tac attack

July 1983

get the facts straight.. pg 4

 ANGLE
OF
ATJACK

It is my extreme pleasure to assume the duties as chief fied people who are properly using proven tech data.
of safety and add my name to the masthead of TA C The lesson is clear -- safety is not an afterthought , or
Attack. even the paramount thought -- safety is the' result of
I will use "Angle of Attack" as a forum for communi- professional mission performance. In short-- do it right
cating safety philosophy directly to you, our readers. Of and it will be safe.
course, to be effective, communication must be two- Col Dick Ely's departure means the departure of five
way. We need your feedback on how we can make this years of "corporate memory" and tremendous safety
publication more helpful and interesting. More impor- expertise. His departure is not TAC's loss because he
tantly, we need your inputs on improving how we do our remains assigned toT AC, going to Wright-Patterson to
business. We solicit your telephone calls, cards, letters, provide Systems Command with T AC experience, know-
and articles. We are committed to making TA CAll ad a ledge, and philosophy. We in T AC will ;continue to
publication that will help you do your job better. benefit from his service. Because of his strong leader-
I'm a strong believer that safety is a by-product of ship, it is my good fortune to assume the helm of a fine
doing things right. History is replete with examples of organization.
accidents directly following those who cut corners, fail
to use tech data, are untrained for the job, or have an
excessive desire to succeed at the expense of doing it
right. This month we chronicle a few instances of the
results of nut doing it right. In each of these cases there
was ample opportunity for one or several people to step
into the situation and say, "Wait a minute, let's do it
right." However, their failure resulted in serious
mishaps.
In all of our units we can point with pride to hundreds Harold E. Watson, Colonel USAF
of activities that occur daily resulting in excellent mis- Chief of Safety
sion accomplishment. We have found that the safe oper-
ations are those which are done professionally by quali-

2 JULY 1983
 ON THE COVER:

..-....;.,=:::~~
THE SOF WATCHES
FROM THE TOWER JULY 1983
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

CONTENTS
Get the Facts Straight
Wrong assumptions lose an airplane. 4
HON VERNE ORR
SECRETARY OF THE TACTips
AIR FORCE Interest items, mishaps with morals, for the TAC aircrew member. 8

GEN W.L. CREECH

Aircrew of Distinction
Major Christopher S. Long 11
COMMANDER
Down to Earth
Information that could affect you, your fami ly, or friends . 12
Sharpening the Falcon's Talons
Modifications on F-16 are being completed. 15
F·4G Wild Weasel
Stipple rendition by Sgt John Steele. 16
Hydraulic Leaks: Is the Aircraft Safe to Fly?
COL HAL WATSON A wipe with a rag isn 't the answer . 18
CHIEF OF SAFETY
Chock Talk
MAJ JIM MACKIN Incidents and incidentals with a maintenance slant. 20
EDITOR Monthly Safety Awards
STAN HARDISON
MSgt Juan M. Mesa and A 1C John Whorley. 23
ART EDITOR The Motorcyclist's Worst Enemy
"We have met the enemy and he is us ." 24
MARTY DILLER
EDITORIAL Weapons Words
ASSISTANT Working with TAC 's weapons systems. 26
SGT JOHN STEELE Letters
STAFF ARTIST
Our turn to take flak. 29
TAC Tally
The flight safety score card . 31

TACRP 127-1
TAC Attack is not directive in nature . Recommendations are intended to comply with existing directives . Opinions expressed are
those of the authors and not necessarily the positions of TAC or USAF . Mishap information does not identify the persons. places , or
units involved and may not be construed as incriminating under Article 31 of the UCMJ . Photos and artwork are representative and
not necessarily of the people or equipment mvolved .
Contributions are encouraged. as are comments and criticism . We reserve the right to edit all manuscripts for readability and
good taste . Write the Editor. TAC Attack, HO TAC/SEPP. Langley AFB. VA 23665; or call AUTOVON 432-3658 .
Distribution (FX) is controlled by TAC/SEPP through the PDO, based on a ratio of 1 copy per 10 persons assigned. DOD units other
than USAF have no fixed ratio ; requests will be considered individually.
Subscriptions for readers outside of DOD are available from the Superintendent of Documents , Government Printing Office ,
Washington , D.C. 20402 . All correspondence on subscription service should be directed to the superintendent, not to TAC/SEPP .
TAC Attack (I SSN 0494-3880) is published monthly by HO TAC/SEPP, Langley AFB, VA.
POSTMASTER : Send address changes to lAC Attack, TAC/SEPP. Langley , AFB, VA 23665.

TAC ATTACK VOLUME 2 3 NUMBER 7 3

GET THE FACTS ST

Being the supervisor of flying (SOF) is one of the

most important and difficult jobs we ' re given. To sit
on the ground and understand what 's taking place in
someone else 's airplane can sometimes call for the
wisdom of Solomon . Over the years we've learned
some lessons about what the SOF can and cannot
do well. The following mishap, which happened sev-
eral years ago in a land far away , contributed to our
corporate knowledge .
A two-ship of F-4s was scheduled for a gunnery
sortie at the range . Recovery weather at home base
was forecast to be low enough to require an alter-
nate , so the flight briefed alternate airfields , which
we ' ll call Northwest AFB and West AFB . Middle
Field was mentioned as an emergency field, but the
weather and approach there weren't covered in the
briefing.
The flight finished the work on the range and
headed home . En route to the home TACAN , the
flight checked with approach control for the
weather. They were told the weather was 500 scat-
tered , 1 ,200-foot broken, 3,000-foot overcast , visibil-
ity 2 miles in rain . So the flight lead asked for single
ship approaches without specifying the type ap-
proach . The wingman split off and was first to make
an approach .
R~GHT
were flying a TACAN-only approach . He saw the air-
plane at about the same time that the crew had seen
the field . The SOF called on tower frequency and
told the aircrew to go around and get a GCA just as
they started their missed approach . The SOF , who
was also the aircrew 's squadron commander. was
rapidly losing confidence in them; he couldn 't under-
stand why they flew aT ACAN-only approach when
GCA was operational.
On their missed approach, the pilot turned slightly
left from the northwest runway heading and inter-
cepted the 290-degree radial outbound . He climbed
to 5,000 feet and requested a GCA frequency . After
contacting GCA, he was told to squawk code 1700.
The aircrew then assumed they were under positive
radar control. They continued out the 290-degree
radial , waiting for GCA to turn them to downwind.
The SOF assumed they had turned south to inter-
cept the GCA downwind . He asked them their fuel ,
and they told him 3,500 pounds . Then he devoted his
As he began his approach, the wingman had attention to monitoring the flight leader's approach
4,800 pounds of fuel on board . Flying the TACAN and landing. While he was watching for Lead , he
arc , the pilot and the WSO of number 2 talked over took a minute to call the squadron ops officer, asking
the type of approach they should fly. Normally the him to call the SOF at Northwest AFB and tell him he
aircrews in this unit ask for a GCA while on the might be getting a diverted F-4 with minimum or
TACAN arc , so the pilot mentioned to the WSO that it emergency fuel . He also told the ops officer that he
was time to get a frequency for GCA. The WSO re- wanted the pilot of number 2 to be restricted to flying
minded the pilot that the week before several aircraft with instructor pilots only . That comment was
had been vectored too far left for a safe approach by another indication that he had lost confidence in the
GCA controllers . Approach control was manned by pilot's flying.
nationals of the host country . not American con- While the SOF turned his attention to the leader 's
trollers . The WSO suggested they fly the whole approach , the GCA pattern controller 's attention
TACAN approach ; the pilot agreed . was also on the leader. So the wingman was allowed
They flew the approach within two degrees on the to continue out the 290-degree radial until he was 20
course direction indicator. As they broke out of the miles from the field before GCA asked his position .
weather on final approach , they were two degrees At 22 miles , GCA turned him to 130 degrees for
right of course by their instruments . The pilot cor- downwind.
rected to the left and looked left for the field . The cor- After Lead had landed , the SOF came back to the
rection put him left of course and the field was ac- GCA frequency that the wingman was on . He ex-
tually to his right . About one-half mile from the run- pected to find them about ready to turn final ap-
way, the WSO spotted the field at their one o'clock proach . The SOF asked GCA. on their frequency,
position . He told the pilot. the pilot saw that they what the position of number 2 was. GCA replied that
were in too close for a safe approach from that point. the wingman was on the 210 radial at six miles . That
so he began to go around . puzzled the SOF . He reasoned that either the pilot
The SOF had heard the crew report 6 miles on was incapable of flying in weather or else the GCA
final. That's when he first became aware that they controller was vectoring them unnecessarily and the

5
GET THE FACTS STRAIGHT

pilot was doing nothing about it. So he called on the sumed the airplane was passing 16,000 feet with
radio to the aircrew, "What are you doing?" 2,000 pounds of fuel. Actually , they were at 6,000
The crew recognized the voice of their squadron feet in their climb .
commander. They began to wonder what they really From there on , the aircrew was on its own . During
should have been doing. The pilot responded, "Try- the climb , the WSO eventually convinced the pilot
ing to get a PAR." Immediately afterward , the GCA that they had to jettison their tanks , so they did . The
controller told them to descend from 5,000 feet to pilot climbed at 350 knots all the way to Flight Level
4,000 feet. 325. Neither he nor the WSO attempted to figure op-
Now the SOF was really perplexed. In his experi- timum climb/cruise information using the checklist.
ence the descent to 4,000 feet had always taken After leveling off, the pilot pulled the power back for
place on a dogleg to base with a heading of 090 de- a very short cruise at altitude. Then at 54 DME from
grees . He assumed that they were on a 090 heading. Northwest AFB, he started down at 250 knots and
But if they were on the 210 degree radial at 6 miles, half-nozzle . Shortly afterwards he pulled the throttles
heading 090 degrees, they were going to be in too
close for a safe approach . The SOF asked what their
fuel was . The pilot answered that they had 2,400
pounds.
The SOF had figured when the aircrew went
around from their first approach that they would be a
decision height for this approach with 2,500 pounds
of fuel on board. He estimated that it would take
1 ,500 pounds of fuel to divert to Northwest AFB , us-
ing optimum techniques . So they should have been
able to shoot the approach , divert to Northwest AFB
if they had to, and still land with about 1 ,000 pounds
of fuel. But now that wouldn't work out.
Believing that the pilot didn't know what he was
doing or else was not under positive GCA control ,
the SOF ordered them to divert. He told them to
climb immediately on a northwest heading and pro-
ceed direct to Northwest AFB. He also told them to
climb to 30,000 feet and remain there until they were
60 miles from Northwest AFB, then to make a 250-
knot emergency descent to the field . He added em-
phatically that he didn't care what anyone told them ,
they were to climb up, proceed direct to Northwest
AFB , and make a straight-in full stop. The weather at
Northwest was good , he said .
The pilot followed orders . He immediately turned
northwest and started a 350-knot climb . The WSO
called the SOF and asked whether they should jetti-
son their empty 370-gallon fuel tanks. The SOF told
them not to jettison at that time because he didn 't
know what the tanks would hit. Then the WSO told
the SOF that they had 2,000 pounds of fuel remain-
ing and he didn't think they could make it to North-
west AFB. Just then the Fuel Low Level light came
on, so the pilot tried to correct the amount to 1 ,800
pounds . But the SOF didn 't hear his call . He as-

6 JULY 1983
 to idle. At 45 miles they had 600 pounds of fuel re- GCA. So they were vectored to a three-mile final. The
maining on the indicator. engines flamed out at 2 1/2 miles , and the crew
At 42 miles the Northwest approach controller ejected. They both survived with minor injuries.
asked them if they wanted to land at Middle Field , Obviously, there were a lot of errors made in this
which was ten miles away. The WSO asked for the mishap. The crew based their original decision not to
weather at Middle Field. It was 2,000 broken, 3,000 get a GCA on incomplete information . The poor vec-
I overcast, 4 miles visibility in light rain . Never having toring the week before had taken place when con-
flown an approach to Middle Field and remembering troller training was in progress , not with fully trained
the strong order by the SOF to go to Northwest AFB , controllers . With only two miles visibility , the field
the aircrew decided to bypass Middle Field and con- was below minimums for the TACAN approach .
tinue to Northwest. Maybe if they had flown a GCA, the incident would
Northwest approach advised the aircrew to ex- never have happened .
pect a visual approach , but the pilot insisted on a The divert was also poorly flown. They almost
made it to Northwest AFB. With better technique ,
they might have landed. ·
But finally , we have to question the way the SOF
handled the whole situation. He was the pilot's
squadron commander and was well aware of the
pilot 's lack of experience. But he let that opinion
cloud his understanding of what was really happen-
ing . He made assumption after assumption without
finding out what was really going on in the cockpit
and in the pattern. He wasn't asking the right ques-
tions of the right people : tower, approach, the
pilot-the folks who had the information and
wherewithal to effect a safe recovery . At the end ,
based on erroneous information, he gave an inap-
propriate directive to the aircrew . The aircrew
responded to the authority of the SOF without mak-
ing him completely aware of the facts and cir-
cumstances of their predicament ; they followed
what they should have sensed was an unsafe course
of action .
TAG 's supplement to AFR 60-2 defines the relation-
ships between the SOF , air traffic control , and the
aircraft commander. The SOF assists the DCO in
directing the activity of unit airborne aircraft to en-
sure the safe conduct of the flying operation . But the
directions must be based on factual , timely, and ob-
jective information to determine a correct course of
action. That's not what happened in this case . In-
stead, the SOF cut across appropriate comunica-
tions channels and did not ask for the right informa-
tion .
This happened a while ago, and we've learned
from it . But maybe all of us , pilots and SOFs, ought to
review our responsibilities in the relationship be-
tween aircraft commander and SOF. Finally , we
must know the tech order and the regulation s. ~

TAC ATTACK 7
 tac tips
NTEREST ITEMS,

Overcentering takes place during the last part of the

Warning Light Isn't handle 's travel .
The warning light went out and the cockpit pres-
Enough surized because the lock tabs were fully engaged ,
despite the fact that overcentering was incomplete.
During preflight , the canopy warning light on the During takeoff roll , airframe vibrat ions and air loads
F-111 checked good. The WSO closed the right can- caused the hatch locking tabs and hatch handle to
opy before the pilot taxied: After the end-of-runway open , allowing the hatch to then open .
checks the pilot closed his canopy. The cockpit pres- The dangerous thing is that this situation gives li t-
surized normally , and the warning light was out. But tle warning of the problem . This unit has submitted a
after liftoff, at about 180 knots , the right canopy change to the flight manual to warn aircrews to pull
hatch flew open. The aircrew brought the airplane on the handle to make sure the lock tab is engaged
in its latch . The canopy warning light doesn 't ensure
a locked canopy.

Virus Victim
A n F-16 pilot was flying his second mission of the
day. About an hour into the mission, he began to feel
bad. He suddenly felt tired, and his legs seemed to
be very heavy. He returned to his home field and
landed OK; but while taxiing back , he began to shiver
from the chills . He parked the airplane and climbed
out, continuing to feel worse. As he was walking in , a
squadron van offered him a ride . He climbed in the
around and landed as soon as they could. The cano- van and asked to go to the hospital instead of the
PY stayed with the airplane, but afterwards the right squadron .
hatch was found to be sprung and had to be re- At the hospital he was admitted for observation . A
placed. check of the airplane 's oxygen system showed no
When the WSO had closed the canopy, he hadn't discrepancies . Initial evaluation of the pilot in the
fully closed the handle even though it looked closed . emergency room also ruled out hypoxia , along with
Actually , the right canopy hatch handle was about hyperventilation and hypoglycemia . Continued ob-
one inch from being fully closed. The handle and servation in the hospital showed that the pilot was
lock tab were resting on top of the safety latch lock- suffering from a viral infection.
ing mechanism . The canopy hatch was all the way The virus infection was compounded by poor nu-
down , but the locking tabs were not yet overcentered. trition : the pil ot hadn't eaten in 20 hours . Dehydra-

8 JULY 1983
MISHAPS WITH MORALS, FOR THE TAC AIRCREWMAN _ _ __

tion , fatigue from a long day, and the stress of ad-

verse weather and demanding missions contributed
to the severity of his symptoms.
The pilot has since recovered from the virus with
no complications. But if the weakness and shakes
had come upon him during a more demanding phase
of the mission, he might have become one of those
unknown-cause losses.
Maybe we can 't do anything to protect ourselves
from viruses , but we can see to it that our bodies are
properly nourished . And even a minor ailment de-
serves a visit to the flight surgeon. In our business ,
complications can really be severe .

parently this unit-or at least this pilot-doesn't fol-

F-4 Swallows Seat Pins low Dash One procedures. The Dash One clearly
states that the crew chief will hand the pin bag to the
Most of our stories about foreign object damage aircrew member for stowing. That's why this story be-
are in " Chock Talk ," but this one belongs here . Read longs here . If the pilot had been more concerned
it and you 'll see why . about his ejection seat being ready for flight, the inci-
The aircrew arrived at their F-4 with plmlty of time dent never would have happened.
to do a good preflight. They strapped in with six min-
utes left before their start-engine time . The crew
chief helped both the pilot and the WSO strap in . He
pulled the WSO 's seat pins, but he didn 't pull the
pilot's face curtain pin. That pin remained installed ; Reversion Perversion
the pin bag was lying on the left canopy rail .
The pilot started engines normally. When he tax- T wo A-1 Os were flying a surface-attack tactics
ied a crosswind from the right blew the pin bag off mission with Mavericks underneath a ragged 1800-
the canopy rail. The bag went down the left intake . foot ceiling. As the weather deteriorated , they
Its velcro fastener came apart, and six seat pins knocked off the tactics work and began to egress the
were sucked into the intake. Four of them entered area. Lead descended to 250 feet at 300 knots. The
the compressor and did extensive damage to all wing'man turned to position himself in formation at
stages of the engine . about400feetabovetheground.
The pilot had never taken the time to ask whether As the wingman was rolling out of his turn, he
his seat pins were pulled . He took it for granted. Ap- reached back to turn off the videotape recorder . He

TAC ATTACK 9
 place during the 14 seconds it takes to transition to
TAC TIPS manual reversion.
This is the second time in recent months that a
pilot has unintentionally selected manual reversion
while turning off the videotape recorder on egress .
(More correctly, this is the second incident that we
moved a switch aft and then noticed a flashing know of. Who knows how many times it has hap-
heads-up display and Master Caution light. Out of the pened without being reported.) The two switches are
corner of his eye, he could see that some other lights shaped the same and require the same type of mo-
were lit on the caution light panel. Then the nose of tion. But the switch for the videotape recorder is six
the airplane pitched down. The pilot pulled back on inches to the rear and four inches to the right of the
the stick and got the nose pointed up. At the same flight control switch.
time, he tried to roll the airplane level, but the control Until the hardware can be changed to distinguish
stick wasn't effective in roll. Using rudders, he was the two switches, maybe we ought to check that we
able to level the wings. have the right switch before we turn off the video-
He climbed until he was just below the overcast, tape. Yet flying formation below 500 feet doesn 't
seem to be the most opportune time to be looking at
switches. Can't the switch wait for a better time?

Write About Your Bad

Feelings
While doing advanced handling maneuvers , an
F-4E pilot started to pitch back into a slice . After the
slats extended , the aircrew checked their G-meters.
The front cockpit showed 8.2 Gs and the rear cockpit
indicated 7.5 The aircraft returned to base and
landed. Afterwards , it was impounded.
The over-G caused a fuel leak in the right wing
where it joins the fuselage. Other than that , the dam-
age was limited to a group of nut plates that needed
replacing.
then pushed the nose over to stay out of the clouds. Two months before, this same airplane had been
He glanced at the hydraulic gages, which appeared involved in another over-G . Both pilots who were fly-
normal. Then he checked the flight control panel and ing during the over-G incidents reported that the air-
saw a Left Aileron Jam light, so he moved the switch plane seemed to be very sensitive in pitch. Other
toward the light, disconnecting the aileron . Glancing pilots in the squadron who had flown the airplane
back at the hydraulic gages, he noticed that the hy- agreed that it was pitch sensitive. So the mainte-
draulic pressures were now at zero. He reached nance troubleshooters checked the pitch control
over to put the flight control switch in manual rever- system and the autopilot. They found a failed pitch
sion. But he found the switch already in manual re- system amplifier and a failed autopilot control ampli-
version. The pilot moved the flight control switch fier . When those were replaced, the pitch sensitivity
back to normal and regained normal flight controls. problem was solved.
Then he reengaged the left aileron, flew home, and Of course , the problem could have been solved
landed without any more problems. much sooner. If one of those pilots who said it felt
It looks like the pilot moved the flight control pitch sensitive had taken the time to write up his feel-
switch during egress when he meant to move the ings in the 781, we might have avoided both over-Gs .
videotape recorder switch. The confusing indica- At the very least, we should have been able to pre-
tions on the hydraulic gages and the jam light took vent the second incident.

10 JULY 1983
AIR CREW
OF
DISTINCTION
On 26 January 1983, MAJ CHRISTOPHER S. LONG
was flying an F-4D on a single-ship transition and de-
sensitization sortie with an inexperienced student wea-
pon systems officer (WSO) in the back seat. After fly-
ing through several maneuvers, Major Long saw the
fire warning light for the left engine illuminate. He
pulled the left throttle to idle. The left engine instru-
ments fluctuated, and the utility hydraulic pressure
dropped to zero. He turned the airplane towards Maj Christopher S. Long
Homestead Air Force Base and shut down the engine. 309 TFTS, 31 TTW
Homestead AFB, FL
Major Long was facing one of the most difficult
emergencies in the F-4-landing with an engine out but Major Long was able to lower the nose, accelerate
and the utility hydraulic system failed. The inexperi- above 300 knots, and regain control of the airplane.
enced WSO was unable to provide much help. On top While still above 5,000 feet, he blew the gear down.
of Major Long's other problems, the Master Caution Coordinating and confirming all checklist procedures
light began to flash, the telelight panel stopped func- with the SOF, he flew final approach at 250 knots,
tioning, and the fuel gage began to cycle continuously. then bled off the airspeed to 230 knots at touchdown,
Declaring an emergency, he began a single-engine intentionally landing 2,000 feet down the runway past
descent and contacted the supervisor of flying (SOF). the approach-end arresting gear. He used emergency
The aircrew was over water about 60 miles from brakes for directional control, lowered the tailhook,
Homestead. They felt two thumps . Unable to check and engaged the departure-end BAK-12 gear at 150
the outside of his aircraft, Major Long thought the knots. The airplane stopped, and Major Long and the
thumps were from the left engine. Actually, both 370- student WSO climbed out normally.
gallon external fuel tanks had jettisoned because of Later investigation showed that a failure in the af-
fire damage to wire bundles in the left engine bay. terburner fuel pump had caused the fire and loss of
Without a qualified WSO to help him with the utility hydraulic pressure. The fire had also damaged
checklist, Major Long set up for a long, straight-in ap- wire bundles and lower fuselage panels and had caused
proach and began slowing for emergency gear lower- secondary fires from oil and hydraulic lines that re-
ing. As he descended through 6,500 feet and slowed sulted in extensive engine damage. Major Long's supe-
below 300 knots, the airplane began an uncommanded rior airmanship in handling this difficult situation pre-
roll to the left. He tried to recover, but the airplane vented loss of the airplane and possible loss of life. He
wouldn't respond. The crew were prepared to eject; has earned the Tactical Air Command Aircrew of Dis-
tinction Award.

11
DOWN TO EARTH
Heat exhaustion (also known as heat collapse or
Heat Stress heat prostration) takes longer to develop and results
from loss of fluids and salt . Symptoms include pro-
Atter working or playing outside on a hot day, fuse sweating , weakness , rapid pulse , dizziness ,
have you ever felt dizzy or had muscle cramps? If nausea , headache, and possible unconsciousness .
you have , then you probably had a reaction to heat Treat it by resting , drinking a cool electrolyte solution
stress . or any other non-alcoholic fluids , and cooling the
Heat stress is a combination of environmental body .
heat and physical activity that produces body heat. Heat stroke is the most dangerous of the heat-
You have to have both to create heat stress . The related illnesses . It 's a failure of the body 's cooling
body reacts according to the degree of heat stress , mechanisms. Symptoms of heat stroke are the same
and sometimes a heat-related illness occurs . There as heat exhaustion except that with heat stroke
are three heat-related illnesses : heat cramps, heat there won 't be any sweating , the skin will be flushed,
exhaustion , and heat stroke . and the body will be hot . Some people can collapse
Heat cramps occur after hard physical activity in from heat stroke without any warning symptoms .
a hot environment . Loss of water is a factor , but lack Heat stroke is a medical emergency. Get the person
of salt intake is what causes the cramps . Legs and to a hospital or doctor immediately . In the meantime
stomach are where you 'll probably get the cramps , the important thing to do is cool the body. Cool the
body with water, bring the person into an air-condi-
tioned room or put them in the shade , and remove as
much clothing as possible.
You can prevent a heat-related illness by drinking
plenty of fluids , increasing salt intake , wearing light-
weight or light-colored clothes , and taking frequent
breaks from the heat to cool down. Salt tablets are
not recommended-eat salty foods ; and alcoholic
beverages are not recommended fluids because al-
cohol will dehydrate you even more . To combine the
fluids and salt, you can buy an electrolyte solution at
the grocery store .
It also helps to become acclimated to the heat .
Start out slowly with a physical activity in the heat for
about two hours a day for a week . That 's all it takes .
Once you're acclimated to the heat , it takes about
and they will follow heavy sweating . To treat heat two to three months to lose acclimation ; however, a
cramps you need to replenish the salt you lost; so measurable amount can be lost in a few days . If you
drink a cool electrolyte solution , loosen clothing , and stay indoors in an air cond itioned room for a whole
rest . If you don 't have an electrolyte solution , drink weekend or if you have just returned from a trip to a
any non-alcoholic fluids and eat something salty, like coole,r climate , expect your heat tolerance to be
pota to chips or pretzels. lowered.

12 JULY 1983
Excuses, Excuses Think About It
James Stahly of State Farm Insurance Company An airman was sent to get some file folders that
collects strange reasons people have given on insur- were located in a storage area about 10 feet above a
ance accident forms for being involved in an acci- latrine ; so he got a step ladder and climbed up. While
dent. Here are what he cons iders some of his better he was up there , someone moved the ladder to get
ones : to the latrine . Instead of calling tor someone to put
" Coming home , I drove into the wrong house and the ladder back when he got ready to come down ,
collided with a tree I don 't have. " the airman decided to step onto a nearby soda ma-
" A truck backed through my windshield and hit my chine and slide down. As he slid down the side of the
wife 's face ." soda machine, the ring on the finger of his left hand
" I had been driving for 40 years when I fell asleep caught on a hinge and pulled the end of his finger off .
at the wheel and had an accident .·' His entire finger had to be amputated.
" I saw a slow-moving , sad-faced old gentleman as It 's hard to believe that a ring could be a safety
he bounced off the roof of my car ." hazard , but it 's certainly worth thinking about . And ,
while you ' re thinking : if it takes a ladder to get up, it
takes a ladder to get down .

" As I rounded a curve , I felt a sudden rush of air .

When I looked over , my wife was gone ."
-Courtesy of Family Safety,
a publication of the National Safe ty Council

TAC ATTACK 13
 Boating Rules of the Road. When two boats ap-
proach head-on , each must go to the right and pass
left side to left side. When boats cross at right
angles, the boat on the right has the right-of-way.
short shots
When overtaking or passing, the boat being over-
taken has the right-of-way . Rowboats and sailboats
have the right-of-way over powerboats unless they
are overtaking a powerboat.

Medications and Hot 1/veather. If you take tetracy-

cline , tetracycline cousins like minocin and vibramy-
cin , or sulfa drugs like septra, bactrim , gantrasin ,
and gantanol , too much sun could cause skin blotch-
ing or sun poisoning . On the other hand , if you take
diuretic drugs like hydrochlorothiazide (hctz), lasix .
dyazide , or nygrotin , activities in high or intense heat
could cause electrolyte imbalance. If you ' re taking
any drugs , check with your doctor about the effect of
Crumby Toasters. If you let bread crumbs build up those drugs in sun and heat.
in your toaster, you may toast more than your break-
fast . Most toasters have trays on the bottom for easy
cleaning , so clean them regularly . Swimming Pools. Don 't let anyone dive into an
above-ground swimming pool , warns the National
Swimming Pool Foundation. A swimmer won 't be
Charcoal. Serious fires have started by sponta- able to glide out and up safely . One out of eight seri-
neous combustion of charcoal. Store it in a venti- ous spinal-cord injuries is from a diving accident.
lated , dry place, away from the house . If it gets wet , And be careful when handling swimming pool chemi-
don't bring it inside; use it outside or get rid of it. cals , especially powdered chlorine . When it's com-
bined with water , hydrochloric acid is formed and
se rious burns could follow .
Who 's the Fish? If you get snagged with a fish hook
past the barb , the Red Cross recommends that you
cut the line , bandage the wound , and go to a hospital A Note to Golfers. Don 't give those golf balls with
to have it removed . Don 't remove it yourself. broken surfaces to small ch ildren to play with . If the
outer surface is peeled off , the fluid core might ex-
plode .
Air Conditioners on Boats. Make sure there's a
safe distance between the generator exhaust and
the air conditioner intake on your boat. Otherwise , Diving Boards. Check that they are level. If a board
on hot, calm days, the air conditioner could suck car- is tilted up , a diver could hit it coming down . If the
bon monoxide fumes into the cabin . board is tilted down , a diver could be thrown out be-
yond the diving area .

Don't Sink at the Dock . Is your bilge pump work-

ing? Regularly clean the bilge and pump strainer, Burglaries. Most burglaries occur between 9:30
check for leaks, and insure there's an adequate a.m. and 3:30p.m. when there is no one home. Ac-
power source for the pump. An adequate power cess is usually through unlocked or unsecured
source means regularly recharging and servicing doors, windows, and garages . Burglars also get tip-
the battery ; making sure your bilge pump is con- offs from newspaper ads , obituaries , and social an-
nected to a power source, even with the master nouncements-make sure your address isn 't in
switch turned off; and checking for blown fuses , them. And if you ' re home when someone breaks in ,
shorted out wiring, and corrosion of wires and don 't confront them. Some of us might feel like an-
switches . tiques , but we can't be replaced .

14 JULY 1983
SHARPENING
THE
FALCON'S
TALONS
The F-16 Fighting Falcon is re- The movable control stick 1s a
ceiving its first major depot-level major Pacer-Loft I modification in
modifications through a program the cockpit. The original F-16 had
called Pacer-Loft I. a stationary stick that picked up
Pacer-Loft I sa package of 150 the pressure from the pilot's hand
possible modifications that en- and relayed the information to a
hance the avionics and weapons computer for flight control. A new
delivery systems in the Air control stick with some flexibility
Force's multi mission fighter. was designed to give pilots a bet- Up to 17 F-16s at a time can be
The modifications are being in- ter feel of flying the airplane. accommodated. Eighty-nine
stalled on 140 F-16A and B model To make this change, workers planes have been modified so far ,
aircraft at the Ogden Air Logistics on the maintenance production and the program is scheduled for
Center, Hill AFB , Utah. line remove the stick component completion in August.
F-16s are manufactured in and send it to General Dynamics The F-16 is the first aircraft
blocks of planes in a similar con- for modification. Tne cockpit with no mechanical connections
figuration. Technical advances hardware and wiring on the from the cockpit to the flight con-
are incorporated in the system's planes are then modified to trols. Its "fly by wire" technology
design on the production line, so match the new stick configura- allows a pilot to control the air-
the modification requirements tion. craft's flight with computers .
vary from plane to plane. Workers remove the "black Pacer-Loft I modifications are
Pacer-Loft I is designed to boxes " containing computer improving the sophisticated F-16
bring those F-16s manufactured parts and ship them to the manu- to make it even better. " Most of
in Blocks 1 and 5 to the Block 10 facturer for modifications. They the equipment on the F-16 is new
configuration. Aircraft in this pro- then install the wiring and hard- and innovative and will set the
gram were manufactured in ware changes to match the im- pace for the next decade," said
1978, 1979,and1980. proved components returned by 0 . Dale Quinlan , chief of the F-16
"When the airplane leaves our the manufacturers . Operational Production Management Branch
depot, it will be a Block 10 air- checks on various systems such at the Ogden ALC.
plane electronically, " said Ken as the radar and flight control are The F-16 is the first fighter air-
Adams, F-16 Planning Section , also done by the workers. craft designed and co-manufac-
Aircraft Division , at Hill AFB . The improvements organize tured by more than one country.
Maj. Bob Barrett , Ogden ALC the control configuration so a Pacer-Loft I modifications are
test pilot for the F-16 , said, "One pilot can easily switch from a also being incorporated on
of the modifications puts in a plane made in one of the produc- planes from the same production
movable stick that gives better re- tion blocks to one made in blocks in Belgium, Norway, Den-
sponse and the pilot a better feel another. Prior to Pacer-Loft I, mark , and The Netherlands.
of the airplane . It's always been a changes made in the cockpit area Those planes are being modified
fun airplane to fly , and the were not matched to the configu- in European depots. (LOGNEWS)
changes just make it easier. " ration of earlier models. ~

TAC ATTACK 15
F-4G Advanced Wild Weasel
 HYDRAULIC LEAKS: Is the

By TSgt Robert E. Ostenfeld uals that the leak is within limits? Can you effectively
127TFWMAQ and positively determine the exact problem without
applying full aircraft hydraulic operational pressure?
The answer is no. No technical order will tell you that
Just picture yourself as a crew chief on the flight an aircraft is safe to fly with fluid leaking from a hy-
line, helping an aircraft commander preflight for an draulic fitting.
early morning sortie . During the walkaround, the I do not mean that you cannot have hydraulic
pilot notices hydraulic fluid leaking from a fitting . leaks in your systems . You can, but within the tech
You are asked by the pilot, "Is the aircraft safe to order hydraulic limits for specific components.
fly? " You then respond, "Sure, I saw that leak during These hydraulic components are individually identi-
my preflight inspection , it's only a static leak." fied in the T.O. giving the maximum leakage rates .
But is the aircraft safe to fly? Can you prove with- You will find , however , that the maximum leakage
out troubleshooting or referencing technical man- rates given are for individual hydraulic components

18 JULY 1983
aircraft safe to fly ?

and not for general hydraulic nuts, plugs, bolts , or fit- clean with a shop towel to remove any evidence of
tings . hydraulic fluid leaking.
For some unknown reason , some of us are under "Smoking/Reefing " -an incorrect maintenance
the impression that, in some cases, hydraulic leaks practice used to tighten "B" nuts that are leaking.
from nuts , plugs , bolts , and fittings are serviceable This is usually done without a torque wrench and
and within limits. This is not correct and is against with pressure on the system .
technical order directives. "Allowable , minor , or static leakage"-incorrect
Crew chiefs, aircraft mechanics, and specialists terms to justify leakage from hydraulic fittings. Al-
have developed their own terminology and mainte- lowable , minor, or static terms are only applicable to
nance practices when repairing hydraulic fittings specific hydraulic components listed in T.O . 's giving
that are leaking. Some examples are- the maximum allowable leakage rates.
" Rag wrenching " or "evidence removing"- an All of the terminologies mentioned as examples
incorrect maintenance practice of wiping fittings are against T.O. 1-1A-8 directives . In turn , they
cause needless aborts, hydraulic system failures ,
and lost manhours. As maintenance managers, we
must ensure that aircraft hydraulic systems are
maintained correctly . Here are some tips that might
help you .
Ensure that all suspected hydraulic fitting leaks
are pressure checked. Correct discovered leaks in
accordance with the particular aircraft 's technical
order.
If a leak is discovered from a tube assembly
when pressure is on the system, you should never
torque , as this will tend to cut the flare without add-
ing any apppreciable torque to the fitting . This
means tighten fittings without pressure applied and
follow tech data to maintain proper torque.
Be familiar with all hydraulic system component
leakage limits .
Make sure all hydraulic components are within
T.O. limits and allowable fluid leakage is monitored
closely .
Look and keep track of the condition of the air-
craft 's tubing and fittings . This will prevent future
line and fitting leaks .
Do not just remove and replace damaged hy-
draulic fittings. They can be repaired in some cases .
In addition , be familiar with tubing damage limita-
tions in accordance with tech data.
When unsure or in doubt about aircraft hydrau-
lic leaks, refer to your hydraulic tech order and the
Structural Hardware Manuai ,T.0 .1-1A-8, Section 13.

TAC ATTACK 19
 chock talk

incidents and

The Long And The The ground safety observer quickly signaled the
aircraft mechanic in the cockpit to shut down both
engines . The mechanic did shut them down , but it
Short of It was too late . The comm cord knocked out nine sets
of engine fan blades.
After going through a 200-hour phase inspection , The whole incident could have been prevented by
an A-1 0 was towed to the engine trim pad and tied simply following the tech data. A remote trimming
down . The left engine was trimmed first ; then the device should have been attached to the engine
right engine was started . After the right engine ran before it was run . The crew took what they thought
for a few minutes at military power, the ground crew was a short cut, and their supervisor let them violate
could see that the engine needed to be trimmed . the tech data.
The aircraft mechanic in the cockpit pulled the This particular short cut cost $27 ,000 in the long
throttle back to idle . An engine mechanic brought a run .
ladder over and put it in front of the right wing. He
climbed up the ladder, stepped over the slat, hopped
up on top of the fuselage , and walked to the rear of
the aircraft between the engines, dragging his com-
munications cord behind him. Both engines were at
idle .
No Chance To Fly
The engine mechanic began to adjust the T-5 am-
plifier on top of the right engine . Suddenly his com- B ecause it had suffered foreign object damage
munications cord was pulled from his earphones ; (FOD}, the right engine on an F-4 had to be changed .
the cord was sucked into the right engine , ripping the After the engine change, the airplane was towed to
other end of the cord out of the ground communica- the trim pad for an engine run late in the afternoon .
tions recep ta cle. Its intake screens were removed , the intakes in-
spected , and the screens replaced . The engine
started normally ; but when the throttle was moved
forward out of idle , the supervisor saw sparks com-
ing from the tailpipe . He had the crew shut down the
engine .
A check showed that the engine compressor sec-
tion had suffered foreign object damage . Again the
engine would have to be replaced .
About the time the FOD was discovered , the en-
gine specialist who had inspected the intake noticed
that his flashlight was missing . This specialist was
undergoing training . Just as he was crawl ing out of
the intake after his inspection , an instructor had ap-
proached him to discuss filling out the aircraft forms .
Distracted by the discussion , neither the specialist

20 JULY 1983
INCIDENTALS WITH A MAINTENANCE SLANT _ _ _ _ _ __

nor the instructor properly checked the intake area engine master switch. Then he made a successful
before replacing the screen . Guess where the flash- single-engine landing .
light was. About a month earlier, the throttle control box was
We 've got to finish one job before we get dis- found to be worn . It was removed and replaced . Dur-
tracted by another . And as supervisors, we need to ing this work the main fuel control crossover shaft
let our workers finish the job they're working on be- was installed wrong . The crossover shaft has a
fore we distract them. If we have to interrupt a job , quarter-inch groove in it about V2 inch from the end.
we'd better make sure we start over in the checklist The crossover shaft fits into the throttle control
at a point well before the interruption . torque shaft universal, and a quarter-inch bolt is sup-
Otherwise, we 'll have more incidents like this . And posed to go through the universal and seat in the
it 's awfully discouraging when we can't even get a groove in the crossover shaft. That bolt holds the two
sortie on an airplane between FOD incidents . shafts together.
When an engine specialist installed this crossover
shaft , he didn't push it far enough into the universal
shaft . It stopped short of the bolt holes . The bolt then
F-4 Stuck Throttle was inserted into the universal; and since it went all
the way through , the specialist assumed the bolt was
As he pulled off from a dive bomb pass , the F-4 seated in the groove. After inserting the bolt, the
pilot noticed that when he moved the left throttle, it specialist didn't check the integrity of the two shafts.
had no effect on the left engine . The engine rpm A supervisor inspected the work done by the
stayed at 100 percent. The aircrew decided to divert specialist, but he also neglected to check the integri-
to a nearby recovery base. On final approach , the ty of the shafts . The supervisor signed off the red-X
pilot shut down the left engine by turning off the in the forms .
The tightened bolt provided enough clamping
force to hold the crossover shaft in the universa: for
14 sorties before the shaft separated on this sortie .
When the two shafts became disconnected , the
throttle could no longer control the engine . That
situation was foreseen in the tech order, which in-
cludes a caution to " assure the bolt engages under-
cut of crossover shaft after installation to prevent
throttle from becoming disconnected. "
Ironically, the same specialist who had neglected
that caution happened to be sent TOY to the divert
field to fix the airplane . He 's the one who discovered
and reported his own error in installing the bolt. That
embarrassing experience probably drove the point
home better than any lecture on tech order com-
pliance could have .
The rest of us can get the lesson without the
embarrassment-if we take it to heart.

TAC ATTACK 21
CHOCK TALK
the malfunction . However, after this incident the
gear system was again investigated . This time the in-
F-5 Landing Gear vestigators found that two microswitches in the gear
handle control box were sticking in the up position .
Collapses Two other microswitches were out of tolerance .
Because of the bad microswitches , the control box
Before starting an F-5E, the pilot confirmed all was sending a gear-up command to the selector
switches normal with the gear handle down . He had valve no matter what the position of the handle was .
three green lights indicating the gear was down, but Both the pilot and the crew chief did a poor job of
the red light in the gear handle was on , and the land- preflighting. They both failed to check that the gear
ing gear warning horn was sounding . The landing door switch was normal. The cockpit indications
gear alternate release handle was in the reset posi- should have been understood as a warning that
tion . These are the same indications that a pilot nor- either the gear door switch was open or the gear
mally sees before shutting down after the crew chief was unsafe . They both missed the warning .
has opened the gear doors. But besides those obvious errors that showed a
The pilot didn 't have the crew chief check the po- lack of understanding of the system , we ' re stil l
sition of the gear door switch , but he tried to signal to bothered by something else in this mishap. Why was
the crew chief about the red light in the handle . it that the troubleshooters the night before couldn 't
Thinking that the pilot was pointing to a missing bulb , find the bad microswitches? Must we wait until after
the crew chief gave the pilot a thumbs-up. The pilot a mishap to conduct a really thorough investigation?
started the left engine. As soon as the utility hy-
draulic pressure built up , the nose gear retracted.
The airplane's nose settled onto its pitot boom and
Two Cardinal Sins
During a 4-G pullout from a bombing run , the air-
crew in an F-111 heard a loud bang. They checked
the engine instruments ; everything appeared nor-
mal. So they returned to base and made a normal
landing .
Afterwards, foreign object damage was found in
the right engine. Several first stage fan blades were
nicked, and a rivet stem was stuck in the upper blow-
in door. The aircraft was impounded and checked
over more thoroughly. Several rivet stems and
shanks were found laying between the inner and
outer blow-in door segments .
Before this sortie the intake skin had been re-
moved to repair a defective rib . All three outer seg-
"" ' I . ..
••
ments of blow-in doors were removed during the
repair . But none of this work was documented in the
aircraft forms. So supervisory inspections and in-
process inspections weren 't done, and the loose
nose gear door. The pilot aborted the start and rivets laying in the blow-in doors went undetected .
climbed out of the airplane . Two cardinal sins of aircraft maintenance were
The day before , the landing gear had twice failed committed here. The job site wasn 't cleaned up; for-
to extend normally in flight. The handle had to be eign objects were left where they could damage an
cycled to get the gear down . Maintenance trouble- airplane . And the work wasn 't documented ; as are-
shot the problem that night but could not duplicate sult, the first error wasn 't discovered .

22 JULY 1983
CREW CHIEF
SAFETY
AWARD
Ate JOHN WHORLEY of the 1st Tactical Fighter
Wing, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, is this
month's winner of the Crew Chief Safety Award. He is
an EC-135 crew chief with the I st Aircraft Mainte-
nance Unit, 1st Equipment Maintenance Squadron.
During a preflight inspection of an EC-135, Airman
Whorley found an aft body fuel sump drain that was
leaking. He tried several times to reseat the drain but
couldn't because something was clogging it. Here-
moved the old drain and found some tiny coal-like
granules. Airman Whorley then had the fuel tested;
the granules turned out to be charcoal. The aircraft
was grounded and further investigation revealed a
large foreign object in the tank.
Airman Whorley's attention to detail and concern
for safety averted the loss of this EC- 135 and pre-
vented contamination of other aircraft scheduled to be A 1C John Whorley
refueled. He has earned the Tactical Air Command
Crew Chief Safety Award.

INDIVIDUAL
SAFETY
AWARD
MscT JUAN M. MESA, squadron safety NCOIC
with the 354th Equipment Maintenance Squadron,
354th Tactical Fighter Wing, Myrtle Beach Air Force
Base, South Carolina, is this month's winner of the
Tactical Air Command Individual Safety Award.
Sergeant Mesa noticed a fire in the carport of a fam-
ily housing unit. He ran to the house to warn the occu-
pants of the fire, and at the same time he told someone
to notify the fire department. When everyone was out
of the house, Sergeant Mesa started to fight the fire.
Using a garden hose, he fought the fire until the heat
became too intense. But his efforts contained the fire
to the carport area until the fire department arrived.
Sergeant Mesa's actions reduced the severity of the MSgt Juan M. Mesa
fire and prevented personal injury to the occupants.
He has earned the Individual Safety Award.

TAC ATTACK 23
 MOTORCYCLIST'S

We bikers are sometimes our

own worst enemies! After all the
numbers were counted at the end
of last year, we learned that 84
percent of all Air Force personnel
killed in cycle mishaps died be-
cause they made an operator
error!
Although stats can sometimes
be deceptive or misinterpreted,
that statistic should make us all
stop and think. Why did 49 bikers
make driving errors that cost
them their lives? Death is a high
price to pay for one error on the
road . The reasons can also be
found in those year-end stats.
Bear with me a minute and check
out these numbers : 49 percent of
those killed were under the influ-
ence of alcohol ; 59 percent of the
fatal crashes were the result of
excessive speeds; 49 percent
failed to negotiate a turn .
Now I know that we love to
blame all of our problems on the
road on the car drivers , but those

24 JULY 1983
WORST ENEMY By TSgt Donald G. Stormoen
388 TFW Ground Safety

numbers say that isn't neces- The two-second following that we may not know it all, and
sarily the case. Again we ask distance rule (or do some of get some more training. After all,
why? Why did that Air Force mo- us think that we can out we are in a constant training
torcycle rider drink, speed, and brake that car driver, so we mode to learn our jobs, so why
then fail to make that turn? The tail gate?) not apply that same concept to
answer, or at least part of the an- A head check before pass- something as complex as riding
swer, could be in education-or ing or making lane changes that new high-tech motorcycle?
lack thereof. Because, you see, The lane split when traffic is (By the way, 80 percent of the
only nine percent of those dead heavy fatal crashes involved bikes over
riders had attended a formal, How many of us would be 500 cc.)
hands-on cycle safety course like dumb enough to lend our bikes to So let's clean up our own act
the Motorcycle Safety Founda- a buddy not knowing how well he before we throw stones. Sign up
tion (MSF) Better Biking Program. or she can ride? (Six of last year's for that Better Biking program or
This program teaches even ex- fatalities were on borrowed MOST II course at your base. If
perienced riders how to react bikes.) And if you can believe it, there isn't one in your area, write
properly in an emergency situa- 14 of those killed were riding to the Motorcycle Safety Founda-
tion. Reacting properly is the key without helmets! tion, Chadds Ford West, P.O. Box
to surviving. Dr. Harry Hurt, him- Without trying to sound like a 279, Chadds Ford, PA, 19317, or
self a biker, studied over 900 bike know-it-all, I think I may have call toll-free 800-441-7676. Or
mishaps and found that in over 75 another answer to those whys. It better yet, offer your commander
percent of them, the biker made is our ego that gets us bikers into or safety office your assistance
the wrong move or no move at all most of our troubles. I can re- and become involved, become an
to avoid the mishap. In view of member that my first ride on my MSF Instructor.
these stats, we are going to have first bike took all of 2.5 seconds! If you are ever in the area, stop
to start rethinking our attitudes on At the age of 16 my ego would not in, and we'll talk scoots; or call
riding if we are to allow me to admit I did not know me at AUTOVON 458-3402.
survive. how to ride. So I popped the clutch,
Another part of the answer twisted my right wrist while the
could be harder to get at. How front wheel clawed the air, and Editor's Note: A couple of
many of us can truthfully say that the bike bounced off from the other statistics have gotten our
we know- garage wall as I watched from the attention, too. Nearly half of
how fast we can really stop prone position. Real the operators involved had less
that muscle-bike of ours; dumb-right? You bet it was than six months experience on
how to use out-tracking to dumb. But it is the same kind of their bikes. Eighty-four percent
avoid a road hazard; ego that allows a biker to get were under 25 years of age.
what happens to the attitude drunk, borrow a "friend's" bike, And 96 percent of the Air Force
of the bike when we grab a and take off. operators in fatal motorcycle
handful of brake after com- I may have sounded pretty neg- accidents last year had not at-
ing into a corner too hot; ative about our chances on the tended a certified, hands-on
what lane position is right in road, and I may have stepped on motorcycle skills training pro-
all situations? a few attitudes, but my only con- gram. Those numbers are try-
How many of us use the cern is for us, the bikers. Let's ing to tell us something-are
following? swallow some of that pride, admit we listening?

TAC ATTACK 25
WEAPONS WORDS
Arming O ut of The drive socket for the release/lock mechanism
Sequen ce looks like and is located near the umbilical exten-
sion/retraction drive. It can be easily misidentified.
An F-151oaded with AIM-7F missiles needed However, if the safety pin were installed , the mech-
some maintenance work with electrical power on . anism could not have been actuated. That's why,the
So all the missiles were safed and umbilicals discon- sequence of steps in the tech order is to first con-
nected. After the maintenance job was completed , a nect the umbilicals , then arm the missiles .
weapons load crew was tasked to reconnect the um- Even though the situation was a little out of the or-
bilicals and rearm the missiles . The job was a little dinary in this case , the load crew chief could have
different than the normal missile loading routine, but ensured that the correct sequence was used by sim-
the load crew chief didn't take the time to brief his ply telling the number 3 man to wait until the ur:nbili-
crew on how to coordinate their tasks. Instead he cals were connected before arming the missiles . At
simply told the number 2 man to connect the umbili- the very least, he should have stopped the operation
cals and the number 3 man to arm the missiles. and started over when he saw the number 2 man
The number 2 man was slightly delayed . By the working on an armed missile.
time he got to the airplane, the number 3 man had al-
ready armed three of the AIM-7s . So the number 2
man started to work on one of the armed missiles .
Since the missile was armed, the release/lock mech-
F-16 Gun Jam
anism was not protected by a safety pin . The load An F-16 on a dart mission fired 90 rounds from its
crew chief saw that the number 2 man was working nose gun on the first pass. Everything seemed nor-
on an armed missile ; he warned him of the danger mal. The pilot set up for a second pass; this time
but didn 't stop the operation . When the number 2 when he pulled the trigger, he heard a loud pop . He
man tried to extend the umbilical , he actually in- immediately let go of the trigger and safed the gun .
serted his ratchet into the release/lock mechanism Return to base was uneventful .
by mistake. He rotated the ratchet, and the missile When the gun was installed , the weapons crew
crashed to the ground . had not adjusted the conveyor elements in the gun
system chutes correctly . So the elements jumped
the track and became jammed in chute A. As the gun
system rotated rapidly during firing , chute A was torn
apart, and the bracket support was pulled away from
the access unit. That stopped the gun's rotation . The
pop the pilot heard was probably the chute coming
apart .
Better training can help prevent errors of this kind .
But this unit also recommended more inprocess in-
spections by load crew supervisors during the instal-
lation of a gun system . That should help make sure
that the training has taken hold.

26 JULY 1983
Gun Gas Residue or during phase inspection. Maintenance operating
Overheats Engine instructions also created procedures for using
MMICS to insure that the engine washes and gun in-
A n A-1 0 on a surface-attack training mission was spections were done when they were due.
on its third hot strafe pass when the Right Engine This particular engine had been recently over-
Hot light and the Master Caution light both lit up. The hauled . It had only flown 63 hours since it was in-
pilot immediately started to climb. Seeing that the stalled on the airplane. But weapons flight 's muni-
engine temperature was 1,100 degrees Celsius , he tions records showed that the gun had fired 6,700
pulled the throttle to idle. At idle the temperature rounds from the time the engine was installed until
dropped to 1,000 degrees , and the rpm fell to 56 per- the time of the overtemp . Although the gun had fired
cent. The low rpm triggered the automatic start cy- more than twice the 3,000-round limit, the engines
cle for the right engine , so the pilot shut down the had not been washed .
right engine . He landed at a nearby emergency field. A closer look showed that the records of round ex-
penditures in MMICS was not up to date for most of
the aircraft in this unit . So most of the water washes
were being done during phase inspections , or else
they were scheduled by flight hour accumulation .
The system wasn 't working because weapons ,
scheduling , and documentation workers weren't
comply ing with the written procedures . And the unit
supervisors weren 't ensuring compliance .
We know we have a problem with ingestion of gun
gas in the A-1 0 engine . Residue buildup reduces the
stall margin of the engine, leading to compressor
stalls and flameouts. Water washing the engines is
the only way to prevent that.
Cleanliness may not be next to godliness , but in
the A-1 0 engine it comes right after fire, fuel , and air.
Even with MMICS, it 's up to us to make sure that the
information on rounds fired gets to the people who
keep the engines clean . In other words , we have to
Borescope inspection of the engine later showed communicate with each other to get the job done .
no damage but did reveal a large accumulation of
gun gas residue on the compressor blades . Crossed Wires Blow
The tech data requires water washing the engines
after every 2,800 rounds fired through the gun . Local Tank
instructions in this unit called for doing the water C onfigured with a centerline tank, a TER , and a
wash and the 3,000-round gun lubrication inspection SUU-20 , an F-16 flew a surface-attack mission . With
at the same time , whether scheduled , unscheduled , the SU U-20 selected on the first radar laydown pass ,

TAC ATTACK 27
WEAPONS WORDS The Burst Is Real
On a local exercise, the exercise evaluation
the pilot pressed the pickle button prior to there- team (EET) was simulating terrorist infiltration. The
lease cue. The centerline tank immediately fell off scenario called for setting off a ground burst simula-
the airplane. It hit in some mud flats on the gunnery tor near the security police law enforcement build-
range. The airplane returned to base with no ing An EET member pulled the arming lanyard on an
damage. M115A2 ground burst simulator and dropped it on
sloped concrete about 20 feet in front of the law en-
forcement building. The simulator rolled downhill on
the smooth concrete until it was right next to the
building . Then it went off and blew four windows out.
No one was hurt.
Incident after incident shows us that there's a lot
of burst in those ground burst simulators . Using one
requires forethought on what the effects of the burst
might be.

Another A-10
Loses a TER
An A-1 0 was on a weapons delivery mission with
When the weapons release system was tested on 12 BDU-33 practice bombs . The bombs were loaded
the ground, troubleshooters discovered a firing volt- on four TER-9/As on stations 3, 4, 8, and 9. Selecting
age on the aft breech of the centerline pylon MAU-12 stations 4 and 8 first, the pilot flew six passes andre-
whenever one of the other stations was selected, leased all the bombs on those stations. Then he
Master Arm was set to Arm, and the pickle button switched off stations 4 and 8 and selected stations 3
was pressed . With the pylon removed , the aircraft and 9. The seventh pass also went normally. But
system checked out fine. when the pilot pressed the pickle button on the next
The pylon was taken to the shop and tested on the pass, the whole TER on station 3 fell off the airplane.
75500 weapons tester; it failed. The wires to two pins
at the fuselage-pylon disconnect were reversed .
These reversed wires allowed the current to flow to
the aft breech , bypassing the normal routing, as
soon as power was available-that is, when any sta-
tion was selected, Master Arm was armed, and the
pickle button was pressed.
Several months earlier, the pylon had been modi-
fied to comply with a TCTO replacing pylon release
relays. At that time, the fuselage-pylon disconnect
was found to be bad and was replaced. After the
work was done, the pylon was assigned to in-use
status. Apparently it was not checked on the 75500
tester . When the pylon was loaded on the airplane, it
passed the functional check and the jettison check The TER-9/A cable had not been properly installed
because the tester showed voltage present only to the cable attachment on the station 3 pylon. When
when the switches were set. the pilot hit the pickle button , the current was mis-
The only chance of catching the error would have dir~cted, causing the weapons release system to
been in the shop-if the tester had been used. But sense a single store and release the TER .
the work in the shop was done by several different Nothing new here . Load crews failing to correctly
shifts. The shift that finished the work didn 't think of install cannon plugs have cost us other TERs off of
testing the work that had gone before. So the tester A-1 Os. It simply is a matter of not paying attention to
didn't get the chance to help pay for itself. detail-a bad sign if you're working with weapons .

28 JULY 1983
LETTERS

Dear Editor
Your "Reminders to Motorcyclists" (April83
"Short Shots") was full of real good information.
However, in skid control, to follow the instruction to
steer in the direction of the skid would result in a seri- now say to point the nose of the car the way you want
ous spill. A motorcycle is a gyroscopic device; when to go. It's easier to understand and apply, even though
the rear skids out of the plane of travel, it will tend to both statements really say the same thing.
~urn if the front wheel is maintained in the plane of Thanks for pointing out the problem to us.
tra~l. If an attempt is made to turn in the direction of
ED
skid, both wheels will be out of their gyro plane and
enter into gimbal lock by the momentum of the mass Dear Editor
in motion. I feel! must disagree with a statement made by Ma-
Bikers, hold the front wheel in the direction you jor Mike Lichty in the April83 article "Views from
were traveling when the rear wheel lost traction and re- Flight Safety." He stated on page 5 that an F-4 WSO
duce speed by easing off on the throttle; the rear wheel should have intentionally refused to comply with the
will follow the front wheel into its proper path of pilot's decision concerning the position of the com-
travel. The key is that the steering head is a single- mand selector valve (CSV) during an in-flight emer-
point hinge, and you are the control to maintain one- gency. He maintained that "the WSO, in exercising
half of that hinge in proper alignment. sound judgment, should have advised the pilot he was
Keep up the good work. Your tips on motorcycles complying with the checklist and opened the CSV. ''
sure get my attention. I now quote from the subject block of
ALSAFECOM 002/1983, titled "Who's in Charge
WILLIAM E. SHUMAKER
Here?"
MSF Instructor #5473
I. Some recent incidents affecting flight safety pro-
Tyndall AFB, FL
mpt an old story that needs retelling. It involves
the question of command in multi place aircraft.
Dear Mr. Shumaker 2. AFRs 60-1 and 60-16lay it out clearly. The pilot
What you say makes sense. But so does the original in command is designated on orders. He/ she is
article, if it's correctly applied. For instance, the Mo- responsible for the safety of the aircraft anckts
torcycle Safety Foundation's Motorcycle Rider Course occupants. This responsibility cannot be abro-
tells cyclists to "steer slightly in the direction of the gated nor can it be usurped by any other crew-
skid. A rear wheel skid can be overcome by turning member, regardless of rank or aeronautical
slightly in the direction of the skid." rating. Failure on either side of this equation
The difference between that and what you say is could lead to disastrous consequences.
more apparent than real. If the bike's rear skids out, 3. This message should fall on two sets of ears.
say to the right, and you turn the handlebars to stay First, for those in command of the aircraft, be
pointed in the direction you were traveling, you will be sure all know it. Speak up-Don't be timid. It is
turning slightly to the right, in the direction of the your responsibility . For those not, and senior to
skid. Turning further right, however, could result in a the pilot in command-respect his authority and
loss of control. So your suggestion to just keep the equally important, his responsibility. The cock-
front wheel pointed in the desired direction of travel is pit is no place to pull rank.
better; it prevents overcorrecting. I also disagree with the pilot's decision to overrule
The confusion here is similar to the confusion about the checklist. His judgment should be questioned, but
steering a car in the direction of skid. That's why we not overruled in the air. In-flight emergencies are no

TAC ATTACK 29
LETTERS of a "Gold Key" to properly secure the lap belt when
being used for flight. The "Gold Key" is attached to
the zero-delay lanyard which in turn is attached to the
personnel parachute. When there is no occupant and
the ejection seat is empty, a washer (part number
place for committee meetings. Someone must have the
AN960C916) attached to the ejection seat's oxygen
final say. That person must be the aircraft com-
hose is to be used to latch the belt for solo flight. In-
mander. How can someone in T AC Flight Safety tell
structions on the proper installation and use of the
us to overrule his decision by our good judgment? It
washer are contained in TO 1A-37B-2-2. If someone
looks like a clarification is in order.
deviated from the procedures outlined in TO IA-37B-
Sincerely, 2-2, figure 4-17 A, evidently they did not use data pro-
FRANK SCOGGINS, Major, KSANG vided. Your article in TAC Attack on how a ball point
127 TFS, McConnell AFB, KS pen was used in place of the washer (recommended
procedure) implies that this approach of using a ball
Dear Major Scoggins point pen is widely used. We hope that in fact, it is an
Your concern is well founded. But I think we need isolated case. In all fairness to the technicians in the
to distinguish between the authority of the aircraft field, the article places them in unfavorable light be-
commander (or any superior, for that matter) and the cause the majority do follow the existing technical in-
lawfulness of a particular order. None of us has abso- structions.
lute authority, we are all governed by law. In our opin- To say that a new procedure was developed due to a
ion, the aircraft commander was not complying with nonexisting procedure is inaccurate. Attached for your
his written directions, so his order was not/awful. The review is a copy of the recommended procedures which
WSO isn't being asked to merely use his judgment to is extracted from TO 1A-37B-2-2, figure4-17A.
overrule the aircraft commander; he is being asked to When an unsatisfactory condition is noted, an MDR
follow written directives. must be submitted (CAT I orCA T II) in accordance
Of course, judgment is still involved. Those same di- with TO 00-350-54. These reports are forwarded to
rectives give the aircraft commander latitude in un- the prime ALC (for equipment affected) for evalua-
usual circumstances that may require exceptions to the tion of deficiency and analysis of specific items (ex-
checklist. In our reading of the situation, those un- hibit) which failed. An MDR was never received by us
usual circumstances didn't exist. This particular inci- (the prime ALC for HBU-2 Lap Belts) for evaluation
dent was exactly what the checklist procedure was de- of the deficiency as identified in the TA C Attack arti-
signed for. cle. Without complying with TO 00-350-54 for report-
The authority of the person giving the order is not at ing deficiencies, user organizations cannot and should
question. We all agree that the aircraft commander is not expect the prime ALC to resolve deficiencies iden-
in charge: he has full authority to carry out the direc- tified.
tives of those over him, and he has authority to choose
different techniques in many areas that are not gov- J. A. Noel, Deputy Chief
erned by directive. However, no one has the authority Item Management Division
to disregard directives. Director of Materiel Management
Finally, ALSAFECOM 00211983 was addressing a
completely different problem-rank versus authority. Dear Mr. Noel
Let's not confuse the issue of rank versus authority In all fairness to the technicians in the field, we
with the issue of compliance with sound procedures. should point out that the tech data you refer to is dated
ED after the incident we wrote about. At the time, there
were no written procedures covering the problem in
Dear Editor the A-37, although the T-37 has had procedures for
Reference is made to your article in TA C Attack years.
magazine, dated February 1983, titled "Ball point Pen You are right about the MDR; the unit should have
Cheats Seat." From reading your article, we conclude submitted one to ensure the materiel problem was
that the personnel involved were not familiar with the identified. The unit did, however, submit a high-
system or the data provided for proper use of the accident-potential (HAP) report; and your office was
equipment. an addressee.
The use of HBU-2 Lap Belts requires the installation ED
30 JULY 1983
 TA£: ·~~~ .:~
~__,

tac tally
TAC ANG AFR
THRU MAY THRU MAY THRU MAY
MAY 1983 1982
MAY 1983 1982
MAY 1983 1982

CLASS A MISHAPS 3 12 17 0 4 4 0 0 0
AIRCREW FATALITIES 0 4 9 0 3 2 0 0 0
TOTAL EJECTIONS 4 8 IS 0 4 4 0 0 0
SUCCESSFUL EJECTIONS 4 7 13 0 I 3 0 0 0

TAC'S TOP 5 thru MAY '83

lAC FTR/RECCE lAC AIR DEFENSE
class A mishap-free months class A mishap-free months
42 355 TTW 124 57 FIS
30 354 TFW 77 5 FIS
25 67 TRW 74 48 FIS
25 363 TFW 33 318 FIS
21 58 TTW 24 87 FIS

lAC-GAINED FTR/RECCE lAC-GAINED AIR DEFENSE lAC/GAINED Other Units

class A mishap-free months class A mishap-free months class A mishap-free months
133 188 TFG (ANG) 111 102 FIW 166 182 TASG (ANG)
125 138 TFG (ANG) 107 177 FIG 150 110 TASG (ANG)
124 917 TFG (AFR) 73 125 FIG 146 USAF TAWC
121 116 TFW (ANG) 56 119 FIG&142 FIG 138 84 FITS
111 434 TFW (AFR) 43 120 FIG 134 105 TASG (ANG)

CLASS A MISHAP COMPARISON RATE

(BASED ON ACCIDENTS PER 100 ,000 HOURS FLYING TIME )

1983 6.9 5.3 3.4 3.8 4.0

TA
c 1982 7.8 5.7 5.9 5.2 5.9
3.4
AN I 9 83 9. I 7.0 4.4 4.3

G 1982 0.0 2.7 3.2 3.4 3.6

0.0 0.0 0.0
AF 1983 0.0 0.0

R 1982 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1983-639-023/1