 40 of the field, 113-120, 218
soul, 143, 265 of the forms of datum, 253
space, 18, 40, 99, 116, 118, 124, 130, 151, 153-154, 156, of the gap, 180-181
183, 203, 205, 216, 286, 340, 342 of the interiority of the real, 74
spaciality, 118 of the logos, 124-132, 240
Spanish, 3, 10, 15, 16, 31, 41, 121, 124, 127, 135-136, of the real, 234, 259
160, 164, 168, 175, 181, 186, 203, 223-224, 254-255, of the sentient process, 17, 37
257, 267, 284, 297, 324, 363, 365 of the unity of sentient intellection, 359-367
spectre, 70, 138 of thinking intellection, 255
spectrum, 168, 176 of truth and error, 206-207
specular, 265 of verification, 336-341
spirit, 36, 72, 77, 302, 345 of what is apprehended at a distance, 137-143,
spiritual, 142 science and, 303
stability, 86 spatio-temporal structure in Kant, 18
stable, 323 speculative structure of reason, 265
starfish, 28 three structural moments of knowing, 303
stepping back, 28, 124, 127-128, 133, 135-137, 140-141, transcendental structure of the impression of reality, 43-
143, 145-150, 152, 157-158, 164-165, 167, 172, 175, 47
177, 179, 181, 184, 192, 194-195, 197-199, 201-202, understanding and, 91-92
205-207, 212-215, 217, 221, 228-233, 239, 290 Suárez, Francisco, 70
stimulus, 21-26, 28-29, 31-33, 38, 54-55, 60-61, 75, 127, subjective, 18, 23, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 103, 120, 191, 255,
223, 258, 273, 365, 367 256
strata, 37, 263, 319, 357 subjectivism, 63, 65, 229
stratification, 357 subjectivity, 61, 62, 66, 229
stratum, 37, 38, 234, 357 subjectual, 65
structure subsistence, 49
actuality possesses its own, 83 substance, 9, 48, 49, 74, 75, 80, 88, 234, 312
categories and, 309 substantiation, 319
formal structure of sensing, 13-17 substantive, 73, 75, 79, 85, 159, 163, 220, 223, 224, 225,
human, 103-104 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237,
logic and, 318, 342 239
mathematics and, 216, 286, 318 substantivity, 60, 73, 74, 75, 76, 79, 224, 233, 280
modal structure of the apprehension of reality, 39-43 suchness, 47, 78, 281, 312, 344
of actuation and actuality, 53-54 sufficiency, 73, 169, 305, 338, 339, 341
of affirmation, 145-152, 158-165, 192, 206, 234 suggestion, 15, 292, 293, 295, 321, 330, 332, 341
of being, 231-232, 236-237 Sumerian, 294
of certainty, 168 supposition, 66, 197, 198, 283, 284
of coincidence, 195-196, 198-199, 206 suspicion, 171-172, 176
of common actuality, 59-62 syllogism, 275
of doubt, 168 symploke, 309
of dual truth, 195-196, 215 synopsis, 114
of formalization, 18, 29, 76 syntaxis, 114
of intellection, 3-4, 11-12, 237, 240, 289 synthesis, 33, 36, 42, 119, 151, 192, 328, 364
of method, 318-334 system, 15, 19, 38, 56, 65, 68, 73, 74, 76, 77, 85, 86, 94,
of openness, 276 95, 97, 140, 147, 151, 154, 155, 158, 190, 191, 215,
of otherness, 15-16 216, 224, 261, 262, 263, 279, 280, 281, 286, 289, 292,
of possibility, 173 293, 295, 307, 310, 311, 312, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322,
of rational intellection, 297-355 329, 330, 332, 333, 335, 337, 344, 345, 348, 353
of real truth, 237 bodies are more than solid systems, 77
of reality, 273, 275, 283-285, 342, 345 canon and, 261
of reason, 265, 281 construct, see construct system
 INDEX 387

explanation is a system, 344 topological, 118

field is system of the sensed real, 345 topology, 154-155
knowledge not a system of propositions or judgements, topos, 229
337, 353 totality, 14, 16, 74, 86, 113-114, 159, 216, 265, 319, 340,
mathematics and, 151, 154-155, 216, 286 345
nervous, 18-19, 38 touch (sense of), 39, 41, 63, 267
of particles, 330 toward
of rational not a reasoning process, 345 articulates zones of reality, 66-68
of receptors, 15-16 as field and worldly opening, 98-99
of reference, 318-322, 329-330, 332-333, 335, 345 as mode of reality, 127
of the categories, 311-313 as transcendental openness, 98, 130, 138
real not a subject but a system, 310 logos and, 100-101
real thing not just a system of notes, 190 mode of intellection of reality, 39-41, 157, 66-67, 93
real world as system of things, 158 reason and, 100
reason not just a system, 262-263 reflection and, 41-42
science not mere system of concepts, 68 stepping back and, 124
the real is substantive system, 73-75, 76, 85-86, 140 tradition, 63, 305, 307, 342
what is apprehended is a system, 94-95 transcend, 333
world is system of the real, 345 transcendence, 43, 77, 99
systematic, 38, 73, 74, 76, 86, 214, 269, 311, 312, 344, transcendent, 44, 46, 48049, 55
345, 346 transcendental, 38-39, 43-49, 54, 61-62, 71-72, 79-80, 92-
systemic, 345 93, 98-100, 115-119, 123, 126, 130, 196, 219, 243, 248,
tactile, 189 259, 265, 271, 301, 311-312, 326-327, 343, 346
taste, 16, 23, 39-41, 56, 273 transcendental function, 47, 49, 248, 312
tautology, 25, 141, 158 transcendentality, 43-55, 61, 71, 92, 99, 108, 115-116, 218,
tension, 41, 129, 130, 133, 147 248, 312
testing, 282, 324, 326-327, 329-333, 336, 340-341 transformation, 151, 304, 308, 314
Thaetetus, 301 transphysical, 48-49
Theocritus, 88 trigonometry, 259-260
theologian, 295 true encounter, 303
theology, 122, 225 truth, 5, 83-89, 91, 122, 142, 146-147, 151, 157, 177, 183,
theorem, 154-155, 157, 216, 262 192-223, 225-227, 237-240, 243, 254, 263, 279, 285,
theoretic, 275, 294-295, 314 300-301, 303, 317-318, 331-332, 334-337, 339-354
theoretical, 36, 48, 58, 73-74, 104, 252, 257, 285-286, 294, a priori, 203-204
306 adequate, 214, 215, 216
theory, 9-10, 45, 48, 51, 54, 64, 65, 80, 157, 162, 184, 222, affirmation and, 146-147, 206
233, 268, 284, 299, 301, 309, 318, 322, 328, 339-340, and Gödel’s theorem, 157, 332
351 anteriority of reality over, 157
thermal, 21, 284 as coincidence, 197, 239
thermic, 21-23, 25, 33, 78 as fulfillment, 210
thrown, 292-295, 302 authenticity and, 85, 208-210, 213-215, 239, 336
thrust, 99, 109, 136-137, 149, 155, 181, 260, 263, 267, being of the substantive and, 223-225
277, 293, 295, 338 can adopt diverse forms, 85
176 classical philosophy errors with respect to, 208
tilting, 172-173, 176 coformity of judgement with real as, 209-210
time, 3, 5, 9-11, 16, 18, 22, 24, 26-27, 32-33, 36, 38, 42, copulative being and, 220-223
47-48, 51, 58, 60, 65-66, 71, 76, 80, 85, 93-94, 98, 109, Descartes and, 146
113, 115-116, 130, 139, 167-168, 170, 172-173, 186- dual, 85, 194-196, 200, 202, 205-208, 213-215, 217,
188, 196, 201, 209-210, 213, 223, 225, 232, 234, 237- 219, 239, 335-336, 346
239, 247-248, 252, 261, 263, 266, 269, 273-274, 283, elemental, 86, 346
285, 305, 309, 314, 321, 326, 340, 342, 345, 348, 349, error and, 205-207
365 error not finite truth, 205
tonic modification, 13-14, 17, 23, 32, 103, 104 God and, 208
toothache, 21 Husserl and, 203-204
388 INDEX

in Aristotle, 80 of intuition and reason in sentient logos, 191-192

in encounter, 336-346 of men, 77
logic and, 205, 317-318 of movement and duality constitutes expectation, 165
mathematics and, 151-157, 216, 285, 332 of otherness, 16-17
meaning and, 204 of possibilities, 291-292
method and, 317 of potencies, 36
necessary, 151, 212, 229, 332, 342 of rational truth, 350-354
of reality and reason false duality, 343 of reality and actualization, 311-312
of reality, 343 of reality and retraction constitutes the “might be”, 137
of reason, 335-336 of reason and reality, 269
parity and, 203 of reason, 268-269, 289
path of, 204 of respectivity, 248, 345
phases of, 208 of sensing and intellective knowing, 32-34, 104, 301
Plato and, 301 of sensing, 13-14, 43, 104, 301
postulation and, 332 of temporeity, 79
principles and, 289 of the apprehension of reality, 26-27
prior to error, 205 of the “beyond” and the “in”, 57
radical, 84, 237 of the cosmos, 281
rational, 303, 335-354 of the datum in the real, 253-254
real, 83-89, 151, 194-195, 197-201, 205, 213, 217-218, of the “ex”, 181
220, 223, 225, 227, 237, 239, 317, 335, 346, 350, 354 of the field nature moment and the individual moment
reality and being and, 219-238 of the real, 109, 118, 126, 133, 157, 165, 169, 192,
sentient logos and, 193-238 197, 199, 202, 228, 239, 325
simple, 85, 217, 219, 335, 346 of the field, 113-114, 117
stepping back and, 198 of the impression of reality, 32-34, 46-47, 129, 271-272
truth and error are forms of reality, 210 of the logos, 100
types of, 211-213 of the moments of reason, 261-264
unity of, 217-219 of the notes of a real thing, 310
valence and, 200-206 of the phases of dual truth, 207-208, 213-217
what it is, 83-84, 207, 239 of the present analysis, 101
truthify, 83-84, 86, 193, 212, 217, 237, 335, 353 of the primordial apprehension of reality, 94
tuberculosis, 224 of the real, 48-49, 73-74, 76, 165, 219, 225, 228, 234,
ulteriority, 79-80, 97, 101, 221, 225-227, 235, 237 236, 240, 280, 343, 345, 361
uncertainty, 205 of the sentient intelligence, 43, 92-93, 108
understanding, 4, 9, 61, 78, 80, 91, 109, 113, 136, 146, of the structure of knowing, 303
175, 240, 264, 271, 290, 311, 317, 323, 327, 345, 360, of the unreal, 139, 153
363, 364, 366 of truth, 217-219
unification, 32, 99, 199, 201 rupture of the unity of stimulation, 28
unity structural, 280, 283
closed, 16, 73, 76 systematic, 312, 345
connective, 160-164, 220-221 transcendental commonality, 312
formal unity of sentient intellection, 57-62, 271, 351 worldly, 99, 109, 247, 257, 341, 344-345
freedom and, 278, 280 unreal, 57, 85, 138-141, 150, 152-154, 158, 160, 162-164,
of actuality, 56-57, 125, 337 199, 290, 321, 323-324, 326, 333, 348
of being here-and-now, 10, 225 unverifiable, 340-341, 343
of being in intellection, 233-238 vacuum, 140-141, 274, 303, 327, 336
of being, 122, 230 valence, 200, 202-206
of constitution, 160, 162 variability (of notes), 26, 66, 114, 222
of evidence and truth, 211 variety (of notes), 28, 85, 94, 145, 159, 312, 329
of formalization, 18 Veda, 222, 365
of impression, 14-15, 27, 273 Vedanta, 70, 174
of intellection and senses, 41-43, 270 Vedic, 88, 365
of intellection, 191, 355-367 vegetable, 331
of intelligence and reality, 92, 197, 221 Vergil, 160
 INDEX 389

veridictance, 213-215, 239, 336, 346, 348-350, 354 is systematic unity which permits reasoning, 345
verifiable, 303, 320, 339-341, 343 knowing and, 352
verification, 213, 319, 332-334, 336-341, 343-344, 346- mathematical, 216
350, 352, 354 not a zone of things beyond, 338
verify, 85, 88, 332, 337-341, 346-347 not the conjunction of all real things, 247
viability, 28, 330 opening of man to, 38, 77
vidential, 183 openness of, 248-249, 276, 316
virus, 4, 52 physical, 67-68
visible, 37, 41, 228, 284 rational truth and, 341, 343
vision, 39-41, 54, 57-58, 86, 96, 131, 155, 181-184, 186- reason and, 100-101, 271
189, 191, 199, 233, 310, 331, 365 reason is progression from field to, 240, 248-249
volition, 103-104, 146 reason is search for, 271
wave, 67-68, 98, 173, 243, 256, 257, 300, 320, 330, 339 respectivity and, 109,
“what for”, 324, 326-329, 340 sensible and intelligible in Leibniz and Kant, 48-49
wisdom, 41, 366 the real and, 226
Wissen, 366 transcendentality and, 115
Wissenschaft, 366 what it is, 46, 109, 158, 224, 226, 229, 247, 345
world worldly
and personeity, 99-100 actuality, 78, 99, 226, 227, 235, 239
apprehended sentiently as field, 235 exceeding, 344
as a moment of a real thing, 46, 99 functionality, 327, 329
as ulterior mode of actualization, 98 ground, 317, 329
being as actuality in, 78-80, 224-225, 235, 309, 317 moment, 99, 101, 329, 343, 361, 362
being of the affirmed and, 229 otherness, 326
being of the substantive and, 226 reality, 46, 55, 99, 100, 259, 274, 302, 314, 319, 322-
cosmos and, 248, 343 324, 326-327, 335, 340-341, 343, 344, 348, 351-352,
field and, 226, 236, 248, 299, 314, 316, 319, 324, 338- 357-358
339, 342, 344 respectivity, 78, 98, 226, 235-237, 257, 321, 344
field is sensed world, 240, 248, 270, 316, 319, 324, 339, Yahweh, 332
351, 363 yellow, 203
ground of, 316 Zeno, 122
intellective actuality and, 55 zone, 48, 57, 63-67, 113, 338, 341, 343
intellective, 229, 233, 235 Zubiri, Xavier (footnotes), 3, 9, 10, 28, 43, 63, 97, 99, 115,
intelligible, 229-230 117, 124, 135, 152, 160, 168, 175, 223, 243, 254, 280,
is reality in-depth, 278, 299 302, 365
is respectivity of the real qua real, 224, 226, 229, 235,
248, 257, 260, 316, 321, 339, 341, 343
“All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for, aside
from their utility, they are loved for their own sake, and that of sight above all others.” Thus Aristotle
begins Book I of his Metaphysics, posing in rawest form the “problem of knowing”, one of the most seri-
ous of philosophy and one of the most persistent throughout its long history. What can we know? And
how can we know it? Such are the questions which Plato sought to answer in Book VII of the Republic,
Aristotle in his Organon, Descartes in his Discourse on Method, Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason,
Hegel in his Logic, Husserl in his Logical Investigations, and many others. Today the subject finds itself
in a situation even more disquieting than in any previous epoch. The bibliography on the “critical prob-
lem,” epistemology or the theory of knowledge, is overwhelming. But not so the solutions which, starting
with the preface to this book, Xavier Zubiri describes as conceptivist and in the final analysis, idealistic…
In the full maturity of his philosophy, Zubiri takes up the question with exceptional vigor and rigor. In a
continual dialog with the philosophical tradition, Zubiri goes page by page describing the act of human
intellection, dismantling the cluster of hypotheses and theories that underlie the so-called “problem of
knowledge.” Upon finishing the book, the reader is conscious of the tangled maze upon which rest the
most classical theses, and the heap of pseudo-problems which make approach to the subject so difficult—
tantamount to the approach to reality itself. Shunning both naiveté and prejudice, Zubiri succeeds in de-
scribing in what the human act par excellence, intellection, consists. And he does so by recourse to a
purely descriptive procedure…Sentient Intelligence is comparable in scope to that work which, exactly
two centuries ago, unleashed the so-called “critical problem,” Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. For Kant,
intellection is transcendental synthesis. No, Zubiri says, human intellection is not transcendental synthe-
sis—as Kant erroneously thought—but something much simpler yet at the same time much more radical,
the mere actualization of the real in the sentient intelligence.
—from the cover of the original Spanish edition of Part I.

Ever since the time of Parmenides, philosophy has sought to resolve the problem of the relation between
intelligence and reality on the very point which is the central theme of this work, the “logos,” whose most
classical expression is the “judgement.” Zubiri is squarely opposed to this tradition, which according to
him leads to a formalistic logicism that distorts the role of the intelligence and impedes access to reality.
He affirms the preeminence of intellection over logos. Intelligence…merely actualizes things insofar as
they are “real.” Logos is an ulterior mode of intellection which allows us to express what real things are
“in reality”.
—from the cover of the original Spanish edition of Part II.

…this work definitively confronts the most classical themes of the philosophy of knowledge: what is
knowing? In what does reason consist? What is the method of knowledge?…Knowing things as real
does not mean that we know what they are “in reality”—logos—and still less what they are beyond ap-
prehension, i.e., “in reality itself”…By means of reason, human intelligence seeks to know what things
are “in reality itself,” as Zubiri says. Only at this level does intellection become authentic knowledge.
This knowledge, moreover, is never complete; it is always open and problematic…
—from the cover of the original Spanish edition of Part III.

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