Received: 31 December 2021

DOI: 10.1049/qtc2.12044

INDUSTRY ARTICLE
- -Revised: 3 May 2022 Accepted: 5 June 2022

- IET Quantum Communication

Towards the industrialisation of quantum key distribution

in communication networks: A short survey

Ruiqi Liu1,2 | Georgi Gary Rozenman3,4 | Neel Kanth Kundu5,6 |

Daryus Chandra7 | Debashis De8
1
Wireless Research Institute, ZTE Corporation, Beijing, China
2
The State Key Laboratory of Mobile Network and Mobile Multimedia Technology, Shenzhen, China
3
Raymond and Beverly Sackler School of Physics and Astronomy, Faculty of Exact Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
4
School of Electrical Engineering, Iby and Aladar Fleischman Faculty of Engineering, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
5
Department of Electronic and Computer Engineering, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong
6
Department of Engineering, University of Ferrara, Ferrara, Italy
7
School of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK
8
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Centre of Mobile Cloud Computing, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad University of Technology, Kolkata, West Bengal, India

Correspondence Abstract
Ruiqi Liu, Wireless Research Institute, ZTE Quantum information and communication technology will lead us to the new era of ultra‐
Corporation, 14th floor, SinoTrans Tower A, Anding
Road, Chaoyang District, Beijing 100029, China.
fast and absolute‐secure networks. With the emergence of quantum supremacy on the
Email: [email protected] horizon, the security of various classical encryption systems soon may be deemed
obsolete. As a remedy, quantum key distribution (QKD) is proposed as a novel quantum‐
Funding information based secret keys exchange, which is developed to solve the problems of legacy
Overseas Research Award; The Hong Kong Ph.D. encryption. It is anticipated that QKD will provide stronger security for future
Fellowship Scheme
communication systems even in the presence of malicious quantum attacks. As the QKD
research and development is getting mature, the theoretical use cases of QKD in various
industries are proliferating. In this treatise, we summarise the potential applications of
QKD for future communication technology while highlighting the ongoing stand-
ardisation efforts essential for the sustainability and reliability of the near‐future
deployment. Additionally, we also present the various challenges faced by both discrete
variable and continuous variable QKD schemes hindering their widespread imple-
mentation into our future communication networks.

1 | INTRODUCTION quantum computing, which include the increasing number of

quantum bits (qubits)1, may put the security of the RSA al-
The security of the classical public‐key encryption algorithms gorithm in jeopardy since it can be broken by running the
such as the Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) algorithm relies on Shor's factoring algorithm on a fault‐tolerant quantum pro-
the assumption that a classical computer is not capable of cessor [1, 2]. As an alternative solution, One‐Time‐Pad (OTP)
solving the computationally hard problem of prime factorisa- based encryption schemes could provide unconditional secu-
tion efficiently. However, with the recent advances in practical rity provided that the two users invoke completely random

1
IBM recently launched a 127‐qubit quantum processor [5].

-
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© 2022 The Authors. IET Quantum Communication published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of The Institution of Engineering and Technology.

IET Quant. Comm. 2022;3:151–163. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/qtc2 151

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- LIU ET AL.

keys that are unknown to the eavesdropper and discard the

keys after a single utilisation [3]. However, OTP faces the
impracticality of implementation when it comes to realising the
flawless telepresence required by the current communication
technologies. Furthermore, classical key distribution algorithms
such as Diffie–Hellman algorithm [4], whose security is guar-
anteed on the assumption that current classical computers
cannot efficiently solve the computationally hard problem of
the discrete logarithm, is also not secure with the rapid
development in quantum computing [5]. FIGURE 1 Schematic of a general quantum key distribution (QKD)
Although quantum computing imposes a threat to the protocol
current encryption algorithms, another quantum technology
known as quantum key distribution (QKD) comes to our
rescue by providing unconditional security to the future prepare‐ and measure‐based DV‐QKD protocol proposed in
communication systems [6]. QKD is a novel key distribution 1984. In the BB84 protocol, the key information is encoded
algorithm that exploits the laws of quantum physics to using randomly chosen rectilinear or diagonal polarisation of
distribute truly random secret keys between two users even in the photons. Bob then also uses randomly chosen rectilinear or
the presence of an eavesdropper. In general, QKD is devel- diagonal basis for measuring the received photons [7]. Any
oped based on the principles of the no‐cloning theorem and disturbance to the quantum state can be detected by Alice and
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. In QKD, the key infor- Bob due to the no‐cloning theorem and the indistinguishability
mation is encoded on the quantum states of quantum particles, theorem of non‐orthogonal quantum states. The no‐cloning
such as photons, by the sender Alice, which is then transmitted theorem states that it is not possible to make a perfect copy
to the legitimate receiver Bob. To elaborate a little further, a of an arbitrary quantum state while the indistinguishability
QKD protocol requires a quantum channel for transmitting theorem states that it is not possible to perfectly distinguish
the quantum states and an authenticated classical channel for two non‐orthogonal quantum states. A few years later in 1991,
exchanging the measurement basis information and for car- Ekert proposed the E91 protocol that exploits pre‐shared
rying out the information reconciliation to extract the final maximally‐entangled Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) pairs
secret keys. The schematic of a general QKD protocol where to distribute secret keys between two legitimate users [8]. The
Alice and Bob want to share a secret key in the presence of an security of the E91 protocol is based on Bell's inequality, which
eavesdropper Eve is shown in Figure 1. In this scenario, Eve can detect the presence of an eavesdropper by evaluating the
may intercept the quantum channel by measuring the trans- Bells' parameter [3].
mitted quantum states and inserting a quantum state replace- By contrast, in CV‐QKD, the key information is encoded
ment in the quantum channel. However, owing to the laws of in the quadratures of the Gaussian coherent or squeezed states
quantum physics, any disturbance to the quantum states during of electromagnetic waves [6, 9, 10]. The security of CV‐QKD
the transmission by the eavesdropper can be easily detected by is based on the principle of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle,
Alice and Bob, who can then abort the protocol and discard which states that it is impossible to simultaneously measure
the keys. Additionally, Eve can also listen to the classical both the quadratures of the Gaussian quantum state with
messages shared on the authenticated classical channel. How- perfect precision. In the prepare‐and‐measure CV‐QKD
ever, since the classical channel is used only for sharing the scheme, Alice first generates classical random variables and
measurement basis between Alice and Bob, and not the actual uses them to encode the key information in the quadrature of
measurement results, Eve still will not be able to recover the the Gaussian coherent or squeezed quantum states. Alice then
information about the secret keys. Ultimately, QKD provides transmits the coherent or squeezed states to Bob over a
the guarantee that Alice and Bob can share a truly random bosonic Gaussian channel, which may be constituted by free‐
secret key even in the presence of an eavesdropper. space or fibre optical channel [11–13]. Next, Bob measures
Based on how the key information is encoded on the the received quantum states by performing the homodyne or
quantum states, QKD may be classified into two major cate- heterodyne measurement. As a result, Alice and Bob now share
gories, namely discrete variable QKD (DV‐QKD) and a string of correlated random variables from which the secret
continuous variable QKD (CV‐QKD) [3, 6]. Furthermore, keys can be extracted by performing information reconciliation
QKD protocols can also be classified into prepare‐ and and privacy amplification. In the entanglement‐based CV‐
measure‐based protocols or entanglement‐based protocols QKD scheme, Alice generates an entangled quantum state—
based on the type of quantum state preparation and mea- for example, the two‐mode squeezed vacuum state (TMSV)
surement used by Alice and Bob [3, 6]. In DV‐QKD, single‐ —and then transmits one of the modes to Bob while keeping
photon sources are used to encode the key information in the other mode herself. Similarly, Alice and Bob can share a
the polarisation of the photons. The BB84 protocol, named string of correlated random variables by performing a homo-
after its developers Bennett and Brassard, is the earliest dyne or heterodyne measurement on their part of the TMSV
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LIU ET AL.
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mode. The secret key is then extracted by performing the in-

formation reconciliation and privacy amplification steps similar
to the prepare‐and‐measure CV‐QKD protocol [6].
Although there is a plethora of research papers in the field
of quantum technologies for communication networks [14],
there is an inadequate number of papers in the open literature
summarising the QKD development from the industry point
of view. Therefore, we are aiming to fill in this gap. More
specifically, throughout this treatise, we try to provide a
comprehensive review of the QKD development by high-
lighting the industrial challenges hindering its commercial
implementation as well as the standardisation progress for both
DV and CV‐QKD schemes.
The rest of this treatise is organised as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we summarise the key use cases of QKD in
communication networks. It is followed by Section 3, where
we present a comprehensive survey of the funded research
projects on QKD as well as the industrialisation progress. We
give an in‐depth analysis of the industrial challenges faced by
the QKD integration into communication networks in Sec-
tion 4. In Section 5, we provide a roadmap towards the QKD
global standardisation for our future communication net-
F I G U R E 2 Various use cases of quantum key distribution (QKD) for
works. Finally, we conclude and summarise our paper in future communication technologies
Section 6.

2.1 | Data centres and cloud computing

2 | USE CASES OF QKD IN
COMMUNICATION NETWORKS Data centres store and process a large amount of data. They also
transmit the data from one server to another during which
As elaborated briefly in previous sections, QKD will poten- various malicious attacks may compromise the security of the
tially play a major role in enhancing the security and privacy of sensitive data in transmission. With the rapid advancement in
data in future communication networks. Most of the early fibre optics‐based QKD, secret keys can be generated by utilising
QKD experiments were performed to show proof of concept standard telecommunication equipment. These secret keys can
and had limited applications only for governmental and mili- then be used to secure the data centres by providing quantum‐
tary purposes. It is now expected that QKD will enter the safe encryption for the data transmission between two or
mainstream applications for future communication networks more data centres. The data transmitted to high‐performance
with the widespread standardisation activities carried out by the computers for processing can also be secured by using the se-
industry. cret keys generated from QKD. Moreover, QKD can also be
Evidently, QKD has been implemented for secure used as a cloud service where quantum‐safe secret keys are
communication which are extended by employing satellites distributed upon request to the end users by the servers.
equipped with high‐quality optical links [15]. Other experi-
ments suggest that QKD can be mediated in laboratory
water channels and in rivers [16, 17], and for educational 2.2 | Quantum cryptography for beyond 5G
purposes [18]. networks
The secret keys generated from the QKD protocol can be
used for OTP‐based physical layer security. Moreover, the keys With the proliferation of 5G mobile devices, QKD can be used
can also be used for higher layer symmetric key encryption to secure the 5G network and beyond by securing the base
algorithms such as advanced encryption standards (AESs) and station to the core 5G network link as well as the base station
digital encryption standards (DESs). The major use cases of to the user link in order to provide quantum‐safe end‐to‐end
QKD in future communication networks are summarised in voice, text and data communication services. Currently, the
Figure 2. The major use cases of QKD are presented based on secret key generator cannot ensure absolute security if the
the different QKD test‐beds developed by the OpenQKD physical channel is eavesdropped on. Additionally, QKD can
project, which is a cooperation formed by European industry, also be used to improve the 5G network virtualisation services
startups, and academia [19]. The core ideas of various QKD by enhancing the security of virtual network infrastructure
use cases are based on building a secure digital society in the management. Software‐defined networking, which is used for
future. The following are the detailed description of QKD use managing 5G networks, can also be used to manage QKD
cases. links and QKD applications in beyond 5G networks.
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154
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Furthermore, QKD can be used to support various privacy‐ layer security to power line communication in order to protect
preserving services, such as secure multi‐party computation, the smart grid from malicious attackers.
federated learning and homomorphic encryption in beyond 5G
networks. Besides the typical base station to user scenario,
beyond 5G networks will witness more forms of transmissions 2.6 | Healthcare
such as integrated access and backhaul [20], high altitude plat-
form based non‐terrestrial networks [21], side‐link transmission Telemedicine and e‐healthcare services have become a major
[22] and actively configurable radio environment [23, 24], which part of the healthcare sector due to the pandemic. Hence, it
can all benefit from the use of QKD. may become extremely necessary to exploit the secret keys
generated by QKD for securing the storage, transmission and
processing of sensitive patient data. Moreover, various bio-
2.3 | Internet of Things (IoT) and Mobile sensors are now embedded in smartwatches and other wear-
Edge Computing (MEC) able devices that collect and transmit personal health data and
the day‐to‐day activity of the user. These devices store the
The threat of malicious attacks will increase with the huge medical conditions of the user and use them to predict any
number of devices and sensor nodes being deployed in the IoT serious medical problems for the user. The unconditional se-
networks. The IoT devices will be utilised for collecting sensitive curity and confidentiality of these intimate health data in the
personal data such as location and video surveillance. The se- era of quantum computing can be ensured by using QKD‐
curity and privacy of the data collected by IoT sensors can be based encryption schemes.
enhanced by using the secret keys generated from QKD. Since
IoT devices have limited power and computing capabilities, IoT
controllers need to distribute the secret keys to the edge devices. 3 | INDUSTRIAL PROGRESSES,
The devices can then use the secret keys to encrypt the data PROJECTS AND STANDARDISATION
before sending it to a central data processor. On the other hand,
MEC will support new low latency services such as Industry 4.0, As we have elaborated earlier, QKD may provide multiple
self‐driving cars, IoT and smart manufacturing. MEC is capable beneficial applications for future communication technologies.
of reducing the latency by processing the data at the edge rather However, the realisation and commercialisation of QKD sys-
than using cloud computing. In this regard, secret keys generated tems are still in their infancy. Nevertheless, there are some
using QKD can be used for enhancing the security, privacy and proof‐of‐concept platforms and hardware testbeds that have
sovereignty of low latency MEC services. been built by different teams around the world, which can
substantiate and verify theories and help researchers to better
study the system models.
2.4 | Government and banking In this section, the industrial progress on QKD systems are
introduced from the following four different perspectives:
Data security and sovereignty is of utmost importance for gov- demonstrated prototypes, published white papers, projects
ernment agencies and the military in order to safeguard critical supported by funding agencies and ongoing standardisation
national data, such as defence secrets, intellectual property and activities.
citizen data from hackers. QKD will play a major role in In 2009, a group of researchers demonstrated the first real‐
providing quantum‐safe security for critical national data. In this world implementation of a QKD system in the Swisscom fibre
regard, QKD can be used for securing the private communica- optic network [32]. The reported QKD system uses the coherent
tion links between different government agencies for sharing one‐way (COW) protocol and it is capable of continuous and
confidential data between them. Moreover, secret keys generated autonomous operation. The trial was conducted over a physical
using QKD can be used by the banking sector for secure ATM distance of 110 km with a fibre transmission distance of 150 km
transactions, online credit card transactions and securing the in a 43 dB loss transmission line, corresponding to over 200 km
customer data stored in the bank data centres. The government of standard fibre. The QKD system was verified to be fully
agencies and banks can deploy a trusted repeater‐based local autonomous with an average distribution rate of 2.5 bps. In the
quantum network in order to provide QKD‐enabled end‐to‐end same year, a proof‐of‐concept prototype of a customised BB84
encryption. system was demonstrated [33].
Since the first demonstrated QKD system by IBM in 1992,
there have been more and more prototypes that have been
2.5 | Smart grid and national pipelines built and demonstrated by companies and even ready‐to‐go
QKD modules, which can be easily purchased. In the QKD
Smart grid and national pipelines used for transporting oil and industry, multinational technology giants, as well as hidden
gas are the backbones of the economy of every nation. Hence, champions, have interesting findings to offer. ID Quantique, a
QKD may play an important role in securing the smart grid to company aiming to provide high‐performance quantum‐safe
prevent any blackout and to protect the national pipelines from security solutions for data transmission, currently offers four
hackers. To this aim, QKD can be used to provide physical different QKD platforms [34]. Magiq, a company founded in
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LIU ET AL.
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To be integrated with classical networks to unleash unprecedented performance

1999 in Greater Boston, offers a system called the QPN, which

required hyper‐secured networks for certain 6G applications and use cases

Providing strong security by applying a quantum key based on the quantum

implements QKD based on the BB84 protocol [35]. Toshiba

Solving the problem of current encryption methods and providing a higher

Providing long‐term security based on principles of quantum mechanics

develops its QKD systems offering two variants: the multi-

Enabling long‐term security based on principles of quantum mechanics

Providing unique physical layer security features, thereby enabling the
plexed system—which can be operated on data carrying fibre—
and the long‐distance system for the highest possible key rate

level of security for satellite, optical and marine networks

and range [36]. Founded in 2008 in Canberra, Australia, Quin-
tessenceLabs targets to offer the strongest security foundation
for data transmission and storage, including its QKD products

in quantum sensing, communication and security

no‐cloning theorem and uncertainty principle
[37]. Hyperion Technologies, a start‐up company that manu-
factures QKD modules [38], currently is also exploring under-

Acting as a key enabling technology for 6G

water QKD systems. Finally, SEQRE.net is a quantum
cryptography research, development and commercialisation

Providing a novel solution to security

Enabling security for 6G networks

company with state‐of‐the‐art QKD products, including the

Enabling secure communications

CV‐QKD devices [39].
As in‐depth research on QKD progresses, researchers
from not only the field of quantum physics but also tele-

Use cases identified

communications are starting to discuss the applications of
QKD in future telecommunication networks. Out of 43 white
papers on the sixth generation (6G) networks published from
the year 2019, eight of them have mentioned QKD as a
candidate technology for future secure communications. The
white papers are summarised in Table 1. As also reflected by
the analysis in the white papers, besides the promising future
of QKD to be integrated into future wireless networks, there Publication month
are some remaining open problems waiting to be solved. For
instance, in Ref. [25], the authors asked the question of
Nov 2019

Nov 2020

Nov 2020

Nov 2020
June 2020

June 2020

June 2021
Aug 2020
Sep 2019

Sep 2021
whether QKD with optical—or even microwave in the future
—can be practical for wireless communications. Additionally,
most of the QKD research studies focus on optical channel
models and point‐to‐point communication links. Conse-

Preliminary Study of Advanced Technologies towards 6G Era

Visions on 6G Network Architecture and Key Technologies

quently, more research efforts are required to investigate the
Key Drivers and Research Challenges for 6G Ubiquitous
Summary of white papers on quantum key distribution (QKD) for 6G networks

feasibility of QKD for the wireless channel as well as multi‐

European Vision for the 6G Network Ecosystem [31]

point communication links.
White Paper on Critical and Massive Machine Type

6G White Paper on Localisation and Sensing [27]

The alluring benefits of QKD also motivate the funding

Wireless Technology Trends towards 6G [30]
The 6G blueprint from multiple perspectives

agencies worldwide to provide more investment in this

evolving technology by supporting related research. Projects
Communication Towards 6G [26]

that are related to studying quantum information theory, signal

ICDT Integrated 6G Network [29]
White Paper on 6G Research [28]

processing or communication are summarised in Table 2.

Since quantum communication is a very dynamic research field
Wireless Intelligence [25]

involving multi‐disciplinary efforts, projects aiming at both

physical and higher layers of quantum communication systems
are proliferating. Starting from the early 2000s, there have been
numerous dedicated research projects that contributed signif-
icantly to the theoretical study as well as the engineering
development of the QKD. Some projects are already
Title

completed with deliverables such as research papers, technical

reports and proofs‐of‐concept while some are still ongoing.
Besides the individual projects listed in Table 2, the National
IMT‐2030 (6G) Promotion Group
6G Flagship, University of Oulu

6G Flagship, University of Oulu

6G Flagship, University of Oulu

Science Foundation (NSF) has awarded 9.75 million USD to

support workforce development for advancing quantum
computing and quantum communication research and edu-
Southeast University

cation in 13 universities across the United States (US). The

FuTURE FORUM

FuTURE FORUM

FuTURE FORUM

FuTURE FORUM

programme—called the Quantum Computing and Informa-

tion Science‐Faculty Fellows (QCIS‐FF) [40]—aims to grow
TABLE 1

the research capacity in the field of computing and informa-

5GPPP
Source

tion science to support enhancements in quantum communi-

cation in the long term. Specifically, QCIS‐FF supports
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TABLE 2 Summary of funded research projects on quantum key distribution (QKD)

Start End Funding Overall

Title Main objectives and outcomes month month agencies budget
SECOQC—Development of a Global Design and validate a network for dependable Apr 2004 Sep 2008 FP6‐IST € 16,823,437
Network for Secure Communication and secure long‐range communication built
based on Quantum Cryptography upon QKD
[41]

Quantum Cryptography and Engineer a novel generation of continuous Apr 2007 Mar 2010 FP6‐MOBILITY € 252,971
Communication variable protocols, whose performances are
Networks [42] improved enough to enable an efficient and
secure key distribution among the nodes of
future networks

QUROPE—Quantum information Drive progresses in quantum information Sep 2006 Aug 2009 FP6‐IST € 1,038,952
processing processing and communication with inter‐
and communication in Europe [43] disciplinary efforts
in theoretical and experimental physics,
computer science, engineering, mathematics
and material science

AQuS—Analog quantum simulators for Develop platforms for dynamical simulators, Jan 2015 Dec 2017 Horizon 2020 € 2,000,500
many‐body dynamics [44] and use these to address largely unexplored
key questions on the power of quantum
simulators, as well as to probe important
questions in fundamental and applied
physics

QCALL—Quantum Communications Investigate disruptive technologies that enable Dec 2016 May 2021 Horizon 2020 € 3,924,884
for ALL [45] wireless access to quantum networks, and
develop new devices and protocols that
enable multi‐party quantum
communications with experimental
examination

QuantCom—Ubiquitous Quantum Develop Pareto‐optimum error control, secret June 2018 May 2023 Horizon 2020 € 2,496,372
Communications [46] key‐distribution, network coding and
entanglement distribution schemes to
eventually support
quantum communications for aircrafts

QCUMbER—Quantum Controlled Enhance quantum channel capacities per signal Sep 2015 Aug 2018 Horizon 2020 € 3,219,721
Ultrafast state, enable precision time‐frequency
Multimode Entanglement and measurements beyond classical boundaries
Measurement [47] and open new avenues to scalable quantum
information processing and
communications

NanOQTech—Nanoscale Systems for Build nanoscale hybrid quantum devices that Oct 2016 Sep 2019 Horizon 2020 € 3,378,428
Optical strongly couple to light
Quantum Technologies [48]

CiViQ—Continuous Variable Quantum Open a novel avenue towards flexible and cost‐ Oct 2018 Mar 2022 Horizon 2020 € 9,974,006
Communications [49] effective integration of quantum
communication technologies, and in
particular CV‐QKD, into emerging optical
and wireless telecommunication networks

Centre for a Quantum‐Engineered Develop novel approaches for quantum Sep 2019 Aug 2021 NSF $ 149,625
Distributed Computing and communication and quantum networking
Communication Testbed [50]

Centre for Interdisciplinary Research in Fill the theory gap between existing quantum Sep 2019 Aug 2022 NSF $ 118,125
Quantum Information Theory and information science theory and real‐world
Simulation [51] experimental platforms for quantum
computing, simulation, and communication

OPENQKD—Open European Raise awareness of the maturity of QKD and its Sep 2019 Sep 2022 Horizon 2020 € 17,974,246
Quantum Key Distribution Testbed seamless integration into existing security
[52] and networks for a wide range of use cases
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LIU ET AL.
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T A B L E 2 (Continued)

Start End Funding Overall

Title Main objectives and outcomes month month agencies budget

NSF Engineering Research Centre for Develop one of the world's first long‐distance Sep 2020 Aug 2025 NSF $ 26,000,000
Quantum Networks (CQN) [53] quantum communications networks enabled
by fault‐tolerant quantum repeaters,
supported on a network backbone of
quantum repeaters and switches

departments and schools that conduct research and teaching in architectures. The ISG is also completing another GR, which
computer and information science, with the specific goal of defines management interfaces to integrate QKD with software‐
encouraging the hiring of tenure‐track and tenured faculty in defined networks (SDN). The GR defines abstraction models
quantum computing and quantum communication. and workflows between an SDN‐enabled QKD node and the
As quantum information and communication technology is SDN controller. Both GRs are published and available on the
still an emerging industry, researchers and engineers around the website of ISG. Besides this ISG on QKD, a working group on
world are contributing mostly to pre‐standard affairs and there quantum‐safe cryptography (QSC) has started its work as well
is no clear plan yet for formal standardisation of quantum [58], aiming to assess and make recommendations for QSC
communication in international standard development orga- protocols and implementation considerations. The major
nisations (SDOs). However, companies already in the quantum outcome of the working group is a technical report defining
information field are taking steps to organise the marketplace, migration strategies and recommendations for quantum‐safe
such as through the formation of the United States (US) schemes, which is publicly available on their website.
Quantum Economic Development Consortium (QED‐C) [54]. Within the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)'s
The QED‐C was established with support from the National Telecommunication Standardisation Sector (ITU‐T), a focus
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as part of the group on quantum information technology for networks (FG‐
federal strategy for advancing quantum information science QIT4N) was established in 2019 [59]. The major goal of the
and as called for by the National Quantum Initiative Act focus group is to study the evolution and applications of
enacted in 2018. The major goal of QED‐C is to enable and quantum information technologies for networks, with QKD
grow the quantum industry with a focus on the US. constituting the key technology. As one of the five active focus
Under the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers groups within ITU‐T, the FG‐QIT4N has planned its ninth
(IEEE), an initiative named IEEE Quantum was launched in meeting in August 2021 with participants from both academia
2019 [55]. IEEE Quantum aims to serve its members with all and industry gathering to discuss the latest technological trends
relevant activities related to quantum technologies, including of quantum information technologies. The focus group will
original research, prototyping and standardisation. IEEE also actively collaborate with other SDOs to promote the use of
Quantum is currently working on three specifications, which quantum technologies for communication networks. Under
are software‐defined quantum communication, standard for ITU‐T study group (SG) 13, a number of work items either are
quantum computing definitions and standard for quantum ongoing or have already published their reports. SG 13 studies
computing performance metrics and performance bench- topics related to future networks, with a focus on IMT‐2020
marking. Within the communication society (ComSoc) of systems. ITU‐T SG 17 also studies QKD networks since the
IEEE, the emerging technical committee on quantum com- group is focussed on security studies. These work items are
munications and information technology (QCIT‐ETC) was summarised in Tables 3 and 4,.
founded by researchers from universities and corporations in The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is
2015 [56]. The QCIT‐ETC actively organises workshops, also actively contributing to the standardisation of quantum
special issues and keynote speeches in IEEE conferences and technologies. Along with other organisations, such as the ITU
journals. Standard‐wise, the QCIT‐ETC also participates and and IEEE, the joint symposium on standards for quantum
contributes to the specification of software‐defined quantum technologies was hosted in March 2021 [60]. The symposium
communication, which is led by IEEE Quantum. focusses more on quantum computing but quantum commu-
Within the European Telecommunications Standards Insti- nication is listed as a future working direction of the group.
tute (ETSI), an industry specification group (ISG) dedicated to
QKD was established to address research and pre‐standard is-
sues related to QKD in the year of 2008 [57]. Founded to develop 4 | INDUSTRIAL CHALLENGES
specifications describing quantum cryptography for information
and communication networks, the ISG meets regularly and up- Quantum technologies have been implemented rapidly into the
dates the group specification (GR) every year. In 2020, one GR industry in the past 2 decades. However, based on expert
on the QKD application interface is revised in response to recent experience and a literature review, the implication of quantum
networking developments, with modifications including the cryptography on the market remains limited, as several barriers
introduction of additional parameters to adapt to new network prevent the industrial transfer of classical into quantum
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TABLE 3 Summary of work items on quantum key distribution (QKD) under ITU‐T SG 13

Work item code Title Time to publish reports

Y.3800 Framework for networks to supporting Quantum Key Distribution 2019–10

Y.3801 Functional requirement of the Quantum Key Distribution network 2020–05

Y.3802 Functional architecture of the Quantum Key Distribution network 2020–07

Y.3803 Key management for Quantum Key Distribution network 2020–07

Y.3804 Control and Management for Quantum Key Distribution Networks 2020–07

Y.QKDN_SDNC Software Defined Network Control for Quantum Key Distribution Networks 2021–09

Y.QKDN_BM Business role‐based models in Quantum Key Distribution Network 2021–03

Y.QKDN_frint Framework for integration of QKDN and secure network infrastructures 2021–07

Y.QKDN‐qos‐req Requirements for quality of service (QoS) Assurance of the Quantum Key Distribution Network 2021–10

Y.QKD‐Nqos‐gen General Aspects of QoS on the Quantum Key Distribution Network 2021–10

Y.QKDN‐qos‐fa Functional architecture of QoS assurance for quantum key distribution networks 2021–12

Y.QKDN‐qos‐ml‐req Requirements of machine learning‐based QoS Assurance for quantum key distribution networks 2022–07

TABLE 4 Summary of work items on quantum key distribution (QKD) under ITU‐T SG 17

Work item code Title Time to publish reports

X.1702 Quantum Noise Random Number Generator Architecture 2019–11

X.sec_QKDN_ov Security Requirements for QKD Networks—Overview 2020–08

X.sec_QKDN_km Security Requirements for QKD Networks—Key Management 2020–08

X.cf_QKDN Key combination and confidential key supply for quantum key distribution networks 2020–08

X.sec_QKDN_tn Security requirements for Quantum Key Distribution Networks—Trusted node 2021–03

TR.sec_QKD Technology Report: Security considerations for Quantum Key Distribution network 2020–03

cryptography [61–64]. Previous processes of implementing relatively slow, leading to meagre operation rates. It is known that
concepts in optics, such as optical fibres and adaptive optical single photons can be generated by utilising one of two photons
systems, rely on developing devices in the industrialisation of any produced from a non‐linear process called spontaneous para-
optical technology. QKD devices are no different as high costs metric down‐conversion (SPDC) or spontaneous four‐wave
are involved in the integrability of such devices. Present‐day mixing (SFM) [65]. An illustration of a SPDC process is depic-
QKD devices often include an optical table, superconducting ted in Figure 3. To overcome the unpredictable generation times
wire detectors, expensive and fragile single photons sources, and of heralded photons, multiplexing schemes are being developed
precision optics. These conditions require extensive and con- to rearrange them into regular intervals. However, more work is
stant maintenance and may be operated only by trained experts needed to improve the single‐photon purity and efficiency of
[18, 62]. Therefore, QKD has many industrial challenges and is such schemes, which are currently primarily limited by losses in
far from being implemented in the market. A few of these switching, photon storage, and detection.
challenges are explicitly elaborated in the following. For industrial purposes, photon sources should work at
room temperature and emit information at commonly used
wavelengths, that is, 810 or 1550 nm. Furthermore, they should
4.1 | Single photon sources be integrable with other devices such as detectors and on‐chip
photonic circuits. At present, electrically driven photon emis-
Different methods were proposed to generate single photons sion systems appear to be more suitable for telecommunica-
throughout the history of single‐photon sources (SPS). First, the tion, as they are more compact and controllable on chips.
atomic transition of sodium atoms was used; however, the effi-
ciency of this method was limited [63]. In the present day, it is
possible to control cold atoms to produce single photons [64]. 4.2 | Single photon detectors
However, from an industrial point of view, such sources still
require complex and non‐accessible set‐ups for industrial pro- Single‐photon counting (SPC) is a necessary technique for the
poses, and the loading of atoms or ions can be challenging. implementation of QKD into the industry. In SPC, individual
Furthermore, the dynamics of atom‐based sources are also photons are counted using a single‐photon detector (SPD)
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LIU ET AL.
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4.3 | Quantum repeaters devices

Sending quantum‐entangled photons or qubits over long dis-

tances via devices such as optical fibres is a challenging task
[71–73]. In a typical quantum communication setup, photons
should be sent over 1000 Km at rates of 10 GHz or above [74].
If these photons would propagate naturally in an optical fibre,
detection times could be anywhere from minutes to years,
which is not practical for any industrial applications. In modern
F I G U R E 3 Schematic of a spontaneous parametric down‐conversion
(SPDC) process. (a) A laser beam, defined as a “pump” beam, is directed at classical telecommunication, introducing amplifiers that boost
a non‐linear crystal (typically BBO—beta‐barium borate or equivalent). the signal along the way can solve this problem. It is important
Most of the photons continue straight through the crystal. However, some to note that the amplifier must measure the incoming
of the photons undergo spontaneous down‐conversion and the resultant information‐carrying unit, which is, in our case, an entangled
correlated photon pairs have trajectories that are constrained along the
photon. In such conditions, the measurement procedure de-
edges of two cones. These photon pairs are defined as signal and idlers.
(b) Energy conservation diagram in the non‐linear process stroys the quantum characteristics, such as entanglement, of
these photons, and even in principle, the quantum information
cannot be copied according to the no‐cloning theorem [75].
[66]. In contrast to a conventional photodetector, which gen- Thus, a quantum approach, generally known as the quantum
erates an analogue signal proportional to the photon flux, a repeater, is required in order to overcome transmission loss
single‐photon detector generates a short pulse every time a which is illustrated in Figure 4.
photon is detected. Then, the sum of all pulses is counted, As mentioned, quantum repeaters are conceived to extend
resulting in the integer number of photons detected per quantum entanglement properties over space, despite the
measurement period. In contrary to photodetectors, the fundamental limitations of the no‐cloning theorem [76].
counting efficiency is determined by the quantum efficiency of These devices motivate a base‐level entanglement over a
the detector and any electronic losses that are present in the physical link and coupling entangled links along an end‐to‐end
system [67]. Single‐photon detectors have been extensively path [77]. Let us now discuss two methods for a quantum
studied in the past 2 decades and have created a broad interest repeater creation: (i) the solid‐state approach that is based on a
in new single‐photon detector technologies [67–69]. A signif- static buffer memory [78], and (ii) the optical approach without
icant cause of this trend has undoubtedly been the push to- a static buffer memory [79].
wards optical quantum information applications such as QKD. There is currently a range of proposals based on different
The on the growing demand for industry QKD applications physical systems relying on ensembles of atoms, intended to
places a great demand for quality detector performance that go collectively interact with an entangled photon to store the
beyond the capabilities of established single‐photon detectors. quantum information encoded by the entangled photon itself.
At present, the considerable effort to improve established The purpose of employing an ensemble of atoms instead of a
SPDs and to transform new device concepts into workable single atom is to increase the probability that the entangled
technologies for optical quantum information applications photon will interact with the ensemble of atoms. An ensemble of
continues. In order to proceed into the industry, SPD's must atoms can store more than one photon at a time, which is
have a few main qualities (i) high‐performance detection, (ii) beneficial for increasing the communication rate [80]. At present,
low cost, and (iii) a possibility of integration in existing systems. several elements are being considered for creating the mentioned
One main challenge for such detectors is the implementation atomic ensemble, among which rare earth elements embedded in
into systems involving silicon photonics used for solid‐state crystals are the most promising [81].
manufacturing other optical components. In fact, none of the Such elements require cryogenic cooling at around 1.5 K.
currently available SPDs meets these requirements. As such, it Elements, such as ytterbium, can offer both operations at the
is widely acceptable in present to date industrial research and 980 nm wavelength used in QKD and 1 ms of coherence time.
development laboratories to use currently available SPD's to However, 1550 nm is more common. Hence, Erbium, which
demonstrate the operation of QKD systems and protocols supports 1550 nm wavelengths, might be better. Europium was
while maintaining these capabilities and preparing the funda- also proposed for the same purpose, and it shows a coherence
mentals while the future detector technologies are being time of about 6 h at 2 K [82]. In terms of implementation for
developed. One of the most commonly used SPD's are industrial applications, these approaches seem relatively poor. It
waveguide single‐photon avalanche diodes (WG‐SPADs) [70]. is hard to imagine a wide‐scale array of devices cooled to tem-
WG‐SPADs are suitable for mass production and mono- peratures of 1 − 2 K. Optical quantum repeaters based on
lithically integrated into silicon photonic integrated circuits photonic structures seem more promising as the quantum in-
(SPIC). WG‐SPADs are manufactured around a waveguide, formation is instead encoded and protected in multi‐photon
such that light can be effectively coupled from optical circuits entangled states [83] and these devices can operate at room
into the detector. These SPDs operate slightly below room temperature. It was recently shown that highly entangled pho-
temperature (from −50 to 0c) while maintaining high efficiency tons in so‐called graph states could be used for photonic quan-
at a relatively low cost. tum repeaters, which require substantially fewer resources
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hardware filtering solutions are also necessary for reducing the

cross‐talk and Raman noise in QKD transmission using WDM
in optical fibres.

4.5 | Low‐Noise Homodyne and

Heterodyne Detectors

One of the key components in a CV‐QKD system is the

homodyne/heterodyne detector, which measures the quadra-
ture of the received quantum state. In order to maintain the
quantum effects, it is necessary to have a low‐noise homodyne/
F I G U R E 4 A typical quantum repeater schematic design is composed
heterodyne detector, whose electronic noise is well below the
of two sources of entangled photons. The four photons go in four different quantum shot noise. This is the key difference between the CV‐
fibres arranged so that one photon of each source goes to a quantum QKD system and the coherent optical communications used
measurement device, whereas the two remaining photons go in opposite for classical data transmission in optical fibres. Moreover, the
directions. The quantum measurement device asks the question, “are you hardware imperfection of the amplifier used in the homodyne/
identical?” to the two photons arriving simultaneously. If the measurement
succeeds, the two other photons are entangled together, and the state
heterodyne detector introduces additional noise. The common‐
representing this entanglement depends on the result of the quantum mode rejection ratio (CMMR) quantifies this noise, which is a
measurement. Using this quantum measurement, we have established the ratio of the differential gain and the common‐mode gain. A
entanglement of two photons separated by a distance more prominent than practical homodyne/heterodyne detector should have a high
the one reached using a single source of entangled photons CMMR in order to reduce the effects of additional noise. Some
recent experimental prototypes have achieved a shot‐noise to
compared to atomic‐memory‐based repeaters [84]. However, electronic noise ratio of more than 10 dB and a CMMR of more
standard approaches to building multi‐photon entangled states than 50 dB [91, 92]. However, a massive effort from the in-
through pairwise probabilistic entanglement generation severely dustry is still required to develop cost‐efficient and low noise
limit the size of the state that can be created, therefore, limiting homodyne/heterodyne detectors for widespread commercial
this approach to industrial applications. We conclude by stating deployment of CV‐QKD in future communication networks.
that although up‐to‐date photonic quantum repeaters are not yet
suited for industrial applications, these devices seem the most
promising for that purpose. 5 | FORECASTED ROADMAP FOR
STANDARDISATION OF QUANTUM
COMMUNICATION
4.4 | Coexistence of classical and quantum
data in optical fibre In this treatise, we have mainly discussed the integration of
QKD in communication systems. To demonstrate the way
In the near term, it is expected that both DV‐QKD and CV‐ forward towards the future commercial deployment of QKD‐
QKD schemes will utilise the conventional optical fibre used assisted networks, a critical analysis of the associated stand-
in the current telecommunication networks for high‐speed ardisation process is necessary.
classical data transmission. This is necessary for reducing the Prior to formal standardisation, novel technology is usually
deployment cost of QKD in future communication networks. studied by researchers from academia for a considerable period
Therefore, it is also important to design an efficient wavelength of time. Formulation of the system model and key problems, as
multiplexing scheme, which can simultaneously support quan- well as solutions to the identified technical problems, are given
tum communication and classical data transmission by reducing and initial use cases have also emerged during this phase.
the cross‐talk between the classical and quantum channels Meanwhile, this technology is investigated by the industry
[85–88]. To elaborate a little further, the DV‐QKD scheme uses targeting one or more major use cases and practical deploy-
weak coherent pulses for encoding the secret key information. ment scenarios. As both academic and industrial researchers
By contrast, the classical data transmission uses high power proceed with their research activities, the proofs‐of‐concept
optical pulses, which will act as a noise source for the DV‐QKD and prototypes are developed and tested, which accelerates
signal. Similarly, when the CV‐QKD secret key information is the evolution of the technology. It is at this stage that early
multiplexed with classical data in the same optical fibre using standardisation activities are kicked off. The standardisation
wavelength division multiplexing (WDM), the CV‐QKD signal process is usually triggered with one or multiple study items
will be affected by Raman noise produced by broadband noise (SIs) in regional standards developing organisations (SDOs),
photons due to Raman scattering [87, 89, 90]. Therefore, and proceeds in international SDOs with global impacts, such
considerable efforts from the industry are required to investigate as the third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). The
and standardise resource allocation schemes for hybrid classical‐ outcome of SIs are usually for information only and cannot
quantum communications in optical fibres. Moreover, efficient serve as a normative document. The next step is the
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LIU ET AL.
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instantiation of a work item, which leads to publishing tech-

nical specifications that comprehensively defines the detailed
designs as well as requirements related to this technology and
potential products.
With continuous efforts from both research institutes and
businesses, swift progress on implementing and testing
advanced and realistic prototypes is expected. Universities and
corporations in the quantum and communication industry have
already started the realisation of prototypes since the beginning
of this century as depicted in Figure 5. The trials provide re-
searchers and engineers with firsthand data and working
knowledge on the performance offered by QKD in real‐world F I G U R E 5 Forecasted timeline for the standardisation of quantum
key distribution (QKD) into communication systems
deployment scenarios, which will further accelerate the
research process. Figure 5 depicts the current status of research
and standardisation of QKD in communication networks as
well as the forecasted roadmap ahead. use cases and several plausible QKD protocols. More specif-
It is well‐noted that the current trials and standardisation ically, we have summarised the standardisation progress and
efforts focus more on wired transmissions and point‐to‐point the industrial challenges hindering the widespread imple-
channels. However, there is also a strong need for secure mentation of QKD for our future communication networks
communication from the wireless industry. It is observed that for both DV and CV‐QKD schemes. Indeed, it is very clear
QKD and physical layer secret keys generation over the air that the road towards industrialisation of QKD is long and not
can offer an ultra‐high level of security in a post‐quantum era a straight forward one. To conceive the ultimate goal of
where quantum computers can readily crack traditional quantum‐safe communications systems, a multi‐disciplinary
encryption and would provide value for vertical industries as approach is mandatory, ranging from the theoretical study of
well as the end users of 6G. Thus, the analysis of how QKD the QKD use cases to the physical implementation of QKD
can be standardised in 3GPP is given herein. As to the 3GPP, devices. To conclude this treatise, we believe that intimate
the current focus is on starting the second phase of 5G, the collaborations between academia, industry, and government
5G Advanced, with Release 18, while there is no official plan will immeasurably accelerate the progress of standardisation
for 6G yet. According to past experience, it is reasonable to and industrial deployment of QKD.
expect that possible discussions on requirements of 6G sys-
tems will begin after 2027. Based on the current stand- A C K N OWL E D G E M E N T
ardisation progress on 5G, we estimate the first 6G release The authors would like to thank Dao Tian and Bo Sun from
will be between Release 20 to Release 22. With the COVID‐ ZTE Corporation for providing information on the latest
19 pandemic and its profound impact on the global economy status of standardisation of quantum technologies in various
and society, the future schedule of 3GPP may be further standard development organisations. Georgi Gary Rozenman
delayed. is thankful to Prof. Ady Arie for his guidance. Neel Kanth
To standardise QKD as an entirely new approach to Kundu is thankful to Prof. Matthew R. McKay for his guid-
generate a secret key for secure wireless communication, some ance. The work of Neel Kanth Kundu was supported in part
preparation work needs to be done to help companies aligned by The Hong Kong Ph.D. Fellowship Scheme (HKPFS) and
and have a clear understanding of this feature. Thus, it is Overseas Research Award (ORA).
anticipated that QKD will be studied in the first release of 6G,
which will be likely to take place in around 2028 or 2029. Then, C O N FL I C T O F I N TE R E S T
a work item will continue to specify physical layer designs, No conflict of interest to disclose.
higher layer designs and signalling as well as requirements for
QKD in wireless networks. DA TA AVA I L A B I L I T Y S TA TE M E N T
Data that support the findings of this study are available from
the corresponding author upon reasonable request.
6 | CONCLUSION
O R CI D
QKD constitutes the near‐commercialisation quantum tech- Ruiqi Liu https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6091-1138
nologies with multiple potential benefits for our future Neel Kanth Kundu https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6439-
communication technologies. As we have described compre- 4024
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