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Subject: Interpretation of Statute

B.A.LL.B-Xth Sem
Subject Teacher: Akhlaqul Azam
Study Material of Unit-I(C)
Topic: Rules of Interpretation

Other Rules of Interpretation

1. Rule of Literal Interpretation

In construing Statutes the cardinal rule is to construe its provisions literally and grammatically
giving the words their ordinary and natural meaning. This rule is also known as the Plain
meaning rule. The first and foremost step in the course of interpretation is to examine the
language and the literal meaning of the statute. The words in an enactment have their own natural
effect and the construction of an act depends on its wording. There should be no additions or
substitution of words in the construction of statutes and in its interpretation. The primary rule is
to interpret words as they are. It should be taken into note that the rule can be applied only when
the meanings of the words are clear i.e. words should be simple so that the language is plain and
only one meaning can be derived out of the statute.

The primary and important rule of interpretation is called the Literal Rule, laid down in the
Sussex Peerage Case (1844). This rule stated that:

"The only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is, that they should be construed
according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the statute are in
themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those
words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case; best
declare the intention of the lawgiver. But if any doubt arises from the terms employed by the
Legislature, it has always been held a safe mean of collecting the intention to call in aid the
ground and cause of making the statute, and to have recourse to the preamble, which, according
to Chief Justice Dyer is "a key to open the minds of the makers of the Act, and the mischiefs
which they intend to redress".
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In Municipal board v. State transport authority, Rajasthan, the location of a bus stand was
changed by the Regional Transport Authority. An application could be moved within 30 days of
receipt of order of regional transport authority according to section 64 A of the Motor vehicles
Act, 1939. The application was moved after 30 days on the contention that statute must be read
as “30 days from the knowledge of the order”. The Supreme Court held that literal interpretation
must be made and hence rejected the application as invalid.

Lord Atkinson stated, ‘In the construction of statutes their words must be interpreted in their
ordinary grammatical sense unless there be something in the context or in the object of the
statute in which they occur or in the circumstances in which they are used, to show that they
were used in a special sense different from their ordinary grammatical sense.’

Meaning

To avoid ambiguity, legislatures often include “definitions” sections within a statute, which
explicitly define the most important terms used in that statute. But some statutes omit a
definitions section entirely, or (more commonly) fail to define a particular term. The plain
meaning rule attempts to guide courts faced with litigation that turns on the meaning of a term
not defined by the statute, or on that of a word found within a definition itself.

If the words are clear, they must be applied, even though the intention of the legislator may have
been different or the result is harsh or undesirable. The literal rule is what the law says instead of
what the law means.

Tata Consultancy Services v. State of A.P (2005) it was held that a literal construction would not
be denied only because the consequences to comply with the same may lead to a penalty. The
courts should not be overzealous in searching for ambiguities or obscurities in words which are
plain.

The literal rule may be understood subject to the following conditions –

 Statute may itself provide a special meaning for a term, which is usually to be found in
the interpretation section.
 Technical words are given ordinary technical meaning if the statute has not specified any
other.
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 Words will not be inserted by implication.

 Words undergo shifts in meaning in course of time.
 It should always be remembered that words acquire significance from their context.

When it is said that words are to be understood first in their natural ordinary and popular sense, it
is meant that words must be ascribed that natural, ordinary or popular meaning which they have
in relation to the subject matter with reference to which and the context in which they have been
used in the Statute. In the statement of the rule, the epithets ‘natural, “ordinary”, “literal”,
“grammatical” and “popular” are employed almost interchangeably to convey the same idea.

For determination of the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute, the first question is what is
the natural and ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the statute but when that
natural or ordinary meaning indicates such result which cannot be opposed to having been the
intention of the legislature, then to look for other meaning of the word or phrase which may then
convey the true intention of the legislature.

Another important point regarding the rule of literal construction is that exact meaning is
preferred to loose meaning in an Act of Parliament. In the case of Pritipal Singh v. Union of
India(1990), it was held that there is a presumption that the words are used in an Act of
Parliament correctly and exactly and not loosely and inexactly.

Rationale for this Rule

Proponents of the plain meaning rule claim that it prevents courts from taking sides in legislative
or political issues. They also point out that ordinary people and lawyers do not have extensive
access to secondary sources. In probate law the rule is also favored because the testator is
typically not around to indicate what interpretation of a will is appropriate. Therefore, it is
argued, extrinsic evidence should not be allowed to vary the words used by the testator or their
meaning. It can help to provide for consistency in interpretation.

In Fisher v Bell [1960] the defendant, a shopkeeper, displayed in his window a flick knife with a
price ticket, and was prosecuted for “offering for sale” an offensive weapon contrary to the
Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959. The High Court said the phrase “offer for sale” was
to be taken literally, in accordance with its meaning in contract law, and that the shopkeeper’s
display of the weapon was no more than an invitation to treat. It was presumed that
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Parliamentary draftsmen know technical legal language thus common law expression was not
altered.

2. Golden Rule of Interpretation

The Golden rule, or British rule, is a form of statutory interpretation that allows a judge to depart
from a word’s normal meaning in order to avoid an absurd result. It was originated in England in
1854 and was coined by C.J. in the case of:

Matterson v. Hart (1854)

In this case, British Parliament applied the Golden Rule by giving the words used by the
Legislature, their plain and natural meaning, unless injustice and absurdity would not result from
so continuing them. This rule was named as ‘Golden Rule’ for the reason, it solves all problems.

Circumstances leading to the application of the golden rule

Golden rule gives the words in a statute, their plain ordinary meaning. If it leads to irrational
result that is unlikely to be the legislature’s intention, the golden rule dictates that a judge can
depart from this meaning. Where a word contains/conveys more than one meaning, the judge can
choose the preferred meaning of his choice. If a word conveys only one meaning and application
of the same leads to bad decision, then the judge can apply that word completely different
meaning.

According to the Golden Rule, the courts in order to find out the intention of the legislature from
the word used in the statute, give the words, their original and natural meaning. In case, it leads
to any absurdity, repugnancy, inconvenience, hardship, injustice or evasion, the courts must
modify the meaning of the words in the statute to such an extent so as to prevent the
consequences as a result of such absurdity hardship etc. Hence, the Golden Rule of interpretation
is a modification in the rule of Grammatical Interpretation.

It was set out by Lord Blackburn in River Wear Commissioners v, Adamson. (1877) The golden
rule, he stated, enabled the courts: "to take the whole statute together, and construe it all together,
giving their words their ordinary significance, unless when so applied they produce an
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inconsistency, or an absurdity or inconvenience so great as to convince the court that the

intention could not have been to use them in their ordinary significance, and to justify the court
in putting on them some other signification, which, though less proper, is one which the court
thinks the words will bear."

The rule stated above have been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Harbhajan Singh
v. Press Council of India (2002) wherein the Court observed: "Legislature chooses appropriate
words to express what it intends, and therefore, must be attributed with such intention as is
conveyed by the words employed so long as this does not result in absurdity or anomaly or
unless material-intrinsic or external-is available to permit a departure from the rule."

It is a compromise between the plain meaning (or literal) rule and the mischief rule. Like the
plain meaning rule, it gives the words of a statute their plain, ordinary meaning. However, when
this may lead to an irrational result that is unlikely to be the legislature’s intention, the judge can
depart from this meaning. In the case of homographs, where a word can have more than one
meaning, the judge can choose the preferred meaning; if the word only has one meaning, but
applying this would lead to a bad decision, the judge can apply a completely different meaning.

This rule may be used in two ways. It is applied most frequently in a narrow sense where there is
some ambiguity or absurdity in the words themselves.

For example, imagine there may be a sign saying “Do not use lifts in case of fire.” Under the
literal interpretation of this sign, people must never use the lifts, in case there is a fire. However,
this would be an absurd result, as the intention of the person who made the sign is obviously to
prevent people from using the lifts only if there is currently a fire nearby.

The second use of the golden rule is in a wider sense, to avoid a result that is obnoxious to
principles of public policy, even where words have only one meaning. Example: The facts of a
case are; a son murdered his mother and committed suicide. The courts were required to rule on
who then inherited the estate, the mother’s family, or the son’s descendants. There was never a
question of the son profiting from his crime, but as the outcome would have been binding on
lower courts in the future, the court found in favour of the mother’s family.

Golakh Nath v. State of Punjab (1967)

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In this case, the Supreme Court applied the golden rule of interpretation and held that the
parliament cannot amend the constitution affecting the provisions under Part III (Fundamental
Rights) of the constitution (and overruled the earlier decisions in Shankari Prasad’s case and
Shajjah Singh’s case).

3. Mischief Rule Of Interpretation

The third basic rule of interpretation of statutes is “the mischief rule of Interpretation. This rule
was laid down by the Lord. Coke in Re Heydon’s Case (1584). Hence, it is known as ‘the rule in
Heydon’s case”. This rule now attained the status of classic is known as “the Mischief Rule”.
This rule is called purposive construction. According to this rule, the courts must adopt that
construction, which shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. This rule is applied,
when the meaning of the words in a statute is not plain and clear. The purpose of the rule is to
find out the true intention of the legislature by removing ambiguity and mischief. This rule is so
called as ‘mischief rule’ because it envisages that construction, by which the mischief is
suppressed. This rule enables the judges more discretionary power than Grammatical Rule and
golden rule, as it allows him to decide effectively on Parliament’s intent. Hence, it is the duty of
the court to make such construction of a statute, which shall suppress the mischief and advance
the remedy.

The mischief rule is a certain rule that judges can apply in statutory interpretation in order to
discover Parliament’s intention. It essentially asks the question: By creating an Act of Parliament
what was the “mischief” that the previous law did not cover?

Heydon’s case

This was set out in Heydon’s Case(1584) where it was stated that there were four points to be
taken into consideration when interpreting a statute:

 What was the common law before the making of the act?
 What was the “mischief and defect” for which the common law did not provide?
 What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth?
 What is the true reason for the remedy?
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The office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief,
and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the
mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according
to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.

The application of this rule gives the judge more discretion than the literal and the golden rule as
it allows him to effectively decide on Parliament’s intent. It can be argued that this undermines
Parliament’s supremacy and is undemocratic as it takes lawmaking decisions away from the
legislature.

Use of this Rule

This rule of construction is of narrower application than the golden rule or the plain meaning
rule, in that it can only be used to interpret a statute and, strictly speaking, only when the statute
was passed to remedy a defect in the common law. Legislative intent is determined by examining
secondary sources, such as committee reports, treatises, law review articles and corresponding
statutes. This rule has often been used to resolve ambiguities in cases in which the literal rule
cannot be applied.

In the case of Thomson v. Lord Clan Morris (1900), Lord Lindley M.R. stated that in interpreting
any statutory enactment regard should not only be paid to the words used, but also to the history
of the Act and the reasons which lead to its being passed.

In the case of CIT v. Sundaradevi (1957), it was held by the Apex Court that unless there is an
ambiguity, it would not be open to the Court to depart from the normal rule of construction
which is that the intention of the legislature should be primarily to gather from the words which
are used. It is only when the words used are ambiguous that they would stand to be examined
and considered on surrounding circumstances and constitutionally proposed practices.

The Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar (1995), applied the mischief rule
in construction of Article 286 of the Constitution of India. After referring to the state of law
prevailing in the province prior to the constitution as also to the chaos and confusion that was
brought about in inter-state trade and commerce by indiscriminate exercise of taxing powers by
the different Provincial Legislatures founded on the theory of territorial nexus, Chief Justice S.R.
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Das, stated “It was to cure this mischief of multiple taxation and to preserve the free flow of
interstate trade or commerce in the Union of India regarded as one economic unit without any
provincial barrier that the constitution maker adopted Article 286 in the constitution”.

A principle to be valued must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
existence. These are designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can
approach it’. Mischief Rule is applicable where language is capable of more than one meaning. It
is the duty of the Court to make such construction of a statue which shall suppress the mischief
and advance the remedy.

Advantages

 It vanishes loopholes in law and help laws to develop.

 It allows the statutes to be refined and developed.
 It upholds the doctrine of separation of powers, parliamentary supremacy and sovereignty
of the state.
 It avoids unjust or absurd results in sentencing.

Disadvantages

 It is considered to be out of date as it has been in use since the 16th century, when
common law was the primary source of law and parliamentary supremacy was not
established.
 It gives too much power to the unelected judiciary which is argued to be undemocratic.
 In the 16th century, the judiciary would often draft acts on behalf of the king and were
therefore well qualified in what mischief the act was meant to remedy.
 It can make the law uncertain.

4. Rule of Harmonious Construction

When there is a conflict between two or more statues or two or more parts of a statute then the
rule of harmonious construction needs to be adopted. The rule follows a very simple premise that
every statute has a purpose and intent as per law and should be read as a whole. The
interpretation consistent of all the provisions of the statute should be adopted. In the case in
which it shall be impossible to harmonize both the provisions, the court’s decision regarding the
provision shall prevail.
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The rule of harmonious construction is the thumb rule to the interpretation of any statute. An
interpretation which makes the enactment a consistent whole should be the aim of the Courts and
a construction which avoids inconsistency or repugnancy between the various sections or parts of
the statute should be adopted. The Courts should avoid “a head on clash”, in the words of the
Apex Court, between the different parts of an enactment and conflict between the various
provisions should be sought to be harmonized. The normal presumption should be consistency
and it should not be assumed that what is given with one hand by the legislature is sought to be
taken away by the other. The rule of harmonious construction has been tersely explained by the
Supreme Court thus, “When there are, in an enactment two provisions which cannot be
reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted, that if possible, the effect should be
given to both”. A construction which makes one portion of the enactment a dead letter should be
avoided since harmonization is not equivalent to destruction.

Union of India v. B.S. Aggarwal (1998) it was held that It is a settled rule that an interpretation
which results in hardship, injustice, inconvenience or anomaly should be avoided and that which
supports the sense of justice should be adopted. The Court leans in favour of an interpretation
which conforms to justice and fair play and prevents injustice.

When there are two provisions in a statute, which are in apparent conflict with each other, they
should be interpreted such that effect can be given to both and that construction which renders
either of them inoperative and useless should not be adopted except in the last resort.

This principle is illustrated in the case of Raj Krishna v. Binod(1954). In this case, two
provisions of Representation of People Act, 1951, which were in apparent conflict, were brought
forth. Section 33 (2) says that a Government Servant can nominate or second a person in election
but section 123(8) says that a Government Servant cannot assist any candidate in election except
by casting his vote. The Supreme Court observed that both these provisions should be
harmoniously interpreted and held that a Government Servant was entitled to nominate or second
a candidate seeking election in State Legislative assembly. This harmony can only be achieved if
Section 123(8) is interpreted as giving the govt. servant the right to vote as well as to nominate
or second a candidate and forbidding him to assist the candidate in any other manner.

The Important Features of This Principle Are –

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 The courts must avoid a head on clash of seemingly contradicting provisions and they
must construe the contradictory provisions so as to harmonize them.
 The provision of one section cannot be used to defeat the provision contained in another
unless the court, despite all its effort, is unable to find a way to reconcile their
differences.
 When it is impossible to completely reconcile the differences in contradictory provisions,
the courts must interpret them in such as way so that effect is given to both the provisions
as much as possible.
 Courts must also keep in mind that interpretation that reduces one provision to a useless
number or a dead lumbar, is not harmonious construction.
 To harmonize is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it loose.

The Supreme Court laid down five principles of rule of Harmonious Construction in case of CIT
v Hindustan Bulk Carriers (2003):

1. The courts must avoid a head on clash of seemingly contradicting provisions and they
must construe the contradictory provisions so as to harmonize them.
2. The provision of one section cannot be used to defeat the provision contained in another
unless the court, despite all its effort, is unable to find a way to reconcile their
differences. When it is impossible to completely reconcile the differences in contradictory
provisions, the courts must interpret them in such as way so that effect is given to both
the provisions as much as possible.
3. Courts must also keep in mind that interpretation that reduces one provision to a useless
number or dead is not harmonious construction.
4. To harmonize is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it fruitless.

Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore(1958)

In this case the Supreme Court applied the rule of harmonious construction in resolving a
conflict between Articles 25(2)(b) and 26(b) of the Constitution and it was held that the right of
every religious denomination or any section thereof to manage its own affairs in matters of
religion [Article 26(b)] is subject to a law made by a State providing for social welfare and
reform or throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and
sections of Hindus [Article 25(2)(b)].

Calcutta Gas Company Pvt. Limited v State of West Bengal (1962)

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The Legislative Assembly of WB passed the Oriental Gas Company Act in 1960. The respondent
sought to take over the management of the Gas Company under this Act. The appellant
challenged the validity of this act by holding that the state Legislative Assembly had no power to
pass such an under Entries 24 and 25 of the State List because the Parliament had already
enacted the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 under Entry 52 of the Central
List dealing with industries. It was observed by the Supreme Court that there are so many
subjects in three lists in the Constitution that there is bound to be some overlapping and it is the
duty of the courts in such situation is to yet to harmonise them, if possible, so the effect can be
given to each of them. Entry 24 of the State List covers entire Industries in the State. Entry 25 is
only limited to the Gas industry. Therefore Entry 24 covers every industry barring the Gas
Industries because it has been specifically covered under Entry 25. Corresponding to Entry 24 of
the State List, there is Entry 52 in the Union List. Therefore, by harmonious construction it
became clear that gas industry was exclusively covered by Entry 25 of the State List over which
the state has full control. Therefore, the state was fully competent to make laws in this regard.

Sirsilk Ltd. v Govt. of Andhra Pradesh (1964)

An interesting question relating to a conflict between two equally mandatory provisions, viz., ss
17(1) and 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is a good illustration of the importance of
the principle that every effort should be made to give effect to all the provisions of an act by
harmonizing any apparent conflict between two or more of its provisions. Section 17(1) of the
Act requires the government to publish every award of a Labour Tribunal within thirty days of its
receipt and by sub – section (2) of section 17 the award on its publication becomes final. Section
18(1) of the Act provides that a settlement between employer and workmen shall be binding on
the parties to the agreement. In a case where a settlement was arrived at after the receipt of the
award of a Labour Tribunal by the Government but before its publication, the question was
whether the Government was still required u/s 17(1) to publish the award. In construing these
two equally mandatory provisions, the Supreme Court held that the only way to resolve the
conflict was to hold that by the settlement, which becomes effective from the date of signing, the
industrial dispute comes to an end and the award becomes infructuous and the Government
cannot publish it.

Commissioner of Sales Tax, MP v Radha Krishna (1979)

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Under section 46 (1) c of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, criminal prosecution
of the respondent partners was sanctioned in this case by the Commissioner when even after
repeated demands the assesse did not pay the sales tax. The respondent challenged this provision
on the ground that there were two separate provisions under the Act, namely, section 22 (4 – A)
and section 46 (1) c under which two different procedures were prescribed to realize the amount
due but there was no provision of law which could tell that which provision should be applied in
which case. According to the Supreme Court, the provision prescribed u/s 46 (1) c was more
drastic. It was held that by harmonious construction of these two provisions, the conclusion
drawn is that the Commissioner had a judicial discretion to decide as to which procedure to be
followed in which case. Whenever the Commissioner will fail to act judicially, the court will
have the right to intervene. However, in this case, the Commissioner had correctly decided that
the more drastic procedure under section 46 (1) c deserved to be followed because of the failure
of the assesse firm in paying sales tax despite the repeated demands by the sales tax officer.

5. Rule of Beneficial Construction

Beneficent construction involves giving the widest meaning possible to the statutes. When there
are two or more possible ways of interpreting a section or a word, the meaning which gives relief
and protects the benefits which are purported to be given by the legislation, should be chosen. A
beneficial statute has to be construed in its correct perspective so as to fructify the legislative
intent. Although beneficial legislation does receive liberal interpretation, the courts try to remain
within the scheme and not extend the benefit to those not covered by the scheme. It is also true
that once the provision envisages the conferment of benefit limited in point of time and subject to
the fulfillment of certain conditions, their non-compliance will have the effect of nullifying the
benefit. There should be due stress and emphasis to Directive Principles of State Policy and any
international convention on the subject.

There is no set principle of construction that a beneficial legislation should always be

retrospectively operated although such legislation such legislation is either expressly or by
necessary intendment not made retrospective. Further, the rule of interpretation can only be
resorted to without doing any violence to the language of the statute. In case of any exception
when the implementation of the beneficent act is restricted the Court would construe it narrowly
so as not to unduly expand the area or scope of exception. The liberal construction can only flow
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from the language of the act and there cannot be placing of unnatural interpretation on the words
contained in the enactment. Also, beneficial construction does not permit rising of any
presumption that protection of widest amplitude must be deemed to have been conferred on those
for whose benefit the legislation may have been enacted.

Beneficial Construction of statutes have enormously played an important role in the development
and beneficial interpretation of socio – economic legislations and have always encouraged the
Indian legislators to make more laws in favour of the backward class of people in India.

In the case of Sant Ram v Rajinderlal (1979), the Supreme Court said that welfare legislation
must be interpreted in a third World perspective favoring the weaker and poor class. It has also
been laid down in the case of labor legislation that courts should not stick to grammatical
constructions but also have regard to ‘teleological purpose and protective intendment of the
legislation. Interpretation of labor legislations should be done by the courts with more concern
with the colour, the context and the content of the statute rather than its literal import.

Industrial Disputes Act 1947 is one of welfare statute which intends to bring about peace and
harmony between management and labour in an industry and improve the service conditions of
industrial workers which in will turn accelerate productive activity of the country resulting in its
prosperity. As a result the prosperity of the country in turn will help to improve the conditions of
the workmen. Therefore this statute should be interpreted in such a way that it advances the
object and the purpose of the legislation and gives it a full meaning and effect so that the ultimate
social objective is achieved. The courts while interpreting labour laws have always stressed on
the doctrine of social justice as enshrined in the Preamble of Constitution.

Limitation on the Application Of Beneficial Construction

If on the application of the rule of beneficial construction, the court finds that it is doing
complete justice and delivering a fair judgment then there is no question of why should not such
rule is applied? But there are certain restrictions which the court has to take care of which at the
time of application have to be adhered to –
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1. Where the courts find that by the application of the rule of beneficial construction, it
would be re legislating a provision of statute either by substituting, adding or altering any
provision of the act.
2. Where any word in a statute confers to a single meaning only. Then the courts should
refrain from applying the rule of benevolent construction to the statute.
3. When there is no ambiguity in a provision of a statute so construed. If the provision is
plain, unambiguous and does not give rise to any doubt, the rule of beneficial
construction cannot be applied.

The principle of liberal construction can be taken to extreme limits at some times in order to
achieve the object of the legislation. In the case of National Insurance Co Ltd v Swarn Singh
(2004)

In the case relating to insurance aspect of motor vehicles, the Supreme court held that to prove its
defence the insurer has to prove: (i) breach of condition by the insured was done knowingly or
resulted due to his negligence and (ii)breach was fundamental and had contributed to cause of
accident. It was also held that even in cases where the insurer is able to prove the defence of
breach of condition, it will have to satisfy the award against the insured but it can recover the
amount paid to the claimant from the insured in the same proceedings before the tribunal.

In a recent judgment in the case of The Bangalore Turf Club Ltd. Vs. Regional Director,
Employees State Insurance Corporation (2003), the Supreme Court judged the ESIC act on
beneficial grounds and emphasized that the beneficient construction is being preferred to help the
intended beneficiaries.

Probable Questions

1. Define interpretation and discuss relevance of approaches to interpretation.

2. Explain relevance of various rules of interpretation.
3. What are the basic rules of interpretation?
4. Explain the following:
i. Mischief Rule of interpretation
ii. Golden Rule of interpretation
iii. Literal Rule of interpretation
5. Analyze relevance of beneficial rule of interpretation in light of Social-Welfare
Legislation.
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6. “As a general rule plain and ordinary meaning of a provision of statute should be used for
interpretation”. Comment