10.2. Mathematics.

Systematical Concepts

Paola Cantù

Keywords
Wolff, mathematical method, number, quantity, similarity, probability

Abstract
The paper investigates the notions of number, extensive quantity, algebraic quantity,
similarity, and probability as introduced in Wolff’s mathematical writings, and evalu-
ates the coherence of these definitions with Wolff’s presentation of the mathematical
method. Wolff’s original epistemology is based on the belief that the discussion on the
foundation of mathematics and on the history of mathematical ideas is essential not
only to pure mathematics but also to its application and teaching. Mathematics is inte-
grated into a larger body of knowledge and subordinated to philosophy, which explains
the impurity of definitions and proofs and why certain notions, such as that of similari-
ty and probability, cannot be understood without reference to ontology and logic.
Wolff’s investigation of probable propositions allowed for a unique demonstrative
methodology applied to philosophical mathematical and historical knowledge, thus
explaining probable reasoning as an insufficient knowledge of the requisites for the
truth of the premises. This explains the importance assigned to the right order of con-
cepts and the inferential role of definitions. The paper shows the internal coherence
between Wolff’s choice of mathematical definitions and his overall epistemology, and
underlines the heritage of Descartes, of Barrow’s edition of Euclid’s Elements and of
Aristotle’s notion of contiguity rather than the influence exerted by Leibniz’s mathe-
matics or by Newton’s fluxional conception of geometrical quantities.

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1 Introduction
Both in philosophy and in mathematics Wolff has often been considered a mere epi-
phenomenon of other authors (Leibniz, Euclid), at best appreciated for his didactical
influence. Certainly the construction of the so-called Leibnizio-Wolffian tradition has
seen Wolff play this role in the history of philosophy. In the history of mathematics,
Wolff was mainly mentioned for his influential textbooks, which practically replaced
Euclid’s Elements in the university curricula. His mathematical contributions, on the
contrary, have mostly been criticized, because of his insistence on geometrical repre-
sentation, on the non-existence of negative quantities, and on the idea that infinitesi-
mals cannot be taken to be numbers (see § 2.4).1

Whereas the literature on Wolff’s philosophy is now quite rich, the same cannot be
said for the analysis of Wolff’s mathematical notions, which are still evaluated mainly
in comparison to others’ ideas—especially Euclid’s2 or Leibniz’s,3 or appreciated for

1 Interesting exceptions are Shabel and Schubring, who analyze in detail Wolff’s mathemat-
ical practice and Wolff’s foundational stance on algebra, geometry, and analysis. Shabel traces the
origin of Wolff’s concept of number in traditional geometric notions, underlying the connection
with a mathematical tradition that was strongly influenced by Euclid, and includes Descartes, Viète,
Williamson, Barrow and Lamy. Schubring discusses at length the connection between proportion
theory and Wolff’s reasons for refuting the idea that zero is a number, as well as earlier and later
supporters of similar arguments (Arnauld, Leibniz, Duhamel, Martin). See Lisa Shabel, Mathematics
in Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Reflections on Mathematical Practice, New York and London, 2002; see
also Gert Schubring, Conflicts Between Generalization, Rigor, and Intuition. Number Concepts Under-
lying the Development of Analysis in 17th-19th Century, New York, NY, 2005.
2 See Shabel, Mathematics in Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Reflections on Mathematical Practice,
op. cit.; see also Henk J.M. Bos, Lectures in the History of Mathematics, London, Providence, 1993, pp.
141-152.
3 See Shabel, Mathematics in Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Reflections on Mathematical Practice,
op. cit.; see also Katherine Dunlop, Mathematical method and Newtonian science in the philosophy of
Christian Wolff, in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44/3 (2013),

2
their historical and pedagogical impact.4 For example, Wolff has been considered as an
opponent of negative numbers,5 and contrasted to Kant.6 With the exception of Käst-
ner and Lambert, who combined sharp criticism of specific aspects of Wolff’s mathe-
matics with general praise for undertaking such a difficult task, mathematicians have
mainly been critical towards Wolff (e.g. Gauss and Schumacher, Euler, …).7

This article will investigate Wolff’s mathematical definitions from a point of view that is
rather internal to his epistemology, especially in the light of the mathematical method
presented in the mathematical writings. The aim will be to evaluate the coherence and
epistemic value of Wolff’s elucidation and definition of mathematical technical terms.
Much has been said in the literature about Wolff’s mathematical method, but the fo-
cus has often been on the application of this method to Wolff’s philosophy, or its in-
trinsic relation to logic.8 Consequently, the mathematical method has often been pre-

Cf. Charles A. Corr, Christian Wolff and Leibniz, in: Journal of the History of Ideas 36(2)
(1975), pp. 241–262.
4 See Joseph W. Dauben and Cristoph J. Scriba, Writing the History of Mathematics. Its His-
torical Development, Basel, 2002.
5 See Johann Michael Hube, Versuch einer Analytischen Abhandlung von den Kegelschnitten,
Göttingen, 1759, p. xxxi, cited in Schubring, Conflicts Between Generalization, Rigor, and Intuition,
op. cit., p. 135, fn.77.
6 See Jennifer McRobert, Kant on negative quantities, real opposition and inertia, Paper Pre-
sented at the 2004 Meeting of the Western Canadian Philosophical Association in Victoria B.C., Can-
ada, 2004.
7 See Christian Friedrich Gauss, Briefwechsel zwischen C.F. Gauss und H.C. Schumacher, ed.
by C.A.F. Peters, Altona, vol. 4, 1862, pp. 332-342; see also Calinger, R. S. (2015). Leonhard Euler:
Mathematical Genius in the Enlightenment. Princeton, NJ, 2015, pp. 146 ss.; see Schubring, Conflicts
Between Generalization, Rigor, and Intuition, op. cit., p. 134 and p. 135, fn, 77.
8 See Herman J. d. Vleeschauwer, (1931). La genèse de la méthode mathématique de Wolff,
in: Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire 11 (1931), pp. 651–677; see Giorgio Tonelli, Der Streit über
die mathematische Methode in der Philosophie in der ersten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts und die Ent-
stehung von Kants Schrift über die “Deutlichkeit”, in: Archiv für Philosophie 9 (1959), pp. 51–84; see

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sented as it is introduced in Wolff’s philosophical—especially logical or metaphysical—
writings. The starting point here will be the method as it is presented in the mathe-
matical writings, in order to verify its application in Wolff’s mathematical textbooks.
We will consider here only pure mathematics, but a second step of the investigation
should include applied mathematics too, given Wolff’s firm belief that applications
belong to mathematics, and especially that the practical use of a theory should be ex-
plained together with the theory itself.9 The analysis is focused on the first edition of
Wolff’s Mathematical Dictionary,10 on the German and Latin editions of the Elements
of All Mathematical Sciences, on their German and Latin summaries, and on the Math-
ematico-Philosophical Essays and Dissertations (1740).11

Tore Frängsmyr, Christian Wolff’s mathematical method and its impact on the Eighteenth century,
in: Journal of the History of Ideas 36/4 (1975), pp. 653–668; see Guido Zingari, Die Philosophie von
Leibniz und die “deutsche Logik” von Christian Wolff, in: Studia Leibnitiana 12/2 (1980), pp. 265–
278; see Katerine Dunlop, Mathematical method and Newtonian science in the philosophy of Chris-
tian Wolff, in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44/3 (2013), pp. 457–469; see
Paola Basso, Il secolo geometrico. La questione del metodo matematico in filosofia da Spinoza a Kant.
Firenze, 2004; see Volker Peckhaus, Logik, Mathesis universalis und allgemeine Wissenschaft. Leibniz
und die Wiederentdeckung der formalen Logik im 19. Jahrhundert. Berlin, 1997; see Ferdinando L.
Marcolungo, Wolff e il problema del metodo, in: Nuovi studi sul pensiero di Christian Wolff, ed. by
Sonia Carboncini and Luigi Cataldi Madonna, Hildesheim, Zürich and New York, 1992, pp. 11-37.
9 See Henk J.M. Bos, Lectures in the History of Mathematics. Providence, RI and London,
1993. p. 146.
10 Wolff never acknowledged further editions of the dictionary. See Christian Wolff, Elemen-
ta Matheseos V, chap. 1, p. 10 (GWII 33). See also Moritz Cantor, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der
Mathematik, Leipzig, vol. 3, 1898, p. 478.
11 See in particular the following writings: Mathematisches Lexicon (1717) (GW I 11),
Auszug aus den Anfangs-Gründen aller mathematischen Wissenschaften (1732) (GW I 25), Anfangs‐
Gründe aller mathematischen Wissenschaften (1737) (GW I 12‐15), Elementa Matheseos I-V (1740-
46) (GW II 29‐33), Christiani Wolfii Meletemata Mathematico-Philosophica Quibus Accedunt Disser-
tationes (1740) (GW II 35), Kurtzer Unterricht von den vornehmsten mathematischen Schriften (GW I
15.2).

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Among the most important mathematical concepts defined by Wolff, one should ex-
amine the notions of number, extensive quantity and algebraic quantity—occurring in
the definition of mathematics itself—but also the concept of probability,12 the notions
of infinitesimals and continuum,13 and the concept of similarity, which is related to the
concepts of quantity and quality.14

2 Mathematics consists of arithmetic, algebra and geometry

The concepts of arithmetical number, algebraic quantity, and geometrical magnitude
are the subjects of what Wolff identifies as the three main disciplines of mathematics:
arithmetic, geometry, and algebra. The analysis of Wolff’s definition of these notions is
useful to test his mathematical method, which rests exactly on the analysis and com-
parison of definitions. As Cantor remarked, the mathematical dictionary is a collection
of definitions or clarifications of technical mathematical terms, rather than an intro-
ductory survey of mathematics.15 The survey of contemporary mathematics is not ex-
tensive neither in the Latin nor in the German version of the Elements of Mathematics
either, and many shortcomings and gaps have been noted. Besides criticism of short-
comings and gaps in the treatment of mathematical topics, mathematicians criticized
Wolff’s choice of definitions: e.g. Schumacher and Gauss commented on the errors

12 See Luigi Cataldi Madonna, Wolff, Bolzano e la probabilità, in: Nuovi studi sul pensiero di
Christian Wolff, ed. by S. Carboncini and L. Cataldi Madonna, Hildesheim and New York, NY, 1992,
pp. 107–130. See also Martin Schönfeld, Wolff, Christian (1679–1754), in: Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy, ed. by D. M. Borchert, Detroit, vol. 9, 2006, pp. 822–832. See Luigi Cataldi Madonna, Wahr-
scheinlichkeit und wahrscheinliches Wissen in der Philosophie von Christian Wolff. Studia Leibnitiana
XIX/1 (1987), pp. 2-40.
13 See Gert Schubring, Conflicts Between Generalization, Rigor, and Intuition. op. cit.
14 See Daniel Sutherland, Philosophy, Geometry, and Logic in Leibniz, Wolff, and the Early
Kant, in: Discourse on a New Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Sci-
ence, ed. by M. Friedman, M. Domski, and M. Dickson, Chicago, 2010, pp. 155-192.
15 Moritz Cantor, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Mathematik, op. cit., p. 477.

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contained in the definition of barycenter.16 This proves not only the difficulty but also
the fruitfulness of Wolff’s enterprise, which had at least the merit of highlighting the
problematic character of several definitions actually used in mathematical practice or
in teaching practice, thereby calling for emendations. But the modernity of Wolff’s
perspective lies mainly in his belief that the discussion about the foundation of math-
ematics and about the history of mathematical ideas is not only intrinsic to the devel-
opment of pure mathematics, but is also essential to the applications of mathematics
and to the whole enterprise of education. Not only did he create a new literary genre
(see e.g. Bolzano’s text “On the mathematical method”), but he based his textbooks on
extensive surveys of mathematical literature, long before Kästner. 17

2.1 Mathematics as the science of quantities

Mathematics is, according to Wolff’s definition in the Mathematical Dictionary, a sci-

ence that measures all that can be measured, a “science of quantities” [scientia quan-
titatum, Grössenlehre], i.e. a science of all things that can be enlarged or reduced;
pure mathematics embraces only three disciplines: geometry, arithmetic and alge-
bra.18 In the Latin version of the Elements of mathematics Wolff distinguishes between
arithmetic, geometry, trigonometry, finite analysis (algebra), and infinite analysis (dif-

16 See Christian Friedrich Gauss, Briefwechsel zwischen C.F. Gauss und H.C. Schumacher, ed.
by C.A.F. Peters, Altona, vol. 4, 1862, pp. 332-342.
17 I do not share here Dauben and Scriba’s belittling remark that Wolff’s achievements in
the fifth volume of the Anfangsgründe and in the fifth volume of the Elementa Matheseos, were “no
more than a dry annotated guide to the literature”, or Struijk’s comment on Kästner’s Geschichte der
Mathematik as “an artless compilation of titles and descriptions of ancient books without an at-
tempt at a readable narrative”. See Dauben, and Scriba, Writing the History of Mathematics. Its His-
torical Development, op. cit., pp. 111-113.
18 See Mathematisches Lexicon, pp. 864-66 (GW I 11). But in the entry on mathesis pura,
Wolff also mentions trigonometry as a distinct discipline. Ibid., p. 868 (GW I 11).

6
ferential and integral calculus).19 But to better understand what mathematics is, let’s
look at what it is not.

Mathematics is not a universal mathesis, which means that mathematics is not a calcu-
lus, because Wolff distinguishes four different conceptions of mathesis universalis,
which have in common precisely the fact that they are kinds of calculi: 1) Rasmus
Berthelsen’s art of symbolical calculus, 2) John Wallis’ calculus with cyphers and let-
ters, 3) the investigation of general properties of quantities by means of the symbolical
calculus, and 4) Leibniz’s science of the measurement of all things.20 Wolff’s distinction
is acute, because he clearly distinguishes four tendencies in mathematics that have
sometimes been misunderstood: 1) the literal calculus, 2) the unification of arithmeti-
cal and algebraic calculus (Wallis), 3) the study of general properties of magnitudes
(Viète, Descartes, Newton), and 4) the investigation of other things beyond quantities
(Leibniz). Yet, Wolff does not really do justice to Leibniz’s project, because even if he
rightly asserts that it concerns all things, he also insists on the notion of measurement,
whereas Leibniz claims that the mathesis universalis does not concern only the rela-
tionship of equality, and thus size and quantities, but also other types of relationships
between things, and therefore also quality.21

19 See Elementa Matheseos I, § 132, p. 341 (GW II 29). Note that in the Mathematical Dic-
tionary, the differential calculus included differential, exponential and integral calculus [Calculus
differentio-differentialis, exponentialis, integralis seu sommatorius]. See Mathematisches Lexicon,
pp. 283-291 (GW I 11). Analysis is a part of algebra because differentiation and integration were
conceived as arts of calculi, or, as Shabel has claimed, because both analysis and algebra are, in a
sense, arts of calculi. See Shabel, Mathematics in Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Reflections on Mathemat-
ical Practice, op. cit.
20 See Mathematisches Lexicon, p. 869 (GW I 11).
21 See Gottfried W. Leibniz, Mathesis universalis, in: Leibnizens mathematische Schriften, ed.
by C.I. Gerhardt, vol. 7, Halle, 1863, pp. 49–76. See also Vincenzo De Risi, Geometry and Monadolo-
gy: Leibniz’s Analysis Situs and Philosophy of Space, Basel, Boston and Berlin, 2007, p. 118.

7
To resume, mathematics is the science of the measurement of certain kinds of things
that Wolff generically calls quantities. To avoid the ambiguity of the term, let’s turn to
the analysis of the objects of the main mathematical disciplines: the number in arith-
metic, extensive quantities in geometry, and quantity in algebra.

2.2 Arithmetical numbers

Wolff defines arithmetic (Arithmetica, Rechenkunst) as the science of numbers, which

includes the infinitesimal calculus and the arithmetic of irrationals.22 Again, arithmetic
is better understood by verifying what it is not: it is distinguished from the algebraic or
literal calculus [arithmetica speciosa sive litteralis, Buchstabenrechenkunst], and from
algebra, which Wolff conceives as the theory of equations (see further § 2.4).23 Yet,
Wolff’s analysis undergoes some changes over time, because in the later Latin versions
of the Elements of mathematics, algebra is merged with finite analysis, and the latter is
part of arithmetic.24

If arithmetic is the science of numbers, and includes analysis, the definition of number
[numerus, eine Zahl] should be as general as possible, in order to include not only inte-
gers, but also rational and irrational numbers, and even 1, which is not a number ac-
cording to the Euclidean definition of number as a multitude of units.25 On the contra-
ry, the definition should not be as general as to include zero, which is, according to
Wolff, a sign, and not a concept. This depends on the metaphysical implications of
Wolff’s understanding of a concept as a representation of a thing that the subject

22 See Mathematisches Lexicon, pp. 169, 176, 179 (GW I 11).

23 Ibid., pp. 280, 292, 178 (GW I 11).
24 See Elementa Matheseos I, §132, p. 341 (GW II 29).
25 See Mathematisches Lexicon, p. 945 (GW I 11).

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should acknowledge. Zero [Cyphra, eine Nulle] is not a concept, because it does not
represent anything; it is rather a cipher that is used in decimal notation.26

Wolff defines a number as “what stands in proportion to 1 as a straight line stands in a

proportion to another straight line”.27 For example, an integer [Numerus integer, gan-
ze Zahl] is “a number that stands in proportion to 1 as the whole stays to a part”; a
fraction [Fractio, Bruch] is “a number that stands in proportion to 1 as a part stays to
the whole”; a rational number [Numerus rationalis, eine Rational-Zahl] is “a number
that consists either of pure units or of equal parts of the units”; an irrational number
[Numerus irrationalis, surdus, eine Irrational-Zahl] is “a number that has no rational
proportion to 1”.28 So, arithmetic is the science of natural, fractional, rational and irra-
tional numbers.

It should be noted that fractions are numbers of the form 1/b, whereas rationals have
the form a/b, with a and b being natural numbers. Even if this is certainly far away
from the contemporary distinction between fractions and rational numbers (a distinc-
tion that has been introduced only at the beginning of the 20th century,29 it is very in-
teresting to remark that Wolff accurately distinguishes these two kinds of number,
which are used in different ways in their applications: one use is to divide a whole into
parts (fraction), another use is to measure how many times a quantity is measured by
another quantity, thereby establishing the ratio of two quantities. Wolff’s belief that

26 “The symbol 0, denoting nothing […] is needed to fill in the empty places, where no num-
ber stands. For example 1 means in the third place ‘hundred’: to understand that it stays in the third
place, when there are no other numbers near to him, two zeros are placed there. So, ‘hundred’ is
written 100”. Ibid., p. 1485 (GW I 11).
27 Ibid., p. 944 (GW I 11).
28 Ibid., pp. 953, 647, 965, 953 (GW I 11).
29 See Alessandro Padoa, Che cosa è una relazione?, in: Atti della Accademia Reale delle Sci-
enze di Torino, 41 (1905-06), pp. 818-826. See also Alessandro Padoa, Frazioni, relazioni ed astra-
zioni, in: Periodico di Matematica, (3) 25/7 (1910), pp. 257-258.

9
the applications of mathematics belong to mathematics is evident here: the operation
that gave origin to the specific kind of number is recalled in its definition. Only after-
wards, a general definition is given that might include all the specific cases. As a result,
one should not expect Wolff to produce pure definitions, i.e. definitions that include
notions belonging to the same discipline, e.g. only arithmetical notions in arithmetic.
Another reason is of course that mathematics is subordinated to philosophy.30 Wolff’s
definition of number is impure for two reasons: it presupposes the notion of straight
line, and the notion of 1. If 1 is conceived as the integer number 1, then the definition
is circular (at least in the case of number 1 itself). If 1 is conceived as the whole, then
metaphysical, or more precisely ontological notions enter into the definition of num-
ber, which is then impure because philosophical considerations enter into an arithmet-
ical definition.

The presence of non-arithmetical elements in Wolff’s definition has been explained in

the literature as an effect of his interpretation of Descartes’ geometry, where an oper-

30 The notion of purity is usually applied to proofs, and goes back to a passage by Aristotle,
where he claims that “you cannot prove anything by crossing from another kind—e.g. something
geometrical by arithmetic. . . . where the kinds are different, as with arithmetic and geometry, you
cannot attach arithmetical demonstrations to what is incidental to magnitudes—unless magnitudes
are numbers. ... Hence the kind must be the same, if a demonstration is to cross”. See Aristotle, Pos-
terior Analytics, 75a-75b, transl. by Jonathan Barnes, Oxford, 1994, p. 12. The notion of a pure defi-
nition is less common in the literature. Transposing Arana’s notion of extraneousness from proof to
definitions is one way to give a general definition of impure definition, i.e. definitions containing
notions that are extraneous to the disciplinary field. See Andrew Arana, On formally measuring and
eliminating extraneous notions in proofs, in: Philosophia Mathematica 17/2 (2009), pp. 189-207 and
also Andrew Arana, Purity in arithmetic: Some formal and informal issues. In Formalism and Beyond.
On the Nature of Mathematical Discourse, ed. by M. Detlefsen and G. Link, Boston, 2014, pp. 275-
314. Craig Walton used the notion of impure definition in a different sense, as he considered Ramus
as one of the first who explicitly introduced impure definitions in mathematics, i.e. including no-
tions that do not belong to pure mathematics but rather to its applications. See Craig Walton, Ra-
mus and Socrates, in: Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 114/2 (1970), p. 122.

10
ation of addition and multiplication is defined in segments by means of certain geo-
metrical constructions.31 Following Euclid, Wolff defines a ratio as “the relation of a
thing to another homogeneous thing that determines the quantity [Grösse] of the
former by means of the quantity of the latter, without need for a further measure
[Maass]. For example, “taking the width of a window as measurement unit, then if the
length of the window is the double of the width, the relation of the latter to the former
is 1:2. On the contrary, if the length of the window is taken as measurement unit, then
the relation of the height to the width is 2:1.”32 So, a ratio of two quantities expresses
a measurement of the quantities, but is not a number. Numbers are introduced only by
proportions, i.e. by “the similarity of two ratios”.33

It has been remarked that Wolff’s definition is similar to Newton’s definition of num-
ber as the ratio of two quantities, but Newton is not explicitly mentioned in the 1714
edition, and one should note that Wolff defines number as the fourth proportional of a
proportion and not explicitly as the ratio of two quantities. This difference is even
more evident if one considers that Newton’s definition is not as impure as Wolff’s. The
modern aspect of Wolff’s notion, an aspect that he was probably unaware of, is that

31 See Shabel, Mathematics in Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Reflections on Mathematical Prac-

tice, op. cit. Shabel’s remarks on the geometrical origin of the notion are certainly confirmed by
Wolff’s own claim that his definition explains why “it is possible to multiply and divide lines by lines
so that the product or respectively the quotient might be itself a line, as Descartes showed in Book 1
and 2 of Geometry”, and is thus useful in the application of algebra to geometry. See Mathematisches
Lexicon (GW I 11), pp. 944-5. Yet, it should be remarked that Wolff gives an epistemological justifi-
cation too. Wolff’s notion of number satisfies what is nowadays called an “application constraint”,
i.e. the fact that the notion already contains a hint to its possible application.
32 Ibid., p. 1169 (GW I 11). See also Elementa Matheseos I, § 126, p. 55 (GW II 29).
33 See Mathematisches Lexicon, p. 1105 (GW I 11). Here Wolff introduces only numerical
examples, but elsewhere he considers generic quantities (letters or numbers). See Elementa Arith-
meticae, part III, § 155 in Elementa Matheseos I, p. 60 (GW II 29). See Gert Schubring, Conflicts Be-
tween Generalization, Rigor, and Intuition, op. cit.

11
measuring (constructing ratios of quantities) might take place both between numbers
and between lines, but numbering arises only when one perceives the similarity be-
tween the two ratios by means of a proportion. In modern parlance, numbering occurs
when one recognizes by means of a representation theorem that the structure of a
given numerical system and the structure of the quantities to be measured are similar.

2.3 Geometrical extensive quantities

The definition of geometry and in particular of geometrical quantities is ambiguous. It

changes over time, and expresses in the clearest way Wolff’s tension between the at-
tention to mathematical practice, the search for distinct and adequate definitions (see
below), and the debt to Euclid’s tradition. Wolff considers geometrical quantities
sometimes from a rather applied perspective (e.g. in the Anfangsgründe and in the
Mathematisches Lexicon), and sometimes from a pure mathematical point of view (as
in the later editions of the Elementa Matheseos). Besides, Wolff is partly fascinated by
Barrow’s edition of the Elements, and partly strongly dissatisfied with the order of the
propositions in the Elements. The definition of arithmetic is based on the kind of ob-
jects it concerns (i.e. numbers) but can also be enriched by opposition to what arith-
metic is not (mathesis universalis). Geometry on the contrary is defined only by refer-
ence to its objects. This makes it more difficult to understand what it actually is, espe-
cially because Wolff gives at least two rather divergent definitions.

In early works, geometry “is the science of space, which considers physical things ac-
cording to their length, width, and height”, whereas in later writings it is “the science
of extensive things (Extensorum), inasmuch as they are finite, i.e. lines, surfaces and
solids”.34 In the Mathematical Dictionary Wolff considered lines and surfaces as ab-
stractions of solids, claiming that lines are quantities, but cannot actually be separated

34 See Mathematisches Lexicon, p. 665 (GW I 11); see also Elementa Matheseos I, § 1, p. 121
(GW II 29).

12
in thought from width and depth.35 On the contrary, in the Elements of Mathematics
he considered lines, surfaces and solids to be extensive quantities: “a line is described
when a point A moves to a point B”; a point is “what delimits itself wheresoever
turned, or what does not have ends distinct from itself”.36

In the earlier writings the impure nature of the definition relies mainly in the fact that
geometry is considered as the science of space, and thus as having to do directly with
physical things, of which it considers certain aspects (length, width, and height).37 In
later writings, the definition is impure for a different reason: it relies on the notion of
extension, which Wolff defines in the ontology as “multorum diversorum, aut, si mavis,
extra se invicem existentium, coëxistentia in uno, atque conflituatur multorum extra se
invicem existentium unione (the coexistence in one of several different, existing one

outside the other, which is generated by their union)”.38 A straight line is an extensive
quantity because we can distinguish in it many separate parts that, once unified, gen-
erate the line. This notion of extension, which has been compared with the Aristotelian
notion of continuity based on contiguity,39 is taken from philosophy rather than from
physical applications, but again is not explained in geometrical terms. On the contrary,
the insistence on the operation of unification of separate parts is clearly opposite to
Newton’s fluxional perspective: “Lines are described, and by describing are generated,

35 See Mathematisches Lexicon, p. 792 (GW I 11).

36 See Elementa Matheseos I, § 10, p. 122 and § 6, p. 121(GW II 29) respectively.
37 One should also note that geometry is not considered as a mixed or applied discipline,
and not as a mixed science, as was often the case in the 19th century. Wolff claims that geometry is
pure rather than applied, because it concerns “the straight line in general”, and not “the straight line
as the width of a river, the height of a body, the distance between earth and moon”, and so on. See
Mathematisches Lexicon, pp. 866-7 (GW I 11).
38 See Philosophia prima sive Ontologia, Part II, Sect. I, Chap. II, § 548, p. 428 (GW II 3).
39 See Antonio Moretto, La rilevanza matematica della discussione sui concetti di continuo e
di funzione nella filosofia tedesca dell’età dell’illuminismo. Grandezza estensiva, continua e inten-
siva in Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten e Kant, in: Fenomenologia e società 18/2-3 (1995), p. 117.

13
not by any apposition of Parts, but by a continual motion of Points”.40 The shift from a
physical to a philosophical definition of extension does not alter the opposition that
Wolff introduces between geometry, and Leibniz’s calculus situs, which is considered
as an investigation of the respective position of lines (e.g. of orthogonality and parallel-
ism) rather than of their length.41 The latter, as was already the case for algebra and
analysis, is considered as a calculus and is not really included in Wolff’s definition of
mathematics as the science of quantities.

So, Wolff does not seem to include qualities in the definition of geometry. Yet, in the
Latin version of the Elements of Mathematics he aims at improving Euclid’s order of
geometrical propositions, and uses a philosophical notion of similarity to ground the
geometrical similarity between angles and figures. Wolff shares Leibniz’s conception of
similarity, at least inasmuch as it concerns the fact that “qualities are those properties
of an object that can be distinctly known or understood when viewed in isolation from
other objects, and the similarity of two objects consists in identity of such proper-
ties”.42 So, on the one hand, similarity is not obtained by proportions, and on the other
hand it makes it possible to investigate qualities as well as quantities in geometry. We
find here another example of impurity underlined by Lambert and Kant: the use of a
philosophical notion of similarity to exploit the geometrical notion of similarity, and to
reform the logical order of the Elements.43

40 See Isaac Newton, Quadrature of curves, in: Mathematical Works of Isaac Newton, ed. by
D.T. Whiteside, New York, vol. 1, 1964, p. 141.
41 See Mathematisches Lexicon, p. 292 (GW I 11).
42 See Daniel Sutherland, Philosophy, Geometry, and Logic in Leibniz, Wolff, and the Early
Kant, op. cit., p. 166.
43 See Sutherland, Philosophy, Geometry, and Logic in Leibniz, Wolff, and the Early Kant, op.
cit., p. 155.

14
2.4 Algebraic quantities

We have already mentioned that algebra as a discipline is distinguished by Wolff both

from the literal calculus and from Leibniz’s general investigation on qualities. On the
one hand, it is defined as the science that uses equations to solve given problems,
thereby recalling its origin and development; on the other hand it is associated with
the determination of the rules that govern the search for solutions, and to the applica-
tion to infinitesimal small quantities.44 Yet, as Wolff distinguishes ancient from modern
algebra, i.e. numerical [algebra numerosa] from literal equations [algebra speciosa], he
defines the former as a calculus on numbers and the latter as a calculus on letters,
thereby suggesting the close relationship between algebra and calculus.45

The notion of algebraic quantity is even more difficult to clarify.46 It is a quantity ex-
pressed in an algebraic way, an indeterminate number expressed through letters,47
whereas a quantity in general is something that can be increased or decreased. The
choice of the terms ‘vermehren’ and ‘vermindern’, which derive from the terms ‘mehr’
and ‘minus’, i.e. from the names of the arithmetical signs + and –, already indicates the
algebraic meaning attributed by Wolff to quantities, as well as his debt to Descartes:

44 See Mathematisches Lexicon, p. 34 (GW I 11).

45 See Shabel, Mathematics in Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Reflections on Mathematical Prac-
tice, op. cit.
46 In the entry “quantitas, eine Grösse” Wolff says that quantities, identified here with “in-
determinate numbers” [undeterminierte Zahlen], are what can be increased or diminished [ver-
mehren and vermindern}, whereas in the entry “mathematics”, defined as the science of quantities”,
the latter are defined as that which might be enlarged or reduced [vergrössern and verkleinern],
without taking into due account the linguistic nuance between these respectively discrete and con-
tinuous terms. See Mathematisches Lexicon, p. 1143, and pp. 864—66 (GW I 11) respectively. Be-
sides, Wolff uses the same term Grösse both to translate quantitas and to translate ‘Moles, Volu-
men’, i.e. the space that a body occupies according to its length, height, and width. See Mathe-
matisches Lexicon, pp. 906-7 (GW I 11). Cf. Paola Cantù, Aristotle’s prohibition rule on kind-crossing
and the definition of mathematics as a science of quantities, in: Synthese, 174/2 (2008), pp. 225–235.
47 See Mathematisches Lexicon, p. 1144, and p. 1143 (GW I 11) respectively.

15
“Notandum est deinde, nihil ad istam aequalitatem reduce posse, nisi quod recipit ma-
jus et minus, atque illud omne per magnitudinis vocabulum comprehendi (One has to
note, moreover, that nothing can be reduced to such an equality except what admits of
more and less, and that all this is covered by the term ‘magnitude’)”.48 Quantities are
indeterminate numbers when it is unsettled to which unit they should refer: the pro-
portion used to define a number is thus incomplete. The importance of defining quan-
tities as indeterminate numbers relies on the fact that it becomes possible to apply
them to “all what has been demonstrated upon numbers”.49 A similar notion is main-
tained in the Latin version of the Elements of Mathematics, where quantities are dis-
tinguished as being either determinate or indeterminate, according to the fact that
they refer to a given unit or to a vague unit: so for example the quantity of the width
of a river is an indeterminate quantity that is referred to a vague unit, because the
number associated to it might vary according to the measurement unit that is as-
sumed.50

Anyway, algebraic letters always stand for quantities. Wolff’s definition does not in-
clude qualities among the possible objects of algebra. Wolff seems to have been more
influenced by the Cartesian symbolism in the treatment of geometrical figures than by
the Leibnizian definition of quantity, which is determined by the presence of some-
thing to be measured and of something that might play the role of a measurement
unit.51 Leibniz himself remarked upon a discrepancy between his own conception and

48 René Descartes, Regule ad Directionem Ingenii. Rules for the Direction of the Natural Intel-
ligence, ed. by G. Heffernan, Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA, 1998, pp. 180-181.
49 See Mathematisches Lexicon, p. 1143 (GW I 11).
50 See Elementa Matheseos I, §§ 13-14, p. 24, (GW II 29).
51 See Gottfried W. Leibniz, Initia rerum mathematicarum metaphysica, in: Leibnizens math-
ematische Schriften, ed. by C.I. Gerhardt, volume 7, Halle, 1863, pp. 18-19. Engl. transl in Gottfried
W. Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters: A Selection, ed. by L.E. Loemker, Dordrecht, Boston,
and London, 1975, p. 667.

16
Wolff’s presentation of it.52 We have already mentioned that Wolff acknowledges the
importance of Leibniz’s calculus situs, but does not modify the definition of geometry
in order to include the study of orthogonality or parallelism. Again, he introduces a
distinction between absolute, positive and privative quantities that had never been
thematized before,53 but then restricts mathematics to positive quantities, claiming
that positive and negative (privative) quantities are not homogeneous, i.e. once multi-
plied, cannot exceed one another.

The insistence on a condition of homogeneity was probably derived from Euclid’s Ele-
ments, but might also be related to the fact that Wolff conceived proportions as a way
to determine numbers rather than as a way to study qualitative relations between
things. It is the definition of number as the fourth proportional that forced him to in-
clude among quantities only those that can be put in proportion, i.e. only homogene-
ous quantities. This was also the main reason why Wolff did not admit negative quanti-
ties: given that they lack some positive property (and should thus rather be called priv-
ative quantities), they cannot be compared to quantities that have positive properties.
So, setting apart the critical remarks by mathematicians who saw a regressive trait in
this aspect of Wolff’s mathematics (see e.g. Kästner’s criticism),54 Schubring has con-
vincingly shown that Wolff was quite consistent on this point, and that his arguments
were based on claims that had been advanced by Arnauld and accepted also by Leib-
niz.55 The same line of reasoning was used to defend the idea that infinitesimals could

52 Leibniz actually refers to an anonymous review of the first volume of the Elementa
Matheseos published in the Acta Eruditorum in 1714. See Leibniz, Initia rerum mathematicarum
metaphysica, op. cit. p. 17; Engl. transl. p. 667 and p. 673, fn. 1. See also De Risi, Geometry and Mon-
adology, op. cit., p. 118.
53 See Schubring, Conflicts Between Generalization, Rigor, and Intuition, op. cit., p. 96.
54 Ibid., p. 134 and p. 135, fn. 77.
55 Arnauld refused to admit negative quantities on the basis of the following reasoning ap-
plied to the proportion -1: 1 = 1: -1: How is it possible that a minor is to a major like a major to a
minor? See Schubring, Conflicts Between Generalization, Rigor, and Intuition, op. cit., p. 97.

17
be ignored, because they are not homogeneous to other quantities, and thus cannot
enter in the proportion used to define numbers.56 So, if one accepts Wolff’s definition
of number, then it is difficult to include negative numbers. In this case, Wolff’s defini-
tions do not account for a mathematical practice that he knew and accepted in appli-
cations, where he used numbers preceded by the sign minus to express debts. A rea-
son for this discrepancy between conceptualization and practice might rely in the idea
that the ‘numbers’ used in the calculus of debts and credits are not a true case of
numbering, because it is not possible to build a proportion based on the similarity with
quantities to be measured, which are, in a sense, always something, and thus positive.

Another line of criticism against Wolff’s algebra concerns his ‘regressive’ insistence on
geometrical representation. Yet, the latter is not merely the effect of the influence of
Descartes’ geometrical operations on segments, but also a consequence of the applica-
tion of his mathematical method. Wolff’s geometrical representation is coherent with
his insistence on the nature of definitions that have an abstract as well as a construc-
tive component.57 So, the impurity related to the use of a philosophical definition of
similarity in geometry is associated with the impurity of reformulating the Elements
giving preeminence to thirty practical problems, or practical constructions.58 Besides,
the insistence on geometrical representation also had some innovative aspects, be-
cause Wolff, influenced by Leibniz’s calculus, explicitly defined the notion of a variable
quantity [quantitatis variabilis] as opposed to that of constant quantity. Variable quan-
tities are quantities that always increase or decrease, when other quantities increase
or decrease. What strikes the modern reader here is the constructive flavor of Wolff’s

56 Ibid., pp. 239 ss.

57 As Shabel puts it, “geometrical constructions not only provide a representation of math-
ematical objects but also constitute their definition”. See Shabel, Mathematics in Kant’s Critical Phi-
losophy. Reflections on Mathematical Practice, op. cit., p. 162.
58 See Sutherland, Philosophy, Geometry, and Logic in Leibniz, Wolff, and the Early Kant, op.
cit., p. 163.

18
approach. Yet, this aspect should not be overemphasized, because it is somehow de-
rived from practical applications rather than from a theoretical reflection on the con-
structability of mathematical concepts.

2.5 Probability theory

It has often been claimed that Wolff did not take into due account the mathematical
theory of probability, and especially the improvements to it made by Jakob Bernoulli.59
On the contrary, Wolff was aware of the contemporary mathematical developments
already in 1714.60 Wolff developed an original theory of probability, that had a consid-
erable influence on Kahle, Mendelssohn, Bolzano, and Kästner.61 In light of the con-
temporary distinction between logical, subjective and objective probability, 62 Wolff’s

59 See Nicolao Merker, L’illuminismo Tedesco. Età di Lessing (1968), Germ. transl. by D.
Doucet-Rosenstein and R. Wagenknecht in: Die Aufklärung in Deutschland, München 1982, p. 84; see
Raffaele Ciafardone, Illuminismo tedesco. Metodo filosofico e premesse etico-teologiche (1690-1765),
Rieti 1978, p. 82; see Schönfeld, Wolff, Christian (1679–1754), op. cit.
60 See for example the (anonymous) review of Bernoulli’s Ars Conjectandi published in the
Acta Eruditorum in 1714 (GW II 38.1), but also Wolff’s references to the same book in the Mathe-
matisches Lexicon (GW I 11, p. 401), and in the bibliographic section of Elementa Matheseos V, Part
IV, § 14, p. 57 (GW II 33). Wolff’s definition of stochastic (Muthmassungskunst) as the art to deter-
mine the probability of a thing is an almost exact transcription of Bernoulli’s definition of probabil-
ity. See Mathematisches Lexicon pp. 1328-29 (ibid.) and Jakob Bernoulli, Ars Conjectandi. Basel,
1713, §IV.2, p. 213. See also Cataldi Madonna, Wahrscheinlichkeit und wahrscheinliches Wissen, op.
cit.
61 See ibid., pp. 4-5; see Cataldi Madonna, Wolff, Bolzano e la probabilità, op. cit.; see Edith
Dudley Sylla, Mendelssohn, Wolff, and Bernoulli on Probability, in: Moses Mendelssohn’s Metaphysics
and Aesthetics, ed. by R. Munk, Dordrecht, Heidelberg, London and New York, 2011, pp. 41–63; see
Rüdiger Campe, The game of probability. Literature and calculation from Pascal to Kleist. Stanford,
2012, especially pp. 305-310 and p. 256.
62 I distinguish here three ways of conceiving probability: 1) a logical (objective) notion,
that should measure the strength of the evidence for a given event, on the basis of the analysis of
the space of possible outcomes; 2) a subjective notion, that should measure the degree of an agent’s
belief in his own assertions by an investigation of his betting behavior; 3) a scientific (objective)

19
notion could be considered to be at the same time logical and subjective, because it is
based on the space of all requisites for the truth of a proposition, and can measure the
degree of belief of the agent.63

Wolff aims at developing Leibniz’s logica probabilium, which is based on the principle
of sufficient reason, in light of the contemporary mathematical notion of probability
developed by Jakob Bernoulli among others. Wolff defines the degree of probability of
a proposition64 as the ratio between the number of requisites for the truth of the

notion that applies to the relations between things (either by considering all actual outcomes or by
analyzing the physical propensity or disposition towards a given outcome). See Alan Hàjek, Inter-
pretations of probability, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by E. N. Zalta, Stanford,
Winter 2012 Edition. Classical probability is usually associated with Laplaces’ formulation, but it is
related to the writings of several authors that were well known to Wolff (e.g. Pascal, Jakob Bernoul-
li, Huygens, and Leibniz). Even if its interpretation is multiple, it is often considered as an instance
of a quasi-logical objective notion, because it is based on an exploration of the space of possibilities:
the probability of an event depends on the ratio between the number of cases favorable to that
event and the number of all possible cases. The subjective approach (De Finetti, Ramsey, Kemeny)
connects probabilities with rational preferences and utilities, and finds its forerunners in Daniel
Bernoulli. The third approach includes theories like frequentism, propensity, and the best system
interpretations that were developed in late 19th or early 20th century: they are based on actual
rather than on possible outcomes.
63 Wolff was clearly aware of the distinction between objective and subjective probability,
for he explicitly mentions Bernoulli’s distinction between an objective treatment of certainty (con-
cerning the actual existence, present or future, of a thing) and a subjective treatment of certainty
(relative to us and consisting in the measurement of our knowledge of that actuality). See Jakob
Bernoulli, Ars Conjectandi, op. cit., § IV.1, p. 210 and Wolff’s review, p. 22 (GW II 38.1).
64 It should be noted that probability concerns propositions rather than inferences. The
conclusion of an inference is probable only if one of the premises is probable, and not because the
inference rule is probable. Wolff maintains, like Aristotle, that there is only one inferential structure
(deduction), and that the probability concerns propositions. Claiming that there is a strong continu-
ity between Wolff’s and Bolzano’s notion of probability, Cataldi Madonna insists on the fact that
Wolff considers also the probability of implications—what he calls “quasi-implications”—but does
not give textual support for this claim. See Cataldi Madonna, Wolff, Bolzano e la probabilità, op. cit.,

20
proposition that are accessible to an agent (insufficient reason), and the number of all
requisites for the truth of that proposition (i.e. its sufficient reason).65 In other words,
truth and falsity are the limit values 1 and 0 that such ratio might assume, when all
requisites are known and the knowledge is certain.

This continuity between probable and certain knowledge explains why the theory of
probability can be applied not only to the investigation of the physical world, but also
to the solution of questions that belong to historical science, such as Süssmilch’s popu-
lation statistics.66 This change is made possible by the logical turn that is given to prob-
ability, which is no more considered as the probability of things (as it was the case in
the mathematical textbooks), but rather as the probability of propositions, whereby
the latter is grounded on the principle of sufficient reason, which is a general principal
of all human knowledge. The requisites for the truth of a proposition are at the basis of
both certain and uncertain knowledge: there is a difference of degree and not a differ-
ence of nature.67

p. 111. Wolff distinguishes demonstrations (demonstrationes), based on certain premises, from

proofs (probationes) based on uncertain premises: proofs are probable if the premises are proba-
ble, and precarious if the premises are precarious. See Logica, §§ 599-602, pp. 446-447 (GW II 1.3).
This does not imply, however, that Wolff admits probable inferences. On the contrary, the logical
rules are the same both in demonstrations as in proofs, and this is exactly what allows him to estab-
lish a continuity between physico-mathematical sciences, and historical and social sciences.
65 See Philosophia rationalis sive Logica, §§ 579 (GW II 1.3). See also Cataldi Madonna, Wolff,
Bolzano e la probabilità, p. 110.
66 Wolff wrote in the introduction to Süssmilch’s book: “[A]s yet no one has discussed in a
comprehensive theory how to use the faculties of reason in order to explore that which is probable.
But attempts have been made to test how a theory of probability might be developed for the sake of
use in everyday life. The present book is among these.” See Campe, The game of probability, op. cit.,
pp. 216-217, 255-256, 448, fn. 1.
67 On this application of the logic of probability both to physical sciences (the domain of the
legiform) and the moral and historical sciences (the domain of singularities) see in particular
Campe, The game of probability, op. cit., pp. 315-317. On the Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason

21
Wolff’s main contribution to the development of an extended understanding of scien-
tific knowledge concerns the attention to observations and experience as elements
that might furnish a probable knowledge68 that is not opposed to the knowledge of
truth, but rather presented in continuity with the latter. This continuity is guaranteed
by Wolff’s idea that, even if there are differences between mathematical, philosophi-
cal, and historical knowledge, there is somehow a unique methodology that unifies
them, and that is based on the ideal of demonstrative knowledge. Wolff’s treatment of
probable reasoning (as depending on an insufficient knowledge of the requisites for
the truth of the premises) better explains the role assigned to definitions in the math-
ematical method (see § 3.2), and the sense in which their incompleteness might pro-
duce a fallacy.69

3 On Wolff’s mathematical method

3.1 Many names, one method?

It is questionable what should be understood as Wolff’s mathematical method, first of

all because Wolff calls his method by many different names: mathematical, geomet-
rical, demonstrative, philosophical, scientific.70 Secondly, because it is defined in dif-
ferent ways in different texts; so, it is not clear in which discipline one should look for
it: logic, where its principles and rules are clarified; philosophy, where it is applied in
metaphysics; or mathematics, where it occurs in arithmetic, geometry, and algebra,

as common ground of true and probable knowledge, see also Cataldi Madonna, Wolff, Bolzano e la
probabilità, op. cit., p. 116 ss.
68 See Cataldi Madonna, Wahrscheinlichkeit und wahrscheinliches Wissen, op. cit.; see also
Zingari, Die Philosophie von Leibniz und die “deutsche Logik“ von Christian Wolff, op. cit.
69 See Philosophia rationalis sive logica II, Part II, Sec. 1, § 633, p. 461 (GW II 1.2). See Jean
École, Introduction, in: Philosophia rationalis sive logica, pp. v–lxxxvii (GW II 1.1), and also Jean
École, Introduction, in: Philosophia rationalis sive logica, esp. p. cv (GW II 1.2 ).
70 See Tore Frängsmyr, Christian Wolff’s mathematical method and its impact on the Eight-
eenth century, in: Journal of the History of Ideas, 36/4 (1975), p. 655.

22
but also in applications. Most studies in the literature focus on logic, philosophy, and
their origins, rather than the achievements of Wolff’s method.71 For example, it has
been questioned whether Wolff’s mathematical method is the heir of Aristotle’s syllo-
gistic logic, of Scholastics, of Port Royal Logic, of the mathesis universalis tradition, of
Euclid’s Elements, of Newton, of Descartes and Tschirnhaus, of Barrow, or of Leibniz.72
In what follows I will try to combine the two approaches, discussing the characteriza-
tion of the method offered in the mathematical textbooks as well as its application in
the definition of mathematical key concepts. Having analyzed Wolff’s main concepts in
the former section, I will now discuss the features of the mathematical method and
make references to several features of those definitions.

3.2 Mathematical method as order

Wolff’s mathematical method concerns the order of exposition used by mathemati-

cians: first, the definitions, then the axioms and postulates (or experiments and obser-
vations in mixed mathematics), and finally the theorems and problems, all accompa-

71 See in particular the literature mentioned in footnote 8. Paola Basso regrets that Wolff’s
method gets rid of the strictly geometrical nature, thus losing some of its focus on the logic of dis-
covery, to the investigation of the connection between truths, and to the limits of its application.
Basso claims that the method thus becomes a universal and thus void method, whereby the order of
exposition is much more important than the discovery of truths, and the effort to define is prior to
the effort to prove. See Paola Basso, Il secolo geometrico, op. cit.
72 Cf. in particular Frängsmyr, Christian Wolff’s mathematical method, op. cit., p. 656. Shabel,
Mathematics in Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Reflections on Mathematical Practice, op. cit.; cf. Dunlop,
Mathematical method, op. cit.; cf. Vleeschauwer, La genèse de la méthode mathématique de Wolff
op. cit.; cf. Zingari, Die Philosophie von Leibniz, op. cit. Significant exceptions are Sutherland, Schu-
bring, Dauben and Scriba, who tend to focus on specific results of Wolff’s mathematics, but do not
connect them to the question of the method. See Sutherland, Philosophy, Geometry, and Logic in
Leibniz, Wolff, and the Early Kant, op. cit.; see Schubring, Conflicts Between Generalization, Rigor, and
Intuition, op. cit.; see Dauben, and Scriba, Writing the History of Mathematics. Its Historical Develop-
ment, op. cit.

23
nied by corollaries and scholia, whenever necessary. Definitions are the fundamental
notions from which all the rest is deduced.73 The mathematical order thus focuses on
definitions, and on the derivation of theorems and problems, as well as on axioms and
postulates coming from them. If the derivation of theorems is a standard requirement
of the axiomatic method from Euclid’s elements onwards, the sense in which geomet-
rical axioms could be derived from definitions needs to be clarified. This approach
seems quite incompatible with modern axiomatics, where on the contrary, definitions
do not play any inferential role, but rather serve as clarifications, whereas the axioms
are the beginning of the inferential process. When Wolff aims at reforming Euclid in
order to determine the “fundamental concepts from which all knowledge can be de-
rived by means of definitions”,74 he believes in a unique hierarchy of concepts, inte-
grating geometry, philosophy, and all other branches of human knowledge. And he
believes in the possibility of a conceptual analysis that clarifies the notions that should
be taken as primitive: e.g. similarity is more fundamental than congruence in geome-
try, and thereby all theorems that depend on a principle of similarity should precede
the theorems that depend on congruence. Wolff’s concern for the right order of con-
cepts is thus not completely opposed to foundational questions such as those that
arose in Hilbert’s Grundlagen, as he grouped theorems concerning basic relations such
as incidence, order, congruence, parallelism and continuity. Besides, even in the 20th
century authors like Peano and Gödel, who had been strongly influenced by Leibniz,
were quite responsive to the question of the right order of concepts.75

73 See Elementa Matheseos I, § 1-3, p. 5 (GW II 29).

74 See Sutherland, Philosophy, Geometry, and Logic in Leibniz, Wolff, and the Early Kant, op.
cit., p. 168.
75 See Paola Cantù, The right order of concepts: Grassmann, Peano, Gödel and the inheritance
of Leibniz’s universal characteristic, in: Philosophia Scientiae. Studies in History and Philosophy of
Science, 18/1 (2014), pp. 157–182.

24
3.3 Mathematical definitions

This idea of an integrated human knowledge explains Wolff’s characterization of

mathematical definitions as a special case of definitions in general. Definitions are fun-
damental notions of something, fundamental representations of a thing in the mind.76
Following Leibniz, Wolff distinguishes:

1. clear (obscure) notions i.e. notions that are sufficient (insufficient) for one to
recognize the denoted object whenever presented with it;
2. distinct (confused) notions, i.e. such that one can enumerate the characteristics
[Merkmale] that make the recognition possible; and
3. adequate [vollständig] (inadequate) notions, whenever the representation of
the characteristics that make the recognition possible is itself distinct.77
Mathematical definitions should amount to distinct, and—whenever possible—
adequate notions. Impure definitions that involve some features derived from applica-
tions might help us to form clear notions of mathematical objects, whereas philosophi-
cal notions might improve the distinctness and adequateness of the definitions. Even if
Wolff does not say this explicitly, one might find a reason for admitting impure defini-
tions in the search for virtues, such as clarity, distinctness and adequateness.

Wolff then considers two kinds of definitions:

1. nominal definitions are enumerations of the features that are sufficient to dis-
tinguish the represented thing (e.g. a square defined as a quadrilateral, equilat-
eral and rectangular figure); and

76 See Elementa Matheseos I, § 3, p. 6 (GW II 29); see also Auszug aus den Anfangs-Gründen
aller mathematischen Wissenschaften, § 2, p. 3 (GW I 25).
77 See Elementa Matheseos I, §§ 4-12, pp. 6-7 (GWII29). Cf. also Deutsche Logik, chap. I, § 9
ff., p. 126 ff. (GW I 1).

25
 2. real definitions are distinct notions that express the genesis of the thing, i.e. the
way it might become (e.g. a circle conceived as described by the movement of a
rectilinear line around a fixed point).78
The search for real definitions explains the importance given to geometrical construc-
tions, and also the effort to separate each definition in two parts: a nominal and a real
one. This holds for the definition of geometrical figures as extensive quantities (i.e.
based on relations of contiguity between their parts), or as the result of specific geo-
metrical constructions. But this might also explain Wolff’s hesitation between physical
definitions and geometrical definitions (e.g. infinitesimals are sometimes described as
particles, straight lines as the length of physical things, and so on).

3.4 The inferential role of definitions

Wolff’s effort to consider definitions not only as a “nomenclature teaching the names
of things”, but also as something from which we can derive postulates, had some un-
desirable consequences in mathematics. Lambert regretted that Wolff “granted too
much to definitions”, as he claimed that even the principles had to be preceded by
definitions in order to be rightly conceived and understood. Lambert claimed that
Wolff’s use of philosophical definitions as nominal definitions that were assumed to
wrongly prove certain theorems, had the effect that “the very proposition that every
definition, before it is proven, is an empty hypothesis—the very proposition that Euclid
knew so well and took so seriously—was, if not completely lost, then pretty much for-
gotten”.79 Interestingly enough, Bolzano’s own reformulation of Euclid’s geometry was

78 See Elementa Matheseos I, §§ 13-18, p. 7 (GWII29).

79 See J.H. Lambert, Theorie der Parallellinien, in: Die Theorie der Parallellinien von Euklid bis
auf Gauss, ed. by Engel and Stackel, Leipzig, 1895, pp. 157-58, Engl. transl. by A. Laywine in: Kant
and Lambert on geometrical postulates in the reform of metaphysics, in: Discourse on a New Method:
Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science, ed. by M. Friedman, M. Domski,
and M. Dickson, Chicago and La Salle, Illinois, 2010, p. 118. See also Jeremy Heis, Kant (vs. Leibniz,

26
influenced by Wolff’s principle of similarity, but Bolzano specifically mentions the in-
fluence he received from the formulation presented in the Ontology and only generi-
cally mentions the treatment of similarity in Wolff’s mathematical writings.80 The com-
parison with Bolzano is interesting, because Bolzano, like Wolff, was a non-
professional mathematician who published mathematical essays. Bolzano also used
conceptual analysis as an inferential tool, obtaining results that are mathematically
more interesting, as an inductive procedure to prove certain numerical equalities.

Wolff’s understanding of definitions is entirely centered on Leibniz’s idea of conceptual

analysis and on the decomposition of a concept in its features. The main problem con-
cerns the possibility of deriving relational properties of the denoted things from non-
relational features of the notions that compose their concept and that occur in Wolff’s
definition. Lambert would say that only postulates contain the mutual relation be-
tween concept and thing, because they concern the possibility of the construction of
the thing and at the same time the universality of its concept, for it can be applied to
any construction.

4 Summary
Wolff’s mathematics is better known as the critical target of Gauss, Schumacher, Leib-
niz, Bernoulli, Kästner, Cantor, and other mathematicians, who disliked the fact that
his books were conceived as textbooks rather than as research writings, and criticized
some of his definitions. This criticism, as well as other remarks on mistakes made in
Wolff’s inferential procedures, prove how Wolff’s philosophy and theory of knowledge
influenced his mathematical orientation. But it is important to show that there is at

Wolff and Lambert) on real definitions in geometry, in: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 44/5-6
(2014), pp. 605–630.
80 See Bernard Bolzano, Betrachtungen über einige Gegenstände der Elementargeometrie,
Prag, 1804, Engl. transl. in The mathematical works of Bernard Bolzano, ed. by S. Russ, Oxford 2004,
p. 42.

27
least an internal coherence between the normative requirements suggested by Wolff’s
philosophy, and in particular by his conception of the mathematical method, and the
notions he actually defined in his textbooks. The impurity of definitions and the impu-
rity of proofs that Wolff has been charged with by Kant and Lambert was a trait that
Wolff shared with other authors of his time such as Leibniz. Indeed, it constituted the
fundamental desideratum of Wolff’s own epistemology, because he believed in the
integration of mathematical knowledge into the larger body of human knowledge, and
shared the idea that a right order of concepts should not only be introduced separately
in each discipline, but also in the general hierarchy of concepts. This holistic and at the
same time hierarchic vision of human knowledge is certainly very far from successive
hyper-specialization and separation of disciplines, but is part of a coherent epistemo-
logical frame. This explains why several topics that Wolff did not fully develop in his
mathematical books (such as probability, and partly the theory of extensive quantities)
are rather discussed in logic or in metaphysics. This confirms the thesis that Wolff’s
works (like Leibniz’s, Newton’s or Descartes’) cannot be read separately, and that a
fully complete view of Wolff’s mathematics cannot be achieved without a deeper in-
vestigation of the relations between mathematics, ontology, metaphysics, and logic.

The analysis of Wolff’s definitions of number and quantity in light of his theory of what
mathematical definitions should be, reveals on the one hand that Wolff’s debt to Des-
cartes—whose intense reading has been attested by Hofmann81—is perhaps as con-
spicuous as the influence he received from Leibniz, notwithstanding his defense of
Leibniz in the priority controversy on the discovery of the infinitesimal calculus, and his
acknowledgement of Leibniz’ highest contributions to algebra, universal mathesis and
calculus situs. Besides, it reveals that Wolff’s geometrical definitions were strongly
influenced by Euclid—especially by Barrow’s English edition of the Elements—as well

81 See J.E. Hofmann, Vorwort to Mathematisches Lexicon, p. ix (GW I 11).

28
as by Aristotle’s notion of contiguity, rather than by Newton’s fluxional conception of
geometrical quantities.

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