PALERMO, CASSANDRA CLAIRE A.

JD1-A

Jesus P. Morfe vs. Amelito R. Mutuc, as Executive Secretary, et al

Facts:

 In 1960, Congress enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act to deter public
officials and employees from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of
morality in public service.
 A provision in the Anti-Graft Law requiring public officers to submit periodically a
sworn statement of assets and liabilities was challenged as an oppressive exercise of
police power and is unconstitutional
 The petitioners relied upon both the protection of due process and the assurance of
privacy of the individual as may be inferred from the prohibition against
unreasonable search and seizure and self-incrimination were relied upon.
 Then Executive Secretary and Secretary of Justice as defendants, filed in their
Answer practically admitted the facts alleged, they denied the erroneous conclusion
of law and as one of the special affirmative defenses set forth: “1. That when a
government official, like plaintiff, accepts a public position, he is deemed to have
voluntarily assumed the obligation to give information about his personal affair, not
only at the time of his assumption of office but during the time he continues to
discharge the public trust. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated
from his public life…”. The Answer likewise denied that there was a violation of his
constitutional rights against self-incrimination as well as unreasonable search and
seizure and maintained that “the provision of law in question cannot be attacked on
the ground that it impairs plaintiff’s normal and legitimate enjoyment of his life and
liberty because said provision merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of
insuring the interest or general welfare in honest and clean public service and is
therefore a legitimate exercise of the police power.”
 With or without memoranda, the case was deemed submitted for decision the lower
court being of the belief that “there is no question of facts… the defendants having
admitted all the material allegations of the complaint.”
 June 19, 1962, Sec. 7 of R.A. 3019 was declared unconstitutional, null and void, by
the lower court “insofar as it required periodical submittal of sworn statements of
financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official or employee of the
government after he had once submitted such a sworn statement upon assuming
office…”

Issues:

 WON the due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus
resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the
provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities
is violative of the constitutional right to privacy
Ruling:

 No.
 In the absence of a factual foundation, the lower court deciding the matter purely
“on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must
prevail” – Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. The Mayor of
Manila
 In the case at bar, there was no factual foundation on which the nullification of the
assailed section of the statute could be based
 The Resolution which states: This is not to discount the possibility of a situation
where the nullity of a statute, executive order, or ordinance may not be readily
apparent but the threat to constitutional rights, especially those involving the
freedom of the mind, present and ominous.” denying the Motion for Reconsideration
is affirmed. In this instance then, “there should not be a rigid insistence on the
requirement that evidence must be presented.”
 The court said that “it would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore
the harsh and compelling realities of public service with its ever-present temptation
to heed the call of greed and avarice” were it condemn such requirement as
arbitrary and oppressive
 The Supreme Court noted that according to Mr. Justice Brandeis, privacy, which is
the right to be let alone is “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.”
 The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection
 "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental
powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is
indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government.
Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the
hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government,
safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it
from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector
— protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has
become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a
technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate to
narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the
capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference
between a democratic and a totalitarian society." – Prof. Emerson
 It cannot be said that the contested statutory provision requires disclosure of
information that infringes on a person's right to privacy, even with the recognition
of such perspective.
 It cannot be denied that the rational relation that such a requirement has to the
purpose of a valid statute goes very far in preventing assent to an objection of this
nature.
 This does not mean that because of the position a public officer holds, he is not
constitutionally protected; suffice it to note that by making it subject to such
mandatory disclosure, there is no unconstitutional interference in anything that
would otherwise be a private sphere.