THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. LORENZO B.

VENERACION

G.R. Nos. 119987-88 │ October 12, 1995

____________________________________________

FACTS:
On January 31, 1995, Henry Lagarto and Ernesto Cordero were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape with homicide. According to RA 7659, the punishment for
such crime should be death. Judge Lorenzo Veneracion, however, sentenced the
accused only to reclusion perpetua.

The city prosecutor of Manila then filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that
the penalty be changed to death as this is in accordance with the law.

ISSUE:
Can the judge allow any discretion in imposing either the death penalty or reclusion
perpetua when the law clearly provides that the former should be imposed?

HELD:
No. Judges are bound to apply the laws as they are without the privilege of
discretion when the law so clearly provides the punishment for crimes. If judges are
allowed to do otherwise, the law would become meaningless.

Even if the law seems to harsh, judges are bound to abide by them regardless of
their religious or political beliefs.
 EDGAR Y. TEVES vs. COMELEC and HERMINIO G. TEVES, Respondents.

G.R. No. 180363 │ April 28, 2009

____________________________________________

FACTS:
In Oct 2007, petitioner Teves was officially disqualified to run for a congressional
seat in the May 2007 election because of a Sandiganbayan decision rendered against
him in 2005 involving a crime, allegedly, of moral turpitude. The COMELEC likewise
rendered the issue raised by petitioner as moot since the latter lost in the said
election.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was abuse discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when COMELEC disqualified petitioner in view of the petitioner’s
conviction.

HELD:
The Court ruled that the crime for which petitioner was convicted in Sandiganbayan
in 2005 did not involve moral turpitude. As found in the Sandiganbayan, petitioner,
then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to gain
pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit. Second, while possession of business
and pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local government unit is expressly
prohibited by the present LGC, however, its illegality does not mean that violation
thereof necessarily involves moral turpitude or makes such possession of interest
inherently immoral. The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is
not illegal per se. It was held that it was not for the judiciary to settle questions
which is for other branches of the government to deal with.

Being so, the Court reversed the COMELEC’s decision of disqualifying petitioner.
 JUSTA G. GUIDO vs. RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION
G.R. No. L-2089 │ October 31, 1949
____________________________________________

FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the Rural Progress Administration and
Judge Oscar Castelo of the Court of First Instance from proceeding with the
expropriation of petitioner Justa Giudo’s land, 2 adjoining lots, part commercial with
combined area of 22,655 sq meter, situated in Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal.

The Petitioner in this case and majority of the tenants have entered valid contract
for lease, or option to buy at an agreed price.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land sought to be expropriated is commercial and therefore
excluded within the purview of the provisions of Act 539.

HELD:
The petition was granted. The condemnation of a small property in behalf of 10, 20
or 50 persons and their families does not inure to the benefit of the public to a
degree sufficient to give the use of public character. The expropriation at bar have
been instituted for economic relief of few families devoid of any consideration of
public health, public peace and order, or other public advantage.
What is proposed to be done is to take plaintiff’s property, which she acquired by
sweat and sacrifice for her and her family’s security, and sell it at cost to a few less
who refuse to pay the stipulated rent or leave the premises.

Article III of the Constitution forbids by necessary implication the appropriation of

private property for private uses which works in consonance with Section 4 of Article
XIII.

Philosophical based, it has been said that the assertion of the right on the part of the
legislature to take the property of the citizen and transfer it to another, even for a
full compensation, when the public interest is not promoted thereby, is claiming an
absolute power, and one inconsistent with every principle and fundamental maxim
of a free government. In equality and justice, it is believed that God gave us
dominion over our bodies. He gave us dominion over things. We put value out of
labor. What man puts value through his labor becomes his own. What one does not
work for, he cannot own. Justice is to give what one deserves.
 THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,

vs. MILTON E. SPINGER, DALAMACIO COSTAS, and ANSELMO HILARIO,

G.R. No. L-26979 │ April 1, 1927

____________________________________________

FACTS:
This is an original action of quo warranto brought in the name of the Government of
the Philippine Islands against three directors of the National Coal Company who
were elected to their positions by the legislative members of the committee created
by Acts. Nos. 2705 and 2822.

The purpose of the proceeding is to test the validity of the part of section 4 of Act
No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, which provides that "The
voting power of all such stock (in the National Coal Company) owned by the
Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested exclusively in a committee
consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives.

Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the
Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that: “The voting
power … shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-
General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.”

In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which
divested the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The
EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General
who is the head of the government (President at that time was considered the head
of state but does not manage government affairs).

A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate President and the House Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well
as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-
General, still elected Milton Springer and four others as Board of Directors of NCC.

Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against
Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of NCC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO no. 37 is valid.
HELD:

Yes. E.O. No 37 is valid.

It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court

emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with
designating the persons to fill the office.

Appointing persons to a public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a

government owned and controlled corporation. It was created by Congress. To
extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate President and the
House Speakers, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive
powers. The Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this
rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception
can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within
the legislative branch – this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the
executive branch.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JACOB ROSENTHAL and NICASIO

OSMEÑA,

G.R. Nos. L-46076 and L-46077 │ June 12, 1939

____________________________________________

FACTS:
Jacob Rosenthal and Nicasio Osmeña were founders and shareholders of the O.R.O.
Oil Company. The main objects and purposes of the company are to mine, refine,
market, buy and sell petroleum, natural gas and other oil products. Rosenthal and
Osmeña were found guilty by the RTC in two cases of selling their shares to
individuals without first obtaining the corresponding written permit or license from
the Insular Treasurer of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.

This is in violation of Sections 2 & 5 of Act No. 2581, commonly known as the
Blue Sky Law.

Section 2 of said law provides that every person, partnership, association, or corporation
attempting to offer to sell in the Philippines speculative securities of any kind or character
whatsoever, is under obligation to file previously with the Insular Treasurer the various
documents and papers enumerated therein and to pay the required tax of twenty-pesos.
(20k)

Sec 5, on the other hand, provides that “whatever the said Treasurer of the Philippine Islands
is satisfied, either with or without the examination herein provided, that any person,
partnership, association or corporation is entitled to the right to offer its securities as above
defined and provided for sale in the Philippine Islands, he shall issue to such person,
partnership, association or corporation a certificate or permit reciting that such person,
partnership, association or corporation has complied with the provisions of this act, and that
such person, partnership, association or corporation, its brokers or agents are entitled to
order the securities named in said certificate or permit for sale”; that “said Treasurer shall
furthermore have authority, whenever in his judgment it is in the public interest, to cancel
said certificate or permit”, and that “an appeal from the decision of the Insular Treasurer
may be had within the period of thirty days to the Secretary of Finance.”

The shares are said to be speculative because their value materially depended upon
a promise of future promotion and development of the oil business, rather than on
actual tangible assets.
On appeal, Rosenthal Osmena argued that Act 2581 is unconstitutional on the
ground that it constitutes undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular
Treasurer.

ISSUE:
Whether there is undue delegation of legislative authority to the Insular Treasurer.
HELD:

The Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Treasurer to follow in reaching a
decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit.

The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person,
partnership, association or corporation applying therefor “has complied with the
provisions of this Act”, and this requirement, construed in relation to the other
provisions of the law, means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the Insular
Treasurer when the provisions of Act 2581
have been complied with.

Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate or
permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation “is in the public
interest.” In view of the intention and purpose of Act 2581 to protect the public
against “speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue
sky” and against the “sale of stock infly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant
gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations”, the Supreme Court held that
“public interest” in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in
reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of
certificates or permits.