CORREGIDOR 1945

Repossessing the Rock

MARK LARDAS ILLUSTRATED BY JOHNNY SHUMATE

CAMPAIGN 325

CORREGIDOR 1945
Repossessing the Rock

MARK LARDAS ILLUSTRATED BY JOHNNY SHUMATE

Series editor Nikolai Bogdanovic
CONTENTS
ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN 5

CHRONOLOGY 9

OPPOSING COMMANDERS 11
United States n Japan

OPPOSING FORCES 16
United States n Japan n Orders of Battle

OPPOSING PLANS 27
United States n Japan

THE CAMPAIGN 36
Preliminary operations: January 23–February 15, 1945 n L-Day on Corregidor: February 16, 1945
Consolidation on Corregidor: February 17–20, 1945 n Mop-up on Corregidor: February 21–28, 1945
Taking the outlying islands: March 3–April 16, 1945

AFTERMATH 89

THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY 91

FURTHER READING 93

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 94

INDEX 95
The Philippines, 1945

N
US front line on January 31
US front line on February 15

0 50 miles

0 50km

1. Lingayen landing January 9, 1945

2. Mariveles landing February 15, 1945
South China 3. Invasion of Corregidor February 16, 1945
Sea
XXXXX

Shobu
YAMASHITA

Luzon

Lingayen
Gulf

1 Philippine Sea

XXXXX

Kembu
TSUKADA
San Marcelino

MA N IL A Manila
2 B AY
Mariveles
3
Corregidor
XXXXX

Shimbu
YOKOYAMA

Mindoro Sibuyan
Sea
Mindoro Strait McGuire
Masbate Samar

4
ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN
Corregidor Island, commanding the entrance to Manila Bay, was known
as “The Rock.” It dominated the best approaches to Manila, and the best
harbor in the Philippines. Named Corregidor by the Spanish when they
conquered the islands in the 16th century, it was a tadpole-shaped island
4 miles long and 1¼ miles wide, that looked like it was swimming out of
Manila Bay to the South China Sea. Its round head pointed west, and a long
tail wriggled east.
The head dominated the island. It rose nearly 600ft above the water’s
surface, roughly 1½ x 1¼ miles of uneven mesa jutting up. It was called
Topside. The rest of the island shrank to a narrow band of low ground.
There were other hills on that stretch of Corregidor, most notably Malinta
Hill, in the middle of the island, which rose 390ft.
The area in the waist of the island between Malinta Hill and Corregidor’s
swollen head was called Bottomside. It held the town of San Jose and the
docks used to supply Corregidor. Bottomside was linked with Topside by
Middleside, a slope that initially rose gently, then steeply, near Topside. Small
rises dotted the tail east of Malinta Hill, with one low, flat area covering half
of the eastern quarter of the island, most of which was 100–150ft above sea
level. This was Tailside.

Corregidor, viewed from the

east. Its resemblance to a
tadpole swimming for the
South China Sea is obvious. Its
location made it the guardian
of the approaches to Manila
Bay. (DVDIS)

5
The most extreme makeover
of Manila Bay’s islands into
fortifications was at El Fraile,
which was converted into Fort
Drum, the “concrete battleship.”
It is shown here sometime in
the 1930s. (AC)

The location and rocky terrain made it an obvious site for fortification.
During their tenure the Spanish placed batteries on Corregidor and two other
islands in the entrance to Manila Bay, El Fraile and Caballo. They were not
enough to deter Commodore George Dewey from slipping the US Navy’s
Asiatic Squadron, which he commanded, past them on May 1, 1898. He then
defeated the Spanish Fleet anchored at Cavite Bay.
The victory gave the Philippines to the United States. The US then fought
a seven-year struggle, from 1899 to 1906, to control the islands. It eventually
defeated the nascent Philippine Republic to turn the Philippines into a US
colony. Some of the insurgents became part of the colonial government. By
1916 the US planned to grant the Philippines independence. In 1934 they set
the date for 1944.
In 1904, remembering the opportunity inadequate fortification had given
Dewey’s squadron, the United States began a major fortification construction
project in Manila Bay. Corregidor, Caballo, El Fraile, and Carabao were fortified
with state-of-the-art defenses. When completed, the four fortresses provided
interlocking fields of fire across the whole of the entrance to Manila Bay.
Corregidor was transformed into Fort Mills. It had six major gun
batteries equipped with a total of two 10in. and six 12in. guns, and twelve
12in. mortars; two batteries with a total of five 6in. guns; and a battery of
four 3in. guns. All but the 3in. guns were on disappearing mounts. Three
additional batteries of two 3in. guns each and two batteries each with a single
12in. gun were added later. An extensive collection of barracks and garrison
buildings were constructed, to support the batteries. An airfield was added
to Corregidor’s tail in the 1920s. Adequate for aircraft of that period, it was
too small to be expanded, and was only suitable for light aircraft by 1940.
Caballo Island, immediately south of Corregidor, became Fort Hughes.
It was armed with two 14in. guns, four 12in. mortars, two 6in. guns, and
two 3in. guns when it was completed in 1914. Carabao Island, near the
southern end of the entrance to Manila Bay, was similarly transformed and
became Fort Frank. It, too, had two 14in. guns, and eight (instead of four)
12in. mortars. Both islands’ guns were mounted on disappearing carriages,
with the mortars in sunken casemates. The forts were completed in 1914 and
1913 respectively.

6
 The most extreme makeover was
at El Fraile. Started in 1911 and
completed in 1914, it became Fort
Drum. The Army shaved off the top of
the island down to the waterline. They
then installed a massive reinforced
concrete structure, 350ft long, 144ft
wide, and 40ft high. The deck was 20ft
thick, with concrete walls ranging from
25ft to 36ft thick. It was considered
impregnable, and was topped by two
twin turrets mounting 14in. guns
commanding a 270-degree arc centered
on the South China Sea. Four casemate-
mounted 6in. guns guarded the rear arc
the big guns could not reach. It looked
like a motionless warship and was
soon dubbed the “Concrete Battleship.” It was better than a battleship: it Malinta Tunnel during the
could not be sunk. 1942 siege of Corregidor by
Japan. Despite its impressive
All four fortresses were designed before the advent of the military aircraft. fortifications, Corregidor twice
While no surface warship would be likely to prevail against them, all except proved more of a trap for its
Fort Drum were highly vulnerable to aircraft. The disappearing mounts and defenders than an obstacle to
mortars were in open pits, unprotected from above. As a result, in the 1930s, its attackers. (USNHHC)
the Army began digging underground tunnel complexes on Corregidor,
Caballo, and Carabao islands.
The largest and most complex series of tunnels was burrowed into
Malinta Hill. Started in 1932, it consisted of a main tunnel and 25 lateral
tunnels. Dug by convicts, and blasted with condemned TNT, it was largely
complete by 1934. The tunnels were lined with concrete, provided with
forced ventilation, and fully electrified. An electric trolley ran through the
main tunnel. Once the initial 25 laterals were complete, more tunnels were
dug. The work continued until December 1941. By then another 23 tunnels
had been dug. Its laterals served as barracks, office space, hospitals, and
magazines. Several thousand personnel could be accommodated comfortably.
The inadequacy of the fortifications as well as their resilience was
demonstrated when Japan invaded the Philippines in 1942. Their guns
proved irrelevant when faced with an attack from inside Manila Bay, from
shores the guns could not cover. Yet Corregidor held out for almost five
months, including a month of intense bombardment in April 1942. Finally,
on May 5, the Japanese invaded Corregidor, capturing it the following day.
The day after that, Fort Hughes on Caballo Island, Fort Drum on El Fraile,
and Fort Frank on Carabao surrendered.
Japan then took possession of the islands. The US garrisons destroyed the
guns of these fortresses before surrendering. Japan never bothered repairing
the US big guns and mortars. The Philippines were deep within Japan’s
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and were in no danger of being
attacked. Even without the big guns, the four islands remained formidable
defensive positions. Their natural and man-made strengths meant any
attempt to take them would be difficult. Nearly half Japan’s invading troops
became casualties when they took Corregidor in 1942, but Japan believed its
forces they could inflict greater punishment on any invader.

7
 As 1944 began, it became clear, even to Japan, that
their beliefs that the US lacked the will to fight, and that
the Philippines were secure, were both overoptimistic. By
June, with the US invasion of the Marianas, the Philippines
were clearly at risk of reinvasion. The four islands at
Manila Bay’s entrance again became militarily important.
In September 1944 Japan began refortifying them. It was
too late to restore the big guns, but they moved a few of
their own 150mm guns on these islands, and repaired some
of the 6in. and smaller US guns left on the islands.
A flotilla of 70 Shinyo suicide motorboats was sent
to Corregidor. Antiaircraft batteries were installed. The
garrisons were reinforced. The garrisons also dug tunnels
into the rock of the four islands, adding to the prewar
tunnels the US had created. While the Japanese lacked the
offensive strength the US had with the prewar fortifications,
the four islands remained tough defensive positions.
Once the US invasion of Luzon began in January 1945,
the islands had to be recaptured from the Japanese. Manila
needed to be reopened to Allied cargo vessels. Luzon’s
Japanese invaders lower the ground transportation network radiated out from Manila. It was also
US flag on Corregidor on May intended to serve as a logistical center for future Allied thrusts against Japan.
6, 1942. They would hold the
But the four islands, especially Corregidor, had enough artillery on them to
island and the other Manila
Bay fortifications unchallenged make using Manila as a port impossible. The Japanese might not be able to
until January 1945. They sink major warships, but their batteries could easily sink unprotected cargo
neglected its defenses for vessels, and they remained formidable defensive positions.
the first two years they held The Japanese knew this too. When the Allies finally landed on the
it. (USNHHC)
shores of Lingayen Gulf, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, commander of the
Fourteenth Area Army on Luzon, and all Japanese forces in the Philippines,
fell back into a fortified redoubt northeast and east of Lingayen Gulf. He left
only token forces on Luzon’s central plains and around Manila, intending for
these forces to be withdrawn before US forces arrived.
Rear Admiral Sanji Iwabuchi, commanding Manila, went rogue,
disobeying orders to withdraw, determined to hold Manila and its seaboard
approaches to the death. Holding Corregidor was the key to denying Manila
to the Allies. While Fort Drum only had a few 6in. guns, it was viewed as
impossible to invade. Caballo would be difficult to attack until US forces
controlled Corregidor. Carabao was the most distant island from the
Lingayen beachhead, sheltered by geography, but it and El Fraile could be
bypassed if Corregidor fell.
The Japanese were ready for an invasion of Corregidor. They felt it had
to come by sea. The only terrain suitable for an airdrop was on the tail of
the island. That was also the only practical place for an amphibious landing.
Why send lightly armed paratroopers there, when heavier amphibious forces
could reach it? They prepared a warm welcome for any force arriving on
Corregidor’s eastern half. They had dug defensive positions into the island’s
heights on Malinta Hill and the hills of Topside and Middleside overlooking
the beaches the US had to use.
There was one problem: the US knew what the Japanese expected—but
the US found a way to do the unexpected, and confound the Japanese plans.

8
CHRONOLOGY
1898 1944

May 1 Battle of Manila Bay gives the September Japan posts elements of the 31st
Philippines to the United States. Special Naval Base on Corregidor,
Caballo, El Fraile, and Carabao,
1902 and assigns a 70-boat Shinyo unit to
Corregidor.
April 11 Corregidor, Caballo, El Fraile, and
Carabao islands become parts of the October Allied forces invade Leyte, returning
Manila Bay defense system. The Corps to the Philippines.
of Engineers begins surveying the
islands. December 13 Allied forces invade Mindoro, setting
the stage for a January invasion of
1904 Luzon.

September Construction begins on first gun 1945

battery on Corregidor.
January 9 Allied forces land on Luzon on the
1909–14 shores of Lingayen Gulf.

Forts Hughes, Drum, and Frank built. January 22 General Douglas MacArthur orders
the recapture of Corregidor.
1910
January 23 US Army Air Forces (USAAF) begin
Fort Mills completed. aerial bombardment of Corregidor.

1932–34

First phase of Malinta Tunnel built.

1941

December 7 Japan attacks Pearl Harbor, the Pacific

War begins.

December 8 Japan invades the Philippines, landing

on Batan Island.

December 22 Japanese troops land on the shores of

Lingayen Gulf.

December 24 US-Filipino forces fall back to Bataan.

1942

January 7–April 9 Siege of Bataan.

April 9 Bataan surrenders.

April 9–May 6 Siege of Corregidor.

May 5 Japan invades Corregidor.

May 6 US garrison on Corregidor surrenders.

Forts Hughes, Drum, and Frank also
surrender upon orders from General
Jonathan M. Wainwright. US paratroopers of the 503rd Parachute Regimental Combat Team
(PRCT) land on Topside on the morning of February 16, 1945. It
marked the US return to Corregidor after a 33-month absence. (AC)

9
February 3 Formal tactical planning for the March 2 Corregidor is declared secure. A flag-
invasion of Corregidor begins. raising ceremony is held, with General
MacArthur present.
February 12 US Sixth Army begins moving into the
Bataan Peninsula with elements of the March 8 The 503rd PRCT is withdrawn from
6th and 38th Infantry divisions. Corregidor.

February 15 US 151st Regimental Combat Team March 9 Work begins on clearing Manila
(RCT) lands at Mariveles. Harbor.

February 15 US Navy conducts naval March 15 The first ship docks at Manila.
bombardment of Corregidor, Caballo,
El Fraile, and Carabao islands, while March 18 A platoon from the 151st Infantry
US Navy minesweepers clear the Regiment lands on Caballo Island,
minefields around these islands. discovers it is occupied by numerous
Japanese, and is withdrawn.
February 15–16 Japanese Shinyo boats attack the
landing craft in Mariveles Harbor. March 31–April 4 Engineers pump fuel oil into the
tunnels on Caballo in which the
February 16 Rock Force lands on Corregidor. Japanese are hiding and ignite the oil
Captain Akira Itagaki, Japanese with a white phosphorous grenade.
commander of Corregidor, is killed.
April 6–7 Engineers pump more fuel oil into the
February 17 Troops from the 503rd PRCT and Caballo tunnels and again ignite the
34th Infantry Regiment link up. Rock fuel.
Force is reinforced by 1st Battalion,
503rd PRCT, which arrives by boat. April 13 US soldiers enter the Caballo tunnels,
discover one live Japanese soldier, and
February 19 Japanese troops on Topside between kill him when he refuses to surrender.
Wheeler Point and Cheney Ravine Caballo is taken.
launch a banzai charge assault that is
repulsed by the 503rd PRCT. April 13 F Company, 151st Infantry Regiment
boards Fort Drum, and with the help
February 21 The Japanese attempt to blow the of engineers, fills Fort Drum with fuel
eastern entrance of Malinta Tunnel oil and ignites it. It sets off the 14in.
open. They overestimate the amount ammunition stored since 1942.
of explosives needed, killing most of
the breeching party. April 14 The USAAF and US Navy begin a
two-day bombardment of Carabao
February 23 Japanese troops at Wheeler Point Island.
launch another assault, which is
decisively repulsed by the 503rd PRCT. April 16 1st Battalion, 151st Infantry attacks
Carabao Island and discovers the
February 24 The 503rd PRCT launches an Japanese defenders have abandoned
offensive against Tailside from it. The battalion takes Carabao
Malinta Hill. The 34th Infantry without a fight.
Regiment is relieved by 2nd Battalion,
151st Infantry Regiment, and departs April 18 Scouts from the 151st Infantry enter
Corregidor. the still-smoldering Fort Drum and
discover all of its garrison are dead.
February 25 A PT boat approaches El Fraile, which
is occupied by hostile Japanese, who May 1 Manila Bay is largely cleared of
shoot at the PT boat. wrecks and mines.

February 26 The Japanese detonate ammunition in May 15 (Approximate) 151st Infantry departs
Radio Intercept Tunnel under Monkey Corregidor, relieved by elements of the
Point killing 150 Japanese and 52 US 6th Infantry Division.
soldiers.
August 15 Japan surrenders.
February 27 The 3rd Battalion, 503rd PRCT
reaches Tail End.

10
OPPOSING COMMANDERS
The opposing commanders of both nations came from highly professional
militaries. At the senior level both sets were highly trained, having gone
through tough service academies to obtain their commissions and had years
of experience, including in battle. At the corps and army levels both sides
had their varsity managing the battlefield. Many of the senior commanders
had seen combat in two or three wars by 1945. By the start of the Pacific
War’s fourth year these high-level commanders could be counted on to
make competent strategic decisions, and use the resources they had to
best advantage.
The militaries of both nations experienced massive expansions in the
1930s and 1940s. A core of service academy-trained officers existed in the
General Douglas MacArthur
field officer ranks, from captain to colonel (or their naval equivalent of had commanded Allied
senior lieutenant to naval captain). Yet both nations had a large pool of forces in the Philippines from
reserve officers filling those slots. Corregidor in 1942. Following
These men had received commissions through battlefield commission, the US return to Luzon in
January 1945, he ordered the
officer candidate schools, or short reserve officer training. There were not recapture of Corregidor as a
enough regular officers to go around. While many would prove excellent, precursor to opening Manila’s
others were wanting. Some could have become excellent officers, but lacked harbor. (AC)
the experience to grow into their jobs. In other cases, the
demand for officers led to regular officers that lacked
competence being retained and promoted beyond their
abilities. In peacetime these men would have been eased
out at relatively low ranks. Instead, they were retained
because there was a war on.
This problem affected Japan more than the United
States in the Corregidor campaign. Japan suffered
much higher casualties among field and junior officer
ranks than the US. There was greater pressure for them
to raise marginally competent men into leadership
positions. The US was also on the offensive, which
offered two advantages: it allowed good officers to be
put in challenging positions, and also allowed duds to be
shifted to commands of limited consequence where they
might also do some good. The good officers would be
slotted into combat commands, while those not up to the
challenges of combat received garrison postings.
This difference in field-command quality played a
major role in the outcome of the campaign. It was not so

11
 much that the Japanese lacked officers of the quality of those commanding
US battalions and regiments at Corregidor, but rather holding Corregidor
was a low priority. The best Japanese field officers were shifted to the
locations viewed as critical, while Corregidor and the other islands at the
entrance to Manila Bay were sent what was left.
Capturing those islands was a priority for the US. The units sent—army,
navy, and air force—were led by competent, capable officers, the best the
United States had. Good leadership at the theater level was important: getting
the resources available to where they were needed most depended on this.
Leadership in the field was critical to the performance of men fighting at a
tactical level. Ultimately, the fight for the Manila Bay islands was a tactical
struggle, and it was there the US leadership advantage told.

UNITED STATES
Six US commanders played a critical role in the Corregidor campaign; two
at the strategic level, two in support commands, and two on the ground
in battle.
In February 1945 General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was
commander of what was still named the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA).
Lieutenant-General George
Kenney commanded the US
He was in charge of all activities in the Philippines and the theater from
Fifth Air Force during this Australia to the Philippines. The recapture of Corregidor was personally
campaign. His aircraft enabled ordered by him.
the invasion, softening up MacArthur was (and remains) a controversial figure. His military talent
Corregidor before the landing,
and providing the 503rd PRCT
was significant, but was exceeded by his ego. He came from a military family
a ride to the battlefield and air (his father won a Medal of Honor in the Civil War). Graduating from West
support thereafter. (AC) Point first in his class in 1903, he quickly rose in rank. He commanded the
42nd Division in France in 1918, then became superintendent of
West Point in 1919 and Chief of Staff of the US Army in 1930.
MacArthur retired from the US Army in 1937 to lead the
Philippine Army, which he commanded with the rank of field
marshal. Recalled to active duty in July 1941, he commanded
US and Filipino forces in the Philippines when Japan invaded.
Missteps by MacArthur led to a humiliating defeat at the
hands of the Japanese. Ordered to Australia while besieged in
Corregidor, he left the Philippines shortly before the island’s
fall. Once in Australia, he took command of Allied forces in the
SWPA, and led the drive back to the Philippines.
By 1945, Lieutenant-General Walter Krueger was fighting in
his fourth war. Born in Flatow, Prussia in 1881, he immigrated
to America as a boy. He enlisted in the US Army as a teenager
during the Spanish-American War, in which he fought in Cuba.
Reenlisting to fight in the Philippines during the Philippine
Insurrection, he gained a field promotion to lieutenant in 1901.
He, too, served in France during World War I, with the 84th
Division. In October 1918 he became the Tank Corps’ chief
of staff.
Between the two world wars he served in a number of
positions, including being one of the few US Army officers to
attend the Naval War College. In 1941 he commanded the Third

12
Army, leading it in the Louisiana Maneuvers prior to
the US entry into the war. Since he was in his fifties
when the US entered World War II, Krueger expected
to run training commands in the United States. Instead,
in 1943 he was sent to the Pacific to command Sixth
Army, under MacArthur. Sixth Army was the major
field formation on Luzon in 1945.
While Krueger frequently clashed with MacArthur,
the latter retained faith in Krueger. In turn, Krueger led
Sixth Army commendably. Krueger developed the initial
concept behind recapturing Corregidor, and picked the
units involved and the officers that led them.
Lieutenant-General George Kenney commanded the
Allied Air Forces, SWPA, which provided the air support
critical to US success at Corregidor. Born in 1889,
Kenney was a civil engineer in New York when the US
entered World War I. He enlisted as an aviation cadet in
1917, and was commissioned as a first lieutenant upon
completing the program. He served in France, seeing
combat as a pilot in the 91st Aero Squadron.
A reserve officer, he remained in the US Army after
World War I, receiving a regular commission in 1920.
Prior to World War II Kenney served in a wide number of assignments Rear Admiral Russell S. Berkey
(including a temporary one training infantry officers in infantry tactics at commanded the US Navy’s
forces tasked with assisting
Fort Benning, Georgia). As Assistant Military Attaché for Air in France he the recapture of Bataan, and
observed Allied operations in Europe in 1940. Corregidor and the other
In July 1942 Kenney was given command of the Fifth Air Force in the Manila Bay islands. It was an
SWPA. He introduced innovative tactics and weapons after his arrival. assignment encompassing a
wide array of tasks. (USNHHC)
He pioneered close air support tactics such as low-level skip bombing and
machine-gun fire (strafing) bombers. This turned the Fifth Air Force into
an effective killing machine. By 1945 he was in charge of all non-naval air
operations in the Philippines. His units were competent and effective.
Rear Admiral Russell S. Berkey commanded US Naval forces during the
campaign to capture Corregidor and the other Manila Bay entrance fortress
islands. He was born in 1893 in Goshen, Indiana, and attended the US Naval
Academy, graduating in 1916. Following this he served aboard the battleship
New York, assigned to the British Grand Fleet in 1917–18. Between 1920
and the US entry into World War II he served in a variety of roles, including
two tours as commander of the Yangtze River gunboat USS Panay.
Berkey assumed command of the antiaircraft cruiser Santa Fe in October
1942. Promoted to rear admiral in 1943 he commanded several cruiser
squadrons over the next two years. This included participating in the Battle
of Surigao Strait. In February 1945 he commanded a task group providing
fire support at both Lingayen Gulf and Manila Bay. It was made up of
Cruiser Squadron 12 and Destroyer Squadron 21. At Manila Bay Berkey
also supervised the minesweepers, landing craft, patrol torpedo boats, and
other small warships necessary for a successful amphibious landing.
Berkey was more involved with the tactical deployment provided during
the operation to retake the islands than Kenney was with the air support.
The US Navy’s contribution operated on a smaller scale than the that of the
USAAF, and was also more closely focused.

13
 Colonel George M. Jones III commanded the 503rd
PRCT. He also held overall command of Rock Force,
i.e. all ground forces invading Corregidor. He provided
the tactical guidance for the battle. This included pre-
invasion planning, coordinating the combat parachute
drops, and running the operation once US troops were
on the ground.
Born in 1911, Jones attended the US Military
Academy, graduating in 1935. He was commissioned
in the infantry, and served in a number of infantry
assignments between graduation and 1940. When
the US Army began organizing parachute units, Jones
volunteered for jump training. Upon completion of
training in 1941, he was given command of the 501st
Parachute Infantry Battalion (PIB, the first organized by
the US Army) which was sent to Panama late in 1941
for jungle training. In February 1942, the 501st PIB
was rolled into the 503rd PRCT, and sent to the SWPA.
After participating in a combat jump at New Guinea
in September 1943, Jones was promoted to Regimental
Executive Officer. After the 503rd PRCT’s commander
committed suicide, Jones was promoted to colonel and
given command of the regiment. He led this unit in a
second combat jump at Noemfoor Island in July 1944.
When the 503rd PRCT moved to the Philippines, it
Colonel George M. Jones was assigned to the invasion of Corregidor and Jones was tasked with the
commanded both the 503rd planning and execution of the assault.
PRCT and Rock Force, which
consisted of all US Army
Lieutenant-Colonel Edward M. Postlethwait commanded the 3rd
ground forces on Corregidor. Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment at Corregidor. Postlethwait was tasked
He was a pioneer in airborne with landing his battalion on a hostile beach against an alerted enemy. He
activities, commanding the then had to establish his command on the beachhead, capture Malinta Hill,
first parachute battalion
and then move up from Bottomside to Topside and relieve the 503rd PRCT.
organized. (AC)
It was a critical command. His contribution was often ignored in favor of
the more glamourous role played by the paratroopers, yet he executed his
assignments superbly.
Postlethwait was born in 1911 in Warren, Missouri, and attended the
US Military Academy at West Point. He graduated in 1937, receiving a
commission in the infantry. He served in a number of infantry assignments
prior to World War II. This included three years at Fort McKinley, near
Manila in the Philippines. In 1940 he returned stateside and joined the
3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment as a company commander. He saw
extensive combat in the Pacific, rising to the rank of lieutenant-colonel by
1944 and command of the 3rd Battalion. He led the battalion on Leyte and
Luzon between October 1944 and January 1945, before it was selected to
reinforce Rock Force as the amphibious component.

JAPAN
There were three principle Japanese officers involved in this campaign; two
at the strategic level and one at the tactical level.

14
 General Tomoyuki Yamashita was Japan’s military
governor of the Philippines from September 26,
1944 until he surrendered surviving Japanese forces
there on September 2, 1945. He was one of Japan’s
most competent military leaders. Born in 1885 he
graduated from the Imperial Japanese Army Academy
in Tokyo in 1905, in the top 5 percent of his class. He
saw combat in World War I and in China during the
Second Sino-Japanese War.
Prior to World War II he advocated ending the
Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45) and maintaining
peace with the United States and Britain. Despite this,
he was given command of the Twenty-Fifth Army,
assigned with capturing Malaya and Singapore.
Outnumbered by over 2:1, he completed his conquest
in just over two months.
Following the Leyte landings in October 1945,
Yamashita concluded he could not defend the Philippines
and his best choice was to fight a delaying action in the
Luzon highlands to tie down as many Allied forces
as possible to prevent their use against the Japanese
Home Islands. He ordered all Japanese forces on Luzon
withdrawn to this redoubt following the Lingayen Gulf
landing. This entailed abandonment of Manila.
Rear Admiral Sanji Iwabuchi was sent to the Philippines in November General Tomoyuki Yamashita
1944 to command the Third Southern Escort Fleet. Its tasks included the commanded all Japanese
forces on Luzon in 1945. Known
defense of Manila and Manila Bay. He graduated from Japan’s naval academy as the “Tiger of Malaya” for his
at Etajima in 1915, and became a gunnery expert. By 1942 he was a captain, swift capture of Malaya and
and commanded the battleship Kirishima from April 1942 until it was sunk Singapore in February 1942, he
at Guadalcanal in November 1942. He disobeyed orders to evacuate Manila had ordered Manila evacuated,
but was disobeyed by a naval
and join Yamashita in northern Luzon, seeking to avenge the disgrace of
captain intent on dying in
losing Kirishima through death in battle. This included sending garrisons to battle. (AC)
the Manila Bay islands. He succeeded in finding death in battle, at the cost
of the lives of thousands of civilians alongside him.
Captain Akira Itagaki in practice commanded the Japanese forces on
Corregidor, Caballo, El Fraile, and Carabao. Although a naval officer of
the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), who attended and graduated from
Etajima, Itagaki had spent his career as a shore-based staff officer. Instead of
commanding ships, he managed shore establishments. He was Rear Admiral
Iwabuchi’s senior staff officer in the 31st Special Naval Base. Since Iwabuchi
intended to remain in Manila, he sent Itagaki to command the Corregidor
garrison and manage the remaining Manila Bay entrance garrisons.
Command was quite different to the conventional staff position he
was used to filling. Regardless, he was a competent commander and did
a workmanlike job preparing Corregidor to repel an expected amphibious
landing. His inexperience led him to disregard the possibility of an airdropped
assault, despite being specifically directed to expect one. He could not see
where paratroopers could land, except Kindley Field on Tailside. Should they
do so, he felt he could cover an airdrop within defenses to repel an amphibious
landing. His mistake was excusable. Even Jones, an airborne expert, initially
discounted landing on Topside. However, it proved a fatal error.

15
OPPOSING FORCES
The opposing forces in this campaign were a study in contrasts. The Allied
forces, which were almost exclusively drawn from the armed forces of the
United States, were a picked force. They were well trained, and were drawn
from coherent units, which had previous combat experience, had previously
fought as individual units, and had fought in support of other Allied units.
They were a combined-arms force, made up of US Army ground units, US
Navy warships, and USAAF aircraft. They were used to working with other
branches of service. The soldiers actually landing on Corregidor, conducting
the invasion, were trained in ground combat and were first-line troops.
The Japanese defenders were almost diametrically opposite. They had no
air contingent. The defense would be conducted exclusively by the garrison
of the island. Their seagoing naval component consisted exclusively of small
craft, useful only at night. While the ground forces were numerous, they were
largely untrained in ground combat. Most were naval personnel or armed
civilians. The Japanese commander was an administrator, not a warrior.
Their units were composites, thrown together from available resources,
often sailors left without ships after the Battle of Leyte Gulf. They had never
worked together as a coordinated unit.
Despite the garrison’s handicaps, the invaders were not assured victory.
The terrain of Corregidor served as a force multiplier for the defenders. The

Japanese landing craft carrying

troops to Corregidor during
their May 1942 invasion.
The Japanese viewed their
successful 1942 invasion
as the blueprint the United
States would follow during its
own invasion of Corregidor,
and planned their reponse
accordingly. (USNHHC)

16
caves and tunnels of Corregidor acted as both refuges and conduits safe from
the invaders. Most importantly, the defenders expected to hold the high
ground, especially the formidable heights of Topside.

UNITED STATES
The land forces the United States committed to Rock Force (as those chosen
for the recapture of Corregidor were called) were some of the best available
in the theater. The airborne troops represented an elite. The regular infantry
units committed had not undergone special training, but they were battle-
hardened and represented the best standard infantry units available to the
Sixth Army. Similarly, while the naval and air units used in the battle could
not be considered elite or special units, the combat units of the US Navy’s
Seventh Fleet and the USAAF’s Fifth Air Force possessed a uniformly high
level of competence.
A paratrooper of the 503rd
Ground forces PRCT prepares to use a bazooka
Ground troops used in this campaign were primarily drawn from three to flush Japanese troops out of
regiments: the 503rd PRCT, and the 34th and 151st Infantry. They were their position. The men of the
assisted by the 113th Combat Engineering Battalion (CEB). In total roughly 503rd were highly motivated,
innovative, and well armed.
6,000 men were committed to the recapture of the four islands. They were among the best
The 503rd PRCT and 34th Infantry were Regular Army units, maintained light infantry the US Army
in a state of readiness during peacetime. The 151st Infantry Regiment had. (US Army)
and 113th CEB were National Guard
formations, maintained in reserve
status by individual American states
during peacetime (Indiana for these two
units) and mobilized during periods of
national emergency. All were largely
filled by wartime-service volunteers
and conscripts.
The 503rd PRCT was a true elite
unit. Its members were all men who had
completed infantry advanced training.
They then volunteered for paratrooper
service, attending and passing jump
training, and the rigorous physical
conditioning that accompanied jump
school, before being accepted into a
parachute infantry unit. The 503rd
had been formed two months after the
United States entered World War II
by combining three of the four oldest
prewar independent parachute infantry
battalions. Even by 1945 the core of the
regiment was made up of soldiers who
joined prior to World War II.
Since its formation, it had conducted
the US Army’s first combat parachute
drop in September 1943 and a second

17
Soldiers of the 151st Infantry
Regiment advance on Carabao
Island. Originally a National
Guard unit, the 151st had
less combat experience than
either the 503rd PRCT or
34th Infantry. It was the only
unit present during combat
operations on all four Manila
Bay islands. (US Army)

combat jump in July 1944. It had over two years combat experience before
being picked for Rock Force in February 1945. Its men were motivated and
used to tough assignments. It was selected for Rock Force over a regiment of
the 11th Airborne Division due to its greater airdrop experience.
The 503rd’s paratroopers were light infantry. They were intended to take
an objective and hold it until relieved. They had no organic vehicles larger
than jeeps (none of which were dropped in this operation) and the regimental
artillery consisted of a battalion with 75mm pack howitzers and .50-cal.
machine-gun batteries. Unless supported by standard infantry or attached
105mm guns and transportation, they could be overrun by armor or standard
infantry. When fighting other light infantry, they could not be matched.
The regular infantry units assigned to these operations were not nearly
as elite as the parachute infantry, but they were competent, having all the
training a paratrooper had except jump training. Their advantages over
airborne units comprised organic vehicles and heavier artillery. A standard
infantry regiment had a battery of 105mm howitzers, as well as 57mm
antitank guns, and 81mm and 60mm mortars. They could also have armor
attached. This gave them more hitting power.
The 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry, which provided the amphibious
component of Rock Force, came from a Regular Army formation. It began
the war largely made up of prewar volunteers. Draftees and wartime
volunteers were added to replace combat casualties, but it was a solid unit,
proven in combat. Its combat experience started in New Guinea in April
1944, and included participation at Biak, Leyte, and Luzon prior to being
committed to Rock Force.
The battalion was reinforced for the Rock Force action, having four
infantry companies instead of the more typical three. It had a tank company,
antiaircraft battery, and an antitank platoon and cannon company attached

18
from regimental sources. This gave it the firepower it needed to achieve A C-47 on static display at
its objectives. Dyess Air Force Base in Abilene,
Texas. It is painted in the
The 151st Infantry was a National Guard unit raised in 1941, prior to the colors and markings of the
US entry into World War II. It had a mix of prewar draftees and volunteers, 317th Troop Carrier Group. The
largely drawn from Indiana. The regiment had less combat experience than “Jungle Skippers” carried the
the 34th Infantry, having seen limited combat in New Guinea, before being 503rd PRCT on the Corregidor
campaign and two previous
committed on Luzon. The 151st Infantry played a follow-up role in the
airdrops. (DVDIS)
Corregidor campaign. The 1st Battalion relieved the 3rd Battalion, 34th
Infantry late in the recapture of Corregidor, and served as the invasion force
at Carabao. The 2nd Battalion invaded Caballo and El Fraile islands.
The 113th CEB was primarily used against Caballo and El Fraile, after
initial assaults failed to root the defenders out of deep bunkers. Its men
provided demolition services, literally burning the Japanese out of their
positions. These were specialist troops, possessing technical skills required
for military engineering. They were motivated and competent.

Air forces
The air support provided to Rock Force was a major reason for US success.
It was conducted by the Fifth Air Force. At Corregidor it began four weeks
before the landing and continued throughout the battle. The Fifth Air Force
also provided the transports used to drop paratroopers on Corregidor and
resupply them in the opening days of the campaign. While air support at the
other islands was not as extensive as at Corregidor, it was significant.
The Fifth Air Force used most of its suite of aircraft to support the
operation. Four-engined B-24s softened up the island preinvasion. Tactical
twin-engined bombers—the B-25 and especially the A-20—provided
preinvasion support and tactical air support after the landing. Fighter-
bombers, including the P-51 and P-47, provided close air support to troops

19
 on the ground. The Douglas C-47 carried the paratroops and their supplies
and heavy weapons to Corregidor. Almost all the Fifth Air Force’s combat
units supported the operation.
By 1945 the Fifth Air Force had developed into one of the most effective
tactical air organizations of World War II. It had been activated in February
1942 with warplanes that escaped the Philippines, and had been in continuous
combat since then. It had grown from eight groups in September 1942 to
nearly 20 major combat formations and a troop carrier wing by 1945. It
developed innovative weapons and tactics, making it deadly against both
ground and sea targets.
Its aircrew volunteered for service in the USAAF, and flight status. They
were selected based on physical excellence, high intelligence, and mechanical
aptitude. They considered themselves among the best the United States had
to offer, a generally accurate judgment. Despite rapid expansion (it had
20,000 men in 1938 and 2.4 million by 1944) the USAAF maintained high
standards for air crew, who numbered approximately 200,000 by 1945. A
long-service outfit like the Fifth Air Force was built around a core of prewar
regulars and reservists, but by February 1945 most of its aircrew doing the
The US Navy provided a broad
range of support during the
actual fighting were wartime inductees. These men were backed up by an
campaign. This included fire extensive and competent ground support component.
support. This is one of the The 317th Troop Carrier Group (known as the “Jungle Skippers”) was
LCIs the US Navy used for fire assigned the task of dropping the 503rd PRCT. Its aircrews comprised long-
support on the invasion’s first
day. Paratroopers can be seen
term combat veterans, and had worked with the 503rd PRCT on two previous
descending on Topside in the airdrops. They had more experience in combat airdrops than any other Fifth
background. (USNHHC) Air Force unit, and owned the confidence of the troops they were to drop.

Naval forces
The naval component for these operations
was provided exclusively by the US Navy.
Allied navies such as the Royal Australian
Navy and Royal New Zealand Navy
participated in other Philippine operations,
including providing fire support at the
Mariveles Harbor landings that immediately
preceded the Corregidor landings. They did
not take part in the landings to recapture the
Manila Bay islands. For those operations, the
US Navy contributed a cruiser division and
a destroyer division to provide fire support,
and an array of auxiliary and light naval units
necessary to conduct an amphibious landing.
Landing craft included a mix of Landing
Craft Vehicle and Personnel (LCVP), Landing
Craft Personnel (LCP), Landing Craft Infantry
Large (LCI(L)), Landing Craft Support
Large (LCS(L)), Landing Craft Mechanized
(LCM), and Landing Ship Tank (LST). In
addition, a flotilla of minesweepers ensured
the approaches to the landing beaches were
clear of mines, and Patrol Torpedo (PT) boats
escorted the auxiliaries and stood offshore

20
to rescue paratroopers blown into the water. There was also a number of
LCI(R) and LCM(R) rocket-equipped landing craft to provide close-in fire
support to landing troops.
The naval contingent added mobility. It served as a force multiplier. A
single destroyer possessed the firepower of a US Army regiment’s organic
artillery. One of the light cruisers assigned to support the invasions carried a
main battery of 12 or 15 6in. guns and a secondary battery of eight to 12 5in.
guns. This was not quite equivalent to the firepower of a US infantry division’s
organic artillery, but it was close. Naval artillery could not match the mass
provided by USAAF bombers, but it could deliver its fire with greater accuracy.
The US Navy began World War II as an all-volunteer force. Due to
massive expansion, it turned to conscription in February 1943. Up until
then, it maintained higher standards for recruiting than the Army. After
that date, both services used the same standards. By 1945, 60 percent of the
US Navy’s enlisted personnel were volunteers. They were proficient at their
jobs, which were highly technical in nature. Despite Army–Navy rivalries,
the US Navy coordinated closely with the Army to support the invasions of
the Manila Bay islands.

JAPAN
The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) forces
on Corregidor and the other Manila Bay islands were not nearly as well
organized, well supplied, or well prepared as the US forces invading them.
The islands had been hastily regarrisoned in the early fall of 1944. Both guns
and troops had been sent in an ad hoc and improvised manner.
The guns of the IJA’s 3rd Battalion, 22nd Field Artillery Regiment had
been split between Corregidor and Caballo. Three batteries of 150mm guns
were sent to Corregidor, with the fourth emplaced on Caballo. Several of the
6in. guns at Fort Drum on El Fraile were repaired and manned. The Japanese
reportedly repaired one of the 14in guns at Fort Frank, and moved three
100mm guns to Carabao in late 1944. (Carabao was evacuated before the US
landing there in April 1945.) This was the extent of the artillery available to
the defenders It was enough to make Manila inaccessible to cargo vessels, but
not strong enough to withstand a determined bombardment by naval forces.
To protect the batteries, an IJN garrison of just over 800 men was
sent to Corregidor and between 250 and 300 men to Caballo. Another
300 to 350 Japanese marines garrisoned Carabao. Corregidor also had
four heavy weapon batteries operated by 280 men. While US accounts
of the battles to retake these islands refer to these troops as Imperial
Japanese Marines, they were almost certainly not Special Naval Landing
Force (SNLF, Kaigun-tokubetsu-rikusen-tai), the IJN’s naval infantry and
the Japanese equivalent of the United States Marine Corps. They were
more likely drawn from either Defense Units troops (Bōbi-tai) or Guard
Units soldiers (Keibi-ta). Both the latter were formations used to guard
naval installations or facilities from ground attack. Defense Units troops
also maintained the minefields used to deny hostile naval vessels access to
waters such as Manila Bay. Such minefields surrounded Corregidor (and
Mariveles Bay), requiring operators. The naval base at Manila would have
had several thousand men in such units, so they would have been available

21
22
N

North Channel
MAN ILA BAY

North Point
Cavalry Point
Morrison Point Battery Point C ORREGIDOR BAY Infantry Point II Kindley
I
I James Land 329 Landing Field I
••• Engineer Point 4
2 5 219 I Garrison (292) 6 331
Morrison Land (100) I East Point
(30) ••• I (c.75) North 3 (120)
Garrison 3 331 I
4 219 2 Land (100) I I
James (c.75) Garrison Dock Malinta (120) ••• 6 Land 7 331
(160) ••• 2 331 Garrison
Rock Point Ravine I
B 1 (115)
••• Morrison 2 MG Tunnel (115) (160) I
I 2 5 Land (40)
X
Hill (67) Garrison 5 331 Monkey Point
4 HQ (79) (100) I (115)
••• I Malinta I
(35) 4 331 Land
1 31 SNB1 Middleside 1 331 Hill 7
III (115) Garrison
(44) Barracks (115) San Jose Ordnance Point (160)
••• Corregidor
3 219 •••
Grubbs
(c.70) A 1 (50) Island San Jose
(40) Way Hospital South Point
I X
Smith Hearn Land Dock HQ Hooker Point
Topside 1
Garrison
Cheney Ravine Barracks (100) SNB2
Ramsey (65)
Parade SAN JOSE I
Cheney Ground ••• Topside
••• ••• BAY 115th Fishing Unit
1 219 MG
2 219 3 (70)
I (50) Golf Course
(c.70) (67) I
Japanese units on Corregidor, early February 1945

3 Signal Unit
Wheeler I
(94) 1 Geary (54)
MG
4 II
Wheeler Point Breakwater Torpedo Boat Unit
Ramsey (74)
(69) Crockett and Water Patrol Unit
Ravine Point (489)
I
Administration and
Armament Units
Geary Point (135)
III

Suicide Boat Unit

(916)

These units operated out of the Bottomside

Caballo
South China Sea Island
docks or in the Malinta Tunnel and would be
stationed inside it during bombardments.

Japanese battery

Troop strengths for each unit are given in brackets.

0 1 mile

0 1km
 The Imperial Japanese Marines
garrisoning Corregidor were
not elite shock troops. Rather,
they belonged to Guard Units,
such as the ones pictured
here conducting this prewar
landing drill at Cam Ranh Bay,
Indochina. (AC)

for transfer to the Manila Bay islands. While trained as infantry, they were
garrison troops, not elite assault troops.
Some of the men in these units may not have been trained infantry. The
IJN lost many ships at the Battle of Philippine Sea. Many survivors had been
dumped at Manila, where they were organized into composite infantry units
or used to reinforce understrength Defense and Guard units. The 68-man
detachment at El Fraile was made up of survivors from the super-battleship
Musashi, sunk in the Visayan Sea, near Luzon. (As El Fraile was the “concrete
battleship,” the decision made sense.)
These second-rate soldiers were the best combat troops available to defend
the islands. The rest of Corregidor’s garrison was made up of auxiliary units.
There were three construction battalions; the support and maintenance
components for the suicide boats, torpedo boats, and patrol boats stationed
at Corregidor; an administrative unit; units to operate the searchlights, radios,
and radar; and even a fishing unit used to collect food for the garrison.
The construction battalions were more accurately described as civil
engineering units than combat engineers. They had been sent to improve
Corregidor’s fortifications. There were around 1,450 of these construction
workers. Over 300 were civilian laborers. There was also a 220-man
lumbering unit at Corregidor, which went to Bataan to harvest timber for
use in Corregidor’s fortifications, returning to Corregidor to sleep.
Another 950 men maintained the 70 suicide boats stationed at Corregidor,
with 480 more keeping the patrol and torpedo boats operating out of
Corregidor running. These men were all sailors. They had gone through
rudimentary weapons and infantry training as part of their basic training
when they joined the IJN, but were primarily mechanics, technicians, and
armorers. Of the 100-odd men in the fishing unit, two-thirds were civilian.
Another 300 men were administration, supply, maintenance, and medical
personnel. Of these, just under 100 were civilians.
In all, the Japanese had roughly 5,100 men on Corregidor, and around
800 on the other three islands. At least that is what Japanese records

23
The Corregidor garrison
included some 70 Shinyo
suicide boats, like the one
pictured here. Some 950 men
of the Japanese garrison were
assigned to units servicing and
maintaining these vessels. (AC)

captured after the battle tallied. Although most of the garrison was not made
up of combat troops, they would fight. Almost all of the army and naval
personnel, and even most of the civilians, were willing to pick up a weapon
and attack the enemy. The chance of success did not matter. Their training
led the IJA and IJN members of the garrison to believe that death in combat
was preferable to the disgrace of surrender. Even against hopeless odds they
usually fought to the death. Many of the civilian workers emulated them.
Being willing to fight did not translate into fighting effectively. Not only
was most of the garrison ill-trained for combat, they were not well organized.
The garrison had been drawn from whatever forces were at hand when
Rear Admiral Iwabuchi decided to hold the islands instead of retreating.
They were organized into composite and improvised units. Their personnel
had not trained together, and lacked unit cohesion. Individual units were
incapable of coordinating with other units. This handicapped any ground
defense. Captain Itagaki was aware of these shortcomings and planned to
fight a set-piece battle from fixed positions against an amphibious assault.
Corregidor also had naval defenses, but they consisted of small craft. The
weapons with the deadliest potential were the 70 suicide boats. Known as
Shinyo (“Sea Quake”) boats, they were small, fast motorboats. The ones used
at Corregidor were one-man craft, with a 300kg (660lb) explosive charge in
the bow. They could travel at up to 26 knots, and were intended to break up
amphibious landings. They were capable of sinking ships up to the size of an
LST. Like a honeybee, their sting was fatal to them as well as their prey: the
charge was detonated by ramming a target. Extremely fragile, they depended
on stealth and surprise for success. If spotted, they were easily destroyed.
There were also a small number of torpedo boats and motor patrols at
Corregidor. They were intended to escort the Shinyo boats, protect them
from attackers, and draw fire to allow the Shinyos to reach their targets.
Although sturdier than the Shinyos, they, too, were vulnerable to all but the
smallest guns.

24
ORDERS OF BATTLE
DD-694 USS Ingraham
UNITED STATES DD-723 USS Walke
DD-725 USS O’Brien
US ARMY Minesweeping Detachment (all Admirable class)
Sweep Unit 4 (Lieutenant-Commander J.R. Kiefer)
Rock Force
AM-295 USS Saunter
503rd Parachute Regimental Combat Team (Colonel George Jones)
AM-294 USS Salute
1st Battalion, Parachute Infantry
AM-296 USS Scout
2nd Battalion, Parachute Infantry
AM-297 USS Scrimmage
3rd Battalion, Parachute Infantry
AM-299 USS Sentry
462nd Parachute Field Artillery Battalion
One other, name unknown
161st Airborne Engineer Company
Sweep Unit 5 (eight minesweepers)
Detachment 592nd Joint Assault Signal Company
Sweep Unit 6 (eight minesweepers)
34th Infantry Regiment
Amphibious Force
3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry (reinforced)
DD-371 USS Conyngham (Mahan class)
Battery A, 950th Antiaircraft (AA) Battalion
25 LCMs
18th Port Surgical Hospital (reinforced)
Approximately six LCP(R)s
174th Ordinance Service Detachment (Bomb Disposal Squad)
Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron (12 PT boats)
Detachment, 98th Signal Battalion
Detachment, 592nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment
603rd Tank Company (elements) USAAF: FIFTH AIR FORCE
Detachment, 592nd Joint Assault Signal Company Elements included the following:
Detachment, 6th Support Air Party (SAP) 3rd Bombardment Group (Light)
3rd Platoon, Antitank (AT) Company, 34th Infantry Regiment 8th Bombardment Squadron (Light) (A-20)
3rd Platoon, Cannon Company, 34th Infantry Regiment 13th Bombardment Squadron (Light) (A-20)
592nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment 89th Bombardment Squadron (Light) (A-20)
Rock Force Reserve 90th Bombardment Squadron (Light) (A-20)
151st Infantry Regiment 22nd Bombardment Group (Medium)
1st Battalion, 151st Infantry Regiment 2nd Bombardment Squadron (Medium) (B-25)
Caballo Invasion Force 19th Bombardment Squadron (Medium) (B-25)
151st Infantry Regiment 33rd Bombardment Squadron (Medium) (B-25)
2nd Battalion, 151st Infantry Regiment 408th Bombardment Squadron (Medium) (B-25)
113th Engineering Battalion (elements)
Fort Drum Invasion Force
113th Engineering Battalion (elements)
151st Infantry Regiment
2nd Battalion, 151st Infantry Regiment
F Company
Carabao Invasion Force
151st Infantry Regiment
1st Battalion, 151st Infantry Regiment

US NAVY
Heavy Cruiser Division
HMAS Shropshire (County class)
CA-36 USS Minneapolis (New Orleans class)
CA-33 USS Portland (Portland class)
Cruiser Division 12
CL-46 USS Phoenix (Brooklyn class)
CL-47 USS Boise (Brooklyn class)
CL-57 USS Montpelier (Cleveland class)
CL-58 USS Denver (Cleveland class)
Destroyer Squadron 21 (all Fletcher class)
DD-449 USS Nicholas
DD-445 USS Fletcher
DD-446 USS Radford
DD-450 USS O’Bannon
DD-448 USS La Vallette
DD-681 USS Hopewell
Destroyer Squadron 46 (all Fletcher class)
DD-685 USS Picking
DD-580 USS Young
DD-578 USS Wickes
Destroyer Squadron 60 (all Allen M. Sumner class)
Members of the 503rd PRCT land at the Golf Course on February
DD-722 USS Barton
DD-693 USS Moale 16, 1945. This photo captures the rough terrain on which they
landed. (LOC)

25
35th Fighter Group 1st Battery, Fortress (Lieutenant Endo, IJN; 44)
39th Fighter Squadron (P-47) 2nd Battery, Fortress (Ensign Funaki; 30)
40th Fighter Squadron (P-47) 3rd Battery, Fortress (Warrant Officer Yamoto; 94)
41st Fighter Squadron (P-47) 4th Battery, Fortress (Ensign Takahaski; 35)
58th Fighter Group 1st Dual Purpose Gun Battery (Ensign Ishiguro; 99)
69th Fighter Squadron (P-47) 2nd Dual Purpose Gun Battery (Ensign Furutani; 79)
310th Fighter Squadron (P-47) 1st Machine-Gun Battery (Ensign Tamura; 74)
311th Fighter Squadron (P-47) 2nd Machine-Gun Battery (Warrant Officer Araki; 67)
71st Recon Group 3rd Machine-Gun Battery (Warrant Officer Tashiro; 67)
17th Recon Squadron 4th Machine-Gun Battery (Warrant Officer unknown; 69)
317th Troop Carrier Group—“Jungle Skippers” Suicide Boat Unit (Commander Shinotai; Headquarters 18)
39th Troop Carrier Squadron 70 Shinyo suicide boats
40th Troop Carrier Squadron 9th Suicide Unit (Lieutenant Nakashima; 176)
41st Troop Carrier Squadron 10th Suicide Unit (Lieutenant Ishikawa; 153)
46th Troop Carrier Squadron 11th Suicide Unit (Lieutenant Yamasaki; 201)
345th Bombardment Group (Medium) 12th Suicide Unit (Lieutenant Matsue; 199)
498th Bombardment Squadron (Medium) (B-25) 13th Suicide Unit (Lieutenant Horiuchi; 187)
499th Bombardment Squadron (Medium) (B-25) Torpedo Boat Unit (125)
500th Bombardment Squadron (Medium) (B-25) Water Patrol Unit (364, including 93 civilians)
501st Bombardment Squadron (Medium) (B-25) Land Garrison Unit (Captain Ichinozawa, IJN; 822)
348th Fighter Group Signal Unit (Telegraph and Radar) (Major Oyamada; 54)
340th Fighter Squadron (P-47) Administration Unit (Lieutenant Ueda, IJN; 75, including 27 civilians)
341st Fighter Squadron (P-47) Ordinance Unit (Technical Lieutenant Goto; 60, including 58
342nd Fighter Squadron (P-47) civilians)
460th Fighter Squadron (P-47) Expeditionary Unit, Civil Engineering Department
494th Bombardment Group (Heavy) 219th Construction Battalion (Technical Captain Shida; 341,
864th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy) (B-24) including 313 civilians)
865th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy) (B-24) 329th Construction Battalion (Technical Lieutenant Kino, IJN;
866th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy) (B-24) 292)
867th Bombardment Squadron (Heavy) (B-24) 331st Construction Battalion (Commander Yoshida; 822)
Medical Unit (Medical Lieutenant Matsumoto, IJN; 28)
111th Fishing Unit (70)
Searchlight Unit (Warrant Officer Usui; 39)
JAPAN Mariveles Lumbering Expeditionary Unit (Warrant Officer Chayamo;
223, including seven civilians)
31ST SPECIAL NAVAL BASE On Caballo Island
Captain Akira Itagaki Caballo Garrison (approximately 400)
(Troop numbers are given in brackets.) On El Fraile Island (Fort Drum)
On Corregidor Fort Drum Detachment (68)
HQ Unit (115) On Carabao Island
3rd Battalion, 22nd Field Artillery Regiment Carabao Garrison (350)

Three Japanese soldiers killed

on Corregidor. The Japanese
garrison troops proved
tenacious foes. They rarely
surrendered, preferring to fight
to the death rather than suffer
the dishonor of surrender. (AC)

26
OPPOSING PLANS
The difference between the two sides went beyond the type of forces
employed in this campaign. It also included the planning by both sides. The
resources the US employed had been carefully chosen to provide the best
results. Similarly, the plans for retaking the islands were meticulously drawn
up, showed careful attention to detail, covered all expected contingencies,
and had the flexibility to adjust to unexpected eventualities. By contrast, just
as the Japanese forces committed to the defense of the islands were ad hoc
and thrown together, Japanese plans to defend Corregidor, Caballo, El Fraile,
and Carabao were improvised and haphazard.
The campaign’s results reflected the level of planning by both sides. Both
sides made errors. (The biggest one by the United States was to grossly
underestimate the size of the Japanese garrison, which was six times larger
than expected.) Because the US planners created planning in depth, their
mistakes became distractions instead of overwhelming obstacles. Because
Japanese commanders relied on sketchy and incomplete plans, their mistakes
led to failure, and collapse. Worse, they failed in their only achievable
objective: to maximize enemy casualties.

Japanese infantry,
accompanied by a tank,
advance during Japan’s
successful May 1942 invasion
of Corregidor. Japan’s
defensive preparations
were intended to forestall
a similar US amphibious
invasion. (USNHHC)

27
The Entrance to Manila Bay

1. Capture of Mariveles (February 15, 1945)

Cabcaban 2. Battle of Corregidor (February 16–28, 1945)
III
3. Battle of Caballo Island (March 27–April 13, 1945)
1 155
II
4.
5.
Destruction of Fort Drum (April 13, 1945)
Invasion of Carabao (April 16, 1945)
III 34
BATAAN
Mariveles

North Channel MANILA BAY

2 X

Fort Mills

Corregidor Island II

Fort Hughes 3

Caballo Isand

South Channel
South China Sea

I
4

N
Fort Drum El Fraile Island

Carabao Island Ternate

II 5 Caylabne
0 3 miles Fort Frank (-)

0 3km Luzon

Both sides built their plans around the battlefields’ terrain and the prewar
defenses built into them. On Corregidor the Japanese extensively improved
those defenses, while on the other three islands they depended chiefly on
existing fortifications. The geography of Corregidor dictated the plans of
both sides. However, while the Japanese merely relied on terrain to protect
them, US plans made use of Corregidor’s geography in ways unexpected by
the Japanese defenders.

UNITED STATES
The decision to take Corregidor was made by General MacArthur on 22
January 1945; a mere two weeks after the US Sixth Army had landed at
Lingayen Gulf, and only four weeks before the invasion of Corregidor
occurred. By 22 January US forces had broken out of their Lingayen
beachhead, and established a second one south of Manila Bay and southwest

28
of Manila. The race to Manila was
beginning, and Manila’s harbor was
important to future Allied plans. This
required clearing the Japanese from
the Bataan Peninsula, Corregidor,
and Caballo. Control of that terrain
ensured a safe path to Manila. All
that was really necessary was control
of southern Bataan and Corregidor as
ships could traverse North Channel
between the two avoiding the other
fortified islands. Caballo’s proximity to
Corregidor meant its guns could shell
Corregidor, so Caballo was added to
the target list.
MacArthur turned over operational
planning of the invasion to Sixth
Army’s commander, General Walter Kreuger. MacArthur recommended Troops of the 503rd PRCT
Krueger take Corregidor by parachute drop, amphibious invasion, or both. prepare to make a combat
jump from a C-47. The use of
Krueger’s operations section quickly drew up a plan. It envisioned an airdrop paratroopers gave the US an
by the 503rd PRCT, reinforced by a near-simultaneous amphibious landing. element of tactical surprise
The basic concept was for the 503rd PRCT, an independent formation then that facilitated victory on
in reserve on Mindoro, to capture key terrain on Corregidor and tie up the Corregidor. (US Army)
main Japanese forces. It would establish a defensive perimeter, which it would
hold until relieved. The relief would be provided by an infantry battalion
reinforced with armor and artillery detachments. It would arrive through a
shore-to-shore amphibious landing from Bataan Peninsula to Corregidor.
This was simple in concept, but difficult in execution. It contained a
lot of moving parts, all of which had to be coordinated for success. Army
intelligence revealed the Japanese expected an amphibious landing, deploying
the defenders to repel one. Tailside and Bottomside beaches were covered
by machine guns and light artillery. Although a preinvasion bombardment
would force the gun crews into shelter, it would cease as the landing craft
approached the beaches. This gave gun crews time to man their positions
prior to a landing and engage the landing craft in a withering crossfire.
An airdrop solved that problem. The troop-carrying aircraft followed
the last wave of bombers. Almost immediately after the last bomb dropped,
paratroopers followed. They would only be armed with light weapons
immediately after landing, but that was enough to keep heavy weapons
crews from reaching their positions. That bought time for the amphibious
reinforcements to reach shore largely unmolested. These forces, armed with
heavier weapons up to and including tanks and 105mm howitzers, would
relieve the paratroopers.
The decision to undertake an airdrop resolved the composition of Rock
Force, as planners dubbed the invasion force. A regiment of paratroopers was
the right size for Corregidor. There was little room for more to be dropped.
A reinforced infantry battalion would make up the amphibious component.
A second infantry battalion would be held in reserve, in the event one of the
four battalions committed to the invasion needed relief.
Where to drop paratroopers and land the amphibious contingent
became the next question. The only place on Corregidor large enough for

29
 a standard landing zone was Tailside,
around Kindley Field. Even that was
only marginally large enough. Colonel
George Jones, commanding Rock Force,
originally recommended it as the drop
zone after conducting a personal aerial
reconnaissance of Corregidor.
Krueger overruled Jones. Corregidor’s
dominant terrain was Topside. From
Topside, artillery could hit any point
on Corregidor, including Kindley Field,
using indirect fire. Even if a beachhead
was established there, US forces would
then face two uphill fights. The first, to
take Malinta Hill, would be followed by
a long slog across Bottomside and then
This is typical of the appearance up Middleside before reaching Topside. It was the battle the Japanese fought
of much of Topside in February in 1942, the one they expected the US to fight in 1945, and the one they were
1945. It was an uninviting drop
prepared to fight.
zone, filled with obstacles and
debris. Only two marginally Sixth Army planners did not want to fight Japan’s battle. Instead, Jones
acceptable drop zones were was directed to land on Topside. Operations planners felt this put the 503rd
found, and both were far PRCT directly on the key terrain and behind the Japanese gun emplacements
smaller than conventional ringing the periphery of Topside. Further, they believed the rough terrain of
landing zones. (AC)
Topside would convince the Japanese a landing there was impossible. That
provided an element of surprise which would help minimize US casualties.
Given his orders, Jones found two locations suitable for a drop zone.
“Suitable” was defined as relatively flat and not covered with the ruins
of prewar buildings. These were a parade ground and a golf course. Both
were on the south side of the island near the middle of Topside. Both were
small. The parade ground was 325 yards long by 250 yards wide. The Golf
Course was 350 yards by 185 yards. The two were separated by around
150 yards. Both were surrounded by tangled undergrowth and shattered
trees. They were pockmarked by bomb craters. While both had the virtue of

Colonel George Jones,

commander of 503rd PRCT,
and his staff plan the parachute
drop using a scale model of
Topside. One of the keys to US
success was the meticulous
planning conducted prior to
joining combat. (US Army)

30
being relatively flat, both fell off sharply to the south and west, giving way A “stick” of paratroopers
to steep cliffs. descends on Corregidor
on February 16, 1945. Each
Any airdrop would be complicated by the winds. At that time of year individual aircraft dropped six
winds over Corregidor averaged 15–20mph with gusts of 25–35mph. to ten paratroopers or drop
That guaranteed a difficult landing even when hitting the drop zone. In bundles during each pass over
the February dry season, prevailing winds blew from the north to south the drop zones. This resulted in
a protracted drop period. (AC)
and northeast to southwest. This meant gusts had the potential to blow
paratroopers past the drop zone and into or past the high cliffs at the edge
of the drop zones.
The small drop zones and steep drop-offs near them prevented standard
drop tactics. A standard “stick” (the contents of one aircraft dropping all
its paratroopers in one pass) had a landing footprint 1,000 yards long.
Pilots had to provide pinpoint precision when dropping troops including
accounting for variable winds. The drop zones were too narrow for standard
aircraft formations, in which the carrier aircraft flew in three-transport “V”
formations.
Instead, the 317th Troop Carrier Group planned an entirely new flight
pattern. Aircraft would fly in two single-column formations, one over each
drop zone. The direction of flight would be from southwest to northeast,
along the long axis of each drop zone and into the wind to lengthen time over
target. As each aircraft reached the drop point, it had a 6–8-second interval
in which it could drop troops. On each pass an aircraft would drop a stick
of six to eight men (instead of the standard 21).
Once past Corregidor, the aircraft would circle around for another pass.
The aircraft dropping on the parade ground (west of the Golf Course) would
turn counterclockwise. The aircraft dropping on the Golf Course turned

31
 clockwise. The lead aircraft in each formation would join the formation
behind the trailing aircraft. Each half of the 317th Troop Carrier Group
would fly in a race-track oval over Corregidor until all paratroopers had
been dropped. Three circuits of the race track were expected to be necessary.
This offered several advantages. It provided the best opportunity for men
to actually land on their drop zone. It allowed a drop-master flying in an
observing aircraft to adjust the altitude and time at which men were dropped
to compensate for wind conditions. Circling in different directions separated
the two formations, reducing impingement and possible resulting confusion
or collisions. Regardless, Jones expected 20 percent casualties from the
drop alone.
Three battalion-sized drops were planned: one on landing day at 0830hrs;
a second at 1215hrs that day; and a third the following day at 0830hrs.
Sunrise was at 0720hrs and sunset at 1901hrs. This timing allowed the
transports to take off in predawn twilight and the first wave of paratroopers
to land in full daylight.
Planners expected some
paratroopers to be blown past
Each lift would drop one battalion of parachute infantry, a detachment
the drop zone, possibly into of the 503rd Headquarters Company, a battery of 75mm artillery, and a
the water around Corregidor. platoon of .50-cal. machine guns from the 462nd Parachute Field Artillery
The US Navy stationed PT boats Battalion. The first lift would include the 503rd PRCT’s engineering company
offshore to rescue these men.
Here, a raft from a PT boat
and a detachment of a Joint Assault Signal Company (JASCO, to control naval
extracts a paratrooper from the gunfire support), and the second its service company. The Day 1 drops were
water. (USNHHC) each assigned 51 C-47s. Day 2’s drop had 43. Twelve C-47s were assigned to
daily resupply drops starting on Day 2.
These would continue until amphibious
resupply from the beach occurred.
The amphibious landing was no
less meticulously organized. The
landing was scheduled to occur
at 1030hrs, two hours after the
paratroopers first touched down. The
landing site, designated Black Beach,
was at San Jose, on the south side
of Corregidor in Bottomside. Their
objectives were to split the island
between South Dock and North
Dock, secure control of Malinta
Hill, establish a secure beachhead for
amphibious resupply and evacuation,
and establish road communications
with the 503rd PRCT on Topside.
Taking Bottomside divided the
Japanese garrison into two parts
that could be destroyed in detail.
Bottomside was also close enough to
Topside that a quick junction with the
503rd PRCT could occur. Controlling
Malinta Hill allowed the US to contain
any Japanese forces in the Malinta
Tunnel complex and Tailside, and
destroy them in a sequenced manner.

32
 The 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry would be heavily reinforced. A fourth
infantry company was attached. In addition to organic weapons, the
battalion heavy weapons company, a tank platoon, and an antiaircraft
battery accompanied the landing. A bomb disposal squad, and an antitank
company and cannon company from the 34th Infantry Regiment’s organic
artillery rounded out the combat forces A surgical hospital accompanied the
landing force.
The Army would be heavily assisted by the US Navy and USAAF. The
Navy provided firepower in the form of seven cruisers and 14 destroyers.
The original plan called for four light cruisers and six destroyers to provide
fire support to reduce the batteries on both Corregidor and Caballo, starting
three days prior to the intended landing, and to protect the auxiliary vessels
needed to clear minefields and move troops. It was also supposed to provide
on-call fire support to the troops on the islands. This force was reinforced
by three heavy cruisers and five destroyers on L-1 (Landing Day minus 1).
The Navy also provided a flotilla of minesweepers, which were to clear
Mariveles Harbor and the approaches to Corregidor, Caballo, El Fraile,
and Carabao. The minesweeping was to be completed two days before the
landings. A PT-boat squadron accompanied the other ships, to protect the
landing craft and minesweepers from any attacks by Japanese small craft,
Shinyo boats, and patrol boats. The PT boats were also to serve lifeguard
duty, hovering near the shore of Corregidor to rescue any paratroopers
blown off the island during the airdrop.
The USAAF started a prelanding bombardment on January 23, the
day after MacArthur decided to recapture Corregidor. Their plan was
straightforward: flatten everything on Corregidor. Between January 23 and
up until the arrival of the troop-carrying C-47s on L-Day, they plastered
Corregidor with bombs. Over the next 25 days the US bombers dropped
a total of 3,128 tons of bombs during their daily raids. The targeting was
indiscriminate. Anything manmade was considered fair game.

JAPAN
The Japanese garrison knew it had almost no chance of repelling an invasion
of Corregidor and the other Manila Bay island fortresses. No reinforcements
were coming, as the islands were ordered abandoned and the garrisons were
withdrawn to the mainland. Yet the commander of the 31st Special Naval
Base felt it a matter of honor to fight to the last man to hold his position. His
deputy commanding Corregidor planned to follow those orders. A glorious
resistance which bled the attackers would buy time to prepare the defenses
of Japan’s Home Islands. If enough casualties could be inflicted on the Allies,
they might agree to a negotiated end to the war, leaving Japan uninvaded.
Japan knew how difficult an invasion of Corregidor could be. They took
2,100 casualties, including 900 dead, when they landed on Corregidor in May
1942. The US defenders inflicted this amount even though they surrendered
when Japanese forces reached Malinta Hill. Japanese troops were unwilling
to surrender. Their planners reasonably expected US casualties to exceed
what they had suffered three years earlier, perhaps by an order of magnitude.
Corregidor’s commander, Captain Akira Itagaki, believed any invasion
of Corregidor would be exclusively amphibious. There were three places

33
 where invaders might land: Tailside,
Bottomside, or the draws on the western
end of Corregidor that offered a pathway
to Topside’s crest, avoiding the unscalable
cliffs on that end of the island.
Tailside, the long, low, eastern
portion of the island, was viewed as the
most likely landing area. It was where
Japan landed in 1942. It had the poorest
defensive terrain on Corregidor, and
offered good locations for landing craft
to beach. “The poorest defensive terrain”
was relative, however. It was filled with
tunnel complexes (notably at Ordnance
Point and Monkey Point) and riddled
with defensive positions, many deep
enough to provide shelter from a pre-
invasion bombardment.
Bottomside presented a more
problematic landing zone. It contained
North Dock and South Dock, the main
facilities for supplying Corregidor.
That made it valuable to any attacker.
However, it lay between Malinta Hill and
Corregidor’s head. Any forces landing
Japanese troops advancing there could potentially get caught in crossfire between gun positions on
up Tailside in May 1942. The Malinta Hill and Topside. It was also filled with ruined buildings and debris,
Japanese suffered 2,100
casualties when they invaded
which would slow attacking movement. Captain Itagaki probably hoped the
Corregidor in 1942. They hoped US would land there, as it could be turned into a killing ground.
to inflict a multiple of that Finally, the draws leading to Topside had potential as landing beaches,
number on the US when it but they were too small to support large formations. They could also be easily
invaded. Japanese plans were
covered by light artillery and heavy machine guns, making any advance up
built around maximizing US
casualties. (USNHHC) them suicidal. They could also be covered by the prewar artillery positions.
While the prewar guns were useless, the reinforced concrete fortifications
housing them were excellent defensive positions. Again, Captain Itagaki
probably hoped the US would attempt landings there.
Captain Itagaki had been cautioned the US might conduct an airdrop.
He believed the only suitable airdrop landing zone was at Kindley Field on
Corregidor’s tail. Malinta Hill, Middleside, and Topside were rocky hills,
unsuitable for airdrops. The few flat areas on Topside were small, surrounded
by wrecked buildings, precipices, and brush.
Paratroopers landing at Kindley Field would reinforce any amphibious
troops, but would then have to battle uphill to capture Malinta Hill and
then Middleside before reaching Topside. Since airborne troops had lighter
weapons than standard infantry, there was no reason to drop them there
rather than land the equivalent amount of conventional infantry by sea.
Captain Itagaki planned his defense around that assessment, and using
all assets available to him. The artillery on Corregidor and Caballo guarded
seaborne approaches to Corregidor. The guns would engage any invasion
fleet until they were knocked out or their crews forced to withdraw within
fortifications. He would also deploy the Shinyo boats at Corregidor during

34
the enemy’s approach to the island. Since invasions typically took place near A map showing the May 1942
dawn, the Shinyo boats and their escorting torpedo boats would attack Japanese invasion, during
which Japanese troops had
during nighttime hours. landed on the north coast of
Once the invaders had battled their way through these defences, Captain Tailside. In 1945, since Captain
Itagaki planned a protracted fight on Corregidor. He placed perhaps half his Akira Itagaki (the Japanese
available infantry in the tail to bleed the initial landings he expected there. commander on Corregidor)
considered the only suitable
He fortified Malinta Hill. He placed light artillery and machine guns around
parachute drop zone to be
the perimeter of Topside and Middleside to cover the draws, and so they Kindley Field, he placed most
could engage US troops as they advanced across Bottomside once they took of his available infantry in
Malinta Hill. If the US forced its way across Bottomside and up Middleside, defensive positions on Tailside
to repulse the landing expected
the Topside fortifications would be used for a last stand.
there. (AC)
Similar defenses were planned for Caballo, El Fraile, and Carabao. Their
garrisons would attempt to resist a landing by US forces, but would fall back
if unsuccessful. Then, they would retreat into the prewar fortifications built
on the respective islands and wait for the invading troops to dig them out.
Had the US followed Japan’s plan, Captain Itagaki’s dispositions would
have created massive US casualties. The artillery on Topside dominated the
whole island. The Imperial Japanese Army 150mm cannon could reach every
spot on the tail, although they needed artillery observers on Malinta Hill
for indirect fire in its shadow. The Japanese arranged the defensive works
to resist an east-to-west and uphill advance. Captain Itagaki established
a command post on the southeast side of Topside, from where he could
observe the presumed direction of the enemy advance and direct the
battle. Communications lines ran to this post, facilitating coordination
of counterattacks.
The one thing he failed to prepare for was a parachute drop on
Topside itself. His engineers placed no obstacles to block gliders or impale
paratroopers. The existing terrain was viewed as a sufficient obstacle. Nor
were many of the defensive positions optimized to guard against an attack
from the rear. Topside was the weakpoint in his defense perimeter.

35
THE CAMPAIGN
The campaign to clear the Manila Bay islands started on January 23, 1945
and ended on April 16. It was a relatively small campaign in terms of troop
numbers. Each side committed no more than 6,000 ground soldiers. Perhaps
as many as 20,000 members of the US Navy and USAAF participated at
some point during this period. They provided fire support, transportation,
and supply to the US soldiers on the ground.
Despite the length of the campaign, relatively little of it involved ground
combat. There was a 12-day fight on Corregidor between February 16 and
27. Fighting on Caballo Island consumed another ten days, of which only
An aerial reconnaissance
photograph of Corregidor four days involved conventional ground combat; the rest was a combat
taken in January 1945. Bataan engineering exercise. The battle for El Fraile was a brief day, with the infantry
Peninsula can be seen to the providing security for combat engineers. There was no fighting on Carabao,
north (upper left) and Caballo and only a single casualty—a pig, who survived the battle but ended up the
Island to the south (bottom
right). The channelizing effect
guest of honor at a barbeque following the assault.
of these islands on travel to Preparations consumed most of the time. Twenty-six days of intense aerial
Manila is obvious. (US Army) bombardment preceded the invasion of Corregidor. During the last three days
of this bombardment, the US Navy joined
in, shelling Corregidor and Caballo for 72
hours. Mariveles Harbor was cleared the day
before the Corregidor landing. Minesweeping
consumed three days.
The US Army captured Bataan in the days
immediately before the Corregidor landings,
through a combination of troops advancing
overland from the north and an amphibious
landing at Mariveles. This provided the
jumping-off point for amphibious forces
attacking Corregidor.
The operation against Corregidor, despite
its complexity and compressed planning
schedule, went largely as planned. The
battle was decided by the end of its second
day. Fortune favored the more-prepared
side, which was the United States. Japanese
missteps, combined with breaks falling the
American way, gave the US control of the
most important strategic parts of Corregidor
by sunset on February 17.

36
 Corregidor under aerial
bombardment prior to the
arrival of US forces. During a
two-week blitz the Fifth Air
Force, assisted by the Seventh
and Thirteenth Air Forces,
dropped a total of 3,128 tons of
bombs on Corregidor. Most of
the Fifth Air Force’s B-24 heavy
bombers were committed to
this campaign. (USAF)

A week of hard fighting followed, but it consisted of mopping-up. No

combination of Japanese counterattacks could have driven the US off the
islands. The garrison even failed to cause severe casualties among the invasion
force. The 503rd PRCT and 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry were committed to
new campaigns the month following Corregidor’s capture.
The recapture of Corregidor opened a passage between the South China
Sea and Manila, which itself was recaptured on March 3. Ships could now use
North Channel between US-held Bataan and Corregidor and across Manila
Bay without the Japanese molesting them. The capture of the three remaining
islands were clearing actions conducted by fresh troops, some drawn from
the force occupying Corregidor. All were relatively minor operations, but
demonstrated the ability of US forces to use unconventional means to defeat
unexpectedly stubborn resistance.

PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS: JANUARY 23–

FEBRUARY 15, 1945
Formal planning for the Corregidor landings began on February 3, 1945.
Preparing Corregidor for a landing began 12 days before that. Upon being
informed of MacArthur’s intention to capture Corregidor, Lieutenant-
General George Kenney began an aerial siege of the island. Most of the Fifth
Air Force’s Fifth Bomber Command B-24 heavy bombers spent the next two
weeks hitting Corregidor. They were joined by heavy bombers of the Seventh
and Thirteenth Air Forces, which used Corregidor as a target of last resort
when weather prevented primary and secondary targets from being hit.
Corregidor’s area measures 2.1 square miles. Topside’s area is less than 1
square mile. By February 16, a total of 3,128 tons of bombs had been dropped
on the island, an average of 260 tons per day. This was the equivalent of
90 sorties per day, as most of the bombs were dropped by B-24s during this
period. Most of the tonnage was dropped on the western half of the island,
from Malinta Hill to Cheney Ravine. Primarily targeted were any visible
manmade structures: buildings, gun emplacements, and fortifications which
could be seen from the air.

37
 Although impressive, the damage
done by the bombing was limited.
Most of the structures on Corregidor
were destroyed. San Jose was
flattened. The visible gun positions
were silenced. Yet most bombs lacked
sufficient penetration to damage the
cave structures riddling the island.
Even 2,000lb bombs could not create
a crater deep enough to disturb the
prewar fortifications built by the US.
(The Japanese had tried and failed to
penetrate them using armor-piercing
290mm shells in 1942.)
The heavy US bombardment Many of the bombs dropped on Corregidor during this phase were
created relatively light general-purpose or semi-armor-piercing 500lb bombs. They were highly
Japanese casualties.
effective against frame and metal roof construction and could fracture
Fortifications on Corregidor,
including the Malinta Tunnel roadways, runways, and concrete foundations. They turned Topside into
complex (the entrance of a moonscape, creating rubble until the rubble bounced, but they could not
which is shown here), provided reach the underground bunkers and magazines, where the garrison sheltered.
excellent protection for the The bombardment was effective in disrupting the Japanese defenses.
garrison. (US Army)
Any artillery in a surface mount was silenced. Never heavy to begin with,
antiaircraft fire from Corregidor ceased by February 12. The surviving guns
were taken underground to preserve them for the invasion. The bombardment
also conditioned the garrison to wait in their shelters. However quickly they
remanned their positions after the bombardment ceased in the first few days
of the siege, by February 16, they were content to wait in their shelters until
well after the bombs stopped dropping.
The USAAF also patrolled the waters around Corregidor. Japanese barge
traffic between Bataan and Corregidor began increasing in early February.
Fighter sweeps by the P-47s of the 348th Fighter Group interdicted the barges.
Between February 11 and 15, P-47s strafed and rocketed barges attempting
to ship troops from Bataan (which was being invaded by US Army ground
forces) to Corregidor. They claimed 2,000 enemy soldiers killed.
The US Army launched its sweep into the Bataan Peninsula on February
12. While not part of the seizure of Corregidor, it was a necessary precursor
to the invasion. Holding Bataan gave the US control of both sides of North
Channel. Bataan proved lightly held. There were perhaps 1,400 Japanese
scattered throughout the peninsula. Pro-US Filipino guerrillas did such an
efficient job of blowing bridges along Bataan’s roads that this was more of
an impediment to the US advance than the Japanese resistance.
The US 1st Regiment, 6th Infantry Division began a sweep down the
east coast of the Bataan Peninsula that day. Starting at Dinalupihan at the
northern entrance of Bataan, they swept down the coast road. At Pilar, the
regiment split. Part of it advanced across Bataan on the Bagac–Pilar road
which ran in the valley formed between Mount Natib and Mount Mariveles.
The rest continued south on the coast road to Limay, reaching the town by
February 16.
Meanwhile, the 1st RCT boarded boats at Olongapo, and leapfrogged
by sea to the southern tip of Bataan, landing at Mariveles on February 15.
Opposition was light, limited to a few machine guns. They had control of

38
the town of Mariveles by nightfall. The
next day they sent two columns out to
complete the conquest of Bataan. One
went north along a road paralleling
Bataan’s western coast, to join forces
with 1st Regiment troops in Bagac.
The other went east along the road to
Limay, where they linked up with 1st
Regiment forces waiting in that town.
By February 18, the two regiments
had sealed off Corregidor from
reinforcement through Bataan.
Part of the reason for anemic
Japanese resistance, especially at
Mariveles, was Fifth Air Force’s pre-
invasion air support. The Fifth Air
Force began pounding Mariveles on
February 10. Twenty-four B-24s,
and 72 A-20s escorted by a fighter squadron hit Mariveles that morning. Five light cruisers sail from
Identical numbers of B-24s and A-20s returned for afternoon strikes. The Subic Bay on February 13
to conduct a prelanding
Fifth Air Force repeated raids on the same scale daily through February 15. bombardment of Mariveles,
It also sent 48 B-25s and 60 fighters to conduct a rolling air barrage along Corregidor, and Caballo.
the Bagac–Pilar road, assisting the US Army’s advance. Photographed from USS
The greatest challenges to the Bataan landings came from the mines at sea Phoenix (CL-46), the other
visible ships are (from left to
and gunfire from Corregidor. There was only one naval casualty, LSM-169,
right): USS Boise (CL-47); USS
which struck a mine in the seventh wave and caught fire. It did not sink, but Denver (CL-58); USS Cleveland
the 24th Reconnaissance Troop aboard the landing ship suffered personnel (CL-55); and USS Montpelier
casualties and lost most of its equipment. LSM-169 was successfully (CL-57). (USNHHC)
beached, patched up, and safely returned to Subic Bay. A Japanese gun
from Corregidor landed a near miss on a high-speed US destroyer transport
loading troops into a landing craft. Seventeen infantrymen were wounded.
That only one ship struck a mine and only one warship was hit by artillery
in Mariveles Harbor was due to the efforts of the US Navy. Its preparations
began two days prior to the Mariveles landing. It had sent Task Group (TG)
77.3, a mixed force of destroyers and cruisers under Rear Admiral Berkey,
to provide fire support at both Bataan and Corregidor. Also sent were 21
minesweepers led by Lieutenant-Commander John R. Keefer. Their task was
to sweep the mines around the entrance to Manila Bay, in Mariveles Harbor,
and around the four islands guarding the entrance to Manila Bay.
These ships had a second function: bait. They were slow moving, and
minesweeping required the ships to follow straight, unmaneuvering paths.
Berkey’s TG 77.3 accompanied the sweepers. Berkey hoped the Japanese
batteries, silent since February 10, would be tempted to fire at the easy
targets offered by the minesweepers.
Minesweeping began on February 13. As the small vessels systematically
swept the approaches to Manila Bay, TG 77.3 began a methodical
bombardment of the Bataan shore, and targets on Corregidor, Caballo, El
Fraile, and Carabao. To Berkey’s disappointment, the Japanese refused to
take the bait on the 13th, declining to respond. Berkey wrote in his report,
“Juicy targets were placed under the [Japanese] nose, but he declined to take
a crack at them.” Sweeping work was completed by the end of the day on

39
 February 13; warships and minesweepers
returned to Subic Bay for the night.
When they returned the next morning,
they received a different reception. The
morning started with the minesweepers
clearing the channel between Corregidor
and Caballo. Berkey’s cruisers and
destroyers began their scheduled
bombardment of Corregidor at 0840hrs.
At 0933hrs the sweepers reported being
fired on from Corregidor. USS Boise was
detached to silence the offending Japanese
battery. A few minutes after that, batteries
from Caballo opened up on minesweepers
working the waters south of Caballo.
Soon, other guns from Corregidor were
engaging the minesweepers, as were guns
from Bataan and Carabao.
A brief but intense firefight began,
USS Hopewell comes under with the minesweepers joining in with the cruisers and destroyers to silence
fire as it provides protection to the Japanese fire. By 1018hrs, the Japanese guns fell silent. The minesweepers
minesweepers clearing Manila
and Mariveles bays. Berkey’s
finished sweeping the sea around Corregidor and Caballo by 1130hrs. They
force quickly silenced the then moved to Mariveles Bay to sweep the approaches to the landing area.
Japanese shore batteries, but Destroyers preceded the minesweepers, sinking buoys and floats in the
not before they sank YMS-48 harbor to provide the sweepers a clear approach. At 1300hrs, Fletcher was
and damaged Hopewell badly
struck on the forecastle by a 6in. shell fired from Corregidor. Phoenix and
enough to require shipyard
repairs. (USNHHC) two destroyers located the battery in a tunnel through Topside’s cliffs, and
then silenced it permanently.
There were other Japanese batteries that could reach Mariveles Bay, and
they soon had the minesweepers under fire. Hopewell was sent in to protect
the minesweepers. At 1359hrs YMS-48 was struck by a shell, and set ablaze.
The minesweepers were ordered out of Mariveles Bay, while Berkey’s ships
dealt with the shore batteries. They silenced them, but not without injury.
At 1413hrs Hopewell was struck four times. The damage was severe enough
to merit a trip to Manus in the Admiralties for repairs. Meanwhile, Fletcher
laid down a smokescreen to allow it to take the crew off YMS-48, and sink
the crippled vessel.
Guns silenced, the minesweepers resumed clearing Mariveles Harbor,
covered by La Vallette and Radford. These destroyers were supposed to sink
floaters (mines cut by the sweepers). La Vallette misjudged its approach to a
mine and struck it. Radford, attempting to aid La Vallette, ran into a second.
Both were able to steam to Subic Bay, but were out of the fight.
Berkey’s ships had gone through so much ammunition on February
14 that reinforcements were sent. TG 78.3, three heavy cruisers and six
destroyers, arrived on the 15th. At dawn, the two task groups, less the three
damaged destroyers, steamed between Bataan and Corregidor. They began a
systematic bombardment of Corregidor, with the cruisers’ off-side 5in. guns
covering the Mariveles landing beaches. Japanese batteries on Corregidor
fired back a few times, but were so smothered with return fire they quickly
ceased fire. Naval gunfire ceased at 0900hrs as the USAAF took over
pounding Corregidor with an airstrike.

40
 It soon became apparent the
Japanese on Corregidor had not been
silenced, but had merely ceased firing.
As the first wave of landing craft
approached Mariveles 30 minutes
later, the Corregidor guns began firing
at those within range. They failed to
disrupt the landing. Their accuracy
was poor. Only one ship was hit and
damaged, an LCP(R). Destroyers and
cruisers responded quickly, and the
Corregidor batteries on the island’s
north side were finally silenced. They
did not resume firing for the rest of the
day, nor the next day.
The first wave of US troops landed at Mariveles at 1100hrs. The final US Navy warships bombard
wave beached at 1135hrs. Unloading proceeded slowly, and some LSTs still Corregidor (foreground) and
Caballo (background) on
had cargo aboard when night fell. They remained beached, and unloading February 15, the day before the
continued into the night. High water was at 0115hrs, by which time US landings. (USNHHC)
they were empty, and were unbeached. Mariveles Bay was filled with US
shipping, including the 35 LCMs that would carry the 3rd Battalion, 34th
Infantry from Mariveles Bay to Corregidor. They formed a target perfect
for Corregidor’s 17ft-long Shinyo boats.
The Shinyos began slipping out of Corregidor after midnight on January
16. The suicide boats had been stored in Corregidor’s tunnel system behind
steel doors in a water gate, intending to preserve them despite their fragility.
Japan sent 70 of these craft to Corregidor, but there is no record of how
many still remained operational by February. US Navy records indicate
30-odd boats reached Mariveles Harbor. More may have been sent, but
sank before reaching their targets due to the hazards of the sea. They may
have been swamped by waves or simply fell apart en route. Some remained
behind at Corregidor, most likely due to mechanical problems. They would
later be discovered in tunnels on Corregidor’s tail after the island’s capture.
Others could have been entombed in sections of tunnel brought down later
by the Japanese and never found; or the US Navy simply undercounted the
attackers. Thirty were more than enough to cause mischief. They arrived at
the entrance to Mariveles Harbor at 0315hrs.
The harbor was well guarded. A cordon of LCS(L)s, supported by LCI
support craft, were anchored across the harbor mouth. The LCIs had been
converted to support craft to provide fire support at landing beaches, armored
and with extra guns. This cordon served as pickets that night, protecting the
LCMs to be used to carry troops to Corregidor later that day and the LSTs
unloading supplies for troops ashore at Bataan. They were supported by an
outer ring of destroyers.
The sea and sky were dark on the night of February 15/16, which fell
three days after the new moon. The moon had set at 0840hrs on February
15, and would not rise until after dawn, and thus the resulting battle was
fought on a moonless night. The small, wooden Shinyo boats proved difficult
to spot in the darkness and were elusive targets for radar. From the boats, the
slab-sided landing craft were silhouetted against the starlit skies. The Shinyos
kept their speed down as they crossed the straits to Mariveles.

41
42
43
 1 4
3

BATTLE WITH THE SUICIDE BOATS, MARIVELES HARBOR, FEBRUARY 16, 1945 (PP. 42–43)

In the predawn hours of February 16, the Japanese garrison on they came close to it. It stopped and sank a sixth Shinyo (2), but
Corregidor launched Shinyo suicide boats to attack the US Navy not until it was almost on top of LCI(L)-27. The Shinyo boat blew
landing craft in Mariveles Harbor, with the intention of sinking up close enough to cause significant damage to the landing craft,
them. It was a last-ditch effort to prevent Corregidor from being disabling it.
invaded. How many Shinyos left Corregidor that night is unknown. Shown here is the scene at the height of the battle, as the
There may have been as many as 50, or as few as 30. We know that sixth Shinyo is attacking the 158ft-long landing craft to port. A
30 reached Mariveles Harbor. At its entrance the US Navy had a destroyed Shinyo can be seen burning in the background (3),
picket line of LCI(L)s and LCIs to guard the harbor. A wild nighttime as well as other US landing craft in the harbor (4). The damage
melee ensued between the Shinyos and the guardian landing craft. inflicted on LCI(L)-27 required dry dock repairs before it could
Three LCIs were sunk by Shinyos, all in the initial wave. A fourth, return to service. LCI(L)-27 served in the Pacific until the end of
LCI(L)-27 (1), commanded by Lieutenant Edwin R. Gardner, USNR the war, and was decommissioned in January 1946.
ended up tangling with a handful of Shinyos, sinking five before

44
 The equivalent of a naval knife fight
developed into a no-holds-barred brawl between
the Shinyo boats and the defensive cordon that
lasted until dawn. The Shinyo had to ram to
attack, with attacker and target being consumed
by the explosion of the charge in the Shinyo’s
bow. Initial surprise was total. The US forces
were unaware of the Japanese presence until the
first boats to arrive accelerated for their final
attack. Shinyos struck LCI(L)-7, LCI(L)-26,
and LCI(L)-49 in the initial wave as they stood
sentinel at the harbor’s mouth. All three sank,
LCI(L)-26 taking its 66-man crew with it.
The fight grew general after that. The
Shinyos did not attack in a massed wave
formation. Rather, they trickled in during the
remaining hours of darkness. The US vessels,
now aware of their enemy’s presence, opened up
on the remaining Shinyos. The fire laid down
proved deadly to the fragile boats. One LCI(L),
LCI(L)-27, sank six of the suicide boats. Five
were destroyed well away from the vessel, and it
did not hit the sixth until it was far too close. The explosion badly damaged Japanese Shinyos struck the US
LCI(L)-27. Two members of its crew were killed by the blast and the landing Navy at Mariveles Harbor in the
predawn hours of February 16.
craft had to be beached to prevent it from sinking. It was later repaired, LCI(L)-27 (shown in 1944) sank
refloated, and returned to service. five Shinyos without damage
The predawn twilight brought the nightmare to a close. In the to itself before a sixth exploded
strengthening light, the destroyers outside the harbor could finally see the close enough to cause it severe
damage. (AC)
remaining Shinyos. Conyngham 1½ miles southwest of Mariveles, spotted a
Shinyo at 0700hrs, 20 minutes before sunrise. It engaged and sank the boat.
Shortly thereafter, Young and Nicholas spotted two other Shinyos and sent
them to the bottom.
It was the end of a long and terrifying night, but with it came the end of
the Shinyo threat. By morning all available Shinyo boats had been expended.
It had cost the US three ships sunk and one beached, but the picket line
had served its purpose. None of the Shinyos actually entered the harbor,
expending themselves on the harbor’s guardians. The landing craft intended
to lift soldiers to Corregidor had been given a light show by the battle at the
harbor’s mouth. None had been damaged, and all were available to support
the landing. With dawn the curtain was rising on the main event: the invasion
of Corregidor.

L-DAY ON CORREGIDOR: FEBRUARY 16, 1945

At 0630hrs a final US prelanding bombardment began. The gunfire support
cruisers virtually emptied their main gun magazines over the next 86 minutes.
Both sides of the island received attention, as did Caballo Island. Throughout
the barrage, Corregidor’s guns were silent.
Fourteen minutes after the gunfire ceased, the USAAF’s aircraft arrived.
At 0800hrs, 24 B-24 heavy bombers appeared, saturating gun positions

45
 on Corregidor with fragmentation bombs,
deadly against personnel in the open and
highly effective against antiaircraft guns.
These were 500lb high-explosive bombs
wrapped with wire. The wire shredded
when the bombs exploded, sending metal
fragments flying.
At 0802hrs, 11 twin-engine B-25 medium
bombers and 31 A-20 light bombers arrived.
They spent the next 26 minutes working
over Corregidor and Caballo. The B-25s
bombed and strafed antiaircraft positions
and strongpoints on Corregidor’s south coast.
The A-20s attacked defensive positions on
Corregidor and Caballo. They dropped bombs,
registering direct hits and near-misses on their
targets. With their bomb bays empty, they
thoroughly strafed the islands. The saturation
attack forced Corregidor’s defenders deep into
their shelters. The garrison had undergone
heavy bombardments previously, but none
had been as severe or prolonged as experienced
on February 16. This, more than any damage
inflicted on Corregidor’s installations, was the
aerial assault’s purpose.
The final bombardment One minute after the last of the B-25s and A-20s departed, a formation
of Corregidor involved of 51 more twin-engine aircraft arrived. The fat-bellied aircraft were
fragmentation bombs.
Normally used against airfields,
flying low, 600ft above the crest of Topside. The garrison assumed they
as shown in this photo of an were more medium bombers. They looked like Japanese twin-engine
attack on Clark Field, their Betty bombers. The garrison remained in their shelters until these aircraft
purpose at Corregidor was unloaded their contents.
to force the defenders into
This formation consisted of two columns of C-47 transports carrying the
their shelters, something they
succeeded in doing. (AC) 3rd Battalion, 503rd PRCT and support units. For the next hour the Douglas
Skytrains unloaded paratroopers, and drop bundles containing their heavy
weapons and supplies, on Topside.
Twenty-five aircraft dropped men and weapons on Drop Zone A, the
former Parade Ground. Twenty-six unloaded over Drop Zone B, the Golf
Course. Colonel Jones was aboard one of the C-47s, observing the result of
each drop, and adjusting subsequent drops to improve accuracy.
The first stick of US paratroopers jumped at 600ft, led by Lieutenant-
Colonel John Erickson, commanding 3rd Battalion. High winds blew this
stick past the drop zones into rocks and debris south of it. A few of the
early jumpers were carried beyond Topside, landing on the cliff sides or in
the South China Sea, south of Corregidor. PT boats stationed south of the
drop zone against this eventuality plucked nine fortunate paratroopers from
the sea.
Seeing the results of the first drop, Jones ordered the jump height lowered
to 400ft. It helped, but not enough. Many men and bundles going out in
the early drops still missed the drop zone, landing on Topside, short of the
cliffs. Subsequent drops compensated for the unexpectedly high gusts by
having jump masters for each C-47 delay departure of a stick by five to

46
ten seconds after the jump light turned
green, giving permission to jump.
Each plane carried 10–24 men and
up to nine drop bundles. The drop
bundles contained artillery, heavy
machine guns, extra equipment, and
ammunition. Their parachutes were
color-coded to facilitate recovery. On
every pass over the drop zone six to
eight men jumped or up to eight drop
bundles went out the door. Most C-47s
made three passes over their drop zone.
In all, 1,007 personnel—a 75mm
pack howitzer battery, a .50-cal.
machine-gun platoon, equipment
for the engineering platoon, the 3rd
Battalion’s headquarters, and elements
of the regimental headquarters—landed on Topside. Regimental headquarters The first wave of US
included Colonel Jones. He jumped near the end of the drop, satisfied the paratroopers descends on
troops were hitting the landing zone. Topside. The Japanese had
discounted the ability of the
Among those landing in the first wave were several men who never US to land paratroopers on
previously made a parachute jump, including a five-man signal corps photo Topside, an error that cost them
team, a JASCO communications team to coordinate naval gunfire, an observer dearly. (US Army)
for the Armed Forces Far East Board, and Harold Templeman, the American
Red Cross Field Director. He arrived armed with a coffee pot to set up a Red
Cross canteen. (The presence of the photographers meant this became one of
the best photo-documented battles of the Philippines campaign.)
The entire drop took 105 minutes. Despite the length of the drop, there
was no antiaircraft fire, and the majority of injuries sustained during the
jump appear to have been landing accidents. Surprise was complete. There
was no organized resistance; only individual actions by paratroopers against
Japanese soldiers who happened to be where a paratrooper landed.
Jones expected 20 percent landing casualties, but feared they could run
as high as 50 percent. In addition to the nine men blown off the island
and recovered by PT boats, a further 214 were killed, missing, or severely
injured when landing (just over 200 of these were injured). Total casualties
were 25 percent, a little over Jones’s expected 20 percent, but well below his
worst fears. Several paratroopers were shot and killed by the Japanese while
landing, Most of these landed in the cliff near Japanese strongpoints.
Once on the ground, men discarded parachutes, collected equipment, and
headed towards designated rally points. Usually, men in a stick gathered
together for mutual support before moving to the rally point. They ran into
relatively little Japanese resistance.
One exception was a group of men which missed the Golf Course
drop zone, and landed between the cliffs and the Golf Course near Geary
Point. They were probably from several different sticks, men who jumped
early in each stick and were blown south by wind gusts. Between 0900hrs
and 0930hrs, while heading to the rally point, they were fired upon by
Japanese at an observation post (OP). The paratroopers instinctively and
aggressively engaged the Japanese. Most of the Japanese were officers
armed only with side arms. The paratroopers, with superior infantry

47
THE CORREGIDOR AIRDROP
The airdrop used at Corregidor was unique. Since the drop zones were
so small, a unique drop procedure was used. The C-47s approached
each drop zone in single file. As each plane reached the drop zone,
only six to eight paratroopers could jump before the C-47 was past
the drop zone. The result was two columns of C-47s flew over the drop
zones in sequence, dropped part of the troops aboard, then circled
around, flying over the drop zone again until all of the paratroopers
aboard the airplane were dropped. In most cases, three passes were
required. This illustration reveals the complexity of the drop.

PARADE
6 5 GROUND
2
GOLF COURSE

EVENTS
1. Two columns of C-47s approach Topside from McGuire Field on Mindoro.
2. The C-47s descend to the drop altitude of 600ft above Topside (c.1,200ft altitude).
3. They begin to drop paratroopers and bundles on the drop zone, descending further to 400ft above Topside after the first sticks drop.
4. After clearing Corregidor, the C-47 columns turn in opposite directions to drop again.
5. Aircraft with paratroopers and bundles aboard make second (and third) passes over Topside to drop men and materiel.
6. The empty C-47s return to McGuire Field on Mindoro.

48
4

US AIRCRAFT
A. 26 C-47 planes, 317th Troop Carrier Group, heading
for drop zone over the Golf Course
B. 25 C-47 planes, 317th Troop Carrier Group, heading
for drop zone over the Parade Ground

49
 tactical training and better firepower,
quickly killed all but one man in the
OP. That man surrendered. He was
Captain Itagaki’s Korean orderly.
Itagaki and his command staff were
in the OP to observe the progress
of the landing craft carrying the
3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry to their
landing zone at Bottomside. When the
paratroopers attacked the OP, the 3rd
Battalion was south of Geary Point
about an hour from reaching San
Jose. This chance encounter at the OP
decapitated the Japanese command
structure on Corregidor.
The airdrop had a second
unexpected benefit. Itagaki planned to
run the battle from a command center
on Topside, near the 503rd PRCT’s
drop zones. Secure communication
lines ran from all Corregidor
strongpoints to this command post.
However, control had depended on
holding this command post, which
quickly fell into enemy hands. Losing
the garrison’s commander left it
leaderless. Losing the communications
Two 503rd PRCT paratroopers network left the various Japanese outposts isolated, unable to communicate
climb up a flagpole on Topside and coordinate counterattacks.
under fire to raise the US colors.
While the flag-raising attended
By 0930hrs the first drop achieved all three of its objectives. It secured the
by Douglas MacArthur is better drop zones for the second airdrop, obtained a base for further operations on
known, to most Corregidor Topside once the 2nd Battalion, 503rd PRCT landed, and could provide fire
veterans this was the flag- support for the landing of the 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry. The paratroopers
raising that counted. (AC)
had established a defensive perimeter around both drop zones which linked
them together. They also emplaced two of the dropped .50-cal. machine guns
to provide a base of fire to protect Black Beach.
The 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry departed Mariveles Harbor aboard
52 LCMs at 0830hrs, just as the first paratroopers were touching down
on Topside. They followed a circuitous route to reach Black Beach well
west and south of Corregidor. The convoy crawled along at 6 knots. By
0930hrs lead elements were past the head of Corregidor and were ready to
make their final approach to Black Beach. Three destroyers provided fire
support—Wickes north of Corregidor opposite North Pier, and Pickering
and Young on the south side, opposite the beach. All three conducted a
preliminary bombardment from 0942hrs until 1020hrs. When they lifted
fire, the destroyers had fired 1,200 5in./38-cal. rounds at the beach, the cliffs
of Topside and Middleside, Malinta Hill, and any visible strongpoints that
could endanger landing troops.
At 1022hrs, as the first wave approached Black Beach, Japanese guns on
Caballo opened up on the Corregidor-bound flotilla. Pickering and Young
moved in and opened fire on the Japanese battery, peppering the Japanese

50
positions with shells from the destroyers’ 5in. main guns, and 40mm mounts.
The Japanese battery, stopped almost as quickly as it began firing. It never
resumed firing. No damage was done to the flotilla.
Black Beach measured only 230 yards across and 10 yards deep. Beyond
the beach was a collection of bombed-out buildings, bomb craters, cliffs,
and hills. At the eastern edge there was no beach, just the rise of Malinta
Hill. The first wave beached at 1028hrs, two minutes ahead of schedule.
LCI(R)s, armed with rockets, fired a final barrage just before the troops
began unloading. Additionally, the 40mm and 3in. guns on the landing
vessels put down suppressive fire.
Initially, there was no resistance. The defenders were either still too
stunned to respond, busy dealing with the 503rd PRCT, or simply holding
fire. Since the garrison was largely naval, they may have been following the
tradition that a ship does not open fire until ordered by the captain. Itagaki
planned his defense as an intricately organized and timed ambush. Many
may have awaited an open-fire order that could never come from their now-
dead commander.
Not until the fifth and final wave approached did the surviving defenders
recover from their shock. They realized if they did not shoot then, they
would not get a future chance. They opened up with everything available,
but the Japanese heavy weapons were quickly silenced by return fire from
the supporting destroyers and the landing ships.
It was too late for the Japanese; their defenses around Black Beach were
already overrun. K and L companies of the 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry
unloaded in the first two waves. They maneuvered around the ruins of
San Jose, and up Malinta Hill. Resistance on the hill was disorganized
and ineffective. By 1100hrs, 30 minutes after the landing began, the two
companies had Malinta Hill secured.

Two hours after paratroopers

began touching down on
Topside, the 3rd Battalion,
34th Infantry prepared to land
on Bottomside. This photo
shows the first wave and
following waves of landing
craft approaching Black
Beach. (US Army)

51
52
53
 1 4

5 6

CAPTAIN ITAGAKI’S COMMAND STAFF IS WIPED OUT ON TOPSIDE (PP. 52–53)

When the US airdrop began, Captain Akira Itagaki, was at an The paratroopers were well armed with automatic and
observation post on the north side of Topside. It was well semiautomatic weapons, such as the M3 .45-cal. submachine
away from his central command post. He was observing the gun shown here (3). They were trained to display individual
amphibious approach of the 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry (1) initiative and unwilling to leave an enemy force in their rear.
to their Black Beach landing zone. This was the invasion he The paratroopers in the area chose to counterattack the
was expecting. What he was not expecting was an airdrop Japanese position.
on Topside. While conjectural, the attack probably went as shown in this
Some of the US paratroopers (2) were blown off course by high reconstruction. The paratroopers most likely split into two groups,
winds, and landed around his position. Some of Itagaki’s party, with one group laying down a base of fire to pin and distract the
perhaps even Itagaki himself, shot at these paratroopers. This was enemy (4). The second group attacked the unware Japanese from
ill advised because Itagaki’s party was made up mainly of officers, the flank (5). The outcome was that every member of Itagaki’s
who were not properly armed for ground combat. The enlisted command staff (6) was killed except for one Korean orderly. He
guards may have had rifles, but these were bolt-action Arisaka took shelter, surrendered, and later revealed who had been killed.
rifles. All shooting at the paratroopers did was alert them to the The Japanese command on Corregidor had been decapitated in
presence of the Japanese troops. the first minutes of the invasion of the Rock.

54
 Just before landing, Black
Beach was softened up by
LCI(R)s, like this one, firing
salvos of 5in. rockets. (AC)

Next to land was I Company, securing the beachhead. Its men were
followed by the rest of the battalion and attached support units. This was
when casualties started mounting. The beaches were mined, but the mines
were visible. Infantry avoided them, walking around them. Heavy vehicles
could not. A tank and a bulldozer that unloaded in the first wave struck
mines almost immediately and were disabled. An M7 self-propelled 105mm
howitzer, a truck, and a 37mm antitank gun followed, and were destroyed
by mines or enemy gunfire.
The 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry established a firm lodgment on
Bottomside by noon. Japanese resistance was only coming from machine
guns and light cannon positions on Ramsey Ravine and Breakwater Point
and the cliff at San Jose Point on Malinta Hill. These guns were soon silenced
by naval gunfire. Shore party spotters identified their locations, and directed
naval gunfire on the positions. Destroyers firing single 5in. and 40mm rounds
at close range took them out.
The defenders’ woes increased at 1230hrs, when the 3rd Battalion, 503rd
PRCT was reinforced. The C-47s of the 317th Troop Carrier Group had
flown back to McGuire Field on Mindoro, refueled, and loaded up the 2nd
Battalion, 503rd PRCT, the 503rd PRCT’s Service Company, another battery
of pack howitzers, and a 0.50-cal. machine-gun platoon.
There had been discussion on Topside about the second lift. The winds had
picked up. Several officers on the scene recommended scrubbing the second
drop in view of the high landing casualties of the first wave. By this time
part of the second lift was already airborne. Jones decided a counterorder
canceling the airdrop was likely to lead to disorder, so no action was taken
to stop the drop.
The first C-47s arrived at 1240hrs, 25 minutes behind schedule. They
were 400ft above Topside. Despite the higher winds than that morning, most
of the men and bundles arriving in the second lift landed in their designated
drop zones. They suffered significantly fewer drop casualties than the first
lift. Where the first drop experienced a drop casualty rate over 20 percent,
the second drop’s was less than 5 percent. It was a testimony to the 317th
Troop Carrier Group’s ability to quickly adjust to landing conditions. Total
jump casualties for both drops stood at 14 percent.

55
The 317th Troop Carrier Group
made a second airdrop on
Topside at 1240hrs. While the
first drop went unopposed,
antiaircraft fire greeted the
second. Here, ground crews
examine the damage to a hit
C-47 after its return to McGuire
Field. (DVDIS)

Unlike the first drop, which went unopposed by the Japanese, the second
drop drew antiaircraft fire. A Japanese 20mm cannon was brought into
action, damaging several of the C-47s. Two .50-cal. machine guns also
opened up. Both were US machine guns dropped during the first lift, which
fell outside the landing zone. Recovered by the Japanese, they were put into
service against their original owners. The Japanese also spent more effort
firing at descending paratroopers on the second drop. Most of the eight
paratroopers killed and the 50 wounded by enemy fire during both drops
were hit in the second drop.
The second drop took less time than the first drop. All men and bundles
were unloaded in approximately an hour. One result was paratroopers and
drop bundles were at greater risk of landing on other paratroopers as the
jump zone became crowded with new arrivals. The drop zone became more
crowded still when a supply lift arrived at 1400hrs. Twelve C-47s dropped
ammunition, rations, and water.
The two battalions quickly sorted themselves out and began taking
control of Topside. The three companies of the 2nd Battalion occupied a
200-degree arc of the defensive perimeter and provided perimeter defense to
the south and west of the drop zones.
H Company, 3rd Battalion assembled on the Parade Ground, and cleared
the ruins of the barracks just north of the Parade Ground of the few Japanese
present. They then pushed 300 yards north, and secured the wrecked hospital.
One platoon thrust 600 yards to the northeast to seize a knoll on Morrison
Hill that dominated the northeast section of Topside. I Company backfilled
H Company at the hospital.
G Company pushed east, down slopes connecting Topside to Middleside.
They soon occupied a knoll overlooking the head of Ramsey Ravine. The
ravine itself was a Japanese strongpoint, one of the draws fortified to prevent
amphibious access to Topside. The position was only 250 yards west of the
closest elements of the 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry. The amphibious and
airborne elements had not joined hands yet, but they were close.
By 1500hrs the 503rd PRCT troops on Topside held their designated
landing-day objectives. Between then and dusk, some three hours later,

56
they consolidated their position on
Topside. Aggressive patrolling continued
throughout late afternoon, revealing
the Japanese had their greatest strength
in the cliffs and draws west and south
of Topside.
The paratroopers now held the
high ground above the defenders. The
Japanese heavy weapons in the draws
around Topside—those which survived
bombardment by US destroyers—pointed
the wrong way. The Japanese had to
attack uphill against a sheltered enemy
that was better armed. The 503rd PRCT
began digging in, preparing for possible
night counterattacks by the Japanese.
On Bottomside, the 3rd Battalion,
34th Infantry was consolidating its hold.
It had two companies atop Malinta Hill,
covering the exits from the Malinta
Tunnel complex. The Japanese there were trapped, unable to exit without By early afternoon on February
being cut down by US soldiers. I Company had pushed to the north shore 16, the 3rd Battalion, 34th
Infantry had full control
of Bottomside, clearing the ruins of San Jose of Japanese defenders. They of Malinta Hill (seen in the
swung west after reaching the shore and established defensive positions at the distance, framed between two
entrance to Middleside on the north side of Corregidor. A Company similarly paratroopers). The Japanese
pushed west into Middleside along the south shore. The two companies split inside the Malinta Tunnel
complex underneath Malinta
the defense of their left flank halfway between the two shores.
Hill were trapped by the US
Lieutenant-Colonel Edward M. Postlethwait, commanding the 3rd soldiers atop it. (US Army)
Battalion, 34th Infantry and the amphibious forces, was turning Bottomside
into a base. A field hospital was set up, as were a headquarters and a
communications post. Supplies were unloaded and cached. Landing facilities
were improved. The artillery sent with the battalion was set up in a battery
where it could support offensive operations during the following days.
As evening approached, Colonel Jones felt confident about the situation.
Two solid footholds had been established on Corregidor, even if they had
not yet linked up. The US controlled the center of Topside. With Bottomside
firmly in US hands, Jones decided to cancel the airdrop of the 1st Battalion,
503rd PRCT, scheduled for the following morning. Opposition had proved
lighter than expected. There was no need for further jump casualties. The
battalion could be brought in by landing craft at Bottomside. He radioed the
recommendation to Sixth Army Headquarters, with a further request that
only supplies be dropped the following day. The request was approved. A
message was sent to McGuire Field on Mindoro rerouting the 1st Battalion.
The Japanese defenders were scattered, disorganized, and leaderless. At
least 2,000 men of the garrison were in Malinta Tunnel, trapped under the
US soldiers holding the hilltop, effectively out of the fight. Another 2,500
were scattered around the periphery of Corregidor’s bulbous west end. The
rest of the Japanese garrison was dotted uselessly along Corregidor’s eastern
tail, guarding against a nonexistent threat from the sea.
While the surviving Japanese were well protected, their fortifications
pointed the wrong way; outwards instead of inwards, downwards to the

57
58
N

North Channel
MANI LA BAY

North Point
Cavalry Point
Morrison Point Battery Point C O R R EG I D O R B AY Infantry Point
II
Kindley
James I
Engineer Point Landing Field •••
I
•••
Morrison I East Point
I North
James Dock I
Rock Point Ravine Morrison ••• K 3/34 I
MG
Hill Malinta Tunnel I
I Monkey Point
I
Corregidor Island I 3/34 Malinta I
I
I Hill I
•••
H 3/503 A 3/34 L 3/34 Ordnance Point
Night positions, February 16, 1945

••• I Middleside San Jose

Grubbs
••• I 3/503 Barracks San Jose
Way I South
Hearn Point
I Hospital G 3/503 Dock
Smith I Hooker Point
F 2/503 Topside 115th Fishing Unit
Cheney Ravine Barracks
Parade Ground Ramsey I
Cheney I Topside SAN JOSE Signal Unit
I
••• D 2/503 E 2/503 ••• BAY
MG II
Torpedo Boat Unit
I Golf Course
and Water Patrol Unit
Wheeler I Geary I
Administration and
MG
Armament Units
Wheeler Point Breakwater
Ramsey Crockett III
Ravine Point Suicide Boat Unit

Geary Point These units operated out of the Bottomside

docks or in the Malinta Tunnel and were
now trapped inside the tunnel.

Caballo
South China Sea Island

Japanese battery

0 1 mile

0 1km
sea instead of upwards to Topside. The Japanese defenses had become
completely irrelevant. Moreover, there was no way to coordinate the type of
simultaneous, multi-pronged counterattacks required to drive the US troops
off Topside.
The US gamble on an “impossible” airdrop on Topside paid off. It
required a pair of airdrops combined with an amphibious landing, all of
which had to be closely coordinated. Yet everything that needed to go right
had gone right that day. While a lot of hard fighting remained, US forces
had broken the back of Japanese resistance on Corregidor on February 16.

CONSOLIDATION ON CORREGIDOR:
FEBRUARY 17–20, 1945
As January 17 dawned over Corregidor, both sides prepared to renew the
battle. The night had passed relatively quietly. US forces on Topside and
Bottomside had withdrawn to defensive night positions, preparing for a
Japanese counterattack. The Japanese on their part were still in a state of
disorder. They had not recovered from the shock of the first day’s battle. They
still outnumbered the US forces, but they were scattered. Communications
between the individual pockets of Japanese had not been restored. No one
was yet ready to take the initiative and attack the Americans.
The sole exception was on Malinta Hill. There the Japanese launched a
series of small, but determined, counterattacks on the north side of Malinta
Hill. The US lost ten soldiers killed; however, at daybreak the US defenders
counted 35 Japanese bodies from their hilltop positions. As many as 20 other
Japanese troops may have been injured, as there were numerous blood trails.
With sunrise, the 503rd PRCT went on the attack. At daybreak they were
Two 34th Infantry Regiment
resupplied. Forty B-24s dropped supply bundles on Topside. Sixteen were hit soldiers man a machine gun
by Japanese antiaircraft fire, but the damage suffered was slight. However, in on Malinta Hill on February
firing, the Japanese revealed their positions. They were silenced permanently. 17, 1945. Small contingents of
The paratroopers used everything from carbines to 75mm pack howitzers, Japanese troops attempted to
exit Malinta Tunnel during the
and reinforced that counterfire by calling in naval gunfire. night of February 16/17, only to
At 0730hrs two attacks were launched. The 3rd Battalion began a be forced back by 34th Infantry
coordinated assault on Morrison Hill to its northeast, while 2nd Battalion soldiers. (US Army)
made an attack on the Battery Wheeler
area on the southwest side of the US
positions. Controlling Morrison Hill was
key to linking up with the 34th Infantry
Regiment. It overlooked North Dock.
Battery Wheeler’s prewar fortifications
had been converted into a strongpoint.
US probes revealed it, too, possessed a
large Japanese garrison.
Other teams began clearing tunnels
and caves within the US Topside
perimeter, eliminating any Japanese
troops huddling in them. This was
small-unit work. A flamethrower team
and .50-cal. machine-gun team provided
support for a demolition team to seal

59
 the cave or tunnel, while
an infantry squad provided
security against snipers. There
were relatively few Japanese
on this part of Topside, but
there were numerous places
for them to hide.
At 0830hrs a formation
of 51 C-47s flew over
Corregidor’s Topside drop
zones. The planes were
carrying the third lift of
the 503rd PRCT. Orders
canceling that morning’s drop
did not reach McGuire Field
until the 1st Battalion and
the rest of the third lift were
putting on their parachutes,
and boarding aircraft to make
the drop. The C-47s were
Day two of the invasion was fueled and loading was underway. Major Robert “Pug” Woods, commanding
marked by several supply 1st Battalion, decided the simplest thing was to fly the mission more or less as
airdrops, including this one.
These runs provided critically
planned. He decided to have the flight go over Corregidor, but it would only
needed ammunition, rations, drop equipment bundles. That would save his men humping the ammunition
and water. They were not and heavy equipment across the beach. The paratroopers would remain
intended as the main source aboard, and fly to a rendezvous with the fast naval transports that would
of supply for the 503rd PRCT,
carry them to Corregidor. Since the 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry successfully
however. (US Army)
landed the day before, Woods assumed the landing would be unopposed.
The drop over Corregidor went smoothly. There was no antiaircraft fire
during it. Instead, the paratroopers aboard the C-47s remained spectators
as the circling transports sent drop bundles down to their destinations.
The paratroopers on Topside easily recovered the bundles. After that was
accomplished, the Skytrains set course northwards, taking the almost fully
loaded transports carrying the troops to San Marcelino Airfield, near Subic
Bay. A prewar field, it had just reopened following its recapture by the Sixth
Army. From there, the paratroopers were trucked to Subic Bay, and loaded
aboard APDs, fast transports converted from old flush-deck destroyers,
equipped with LCVPs. While old, the APDs could cruise at 20 knots. They
steamed from Subic to Corregidor, unloading at Black Beach at 1630hrs. The
paratroopers arrived eight hours later than if they had jumped in, but they
avoided jump casualties.
The 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry had two objectives that morning: hold
their right flank, anchored on Malinta Hill; and link up with the 503rd
PRCT on their left flank.
They had a solid grip to their east, having occupied Malinta Hill shortly
after landing. The hill was covered with prewar concrete strongpoints and OPs.
US troops occupied these, giving them commanding fields of fire. In particular,
artillery observers set up shop in one known as Base End Station B-23. It had
been used by the US garrison in 1942 to defend against the Japanese, and
resumed that role on February 17. It offered a dominating view of the entire
island, allowing the forward observers to call down fire wherever needed.

60
 The Japanese inside the Malinta
tunnel complex were trapped. All of
the exits were soon known. Several
had been sealed by bombardment or
demolition charges, K and L Companies
had the minor exits on Malinta Hill
under observation, and the main western
entrance, which overlooked the landing
beach, had been sealed by 8in. naval
artillery fire the previous day.
The remaining companies of the 3rd
Battalion, 34th Infantry concentrated on
their second objective: linking up with
the 503rd PRCT. They began securing the
roads leading up Middleside to Topside.
This involved much the same effort the
503rd PRCT was going through to clear
the Japanese from Topside.
The two forces linked up by mid-
afternoon. It was a tenuous link initially.
The first vehicle to make the round trip
was armored, the surviving M7 self-
propelled howitzer. Its mission was not
to provide fire support, but rather to run
water to the paratroopers, and (more
importantly) evacuate badly wounded
paratroopers to the beachhead where
they could be treated in a fully equipped field hospital or evacuated to Luzon, An M7 self-propelled howitzer
if necessary. The M7 was chosen because its open top allowed stretcher cases made the first round-trip run
from the 34th Infantry on
to be carried, while its armored sides were protection against the rifle fire and Bottomside to the 503rd PRCT
grenade fragments to which it was exposed. on Topside. This run was made
Most of the fights in which the 503rd PRCT and 34th Infantry engaged under small-arms fire, but the
during the first day were small-unit battles, the US pitting platoons or squads vehicle was able to successfully
bring water to the 503rd and
against Japanese entrenched in pillboxes, inactive battery fortifications, or
evacuate wounded to the
other defensive strongpoints. beach. (US Army)
The 1st Battalion, 503rd PRCT arrived around the time the M7 returned
to Black Beach. Major Woods discovered his assumptions about facing a
tamed beach were optimistic. Just as they had the previous day, two Japanese
heavy machine guns in Ramsey Ravine and at Breakwater Point opened up
on the approaching LCVP. Once again, US Navy warships, including the
ADPs (which carried 4in. guns forward) that had lifted the 1st Battalion,
suppressed the enemy fire. The enemy fire was high and inaccurate, but it
managed to kill six of the 1,000-plus men arriving at Corregidor.
The 1st Battalion’s pack howitzers and heavy machine guns, along with
their reserve ammunition and other supplies, were on Topside, where they
had been dropped earlier that day. The paratroopers had their personal
weapons and the ammunition they would have dropped with, so they could
fight as light infantry. They fought their way up Middleside, reunited with
their weapons, and became the regimental reserve.
With the 503rd PRCT at full strength, the 503rd PRCT and 1st Battalion,
34th Infantry set boundaries. The 503rd PRCT took responsibility for

61
62
N

North Channel
MANI LA BAY

North Point
Cavalry Point
Morrison Point Battery Point C O R R EG I D O R B AY Infantry Point
Kindley
James Engineer Point Landing Field
East Point
North
James Morrison
Ravine Dock I
Corregidor Island
Rock Point I
Morrison K 3/34
H 3/503 Hill
I I Malinta Tunnel Monkey Point
I
E 2/503 G 3/503 I 3/34 Malinta
Hill I
I
L 3/34 Trapped Japanese Ordnance Point
Grubbs A 3/34
Middleside San Jose garrison within the
Barracks San Jose Malinta Tunnel
I
South Point
Smith Hearn Way Hospital
I Dock
I 3/503 Hooker Point
Cheney Ravine F 2/503 Topside
Barracks Ramsey SAN JOSE II
Parade Ground Topside BAY 1 503
Cheney I
Arrived via
D 2/503
Golf Course amphibious landing,
1400hrs, February 17
Wheeler Geary
Wheeler Point Breakwater
Ramsey Crockett
Ravine Point

Geary Point
The advance of US forces on Corregidor, February 17–20, 1945

South China Sea

Caballo
Island
US positions, dawn February 17
Japanese positions, dawn February 17
US positions, dusk February 20
Japanese positions, dusk February 20
Japanese battery

0 1 mile

0 1km
Corregidor from the old stockade west.
The 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry took
charge of the area east of that to Malinta
Hill. The 503rd PRCT would clear the
tadpole’s head, while the 1st Battalion,
34th Infantry contained the Japanese in
Malinta Tunnel and Tailside, ensuring
those troops did not bother the 503rd
PRCT’s efforts.
By the time the day ended, the US
had the drill for clearing out Japanese
installations perfected. The first step was
to call in an airstrike or naval fire support.
As soon as this ended, the infantry
attacked. If they failed, heavy weapons
were brought forward, often including a 75mm pack howitzer, to soften P-47 Thunderbolts from the
up the target. Infantrymen with rifles or submachine guns would cover the Fifth Air Force kept Rock
Force well supplied with air
approaches as an assault team was brought in. These included flamethrower support. Many carried napalm
teams. To prevent backsplash, the operators often projected fuel unignited, rather than bombs, and all
tossing in a white phosphorous grenade to set off the fuel. If after all that could strafe targets with the
Japanese troops were still alive and refusing to surrender, a demolition team aircraft’s eight .50-cal. machine
guns. (AC)
came in and blocked the entrance, entombing the resisting soldiers.
There was generous support from both the US Navy and USAAF. The
Navy left two and sometimes three destroyers continuously on call off
Corregidor. Similarly, the USAAF kept four to eight aircraft, typically P-47
fighter-bombers, over Corregidor throughout the daylight hours. Carrying
two 500lb bombs, or two 200-gallon tanks of napalm, they would circle
until called on for an airstrike. (If they ran low on fuel without being used,
a ground controller typically gave them a target to bomb so they did not go
home with unexpended ordnance.)
This support was carefully coordinated. For airstrikes a USAAF forward
observer contacted the aircraft leader, and designated the target, using air
support photos. The leader would be given the position of the nearest friendly
troops, and a line of flight where overs and shorts were harmless to them.
US lines were marked with colored smoke, while the target was marked by
a white phosphorous round. Runs were made by individual aircraft, with
adjustments made on each try. Bombs were used on point targets, napalm
on area targets. After the battle, Lieutenant-Colonel Postlethwait wrote of
the effects of napalm: “A two-hundred-gallon tank of that stuff bursting in
the undergrowth of a ravine flushes out the rodents in it most efficiently.”
By sunset the 503rd PRCT had cleared batteries Way and Geary (sites of
prewar 12in. mortars), pillboxes east and northeast of Battery Cheney, and a
pillbox north of the hospital, as well as clearing numerous caves and bunkers
within the 503rd PRCT’s perimeter. They held most of Morrison Hill and
were ready to move into Morrison Ravine the next day. Communications
with the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry had been established. The 1st Battalion
was holding the area around the stockade. In the process they had killed over
360 Japanese troops on Topside, nearly 200 of which were killed by 75mm
artillery fire. The cost was eight US paratroopers killed.
The 503rd PRCT was well supplied. In addition to the morning drop,
a supply drop at 1300hrs delivered 250 gallons of water and two days’

63
 K-rations for a regiment. After
1600hrs they had communications
with the beach. They had motor
transportation, a captured Japanese
truck they had been using since
morning, and two jeeps with
trailers that had made the trip from
Bottomside to Topside, loaded with
5-gallon water cans. They also
captured significant quantities of
Japanese supplies and rations.
The 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry
was similarly well situated, with a
firm hold on Malinta Hill. Its troops
killed an estimated 50 Japanese
men that day, but had over 2,000
penned up in Malinta Tunnel, and
1,000–1,500 more contained in
Rooting the Japanese out of Corregidor’s eastern end. Both units settled into night positions, the 503rd
their caves often required PRCT withdrawing from some gains to secure a more defensible perimeter.
a coordinated effort. In this
photo several US paratroopers
The night of February 17/18 passed quietly. There were no Japanese
are providing suppressive counterattacks. Instead, the Japanese infiltrated back to positions they lost
fire, allowing a flamethrower the previous day. The paratroopers soon discovered this when they began
or bazooka man to move the systematic reduction of enemy installations the next morning. Most of
up and provide a killing
this infiltration was due to the Japanese using interconnecting tunnels, which
stroke. (US Army)
they knew of due to their familiarity with the island. Company OPs also
spotted small parties of Japanese troops using crevices and ravines to hide
their movements. The paratroopers applied the tactics used the previous day
to root out these infiltrators. They worked even more effectively than they
had on the 17th. Artillery fire killed 70 Japanese men, aggressive patrolling
another 719. The paratroopers took 19 casualties.
At Malinta Hill, more Japanese activity was seen than on the previous
day. The Japanese opened a southwest exit to Malinta Tunnel and attempted
to operate a 75mm cannon from it. They were observed setting up the gun,
and were fired on and eliminated. Japanese forces on Tailside intermittently
fired machine guns at US defensive positions atop Malinta Hill. Lieutenant-
Colonel Postlethwait concluded the Japanese were consolidating for
an attack.
Logistics and evacuation also took place on February 18. Dead and
wounded were brought down from Topside by ambulance to Bottomside
using the jeeps and trailers sent up the previous day. On the return trip to
Topside, the jeeps brought up water, radios, rations, and flamethrowers. A
portable surgical unit was sent up from the beach and set up in a previously
empty building on Topside. Ammunition and other supplies arrived by
airdrop, were collected by details, and brought to the regimental supply
dump. Things seemed to be going well for Rock Force as the sun set.
The next day proved a long one. It started at 0200hrs, when 40 Japanese
troops near Breakwater Point blew up an ammunition dump and 400 Japanese
soldiers in Cheney Ravine and at Battery Wheeler made a massive counterattack.
The explosion killed 15–20 men from I Company, 3rd Battalion, 503rd PRCT
who were in a building directly above the subterranean ammunition dump.

64
 Fire was a particularly
effective weapon against
a dug-in enemy. Here, two
US paratroopers provide
overwatch as they wait for
napalm to finish burning out a
Japanese position. (US Army)

The counterattack was led by IJN Lieutenant Endo, probably the senior
surviving officer on Topside by that point. It was a massed infantry attack,
the type Pacific theater GIs described as a “banzai” assault. Its object was
less to defeat the enemy, but rather to allow the soldiers conducting it an
opportunity to die gloriously for the Emperor while inflicting maximum
punishment on the enemy. It was an indication of Japanese desperation, and
the effectiveness of the US offensive to date.
It was also highly successful. It reached its climax at 0600hrs, just before
morning twilight. The attack from Cheney Ravine hit the seam between
the front defended by F Company, 2nd Battalion and D Company, 2nd
Battalion. The attackers broke through the front lines and pushed deep
into 503rd PRCT-held territory. Some elements pushed as far in as 2nd
Battalion Headquarters near the Topside Barracks before being stopped.
The paratroopers’ counterattack prevented the Japanese from exploiting
their gains. The Japanese troops were back to their original lines by 0800hrs
with heavy casualties. The 503rd PRCT hunted down the scattered Japanese
soldiers in hiding behind US lines by 1100hrs.
That marked the tone of the day. There was heavy fighting throughout
Topside all through February 19. Despite the suicide at the ammunition
dump, there were plenty more Japanese at Breakwater Point, and I Company
required reinforcement from G Company and naval gunfire support to make
progress. They killed 70 more Japanese soldiers that day. They also captured
a prisoner, one of three taken that day. They were among the first captured
since the battle began.
The Japanese around Morrison Hill also blew up two separate
ammunition dumps, taking their occupants with them. It was an additional
sign of Japanese desperation. H Company moved against Battery James in
the afternoon, aided by P-47s dropping 2,000 gallons of napalm. E Company
made progress against batteries Grubbs and James. By dusk the Japanese had
lost another 500 killed, while Rock Force lost 50 killed and 75 wounded.

65
BREAKWATER POINT, FEBRUARY 19, 1945
The Japanese defenders were located in a series of tunnels, caves, and bunkers
in the hills immediately around Breakwater Point. The 503rd PRCT picked
February 19, three days after the initial American landing, as the day to dig
them out. Paratroopers from I Company, 3rd Battalion, 503rd PRCT were given
that task, deploying after sunset on February 18 for a dawn attack the next
day. The battle started early when, around 0200hrs, the Japanese in the tunnel
closest to the US lines blew themselves up, taking nearly 20 paratroopers in a
building above with them. The fighting the next day saw tenacious resistance
by the remaining Japanese. The 3rd Battalion finally cleared the Japanese from
Breakwater Point, but the battle endured from midday to dusk. I Company
required help to finish the job. US Navy destroyers assisted by directly shelling
the Japanese positions, and G Company was also sent in to assist.

EVENTS
(All take place on February 19.)
1. 0200hrs: The Japanese defenders blow up an underground ammunition dump
on Ramsey Ravine.
2. 0900hrs (approximately): I Company, 3rd Battalion, 503rd PRCT launches an
attack on Breakwater Point.
3. 0930–1730hrs: Using artillery spotting from shore, US Navy destroyers seal the
tunnels and caves using naval gunfire, frequently firing guns individually.
4. 1100hrs: G Company, 3rd Battalion, 503rd PRCT is sent to reinforce I Company
due to slow progress caused by Japanese resistance.
5. 1300hrs: Reinforced, 3rd Battalion paratroopers continue pushing the Japanese
out of their positions, killing or sealing in any who refuse to surrender.
6. 1730hrs: Organized Japanese resistance on Breakwater Point ends. The remaining
Japanese are confined to isolated caves along its edge, which are sealed on February
20.

66
 C

US UNITS
A. G Company, 3rd Battalion, 503rd PRCT
B. I Company, 3rd Battalion, 503rd PRCT
C. Two US Navy destroyers of DESDIV 46

BREAKWATER
POINT

1
5

2
1
1
B

JAPANESE UNITS
4 1. Strongpoints

67
US paratroopers use a mortar
to clear out Japanese troops
hiding in a cave on Topside.
While the term “mopping up”
implies minor combat, this type
of small-scale action could be
intense. (US Army)

The events of February 19 marked a turning point on Topside. The

predawn attack would be the last offensive action conducted by the Japanese
on Topside. That did not mean the fight for Topside was over; there was
still much more to do. The paratroopers needed to dig out the remaining
Japanese scattered in tunnels and caves throughout Topside. There were
significant pockets of Japanese remaining in the cliffs and ravines around
the periphery of Topside, entrenched in fortifications originally built to repel
invaders approaching from the sea or designed to protect the coastal artillery
that gave Corregidor its significance.
Even though the strongest defenses pointed outwards and the paratroopers
were taking them from the rear, they were still formidable defensive positions.
This required a systematic and methodical clearance. One bug that turned
into a feature was the Japanese tendency to reoccupy positions that had been
cleared out the day before. They would infiltrate at night, when US forces
withdrew to night positions.
By February 20, the 503rd PRCT’s men were learning to keep positions
difficult to retake occupied at night in order to prevent this. Other positions
looked defensible to the Japanese reoccupying them, but were death traps,
easy for the US to clean up with little risk to US soldiers. These were left
empty for the Japanese, baited traps that simplified the task of clearing
Topside of its original tenants.
There was also significant offensive action by the 503rd PRCT.
Breakwater Point, Wheeler Point, Rock Point, and Battery James were scenes
of particularly hard fighting. Assisted by naval artillery, I Company sealed
53 caves around Breakwater Point on February 20, and cleared out Ramsey
Ravine. C Company took Battery Wheeler, and cleared out much of Wheeler
Point. G Company swept the area between Morrison Hill and the coast,
closing 17 caves. Destroyers and P-47s helped the 503rd PRCT clear out the
area between Rock Point and James Ravine. By nightfall most of the fighting

68
on Topside was over. While there were still holdouts (a last, small banzai
attack would be launched from Wheeler Point on February 23), it was time
to turn attention to the eastern half of Corregidor.

MOP-UP ON CORREGIDOR: FEBRUARY 21–28,

1945
As things were brought under control on Topside, preparations began to clear
Corregidor’s eastern half of Japanese troops. An offensive involving a two-
battalion push was planned, with a start date of February 24. Preparations
included a general police-up of Topside. The 503rd PRCT organized salvage
parties to collect equipment lost on the first day’s jump. Forty percent of the
pack howitzers, 30 percent of the light and heavy machine guns, half the
mortars and flamethrowers, and one-quarter of the radios dropped went
astray on the first day. Salvage parties collected the weapons and equipment
of the dead and wounded which had been left on the battlefield. The salvaged
items were placed in normal storage and issued as needed. Demolition
equipment and medical supplies were sent from Mariveles.
The 503rd PRCT continued its systematic clearance of Topside, but there
was less enemy activity and contact there on account of fewer Japanese
troops. Fighting continued in James and Ramsey ravines, and at Rock Point,
Battery Cheney, and Wheeler Point. It often involved paratroopers retaking
positions they captured the previous day. By this time, some positions were
being abandoned deliberately to bait a man trap. They were also moving into
hitherto ignored areas, like Geary Point and Searchlight Point.
The US Navy and USAAF focused on Corregidor’s tail during February
21, conducting a preparatory bombardment of Tailside. Two USN destroyers
shelled suspected enemy positions, as fighter-bombers (mostly P-47s) worked
over areas east of Malinta Hill. B-24s conducted saturation bombing on
locations of known tunnels on Tailside and on Kindley Field.
While the 503rd PRCT had been reducing Topside, the 34th Infantry was
holding Malinta Hill. The Japanese kept launching small probing attacks
against the 34th Infantry’s positions at night. They were conducted by small
parties from Tailside attempting to infiltrate into Malinta Hill and by small
parties leaking out of Malinta Tunnel through undiscovered minor exits.
These nuisance (but still dangerous) attacks could not be coordinated, and
attempts to surprise the Americans failed.
The Japanese trapped within Malinta Tunnel realized they could not
attack the US troops on the hilltop in large enough numbers through the
small exits available to them. The main entrances to Malinta Tunnel had
been sealed off by February 18, collapsed by naval gunfire. Reopening the
western entrance was hopeless. It had been brought down by 8in. gunfire.
The gunfire was overkill, but overkill was viewed as necessary to protect the
landing beaches.
The eastern entrance was not as completely collapsed. The Japanese
trapped within the tunnels believed they could blow it open, allowing the men
within it to launch a mass attack against the Americans atop Malinta Hill,
overwhelming them. If that failed, they could join forces with the Japanese
troops on Corregidor’s tail. They set off demolition charges at 2130hrs on
February 21.

69
Battery Cheney at the end of Whoever set the demolition charges had more enthusiasm than
the campaign. (US Army) knowledge. Malita Tunnel was generously stocked with ammunitions and
explosives. Unsure of the amount of explosive needed to clear the entrance,
those setting the explosives ended up using too much. The resulting blast
rocked Malinta Hill. Debris, including large rocks, sprayed out of the
entrance like a giant shotgun blast. It created a landslide that buried six US
soldiers of A Company, 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry. It also set off secondary
explosions within Malinta Tunnel. Remarkably, several hundred Japanese in
a side tunnel, sheltered from the blast, were able to exit Malinta Tunnel from
the East Exit and various smaller outlets, and some attacked the US troops
atop the hill. They were repulsed, but about 300 successfully escaped to the
east, reinforcing the Japanese on Tailside.
The rest of the Japanese personnel in Malinta Tunnel—those not killed
by the breeching explosion—remained trapped. They could not escape.
On February 23 and 24, intermittent explosions shook Malinta Hill as the
remaining Japanese within Malinta Tunnel committed suicide by setting off
additional ammunition within the tunnel complex.
During February 22 and 23, the 503rd PRCT’s 1st Battalion and 3rd
Battalion came off Topside to position for a sweep east of Malinta Hill. The
462nd Parachute Field Artillery Battalion had 11 of its 18 75mm howitzers
and 19 of its 24 .50-cal. machine guns serviceable by February 22. They
accompanied the infantry, assembling on the Parade Ground on February 22.
US forces were also improving the portion of Corregidor they controlled.
Bulldozers were sent the first day. By February 22, they carved out an
airstrip on Topside capable of operating light aircraft. At 1000hrs the
first L-4 Grasshopper (the military version of the Piper Cub) landed on
Corregidor. Bulldozers also improved roads, and cleared away debris and
refuse, improving sanitary conditions. The US attended to burying the enemy
dead. Equipment that landed outside the perimeter on the first day’s drops
was located and moved to supply dumps. Weapons abandoned by dead and
wounded paratroopers were collected.
Insecticide and sprayers were sent from Luzon. That day’s airdrop
included mail and two days’ rations. The 503rd PRCT’s command also asked

70
 The Japanese underestimated
the effects of the explosives
they used to open the east end
of Malinta Tunnel. The resulting
blast brought down that side
of Malinta Hill, as shown in this
picture. (AC)

that 2,700 paratrooper coveralls be airdropped the next day. The fighting
had left many paratroopers wearing rags.
The Topside mop-up was by no means a trivial operation. The Japanese
were still resisting fiercely, although there were fewer of them. There would
be scores of sharp, small-unit fights on February 22 and 23. These were
on the periphery of Topside and Middleside, in the regions of the shoreline
cliffs, and involved the systematic clearing of the subterranean fortifications
in which the Japanese were concealed. Enemy morale was still high. They
were well supplied and well fed, so they could not be starved out. They had
to be dug out.
The fighting took a toll on the remaining Japanese. On February 22, 119
Japanese killed-in-action were counted. Only one prisoner was taken. The
Japanese launched another mass attack on Topside at 0430hrs on February
23. Starting from positions around Wheeler Point, 400 Japanese struck
the 503rd PRCT’s perimeter in a last attempt to regain the high ground on
Topside. It failed.
The surviving Japanese withdrew to their starting point. The 2nd
Battalion, 503rd PRCT continued its systematic clearing of the caves and
bunkers around the periphery of Topside. Clearing activities would continue
until March 2. The Japanese troops on Topside were unable to launch any
further offensive actions. Those holding out on Topside could only maintain
their positions until the 503rd PRCT turned its attention to dealing with
them, at which point they were faced with surrender or death.
Almost all the remaining Japanese on Topside chose the latter. Only six
Japanese prisoners were taken during the first week’s fighting. The US killed
just under 2,500 Japanese troops during that period. Several hundred others
opted for death by suicide in the depths of the caves and tunnels they were
in. US casualties to that point totaled 118 killed in action and 314 wounded.
Meanwhile, the rest of the 503rd PRCT used February 23 to prepare for
its assault on the eastern half of Corregidor, scheduled to start the next day.
Troops of the 1st and 3rd battalions and the 462nd Parachute Field Artillery
Battalion moved to marshaling areas on Middleside and Bottomside.
Hand grenades and bazooka rounds were shipped to Corregidor from

71
By February 22, the fighting
on Topside had quieted
down considerably. Men
of the 503rd PRCT spent
part of the day policing
the battlefield, collecting
equipment and weapons left
there during the previous days’
combat. (US Army)

Mariveles, and issued to the paratroopers. Equipment was checked, and if

necessary replaced.
While the troops prepared for the next day’s offensive, regimental and
battalion commanders along with members of the regimental and battalion
staffs moved to Malinta Hill. There they familiarized themselves with the
terrain on which they would be fighting the next day. Battle plans were
adjusted, based on their observations.
The attack opened at 0730hrs, shortly after sunrise. In the hour before
that, the US Navy and USAAF conducted a heavy bombardment of the area
between Malinta Hill and the western end of Kindley Field. The regiment’s
artillery had moved onto firing positions on Malinta Hill before the attack
began. They opened the attack with an intense barrage—or as intense as 11
75mm howitzers could provide.
Initially, the 1st Battalion, 503rd PRCT led the attack, passing through
the positions held by the 34th Infantry, reinforced by two M4 Sherman
tanks, still on loan. Once they began advancing, they encountered heavy
mortar and machine-gun fire. US counterfire allowed the 1st Battalion to
push forward. The 3rd Battalion followed behind the 1st, clearing bypassed
enemy positions. They were soon pushing east.
They encountered serious resistance at Engineer Point, on the north side
of the tail, just east of Malinta Hill. Offshore bombardment, combined with
vigorous action by 1st Battalion paratroopers, stifled the Japanese opposition.
The 1st Battalion bypassed Engineer Point, and 3rd Battalion cleaned it out.
The delay allowed Japanese troops east of Engineer Point to prepare a
counterattack. While 1st Battalion was moving toward Infantry Point, 800
yards east of Engineer Point, the Japanese massed 600 men 300 yards east
of Engineer Point. They occupied positions on either side of a road running
through Tailside. A mix of naval marines and combat engineers, these were
combat troops trained to fight as infantry. They posed a real threat to the
lead elements of 1st Battalion.

72
 The 462nd Parachute Field
Artillery Battalion came into its
own. The Japanese troops were
too close to US lines for airstrikes
or naval gunfire support. The crew
of the 462nd’s pack howitzers had
been working with the parachute
infantry for over a week. They
had no problem distinguishing
friend from foe at close quarters.
As the Japanese prepared a charge
against the 1st Battalion, the 462nd
unleashed a barrage. Catching the
enemy in the open at the start
of the charge, the 75mm shells
blew the attack apart. Artillery
fire killed some 300 Japanese
soldiers. Parachute infantrymen
easily turned back the survivors,
killing still more. The rest fell back
in confusion.
At Engineer Point one tunnel
complex captured by US troops
yielded 19 Shinyo suicide boats.
They were almost certainly unserviceable. The US Navy destroyers providing A howitzer and its crew from
Corregidor with gunfire support would have been perfect targets for Shinyos. the 462nd Parachute Field
Artillery Battalion. The battalion
The 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment was relieved in place by had jumped on February
the 2nd Battalion, 151st Infantry Regiment. The 3rd Battalion, 34th 16 with the 503rd PRCT. It
Infantry assembled near South Dock for transportation to Mariveles, served valiantly throughout
and reunification with the rest of their regiment. The 151st was part of the campaign, but never as
effectively as it did on February
the 38th Infantry Division, a National Guard Division made up of units
23, breaking up a Japanese
drawn from Midwestern states. The 151st played a minor role in the capture charge. (US Army)
of Corregidor, largely serving as garrison troops, but would take part in
subsequent operations on the other Manila Bay islands.
February 24 ended with the 503rd PRCT reaching its intended objective,
a line cutting north–south across Corregidor just east of Soldier Point and
Camp Point. The 503rd’s 1st and 3rd battalions cleared Japanese troops
out of the ground between Malinta Hill and the objective line. Over 700
Japanese died that day resisting the regiment’s advance. US casualties
were light, but one of those killed was Major Robert “Pug” Woods, 1st
Battalion’s commander.
On Topside, 2nd Battalion, 503rd PRCT continued clearing the area
around Wheeler Point, meeting stiff resistance. On Bottomside and Malinta
Hill, the 2nd Battalion, 151st Infantry settled into the positions it had taken
over from the 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry.
The 503rd PRCT continued its eastward progress on February 25. It
advanced east another half-mile, conducting a methodical sweep as it moved
forward. There were fewer tunnel and cave complexes on this stretch of
Corregidor. It pushed the Japanese out of the fortifications at Ordnance
Point and the location of the prewar Battery Denver. By nightfall, it had
recaptured most of Kindley Field, and was occupying North Point. Japanese

73
74
75
 5

1
4 2
3

THE LAST LARGE JAPANESE COUNTERATTACK, FEBRUARY 24, 1945 (PP. 74–75)

On February 24, the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 503rd PRCT workers (3). While ill trained in infantry tactics, they were willing to
launched an offensive to clear Japanese troops from Tailside. die for their emperor. Six hundred men lined up on either side of
The attack started at 0730hrs and began sweeping east from the road running through Tailside and charged the paratroopers.
Malinta Hill. Initial progress was good, but stalled at Engineer This number also included officers (4).
Point, a prewar tunnel complex. The Japanese resistance was The US and Japanese lines were too close to allow US airstrikes
soon overcome, but the time spent there allowed the remaining or naval bombardment. There was too much risk of fratricide.
Japanese troops on Tailside to mount a counterattack. However, the 462nd Parachute Field Artillery Battalion was on
The Japanese put together a force of 600 men (1). Many were Malinta Hill with 11 75mm howitzers. The battalion was used to
combat engineers or naval infantry (2) stationed on Tailside to working in close proximity to the rest of its regiment. It unleashed
repel the expected landings and heretofore bypassed by the a barrage (5) on the charging Japanese that killed half of the force
fighting elsewhere on the island. Others were sailors who had before the charge built momentum. The paratroopers easily dealt
escaped from the Malinta Hill tunnels or civilian construction with the survivors, forcing them back.

76
 Paratroopers clearing out
Japanese troops on Topside.
The 2nd Battalion, 503rd PRCT
continued this process even as
paratroopers from the1st and
3rd battalions worked to clear
out Tailside. (US Army)

resistance at Monkey Point proved stiffer than expected. Major John N.

Davis, who replaced “Pug” Woods as 1st Battalion’s commander, decided
to leave it for the next morning. The battalion bivouacked west of Monkey
Point that night.
Between one and two hundred Japanese members of Corregidor’s
garrison abandoned the island that night. They attempted to swim across
North Channel to reach Bataan or South Channel to get to Caballo, or made
the passage in makeshift rafts. Many carried arms with them. The waters
around Corregidor were filled with sharks and reaching Bataan required
a swim of 6 miles. It was doable if luck was with you. Some 20 Americans
captured at Corregidor in 1942 successfully swam across North Channel to
reach Bataan in May and June 1942.
Japanese soldiers had more to deal with than sharks. Navy warships, from
destroyers to PT boats, patrolled the waters around Corregidor, stopping
any escapees they found. Those who refused to surrender—almost all—were
killed. The US soldiers on Corregidor had no desire to allow those who had
taken to the sea to live to fight another day. Snipers dealt with those spotted
near shore, and artillery attacked those out of rifle range. Aircraft joined in
once the sun rose. Few Japanese made it to either shore.
The 503rd PRCT began February 26 intending to retake or seal the
US Navy’s Radio Intercept Tunnel under Monkey Point, and complete its
conquest of Kindley Field. It was expecting lighter resistance than experienced
on the previous two days, due to the heavy casualties the Japanese suffered
over the previous 48 hours and Japanese attempts to flee island. Instead, for
the US, it turned into the bloodiest day of the campaign.
The assault on Monkey Point was an all-US Army affair. American
troops were too close to the Japanese positions for air or naval support
without risking friendly fire casualties. The 1st Battalion, 503rd PRCT felt
it could dig out the Japanese troops without this, using pack howitzers,
Sherman tanks, bazookas, demolition charges, and flamethrowers to root
the enemy out of their positions atop Monkey Point. Paratroopers of A

77
78
N

North Channel
MANI LA BAY

North Point
Cavalry Point
Morrison Point Battery Point C O R R EG I D O R B AY Infantry Point
Kindley
James Engineer Point Landing Field
Morrison East Point
North
James I
Ravine H 3/503 Dock I Corregidor
Rock Point K 3/34
Morrison Island
Hill I
Malinta Tunnel Monkey Point
I Malinta
G 3/503 I 3/34 Hill
I I
I
B 1/503 L 3/34 Ordnance Point
Grubbs A 3/34
Middleside San Jose
Way Hospital Barracks San Jose
Smith I
South Point
Hearn 2 503 I
Dock Hooker Point
Cheney Ravine (in reserve) I 3/503
Topside
Barracks Ramsey SAN JOSE II
Parade Ground BAY 1 151
The end on Corregidor, February 21–28, 1945

Cheney Topside
I Arrived via
C 1/503 Golf Course amphibious landing,
I
Wheeler 1200hrs, February 23
A 1/503
Geary
Wheeler Point Breakwater
Ramsey Crockett
Ravine Point

Geary Point

South China Sea

Caballo
US Japanese Island
Front line, February 21
Front line, February 23
Front line, February 25
Front line, February 28
Japanese battery

0 1 mile

0 1km
Company did just that, clearing the Japanese troops from the hilltop and The Corregidor Lighthouse on
taking possession of it themselves, by about 1030hrs. At 1100hrs, Monkey Topside. A famous landmark
prior to World War II, by the
Point was rocked with a tremendous explosion that blew off the top of end of the campaign it was a
the hill. wreck. (US Army)
The Radio Intercept Tunnel, built just before the Pacific War started to
house a codebreaking unit, was one of the best-protected spots on Tailside.
The Japanese had turned it into an ammunition dump. It contained many
tons of ammunition. Realizing defeat was inevitable once the US occupied
the terrain over them, the Japanese detonated the stored ammunition.
The explosion flipped a 35-ton Sherman tank into the air like a child’s
toy. Four of its five-man crew were killed. The survivor was wounded. Major
John Davis, who assumed command of 1st Battalion following Woods’s
death, was tossed into the air. Miraculously, he survived uninjured. Many
other 1st Battalion paratroopers were less lucky. Fifty-two were killed.
Another 144 were wounded. Medics rushed in. It took them 90 minutes
to treat and evacuate the wounded. Around 150 Japanese personnel in the
tunnel were killed in the explosion.
The 1st Battalion was so badly battered that Colonel Jones placed it
into the regimental reserve. It was sent to an assembly area on Topside on
February 27, where it remained for the rest of the campaign. Jones ordered
the 3rd Battalion to take over the offensive. They advanced over the dead
and wounded to retake the rest of Kindley Field. They occupied all of it, and
terrain east of it, by nightfall on February 26.

79
 The capture of Monkey Point
and the explosion of the Radio
Intercept Tunnel marked the end of
organized resistance on Corregidor.
The 3rd Battalion reached the tip of
Corregidor’s eastern tail well before
nightfall on February 27. Enemy
resistance was minimal. At the other
end of Corregidor, the 2nd Battalion
finished clearing Wheeler Point and
Searchlight Point. There were isolated
pocket of Japanese troops in waterline
caves near Wheeler, Engineer,
Infantry, and Cavalry points as well
as scattered individuals hiding in
Corregidor’s ravines. Although some
survived until the war’s end, they
posed no more than a nuisance, and
were not real threats.
The 503rd PRCT spent two more
days hunting down survivors and
rooting Japanese soldiers out of their
remaining hiding holes. On March 2,
Jones declared Corregidor secured.
The Japanese explosion at the Japanese casualties were high. US forces counted 4,500 bodies. Another 200
old US Navy Radio Intercept died trying to flee the island. The remaining 1,000-odd Japanese personnel
Tunnel at Monkey Point
killed the 150-odd Japanese
believed to have been occupying Corregidor when US forces arrived on
personnel in the tunnel and 52 February 16 were never accounted for. They had almost certainly been killed,
US paratroopers. A further 144 and were either buried in tunnels where they could not be counted, drowned
were wounded. The explosion attempting to flee, or had been blown to uncountable fragments.
was powerful enough to
toss a 35-ton Sherman tank,
Only 20 members of the Japanese garrison surrendered. Most were
like the one shown, into the Korean auxiliaries, like Captain Itagaki’s orderly. The Nisei translators sent
air. (US Army) to conduct prisoner interrogations had a lot of spare time. As for US forces,
they suffered 1,015 casualties, of whom 455 were killed and 560 wounded.
Three-quarters of these came from the 503rd PRCT.

TAKING THE OUTLYING ISLANDS: MARCH 3–

APRIL 16, 1945
With the capture of Corregidor, attention turned to the other three islands:
Caballo, El Fraile, and Carabao. There was no urgency in retaking them.
With Corregidor and Bataan in US hands, the path to Manila was open. US
Naval bombardment prior to and during the day of the Corregidor landing
had silenced any batteries capable of engaging ships heading to Manila via
the route through Manila Bay starting at North Channel. Yet the task would
not be complete until the three islands had been cleared of an enemy presence.
Caballo was the first to fall. Located roughly two miles southeast
of Corregidor, a mile across east to west, and 500 yards wide, it was the
most convenient starting point. On March 18, the commander of the
38th Infantry Division, to which the 151st Infantry belonged, requested

80
 Once Corregidor was taken,
the next target was Caballo
Island, which lay roughly two
miles southeast of Corregidor.
This picture was taken prior to
World War II. (US Army)

permission to reconnoiter Caballo. A platoon of the 2nd Battalion, 151st

Infantry, occupying Corregidor, was sent by LCM to Caballo. Its landing
was unopposed, but it soon discovered the enemy in force, dug in on high
ground in the center of the island.
Prudently, the platoon withdrew and reported its findings. The Japanese
troops were entrenched on three small knolls in the center of Caballo, which
rose from 150 to 250ft high. The US codenamed them Hill 1, Hill 2, and
Hill 3, from east to west. As a result of the reconnaissance, US intelligence
estimated a mixed force made up of 400 IJA and IJN personnel were
occupying Caballo Island. This included the artillerymen who manned the
150mm battery placed there. The guns had been knocked out, but some of
their crew had survived.
The 151st Infantry returned to Caballo on March 27, this time with its
2nd Battalion reinforced by armor and artillery. The landing was preceded
by air and naval bombardment. The USAAF had been using Caballo for
practice bombing and increased the number of sorties prior to March 27;
and US Navy destroyers worked over any likely targets.
The landing took place at 0900hrs. Prior to that, Fifth Air Force B-25s
and P-51s bombed, strafed, and dropped napalm on Caballo. Divisional
and regimental artillery from Bataan and Corregidor, including the 151st
Infantry’s 81mm mortars, joined in the aerial bombardment. Just before
landing, US Navy destroyers and rocket-equipped PT boats bombarded the
island for 20 minutes. Then the 2nd Battalion landed, carried by LCMs
from Corregidor.
The landing went smoothly at first. The Japanese defenders were stunned
or in hiding. The 151st Infantry secured Hill 1 within 15 minutes of landing.
By the time they began their advance to Hill 2, the Japanese troops had
recovered, responding with heavy mortar and machine-gun fire. The hill’s
rugged terrain and steep slopes further slowed the US assault. It took the rest
of the day to capture Hill 2, but by sunset the 151st Infantry had occupied
its crest and was securely in possession of it.

81
On Caballo, the surviving
Japanese troops took shelter
in the mortar pits of Battery
Craighill. Rather than launch
a direct assault, which would
result in high casualties, the US
commander decided to burn
the Japanese defenders out.
To pump the fuel oil where it
was needed, engineers from
the 113th Combat Engineering
Battalion built this pipeline up
the side of Caballo Island. (AC)

The next day they cleared Hill 3 of Japanese troops, and were in control
of most of Caballo. The 151st Infantry had killed half its garrison. Any
Japanese survivors withdrew to the mortar pits of Battery Craighill, near the
base of Hill 2’s eastern slope. There the battle entered a stalemate.
Battery Craighill was a prewar fortification. It had housed four 12in.
mortars in sunken pits. The ammunition to feed these weapons came
from heavily protected bunkers built of reinforced concrete. The layout
was such that direct-fire artillery was ineffective. Tanks and self-propelled
guns could not depress their guns far enough to target the entrances to
the tunnels. The approaches to the pits were too steep for a tank to travel
to the bottom.
The Japanese defenders set up their surviving mortars and machine guns
to command the approaches to Battery Craighill. Unless they were silenced,
they would stop any US infantry advance—at a high cost to the attackers.
The American forces could not silence these guns with indirect artillery. The
tunnels were too well protected. Using mortar fire to suppress them did
not work, either. The Japanese retreated to their tunnels while the barrage
occurred, and re-manned their guns as soon as US fire lifted, before the
assaulting US infantry were in position to attack the guns. US commanders
did not want to sacrifice troops to take the pits. They were insignificant
objectives. But they did want to maintain a force on Caballo to contain
the Japanese. On March 31 engineers attempted to burn the Japanese out,
pouring fuel oil down a ventilator shaft, and igniting it, but they could not
get enough of the fuel oil up the hill and into the shaft.
The commander of the 113th CEB, attached to the 38th Division,
suggested pumping the oil up the hill from the beach via a pipeline. The
suggestion was adopted. The US Navy donated two fuel cubes with the
necessary oil. The USAAF contributed a 110hp pump and flexible hose for
the pipeline. The 592nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment provided an
LCM to carry everything.
On April 5 the engineers pumped over 2,500 gallons of fuel oil into
the ventilator shaft, and set it off with a phosphorus grenade. A massive

82
 Taking their inspiration from
their success on Caballo Island,
fire was used as the main
weapon against Fort Drum.
Soldiers of the 151st Infantry
are shown here boarding the
fort from a special drawbridge
built on LSM-51. After they
secured the top, engineers
rigged a hose to pump fuel oil
into Fort Drum which would
be ignited using a satchel
charge. (US Army)

flash fire occurred, followed by explosions as Japanese ammunition ignited.

They repeated the process on April 6 and 7. Finally, they lowered two
demolition charges down the ventilator shaft and laid one at an accessible
tunnel entrance, and set off all three simultaneously. Massive flames erupted,
followed by more explosions.
A few Japanese survived the fires and explosions. The US troops spent
the next few days trying to convince them to surrender, but failed. Finally,
on April 13, a patrol entered the tunnels to clear them. They found one
surviving Japanese soldier. He refused to surrender and was killed, ending
the battle for Caballo.
Fort Drum/El Fraile was next. US forces landed on the concrete battleship
in late February. A PT boat was patrolling near the fort. Its crew convinced
themselves it had been abandoned. They stopped, boarding the fort at the
sally port. Seven members of the crew, including its captain decided to
explore it. The Japanese held fire as the Americans entered a concrete-lined
tunnel. When the party was well within the fort, the Japanese opened up with
a machine gun, killing one officer, and wounding another and several enlisted
men. The survivors made a hasty retreat, boarded the PT boat, returned to
base, and reported their find.
Documents captured on Corregidor indicated Fort Drum had a garrison
of 70. As with Battery Craighill on Caballo, no one wanted US soldiers killed
for an objective as insignificant as the fort. Yet something had to be done
to remove the garrison. The 38th Infantry Division’s leaders decided to wait
until a solution appeared.
Fire had worked well on Caballo, so it was decided to use fire on Fort
Drum. The plan was simple: take control of the top of Fort Drum, pour fuel
oil down the ventilation shafts, and set this off with demolition charges.
There were challenges in executing the plan. The 20ft-thick concrete deck

83
FORT DRUM: THE CONCRETE BATTLESHIP
El Fraile had been converted to Fort Drum between 1909 and 1914. The top of
the island had been shaved off and replaced by a 20ft concrete deck, 2–3ft thick
concrete walls, and two twin 14in. gun turrets. The guns were disabled in 1942.
Once the Japanese were discovered occupying the island, plans were laid to
remove them. Since Fort Drum was impervious to conventional bombardment,
and digging the Japanese out by conventional means would be bloody, an
imaginative plan was developed to destroy the fort with incendiaries.

FORT DRUM 3

EVENTS
1. LSM-51, accompanied by an LCI(L) and several LCVPs, approaches Fort Drum.
2. Using a special bridge on LSM-51, troops board Fort Drum’s top deck. They secure
the deck, and block all but one ventilator shaft. LSM-51 is maintained in place against
the fort’s side by the LCVPs.
3. A fuel line is run to the open ventilator shaft, and fuel oil pumped in. The
Japanese occupants are down within the fort’s engine room, toward its eastern end.
US troops then evacuate Fort Drum as a time-fuzed demolition charge is dropped
down the ventilator shaft.
4. The US flotilla departs. The fuel oil catches fire when the demolition charge
explodes. This, in turn detonates the 14in. gun ammunition still stored in Fort Drum.

84
1

C
C
C

US NAVY
A. LSM-51
B. LSI(L)
C. LCVP

85
The first round of explosions on
Fort Drum was unimpressive.
Then the fire touched off
ammunition for the 14in.
guns still stored in Fort
Drum’s magazines. The result,
shown here, was far more
remarkable. (US Army)

of Fort Drum was too high to use conventional landing craft, and using the
sally port to board the fort was inadvisable.
LSM-51 was modified to add a tower topped with a drawbridge, a 20th-
century version of the Roman corvus boarding device. This was the same
LSM used at Caballo, with fittings to store and pump oil. On April 18,
LSM-51, accompanied by an LCI(L), several LCVPs, and F Company of the
2nd Battalion, 151st Infantry approached the concrete battleship. LSM-51
lay alongside the fort. The drawbridge was lowered and the infantrymen and
engineers boarded the fort. Spreading over the fort’s top, the engineers sealed
all openings except the one ventilator shaft, and the infantry secured the top
against a possible Japanese attack.
That did not happen. Except for a few Japanese snipers, firing rifles out
of one of the 6in. gun casemates, the Japanese remained passive throughout
the US activity. Once the top was secured, a hose was fed over and fuel
oil pumped down the ventilator shaft, a demolition charge dropped down
it, and a 30-minute fuze lit. After that the US troops reboarded LSM-51
while pumping continued. The LVCPs were used as tugs to hold LSM-51 in
place. Despite this, high waves broke the fuel oil line. Major Paul LeMasters,
commanding 2nd Battalion, reboarded Fort Drum and cut the fuze. The fuel
oil line was repaired, pumping concluded (with 3,000 gallons dumped into
Fort Drum), and the fuze reset. Then the flotilla of landing craft pulled away
to a safe distance to await the results.
The first explosion occurred at 1035hrs, and proved a damp squib. It
did start fires, but did not result in the expected demolition of the fort. The
attackers withdrew to consult with the admiral in charge. Meanwhile, the
fires continued burning and spreading. Eventually, they reached the magazine
where the 14in. ammunition was stored prewar. It had never been removed.
At 1045hrs, before LSM-51 reached the flagship, a massive explosion rocked
the fort. Concrete chunks and steel plates were tossed into the air, landing
1,000 yards from the fort. Flames shot out of every opening.
Flames and explosions continued the rest of the day and for several days
afterwards. Not until April 18 was it safe to approach Fort Drum. That day,
a patrol entered the fort, and explored it. The garrison had all been killed.
The patrol counted 65 Japanese dead within it.

86
 That left Carabao Island. Half a mile long, and 750 yards across at
its widest point, its coast is surrounded by 100ft bluffs. It was the site of
Fort Frank, armed prewar with two 14in. guns on disappearing mounts in
individual batteries and a mortar pit with eight 12in. mortars. The Japanese
had gotten one of the 14in. guns working, and had mounted three working
100mm guns on Carabao in February 1945.
None of these guns were operable in April 1945; they were destroyed
by aerial and naval bombardment prior to the Corregidor landing. Yet the
batteries and mortar pits remained formidable defensive positions, even
without guns. The 38th Infantry Division’s planners must have been having
thoughts about their experiences on Caballo Island. Carabao seemed to
promise a reprise of that battle, especially since captured documents indicated
it was garrisoned by 350 Japanese soldiers and sailors.
There was no preliminary reconnaissance by a single platoon at Carabao.
The 151st Infantry, tasked with taking the island, assigned its 1st Battalion
and C Company of the 113th CEB with its capture. They landed on April
16. The landings were preceded by a massive and prolonged preinvasion
bombardment. Fifth Air Force aircraft rocked the island with two days of
airstrikes, saturating Carabao with napalm and 1,000lb bombs. For good
measure, the US Navy joined in with gunfire support.
The assault was an anticlimax. The US soldiers stormed ashore, meeting
no opposition—just as had happened at Caballo. As they pushed cautiously
forward, they continued without meeting resistance. The Japanese were gone.
They had been withdrawn in early March to reinforce the garrison of Ternate.
They were thrown into the defense of this minor port on Manila Bay’s south
shore, amalgamated with the IJN’s 111th Surface Raiding Base Battalion.
The 111th were Japanese marines in the same sense as the US Marine
Corps, naval personal trained to fight land battles, rather than sailors armed
with infantry weapons and told to fight as infantrymen. It did not matter.
The Japanese defenders at Ternate came up short in a battle with the 188th
Glider Infantry Regiment of the 11th Airborne Division in early March.
Assisted by Filipino guerrillas, the 11th Airborne pushed the Japanese out of
Ternate that month.

A battalion from the 151st

Infantry Regiment was sent
to occupy Carabao Island.
Although intelligence
estimated there were 350
Japanese present, they had
been withdrawn prior to the
invasion, and these US soldiers
found the island occupied by a
solitary wild pig. (US Army)

87
AFTERMATH
On March 2, 1945 General of the Army Douglas MacArthur visited
Corregidor. He arrived the same way he had departed the island on March
11, 1942: aboard a PT boat. Several members of his staff who accompanied
him that day had been with MacArthur when he departed Corregidor, almost
exactly three years earlier. Now he was there for an official flag-raising
ceremony to mark the successful capture of the island.
The PT boat tied up at Bottomside. MacArthur inspected the ruined
south entrance of Malinta Tunnel before he and his entourage were driven
away for a quick tour of Topside. He stopped at Battery Wheeler and the
Administration building, which housed his office. There was a gaping hole
where his desk had been. Then he drove to the Topside Parade Ground.
The ceremony was held on the same parade ground that had served as a
drop zone two weeks earlier. It would not be the first time the flag had been
run up a flagpole on Topside. On the day of the landing two paratroopers
shinnied up a pole under sniper fire to set a 48-star flag at its peak. They
wanted the world to know the US was repossessing the Rock, evicting its

The flag-raising ceremony held

at the Parade Ground when
General Douglas MacArthur
visited Corregidor on March
2, 1945. The Parade Ground
has been cleaned up, but
evidence of the battle abounds.
The ruins of Mile-Long
Barracks can be seen in the
background. (US Army)

88
current tenants. The March 2 ceremony
marked the completion of this task.
The dead (of both sides) and US
injured had been removed, and the debris
and rubble present during the battle was
gone. Bulldozers had hastily scraped the
Parade Ground flat to accommodate
the ceremony. Parachute canopies still
hung in the branches of the trees around
the ground.
No representatives of the 34th
Infantry Regiment were present. They
had left a week earlier. The 503rd PRCT
was there, all three parachute infantry
battalions, and the support units, the
paratroopers wearing jump coveralls.
As MacArthur approached, Colonel George M. Jones stepped forward. The US units that participated
He saluted, and stated, “Sir, I present to you Fortress Corregidor.” in the Corregidor campaign
swiftly went on to other
MacArthur gave a brief speech. He told the paratroopers their recapture assignments. This shows
of Corregidor was “one of the boldest and most daring feats in military soldiers of the US 3rd Infantry
history.” He then turned to Colonel Jones and said, “I see the old flagpole Regiment marching along
still stands. Have your troops hoist the colors to its peak and let no enemy a road on Mindoro later in
1945. (US Army)
ever haul them down.”
To the notes of a bugle playing To the Colors, the flag slowly rose to the
top of the flagpole, a ship’s mast. It was bent, with twisted rigging and a rope
ladder tied to the mast top. The ceremony complete, MacArthur departed.
Six days later, on March 8, the 503rd PRCT departed Corregidor.
They boarded LCIs at Black Beach, then traveled to Mariveles and back to
Mindoro. On April 7 the 503rd was committed to combat again, reinforcing
the 40th Infantry Division on Negros Island. Originally scheduled for
another combat jump, which was canceled, the 503rd PRCT was inserted
amphibiously. It spent the rest of the war on Negros, at one point battling
remnants of the IJA’s 2nd Raiding Brigade, an airborne unit.
The 34th Infantry Regiment, as part of the 24th Infantry Division, landed
on Mindanao on April 17. It participated in an intense campaign there,
moving from Parang on Mindanao’s western coast to the capital Davao
on the east. It remained on Mindanao for the rest of the war, moving to
occupation duty in Japan upon the war’s end.
The 151st Infantry Regiment departed the Manila Bay islands upon
completion of their assignments. Its 1st Battalion was withdrawn from
Corregidor in mid-April, being relieved by the 2nd Battalion, which itself
departed in mid-May. The regiment, part of the 38th Infantry Division,
moved to Luzon in May, attacking the Shimbu Line, east and south of
Manila, before moving into southern Luzon. It remained in the Philippines,
on mop-up duties in southeastern Luzon, until the Japanese surrender in
August 1945.
Only one Japanese unit came out of the Manila Bay islands campaign
intact, the composite unit holding Carabao Island, withdrawn around the
time Corregidor fell to defend Ternate. When Ternate fell, 350 of the 1,200
Japanese were killed. The rest escaped into rough, hilly ground southeast
of Ternate, with only their personal weapons and what they could carry on

89
The port of Manila in summer their backs. A few made it to the Shimbu Line. The rest were hunted down
1945, crowded with ships. by Filipino guerrillas and US forces in the area. Those that did make it to
Access to the Philippine
capital was the payoff for the
the Shimbu Line were wiped out when the US attacked it in May 1945. It is
repossession of Corregidor, doubtful many members of Carabao’s garrison survived until the Japanese
Bataan, and the other fortified surrender in August.
Manila Bay islands. (AC) There were some Japanese survivors of the campaign. Perhaps 50 managed
to reach shore after abandoning Corregidor. All of those reaching Caballo
would have died when it was taken, and those who reached Bataan would
have been in enemy-held territory, with the indigenous Filipinos against
them. How many survived to the end of the war is unknown. However, at
war’s end 20 holdouts on Corregidor finally surrendered, the only known
survivors of the Japanese garrison except for the handful taken prisoner.
The campaign to take the four islands, although small, was significant.
Success permitted maritime access to Manila; but the capture of the Philippine
capital and its port had less impact on the drive on Japan than many later
commentators claimed. Those supply routes ran across the Central Pacific to
Ulithi, and then from there to Okinawa. Although forces in the Philippines
would have been used in the planned invasion of Japan, they would have
been relocated to Okinawa prior to the landings, and supplied from the
Central Pacific route, bypassing Manila.
Yet Manila was critical for future operations in the Philippines from May
through to the end of the war. It was the Philippines’ finest port and Luzon’s
transportation network radiated out from the capital. Having the port of
Manila available simplified campaign logistics. It also simplified supplying
Manila, a city with a population of over 1 million people.
Without port access to Manila, supplies to feed its civilian population
and rebuild the ruined city had to come from Lingayen Gulf or Subic Bay.
This required a 110-mile drive from Lingayen or a 77-mile journey from
Subic over narrow winding mountain roads in 2½-ton trucks—a logistical
nightmare. Failure could have led to famine. As a result of repossessing the
Rock, Liberty ships could unload 10,000 tons of cargo directly into Manila.
It made a big difference.

90
THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY
The United States armed forces abandoned forts Mills, Hughes, Drum, and
Frank after World War II ended. Following Philippine independence in 1946,
control of the islands on which they were located was transferred to the
Philippine government. Today all four fall under the jurisdiction of Cavite.
For years afterward these forts remained abandoned and neglected. The
buildings were left as they were when the war ended, and looters allowed to Today, tourism forms an
strip them of metal fittings left there. important part of Corregidor’s
The islands, especially Corregidor, became a magnet for veterans of economy. Some locations
the Pacific War and their families in the postwar years. Surviving US and on the island involved in
the fighting have been
Filipino veterans who fought there in 1942 and 1945 came to revisit their restored. This is the eastern
wartime experiences. The few surviving Japanese veterans who had fought entrance to Malinta Tunnel as
on Corregidor and visited postwar were either among the 40 survivors of the photographed in 2017. (DVDIS)

91
 1945 battle or were among those captured in the 1942 Japanese invasion of
Corregidor who survived until war’s end. Families of those who had died
fighting for the islands came from all three nations.
Today the islands, especially Corregidor, have become tourist attractions
and hold war memorials. The Philippine government runs Corregidor as a
park. At the highest point on Topside is the Pacific War Memorial, built by
the US Government to honor US and Filipino soldiers who participated in
World War II. It was completed in 1968. At the opposite end of Corregidor at
Tail End is the Filipino Heroes Memorial, built by the Philippine government
to honor Filipino warriors throughout history. Between them is the Japanese
Garden of Peace, a memorial funded by the Japanese government. A Shinto
shrine, it commemorates the Japanese who died in combat on the island.
Most of the battlefield is unrestored. Parts of Malinta Tunnel have been
reopened and can be visited by the public. Many of the side tunnels remain
barred to the public. They are in a state of decay and in danger of collapse.
While time has scoured away many markers of the battles fought there, much
remains. The big guns and mortars of Fort Mills were too heavy to remove
and now comprise the largest collection of 20th-century US coastal artillery
remaining. Many of the caves and tunnels remain. Visitors can hire guides to
show them the battlefield.
There are no monuments on the other three islands. Caballo is currently
occupied by the Philippine Navy. It is off-limits to civilians. The prewar
structures on the island have been abandoned and are in a state of decay.
El Fraile island is completely abandoned, largely stripped of its metal save
for the disabled turrets and 14in. guns. A navigation light was placed on it
in 2001. Boats can be hired to take tourists to visit the concrete battleship.
Carabao Island is almost totally abandoned. An afterthought during the
campaign, it remains a tourist afterthought today. Only unauthorized scrap
metal collectors visit the island.

92
FURTHER READING
There are several excellent accounts of the capture of Corregidor by Rock
Force that have appeared in the last 40 years. In my opinion the two best
are Corregidor: The Rock Force Assault, 1945 by E. M. Flanagan, originally
published by Presidio Press in 1988, and Rock Force: The American
Paratroopers Who Took Back Corregidor and Exacted MacArthur’s Revenge
on Japan, by Kevin Maurer, published by Dutton Caliber, 2020.
Both are fast-paced accounts of the action, written by knowledgeable
authors. Flanagan was a World War II veteran who served in airborne units
during that war and retired a lieutenant-general in 1978, before turning
to writing airborne history. Maurer is an award-winning journalist who
specializes in military history, especially accounts of elite troops.
I liked both books, yet felt both focused too much on the 503rd PRCT’s
role in the battle—understandable given the interests of both authors. The
roles of the US Navy and USAAF were largely overlooked. Additionally,
the contribution of the 3rd Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment and that
of the 151st Infantry Regiment were minimized, due to the focus on the
airborne forces. Here, I have tried to expand the story to include these
elements.
The works below represent the main sources I drew upon for this book. It
is not a complete list, but includes US Army histories and studies, and books
on the USAAF and US Navy contributions.

Bush, James E. (Major), Cochrane, William M. (Major), Gingrich, John R. (Major), Gross,
David F. (Captain), Hackett, Craig D. (Major), and Schultz, Douglas P. (Major), Corregidor—
February 1945: A Battlebook Presented to the Staff and Faculty of the United States Army
Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1983
Craven, Wesley Frank and Cate, James Lea (eds.), The Army Air Forces In World War II, Vol. V:
The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945, Office of Air Force History,
Washington DC, 1983
Cressman, Robert J., The Official Chronology of the U.S. Navy in World War II, Naval
Historical Center, Washington DC, 1999
Konz, Matthew J., Operational Employment of the Airborne Brigade Combat Team: The 503d
Parachute Infantry Regiment as a Case Study, School of Advanced Military Studies, United
States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2009
MacArthur, Douglas, and Willoughby, Charles Andrew, Japanese Operations in the Southwest
Pacific Area, Vol. II, Part II, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1966
Morison, Samuel Eliot, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. XIII:
The Liberation of the Philippines: Luzon, Mindanao, the Visayas: 1944–1945, Little Brown,
Boston, Massachusetts, 1959
Smith, Robert R., United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific: Triumph in the
Philippines, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1963

93
 Sweeney, Matthew A., American Airborne Operations in the Pacific Theater: Extending
Operational Reach and Creating Operational Shock, School of Advanced Military Studies,
United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2014
Templeman, Harold, The Return to Corregidor, The Battery Press, Nashville, Tennessee, 1977
United States Pacific Warfare Board, Report No. 11: Parachute Field Artillery, Army War
College, Washington DC, June 19, 1945

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AA antiaircraft
APD High speed transport (converted destroyer or destroyer escort)
AT antitank
CEB Combat Engineering Battalion
IJA Imperial Japanese Army
IJN Imperial Japanese Navy
JASCO Joint Assault Signal Company
L-Day Landing Day
LCI(L) Landing Craft Infantry Large
LCI(R) Landing Craft Infantry (Rocket)
LCM Landing Craft Mechanized
LCM(R) Landing Craft Mechanized (Rocket)
LCP Landing Craft Personnel
LCS(L) Landing Craft Support Large
LCVP Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel
LSM Landing Ship Medium
LST Landing Ship Tank
OP observation post
PIR Parachute Infantry Regiment
PRCT Parachute Regimental Combat Team
PT Patrol Torpedo (boat)
RCT Regimental Combat Team
SAP Support Air Party
SNLF Special Naval Landing Force
SWPA Southwest Pacific Area
TG Task Group
USAAF United States Army Air Forces
USNR United States Navy Reserve

Image credit abbreviations

The following abbreviations indicate the sources of the illustrations used in this volume:
AC Author’s collection
DVIDS Defense Visual Information Distribution Service
LOC Library of Congress, Washington DC
USAF United States Air Force
US Army United States Army
USNHHC United States Naval Heritage and History Command

L-Day on Corregidor. This

aerial shot of the island taken
on February 16, 1945 shows
Corregidor during the last
of the preinvasion aerial
bombardment. (US Army)

94
INDEX
Figures in bold refer to illustrations. bombardment of 39, 41, 46 Endo, Lieutenant 65
fortifications and defenses 6–8, 21 Engineer Point 72–73, 80
aircraft garrison 21 Erickson, Lieutenant-Colonel John 46
C-47s 19, 29 Japanese plans 35
overview of US 19–20 nowadays 92 Filipino Heroes Memorial 92
P-47s 63 strategic importance 29 flag-raising 50, 88–89, 88
airdrops Cam Ranh Bay 23 Fletcher, USS 40
Japanese assumptions 34–35 Carabao (Fort Frank) 18 Fort Drum see El Fraile
stick size 31 battle for (1945) 28, 36, 87, 87 Fort Frank see Carabao
supply 5, 9, 60, 60, 63–64, 70–71 bombardment from 40 Fort Hughes see Caballo
troops 9, 31, 46–50, 47, 48–49, bombardment of 36, 39 El Fraile (Fort Drum) 6
55–56, 57, 60 fortifications and defenses 6–8, 21, 87 battle for (1945) 28, 36, 83–86, 83,
US plans 31–32 garrison 21, 87, 89–90 84–85, 86
airstrike procedures 63 Japanese plans 35 bombardment of 39
amphibious landings nowadays 92 fortifications and defenses 7–8, 21
actual 50–55, 60, 61 casualties 80 garrison 23
Japanese assumptions 33–34 Cavalry Point 80 Japanese plans 35
US plans 32–33 Cheney Ravine 64, 65 nowadays 92
Clark Field 46
banzai assaults 65, 69 clearing Japanese installations Gardner, Lieutenant Edwin R. 44
Bataan Peninsula 36, 36, 38–39, 40 Caballo 82–83, 82 Geary Point 69
Battery Corregidor 63, 64, 65, 68, 68, 71 guerrillas 38, 87
Cheney 63, 69, 70 El Fraile 83–86
Craighill 82, 82 Cleveland, USS 39 Hopewell, USS 40, 40
Denver 73 commanders
Geary 63 Japanese 11–12, 14–15 Imperial Japanese Army
Grubbs 65 US 11–14 2nd Raiding Brigade 89
James 65, 68 Conyngham, USS 45 22nd Field Artillery Regiment 21
Way 63 Corregidor see also Japanese forces
Wheeler 59, 64, 68 aerial views 5, 36 Imperial Japanese Navy
battle orders 25–26 bombardment from 40, 41 11th Surface Raiding Base Battalion
battle scenes 42–43, 52–53, 74–75 bombardment of 36, 37–40, 37, 41, 87
Berkey, Rear Admiral Russell S. 13, 13, 45–46, 69, 94 115th Fishing Unit 22, 23, 58
39 fortifications and defenses 6–8, 21, Caballo garrison 21
bird’s-eye views 48–49, 66–67, 84–85 29, 35 Carabao garrison 21, 87, 89–90
Black Beach 32, 50–55, 51, 55, 60, 61 garrison 21, 23 construction battalions 21
boats and ships geography and terrain 5–6, 30, 30, 34 Corregidor garrison 21, 23
landing craft 16, 20–21, 42–43, 55 history 5–6 El Fraile garrison 23
overview of Japanese 24 infrastructure improved by US 70 Signal Unit 22, 23, 58
overview of US 20–21 Japanese capture (1942) 7, 8, 27, 33, suicide boat units 22, 23, 41–45,
PT boats 32, 33 34, 35 42–43, 45, 58
Shinyo suicide boats 24, 24, 34–35, name’s origin 5 Torpedo Boat Unit 22, 23, 58
41–45, 42–43, 45, 73 nowadays 91–92 Water Patrol Unit 22, 23, 58
support vessels 33 size 37 see also Japanese forces
see also individual craft by name strategic importance 8, 29 Infantry Point 72, 80
Boise, USS 39, 40 US capture (1945) 37–80 Itagaki, Captain Akira 15, 33–35, 50,
bombs 38 Corregidor campaign (1945) 51, 54
Bottomside bombardment 33, 36, 37–40, 37, Iwabuchi, Rear Admiral Sanji 8, 15
as amphibious landing site 32 50–51, 69, 94
defenses 29 Corregidor consolidation 59–69, 62 James Ravine 68, 69
fighting on 73 Corregidor landings 45–59, 58 Japanese forces
geography 5 Corregidor mop-up 69–80, 78 battle order 26
Japanese assumptions 34 duration 36 commanders 11–12, 14–15
as US base 57 other islands captured 80–87 disposition 22
US landings on 50–55, 51, 57 overview 36–37 overview 16, 21–24
Breakwater Point 55, 61, 64, 65, 66–67, preliminary operations 37–45 plans 27–28, 33–35
68 troop numbers 36 and surrender 24, 26, 65, 71, 80
Corregidor Lighthouse 79 survivors’ fate 77, 89–90
Caballo (Fort Hughes) 36, 81 see also Imperial Japanese Army;
battle for (1945) 28, 36, 80–83, 82 David, Major John N. 77, 79 Imperial Japanese Navy
bombardment from 40, 50–51 Denver, USS 39 Japanese Garden of Peace 92

95
Jones, Colonel George M. 14, 30 North Point 73 Battalion 32, 70, 71, 73, 73, 76
background and character 14 503rd PRCT 9, 14, 17–18, 17, 29–30,
and campaign 46–47, 55, 57, 79, 80 Ordnance Point 34, 73 29, 37, 46–50, 50, 52–53, 55–57,
and Corregidor flag-raising 89 59–69, 70–80, 72, 77, 89
plans 30–32 Pacific War Memorial 92 JASCO 32, 47
Philippines US Army Air Force
Keeper, Lieutenant-Commander John fortifications and defenses 6–7 Fifth Bomber Command 37–38
R. 39 Japanese invasion (1942) 7, 8, 27, 33, Seventh Air Force 37
Kenney, Lieutenant-General George 12, 34, 35 Thirteenth Air Force 37
13, 37 map 4 317th Troop Carrier Group 20, 31–
Kindley Field 34, 69, 73, 77, 79 Phoenix, USS 39, 40 32, 46–50, 55–56, 60
Krueger, Lieutenant-General Walter Pickering, USS 50–51 348th Fighter Group 38
12–13, 29, 30 plans air support operations 33, 36–38, 49,
Japanese 27–28, 33–35 40, 45–46, 63, 69, 72, 81, 87
LC(L)-7 45 US 27–33 overview 19–20
LC(L)-26 45 Postlethwait, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward US forces
LC(L)-27 42–43, 45 M. 14, 57, 63, 64 battle order 25–26
LC(L)-49 45 commanders 11–14
LeMasters, Major Paul 86 Radford, USS 40 overview 16–21
logistics 9, 59, 60, 63–64, 69, 70–71 Radio Intercept Tunnel 78–79 plans 27–33
LSM-51 83, 84–85, 86 Ramsey Ravine 56, 61, 68, 69 US Navy
LSM-169 39 Red Cross 47 overview 20–21
Luzon 89 Rock Point 68, 69 support operations 33, 36, 39–45, 39,
50–51, 61, 63, 69, 72
MacArthur, General Douglas 11 San Jose 32, 38, 57 TG 77.3 39, 40
background and character 12 Searchlight Point 69, 80 TG 78.3 40
flag-raising on Corregidor 88–89, 88 Shimbu Line 90 see also individual ships by name
plans 28, 29 ships see boats and ships
relations with Krueger 13 South Dock 32, 34 La Vallette, USS 40
Malinta Hill
defenses 8, 35 Tailside weapons and artillery
explosion 69–70, 71 bombardment of 69 bazookas 17
fighting on 51, 57, 57, 59–60, 59, defenses 29 howitzers 61, 61, 73
60–61, 63, 64, 69–70 as drop zone 29–30 machine guns 59
geography and terrain 5, 34 fighting on 63, 64, 72–73, 74–75 overview of Japanese 21
tunnel 7, 7, 38, 57, 91, 92 geography 5 overview of US 18–19, 33
US plans to capture 32 Japanese assumptions 34 submachine guns 52–53
Manila tanks 80 Wheeler Point 68, 69, 73, 80
port 90 Templeman, Harold 47 Wickes, USS 50
strategic importance 8, 9, 90 Ternate 87, 89–90 Woods, Major Robert “Pug” 60, 61, 73
US advance upon 28–29 Topside 1, 9
Manila Bay 28 airstrip carved out by US 70 Yamashita, General Tomoyuki 8, 15, 15
Mariveles 28 bombardment of 38 YMS-48 40
minesweeping 36, 39, 40 defenses 8, 35 Young, USS 45, 50–51
US landing 38–39, 41–45, 42–43, 45 as drop zone 30–32
memorials 92 fighting on 59, 63, 64–69, 71, 73, 77
Middleside geography and terrain 5, 30, 30, 34
defenses 8, 35 Japanese assumptions 34
fighting on 57, 61, 71 size 37
geography and terrain 5, 34 US airdrops on 9, 46–50, 47, 50,
Mindanao 89 52–53, 55–57, 60
Mindoro 89
minefields and minesweeping 21–23, 33, US Army
36, 39–40 1st RCT 38
Monkey Point 34, 73–79 3rd Infantry Regiment 89
Montpelier, USS 39 6th Infantry Division 38–39
Morrison Hill 59, 63, 65, 68 34th Infantry Regiment 14, 17, 18, 33,
Morrison Ravine 63 37, 50–55, 52–53, 57, 57, 59–64,
59, 69–70, 72, 73, 89
napalm 63, 65, 81, 87 113th CEB 19, 82–83, 83
Negros 89 151st Infantry Regiment 17, 18, 19,
Nicholas, USS 45 73, 80–87, 89
North Dock 32, 34 462nd Parachute Field Artillery

96
OSPREY PUBLISHING Artist’s note
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Kemp House, Chawley Park, Cumnor Hill, Oxford OX2 9PH, UK Readers can discover more about the work of illustrator Johnny Shumate at
29 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin 2, Ireland the below website:
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E-mail: [email protected] https://johnnyshumate.com
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Osprey Publishing supports the Woodland Trust, the UK’s leading woodland
OSPREY is a trademark of Osprey Publishing Ltd conservation charity.

First published in Great Britain in 2023 To find out more about our authors and books
This electronic edition published in 2023 by Bloomsbury Publishing Plc visit www.ospreypublishing.com. Here you will find extracts, author
interviews, details of forthcoming events and the option to sign up for
© Osprey Publishing Ltd, 2023 our newsletter.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or Dedication

transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, To Tim Huete, another Ricochet friend. It was good meeting you. You may
including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval be a jarhead, but you know Corregidor and the battle fought there in 1945.
system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers.

A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN: PB 9781472854698; eBook 9781472854681; ePDF 9781472854704;

XML 9781472854674

Maps by Bounford.com
3D BEVs by Paul Kime
Index by Alison Worthington
Typeset by PDQ Digital Media Solutions, Bungay, UK

Key to military symbols

Army Group Army Corps Division Brigade Regiment Battalion

Company/Battery Platoon Section Squad Infantry Artillery Cavalry

Airborne Air defense Air Force Air mobile Air transportable Amphibious
Unit HQ

Antitank Armor Air aviation Bridging Engineer Headquarters Maintenance

Medical Missile Mountain Navy Nuclear, biological, Ordnance Parachute

chemical

Reconnaissance Signal Supply Transport Rocket artillery Air defense artillery

movement

Key to unit identification Front cover main illustration: US paratroopers take out Captain
Unit Parent
Akira Itagaki’s command staff on Topside. (Johnny Shumate)
identifier unit
Commander

Title page photograph: US paratroopers clearing out Japanese

(+) with added elements
(–) less elements

troops on Topside, Corregidor Island. (US Army)