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Exposure to and learning from the IPCC special report on

1.5 °C global warming, and public support for climate protests
and mitigation policies
Rouven Doran1 ✉, Charles A. Ogunbode1,2, Gisela Böhm1,3 and Thea Gregersen1,4,5

Based on national survey data from Norway, this study assesses if exposure to the IPCC special report on global warming of 1.5 °C
can be associated with support for climate protests and mitigation policies. Respondents were asked if they had heard about the
report (closed-ended question) and what they had learned from or about the report (open-ended question). Analyses of the closed-
ended question showed that those who had heard about the report were also more likely to express their support for, as well as to
plan on engaging in, protest for increased action by the government against climate change. A similar pattern was observed with
respect to support for policy changes that can assist in mitigating climate change. Complementary analyses of the open-ended
question revealed that evaluative statements formed the largest category of responses. This category included both references to
the seriousness of the evolving climate crisis and comments questioning the credibility of the presented information, with the
former being the most frequent response. The findings from this study are discussed in the context of public engagement with
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climate change, with a particular scope on the potential impacts of making the insights from scientific reports known to the general
public.
npj Climate Action (2023)2:11 ; https://doi.org/10.1038/s44168-023-00042-9

INTRODUCTION An analysis of narratives that are shared amongst contemporary

Anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from fossil fuel climate movements suggests that science may serve different
consumption, deforestation and agriculture are driving unprece- purposes. This included materials (webpages, press statements,
dented changes in the climatic system; raising global tempera- and media coverage) from Fridays For Future, Extinction Rebellion,
tures and threatening the ecological systems that support life on and the Sunrise Movement; for more details, see ref. 7. Whereas
earth. Scientific discourse concerning solutions to address these science has been employed to gain a sense of legitimacy and
changes highlights key roles for political, social and technological public recognition, especially in the initiating stages, the
interventions to facilitate the global transition to a low-carbon supporters of these movements also tend to proclaim their role
economy1. This is partly mirrored in the public sphere by the as communicators that share knowledge about the projected
international expansion of activist groups demanding increased consequences of failing to comply with the 1.5 °C target with the
government action on climate change2,3. The current study public7.
addresses support for activism and policy changes that are The IPCC special report on global warming of 1.5 °C generated
targeted at reducing anthropogenic GHG emissions, especially considerable news coverage after its release in October 20188.
those that entail substantial individual effort and sacrifice. This References to this and other reports have been common among
was done against the background of the Intergovernmental Panel activists attempting to galvanize public support for, and further
on Climate Change (IPCC) special report on global warming of involvement in, the school strikes and other forms of protest. A
1.5 °C, which described mitigation scenarios that would be (in) key observation is that the IPCC tends to be viewed as an
consistent with keeping the emission reduction targets outlined authoritative source of information with respect to what needs to
by the Paris Agreement1. be done to prevent a major climate crisis9–11. While activists have
In 2019, the youth-led school strikes around the world have been characterized as displaying low trust in governments to take
helped elevate the threat of climate change into the mainstream measures against climate change, they also tend to show high
public debate. Not only coincided these and other forms of trust in scientists to supply them with accurate information12. Also,
climate protests with intensified media coverage about the topics there is evidence from Germany and the US suggesting that large
of ‘global warming’ and ‘climate change’, but there was also a parts of the public are not opposed to scientists getting more
notable increase in internet searches that employed the terms involved in the political discourse on climate change, such as by
‘climate crisis’ or ‘climate emergency’4. In this context, many of the advocating for specific mitigation policies13.
protesters articulated their demand that political leaders acknowl- Research investigating the use of scientific knowledge by
edge the available science on climate change5,6. Now, the activists has highlighted its function as a moral resource used to
pressure on governments to adhere to internationally agreed legitimatize their demands and actions14. When it comes to the
emission reduction targets must be sustained into the future to question of whether exposure to information affects how people
secure lasting changes in climate-relevant policies and practices. construe and respond to climate change, the empirical evidence

1
Department of Psychosocial Science, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway. 2School of Psychology, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, United Kingdom. 3Department of
Psychology, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, Lillehammer, Norway. 4Centre for Climate and Energy Transformation (CET), University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway.
5
Norwegian Research Centre (NORCE), Bergen, Norway. ✉email: [email protected]
 R. Doran et al.
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on the subject has been mixed. This resonates with some broader
Table 1. Demographic profile of the sample.
criticism of the information deficit model in terms of it providing a
simplistic understanding of public engagement with climate n %
change15. For example, media usage has been associated with
intentions to engage in climate change mitigation actions at the Gender
household level16, but other research suggests that sharing Male 646 49.1
information about the seriousness of global warming may not Female 671 50.9
uniformly make people more receptive to calls for behavior
change17,18. Similarly, while newspaper coverage of global Age (birth cohort)
warming has been shown to correlate positively with public 1959 or earlier 607 46.1
concern in Japan19, evidence for the effects of exposure to 1960–1989 614 46.6
climate-related information via the media has been inconclusive in 1990 or later 96 7.3
other contexts20,21. Education (highest completed)
News covering the IPCC special report on global warming of
No education/Elementary school 96 7.3
1.5 °C (hereafter only referred to as the IPCC special report)
spotlighted its pronouncements on the consequences of failure to Upper secondary education 356 27.0
reduce global GHG emissions radically by 20308. While core University/University College 816 62.0
messages from the report were widely quoted by prominent Not answered 49 3.7
figures of the climate movement, exemplified by Greta Thunberg’s Total 1317
address at the World Economic Forum in Davos, January 25 2019,
relatively little is known about the extent to which this coverage Table shows unweighted data.
might have had relevance for public views about the urgency of
climate action. One study from Norway analyzed longitudinal
NCP currently consists of more than 10,000 active participants.
panel data to show that exposure to the IPCC special report
While the core questions are asked to the full panel, participants
increased worry about climate change among large parts of the
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are randomly divided into sub-samples for the remaining waves. In

public. An important finding was that the magnitude of these
this study, we analyzed items that were included in NCP Wave 14
changes varied based on political orientation; with those locating
(January-February 2019) and NCP Wave 15 (May-June 2019).
themselves on the right of the political spectrum appearing to be
Response rates for these two waves were 76.3% and 74.4%,
less affected22. Exposure to the report also happened predomi-
respectively; for more information on the sampling and recruit-
nantly via media, particularly newspapers and television, and only
ment procedures, see refs. 24,25. A detailed description of the
a small fraction of the participants had read parts of the actual
demographic profile from the respondents that received questions
report or the summary for policymakers22.
inquiring about their exposure to, and possibly learning from, the
IPCC special report in NCP Wave 15 is reported in Table 1.
AIMS
In the following, we report findings from a study that employed a Measures
combination of open-ended and closed-ended questions to Items that entered the analyses are shown in Tables 2 and 3. These
scrutinize the role of the IPCC special report for public items were included either in NCP Wave 14 (i.e., political
engagement with climate change in Norway. We were particularly orientation) or in NCP Wave 15 (i.e., climate protests, climate
interested in assessing variations in what people claim to have change mitigation policies, exposure to the report, learning from
learned from or about the report, along with an exploration of or about the report, lifestyle changes, demographics).
whether exposure to the report shows any significant associations Two items measured support for, and self-reported likelihood of
with supporting climate protests and mitigation policies. The latter engaging in, climate protests. Three items measured support for a
included policy changes with mitigation potential in areas like selection of different climate change mitigation policies, ranging
energy, transportation, and food. Aside from political orientation, from public investment in renewable energy to the imposition of
we accounted for the extent to which people already altered their taxes on frequent air travel or on high-carbon foods. To assess
lifestyles due to climate change. There have been findings exposure to and learning from the IPCC special report, respon-
suggesting that topic-related media exposure may reinforce pre- dents were first asked whether they had heard about the report
existing views among those taking extreme positions toward (closed-ended question), and if this was affirmed, they were then
climate change (dis)engagement23. asked what they have learned from or about the report (open-
ended question). Aside from an item measuring political orienta-
tion, the analyses included one item that asked the respondents
METHOD about the extent to which they have changed their lifestyles
Sample because of climate change. We included this item as an indicator
This study uses data from the Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP), for prior climate change (dis)engagement. For a linguistic analysis
which is an online survey that addresses public views on issues of self-reported motivations for adopting changes to one’s
with social and political relevance among residents in Norway. All lifestyle, see ref. 26.
questions included are presented in Norwegian, and the only Answers to the open-ended question were subject to content
eligibility criteria for being considered as a panelist is to be at least analysis27, for which purpose a multilevel coding scheme was
18 years of age and resident in Norway. The panelists are randomly developed. First, answers were screened independently by two
selected from the National Population Registry, maintained by the individuals, one researcher involved in the study and one research
Norwegian Tax Administration. The NCP has several waves of data assistant, each of which suggested a system for categorization.
collection each year, where the first wave is used to update Second, these suggestions were integrated into a coding scheme
information on core questions that are unlikely to fluctuate after a joint discussion, accompanied by desk research. The final
throughout a year, such as for instance political orientation. These coding scheme comprised a range of superordinate categories,
core questions are meant to be combined with data from which in turn could include several more subordinate categories
subsequent rounds to reduce the length of each survey. The to reflect different levels of specificity; for details, see

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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and item wording for the dependent variables.

Variables Responses

Climate protests
In many parts of the world, groups of citizens have been engaging in various forms of civil disobedience and protest with the aim of M SD
pressuring their governments and leaders to take more drastic measures against climate change and carbon emissions.
To what extent do you support or oppose people engaging in non-violent civil disobedience and protests to pressure government 4.98 1.51
representatives to act against climate change?a
How likely would you be, over the next 12 months, to participate in a protest for increased action by the government against climate 2.10 1.00
change?b
Climate change mitigation policies
Various policies might be used to reduce climate change or deal with its effects. To what extent do you support or oppose the following M SD
policies in Norway?
Using public money to extend renewable energy, such as wind and solar power.a 5.53 1.42
A law requiring additional charges on people who fly more than twice a year (a ‘frequent flyer levy’).a 3.81 1.97
A carbon tax on food items with high emissions, such as beef and dairy products.a 3.39 1.88
Means and standard deviations exclude respondents who did not answer the item in NCP Wave 15 (n = 8 for protest support, n = 6 for protest likelihood,
n = 12 for renewable energy, n = 10 for frequent flying, n = 10 for food items). Table shows unweighted data.
a
Seven-point scale (1 = Strongly oppose, 7 = Strongly support).
b
Five-point scale (1 = Not likely at all, 5 = Very likely).

supplementary material. Answers were to be coded at the most RESULTS

specific category available, but it was possible to assign one Exposure to and learning from the IPCC special report
answer into multiple categories where applicable. Most respondents (74.6%) had heard about the IPCC special
The superordinate categories can broadly be described as report, which was followed up by the open-ended question. When
learned content regarding (i) perceived impacts of climate change asked specifically about what they had learned from or about this
(e.g., impacts on human life, the ecosystem, and/or on biodiver- report, the respondents mentioned a range of topics that could
sity), (ii) responses to climate change (e.g., actions, activities, and further be differentiated based on their level of specificity. Table 4
solutions implemented to mitigate or adapt to climate change), summarizes the distribution of these responses, excluding those
(iii) responsibility for climate actions (e.g., individual, collective, who either had not heard about the report or who had heard
and political responsibility), (iv) evaluations of the IPCC special about the report but failed to provide an answer to the open-
report and climate change (e.g., credibility of the information), (v) ended question. While it could be speculated that leaving the text
no learning (e.g., response indicates that the participant has field empty means that the respondents did not learn anything
learned only little [if anything at all] from the report), and (vi) from the report, they consider worth mentioning, the exact
remnant responses that do not fit into any of the aforementioned reasons cannot be inferred from the current data.
categories. Two research assistants coded the answers. Based on The largest category comprised an evaluation of the informa-
their initial independent coding, the research assistants reached tion presented in the report (57.8%). In addition to some more
the same conclusion in 95.9% of the cases. Some differences could general (unspecific) evaluative statements, a significant proportion
be resolved by discussion between the research assistants who of the respondents made explicit references addressing the
would then assign a mutual code (0 = category not mentioned, seriousness of the climate crisis (e.g., “The report is a serious
1 = category mentioned). As for the remaining differences in reminder of the problem”; 36.1%), followed by references to the
which no such agreement could be reached, the respective credibility of the facts and data presented by the report as a whole
category was treated as if it had not been mentioned. (e.g., “UN is not independent and has little credibility”; 12.4%).
Gender (1 = Male, 2 = Female), age (1 = 1959 or earlier, The second largest category includes potential impacts from
2 = 1960–1989, 3 = 1990 or later), and education (1 = No educa- climate change (29.2%), of which the ecosystem (e.g., “If we are
tion/Elementary school, 2 = Upper secondary education, 3 = Uni- unable to reduce global warming, we will have a more
versity/University College) were included as covariates. This was unpredictable weather. …”; 15.4%) was more frequently men-
informed by evidence showing that certain demographics tend to tioned than impacts on human life (e.g., “Areas can become
be overrepresented in climate protests, including a disproportio- uninhabitable”; 9.3%) or on biodiversity (e.g., “… human activity
nately large number of young, female, and well-educated can have significant and sometimes unpredictable negative
participants28,29. consequences for the living conditions of living organisms on
our planet. …”; 5.9%).
The third largest category included comments that can be
Analyses described as measures that could be taken in response to climate
First, we screened responses for whether the respondents had change (20.9%). This included references to individual actions
heard about the report, which was followed up by mapping (e.g., “Do something ‘different’ than driving an electric car”; 4.2%),
responses based on what they had learned from or about the societal actions (e.g., “Use of taxes/regulation”; 4.7%), and
report. Second, we ran a series of regressions with exposure (to technological solutions (e.g., “More renewable energy”; 2.4%).
the report) as the independent variable, political orientation and The remaining categories comprised statements indicating that
lifestyle changes as moderating variables, and the above- the respondents learned little or nothing at all from the report
mentioned demographics as covariates. This procedure was (e.g., “Not much”; 16.1%), as well as ascriptions of responsibility for
repeated with measures on climate protests (i.e., protest support, action on climate change (13.5%). These ascriptions tended to
protest participation) and climate change mitigation policies (i.e., focus on collective (e.g., “All must act”, 8.8%) rather than political
energy, transportation, food) as dependent variables. (e.g., “Politicians must act. Politicians have an extra large

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a greater self-reported likelihood of personally engaging in these
Table 3. Descriptive statistics and item wording for the independent
forms of protest (see Table 6). Support and engagement showed
variables.
in addition positive associations with the extent to which the
Variables Responses respondents had already changed their individual lifestyles due to
climate change. This was contrasted by a negative association
Exposure (to the report) with political orientation; the more people positioned themselves
The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC to the right of the political spectrum, the less likely they were to
is an international working group of scientists who support and/or engage in protests. Further, there was a significant
regularly publish reports to summarize scientific interaction between exposure to the report and political orienta-
assessment on climate change. In October 2018, they tion in explaining support for non-violent forms of civil
published a special report on the impact of global disobedience to pressure governments to act on climate change;
warming exceeding 1.5 degrees. the strength of the association was greatest among people who
Have you heard about this report? N % placed themselves to the left of the political spectrum. Education
Yes 982 74.6 showed a positive association with likelihood of participating in
No 327 24.8 protests, and gender predicted both support for and likelihood of
engagement.
Not answered 8 0.6
Likewise, exposure to the IPCC special report predicted support
Learning (from or about the report) for each climate change mitigation policy: extending renewable
What have you learned from or about this report? All N % energy, taxing frequent fliers, and taxing high-carbon foods (see
replies would be welcome, preferably a couple of Table 6). Again, exposure to the report explained unique variance
sentences, or just a few words if you prefer.a alongside lifestyle changes (positive association with policy
Answered 623 63.4 support) and political orientation (negative association with policy
Not answered 359 36.6 support). There was no significant interaction of exposure to the
Lifestyle changes report with political orientation or lifestyle changes. The only
demographic variable that showed a significant association with
In previous surveys, we have seen that many Norwegian N %
citizens are willing to change their way of life to limit
policy support was education, which predicted support for
harmful climate change. Have you changed your way of life extending renewable energy and for imposing taxes on high-
to help limit harmful climate change? carbon foods policies, but not for imposing charges on frequent
Yes, a lot 114 8.7
flying.
Yes, a little 955 72.5
No 242 18.4 DISCUSSION
Not answered 6 0.5 It is evident that limiting global warming to no more than 1.5 °C
Political orientation above pre-industrial levels requires reducing global GHG emis-
In politics, people often talk about the ‘left wing’ and the M SD sions at an unprecedented scale1. Increased public engagement
‘right wing’. Below is a scale where 0 represents those who 5.92 2.30 has the potential to facilitate these reductions, as public support
are on the far left politically, while 10 represents those who remains integral to the successful implementation of climate
are on the far right. Where would you place yourself on policies. This is evidenced by research linking public attitudes
such a scale?b toward environmental protection with national commitments to
climate change mitigation strategies30,31. Consistent with the
Mean and standard deviation excludes respondents who did not answer
the item in NCP Wave 14 (n = 184 for political orientation). Table shows
interpretation that the IPCC special report could have made the
unweighted data. public more receptive to calls for mitigation action, exposure was
a
Contingent upon responding ‘yes’ to the previous item. stably associated with support for policies directed at the
b
Eleven-point scale (0 = Left, 10 = Right). transition to a low-carbon economy. A similar pattern was
observed regarding support for, and enhanced likelihood of,
engaging in civil disobedience and protests to put pressure on
responsibility”; 2.9%) or individual (e.g., “That we need to become governmental representatives. These associations were insensitive
more conscious about reducing CO2 emissions - and internalize to whether people have already changed their lifestyles because
this awareness in our daily routines”; 1.0%) responsibility in taking of climate change, herein strengthening the conclusion that
action against climate change. scientific reports could have a part in shaping public acceptance
There were a few responses that could not be allocated clearly of increased effort and sacrifice to tackle climate change.
to one of the above-mentioned categories (e.g., “I have heard Along with evidence for the biased assimilation of information
about the UN’s climate panel but I have not read it”; 2.9%). These when people confront climate-related news reporting32,33, expo-
responses were subsumed under a remnant category. sure to the IPCC special report was shown to have more
pronounced effects on climate concern among those locating
themselves on the left of the political spectrum22. In the current
Explaining support for climate protests and mitigation
study, however, we did not find a similar pattern with respect to
policies with exposure to the IPCC report
support for climate change mitigation policies. A more nuanced
Table 5 summarizes responses to items measuring support for picture was obtained for climate protests, where the strength of
climate protests and climate change mitigation policies. Respon- the association varied as a function of political orientation for one
dents showed greater support, on average, for using public funds of the item measures. While the analyses failed to suggest an
to extend renewable energy than for imposing additional costs on interaction effect for protest participation, the association with
frequent air travel or high-carbon foods. Further, though many protest support was relatively weaker among respondents
expressed their support for engagement in civil disobedience or positioning themselves to the right of the political spectrum. This
protests (see Table 5), only a small proportion indicated they were only partially supports prior studies where the public response to
likely to participate themselves (see Fig. 1). the IPCC special report differed across the political spectrum. Note
Exposure to the IPCC special report was positively associated that the latter remained a consistent predictor for supporting
with support for non-violent forms of civil disobedience and with climate protests and policy, which aligns with literature

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Table 4. Distribution of the mentioned content across the categories of the coding scheme.

Codes Categories Percentages

Label Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3

R1 1 Impacts 29.2
R1.0 10 No specification 8.5
R1.1 11 Impacts on human life 9.3
R1.1.0 110 No specification 4.3
R1.1.1 111 Migration 3.2
R1.1.2 112 Food supply 1.6
R1.1.3 113 Water supply 0.6
R1.1.4 114 Generational injustice 0.5
R1.1.5 115 Geographical injustice 0.6
R1.2 12 Impacts on the ecosystem 15.4
R1.2.0 120 No specification 1.9
R1.2.1 121 Sea level rise 6.7
R1.2.2 122 Ice melting 4.8
R1.2.3 123 Extreme weather 6.1
R1.2.4 124 Temperature rise 5.1
R1.3 13 Impacts on biodiversity 5.9
R1.3.0 130 No specification 3.2
R1.3.1 131 Animals 2.6
R1.3.2 132 Plants and vegetation 1.0
R2 2 Responses 20.9
R2.0 20 No specification 12.0
R2.1 21 Individual actions in response to climate change 4.2
R2.2 22 Societal activities in response to climate change 4.7
R2.3 23 Technological solutions to handle climate change 2.4
R3 3 Responsibility 13.5
R3.0 30 No specification 2.2
R3.1 31 Individual responsibility to take action on climate change 1.0
R3.2 32 Collective responsibility to take action on climate change 8.8
R3.2.0 320 No specification 5.1
R3.2.1 331 Collective local responsibility 0.2
R3.2.2 332 Collective global responsibility 3.5
R3.3 33 Political responsibility to take action on climate change 2.9
R4 4 Evaluations 57.8
R4.0 40 No specification 11.7
R4.1 41 Information credibility 12.4
R4.1.0 410 No specification 5.3
R4.1.1 411 Skepticism towards the scientific community 2.6
R4.1.2 412 Skepticism towards the scientific consensus 2.7
R4.1.3 413 Belief in hidden agenda underlying the report 1.3
R4.1.4 414 Belief in anthropogenic causes of climate change 2.1
R4.1.5 415 Belief in natural causes of climate change 1.0
R4.2 42 Information severity 36.1
R4.2.0 420 No specification 18.5
R4.2.1 421 Optimism towards the future 0.8
R4.2.2 422 Pessimism towards the future 1.9
R4.2.3 423 Affective evaluation of the present situation 4.2
R4.2.4 424 Cognitive evaluation of the present situation 11.9
R5 5 Little (or no) learning 16.1
R6 6 Remnant 2.9
Percentages are based on valid responses (n = 623); excludes respondents who heard about the report without making any statement about what they
learned from or about this report (n = 359). Level 1 categories are in boldface. Responses were coded as specific as possible but could be assigned to more
than one category. Table shows unweighted data.

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 R. Doran et al.
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highlighting the role of political affiliation and ideology as possible doomsday scenarios unless there will be rapid and far-
predictors of climate change engagement34,35. reaching socio-economic transformations8.
More than half of the respondents who answered the open- It has been documented that people are more likely to respond
ended question included some sort of evaluative statement, such to messages that depict threats posed by climate change if these
as highlighting the gravity of the evolving climate crisis. The are paired with cues about how these threats can be coun-
second most frequently mentioned category consisted of state- tered37–39. A fair proportion of respondents in this study
ments comprising an assessment of anticipated impacts of mentioned the severity of the emerging climate crisis, which
continuous global warming, like disruptions in the ecosystem. could mean that the IPCC special report elevated public awareness
Such statements were more frequent than suggestions for about the consequences of not meeting the 1.5 °C target. In the
concrete measures that could be taken to address climate change meantime, however, there were comparatively fewer statements
that focused on specific mitigation options that could be
and more frequent than comments about the responsibility of
implemented in response to climate change. The apparent
different societal actors. The predominance of evaluative state-
overweight of threat appraisals may not be surprising when
ments in respondents’ recollections about what they have learned, considering results from research subjecting the summary for
in addition to describing possible impacts, perhaps reflects shared policymakers of the 5th IPCC assessment to content analysis40. This
narratives in news coverage. It has been recognized that the research found that threat-related content (e.g., projected increase
public discourse on climate change evolves at least partly from in extreme weather events) was emphasized more frequently than
agenda setting in the media36, which in the case of the IPCC efficacy-related content (e.g., possible measures to reduce global
special report, was often reflected in news outlets portraying GHG emissions). For a further discussion on when and where
communications employing references to assessments and
Table 5. Distribution of responses to items measuring support for reports by the IPCC could benefit from a greater focus on efficacy
climate protests and climate change mitigation policies. appeals, see ref. 41.
It remains open for discussion whether the content that
Engaging in Funding of Imposing Taxing respondents reported to have learned from the report reflects
non-violent renewable extra high- their prior knowledge on the subject. An analysis of media
civil energy charges carbon coverage of the 5th IPCC assessment report suggests that frequent
disobedience extensions on foods exposure to related news coverage in the (print) media may have
and protests frequent supported the acquisition of knowledge about climate change
flying consequences42. However, these effects were shown to be rather
Answer options n % n % n % n % small when accounting for the extent to which people already
possess corresponding knowledge from before the report was
Strongly oppose 37 2.8 40 3.1 206 15.8 258 19.7 publicized42. The current study included education as a covariate,
Oppose 62 4.7 37 2.8 248 19.0 288 22.0 yet there was no separate assessment for any knowledge that
Somewhat oppose 105 8.0 49 3.8 129 9.9 169 12.9 respondents possessed prior to being exposed to the report in the
media or elsewhere. An empirical juxtaposition of prior versus
Neither support nor 248 18.9 82 6.3 182 13.9 170 13.0
oppose acquired knowledge, and their integration in explaining self-
reported learning after exposure to scientific reports, would make
Somewhat support 291 22.2 258 19.8 221 16.9 199 15.2
a useful addition in future studies that choose to employ a similar
Support 364 27.8 531 40.7 194 14.8 147 11.2 research design.
Strongly support 202 15.4 308 23.6 127 9.7 76 5.8
Not answered 8 12 10 10
LIMITATIONS
Percentages are based on valid responses; excludes respondents who did One limitation is the time delay between the initial release of the
not answer the item in NCP Wave 15. Table shows unweighted data.
IPCC special report (October 2018) and the point at which

Very likely 2.8%

Likely 6.9%

Somewhat likely 17.9%

Not likely 42.4%

Not likely at all 29.9%

Not answered

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Fig. 1 Distribution of responses to the item measuring likelihood of participating in a protest for increased action against climate
change by the government. Percentages are based on valid responses (n = 1311); excludes respondents who did not answer the item in NCP
Wave 15 (n = 6). Figure shows unweighted data.

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Table 6. Explaining support for climate change mitigation policies and climate protests.

Climate change mitigation policies Climate protests

Funding of renewable energy Imposing extra charges on Taxing high-carbon Protest Protest
extensions frequent flying foods support participation

B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)

Constant 4.57 (0.23)*** 3.16 (0.31)*** 1.79 (0.29)*** 4.27 (0.23)*** 1.58 (0.15)***
Exposure (to the report) 0.28 (0.10)** 0.47 (0.14)** 0.48 (0.13)*** 0.26 (0.10)** 0.39 (0.06)***
Political orientation −0.10 (0.02)*** −0.27 (0.02)*** −0.22 (0.02)*** −0.23 (0.02)*** −0.16 (0.01)***
Lifestyle changes 0.46 (0.08)*** 0.72 (0.11)*** 0.72 (0.10)*** 0.51 (0.08)*** 0.48 (0.05)***
Exposure × Political −0.04 (0.05) −0.10 (0.06) −0.05 (0.06) −0.10 (0.05)* −0.04 (0.03)
orientation
Exposure × Lifestyle 0.29 (0.19) −0.21 (0.25) 0.35 (0.24) 0.36 (0.19) 0.23 (0.12)
changes
Demographics
Gender 0.05 (0.09) 0.19 (0.11) 0.20 (0.11) 0.25 (0.08)** 0.18 (0.05)**
Age (birth cohort) 0.08 (0.07) 0.00 (0.09) 0.15 (0.08) 0.09 (0.07) 0.01 (0.04)
Education (highest 0.29 (0.07)*** 0.15 (0.09) 0.41 (0.08)*** 0.08 (0.07) 0.09 (0.04)*
completed)
R2 0.11 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.30
df (8, 1081) (8, 1082) (8, 1082) (8, 1085) (8, 1085)
F 15.96*** 30.45*** 32.58*** 38.84*** 57.64***
Parallel moderation model (Model 250) based on 5000 bootstrap samples and 95% percentile bootstrap confidence intervals, variables that define products
were mean-centered. Demographics were included as covariates.
B unstandardized regression coefficient, SE standard error.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

respondents answered the items analyzed in this study (May-June with global warming47. It could be that worldviews influence what
2019). This could have made it more difficult for the respondents aspects of scientific reports receive the most attention, and by
to recall specific content from the report. The topic of global extension, the extent to which individuals express their support
warming has been prevailing in the media before and after the for climate change mitigation policies.
report was published, yet news coverage of the report was
greatest immediately after its initial release date8. Another
limitation was that exposure to the IPCC special report was CONCLUSION
assessed by using a dichotomous variable, which precludes Drawing upon national survey data from Norway, the present
testing whether repeat exposure plays a role in eliciting an study addressed the role of the IPCC special report on global
attitudinal response. Including measures on how often people warming of 1.5 °C in understanding the landscape of public
attend to sources mentioning the IPCC special report could have engagement with climate change. While the employed research
provided a more nuanced picture of the role of information design warrants caution in making causal inferences from these
exposure in this context. Finally, this study did not explore if the data alone, the findings provide some novel insights into the
source for exposure has any bearing on the type of content that possible role of scientific reports in shaping support towards
was learned from the report. An analysis of online articles on the climate protests and mitigation policies. Future research focusing
2015 climate summit in Paris yielded some notable variation in on individual encounters with these reports, particularly those
terms of which themes (e.g., civil societal protests) became produced by the IPCC, may consider the influence of group
spotlighted as part of the coverage, as well as in terms of the processes and individual differences in worldviews. Addressing
number of articles that were published in relation to the event43. these factors would yield further insights into when and how
sharing information on global warming may shape motivations for
climate action and support for climate policies among the public.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
More research is needed to contrast the relative importance of
exposure to scientific reports with other factors that were not DATA AVAILABILITY
accounted for by this study. First, group processes such as social Data will be made available on reasonable request.
identification can be crucial for mobilizing and maintaining
individual participation in climate protests44,45, possibly more so Received: 22 July 2022; Accepted: 23 March 2023;
than appraising anthropogenic climate change as a serious threat
that is insufficiently addressed by current policies46. Accounting
for these processes could help clarify the circumstances under
which exposure to scientific reports can make a difference, and if
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narratives. This has been shown, for instance, in the context of
the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and
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Centre for Research Data (NSD). Neither UiB nor NSD is responsible for the analyses/ Reprints and permission information is available at http://www.nature.com/
interpretation of the data presented here. reprints

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