for the case :

Meridian Systems
Robin Eisenstadt finished the sandwich she was eating for lunch with Dana Stevens,
vice president of sales at her company, Meridian Systems. “Dana,” she said, “we
need to decide how to roll out GingerSnap and examine the implications this
introduction may have for our sales strategy and how we deploy our sales force.”
Meridian Systems sold restaurant point-of-sale (POS) systems—the terminals and
software that managed menus, created orders and checks, and processed customer
payments. Since Eisenstadt had founded Meridian, it had carved out a successful—if
small—position in the restaurant POS market. Now, in February 2018, Meridian was
about to roll out its tablet-based system, called GingerSnap, a relatively new
style of POS system based on an Android tablet or iPad that restaurant servers
carried with them and used to take orders and send them to the kitchen, create a
bill, and process customer payments. The system ran on a cloud-based app that
updated and managed this software-as-a-service (SaaS) product. Eisenstadt and
Stevens had several decisions to make:
• First, should Meridian create a separate sales force for GingerSnap? Or should it
simply fold it into the existing sales effort and allow Meridian’s existing direct
sales force to sell the product? Until now, this sales force had focused solely on
the terminal-based system. If Meridian created a separate sales force, it needed to
decide if this should be a field/direct sales force or an “inside” sales force that
sold over the phone and the web, or perhaps a hybrid of these two approaches.
• Second, how should sales reps be compensated for selling GingerSnap? Would this
compensation strategy affect sales of Meridian’s terminal-based product?
• Finally, should the sales effort be focused by type of client—specifically
customer size or type of restaurant? The sales force currently did not specialize
by either customer size (number of units) or restaurant type (fast food, casual, or
fine dining). The existing nonspecialized approach had worked well so far, but the
introduction of the new product was leading Eisenstadt and Stevens to revisit this
question.

Restaurant POS Systems

Restaurant POS systems had evolved from simple cash registers that kept track of
the sum of checks rung-up and held cash for making change. Computer technology,
when applied to the restaurant industry, gave the opportunity to add value to the
device in numerous ways:
• The server would enter the ordered menu items into the POS terminal (possibly a
mobile terminal, if it was a tablet-based system) and that would simultaneously
create items for the customer’s check and send the order to print out in the
kitchen for the chef, signaling the preparation of the food.
• The entry of detailed recipes for each menu item into the POS system would allow
the food amounts used for a day, a week, or a month’s worth of customer orders to
be precisely calculated.
• The entry of data on beginning inventory and received food goods (e.g., 10 pounds
of tomatoes and 22 lobsters) would, in combination with the above data, allow for
the precise calculation of expected food on hand over any period. When combined
with a physical inventory at a period’s end, managers could spot discrepancies,
which could indicate pilferage of food, portion sizes that varied from the size
called for in the recipe, or a customer’s food order not being entered into the
check system.
• The entry of prices for received food (e.g., tomatoes $1.69/pound, lobsters $9.00
each) would allow the value of food on hand for inventory purposes to be
calculated. In turn, this would allow the cost of goods sold (COGS) for the period
(i.e., beginning inventory + purchases – ending inventory = COGS) to be calculated.
A theoretical COGS could also be calculated on the basis of the recipe for each
food item offered and the number of those items expected to be sold during a
period.
• The terminal could serve as a credit card interface, printing credit card
receipts and communicating with credit card networks for card approval and payment
processing.
• Some POS systems managed staff scheduling, clocking in and out, and payroll
processing.
• These data could provide valuable help in managing restaurant operations. For
example, they could indicate which were the highest- and lowest-margin items on the
menu, and which were the highest- and lowest-volume items. If the price of tomatoes
doubled, they could forecast the effect of the price rise on each menu item that
contained tomatoes.
• Finally, some systems also came with the ability to integrate reservations and
manage table assignments, and they served as a platform for outbound customer
marketing and loyalty program management (e.g., frequent diner cards and gift
cards).
The U.S. Restaurant Industry
In 2017 U.S. restaurant industry sales were approximately $736 billion. They had
grown slightly over 4% annually for several years. (Exhibit 1 shows industry
sales.) The largest segments included the following:
• Full-service restaurants (defined as restaurants where patrons order from their
table and pay after eating), with $263 billion in revenues.

• Quick-service restaurants (QSRs, defined as restaurants where patrons pick up

their own food and pay when ordering, which accounted for approximately 80% of U.S.
restaurant visits in 2017), with $234 billion in sales1
• Hotel restaurants, snack bars, educational and institutional service, and the
military
There were approximately 620,000 restaurants in the United States. Of these,
290,000 were chain restaurants and 330,000 were classified as independently owned.
188,000 chain restaurants were QSR franchises. There were approximately 31,000
full-service restaurant franchises. The largest QSRs in the U.S. were McDonald’s,
Starbucks, Subway, Burger King, and Wendy’s. These chains had anywhere from 6,500
to 14,500 U.S. locations. The largest chains of full-service restaurants included
Olive Garden, Red Lobster, Applebee’s, Outback Steakhouse, and Chili’s Grill & Bar.
These chains had 500 to 2,000 units nationwide.2 Within the full-service category,
“fine dining” constituted the high-end segment. Casual dining was a lower-end
segment that included most other full-service restaurants.
Current Restaurant POS Systems
Worldwide, restaurant POS systems were a $10.2 billion market. The United States
accounted for $2.8 billion of this amount in 2017. Full-service restaurants
accounted for 40% of this amount; quick-service accounted for 35%; institutional,
10%; and the remaining services comprise the remaining 15%.3 The top half dozen or
so players in the restaurant POS space accounted for about half the market and
included Aloha POS (a subsidiary of NCR), MICROS, Digital Dining, Clover, Future
POS, and POSitouch. After this group, numerous POS companies each accounted for 2–
3% of the market. The traditional POS system was a fixed terminal, with a touch-
based computer screen that allowed servers to select, by means of a touch screen,
the table that had ordered, and then select the menu items that had been ordered
for each patron at that table. The terminal sent the order to the kitchen, kept
track of all items ordered (e.g., a medium-rare cheeseburger, diet cola, and pecan
pie for patron no. 1 at table no. 16) prepared the check, and processed the payment
for the check.
The mobile or tablet-based system was relatively new. Wi-Fi and tablets had enabled
much of the fixed-terminal technology to migrate to small devices that could be
carried by waitstaff. This cut down on the time servers needed to walk back and
forth between fixed terminals and allowed them to enter and send orders to the
kitchen from the table. Some restaurants had taken the technology a step further
and put their menus directly on tablets, allowing customers to order themselves and
bypass the server entirely. This was a small subset of restaurants now, but it was
expected to grow. Similarly, mobile systems allowed payment processing at the table
by the patron. This self-service system was currently in about 10% of restaurants,
but it was expected to expand to a significant fraction of restaurants in the
“fast-casual” segment. Most tablet-based systems were cloud-based, though this was
not a technical necessity, and were sold by subscription.

While terminal-based systems represented 85% of the market (in dollar terms),
tablet/cloud-based systems were expected to grow at 14% annually, compared to 8–10%
for terminal-based systems. Moreover, according to many observers, “These systems
provide a high return on investment by enhancing order accuracy, rationalizing
order processing, and improving sales and profitability.”4 The QSR segment
accounted for about 31% of the POS market, and it was expected to be the highest-
growth segment for POS sales: more than 11% annual growth was forecast.5
The average price for a terminal-based restaurant POS system in 2017 was about
$13,500, down from $18,000 in 2012.6 Larger-volume restaurants, which could support
a higher level of investment, found that it cost $30,000 to $40,000 for a fully
featured, sophisticated POS system. Restaurants then typically paid an additional
10% or so of the purchase price for an annual support contract, which usually
covered 24-hour telephone support as well as service visits. Software upgrades
would be offered every three years or so for an additional charge, and the hardware
might wear our or become obsolete. Historically, restaurants replaced their POS
systems every five to seven years (generating sales of approximately 150,000 units
per year).7
Toast, TouchBistro, and Breadcrumb were three popular tablet-based competitors.
Toast, a venture-backed company founded in Boston in 2012, had raised over $130
million in venture capital. In August 2015 Toast announced that it had signed 1,000
customers in under two years. The website Techcrunch estimated that over $350
million had been invested (by mid-2016) in restaurant POS platforms.8
The tablet-based systems had several advantages. They used standardized hardware—
iPads and Android tablets that were produced by the millions, which allowed the
cost of the hardware to ride down the cost curves enabled by worldwide economies of
scale. Restaurant owners were also attracted to the mobility and other in-store
advantages offered by the tablet-based systems.
Toast’s typical customer had 2.5 tablets and paid the company about $2,400 per
year. Other competitors offered subscription services starting at $69 per month per
tablet. Many of these tablet-based competitors also processed payments, collecting
the 2% or so payment-processing fee that all restaurants paid for credit card
processing. These fees were not all margin to the tablet-based POS companies, which
had to pay other companies for downstream payment processing.
Many restaurant operators, however, were uncomfortable with having their data in
the cloud. One restaurateur commented, “With a terminal-based system, you can
operate without the internet. With cloud-based tablets, when the internet goes
down, you cannot process payments online; we must bring out the old credit card
swipers and run the card on a piece of paper with a carbon paper copy, and then run
everything through once the internet is back up. It’s a pain, and if you depend on
the internet, a few hours of downtime during the dinner rush can cost you thousands
of dollars.”

Background—Meridian Systems
Eisenstadt founded Meridian after five years as a product manager with Baird
Technologies: “Baird was a startup in the restaurant POS space. It was underfunded,
the CEO was not a great leader, and we went bankrupt. But I saw the industry from
the inside out and saw a better way. Meridian started with a simple, dedicated
terminal system, focusing more on back-of-the-house functionality.”
Many other POS companies were migrating their products and clients to the cloud
through tablet-based SaaS systems, but Meridian had stayed focused on terminal-
based systems: “Most restaurants are small, mom-and-pop-type businesses. They value
the peace of mind that comes with knowing that all their data are on their
machine.” Still, Meridian had foreseen the rise of tablet-based POS systems.
Eisenstadt explained, “The potential of these systems was clear. We started
developing one internally. When Square began to gain traction, that highlighted the
potential of these systems for small businesses. Now we have had a tablet-based
SaaS system—GingerSnap—in beta for about six months, and it has gone well. We are
ready to roll it out as a second product in our line.”
Meridian had been funded with two rounds of venture capital, totaling $22 million,
and had been profitable for the previous three years. (See Exhibit 2 for Meridian’s
income statement.) The company had invested a large sum in research and development
(R&D) to develop GingerSnap, and Eisenstadt observed, “We need to keep our sales
expense as a percentage of revenues roughly equal to what it has been in the
terminal-based business. We can’t afford to destroy our profitability.”9
Customers and the Buying Process
Meridian’s current customers tended to be larger, full-service restaurants, with a
single unit, and very small chains (i.e., those with five or fewer units; small
chains were those with 6 to 25 units, and medium-sized chains were those with 26 to
100 units). In many cases, Meridian’s customers were not chains per se, in the
sense that all four or five restaurants were the same, but were more likely to be
situations where a single owner ran several different restaurant concepts under a
group umbrella (e.g., a brick-oven pizzeria, a seafood house, and a steak
restaurant).
Eisenstadt explained: “We have focused on single units and very small local chains
that see our value proposition in terms of the full range of value-added modules
and the customizability of our solution. While the average Toast customer might
have 2.5 tablets, our existing clients would need 12 or 15 tablets if they were
going to run their business on a tablet system—they are significantly larger than
the average small restaurant.” Stevens elaborated,
In single unit and smaller chains, most owners are very involved. They network a
lot with their local competitors, and they know a lot of people from regional and
national conferences. Referrals are very important. Whether it is a POS system or
warming ovens, they call around and talk to their counterparts and get advice and
recommendations. We have good word of mouth because we provide a customizable
product and good service, but we need a high price point to support this approach.
We get leads from restaurant conferences, from our web presence, and by referrals
from existing customers. With our existing terminals, we can move from a warm lead
to close in 60 days or so. The key buying criteria—for our clients—are
functionality and follow-on support. We are less successful when the customer wants
a bare-bones system and is more price sensitive. For GingerSnap, this will be
different: ease of use and reliability are the key factors for tablet buyers—they
expect to be able to “plug and play.”
Another category of full-service restaurants was national or regional chains, where
headquarters staff often evaluated products and vendors and standardized their
systems and suppliers. Often, headquarters created a preferred list of vendors, and
the local units could select from these options. In the case of POS systems, chain
restaurants tended to standardize on a single vendor. Stevens said,
The investment in learning and in-house support for these chains can be
significant, and the learning curve for a POS system is steep. They do not want to
learn multiple systems. The small and medium-sized chains that make up our customer
base tend to be higher-end establishments. Most chains build some in-house support.
They value our service less and are more price sensitive. When we get involved in
this kind of sale, it is usually driven by the VP of operations and/or the head of
information systems. There is always a committee of restaurant managers and
headquarters staff, including finance, operations, and information systems people.
It tends to be a four- or five-month sales cycle. It can be nine months for large
chains. References and word of mouth count far less. We expect to target this
market with GingerSnap, so that will be a change for us. And once you get over 30
or so restaurant units, the chains tend to be national, or at least super-regional,
so that will be another change.
Finally, QSRs tended to be either single unit, mom-and-pop-type restaurants—like a
local pizza parlor or sub shop—or large franchised operations. The single-unit QSRs
often did not use a POS system, but simply managed the business out of a cash
register. Eisenstadt noted, “Selling to smaller restaurants will be new for us, and
this should be a simpler, shorter sales cycle, say, 30 to 45 days. In these kinds
of units, it is almost always the owner/operator who drives the whole process.”
Most large chains of franchised QSRs like McDonald’s, Pizza Hut, and Subway, were
centralized. In many cases, centralized regional or national groups established the
specifications and, often, the specific vendors for equipment, including POS
equipment. In other situations, franchisees were free to choose, and headquarters’
approval was a “hunting license” that allowed an approved vendor to contact
individual franchisees who owned perhaps one restaurant or owned and operated many
units.
When buying items like meat and bread, there was often a preference for using local
vendors, and franchisees exercised more flexibility. For POS systems, however,
owner-operators had less incentive to search out vendors and do their own research.
Instead, the franchisor had a large staff of experts who did this work. POS systems
needed to integrate with systemwide reporting requirements, and headquarters
negotiated hard for better pricing than an individual owner was likely to obtain.
Stevens noted, “They really squeeze every nickel and can afford to buy a very basic
platform and put a lot of their own development effort into customizing.”
For Meridian’s existing terminal-based POS systems, new restaurant entrants
constituted the largest share of growth. Virtually all restaurants of Meridian’s
target size already had a POS system. For tablet-based systems, however, there was
a significant opportunity to convert small, single-unit restaurants that had until
then operated solely out of a cash register.
Beyond the natural replacement cycle, other changes, such as a significant upgrade
or refurbishment, a change in ownership, or the opening of a new unit, could
initiate a search for a POS system. Most restaurants used the same vendor, largely
because of familiarity with the software; a change would require significant
training for staff. On the other hand, buyers evaluated alternatives, if only to
keep their existing vendors honest. Many customers were dissatisfied with their
existing vendor owing to support or technical issues, or because a POS system did
not integrate with other systems (e.g., accounting).
Meridian’s Existing Sales Approach
Meridian sold its product with a direct sales force in three offices: Boston
(eastern region), Chicago (central) and San Diego (western). Exhibit 3 shows the
organization chart for the sales force. A regional sales manager (RSM), who had
responsibility for hiring, training, developing, and firing in her region, led each
office. RSMs also carried a quota, as did other sales reps. Each region had several
senior-level reps, called sales directors (SDs). (RSMs and SDs were collectively
referred to as reps.) SDs followed up on warm leads, made sales presentations, and
closed sales. Each region also employed sales associates (SAs), who made cold calls
in person and by phone and email, developed sales presentations, set up
appointments for more senior-level sales reps, and followed up after a sale. Of the
sales force, only RSM and SDs were eligible for commission-based compensation.
Finally, each region employed a sales tech (ST), who detailed the technical
specifications for systems, answered technical questions, and performed post-sales
support. Installing a sophisticated POS system required significant upfront
investment to get the most out of the technology: recipes had to be entered, and an
initial template for all menu items, ingredients and pricing, and starting
inventory levels, needed to be developed and entered. Meridian had a network of
independent consultants who could perform these tasks when the restaurants did not
undertake them.
Boston was both a headquarters (HQ) and regional office. Besides the usual
complement of regional sales staff, HQ staff included Stevens, VP of sales, and
certain corporate support staff.
Confronting a Changing Landscape
As Eisenstadt reviewed plans for the upcoming year, she saw several issues that
affected how Meridian was currently deploying its sales force:
GingerSnap has forced us to reconsider our sales force deployment and compensation
strategy. It is similar in functionality to the existing terminal-based offering,
but different both in form factor and in being cloud-based. The pricing is also
different. The terminal sale is a big upfront investment. GingerSnap is a monthly
subscription and a smaller upfront charge for the hardware. Our existing sales
force might give the new product short shrift because the dollars will look smaller
to them. If we develop a dedicated sales force, we can have a completely different
compensation model. If the same sales force sells both products, we may need a
compensation structure that doesn’t bias reps against the tablet-based system.
We need to get this working right out of the box. The next two years will be
critical for penetrating the tablet-based market. This is our window—if we miss it,
I fear we will never catch up to the competitors who already have a head start on
us.
See Exhibit 4 for an overview of the buying process with Meridian’s existing
clients, and as it was expected to play out for two types of tablet buyers—single
units and very small chains, and the larger, medium-sized chains.Meridian’s
Existing Compensation Structure
Meridian currently paid its reps on the basis of on-target comp (OTC), the total
compensation that a well-performing rep could be expected to earn in a year. OTC
had two components—a base salary and variable compensation that was based on the
commissionable sales times the commission rate. For instance, if an SD had an OTC
of $155,000, base salary was $80,000 per year and the target variable incentive
compensation was $75,000. Reps had a quarterly quota, and they were paid a
percentage of their quarterly variable compensation as a function of the attained
percentage of quota. This system functioned like a commission-based system, and the
effective commission rate was approximately 3.75% of sales. In the existing
compensation model for the terminal product, quotas were based on—and reps were
paid on—hardware sales only, not the value of annual recurring maintenance,
support, and service. See Exhibit 5 for details of this plan as it had played out
during 2017 for one of Meridian’s regions. (See Exhibit 6 for background on product
pricing.) Eisenstadt commented,
The average sale of the terminal-based product is $36,500 per restaurant, and our
average client runs 2.4 restaurants. We pay a rep at quota about $155,000 per year,
so we attract good people. With GingerSnap, the upfront fees are low, and it is a
subscription service. These restaurants are smaller than the restaurants we sell
our terminal-based systems to. The average first-year revenue (per restaurant) to
Meridian is about $2,000 up-front and $500 per month. With the same comp structure
and number of restaurants per sale, that equates to a much lower variable
compensation for the rep. We could change the incentive structure to equalize the
expected compensation, but then the product becomes less attractive for us. We also
want to sell to larger chains, which will help the economics. But our ability to
succeed with larger chains is an unknown. We are more confident in our sweet spot
of single or two to three units, where we have a reputation. For a medium or large
chain, the effort to sell GingerSnap is about the same as that for a terminal-based
system.
Sales Force Deployment
Meridian’s sale force was currently deployed on a geographic basis: reps focused on
restaurants headquartered in their respective geographic regions. Most current
clients were single units or very small chains, not larger chains spread across
Meridian’s sales regions. Stevens observed,
Large, fast-food restaurant chains aren’t a sweet spot for us, but larger chains of
more casual dining restaurants are a good target for GingerSnap. As they consider
swapping out legacy systems for a tablet-based system, they should see that our
product delivers a lot of value. One beta customer is a chain of 29 family-style
Italian restaurants in the Midwest. It has been pleased with our system. We hope to
be able to land a lot more clients like that, in addition to the single-unit
operators and very small chains. An inside sales force could be effective with the
single-unit and small-chain segment, where we are usually dealing with a single
owner-operator.
There were varying views about whether Meridian should create a separate sales
force focused on GingerSnap—or fold it into the existing sales effort. Stevens
noted, “Building a standalone sales force is expensive, and it isn’t clear what
advantages it brings. Reps should be able to learn the particulars about the
GingerSnap product relatively quickly. And when they reach out to a potential new
account, they won’t necessarily know which product the customer wants. So it will
pay to have both arrows in their quiver.”
Eisenstadt saw it differently:The same sales force might work when it comes to
single units and very small chains. But to succeed, we need to target chains that
are larger than our current customer base and have different needs from those of
our terminal-based customers. Larger chains are more cost sensitive and more
concerned with simplicity and standardization. The tablet-based system fits these
needs, and a dedicated sales force could better sell these benefits. Yet we might
have more success selling our existing terminal-based system to larger chains if we
tweaked our volume pricing and focused on that segment, where we haven’t pushed. We
have considered letting the same sales force sell both products, but putting in a
“trigger” so that reps will be paid a lower commission rate on terminal sales
unless they hit the trigger for the number of tablet sales they make in a quarter.
This would force them to expend some effort on GingerSnap, even if the commission
structure doesn’t favor it.
Eisenstadt highlighted another key issue—whether to develop an inside sales team to
focus on GingerSnap:
The margins on GingerSnap are lower. We currently use sales associates in each
region to make cold calls, as well as to follow up on warm leads from conferences,
advertising, and internet inquiries. SAs qualify leads and set up appointments for
the sales reps, who make in-person sales calls. We could try to develop a larger,
more professional group of SAs to do this work and to carry the sales cycle through
to completion in an inside sales model where reps sell remotely and work with
prospects by phone, email, and WebEx-type demos and video interactions. It is less
expensive and we can hire lower-skilled people at a lower cost.
Stevens estimated the economics of an inside sales approach for GingerSnap:
The fully loaded cost of an SA is currently about $80,000: $40,000 in direct
compensation and about $40,000 in overhead and other costs. Our SAs don’t really
have an incentive piece to their pay, but if we did go that route with GingerSnap,
we’d probably want to add $10,000 or $20,000 to their total compensation to cover
the incentive that would be required to get them to sell it. Most of our work
selling GingerSnap in beta has been with current customers, so it’s not really a
fair test. For sales to single-unit operators and very small chains, GingerSnap is
an easier sale than the terminal because it is simpler, and the technical
implementation is far easier. The buyer is almost always the single owner-operator
we are used to selling to. We could expect a successful SA to carry an annual quota
of $500,000 (in upfront purchases), selling about 20 systems per month to hit that
quota.
There is no internal support for an inside sales model. Some RSMs and SDs feel
threatened by an inside approach or see it as a step down from the current sales
approach. They insist that in-person selling by skilled and well-paid reps will
give us the best closing percentages. But at what cost per sale?
Finally, Stevens addressed the issue of focusing on the larger chains with
GingerSnap:
The single unit and very small chains remain the spot where we are best known. But
single units that are a target for GingerSnap will be smaller restaurants than the
large one that is buying a terminal-based system. The typical GingerSnap customer
will be about half the size—in terms of the revenue per restaurant and the average
number of servers—and therefore terminals or tablets required to operate the
business. Obviously, selling to a chain of 10 to 30 restaurants represents a
multiple of margin to us and warrants an increased investment in selling. Our
success in beta with GingerSnap at some chains of this size makes me think we
should devote some specialized sales effort to this segment.
Having an inside sales force would be a new challenge. A hybrid approach, with an
inside sales force for small accounts and a direct sales force for larger ones, is
more complicated. Our venture capitalists have been very patient, and we are
profitable, although not at the levels we’d like. Our investment in the tablet
product has been a drag on earnings, but that is behind us now. If we focus on
larger customers, that longer sales cycle will be a further drag on earnings,
compared with going for some quick wins. But the tablet-based sector is rapidly
growing and shaking out. Can we afford to wait longer than we already have?
Eisenstadt weighed in:
Selling different products with different margin structures to the same market is
complicated but necessary. Our margin on the equipment purchase is 50% for the
terminal business and 20% for GingerSnap. That reverses on the monthly recurring
charges: For Gingersnap, the margins should be about 90%, versus 80% for the
terminal product. The other significant difference is churn: the fraction of
customers who re-up annually. The equipment purchase ties people in on the terminal
side of the business. Our churn there is 2% per year. For GingerSnap, we expect
churn to be higher—say, 10% per year.
Should we worry about cannibalizing our terminal-based product if the percentage
margins on the SaaS product are higher? What’s the net gain if we swap out our
terminals for tablets? Moreover, our best reps want to sell GingerSnap. They say
they can succeed and will put their muscle behind it if the comp plan provides the
right incentives and rewards.
The future of the industry may be tablet-based POS. We can’t afford to give it
short shrift. Once we get our tablet-based product out into the market and have
more experience selling it, we might even decide to use our sales force to migrate
our installed base to tablets. After all, we have only 2% of the market in the
terminal space; our competitors are big. But the tablet market is still unfolding.
We can prosper there with the right sales approach.

Based on the case provide the list of decisions to be made / questions to be

answered and answer them.