Tac Attack

July 1985

Could it happen to me?

 Angle of attack

TAC Attack- briefcases by folks who want to hold it until they

have time to fully digest a key article.
A PROACTIVE I urge you to go back a few issues, spend an
hour distilling information that's pertinent to
SAFETY TOOL you, learn the lesson and apply the principles.
Use the articles as points of departure for dis-

A re you using TAC Attack in your daily oper-

ation? If not, you are missing a considerable
amount of valuable information. Worse, recent
cussion with the troops. Then, if you find we are
off track, or that you have a better idea, drop 1!
a line or call. If we all share the insights from
history has grimly shown that many of our mis- T AC Attack with co-workers, subordinates and
haps were discussed in TAC Attack before they family members, it will make our jobs and our
occurred. lives more productive, thus safer.
Obviously, we are not clairvoyant. But we Finally, we all learn our best lessons first-
study Class A, Band C mishaps and high acci- hand. That means the great ideas for articles will
dent potential reports; we travel extensively continue to come from you. Instead of just shar-
throughout the command; we have access to vol- ing your good ideas locally, use TAC Attack to
umes of statistics; and we have regular discus- pass them along to other people who need to
sions with many of you, the experts in the know. That gives you a big part in mishap pre-
trenches (most of our articles come from you). vention. It's also worth a significant OER com-
Consequently, we have the opportunity and the ment for a young guy who's flyin' and fightin' for
responsibility to see a larger slice of the picture. a living.
F-16 low-altitude airstarts, G-induced loss of Make certain that T AC Attack is on top of your
consciousness, F-16 AOA probe icing, use of the professional tool kit. Don't leave the epitaph "If
HUD and many articles on human factors and only he had read TAC Attack."
the philosophy of smart, therefore safe, execution-
that's not history, it's where we live. One of
our recent subjects was spatial disorientation.
Unfortunately, some of our aircrews apparently
did not take advantage of the lessons ...
Perhaps some outfits don't realize that we don't
send TAC Attack to every TAC organization (you
have to request it). Perhaps there are too few
copies in the right places. Perhaps the magazine HAROLD E. WATSON, Colonel, USAF
is being hoarded in desk drawers, lockers and Chief of Safety

2
TAC ATTACK JULY 1985
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

FEATURES------------~
4 GLC-Could It Happen to Me?
No warning signals, no gray-out, no
tunnel vision . ..
11 A-10 Emergency Situation Training
What'cha gonna do now, Ace?
16 IN THE CENTER
RF -4C Phantom II.
18 I'm Here to Tell You
I thought I was less susceptible to SD
than other pilots ...
24 First, You Have to Want To
Here's another nickel on the grass.
29 What I Want from You as My Flight
Commander
You can help us both do a better job
for the Air Force.

DEPARTMENTS---.
7 Aircrew of Distinction
8 TAC Tips
12 Chock Talk
15, 30 TAC Safety Awards
22 Weapons Words
26 Down to Earth
28 Short Shots

TACRP 127-1
TAG Attack is not directive in nature. Recommendations are intended to comply with existing directives. Opinions ex-
pressed are those of the authors and not necessarily the positions of TAC or USAF. Mishap information does not identify the
persons, places or uni ts involved and may not be construed as incriminating under Article 31 of the UCMJ. Photos and
artwork are representative and not necessarily of the people or equipment invol ved.
Contributions are encouraged, as are comments and criticism. We reserve the right to edit all manuscripts for readability
and good taste. Write the Editor, TAG Attack, HQ TAC/SEP, Langley AFB, VA 23665-5001; or call AUTOVON 432-3658.
Distribution F(X) is controlled by TAC/SEP through the PDQ, based on a ratio of 1 copy per 10 persons assigned. DOD
units other than USAF have no ftxed ratio; requests will be considered individually.
Subscriptions for readers outside DOD are available from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. All correspondence on subscription service should be directed to the superintendent, not to TAC/SEP.

VOLUME 25 NUMBER 7
 GLC

HON VERNE ORR

SECRETARY OF THE
AIR FORCE
GEN ROBERT D. RUSS
COMMANDER

COL HAL WATSON

CHIEF OF SAFETY
Could it happen to me?
MAJ LEW WITT
MAJ DON RIGHTMYER
EDITORS
MARTY DILLER
WRITER-EDITOR

STAN HARDISON
ART EDITOR

A1C KELVIN
TAYLOR

TAC Attack (ISSN 0494-3880) is

published monthly by HQ TAC/SEP,
Langley AFB, VA. POSTMASTER:
Send address changes to TAC
Attack, TAC/SEP, Langley AFB, VA
23665-5001. Second-class postage
paid at Hampton, Virginia, and ad-
ditional mailing offices.

4 JULY 1985
 2d Lt J. Lloyd Eldredge
61 TFTS
MacDill AFB, Florida

-induced loss of consciousness (GLC) is a

G touchy subject in the F-16 community. I'm
speaking with authority because it happened to
me.
AS THE TWO AIRCRAFT APPROACHED THE
MERGE, THE FIGHT BEGAN FROM A HEAD-ON
PASS WITH LT ELDREDGE COMING FROM
HIGH TO LOW AND THE IP FROM LOW TO
HIGH. THE IP TOOK THE FIRST SHOT, A FRONT
QUARTER FOX 2 LIMA. THEN, AS THE IP
PASSED TO LT ELDREDGE'S RIGHT, THE LIEU-
TENANT TRIED TO PITCH BACK RIGHT AT 550
KTAS FROM A 15-DEGREE NOSE LOW ATTI-
TUDE. DURING THE MANEUVER AND WHILE
LOOKING OVER HIS RIGHT SHOULDER TO
MAINTAIN TALLY, LT ELDREDGE LOST CON-
SCIOUSNESS. UNATTENDED, THE AIRCRAFT
TRANSITIONED TO A STEEP DIVE, 60 TO 70
DEGREES NOSE LOW WITH A STEEP LEFT
BANK AND ACCELERATED THROUGH 700
KT AS. AFTER REGAINING USEFUL CON-
SCIOUSNESS, LT ELDREDGE BEGAN PULLING
OUT OF THE DIVE AND FINALLY LEVELED THE
FALCON NEAR 6,000 FEET ABOVE THE WATER.

This article is not a discourse on how to in-

crease G-tolerance, but I would like to tell you
what happened to me and share with you some
insights I've gained the hard way.
There are many factors contributing to the

TACAITA!}f> 5
 -Could it
en to me?

was 15 degrees nose low, and I had 500-plus

GLC- could it happen to me?
KCAS at the merge.
I snatched the stick to the limiter in an effort
to pitch back into the fight at FL 240 and be-
came somewhat coherent passing 10,500 feet. I
recovered at 5,900 feet still totally disoriented
and called "Knock it off." I wasn't afraid; I didn't
even fully understand what had happened. It
wasn't until we were headed home that I began
to realize that I probably had a GLC experience.
The video cassette confirmed my suspicions,
and finally on the ground I realized how close I
had come to actually dying. A factor contributing
to the GLC occurred just prior to the merge when
lead called a missile shot. Startled, I immediately
began pulling before initiating my straining
maneuver. My intentions were to pitch back, but
as I reached 8.2 Gs I exhaled and went from tot·

I received no warning symptoms, no gray-

out and no narrowing tunnel vision.

visual acuity to unconsciousness. I received no

warning symptoms, no gray-out and no nar-
rowing tunnel vision. The plane performed a
dished out barrel roll ending up 60 degrees nose
low and accelerated to about Mach 1.1 at 10,500
mishap, and all should be taken into account; feet. I was unconscious for only 12 seconds, but
however, the cause of the GLC incident was that had I delayed my pullout five seconds longer, I
I did not perform a proper G-straining maneuver. would not be writing this article.
I was flying an ACM (air combat maneuver) mis- In summary, the factors contributing to the in-
sion over the Gulf of Mexico, 2-v-1 against an cident were fatigue , a poor G-straining maneu-
F-15. After six short engagements, the F-15 ver, looking back over my shoulder and the lack
reached bingo fuel and departed. We still had of visual symptoms. The lesson learned is a
fuel remaining and set up for a 1-v-1 intercept to healthy respect for the capabilities of the F-16. I
an engagement. There was a slight haze below us also learned that my habit patterns have not
so I opted to go high, hoping for a cold intercept. been reinforced with enough time and experience.
Lead had the same idea but detected me and I thought that my straining maneuver was some-
went lower to obtain turning room. As is usually thing I subconsciously performed as I needed it,
the case, my cold intercept became hot pretty and it usually is. Today I'm no longer willing to
fast, and we met 180 degrees out. My aircraft bet my life on it. Are you? __;::>-

6 JULY 1985
AIRCREW OF DISTINCTION

n 10 January 1985, MAJ RoGER E. TAYLOR was

0 returning his F-5E to base for landing fol-
lowing a 2-v-2 dissimilar air combat training
mission. After a routine overhead traffic pattern,
Major Taylor landed his Aggressor aircraft on-
speed at 135 knots, 500 feet beyond the thresh-
0ld. At touchdown, the mission abruptly departed
1e realm of routine-two components of the
.anding gear system failed, triggering an un-
commanded gear retraction.
As the aircraft undercarriage began to collapse,
Major Taylor sensed a settling motion at the
same time he noticed several cockpit indications
of unsafe gear. His response was immediate: he
selected full afterburner and skillfully kept the
aircraft from fully settling onto the runway. Fly-
ing inches above the runway while the engines
were still accelerating from idle to afterburner,
· the aft portion of the tail section and landing
gear doors scraped the concrete runway. After a
very long moment, the aircraft
began to accelerate, and Major
Taylor gently flew the aircraft away
from the runway and back into the traffic
pattern.
Once airborne, Major Taylor used the alternate
extension to lower the gear. A chase aircraft con-
firmed the rollers down and locked, and an un-
eventful straight-in full stop followed .
Major Taylor's outstanding airmanship at a
critical moment in flight saved his life and pre-
vented the loss of a valuable fighter aircraft. He
as earned the Tactical Air Command Aircrew of
Jistinction Award. ......>-
tac tips
NTEREST ITEMS,

Unbinding the
strongman
"R oll out, you pig!" shouted a somewhat his workmates and continue the mission. Any-
concerned OV-10 pilot as he un- thing wrong with that picture?
successfully tried rolling out of the left turn from Here is some wisdom from the School of Hard
downwind to base leg on a rocket pass at a Knocks that's contained in the 55-series book-If
nearby range. The more he forced the stick to the a flight control malfunction is experienced (in-
right, the more resistance he felt. Meanwhile, the cluding an uncommanded flight control input
aircraft continued rolling left. As the bank in- which apparently returns to normal) , terminate
creased through 60 degrees, the pilot stomped the mission immediately and land as soon as
hard on the right rudder and managed to coax practical.
the Bronco back to level flight. Whew. As it turned out, a bolt in the linkage of the
right aileron's trim tab had backed out. At the
moment the pilot applied right stick to roll out of
the left turn, the bolt caught on the outboard flap
and prevented the right aileron from coming
up. The binding aileron was finally freed when
the strongman used enough stick pressure to
sheer the bolt.
This fellow got off lucky .. . but we can't al-
ways count on that, can we?

After climbing straight ahead to a comfortably

Near miss
high altitude, the pilot began checking the air-
craft's flyability. This time the ailerons worked
air-to-ground style
just fine in both directions. Hmmm. Must've been
wake turbulence from one of the preceding
aircraft.
A n EOD (explosives ordnance disposal) group
was removing scrap and such from a range
where HE (high explosive) munitions are rou-
What would you do at this point? tinely delivered. The range was officially cold (n
This troop decided to descend back down, rejoin ordnance delivery scheduled or approved). Then

8 JULY 1985
MISHAPS WITH MORALS, FOR THE TAC AIR CREW M A N - - - ·

came the ten percent who didn't get the word ... their back-up mission on the class C range, and
As the flight split and alternately rolled in on now we have this personnel problem finding
the off-limits target, the workers scrambled for enough EOD people.
cover as BDU-33 practice bombs began falling. We can help fix their problem by keeping an
1e of the men popped a red smoke grenade to eye open for details like these when we're putting
,nal the pilots that the range was closed. After together a mission ...
our hot passes, the flight lead noticed the smoke
and called "Knock it off." Then he flew by the
target for a little poststrike recce and spied a
blue Air Force truck and several people waving
their fists at him. Fortunately, no one was hurt.
How do things like this happen? Some minor
Smoked tuna
details were overlooked.
First, the flight lead heard an earful of bad
news from the weatherman-the planned low
A fter 25 minutes of flight , a single-ship Oscar
Deuce pilot began feeling lousy. He was
suddenly nauseous, his visual acuity deteriorated
level route was IMC . Flexibility being the key to and he felt lightheaded. The symptoms didn't get
airpower, the flight lead swung by the ops desk any better, so he put the 0-2 down at the nearest
and told the 271 (squadron ops specialist) to suitable emergency field . After landing, he
shuffle his range times. He requested a longer climbed out of the aircraft and barfed all over the
stay than the schedule reflected on the class A ramp. He was really sick. Good thing he was in a
range and he also wanted time on a second range light aircraft; emergency airfields for some air-
(class C) nearby. Unfortunately, the pilot didn't craft are not so abundant.
read the fine print on the range schedule which His unit had to air-evac a flight surgeon and
said that the class C range was no ordnance only. medical technician into the airfield to attend the
And the 271 either didn't hear the request for the pilot. After a while, he was well enough to be
class C range or forgot about it; so it was never med-evacuated back to the base.
coordinated. All that troubleshooters could find wrong with
So the flight gets airborne, drives over to the the aircraft was a small hole in the heater box.
first range and checks in with the range mother Since the pilot had selected defrost and had the
--·bo said, "Forget it, Ace, the bomb scoring vents closed, carbon monoxide may have been the
tipment is down." So the flight departed for culprit.

TAC ATTA!Jj> 9
tac tips
available material and then condense it so it will
fit in a typical fighter pilot's attention span.
Another possibility was lunch, which he ate Question: Where's the beef?
about two hours before the flight. A tuna sand- Answer: 1. FITS = fighter index of thermal stress.
wich was one of the culinary delights he pulled 2. Three zones: normal, caution and danger.
out of his brown bag lunch that had been kept in 3. Weather shop determines which zone.
his car for a couple of hours before he ate it. 4. Normal = ops normal.
It's not the season for that. 5. Caution = limit ramp time to 90 minutes.
6. Danger = limit ramp time to 45 minutes.
7. Normal person loses 2-3 quarts of water
Hot weather articles without exertion. On hot days, you can
lose that much in an hour.
give me the FITS 8. Should drink 6-8 glasses (6-8 oz) of liquid
per day. Water, diluted fruit juice, iced
Maj Roger Cude
tea, sodas are good replacements.
ATC Safety
9. Salt tablets not necessary.
Randolph AFB, Texas 10. Significant time required to recover from
Question: What's harder than reading another heat loads absorbed.
article about hot weather ops? 11. Carry and use a plastic water bottle.
Answer: Writing one that's interesting. 12. Stop at water fountain before and after
Question: If you wanted aircrews to read an arti- sortie.
cle about hot weather and its effects on crew- Question: How's your hot weather ops attention
members, how would you do it? span doing?
Answer: Interview the flight surgeons, read all Answer: My what?
Courtesy ATC OPS TIPS
'Ns

There's a million stories out there

in the Tactical Air Command.
Send me some of them.
Editor, TAC Attack
Hq TAC/SEP
Langley AFB,VA 23665
Atvn 432-3658

13101110111
]ii JULY 1985
 ~ D
~
~s A-10 Emergency Situation Training

SITUATION TRAINING
laj Jim Lee
HQ TAC/DOV
SITUATION: On-speed, on-course and on- good ILS parameters to continue; if you are
glidepath. Four miles from touchdown, leading lightweight and aren't carrying anything that in-
the best formation ILS approach of your life creases yaw; if there is plenty of fuel to go

S
when your number one engine fire handle lights around and try it again; and if the weather isn't
up. Weather is reported solid from 700 to 5,000 getting worse, etc. If you decide to go around,
feet (so thick you can barely see your wingman), make your control inputs smooth and positive.

S and there's 5 miles vis underneath. Your wingie

reports he thought he saw fire coming from your
Option D may be the best of these alternatives.
First, execute the boldface: Rudder-Control

S
engine. What'cha gonna do now, Ace? Yaw (thus far no problem here); Throttles-
OPTIONS: A. Punch out now. Why wait? Max (momentarily, until you have reconfigured);
B. Keep your wingman in position and call the Speedbrakes-Close (to get ready for a possible

S SOF. Execute the Engine/APU Fire checklist. engine failure); Flaps-MVR (because the TO

s
C. Tell number 2 to go lost wingman. You ex- says it significantly decreases drag without im-
ecute a go-around. posing a severe penalty in stall margin). Acceler-
D. Tell number 2 to go lost wingman. You land. ate to single-engine airspeed (above 150 KIAS). If
DISCUSSION: If the aircraft doesn't keep fly- you're not out of the weather yet, but you're still
ing in a somewhat upright position, Option A is flying a decent ILS that will get you below the

s
definitely a player; at 4 miles on final on a 3- weather, you're probably in a better position to
degree glidepath, you're only about 1,200 feet continue now rather than going around and
above the ground. Option B contains some mis- spending another 10-15 minutes in a sick air-
placed priorities. Calling the SOF may come plane in the weather. As the Dash One says,
later, but now is not the time, and this checklist "Devote full attention to completing the landing"
n't appropriate once you're configured for land- and "Take care of the fire as time and cir-
~g. First, get the aircraft reconfigured for single- cumstances permit." To me, that means waiting

'

~'''''aren't wiilin
engine flight. Option C has possibilities, but a lot until clear of the weather or after landing if
possible. ~
chock talk incidents and

Could've been tense

A s the F-4's burners lit and accelerated the
Phantom down the runway, the aircrew no-
ticed the airspeed stagnating. Looking out the
speed indicator rolled back to zero and died.
On this mission, it was a simple matter for the
pilots to change position and let the aircraft with
window, it was obvious that the aircraft was rac- the reliable airspeed indicator lead the one with
ing to get airborne at a greater rate than the air- the sick gauge back around for a formation land-
speed indicator was willing to admit. Since a ing. But what might have happened to a single- )
ship aircrew on a dark and stormy night or a da.
when it was yucky from minimums all the way
up?
How'd it happen? A specialist who was working
in the cockpit to replace a pressure regulator for
the canopy seal had removed the map case in or-
der to get at the regulator. This jet was equipped
with a VTR (videotape recorder ) which required
moving the map case to the left side of the cock-
pit where the VGH recorder used to be.
Since removing the map case wasn't part of the
procedure that he was following, he didn't docu-
ment its removal in the aircraft forms. Later
when the map case was reinstalled, the lines that
provided airspeed, G and altitude inputs to the
VGH recorder should have been capped off at the

l
back of the map case. But the technician forgot to
reconnect the lines. And that's what caused the
loss of airspeed.
The tech data has long since been corrected,
and the technician learned the importance of
complete documentation. But there's another
point that supervisors and inspectors should read
wingman was tagging along on this formation between these lines-we need to look beyond
takeoff, the flight lead elected to continue the what's merely written in the aircraft forms to th~
takeoff rather than abort. Once airborne, the air- substance of the work that's been done. '

12 JULY 1985
INCIDENTALS WITH A MAINTENANCE SLANT

Ants and elephants

F ollowing the first sortie of the day, an alert
F-15 crew chief noticed a nick on a first-
stage compressor blade of one of the engines dur-
ing his thru-flight inspection. a#!$&* Couldn't
have happened at a worse time-right in the
"ddle of a sortie surge exercise. Oh well, poten-
\.._...., l engine problems are no respecters of persons-
or exercises; better call Red Ball. With any luck
the nick will be within limits and we can blend it
right here on the spot. The pilot won't even have to
hop out of the cockpit.
A couple of specialists responded to the crew
chiefs call. One of them climbed into the intake
and determined the nick was within TO limits.
He began using a file to blend the nicked blade.
In the process, however, the file he was using
broke in two. So he removed another file from
the file box, which held several files, and soon
completed the job.
After the specialist hopped out of the intake, til about a half-hour after takeoff when the file
he handed the broken file and the file box to the box was turned in and the missing file was dis-
other worker and asked him to check it. In the covered. Then, when the aircraft landed, the next
rush to get the pilot airborne on time, no one no- intake inspection revealed serious non-blendable
ticed the open hole in the file box. What open compressor blade damage.
hole? The one where the second file should have Ev~ryone paid a great deal of attention to
gone. You know, the second file that was left in hurrying to blend the ant-sized nick so the pilot
the intake .. . could make the almighty takeoff time. The result
Well, the pilot took off on time. He didn't have was some elephant-sized FOD. Using the spare
to climb out of the aircraft and into a spare aircraft option would have met the mission de-
(which was available). But the recently blended mands while defusing the time pressure.
~ 1 00 engine took it in the teeth. Any time pressure at your place? Keep an eye
ro one suspected that anything was wrong un- out for the elephants.
"-----'
TACAITA~ 13
flying safety
for the
birds?

One day I sat upon the sand Today I watched a robin land
And watched two seagulls fly , As sweetly as you please,
Their wings but slightly cleared the waves Next to his nest up in a tree
And so I wondered why; And then I said, "Now think;
never seen one in a turn Have ere you seen a robin fail
Misjudge and hit the ground. To land without his feet,

lf
r disappear into the drink-
Another seagull down.
And cause the Robin Wing DO
To have a Mozam Beak?"

wonder if they die that way, I wonder if they land gear-up,

111/f I rather think they don't; I rather think they don't;
r if they'll make that last mistake, Or ding their breast by carelessness,
I rather think they won't. I rather think they won't.
1/r nd then out in the wild I saw So why are birds so error-free
An eagle holding high, Who have such little minds,

I f
11111//111

,,
II
e came in hot and shacked his prey
And then I wondered why;
ve never seen an eagle foul
I pll /1 \( /1 Or press and not abort,
11\\)i/II///)I've never seen one target-fixed
Whose judgment is restrict ed to
What nature gives t heir kind?
They master their environment
With awe-inspiring ease,
While we commit the same mist akes
l/)11'1 Become the latest mort. We have since nineteen three.

II , 11/illliiii/II wonder if they hit the dirt,

I rather think they don't;
Have we a chance to be their peers,
I rather think we don't ;
if they'll pull out late one day, Or will we master flight as they,
I rather think they won't. I rather think we won't.

Capt Tim Murphy

80 TFS (PACAF)
Kunsan AB, Korea

14 JULY 1985
 SPECIAL ACHIEVEMENT IN
SAFETY AWARD
SSGT CHARLES T. THOMPSON and SSGT MICHAEL J.
SANDOVAL were standing on the aircraft parking
ramp watching a flight of F-4 aircraft take off.
After the aircraft were airborne, they turned
around to leave the area and noticed some
workers from a TDY organization towing a
C-130. They saw that there were no wing
walkers around the aircraft and the aircraft was
not following the taxi lines. When the right wing
tip of the aircraft under tow was about 10 feet
from hitting the flight station of a parked C-130,
they took quick action.
Sergeants Thompson and Sandoval immedi-
ately ran toward the tow vehicle and got the op-
erator's attention; the operator stopped the ve-
hicle. They also helped the TDY unit establish a SSgt Charles T. Thompson
wing walker and realign the aircraft on the taxi SSgt Michael J. Sandoval
line; the towing operation was then successfully 24 CAMS, 24 COMPW
completed. Howard AFR, Panama

HEADS UP

Coming IN THE CENTER

of the SEPTEMBER issue
is the A-7D Corsair II. But
Next month in the we need your help to find
a suitable animal name-
AUGUST sake. Who can show us how
issue of TAC Attack to stipple a SLUF? It's
you'll see TAC's worth a Fleagle T-Shirt to
1985 Air Losses the firstest with the bestest.
TN HE CENTER. Our address is on page 4.

TAC ATTAC, 15
RF-4C Phantom II
 I'm here to tell you Maj Allen McLellan and
Capt Neil McAskill
15 TRS (PACAF)
Kadena Air Base, Japan

hen I entered the

W squadron that morning,
the desk dog told me about an-
other safety read file item that
I needed to read and sign off
before my night mission. I
opened the pubs file and began
to read. The message was a
familiar one: it seems another
pilot rode his aircraft into the
ground. On initial climbout,
the formation entered the
weather and number two went
lost wingman. He impacted the
ground shortly thereafter, in a
30-degree nose-low attitude
with 60 degrees of bank. The
safety board findings were pre-
dictable: spatial disorientation,
failure to transition to instru- ~
ments, etc. I signed it off and
mentally filed it away with the
hundreds of other, similar acci-
dent and safety reports I had
read over the years. Transition
to instruments, I thought, that's
the kicker. Got to believe those
instruments. That had been
pounded into me as far back as
basic pilot training.
Our mission that night was a
practice tactical qualification
check with a night air re-
fueling. It was my third con-
secutive night sortie that week,
and one which I approached
with waning enthusiasm. The
premission brief was routine.
The weather was forecast to be
VFR throughout the low-level
flying area, but the visibility at
the airfield was predicted to be
2 miles with fog . No sweat. I
had every reason to believe
that this would be just anothe
routine RF-4C night radar rid
18 JULY 1985
 And why not? My tailgunner checks complete , we started This sensation was reinforced
was an experienced WSO, an our descent-on-course, on- by the fact that all I could see
ex-SEFE with over 1,000 hours glidepath and on-airspeed. out of the cockpit were stars
in the pit. I had just completed Passing 2,000 feet, we settled above a downward sloping
the instructor pilot upgrade into a fog layer. About 4 miles layer of fog. This fog layer
and was confident in my ability out on final, I glanced out of completely obscured the hori-
to fly both the aircraft and the the cockpit, looking for some zon as well as any ground/sky
mission. We were both very visual cues to confirm that my references. The only ground
familiar with the local flying instruments were accurate. references that I could see were
area and procedures. We had When I looked out over the the faint flickering of the run-
flown together before and were glare shield, I was overwhelmed way sequenced flashing lights
comfortable with each other as with the sensation that we off in the distance.
a crew. There was absolutely were climbing. I felt-no-! I unconsciously released back-
nothing about tonight's mission knew we were in a 30- to 40- pressure on the stick and came
that could increase my adren- degree nose high attitude, and back inside to my instruments.
alin flow . that if we continued, the air- The aircraft quickly transi-
It was a twilight takeoff. The craft would ultimately stall. tioned from on-glidepath to
visibility had begun to drop
and was already down to 2
Hes around the airfield. The
_5ht-refueling portion of the
· ission was uneventful. When
we left the tanker, we dis-
covered that we had a radar
problem which prevented us
from flying the tactical portion
of the mission. We decided to
return to base and fly ap-
proaches until we were light
enough to land. We requested
and were cleared for the high
ILS penetration and approach.
I briefed the published ap-
proach procedure to my back-
seater and readied my cockpit
for the descent. After the pen-
etration, we turned off the arc
and established ourselves on a
15-mile ILS final. At 12 miles,
we configured ·for a normal ap-
proach. As the WSO read the
stepdown altitudes, I concen-
trated on maintaining course
alignment and prepared to
·..,tercept the glidepath. At 7
les, with the before landing

TAC ATTA!))> 19
 I'm here to tell you

well below glidepath. I remem- him, as best we could, what and talked to a physiologist
ber crosschecking each of my had occurred and asked him to that I fully understood what
critical flight instruments: the warn other aircraft of a strong had happened. As we descended
VVI was minus 2,000 fpm, the visual illusion at 3 to 4 miles into the fog, the horizon disap-
ADI read 5-degrees nose high, out on final. My WSO sug- peared and all outside refer-
the altimeter was decreasing gested that he fly the next ap- ences became either indis-
through 1,200 feet MSL, we proach while I monitored. This tinguishable or distorted. It
were on course but at least two sounded like a good idea; it al- looked as though we were fly-
dots below glidepath. For the lowed me time to regain my ing through a goldfish bowl.
next few seconds (which composure and study the visual The distant runway lights,
seemed considerably longer), I illusion in more detail. By along with the sloping fog deck,
struggled with what the data monitoring this second ap- combined to substitute for the
from the instruments were proach, I was able to identify true horizon. Because of the
showing me and what every exactly when and 'where this il- downward slope of the fog deck,
nerve in my body was telling lusion would take place. I flew I was able to see the stars out
me. I wanted to believe my in- the next approach, and then we over my glare shield. All of
struments, but somewhere came around for a full-stop these factors led me to believe,
within the process whereby the landing. The illusion was so instantly and without a doubt,
brain absorbs data, analyzes it real that on each approach, that I was climbing in a nose-
and sends instructions to the even though we knew what to high unusual attitude.
muscles to react to that data, expect, we experienced varying Whether or not you under-
the process broke down. I was degrees of disorientation. The stand the details of this event,
unable to react. I continued difference was we were pre- as I have described them, is un-
trying to fight this mass of sen- pared for it. important. The likelihood that
sory confusion; finally, as the It wasn't until I had landed you will ever see these same
altimeter fell through 1,000
feet, I asked the WSO to "Take
the aircraft." The pitter im-
mediately came on the controls
and started a go-around.
The aircraft started to climb
after descending below 700
feet. My internal gyros began
to stabilize as we climbed
through the fog layer, and the
horizon became visible again. I
gang-loaded my oxygen regu-
lator, took control of the jet,
contacted approach and turned
to our downwind heading.
While on downwind, I tried to
reconstruct what had happened
and how it affected me. We
contacted the SOF and told

20
 atmospheric conditions is prob- orientation which can lead to lar results. He too descended
ably quite slim. What is impor- the disastrous results we've all below glidepath and recovered
tant is that you are aware of read about in safety magazines approximately 2.5 miles out at
the power and reality of the vi- and accident reports. Those of 500 feet AGL. Had the crew
sual illusion, so that when it's you who have experienced thought about notifying the
your turn in the barrel, you something like I've described in SOF or approach control of the
will be better prepared. this article can relate to my visual illusion, we would have
story. For those who have not, been better prepared to deal
Lessons Learned my hope is that you will re- with it.
This can happen to you. Like examine your beliefs about the Be prepared. Remember, a
many of you I have been num- power of the visual illusion. visual illusion is just that. It is
ber four at night, in and out of Familiarity breeds com- not a mirage in the desert or
the weather. I've battled the placency. During approach or an aberration brought on solely
leans and overcome various any other critical phase of by fatigue or other physiologi-
types of spatial disorientation flight, our attention needs to be cal factors. It is a set of atmos-
with the best of them. I've on the task at hand. During a pheric conditions which have
flown approaches down to cate- penetration or on final is not and will cause aircraft losses
'ry A minimums, failed to the time to be filling out the and aircrew fatalities. All vis-
eak out and had to go 781 or thinking about anything ual illusions will create some
'---around. With each of these other than the safe operation of degree of spatial disorientation.
little successes my confidence that "mass of metal and JP-4" The impact of this disorienta-
has increased. I began to be- entrusted to you. Had this sit- tion on the control of your air-
lieve, perhaps as you might uation been compounded by an craft will be affected by how
now believe, that I was less emergency or had my WSO not well you are prepared, both
susceptible to the types of dis- been ready to initiate a go- mentally and physically, to
around, we may not have been deal with it when it happens.
here to write this article.
Tell somebody. The first per- Epilog
son you should notify when I'd have to say that I am a
something is wrong or doesn't better pilot now, after that ex-
appear normal is your pilot/ perience. I've flown more night
WSO. Don't be afraid to speak radar missions, in more fog
up or take action if the situa- banks, and hung on more
tion dictates it. A sudden wings in the weather. But I no-
plunge to minus 2,000 fpm on tice a more serious tone in my
the VVI, after being estab- voice when I brief those special
lished on the glidepath, must interest items, especially that
be instantly challenged. particular item called spatial
That night, there was an- disorientation. I number myself
other aircraft in the pattern as one of the fortunate to have
flying approaches before we ar- experienced the power of the
rived. The pilot in this aircraft visual illusion and to be able to
experienced the same visual il- sit here and say, "I'm here to
lusion with frighteningly simi- tell you." __::::-

TAC ATTA!l}t> 21
WEAPONS WORDS

Truth or consequences
A n EOD team was out taking care of several
rounds of unserviceable 30mm TP ammo.
While destroying the ammunition, two of the
The primer exploded with such force that it
flew out of the primer pocket and punctured the
propane cylinder. The propane exploded and
workers agreed that a 30mm round would look touched off a fairly serious fire.
pretty nifty mounted on a wall plaque. So they In our travels around the Air Force, most of us
set one round aside and agreed to inert it later. have seen 30mm souvenirs hanging around - on
Wonder how the disposal official certified that all desks and I-love-me walls. And they're nice.
the rounds were destroyed if they had one tucked I mean you don't have to go up to a guy who ha
away. Hmmm. one and ask him what he does for a living; his
When the weekend rolled around, the twosome momento is trying to tell you. But AFR 127-100
gave up cartoons and showed up in the shop. prohibits inerting a live round for the purpose of
They drilled a small hole in the casing and making a souvenir. Period. So don't try it.
poured out the propellant. Then they put the
round in a vise and propped up a propane torch
beneath it. They directed the flame against the
primer and left the room, waiting for the pop.
KABLOOIE! They got more than they bargained
for ...
Trailer hitch
S ometime during an alarm black of a local ex-
ercise, a munitions crew, working in the rain
and wearing their full chem gear, was transfer-
ring some MK-20 Rockeye antitank cluster
bombs from a storage area to an MHU-110
trailer. The trailer they were loading had just re-
turned from carrying a load of CBU-58s. While
prepping the trailer to carry MK-20s, the crew
chief left the trailer's support rails in positions
5 and 6 where they were from hauling CBU-58s.
Apparently, he didn't read the tech data as
closely as he should have - the rails should have
been switched to positions 5 and 7.
~·small potatoes in the heat of battle," you

JULY 1985
might say. In fact the omission was significant: The heat-of-battle excuse doesn't hack it. We
as the MK-20s were being positioned on the work hard to train our people to employ their
trailer, one of the chock straps got hung up on wartime skills. We create conditions that are as
the rail extender. Since the rails weren't right, close to combat as safely possible. We do all that
the CG (center of gravity) was off and the bomb because history shows people will fight the way
shifted forward and slipped off the trailer nose- they train. We're not going to toss out all the tech
~-st. That could be bad news- in combat as data when the balloon goes up. Let's not overlook
ll as training for combat. it during exercises.

not so fast, ace

t's not our intention in the emergency situa- execute lost wingman/missed approach if neces-
I tion training department to only present the
school solution. Our objective is to give aircrews
sary. He can reconfigure as you do, and in
another 40 seconds or so, you'll both be VMC
an emergency that has or can happen in a partic- where he can circle or drag and land behind you.
ular TAC aircraft and some solutions to consider. Of course, this method of solving the equation
The limited space on one page often precludes an requires you to count heavily on the weather be-
exhaustive list of options and explanations. You ing pretty pure underneath. But a recent weather
may have a better idea; and if you do, we hope update (required by AFM 51-37 before com-
you'll write and share your thoughts with the mencing the approach) would do that. And you'd
rest of us. need to have a good idea of your wingman's abil-
As some of us were reviewing Maj Jim Lee's ity to hang in there. Let's face it, some guys
good work on page 11, we wondered about might need to be sent around the flagpole. Maybe
another option- namely, why not tell the wing- while you're going through the steps isn't the
man to hang tight? He's already well aware of best place to decide which variety you were
what's going on in your Hog and should be antic- issued ...
ipating what's going to happen next- particu- The point is , first, fly the aircraft, then
,arly if you give him a hand: tell him you're go- execute the proper decision. Which one is that?
ing through the boldface and to be prepared to It's your call , Ace. __.::-
 Attitude First, you have to want to

Col Coupe De Ville

Chief, TAC Flight Safety

M any of us more ... er ...

senior fighter pilots have
a little fighter pilot philosophy-
that quite a few of our pilots
today don't really have a phi-
losophy per se. That concerns
need to take that same attitude
and square it. So I call it A2 .
It's the attitude that reminds
some of us a whole bunch - me. Because to develop the you day-in and day-out that
that we have used to keep the kind of commitment that en- after you strap on the jet, you
tradition of fly & fight in ables a fighter pilot to with- are getting ready to do the
proper perspective. That phi- stand the trials of a peacetime most important thing in your
losophy is the basis for our force while he's preparing for Air Force career - fly.
commitment to being fighter combat, one needs a sound phi- It's A 2 that enables you to
pilots - commitment so strong losophy to build on. So I'm go- plan and learn on every flight.
that it carries the highest ing to share three attributes of Some whiners have said, "Hell,
muzzle velocity - known to some sound Cajun fighter pilot Coupe, you can't expect us to
withstand ego drift, peer pres- philosophy. fly every sortie like we were
sure bend, complacency drop, A2 is first. To be a fighter pi- flying combat ... "I check six
single-mindedness ricochet and lot - and anyone can be a with, "What are you gonna do
things such as these. fighter pilot, but first you have in combat, Bubba, tell the
During some of my recent to want to- you must possess Amarougians to stop hosing
trips to the trenches (trying to a strong positive ATTITUDE. If you so you can relax?" If you
win a few quarters), I learned you want to be the best, you hitch enough rides on de craw-
24 JULY 1985
 fish boat to cross de bayou be- during training at home plate. a winner by the rules. A
cause it's easier than swimming, A true master of the art always cheater may win a few quarters
you not only lose the skills of a knew the threat and the tactics on the range, but in combat
strong swimmer needed when the to counter it. Why? Because he's gonna be gamblin' with
floods come, but you begin to during peacetime training he wooden nickels. If he's on your
smell like de crawfish. looked at the ROE as an aid to wing, you lose; if he's your
You don't square the A enhance his art, not as some- leader, you lose big time ...
automatically - it's something thing that would tarnish his Do you have the light on the
you have to work at every day. image as a fighter pilot. star yet? Hope I've started a
In combat, A2 will make the The final ingredient is the few of you to think about what
difference. The guys with the WILL TO WIN. The will to win being a fighter pilot means to
whiskey-delta attitudes (ho- is the one thing that makes many of us over-the-hill troops.
hum, just another tree-bustin' you work your buns off to im- In peacetime, we need a strong
mission) don't last very long in prove. Most of us have a true basic philosophy to keep every-
combat when things turn to will to win - every top gun thing in perspective- in com-
stink. We must prepare for the does - but some of us con- bat it's absolutely essential. We
so-called routine like we do for centrate on this one aspect so can keep smoking holes to a
the-dirty-pinkos-are-trying-to- hard that we go GLC on the minimum if each of us formu-
kill-me missions. And keeping two previous ingredients. Will lates a philosophy based on at-
the A squared helps us do just to win is essential in combat, titude, discipline and winning
that. It's deadly on ego drift but it's deadly if not tempered - and if we fly like we believe
<> nd complacency drop. But re- with attitude and discipline. it. But remember, first you
mber, to keep the A Everyone likes a winner, but have to want to. _.;;:::-
uared, FIRST YOU HAVE
TO WANT TO.
The next ingredient is SELF-
DISCIPLINE. Without it you
won't produce a fighter pilot
worth his JP-4. Discipline is
the key factor you rely on in
combat when you face the un-
known. In the heat of battle,
it's discipline that prevents you
from rolling in unless you posi-
tively have the friendly posi-
tions. If I had to commit on any
one trait, it would be discipline.
Here again, you don't just in-
herit discipline when they pin
on your wings. It's something
you must work hard to obtain.
And once attained, it's harder
still to fight off the one factor
that erodes discipline- com-
placency, the killer of young
and old fighter pilots.
Top combat pilots in every
; used discipline religiously,
1 they began developing it
'----"'
TAC ATTA{$>- 25
 DOWN TO EARTH
-•ITEMS THAT CAN AFFECT YOU AND YOUR FAMILY HERE ON

Clip and save

Hotel/Motel Fires way all the way down. Find out if and where you
Ask the front desk what the fire alarm sounds exit the building or if you end up in the base-
like (some alarms sound like the phone and ment or lobby. Now follow the stairway all the
might not alarm you) and where the fire emer- way up. Can you exit out onto the roof?
gency plan is located (usually it's on the door of Please, Please, Please
your room, but ask anyway). • Teach your children to be self-sufficient in an
When you get to your room, make sure every- emergency - they may have to save their own
one knows where the phone is and what numbers lives.
to call (fire, police and front desk - call in that • Read the emergency escape plan that you find
order if there's an emergency and you have time). on the back of the door.
Designate a specific spot to place the room key
and flashlight when you're in the room (prefer-
ably the night stand). Check out the windows in
your room: can they be opened and is there a
ledge or balcony you can jump from (from the
third floor, there's only a 50-50 chance of sur-
vival; fourth floor and higher, forget it)?
Plan ahead - know how to exit the building.
First, designate a meeting place outside the
building. Then, locate at least two fire exits at
opposite ends of the building. Count the number
of doors and note other features (like drink or ice
machines) between your room and the exits.
Count on being in the dark, in smoke and crawl-
ing. Feeling your way out and knowing what to
expect could save your life. Take a trip through
the exits - they shouldn't be blocked, locked or
held open. Note if the doors can be opened from
the stairway, many can't: once you're in the
stairway, you're committed to it. Follow the stair-

26
 the ground

• Never use an elevator. The upper-level lights have been offered as a

• Always crawl- smoke is usually the killer. luxury item on some sports cars since 1970. But
A void it at all costs. the government believes the lights will help re-
lways check out a commotion - it might not duce the number of rear-end accidents.
:1 party. The National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
• Don't hesitate to report a possible fire- better istration estimates that there are 3.5 million
safe than ... rear-end accidents each year, causing. about
• Always take the room key with you - you may 600,000 injuries. The extra light could eliminate
have to return to your room if the exits are 40,000 of these injuries and save $434 million in
blocked. property damage.
• Close all doors behind you. The light is expected to add $7 to the price of a
• Hold on to handrails in stairways - panicked car at first, then drop to $4. You can buy the
people could knock you down. light for an older-model car at an auto parts store
• Don't break any windows unless rescue is im- and install it yourself.
mediate - smoke could enter the room from the
outside.
• If your clothing catches fire, never run: drop NOTICE REGARDING POSSIBLE
and roll. INSURANCE DISCOUNTS
• Once outside, don't go back in. Go immediately You may be entitled to a premium discount on
to your designated meeting place. your automobile insurance after your collision
avoidance light has been properly installed.
At the time this light was manufactured and
packaged, several major insurance companies
Why you're seeing were considering a premium discount for each
policy holder who installed a collision avoidance
more red light, although none had as yet offered such a
ou may have noticed an extra red light on the discount.
Y back of some 1985 cars. Next year, by order
be federal government, all 1986-model cars
THEREFORE, WE RECOMMEND THAT YOU
CHECK WITH YOUR INSURANCE AGENT.
"-.__...... be equipped with them.

TAC ATTA!)J> 27
 So, you're going to drive to Timbuktu over
the 4th of July holiday weekend. Well, pace
yourself: take a break every two hours and eat
something. Researchers have found that eating
food during a rest break improves driving per-
formance . Avoid highway hypnosis - keep mov-
ing your eyes. Know the signs of fatigue: burning
eyes, excess blinking, lights bothering you, driv-
ing slower or faster than you thought you were
going.

Rego LP gas regulator product recall. All

Rego Model 210 LP gas regulators should be im-
mediately removed from service. They may be
found on any recreational vehicle, mobile home,
travel trailer, park trailer, fifth-wheel trailer,
short shots truck camper, van conversion, outdoor grill or
home where LP gas is used for heating or cook-
ing. Without warning, any Rego Model 210 regu-
lator may suddenly experience a mechanical fail-
ure which could result in a fire or explosion.
Children are out of shape. A study conducted There is no way to predict this failure. Please
by the Amateur Athletic Union shows that call the Rego Company at 1-312-685-1121 for a
American children are in poor shape. Tests of free replacement.
more than four million boys and girls, aged 6 to
17, showed that only 36 percent can pass basic
physical fitness tests. In 1979, 43 percent could Little League Baseball Inc. recommends all
pass the test. The drop-off may be caused by the children wear baseball face masks. Baseball ac-
elimination of compulsory gym classes after counts for more children's eye injuries than any
eighth grade in many school districts. other sport. The preferred mask is transparent
and attaches to a batting helmet, guarding a
player's eyes and face from injury.
If you're an insulin-dependent diabetic, tan-
ning booths, hot baths and saunas can accelerate
your absorption of the previous insulin injection,
causing the blood sugar level to plummet. Make
appropriate dietary or insulin adjustments before
you indulge.

Sodium-labeling rules take effect this month

(July). All foods that make nutritional claims
have to add sodium content: sodium free means
fewer than 5 mg per serving, very low sodium is
35 mg or less per serving and low sodium is 140
mg or less per serving. Reduced sodium means
the normal salt level has been reduced 75 per-
cent; unsalted means the product used to be made
with salt, now it isn't. Safe and adequate sodium
intake is 1,100 to 3,300 mg a day.

28 JULY 1985
 what I want from you as my flight commander

From 2nd Lt Newguy. sense to distinguish between situations that re-

First, and maybe most obvious, maintain quire you to simply delineate issues for your boss
;hnical competence in your flying skills. I will and those that require you to take an advocacy
'--oe depending on you to know your job, in depth, role, ranging from a simple recommendation to a
as an expert. Teach me what I need to know, but ringing insistence. I've noticed that the officer
don't do it only as problems arise-as a part of a who is continually excited about the issues at
firefighting process. Do it on a systematic and hand, who is always outraged, upset, angry or
regular basis as a part of our relationship right absolute can't possibly be as effective in the long
from the first day we begin to work together. run as the man who knows how to vary his pitch
Be aware of your own limitations and don't try according to the needs of a particular situation.
to snow me. You will probably be able to get Likewise, the leaders I admire most realize that
away with it for a while. But when I do catch they don't have to win every contested point in
you, as I inevitably will, you're going to lose the order to be successful; they save their "big guns"
one thing that our relationship can't really exist for the times they're needed most.
without-credibility. It's much better to admit Be loyal. Be charitable of my faults and don't
being wrong or even ignorant about a situation play the big man by cutting me down to your
than to try to take it through when you know peers, tempting as that may be. Criticize me face-
you're over your head. Simply put, I can handle to-face when necessary, because it's really one of
the knowledge that you don't know everything the services I need from you.
much better than I can handle the knowledge Don't keep me in the dark. Be sensitive and
that I can't fully trust what you tell me. tuned in to my need and my desire for detail.
Talk to me. A lot. Orders are the least effective Keep me informed, but don't overload me with so
way of getting things done in any endeavor, be- many details and worries that I lose sight of the
cause personal commitment is the key ingredient overall picture.
that makes for success in any effective organiza- I hope that at least a few of these suggestions
tion. Always remember that what you say is will strike home and by doing so help us do a
-~ally no more important than how you say it. better job for the Air Force. _:::....
1:3e skillful in your advisory role. Develop the

TAC ATTA!J}J> 29
TAC SAFETY AWARDS
INDIVIDUAL SAFETY AWARD
CAPT LEM J . ALLEY, JR., has earned an out-
standing reputation in the 0-2A (Cessna 337)
community, military and civilian, for his con-
tribution in solving the engine-quit problem.
After becoming the 0-2 flight safety officer,
Captain Alley initiated an independent research
program to discover ways to reduce the high
engine-quit rate in the 549 TASTG. He inspected
locally owned civilian versions of the 0-2 to de-
termine if design changes had occurred that had
not been incorporated in Air Force aircraft; he
visited the engine manufacturer to discuss design
deficiencies and examine technical data; and he
also reviewed earlier studies by the Kelly AFB
Air Logistics Center.
To gather additional data, Captain Alley de-
veloped a survey that was sent to over 1,200 Capt Lem J. Alley, Jr.
civilian owners of the Cessna 337. More than 600 549 TASTG, 507 TAIRCW
questionnaires were completed and returned. Patrick AFB, Florida
After compiling all this data, Captain Alley con-
cluded that vapor in the fuel line to the engine- mended changing the frequency of the engine
driven fuel pump was the probable cause of the conditioning inspection from every 100 hours to
problem. He then made a modification proposal every 50 hours. Because of this change, fuel-flow
to TAC which has been approved and will be adjustments are being made more often and hav
tested soon. resulted in a 78-percent reduction in engine-
During his research, Captain Alley recom- quits, from 18 in 1982 to only 4 in 1984.

CREW CHIEF SAFETY AWARD

During a thru-flight inspection of his T-33A
aircraft, SRA ScoTIA. WHALEY noticed the static
ground receptacle by the aileron on the top of the
right wing was missing. Airman Whaley
searched all accessible areas in and around the
aircraft for the missing item without results.
Instead of assuming the receptacle had been
lost in flight, Airman Whaley had the aileron
removed to search the wing's interior. The search
revealed the receptacle had stuck in the aileron
bellcrank. Airman Whaley retrieved the old re-
ceptacle and properly installed a new one. He
had the aileron reinstalled, and the aircraft made
its next scheduled flight on time.
Despite the pressure to launch the aircraft on
time, Airman Whaley took his time and checked
out other possible solutions. His actions set a SrA Scott A. Whaley
good example of safety awareness and prevented 325 AGS, 325 TTW
a serious mishap from occurring. Tyndall AFB, Florida
 tac tally

TAC ANG AFR

THRU MAY THRU MAY THRU MAY
MAY 1985 1884
MAY 1985 1Qf
MAY 1985 ltM
9 9 1 5 3 0 0 q
CLASS A MISHAPS
AIRCREW FATALITIES
--33 6 9 0 2· 2 0 0 !:.34):'
TOTAL EJECTIONS 1 7 5 2 5 2 0 0 ... o :s
~<:

SUCCESSFUL EJECTIONS 1 6 3 2 5 2 0 0 o:~t·

TAC'S TOP 5 thru MAY 85

TAC FTR/RECCE TAC AIR DEFENSE
closs A mishap-free months doss A mi-.,..fret ~tanths
34 405 TTW (F-15, 141 57 FI 5 (F-4)
F- 5)
Luke AFB, AZ Keflavik, Iceland
~
(F-15) (F-15l
28 1 TFW Langley AFB, VA 101 5 FIS Minot AFB, ND

48 FIS
(F-15)
~J''27 33 TFW Eglin AFB, FL 98 <F-15l .
Langley AFB, VA
318 Fl 5
(A-10) (F-15)
25 23 TFW England AFB, LA 57 McChord AFB, WA
25 J'66 TFW <F- 111 >
Mtn.HomeAFB , ID 48 87 FIS <F-106!
KI Sawyer AFB, MI

~AC-GAINED FTR/RECCE lAC-GAINED AIR DEFENSE lAC/GAINED Other Units

class A mrshap-free months class A mishap-free months clcass A mishap-free eoalt.s
157 188 TFG ANG(F-4)
Ft Smith, AR 131 17 7 FIG Atlantic
ANG(F-106 )
City, NJ 1·190 18 2 TA 5 G ANG(OA-37)
Peo ria , I L
ANG(A-7)
149 138TFG Tulsa, OK 97 125 FIG ANGC F-106) 174 110 TASG ANG(OA-37 )
J acksonville FL Battle Creek, MI
AFR(A-10)
148 917 TFG Barksdale 80 119 FIG ANG(F-4) 170 U 5 AFT A W C (many fightersi
AFB, LA Fargo, ND Eglin AFB, FL
ANG(A-7 )
126 114 TFG Sioux Falls, SD 64 107 Fl G ANG(F-4)
Niagara Falls. NY 162 (T-33)
84 FITS Castle AFB CA
115 183 TFG ANG(F-4)
Springfield, IL 55 147 FIG ANG(F-4)
Ellington AFB, TX 104 (~- 3 ' EC- 130 )
552AWACW Tmker AFB, OK

ClASS A MISHAP COMPARISON RATE

(BASED ON ACCIDENTS PER 100,000 HOURS FLYING TIME )

1985 3.2 3.4 2.7 2.4 2.9

TA
c 1984 3.4 4.3 3.3 2.5 2.9
1985 4.8 4.8 3.0 4.5
NG 0.0 2.3
1985 0.0 0.0
AF
R 1984 0.0
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1984-739-022/10