The Complex Nature of Power 235

RADITIONALLY, THE STATE has been at the center of the international system,

T and each state’s pursuit of its self-defined national interests has been the central
dynamic of world politics. This process, how states pursue their national interests,
is the focus of this chapter.
National capabilities are the first thing we will explore. Each state’s ability to
achieve its goals is based in substantial part on a range of capabilities. These are
particularly important when the goals of two or more states clash, and the story line
of the global drama is often about whose interests prevail and whose do not. But
capabilities, such as the ability to skillfully articulate goals and persuade others
that the goals are mutually beneficial, are even important in noncompetitive situa-
tions. Power is the term we will use here to represent the sum of a country’s capa-
bilities. Because power in common usage carries the connotation of “hit-over-the
head” or “make you” capabilities, it is very important to stress that power as used
here is more than that. As we will explore later in the following pages, power can
be based on positive persuasion as well as negative coercion. Indeed, power has
many forms. Military muscle, wealth, and some others are fairly obvious and tangi-
ble. Others such as national will power and diplomatic skills are much less obvious
and intangible.
Applying national capabilities in the pursuit of the national interest is our second
topic. Foreign policy includes not just the international goals that a country has, but
how countries use their national capabilities to achieve those goals. A great deal of
discussion in chapter 3 focuses on how foreign policy is made. Here the emphasis
will be on how it is carried out. Statecraft is the term often used to encapsulate how
a country applies its national capabilities to achieve its foreign policy goals. As one
scholar has defined it, statecraft:
refers to the use of policy instruments to satisfy the core objectives of nation-states
in the international system. . . . Statecraft is most usefully thought of in broad and
multidimensional terms. It involves the application and interplay of multiple
instruments—military, economic, diplomatic, and informational—to achieve the
multiple objectives of states, including national security, economic prosperity, and
political prestige and influence. (Mastanduno, 1988:826)

Before moving on to our exploration of power and the implementation of foreign

policy, note that in the context of this book’s theme—the traditional and alternative
approaches to world politics—this chapter looks at the traditional ways of establish-
ing which policies will prevail in the world. Usually that is determined by which
country or coalition has the greater capabilities. The alternative approach, discussed
in chapter 9, involves the establishment of international law and norms of justice to
regulate the conduct of international relations. Chapter 9 also examines the role of
international courts in trying to ensure that the rule of law limits destructive behav-
ior by states and individuals. That way who is right, rather than who is mightiest, has
a better chance of prevailing.

THE COMPLEX NATURE OF POWER

Power is an elusive concept. Its multifaceted characteristics make it hard to precisely

describe or measure. As former Harvard University dean and top U.S. national secu-
rity official Joseph Nye (2000:55) puts it, power “is like the weather. Everyone talks
about it, but few understand it.”
236 CHAPTER 8 National Power and Statecraft: The Traditional Approach

Characteristics of Power
One of the many reasons that it is so challenging to get a handle on power is that it
has many characteristics, some of which seem almost contradictory. It is both an
asset and a goal, hard and soft, absolute and relative, objective and subjective, and a
function of both capabilities and will. Additionally, power is situational.

Power as an Asset and Goal

One source of confusion in discussions about power is that it is both an asset and a
goal. Our discussion of power so far has generally treated it as an asset that can be
applied to help countries achieve goals. In this sense, power is akin to money as a
sort of political currency that can be used to acquire things. Money buys things;
power causes things to happen. There are, of course, differences between money and
power. One is that political power is less liquid than money; it is harder to convert
into things that you want. A second difference is that power, unlike money, has no
standard measurement. Therefore it is much harder to be precise about how much
power any country has, as we shall see in our section on measuring power.
Power is also a goal because in a world of often conflicting goals among countries
it is only prudent to seek, acquire, or preserve sufficient power to pursue your national
goals. Here again, the analogy between power and money has merit. We all expend
money as an asset, yet we also seek to acquire money and to build up a reserve
against both anticipated needs and contingencies.
The duality of power as an asset and goal creates a debate over whether more is
always better. Some people believe that countries can become fixated on acquiring
power, especially military power, beyond what is prudently needed to meet possible
exigencies. This, critics say, is unwise because power is expensive, it creates a temp-
tation to use it, and it spawns insecurity in others. Critics of recent U.S. foreign policy
see its massive arms spending and its misadventure in Iraq as a case in point.
To such charges, realists warn that not being willing to pay the price today to
guard against future and unknown dangers leaves states vulnerable (Schweller,
2004). Realists also dismiss the concern about having too much power and say that
the real danger is unwise use of the power you have by wasting it on marginal goals.
A third realist caution is against a country being too reluctant to expend its power to
advance its national interests. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, for one,
portrays Americans as sometimes too-reluctant warriors and believes that “American
leadership [needs] to articulate for their public a concept of the national interest and
explain how that interest is served . . . by the maintenance of the balance of power”
through a forceful U.S. presence on the world stage.1

Hard and Soft Power

As noted earlier, the most common image of power involves the ability to make
someone else do something or suffer the consequences. Often called hard power,
this type of power rests on negative incentives (threats, “sticks”) and on positive
incentives (inducements, “carrots”). There is also soft power, the ability to persuade
others to follow your lead by being an attractive example. As one scholar puts it, “A
country may obtain the outcome it wants in world politics because other countries—
admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and
openness—want to follow it” (Nye, 2004:5).
The value of these two forms of power is the source of much debate. Hard power
is easier to appreciate because it is easier to see that certain coercive measures or
positive incentives have been used and to observe the result. Realists are also apt to
 The Complex Nature of Power 237

dismiss the concept of soft power, arguing that coun- FIGURE 8.1 U.S. Soft Power and Iraq
tries follow other countries’ lead if they share the
59% 59%
same interests, not out of altruistic sentiments such
53%
as admiration. 50% 50%
47%
Rebutting this, those who believe that soft power
can be potent point, as an example, to the negative 39% 40%
37%
impact they say the Iraq War has had on U.S. soft 40%
35%
power by greatly diminishing the U.S. image abroad. Opinion of U.S. is favorable
31% Unfavorable
Citing poll results, such as those in Figure 8.1, show- Unsure
ing that opinion about the United States has plum- Pre-Iraq Post-Iraq 15%
meted almost everywhere in the past several years,
10% 10%
one analyst worries that “the United States’ soft 14% 7%
4%
power—its ability to attract others by the legitimacy
of U.S. policies and the values that underlie them—
is in decline as a result” (Nye, 2004a:16). One reason 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
this is a concern, according to this view, is because the
Polls in six countries indicate that after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in
United States needs the cooperation of other coun- March 2003 there was an increase in the share of people who viewed
tries to combat terrorism and many other problems, the United States unfavorably and a similar decline in the U.S. favorable
but “When the United States becomes so unpopular rating. The shifts between 2000 and 2002 may be related to the fact
that being pro-American is a kiss of death in other that by the summer of 2002 when the poll was taken, there were
countries’ domestic politics, foreign political leaders already strong reports of a U.S. readiness to act against Iraq. This
are unlikely to make helpful concessions, reducing decline in U.S. prestige arguably undercut U.S. “soft power” and the
willingness of other governments to cooperate with Washington.
U.S. leverage in international affairs.” To such com-
mentary, those who are skeptical of the importance of Note: The question was, “Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat
favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the United States.” The
soft power might echo the words of President Bush, six countries were France, Germany, Great Britain, Pakistan, Turkey, and Russia. Pew
who professed his “respect [for] the values, judgment, reported the favorable data only for 2000; the two other data points for that year are
estimated.
and interests of our friends and partners,” but also Data source: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (2000, 2003, 2006).
asserted, “We will be prepared to act apart” if neces-
sary and “will not allow . . . disagreements [with
allies] to obscure our determination to secure . . .
our fundamental interests and values.”2

Absolute and Relative Power

By one standard, power that indisputably exists and can be potentially used is absolute
power. An example is the approximately 5,000 nuclear warheads and bombs that are
deployed on about 1,000 U.S. missiles and bombers. They indisputably exist, will
have a specific impact if used, and in theory can be used by a president without any
legal check on the ability to authorize their deployment.
Whatever the theory may be, however, power does not usually exist in a vac-
uum. Since power is about the ability to persuade or make another actor do or not do
something, calculating power is of limited use except to measure it against the power
of the other side. When assessing capabilities, then, relative power, or the compara-
tive power of national actors, must be considered. We cannot, for example, say that
China is powerful unless we specify in comparison to whom. Whatever Beijing’s
power resources may be, China’s relative power compared to another major power, Web Link
such as Japan, is less than is China’s relative power compared to a smaller neighbor, You can play a zero-sum game
such as Vietnam. and a variety of other political
strategy games such as “Free
A related issue is whether power is a zero-sum game. If a gain in power of one
Rider” and “Prisoner’s Dilemma”
actor inevitably means a loss of power for other actors, the game is zero-sum. If an online at www.egwald.com/
actor can gain power without the power of other actors being diminished, then the operationsresearch/
game is non-zero-sum. Realists tend to see power as zero-sum; idealists usually portray gameintroduction.php.
238 CHAPTER 8 National Power and Statecraft: The Traditional Approach

it as non-zero-sum, that is, gains do not necessarily come at the expense of others.
Without delving too far into this controversy, we can say that the relative nature of
power implies that sometimes, especially between antagonists, power approaches zero-
sum. When China’s Asian rival India tested nuclear weapons in 1998, it decreased
China’s relative power compared to India and arguably reduced China’s influence in
the countries to its southwest. More broadly, though, only the most cynical would see
power as absolutely zero-sum. As some of the world’s less developed countries (LDCs)
have moved from the low-income category to lower-middle- or even upper-middle-
income status, their economic strength has increased. Yet it would be hard to make
the case that this decreased the economic strength of the economically developed
countries (EDCs). Indeed, the progress of the LDCs has arguably benefited the EDCs
by, for instance, providing new investment opportunities and new markets.

Power as Capacity and Will

Every country’s power is determined substantially by its power assets: its military
and economic strength, its leadership, the size and talents of its population, and
numerous other factors. Together these make up a country’s power capacity, its
potential for exercising international power. By themselves, though, substantial power
assets are not enough to create a powerful global presence. They give a country the
capacity to exercise power, but to be effective they must be supplemented by a will
to power. This is a country’s willingness to use its
capacity, to turn potential power into applied power.
Japan offers a current example.
Economically Japan is the world’s second most
powerful country, with an annual GNP that is second
only to that of the United States and larger than that
of China, France, and Great Britain combined. Japan’s
127 million well-trained people are also a significant
asset. With little fanfare, Japan has also amassed a
very well-equipped military force supported by an
annual military budget of over $41 billion. Yet for
all of this, Japan’s global influence has been limited
by its post–World War II reluctance to assert itself.
Symbolically, the Japanese constitution forbids the
“use of force as a means of settling international dis-
putes.” More importantly, the Japanese have been
unwilling to take an assertive stand, much less use
their forces, to promote their views.
This attitude has begun to change (Szechenyi,
2006). Polls show a growing sense of national pride
in Japan, and recent prime ministers have found it
politically wise to annually visit the Yasukuni Shrine,
which honors Japan’s troops killed in World War II.
Japan has also very slowly begun to deploy military
units abroad. They now participate in UN peace-
Having the will to use the power you possess is an important power keeping missions, and Tokyo deployed 600 noncom-
factor. Japan has a strong military force but its people have been
batant troops (engineering and medical units) to Iraq
unwilling to use it because of their experience in World War II. This
reluctance to use force is beginning to change, and Japan has taken a
in 2003. Additionally, the Japanese navy is ready-
number of tentative steps toward a more assertive foreign policy. It has ing its first helicopter-carrier ship and intensifying
deployed its troops, including this Japanese soldier in Iraq, to support commando training, both moves that will add to
the U.S.-led mission there. the country’s ability to project its power further from
 The Complex Nature of Power 239

its shores. This worries some of Japan’s neighbors, especially when combined with
recent renewed claims by Japan to islands and territorial waters lost to or in dispute
with China, Russia, and South Korea since World War II. Yet another sign of grow-
ing Japanese assertiveness is the country’s campaign for a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council. “Japan is changing,” the U.S. ambassador there recently commented.
“I think Japan has decided, ‘We’re a great, big country, we’re the second-largest econ-
omy in the world, and we probably have the second-largest navy in the Pacific. We
want a seat on the Security Council. We want a role to play in the international
arena.’ I think all those changes are at work and will continue.” Confirming that
impression, Japan’s foreign minister told reporters, “There are expectations that Japan
play a greater role in dealing with international conflicts. And I believe that Japan must
do so.”3 All this portends a Japan that will increasingly convert its power capacity into
applied power and play a stronger role.

Objective and Subjective Power

Just as a country’s power is influenced by its willingness to use its assets, so too
it is influenced by what other countries perceive to be those assets and the intent
to use them. Objective power consists of assets that you possess and that you are
willing to use. As such, objective power is a major factor in determining whose
interests prevail, as Iraq found out in 2003 in its war with the U.S.-led coalition
forces.
Subjective power is also important. A common assertion is that a country will
damage its reputation for strength and tempt future aggression if it does not display
unity, abandons a commitment, or backs down in a crisis (Foster, 2006). One aspect
of this that has been an issue for the United States in recent decades relates to the
belief that, as one French general put it, Americans want “zero-dead wars.”4 The view
that American public opinion will not tolerate many U.S. casualties was formed amid
the U.S. reluctance to commit ground forces in the aftermath of the frustrating Vietnam
War and has been intensified in the mind of some by the U.S. withdrawal in the face
of relatively minor casualties in Lebanon (1983) and Somalia (1993), and the U.S.
decision to use air power exclusively, but not troops, to defeat Yugoslavia during the
Kosovo crisis in 1999 (Koch & Gartner, 2005; Smith, 2005; Vasquez, 2005). Those
who doubt American resolve in the face of casualties also point to the reaction to
approximately 3,200 U.S. troops that died in the first four years of the Iraq War and
occupation. While every death in every war is sad, it is also the case that in the over-
all history of military actions, U.S. casualties in Iraq have been relatively light. By
one measure, far more Americans were killed on a single day at Pearl Harbor (4,498)
in 1941 or on D-Day (4,900) in 1944. By another standard, the 3,200 death toll in
Iraq pales beside the more than 67,000 Americans who died at the hands of drunk
drivers during the same period. Yet this slaughter draws much less attention than
does Iraq.
Because it is difficult to measure reputation, judging its impact is challenging.
Some scholars conclude that concern over reputation is overdrawn, but that does
not negate the case that a country’s power is to a degree based on others’ percep-
tions of its current or potential power or its reputation for being willing (or not
willing) to use it and that the perception that a country is not currently powerful
can tempt another country. It is arguable, for example, that Saddam Hussein’s
willingness in 1991 and 2003 to risk war with the United States was based in part
on his perception that Americans would not tolerate the cost and casualties neces-
sary to invade Iraq and topple him. As Saddam put it prior to the first war, “The
nature of American society makes it impossible for the United States to bear tens of
240 CHAPTER 8 National Power and Statecraft: The Traditional Approach

FIGURE 8.2 Casualties and Support for Iraq War

100%

Oppose/unsure about war

42% 43% 46%
51%
50% 58% 57% 59%
54% 49% 65%
41% 77%
Support war 35%
23%
0%
Anti/pro-war 100 500 1,000 5,000 5,000+ Unlimited
Projected U.S. troops killed

Before the Iraq War began in 2003, one poll asked Americans if they would support a decision by the
president to launch a ground attack against Saddam Hussein. Most (58%) said yes; 35% said no, and
7% were unsure. Remember that in 2003, most Americans thought Iraq had weapons of mass destruction
and was cooperating with terrorists. The poll then presented war supporters with a range of potential
U.S. casualties. As this figure shows, American support for an attack went down as the possible U.S.
deaths went up. By 1,000 deaths, support had dropped below 50%. Does this show a prudent public
or a weak public unwilling to accept military casualties to achieve U.S. policy goals?
Data source: Los Angeles Times poll, December 2002; data provided by The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research,
University of Connecticut.

thousands of casualties.”5 Figure 8.2 examines U.S. support for the 2003 Iraq War
in light of projected mounting casualties and asks what you think the data says
about Americans.

Situational Power
A country’s power varies according to the situation, or context, in which it is being
applied. A country’s situational power is often less than the total inventory of its
capabilities. Military power provides a good example. During the last weeks of March
and first weeks of April 2003, American and British forces faced those of Iraq in a
classic conventional war situation. In that context, the conflict was one-sided with
the U.S./U.K. forces quickly destroying and dispersing those of Iraq. During the post-
war period, the conflict situation changed when forces opposed to the U.S./U.K. pres-
ence in the country began to use guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics. Soon, more U.S.
soldiers had died in the “postwar” period than during the war, and U.S. policy was in
considerable disarray even though the American forces in Iraq were as numerous as
the ones that had so easily toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein. The difference was
that in the very different situation after “victory,” a great deal of the U.S. high-tech
weapons inventory, its heavy armored vehicles, and its air power were of no use in
countering the resistance tactics in Iraq.
www
Measuring Power
SIMULATION
It would be a very good thing if it were possible to measure power precisely. One
Winning Wars Isn’t Simple
reason is that countries sometimes wind up in wars because they miscalculate their
own power or that of their opponent. To a degree that is what happened to the United
States following its invasion of Iraq in 2003. The equation of comparing U.S. military
power to Iraqi military power was relatively easy. The United States was immensely
more powerful, and that was demonstrated by the ease with which U.S. forces
 The Complex Nature of Power 241

Most aspects of national power

are relevant in only some
situations. During the invasion
of Iraq in 2003, U.S. tanks
helped rout Iraq’s poorly
equipped military. In the
subsequent occupation
phase that featured terrorist
attacks and guerrilla fighting,
often in urban areas filled with
noncombatants, this column
of U.S. tanks and other
weapons systems had very
limited relevance to the
struggle.

defeated Iraq’s armed forces. That was only part of the equation, though, and U.S.
leaders miscalculated both the strength of the long-term resistance to U.S. occupa-
tion forces and the power of existing U.S. forces in Iraq to deal with those attacks.
Unfortunately, power is very difficult to measure, both because of the difficulty in
quantifying many of its aspects and because it is highly changeable.

Quantification Difficulties
At a general level, it is possible to measure or at least estimate power. There can be Web Link
no doubt, for example, that China is more powerful than Mongolia. Beyond such View an online version of a
broad judgments, there is no widely accepted formula for measuring power. It is easy recent attempt to measure
enough to measure such tangible factors as per capita GNP or number of soldiers. national power at www.rand.org/
But it is harder to assign weights to each to establish their relative importance to one publications/MR/MR1110/.
another when constructing a power formula. Even harder is measuring and giving
relative weights to intangible factors such as the diplomatic skill of a country’s leaders
or its soft-power ability to lead by example. These difficulties were illustrated by a
study that reviewed four attempts by various scholars to devise formulas to measure
national power during the cold war (Taber, 1989). The four often came to dramati-
cally different conclusions because of different methods of measuring power. Two
studies rated the Soviet Union the most powerful. One each rated the United States
and China most powerful. One ranked China only seventh. Brazil ranked number
three in one study, and India ranked number four in another study; yet two studies
did not place either country in the top ten. The list need not go on to make the point
that different formulas for measuring power yielded very different results.

Power Dynamics www

Power is also difficult to measure because it is in constant flux. Economies pros-
per or lag, arms are modernized or become outmoded, resources are discovered ANALYZE THE ISSUE
or are depleted, and populations rally behind or lose faith in their governments. Measuring a Country’s Power
242 CHAPTER 8 National Power and Statecraft: The Traditional Approach

No superpower from Rome, through imperial Britain, to the Soviet Union has main-
tained its status permanently. Each eventually declined and some even vanished, as
did the USSR. To take their place, other countries have risen from humble beginnings
to the rank of major power, as did the United States. Still others, like China today, may
reemerge from a period of eclipse and strive to recapture their lost status (Tammen
et al., 2002).
There are numerous reasons why power is so fluid. One theory of system-level
analysis is that power cycles occur over a period of a few decades, or even as much as
a century (Tessman & Chan, 2004). The cycles are demarcated by great-power or
“systemic” wars, such as the two world wars, that reflect strains or power shifts
within the system and act as political earthquakes, altering the system by destroying
the major power status of declining powers and elevating rising powers to pole sta-
tus. Then the process of power decay and formation begins anew. Balance-of-power
politics is another system-level cause of change as countries form alliances and take
other actions to avoid being dominated.
From a state-level-of-analysis perspective, several factors account for the rise or
www fall of a country’s power. One involves the sources of power. The advent of nuclear
weapons some 60 years ago instantly elevated the status of countries that possess them.
Internal conditions also affect an actor’s power. The Soviet Union collapsed in part
SIMULATION
Creating Your Own because it no longer commanded the loyalty of most of its citizens. Most Americans
International Power Index are patriotic, but the country cannot remain a superpower if its people are unwilling
to bear the cost of being a leader in the international system. That does not mean the
United States should lead, only that it cannot remain dominant unless it accepts the
burdens, as well as the benefits of leadership.

THE FOUNDATION OF NATIONAL POWER

Although it is common to think of national power in terms of military might and

wealth, those elements of power rest substantially on a more basic foundation. The
elements of that foundation include national geography, the quality of the popula-
tion, the quality of the government, and the country’s technological infrastructure. In
the following sections, we will analyze these basic elements. The first element focuses
on the core of the national state. That core can be roughly divided into three parts:
national geography, people, and government.

National Geography
Shakespeare’s King Henry VI proclaimed:
Let us be backed with God and with the seas
Which He hath given for fence impregnable, . . .
In them and in ourselves our safety lies.

Whether or not God has ever aided England, King Henry’s soliloquy reminds us
that the English Channel has helped save Great Britain from Napoleon, Hitler, and
every other threat from Europe for nine centuries. Geography counts.
Location can be an advantage or a disadvantage. Spain was able to avoid involve-
ment in either world war partly because of its relative isolation from the rest of Europe.
Poland, sandwiched between Germany and Russia, and Korea, stuck between China
and Japan, each has a distinctly unfortunate location. The Israelis would almost cer-
tainly be better off if their promised land were somewhere—almost anywhere—else.
 The Foundation of National Power 243

And the Kuwaitis probably would not mind moving either, provided they could take
Did You Know That:
their oil fields with them. Location also impacts relative power. The weight of China’s
Mexico’s President Porfirio
army as a power factor is different in Beijing’s relations with the United States and
Díaz (1886–1911) once
Russia because Russia and China share a border, while the vast Pacific Ocean sepa- lamented, “Poor Mexico, so
rates China and the United States. far from God, so close to the
Topography—a country’s mountains, rivers, and plains—is also important. The Alps United States.”
form a barrier that has helped protect Switzerland from its larger European neighbors
and spared the Swiss the ravages of both world wars. Throughout history, Afghanistan’s
rugged mountains have bedeviled invaders, including since 2001 U.S. and other NATO
troops trying to eliminate al Qaeda and Taliban forces. Topography can also work against
a country. For example, the southern and eastern two-thirds of Iraq is a broad plain that
provided a relatively easy invasion avenue for the mechanized U.S. and British forces in
2003. The Tigris and Euphrates river systems and the associated swampy areas provided
some topographical defenses, but too few to make a difference.
Size is an important geographic factor. Bigger is often better. The immense expanse
of Russia, for example, has repeatedly saved it from conquest. Although sometimes
overwhelmed at first, the Russian armies have been able to retreat into the interior
and buy time in exchange for geography while regrouping. By contrast, Israel’s small
size gives it no room to retreat.
Climate can also play a power role. The tropical climate of Vietnam, with its
monsoon rains and its dense vegetation, made it difficult for the Americans to use
much of their superior weaponry. At the other extreme, the bone-chilling Russian
winter has allied itself with Russia’s geographic size to form a formidable defensive
force that decimated Napoleon’s soldiers in the winter of 1812–1813 and the German
army during World War II. In fact the Russian winter has proved so formidable that
Czar Nicholas I commented, “Russia has two generals we can trust, General January
and General February.”

People
A second element of the national core is a country’s human characteristics. Tangible
demographic subcategories include number of people, age distribution, and such
quantitative factors as health and education. There are also intangible population
factors such as morale.

Population
As is true for geographic size, the size of a country’s population can be a positive or a
negative factor. Because a large population supplies military personnel and industrial
workers, sheer numbers of people are a positive power factor. It is unlikely, for
instance, that Tonga (pop. 115,000) will ever achieve great-power status. A large
population may be disadvantageous, however, if it is not in balance with resources.
India, with 1.1 billion people, has the world’s second-largest population, yet because
of the country’s poverty ($720 per capita GNP), it must spend much of its energy and
resources merely feeding its people.

Age Distribution Web Link

It is an advantage for a country to have a large percentage of its population in the You can find the current and
economically productive years (15–64 by international reporting standards). Some projected age distribution (popu-
lation pyramid) of countries and
countries with booming populations have a heavy percentage of children who must
territories around the world on
be supported. In other countries with limited life expectancy, many people die before the U.S. Census Bureau Web
they complete their productive years. Finally, some countries are “aging,” with a geriatric site at www.census.gov/ipc/www/
population segment that consumes more resources than it produces (Longman, 2004). idbpyr.html.
244 CHAPTER 8 National Power and Statecraft: The Traditional Approach

FIGURE 8.3 Age Distribution and Dependency Ratios

28% 50%

*Dependency Dependency
6.5%
7% ratio ratio
65% 2% 1.1:1
1.9:1
48%

World Uganda

19% 14%
72% Dependency 66% Dependency
9% ratio 20% ratio
2.6:1 2.0:1

South Korea Italy

Age 0–14 15–64 65+

Most less developed countries (LDCs), like Uganda, are disadvantaged because their population has a
high percentage of children. These children consume resources for their education and general care
that they will only begin to “repay” the system in terms of productivity and taxes when they become
adults. A high percentage of senior citizens, as in Italy, is also economically suboptimal. South Korea
has good age distribution with 72% in the “working years.”
*Dependency ratio is a World Bank calculation of the ratio of the working-age population (ages 15–64) to the dependent
population (age 14 and younger plus age 65 and older). Generally, the higher the ratio, the more economically advantaged a
country is.
Data source: CIA online.

Worldwide, 28% of Earth’s population was less than 15 years old in 2006; 7%
www was 65 or over; 65% was in the working-age years (15–64). Figure 8.3 shows the age
distributions of several countries, which you should compare. The figure also shows
MAP
the dependency ratio of young and old people combined compared to the working-
Employment by age population. Many analysts would contend that South Korea is relatively advan-
Economic Activity taged by its large working-age population, while Uganda, with numerous children,
and Italy, with a high percentage of senior citizens, are relatively disadvantaged.
Whereas growing populations and high ratios of children were once the main
population worries, there is now growing concern in some places about low birthrates,
zero or even a negative population growth, and demographic graying, that is, a grow-
ing proportion of the population is of retirement age. A negative aspect is that a rela-
tively large retirement-age population slows down per capita GDP growth because of a
relative scarcity of workers. A growing geriatric population also challenges a country’s
ability to pay the cost of providing pensions and other services to retired citizens. De-
mographic graying is already pronounced in the economically developed countries
and is projected to increase. By 2050, for instance, 33% of Japan’s population and
30% of Europe’s will be age 65 and older. The U.S. age distribution is still relatively
 The Foundation of National Power 245

DEBATE THE POLICY SCRIPT

Is Immigration a Solution to Demographic Graying?
Japan and Europe are facing a problem that could undermine Immigrants help keep the percentage of the U.S. working-
their economic vitality and international power. They are gray- age population higher than in most other EDCs. Currently, 59%
ing demographically, with a growing percentage of their popu- of all foreign-born Americans are between ages 25 and 54,
lations aged 65 or older. Increased longevity is one cause. Life whereas only 42% of native-born Americans are in that age
expectancy in the EDCs is now 78 years, up 9% since 1975. group. Immigrants are also the reason that the U.S. fertility rate
Decreased fertility rates (the average number of children a (2.1) is actually up since 1980 (1.8). Whites (2.0) and African
woman will have) are the second cause of graying. In Western Americans (2.1) are at about the replacement rate, but Asian
Europe and Japan, the rate is now 1.4, far below the replace- Americans (2.3) and Hispanics (2.9) are above it. Thus it is
ment rate (about 2.1) needed to keep the population from de- these groups that are disproportionately producing the chil-
clining and to produce younger adults to offset the older adults dren of today and the adult workers of tomorrow.
reaching retirement age. Another thing many EDCs share is a heated debate about
A graying population is a double-barreled problem. One immigration policy. A 2005 survey of Americans found that
threat is that with relatively fewer children being born, the sup- 41% agreed with the statement, “Immigration adds to our
ply of future adults is waning. A relatively smaller workforce will character and strengthens the United States because it brings
cause labor shortages, a dropoff in consumer spending, and diversity, new workers, and new creative talent to this country.”
other problems that will harm economic growth. The second But 48% differed, saying, “Immigration detracts from our char-
threat is that governments will struggle to pay for retirement, acter and weakens the United States because it puts too many
health care, and other programs that support senior citizens. burdens on government services, causes language barriers,
The United States is graying also, but less markedly than and creates housing problems.” Another 10% said “both” or
most EDCs. Whereas 30% of the population in Europe will be “it depends,” and 1% were unsure.1 Reflecting this division,
65 or older in 2050, only 21% of Americans will be 65 by another poll found that 33% of its respondents wanted to keep
mid-century. Immigration is the most important reason for the immigration at its current level, 14% wanted to increase it,
relative U.S. advantage. U.S. immigration has risen substan- 49% wanted to decrease it, and 4% were unsure.2
tially and now averages about 1 million immigrants a year. The
share of the U.S. population that is foreign-born grew from 6% What Do You Think?
in 1980 to 11% in 2000. Europe once provided most immi- Should immigration continue at its current level, be increased,
grants. Now most come from Latin America and Asia. or be cut? If you favor an increase or decrease, by how much?

good: 0–14 (20%), 15–64 (67%), and 65 (13%). But Americans are also graying,
and the retirement-age population is projected to rise to 21% in 2050.
So far, demographic graying is mostly confined to the EDCs, but it is beginning to
also affect LDCs, especially China. Its one-child-per-couple policy instituted to re-
strain population growth coupled with increasing longevity means that senior citizens
will rapidly increase as a share of China’s population from 8% now to 25% by 2050.
Graying will steadily increase the daunting costs of providing health care, housing,
and other social services for the elderly. Furthermore, as global aging progresses, a
smaller percentage of the population will be between 15 and 64 “doing the work,
paying the taxes, saving for the future, and raising the next generation” (Peterson, www
2001:3). How to address this problem is a major policy challenge for the United
States and other EDCs, and one possible solution is presented for your consideration JOIN THE DEBATE
in the decision box, “Is Immigration a Solution to Demographic Graying?” The Foreign Student Program
in the United States:
Education Does It Serve U.S.
An educated population is important to national power. Quantity of education is National Interests?
one factor, and it is a source of weakness for the LDCs, especially the poorest ones.
Although education has improved substantially in low-income countries over the
last 15 years or so, with the primary school completion rate up 9%, it is still only
246 CHAPTER 8 National Power and Statecraft: The Traditional Approach

FIGURE 8.4 Comparative 75%. In the United States it is 93%. Beyond primary
Educational Achievement school, the data become progressively worse. Less
than half of children in low-income countries go to
Japan 629 high school, and only about 9% get any post-
secondary technical or college education and can
South 624 serve as the nucleus of the educated workforce a
Korea
modern economy needs. Moreover, in a circular
Finland 620
problem, the lack of opportunity in many of the
Australia 589 poorest LDCs creates a “brain drain,” as its profes-
sionals emigrate to seek a better life.
Average 500 Quality of education is also important. For exam-
ple, 84% of Americans over age 24 have graduated
United
496 high school, 27% have a college degree. Furthermore,
States
the country spends a greater percentage of its wealth
Poland 432
on education than all but a handful of countries. Yet
Portugal 383
there is evidence that the U.S. educational system is
not adequately preparing students to meet the re-
Greece 382 quirements of the modern world. It may be that the
basic 3 Rs—reading, ’riting, and ’rithmetic—that
Mexico 283 Achievement level once served to train a workforce will no longer suf-
fice in the 21st century. Instead, the requirements
National power rests in part on a well-educated populace. For will be more like the 3 Cs—computers, calculus,
Americans, this is something of a concern. The data in this figure and communications. Another problem may be that
is drawn from the overall scores amassed by 15-year-old students American students during their four years of high
in 26 mostly developed countries for skills in reading, mathematics,
school spend an average of only about half as much
and science. The results here are for the four countries with the
highest and lowest scores, the United States, and the average of the
time on core subjects as do students in Japan, France,
26 countries. As evident, American students finished below average, and Germany. An additional difficulty may be disci-
well below the leading countries, and not that far ahead of some pline in American schools. Students in the United
relatively poor countries, such as Poland. States, for instance, are six times more likely to en-
Note: The actual scores were reduced by 1000 to better highlight comparative data. counter discipline problems in the classroom than
That is, for example, the score for Japan was actually 1629. Japanese students.6 Whatever the cause, a recent
Data source: Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation, Education at
a Glance, 2005.
study in 26 mostly developed countries measuring the
mathematic, scientific, and reading skills of 15-year-
olds showed that American students finished 14th overall and below average in each
of the three areas of study. Figure 8.4 depicts some of the results.
Yet another way to break down general educational statistics is to see how well a
country trains various segments of its population. Most countries limit their power
potential by underutilizing major elements of their population. For example, sexism
limits the possible contribution of women in virtually all countries. In Bangladesh,
for instance, a male teenager is almost twice as likely as a female teenager to be en-
rolled in secondary school. Racial, ethnic, and other bases of discrimination add to
this failure to maximize a population’s potential. The fact that among adults over age
24 in the United States just 18% of African Americans and 13% of Latinos, compared
to 30% of whites, have completed college means that the potential of a significant
number of these disadvantaged people has been lost to the country.

Health
Web Link
Poor health can also sap a country’s power. Providing an example, Russia is experienc-
Health-related data for countries
can be found on the World
ing a health crisis among its men due to widespread alcoholism and smoking. Drug
Health Organization Web site addiction is also on the rise. Two-thirds of all adult Russian males smoke (2.5 times
at www.who.int/countries/en/. the U.S. rate), and the lung cancer death rate is twice that of the United States. To make
 The Foundation of National Power 247

matters worse, about 60% of all Russian men are

alcohol abusers, with the average Russian male drink-
ing a quart of vodka every two days, supplemented
by other alcohol. “Sobriety is no longer the moral
norm in Russia,” says one health official there.7
The effect is lethal. Longevity for Russian males
has declined to less than 59 years (compared to
73 years for Russian women). Widespread bootleg-
ging adds to the problem, with 17,000 Russians dying
in 2006 from unsafe homemade vodka and other spir-
its. Alcoholism threatens Russia’s national strength in
several ways. If current trends continue, the country’s
population could drop by a third in the next two
decades. There are also immense economic conse-
quences, including lost productivity and the costs of
providing medical treatment and supporting aban-
doned families. Another issue relates to Russia’s mili-
tary strength. Officers complain that most potential
military recruits are so wasted from alcohol and drugs
that they cannot withstand basic training. Overall,
the internal health crisis has replaced any possible
external enemy as “the clearest possible threat to na-
tional security,” according to one Russian study.8

Attitudes
The beliefs and orientations of a country’s population
on a number of dimensions affect national power.
For example, countries such as the United States,
China, and Japan whose people have a reasonably
unified national identity are in a stronger position
than are countries with deep ethnonational divi-
sions, as chapter 4 details. Similarly, countries in
which morale is low because of economic or other Russia’s power is being undermined by epidemic alcoholism, especially
difficulties are disadvantaged. Low national morale among its men. The health crisis in Russia is presented with irony in
can lead to civil unrest and even topple govern- this image of an inebriated Russian holding himself upright only by
ments. The end of the USSR in 1991 provides an grasping the statue of a drunken man in the city of Krasnoyarsk.
example of the impact of both ethnonational divi-
sion and low morale. As the country’s economic system went from bad to worse,
the populace was increasingly disheartened. By 1990, 90% believed that the coun-
try’s economic situation was dire, and 57% had no confidence in the future. This
profound pessimism led to an almost total collapse of support for the government
Did You Know That:
of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and, indeed, the country’s political system.
Accelerating Soviet difficulties, the ethnonational identities of Ukrainians, Kazaks, Vodka has long undermined
Russia’s power. In 1373 the
Latvians, and the other nationalities reasserted themselves. Soon the Soviet Union Russians lost a battle to the
imploded amid a vacuum of public support. Tartars reportedly because
the czar’s forces were too
inebriated to fight. The de-
Government feated Russians were thrown
into a nearby river, which
A third power element associated with the national core is the quality of the govern- was then dubbed the Reka
ment. Administrative effectiveness is one aspect. It involves whether a state has a well- Pianaya, the Drunk River.
organized and effective administrative structure to utilize its power potential fully.
248 CHAPTER 8 National Power and Statecraft: The Traditional Approach

For example, U.S. power has been undoubtedly undermined by problems in the
country’s intelligence agencies. Intelligence failures led, among other things, to the
expenditure of vast amounts of U.S. power in a war with and occupation of Iraq,
launched primarily to destroy weapons of mass destruction that in fact did not exist.
Reflecting that, a presidential commission bemoaned what it called “one of the
most . . . damaging intelligence failures in recent American history.” As for the cause
of the catastrophe, the commission concluded:
This failure was in large part the result of analytical shortcomings; intelligence analysts
were too wedded to their assumptions about Saddam’s intentions. But it was also a
failure on the part of [the intelligence agencies]. . . . [They] collected precious little
intelligence for the analysts to analyze, and much of what they did collect was either
worthless or misleading.9

Leadership ability is a second aspect of government that adds or detracts from a

country’s power. As chapter 3 indicates, leadership is a mix of administrative, politi-
cal, and public relations skills. Like other intangible power assets, leadership capa-
bilities are hard to measure, yet they clearly make a difference. Table 3.1, p. 84,
provides an estimate of the foreign policy leadership of recent U.S. presidents.

National Infrastructure
National power also rests on a country’s infrastructure, which might be roughly
equated with the skeleton of a human body or to a building’s foundation and its fram-
ing or girders. To examine the infrastructure of the state as an element of national
power, the following sections will discuss technological sophistication, transportation
systems, and information and communications capabilities. Each of these factors is
related to a country’s power capacity.
Overall technological availability and sophistication is at the heart of this element
of power. Think about how monumentally wrong Charles H. Duell, commissioner of
the U.S. Office of Patents, was when he declared in 1899, “Everything that can be
invented has been invented.” To the contrary, most of the technology that undergirds
a great deal of contemporary national power has been invented since Duell’s short-
sighted assessment. Air conditioning modifies the impact of weather, computers
revolutionize business and education, robotics speed industry, synthetic fertilizers
expand agriculture, new drilling techniques allow for undersea oil exploration,
microwaves speed information, and lasers bring the military to the edge of the Star
Wars era. Thus, technology is an overarching factor and will be discussed as part of
the tangible elements of power.
One source of U.S. strength is the considerable money that its government, cor-
porations, and universities spend on research and development (R&D). Indeed, invest-
ment in basic research is an essential element in “the scientific balance of power.”10
During 2005 the United States was the global leader, spending $285 billion, far ahead
of the three next largest spenders on R&D: Japan ($114 billion), China ($85 billion),
and Germany ($57 billion). Another good measure of technological sophistication
and capability is computing capacity. Needless to say, business, education, science, and
other key elements of national power depend on computers, and, as Figure 8.5 shows,
there is a vast disparity in national capabilities.
Transportation systems are a second and more specific part of the national infra-
structure. The ability to move people, raw materials, finished products, and sometimes
the military throughout its territory is another part of a country’s power equation
and is heavily dependent on technology. For example, one of the major hurdles that
Russia must overcome to invigorate its economy is its relatively limited and decrepit
 Military Power 249

FIGURE 8.5 Computing Capacity

749
Computers per 1,000 people

587
561

132 130
108 105
41
7

U.S. Japan Germany Russia World Mexico Brazil China Nigeria

Computer capacity is an indication of the strength of a country’s technological infrastructure. As evident

here, there is a huge gap, called the “global digital divide,” among countries in computing power.
Data source: World Bank online.

transportation systems. As one standard, for every 1,000 square miles of its land ter-
ritory, the United States has 14 times as many miles of paved roads and four times as
many miles of railroad track than does Russia. Inadequate transportation systems are
also a problem for LDCs.
Information and communications systems are yet another part of the national
technological infrastructure, and capabilities in these areas are becoming increas-
ingly important to national power. Satellites and computers have accelerated the rev-
olution begun with radio and television. Photocopying machines, then fax machines,
and now the Internet have dramatically changed communications. Enhanced com-
munications technology increases the ability of a society to communicate within
itself and remain cohesive. It also increases efficiency and effectiveness in industry,
finance, and the military. Here again, the gaps among countries are wide. For example,
U.S. annual per capita expenditures on information and communications ($3,595)
are more than 54 times that of China ($66). On a per capita basis, there are 2.3 times
more cell phone subscribers and 8.6 times more people with access to the Internet in
the United States than in China.

MILITARY POWER

For good or ill, military power is an asset that sometimes determines whether a coun-
try will prevail or not in its pursuit of its foreign policy goals. Therefore, it is appro-
priate to consider the nature of military power that provides the sword for policy
makers to wield.

Measuring Military Power

Some aspects of military power, such as numbers of weapons and troops, are easy to
count. Other factors, including training, equipment quality, and military morale, are
much harder to quantify. A third set of factors, such as military and civilian leader-
ship, are almost impossible to measure precisely.
250 CHAPTER 8 National Power and Statecraft: The Traditional Approach

FIGURE 8.6 U.S. and China’s Military Spending

U.S. U.S.
$498 $498
billion billion

China
$155
China billion
$41
billion

Unadjusted Adjusted for purchasing power parity

Measuring defense spending by amount is tricky. The left pie chart shows that in unadjusted spending,
the United States annually spends over 12 times as much on its military than does China. When
spending is adjusted for the relative cost of living in the two countries (purchasing power parity: PPP),
however, the spending gap shrinks from about 12:1 to about 3:1. Neither measure is satisfactory by
itself. For instance, using PPP helps adjust for the relative cost of pay and other personnel costs. But
PPP is less relevant for fuel costs, since both U.S. and Chinese forces depend in part on imported
petroleum, which costs both countries the same.
Note: Chinese military spending official reports are understated. The figures here are the author’s estimates based on the
sources listed below.
Data sources: CIA, SIPRI, and the ISSI, all online.

Military Spending
Defense spending is one of the largest categories in most countries’ budgets, and
there can be little doubt that the level of spending has some impact on military ca-
pabilities. U.S. expenditures ($498 billion in 2006) far exceed those of any other
country, and there are relatively few scenarios in which the armed forces of any other
country could defeat U.S. forces in a conventional war.
Yet none of the ways defense spending is commonly reported is wholly satis-
www factory. Amount, either total spending or on a per capita basis, can be misleading
because of what the money can buy in different countries. An entry-level American
soldier’s monthly base pay is $1,300 a month; a similar Chinese soldier makes $40.
SIMULATION
What Would You Spend Figure 8.6 compares the military spending of China and the United States in unad-
for Security? justed currencies and in terms of the purchasing power parity (PPP), an adjustment
for the different cost of living in the two countries. Economic burden—defense spend-
ing as a percentage of a country’s GNP—can also be deceptive. Israel spends about
9% of its GNP on defense, much higher than the world average of 2.5%, but Israel’s
expenditures must also be analyzed in terms of the monumental threats it faces.

Weapons
Web Link Comparison of two countries’ or alliances’ military might are often focused on number
The Federation of American of weapons. Quantity is certainly an important consideration. Knowing that the United
Scientists maintains an excellent States had 16,000 tanks and Iraq had 1,900 tanks prior to their war in 2003 is one in-
site with details about American dication of the relative power of the two countries’ armored forces. Had the potential
military weaponry at www.fas.org/
combatants been the United States and Russia or China, Moscow’s 21,000 tanks or
man/index.html. Other countries’
systems can be explored by
Beijing’s 11,000 tanks would have made for a much different military situation.
keying “rest of world” in the Numbers are only part of the military weapons equation, however, with quality at
Search function. least equally important. Even if the U.S. and Iraqi tank forces had had equal numbers,
 Military Power 251

Iraq’s aging Soviet-export tanks would have been no match for U.S. main battle tanks,
which are capable of maneuvering at nearly highway speeds, using thermal sights
and computerized targeting, firing shells coated with depleted uranium that can de-
stroy almost any armored opponent, and clad in depleted uranium armor capable of
repelling the shells fired by Iraqi tanks.
For all the advantages of sophisticated weapons, there are drawbacks. An F-22,
one of the newest U.S. fighters, is a technological marvel that can defeat any other
fighter. Each costs $150 million, though, compared to a less excellent, but still good
Russian-built SU-30 fighter, which is available for export at $37 million each. Second,
high-tech weapons are often also more difficult to operate and repair. Third, the effec-
tiveness of military hardware is very situational. Therefore, a country’s military systems
need to be appropriate to the challenges they will face. American tanks were very
effective during the short conventional warfare phase of the Iraq war; U.S. tanks were
only marginally relevant to fighting the insurgency that followed.

Personnel
As with weapons, a number of quantitative and qualitative factors determine the
capabilities of a country’s military personnel. Number of troops, both total and com- www
pared to an opponent, is one factor. Generally, size matters. For example, China
(2.3 million troops), India (1.7 million), the United States (1.5 million) and Russia MAP
(1.0 million) all have enough troops to play a major regional and even global role. By Size of Armed Forces
contrast, Belize, with about 1,000 troops, has very little military muscle to use as a
diplomatic asset. Like spending, though, sheer numbers of troops must be measured
against the scope of their deployments and reasonable estimates of their potential use.
For example, the large U.S. force becomes less dominant when its global commit-
ments are considered. Indeed, U.S. forces have been stretched thin by their deployment
in Iraq, requiring an extensive, long-term call-up of reserve units.
Recruit quality is a second factor impacting personnel. To build a good military,
Did You Know That:
a country must be able to recruit intelligent, healthy, reliable enlisted troops and
The world’s smallest army is
officers. Standards for U.S. recruits have traditionally been high, but the strain of the
the Vatican’s 110-man Swiss
Iraq War created some cause for concern. The U.S. Army has experienced problems in Guard. The original force was
recruiting enough soldiers, falling 17% below the target of 80,000 recruits in 2005. To a formed from Swiss merce-
degree shortfalls have been overcome by lowering the educational and moral standards naries who had defended
for recruits. Between 2003 and 2006, for example, the number of waivers given for a Pope Clement VII during the
sacking of Rome in 1527 by,
criminal background jumped 65%, and reached 11% of all Army recruits in 2006.
oddly, Charles V, the Holy
Training is a third personnel factor. Good training significantly improves the Roman Emperor.
quality of a country’s military force. This is especially true given the complicated
nature of many of today’s high-tech weapons. For instance, considerable flight time
is critical for fighter pilots because of the complex weapons systems they use. Yet
providing practice is costly, and significant differences in training exist. The coun-
tries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) generally meet the alliance’s
standard of providing fighter pilots with 180 to 200 hours of inflight training annu-
ally. Because of Russia’s struggling economy, its pilots reportedly receive only about
20 hours a year in the air to hone their skills.
Morale is a fourth variable in measuring military personnel. Russian soldiers fought
with amazing valor amid horrific conditions during World War II. Yet in more recent
times, the morale of Russia’s soldiers has been sapped by poor pay, housing, equipment,
and training and by the widespread image of corruption and incompetence among
officers (Hespring, 2006). In the aftermath of the collapse of Iraq’s army in 2003, some
Russian military experts were worried that a similar fate might await Russia’s army in
a war. “Go on the street and ask who is ready to defend the motherland, and you will
252 CHAPTER 8 National Power and Statecraft: The Traditional Approach

immediately see unpleasant parallels,” fretted one Russian military expert. “The out-
come of a war depends on the army’s morale.”11
Leadership is a fifth personnel variable. U.S. and British forces would have surely
defeated the Iraqi military in 2003, but Saddam Hussein’s practice of placing those
most loyal to him, rather than the best officers, in command of his country’s armed
forces accelerated the rapid collapse of Iraq’s army. Saddam did this, according to one
Iraqi colonel, because “he was afraid the regular army might rise up against him.”
However, when war came, another Iraqi officer explained, the result was, “there was
no coordination between [the generals]—they hate[d] each other.”12

Military Power: Debating How Much

Given the importance of military power as an instrument of foreign policy, a common
assumption is that more is better. This is not necessarily so because there are dangers
associated with overemphasizing military power. These perils include insecurity,
temptation, and expense.
Military power creates insecurity. One result of amassing power is the “spiral of
insecurity.” Efforts by one country to increase its power to achieve security are fre-
quently perceived by other states as a threat. They then seek to balance power, which
the first country sees as threatening, causing it to acquire even more power, and so
on ad infinitum, in an escalating spiral. As chapter 11’s discussion of disarmament
details, arms races are not automatic. Still, the interaction of one country’s power and
other countries’ insecurity is an important factor in world politics.
Military power creates temptation. A second peril of amassing excess military
power is the temptation to use it in a situation that is peripheral to the national
interest (Fordham, 2004). The United States went to war in Vietnam despite the
fact that President Lyndon Johnson derided it as a “raggedy-ass fourth-rate country.”
One reason Americans intervened in Vietnam was because of a so-called arrogance of
power. Had U.S. military power been more modest, the United States might have
emphasized diplomacy or maybe even acquiesced to the reunification of North and
South Vietnam. One can never be sure, but it is certain that it is hard to shoot some-
one if you do not own a gun.
Military power is expensive. A third problem with amassing military power is that
it is very expensive. In addition to short-term budget pressure, there is a longer-range
concern related to high military spending. Some analysts argue that it saps national
economic strength. One scholar who studied the decline of great powers between
1500 and the 1980s formulated an imperial overstretch thesis to explain their de-
generation (Kennedy, 1988). He argued the former superpowers spent so much on
military power that, ironically, they weakened their strength by siphoning off resources
that should have been devoted to maintaining and improving the country’s infrastruc-
ture. Kennedy’s study did not include the Soviet Union, but it is arguable that the col-
This drawing of Uncle Sam lapse of the USSR followed the pattern of overspending on the military while starving
reaching beyond his grasp the country’s economic core. Declinists warn that the United States is similarly guilty
illustrates the view that U.S. of imperial overstretch and could go the way of other great powers that rose, domi-
power is declining because of nated, then declined. “America is marching in the well-trod footsteps of virtually all of
“imperial overstretch,” whereby the imperial powers of the modern age,” one such analyst writes (Snyder, 2002:2).
a country spends so much on
The imperial overstretch thesis has many critics (Levey & Brown, 2005). Some
military power that it neglects
other important aspects of
argue that far more danger is posed by a “lax Americana” than by any effort to create
power such as education, a “pax Americana.” The reasoning, as detailed in chapter 3, is that a U.S. failure to
health, and renewing its exercise leadership as the hegemon puts the international system in danger of falling
infrastructure. into disorder.13 Similarly, critics of the declinist thesis warn that cuts in U.S. defense
 Economic Power 253

FIGURE 8.7 U.S. Defense and Human Resources Spending

16%
Human resources spending 12.8%
12%

8% 5% Percent of GDP

4%
5.2% Defense spending 5%
0%
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2007

Some argue that U.S. defense spending is too high and saps the national economy by diverting funds
that could be better spent to strengthen the national infrastructure. Those who dispute this point out
that defense spending has generally declined as a share of the U.S. GDP since the early cold war years,
and that despite the upturn under President Bush in recent years, it was at the same level in 2007 as
in 1950. These analysts contend that the real problem with the U.S. budget is increased outlays on
human resources, such as health and income security, which grew from 5.2% of the GDP in 1950
to 12.8% in 2007.
Notes: Human resource spending includes education, health, Medicare, income security, Social Security, and veterans’
benefits. In 2007, education and veterans’ benefits combined were less than 1% of human resource spending. The author
added 0.08% of GDP to defense spending for 2007 to reflect the Bush administration’s supplemental budget requests for Iraq
and Afghanistan not included in the regular budget.
Data sources: U.S. Budget, FY2008 and author’s calculations.

spending are shortsighted. One study that reviewed the sharp cuts in U.S. military
spending at various points since World War II concluded, “In each case the savings
proved only temporary, as declining defense budgets eroded military readiness and
necessitated a rush to rearm in the face of new dangers abroad” (Thies, 1998:176).
Finally, those who disagree with the declinists point out that U.S. defense spend-
ing measured in terms of U.S. wealth is not at a dangerous level and in fact has
declined during the decades the United States has been a superpower. Indeed, some
advance a social overstretch thesis, arguing that it is out of control social spending,
not military spending, that saps national economies. According to one such view,
“Whether in the form of bread and circuses in the ancient world or medical care for
the lower classes and social security for the aged in the modern world,” it is social
welfare spending that has undermined national economies (Gilpin, 1981:164).
Figure 8.7 compares U.S. defense and social welfare spending.

ECONOMIC POWER

Countries not only adopt foreign policies to increase their economic strength, they
also use their economic power to pursue a wide range of both economic and noneco-
nomic foreign policy goals. The determinants of national power include financial
position, natural resources, industrial output, and agricultural output.

Financial Position
The center of any country’s economic power is its basic financial position. Numerous
factors make up a country’s financial position, and we can analyze these and how
they add or detract from economic power by examining the United States.
254 CHAPTER 8 National Power and Statecraft: The Traditional Approach

FIGURE 8.8 U.S. Foreign Debt Overall size of the economy is one factor, and big-
ger is better. At almost $13 trillion, the U.S. GNP is
44.2%
Percentage of federal public
immense: the world’s largest, twice the size of the
debt held by foreigners next largest country ( Japan), and equal to 29% of the
world’s combined GDP. Per capita size of the economy
31.0%
is also important. China has the world’s fourth largest
GNP overall but ranks 110th among countries on a
per capita GNP basis. Exports of goods and services,
18.1% 22.2%
16.7% which bring in earnings, also contribute to financial
18.3% strength. Here again the U.S. position is good, with
17.1%
its over $1.2 trillion in annual exports slightly more
4.7% than the next largest country (Germany) and equal to
5.0% almost 11% of all exports. International investments,
which also bring in revenue, are a third positive area,
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2006 with Americans having more than $10 trillion in for-
eign investments, far more than any other country.
To finance its budget deficits, the U.S. government borrows money,
partly by selling bonds. The debt owed to those holding U.S. bonds Yet despite its size, the U.S. economy, like the
grew from $261 billion in 1965 to $4.8 trillion in 2006. Increasingly, as biblical Goliath, has worrisome vulnerabilities. Most
this figure shows, that debt is held abroad, creating vulnerabilities for of the U.S. weaknesses are associated with lack of
the U.S. economy. One is that the U.S. government paid $83 billion in financial discipline. Budget deficits are one weakness.
interest to its foreign debt holders in 2006. The U.S. government had a budget deficit for 50 of
Data source: U.S. Federal Budget, FY2007. the 58 years during the period FY1950–FY2008. One
result of chronic deficit spending is that the U.S.
government has had to increasingly borrow money from foreigners to finance the
debt, as Figure 8.8 shows. This leaves the country vulnerable to external financial
pressure. Net trade is a second weakness and indication of lack of financial discipline.
Americans import far more than they export, and have rung up a net trade (exports
minus imports) deficit during all but two years since 1971. The $764 billion trade
deficit for 2006 was the largest ever, and far bigger than any other country’s. Balance
of payments is a third U.S. problem area. The enormous net trade deficit and other
flows of money out of the country have made for a huge U.S. deficit in its balance of
payments for current accounts, a measure that represents the entire flow of money
Web Link into and out of a country’s economy except funds for investments. Since its last sur-
An excellent source for details plus in 1989, the United States has amassed ever-larger balance-of-payments deficits,
of the current U.S. balance of both in dollars and as a percentage of the country’s GNP. The $791 billion deficit
payments and other data on the
in 2005 equaled a very worrisome 5.7% of the U.S. GNP. Thus far, the immense
U.S. position in the international
economy is the Web site of the
U.S. economy has been able to absorb these negative trends in U.S. budget, trade, and
U.S. Bureau of Economic balance-of-payments deficits, but even the financially mightiest of countries must
Analysis at www.bea.gov/. eventually balance its accounts or face severe financial problems.

Natural Resources
The possession, or lack, of energy, mineral, and other natural resources has become an
increasingly important power factor as industrialization and technology have ad-
vanced. Natural resources affect power in three related ways: (1) The greater a coun-
try’s self-sufficiency in vital natural resources, the greater its power. (2) Conversely,
Did You Know That:
the greater a country’s dependency on foreign sources for vital natural resources, the
Americans, who make up less its power. (3) The greater a country’s surplus (over domestic use) of vital resources
about 5% of the world
population, consume about
needed by other countries, the greater its power.
25% of its petroleum. The key here is not just how much of a given resource a country has and how much
it extracts for use each year; it is production compared to consumption. Oil is the most
obvious example, and is illustrated in Figure 8.9. For countries with large reserves,
 Economic Power 255

FIGURE 8.9 Petroleum Resources and Use

24.6%
Share of world petroleum Reserves
22.0%
Production
19.1%
Consumption

13.5%
11.5% 12.1%

8.5% 8.0%
6.2% 6.2% 6.4%
5.1%
4.6%
3.4%
2.3% 2.0% 2.4%
1.3% 1.5%
0% 0%

Saudi Arabia Iran Russia China United States European Union Japan

Every country’s power is affected by how much of various economically vital natural resources it has
(reserves), how much of each it produces, and how much of each it consumes. Oil is a vital resource,
and of the countries here, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia are in relatively powerful positions because
each has large reserves and uses much less than it produces. China, the United States, the European
Union, and Japan are relatively vulnerable because each has small or no reserves of oil and consumes
far more than it produces.
Note: Data on reserves does not include deposits in tar sands and oil shale.
Data sources: BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2006, online, and author’s calculations for the EU.

high production, and low consumption, the so-called black gold has been a major
source of revenue. For example, Saudi Arabia’s oil exports totaled about $206 billion
during 2006. Oil has also increased the global political power and significance of
Saudi Arabia and other such oil-surplus countries. By contrast, the United States has
only limited reserves and despite pumping them at a high rate still uses far more
petroleum than it produces. The resulting need for
vast quantities of imported petroleum makes the FIGURE 8.10 Vehicle Production
country vulnerable to disruptions in the flow of oil that
it needs to maintain prosperity and fuel its military. Share of
world vehicle
Second, when international instability or other factors production
drive up energy prices, as has happened in recent Rest of
world European
years, the cost to Americans increases, the economy 21% Union
can lag, and the trade deficit goes up. During 2006 24%

alone, the United States imported about $325 billion South

Korea 5%
in oil, an amount roughly half that year’s trade deficit.
China
9% NAFTA
Industrial Output Japan
25%

16%
Even if a country is bountifully supplied with natural
resources, its power is limited unless it can convert
those assets into industrial goods. On a global basis,
industrial production is highly concentrated. For
Global industry is highly concentrated. The countries of the North
instance, just five countries (China, Japan, Russia, the American Free Trade Association (NAFTA: Canada, Mexico, and the
United States, and South Korea) produce a majority United States) and the European Union each produce about a fourth
of the world’s steel. Vehicle production is another of the world’s cars, trucks, and buses each year, and along with Japan,
indication of industrial concentration, as indicated China, and South Korea make four out of every five vehicles. The United
in Figure 8.10. It shows that in 2004 the three States (18%) is the largest producer in NAFTA; Germany (9%) is the
biggest vehicle manufacturers (Germany, Japan, and largest in the EU. About 66.5 million vehicles were produced in 2006.
the United States) made 44% of the global total. Data source: International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers.
256 CHAPTER 8 National Power and Statecraft: The Traditional Approach

Those 3 plus the other 7 countries that make up the top 10 vehicle producers ac-
counted for 78% of world production. About 85% of the world’s countries (including
all those in Africa) produce no, or only a negligible number of, vehicles.

Agricultural Output
A country’s agricultural capacity adds or detracts from its economic power. Self-
sufficiency varies widely in the world. The United States not only meets its own needs,
it also earns money from agricultural exports. With agricultural exports exceeding
imports by about a 10-to-1 ratio in 2006, the U.S. net trade surplus came to approxi-
mately $50 billion. Other countries are less fortunate. Some have to use their economic
resources to import food. Sub-Saharan Africa is in particularly desperate shape. Senegal,
for one, needs to import machinery, fuel, and other products necessary to diversify and in-
dustrialize its economy, yet it must spend 28% of its limited import funds to buy food.
Another significant agricultural factor is the percentage of its economic re-
sources that a country must expend to feed its people. Countries are relatively disad-
vantaged if they have larger percentages of their workforce engaged in agriculture,
and thus not available for the manufacturing and service sectors. For example, over
half of China’s workforce is in agriculture compared to only 2% of all U.S. workers.
A country is also challenged if it has to spend a significant part of its economic effort
(measured as a percentage of GDP) to feed its people. Here again, China is relatively
disadvantaged by having to devote 15% of its GDP to farming, compared to just 2%
for the United States. A major problem for China and similar countries is that they
are inefficient because they have so little farm machinery. As one measure, Americans
have almost three times the number of tractors per square mile of farmland than do
the Chinese.
Now that we have explored national capabilities, we can turn to foreign policy
implementation, to how countries seek to utilize their resources, skills, and other
capabilities to promote their national interests. A first step is to reiterate that power is
a very sophisticated concept, including but also extending well beyond military might
and wealth. As we shall see presently, these two factors often have little or nothing to
do with whether a country succeeds or fails in advancing its foreign policy goals.
The second step in this introduction to implementing foreign policy is to take up
statecraft by identifying the instruments of foreign policy, the tools that countries
use to implement their policy. There are four instruments: military, economic, diplo-
matic, and informational.

THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT

War is sometimes a spasm of violence begun by an irrational leader or set off by

an emotional reaction. Normally, however, a country’s military assets are part of its
overall power that can be used directly or indirectly to help the country achieve
its diplomatic goals. As German strategist Carl von Clausewitz argued in On War
(1833): “War is not merely a political act, but also a political instrument, a continu-
ation of political relations, a carrying out of the same by other means.” Used wisely,
force remains a tool of diplomacy. Even UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan had
to concede, “You can do a lot with diplomacy, but of course you can do a lot more
with diplomacy backed up by firmness and force.”14 Chapter 10 includes an
extended examination of the use of violence in the international system, but it is
 The Military Instrument 257

appropriate here to briefly review violence as a national policy instrument. This

mostly involves the military, but it can also involve assassinations and other covert
forms of violence.

Applying Force from Intimidation to Attack

Military power may be applied in several escalating ways. These range from serving
as a diplomatic backdrop, through threats, to using military forces to defeat an op-
ponent (Slantchev, 2005; Cimballa, 2002; Nathan, 2002). It also should be noted that
the options provided by the five levels of violence form a multiple menu. That is, they
are often exercised concurrently.
The very existence of significant military power establishes a diplomatic backdrop
Did You Know That:
that influences other countries. Military strength not only deters opponents, it also
King Frederick the Great of
influences friends and neutrals. One reason the United States has been, and remains,
Prussia (1712–1786), once
a leader of the West is because massive U.S. conventional and nuclear military power commented, “Diplomacy
creates a psychological assumption in others that Washington will play a strong role. without arms is like music
This reality led one U.S. ambassador to China to put a photograph of a U.S. aircraft without instruments.”
carrier on his office wall with the caption, “90,000 tons of diplomacy.”15
Overt threats are the next step up the escalation ladder. That is what President
Bush did in his address on March 17, 2003, when he declared, “Saddam Hussein and
his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military
conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing.”
Indirect and covert intervention is a further escalation and includes the use of any
of a number of techniques to apply military power while avoiding a commitment of
your armed forces to direct combat. One example is supplying arms or providing
training and advisers to another government or to a rebel force. Another is conducting
covert operations using special military forces, intelligence agents, or mercenaries in
another country to conduct clandestine operations.
Limited demonstrations are well up the escalatory ladder. These involve overtly
wielding restrained conventional force to intimidate or harass rather than defeat
an opponent. On two occasions (1993 and 1996), for example, the United States
attacked Iraqi military installations with cruise missiles in retaliation for Baghdad’s
attempt to assassinate former President Bush, then to pressure Iraq to end military
operations against the Kurds in the northern part of Iraq.
Direct action is the most violent application of a country’s military assets. It
involves using full-scale force to attempt to defeat an opponent. Within this context,
the level of violence can range from highly constrained conventional conflict, as
occurred in Iraq in 2003, to unrestricted nuclear war.

The Effectiveness of Force

Deciding to use force is the most fateful decision that a country can make. People will
almost certainly die, the cost of war and reconstruction is high, and victory is never
assured. German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg was wise when he
warned as Europe teetered on the edge of World War I in 1914, “If the iron dice roll,
may God help us.” Given these realities, we should explore the effectiveness of force
by looking at measurements of and conditions for success.

Measurement
Cost/benefit analysis is one way to measure the effectiveness of force. War is very ex-
pensive. There is no accurate count of the deaths in the Iraq War, but in the initial
258 CHAPTER 8 National Power and Statecraft: The Traditional Approach

military invasion and the following occupation through early 2007, 3,400 U.S. and
coalition troops died and 23,400 were wounded. About 90% of these have been
Americans. Between 20,000 and 45,000 Iraqi soldiers and at least 2,500 civilians
died during the invasion, and the estimated number of Iraqis to have died during the
occupation either directly or indirectly from the violence and destruction range from
50,000 to 600,000. As far as financial costs, U.S. spending on the war and subsequent
occupation was approaching the $400 billion mark in early 2007. The cost to Great
Britain and other intervening countries and the destruction in Iraq easily push the
total cost of the war past the $1 trillion mark. Most Americans would say that the
war has not been worth the cost, but what goal would be? Answering that is difficult
because while the decision for war, to trade lives and treasure for a political goal, is
often made, it is impossible to arrive at any objective standards that can equate the
goal sought and the price to be paid even if you could accurately calculate it before
taking action.
Web Link Goal attainment is the second way to judge the effectiveness of force. Generally,
the decision for war is not irrational because leaders usually calculate, accurately or
An up-to-date calculation of the
ongoing cost of the Iraq war and not, their probability of successfully achieving their goals. This calculation is called
occupation for the United States is the “expected utility” of war. By the utilitarian standard, war does sometimes work.
available at http://costofwar.com/. From 1495 to 1991, great powers won 60% of the wars they started (Wang & Ray,
1994). Moreover, the success rate went up from 59% through 1799 to 75% between
1800 and 1991. During the first three centuries (1495–1799), the initiators won
59% of the wars they fought. But during the last two centuries (1800–1991), the
success rate increased, with the initiators winning 75% of the wars. Leaders often
miscalculate, as Saddam Hussein did in 1990 and again in 2003, and start or risk
a war they ultimately lose. Also, it is sometimes hard to evaluate whether goals
were attained. If the U.S. goal in 2003 was to defeat Iraq and topple Saddam
Hussein, it certainly succeeded. However, to the extent the goal was to destroy Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the invasion was a failure since they did not
exist. Finally, to the degree that the goal was to bring democracy to Iraq, the verdict
is still out about whether Iraq’s future will be one of democracy or an internal
bloodbath as various religious factions fight for power, but the prospects are grim
at best.

Conditions for Success

The next question, then, is: When does force succeed and when does it fail to
accomplish its goals? There is no precise answer, but it is possible to synthesize
the findings of a variety of studies and the views of military practitioners to arrive
at some rudimentary rules for the successful use of military force, especially in cases
of intervention when a country has not been directly attacked.16 Note that these cri-
teria do not guarantee success. They only improve the chances. With that caveat
in mind, a country improves its chances of success during an intervention when
military force is:
1. Used in areas where it has a clearly defined, preferably long-standing, and
previously demonstrated commitment.
2. Supported firmly and publicly by most of the country’s leaders.
3. Supported strongly by public opinion.
4. Utilized to defeat other military forces, not to control political events.
5. Applied early and decisively, not after extended threatening and slow
escalation.
6. Meant to achieve clear goals and does not change or try to exceed them.
 The Economic Instrument 259

Many analysts believe that

a country’s ability to use
military force successfully is
determined in part by strong
support of the action by public
opinion. The U.S. invasion
and occupation of Iraq were
not very popular among
Americans to begin with, and
public opinion and support
dropped off steadily once U.S.
casualties began to mount.
This further diminishes any
chances of success for the
occupation.

THE ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT

Although economic power cannot be as easily wielded as military power, countries

with considerable economic power have a potent policy instrument in their ability to
use trade, aid, and other economic means to achieve national foreign policy ends.
Chapters 11 and 12 focus on economics and include in-depth discussions of trade,
aid and other aspects of the international political economy. That material supple-
ments the somewhat narrower discussion of incentives and sanctions as economic
instruments for foreign policy.

Economic Incentives
States regularly offer economic incentives to induce other states to act in a desired
way. Incentives include providing foreign aid, giving direct loans or credits, guaran-
teeing loans by commercial sources, reducing tariffs and other trade barriers, selling
or licensing the sale of sensitive technology, and a variety of other techniques. Some-
times incentives are meant to achieve an economic goal, but more often specific of-
fers (as distinct from, say, general foreign aid) are aimed at achieving a political goal.
For example, the efforts by the EU to persuade Iran to give up its alleged nuclear
weapons development program and the similar effort by the United States and other
countries to convince North Korea to give up its program both involve the offer of
energy aid and significant other economic incentives. One study finds incentives
more effective with authoritarian than democratic countries (Lai & Morey, 2006).
Some foreign aid is given multilaterally through the World Bank and other
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), but the United States and most other aid
donors give funds directly to other countries. About 80% of all U.S. foreign aid is
bilateral. Much of it has a political focus. Indeed, about 40% of U.S. aid is military aid.
260 CHAPTER 8 National Power and Statecraft: The Traditional Approach

Following the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration focused aid heavily in support
of the war on terror. In 2006, Iraq was the top U.S. aid recipient, with Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and the moderate Arab regimes in Egypt and Jordan also among the top
ten recipients. U.S. concerns about the Islamic extremists in Somalia, Sudan, and
elsewhere in the northeastern African “horn” region also put Ethiopia among the top
ten recipients. That paid off when Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia in late 2006
and ousted the Islamic fundamentalist regime that dominated Mogadishu and most
of the rest of the country. A few other U.S. strategic interests were also evident in
the distribution of aid. Concern about illegal drugs led Colombia to be a top-10 aid
recipient.
It is important to note that the political use of aid is not confined to the United
States. It is somewhat ironic that China, which once loudly criticized aid from the
West to less developed countries (LDCs) as imperialist, became itself subject to that
charge once it began to give limited aid. There has been considerably criticism of
Beijing, for example, because of its aid to and general support of Sudan, despite the
Sudanese government’s horrific ethnic cleansing campaign in Darfur. China claims
it opposes outside interventions in other countries’ domestic affairs, but critics tie
China’s support to its considerable interests in Sudan’s oil fields. Elsewhere in Africa,
China’s aid has been tied to easier access for Chinese goods and other benefits, lead-
ing South Africa’s President Thabo Mbeki to rebuke China for seeking for itself
“a replication of that colonial relationship” that once existed “between Europe and
its African possessions a century ago.”17

Economic Sanctions
Web Link Countries can also use their economic power in a negative way by applying sanc-
Current UN sanctions are tions. The use of economic sanctions dates back to at least 432 B.C. when the city-
available at www.un.org/sc/ state of Athens embargoed all trade with another city-state, Megara, an ally of Sparta,
committees/; current U.S. which was a bitter rival of Athens. Despite being ancient, though, sanctions were
sanctions are listed at www.treas uncommon until fairly recently (Elliot & Oegg, 2002). Increased use has occurred,
.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/
in part, because countries are more willing to ignore sovereignty and impose penal-
programs/index.shtml.
ties on oppressive governments, because economic interdependence makes target
countries more vulnerable to sanctions, and because they are an alternative to war.
For example, the United States imposed sanctions on Syria in 2004 because of its
alleged support for terrorism, its occupation of Lebanon, and its chemical weapons
program. Overall, in 2006 the U.S. government had economic sanctions ranging
from full economic embargoes (no trade) to more limited restrictions in place against
Belarus, Burma (Myanmar), Cuba, Iran, Ivory Coast, North Korea, Serbia, Sudan,
and Zimbabwe. It should be noted that sanctions can be imposed by international
organizations as well as by individual countries. During its history, the UN has used
sanctions against numerous countries, with restriction in place against 10 countries
in early 2007.

The Effectiveness of Sanctions

Whether imposed unilaterally or multilaterally through the UN or some other IGO,
economic sanctions have two purposes. One is to register symbolic disapproval. This
may not have a practical impact, but there is something to be said about refusing
to have normal economic relations with a country that has committed aggression,
is engaged in ethnic cleansing, or is otherwise morally deficient. The second use of
economic sanctions is to attempt to change a target country’s behavior. In this more
applied use, the effectiveness of sanctions is mixed (Druary & Li, 2006; Marinov,
 The Economic Instrument 261

2005). Sometimes they can be effective. For example, the sanctions first imposed
on Libya in the early 1990s almost certainly played a role in its 2003 agreement to
end its program of building weapons of mass destruction and to allow inspections by
the International Atomic Energy Agency and other international agencies. Usually,
though, sanctions fail to accomplish their goal, with success-rate estimates rang-
ing from 5% to 33% (Elliott & Oegg, 2002). Thus while scholars disagree on the
exact success rate, “something of a conventional wisdom has emerged,” one writes,
“suggesting that, while sanctions may serve domestic political or symbolic purposes,
they are not particularly effective at inducing target states to change their behavior”
(Morgan, 2005:1).
Studies also indicate that sanctions are most likely to be effective in certain cir-
cumstances (Lacy & Niou, 2004). These include instances when (1) there is strong
multilateral cooperation; (2) the target is politically unstable and/or economically
weak; (3) those imposing the sanctions are strong economically; the targeted coun-
try has substantial trade with the targeting countries; (4) sanctions are put into effect
quickly and decisively to maximize psychological impact; and (5) the targeting coun-
tries are not themselves harmed significantly by the cost of maintaining the sanc-
tions. Within this list, it is most important to note the first criterion: multilateral
cooperation. Unilateral sanctions, those imposed by one country against another,
have a very slim chance of success. The United States has had various sanctions in
place against Cuba since 1960 in an effort to topple the leftist regime of Fidel Castro.
Yet as of 2007, Castro was still in power and, indeed, was the world’s longest serving
political leader. Reports of serious ill health make it unlikely that Castro will remain
as president another 48 years, but it is far more likely that time and nature will
remove him from power than will the United States.

The Drawbacks of Sanctions

Countries that apply sanctions must be wary of their potential negative impact on un-
intended victims. One such difficulty is that sanctions may harm economic interests www
other than those of the intended target. The UN sanctions imposed on Iraqi oil exports
between 1991 and 2003 cost Jordan and Turkey many millions of dollars annually
JOIN THE DEBATE
by way of lost revenues. Both countries would have earned revenues for the use of Are Sanctions against Cuba
pipelines that run from Iraq through them and on to ports from which the oil is shipped. Still in the Best Interests
Economic interests in the targeting country can also be harmed. For instance, U.S. of the United States?
sanctions barring trade with other countries reduced American exports by about
$15 billion a year. That is a tiny part of the U.S. economy, but, as one study notes, “the
costs of sanctions are never spread evenly” across the economy. For example, the
analysis continues, “the long-standing U.S. embargo on Cuba arguably has a much
larger impact on Florida than on other states” (Hufbauer & Oegg, 2003:8).
A third criticism of sanctions is that they are often the tool used by EDCs to
continue their dominance of LDCs. Of the 71 incidents of sanctions applied during
the 1970s and 1980s, 49 of the cases (69%) involved EDCs placing sanctions on
LDCs (Rothgeb, 1993). A fourth charge against sanctions is that they may constitute
a rogue action in the view of many countries that do not support them. For the
15th consecutive year and by a vote of 183 to 4, the UN General Assembly in 2006
condemned the unilateral U.S. sanctions against Cuba. A fifth criticism is that
sanctions often harm the innocent. Taking this view, President Fidel Castro of Cuba
has called them “noiseless atomic bombs” that “cause the death of men, women,
and children.”18 Iraq provides a good example of Castro’s point. There, the UN sanc-
tions that remained in place with strong U.S. support between 1991 and 2003 had a
devastating impact on the Iraqi population, especially its children. There is a debate
262 CHAPTER 8 National Power and Statecraft: The Traditional Approach

FIGURE 8.11 Child Mortality Rates

133
Deaths before age 5
130
for each 1,000 children
125

Iraq
Iran
Jordan
85 Kuwait
83 Saudi Arabia
Syria
74 Turkey
65

38
32
34 27
27
16

Sanctions on Iraq begin 12

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004

Throughout the Persian Gulf region, the child mortality rate for Iraq and all its neighbors declined
steadily from 1980 to 1990. Then UN sanctions were placed on Iraq. From that point, the child
mortality rate for Iraq shot upward alarmingly, while the rate for all its neighbors continued to decline.
In 2004, the number of children per 1,000 dying in Iraq before they reached age 5 was 125 (or
12.5%). This was more than three times the rate of the next highest country in the region (Iran, 38),
and 51% higher than Iraq’s own rate in 1980 (83). Such data casts doubt in the minds of some about
the morality of economic sanctions.
Data sources: World Bank online, UNICEF online.

over whether the sanctions themselves should be blamed or whether the fault lies
with Saddam Hussein for diverting funds that should have been spent on food and
medicine for the civilian population. Whatever the resolution of that argument, the
net result, according to various studies by the UN, Harvard University’s School of
Public Health, and others, was that during the sanctions period over 1 million Iraqi
children than would normally be expected were malnourished and upward of
500,000 died. This deleterious effect is evident in Figure 8.11, which compares the
child mortality rate in Iraq to that of its neighbors.

THE DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENT

National diplomacy is a complex game of maneuvering in which a country tries to

get other countries or international organizations to do what it wants them to do.
While diplomacy is often portrayed by an image of somber negotiations over highly
polished wooden tables in ornate rooms, it is much more than that. Modern diplo-
macy is a far-ranging communications process including many channels in addition
to ambassadors and other such diplomats (Starkey, Boyer, & Wilkenfeld, 2005; Steiner,
2004). Additionally diplomacy is not only about words. Although it is presented here
 The Diplomatic Instrument 263

as an individual instrument of foreign policy, the reality is that diplomacy is con-

Did You Know That:
ducted along the scale of methods ranging from the overt use of economic and mili-
The oldest surviving diplo-
tary muscle, through the argumentation of skilled diplomats who have little power
matic document is a
other than their own abilities to support their country’s goals. Moreover, diplomacy message on a tablet sent
involves building up a reserve of good will and respect, soft power, that can be drawn about 2500 B.C. by Ibubu,
upon in future negotiations or even confrontation to try to maintain allies, help assuage chief minister to the king of
opponents, and otherwise achieve a positive result. Ebla (in modern Lebanon),
to King Zizi of Hamazi (in
modern Iran). Ibubu pledges
The Context of Diplomacy goodwill, relates that he is
sending Zizi a quantity of
Before taking up the conduct of diplomacy, it is important to understand the global rare wood, and urges him to
context in which it operates. Diplomacy is an ancient art, dating back at least to the return the favor by sending
mercenaries to fight for Ebla.
time of the great Babylonian emperor, Hammurabi (1792–1750 B.C.). But while
treaties, ambassadors, and some other parts of modern diplomatic practice also have
long histories, diplomacy has changed dramatically because of the evolving context
of world politics. The early 20th century serves as a benchmark in the transition to
modern-era diplomacy. In this evolving new context, the “old diplomacy” did not
vanish, but it changed substantially. The eclipse of colonialism, advances in travel
and communications, the spread of democracy, and other factors have all played a
role in changing the context of diplomacy.

Multilateral Diplomacy
Although there were a few exceptions, the normal form of negotiation prior to 1900 Web Link
was bilateral diplomacy, direct negotiations between two countries. The use of Interactive historical maps
multilateral diplomacy, conferences involving a number of nations, has expanded representing world power in
greatly since then. More than any event, the founding of the League of Nations in 1920 the early 20th century can be
marked this change, and there are now about 250 permanent world and regional inter- found at http://users.erols.com/
mwhite28/20centry.htm.
governmental organizations (IGOs). Conferences to address specific issues and treaties
are also more apt to be multilateral. Before 1900, the United States attended an average
of one multilateral conference per year. Now, the United States is a member of scores of
international organizations and American diplomats participate daily in multilateral
negotiations. For example, the effort to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear
weapons program has been conducted through the Six Party talks hosted by China and
also include Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States.
One reason that multilateral diplomacy has increased is that modern technology
allows faster and more frequent contacts among countries. Second, many global con- www
cerns, such as the environment, cannot be solved by any one country or through
traditional bilateral diplomacy alone. Instead, global cooperation and solutions are SIMULATION
required. Third, diplomacy through multilateral organizations is attractive to smaller An Adventure in Diplomacy
countries as a method of influencing world politics beyond their individual power.
Fourth, there is the growing expectation of multilateralism, the notion that
important international actions, especially those using military force, will be taken
within the framework of a multilateral organization such as the United Nations. The
contrasting approach is unilateralism. This occurs when a single country, perhaps
leading a small coalition of other countries, takes action without the approval of an
IGO. Recent wars against Iraq illustrate the two approaches. Prior to the Persian Gulf
War (1991) the first President Bush secured the authority of the UN to oust Iraq
from Kuwait, and the U.S.-led invasion included military support from 33 countries.
In 2003, President Bush sent troops into Iraq without the UN’s imprimatur and with
substantial military support only from Great Britain and token support from 3 other
countries.
264 CHAPTER 8 National Power and Statecraft: The Traditional Approach

Many political leaders within the United States and internationally have strongly
criticized what they see as the arrogant and heavy-handed unilateralism of the sec-
ond President Bush. Not atypically, one condemnation of Bush’s foreign policy blasts
unilateralism as a “flagrant disregard for . . . cooperation,” and also “foolhardy [be-
cause] it makes of one [country] a clear aggressor, a likely target of retaliation, and
liable to bear the full brunt of paying for the operation, both in personnel and
money” (Seigfried, 2006:20). Others have taken the opposite view, though, arguing
against what is “short-term popular, but long-term unwise. . . . trust[ing] U.S. secu-
rity to the goodwill of international organizations” (Rubin, 2006:3). From a different
perspective, a recent review of the general scholarly commentary against unilateral-
ism argues that it has been mostly based on views of the policies, such as the Iraq
War, themselves and not on the actual process of unilateralism. That review con-
cludes, “Unless and until” better research is done, “scholarly grounds for a general
stance against U.S. unilateralism on the basis of its purported international costs do
not exist” (Brooks & Wohlforth. 2005:524).

Leader-to-Leader Diplomacy
It was once rare for monarchs and other leaders to meet or otherwise communicate
Did You Know That:
directly with one another. Now modern transportation and communications have
Bill Clinton is the most
traveled U.S. president,
made direct exchanges common. President Bush departed on his first foreign visit
having made 54 trips to only 27 days after his inauguration in 2001, and during his first six years made
133 countries and being 36 trips and visited 58 countries. Additionally during that time, he received visits from
abroad for 229 of his 2,190 heads of government or foreign ministers representing 80 countries. Beyond
2,922 days in office. such face-to-face encounters, presidential telephone calls to foreign leaders are a
common occurrence.
There are advantages to face-to-face meetings. Sometimes they have high sym-
bolic value. Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 to meet Chairman Mao Zedong
signaled an epic shift in U.S. policy. Another advantage is that leaders sometimes
make dramatic breakthroughs. The 1978 Camp David Accords, which began the
process of normalizing Egyptian-Israeli relations after decades of hostility and three
wars, were produced after President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat,
and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin isolated themselves at the presidential
retreat in Maryland. A third advantage of leader-to-leader diplomacy is that it can
facilitate communications and smooth relations. The first President Bush believed
that “The best diplomacy starts with getting to know each other” and that “If [another
leader] knows the heartbeat a little bit from talking [with me], there’s less apt to be
misunderstanding.”19
Sometimes personal warmth grows between two leaders that can be helpful.
George W. Bush learned during his friendly conversations with Junichiro Koizumi
that the Japanese prime minister is a huge fan of rock ’n’ roll and especially Elvis
Presley. So when Koizumi visited the United States in 2006, Bush presented him
with a vintage jukebox complete with 1950s and 1960s rock ’n’ roll records and then
escorted him to visit Graceland in Tennessee. There, when Bush urged Koizumi to
sing some of his favorite Elvis tunes, the prime minister warbled a few bars of “Love
Me Tender,” then crooned, “Wise men say, ‘Only fools rush in’,” which is also pretty
good diplomatic advice.
Disadvantages also exist in leader-to-leader diplomacy. One is that there are
numerous instances when leaders have made and reached what each thought was a
mutual agreement, only to find to their dismay that they had misunderstood each
other. A second problem is that while leaders can disavow mistakes made by lower-
ranking officials, a leader’s commitments, even if not wise, cannot be easily retracted.
 The Diplomatic Instrument 265

“When presidents become negotiators no escape routes are left,” former Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger warns (1979:12). “Concessions are irrevocable without dis-
honor.” Additionally, poor personal chemistry can damage relations between leaders.
For example, relations between President G. W. Bush and German Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder turned sour in 2002 over their opposing views, “The personal relationship is
not just damaged, it is broken, and I fear beyond repair,” lamented a German official.
“That is regrettable because personal trust in the negotiating parties is important for
political cooperation.”20

Democratized Diplomacy
Few countries were democracies before the 20th century, and in that context con-
ducting diplomacy and agreeing to treaties and other international obligations were
almost exclusively within the monarch’s realm of authority. “L’état, c’est moi” (I am
the state), Louis XIV supposedly proclaimed with some justification. Executive leaders
still dominate the foreign policy–making process, but it is no longer their exclusive
domain. Instead, democratized diplomacy is the norm, with legislatures, interest
groups, and public opinion all playing a greater role.
Indeed, the importance of domestic politics in foreign policy making has given
rise to two-level game theory. This holds that to be successful a country’s diplomats
must find a solution that is acceptable to both the other country at the international
level and, at the domestic level, to the political actors (legislators, public opinion,
interest groups) in the diplomat’s own country (Tarar, 2005). From this perspective,
the diplomatic setting exists at the domestic as well as at the international level, and
is influenced by the interplay of the two levels when leaders try to pursue policies
that satisfy the actors at both levels. During the several tense times over the future of
Taiwan, for instance, U.S. and Chinese leaders not only have had to find points of
agreement between themselves, they also have had to fend off domestic forces in
their respective countries pushing to escalate the crisis. As China’s president put it,
“Any leader who lets this [Taiwan’s independence] pass would be overthrown.”21

Parliamentary Diplomacy
Another part of the modern diplomatic context is parliamentary diplomacy. This in-
cludes debate and voting in IGOs as a supplement to negotiation and compromise.
The maneuvering involved in parliamentary diplomacy was strongly evident in the
UN during the U.S. campaign to win Security Council approval for an invasion of
Iraq in 2003. That required the backing of 9 of the Council’s 15 members, including
a “yes” vote or an abstention from each of the 5 veto-wielding permanent members.
Washington’s strategy, according to one U.S. diplomat, was to “win backing like you
would in Congress—going after votes one by one by one.” Tactics reportedly included
offering a variety of economic incentives such as access to lucrative contracts to
rebuild postwar Iraq. As one U.S. diplomat conceded, “We’ll put it to them simply:
Do you want to be part of reconstruction and all that means—or leave it to us?”22 In
the end, Washington was certain that France and perhaps Russia would veto the
U.S./U.K. resolution, which probably did not even have 9 votes. To avoid an embar-
rassing defeat, the British ambassador to the UN announced that Washington and
London “have agreed that we will not pursue a vote.”23

Open Diplomacy
Secrecy was once the norm in diplomacy, with negotiations and sometimes even
treaties concluded in secret. Seeking change, Woodrow Wilson called for “open
covenants, openly arrived at” in his Fourteen Points. He got his wish and in the context
266 CHAPTER 8 National Power and Statecraft: The Traditional Approach

of expanded democracy since his time, the norm is open diplomacy, with negotia-
tions and the contents of international agreements widely reported and documented.
While this change is important to the principle of democratic government, it does
have its disadvantages. Public negotiations are difficult. Disclosure of your bargain-
ing strategy compromises your ability to win concessions. Public negotiations are
also more likely to lead diplomats to posture for public consumption. Concessions
may be difficult to make amid popular criticism. Perhaps the most critical negotia-
tions in all history possibly prevented a nuclear war when the United States secretly
agreed to never seek to overthrow Fidel Castro in return for Soviet withdrawal of
their nuclear weapons from Cuba during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In sum, it is
difficult to negotiate (or to play chess) with someone kibitzing over your shoulder.
Indeed, domestic opposition to dealing with an adversary may be so intense that it
may be impossible to negotiate at all.

Diplomacy as a Communications Process

As a communications process, diplomacy involves (1) communicating to one or more
countries or other actors what your concerns, general goals, and specific objectives
are, and (2) persuading the other actors to support or comply with your objectives.
Such communications are not carried out solely by designated diplomats, such as
ambassadors. Instead there are multiple channels that range from a country’s presi-
dent or prime minister down through the government structure and sometimes even
involve private citizens. We shall also see that diplomatic communications can include
actions as well as words. Whatever the specifics, the diplomatic communication
process is carried out through negotiation and signaling.
Negotiations occur when two or more parties communicate with one another,
either directly or indirectly through an intermediary. It is very difficult to accomplish
anything unless the different sides are talking directly or at least indirectly through
an intermediary. As U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell once put it, diplomacy is
about seeking solutions, and “what will get us there are political discussions and the
sooner we can get them the better.”24
Most diplomatic communications are part of an exchange of views, but they can
sometimes be one-sided. When, in 1972, South Vietnam resisted the U.S.-negotiated
settlement with North Vietnam, President Richard Nixon cabled President Nguyen
Van Thieu that “all military and economic aid will be cut off . . . if an agreement is not
reached” and that “I have . . . irrevocably decided to proceed . . . to sign [the agreement].
I will do so, if necessary, alone [and] explain that your government obstructs peace.”
“Brutality is nothing,” Nixon told an aide. “You have never seen it if this son-of-a-bitch
doesn’t go along, believe me” (Kissinger, 1979:1420, 1469). Thieu went along.
Signaling entails saying or doing something with the intent of sending a message
to another government. When leaders make bellicose or conciliatory speeches,
when military forces are deployed or even used, when trade privileges are granted or
sanctions invoked, or when diplomatic recognition is extended or relations are bro-
ken, these actions are, or at least should be, signals of attitude and intent to another
country.
Signals can be quite direct and, indeed, sometimes leaders signal one another
through the open airwaves rather than through diplomatic channels. That is what
was occurring in 2006 when Vice President Richard Cheney publicly warned, “The
Iranian regime needs to know that if it stays on its present course [toward developing
nuclear weapons], the international community is prepared to impose meaningful
consequences.” Adding to the threat, Cheney did not forswear the use of military
 The Diplomatic Instrument 267

force, instead noting, “For our part, the United States is keeping all options on the
table. We will not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon.”25
Less direct signaling was evident in the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan after the
9/11 terror attacks. Certainly that was meant to attack al Qaeda and the Taliban gov-
ernment, but it was also a signal to others. “Let’s hit them hard,” Bush told the chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he directed the general to send ground troops
as well as warplanes and missiles against Afghanistan. “We want to signal this is a
change from the past,” the president explained. “We want to cause other countries
like Syria and Iran to change their views [about supporting terrorism].”26

Conducting Diplomacy
Skilled diplomacy is more art than science. To be effective, diplomats must tailor Web Link
their approach to the situation and the opponent. Still, there are some basic rules of An online diplomatic game,
good diplomacy, and it is also wise to understand the implications of various choices Diplomatic Pouch, is available
diplomats make about the channel, level, visibility, type of inducement, degree of at www.diplom.org/index.py.
precision, method of communication, and extent of linkage that they will use.

General Rules of Effective Diplomacy

Delineating the methods of diplomatic communications is far easier than utilizing
them effectively. There is no set formula that will ensure success, but unless you are
willing to quickly escalate a conflict, some basic rules of effective diplomacy are:
■ Be realistic. Have goals that match what you can and are willing to do to
achieve them. Getting North Korea to unilaterally give up its nuclear
weapons might have been ideal, but the United States did not have the
power to do that short of a first-strike nuclear attack. Therefore offering
North Korea economic incentives in 2007 in return for beginning to shut
down its capacity to make new weapons was an achievable goal.
■ Be careful about what you say. Many observers feel that North Korea’s deci-
sion to test a nuclear weapon in 2006 may have been a defensive reaction
that can be traced to 2002 when President Bush called North Korea one of
the “axis of evil” countries and 2003 when he ordered the invasion of Iraq,
another of the axis of evil countries.
■ Seek common ground. Focus first on common interests, perhaps avoiding
war, and work toward achieving them. Research indicates, for instance, that
peace treaties reached through common accord are much more durable than
those imposed on one or more belligerents (Werner & Yuen, 2005).
■ Be flexible. Generally be willing to compromise or to give way for an offset-
ting concession on everything other than the most vital points.
■ Understand the other side. Try to find out what your opponents really want
and also appreciate their perspective even if you do not agree with it. There
was good diplomatic advice in the Elvis Presley song, “Walk a Mile in My
Shoes,” which urged in part: “Before you abuse, criticize, and accuse / . . .
walk a mile in my shoes.”
■ Appreciate the other side’s domestic constraints. Remember that they, like you,
have domestic political problems that, again just like you, push them to engage
in two-level diplomacy. It is impossible to be realistic about negotiations in
the Middle East unless you understand that whatever concessions moderate
Palestinian and Israeli leaders might be willing to make are apt to be violently
opposed by each side’s hardliners.
268 CHAPTER 8 National Power and Statecraft: The Traditional Approach

■ Be patient. Being overly anxious may result in unwise concessions or to

deadlines that, if not met, can lead to an escalation of conflict. Throughout
the negotiations with North Korea, which were frustrating and included
many setbacks, the Bush administration wisely avoided time lines.
■ Leave avenues of retreat open. The adage that rats will fight if trapped in a
corner often applies to countries. Therefore, it is usually wise to leave
yourself and your opponent an “out.” Ultimatums, especially public ones,
often lead to war. Whatever its other merits, President Bush’s demand that
in 2002 Saddam Hussein leave Iraq in 24 hours or face war left no room for
him to maneuver. War followed.

Direct or Indirect Negotiations

One issue that diplomats face is whether to negotiate directly with each other or in-
directly through an intermediary. Direct negotiations have the advantage of avoiding
the misinterpretations that an intermediary third party might cause. As in the old
game of “Gossip,” messages can become garbled. Direct negotiations are also quicker.
An additional plus is that they can act as a symbol.
Indirect negotiations may also be advisable. Direct contact symbolizes a level of
legitimacy that a country may not wish to convey. For example, the Bush adminis-
tration has resisted talking directly and bilaterally to Iran because that would have
handed a diplomatic victory to a country that the United States has not recognized
since 1980 when it allowed a mob to seize the U.S. embassy in Tehran and hold
52 American diplomats hostage for 444 days. Yet Washington has not closed the
diplomatic doors completely, and has kept a range of unofficial contacts with Iran
alive. Among these have been recent exchanges through Iran’s UN Ambassador Javad
Zarif. He is considered a moderate by Iranian standards and holds a B.A. and M.A. in
international relations from San Francisco State University and a Ph.D. in interna-
tional law and policy from the Graduate School of International Studies, University
of Denver, the same program where Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice earned her
doctorate.

High-Level or Low-Level Diplomacy

Who should communicate is another important choice in the conduct of diplo-
macy. Should high- or low-level diplomats be sent to a conference, should positions
be announced at a high level, perhaps by the head of government, or by a lower
level official?
High-level diplomacy has its advantages. Verbal and written statements by heads
of government are noted seriously in other capitals. It was major news during the
diplomatic maneuvering over North Korea’s nuclear program in 2003 when President
Bush took the occasion of a trip to Asia for an international conference to declare
publicly, “I’ve said as plainly as I can say that we have no intention of invading North
Korea” and that there might be a way “to say exactly what I said publicly on paper.”27
This move, in turn, caused a shift in North Korea’s position from demanding a formal
treaty to a more flexible willingness to meet with the United States and other coun-
tries to explore the president’s intimated readiness to sign some document pledging
nonaggression.
Low-level diplomacy is a wiser move at other times. Communications at a low
level avoid overreaction and maintain flexibility. Dire threats can be issued as “trial
balloons” by cabinet officers or generals and then, if later thought unwise, disavowed
by higher political officers. During the ongoing tensions over Taiwan, the principal
leaders generally have used lower level officials to make military threats. For example,
 The Diplomatic Instrument 269

China’s military newspaper, Liberation Army Daily, was far enough removed from
official policy makers to warn provocatively that China would “spare no effort in a
blood-soaked battle” if Taiwan declared independence.28 From a position safely distant
from the pinnacle of U.S. authority in the Oval Office, a mid-level Defense Depart-
ment official growled back that China would face “incalculable consequences” if it
attacked Taiwan.29

Using Coercion or Rewards

Yet another diplomatic choice is whether to brandish coercive sticks or proffer tempt-
Did You Know That:
ing carrots. To induce an opponent to react as you wish, is it better to offer rewards
Humorist Will Rogers once
or to threaten punishment? Coercive diplomacy can be effective when you have the defined diplomacy as
power, will, and credibility to back it up (Lake, 2005). At one point when China “Saying ‘Nice doggie’ until
became particularly alarmed about Taiwan’s intentions, Beijing conducted military you can find a rock.”
“training” operations near Taiwan. This demonstration of military might included,
among other things, firing six nuclear warhead–capable missiles into the seas off
Taiwan’s coast. For its part, the United States responded to the implied Chinese
threat by sending a major naval flotilla, centered around the carriers USS Nimitz and
USS Independence, into the waters off Taiwan.
There are also drawbacks to coercive diplomacy. If your threat does not work,
you face an unhappy choice. Not carrying out your threats implies weakness that
may well embolden the opponent and perhaps future opponents in crises to come.
Yet putting one’s military might and money where one’s mouth is costs lives and dol-
lars and is not necessarily successful either. Even if coercion does work, it may entail
a long-term commitment that was not originally planned or desired. The U.S. ensnare-
ment in Iraq after a quick military victory in 2003 serves as a case in point.
There are many times when offers of rewards may be a more powerful inducement
than coercion. One song in the movie Mary Poppins includes the wisdom that “a
spoonful of sugar helps the medicine go down,” and an increase in aid, a trade conces-
sion, or some other tangible or symbolic reward may induce agreement. At the heart of
the 2007 breakthrough in negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear arms program was
an offer by the United States and others to provide Pyongyang with about $400,000
million in fuel and other forms of economic aid.
Often, the best diplomacy mixes carrots and
sticks. As one U.S. State Department official com-
mented, it is difficult to apply a “scientific cookie-
cutter approach” that works consistently. “Sometimes
it’s the carrot, and sometimes it’s the stick,” he said,
adding that the right mixture varies from situation
to situation. “You can slice and dice this any way
you want. Hopefully, you know, the sausage machine
produces something that’s halfway coherent at the
end.”30
Economic sanctions and other diplomatic sticks
helped topple the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in
October 2000. The new government refused, how-
ever, to turn him over for trial by the war crimes
tribunal sitting in The Hague. What seemingly turned It is not clear whether the Filipino editorial artists who drew this image
of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il approved or disapproved of the aid
the trick was proffering an exceptionally attractive package that helped persuade North Korea to halt its nuclear arms
bunch of carrots to Belgrade. In an unspoken program. However, there can be no doubt that economic incentives
but obvious deal, the Yugoslav government extra- were part of the diplomatic maneuvering that moved the Six Party talks
dited Milosevic in June 2001, and within hours the to success.
270 CHAPTER 8 National Power and Statecraft: The Traditional Approach

United States, the European Union, and other donor countries and organizations
(such as the World Bank) that were meeting in Brussels pledged $1.28 billion in aid
to the country.

Being Precise or Intentionally Vague

Most diplomatic experts stress the importance of being precise when communicat-
ing. There are times, however, when purposeful vagueness may be in order. Precision
in both written and verbal communications is usually advantageous because it helps
avoid misunderstandings. Being precise can also indicate true commitment, especially
if it comes from the national leader.
Vagueness may sometimes be a better strategy. Being vague may paper over irrec-
oncilable differences. Lack of precision can also allow a country to retreat if necessary.
A degree of ambiguity was one hallmark of legislation passed by China’s parliament in
2005 that authorized the use of force against Taiwan if “major events” move the island
toward independence or if “possibilities for peaceful reunification are completely
exhausted.” Since China’s leaders do not need permission from the rubber-stamp
parliament, the act was meant as a strong signal to Taiwan. Still, it left the leadership
room to maneuver by not defining what a major event was or what would constitute
the exhaustion of the possibilities for peaceful reunification. Adding to the statute’s
mixed message, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao held a press conference soon after it was
enacted and focused his remarks on other provisions of the law that call for more
economic and cultural exchanges with Taiwan. “This is a law for advancing peace-
ful reunification. It is not targeted at the people of Taiwan, nor is it a war bill,”
Wen reassured his listeners with one breath, then, with another added a bit more
ominously, “Only by checking and opposing Taiwan’s independence forces will peace
emerge in the Taiwan Strait.”31

Communicating by Word or Deed

Diplomacy utilizes both words and actions to communicate. Oral and written com-
munications, either delivered directly or through public statements, can be good
diplomatic strategy. Washington has repeatedly assured Beijing that U.S. policy does
not favor an independent Taiwan and will not support a unilateral Taiwanese decla-
ration of independence. Such communications have helped ease China’s fears and
thus its reactions to pro-independence leanings in Taiwan’s government. Verbal
threatening signals also have their place. Secretary of State Rice was clearly trying to
put pressure on North Korea to resume talks when during a 2005 trip to South
Korea she told reporters, “We need to resolve this issue. It cannot go on forever” and
that if Pyongyang refused to end its nuclear weapons program through negotiations,
“Then we will have to find other means to do it.”32 What that meant, ranging from
economic sanctions to military force, she left unclear.
Signaling by action is often more dramatic than verbal signaling and it has its
uses. When Secretary of State Rice visited South Korea in 2005, she signaled U.S.
determination to defend that country by becoming the highest-ranking American
official to ever visit Command Post Tango, a bunker built into a mountain that would
serve as the command center during a war with North Korea. There are drawbacks
to such physical signals, though, because it is harder to retreat from them than
from words. When the Soviets threatened to blockade Berlin in 1961, President
John F. Kennedy took the risky step of going there and publicly proclaiming himself
a symbolic citizen of the threatened city. “Ich bin ein Berliner,” Kennedy’s words rang
out. By putting his personal honor on the line, Kennedy persuaded the Soviets to
back down. He also gave Germans on both sides of the Berlin Wall a good chuckle by
 The Diplomatic Instrument 271

making a minor grammatical error. “Ich bin Berliner” (I am a Berliner) is what he

Did You Know That:
meant to say. Inadvertently adding “ein” changed the meaning of Berliner to refer to
Similar to President
a jelly doughnut locally called a berliner. This left the leader of the free world actually
Kennedy’s diplomatic verbal
declaring, “I am a jelly doughnut.”33 faux pas about pastry, Presi-
dent Boris Yeltsin of Russia
Linking Issues or Treating Them Separately once inadvertently greeted
A persistent dispute is whether a country should deal with other countries on an his American counterpart
with a hearty, “Welcome,
issue-by-issue basis or link issues together as a basis for a general orientation toward
Blin Clinton!” Blin means
the other country. Advocates of linking issues argue that it is inappropriate to have pancake in Russian.
normal relations on some matters with regimes that are hostile and repressive. Those
who favor treating issues separately claim that doing so allows progress on some issues
and keeps channels of communications and influence open.
Critics of the Bush administration have charged that its professed commitment
to promoting democracy is hypocritical. Among other things, they point to Bush’s
continued good relations with Russia despite the increased restrictions on democracy
under the Putin government and the brutal campaign against the Chechen indepen-
dence movement. From the administration’s point of view, linking Russia’s internal
policies to U.S. relations with that country on a range of other matters would be fool-
hardy. One top U.S. official explained that while “the issue about the democracy and
freedom agenda is at the center of the president’s foreign policy,” it was also the case
that “there’s a lot more to our relationship with Russia than just this discussion
[about democracy].”34
Cuba has been another matter, though, and the delinkage of issues has not
extended to that country. A number of U.S. measures, including the Helms-Burton
Act (1996), have instituted economic sanctions on Cuba and foreign companies
doing business with Cuba in an attempt to weaken the government of President Fidel
Castro. President Bush increased those in 2004, imposing additional sanctions as a
“strategy that says, ‘We’re not waiting for the day of Cuban freedom, we are working
for the day of freedom in Cuba.’”35 What is unclear is why delinking is good policy
toward Russia and not toward Cuba.

Maximizing or Minimizing a Dispute

Diplomats face a choice over whether to put a confrontation in a broad or narrow
context. Maximizing a dispute by invoking national survival, world peace, or some
other major principle may be advantageous because doing so increases credibility. At
one point, China maximized the stakes of the Taiwan issue when its premier publicly
depicted the matter as a “core principle” involving China’s “territorial integrity.”36 The
drawback of maximizing a dispute is that it makes it very hard to back away from con-
frontation if a settlement is not reached. President Bush maximized the stakes of the
crisis with Iraq. Speaking before the UN General Assembly he declared that the world
was being “challenged . . . by outlaw groups and regimes that accept no law of moral-
ity and have no limit to their violent ambitions,” and he singled out Iraq’s “weapons of
mass murder” as the single greatest global threat.37 By doing so, the president signaled
U.S. resolve, but he also painted himself into something of a corner. Given the dire pic-
ture he painted, he arguably would have appeared weak internationally and also been
politically vulnerable domestically unless the Iraqis totally capitulated to U.S. demands
or were defeated in a war to remove the threat (which, ironically, did not exist).
Minimizing a dispute may work positively to avoid overreactions. In contrast
to its rhetoric about Iraq, the Bush administration sought to cool the atmosphere
regarding North Korea by, among other things, refusing to call it a crisis. Describing
it as the “C-word,” one U.S. official said, “We are not thinking in those terms,” and
272 CHAPTER 8 National Power and Statecraft: The Traditional Approach

the administration labeled the North Korean decision to restart its nuclear facility
as merely “regrettable,” rather than using a more heated term. Some observers
applauded the U.S. restraint, but others criticized it as weakness in the face of a
threat. From this perspective, Bush’s choice of “regrettable” was “the kind of word
you use when the soup isn’t very good before dinner.”38

THE INFORMATIONAL INSTRUMENT

Traditional diplomacy primarily involves interacting on a government-to-government

basis with another country. The information instrument involves communicating
specific information and general images beyond another country’s leaders to a much
wider array of politically important forces, such as public opinion, in an effort to in-
fluence it. Sometimes this information is knowingly false and falls into such categories
as disinformation and propaganda. At other times, the information is highly selective
and reflects the bias of the transmitter. U.S. government–produced images of American
activity in Iraq tend to focus on rebuilding, on the
decimation of civilians by car bombs and other ter-
rorist devices, and other themes that support U.S.
objectives. By contrast, Al-Zawraa TV, which is run
by a former Saddam Hussein official and beamed from
Damascus, Syria, by satellite throughout the Middle
East, concentrates on images of civilians injured by
American military actions, attacks on U.S. forces by
insurgents, and other anti-American scenarios.
Whether false, biased, partly true, or completely true,
the information instrument is part of an effort to win
over “the hearts and minds” of the public, as the
phrase popularized during the Vietnam War goes.
Such efforts are not new. Information and the
ability to convey specific pieces of it and general
images to others has always been a powerful instru-
ment of foreign policy. During the thirteenth century,
for example, the Mongols under Genghis Khan and
his successors followed a policy in which they slaugh-
tered most of the population in cities that refused to
surrender, but spared most of the population in cities
that surrendered without a fight. In either case, some
of the survivors were sent ahead to other cities to
carry the information about the different fates of those
cities that resisted and lost and those that gave way
immediately. Resistance became increasingly rare.
What has changed about informational cam-
paigns is their frequency. This shift has occurred for
two reasons. One is the spread of democracy. As noted
earlier, more and more countries have become democ-
racies. This means that how the media, public opinion,
Public diplomacy, which attempts to reach beyond leaders and influence interest groups, and legislators react to other coun-
public opinion, is the purpose of this billboard in Ulan Bator, the capital tries and to events is much more important than it
of Mongolia. It promotes democracy and U.S.-Mongolian friendship. once was in the foreign policy–making process. The
 The Informational Instrument 273

second reason that it is important to reach beyond other countries’ leaders to try to
Did You Know That:
influence the wider domestic structure is the communications revolution. Radio, then
The International Telecom-
television, and now the Internet place countries, their leaders, and their policies in-
munications Union reports
creasingly on display before the world. The communications revolution also allows that 84% of the world’s
governments to communicate much more easily with a worldwide audience. households now have a
As a result, international relations are also increasingly conducted through television set.
public diplomacy. This is the process of creating an image that enhances a country’s
ability to achieve diplomatic success by increasing its soft power. Highlighting the
idea behind public diplomacy, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan commented, “If I
can’t get the support of governments, then I’ll get the support of the people. People
move governments.”39
In addition to traditional propaganda, public diplomacy includes shaping what
leaders and other top diplomats say and do to play to public opinion abroad and www
otherwise conducting diplomacy in part as a public relations campaign. One scholar’s
concept of public diplomacy envisions a “theater of power” that is a “metaphor for ANALYZE THE ISSUE
the repertoire of visual and symbolic tools used by statesmen and diplomats.” As Multitrack Diplomacy
players in the theater of power, leaders “must be sensitive to the impression they
make on observers. . . . They surely [are] subject to the same sort of ‘dramatic,’ if not
aesthetic, criticism of other kinds of public performances” (Cohen, 1987:i–ii).
Public diplomacy is practiced in all phases of a country’s foreign policy effort.
When President Bush traveled to Russia in May 2005 to join in ceremonies marking
the 60th anniversary of VE Day (May 8, 1945), the end of World War II in Europe, he
was careful to also schedule visits to two former Soviet republics, Latvia and Georgia,
to demonstrate continued U.S. support of the countries against any outside interfer-
ence, especially by their former overlord, Moscow. Among other things, Bush under-
lined that point by placing a wreath at a monument in Riga honoring those who died
fighting for Latvian independence.
Governments also use a variety of agencies and other organizations to project
their image. The United States, for one, operates or sponsors the Voice of America,
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Radio Martí. The U.S. Information Agency also
produces Worldnet, a television service available globally, provides Web sites, and
has other modern communications capabilities. Other efforts are contracted to pri-
vate public relations firms. In one such effort in 2002 and 2003, the United States ran
a $15 million television campaign in several Arab countries. Called “Shared Values,”
the media effort was meant to convince viewers that Americans were tolerant of Mus-
lims and their beliefs and practices. In one spot, an Arab American female school-
teacher explained, “I wear a hijab (head covering) in the classroom where I teach.
I have never had a child who thought it was weird or anything like that.”40 Evidence
surfaced in 2005 that the U.S. government was also paying freelance reporters to
“place” stories favorable to the United States in newspapers in the Middle East and
elsewhere. More broadly, all U.S. diplomats abroad are expected to be part of the
image effort. This was highlighted in a 2006 message from U.S. Undersecretary of
State for Public Diplomacy Karen Hughes to all U.S. diplomatic posts spelling out
“Karen’s Rules” for dealing with the media, including:
Rule #1: Think Advocacy. I want all of you to think of yourselves as advocates for
America’s story each day. . . . I want you out speaking to the press, on television
interviews preparing and executing a media strategy, and providing our points on
issues. As President Bush and Secretary Rice have stated, public diplomacy is the
job of every [diplomat]. We want you out there on television, in the news, and on
the radio a couple of times a week and certainly on major news stations in your
country and region.41
274 CHAPTER 8 National Power and Statecraft: The Traditional Approach

CHAPTER SUMMARY

THE COMPLEX NATURE OF POWER THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT

1. National power is the sum of a country’s capabili- 8. Force can be used in a range of ways that extend
ties to successfully implement its foreign policy, from serving as an unspoken backdrop to negotia-
especially when those policies are opposed by tions to all-out war.
other states or need the cooperation of other states. 9. Measuring the effectiveness of force is easier in
2. Measuring power assets is especially difficult. The terms of goal attainment than on a cost/benefit basis.
efforts to do so have not been very successful, but 10. Using force is always very risky, but there are some
they do help us see many of the complexities of standards that improve the chance of success.
analyzing the characteristics of power. These char-
acteristics include the facts that power is dynamic; THE ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT
both objective and subjective, relative, and situa- 11. Economic power can be applied through a variety
tional; and a country’s will to power expresses its of economic incentives, such as foreign aid, and
determination to apply power assets. economic sanctions, such as trade embargos.

THE FOUNDATION OF NATIONAL POWER THE DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENT

3. National power rests on a foundation that includes 12. Modern diplomacy occurs in a context including
the country’s geography, people, government, and multilateral diplomacy, parliamentary maneuver-
infrastructure. ing, democratized diplomacy, open diplomacy, and
4. The national infrastructure consists of a country’s leader-to-leader interactions and communications.
technological sophistication, its transportation 13. Diplomacy is a communication process includ-
system, and its information and communications ing transmitting information and intentions and
capabilities. persuasion.
14. There are some general rules for conducting effec-
MILITARY POWER tive diplomacy and also a series of options includ-
5. Military power is both tangible and intangible. ing whether contacts should be direct or indirect,
Tangible elements of power, such as tanks, are what level of contact they should involve, what re-
relatively easy to visualize and measure. Intan- wards or coercion should be offered, how precise
gible elements of military power, such as mo- or vague messages should be, whether to commu-
rale and reputation, are much more difficult to nicate by message or deed, whether issues should
operationalize. be linked or dealt with separately, and the wisdom
6. More military power is not always better. It creates of maximizing or minimizing a dispute.
the temptation to use it, it makes others insecure,
and it is costly. THE INFORMATIONAL INSTRUMENT
15. Conveying information beyond other govern-
ECONOMIC POWER ments to their citizens has become increasingly
7. Economic power is based on financial position, important with the advance of democracy and
natural resources, industrial output, and agricul- rapid communications. Public diplomacy is a
tural output. major part of a country’s foreign policy activity.

For simulations, debates, and other interactive activities, a chapter quiz, Web links,
and much more, visit www.mhhe.com/rourke12/ and go to chapter 8. Or, while
accessing the site, click on Course-Related Headlines and view recent international
relations articles in the New York Times.
 Key Terms 275

KEY TERMS

absolute power hard power non-zero-sum social overstretch thesis

balance of payments for imperial overstretch objective power soft power
current accounts thesis open diplomacy statecraft
bilateral diplomacy instruments of foreign parliamentary diplomacy subjective power
coercive diplomacy policy power two-level game theory
democratized diplomacy leadership capabilities power capacity unilateralism
demographic graying multilateral diplomacy public diplomacy will to power
economic sanctions multilateralism relative power zero-sum game
foreign policy net trade situational power
C H A P T E R

9
International Law
and Justice: An FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND JUSTICE

Alternative Approach The

The
The
Primitive Nature of International Law
Growth of International Law
Practice of International Law
The Fundamentals of International Justice
Which is the wiser here, Justice or Iniquity?
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
—William Shakespeare, Measure for Measure The Philosophical Roots of Law
How International Law Is Made
The law hath not been dead, though it hath slept.
Adherence to the Law
—William Shakespeare, Hamlet Compliance with the Law
Enforcement of the Law
Adjudication of the Law
International Courts
Jurisdiction of International Courts
Effectiveness of International Courts
APPLYING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE
Law and Justice in a Multicultural World
Law and Cultural Perspectives
Standards of Law for States and Individuals
States, War, and International Law
Just Cause of War
Just Conduct of War
Applying International Law and Justice
to Individuals
Post–World War II Tribunals
Current International Tribunals
The International Criminal Court
The Pragmatic Application of Law and Justice
THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND JUSTICE
CHAPTER SUMMARY

It is easy to disparage the idea of international law in a world of violence

where might often means success. As this chapter discusses, however,
the law is gradually playing a greater role. These Bosnian women are
demonstrating outside the International Court of Justice in The Hague, the
Netherlands, where the world court was hearing a case brought against
Serbia. Bosnia accused Serbia of genocide against Bosnian Muslims and
Croats during the implosion of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Many were
dismayed when in 2007 the ICJ dismissed the case, but it is important
that such cases are beginning to be tried in court.
 Fundamentals of International Law and Justice 277

HIS CHAPTER FOCUSES ON international law and justice in the conduct of world

T politics as an alternative to the power-based diplomatic pursuit of self-interest

discussed in chapter 8. It would be naïve to ignore the reality that most global
actors emphasize their own interests. However, this is also true in domestic systems.
What is different between global and domestic systems is not so much the motives of
the actors as the fact that domestic systems place greater restraints on the pursuit of
self-interest than the international system does (Joyner, 2005).
Legal systems are one thing that restrains the power-based pursuit of self-interest
in a domestic system. Certainly, powerful individuals and groups have advantages in
every domestic system. Rules are broken and the guilty, especially if they can afford
a high-priced attorney, sometimes escape punishment. Still, laws in the United States
cannot overtly discriminate under the “equal protection” clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution; for example, an attorney is provided to indigent
defendants in criminal cases. Thus, the law somewhat evens the playing field.
Justice is a second restraint on power in domestic systems. What is just and what
is legal are not always the same. Justice involves what is “right” here, not just what is
legal. Whether the word is just, moral, ethical, or fair, there is a greater sense in domes-
tic systems than there is in the international system that justice should prevail, that
the ends do not always justify the means, and that those who violate the norms should
suffer penalties. Surely, there is no domestic system in which everyone acts justly
(Amstutz, 2005). Yet the sense of justice that citizens in stable domestic systems have
does influence their behavior.
This means that since it is possible to restrain power politics in the domestic sys-
tem by the creation of legal systems and through a greater emphasis on what is moral
and fair, then it is theoretically possible to use the same standards to curb the unbri-
dled pursuit of interests in the international system. Accomplishing that will require
major changes in attitudes and practices, but it can be done.

FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND JUSTICE

What actors may and may not legitimately do is based in both international and do-
mestic law systems on a combination of expectations, rules, and practices that help
govern behavior. We will explore the fundamentals of these legal systems and moral
codes by looking first at the primitive nature, growth, and current status of interna-
tional law; then by turning to issues of justice.

The Primitive Nature of International Law Web Link

Some anthropologists study
All legal systems, domestic or international, evolve. Each advances from a primitive
the development of law as part
level to more sophisticated levels. As such, any legal system can be placed on an evo- of the evolution of political
lutionary scale ranging from primitive to modern. Note that modern does not mean systems. More on this focus
finished; people in the future may consider our current legal systems to be rudimen- can be found on the Web site
tary. This concept of a primitive but evolving legal system is important to understanding of the Association for Political
and Legal Anthropology
international law.
at www.aaanet.org/apla/.
The current international legal system falls toward the primitive end of the evo-
lutionary scale of legal systems. First, it does not have a formal rule-making (legisla-
tive) process as more sophisticated systems do. Instead, codes of behavior are derived
from custom or from explicit agreements among actors. Second, there is little or
278 CHAPTER 9 International Law and Justice: An Alternative Approach

no established authority to judge or punish violations of

law. Primitive societies, domestic or international, have no
police or courts. They rely on self-help techniques ranging
from negotiation to violence and occasionally on mediation
to resolve disputes. Viewing international law as a primitive
legal system helps us to understand that international law
does exist, even if it is not as developed as we might wish.
Also, we can see that international society and its law may
evolve to a higher order, as have domestic systems.

The Growth of International Law

International law has its beginnings in the origin of states
and their need to regulate their relations. Gradually, ele-
ments of ancient Jewish, Greek, and Roman custom and
practice combined with newer Christian concepts to form
the beginning of an international system of law. A number
of theorists were also important to the genesis of interna-
tional law. The most famous of these was Holland’s Hugo
Grotius (1583–1645), the first scholar of international
law who wrote De Jure Belli et Pacis (On the Law of War
and Peace). Grotius and others advanced ideas about the
sources of international law, its role in regulating the
relations of states, and its application to war and other
The injustices of war and other aspects of international relations specific circumstances. From this base, international law
led the Dutch jurist and statesman Hugo Grotius (1583–1645)
to formulate rules to govern conflict and other interactions
evolved slowly over the intervening centuries, as the inter-
among states. This effort earned him the title “father of actions between the states grew and as the needs and ex-
international law.” pectations of the international community became more
sophisticated.
During the last century or so, concern with international law has grown
rapidly. Globalization has significantly expanded the need for rules to govern func-
tional areas such as trade, finance, travel, and communications. Similarly, our
awareness of our ability to destroy ourselves and our environment, and of the suf-
fering of victims of human rights abuses, has led to lawmaking treaties on such
subjects as genocide, nuclear testing, use of the oceans, and human rights. Even the
Did You Know That:
most political of all activities, war and other aspects of national security, have in-
The phrase international law
creasingly become the subject of international law. Aggressive war, for example, is
was first used by England’s
Jeremy Bentham in outside the pale of the law. The UN’s authorization of sanctions and then force
“Principles of International against Iraq after that country invaded Kuwait in 1990 reflected that. So did the
Law” (1789). A utilitarian UN’s refusal to support what most countries saw as an unjustified U.S.-led invasion
philosopher, Bentham of Iraq in 2003.
argued that sovereigns
should observe international
law because it would be The Practice of International Law
mutually beneficial to do so.
Those who discount international law contend that it exists only in theory, not in
practice. As evidence, they cite war, human rights violations, and other largely un-
punished examples of “lawlessness.” What this argument misses is that international
law is effective in many areas despite many holes in its coverage. There is substantial
evidence in the behavior of states that they “do accept international law as law, and,
even more significant, in the vast majority of instances they . . . obey it” ( Joyner,
2000:243). Furthermore, the fact that the law is not always followed does not disprove
 The International Legal System 279

its existence. There is, after all, a substantial crime rate in the United States and most
other countries, but that does not mean they are lawless.
International law is most effective in governing the rapidly expanding range of
transnational functional relations. These involve “low politics,” a term that designates
such things as trade, diplomatic rules, and communications. International law is least
effective when applied to “high-politics” issues such as national security relations.
When vital interests are involved, governments still regularly bend or even ignore in-
ternational law. Yet it is also the case that the law and standards of justice sometimes
do influence strategic political decisions. Both international law and world values, for
instance, are strongly opposed to states resorting unilaterally to war except in imme-
diate self-defense. Violations such as Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait still occur, but they are
met with mounting global condemnation and even counterforce. Now even countries
as powerful as the United States regularly seek UN authorization to act in cases such
as Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, when not long ago they would have acted on
their own initiative. It is true that the United States and Great Britain ultimately went
ahead in 2003 without UN support, but that does not disprove the existence of the
norm against unilateral war. Indeed, the widespread condemnation of the invasion
shows the norm does exist, and the ability of the United States to ignore the norm
demonstrates that power often continues to trump international law and justice.

The Fundamentals of International Justice

Concepts of just behavior stem from religious beliefs, from secular ideologies or
philosophies, from the standard of equity (what is fair), or from common practice.
We will see in our discussion of roots of international law that what a society con-
siders just behavior sometimes becomes law. At other times, legal standards that are
considered just are gradually adopted by a society. Insofar as just behavior remains an
imperative of conscience rather than law, we can consider justice in a broad sense.
Distinctions can be made between moral, ethical, equitable, and humanitarian stan-
dards and behavior, but the four individually and in sum equate to justice.
It would be wrong—given recurring war, gnawing human deprivation, persis- Web Link
tent human rights violations, and debilitating environmental abuse—to imagine that A good entry point for more
justice is a predominant global force. Yet it would also be erroneous to use these ills information on international
to argue that law and justice do not play a role. Instead, the conduct of most coun- law and international courts
tries is a balance between what is ideal and what is pragmatic. Moreover, there is a is through the UN at
http://www.un.org/law/.
growing body of ethical norms that help determine the nature of the international
system. Progress is slow and inconsistent, but it exists. American and British forces
did not drop nuclear weapons on Iraq in 2003, even though doing so arguably could
have saved time, money, and the lives of American and British troops. Many coun-
tries give foreign aid to less developed countries. National leaders, not just philoso-
phers and clergy, regularly discuss and sometimes even make decisions based on
human rights. Thus the reality is that world politics operates to a degree within the
context of international law and justice.

THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM

International law, like any legal system, is based on four critical considerations: the
philosophical roots of law, how laws are made, when and why the law is obeyed (ad-
herence), and how legal disputes are decided (adjudication).
280 CHAPTER 9 International Law and Justice: An Alternative Approach

The Philosophical Roots of Law

Where does law originate? There are three major schools of thought. Two of these are
rooted in sources external to the practices of human society. The third holds that the
law reflects the internal desires and conduct of each society. A key implication of law
being external to society is that there exists a standard of law that governs all
humans, whether or not they accept it or abide by it. By contrast, if law is derived
from society and, as is the case, there are many human societies (nations), then there
is (a) no single law and (b) no basis for asserting the moral superiority of one system
of law and values over another.
The first external law view is the ideological/theological school of law, which
holds that law is derived from an overarching ideology or theology. For instance, a
substantial part of contemporary international legal theory can be traced back to
Christian doctrine such as the writings of Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas
on the law of war. There are also long-standing elements of law and scholarship in
Islamic, Buddhist, and other religious traditions that serve as a foundation for just
international conduct.
The naturalist school of law advances the other set of ideas about an external
source. This approach contends that humans, by nature, have certain rights and obli-
gations. English philosopher John Locke argued in Two Treatises of Government
(1690) that there is “a law of nature” that “teaches all mankind, who will but consult
it, that all [people] being equal and independent [in the state of nature], no one
ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.” Since countries are
collectives of individuals, and the world community is a collective of states and in-
dividuals, natural law’s rights and obligations also apply to the global stage and form
the basis for international law.
The third view of the roots of law focuses on the customs and practices of society.
This is the positivist school of law, which advocates that law reflects society and the
way people want that society to operate. Therefore, according to positivist principles,
law is and ought to be the product of the codification or formalization of a society’s
standards.
Each of these schools has detractors as well as advocates. Those who reject the
idea of external sources of law contend that standards based on ideology or theology
www are undemocratic because the law is decided and interpreted by either religious
officials or, for ideologies, by dogmatists such as Communist Party officials. As for
natural law, critics charge that it is vague and also puts so much emphasis on indi-
ANALYZE THE ISSUE
Law and Justice: Finding vidualism that it almost precludes any sense of communitarian welfare. For example,
Its Place in the Current Locke argued that people had a right to their property. If it is true that a person’s
International System property is protected by natural law, then, among other things, it is a human rights
violation to take an individual’s property through taxes levied by the government
without the individual’s explicit agreement. Critics condemn the positivist approach
as amoral and sometimes immoral, in that it may legitimize immoral, albeit common,
beliefs and behavior of a society as a whole or of its dominant class. These critics would
say, for instance, that slavery was once widespread and widely accepted, but it was
never moral or lawful, by the standards of either divine principle or natural law.

How International Law Is Made

Countries usually make domestic law through a constitution (constitutional law),
by a legislative body (statutory law), or through statutorily authorized rule making
by government agencies and officials (decrees, regulation). In practice, law is also
 The International Legal System 281

established through judicial decisions (interpretation), which set guidelines (prece-

dent) for later decisions by the courts. Less influential sources of law are custom
(common law) and what is fair (equity). Compared to its domestic equivalent, mod-
ern international lawmaking is much more decentralized. There are, according to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, four sources of law: international
treaties, international custom, the general principles of law, and judicial decisions
and scholarly legal writing. Some students of international law tentatively add a fifth
source: resolutions and other pronouncements of the UN General Assembly. These
five rely primarily on the positivist approach but, like domestic law, include elements
of both external and internal sources of law.
International treaties are the primary source of international law (Simmons &
Did You Know That:
Hopkins, 2005). A primary advantage of treaties is that they codify, or write down,
The word genocide was
the law. Agreements between states are binding according to the doctrine of pacta coined by Raphael Lemkin
sunt servanda (treaties are to be served/carried out). All treaties are binding on those in Axis Rule in Occupied
countries that are party to them (have signed and ratified or otherwise given their Europe (1944) and is derived
legal consent). Moreover, it is possible to argue that some treaties are also applicable from the Greek word genos
to nonsignatories. When a large number of states agree to a principle, it begins to (race, tribe) and the Latin
suffix cide (to kill).
take on system-wide legitimacy. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (1948), for example, has been ratified by 140 countries.
Therefore, genocide is arguably a crime under international law, and that standard is
binding on all states whether or not they are party to the treaty. Now people are being
tried, convicted, and sentenced for genocide, whether or not their country ratified
the antigenocide treaty.
International custom is the second most important source of international law.
The old, and now supplanted, rule that territorial waters extend three miles from the
shore grew from the distance a cannon could fire.
If you were outside the range of land-based artillery,
then you were in international waters. Maritime
rules of the road and diplomatic practice are two
other important areas of law that grew out of cus-
tom. Sometimes, long-standing custom is eventually
codified in treaties. An example is the Vienna Con-
vention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, which
codified many existing rules of diplomatic standing
and practice.
International custom is also found in domestic
legal practices and standards that are common to
most states. Such commonalities help determine
international law and are sometimes applied by a
country’s courts to domestic as well as international
law cases. In one recent example, the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled in Roper v. Simmons (2005) that execut- One source of international law is what is customary among the states.
ing individuals for crimes committed as a juvenile Sometimes, in turn, a country’s courts apply such standards to its own
violated the Constitution’s ban on “cruel and unusual system. This occurred when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Roper v.
punishments.” To demonstrate the punishment was Simmons (2005) that executing an individual for crimes committed
“unusual” the court pointed to “the stark reality that as a juvenile violated the Constitution’s ban on “cruel and unusual
the United States is the only country in the world” to punishments.” In the ruling, the justices cited the fact that world
custom did not allow such executions. Many people hailed the
execute people for crimes committed as a child and decision, but others, including the artist who drew this editorial
also noted “the overwhelming weight of interna- cartoon, were appalled that the Supreme Court would be influenced
tional opinion against the juvenile death penalty.” by world opinion and practice. Should U.S. courts look abroad or
Some hailed the court’s decision as an advance for stick strictly to U.S. law and opinions?
282 CHAPTER 9 International Law and Justice: An Alternative Approach

human rights. Others condemned it as a violation of U.S. sovereignty. One such

critique charged that “globalization has [spawned] a variety of ‘global networks,’
including. . . . a transnational class of judicial . . . elites who are increasingly freed
from the constraints of territoriality, national sovereignty, and domestic political con-
stituencies, and whose judicial . . . decisions reflect a deterritorialized, ‘cosmopolitan’
moral sensibility” (Delahunty & Yoo, 2005:329).
General principles of law are a third source of international law. The ancient
Roman concept of jus gentium (the law of peoples) is the basis of these principles,
and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) depicts them as “the general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations.” Such language serves to incorporate “external”
sources of law, such as the idea that freedom from unprovoked attack is an inherent
human right, into international law. More than any other standard, it is for violating
basic human rights principles that former president of Liberia Charles Taylor was
arraigned in 2002 before an international tribunal in the Netherlands. Some charges
against Taylor are for violating specific treaties such as the Geneva Conventions.
But the indictment was also based on jus gentium, including such “crimes against
humanity” as abetting “sexual slavery and any other form of sexual violence” and
“other serious violations of international humanitarian law” including “conscripting
or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups.”
Judicial decisions and scholarly writing also add to the law. In many domestic sys-
tems, legal interpretations by courts set precedent according to the doctrine of stare
decisis (let the decision stand). This doctrine is specifically rejected in Article 59 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, but in practice judges on both domestic
and international courts cite other legal decisions in justifying their own rulings
(Slaughter, 2003). Judicial review, deciding whether a government law or action is
constitutional, is another possible role of international judicial bodies. Many domestic
courts have this authority, and a few international courts also have it. The European
Union’s Court of Justice (commonly called the European Court of Justice, ECJ) can
review decisions of the EU political and bureaucratic decision makers for compliance
with EU law and to a degree can also review decisions of EU member-states by the
same standard. Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which was
established in 1959 under Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (1953) has some judicial review authority over the 46 coun-
tries in Europe that adhere to it. In a recent case, the Salvation Army brought suit
against the city of Moscow, which refused to let the charitable organization operate
on the grounds that its members wore uniforms and had ranks and, therefore, were
members of a “paramilitary organization.” Russian courts upheld the city’s stance, but
the ECHR rejected it in a 2006 decision. Russia’s foreign minister angrily charged,
“We consider some rulings of the European Court to be politicized,” but then added,
“Despite the fact that we do not agree with certain rulings of the court in principle,
we do comply with them.”1
International representative assemblies are arguably a fifth source of international
law. Compared to the generally recognized preceding four sources of international law,
the idea that laws can come from the UN General Assembly or any other international
representative assembly is much more controversial. Clearly, to date, international law
is not statutory. The General Assembly cannot legislate international law the way that
a national legislature does. Yet, UN members are bound by treaty to abide by some of
the decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, which makes these
bodies quasi-legislative. Some scholars contend that resolutions approved by over-
whelming majorities of the General Assembly constitute international law because
such votes reflect international custom and/or the general principles of law. We may,
 The International Legal System 283

then, be seeing the beginnings of legislated interna- FIGURE 9.1 Opinions on Torture
tional law, but, at best, it is in its genesis. Certainly,
UN resolutions and mandates often are not followed, Italy 81% 5% 14%
but some would argue that this means that the law is France 75% 6% 19%
being violated rather than that the law does not exist. Australia 75% 3% 22%
Multiple, reinforcing sources, while not a separate Canada 74% 4% 22%
source of law, are perhaps the strongest foundation for United Kingdom 72% 4% 24%
international law. The prohibition of torture provides Germany 71% 8% 21%
an example. There are numerous multilateral treaties South Korea 66% 3% 31%
that bar torture. Among them, the Convention against Spain 65% 19% 16%
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Egypt 65% 10% 25%
Treatment or Punishment (1984) has been ratified Chile 62% 16% 22%
by 75% of the world’s countries. Various judicial deci- Turkey 62% 14% 24%
sions have found that torture violates the specific Poland 62% 11% 27%
treaties and the general principles of law, and some Brazil 61% 7% 32%
individuals have been jailed for ordering or tolerating Average 59% 12% 29%
torture. The UN General Assembly has repeatedly United States 58% 6% 36%
and by lopsided margins condemned torture, and, Philippines 56% 4% 40%
as Figure 9.1 indicates, most people in most countries Iraq 55% 3% 42%
oppose torture. Whatever the view of an individual Ukraine 54% 17% 29%
or a country, it is safe to say that torture violates inter- Kenya 53% 9% 38%
national law. Indonesia 51% 9% 40%
Mexico 50% 14% 36%
China 49% 14% 37%
Adherence to the Law Nigeria 49% 12% 39%
Adherence to the law is a third essential element of Israel 48% 9% 43%
any legal system. As Figure 9.2 represents, people Russia 43% 20% 37%
obey the law because of a mixture of voluntary and India 23% 45% 32%
coerced compliance, and they enforce the law through Percent favoring: No torture Unsure Some torture
a mixture of enforcement by central authorities and
enforcement through self-help. World public opinion helps to establish international custom and
general principles of law, which are sources of international law.
Compliance with the Law Whether it is permissible to torture suspected terrorists and others for
information has been widely debated since 9/11. A majority of the
Obedience to the law in any legal system—
people in 18 of the 24 countries shown here and a majority of people
whether it is international or domestic, primitive or overall oppose torture. There was no country in which a majority
sophisticated—is based on a mix of voluntary com- favored torture, and only 29% worldwide did so.
pliance and coercion. Voluntary compliance occurs
Data source: BBC World Service Poll, 2006; data courtesy of World Public Opinion.
when the subjects obey the law because they accept its
legitimacy, that is, people abide by rules because they
accept the political authority that made the rules and/or agree with the rules them-
selves. Coercion is the process of gaining compliance through threats of violence,
imprisonment, economic sanction, or other punishment.
Any society’s legal system can be placed somewhere along the compliance scale
between complete reliance on voluntary compliance and complete reliance on coer-
cion. Voluntary compliance is usually more important, but there are wide variations
among societies. Americans tend to obey the law voluntarily; in Myanmar (Burma)
obedience to the laws of the country’s military junta is primarily a function of force.
Compliance with international law is mostly voluntary rather than based on
coercion. Pragmatic legitimacy is the key to international voluntary compliance.
Countries recognize the need for a system that is made predictable by adherence to
laws. Therefore they follow the law because it is in their interest that other countries
284 CHAPTER 9 International Law and Justice: An Alternative Approach

FIGURE 9.2 Factors in Adherence to the Law follow it (Goldsmith & Posner, 2005; von Stein,
2005). For this reason, functional international law
governing day-to-day relations between states has
Enforcement by central authorities
expanded. Legitimacy based on norms is less well
United States Myanmar established, but it has also grown. Aggression, viola-
(domestic) (domestic) tion of human rights, and other unacceptable prac-
Compliance
Voluntary tices still occur, but they increasingly meet with
through
compliance
coercion widespread condemnation. Unilateral military action
21st century Pre-21st century
world society world society is, for example, becoming ever more difficult for a
country to launch without meeting severe criticism.
Enforcement through self-help Such events continue to occur, as the U.S.-led inva-
sion of Iraq in 2003 indicates. But they occur much
less often than they once did. Moreover, even coun-
Two crucial factors in international law are how the law is enforced and
what encourages compliance. These factors differ over time and for
tries determined to go to war will almost always
different societies. make a concerted effort to gain international autho-
rization, as the diplomacy leading up to the 2003 war
again shows. Also, failure to win support subjects a
country, no matter how just it thinks its cause, to extensive international criticism,
which, as noted, was amply evident in global reactions to the 2003 war against Iraq.
A very powerful country like the United States can ignore international opposition in
the short run, but there may be a price to pay later. Washington found this out after
the war when it mostly failed in its effort to get other countries to share the financial
and military burden of occupying and rebuilding Iraq.

Enforcement of the Law

In all legal systems, enforcement relies on a combination of enforcement through self-help
and enforcement by central authorities. Primitive societies begin by relying primarily
on self-help to enforce laws and norms, then gradually develop central enforcement
authorities. Advanced legal systems, like those found in stable countries, rely mostly
on formal law enforcement organizations (usually the police) and sanctions (fines,
prison) to compel compliance with the law. Still, even advanced legal systems recog-
nize the legitimacy of such self-help doctrines as self-defense.
As a primitive society, the global community continues to focus on self-help for
enforcement, and neither law enforcement organizations nor sanctions are well
developed at the international level. Yet there is observable movement along the evolu-
tionary path toward a more centralized system. For example, war criminals were pun-
ished after World War II. More recently, indictments have been handed down for war
crimes in Bosnia and elsewhere, and some of the accused have been tried, convicted, and
imprisoned. Economic and diplomatic sanctions are becoming more frequent and are
sometimes successful, as discussed in chapter 8. Armed enforcement by central author-
ities is even less common and rudimentary. The UN-authorized military action against
Iraq in 1991 and the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 were more akin to an Old
West sheriff authorizing posses to chase the outlaws than true police actions, but they
did represent a step toward enforcement of international law by central authorities.

Adjudication of the Law

How a political system resolves disputes between its actors is a fourth element along
the primitive-to-modern evolutionary scale. As primitive legal systems develop, the
method of settling disputes evolves from (1) primary reliance on bargaining between
adversaries, through (2) mediation/conciliation by neutral parties, to (3) adjudication
 The International Legal System 285

(and the closely related process of arbitration) by neutral parties. The international
system of law is in the early stages of this developmental process and is just now de-
veloping the institutions and attitudes necessary for adjudication.

International Courts
There are a number of international courts in the world today. Their genesis extends
back less than a century to the Permanent Court of International Arbitration estab- www
lished by the Hague Conference at the turn of the century. In 1922 the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was created as part of the League of Nations, MAP
and in 1946 the current International Court of Justice (ICJ), which is associated with The International Court
the UN, evolved from the PCIJ. The ICJ, or so-called World Court, sits in The Hague, of Justice (ICJ)
the Netherlands, and consists of 15 judges, who are elected to nine-year terms through
a complex voting system in the UN. By tradition, each of the five permanent members
of the UN Security Council has one judge on the ICJ, and the others are elected to
provide regional representation, as is evident in the accompanying map.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ)

J
J
J J J

J
J

J
J
J
J
J

J Countries with judges on the ICJ in 2007: China, France, Germany, Japan, Jordan, Madagascar, Mexico,
Morocco, New Zealand, Russia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Venezuela.

Countries involved in cases brought to, decided by, or pending before the ICJ, 1947–2007.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ), which sits in The Hague, the Netherlands, draws both its judges
and its caseload from around the world. This map shows the home countries of the ICJ’s 15 judges in
2007, and the 84 countries that have been a party in cases before the ICJ between 1947 and 2007.
286 CHAPTER 9 International Law and Justice: An Alternative Approach

In addition to the ICJ, there are a few regional courts of varying authority and
levels of activity: Europe’s Court of Justice (ECJ) and European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Central American
Court of Justice, and the Community Tribunal of the Economic Community of West
African States. None of these has the authority of domestic courts, but like the ICJ,
the regional courts are gaining more credibility.

Jurisdiction of International Courts

Although the creation of international tribunals during this century indicates progress,
the concept of sovereignty remains a potent barrier to adjudication. The authority of
the ICJ extends in theory to all international legal disputes. Cases come before the ICJ
in two ways. One is when states submit legal disputes that arise between them and
other states. The second is when one of the organs or agencies of the UN asks the ICJ
for an advisory opinion.
From 1946 through 2005, the court has averaged only about two new cases annu-
ally. Although this number has increased slightly in recent years, it remains relatively
low, given the ICJ’s broad jurisdiction and the number of issues facing the world and
its countries. More than any other factor, the gap between the court’s theoretical and
actual roles is a matter of the willingness of states to submit to its jurisdiction, to lit-
igate cases before it, and to abide by its decisions. Although all UN member-countries
are technically parties to the ICJ statute, they must also sign the so-called optional
clause agreeing to be subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. About two-
thirds of all countries have not done so, and others that once were adherents to the
optional clause have withdrawn their consent. For example, when Nicaragua filed a
case in 1984 with the ICJ charging that U.S. support of the Contra rebels and its min-
ing of Nicaraguan harbors violated international law, the United States argued that the
charges were political and, therefore, that the court had no jurisdiction. When the ICJ
ruled that it did have jurisdiction in the case, the United States withdrew U.S. consent
to the optional clause.
It should be noted that nonadherence to the optional clause does not entirely
exempt a country from ICJ jurisdiction. It is common for treaties to have a clause that
commits the signatories to submit disputes arising under the treaty to the ICJ. One such
treaty that has brought two suits against the United States in the ICJ in recent years is
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963). In it the signatories, including
the United States, agree to settle disputes arising from the treaty in the ICJ. The treaty
permits countries to assist their citizens who have been accused of serious crimes in
another country. Mexico in 2003 brought a case to the ICJ contending that various U.S.
states were violating the treaty in several death penalty cases by not allowing German
and Mexican consular officials access to 51 accused or condemned individuals.
The jurisdiction of the regional courts is determined by the charter under which
www each was founded. Of all the regional courts, the ECJ has the broadest jurisdiction. It can
both review a wide range of actions by the EU executive and legislative institutions,
and it can also determine whether the laws and actions of member-countries violate
SIMULATION
The World Court: Creating a EU law. The caseload of the ECJ, shown in Figure 9.3 p. 285, is one mark of its sub-
Trial for the Classroom stantial jurisdiction and growing importance.

Effectiveness of International Courts

There are some important limits on the impact of the ICJ and other international
courts. The jurisdictional limits just discussed are one restraint. Lack of enforcement is a
second impediment to the effectiveness of international courts. All courts rely heavily
on the willingness of those within their jurisdiction to comply voluntarily or, when
that fails, on a powerful executive branch to enforce court decrees. Effective domestic
 The International Legal System 287

courts have these supports. By contrast, countries are FIGURE 9.3 EU Court of Justice Cases
often reluctant to follow the decisions of international
courts, which, unlike the courts in most countries, 504
Average annual number of new cases
are not backed up by an executive branch with pow-
erful enforcement authority. 428
347
The International Court of Justice The ICJ has only
limited effectiveness. The UN Secretariat, which is 152
the ICJ executive branch, does not have the authority 48
20
or power to enforce ICJ rulings. This allows countries
to sometimes ignore ICJ rulings. In United States of
1953– 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000–
America v. Mexico (2003), for example, the ICJ upheld 1959 2005
Mexico’s claim that the United States was violat-
ing the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations One measure of the importance of the European Court of Justice is its
(1963) by not ensuring that U.S. states allow ar- workload. It has increased steadily as indicated in this figure showing
rested Mexican nationals to contact their country’s the average number of new cases filed annually with the ECJ. The
diplomatic representatives. The ICJ directed the court has jurisdiction over EU legislative and executive actions as well
as over some laws passed by EU member-countries.
United States to do so and to provide relief to the
prisoners who had been denied their treaty rights. Data source: European Court Annual Report, 2005.
The United States had ratified the convention in
1969, but the Bush administration responded to the ICJ ruling by announcing it was
withdrawing U.S. consent to the treaty provision allowing the ICJ to decide cases
under the treaty. Many legal experts doubted whether such presidential authority ex-
isted, but the Supreme Court inferentially upheld it by refusing to hear a case asking
for enforcement on the ICJ decision.
Fortunately for global peace and justice, not all ICJ cases end this way. The ICJ
sometimes does play a valuable role. Its rulings help define and advance interna-
tional law. Furthermore, the court can contribute by giving countries a way, short of
war, to settle a dispute once diplomacy has failed. The current ICJ case filed in 2004 by
Bulgaria against Ukraine over their maritime border in the Black Sea provides a good
example. More important than the details of the dispute is the fact that unlike many

Although the jurisdiction and

impact of the ICJ are limited,
the court still makes an
important contribution by
providing countries with an
alternative other than war to
settle disputes. This picture
shows Nicaraguan troops
getting ready to patrol the San
Juan River area, which is in
dispute with Costa Rica. In the
past, countries might have
used force to settle the issue.
In this case, Costa Rica filed
suit in the ICJ, and the case
will probably be argued in
2007 or 2008.
288 CHAPTER 9 International Law and Justice: An Alternative Approach

disagreements throughout history over land and maritime borders that have resulted
in war, the existence of the ICJ provides Bulgaria and Ukraine a way to come to a
peaceful resolution.
ICJ advisory opinions also help resolve issues between IGOs and may even help
establish general international law. In separate actions, the UN General Assembly
and the World Health Organization each asked the ICJ to rule on the legality of using
nuclear weapons. The court ruled in 1996 that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons
would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed
conflict,” except arguably “in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the
very survival of a state would be at stake.” Among other impacts, the ICJ’s ruling puts
any leader considering the use of nuclear weapons except in extremis on notice that
he or she could wind up the defendant in some future war crimes trial.

Regional Courts Like the ICJ, this group of courts has struggled to make an impact.
The two European regional courts, the ECJ and ECHR, have been by far the most
effective of the regional courts.
The ECJ is particularly notable for the number of cases it hears (466 in 2005)
and its authority to make decisions and to have those rulings followed in areas that
were once clearly within the sovereign realm of states. As Figure 9.4 shows, the rul-
ings of the ECJ have tended to promote EU integration by finding for plaintiffs
who argue that the policy of one or another member-country violates EU law. In one
example, the court ruled in 2001 that Germany was discriminating against women
by barring them from serving in combat positions in the military. Soon thereafter,
Germany changed its policy and its armed forces began to train women for combat.
An important pending decision relates to Microsoft Corporation’s appeal of a decision
by the EU Commission fining the software giant $613 million for monopolistic prac-
tices such as bundling Media Player and other programs with its Windows operating
system. That ruling will have a major financial impact on Microsoft and, by exten-
sion, on both the U.S. stock market and possibly the way that software is sold all over
the world.

Evaluating Judicial Effectiveness Given the limita-

FIGURE 9.4 EU Court of Justice Decisions tions on the effectiveness of the ICJ and most regional
courts, it is tempting to write them off as having
Ruled for country little more than symbolic value. Such a judgment
4%
would be in error. Whatever the outcome of a specific
case, there is evidence that countries are gradually
becoming more willing to utilize the ICJ, the ECJ,
and other international courts and to accept their
Ruled against country decisions. The map of the ICJ’s justices and cases
96% on page 285 shows that countries around the world
have justices on the court and almost half are or have
been a party to its cases. Now more than 60 countries,
including Canada, India, and the United Kingdom,
The European Union’s Court of Justice has promoted EU integration by
usually ruling for plaintiffs who bring a case against their home country
adhere to the optional clause giving the ICJ compul-
claiming that one of its laws or policies clashes with EU law. Of 136 sory jurisdiction over their international legal dis-
ECJ rulings in 2005 on complaints that an EU member-country had putes. In sum, it is true that the international judicial
failed to meet its obligations under EU law, the court found for the system is still primitive, but each of the over 160
plaintiff and against the country in 131 cases, dismissing the opinions issued by the PCIJ and the ICJ since 1922
complaint in only 5 cases. is one more than the zero instances of international
Data source: Court of Justice Annual Report, 2006. adjudication in previous centuries.
 Applying International Law and Justice 289

APPLYING INTERNATIONAL LAW

AND JUSTICE

Law and justice are easy to support in the abstract, but it is much more difficult to Web Link
agree on how to apply them. To examine this, we will look at issues of cultural Those interested in a career in
perspective, issues of applying international law and standards of justice equally to international law or other applied
states and individuals, and issues of pragmatism. aspects would do well to check
out the Web site of the American
Society of International Law at
Law and Justice in a Multicultural World www.asil.org/.

As the international legal system evolves and expands to incorporate diverse

peoples, one problem is the “fit” between differing culturally based concepts of law
and justice. Most of international law and many of the prevailing ideas about
justice that influence world politics are based on the concepts and practices of the
West. This is a result of U.S. and European dominance, though, and does not mean
that Western concepts are superior to those held in other parts of the world. Now,
in a changing international system, Africans, Asians, Latin Americans, and other
non-Westerners are questioning and sometimes rejecting law based on Western
culture.

Law and Cultural Perspectives

Western and non-Western precepts of law and justice differ on numerous points. The
Western view of law is based on principles designed to protect the long-dominant
power of this bloc of states. Order is a primary point, as is sovereignty. Closely related
is the theory of property, which holds that individuals (and states) have a “right” to
accumulate and maintain property (wealth). This is a major philosophical under-
pinning of capitalism. Western law also relies heavily on the process and substance
of law rather than on equity. Thus, there is an emphasis on courts and what the
law is rather than on what is fair. One current controversy that touches on both
property rights and “law versus fairness” involves patents held by Western pharma-
ceutical firms and the desire of less developed countries (LDCs) to produce low-cost
generic equivalents. Patent drugs can cost 50 times more than generic equivalents,
and the LDCs argue that it is unfair, whatever patent law may be, for the poor to
suffer untreated because they cannot afford drugs that, in essence, are only available
to wealthy individuals and countries. Additionally, LDCs worry that in the face of a
quickly moving pandemic, the economically developed countries will keep most of
a limited supply of drugs for themselves. One current dispute focuses on Indonesia
and avian influenza. Drug research teams need samples of the latest strains of
bird flu that have occurred to develop drugs to defeat the constantly mutating
virus. Indonesian authorities have been refusing to supply samples, however, until
they receive assurances that they will receive enough vaccine from the EDCs
to fight bird flu if it begins to spread rapidly among humans. Many in the EDCs
condemned Indonesia’s stance, but it struck a positive chord in many LDCs. Com-
mented one official of Thailand’s Ministry of Health, “The Indonesian health minis-
ter is wise, and sending a strong message that, unless developing countries which
are at the epicenter of the pandemic can be assured access to potential pandemic flu
vaccines, they should not cooperate by sending out the viruses to [help develop the
vaccines].”2
The non-Western view of international law is influenced by the different cultural
heritage of non-Western states, by the recent independence of those states, and by
290 CHAPTER 9 International Law and Justice: An Alternative Approach

Much of international law, which is based on Western concepts, sometimes clashes with the views of
justice held elsewhere. In less developed countries many believe that the high prices of U.S. patented
medicines are unjust because they are unaffordable and therefore they should not be protected under
international law. For example, these HIV-positive/AIDS victims in India are demonstrating against a
patent held by U.S.-based Gilead Sciences Inc. for the AIDS drug Tenofovir Disoproxil Fumarate. The
per-patient annual cost is close to $5,000. Gilead asserts that it offers the drug at $208 a year per
patient to poor countries, but Doctors Without Borders claims that few of these countries actually
get the drug.

the history of exploitation their people have often suffered at the hands of the West.
These states claim that since they had little or no role in determining the rules that
govern the international system, they are not necessarily bound by preexisting
agreements, principles, or practices. Instead, they support sovereignty and reject as-
pects of international law that they claim are imperialistic abridgments of that prin-
ciple. They insist on noninterference, which, for example, was one reason that many
LDCs opposed the American and British intervention in Iraq in 2003. Whatever their
sympathies with the plight of the Iraqis under Saddam Hussein, and whatever the
LDCs’ views of whether or not he posed an international danger, they are concerned
that they could be the target of a future intervention. These states are keenly aware
that such interventions are only launched against weaker countries and that the more
powerful economically developed countries are, in effect, exempt from intervention
no matter what the issue (Farer, 2003; Lang, 2003).
The LDCs also reject weighted voting schemes that favor the rich and powerful,
such as those in the UN Security Council, the World Bank, and the International
Monetary Fund. Emphasizing equity over the substance and process of law, for
LDCs, the important standard is justice, especially in terms of what they consider to
be the unjust maldistribution of wealth in the world that leaves a few countries
wealthy and most countries poor. A final note about multiculturalism and its inter-
face with international law and justice is that there are differing cultural perspectives
on human rights. This topic is covered in detail in chapter 14.
 Applying International Law and Justice 291

Standards of Law for States and Individuals FIGURE 9.5 Sovereignty and Intervention
Yet another issue related to the application of inter- Unsure
national law is whether states and individuals should 7%
be judged by the same standards (Erskine, 2003).
Countries have generally not been held accountable
for assassination, massive attacks on noncombatant Yes
18%
civilians, and other acts that would be reprehensible
if committed by individuals. Of course, we recognize No
75%
differences between justifiable and inexcusable ac- If a country seriously
tions, but where do you draw the line? Some have violates human rights,
should its sovereignty
argued that the state cannot be held to individual bar UN intervention?
moral standards. Realist philosopher and statesman
Niccolò Machiavelli wrote in The Prince (1513) that a A large majority of Americans reject the idea that a country that is
ruler “cannot observe all those things which are con- seriously abusing human rights should be able to claim immunity from
sidered good in men, being often obliged, in order to UN intervention on grounds of sovereignty.
maintain the state, to act against faith and charity, Data source: National Opinion Research Center poll, January 2005; data provided by
against humanity, and against religion.” Taking the op- The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
posite view, then Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson
argued in 1793 that since a society is but a collection
of individuals, “the moral duties which exist between individual and individual” also
form “the duties of that society toward any other; so that between society and society
the same moral duties exist as between the individuals composing them.”
Questions about what principles should guide the foreign policy of countries
are not abstract because countries are increasingly being held accountable for their
actions in the court of international opinion and sometimes even in courts of law.
Sovereignty, while still a powerful concept, is no longer a legal absolute. It is being
eroded by a growing number of law-making treaties that limit states’ actions and by
changing attitudes that no longer see sovereignty as a defense against being called
to account for illegal acts. As Figure 9.5 indicates, there is considerable public
opinion to support UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s argument that sovereignty
“was never meant as a license for governments to trample on human rights and
human dignity. Sovereignty implies responsibility, not just power.”3 Views such as
this led, for instance, to international action that ended apartheid in South Africa
(1993) and forced the military junta in Haiti to flee (1994), and to the NATO
bombardment of Yugoslavia until it ceased its ethnic cleansing policy in Kosovo
(1999), and to the international pressure on Sudan to stop the ethnic cleansing in
Darfur. Also, as we will discuss further below, international tribunals are increas-
ingly holding individual leaders responsible for their actions and for those of their
subordinates.
There are numerous policy areas where international law is applicable to the
actions of states. Many of these are covered in other chapters. Chapter 14, for example,
examines the international law of human rights, and Chapter 15 takes up international
law regarding the biosphere. Of all the policy areas, though, the oldest and arguably
still the most critical is the law of war.

States, War, and International Law

Most of the early writing in international law focused on the law of war. This issue
continues to be a primary concern of legal scholarship, but what has changed is that
in addition to issues of traditional state-versus-state warfare, international law now
also attempts to regulate revolutionary and internal warfare and terrorism.
292 CHAPTER 9 International Law and Justice: An Alternative Approach

Illustrating these diverse concerns is the long debate on when and how war
can be justifiably fought. “Just war” theory has two parts: the cause of war and the
conduct of war. Western tradition has believed that jus ad bellum (just cause of
war) exists in cases where the war is (1) a last resort, (2) declared by legitimate
authority, (3) waged in self-defense or to establish/restore justice, and (4) fought
to bring about peace. The same line of thought maintains that jus in bello ( just con-
duct of war) includes the standards of proportionality and discrimination. Propor-
tionality means that the amount of force used must be proportionate to the threat.
Discrimination means that force must not make noncombatants intentional targets
(Rengger, 2002).
As laudable as limitations on warfare are, they present problems. One diffi-
culty is that the standards of when to go to war and how to fight it are rooted in
Western-Christian tradition. The parameters of jus in bello and jus ad bellum extend
back to Aristotle’s Politics (ca. 340 B.C.) and are especially associated with the writ-
ings of Christian theological philosophers Saint Augustine (Aurelius Augustinus,
A.D. 354–430) and Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274). As a doctrine based on
Western culture and religion, not all the restrictions on war are the same as those
derived from some of the other great cultural-religious traditions, including
Buddhism and Islam (Silverman, 2002). Another difficulty with the standards of just
war, even if you try to abide by them, is that they are vague and controversial
(Butler, 2003).

Just Cause of War

The concept of jus ad bellum, the just cause of war, no longer exists only in theory.
www After World War II, the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals held German and
Japanese leaders accountable for, among other things, waging aggressive war. More
recently, UN tribunals have punished those found guilty of war crimes in the Balkans
WEB POLL
Just War? and in Rwanda. Moreover, the treaty that established the International Criminal
Court (ICC) gives it jurisdiction over “the crime of aggression,” which it defines as
acts of war that are not consistent with the UN Charter. It recognizes “the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs,” but apart
from that contingency requires that members “refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force,” and directs that other concerns be taken to the
Security Council, which “shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace . . .
or act of aggression and . . . decide what measures shall be taken.” The Charter also
stresses that every effort at a peaceful settlement should be made before resorting to
force. These clauses closely parallel the traditional standards—that to be just, war
must be the last resort, declared by legitimate authority, waged in self-defense or to
establish/restore justice, and fought to bring about peace.
Because judging right from wrong is usually harder in an applied situation than
in theory, it is worthwhile to examine a specific case, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in
2003, to explore the intricacies of jus ad bellum (Rodin, 2005). To find that Washington
and London conducted a just war, the answer must be “yes” to all of the following
questions:
Was the war the last resort? President George W. Bush argued it was. He told
Americans, “For more than a decade, the United States and other nations have pur-
sued patient and honorable efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime without war. . . . Every
measure has been taken to avoid war.”4 President Jacques Chirac of France disagreed.
He told reporters that he believed the “disarmament” of Iraq could “be done in a
peaceful way,” and that “War is always the worst of solutions. It’s always a failure. . . .
Everything should be done to avoid it.”5
 Applying International Law and Justice 293

Was the U.S. action taken under legitimate authority? The United States made
a legal argument that the authority to act did exist from the UN under earlier
Security Council resolutions. As President Bush put it, “the Security Council
did act in the early 1990s. Under Resolutions 678 and 687—both still in effect—
the United States and our allies are authorized to use force in ridding Iraq of
weapons of mass destruction.” Taking an opposing view, Secretary-General Annan
declared just before the war that if “action is taken without the authority of the
Security Council, the legitimacy and support for any such action will be seriously
impaired.”6
Was the war waged in self-defense or to promote justice? Bush argued that the
United States was threatened by the possibility that Iraq might give weapons of mass
destruction (WMDs) to terrorists or someday use them itself. “The danger is clear,”
the president proclaimed, that the “United States has the sovereign authority to use
force in assuring its own national security,” and that “before it is too late to act, this
danger will be removed.” A statement issued by the heads of 60 Christian organizations
disagreed. Explaining the group’s position, Episcopal Bishop John B. Shane argued that
just war theory differentiates between “anticipatory self-defense, which is morally justi-
fied, and preventive war, which is morally prohibited.”
In the case of Iraq, he continued, “I don’t see the threat
from Iraq to the United States as an imminent threat,
so . . . military action against Iraq is inappropriate.”7
Was the war fought to bring about peace? Here
again, President Bush argued “yes.” He told Americans,
“The cause of peace requires all free nations . . . to
work to advance liberty and peace” in the Persian
Gulf region. Taking a very different view of U.S.
motives, one Middle East analyst contended that
the U.S. invasion of Iraq “has to do with oil and to
do with empire—getting control of Iraq’s enormous
oil resources.” The analyst then explained her belief
that the motive was “not just about importing oil
to the United States.” Instead, “The issue is control,
undermining OPEC [Organization of Petroleum-
Exporting Countries], and controlling access to oil
for Germany, Japan, and the rest of Europe. This
would give the United States tremendous political
and economic clout in the rest of the world.”8
When thinking about jus ad bellum and Iraq,
fairness requires that you not apply 20-20 hindsight.
If, in domestic law, a police officer shoots someone,
the issue is not whether the person presented an
immediate risk of injury or death to the officer,
but whether the officer had reasonable cause to feel
threatened. In the same way, the fact that WMDs
were never found is not applicable to determining
whether President Bush reasonably believed that
a significant and imminent threat existed. Rather it
is his intentions at the onset of the war, not the suc- After thinking about the just cause of war and about the circumstances
cess or failure of the postwar occupation of Iraq in of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, would you agree or disagree with
bringing about justice and peace that is the standard the view of these people in Toulouse, France, that President George W.
to apply. Bush should be considered a war criminal?
294 CHAPTER 9 International Law and Justice: An Alternative Approach

Web Link Just Conduct of War

The U.S. legal case for the Iraq In the realm of jus in bello, there are some clear guidelines about what is unaccept-
war is in a State Department able. The Hague Conferences (1899, 1907) and the Geneva Conventions (1949) set
paper, “Decade of Defiance” down some rules regarding impermissible weapons, the treatment of prisoners, and
(6/12/02), at www.state.gov/p/
other matters. Other treaties have banned the possession and use of biological and
nea/rls/13456.htm. An
Australian government agency chemical weapons, and the ICJ has ruled that in most circumstances the use of nuclear
takes the opposite view, in weapons would be illegal. Most recently, the treaty establishing the International
“‘Disarming’ Iraq under Criminal Court includes an extensive list of war crimes.
International Law” (2/26/03) Still, many uncertainties exist about jus in bello. The treatment of prisoners pro-
at www.aph.gov.au/library/
vides one example. American military personnel and CIA operatives violated just
pubs/cib/2002-03/03cib16.htm.
war standards in their egregious abuse of Iraqi prisoners of war at Abu Ghraib Prison
and elsewhere in Iraq. But there is less clarity about whether the provision of the
Geneva Conventions relating to the treatment of prisoners of war is applicable to the
status of Iraqi insurgents or to Taliban and al Qaeda fighters captured by the United
States in Afghanistan and held at the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. The
U.S. administration eventually took the position that Taliban prisoners were subject
to the Geneva Conventions’ provisions, but that al Qaeda members were “enemy
combatants,” not prisoners of war attached to a national military organization. As
such, the White House reasoned, enemy combatants were not subject to protections
of the Geneva Conventions and, furthermore, could not only be tried, but could be
tried by special military courts (commissions) rather than civilian ones (de Nevers,
2006; Forsythe, 2006).
The Supreme Court ruled in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) that the president
had no authority to create special military courts and that without such legislative
authority, the legal process for prisoners like Salim Ahmed Hamdan, who had been
Osama bin Laden’s bodyguard, had to conform to existing U.S. law and to the
Geneva Conventions. The controversy then moved to Congress, where there was
a sharp struggle over how to treat enemy combatants. The resulting Military Com-
mission Act of 2006 was largely a victory for the White House. The statute broadly
defines an “unlawful enemy combatant” as anyone who has “purposefully and mate-
rially supported hostilities against the United States” and allows their criminal pros-
ecution by military commissions. These courts can make use of hearsay evidence
and even self-incrimination obtained by coercion falling short of “cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment,” and can bar the defendants from seeing evidence obtained
from sensitive intelligence sources. The act does prohibit “grave breaches” of the
Geneva Conventions, but it also gives the president authority to interpret the mean-
ing of the Geneva Conventions and to bar prisoners from legally challenging these
interpretations.
Web Link Another uncertainty about jus in bello involves how to gauge proportionality.
The text of the Military Commis- Almost everyone would agree, for instance, that France, Great Britain, and the
sions Act of 2006 is available at United States would not have been justified in using their nuclear weapons against
www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/ Yugoslavia in 1999 to force it to withdraw from Kosovo or against Afghanistan in
pdf/PL-109-366.pdf. 2001 for refusing to surrender the al Qaeda terrorists. But what if Iraq had used
chemical weapons against the forces of those three countries during the Persian
Gulf War in 1991 or against U.S. and British forces in 2003? Would they have been
justified if they had retaliated with nuclear weapons? Some people even argue that
using nuclear weapons under any conditions would violate the rule of discrimination
and would thus be unjust.
The jus in bello standard of discrimination also involves matters of degree rather
than clear lines. There was heavy bombing, some of it in urban areas, during the
 Applying International Law and Justice 295

invasion of Iraq. American officials went to great FIGURE 9.6 Opinions on Civilian Casualties
lengths to give assurances that all efforts were being
made to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties. For Muslim countries 18% 4% 78%
example, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld Non-Muslim
42% 9% 49%
countries
told reporters, “The targeting capabilities and the
United States 82% 4% 14%
care that goes into targeting, to see that the precise
targets are struck and other targets are not struck is In its effort to avoid civilian casualties in Iraq, the U.S. tried:
as impressive as anything anyone could see—the Very hard Unsure Not hard enough
care that goes into it, the humanity that goes into it.”9
Most Americans agree that the U.S. effort to avoid The Bush administration said, and 82% of Americans agreed, that the
United States had tried very hard to avoid casualties to Iraqi civilians
killing civilians was laudable, but some did not, as
during the invasion in 2003. By contrast, 78% of respondents in mostly
detailed in Figure 9.6. As this discussion illustrates, Muslim countries thought the United States had not tried hard enough.
the law and justice of war remain highly controver- Opinions were much more mixed in predominantly non-Muslim
sial. Most observers would support neither of the countries, although a plurality agreed that the U.S. effort had been
two polar views: (1) that the United States could not insufficient.
be held responsible no matter what the level of civil- Note: The mostly Muslim countries were Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco,
ian casualties; (2) that knowingly taking actions that Pakistan, and Turkey. The mostly non-Muslim countries were Australia, Brazil, Canada,
France, Germany, Great Britain, Israel, Italy, Russia, South Korea, and Spain.
would kill any civilians violates the standards of jus Data source: Pew Research Center, “Views of a Changing World,” 2003.
in bello. It is easier, however, to question two extreme
views than to clearly demarcate the dividing line
between what is just and unjust.

Applying International Law and Justice to Individuals

International law has begun to deal with the actions of individuals. It is possible to
divide these developments into three topics: post–World War II tribunals, current
international tribunals, and the International Criminal Court.

Post–World War II Tribunals

The first modern instances of individuals being charged with crimes under interna- Web Link
tional law came in the aftermath of the horrors of World War II. In the Nuremberg Links to documents of the
and Tokyo war crimes trials, German and Japanese military and civilian leaders were Nuremburg trials and to such
tried for waging aggressive war, for war crimes, and for crimes against humanity. related sites as the U.S.
Twelve Germans and seven Japanese were sentenced to death. Many Germans and Holocaust Memorial Museum
are available on Yale University’s
Japanese also went to prison. Three important precedents were established:
Web site at www.yale.edu/
■ Leaders are criminally responsible for war crimes they ordered. lawweb/avalon/imt/imt.htm.
■ Leaders are responsible for war crimes committed by their subordinates
unless the leaders tried to prevent the crimes or punished perpetrators.
■ Obeying orders is not a valid defense for having committed atrocities.

Current International Tribunals

After an absence of nearly 50 years, international tribunals reemerged in the 1990s.
The driving force was the atrocities that occurred in Bosnia and in Rwanda during www
the 1990s. In both places, people on all sides were abused, injured, and killed; in
Bosnia it was the Muslims who were the principal victims and the Serbs who inflicted
ANALYZE THE ISSUE
greater atrocities including death and degradation between 1990 and 1995. In Nuremberg Trials
Rwanda the Hutus were the murderous aggressors in 1994 and the Tutsis the victims
of genocide in a ghastly slaughter that was revisited in the 2004 film Hotel Rwanda
and the 2005 HBO special Sometimes in April.
296 CHAPTER 9 International Law and Justice: An Alternative Approach

The atrocities in Bosnia and Rwanda shocked

the conscience of the world and made it obvious, as
a former UN official put it, that “a person stands a
better chance of being tried and judged for killing
one human being than for killing 100,000.”10 This
jarring reality led to the establishment in 1994 of a
tribunal for Bosnia and another for Rwanda to pros-
ecute those who committed atrocities. The tribunal
for the Balkans sits in The Hague, the Netherlands.
The Rwanda tribunal is located in Arusha, Tanzania.
In 1999, the authority of the Balkans tribunal was
expanded to include war crimes in Kosovo.
The Hague tribunal has indicted over 160 indi-
viduals as war criminals, and 95% of them have been
arrested. Charges have been dropped for about 10%
An advance in international law is that at least some of those accused
of the accused. Of those whose trials were completed
of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity are now
being brought before the international bar of justice. One of those
by mid-2005, 90% have been convicted, have re-
is former Bosnian Serb senior officer Vidoje Blagojevic, here being ceived sentences of up to 40 years in prison, and
guarded during his trial by an international tribunal in The Hague, the have been transferred to other countries in Europe to
Netherlands. He was found guilty of committing genocide for his role serve their time (Kerr, 2004). The most important of
in the massacre of more than 7,000 Muslims at Srebrenica in 1995 the trials was that of Slobodan Milosevic, because of
and was sentenced to 18 years in prison. his prominence and stature as the former president
of Yugoslavia. But he died in 2006 of heart failure be-
fore his trial was complete. The tribunal expects to complete all its initial trials by
2008 and the appeals process by 2010.
The Rwanda tribunal has made headway more slowly than its counterpart in The
Hague, but it became the first international tribunal since the Tokyo War Crimes tri-
als after World War II to punish a head of government when in 1998 former Rwandan
Prime Minister Jean Kambanda pleaded guilty to genocide and was sentenced to life
in prison. Through early 2007, the tribunal has completed the trials of 36 individuals,
all but 5 of whom were convicted, and it was trying another 26 people. An additional
18 people who have been indicted are at large. Hutu civilian and military leaders have
made up most, but not all, of the convicted and accused. For instance, a Belgian-born
Italian citizen, Georges Henry Joseph Ruggiu, who was a radio journalist in Rwanda,
was sentenced to 12 years in prison for inciting genocide. Among the many other
chilling calls to mayhem he broadcast in 1994: “You [Tutsi] cockroaches must know
you are made of flesh. . . . We will kill you.”11
Web Link Following a somewhat different pattern, a joint UN-Sierra Leone tribunal was
Video presentations from the
established in 2002. It sits in Freetown, the capital of Liberia, and is guarded by UN
Special Court for Sierra Leone peacekeepers. This court’s mission is to deal with war crimes that occurred during
showing the prosecutors’ cases the civil war in Sierra Leone (1996–2002). There three rebel groups killed and
against most of the defendants mutilated many thousands of noncombatants in an attempt to terrorize the popula-
are available at www.sc-sl.org/
tion. Some of the tragedy that befell the country was captured in the 2006 film,
video.html.
Blood Diamond, with Leonardo DiCaprio. By early 2007, 11 individuals had been
indicted, and 10 of them were in custody. These include former Liberian President
Charles Taylor, who is charged with aiding the RUF (Romano, Nollkaemper, &
Kleffner, 2005). Taylor’s trial, which is slated to begin in late 2007, is considered so
explosive that he has been moved to The Hague where a special session of the court
will try him.
Yet another joint tribunal, this time linking the UN and Cambodia, is scheduled to
begin proceedings in mid-2007. It is intended to prosecute members of Cambodia’s
 Applying International Law and Justice 297

former Khmer Rouge regime for the deaths of approximately 1.7 million people Web Link
(about 25% of the population) during its reign of terror (1975–1979). It is uncertain, The Cambodian Master
however, whether the tribunal will ever get under way, much less achieve any success Performers Program supports
amid the complexities of Cambodian politics. Among other issues, Cambodian the revival of the traditional art
Prime Minister Hun Sen was once a low-ranking Khmer Rouge official. Most recently, forms of Cambodia that were
largely destroyed by the Khmer
a joint tribunal was formed between the UN and Lebanon in May 2007. It is investi-
Rouge. You can view its Web site
gating specific crimes, such as the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, and at www.cambodianlivingarts.org.
other examples of the alleged outside interference that has long destabilized the
country and will prosecute those responsible if they can be identified.

The International Criminal Court

The advent of ad hoc international tribunals put war criminals at peril, and moving
to the next step, the UN convened a global conference in 1998 to create a permanent
International Criminal Court (ICC). During the conference, most countries favored
establishing a court with broad and independent jurisdiction. A smaller number of
countries, including the United States, wanted a much weaker ICC. The crux of U.S.
opposition to a strong ICC was the fear that U.S. leaders and military personnel
might become targets of politically motivated prosecutions. “The reality is that the
United States is a global military power and presence. . . . We have to be careful that it
does not open up opportunities for endless frivolous complaints to be lodged against
the United States as a global military power,” explained the U.S. delegate to the
talks.12 The U.S. stand drew strong criticism. For one, an Italian diplomat expressed
disbelief “that a major democracy . . . would want to have an image of insisting that
its soldiers be given license never to be investigated.”13
While some of the U.S. reservations were met, over 80% of the 148 countries at-
tending ultimately voted to create a relatively strong court. The treaty gives the ICC www
jurisdiction over wars of aggression, genocide, and numerous “widespread and sys-
tematic” crimes committed as part of “state, organization, or group policy” during in- MAP
ternational and internal wars. National courts remain the first point of justice, and Countries That Are Party
the ICC is authorized to try cases only when countries fail to do so. The UN Security to the ICC Treaty
Council can delay a prosecution for a year, but the vote to delay or proceed is not
subject to veto (Broomhall, 2004). The ICC treaty became operational in 2002 after
60 countries became party to it, and by July 2007 the number of ratifications stood
at 105. They are shown in the map on page 298.
The countries party to the ICC treaty met in 2003 and elected the court’s 18
judges and its other top officials, including its chief prosecutor. The court began to
operate the following year. Several African countries soon filed complaints with the
ICC in 2005 alleging atrocities by various forces in the long and gruesome fighting in
the central African area that encompasses parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Uganda, Sudan, and the Central African Republic, and the ICC prosecutor has launched
an investigation. ICC prosecutors began a second investigation in 2005 after the
Security Council asked the ICC to address alleged criminal acts committed in the civil
war afflicting the Darfur region of Sudan. That investigation led to an important first
for the ICC. In 2007, its prosecutor issued the court’s first arrest warrants, charging
a Sudanese official who ironically is serving as minister for humanitarian affairs and
a Janjaweed militia commander with 51 counts of crimes against humanity and war
crimes. The Sudanese government immediately rejected the authority of the ICC,
but other governments have derided other international tribunals only to later see the
accused individuals turned over to the courts and tried.
There is little doubt that the creation of the ICC represents an important step in
the advance of international law. However, French President Jacques Chirac was
298 CHAPTER 9 International Law and Justice: An Alternative Approach

Countries That Are Party to the ICC Treaty

Agreed to
Not agreed to
J ICC Judges
as of 2007

J
J

J J

J
J J J

J J
J
J
J J

J J

More than half the world’s countries, including most of Europe and Latin America, have now ratified
the International Criminal Court treaty. The widely dispersed home countries of the court’s judges
(16, with two vacancies) in 2007 is also evident. However, the absence among treaty adherents of
such key countries as China, India, Russia, and the United States is a weak spot for the effectiveness
of the ICC.

guilty of overstatement when he proclaimed, “Starting now, all those who might be
inclined to engage in the madness of genocide or crimes against humanity will know
that nothing will be able to prevent justice.”14 One issue is that the ICC treaty has not
been ratified by 46% of the world states, including such notable countries as the
United States, China, Russia, India, and Japan.
U.S. opposition remains adamant. President Clinton signed the treaty for techni-
cal reasons, but declined to submit it to the Senate for ratification unless revisions
were made. Strengthening the U.S. stand, Congress passed the American Service-
members’ Protection Act (2002) barring U.S. cooperation with the ICC and autho-
rizing the president to use force to free any American held by the ICC. President Bush
agreed, and in 2002 the State Department informed the UN that the United States did
not intend to ratify the ICC Treaty and did not believe there were any U.S. legal oblig-
ations arising from the earlier U.S. signing of the treaty. Bush also threatened to veto
all UN peacekeeping operations unless the Security Council exempted U.S. troops
from possible prosecution by the ICC. This issue has been resolved for now by a series
 Applying International Law and Justice 299

FIGURE 9.7 U.S. Opinions of the ICC

71%
Yes 65%
No
50%
Unsure
37% 35%

22%
13%
7%

Should the U.S. support having Should the ICC be able to try Have you ever heard
an ICC to try war criminals if U.S. soldiers accused of war of the ICC?
their own country won’t? crimes if the U.S. won’t?

If you ask Americans a general question about having the International Criminal Court try war criminals,
as the left question does, you elicit a high level of support for the ICC. However, if you ask about the ICC
possibly trying Americans accused of war crimes, as the middle question does, then only a minority of
Americans supports the court. One reason for the varying opinions is, as the right question shows, that
almost two-thirds of Americans admit that they have never even heard of the ICC.
Data sources: Left question: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations/German Marshall Fund poll, June 2002. Middle question:
Pew Research Center poll, January 2003. Right question: Gallup International poll, 2005. All data provided by The Roper
Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.

of one-year exemptions given by the Security Council to U.S. peacekeepers. The Bush
administration has also negotiated bilateral “Article 98 agreements” (for a clause in
the ICC treaty) with 100 countries agreeing that neither country will surrender the
other’s citizens to the ICC for prosecution. Sometimes these agreements have been
possible because another government agreed with Washington about the ICC; at
other times U.S. threats of foreign aid cutoffs or other pressures have promoted agree-
ment. What most Americans think about the ICC is unclear. As Figure 9.7 indicates,
American views on the court depend on the question in part because most Americans
know little or nothing about the ICC.
Given its hegemonic role in the international system, the U.S. position on the court
is sure to be important—perhaps critical to its success (Johansen, 2006; Ralph, 2005). www
Little change is likely while President Bush is in office. But some observers are opti-
mistic about the U.S. stance in the long run. For one, the ICC’s chief judge, Philippe JOIN THE DEBATE
Kirsch of Canada, predicts, “In the end, this court is going to become universal. It will The International Criminal
not happen overnight. I think it may take a few decades to reach universality, but I Court: To Ratify or Not
believe it is only a question of time.”15 Perhaps Judge Kirsch is correct and American to Ratify–That Is
attitudes will eventually change. Most movie viewers probably supported the idea of the Question
sending the odious dictator of the fictional country Matoba to the ICC for prosecution
in the 2005 film The Interpreter, starring Nicole Kidman and Sean Penn, and perhaps
in time the ICC will seem less threatening. Even the Bush administration relented just
a bit when in 2005 it abstained rather than vetoed the Security Council resolution that
referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC for investigation and possible prosecution.

The Pragmatic Application of Law and Justice

In a perfect world, all laws would be just, everyone would follow them and also act
morally and ethically and insist that others conduct themselves in the same way.
Moreover, everyone would agree on what is and is not legal, just, and moral. Finally,
our choices would always be between good and evil, not between relative degrees of
300 CHAPTER 9 International Law and Justice: An Alternative Approach

good or of evil. Alas, our world is imperfect, and its standards and choices are often
murky, which leads to several questions regarding the prudence of applying stan-
dards of law, justice, and morality.
Can ends justify means? One conundrum is whether an act that by itself is evil
can be justified if it is done for a good cause. Some believe that ends never justify
means. The philosopher Immanuel Kant took a position of moral absolutism in his
Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and argued that ends never justify
means. He therefore urged us to “do what is right though the world should perish.”
Others disagree and argue that faced with complex choices, lofty goals do some-
times justify acts that most people consider morally abhorrent in the abstract. Terror-
ism is a case in point. For example, the Middle East terrorist group Hamas justifies
suicide bombings against Israeli civilians on the grounds that the “heroic martyrdom
operations . . . represent the sole weapon” available to the Palestinian people. The
statement goes on to argue that “denying the Palestinian people the right of self-
defense and describing this as terrorism, which should have been linked with the
occupation [of Palestinian lands by Israel], violates all laws and norms which granted
the people the right of self-defense” and that “considering the Palestinian resistance
as a terrorist act and an outlaw legitimizes occupation because it delegitimizes its
resistance.”16
On the other side are potential victims of terrorism who debate whether tortur-
ing terrorists to learn about and abort planned attacks is justified. The 1998 film The
Siege took the moral position that FBI agent “Hub” Hubbard (Denzel Washington)
was the hero when he arrested General William Deveraux (Bruce Willis) for torturing
a suspected terrorist to death in an effort to gain information about other terrorist cells
in a besieged New York City. But Americans are not so sure who was right. When
asked the type of general question about torture posed in Figure 9.1 on p. 283, most
Americans oppose torture. But a question in another poll that increased the incentive
Did You Know That: to torture by asking, “Would you support the use of torture by [the] U.S. if it might
A 2002 U.S. Justice lead to the prevention of a major terrorist attack?” recorded 58% of Americans saying
Department memo relating they would support torture compared to only 35% saying they would not.17
to the treatment of terrorist In practice, the primitive international political system can make the strict ap-
suspects argued, “For an
act to constitute torture as
plication of strong moral principles, adherence to international law, and other such
defined [in U.S. law] it must altruistic acts unwise and even dangerous. Clearly, most of us do not take such an ab-
inflict pain . . . equivalent in solute position. Nor do we practice amorality. Instead, most people adhere to moral
intensity to the pain accom- relativism. They believe that actions must be placed in context. For example, most
panying serious physical Americans explicitly or implicitly accept capital punishment and the atomic bomb-
injury, such as organ failure,
impairment of bodily
ings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as somehow justifiable as retaliation or even as an
function, or even death.” unfortunate necessity to a better end. The problem, again, is where to draw the line,
as presented to you in the box, “Would You Kill This Baby?”
Should we judge others by our own standards? The issue about whether to judge
others rests on two controversies. The first, which we have already addressed, is
whether one should apply standards of international law and justice given the diver-
gent values of a multicultural world. Some claim that doing so is cultural imperial-
ism; others believe that at least some universal standards exist.
A second objection to any country or even the UN imposing sanctions or taking
other action against a country for committing supposedly illegal, unjust, or immoral
acts is that it violates the sovereignty of the target country. Americans overwhelmingly
supported sanctions and even war against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
Most Americans would have been outraged over the violation of U.S. sovereignty,
however, had the UN imposed sanctions on the United States for what many, perhaps
most people around the world considered the illegal U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.
 Applying International Law and Justice 301

DEBATE THE POLICY SCRIPT

Would You Kill This Baby?
Here is a chance for you to rewrite the script and change the
future. The setting is Braunau, Austria. The address is 219
Salzberger Vorstadt in a building known as the Gasthof zum
Pommer. There, on Easter Sunday, April 20, 1889, a child was
born. It is a year later, and you have been transported back
to that time and are standing in the room with the baby boy.
You are contemplating whether to kill him. If you do, you will be
immediately transported back to the 21st century and will be
beyond the reach of the Austrian police.
The infant is Adolf Hitler, the fourth child of Alois Schickel-
gruber and Klara Hitler. He is a normal, cute baby, as you can
see in the accompanying picture. His parents love him, and
their neighbors think he is adorable. Unlike anyone in Braunau
or indeed the world in 1890, however, you know what the
future holds. Baby Adolf will grow up to be the führer of Nazi
Germany. His Third Reich will be responsible for the horrors of
World War II and the genocidal acts against Europe’s Jews,
Gypsies, and others. You know that he will die by his own hand
on April 29, 1945, in a bunker in Berlin. But by then it will be
too late. Tens of millions of people will have died in the war in
Europe, and 6 million Jews and other people deemed undesir-
able will have perished in death camps. Should you kill the Would you kill this baby? Imagine you have been
baby now? transported back to early 1890 and you are standing
All this may seem macabre, but the point is to struggle just out of this picture. No one but you and the child are
with whether the laudable ends sometimes justify distressing present. The baby in this picture is Adolf Hitler, about
means. A moral absolutist would not kill young Hitler. Someone a year after his birth on April 20, 1889, in Braunau,
who is amoral would have no qualms about doing it. However, Austria. Given your knowledge of the horrors of World
most people, probably including you, are moral relativists War II and the Holocaust, would you kill baby Adolf?
who make moral decisions in a context. Complicating the Would the end justify the means? This and other issues
decision even further, the world drama is partly an improvisa- are raised if one attempts to apply moral standards to
tional play. So in a caution much like Star Trek’s “prime direc- the formation and conduct of foreign policy.
tive,” interfering with the future is risky because you cannot
be absolutely sure of what will occur in the 1930s and the
first half of the 1940s if there is a simple marker reading to focus on developing an atomic bomb, and to ultimately win
“Adolf Hitler, 1889–1890” at the resting place in Braunau. World War II.
Perhaps the Holocaust and World War II will never occur. Or
perhaps a different German führer will come to power, one What Do You Think?
who is smart enough to defeat Great Britain before attack- Should you rewrite the script of history by taking a pillow and
ing Russia, to not declare war on the United States in 1941, smothering baby Adolf?

A third concern stems from what one might call “selective interventions.” The United
States has intervened in Haiti and Iraq at least partly in the name of democracy, yet
in 1990 it sent its forces to defend Saudi Arabia and liberate Kuwait, both of which
are ruled by distinctly undemocratic monarchies. Strong U.S. sanctions exist against
communist Cuba, but U.S. trade with communist China is booming. Such selective
interventions lead to a fourth concern: the suspicion that the invocation of interna-
tional law and justice is often a smokescreen to cover old-fashioned imperialist
intentions (Welsh, 2004; Orford, 2003).
302 CHAPTER 9 International Law and Justice: An Alternative Approach

Is it pragmatic to apply standards of legality and justice? Another objection to try-

ing to apply moral principles is based on self-interest. Realists maintain that national
interest sometimes precludes the application of otherwise laudable moral principles.
They further contend that trying to uphold abstract standards of justice casts a leader
as a perpetual Don Quixote, a pseudo knight-errant whose wish “To dream the im-
possible dream; to fight the unbeatable foe; . . . [and] to right the unrightable wrong,”
while appealing romantically, is delusional and perhaps dangerous. One danger is
that you waste your reputation, your wealth, and the lives of your soldiers trying to
do the impossible. A second peril springs from the reality that since not all states act
morally, those who do are at a disadvantage: “Nice guys finish last.”
Those who disagree with this line of reasoning contend that it fails the test of
courageously standing up for what is right. They might even recall the remonstration
of President John F. Kennedy, who, evoking Dante Alighieri’s The Divine Comedy
(1321), commented, “Dante once said that the hottest places in hell are reserved for
those who in a period of moral crisis maintain their neutrality.”18 More pragmatically,
advocates of applying principles of law and justice contend that greater justice is nec-
essary for world survival. This argument deals, for example, with resource distribu-
tion. It contends that it is unjust to support a system in which a large part of the
world remains both impoverished and without self-development possibilities. The
inevitable result, according to this view, will be a world crisis that will destroy order
as countries fight for every declining resource.
One way out of the dilemma about when and to what degree law, justice, and
other principles should apply to foreign policy may be to begin with the observation
that it is not necessary to choose between moral absolutism and amorality. Instead,
there is a middle ground of moral relativism that relies on moral pragmatism as a
guiding principle. There is a secular prayer that asks for the courage to change the
wrongs one can, the patience to accept the wrongs that one cannot change, and the
wisdom to know the difference. From this perspective, a decision maker must ask,
first, whether any tangible good is likely to result from a course of action and, second,
whether the good will outweigh negative collateral consequences. By the first stan-
dard, taking high-flown principled stands when it is impossible or unlikely that you
will affect the situation is quixotic. By the second standard, applying standards of jus-
tice when the overall consequences will be vastly more negative also fails the test of
prudence. But not taking action when change is possible and when the good will out-
weigh the bad fails the test of just behavior.

THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW AND JUSTICE

The often anarchic and inequitable world makes it easy to dismiss idealistic talk of
conducting international relations according to standards of international law and
justice. This view, however, was probably never valid and certainly is not true now.
An irreversible trend in world affairs is the rapid growth of transnational interaction
among states and people. As these interactions have grown, so has the need for regu-
larized behavior and for rules to prescribe that behavior. For very pragmatic reasons,
then, many people have come to believe, as one analyst notes, that “most issues
of transnational concern are best addressed through legal frameworks that render
the behavior of global actors more predictable and induce compliance from poten-
tial or actual violators” (Ratner, 1998:78). The growth of these rules in functional
 Chapter Summary 303

international interactions has been on the leading edge of the development of inter-
national law. Advances in political and military areas have been slower, but here too
there has been progress. Thus, as with the United Nations, the pessimist may decry
the glass as less than half full, whereas, in reality, it is encouraging that there is more
and more water in the previously almost empty glass.
All the signs point to increasing respect for international law and a greater
emphasis on adhering to at least rudimentary standards of justice. Violations of
international standards are now more likely to draw criticism from the world com-
munity. It is probable, therefore, that international law will continue to develop and
to expand its areas of application. So too will moral discourse have an increasing
impact on the actions of international actors. There will certainly be areas where
growth is painfully slow. A particular barrier is the change in the U.S. attitude from
being a champion of international law and legal institutions after World War II to
being a skeptic today (Murphy, 2004). There will also be those who violate the prin-
ciples of law and justice and who sometimes get away with their unlawful and unjust
acts. But, just as surely, there will be progress.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM

1. International law can be best understood as a 5. The international legal system has four essential
primitive system of law in comparison with more elements: its philosophical roots, lawmaking, ad-
developed domestic law. There are only the most herence, and adjudication.
rudimentary procedures and institutions for mak- 6. The roots of law for any legal system may come
ing, adjudicating, and enforcing international law. from external sources, such as natural law, or from
This does not mean, however, that international within the society, such as custom.
law is impotent, only that it is in an earlier stage of 7. Regarding lawmaking, international law springs
development than domestic law. from a number of sources, including international
2. As a developing phenomenon, international law is treaties, international custom, general principles
dynamic and has been growing since the earliest of law, and international representative assem-
periods of civilization. This growth accelerated in blies. Some scholars argue that resolutions and
the 20th century because increasing levels of in- other pronouncements of the UN General Assem-
ternational interaction and interdependence re- bly should be included as a significant influence.
quired many new rules to govern and regularize 8. Regarding adherence, international law, again like
contacts in trade, finance, travel, communication, primitive law, relies mainly on voluntary compli-
and other areas. The possible consequences of war ance and self-help. Here again, though, there are
have also spurred the development of interna- early and still uncertain examples of enforcement
tional law. by third parties, a feature that characterizes more
3. Thus far, international law is most effective when it advanced systems.
governs functional international relations. Interna- 9. The fourth essential element of a legal system,
tional law works least well in areas of “high poli- adjudication, is also in the primitive stage in in-
tics,” where the vital interests of the sovereign states ternational law. Although there are a number of
are at stake. Even in those areas, though, interna- international courts in the world today, their juris-
tional law is gradually becoming more effective. diction and their use and effectiveness are limited.
4. Justice is another factor in establishing the rules of The International Court of Justice and other such
the international system. It acts as a guide to ac- international judicial bodies represent an increas-
tion and as the basis for some international law. ing sophistication of international law.
304 CHAPTER 9 International Law and Justice: An Alternative Approach

APPLYING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE Primarily, it applies to the treatment of individuals
10. In a culturally diverse world, standards of interna- by states, but it also has some application to the
tional law and justice have encountered problems actions of individuals. Thus people, as well as
of fit with different cultures. Most current interna- countries, are coming to have obligations, as well
tional law and many concepts of justice, such as as rights, under international law.
the stress on individualism, are based on Western 13. It is not always possible to insist on strict adher-
ideas and practices, and many non-Western states ence to international law and to high moral stan-
object to certain aspects of international law as it dards, yet they cannot be ignored. One middle
exists. way is to apply principles pragmatically.
11. The changes in the world system in this century
have created a number of important issues related THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE
to international law. Among these are the status 14. With the growth of international interaction in the
of sovereignty, the legality of war and the conduct last century, international law has developed, and
of war, rules for governing the biosphere, and rudimentary standards of justice are being estab-
observing and protecting human rights. lished. Although this growth has sometimes been
12. International law has been interpreted as applying slow, there will definitely be continued progress in
to states. Now it is also concerned with individuals. the future.

For simulations, debates, and other interactive activities, a chapter quiz, Web links,
and much more, visit www.mhhe.com/rourke12/ and go to chapter 9. Or, while
accessing the site, click on Course-Related Headlines and view recent international
relations articles in the New York Times.

KEY TERMS

adjudication ideological/theological jus ad bellum moral relativism

amorality school of law jus in bello naturalist school of law
codify International Court of moral absolutism pacta sunt servanda
functional relations Justice (ICJ) moral pragmatism positivist school of law