Updated February 24, 2023

China-Russia Relations
The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) and the guide collaboration in this sphere. The PRC and Russia are
Russian Federation (Russia) maintain a strategic and founding members of the Eurasia-based Shanghai
multifaceted relationship with extensive military, Cooperation Organization (SCO), an intergovernmental
diplomatic, and economic connections. Although the group mainly focused on security affairs.
contemporary China-Russia relationship dates back to the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the two countries The PRC and Russia also enjoy strong commercial and
also share a long, tumultuous history that has included financial ties and are partners in their attempts to “de-
periods of security and diplomatic cooperation, fluctuations dollarize” the global economy, which they see as beholden
in ideological alignment, diplomatic crises, and a border to the United States. (See CRS In Focus IF11885, De-
war in the 1960s. Many experts trace the current dynamism Dollarization Efforts in China and Russia.) Both
of the relationship to 2014, when the reaction of some governments express opposition to the use of unilateral
countries to Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine, including sanctions as tools of policy.
sanctions, led Moscow to seek to strengthen its ties to
China and other countries. The PRC and Russia often cooperate and coordinate in
multilateral settings, including the United Nations; the
The two countries’ apparent mutual affinity has led some SCO; the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
U.S. policymakers and Members of Congress to express (BRICS) grouping; and the Group of 20 (G20). In 2022, the
concern that Beijing and Moscow constitute a de facto PRC joined Russia in vetoing a U.S.-led draft U.N.
alliance, and to seek ways to counter their global influence. resolution that would have tightened sanctions against
The PRC and Russia’s bilateral relationship falls short of a North Korea over its missile launches. Where frictions may
mutual defense pact, more closely resembling a non- arise, the PRC and Russia have tried to harmonize the
binding alignment based on shared opposition to what they interests of overlapping ventures, such as the Belt and Road
describe as the U.S.-led international order. This common Initiative (BRI) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).
opposition has spurred cooperation between the two
countries, but has not fully overcome their historical PRC and Russian Perspectives
strategic mistrust. In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of PRC officials frequently describe the current moment as a
Ukraine, Russia’s reliance on China’s economic and “historic high” in the China-Russia relationship, with the
political support has grown, increasing China’s advantage two sides mutually supporting each other’s positions on
in the relationship. national sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, and
economic development. For the PRC, one of the guiding
Key Features of the Relationship principles of the relationship would seem to be flexibility,
Building on the foundation of the 1991 Sino-Soviet Border as is evident in its call to “form partnerships, not alliances,”
Agreement, the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and which has allowed it to distance itself from some of
Friendly Cooperation, among other things, noted Beijing’s Russia’s behavior in the international arena. Russia’s role
and Moscow’s satisfaction on border issues and set broad as a strategic partner in global affairs has at times been
areas of cooperation ranging from economics and trade to disruptive for the PRC, which values access to the markets,
counterterrorism. The renewal of the treaty in 2021 reflects including capital markets, of the United States and Europe.
the overall positive trajectory of relations.
Russian concerns over China’s economic advantage often
The direction of the bilateral relationship appears, in part, to are overshadowed by the benefits (and, perhaps, necessity)
reflect close personal ties between Presidents Xi Jinping of greater economic, political, and military cooperation.
and Vladimir Putin. Since 2013, Xi and Putin have met Despite being aware of the practical benefits of a close
numerous times and established regular dialogue relationship with the PRC, Russian policymakers remain
mechanisms at lower levels. In 2019, PRC and Russian guarded and harbor skepticism toward China’s leaders. This
leaders announced their intention to develop a includes avoiding the binding obligations of a formal
“Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination for a alliance, especially commitments that could draw it into a
New Era,” professing a “high degree of political trust” and potential conflict over Taiwan. Russian officials appear to
“all-around cooperation.” reject the label of a “junior” partner and seek to manage the
relationship on mutually beneficial terms.
Military cooperation between the PRC and Russia is
significant, encompassing exchanges and joint exercises, as
well as intelligence sharing and joint development of
weapons systems. In November 2021, the two sides signed
a Road Map for Military Co-operation for 2021-2025 to

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 China-Russia Relations

Selected Issues China’s total imports. In 2019, crude oil accounted for
nearly 60% of the PRC’s imports from Russia. China’s
Challenging the Global Order transition away from coal could potentially lead to a greater
The PRC and Russia view each other as partners in their role for Russian hydrocarbons (including “green coal” and
efforts to challenge the U.S.-led global order. During a natural gas). The recently-completed Power of Siberia
phone call with Putin on December 30, 2022, Xi expressed Pipeline, when running at full capacity, could make China
that “in a changing and turbulent international environment, the second largest individual importer of Russian natural
it is important that China and Russia remain true to the gas, after Germany. (For more on economic relations
original aspiration of cooperation, maintain strategic focus, between China and Russia, see CRS In Focus IF12120,
enhance strategic coordination,” and “continue to be each China’s Economic and Trade Ties with Russia.)
other’s development opportunity and global partner.”
Impact of Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine
A number of experts contend that while the PRC and Russia Russia’s war against Ukraine has drawn increased scrutiny
both seem to reject the current world order, their visions of to the Beijing-Moscow relationship, including the extent to
what ought to replace it may not be consistent. Many which China is willing and able to help relieve sanctions
analysts view the PRC as a “revisionist” power working to pressure on Russia. Some observers believe Russia’s
change certain aspects of the existing order, possibly with invasion has strained relations, with China unaware of
the intention of superseding it in the long run. PRC officials Russia’s plans and unwilling to be drawn into the conflict.
often depict China’s vision for global order as based on the Nonetheless, China has avoided public condemnation of
principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in Russia’s actions. Russia, meanwhile, appears to be turning
domestic affairs, and contrast it with the current order, to China to circumvent Western sanctions, including selling
which they describe as having subordinated these principles oil and purchasing critical components for its defense
to human rights and interventionism. Russian policymakers industry. Some trade data suggests some PRC firms may be
argue that the existing global order ignores the position and providing dual-use goods to Russia, but it remains unclear
sovereignty of great powers other than the United States, how much support China is providing Russia. Media
and denies other powers what Russian policymakers view reports suggest the PRC government is selective in its
as legitimate spheres of influence. Russian leaders therefore engagement, allowing transactions that maximize
attempt to push back against what they see as U.S. unipolar advantages to China—such as buying oil at a discount, but
overreach, and remind the United States of Russia’s great unwilling to supply lethal weaponry.
power status and role in the international system.
The Biden Administration has repeatedly warned China
Defense Cooperation against assisting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. On January
The PRC and China are close partners in military and 9, 2023, State Department Spokesperson Ned Price stated:
defense affairs. The PRC historically has been a major “We’ve been very clear with the PRC, including in private [
buyer of Russian arms to modernize its growing military. ... ] about any costs that would befall the PRC should they
Defense trade has grown more complex, however, as the decide to assist Russia in a systematic effort to evade U.S.
PRC’s defense industry has grown in sophistication and sanctions or in the provision of security assistance that
Russia has developed concerns about technology transfer would then be used against the Ukrainian people in
and intellectual property violations. Russia’s defense Ukraine.” The Administration has sanctioned one Chinese
industry now relies on importing key components and firm and added several Chinese companies for export
investment from China for the development of advanced controls, and it has threatened further sanctions should
weapon systems. China increase its support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. The
White House stated on January 24, 2023, that it is “closely
Current relations stress conducting combined military monitoring the situation,” and that it “will continue to
exercises, developing interoperability, and increasing communicate to China the implications of providing
defense sector cooperation and joint arms development. material support to Russia’s war against Ukraine.”
Russia has sought to increase its participation in military
exercises with the PRC, including at the strategic and Issues for Congress
tactical level, as well as naval exercises and air patrols in U.S. policymakers, including in Congress, have identified
the Asia Pacific. Russia arguably conducts these exercises countering PRC and Russian challenges to the current
to develop interoperability with PRC forces and to signal to international order as a top national security priority. Both
the world that Russia remains a player in the region. the Trump and Biden Administrations included such
language in their national security strategies. The James M.
Energy and Economics Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
Economic relations between China and Russia are 2023 (P.L. 117-263) requires a report on whether and how
asymmetrical; China’s economy is considerably larger and the PRC has provided support to Russia with respect to its
more dynamic. China is Russia’s second largest export war against Ukraine. The Consolidated Appropriations Act,
market after the European Union (EU); Russia, meanwhile, 2023 (P.L. 117-328) appropriated $325 million and $300
is China’s ninth largest. Russia’s role as a key provider of million, respectively, for the Countering PRC Influence
PRC energy imports is a defining feature of the bilateral Fund and Countering Russian Influence Fund. The 118 th
relationship. According to the U.S. Energy Information Congress may review how these funds are being used to
Administration, in 2021, Russia was China’s second largest counter PRC and Russian narratives. It may also consider
source of crude oil, providing approximately 15% of

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 China-Russia Relations

how sanctions, including potential secondary sanctions Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European
against China, may affect China-Russia relations. Affairs
IF12100
Ricardo Barrios, Analyst in Asian Affairs

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