TAC Attack

December 1982

Season's Greetings
 Angle ..
of
Attack

Can you believe the end of 1982 is almost Fleagle gives us a bonus this month-a New
here? So far, it looks like a better year. But let's Year's Eve caution on the back cover and a holi-
not rejoice too soon; we have a very difficult day reunion inside. All of us here in the TAC
month in front of us. Office of Safety share Fleagle's sentiments in
During this month, stop and think ahead be- wishing you a happy holiday season.
fore you wear yourself out trying to get every- Nothing can ruin the holiday spirit like injury
thing done at once. The article " Fatigue at Night: to or loss of a loved one. Let's do everything we
A Case History" shows what acute fatigue can can, on the ground and in the air, to keep this hol-
do to us. Don't forget, as we approach the holi- iday season happy.
days, our off-duty time can get more hectic and
be less restful. Don't take on more than you can
handle, and don't schedule your people for more

R~;-:q, USAF
than they are capable of doing safely.
December 22 is the official beginning of win-
ter. If you're considering how to fight winter's
cold and still keep your fuel bills down, take a
look at "Wood Stoves and Kerosene Heaters." Chief of Safety
The problems of winter heating are accompanied
by safety considerations. So don't buy an auxili·
ary heater blindly.

2 NOVEMBER 1982
 DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HON VERNE ORR
SECRETARY OF THE
AIR FORCE

GEN W.L. CREECH

COMMANDER Contents
War Stories 4
Aircrew of Dist inction 6
TAC T ips 7
Wood Stoves and Kerosene Heaters 10
Monthly Safety Awards 13
Fatigue at Night: A Case Study 14
COL RICHARD K. ELY
AT-38 16
CHIEF OF SAFETY
Fleagle 's Christmas Homecoming 18
MAJ JIM MACKIN Quarterly Safety Awards 21
EDITOR Chock Talk 22
The Overly Safe Ejection Seat 25
STAN HARDISON Weapons Words 26
ART EDITOR Down to Earth 28
Short Shots 30
MARTY DILLER TAC Tally 31
ED ITORIA L ASSISTANT

JOHN STEELE
STAFF ARTIST
TACRP 127-1
TAC Attack is not directive in nature . Recommendations are intended to comply with existing directives. Opinions expressed are
those of the authors and not necessarily the positions of TAC or USAF. Mishap information does not identify the persons, places, or units
involved and may not be construed as incriminating under Article 31 of the USMJ. Photos and artwork are representative and not
necessarily of the aircraft or equipment involved .
Contributions are encouraged , as are comments and criticism . We reserve the right to edit all manuscripts for readability and good
taste . Write the Editor, TAC Attack , HQ TAC/SEPP, Langley AFB, VA 23665; or call AUTOVON 432-3658 .
Distribution (FX) is controlled by TAC/SEPP through the PDO, based on a ratio of 1 copy per 10 persons assigned . For DOD units oth-
er than USAF, there is no fixed ratio; requests will be considered individually.
Subscriptions are available from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office , Washington, D.C. 20402 . Price:
$14.00 domestic, $17.50 foreign per year. Single issues can be purchased for $2.50 domestic and $3 .15 foreign . All correspondence on
·1bscription service should be directed to the superintendent, not to TAC/SEPP.
\uthority to publish this periodical automatically expires on 26 Oct 1983 unless approval to continue is given before that date .
\ J AC Attack (USPS 531 -170) is published monthly by HQ TAC/SEPP, Langley AFB , VA. Second Class postage paid at Richmond,
--vA.
POSTMASTER : Send address changes to TAC Attack , TAC/SEPP, Langley AFB, VA 23665.

VOLUME 22 NUMBER 12
 war stories

fine line is crossed , and someone is looking to rip

your lips off.
By Lt Col James H. Wood
Where is that fine line? That is a very hard ques-
479 TTW Chief Stan/Eva I
tion to answer. It is fluid , much like mercury used in
thermometers. You ever try to pick that stuff up? It's
elusive. The line moves ; it is very dependent on in-
Ever wonder why the events that make a good war dividual experience , capability, and the conditions at
story happen? In combat most flying stories come the time it is approached . As IPs, it is part of our job
about because someone is shooting back, which is to know where that line is and never to cross it.
expected . But what about peacetime in the con- That is all well and good ; but if I cannot define it
trolled training environment? Not much shooting nor get a hold of it , what good is it, and how can I pre-
goes on , at least with real bullets. So how do the vent crossing it? The best answer I can offer is ex-
events to make a good war story come to pass? "Did perience . Believe it or not, that is why only highly ex-
you hear what happened .to old 'ACE-IP' today? Boy perienced and qualified pilots should become IPs.
he was lucky . .. . " So the story begins . Experience coupled with ability helps an individual to
There is an old saying that there is a fine line be- develop the sixth sense to know when he is ap-
tween an " Awshucks" and an "Attaboy. " Some days proaching that magical line. Ability and experience
everything goes perfect: you brush that line and in flying airplanes is something that is generally r ....--......
come out smelling like a rose, with a good war story. lacking among instructor pilots . Gaining experien,
Then other days everything isn 't quite perfect: that with students is an ongoing thing and something

4
L one of us will ever get enough of. Just as sure as may have recognized and corrected the situation by
the world turns, when you think you've seen it all , himself. All the while that magical fine line is rapidly
some one will show you a new way to do a hi yo-yo, being approached . On the other hand, what learning
an approach to landing, or a new formation wing po- is produced by flying around in ignorance? Igno-
sition . rance is bliss, right? I don 't think so-not with a thou-
How do you survive until you've had time to devel- sand knots of closure.
op that sixth sense? The same way you got your fly-
ing experience-either by being lucky or by being
semiconservative. The biggest difference when
gaining your own experience as a pilot compared to
that as an IP is that you had better control over your
own situation as a pilot. You knew your capabilities
and what was going on in your mind. Ever heard, "I
tried to stop him, but he did it before I realized he
was going to?" I believe I can safely say that no one
will know completely what someone else is thinking ,
especially in our business . It is far easier to know
what a student is not thinking than what he is. If the
airspeed is going berserk, you can bet he is not
thinking about airspeed. If airspeed is important,
who really cares what he was thinking as long as he
gets his mind back to what is important? That's the
job of the instructor: to teach him what is and isn 't
important and how to make it work right.
What then causes most IPs to get on the back side I don't have the answer for every· situation be-
~ f the magical line? I believe there are a couple of cause they are all different, but here are a few help-
reasons . First, overconfidence and inattention to de- ful hints. As a hard rule , I do not trust anyone when it
tails. Overconfidence in either himself or the student comes to flying an aircraft that I am responsible for.
will cause a relaxing on the IP 's part which can re- Yes, that even includes you , although you may be
sult in inattentiveness. Ever wonder why the state- the golden ace of the fighter force .
ment " the most dangerous aircraft is one in which Next, I divide all phases of flight into two cate-
two IPs are flying together" was made? Overconfi- gories : critical and noncritical. This is where ability
dence. comes into play. Any time I must take immediate ac-
The second reason is the approach , or method, of tion to prevent an accident or to prevent a danger-
training . The spectrum goes from total trial and error ous situation from developing, time is critical. There-
to a style that only allows perfection. The optimum fore , I am very close to the stick.l don 't ride the flight
point of teaching, I believe, is somewhere in be- controls because that is very annoying to the other
tween, and most of us use a combination. We dem- jock, no matter how light you think you are on the
onstrate maneuvers and watch the student's at- stick; but I'm only a gnat's hair away. For example,
tempt at duplication. The philosophy that a student you'll never see me in close formation with my arm
learns by his errors is true; however, that can be a resting on the canopy rail , no matter who is flying.
very expensive and time-consuming method of Same way on final approach , even if it is the third
learning. Pure trial and error started going out the one and everything up to that point has been wired.
window when man first began communicating and What I use as a guide is the amount of time I have to
passing on his experiences . This is why and how the react if something unforeseen happens. Hardware
IP comes into play. failures are hard to anticipate. However, think of the
The question that comes up is, At what point do I worst case that could happen in the situation , deter-
as an IP pass on my experience? The tendency to let mine the amount of time necessary for you to react,
the student experience the results or to recognize and that is how close you need to guard. If your reac-
and correct his mistakes has probably caused more tion time required is less than a nanosecond, you're
' ray hair (check mine after 2,000 hours IP time) across the magical line, and it is time to exercise
l nong IPs than anything else.The question is ,How your IP prerogative and do something .
"---rar can I let him go? If I take the airplane early, he Lastly, don 't assume anything . -~

TAC ATTACK 5
 AIRCREW of DISTINCTION

Maj William D. Patton 1Lt Christopher A. Singalewltch

390 TFS, 366 TFW 390 TFS, 366 TFW
Mountain Home AFB, ID Mountain Home AFB, 10
On 2 August 1982, MAJ WILLIAM D. PATION Major Patton radioed Salt Lake City Air Route
and 1ST l T CHRISTOPHER A. SINGALEWITCH were Traffic Control Center and got their help, which
flying an F·111A on a low-level route over south· included vectors for an emergency recovery at a
western Montana. Twenty-five minutes after they civilian airfield in southeastern Idaho. Major Pat·
began the low level, a large bird collided with the ton followed the single engine landing and hy-
right wing and right engine intake area. Major draulic failure checklists for proper configura-
Patton immediately began a climb. He felt severe tion during the recovery. Using emergency sys-
airframe vibrations and saw an illuminated right tems, he extended the landing gear and flaps
engine fire warning lamp. The right engine had while descending from 17,000 feet to a six-mile
failed. Lieutenant Singalewitch noticed a lit cau- final approach. He slowed the aircraft to on-
tion lamp for bleed-air duct failure. speed at one mile and then landed, stopping the
Both crewmembers quickly responded by car· aircraft with the emergency braking system.
rying out the critical action emergency proce- Without nosewheel steering available, the air-
dures. They shut down the right engine, pressed crew shut down on the runway and egressed
the right engine fire pushbutton, activated the safely.
fire extinguishing system, and turned off engine Postflight inspection of the aircraft confirmed
bleed air. The fire warning light soon indicated the wisdom of the fast-paced, orderly recovery.
the fire was extinguished. There were no other The aircraft had sustained significant engine and
indications of aircraft fire. fuselage damage caused by catastrophic fan
Then the aircrew noticed a caution lamp for blade failure and fire. The entire second stage of
the left engine primary hydraulic system. The the three stage fan blade section had broken off
light meant that all hydraulic demands were now from the rotor and departed radially through vari-
being met by a single pump. Major Patton contin· ous sections of the aircraft. A large hole could be
ued his climb to 18,000 feet, using afterburner on seen in one fuel tank and in the aft fuselage
the good engine, in order to get to a good ejec· above the right engine. Very little fluid was left in
tion altitude above adjacent mountain peaks and the operating hydraulic system; only Major Pat-
to improve radio communication with ground ton's prompt action in depressing the fire push-
agencies. Lieutenant Singalewitch selected navi· button, which isolated that hydraulic system, re-
gation aids for an emergency recovery field. tained enough fluid to power the flight controls.
Then he followed up their immediate actions by Major Patton and Lieutenant Singalewitch
referring to his emergency procedures check· saved the airplane with their timely actions and
lists. To handle the several malfunctions, Lieute· outstanding airmanship. By their performance
nant Singalewitch sequenced a half-dozen differ- during this critical emergency, they have proven
ent emergency procedures checklists into a logi· themselves worthy of the title Aircrew of Distinc-
cal, practical flow that greatly aided Major Pat· tion.
ton's actions.

6 DECEMBER 1982
 ... interest items,
TAC Tips
mishaps with
morals, for the
T AC aircrewman
If a little knowledge Ia dangerous, where Ia tfile Man who on the oxygen regulator. That didn't seem to help .
has so much as to be out of danger?
The IP in the back seat took the airplane , declared
an emergency, and began to descend.
Meanwhile , the front seater was moving the swit-
ches on the regulator, trying to get oxygen . As he
leaned over , the pilot's oxygen hose pulled off of his
'OW IMPORTANT IS OXYGEN? CRU-60 connector. When he tried to reconnect the
hose, he noticed that the rubber 0-ring on the CRU-
A T-33 took off on a training mission with a pilot 60 was twisted. The pilot repositioned the ring and
in the front seat and an instructor pilot (IP) in the hooked up the hose. The system gave normal flow in-
back. Passing 5,000 feet , both crewmembers ac- dications , and the pilot's hypoxia symptoms disap-
knowledged the climb check, which includes check- peared. The remainder of the return to base and lan-
ing oxygen pressure , flow , diluter lever, and hose ding were uneventful.
hookup. Passing 18,000 feet , the crew came up on Two points: First , the pilot did a poor PRICE check
another required oxygen check. This time the pilot in on preflight. He obviously didn 't inspect his connec-
front reported that the flow indicator didn 't seem to tions. He also didn 't do a blowback check or select
be working quite right. The blinker wasn 't opening 100 percent and Safety on the regulator. His 5,000-
completely. The crew continued their climb, but at foot check wasn't too pure either . He just didn 't
20,000 feet the pilot in front began feeling light- seem to take his oxygen checks seriously.
headed . He selected 100 percent oxygen and Safety Second, what was the !P doing? When your front
seater tells you his blinker isn 't working right, you
don 't let him continue the climb until he shows symp-
toms of hypoxia . It sounds to us like the instructor
didn 't take oxygen problems very seriously, either.

THE RUNWAY BEHIND YOU

Atter a weekend of heavy snow and freezing rain,
the first mission of the week for an A-1 0 unit returned
from the range and pitched out for an overhead pat-
tern.
The two wingmen took extra spacing in the pattern
as briefed to increase the separation on the runway
after landing. The flight was a little concerned about
stopping conditions. The pilot in number 3 decided

TAC ATTACK 7
 fore taxiing . When he came to the check of tht..
TAG Tips angle-of-attack vane alignment, the pilot unlocked
the canopy to reach the vane . The canopy abruptly
he was going to fly a short-field approach to give flew open then fell shut again . The pilot aborted that
himself more runway available to stop in . aircraft.
Number three set up a wider than normal pattern. In the days before this incident, the airplane had
When he turned final, his glide path was flatter than been covered by snow. During the daytime the tem-
usual, with a higher angle of attack. Just before perature rose enough for the snow to melt; at night
touchdown, the pilot felt the main gear hit a snow-
bank on the runway. Then he touched down 100 feet
past the threshold .
The tower operator saw the A-1 0 hit the snowbank

the melted snow would freeze again. Some of the

moisture froze inside the static ports.
but didn 't say anything on the radio because the roll- Neither the crew chief nor the pilot noticed that
out appeared normal. The airplane taxied all the way the static ports were clogged during their preflights.
to the chocks . There the ground crew noticed that When the pilot went through his cockpit checks, he
the left main gear fairing was missing. On the right neglected to open the cockpit vent door as the
main , besides damage to the fairing and brake lines, checklist says to do before starting . The checkliSt
the lower bracket of the hydraulic line scissors was also calls for opening the vent door before opening
broken. the canopy at any time to relieve cockpit pressure.
The 2 1/2-foot-high snowbank was on the runway The result of this series of oversights was over-
about 40 teet past the threshold. The SOF, the RSO, pressurization of the cockpit. The pressure forced
and the pilot were not aware of the hazar-d. The pilot the canopy to open violently, damaging the actuating
had shaved his pattern so close that his right main system .
wheel had left a track in the snow 65 feet before the
snowbank-25 feet short of the threshold . The left
main didn't hit the snow until the airplane crossed
the heaped snowbank. SI.USH t~USES 1/.~MEOUT
How many errors can you find?
The two-ship of OA-37s taxied onto the runway.
The leader had briefed 15-second spacing on takeoff
~-1 OVERPRESSURE because of the light snow cover on the runway. The
leader lined up on the right half of the runway, and
Because it was cold outside, the pilot decided to his wingman lined up on the left. After the usual
start his A-7 with the canopy closed . After a normal checks, leader released brakes. As two was gettin~
start, the pilot began going through his checks be- ready to release brakes, he heard the leader call

8 DECEMBER 1982
 Abort!" so he held his position.
At about 60 knots, both of leader's engines had
popped and flamed out.
The intakes on leader's aircraft were coated with
clear ice. Although the center of the runway had
been clear of snow, the sides still had snow on them .

in it, because many of us have "been there " -in the

cockpit at something less than 100 percent. How
sick is too sick? Well , that depends, but let me pass
on a couple of war stories of guys who thought they
were well enough to fly, but apparently weren 't.
Last spring , an F-4 crashed during a relatively be-
nign mission, killing both crewmembers. There were
The runway sweeper was out of commission that no indications of aircraft malfunction; the aircraft hit
ty. Even with the temperature ten degrees below at a shallow angle in controlled flight. Why? As is the
.eezing , the loose snow on the blacktop runway usual case in this type mishap, the board was unable
melted into slush . When the leader rolled down the to find one ironclad answer . But one possible contri-
runway , his nosewheel threw the slush up into the in- butory finding was that the pilot had been sick most
ta kes . The officer in the RSU had seen a slush spray of the two days immediately preceding the mishap.
come up just before the engines popped. He had experienced headache, nausea and vomit-
It shouldn 't have been a surprise. The results are ing , and muscle aches. How much of a factor the ef-
just what the Dash One predicts for takeoff on a fects of his illness might have been , we will never
slush-covered runway. The problem was that the know for sure , but it was almost certainly a player.
SOF , the RSO , and the pilot didn't consider the pos- A recent incident in another command gives us
sibility that the snow might be turning into slush . another good look at the possible delayed effects of
an illness . A sleek and racy Eagle Driver, deployed to
a sunny location where you "don't drink the water,"
HOW SICK IS TOO SICK experienced an evening of gastric distress and diar-
rhea. The next morning , he "felt fine " and pro-
By Maj Hank Goddard ceeded on a point cap DACT mission . After the first
T AC Flight Safety engagement, the pilot felt extremely fatigued , then
experienced his personal hypoxia symptoms. The
It's an old story, and always good for a couple of flight lead was calling for him to turn to a heading ,
yuks: The four-ship pulls onto the runway, ready for but every time he attempted to turn, he did an aileron
the last leg of a cross-country. Lead looks at two, ex- roll . This incident had begun at 25 ,000 feet. At 9,500
pecting the customary head nod. But two is shaking feet, the pilot was able to regain control of himself
his head vigorously. Lead, puzzled , watches as two and the aircraft . Scary.
removes his mask and lowers his head . He looked a Well , back to the original question: How sick is too
bit green in the briefing, lead thinks, I wonder if he 's sick? Any sick is too sick . Even a " milk run" has its
. .. ? Just then , two looks up, appears to place an ob- demanding moments when you ' re flying a high per-
' Ct in the map case, and gives lead a thumbs up. formance airplane; the operator has to be at 100 per-
1e flight presses off. cent. Looks like you can be too sick and not even
\._. Like most good stories, it 's got an element of truth feel sick. Think about it.

TAC ATTACK 9
 wood stoves
and
kerosene heaters
Saving money is someth ing we all want to do and
that 's the primary reason why we ' re buying wood
stoves and kerosene heaters. Wood stoves and kero-
sene heaters take some of the burden off a central
heating system , so we can lower our thermostats
and still keep warm . Sound too good to be true? Yep .
Where there 's fire , there 's always a danger. And th
is why wood stoves and kerosene heaters are a he
ard-we forget to respect the fire . Manufacturers<-
wood stoves and kerosene heaters are making them
safer and more energy efficient, but only you can
prevent the fire .
Wood Stoves
There are basically three types of wood stoves.
The earlier stoves from the seventies gave us longer
burn times and more heat output , but they created
more creosote buildup and problems with pollutants
in the air. To remedy these problems , catalytic wood
burners were added to the stoves; as a result , less
wood needs to be used , and there is less creosote
buildup. But catalytics have not been perfected , and
they can 't be installed in earlier model stoves. The
latest model wood stoves, called smoke-scrubbers,
force smoke back over the fire to reburn . They ' re
bigger and cost more, but they have very little creo-
sote buildup.
Wood stoves are a hazard when (1) they have
been improperly installed , (2) they are not cleaned
regularly, or (3) they are not used correctly.
We won 't go into the actual -guidelines for install-
ing a wood stove, but the first thing to do is check
your local fire and building codes . Then check with
your insurance company. Professional installation is
recommended . Consider relining the chimney. R
lining can reduce creosote buildup and contain fll
fires to the chimney.

10 DECEMBER 1982
 Cleaning is assential , not only for efficiency, but Second generation heaters now have wicks, either
because creosote is flammable and its buildup is fiberglass or cotton , and the wick burns. They have a
dangerous. Creosote will accumulate quicker if you low center of gravity, making them harder to tip over;
use the newer, slower-burning heaters and if you but they are unvented, so adequate ventilation is
burn green wood. Clues that you have creosote necessary. Third generation heaters are permanent-
buildup are smoke backing up or the stovepipe giv- ly installed so they can 't be tipped over or moved.
ing off less heat. Creosote buildup in the stove They are vented to the outside , and tre fuel tank is
should not exceed an eighth of an inch . also located outside.
The best time to clean a wood stove is before the First generation heaters were banned in most
first fire of the season ; otherwise wait at least three states because they were so hazardous. So check
days after the last fire . Remove all wood ash and with your local housing and fire authorities before
vacuum . Use a wire brush on the interior. Check for you buy or use any kerosene heater. It might be
air leaks and fix them if there are any. Clean all ex- against the law. Also, check with your insurance
ternal surfaces with soapy water, then rinse with company. Your premiums could go up or even be
clear water, and replace the gasket (fiberglass, not canceled . Next, make sure you can always get K-1 ,
asbestos). Clean the blower and . filter. Remove the water-clear kerosene. Nothing else is safe. And, like
flue pipe; if it' &. usty, crumbly, or clogged, replace it. any other appliance, the most important thing to do
Last, check the chimney. If creosote buildup is 1/4 " is read the manufacturer 's instructions.
thick, the chimney needs to be cleaned. When deciding how large a heater to buy, multiply
When using the stove, make sure nothing is close the square footage of the room by 28 . That will give
enough to it to catch on fire-like curtains, rugs, or you the required BTU rating. Also, think about the
papers. Frequently check the walls, floor , and ceil- amount of activity in the room to determine whether
ing , and if you find any hot spots , recheck your instal- you should buy a convection or radiant heater. A
lation before you use the stove again . Never use convection heater is usually cylindrical in shape and
;tarting fluid , kerosene , or gasoline to start a fire. sometimes contains a fan. They heat the air in all di-
Don 't burn artificial logs, coal , or trash in a wood rections and are better for larger areas. Radiant
stove. Don 't store wood near or under the stove, and heaters , usually rectangular in shape , use a polished
be careful for burning embers when tending the fire . reflector which sends heat forward . These work bet-
Kerosene Heaters ter for smaller areas, or where people will usually be
There are now three generations of kerosene seated.
heaters. First generation heaters were gravity fed ; New model heaters are gravity fed and use a
the kerosene itself burned , so if spilled , a fire was in- wick. This is a substantial safety advantage com-
evitable . These are older units from before 1960. pared to the older units, but there are still problems.
An improperly set wick will give off more pollutants ,
so it's important to know what a safe wick setting is .
The wick also has to be changed . Knowing when to
do this and how to put a new wick in is very impor-
tant. If you aren't sure , have a professional do it. The
newer models have a low center of gravity so they
can 't be tipped over as easily as older models . They
also have an automatic cutoff that's supposed to
shut off the flame and stop the flow of kerosene if the
heater is jarred or upset.
The heaters are designed to use only K-1, water-
clear kerosene. If K-2 kerosene is used , an unac-
ceptable level of sulfur dioxide is given off. Any other
type fuel, especially gasoline, is dangerous and may
cause flash fires . Kerosene heaters should always
be refueled outside and never while in use or when
hot. Newer models have removable fuel tanks for
easy refilling , but there will always be drips-wipe
them up. Kerosene expands when heated, so to pre-
vent overspill, fill up only 80 percent of the tank.

TAC ATTACK 11
wood stoves lated well, just keeping the door to the room open
should be sufficient.

& Proper maintenance is a must. This includes

cleaning or changing the wick, cleaning the tank,

kerosene heaters and periodically adjusting the electric ignition.

Don't put a kerosene heater in an area where
there are flammable liquids or quantities of combus-
tible dust. That means putting a kerosene heater in a
Many newer models have fuel gages.
Kerosene heaters should be used only for zone
heating, that is, one to two rooms at a time . Whether

garage or workshop is dangerous. Never use kero-

sene heaters on boats, no matter what the manufac-
turer states.
Storing kerosene can also be dangerous. Kero-
sene should be stored in a metal container reserved
you have a convection or radiant heater, set it on a for kerosene only. And to avoid confusion, it
level surface at least three feet away from any ob- shouldn't resemble a gasoline container. Keep the
ject. And if you have small children around, keep in kerosene in a cool, well-ventilated area away from
mind that the outside of the heater gets very the house and garage. Don 't stockpile kerosene ;
hot-hot enough to burn .
Kerosene heaters deplete oxygen. You should al-
ways keep the room that the heater is in ventilated,
especially if it isn't a third-generation heater. The
amount of time a heater is used in one day and the
age of the wick make a difference in the amount of
pollutants given off. If you have · a well-insulated
.home, open a window at least an inch and put the
heater under that wJndow. If your home is not insu-

stockpiling is dangerous and might be against the

law.
Before buying a wood stove or kerosene heater,
make sure it has a UL rating. Never leave either one
unattended and always have the proper fire extin-
guishers and detectors available. Wood stoves and
especially kerosene heaters are only as safe as you
make them . Remember that you're dealing with fire
Take extra care.

12 DECEMBER 1982
 TAC
Safety
Awards
Crew Chief
Safety Award SSgt Clay R. Dean
Sgt Craig A. Spengler

SSGT CLAY R. DEAN and SGT CRAIG A. SPENG·

LEA are this month's winners of the Tactical Air burst into flames. Sergeant Dean advised the pi-
Command Crew Chief Safety Award. They are lot of the fire, told him to shut down and egress
members of the 48th Fighter Interceptor Squad· then turned to help Sergeant Spengler move the
ron, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. fire extinguisher into position under the burning
Sergeant Dean (crew chief) and Sergeant aircraft.
Spengler (assistant crew chief) were performing Sergeant Spengler discharged the fire bottle
ground crew duties on an F-15A being run to leak onto the flames and Into engine bay vents, ex-
check a recently replaced AMAD oil line. With tinguishing the fire. Other maintenance person-
the #2 engine running, the #1 engine start se· nel had contacted the fire department and upon
quence was initiated. At about 10 percent rpm arrival firefighters discharged additional agent
the pilot told Sergeant Dean that rpm had stag- as a precaution.
nated and that he was disengaging and shutting The courageous actions of Sergeant Dean and
down the JFS. Sergeant Dean was moving under- Sergeant Spengler prevented the loss of an F-15
neath the aircraft to investigate when the belly of and injury to personnel. They have earned the
the airplane adjacent to the centerline pylon Tactical Air Command Crew Chief Safety Award.

Individual Safety Award

A1C STEPHEN W. GRIFFITH is this month's win·
ner of the Tactical Air Command Individual Safe-
ty Award. He is an electrician with the 35th Com-
ponent Repair Squadron Battery Shop, George
Air Force Base, California.
Airman Griffith has a knack for observing and
correcting safety hazards. When he started work
in the battery shop, Airman Griffith noticed the
ventilation system wasn't moving toxic vapors
out of the shop. He contacted civil engineers and
had a larger ventilation fan installed. He sealed
electrical outlets that were located too close to
the shower. And he created a protective shield to A1C Stephen W. Griffith
keep people who work on generators from get-
ting an electrical shock. handle. Because of what he found, an inspection
He skillfully performs his duties as an electri- was made of all aircraft.
cian. Airman Griffith, on loan to an AMU, was fix- Airman Griffith is a skillful professional who
i ng a faulty landing gear light on an F-4E when he displays safety awareness and attention to de-
found an improperly insulated landing gear tail. He has earned the Tactical Air Command In-
switch that caused a spark in the landing gear dividual Safety Award.
TAC ATIACK 13
 Fatigue at night: a case study

Remember last month's article on "Night Flying roll , the landing gear began to retract. The aircraft
and Fatigue?" It was about circadian rhythm and hu- settled to the runway on the external fuel tanks and
man performance-a bit academic and theoretical, the forward fuselage and then slid to a stop. A small
right? This story brings it all back home. Before you fire flared up beneath the aircraft , fed by residual
get too carried away cramming to catch up on all fuel from the external tanks. The fire was quickly put
your training squares before the year ends, take the out by the crash response force . The pilot climbed
time to read it. Then ask yourself, do I really need to out without injury.
do everything in one day? The airplane 's nose gear was fully retracted ; the
nose gear door was open . The right main gear was
retracted, and the left main was nearly fully re-
At 4 in the morning, an F-1 06 touched down for a tracted. The landing gear handle was up.
full-stop landing after a night intercept training mis- Afterward, no mechanical failures were found in
sion. The drag chute blossomed, and the airplane the landing gear system when it was checked . The
began to decelerate. After a thousand feet of landing aircraft appeared to have no problems which could

14 DECEMBER 1982
 A CASE STUDY
have either caused or contributed to the mishap. The pilot arrived at the simulator at 1615 and went
Since the landing gear handle was up and no mecha- through the emergency procedures check. The sim-
nism was found that would raise the handle without ulator mission was completed at 1830. That allowed
the pilot 's help, it would appear that the pilot himself him 30 minutes to eat supper before reporting for a
raised the handle. 1900 exercise brief. After the briefing he preflighted
Although the gear will not retract on the ground his assigned aircraft, set it up for a scramble , and
with the struts compressed, even if the handle is then waited at a maintenance office for an airborne
raised, that protection is not effective right after order time.
touchdown . Aerodynamic forces prevent strut com- At 2125 he received the order. He took off 16 min-
pression to the degree necessary to engage the utes later and landed with an emergency at 2205. He
safety switches until the airplane decelerates to well debriefed the emergency, worked on the flying
below landing speed . schedule, and preflighted another airplane. At 0153
Still , why would the pilot raise the landing gear he took off on his second sortie , which ended with a
handle after touching down? The answer is obvious : crunch at 0406 .
he wouldn 't do it consciously. But as you may recall Was he tired? Before his second flight , he forgot
from last month 's article , we lose coordination when to sign off the exceptional release on the 781 H, and

L e suffer from short-term fatigue . After touchdown ,

1e pilot would normally move his hand from the
throttle to the drag chute handle, deploy the drag
he forgot to initial the last entry in the 781 A Nor-
mally, he does both . On the approach that ended in
the mishap, the pilot made several errors on the ra-
chute , then move his hand to the idle thrust switch to dio. Twice he used the wrong call sign , giving a dif-
move it to the on position . The motions he used to ferent call sign each time. Then he read back clear-
move the idle thrust switch were exactly the same as ance to descend to 3,300 feet as 4,400 feet .
the motions required to raise the gear handle . If he Was he tired? Would you be tired if you followed
was tired , he could have grabbed hold of the wrong his schedule? His crew duty period technically
handle . started when he reported for his simulator at 1615,
Was he tired? The fact that he was landing at 4 but by then he 'd already put in a full day of study. He
a.m. tells us something . But if he had prepared his had the mishap 11 hours and 51 minutes after his of-
body well for night flying , that fact may not mean ficial crew duty day began .
anything . So let's take a look at how he got ready for Besides being long, the day was stressful. Check-
this sortie. rides , even in the simulator, bring out the adrenalin .
The day before, the pilot was on alert. At 1645, Then the pilot had to deal with an emergency on his
about 36 hours before the mishap, he took off on a first flight that evening . More adrenalin.
training sortie while on alert, landing at 1900. After- What the adrenalin does is fire up the body 's after-
ward he had dinner, returning to the alert facility at burner, burning energy at a tremendous rate . You
2030 . Then he studied until 2330 for a simulator get a bonus in alertness and available energy at the
check on emergency procedures that was sched- time, but you pay for it later.
uled for the next afternoon . He fell asleep at about The fact that the pilot slept from midnight to eight
midnight. in the morning the day before suggests that his body
The pilot was awakened the next morning by the was on a normal (diurnal) circadian rhythm. If so,
telephone at 0800 . After rising at 0900, he studied when he landed at 4 the next morning , he was at or
for his simulator check until noon , took a lunch near the lowest point in his performance curve.
break, and then continued studying until 1530. The Was he tired? If we'd been in his shoes , we 'd be
11ergency procedures check was scheduled for exhausted . Some better questions are, was he set
\ ,30. He rested from 1530 to 1600, when he was re- up for this mishap? Is anybody you know headed in
' - lleved from alert, 12 hours before the mishap. the same direction? ~

TAC ATTACK 15
.....- AT-38 - - - - - - - -
11 JU~' ~'T 'EEM RkSUT Tt,
FEEL rt/1~
{)()Wtv OIV OOE OF.
1U' M001JMPORT~IVT DAY~
OF /?.
1UE OL.D UOMf PLACE AIIV'1
CUANGED tl 811.
TAC Quarterly Awards

TSgt Wolfgang D. Hannig Amn Warren E. D'Aiessandro

GROUND SAFETY AWARD WEAPONS SAFETY AWARD

OF THE QUARTER OF THE QUARTER
T SGT WOLFGANG D. HANNIG is the recipient of AMN WARREN E. D'ALESSANDRO is the recipi·
the Tactical Air Command Ground Safety Award ent of the Tactical Air Command Weapons Safety
for the third quarter of 1982. He is a member of Award for the third quarter of 1982. Airman
he 550th Aircraft Maintenance Unit, 405th Air- D'Aiessandro is a munitions maintenance spe·
aft Generation Squadron, 405th Tactical Train- cialist with the 23d Equipment Maintenance
ng Wing, Luke Air Force Base, Arizona. Due to Squadron, 23d Tactical Fighter Wing, England
Sergeant Hannig's efforts, the 550th AMU did not Air Force Base, Louisiana.
have any ground- or flight-related fatalities or Airman D'Aiessandro is a very safety-con·
permanently disabling injuries in the past year. scious person. While delivering BDU·33D/B prac-
Sergeant Hannig developed a weekly briefing tice bombs to the flight line, the MB·4 Coleman
guide of various safety topics for the AMU. He tug he was operating caught fire. He immediately
designed numerous displays on ground flight notified munitions control, extinguished the fire,
safety and foreign object damage for the AMU's disconnected the explosives-loaded trailer, and
safety bulletin boards. Sergeant Hannig put so kept nonessential personnel clear until the fire
much variety and impact in his safety program department arrived. Not only did he take swift
that the 12th Air Force Safety Staff Assistance and correct action for a serious fire, he also pre-
Team rated his program as the best on base. vented a possible explosives accident.
As a technician, Sergeant Hannig proved him- Airman D'Aiessandro is constantly looking for
self exceptional. On many occasions he acted as ways to do things better. He pinpointed and cor-
specialist flight chief, and he normally served rected a serious foreign object damage problem
the dual role of specialist flight supervisor and concerning lead seals on 30· mm ammo cans.
chief aircraft pneudraulic specialist. Because of Seals were not accounted for after they were
his knowledge and training program, the 550th emptied-and returned to the storage area. Airman
AMU regularly had the lowest repeat and re- D'Aiessandro set up a system to account for
curring pneudraulic discrepancy rate in the wing, these seals, and because of his recommenda·
while maintaining a cumulative 70 percent fully tion, plastic seals are now used.
mission capable rate. Airman D'Aiessandro's enthusiasm, initiative,
Sergeant Hannig's enthusiastic approach in and safety awareness have significantly contrib·
promoting safety awareness and his knowledge uted to weapons safety, and have earned him the
as a technician have made exceptional contribu- Tactical Air Command Weapons Safety Award of
·ons to wing safety. He has earned the Tactical the Quarter.
1r Command Ground Safety Award of the
uarter.

TACATIACK 21
 As soon as he realized what had happened , the
ground crewmember tried to pull the cord out of the
blow-in door, but he could only pull out part of it.
Then he ran to a position abeam the left cockpit and
signaled the crew in the cockpit to shut down the en-
gine. The crew immediately did so.
While this was going on, the observer on the
ground, who was not checked out on engine runs,
had seen the cord go in the blow-in door. He had re-
acted instinctively by trying to help the other crew-
member. In retrospect, he probably could have been
chock talk
more help if he'd stayed where he was and immedi-
ately signaled the crew to shut the engine down .
The damage from the incident was about $3,000 .

...~ ad iluiduttaJ4 It shows that although a coil is a neat way to store a

cord, that same coil can cause damage when it gets

~ill£ 4 ~ dalu.
too close to an intake. A better way might be to use a
shorter cord hooked up at the wheel well interphone
connection .

COilED CORD CAUSES FOD

F-Ill HYDRAUliC FIRE
An F-111 was taxied to the hot brake area for a
maintenance leak check of the main wheel well. The After landing, the aircrew of an F-111 turned off
airplane had been worked on because of a bleed air the runway and stopped to do their checks and to rf
problem. port the airplane's maintenance status to job contr<..
In setting up for the engine run , a maintenance by radio . While the aircrew was talking to job control,
crewmember and an observer remained on the they noticed the right primary hydraulic light begin to
ground . The crewmember hooked up his headset to flash. Primary pressure was still good. The aircrew
the aircraft interphone at the nose interphone box. told job control about the light. Job control requested
Most of the interphone cord was coiled on the that they taxi to parking.
ground about 30 feet to the left and slightly forward Just after the aircrew changed frequencies , they
of the left engine intake. saw the right primary hydraulic light become steady.
With the engine running , the crewmember moved They switched back to job control frequency and told
to the wheel well by way of the number 3 weapons control what had happened. Job control asked if they
pylon and under the engine bay behind the blow-in could still taxi. Seeing that the pressure had dropped
doors. As the crewmember moved in to check for to about 2,600 psi, the aircrew decided to call the su-
leaks, the coil of intercom cord was dragged toward pervisor of flying (SOF) .
the intake. Instead of the cord playing out, the whole The SOF told the aircrew not to taxi until the prob-
coil moved. With the engines at full military power, it lem was checked by maintenance. Then the SOF
wasn't long before the coil of cord was sucked into called maintenance and asked them to send some-
the intake through the lower left blow-in door. one out to the aircraft to check it for leaks. They sent
out a hydraulic specialist, but he arrived at the air-
plane without an interphone cable .
The specialist checked the hydraulic reservoir in .
the wheel well. It was nearly empty. The special ist
couldn 't talk to the aircrew, so he called job control
and told them what he'd found . Job control told him
to signal the airplane to taxi and to marshal it into the
first parking spot.
The aircrew taxied on the specialist 's signal
Cockpit indications remained the same during ta>"
When the airplane arrived at the parking spot anc.

22 DECEMBER 1982
was chocked, the aircrew shut down the engines. Af- " Ha! This will be
ter engine shutdown , smoke could be seen coming One of my easiest fights !''
from around the right engine . As the aircrew climbed And he was still laugh ing
When David punched out his lights .

Now today 's engines

Are good sized too;
But unfortunately,
The same thing is holdin ' true .

All it takes
Is one little stone ;
And a pilot
Could be walking home.

It's awfully embarrassing

For a plane so tall
To come crashing down
out of the cockpit, the maintenance crew opened the
From something so small.
fire access panel. Seeing a fire , a crew ch ief began
spraying on the fire with an extingu isher. He put out
But it will continue to happen
the fi re , but in the pro~ess he got some of the extin-
Unless we clean up our act.
gu ish ing agent in his right eye. The crew ch ief was
It's the only way
taken to the hospital , treated , and released. No one
To keep our eng ines intact.
else was injured .
The hydraulic problem was caused by a burst seal
So pick up the stones
on the number 2 primary hydraulic pump. The re-
That come into view.
sulting fluid loss caused the pump to overheat. The
Or there may be a Goliath
small fire damaged the hydraulic pumps, a wire bun-
Fallin ' on you!
dle , and the fiberglass rub ring for the th ird stage en-
gine fan .
The fire would probably have been prevented if the ~-10 Oil C~PS, ~G~IN
airc rew had shut down earlier and not taxied. But the
aircrew lacked the information to make that deci- As the pilot started engines on an A-1 0, the crew
sion . If the specialist had taken along an interphone chief spotted an oil leak on the right engine . The
cable , he could have informed the aircrew. That crew chief advised the pilot and he aborted.
would have been the simplest solution . The oil was coming from the oil tank filler cap. The
But job control could also have helped get the in- cap had been locked before it was properly seated.
fo rmation to the aircrew, although in a roundabout
way. Instead of taking on themselves the decision to
taxi, they could have passed the information on the
empty reservoir to the SOF , who also had contact
with the aircrew. The SOF and the aircrew should
have made the decision .

GOli~TH TOD~Y
By MSgt Mike Hess
474 Tactical Fighter Wing
Goliath laughed
When David faced him alone; So the locking mechanism wasn 't engaged , which
" You ' re going to what, prevented a good seal and allowed the oil to leak out.
With that little stone?!! " The crew chief had installed the cap, and the assis-

TAC ATTACK 23
 Chock Talk down on his shoulders . When four aircraft taxied out,
he went over to give them their EOR check . As he
walked near the intake area, his parka hood was
tant line chief had signed off the oil cap security pulled in by the engine suction; he was pinned to the
check in the AFTO Form 781 . intake.
After the abort, the crew chief reserviced the oil The aircrew didn't immediately see what had hap-
reservoir and reinstalled the filler cap. The assistant pened. But the pilot shut down the engine because
line chief again signed off the security check. The he heard a buzzing sound and saw the rpm decrease
engine was run with no discrepancies, and the air- at the same time the engine temperature was rising.
plane was put back on the schedule for a later sortie. Fortunately, there was no serious injury.
On that sortie, about 20 minutes after takeoff, the The lesson is not that we can't wear protective
oil pressure caution light illuminated . The oil pres- clothing . Sometimes we need to. But when we do,
sure was fluctuating from 55 to 65 psi. The pilot we must make sure all the parts are fastened down
pulled the throttle to idle, and the oil pressure stabi- and aren't free to flap in the breeze . Otherwise,
lized at 35 psi. The caution light went out. The pilot those parts of our gear may go wandering off, and
headed back home and landed without any further they could take us with them .
problems.
This time the oil had drained out the SOAP sample FOD MYSTERY
tube . The cap on the tube had been installed, but it
had not been properly locked either. The oil leaked After the F-4 took off, as the pilot was bringing
past the seal. When the reservoir was reserviced, it the throttles back out of afterburner, the left engine
took 8 pints of oil. After the cap on the SOAP sample compressor stalled. The pilot moved the throttle to
tube was installed properly, the airplane had no re- idle , and the compressor stall cleared . The pilot then
currence of oil pressure problems.
The oil caps on an A-10 are tricky to install. That 's
why there 's so much emphasis on doing it right , and
that's why a check of the caps ' security by a supervi-
sor is required . Of course, the purpose of the super-
visor's check is defeated if he does not actuallv
check the caps.

ENGINE ATTACKS LOOSE PARKA HOOD brought the airplane back for a successful emer-
gency landing .
Although cold weather clothing is necessary for The engine suffered extensive compressor dam-
our protection from the elements, it can also create age from the 1Oth through the 14th stages. The dam-
some hazards we're not used to. For instance: age appeared to have been caused by a very hard,
When the weather began to get nippy, one of the one-inch-long, cylindrical object with a small diame-
members of the end-of-runway (EOR) crew wore his ter. The foreign object was not found, but we do have
a clue where it came from. Three days earlier, during
work on this engine's variramp, the tip of a punch
broke off. The workers involved conducted a search
but couldn't find the missing punch tip.
In a case like this , the procedures call for notifying
the quality assurance office and making a lost tool
report. This unit's MOl states that when an item can-
not be found, the aircraft may be released for flight
by no one other than the chief of maintenance. But in
this incident the quality assurance office was not no-
tified , no lost tool report was submitted, and the first-
level maintenance supervisor released the airplane
for flight without even notifying the chief of mainte-
parka. But it wasn 't cold enough for him to have the nance.
hood up over his head, so the hood was hanging So, where do you think the FOD came from?

24 DECEM BE R 1982
 The Overly Safe Ejection Seat

'
not removed . Obviously, the pilot and crew chief
missed it during preflight, and they will be the first to
admit it. A day earlier, a specialist had been doing
some work in the Bay 5 area . The specialist did not
obtain the correct sating pin from central support
before arriving at the jet. Once at the aircraft, the
specialist decided to use the tailhook downlock sat-
ing pin since it was readily available and would ex-
pedite the performance of his task . Additionally, the
specialist did not document the aircraft forms with a
An F-15 pilot recently flew a m1ss1on in a de- red-X entry-a required procedure in accordance
armed ejection seat . How could that happen , you with TO 00-20-5 . When questioned, the specialist
say? Please read on . Approximately one hour after was uncertain about the need for a red-X entry. This
takeoff, the pilot noted a flapping sound near the rear was a typical day in which the specialist had several
canopy section and , suspecting a possible loose jobs requiring his expertise. So he signed the forms
panel , returned to base . Other than a little excite- and left the jet with the substitute pin still installed .
ment regarding a possible missing panel, recovery The next morning the exceptional release was
was uneventful-that is, until postflight inspection , signed, and the jet was ready to fly even though it
when the crew chief had the misfortune of dis- had an ejection seat that wouldn 't work.
covering the tailhook downlock sating pin was in- We were lucky this time. Can we learn a few les-
stalled in the canopy-actuated initiator. Yes, there sons from this incident to avoid another test of fate?
was a red "maintenance use only" streamer (which Here are a few for starters:
was badly frayed on one end) attached to the pin. • Aircrews-Use your checklist. Take the time to
Also, the large tailhook unlock pin was loosely at- adequately preflight your ejection seat.
tached to the same streamer. • Crew Chiefs-Check Bay 5 area. Check the
It seems that the loose end of the streamer was forms and recognize red-X entry requirements .
sucked out of Bay 5 through the crack between the • Specialists-Follow your tech orders. Don't
canopy rail and canopy. The flapping of this take shortcuts ; they could be costly. If you have
streamer in the airstream created the nose per- questions, ask your supervisor.
ceived by the pilot to be a possible loose panel. The • Supervisors-Review, and revise if necessary,
overwhelming fact of this incident is that if the pilot the system to issue sating pins . Is someone account-
had needed to eject, the canopy would jettison nor- able for every pin on every aircraft? Ensure your peo-
mally, but the ejection seat would not fire! ple are trained . Create and maintain the awareness
Let's trace back a few steps and try to determine you expect. ~
now this improper pin was installed and why it was -Courtesy 313 ADISEF

TAC ATTACK 25
 weapons words

GIVE THE PILOTS ,f CHOICE

The pilot of an A-7 was pulling off from his second SKIP SOME STEPS ,fNIJ SHORTEN
strafe pass . He ceased firing at 2,200 feet from the THE SORTIE
target and began a normal 4-G recovery when he
heard and felt a thump. The range officer had been Two 370-gallon fuel tanks crashed to the con-
crete ramp below an F-4 . The pilot in the cockpit was
momentarily taken aback . All he had done was turn
on the left master switch to check the battery .
A fire developed. The aircrew climbed out of the
airplane and helped the maintenance troops fight the
fire . Using the flight line fire extinguishers , they
quickly put out the fire .

calling out the cease-fire ranges . he saw nothing un-

usual about the pass .
After the aircraft landed, maintenance found that
a 20 mm slug had entered the intake duct causing
engine damage before it exited at the 3 o'clock posi-
tion of the engine inlet extension .
What caused the ricochet? Well , there was stand-
ing water in the impact area of the strafe pits . The
range officer hadn 't gotten around to telling the fl ight
about the water. If he'd told them , at least the pilots
could have had a say in the risks they were taking .

26 DECEMBER 1982
 The airplane was loaded with two TERS holding
three MK-82s each on the inboard stations and a 80MB CHECK WORKS TOO WEll
SUU-23 gun on the centerline, but only the wing
tanks had jettisoned. Both the wing tank safety pins An F-111 aircrew was checking the dual bomb
and the SUU-23 pin had been removed by the crew timer system . Conventional bomb was programmed
chief as he followed his tech data. The pilot had on the number 3 weapons select cassette indicator.
checked that the tank jettison switches were safety A weapon was present on station indicator pushbut-
wired off and that the emergency stores jettison but- tons 3, 4, and 5, and the bomb arming option indica-
ton (the panic button) wasn't pushed in before he tor showed nose/tail arming .
turned on the master swtich. Afterwards, all the All doors on the SUU-21 dispensers on stations 3,
cockpit switches were found in their correct posi- 4, and 5 were closed. The crew chief was in the
tions. wheel well holding the Enable/Test switch to Enable.
Before the aircrew had come out to the airplane As the pilot moved the Master Arm switch to Arm ,
that morning , the weapons load crew ran a 25-day the WSO pressed station indicator button 5 to set up
jettison check of the outboard stations , although it the check. The indicator showed " SEL." Neither the
wasn 't noted in the aircraft forms. The technician in aircrew in the cockpit nor the crew chief in the wheel
the cockpit used the panic button for the check. He well noticed, but the doors of the SUU-21 on station
held the button down for each wing station. His part- 5 opened .
ner operating the meter at the breeches read 28 The pilot pressed the weapons release button.
volts DC power at each breech. But the meter never When the 10 seconds set on the timer expired, a Mk-
showed zero volts at the end of the check as the 106 practice bomb was ejected from the SUU, firing
checklist requires. the spotting charge . No one was injured and the air-
The load crew also failed to run a stray voltage craft was not damaged.
check in conjunction with the jettison check . That re-
JUirement is in the checklist, too.
An investigation of the airplane circuitry after the
mishap showed a continuous 28-volt current at the
tank pylons whenever external or internal power was
appl ied . The missile jettison circuit breaker was pop-
ped. When the troubleshooters took off the arma-
ment control relay panel, they found a relay (44K312)
that had two contacts melted together in an ener-
gized position . These two contacts can be activated
only through the panic button jettison circuit; they
provide current to the tank pylons and the right in-
board MAU-12.
When the pilot turned on the master switch, bat-
tery power energized the outboard pylons and jetti-
soned the tanks. The current didn 't reach the right
inboard MAU-12 because the missile jettison circuit
breaker had popped.
The melting of the contacts apparently happened
when the panic button was incorrectly used to run
the jettison check. Completing the check by ensur-
ing a zero voltage reading when the button was re- The WSO didn't know that the SUU-21 doors could
leased would have pointed out the problem before open on the ground when the nuclear arming switch
any damage was done. A stray voltage check in con- was off . The doors normally won 't open when B-61 is
junction with the jettison check should also have re- selected on the cassette . But this time, conventional
vealed the hazard. bomb was selected on the cassette.
But then , this load crew didn 't properly follow the The whole incident could have been avoided sim-
'ech data steps. By skipping a few , they finished ply by following the checklist. It says to use an empty
ooner . The aircrew also were finished with their sor- station for the check. Looks like there 's a good rea-
tie sooner than they had expected . son for the checklist requirement.

TAC ATTACK 27
 from injury-don't run them under rugs .
• Outdoors, use only lights and extension cords
specifically made for outdoor use.
• Always unplug all lights before you go to bed or
leave the house.
Trees
• A fresh tree is best-the needles shouldn 't fall
off easily or break when bent.
• Cut one inch off the base and keep the tree in
water both before and after you set it up.
• Don 't use real candles on a tree.
Down to earth • Plastic trees should have a fire retardant label.
• Place tree away from fireplaces, heat registers ,
and radiators . And make sure the tree isn 't blocking
doorways.
• Use unleaded trimmings.
• Keep all decorations out of the reach of small
children .
Gift Wrapping
• Don't burn gift wrapping , boxes , cartons, or
packing material in the fireplace .

HOl/IJ~Y CHECKLIST
Have a safe holiday season . Use this checklist:
Toys
• Don 't buy toddlers toys made of brittle plastic
or having sharp edges.
• Plug-in electric toys should have a testing labo-
ratory label.
• Chemistry and tool sets should include safety
goggles.
• Note that most accidents involve bicycles,
skateboards, roller skates, sleds, toboggans, snow
disks, and anything with projectiles, like BB guns, Parties
darts, bows and arrows. • If you use candles at your party, don 't place
Lights them near curtains, doorways, or plastic and paper
• Only use lights that have a testing laboratory Ia- decorations.
bel. • Use nonflammable holders for candles.
• If your lights, new or old , have broken sockets, • Use flame retardant or noncombustible decora-
frayed wires, or loose connections, replace the set. tions and Santa costumes.
• Never use electric lights on a metal tree. • After a party, check everywhere for smolderinr
• Don't overload extension cords . Three sets of cigarettes, especially under cushions , behind turn ;
lights per single cord is the maximum . Protect wires ture, and in waste baskets.

28 DECEMBER 1982
 DRUNK DRIVING Drinking coffee and taking a cold shower won't
shorten the time .
You've heard it before : drinking and driving don't • If you give a party, stop serving alcoholic bever-
mix. Here is some more proof: Each year 26,000 ages at least an hour before you expect your guests
people die in the U.S. because of alcohol-related ve- to go home. Don 't let them drive if you know they are
hicle mishaps. That equates to 500 people killed a intoxicated-let them spend the night or get them a
week or 73 people killed each day. There are cab .
800,000 drunk-driving collisions each year and more
than 65 percent of all single-car crashes are alcohol-
related. And although states are taking action to CHRISTM~S PRESENTS
toughen drunk-driving laws, only one arrest results
out of every 2,000 drunk drivers. Out of ideas for what to give for Christmas? Try
these:
Smoke Alarms. New features on this year 's mod-
els include detachable escape lights, some of which
activate by the sound of a smoke alarm going off
within a 20-foot radius . There are detectors that in-
clude the light and alarm as one unit. Installment has
been made easier with mounting clips; and for those
people who can 't install an alarm permanently,
many alarms are now made to just hang over a door.
The alarms are getting smaller, down to 5 inches in
diameter, and many now have hush controls so you
can shut off the alarm for five minutes if you have to
clear nuisance smoke. A great gift for the traveler is
a portable smoke alarm travel kit which includes the
detector and escape light, all in a nice travel case .

Until people realize that drinking and driving don't

mix, here's what you can do to combat the problem :
• Wear your seat belts . That's the most effective
way to counter a drunk-driver attack. Have everyone
riding with you use their seat belts and please make
sure all children are buckled up. Don't hold a baby in
your lap; place the baby in a child restraint seat.
• Don 't ride with a driver who has been drinking. Smoke Protectors. Most fire victims die from
• Practice defensive driving , especially during smoke and not fire. Now you can buy a large trans-
the most dangerous driving times-between 10 p.m. parent nylon hood that will give you at least 10 min-
and 3 a.m . on Friday and Saturday nights. utes of breathable air. It's roomy enough for you to
• If you ' re going out with a group and you know hold an infant inside, and it adjusts to fit all sizes.
you 'll be drinking , select one person to be the desig- Fire Retardant Spray. An invisible, odorless spray
nated soberee, and then be sure to let that person that can be used to treat any fibrous material in the
':!rive. home or the car. It can be used on draperies, uphol-
~ • If you have to drink, realize that it takes at least stery, carpeting , unpainted wood , and your Christ-
one hour per drink to sober up enough to drive. mas tree .

TAC ATTACK 29
Down to Earth
I'LL BE HOME FOR CHRISTMAS
The car is packed, and you're going to leave right
after you get off work. You know seat belts save
lives, so everyone will buckle up. But how are you
going to stay awake? short shots

Of Course You Know This. But if you own a front-

wheel drive vehicle and you want your snow tires to
do their job, remember to put the snow tires on the
front , not the back.
Want to Fool Mother Nature? Make sure you al-
ways have these items in your car in case you ge
caught in a winter blizzard: tire chains, a shovel , ex-
tra warm clothing , blankets or sleeping bags , first-
aid kit, working flashlight , candles and matches , and
bags of sand or gravel. But make sure the sand and
gravel can't slide around . Always try to keep a full
gas tank, and when you know Mother Nature will be
at her worst, stay put.
Baby·Sitters. The National Safety Council recom-
mends that you write everything down and not rely
Here's what the National Safety Council recom- on your baby-sitter's memory. Be sure to include
mends: Wear loose clothes, open your coat, and where you ' re going and the telephone number, the
loosen tight collars or cuffs . Don't eat a big meal just name and phone number of a friend or neighbor,
before or during the trip. Don 't drive at night if you numbers for doctor, police, and fire department, and
can avoid it because driving hypnosis is greater after any special instructions.
dark. Keep the dash lights as dim as possible-the Snow Shoveling Tips. Dress for the occasion, es-
glare can also be hypnotic. Stop every hour or so pecially when the wind chill is below 20 degrees, by
and get out of the car and stretch . Have some cof- covering all exposed skin and wearing several layers
fee, tea, or soda. Don't keep you eyes focused on a of loose-fitting clothes. Use a sturdy, lightweight
point dead ahead-keep looking to the right and shovel and push the snow out of the way. If you must
then left. Don 't follow the same car for too long, and lift the snow, take small scoopfuls and use your legs
if you find your eyes beginning to glaze, run the wind- and entire body to help heft the load, not your arms
shield wipers for distraction . Play the radio , but not and back. Don 't smoke-that makes your blood ves-
slow, soothing music . Sing or whistle ; chew gum or sels constrict so your heart and lungs work harder.
eat candy. Keep plenty of fresh air coming in and And don't drink alcoholic beverages-alcohol gives
don 't smoke too much-smoke fatigues the eyes. you a false sense of energy; you could overexert
Vary your speed . Unvarying speeds invite hypnosis. yourself. Shovel before eating or wait two hours after
If you find yourself dozing and these tips don 't you eat. Better yet-pay a kid to shovel the snow for
help, it's time to pull over and take a nap. you.

30 DECEMBER 1982
 tac tally

TAC ANG AFR

THRU OCT THRU OCT THRU OCT
OCT 1982 1981
OCT 1982 1981 OCT 1982 1981

CLASS A MISHAPS 1 24 29 0 s 6 0 1 1
AIRCREW FATALITIES 0 14 J7 0 2 3 0 0 1
TOTAL EJECTIONS 1 21 29 0 5 1 0 2 1
SUCCESSFUL EJECTIONS 1 18 22 0 4 1 0 2 0

TAC'S TOP 5 thru OCTOBER ~82

lAC FTRjRECCE lAC AIR DEFENSE
class A mishap-free months class A mishap-free months
49 1 TFW 117 57 FIS
36 49 TFW 70 5 FIS
35 355 TTW 67 48 FIS
26 347 TFW 26 318 FIS
23 354 TFW 17 87 FIS

lAC-GAINED FTR/RECCE lAC-GAINED AIR DEFENSE lAC/GAINED Other Units

class A mishap-free months class A mishap-free months class A mishap-free months
126 188 TFG (ANG) 104 102 FIW 159 182 TASG (ANG)
118 138 TFG (ANG) 100 17 7 FIG 152 193 ECS (ANG)
117 917 TFG (AFR) 66 125 FIG 147 26 ADS
114 116 TFW (ANG) 49 119 FIG&142 FIG 143 110 TASG (ANG)
104 434 TFW (AFR) 39 144 FIW 139 USAF TAWC

(BASED ON ACCIDENTS PER 100,000 HOURS FLYING TIME)

TA 1982 7.8 5.7 5.9 5.2 5.9 5.7 5. J 4.7 4.4 4.1

c 981 J 4.0 3.0 3.2 5.6 6.0 5.9 6.3 6.2 6.0 5.3

AN 1982 0.0 2.7 3.2 3.4 3.6 2.9 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1

G
1981 9.3 4.8 4.6 3.3 2.6 2.2 1.8 1.6 2.4 2.6

\F 1982 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 3.2 2.8

R19 81 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8 3.4 3.0

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
US GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1982-539-060/6