02 ONeill States

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2 STATES
KEY CONCEPTS
䊏 The state is a central institution in comparative politics, as the centralization
of violence over a territory.
䊏 Regimes guide states by serving as the fundamental rules and norms of

politics.
䊏 Government is the leadership or elite in charge of running the state.
䊏 Political legitimacy can take several forms: charismatic, traditional, and

rational-legal.
䊏 States can vary in autonomy and capacity, and this can shape their power at
home and abroad.
W e begin our study of the basic institutions of politics by looking at

the state. This discussion is often difficult for North Americans, who
are not used to thinking about politics in terms of centralized political power.
Indeed, when Americans in particular think of the word state, they typically
conjure up the idea of local, not centralized, politics.1 But for most people
around the world, “the state” refers to centralized authority, the locus of
power. In this chapter, we will break down the basic institutions that make
up states and discuss how states manage freedom and equality and distribute
power toward achieving that authority. The chapter will define what states
are and what they comprise, distinguishing a state from a government or a
regime. We will also consider the origins of states themselves. For most of
human history, politics was built on organizations other than states, and myr-
iad forms of authority existed around the world. Yet now only states remain.
Why? In other words, we can consider states as an effect—what caused them
to come into existence?
21
22 CH. 2 STATES
Once we have discussed the nature and origins of the state, we will look
at some different ways in which states can be compared. This discussion will
include an analysis of different forms of legitimacy that give a state power
and the actual levels of power itself. Can we speak of states as weak or strong?
And if so, how would we measure that strength or weakness? To answer this
question, we will make a distinction between state capacity and state auton-
omy, and how this might differ across cases and policy areas. Here, we con-
sider states as a cause, in how they can shape other institutions. With these
ideas more clearly in hand, we will return to our theme of individual freedom
and collective equality and consider the future of the state itself.
Defining the State

What exactly do we mean by the term state? Political scientists, drawing on
the work of the German scholar Max Weber, typically define the state in its
most basic terms as the organization that maintains a monopoly of violence
over a territory.2 At first glance, this may seem to be a rather severe defini-
tion of what a state is or does, but a bit of explanation should help flesh out
this concept. One of the most important elements of a state is what we call
sovereignty, or the ability to carry out actions or policies within a territory
independently from external actors or internal rivals. In other words, a state
needs to be able to act as the primary authority over its territory and the peo-
ple who live there, setting forth laws and rights, resolving disputes between
people and organizations, and generating domestic security.
To achieve this, a state needs power, typically (but not only) physical power.
If a state cannot defend its territory from outside actors such as other states,
then it runs the risk that those rivals will interfere, inflicting damage, taking its
territory, or destroying the state outright. Similarly, if the state faces powerful
opponents within its own territory, such as organized crime or rebel movements,
it runs the risk that its rules and policies will be undermined. Thus, to secure
control, a state must be armed. To protect against international rivals, states
need armies. And in response to domestic rivals, states need a police force. In
fact, the very word police comes from the old French word meaning “to govern.”
A state is thus a set of institutions that seeks to wield the majority of force
within a territory, establishing order and deterring challengers from inside
and out. In so doing, it provides security for its subjects by limiting the dan-
ger of external attack and internal crime and disorder—both of which are seen
as threats to the state and its citizens. In some ways, a state (especially a non-
democratic one) is a kind of protection racket—demanding money in return
for security and order, staking out turf, defending its clients from rivals, set-
tling internal disputes, and punishing those who do not pay.3
Defining the State 23
But most states are far more complex than simply being an entity that
applies force. Unlike criminal rackets, the state is made up of a large number
of institutions that are engaged in the process of turning political ideas into
policy. Laws and regulations, property rights, health and labor, environment
and transportation are but a few things that typically fall under the respon-
sibility of the state. Moreover, the state is a set of institutions (ministries,
departments, offices, army, police) that society deems necessary to achieve
basic goals regarding freedom and equality. When there is a lack of agree-
ment on these goals, the state must attempt to reconcile different views and
seek (or impose) consensus. And unlike a criminal racket, which people obey
out of fear or pure self-interest, the state is typically valued for its own sake.
The public views the state as legitimate, vital, and appropriate: Who can imag-
ine politics without it? States are thus strongly institutionalized and not eas-
ily changed. Leaders and policies may come and go, but the state remains,
even in the face of crisis, turmoil, or revolution. Although destruction through
war or civil conflict can eliminate states altogether, even this outcome is
unusual and states are soon re-created. Thus, the state is defined as a monop-
oly of force over a given territory, but it is also the set of political institutions
that create standards through which conflicts related to freedom and equal-
ity can be resolved. It is, if you will, the machinery of politics, establishing
order and turning politics into policy. Thus many social scientists argue that
the state, as a bundle of institutions, is an important causal variable in such
things as variations in economic development or the rise of democracy.
A few other terms that are often used with regard to political organiza-
tion need to be defined here. Although often used interchangeably with the
concept of the state, they are in fact separate institutions that help define and
direct the state. First, we should make a distinction between the state and a
regime, which is defined as the fundamental rules and norms of politics. More
specifically, a regime embodies long-term goals regarding individual freedom
and collective equality, where
power should reside and how it
should be used. At the most IN FOCUS
basic level, we can speak of a The State Is . . .
democratic regime or a nonde-
mocratic one. In a democratic • The monopoly of force over a given territory.
regime, the rules and norms of • A set of political institutions to generate and carry out
politics emphasize a large role policy.
for the public in governance, as • Typically highly institutionalized.
well as certain individual rights • Sovereign.
or liberties. A nondemocratic • Characterized by such institutions as an army, police, tax-
regime, in contrast, will limit ation, a judiciary, and a social welfare system.
public participation in favor of
24 CH. 2 STATES
those in power. Both types of regimes can vary in the extent to which power
is centralized and the relationship between freedom and equality. The demo-
cratic regime of the United States is not the same as that of Canada; the non-
democratic regime of China is not the same as that of Cuba or Syria. Some
of these regime differences can be found in basic documents such as consti-
tutions, but often the rules and norms that distinguish one regime from
another are unwritten and implicit, requiring careful study.
In other words, regimes are an important component of the larger state
framework. Regimes do not easily or quickly change, although they can be trans-
formed or altered, usually by dramatic social events such as a revolution or a
national crisis. Most revolutions, in fact, can be seen as revolts not against the
state or even the leadership, but against the current regime—to overthrow the
old rules and norms and replace them with new ones. For example, France refers
to its current regime as the Fifth Republic. Ever since the French Revolution
overthrew the monarchy in 1789, each French republic has been characterized
by a separate regime, embodied in the constitution and the broader political
rules that shape politics. In another example, South Africa’s transition to democ-
racy in the 1990s involved a change of regime as the white-dominated system of
apartheid gave way to one that provides democratic rights to all South Africans.
In some nondemocratic countries where politics is dominated by a single indi-
vidual, observers may use the term regime to refer to that leader, emphasizing the
view that all decisions flow from that one person. Or as King Louis XIV of France
famously put it, L’état, c’est moi (I am the state). When the Bush administration
spoke of its desire for “regime change” in Iraq and Iran, our broader definition
can apply as well, because the objective was not simply to eliminate the leader-
ship but to facilitate or install democratic institutions. This returns us to the ques-
tion of cause and effect. Regimes can emerge through centuries of slow
development but can also be the product of sudden revolutionary change. How
regimes become institutional-
ized is not clear; it is easy to write
IN FOCUS a constitution, as we saw in Iraq,
A Regime Is . . . but much harder to make it stick,
especially if it is meant to dis-
• Norms and rules regarding individual freedom and collec- place a previous set of rules and
tive equality, the locus of power, and the use of that norms and fundamentally trans-
power. form politics. If anything, some
• Institutionalized, but can be changed by dramatic social political scientists have observed
events such as a revolution. that regime change is most effec-
• Categorized at the most basic level as either democratic tive when there is a general pub-
or authoritarian. lic attachment to the state that
• Often embodied in a constitution. can bind people together through
such periods of transition.4
Defining the State 25
To recap, if the state is a monopoly of force and a set of political institu-

tions to secure the population and generate policy, then the regime is defined
as the norms and rules regarding the proper relationship between freedom
and equality and the use of power toward that end. To use an analogy, if the
state is the machinery of politics, like a personal computer, then one can think
of a regime as its software, the programming that defines its capabilities. Each
computer runs differently, and more or less productively, depending on the
software installed.
This brings us to a third term to add to our understanding of state and
regime: government. Government can be defined as the leadership or elite in
charge of running the state. If the state is the machinery of politics, and the
regime its programming, then the government acts as its operator. The gov-
ernment may consist of democratically elected legislators, presidents, and
prime ministers, or it may be leaders who gained office through force or other
nondemocratic means. Whatever their path to power, governments all hold
particular ideas regarding freedom and equality and attempt to use the state
to realize those ideas. But few governments are able to act with complete
autonomy in this regard. Democratic and nondemocratic governments must
confront the existing regime in the norms and values of politics that have built
up over time. Push too hard against an existing regime, and resistance, rebel-
lion, or collapse may occur. For example, Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempt to
transform the Soviet Union’s regime in the 1980s contributed to that coun-
try’s dissolution.
In part because of the power of regimes, governments tend to be weakly
institutionalized; that is, those in power are not viewed by the public as irre-
placeable, such that the country would collapse without them (Figure 2.1).
In democratic regimes, governments are replaced fairly frequently, and even
in nondemocratic settings, those who rule are continuously threatened by
rivals and their own mortality. Governments come and go, whereas regimes
and states may live on for decades or centuries with a great degree of con-
tinuity.
Finally, we have the term
country, which can be seen as IN FOCUS
shorthand for all the concepts Government Is . . .
so far discussed—state, govern-
ment, regime—as well as the • The leadership or elite in charge of running the state.
people who live within that • Weakly institutionalized.
political system. We will often • Often characterized by elected officials, such as a presi-
speak about various countries dent or prime minister, or unelected officials, such as in
in this textbook, and when we authoritarianism.
do, we are referring to the entire • Limited by the existing regime.
political entity and its citizens.
26 CH. 2 STATES
Figure 2.1 STATE, REGIME, AND GOVERNMENT
Less institutionalized
Government
Regime
State
More institutionalized
Governments are relatively less institutionalized than regimes and states. Govern-
ments may come and go, while regimes and states usually have more staying
power.
The Origins of Political Organization

So far we have noted that modern politics is defined by states, which monop-
olize force and generate and realize policy. This political machinery is given
direction by a particular regime and by the government in power. Govern-
ments generate short-term goals regarding freedom and equality, which are
in part based on an existing regime that provides an institutionalized set of
norms and values about politics. This combination, linking state, regime, and
government, is relatively new in human history. This is not to say that there
is no history of political organization. On the contrary, for thousands of years,
human beings have formed collective groups, ranging from relatively simple
and fluid gatherings to highly complex systems that incorporated hundreds
of thousands or even millions of individuals and lasted for centuries. Com-
plex political forms took root anywhere that people moved from nomadic to
sedentary life. But as we look over the face of the earth in this millennium,
we see that the various forms of political organization that dominated human
history have for the most part disappeared. The globe is now clearly demar-
cated by only one type of political organization—the state—that has displaced
The Origins of Political Organization 27
virtually all other political structures, and within the course of only a few hun-
dred years. Every person and piece of habitable property on the face of the
earth is the subject of some state.
But where did states come from, and why have they displaced all other
forms of political organization? Why are there no longer parts of the world
controlled by city-states, tribes, or empires? To answer this puzzle, we first
need to go back into human history and discuss the origins of political organ-
ization. How human beings have come together and how they have organized
their lives will also be a central issue later on as we look at the role of democ-
racy and nondemocratic rule in the modern world. It would appear that states
have been able to dispatch all other forms of political organization, in spite
of the long history of these other forms. By understanding the origins and
power of states, we can better grasp their functions in the modern world. We
can also consider that just as human beings once existed without states, states
might themselves be replaced in the future by one or more other forms of
political organization.
Archeology and history tell us that human beings have long organized into
political units, although our findings do not necessarily explain why humans
organized in the first place beyond being in a small group. For political sci-
entists interested in current affairs, this original motivation may be of little
concern, but for anthropologists and others focused on human history and
social evolution, the question is important. There are a number of competing
explanations as to why humans organize beyond family or tribe. One impor-
tant factor is probably environment and agriculture. Where people were able
to domesticate plants and animals (a much more difficult process than one
might imagine), they moved from a nomadic hunter-gatherer existence to one
of sedentary living. Concepts that would have previously been meaningless,
such as territory, crops, homes, and personal property, suddenly became life-
or-death issues.
In addition, the rise of agriculture and domestication allowed for the cre-
ation of food surpluses, again a great change from the hunter-gatherer days.
Food surpluses allowed for greater human specialization: some people could
forgo farming and pursue other activities, such as making useful goods that
could be exchanged for food and other items. But while agriculture and a
sedentary existence created property and specialization, it also created, or at
least increased, human inequality. In a system of greater specialization that
relies on a wide array of talents, some individuals will clearly benefit more
than others; wealth and power inevitably become unequally distributed.
This time period is when political organization most likely had its begin-
ning. As societies grow larger, more specialized, and more unequal, they
require new mechanisms to handle disputes. Those with economic surpluses
seek to protect their riches from theft. Those without surpluses seek a greater
28 CH. 2 STATES
share of the group’s resources. And both fear attack by outside groups or inter-
nal competitors that might covet their lands, crops, and homes. Because of
such human innovations as agriculture, the very concepts of individualism
versus the collective, of freedom versus equality, probably first arose. Who
gets what? Who has the right to do what? And how should these decisions be
made and enforced? Having to confront and reconcile freedom and equality
in turn raised questions about where power should reside and toward what
end. Political organizations formed to reconcile these competing demands and
concerns. Once humans could conceptualize the idea of fairness, politics
emerged.
Organizations could settle or prevent disputes between individuals, gen-
erating early notions of law and justice. Political organizations could also
establish rights, punish those found guilty of breaking rules or violating oth-
ers’ rights, and raise a force capable of resisting outside attack. To carry out
these activities, though, political organizations required revenue, creating the
need for taxation. Clearly, then, many of the elements of modern politics
emerged in the distant past, over and over again, around the world.
One thing that remains unclear, however, is whether these political organ-
izations emerged through consensus or through force. In other words, did
political systems develop because some people managed to impose their will
on others, installing themselves as chiefs or kings and using violence to impose
their will? Or did people willingly form political systems as a way to over-
come the anarchy that would otherwise result in a world that lacked central
authority? In the absence of evidence, philosophers have long debated this
issue. Some, like the philosopher Thomas Hobbes, believed that human beings
voluntarily enter into a “social contract” or agreement among themselves to
create a single political authority to overcome anarchy, where neither free-
dom nor equality is ensured. In return for giving up many of their rights, peo-
ple gained security and a foundation on which to build a civilization. In
contrast, Jean-Jacques Rousseau believed that human beings were in essence
“noble savages” whose lives were compassionate and egalitarian. It was rather
civilization, and the rise of the state, that corrupted this life by institutional-
izing a system of inequality. Each of these competing visions provides a dif-
ferent interpretation of civilization and political organization, though both
emphasize that states must be subject to the people, and not the other way
around.
For a long time scholars have assumed that Rousseau’s vision of human
political development was more accurate than Hobbes’s vision of “a war of
all against all,” and that people lived in relative harmony and equality until
technological innovation created more sedentary, more unequal, and more
violent lives. In addition, Rousseau’s vision often argued that the consequent
The Origins of Political Organization 29
shift to political organization was largely consensual, a response to these new

challenges. More recent research, however, indicates that neither is correct.
Pre-state societies were very likely more violent than states in the present. By
one estimate, up to a quarter of the population died at the hands of others.
States appear to have emerged out of this constant warfare as one set of indi-
viduals gained the upper hand over others; at the same time, state coercion
also promised an end to endemic violence, which provided a form of legiti-
macy. Whereas we once speculated that technical innovation, civilization, and
human political organization were the sources of violence, it now appears to
be the opposite.5
Through this mixture of coercion and consensus, complex organizations
began to emerge about 8,000 years ago in the Middle East, bearing the polit-
ical hallmarks of politics that exist to this day, such as taxation, bureaucracy,
laws, military force, and leadership. Some of these political units were rela-
tively small, such as the city-states that emerged in ancient Greece some 2,700
years ago. In other cases, large and highly sophisticated empires emerged, as
in China, South America, the Middle East, and Africa. Across these political
systems, economic relations were based on agricultural production, with more
specialized goods and trade as secondary activities. And unlike in modern
countries, the borders of these early political systems were often undefined.
Beyond their authority, large portions of the inhabited world possessed no
form of complex political organization that would resemble a modern state.6
IN FOCUS
Two Paths of Political Organization
Consensus Individuals band together to

protect themselves and create
common rules; leadership Democratic rule
chosen from among people.
Security through cooperation
Coercion Individuals are brought

together by a ruler, who
imposes authority and Authoritarian rule
monopolizes power. Security
through domination
30 CH. 2 STATES
The Rise of the Modern State

This diversity of political systems eventually gave way to the modern state, which
first arrived in Europe. Why the modern state first emerged in Europe and came
to dominate the world is uncertain, but it may in part be due to historical chance
and the curious advantage of backwardness. Two thousand years ago, Europe,
like other parts of the world, was dominated by a single large empire—in this
case, the Roman Empire. Spanning thousands of miles across western Europe
to North Africa and Egypt, the Roman Empire developed a highly complex polit-
ical system that tied together millions of people and generated an advanced
infrastructure of cities, laws, trade, knowledge, and roads. After a thousand
years, however, the Roman Empire eventually declined, succumbing to the pres-
sures of overexpansion and increased attacks by rival forces. By the fifth cen-
tury C.E., Rome itself was sacked by invaders.
As the Roman Empire collapsed, the complex political institutions and the
other benefits that had extended across its territory largely disappeared, par-
ticularly in western Europe (Figure 2.2). The security generated by imperial
Figure 2.2 EUROPE IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY

d
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Kingdom of Norway go
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K. of Sweden
K. of of Gt P. of
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Scotland
bl
Irish Vladimir
pu
Volga
Re
K. of Denmark P. of Bulgars
P. of Smolensk
ND
Welsh
Polotsk
GLA
P. of
CE
Polish
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P.
Chernigov
Principalities P. of
A N
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F EN
Karakhitai
fV
RAN
GERMAN Kiev M Khanate

olh
P.
K. of o fG U
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Navarre
EMPIRE C
K. O
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F F
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K. of
K. O
Leon K. of Hungary Alans

Venice
P. of
Portugal
K. of
Castile K. K. of E. of
of Aragon Pisa Georgia Shirvan Ghuzz
BYZANTINE E. of
E. of Azerbaijan
MUWAHID Four Emirates Armenia
K. of Seljuk ASSASSINS
Sicily Sultanate of Iconium OF ALAMUT
E
AT
E. of Luristan
C A L I P H AT E EMPIRE P. of Antioch
Seljuk
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Abb
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P. of Tripoli C alip sid Sultanate of

LT
hat Hamadan
e
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K. of Jerusalem
ID
G
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P = Principality
ZA
K = Kingdom
E = Emirate
The Rise of the Modern State 31
control evaporated, replaced by roving bands of marauders. Roads and the

other basic forms of infrastructure that people depended on eroded. Rules
and regulations fragmented and lost their power. The knowledge and tech-
nology accumulated under the empire was lost or forgotten, and the advanced
system of trade and travel between communities came to an end. Much of
Europe reverted to anarchy, entering the period commonly known as the Dark
Ages, from about 500 C.E. to about 1000 C.E. Europe’s rise to power was thus
not preordained; as China, the Middle East, and South America each experi-
enced a period of growth and innovation, Europe experienced decline and
decay.
Yet paradoxically, this period of dramatic decline and anarchy appears to
have set the stage for the creation of the modern state. As the sociologist
Charles Tilly has noted, in Europe’s highly fragmented, unstable, and violent
environment, new political organizations began to develop, in constant com-
petition with their rivals.7 In some cases, these were simply marauders who
realized that they could earn a better living by controlling and taxing one
group of people rather than by constantly pillaging from place to place. War-
lords staked out relatively small areas of land that they could easily defend
and consolidated control over these regions, fighting off rival groups. In other
cases, the people banded together themselves to fight off rival groups. As Tilly
and others have concluded, the modern state emerged from or in reaction to
what was essentially organized crime, with armed groups staking out turf,
offering protection, and demanding payment in return.
The constant warfare among these numerous rivals seems to have gener-
ated a kind of rapid organizational evolution. Groups that could quickly adapt
survived while less successful groups were conquered and disappeared. Rapid
development was thus encouraged by a highly competitive and fluid envi-
ronment.
Not only history but also geography has played a role in the rise of the
modern state. The physiologist Jared Diamond has argued that Europe’s close
proximity to Asia and the Middle East provided benefits in the form of new
plants, animals, and technical innovations that were unavailable to peoples
in the Americas or Africa. At the same time, Europe’s diverse geography hin-
dered political centralization under a single language or culture.8 Even at the
height of the Roman Empire, much of central, northern, and eastern Europe
had lain beyond the Romans’ reach. Contrast this with China, where political
power was centralized and institutionalized already by the third century C.E.
Because China was more politically stable and lacked the kind of competitive
environment seen in Europe, over time its institutions grew inflexible and
resistant to political, economic, or technological change.
Out of the constant warfare of the Dark Ages emerged a new form of polit-
ical organization—the state—that possessed three important advantages over
32 CH. 2 STATES
alternate forms. First, states encouraged economic development. Before and

during the Dark Ages, most Europeans lived under an economic system based
on subsistence agriculture. Property such as land tended to be monopolized by
those in power rather than by those who worked it. Warlords could tie the peo-
ple to the land (serfdom) and extract their labor and levy heavy taxes on those
who produced nonagricultural goods. However, such economic conditions were
counterproductive for society as a whole: individuals had little incentive to pro-
duce if the fruits of their labor were simply taken by others. Those rulers who
created laws, regulations, and infrastructure that permitted and respected pri-
vate property and individual profit, however, found that production grew, giv-
ing the ruler more resources to tax or borrow (and with which to make war).
Property rights thus became a hallmark of state development.9
A second advantage emerged when some rulers similarly encouraged tech-
nological innovation as a means of increasing their own economic and mili-
tary power. As with private commerce and trade, rulers recognized that new
technologies would also stimulate economic development by providing new
goods and services. When technological innovation was harnessed to com-
merce, economic development expanded dramatically. Technological change
was thus viewed by some rulers not as a threat to their power but as a means
to expand it. Many of the advantages that made Europe powerful as it set off
to conquer the world—gunpowder, advanced mathematics, modern map-
making, paper, astronomy—originated in other parts of the world. But the
Europeans absorbed these innovations and put them to new use. What mat-
tered most was not who had discovered these things but rather how these dis-
coveries were encouraged or used. Whether this application of innovation was
primarily a function of intense European competition or certain particular
values among Europeans is still a source of intense and bitter debate (see
Chapter 3).10 Whatever the reason, technological innovation, combined with
the state’s willingness to tolerate or encourage private enterprise, set the stage
for modern capitalism—a system of private property, free markets, and invest-
ment in the pursuit of wealth.
A third advantage came about through the creation of domestic stability,
increased trade and commerce, and the development of infrastructure
whereby the state assisted in the homogenization of peoples who were origi-
nally quite different from one another. The fact that people could travel more
freely within the territory of their state encouraged interaction and the devel-
opment of a shared culture. The state, through printed documents, education,
and legal codes, also contributed to the standardization of language. People
in Europe began to see themselves as belonging to a common ethnic identity
that comprised shared cultural values. Instead of identifying primarily with
their trade, clan, religion, or town, people began to see themselves as English
or French or German. Ethnicity proved to be a powerful asset to the state, for
The Rise of the Modern State 33
it in turn fostered nationalism—a shared political identity. This will be dis-

cussed in detail in the next chapter.
Although the modern state offered all these advantages, by around 1500,
states covered only 20 percent of the globe, the rest belonging to alternative
forms of centralized organization or none at all. But this was soon to change.
Well organized and armed with technological advances, growing national
identity, and economic resources, the states of Europe began to rapidly accrue
power. As economic power grew, so did the ability of the state to manage ever
greater numbers of people and ever more territory. Increased finances and
state organization also allowed for the development of major militaries. Pos-
sessing the ability to conquer and control larger pieces of land, states began
to defeat and absorb their European rivals. Spiritual rivals also fell by the
wayside. The Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), in part a struggle between Roman
Catholicism and Protestantism, culminated in the Treaty of Westphalia in
1648. Under this treaty, the authority of the pope over Europe’s people was
radically curtailed. Without this rival spiritual authority, states were free to
direct religion within their own territory, subordinating the spiritual to the
political. State sovereignty as we understand it today is often dated from the
Treaty of Westphalia.
European states now began to expand their economic, technical, and mil-
itary powers beyond their own shores. During the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, Spain and Portugal took control of large parts of the Americas,
while the Dutch, French, and British expanded state power into Asia. By the
nineteenth century, nearly all of Africa had similarly been divided up among
European states and incorporated into their respective empires.
The organizational structure of the state was thus imposed around the
world by force. Yet as European control receded in the twentieth century, the
structure of the state remained—indeed, states grew in number as these lands
and peoples gained sovereignty. Although peoples all around the world resis-
ted and eventually threw off European domination, they viewed the state as
a superior—or at least inevitable—form of political evolution, and they adopted
it for their own purposes. The world thus became a world of states. States set
forth international boundaries and established international rules and were the
primary actors in domestic and international politics around the world. Coun-
tries like India or Nigeria might throw off colonial rule, but they retained and
expanded the state institutions originally imposed by imperialism.
The rapid spread of states may be viewed as the triumph of a form of
organization that was able to destroy other political rivals, no matter how
sophisticated. But this has not come without cost. Whereas Europe took sev-
eral hundred years to create the modern state, much of the world has been
forced to take up this form of organization more quickly, adopting these insti-
tutions out of necessity or force. Yet the historical paths of Africa, Asia, and
34 CH. 2 STATES
TIME LINE / POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN EUROPE
10th–9th centuries B.C.E. Greek dark ages
8th–7th centuries B.C.E. Beginning of Greek city-states; centralization of

political power in Europe
6th–5th centuries B.C.E. Establishment of Roman republic; first development

of democracy in Athens
2nd–1st centuries B.C.E. Roman conquest of Greece
1st–2nd centuries C.E. Roman Empire expands across Europe and into the
Middle East; zenith of centralized imperial power in
Europe
3rd–4th centuries C.E. Internal decline of Roman Empire; beginning of

European Dark Ages; development stagnates
5th–6th centuries C.E. Rome sacked by the Visigoths; widespread strife

among competing European warlords
7th–8th centuries C.E. Muslim armies enter Spain; Islamic world grows in
power during a period of innovation and expansion
9th–10th centuries C.E. Viking raids across Europe
11th–12th centuries C.E. European crusades into Middle East; warfare begins
to consolidate Europe into distinct political units
12th–13th centuries C.E. Period of rapid innovation and development:

mechanical clock invented; paper, compass adopted
from Asia and the Middle East
14th–15th centuries C.E. Voyages of exploration and early imperialism; early

European states centralize; Islamic world stagnates
16th–17th centuries C.E. Scientific revolution; modern states develop; modern

identities of nationalism and patriotism develop
South America were radically different from those of Europe. Many of these
new states have lacked the resources, infrastructure, capital, and organization
that much older states developed over a thousand years. Consequently, these
newer states often face significant challenges, such as establishing sovereignty
over territories where a multitude of peoples, languages, religions, and cul-
tures may coexist—problems that most European states solved only over the
course of centuries and at the cost of many wars, revolutions, and lives.11 For
better or worse, although Europe no longer directly rules over much of the
earth, it has left us with the legacy of the state itself.
Comparing State Power 35
Comparing State Power

It is clear from the preceding discussion that political evolution has been a
lengthy and somewhat arbitrary process. Where conditions allowed for human
beings to settle permanently, complex forms of political organization emerged,
with features that reflect basic aspects of modern politics: freedom, equality,
and the allocation of power. But only over the past few centuries has the mod-
ern state taken shape, forging new political, economic, and social institutions
that have made it so powerful. States quickly eradicated all other forms of
political organization and laid claim to all corners of the earth.
Still, not all states are the same. As we have already observed, some states
are powerful, effective, prosperous, and stable; others are weak, disorganized,
and largely incapable of effective action. Moreover, a single state can have a
commanding presence in one area but appear ineffectual in another. What
explains this range? How do we understand differences in what we might call
“stateness”—variations in the quality or powers of states? To answer this ques-
tion and make effective comparisons, we need a few more conceptual tools
with which to work.
Legitimacy
The first concept to address is that of legitimacy. Legitimacy can be defined

as a value whereby something or someone is recognized and accepted as right
and proper. In other words, a legitimate institution or person is widely
accepted and recognized by the public. Legitimacy confers authority and
power. In the case of states, we know that they wield a great deal of coercive
force. But is that the only reason that people recognize their authority? In
fact, many people obey the law even when the threat of punishment is slight.
Why? They view such behavior as “the right thing” to do. We may pay our
taxes, stand at the crosswalk, or serve in the military not because of fear of
punishment or a personal benefit but because we assume that the state has
the authority to ask these things of us. As states provide security, they can
engender a sense of reciprocal responsibility to the state. Legitimacy thus cre-
ates power that relies not on coercion, but on consent. Without legitimacy, a
state would have to use the continuous threat of force to maintain order—a
difficult task—or expect that many of its rules and policies would go unheeded.
Legitimacy is therefore a critical component of stateness.
How then does a state become legitimate? Let us turn again to Max Weber,
who argued that political legitimacy comes in three basic forms: traditional,
charismatic, and rational-legal.12 Traditional legitimacy rests on the idea that
someone or something is valid because “it has always been that way.” In other
words, this legitimacy is built on the idea that certain aspects of politics are to
36 CH. 2 STATES
be accepted because they have been accepted over a long period of time. In
some way, they are seen as inseparable from the identity of the people them-
selves. Traditional legitimacy often embodies historical myths and legends as
well as the continuity between past and present. Rituals and ceremonies all help
to reinforce traditional legitimacy by providing actions and symbols that are
ancient, unique, and dramatic. One good example is the legitimacy accorded to
a long-standing monarchy, where a particular family holds the office over gen-
erations. However, the example of a monarchy may also connote that tradi-
tional equals outdated. Yet even modern institutions, like an elected office or a
regime, can develop traditional legitimacy if in place long enough. In short, tra-
ditional legitimacy is a system built on history and continuity. The longer a tra-
ditional political system has been in place, the more institutionalized it becomes,
as it has the weight of history on its side. Change becomes difficult to imagine
if an institution has existed “since time immemorial.”
Charismatic legitimacy is in many ways the very opposite of traditional
legitimacy. When we use the word charisma in everyday conversation, we usu-
ally are describing someone who is good-looking or perhaps a witty conversa-
tionalist. But in politics, charisma means much more. Rather than relying on
the weight of history and the continuity of certain roles or values, charismatic
legitimacy is based on the power of ideas, or what is sometimes called “the gift
of grace.” Charisma is typically embodied by one individual who can move the
public through these ideas and the manner in which she or he presents them.
Some individuals possess a certain magnetism that binds who they are to what
they say. Jesus and Muhammad are perfect examples of charismatic figures
who could gather huge followings through the power of their ideas. In a more
modern and more sinister example, Adolf Hitler was a charismatic figure,
whose power with ideas and language brought about world war and genocide.
As you can imagine, charismatic legitimacy is not institutionalized and
thus is fairly tenuous, since it commonly dies with the individual who pos-
sesses it. But charismatic legitimacy can be transformed into traditional legit-
imacy through the creation of rituals and values that are meant to capture
the spirit and intent of the charismatic leader’s power. Religions, monarchies,
even constitutions and regimes can be examples of this. Weber called this kind
of institutionalization “the routinization of charisma.”
In contrast to the first two forms of legitimacy, rational-legal legitimacy
is based not on history or rituals (as in the case of traditional legitimacy) or
on the force of ideas (as in charismatic legitimacy) but rather on a system of
laws and procedures that are highly institutionalized. Leaders or political offi-
cials are legitimate by virtue of the rules by which they come to office. More-
over, people abide by the decisions of these actors because they believe that
the rules the leaders enforce serve the public’s interest. In this case, it is not
the person who is important or even that individual’s particular values or
IN FOCUS
Three Types of Legitimacy
Type Characteristics Example
Traditional legitimacy Built by habit and custom Monarch

over time, stressing (Queen Elizabeth)
history; strongly
institutionalized
Charismatic legitimacy Built on the force of Revolutionary

ideas and the presence hero (Vladimir
of the leader; weakly Lenin)
institutionalized
Rational-legal legitimacy Built on rules and Elected executive

procedures and the (Barack Obama)
offices that create and
enforce those rules;
strongly institutionalized
ideas, but the office he or she holds. The office is legitimate, rather than the
person in it. Once that person leaves office, he or she loses authority.
As you have probably already guessed, the world of modern states is built
on a rational-legal foundation. States rely on bureaucracies, paperwork, and
thousands of individuals to make daily decisions on a wide range of issues.
Ideally, the public accepts these decisions as the proper way to get things
done, and they presume that these decisions are reasonably fair and pre-
dictable. For example, if there are elections, they accept the outcome even if
their preferred candidate loses, and they obey those who won. The 2000 pres-
idential election in the United States is a perfect example of rational-legal
legitimacy. After weeks of bitter disputes over who had actually won the elec-
tion, the Supreme Court’s intervention effectively ended the battle, and the
Democratic candidate, Al Gore, agreed to abide by the outcome. In spite of
denunciations by some that the election was illegitimate, the majority of Amer-
icans accepted George W. Bush as their president, even if they had not voted
for him (and the majority of voters had not). What’s more, legitimacy is not
confined to political actors within the state; our own individual legitimacy
comes from a rational-legal foundation: our driver’s licenses, identification
numbers, passports, or voter registration cards all confer a certain form of
authority and power that flows between citizen and state.
38 CH. 2 STATES
Note, however, that just because the rise of modern states was built on a
rational-legal legitimacy, that doesn’t mean that traditional or charismatic
legitimacy has disappeared. In almost any country, one can distinguish state-
ness by looking at the mix of legitimacy across these three sources. Political
leaders in many countries throughout modern history have wielded a great
deal of charismatic power and have sometimes become the centers of large
“cults of personality,” which we will explore further in Chapter 6. These cults
portray the leader as the father (or, occasionally, the mother) of the nation
and imbue him or her with almost superhuman powers. Charismatic leader-
ship, and the power that it places in the hands of one individual, can corrupt,
but some charismatic figures have dramatically changed the course of poli-
tics for the better: Mohandas K. Gandhi, in India, or Nelson Mandela, in South
Africa, for instance. Barack Obama clearly rose out of nowhere to become
president of the United States through charisma, not his experience.
Traditional power can similarly be found in a wide variety of circumstances.
The United Kingdom, Japan, Sweden, and more than thirty other countries still
have monarchs. Although the powers of most of these monarchs are now quite
limited, they remain important symbols and attract national and sometimes
even international attention. Canada and Australia retain the British monarchy
as their head of state, even though it exercises no real authority and is part of
its colonial past. Rules and regulations can also eventually take on a kind of
traditional legitimacy if they function for so long that people can’t imagine doing
things any other way. The U.S. Constitution, for example, is not only a set of
rules for conducting politics; it is also considered a sacred symbol of what makes
the United States unique and powerful. Is the difficulty in modifying the U.S.
Constitution due to the procedures involved, or has there developed over time
a resistance to tinkering with this “sacred” document? If the latter is true, then
it is not simply rational-legal legitimacy but also traditional legitimacy that binds
American politics together.
To summarize, a central component of stateness is legitimacy. Traditional
legitimacy stresses ritual and continuity; charismatic legitimacy, the force of
ideas as embodied in a leader; rational-legal legitimacy, laws, and rules. What-
ever the form or mixture, legitimacy makes it possible for the state to carry
out its basic functions. Without it, states find carrying out these tasks very
difficult. If the public has little faith in the state, it will frequently ignore polit-
ical responsibilities, such as paying taxes, abiding by regulations, or serving
in the armed forces. Under these conditions, the state has really only one tool
left to maintain order: the threat of force. Paradoxically, then, states that use
the most coercion against their citizens are often the most weakly institu-
tionalized states, for without violence, they cannot get the public to willingly
comply with the rules and duties set forth.
Centralization or Decentralization
In addition to varying in the kind and level of political legitimacy they enjoy,
states also vary in their distribution of power. As we noted in Chapter 1, indi-
vidual freedom is typically associated with the decentralization of power
whereas collective equality is typically associated with a greater centraliza-
tion of power.
State power can be centralized or decentralized in a couple of different
ways, the first of which is the dispersal of power within the state itself. Under
federalism, significant powers, such as taxation, lawmaking, and security, are
devolved to regional bodies (such as states in the United States, Lander in Ger-
many, or provinces in Canada) that control specific territory within the coun-
try. These powers are defined within the national constitution and therefore
are not easily constricted or eliminated by any government. Here the argu-
ment is that federalism helps represent local interests as well as check the
growth of central power (which is viewed as a threat to democracy). In con-
trast, unitary states invest most political power at the national level, with
limited local authority. The central government is responsible for most areas
of policy. Territorial divisions within unitary states (such as Japan or France)
are less important in terms of political power. The perceived advantage of a
unitary state is that local interests can be represented without recourse to
regional bodies and that federalism tends to weaken state efficiency by dis-
persing power among many local authorities.
In recent years there has been a greater tendency toward decentralization
in many states, something we will speak to at greater length in subsequent
chapters. This process, called devolution, has become popular for a number
of different reasons. In some cases, devolution has been viewed as a way to
increase state legitimacy by vesting political power closer to the people, a con-
cern as states have grown larger and more complex over time. In other cases,
devolution has been seen as a way to resolve problems like ethnic or religious
differences by giving certain groups greater autonomy. Often this does not
lead to outright federalism but nevertheless a significant movement of power
downward from the central state. We will speak more about devolution in
subsequent chapters.
Power, Autonomy, and Capacity
Another way in which we can measure stateness is in the relationship

between the state and other states and domestic actors. At the most basic level
we can make a distinction between strong states and weak states. Strong
states are those that are able to fulfill basic tasks: defend their territory, make
40 CH. 2 STATES
and enforce rules and rights, collect taxes, and manage the economy, to name
a few. In contrast, weak states cannot execute such tasks very well. Rules are
haphazardly applied, if at all; tax evasion and other forms of public non-
compliance are widespread; armed rivals to the state, such as rebel movements,
organized crime, or other states, may control large chunks of territory or the
economy. State officials themselves, having little faith in their office or respon-
sibilities, may use their jobs simply to fill their own pockets through corrup-
tion and theft. In turn, economic development is certain to be much lower as
a result of this unstable political environment. In general, weak states are not
well institutionalized and lack authority and legitimacy. At an extreme, the very
structures of the state may become so weak that they break down to a large
extent. This is commonly termed a failed state (see Table 2.1).13 Afghanistan
prior to 2001 was commonly viewed as a failed state, with no real sovereign
authority, even in the hands of the Taliban; in many ways, Iraq remains a failed
state, one that effectively collapsed in the aftermath of invasion and now has
only limited power and must be backed up by international force.
However, speaking of states as merely weak or strong fails to capture the
complexity of state power. In fact, we run the risk of a tautology (something
that can’t be disproven) if we simply argued that if a state can do something
it must be strong and if it can’t it must be weak. American elected officials
can wage large-scale wars around the globe but can’t ban handguns, whereas
for Canada just the opposite would be true. Which one, then, is weak or strong?
Comparative politics thus further builds on the categories of weak and strong
states through the use of two other terms: capacity and autonomy. Capacity
is the ability of the state to wield power in order to carry out the basic tasks
of providing security and reconciling freedom and equality. A state with high
capacity is able to formulate and enact fundamental policies and ensure sta-
bility and security for both itself and its citizens. A state with low capacity is
unable to do these things very effectively. High capacity requires not just
money but also organization, legitimacy, and effective leadership. Roads get
paved, schools get built, regulations are created and followed, and those who
break the law are punished.
In contrast, autonomy is the ability of the state to wield its power inde-
pendently of the public or international actors. In other words, if an
autonomous state wishes to carry out a policy or action, it can do so without
having to consult the public or worry about strong public or international
opposition that might force it to reverse its decision. A state with a high degree
of autonomy may act on behalf of the public, pursuing what it believes are
the best interests of the country, irrespective of public opinion. A state with
a low degree of autonomy will act largely at the behest of private individuals,
groups, or other states and will be less able to disobey the public will or the
demands of well-organized groups.
Table 2.1 Top Twenty Failed States
Indicators of Instability
Factionalized Elites
Security Apparatus
Displaced Persons
Delegitimization of
Group Grievance
Public Services
Human Rights
Refugees and
Demographic
Human Flight
Development
Intervention
Pressures
Economy
External
Uneven
State
Rank Total Country
1 114.2 Somalia 9.8 9.8 9.5 8.3 7.5 9.4 10.0 10.0 9.9 10.0 10.0 10.0
2 113.0 Sudan 9.0 9.6 8.8 8.8 9.3 7.3 10.0 9.5 9.9 9.8 9.9 9.9
3 112.5 Zimbabwe 9.7 9.0 10.0 10.0 9.6 10.0 9.5 9.6 9.8 9.5 9.3 7.0
4 110.9 Chad 9.1 9.2 9.7 7.8 9.1 8.3 9.7 9.4 9.5 9.8 9.8 9.5
5 110.6 Iraq 9.0 9.0 9.8 9.3 8.5 7.8 9.4 8.5 9.6 9.8 9.8 10.0
6 106.7 Dem. Rep. of 9.6 9.2 8.8 7.9 9.0 8.3 8.3 9.1 8.9 9.6 8.6 9.4
the Congo
7 105.4 Afghanistan 9.1 8.9 9.5 7.0 8.1 8.5 9.2 8.3 8.4 9.6 8.8 10.0
8 104.6 Ivory Coast 8.5 8.3 9.5 8.4 8.0 8.5 8.9 7.8 9.0 9.2 8.9 9.7
9 103.8 Pakistan 8.0 8.6 9.5 8.1 8.8 6.2 9.5 7.1 9.5 9.6 9.8 9.1
10 103.7 Central African 9.0 8.8 8.9 5.5 8.8 8.4 9.2 8.6 8.7 9.4 9.4 9.0
Republic
11 101.8 Guinea 7.9 7.4 8.5 8.3 8.6 8.6 9.7 9.0 8.9 8.4 8.6 7.9
12 100.3 Bangladesh 9.8 7.1 9.7 8.4 9.0 7.1 9.1 7.8 8.0 8.3 9.6 6.4
12 100.3 Burma 8.5 8.5 9.5 6.0 9.0 7.6 9.5 8.3 9.9 9.3 8.7 5.5
14 99.3 Haiti 8.5 4.2 8.0 8.0 8.2 8.3 9.0 8.8 8.9 8.9 8.9 9.6
15 97.7 North Korea 8.2 6.0 7.2 5.0 8.8 9.6 9.8 9.6 9.7 8.3 7.6 7.9
16 96.1 Ethiopia 8.9 7.5 7.8 7.5 8.6 8.2 7.9 7.5 8.5 7.5 8.9 7.3
16 96.1 Uganda 8.7 9.3 8.3 6.0 8.5 7.6 8.3 7.9 7.9 8.1 7.8 7.7
18 95.7 Lebanon 7.2 9.0 9.4 7.1 7.4 6.3 8.0 6.7 7.0 9.3 9.4 8.9
18 95.7 Nigeria 8.2 5.1 9.4 8.2 9.2 5.9 8.9 8.7 7.5 9.2 9.3 6.1
20 95.6 Sri Lanka 7.0 9.0 9.8 6.9 8.2 6.0 9.2 6.6 7.5 9.3 9.5 6.1
Note: Indicators are on a scale of 1–10, with 10 the most severely unstable.
Source: www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4350&page=1.
42 CH. 2 STATES
Each of these concepts helps us to evaluate different states in terms of

power. Strong states with a high degree of capacity and autonomy may be
able to execute major policies relatively easily. A case in point is China’s con-
struction of the Three Gorges Dam, the world’s largest such project, despite
the technical challenges, enormous cost, and widespread international criti-
cism for its possible environmental impact. High capacity and autonomy, how-
ever, may come at the expense of individual freedom. States with a high degree
of capacity but lower autonomy may have widespread powers but at the same
time these powers are subject to public authorization and oversight. The
United States and Canada are good examples of this, further reinforced by
their federal structure. Individual freedom may be high, and this can also con-
strain central authority and consequently hinder national policy making.
States with high autonomy but low capacity, meanwhile, may have few lim-
its on their decision making but lack the ability to realize those policies effec-
tively. Russia may fall into this category; during the last decade the state has
become more centralized and autonomous, but it still lacks a great deal of
capacity in promulgating and enforcing regulations and rights. Finally, states
may lack both autonomy and capacity. This is true of many less-developed
countries, such as in Africa, where states have been “captured” by dominant
elites or groups and are largely unable to fulfill some of the most important
national tasks, such as encouraging economic development or ensuring pub-
lic education. Failed states are extreme examples of situations in which auton-
omy and capacity have left the state.
In short, speaking of state power in terms of autonomy and capacity can
help us better understand stateness: what states are and are not able to do,
and why. However, even when we speak of autonomy and capacity, we should
note that within these two areas individual states may vary widely depending
on the issue or area at hand. An observer of China may conclude from that
country’s rapid economic development or ability to censor the Internet that
this state enjoys high autonomy and capacity. However, China’s corruption,
proliferation of underground religions, widespread disregard of regulations,
and numerous public protests indicate that its autonomy and capacity are in
many areas circumscribed. In contrast, North Korea and Iran suffer from lim-
ited economic development but can master nuclear technology—no small feat.
Autonomy and capacity thus are useful concepts for comparing states but
depend on the issue or task at hand.
Finally, we are left some big questions: Why are some states more cen-
tralized or decentralized? Why do they have more or less capacity or auton-
omy? Some of the answers lie in history, particularly the nature of
international threats and how this affected the relationship between taxation
(to pay for those wars) and representation (to have some say in how the state
conducts itself). For more recently founded states, however, this long histor-
In Sum: Studying States 43
IN FOCUS
State Autonomy and Capacity
High Autonomy Low Autonomy
State is able to fulfill basic State is able to fulfill basic

tasks, with a minimum of pub- tasks, but public plays a direct
lic intervention; power highly role in determining policy and
centralized; strong state. is able to limit state power and
scope of activity.
High Danger: Too high a level of
Capacity capacity and autonomy may Danger: State may be unable
prevent or undermine to develop new policies or
democracy. respond to new challenges
owing to the power of organ-
ized opposition.
State is able to function with a State lacks the ability to fulfill

minimum of public interference basic tasks and is subject to
or direct control, but its capac- direct public control and inter-
ity to fulfill basic tasks is lim- ference—power highly decen-
Low ited. tralized among state and
Capacity nonstate actors; weak state.
Danger: State is ineffectual,
limiting development, and slow Danger: Too low a level of
development may provoke capacity and autonomy may
public unrest. lead to internal state failure.
ical explanation is not particularly useful. How do you build a state so that it
is viable? Is there an ideal mix of legitimacy, centralization, autonomy, and
capacity? Scholars and policy makers are still debating these issues, some-
thing we will return to in later chapters.
In Sum: Studying States

This chapter began by defining the state as a monopoly of force but also as
the institution charged with transforming freedom and equality from ideas
into concrete action. The kinds of decisions made toward this end, however,
are shaped by regimes and governments. Regimes are the fundamental rules
and norms of politics, providing long-term goals regarding individual freedom
and collective equality and the location and use of power toward those goals.
44 CH. 2 STATES
I N S T I T U T I O N S I N
ACTION
STATENESS AND
THE CASE OF IRAQ
For tragic reasons, Iraq is an excellent example of many of our considerations regard-
ing the nature of states. In the run-up to the war with Iraq, many supporters of the
invasion spoke of regime change, believing that a rapid invasion was possible that
would essentially “decapitate” the leadership and regime, allowing for an occupy-
ing force to install a new regime and government within a relatively short period of
time. However, this assumption was predicated on the belief that the state would
remain intact—the leadership may fall, but civil servants would head back to work
once the smoke had cleared. But this assumption proved incorrect for several rea-
sons. First, it underestimated the extent to which state capacity and legitimacy had
eroded under Saddam Hussein and international sanctions since 1991. When the
war began, the state quickly failed, leaving in its wake anarchy. This was com-
pounded by the actions of the Coalition Provisional Authority, which further has-
tened state collapse by marginalizing Iraqis as important players in reconstituting
the state and dissolving the Iraqi military. Some of these failures can be traced to
American political culture—inasmuch as Americans think about the state, they view
it as a necessary evil that must be constrained, not a set of institutions vital to secu-
rity and prosperity. The question now is how one coaxes a state back into existence
after it has been razed: restoring a monopoly of force through military and police,
creating laws and regulations that are respected and enforced, and generally cre-
ating enough autonomy and capacity so that the state is sovereign, effective, and
responsive to the needs of its citizens. There is no simple blueprint for how to do
this, especially in the absence of security.
Governments, in contrast, are those political elites in charge of running the

state. Influenced and constrained by the existing regime, they attempt to for-
mulate policy regarding freedom and equality that may then be executed by
the state. These represent the most basic facets of states everywhere—and
indeed, states are everywhere. Although similar political organizations have
existed for thousands of years, only within the past few centuries did states
arise in Europe and quickly come to dominate the globe. States are the main
political players in the world today.
The universal presence of states, and variations in their stateness, com-
pels comparativists to find some way to study and evaluate them. One way is
by assessing their legitimacy; different kinds of legitimacy—traditional, charis-
matic, and rational-legal—all create their own kinds of authority and power.
The other is by assessing the actual dispersal of power itself; states may be
weaker or stronger, with more or less capacity and autonomy, depending on
Notes 45
how power is distributed within the state and between the state and the pub-
lic. Too much power in the hands of the state risks tyranny; too little power
risks anarchy. Finding the right mix is not simply a technical question but
one that shapes how states and societies reconcile freedom and equality. This
debate over freedom and equality, then, ranges far beyond the boundaries of
the state itself. As we shall see in the chapters that follow, it is influenced by
society, through ethnic and national identity, culture, and ideology; by eco-
nomic institutions and the interaction between states and markets; and by
democratic and nondemocratic practices.
Since the dawn of human civilization, people have relied on some form
of political organization to construct a relationship between individual free-
dom and collective equality. For the past few centuries, modern states have
been the dominant expression of that relationship. We might thus conclude
that states now represent an end point in human intellectual and organiza-
tion evolution. But why should this be so? It seems logical that in future new
forms of political organization will displace states, just as states displaced
empires, city-states, and other institutions. Perhaps challenges to states—envi-
ronmental, economic, or cultural—will overwhelm many, and they will revert
to empires, city-states, or warlordism. Or perhaps technological innovation
will make old forms of political centralization weak or irrelevant, binding
humans in communities where sovereignty is virtual, not physical. Perhaps
the core debate over freedom and equality that has stretched over millennia
will be reconciled once and for all, changing the very nature of politics as we
understand it. These questions may seem unanswerable, more amenable to
fortune-telling than to research. But as we shall see, they lie at the heart of
ideas and conflicts that have transformed the world in the past and may dom-
inate our future.
NOTES
1. In the United States, the word state refers to the federal structure of regional gov-
ernment. As a result, for Americans, the word state conjures up the idea of local
government, whereas for political scientists (and most people around the world),
the word state refers to national, not local, organization. This confusion stems from
U.S. history. During the period of revolutionary struggle and the creation of a fed-
eral system, the former British colonies in America viewed themselves as inde-
pendent political units—in other words, as states. With the creation of a federal
system of government, however, their individual powers were subordinated to a
central authority. The United States of America, in other words, eventually became
a system of national government, with the term state left as a remnant of that brief
period when these units acted largely as independent entities.
46 CH. 2 STATES
2. Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in Gesammelte Politische Schriften (Muenchen,

1921), pp. 396–450.
3. This idea has been developed by Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as
Organized Crime,” in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and T. Skopol, eds.,
Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp.
169–191.
4. Zackary Elkins and John Sides, “Can Institutions Build Unity in Multiethnic States,”
American Political Science Review, 101, no. 4 (November 2007), pp. 693–708.
5. See Azar Gat, War in Human Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006);
also Jared Diamond “Vengeance is Ours,” New Yorker, 21 April 2008, pp. 74–87.
6. S. E. Finer, The History of Government from the Earliest Times, Vol. 1, Ancient
Monarchies and Empires (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
7. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States: 990–1990 (Oxford, UK: Black-
well, 1990).
8. Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York:
Norton, 1997).
9. Mancur Olson, “Democracy, Dictatorship, and Development,” American Political
Science Review, 87, no. 3 (September 1993), pp. 567–576; see also Margaret Levy,
“The State of the Study of the State,” in Ira Katznelson, ed., Political Science: The
State of the Discipline (New York: Norton, 2002), pp. 40–43.
10. For the cultural explanation, see David Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations:
Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor (New York: Norton, 1999).
11. Stephen Krasner, “The Case for Shared Sovereignty,” Journal of Democracy, 16,
no. 1 (2005), pp. 69–83.
12. Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans.
and eds., From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press,
1958), pp. 77–128.
13. Robert I. Rotberg, ed., When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2003).

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7696_ch02_p21-46:7696_TEMPLATE 7/8/09 11:03 AM Page 21

䊏 Regimes guide states by serving as the fundamental rules and norms of

䊏 Government is the leadership or elite in charge of running the state.

䊏 Political legitimacy can take several forms: charismatic, traditional, and

W e begin our study of the basic institutions of politics by looking at

Defining the State

Defining the State 23

Defining the State 25

To recap, if the state is a monopoly of force and a set of political institu-

Figure 2.1 STATE, REGIME, AND GOVERNMENT

The Origins of Political Organization

The Origins of Political Organization 27

The Origins of Political Organization 29

shift to political organization was largely consensual, a response to these new

Consensus Individuals band together to

Coercion Individuals are brought

The Rise of the Modern State

Figure 2.2 EUROPE IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY

GERMAN Kiev M Khanate

Leon K. of Hungary Alans

P. of Tripoli C alip sid Sultanate of

The Rise of the Modern State 31

control evaporated, replaced by roving bands of marauders. Roads and the

alternate forms. First, states encouraged economic development. Before and

The Rise of the Modern State 33

it in turn fostered nationalism—a shared political identity. This will be dis-

TIME LINE / POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN EUROPE

10th–9th centuries B.C.E. Greek dark ages

8th–7th centuries B.C.E. Beginning of Greek city-states; centralization of

6th–5th centuries B.C.E. Establishment of Roman republic; first development

2nd–1st centuries B.C.E. Roman conquest of Greece

3rd–4th centuries C.E. Internal decline of Roman Empire; beginning of

5th–6th centuries C.E. Rome sacked by the Visigoths; widespread strife

9th–10th centuries C.E. Viking raids across Europe

12th–13th centuries C.E. Period of rapid innovation and development:

14th–15th centuries C.E. Voyages of exploration and early imperialism; early

16th–17th centuries C.E. Scientific revolution; modern states develop; modern

Comparing State Power 35

Comparing State Power

The first concept to address is that of legitimacy. Legitimacy can be defined

Comparing State Power 37

Type Characteristics Example

Traditional legitimacy Built by habit and custom Monarch

Charismatic legitimacy Built on the force of Revolutionary

Rational-legal legitimacy Built on rules and Elected executive

Comparing State Power 39

Power, Autonomy, and Capacity

Another way in which we can measure stateness is in the relationship

Comparing State Power 41

Table 2.1 Top Twenty Failed States

Each of these concepts helps us to evaluate different states in terms of

In Sum: Studying States 43

High Autonomy Low Autonomy

State is able to fulfill basic State is able to fulfill basic

State is able to function with a State lacks the ability to fulfill

In Sum: Studying States

Governments, in contrast, are those political elites in charge of running the

2. Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in Gesammelte Politische Schriften (Muenchen,

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