Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 17, Number 1—Winter 2003—Pages 83–104

From EfŽ cient Markets Theory to

Behavioral Finance

Robert J. Shiller

A
cademic Ž nance has evolved a long way from the days when the efŽ cient
markets theory was widely considered to be proved beyond doubt. Behav-
ioral Ž nance—that is, Ž nance from a broader social science perspective
including psychology and sociology—is now one of the most vital research pro-
grams, and it stands in sharp contradiction to much of efŽ cient markets theory.
The efŽ cient markets theory reached its height of dominance in academic
circles around the 1970s. At that time, the rational expectations revolution in
economic theory was in its Ž rst blush of enthusiasm, a fresh new idea that occupied
the center of attention. The idea that speculative asset prices such as stock prices
always incorporate the best information about fundamental values and that prices
change only because of good, sensible information meshed very well with theoret-
ical trends of the time. Prominent Ž nance models of the 1970s related speculative
asset prices to economic fundamentals, using rational expectations to tie together
Ž nance and the entire economy in one elegant theory. For example, Robert
Merton published “An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model” in 1973, which
showed how to generalize the capital asset pricing model to a comprehensive
intertemporal general equilibrium model. Robert Lucas published “Asset Prices in
an Exchange Economy” in 1978, which showed that in a rational expectations
general equilibrium, rational asset prices may have a forecastable element that is
related to the forecastability of consumption. Douglas Breeden published his
theory of “consumption betas” in 1979, where a stock’s beta (which measures the
sensitivity of its return compared to some index) was determined by the correlation

y Robert J. Shiller is the Stanley B. Resor Professor of Economics and also afŽliated with the
Cowles Foundation and the International Center for Finance, Yale University, New Haven,
Connecticut. He is a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research,
Cambridge, Massachusetts. His e-mail address is [email protected] .
84 Journal of Economic Perspectives

of the stock’s return with per capita consumption. These were exciting theoretical
advances at the time. In 1973, the Ž rst edition of Burton Malkiel’s acclaimed book,
A Random Walk Down Wall Street, appeared, which conveyed this excitement to a
wider audience.
In the decade of the 1970s, I was a graduate student writing a Ph.D. dissertation
on rational expectations models and an assistant and associate professor, and I was
mostly caught up in the excitement of the time. One could easily wish that these
models were true descriptions of the world around us, for it would then be a
wonderful advance for our profession. We would have powerful tools to study and
to quantify the Ž nancial world around us.
Wishful thinking can dominate much of the work of a profession for a decade,
but not indeŽ nitely. The 1970s already saw the beginnings of some disquiet over
these models and a tendency to push them somewhat aside in favor of a more
eclectic way of thinking about Ž nancial markets and the economy. Browsing today
again through Ž nance journals from the 1970s, one sees some beginnings of
reports of anomalies that didn’t seem likely to square with the efŽ cient markets
theory, even if they were not presented as signiŽ cant evidence against the theory.
For example, Eugene Fama’s 1970 article, “EfŽ cient Capital Markets: A Review of
Empirical Work,” while highly enthusiastic in its conclusions for market efŽ ciency,
did report some anomalies like slight serial dependencies in stock market returns,
though with the tone of pointing out how small the anomalies were.

The 1980s and Excess Volatility

From my perspective, the 1980s were a time of important academic discussion

of the consistency of the efŽ cient markets model for the aggregate stock market
with econometric evidence about the time series properties of prices, dividends and
earnings. Of particular concern was whether these stocks show excess volatility
relative to what would be predicted by the efŽ cient markets model.
The anomalies that had been discovered might be considered at worst small
departures from the fundamental truth of market efŽ ciency, but if most of the
volatility in the stock market was unexplained, it would call into question the basic
underpinnings of the entire efŽ cient markets theory. The anomaly represented by
the notion of excess volatility seems to be much more troubling for efŽ ciency
markets theory than some other Ž nancial anomalies, such as the January effect or
the day-of-the-week effect.1 The volatility anomaly is much deeper than those
represented by price stickiness or tatonnement or even by exchange-rate overshoot-
ing. The evidence regarding excess volatility seems, to some observers at least, to
imply that changes in prices occur for no fundamental reason at all, that they occur
because of such things as “sunspots” or “animal spirits” or just mass psychology.
The efŽ cient markets model can be stated as asserting that the price Pt of a

1
A good discussion of the major anomalies, and the evidence for them, is in Siegel (2002).
 Robert J. Shiller 85

share (or of a portfolio of shares representing an index) equals the mathematical

expectation, conditional on all information available at the time, of the present
value P *t of actual subsequent dividends accruing to that share (or portfolio of
shares). P *t is not known at time t and has to be forecasted. EfŽ cient markets say that
price equals the optimal forecast of it.
Different forms of the efŽ cient markets model differ in the choice of the
discount rate in the present value, but the general efŽ cient markets model can be
written just as P t 5 E t P *t, where E t refers to mathematical expectation conditional
on public information available at time t. This equation asserts that any surprising
movements in the stock market must have at their origin some new information
about the fundamental value P *t .
It follows from the efŽ cient markets model that P *t 5 P t 1 U t, where U t is a
forecast error. The forecast error U t must be uncorrelated with any information
variable available at time t, otherwise the forecast would not be optimal; it would
not be taking into account all information. Since the price P t itself is information
at time t, P t and U t must be uncorrelated with each other. Since the variance of the
sum of two uncorrelated variables is the sum of their variances, it follows that the
variance of P *t must equal the variance of P t plus the variance of U t, and hence,
since the variance of U t cannot be negative, that the variance of P *t must be greater
than or equal to that of P t.
Thus, the fundamental principle of optimal forecasting is that the forecast
must be less variable than the variable forecasted. Any forecaster whose forecast
consistently varies through time more than the variable forecasted is making a
serious error, because then high forecasts would themselves tend to indicate
forecast positive errors, and low forecasts indicate negative errors. The maximum
possible variance of the forecast is the variance of the variable forecasted, and this
can occur only if the forecaster has perfect foresight and the forecasts correlate
perfectly with the variable forecasted.
If one computes for each year since 1871 the present value subsequent to that
year of the real dividends paid on the Standard & Poor’s Composite Stock Price
Index, discounted by a constant real discount rate equal to the geometric average
real return 1871–2002 on the same Standard & Poor Index, one Ž nds that the
present value, if plotted through time, behaves remarkably like a stable trend.2 In
contrast, the Standard & Poor’s Composite Stock Price Index gyrates wildly up and
down around this trend. Figure 1 illustrates these patterns.
How, then, can we take it as received doctrine that, according to the simplest
efŽ cient markets theory, the stock price represents the optimal forecast of this
present value, the price responding only to objective information about it? I argued
in Shiller (1981), as did also Stephen LeRoy and Richard Porter (1981), that the
stability of the present value through time suggests that there is excess volatility in

2
The present value, constant discount rate, is computed for each year t as p *const, t 5 ¥ `t 5 t1 1 r ( t 2 t) D t ,
where r is a constant discount factor, and D t is the real dividend at time t. An assumption was made
about real dividends after 2002. See note to Figure 1.
86 Journal of Economic Perspectives

Figure 1
Real Stock Prices and Present Values of Subsequent Real Dividends
(annual data)

10000

Real Stock Price (S&P 500)

1000
PDV, Interest Rates
Price

PDV, Constant Discount Rate

100 PDV, Consumption

10
1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020

Notes: The heaviest line is the Standard & Poor 500 Index for January of year shown. The less-heavy
line is the present value for each year of subsequent real dividends accruing to the index discounted
by the geometric-average real return for the entire sample, 6.61 percent. Dividends after 2002 were
assumed equal to the 2002 dividend times 1.25 (to correct for recent lower dividend payout) and
growing at the geometric-average historical growth rate for dividends, 1.11 percent. The thin line is
the present value for each year of subsequent real dividends discounted by one-year interest rates
plus a risk premium equal to the geometric average real return on the market minus the geometric
average real one-year interest rate. The dashed line is the present value for each year of subsequent
real dividends discounted by marginal rates of substitution in consumption for a representative
individual with a coefŽ cient of relative risk aversion of 3 who consumes the real per capita
nondurable and service consumption from the U. S. National Income and Product Accounts.
Real values were computed from nominal values by dividing by the consumer price index (CPI-U
since 1913, linked to the Warren and Pearson producer price index before 1913) and rescaling to
January 2003 5 100. Some of the very latest observations of underlying series were estimated based
on data available as of this writing; for example, the consumer price index for January 2003 was
estimated based on data from previous months. Source data are available on http://www.econ.yale.
edu/ shiller , and the further descriptions of some of the data are in Shiller (1989). See also
footnotes 1, 5 and 6.

the aggregate stock market, relative to the present value implied by the efŽ cient
markets model. Our work launched a remarkable amount of controversy, from
which I will recall here just a few highlights.
The principal issue regarding our original work on excess volatility was in
regard to thinking about the stationarity of dividends and stock prices. My own
work in the early 1980s had followed a tradition in the Ž nance literature of
 From EfŽcient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance 87

assuming that dividends  uctuated around a known trend.3 However, one might
also argue, as do Marsh and Merton (1986), that dividends need not stay close to
a trend and that even if earnings followed a trend, share issuance or repurchase
could make dividends depart from a trend indeŽ nitely. In addition, if business
managers use dividends to provide a smoothed  ow of payouts from their busi-
nesses, then the stock prices might be expected to shift more rapidly than divi-
dends. Marsh and Merton argued that such dividend smoothing could make stock
prices unstationary in such a way that in Ž nite samples prices appear more volatile
than the present values.
Thus, the challenge became how to construct a test for expected volatility that
modeled dividends and stock prices in a more general way. As such tests were
developed, they tended to conŽ rm the overall hypothesis that stock prices had
more volatility than an efŽ cient markets hypothesis could explain. For example,
West (1988) derived an inequality that the variance of innovations (that is, surprises)
in stock prices must be less than or equal to the variance of the innovations in the
forecasted present value of dividends based on a subset of information available to
the market. This inequality is quite general: it holds even when dividends and stock
prices have inŽ nite variances so long as the variance of the innovation (the
unexpected change) in these is Ž nite. Using long-term annual data on stock prices,
West found that the variance of innovations in stock prices was four to 20 times its
theoretical upper bound. 4 John Campbell and I (1988) recast the time series model
in terms of a cointegrated model of real prices and real dividends, while also
relaxing other assumptions about the time series, and again found evidence of
excess volatility.5 Campbell (1991) provided a variance decomposition for stock
returns that indicated that most of the variability of the aggregate stock market
conveyed information about future returns, rather than about future dividends.
Another contested issue regarding the early work on excess volatility ques-
tioned the assumption of the early work that the efŽ cient markets model was best
conveyed through an expected present value model in which the real discount rate
is constant through time. The assumption of a constant discount rate over time can
only be considered a Ž rst step, for the theory suggests more complex relationships.

3
It should be pointed out that dividend payouts as a fraction of earnings have shown a gradual
downtrend over the period since 1871 and that dividend payouts have increasingly been substituted by
share repurchases. Net share repurchases reached approximately 1 percent of shares outstanding by the
late 1990s. However, share repurchases do not invalidate the theoretical model that stock prices should
equal the present value of dividends. See Cole, Helwege and Laster (1996).
4
In more technical terms, this argument is over whether dividends could be viewed as a stationary series.
The discussion was often phrased in terms of the “unit root” property of the time series, where a unit
root refers to notion that when a variable is regressed on its own lags, the characteristic equation of the
difference equation has a root on the unit circle. West (1988) can be viewed as a way of addressing the
unit root issue. In our 1988 paper, Campbell and I handled nonstationarity by using a vector autore-
gressive model including the log dividend-price ratio and the change in log dividends as elements.
5
Barsky and De Long (1993), however, later showed that if one assumes that real dividends must be twice
differenced to induce stationarity (so that dividends are even more unstationary in the sense that
dividend growth rates, not just levels, are unstationary), then the efŽ cient markets model looks rather
more consistent with the data.
88 Journal of Economic Perspectives

One such efŽ cient markets model makes the discount rate correspond to
interest rates. The line in Figure 1 labeled “PDV, Interest Rates” illustrates this
concept.6 However, allowing time-varying interest rates in the present value for-
mula does little to support the efŽ cient markets model. The actual price is still
more volatile than the present value, especially for the latest half century. More-
over, what changes through time there are in the present value bear little resem-
blance to the changes through time in the stock prices. Note for example that the
present value is extremely high throughout the depression years of the 1930s, not
low as was the actual stock market. The present value is high then because real
interest rates were at extreme lows after 1933, into the early 1950s, and since real
dividends really did not fall much after 1929. After 1929, real Standard & Poor’s
dividends fell to around 1925 levels for just a few years, 1933–1935 and 1938, but,
contrary to popular impressions, were generally higher in the 1930s than they were
in the 1920s.7
An alternative approach to the possibility of varying real discount rates looks at
the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution for consumption, which is shown in
Figure 1 with the line labeled “PDV, Consumption.”8 The models of efŽ cient
Ž nancial markets from the 1970s like Merton (1973), Lucas (1978) and Breeden
(1979) concluded that stock prices are the expected present value of future
dividends discounted using marginal rates of substitution of consumption, and in
these models the equations for stock returns were derived in the context of a model
maximizing the utility of consumption. Grossman and Shiller (1981) produced a
plot of that present value since 1881, using Standard & Poor dividend data and
using aggregate consumption data to compute the marginal rates of substitution as
discount factors, and this plot is updated here, and this is what is shown in Figure 1. We

6
The present value, discounted by interest rates, is a plot for each year t of

O
2002 t 2002

P *r,t 5 1/~1 1 r t1j 1 f!D t 1 1/~1 1 r t1j 1 f!P *const,2003 .

t5t j50 j5t

See note to Figure 1.

7
Campbell and I (1989) recast the argument in terms of a vector autoregressive model of real stock
prices, real interest rates and real dividends, in which each of these variables was regressed on lags of
itself and lags of the other variables. We found that the dividend-price ratio not only shows excess
volatility, but shows very little correlation with the dividend divided by the forecast of the present value
of future dividends.
8
The present value, consumption discounted, is a plot for each year t of

O
2002

P *c,t 5 ~C t /C t ! 3D t 1 ~C t /C 2003 ! 3P *const,2003 ,

t5t11

where C t is real per capita real consumption at time t. This expression is inspired by Lucas (1978) and
derived in Grossman and Shiller (1981) assuming a coefŽ cient of relative risk aversion of 3. See note to
Figure 1.
 Robert J. Shiller 89

found, as can also be seen here in Figure 1, that the present value of dividends as
discounted in this model had only a tenuous relation to actual stock prices, and did
not appear volatile enough to justify the price movements unless we pushed the
coefŽ cient of relative risk aversion to ridiculously high levels, higher than the value
of three that was used for the plot.
Grossman and Shiller (1981) stressed that there were some similarities be-
tween the present value and the actual real price, notably the present value peaks
in 1929 and bottoms out in 1933, close to the actual peak and trough of the market.
But the present value does this because consumption peaked in 1929 and then
dropped very sharply, bottoming out in 1933, and the present value takes account
of this, as if people had perfect foresight of the coming depression. But in fact it
appears very unlikely that people saw this outcome in 1929, and if they did not, then
the efŽ cient model does not predict that the actual real price should have tracked
the present value over this period.
Actually, the consumption discount model, while it may show some comove-
ments at times with actual stock prices, does not work well because it does not justify
the volatility of stock prices. I showed (1982) that the theoretical model implies a
lower bound on the volatility of the marginal rate of substitution, a bound which is
with the U.S. data much higher than could be observed unless risk aversion were
implausibly high. Hansen and Jagannathan later generalized this lower bound and
elaborated on its implications, and today the apparent violation of this “Hansen-
Jagannathan lower bound” is regarded as an important anomaly in Ž nance.9
Some very recent research has emphasized that, even though the aggregate
stock market appears to be wildly inefŽ cient, individual stock prices do show some
correspondence to efŽ cient markets theory. That is, while the present value model
for the aggregate stock market seems unsupported by the data, there is some
evidence that cross-sectional variations in stock prices relative to accounting measures
show some relation to the present value model. Paul Samuelson some years ago
posited that the stock market is “micro efŽ cient but macro inefŽ cient,” since there
is considerable predictable variation across Ž rms in their predictable future paths
of dividends but little predictable variation in aggregate dividends. Hence, Sam-
uelson asserted, movements among individual stocks make more sense than do
movements in the market as a whole. There is now evidence to back up this
assertion.
Vuolteenaho (2002) showed, using vector-autoregressive methods, that the
ratio of book-to-market-value of U.S. Ž rms explains a substantial fraction of changes
in future Ž rms’ earnings. Cohen, Polk and Vuolteenaho (2002) concluded that 75
to 80 percent of the variation across Ž rms in their book-to-market ratios can be
explained in terms of future variation in proŽ ts. Jung and Shiller (2002) show that,
cross-sectionally, for U.S. stocks that have been continually traded since 1926, the
price-dividend ratio is a strong forecaster of the present value of future dividend

9
See, for example, John Cochrane’s (2001) book Asset Pricing, which surveys this literature. Much of the
older literature is summarized in my 1989 book Market Volatility.
90 Journal of Economic Perspectives

changes. So, dividend-price ratios on individual stocks do serve as forecasts of

long-term future changes in their future dividends, as efŽ cient markets assert.
This does not mean that there are not substantial bubbles in individual stock
prices, but that the predictable variation across Ž rms in dividends has often been so
large as to largely swamp out the effect of the bubbles. A lot of this predictable
variation across Ž rms takes the form of Ž rms’ paying zero dividends for many years
and investors correctly perceiving that eventually dividends will be coming, and of
Ž rms in very bad shape with investors correctly perceiving they will not be paying
substantial dividends much longer. When it comes to individual stocks, such
predictable variations, and their effects on price, are often far larger than the
bubble component of stock prices.
There is a clear sense that the level of volatility of the overall stock market
cannot be well explained with any variant of the efŽ cient markets model in which
stock prices are formed by looking at the present discounted value of future
returns. There are many ways to tinker with the discount rates in the present value
formulas, and someday someone may Ž nd some deŽ nition of discount rates that
produces a present value series that “Ž ts” the actual price better than any of the
series shown in Figure 1.10 But it is unlikely that they will do so convincingly, given
the failure of our efforts to date to capture the volatility of stock prices. To justify
the volatility in terms of such changes in the discount rates, one will have to argue
that investors also had a great deal of information about changes in the factors
in uencing these future discount rates.
After all the efforts to defend the efŽ cient markets theory, there is still every
reason to think that, while markets are not totally crazy, they contain quite sub-
stantial noise, so substantial that it dominates the movements in the aggregate
market. The efŽ cient markets model, for the aggregate stock market, has still never
been supported by any study effectively linking stock market  uctuations with
subsequent fundamentals. By the end of the 1980s, the restless minds of many
academic researchers had turned to other theories.

The Blossoming of Behavioral Finance

In the 1990s, a lot of the focus of academic discussion shifted away from these
econometric analyses of time series on prices, dividends and earnings toward
developing models of human psychology as it relates to Ž nancial markets. The Ž eld
of behavioral Ž nance developed. Researchers had seen too many anomalies, too

10
Other factors are considered by McGrattan and Prescott (2001), who emphasize tax rate changes, and
Siegel (2002), who considers not only tax rate changes but also changes in the volatility of the economy,
changes in the in ation rate, and changes in transactions costs. Neither of these studies shows a “Ž t”
between present value and prices over the long sample, however. Notably, the factors they use do not
go through sudden changes at the time of the stock market booms and crashes surrounding 1929 and
2000.
 From EfŽcient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance 91

little inspiration that our theoretical models captured important  uctuations. An

extensive body of empirical work, summarized in Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay’s
1996 book The Econometrics of Financial Markets, laid the foundation for a revolution
in Ž nance.
Richard Thaler and I started our National Bureau of Economic Research
conference series on behavioral Ž nance in 1991, extending workshops that Thaler
had organized at the Russell Sage Foundation a few years earlier.11 Many other
workshops and seminars on behavioral Ž nance followed. There is so much going
on in the Ž eld that it is impossible to summarize in a short space. Here, I will
illustrate the progress of behavioral Ž nance with two salient examples from recent
research: feedback models and obstacles to smart money. For overall surveys of the
Ž eld of behavioral Ž nance, the interested reader might begin with Hersh Shefrin’s
Beyond Greed and Fear: Understanding Behavioral Finance and the Psychology of Investing
(2000) or Andrei Shleifer’s InefŽcient Markets (2000). There are also some new
books of collected papers in behavioral Ž nance, including a three-volume set,
Behavioral Finance, edited by Hersh Shefrin (2001), and Advances in Behavioral
Finance II, edited by Richard H. Thaler (2003).

Feedback Models
One of the oldest theories about Ž nancial markets, expressed long ago in
newspapers and magazines rather than scholarly journals, is, if translated into
academic words, a price-to-price feedback theory. When speculative prices go up,
creating successes for some investors, this may attract public attention, promote
word-of-mouth enthusiasm, and heighten expectations for further price increases.
The talk attracts attention to “new era” theories and “popular models” that justify
the price increases.1 2 This process in turn increases investor demand and thus
generates another round of price increases. If the feedback is not interrupted, it
may produce after many rounds a speculative “bubble,” in which high expectations
for further price increases support very high current prices. The high prices are
ultimately not sustainable, since they are high only because of expectations of
further price increases, and so the bubble eventually bursts, and prices come falling
down. The feedback that propelled the bubble carries the seeds of its own destruc-
tion, and so the end of the bubble may be unrelated to news stories about
fundamentals. The same feedback may also produce a negative bubble, downward
price movements propelling further downward price movements, promoting word-
of-mouth pessimism, until the market reaches an unsustainably low level.
Such a feedback theory is very old. As long ago as 1841, Charles MacKay in his

11
For a list of our programs since 1991, with links to authors’ websites, see http://cowles.econ.
yale.edu/behŽ n .
12
Descriptions of new era theories attending various speculative bubbles are described in my book
(2000). Popular models that accompanied the stock market crash of 1987, the real estate bubbles
peaking around 1990 and various initial public offering booms are discussed in my paper in this journal
(1990).
92 Journal of Economic Perspectives

in uential book Memoirs of Extraordinary Popular Delusions described the famous
tulipmania in Holland in the 1630s, a speculative bubble in tulip  ower bulbs, with
words that suggest feedback and the ultimate results of the feedback (pp. 118 –119):

Many individuals grew suddenly rich. A golden bait hung temptingly out
before the people, and one after another, they rushed to the tulip marts, like
 ies around a honey-pot . . . . At last, however, the more prudent began to see
that this folly could not last forever. Rich people no longer bought the  owers
to keep them in their gardens, but to sell them again at cent per cent proŽ t.
It was seen that somebody must lose fearfully in the end. As this conviction
spread, prices fell, and never rose again.13

The feedback theory seems to be even much older than this. Note of such feedback,
and the role of word-of-mouth communications in promoting it, was in fact made
at the time of the tulipmania itself. One anonymous observer publishing in 1637
(the year of the peak of the tulipmania) gives a Ž ctional account of a conversation
between two people, Gaergoedt and Waermondt, that illustrates this author’s
impression of the word-of-mouth communications of that time:

Gaergoedt: “You can hardly make a return of 10% with the money that you
invest in your occupation [as a weaver], but with the tulip trade, you can make
returns of 10%, 100%, yes, even 1000%.
Waermondt: “ . . . . But tell me, should I believe you?”
Gaergoedt: “I will tell you again, what I just said.”
Waermondt: “But I fear that, since I would only start now, it’s too late, because
now the tulips are very expensive, and I fear that I’ll be hit with the spit rod,
before tasting the roast.”
Gaergoedt: “It’s never too late to make a proŽ t, you make money while
sleeping. I’ve been away from home for four or Ž ve days, and I came home
just last night, but now I know that the tulips I have have increased in value
by three or four thousand guilder; where do you have proŽ ts like that from
other goods?”
Waermondt: “I am perplexed when I hear you talking like that, I don’t know
what to do; has anybody become rich with this trade?”
Gaergoedt: “What kind of question is this? Look at all the gardeners that used
to wear white-gray outŽ ts, and now they’re wearing new clothes. Many weav-
ers, that used to wear patched up clothes, that they had a hard time putting

13
Garber questions MacKay’s facts about the tulipmania in his 1990 article in this journal and in his
book Famous First Bubbles. For example, the crash was not absolutely Ž nal; Garber documents very high
tulip prices in 1643. The actual course of the bubble is ambiguous, as all contracts were suspended by
the states of Holland in 1637 just after the peak, and no price data are available from that date.
 Robert J. Shiller 93

on, now wear the glitteriest clothes. Yes, many who trade in tulips are riding
a horse, have a carriage or a wagon, and during winter, an ice carriage, . . . .”14

Casual observations over the years since then are plentiful evidence that such talk,
provoking a sense of relative futility of one’s day-to-day work and envy of the
Ž nancial successes of others, and including some vacuous answer to doubts that the
price rise may be over, is effective in overcoming rational doubts among some
substantial number of people and tends to bring successive rounds of them into the
market.
In my book Irrational Exuberance, published (with some luck) at the very peak
of the stock market bubble in March 2000, I argued that very much the same
feedback, transmitted by word-of-mouth as well as the media, was at work in
producing the bubble we were seeing then. I further argued that the natural
self-limiting behavior of bubbles, and the possibility of downward feedback after the
bubble was over, suggested a dangerous outlook for stocks in the future.
One might well also presume that such simple feedback, if it operates so
dramatically in events like the tulip bubble or the stock market boom until 2000,
ought often to recur at a smaller scale and to play an important if lesser role in
more normal day-to-day movements in speculative prices. Feedback models, in the
form of difference equations, can of course produce complicated dynamics. The
feedback may be an essential source of much of the apparently inexplicable
“randomness” that we see in Ž nancial market prices.
But the feedback theory is very hard to Ž nd expressed in Ž nance or economics
textbooks, even today. Since the theory has appeared mostly in popular discourse,
and not in the textbooks, one might well infer that it has long been discredited by
solid academic research. In fact, academic research has until recently hardly
addressed the feedback model.
The presence of such feedback is supported by some experimental evidence.
Psychologists Andreassen and Kraus (1988) found that when people are shown real
historical stock prices in sequence (and which they knew were real stock prices) and
invited to trade in a simulated market that displays these prices, they tended to
behave as if they extrapolate past price changes when the prices appear to exhibit
a trend relative to period-to-period variability. Smith, Suchanek and Williams
(1988) were able to create experimental markets that generated bubbles that are
consistent with feedback trading. Marimon, Spear and Sunder (1993) showed
experiments in which repeating bubbles were generated if subjects were precon-
ditioned by past experience to form expectations of bubbles.
The presence of such feedback is also supported by research in cognitive
psychology, which shows that human judgments of the probability of future events
show systematic biases. For example, psychologists Tversky and Kahneman have
shown that judgments tend to be made using a representativeness heuristic,

14
Anonymous (1637). Bjorn Tuypens translated this passage.
94 Journal of Economic Perspectives

whereby people try to predict by seeking the closest match to past patterns, without
attention to the observed probability of matching the pattern. For example, when
asked to guess the occupations of people whose personality and interests are
described to them, subjects tended to guess the occupation that seemed to match
the description as closely as possible, without regard to the rarity of the occupation.
Rational subjects would have chosen humdrum and unexceptional occupations
more because more people are in these occupations. (Kahneman and Tversky,
1974). By the same principle, people may tend to match stock price patterns into
salient categories such as dramatic and persistent price trends, thus leading to
feedback dynamics, even if these categories may be rarely seen in fundamental
underlying factors.
Daniel, Hirschleifer and Subramanyam (1999) have shown that the psycho-
logical principle of “biased self-attribution” can also promote feedback. Biased
self-attribution, identiŽ ed by psychologist Daryl Bem (1965), is a pattern of human
behavior whereby individuals attribute events that conŽ rm the validity of their
actions to their own high ability and attribute events that disconŽ rm their actions
to bad luck or sabotage. Upon reading the above passage from the time of the
tulipmania, one easily imagines that Gaergoedt is basking in self-esteem and
relishing the telling of the story. Many readers today can probably easily recall
similar conversations, and similar ego-involvement by the spreaders of the word, in
the 1990s. Such human interactions, the essential cause of speculative bubbles,
appear to recur across centuries and across countries: they re ect fundamental
parameters of human behavior.
There is also evidence supportive of feedback from natural experiments, which
may be more convincing than the lab experiments when they occur in real time,
with real money, with real social networks and associated interpersonal support and
emotions, with real and visceral envy of friends’ investment successes, and with
communications-media presence. Ponzi schemes may be thought of as represent-
ing such natural experiments. A Ponzi scheme (or pyramid scheme or money
circulation scheme) involves a superŽ cially plausible but unveriŽ able story about
how money is made for investors and the fraudulent creation of high returns for
initial investors by giving them the money invested by subsequent investors. Initial
investor response to the scheme tends to be weak, but as the rounds of high returns
generates excitement, the story becomes increasingly believable and enticing to
investors. These schemes are often very successful in generating extraordinary
enthusiasms among some investors. We have seen some spectacular Ponzi schemes
recently in countries that do not have effective regulation and surveillance to
prevent them. A number of Ponzi schemes in Albania 1996–1997 were so large that
total liabilities reached half a year’s GDP; their collapse brought on a period of
anarchy and civil war in which 2000 people were killed ( Jarvis, 1999). Real world
stock-market speculative bubbles, I argued in my 2000 book Irrational Exuberance,
resemble Ponzi schemes in the sense that some “new era” story becomes attached
to the bubble and acquires increasing plausibility and investor enthusiasm as the
market continues to achieve high returns. Given the obvious success of Ponzi
 From EfŽcient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance 95

schemes when they are not stopped by the law, we would need a good reason to
think that analogous phenomena of speculative bubbles are not also likely.
The stock market boom that ended in early 2000 is another relevant episode.
According to my survey data, now expressed in the form of stock market conŽ dence
indexes produced by the Yale School of Management and available at http://
icf.som.yale.edu/conŽ dence.index , the conŽ dence of individual investors that the
stock market will go up in the next year, and will rebound from any drop, rose
dramatically 1989 –2000. As in the tulipmania centuries before, there was a focusing
of public attention and talk on the speculative market and a proliferation of
wishful-thinking theories about a “new era” that would propel the stock market on
a course that, while uneven, is relentlessly upward, theories that were spread by
word of mouth as well as the media.
It is widely thought that there is a problem with the feedback theories: the
theories would seem to imply that speculative price changes are strongly serially
correlated through time, that prices show strong momentum, continuing uniformly
in one direction day after day. This seems inconsistent with the evidence that stock
prices are approximately a random walk.
But simple feedback models do not imply strong serial correlation, as I stressed
in Shiller (1990). There, I presented a model of the demand for a speculative asset
as equaling a distributed lag with exponentially declining weights on past price
changes through time (the distributed lag representing feedback distributed over
time), plus other factors that affect demand. The model asserts that people react
gradually to price changes over months or years, not just to yesterday’s price
change. A history of price increases over the last year may encourage buying today
even if yesterday’s price change was down. Also, the model recognizes that there are
other shocks, besides feedback, in uencing price.
In such a model, a disturbance in some demand factor other than feedback
can in certain cases be ampliŽ ed, at least for a time, because it changes the price
and thus affects future prices through the distributed lag.15 However, unless we
know something about the other factors that drive demand, such a distributed lag
model does not imply anything at all about the serial correlation properties of
speculative price changes. The feedback model does not imply that there is much
serial correlation in day-to-day stock price changes, since the noise in the other
factors feeds directly into short-run changes, and the effect on today’s price of
lagged other factors operates at a low frequency that is essentially unrelated to
day-to-day changes and has effects that can be observed only from its cumulative
effect after a long period of time.
Thus, the approximate random walk character of stock prices is not evidence

15
The feedback model is p t 5 c t2 ` e 2 g ( t2 t ) dp t 1 p t, 0 , c , 1, 0 , g. Here, p t is price at time
t, and p t is the combined effect of other factors on demand. It follows that pt 5 pt 1 (c/(1 2 c))(pt 2
pt), where pt 5 (g/(1 2 c)) t2 ` e 2 ( g / ( 1 2 c) ) ( t2 t ) p t dt is a weighted average of lagged p. See Shiller
(1990, p. 60). Such a model does not imply that price behaves smoothly through time: price can look
much like a random walk if, for example, p t is a random walk.
96 Journal of Economic Perspectives

against feedback. Moreover, even if feedback did imply some momentum, we can
also note that the random walk character of stock prices is really not fully supported
by the evidence anyway, and that in fact there has been more than a little momen-
tum to stock prices. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) found that winning stocks, stocks
that showed exceptionally high six-month returns, beat losing stocks, stocks that
showed exceptionally low six-month returns, by 12 percent over the following year.
In contrast, over longer periods of time this momentum seems to reverse itself. De
Bondt and Thaler (1985) Ž nd that over the period 1926 to 1982, stocks represented
on the Center for Research in Security Prices data set of the University of Chicago
whose returns had been in the top decile across Ž rms over three years (thus,
“winner” stocks) tended to show negative cumulative returns in the succeeding
three years. They also found that “loser” stocks whose returns had been in the
bottom decile over the prior three years tended to show positive returns over the
succeeding three years. Thus, there is a tendency for stock prices to continue in the
same direction over intervals of six months to a year, but to reverse themselves over
longer intervals. Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay (1996) document this fact carefully.16
A pattern like this is certainly consistent with some combination of feedback effects
and other demand factors driving the stock market largely independently of
fundamentals.

Smart Money vs. Ordinary Investors

Theoretical models of efŽ cient Ž nancial markets that represent everyone as
rational optimizers can be no more than metaphors for the world around us.
Nothing could be more absurd than to claim that everyone knows how to solve
complex stochastic optimization models. For these theoretical models to have any
relevance to the stock market, it must somehow be the case that a smaller element
of “smart money” or the “marginal trader” can offset the foolishness of many
investors and make the markets efŽ cient.
The efŽ cient markets theory, as it is commonly expressed, asserts that when
irrational optimists buy a stock, smart money sells, and when irrational pessimists
sell a stock, smart money buys, thereby eliminating the effect of the irrational
traders on market price. But Ž nance theory does not necessarily imply that smart
money succeeds in fully offsetting the impact of ordinary investors. In recent years,
research in behavioral Ž nance has shed some important light on the implications
of the presence of these two classes of investors for theory and also on some
characteristics of the people in the two classes.
From a theoretical point of view, it is far from clear that smart money has the
power to drive market prices to fundamental values. For example, in one model
with both feedback traders and smart money, the smart money tended to amplify,
rather than diminish, the effect of feedback traders, by buying in ahead of the

16
Grinblatt and Han (2001) have argued that this tendency of stock prices to show momentum for a
while and then reverse themselves might be related to the phenomenon that investors tend to hold on
to losers and sell winners (Statman and Shefrin, 1985; Odean, 1998).
 Robert J. Shiller 97

feedback traders in anticipation of the price increases they will cause (De Long,
Shleifer, Summers and Waldman, 1990b). In a related model, rational, expected-
utility-maximizing smart money never chooses to offset all of the effects of irrational
investors because they are rationally concerned about the risk generated by the
irrational investors and do not want to assume the risk that their completely
offsetting these other investors would entail (De Long, Shleifer, Summers and
Waldman, 1990b).17
Often, speculative bubbles appear to be common to investments of a certain
“style,” and the bubbles may not include many other investments. For example, the
stock market bubble that peaked in the year 2000 was strongest in tech stocks or
Nasdaq stocks. Barberis and Shleifer (2002) present a model in which feedback
traders’ demand for investments within a particular style is related to a distributed
lag on past returns of that style class. By their budget constraint, when feedback
traders are enticed by one style, they must move out of competing styles. The smart
money are rational utility maximizers. Barberis and Shleifer present a numerical
implementation of their model and Ž nd that smart money did not fully offset the
effects of the feedback traders. Style classes go through periods of boom and bust
ampliŽ ed by the feedback.
Goetzmann and Massa (1999) provided some direct evidence that it is reason-
able to suppose that there are two distinct classes of investors: feedback traders who
follow trends and the smart money who move the other way. Fidelity Investments
provided them with two years of daily account information for 91,000 investors in
a Standard and Poor’s 500 index fund. Goetzmann and Massa were able to sort
these investors into two groups based on how they react to daily price changes.
There were both momentum investors, who habitually bought more after prices
were rising, and contrarian investors, or smart money, who habitually sold after
prices were rising. Individual investors tended to stay as one or the other, rarely
shifted between the two categories.
Recent research has focused on an important obstacle to smart money’s
offsetting the effects of irrational investors. The smart money can always buy the
stock, but if the smart money no longer owns the stock and Ž nds it difŽ cult to short
the stock, then the smart money may be unable to sell the stock. Some stocks could
be in a situation where zealots have bought into a stock so much that only zealots
own shares, and trade is only among zealots, and so the zealots alone determine the
price of the stock. The smart money who know that the stock is priced ridiculously
high may well use up all the easily available shortable shares and then will be
standing on the sidelines, unable to short more shares and proŽ t from their
knowledge. Miller (1977) pointed out this  aw in the argument for market efŽ -
ciency, and his paper has been discussed ever since.
It seems incontrovertible that in some cases stocks have been held primarily by
zealots and that short sellers have found it very difŽ cult to short. One example is the

17
Shleifer and Summers (1990) present a nice summary of these themes in this journal.
98 Journal of Economic Perspectives

3Com sale of Palm near the peak of the stock market bubble (Lamont and Thaler,
2001). In March 2000, 3Com, a proŽ table provider of network systems and services,
sold to the general public via an initial public offering 5 percent of its subsidiary
Palm, a maker of handheld computers. 3Com announced at the same time that the
rest of Palm would follow later. The price that these Ž rst Palm shares obtained in
the market was so high, when compared with the price of the 3Com shares, that if
one subtracts the implied value of the remaining 95 percent of Palm from the
3Com market value, one Ž nds that the non-Palm part of 3Com had a negative value.
Since the worst possible price for 3Com after the Palm sale was completed would
be zero, there was thus a strong incentive for investors to short Palm and buy 3Com.
But, the interest cost of borrowing Palm shares reached 35 percent by July 2000,
putting a damper on the advantage to exploiting the mispricing.18 Even an investor
who knew for certain that the Palm shares would fall substantially may have been
unable to make a proŽ t from this knowledge. The zealots had won with Palm and
had control over its price, for the time being.
The Palm example is an unusual anomaly. Shorting stocks only rarely becomes
so costly. But the example proves the principle. The question is: How important are
obstacles to smart money’s selling in causing stocks to deviate from fundamental
value?
Of course, in reality, the distinction between zealots and smart money is not
always sharp. Instead, there are sometimes all gradations in between, especially
since the objective evidence about the fundamental value of individual stocks is
always somewhat ambiguous. If selling short is difŽ cult, a number of individual
stocks could become overpriced. It would also appear possible that major segments
of the stock market, say the Nasdaq in 1999, or even the entire stock market, could
wind up owned by, if not zealots, at least relatively optimistic people. Short-sale
constraints could be a fatal  aw in the basic efŽ cient markets theory.
The problem with evaluating Miller’s (1977) theory that a lack of short selling
can cause Ž nancial anomalies like overpricing and bubbles is that there has been
little or no data on which stocks are difŽ cult to short. There are long time series
data series on “short interest,” which is the total number of shares that are shorted.
Figlewski (1981) found that high levels of short interest for individual stocks
predicts low subsequent returns for them, a direction that would be predicted by
Miller’s theory. But the predictability was weak. On the other hand, differences in
short interest across stocks do not have an unambiguous connection with difŽ culty
of shorting. Stocks differ from each other in terms of the fraction of shares that are
in accounts that are shortable. Differences across stocks in short interest can also
re ect different demand for shorting for hedging needs. Thus, there is a signiŽ cant

18
Put option prices on Palm also began to re ect the negative opinions and became so expensive that
the usual relation between options prices and stock price, the so-called “put-call parity,” failed to hold.
One must remember that options markets are derivative markets that clear separately from stock
markets, and overpriced puts have no direct impact on the supply and demand for stock unless
arbitrageurs can exploit the overpricing by shorting the stock.
 From EfŽcient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance 99

errors-in-variables problem when using short interest as an indicator of the cost of

shorting.
Some recent papers have sought to detect the presence of barriers that might
limit short sales indirectly by observing the differences of opinion that can have an
impact on price if there is a difŽ culty shorting stocks. Without observing barriers to
shorting stocks directly, we can still infer that when differences of opinion are high
about a stock, it is more likely that short-sale restrictions will be binding for that
stock, and thus that the more pessimistic investors will not prevent the stock from
becoming overpriced and hence subject to lower subsequent returns.
Scherbina (2000) measured differences of opinion by calculating the disper-
sion of analysts’ earnings forecasts. She found that stocks with a high dispersion of
analysts’ forecasts had lower subsequent returns, and she linked the low returns to
the resolution of the uncertainty. Chen, Hong and Stein (2000) measured differ-
ence of opinion by a breadth of ownership measure derived from a database on
mutual fund portfolios. The breadth variable for each quarter is the ratio of the
number of mutual funds that hold a long position in the stock to the total number
of mutual funds for that quarter. They Ž nd that Ž rms in the top decile by breadth
of ownership outperformed those in the bottom decile by 4.95 percent per annum
after adjusting for various other factors.
What we would really like to have to test the importance of short sales
restrictions on stock pricing is some evidence on the cost of shorting. If those stocks
that have become very costly to short tend to have poor subsequent returns, then
we will have more direct conŽ rmation of Miller’s (1977) theory. There is surpris-
ingly little available information about the cost of shorting individual stocks. Such
data have not been available for economic research until recently. A number of
recent unpublished papers have assembled data on the cost of shorting individual
stocks, but these papers have assembled data for no more than a year around 2000.
Recently, Jones and Lamont (2001) discovered an old source of data on the
cost of shorting stocks. In the 1920s and 1930s in the United States, there used to
be a “loan crowd” on the  oor of the New York Stock Exchange, where one could
lend or borrow shares, and the interest rates at which shares were loaned were
reported in the Wall Street Journal. Jones and Lamont assembled time series of the
interest rates charged on loans of stocks from 1926 to 1933, eight years of data on
an average of 80 actively-traded stocks. They found that, after controlling for size,
over this period the stocks that were more expensive to short tended to be more
highly priced (in terms of market-to-book ratios), consistent with the Miller (1977)
theory. Moreover, they found that the more expensive-to-short stocks had lower
subsequent returns on average, again consistent with the Miller theory. Of course,
their data span only eight years from a remote period in history, and so their
relevance to today’s markets might be questioned.
Why has there not been more data on the cost of shorting? Why did the loan
crowd on the New York Stock Exchange disappear and the loan rates in the Wall
Street Journal with it? Perhaps after the crash of 1929 the widespread hostility to short
sellers (who were widely held responsible for the crash) forced the market to go
100 Journal of Economic Perspectives

underground. Jones and Lamont (2001) document a consistent pattern of political

opposition to short sellers after 1929 and point out that J. Edgar Hoover, the head
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was quoted as saying that he would inves-
tigate a conspiracy to keep stock prices low. By 1933, the rates shown on the loan
list become all zeros, and the Wall Street Journal stopped publishing the loan list in
1934.
Fortunately, this long drought of data on the cost of shorting stocks may be
over, and stocks should become easier to short. In 2002, a consortium of Ž nancial
institutions established an electronic market for borrowing and lending stocks
online via a new Ž rm, EquiLend, LLC. The new securities lending platform at
http://www.equilend.com exceeded $11 billion in transactions in its Ž rst two
weeks, and daily availability posting exceed $1 trillion.
But the true cost of shorting stocks is probably much higher than the explicit
interest cost of borrowing the shares, because of the psychological cost that inhibits
short selling. Most investors, even some very smart investors, have probably never
even considered shorting shares. Shorting shares is widely reputed to involve some
substantial risks and nuisances. For example, the short-seller always stands the risk
that the ultimate owner of the shares will want to sell the shares, at which time the
short-seller is forced to return the shares. This detail may be little more than a
nuisance, for the short seller can likely borrow them again from another lender, but
it may Ž gure largely in potential short-sellers’ minds.
A more important consideration that may weigh on short sellers’ minds is the
unlimited loss potential that short sales entail. When an investor buys a stock, the
potential loss is no greater than the original investment. But when an investor
shorts a stock, the potential losses can greatly exceed the original investment. An
investor can always terminate these losses by covering the shorts, but this action
typically brings considerable psychological anguish. Deciding to cover one’s shorts
and get out of a short position after losses is psychologically difŽ cult, given the
evidence on the pain of regret. Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory (1979)
suggests that individuals are far more upset by losses than they are pleased by
equivalent gains; in fact, individuals are so upset by losses that they will even take
great risks with the hope of avoiding any losses at all. The effects of this pain of
regret have been shown to result in a tendency of investors in stocks to avoid selling
losers, but the same pain of regret ought to cause short sellers to want to avoid
covering their shorts in a losing situation. People prefer to avoid putting themselves
in situations that might confront them with psychologically difŽ cult decisions in the
future.
The stock market that we have today always limits the liability of investors. As
Moss (2002) has documented, the idea that all publicly traded stocks should have
limited liability for their investors was the result of experimenting with different
kinds of stockholder liability in the United States in the early nineteenth century
and the discovery of the psychological attractiveness of limited liability stocks. The
debates in the early nineteenth century were concerned with the balancing of the
agency costs of limited liability, which encourages businesses to take greater risks,
 Robert J. Shiller 101

against the beneŽ ts in terms of peace of mind to investors. Various alternatives were
considered or experimented with, including unlimited liability, unlimited propor-
tional liability (where individual investors in a company are limited to their pro-
portionate share of the company’s losses according to their share in the company),
and double liability (where individual investors are accountable for the capital
subscribed once again). By around 1830, it was apparent from experiments in New
York and surrounding states that investors found it very appealing that they could
put money down to buy a stock today, and from that day forward face no further
losses beyond what they already put down. It allowed them, once having purchased
a stock, to concentrate their emotions on the small probability of the stock doing
extremely well, rather on the small probability that someone would come after
them for more money. People have always been very attracted to lottery tickets, and
the invention of limited liability, Moss concludes, turned stock investments psycho-
logically into something a lot like lottery tickets. By the same theory, then, investors
will not Ž nd shorting stocks very attractive.
Remarkably few shares are in fact sold short. According to New York Stock
Exchange data, from 1977 to 2000 year-end short interest ranged from 0.14 percent
to 1.91 percent of all shares. According to Dechow, Hutton, Muelbroek and Stone
(2001), less than 2 percent of all stocks had short interest greater than 5 percent of
shares outstanding 1976 –1983. Given the obviously large difference of opinion
about and difference of public attention to different stocks, it is hard to see how
such a small amount of short selling could offset the effect on stock price of the
extra demand of investors who develop an irrational Ž xation on certain stocks.

Conclusion

The collaboration between Ž nance and other social sciences that has become
known as behavioral Ž nance has led to a profound deepening of our knowledge of
Ž nancial markets. In judging the impact of behavioral Ž nance to date, it is impor-
tant to apply the right standards. Of course, we do not expect such research to
provide a method to make a lot of money off of Ž nancial market inefŽ ciency very
fast and reliably. We should not expect market efŽ ciency to be so egregiously wrong
that immediate proŽ ts should be continually available. But market efŽ ciency can be
egregiously wrong in other senses. For example, efŽ cient markets theory may lead
to drastically incorrect interpretations of events such as major stock market
bubbles.
In his review of the literature on behavioral Ž nance, Eugene Fama (1998)
found fault for two basic reasons. The Ž rst was that the anomalies that were
discovered tended to appear to be as often underreaction by investors as overre-
action. The second was that the anomalies tended to disappear, either as time
passed or as methodology of the studies improved. His Ž rst criticism re ects an
incorrect view of the psychological underpinnings of behavioral Ž nance. Since
there is no fundamental psychological principle that people tend always to over-
102 Journal of Economic Perspectives

react or always to underreact, it is no surprise that research on Ž nancial anomalies

does not reveal such a principle either. His second criticism is also weak. It is the
nature of scholarly research, at the frontier, in all disciplines, that initial claims of
important discoveries are often knocked down by later research. The most basic
anomaly, of excess volatility, seems hardly to have been knocked down, and it is in
fact graphically reinforced by the experience of the past few years in the stock
markets of the world. Moreover, the mere fact that anomalies sometimes disappear
or switch signs with time is no evidence that the markets are fully rational. That is
also what we would expect to see happen even in highly irrational markets. (It
would seem peculiar to argue that irrational markets should display regular and
lasting patterns!) Even the basic relation suggested by market inefŽ ciency, that
stocks whose price is bid up by investors will tend to go back down later, and stocks
that are underpriced by investors will tend to go up later, is not a relation that can
be easily tested or that should hold in all time periods. The fundamental value of
stocks is hard to measure, and, moreover, if speculative bubbles (either positive
bubbles or negative bubbles) last a long time, then even this fundamental relation
may not be observed except in very long sample periods.
In further research, it is important to bear in mind the demonstrated weak-
nesses of efŽ cient markets theory and maintain an eclectic approach. While theo-
retical models of efŽ cient markets have their place as illustrations or characteriza-
tions of an ideal world, we cannot maintain them in their pure form as accurate
descriptors of actual markets.
Indeed, we have to distance ourselves from the presumption that Ž nancial
markets always work well and that price changes always re ect genuine informa-
tion. Evidence from behavioral Ž nance helps us to understand, for example, that
the recent worldwide stock market boom, and then crash after 2000, had its origins
in human foibles and arbitrary feedback relations and must have generated a real
and substantial misallocation of resources. The challenge for economists is to make
this reality a better part of their models.

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