Instructor Resource

Northouse, Introduction to Leadership, 4e

SAGE Publishing, 2018

Introduction to Leadership Concepts

and Practice 4th Edition Northouse
Test Bank
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Chapter 4: Understanding Philosophy and Styles

Test Bank

Multiple Choice

1. A person’s view of people, work, and human nature shape their ______.
a. personal leadership philosophy
b. outlook on life
c. potential
d. goals and aspirations
Ans: A
Learning Objective: 4-1: Explain leadership philosophies.
Cognitive Domain: Knowledge
Answer Location: Introduction
Difficulty Level: Easy
AACSB Standard: Group and individual behaviors

2. Douglas McGregor’s theory on leadership is ______.

a. laissez-faire
b. Theory X and Theory Y
c. democratic
d. authoritarian
Ans: B
Learning Objective: 4-1: Explain leadership philosophies.
Cognitive Domain: Knowledge
Answer Location: Leadership Philosophy Explained
Difficulty Level: Easy
AACSB Standard: Leading in organizational situations

3. Which of the following is not an assumption of Theory X?

a. People dislike work.
b. People need to be directed and controlled.
 Instructor Resource
Northouse, Introduction to Leadership, 4e
SAGE Publishing, 2018

c. People dislike each other.

d. People want security not responsibility.
Ans: C
Learning Objective: 4-1: Explain leadership philosophies.
Cognitive Domain: Knowledge
Answer Location: Table 4.1: Assumptions of McGregor’s Theory X
Difficulty Level: Easy
AACSB Standard: Interpersonal relations and teamwork

4. Which of the following is an assumption of Theory Y?

a. People like their coworkers.
b. People like and identify with their leader.
c. People believe work conditions will improve.
d. People accept and seek responsibility.
Ans: D
Learning Objective: 4-1: Explain leadership philosophies.
Cognitive Domain: Knowledge
Answer Location: Table 4.2: Assumptions of McGregor’s Theory Y
Difficulty Level: Easy
AACSB Standard: Interpersonal relations and teamwork

5. A manager views their employees as unmotivated unless a reward is given. This

manager’s views align with which assumption of Theory X?
a. People dislike work because managers are generally irresponsible.
b. People need to be directed and controlled.
c. People want security not responsibility.
d. People will argue unless consequences are strict.
Ans: B
Learning Objective: 4-1: Explain leadership philosophies.
Cognitive Domain: Comprehension
Answer Location: Assumption #2. People Need to be Directed and Controlled
Difficulty Level: Medium
AACSB Standard: Interpersonal relations and teamwork.

6. Your new manager is highly motivational, gives clear directions and timelines, and is
quick to point out inefficiencies. They likely ascribe to ______ leadership philosophy.
a. Theory X
b. Theory Y
c. laissez-faire
d. authoritarian
Ans: A
Learning Objective: 4-1: Explain leadership philosophies.
Cognitive Domain: Comprehension
Answer Location: Theory X
Difficulty Level: Hard
AACSB Standard: Interpersonal relations and teamwork
 Instructor Resource
Northouse, Introduction to Leadership, 4e
SAGE Publishing, 2018

7. Former President Jimmy Carter and his work in retirement is given as an example of
which philosophy?
a. Theory X
b. Theory Y
c. laissez-faire
d. democratic
Ans: B
Learning Objective: 4-1: Explain leadership philosophies.
Cognitive Domain: Comprehension
Answer Location: Theory Y
Difficulty Level: Easy
AACSB Standard: Interpersonal relations and teamwork

8. An organization that emphasizes common cultural values, beliefs, and objectives

while highly collaborative is known as a ______.
a. democratic organization
b. Theory Y organization
c. Theory X organization
d. Theory Z organization
Ans: D
Learning Objective: 4-1: Explain leadership philosophies.
Cognitive Domain: Knowledge
Answer Location: Assumption #3. In the Proper Environment, the Average Person
Learns to Accept and Seek Responsibility
Difficulty Level: Easy
AACSB Standard: Interpersonal relations and teamwork

9. ______ is defined as the behaviors of leaders, focusing on what leaders do and how
they act.
a. Leadership philosophy
b. Leadership style
c. Assumption #1 of Theory Y
d. Assumption # 2 of Theory Y
Ans: B
Learning Objective: 4-2: Discuss the authoritarian, democratic, and laissez-faire
leadership styles.
Cognitive Domain: Knowledge
Answer Location: Leadership Styles Explained
Difficulty Level: Medium
AACSB Standard: Leading in organizational situations

10. The authoritarian leadership style is most similar to ______.

a. Theory X
b. Theory Y
c. leader–member exchange theory
 Instructor Resource
Northouse, Introduction to Leadership, 4e
SAGE Publishing, 2018

d. unrealized strengths
Ans: A
Learning Objective: 4-2: Discuss the authoritarian, democratic, and laissez-faire
leadership styles.
Cognitive Domain: Knowledge
Answer Location: Authoritarian Leadership Style
Difficulty Level: Easy
AACSB Standard: Interpersonal relations and teamwork

11. Which of the following is not used to describe authoritarian leadership?

a. pessimistic
b. negative
c. empowering
d. discouraging
Ans: C
Learning Objective: 4-2: Discuss the authoritarian, democratic, and laissez-faire
leadership styles.
Cognitive Domain: Knowledge
Answer Location: Authoritarian Leadership Style
Difficulty Level: Easy
AACSB Standard: Leading in organizational situations

12. Your new manager requires that all communication is directed towards them and not
circulated among the team, determines and sets goals for the team, and is quick to
praise and criticize. Their behaviors most closely align with which style?
a. Theory Y
b. laissez-faire
c. democratic
d. authoritarian
Ans: D
Learning Objective: 4-2: Discuss the authoritarian, democratic, and laissez-faire
leadership styles.
Cognitive Domain: Comprehension
Answer Location: Authoritarian Leadership Style
Difficulty Level: Easy
AACSB Standard: Interpersonal relations and teamwork

13. The outcomes of authoritarian leadership include all of the following except ______.
a. efficient
b. productive
c. submissiveness
d. individuality
Ans: D
Learning Objective: 4-2: Discuss the authoritarian, democratic, and laissez-faire
leadership styles.
Cognitive Domain: Comprehension
 Instructor Resource
Northouse, Introduction to Leadership, 4e
SAGE Publishing, 2018

Answer Location: Authoritarian Leadership Style

Difficulty Level: Hard
AACSB Standard: Interpersonal relations and teamwork

14. You step in to a new position with management of a team. You notice the team
relies heavily on you to set goals, they never offer new ideas, and they depend on you
to make all decisions. It is likely that your predecessor used which style of leadership?
a. Theory Y
b. authoritarian
c. laissez-faire
d. democratic
Ans: B
Learning Objective: 4-2: Discuss the authoritarian, democratic, and laissez-faire
leadership styles.
Cognitive Domain: Comprehension, application
Answer Location: Authoritarian Leadership Style
Difficulty Level: Medium
AACSB Standard: Interpersonal relations and teamwork

15. Authoritarian leadership can become ______ leadership where leaders coerce
followers to engage in unethical or immoral activities.
a. abusive
b. difficult
c. empowering
d. beneficial
Ans: A
Learning Objective: 4-2: Discuss the authoritarian, democratic, and laissez-faire
leadership styles.
Cognitive Domain: comprehension
Answer Location: Authoritarian Leadership Style
Difficulty Level: medium
AACSB Standard: ethical understanding and reasoning

16. ______ leaders provide information, guidance, and suggestions and do so without
applying pressure.
a. Theory X
b. Authoritarian
c. Democratic
d. Laissez-faire
Ans: C
Learning Objective: 4-2: Discuss the authoritarian, democratic, and laissez-faire
leadership styles.
Cognitive Domain: Knowledge
Answer Location: Democratic Leadership Style
Difficulty Level: Easy
AACSB Standard: Interpersonal relations and teamwork.
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form of the certificates, because he, with his usual sagacity, had adapted
them to the habits of the people he was to deal with. Meanwhile his
troops were four, his staff six, his muleteers nearly twelve months in
arrears of pay, and he was in debt every where, and for every thing. The
Portuguese government had become very clamorous for the subsidy, Mr.
Stuart acknowledged that their distress was very great, and the desertion
from the Portuguese army, which augmented in an alarming manner, and
seemed rather to be increased than repressed by severity, sufficiently
proved their misery. The personal resources of Wellington alone enabled
the army to maintain its forward position, for he had, to a certain extent,
carried his commercial speculations into Gallicia, as well as Portugal;
and he had persuaded the Spanish authorities in Castile to give up a part
of their revenue in kind to the army, receiving bills on the British
embassy at Cadiz in return. But the situation of affairs may be best
learned from the mouths of the generals.
“The arrears of the army are certainly getting to an alarming pitch, and
if it is suffered to increase, we cannot go on: we have only here two
brigades of infantry, fed by our own commissariat, and we are now
reduced to one of them having barely bread for this day, and the
commissary has not a farthing of money. I know not how we shall get
on!”
Such were Beresford’s words on the 8th of July, and on the 15th
Wellington wrote even more forcibly.
“I have never,” said he, “been in such distress as at present, and some
serious misfortune must happen, if the government do not attend
seriously to the subject, and supply us regularly with money. The arrears
and distresses of the Portuguse government, are a joke to ours, and if our
credit was not better than theirs, we should certainly starve. As it is, if
we don’t find means to pay our bills for butcher’s meat there will be an
end to the war at once.”
Thus stript as it were to the skin, the English general thought once
more to hide his nakedness in the mountains of Portugal, when Marmont,
proud of his own unripened skill, and perhaps, from the experience of
San Cristoval, undervaluing his adversary’s tactics, desirous also, it was
said, to gain a victory without the presence of a king, Marmont, pushed
on by fate, madly broke the chain which restrained his enemy’s strength.
 CHAP T E R I I I .

When Wellington found by the intercepted letters, that the king’s 1812.
orders for Drouet to cross the Tagus, were reiterated, and July.
imperative, he directed Hill to detach troops, in the same proportion. And
as this reinforcement, coming by the way of Alcantara, could reach the
Duero as soon as Drouet could reach Madrid, he hoped still to maintain
the Tormes, if not the Duero, notwithstanding the king’s power; for some
money, long expected from England, had at last arrived in Oporto, and
he thought the Gallicians, maugre their inertness, must soon be felt by
the enemy. Moreover the harvest on the ground, however abundant,
could not long feed the French multitudes, if Drouet and the king should
together join Marmont. Nevertheless, fearing the action of Joseph’s
cavalry, he ordered D’Urban’s horsemen to join the army on the Duero.
But to understand the remarkable movements which were now about to
commence, the reader must bear in mind, that the French army, from its
peculiar organization, could, while the ground harvest lasted, operate
without any regard to lines of communication; it had supports on all
sides and procured its food every where, for the troops were taught to
reap the standing corn, and grind it themselves if their cavalry could not
seize flour in the villages. This organization approaching the ancient
Roman military perfection, gave them great advantages; in the field it
baffled the irregular, and threw the regular force of the allies, entirely
upon the defensive; because when the flanks were turned, a retreat only
could save the communications, and the French offered no point, for
retaliation in kind. Wherefore, with a force composed of four different
nations, Wellington was to execute the most difficult evolutions, in an
open country, his chances of success being to arise only from the casual
errors of his adversary, who was an able general, who knew the country
perfectly, and was at the head of an army, brave, excellently disciplined,
and of one nation. The game would have been quite unequal if the
English general had not been so strong in cavalry.

F RE NCH PAS S AGE OF T HE DUE RO.

In the course of the 15th and 16th Marmont, who had previously made
several deceptive movements, concentrated his beautiful and gallant
army between Toro and the Hornija river; and intercepted letters, the
reports of deserters, and the talk of the peasants had for several days
assigned the former place as his point of passage. On the morning of the
16th the English exploring officers, passing the Duero near Tordesillas,
found only the garrison there, and in the evening the reports stated, that
two French divisions had already passed the repaired bridge of Toro.
Wellington united his centre and left at Canizal on the Guarena during
the night, intending to attack those who had passed at Toro; but as he had
still some doubts of the enemy’s real object, he caused sir Stapleton
Cotton to halt on the Trabancos with the right wing, composed of the
fourth and light divisions and Anson’s cavalry. Meanwhile Marmont,
recalling his troops from the left bank of the Duero, returned to
Tordesillas and Pollos, passed that river at those points and occupied
Nava del Rey, where his whole army was concentrated in the evening of
the 17th, some of his divisions having marched above forty miles, and
some above fifty miles, without a halt. The English cavalry posts being
thus driven over the Trabancos, advice of the enemy’s movement was
sent to lord Wellington, but he was then near Toro, it was midnight ere it
reached him, and the troops, under Cotton, remained near Castrejon
behind the Trabancos during the night of the 17th without See plan No. 3.
orders, exposed, in a bad position, to the attack of the
whole French army. Wellington hastened to their aid in person, and he
ordered Bock’s, Le Marchant’s, and Alten’s brigades of cavalry, to
follow him to Alaejos, and the fifth division to take post at Torrecilla de
la Orden six miles in rear of Castrejon.
At day-break Cotton’s outposts were again driven in by the enemy,
and the bulk of his cavalry with a troop of horse artillery immediately
formed in front of the two infantry divisions, which were drawn up, the
fourth division on the left, the light division on the right, but at a
considerable distance from each other and separated by a wide ravine.
The country was open and hilly, like the downs of England, with here
and there water-gulleys, dry hollows, and bold naked heads of land, and
behind the most prominent of these last, on the other side of the
Trabancos, lay the whole French army. Cotton however, seeing only
horsemen, pushed his cavalry again towards the river, advancing
cautiously by his right along some high table-land, and his troops were
soon lost to the view of the infantry, for the morning fog was thick on the
stream, and at first nothing could be descried beyond. But very soon the
deep tones of artillery shook the ground, the sharp ring of musketry was
heard in the mist, and the forty-third regiment was hastily brought
through Castrejon to support the advancing cavalry; for besides the
ravine which separated the fourth from the light division, there was
another ravine with a marshy bottom, between the cavalry and infantry,
and the village of Castrejon was the only good point of passage.
The cannonade now became heavy, and the spectacle surprisingly
beautiful, for the lighter smoke and mist, curling up in fantastic pillars,
formed a huge and glittering dome tinged of many colours by the rising
sun; and through the grosser vapour below, the restless horsemen were
seen or lost as the fume thickened from the rapid play of the artillery,
while the bluff head of land, beyond the Trabancos, covered with French
troops, appeared, by an optical deception close at hand, dilated to the
size of a mountain, and crowned with gigantic soldiers, who were
continually breaking off and sliding down into the fight. Suddenly a
dismounted cavalry officer stalked from the midst of the smoke towards
the line of infantry; his gait was peculiarly rigid, and he appeared to hold
a bloody handkerchief to his heart, but that which seemed a cloth, was a
broad and dreadful wound; a bullet had entirely effaced the flesh from
his left shoulder and from his breast, and had carried away part of his
ribs, his heart was bared, and its movement plainly discerned. It was a
piteous and yet a noble sight, for his countenance though ghastly was
firm, his step scarcely indicated weakness, and his voice never faltered.
This unyielding man’s name was Williams; he died a short distance from
the field of battle, and it was said, in the arms of his son, a youth of
fourteen, who had followed his father to the Peninsula in hopes of
obtaining a commission, for they were not in affluent circumstances.
General Cotton maintained this exposed position with skill and
resolution, from day-light until seven o’clock, at which time Wellington
arrived, in company with Beresford, and proceeded to examine the
enemy’s movements. The time was critical, and the two English generals
were like to have been slain together by a body of French cavalry, not
very numerous, which breaking away from the multitude on the head of
land beyond the Trabancos, came galloping at full speed across the
valley. It was for a moment thought they were deserting, but with
headlong course they mounted the table-land on which Cotton’s left wing
was posted, and drove a whole line of British cavalry skirmishers back in
confusion. The reserves indeed soon came up from Alaejos, and these
furious swordsmen being scattered in all directions were in turn driven
away or cut down, but meanwhile thirty or forty, led by a noble officer,
had brought up their right shoulders, and came over the edge of the table-
land above the hollow which separated the British wings at the instant
when Wellington and Beresford arrived on the same slope. There were
some infantry picquets in the bottom, and higher up, near the French,
were two guns covered by a squadron of light cavalry which was
disposed in perfect order. When the French officer saw this squadron, he
reined in his horse with difficulty, and his troopers gathered in a
confused body round him as if to retreat. They seemed lost men, for the
British instantly charged, but with a shout the gallant fellows soused
down upon the squadron, and the latter turning, galloped through the
guns; then the whole mass, friends and enemies, went like a whirlwind to
the bottom, carrying away lord Wellington, and the other generals, who
with drawn swords and some difficulty, got clear of the tumult. The
French horsemen were now quite exhausted, and a reserve squadron of
heavy dragoons coming in cut most of them to pieces; yet their
invincible leader, assaulted by three enemies at once, struck one dead
from his horse, and with surprising exertions saved himself from the
others, though they rode hewing at him on each side for a quarter of a
mile.
While this charge was being executed, Marmont, who had ascertained
that a part only of Wellington’s army was before him, crossed the
Trabancos in two columns, and passing by Alaejos, turned the left of the
allies, marching straight upon the Guarena. The British retired by
Torecilla de la Orden, the fifth division being in one column on the left,
the fourth division on the right as they retreated, and the light division on
an intermediate line and nearer to the enemy. The cavalry were on the
flanks and rear, the air was extremely sultry, the dust rose in clouds, and
the close order of the troops rendered it very oppressive, but the military
spectacle was exceedingly strange and grand. For then were seen the
hostile columns of infantry, only half musket-shot from each other,
marching impetuously towards a common goal, the officers on each side
pointing forwards with their swords, or touching their caps, and waving
their hands in courtesy, while the German cavalry, huge men, on huge
horses, rode between in a close compact body as if to prevent a collision.
At times the loud tones of command, to hasten the march, were heard
passing from the front to the rear, and now and then the rushing sound of
bullets came sweeping over the columns whose violent pace was
continually accelerated.
 Thus moving for ten miles, yet keeping the most perfect order, both
parties approached the Guarena, and the enemy seeing that the light
division, although more in their power than the others, were yet
outstripping them in the march, increased the fire of their guns and
menaced an attack with infantry. But the German cavalry instantly drew
close round, the column plunged suddenly into a hollow dip of ground
on the left which offered the means of baffling the enemy’s aim, and ten
minutes after the head of the division was in the stream of the Guarena
between Osmo and Castrillo. The fifth division entered the river at the
same time but higher up on the left, and the fourth division passed it on
the right. The soldiers of the light division, tormented with thirst, yet
long used to their enemy’s mode of warfare, drunk as they marched, and
the soldiers of the fifth division stopped in the river for only a few
moments, but on the instant forty French guns gathered on the heights
above sent a tempest of bullets amongst them. So nicely timed was the
operation.
The Guarena, flowing from four distinct sources which are united
below Castrillo, offered a very strong line of defence, and Marmont,
hoping to carry it in the first confusion of the passage, and so seize the
table-land of Vallesa, had brought up all his artillery to the front; and to
distract the allies’ attention he had directed Clausel to push the head of
the right column over the river at Castrillo, at the same time. But
Wellington expecting him at Vallesa from the first, had ordered the other
divisions of his army, originally assembled at Canizal, to cross one of the
upper branches of the river; and they reached the table-land of Vallesa,
before Marmont’s infantry, oppressed by the extreme heat and rapidity of
the march, could muster in strength to attempt the passage of the other
branch. Clausel, however, sent Carier’s brigade of cavalry across the
Guarena at Castrillo and supported it with a column of infantry; and the
fourth division had just gained the heights above Canizal, after passing
the stream, when Carier’s horsemen entered the valley on their left, and
the infantry in one column menaced their front. The sedgy banks of the
river would have been difficult to force in face of an enemy, but Victor
Alten though a very bold man in action, was slow to seize an advantage,
and suffered the French cavalry to cross and form in considerable
numbers without opposition; he assailed them too late and by successive
squadrons instead of by regiments, and the result was unfavourable at
first. The fourteenth and the German hussars were hard-pressed, the third
dragoons came up in support, but they were immediately driven back
again by the fire of some French infantry, the fight waxed hot with the
others, and many fell, but finally general Carier was wounded and taken,
and the French retired. During this cavalry action the twenty-seventh and
fortieth regiments coming down the hill, broke the enemy’s infantry with
an impetuous bayonet charge, and Alten’s horsemen being then
disengaged sabred some of the fugitives.
This combat cost the French who had advanced too far without
support, a general and five hundred soldiers; but Marmont, though
baffled at Vallesa, and beaten at Castrillo, concentrated his army at the
latter place in such a manner as to hold both banks of the Guarena.
Whereupon Wellington recalled his troops from Vallesa; and as the
whole loss of the allies during the previous operations was not more than
six hundred, nor that of the French more than eight hundred, and that
both sides were highly excited, the day still young, and the positions
although strong, open, and within cannon-shot, a battle was expected.
Marmont’s troops had however been marching for two days and nights
incessantly, and Wellington’s plan did not admit of fighting unless forced
to it in defence, or under such circumstances, as would enable him to
crush his opponent, and yet keep the field afterwards against the king.
By this series of signal operations, the French general had passed a
great river, taken the initiatory movement, surprised the right wing of the
allies, and pushed it back above ten miles. Yet these advantages are to be
traced to the peculiarities of the English general’s situation which have
been already noticed, and Wellington’s tactical skill was manifested by
the extricating of his troops from their dangerous position at Castrejon
without loss, and without being forced to fight a battle. He however
appears to have erred in extending his troops to the right when he first
reached the Duero, for seeing that Marmont could at pleasure pass that
river and turn his flanks, he should have remained concentrated on the
Guarena, and only pushed cavalry posts to the line of the Duero above
Toro. Neither should he have risked his right wing so far from his main
body from the evening of the 16th to the morning of the 18th. He could
scarcely have brought it off without severe loss, if Marmont had been
stronger in cavalry, and instead of pushing forwards at once to the
Guarena had attacked him on the march. On the other hand the security
of the French general’s movements, from the Trabancos to the Guarena,
depended entirely on their rapidity; for as his columns crossed the open
country on a line parallel to the march of the allies, a simple wheel by
companies to the right would have formed the latter in order of battle on
his flank while the four divisions already on the Guarena could have met
them in front.
But it was on the 16th that the French general failed in the most
glaring manner. His intent was, by menacing the communication with
Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo, to force the allies back, and strike some
decisive blow during their retreat. Now on the evening of the 16th he had
passed the Duero at Toro, gained a day’s march, and was then actually
nearer to Salamanca than the allies were; and had he persisted in his
movement Wellington must have fought him to disadvantage or have
given up Salamanca, and passed the Tormes at Huerta to regain the
communication with Ciudad Rodrigo. This advantage Marmont
relinquished, to make a forced march of eighty miles in forty-eight
hours, and to risk the execution of a variety of nice and difficult
evolutions, in which he lost above a thousand men by the sword or by
fatigue, and finally found his adversary on the 18th still facing him in the
very position which he had turned on the evening of the 16th!
On the 19th the armies maintained their respective ground in quiet
until the evening, when Marmont concentrated his troops in one mass on
his left near the village of Tarazona, and Wellington, fearing for his right,
again passed the second branch of the Guarena, at Vallesa, and El Olmo,
and took post on the table-land above those villages. The light division,
being in front, advanced to the edge of the table-land, overlooking the
enemy’s main body which was at rest round the bivouac fires; yet the
picquets would have been quietly posted, if sir Stapleton Cotton coming
up at the moment, had not ordered captain Ross to turn his battery of six-
pounders upon a group of French officers. At the first shot the enemy
seemed surprised, at the second their gunners run to their pieces, and in a
few moments a reply from twelve eight-pounders shewed the folly of
provoking a useless combat. An artillery officer was wounded in the
head, several of the British soldiers fell in different parts of the line, one
shot swept away a whole section of Portuguese, and finally the division
was obliged to withdraw several hundred yards in a mortifying manner
to avoid a great and unnecessary effusion of blood.
The allies being now formed in two lines on the table-land of Vallesa
offered a fair though not an easy field to the enemy; Wellington expected
a battle the next day, because the range of heights which he occupied,
trended backwards to the Tormes on the shortest line; and as he had
thrown a Spanish garrison into the castle of Alba de Tormes, he thought
Marmont could not turn his right, or if he attempted it, that he would be
shouldered off the Tormes at the ford of Huerta. He was mistaken. The
French general was more perfectly acquainted with the ground and
proved that he could move an army with wonderful facility.
On the 20th at day-break instead of crossing the Guarena to dispute
the high land of Vallesa, Marmont marched rapidly in several columns,
covered by a powerful rear-guard, up the river to Canta la Piedra, and
crossed the stream there, though the banks were difficult, before any
disposition could be made to oppose him. He thus turned the right flank
of the allies and gained a new range of hills trending towards the Tormes,
and parallel to those leading from Vallesa. Wellington immediately made
a corresponding movement. Then commenced an evolution similar to
that of the 18th, but on a greater scale both as to numbers and length of
way. The allies moving in two lines of battle within musket-shot of the
French endeavoured to gain upon and cross their march at Cantalpino;
the guns on both sides again exchanged their rough salutations as the
accidents of ground favoured their play; and again the officers, like
gallant gentlemen who bore no malice and knew no fear, made their
military recognitions, while the horsemen on each side watched with
eager eyes, for an opening to charge; but the French general moving his
army as one man along the crest of the heights, preserved the lead he had
taken, and made no mistake.
At Cantalpino it became evident that the allies were outflanked, and
all this time Marmont had so skilfully managed his troops that he
furnished no opportunity even for a partial attack. Wellington therefore
fell off a little and made towards the heights of Cabeça Vellosa and
Aldea Rubia, intending to halt there while the sixth division and Alten’s
cavalry, forcing their march, seized Aldea Lengua and secured the
position of Christoval. But he made no effort to seize the ford of Huerta,
for his own march had been long and the French had passed over nearly
twice as much ground, wherefore he thought they would not attempt to
reach the Tormes that day. However when night approached, although
his second line had got possession of the heights of Vellosa, his first line
was heaped up without much order in the low ground between that place
and Hornillos; the French army crowned all the summit of the opposite
hills, and their fires, stretching in a half circle from Villaruela to Babila
Fuente, shewed that they commanded the ford of Huerta. They could
even have attacked the allies with great advantage had there been light
for the battle. The English general immediately ordered the bivouac fires
to be made, but filed the troops off in succession with the greatest
celerity towards Vellosa and Aldea Rubia, and during the movement the
Portuguese cavalry, coming in from the front, were mistaken for French
and lost some men by cannon-shot ere they were recognised.
Wellington was deeply disquieted at the unexpected result of this day’s
operations which had been entirely to the advantage of the French
general. Marmont had shewn himself perfectly acquainted with the
country, had outflanked and outmarched the allies, had gained the
command of the Tormes, and as his junction with the king’s army was
thus secured he might fight or wait for reinforcements or continue his
operations as it seemed good to himself. But the scope of Wellington’s
campaign was hourly being more restricted. His reasons for avoiding a
battle except at advantage, were stronger than before, because
Caffarelli’s cavalry was known to be in march, and the army of the
centre was on the point of taking the field; hence though he should fight
and gain a victory, unless it was decisive, his object would not be
advanced. That object was to deliver the Peninsula, which could only be
done by a long course of solid operations incompatible with sudden and
rash strokes unauthorized by any thing but hope; wherefore yielding to
the force of circumstances, he prepared to return to Portugal and abide
his time; yet with a bitter spirit, which was not soothed by the
recollection, that he had refused the opportunity of fighting to advantage,
exactly one month before and upon the very hills he now occupied.
Nevertheless that stedfast temper, which then prevented him from
seizing an adventitious chance, would not now let him yield to fortune
more than she could ravish from him: he still hoped to give the lion’s
stroke, and resolved to cover Salamanca and the communication with
Ciudad Rodrigo to the last moment. A letter stating his inability to hold
his ground was however sent to Castaños, but it was intercepted by
Marmont, who exultingly pushed forwards without regard to the king’s
movements; and it is curious that Joseph afterwards King’s
imagined this to have been a subtlety of Wellington’s to correspondence, MSS.
draw the French general into a premature battle.
On the 21st while the allies occupied the old position of Christoval,
the French threw a garrison into Alba de Tormes, from whence the
Spaniards had been withdrawn by Carlos D’España, without the
knowledge of the English general. Marmont then passed the Tormes, by
the fords between Alba and Huerta, and moving up the valley of
Machechuco encamped behind Calvariza Ariba, at the edge of a forest
which extended from the river to that place. Wellington also passed the
Tormes in the course of the evening by the bridges, and by the fords of
Santa Marta and Aldea Lengua; but the third division and D’Urban’s
cavalry remained on the right bank, and entrenched themselves at
Cabrerizos, lest the French, who had left a division on the heights of
Babila Fuente, should recross the Tormes in the night and overwhelm
them.
It was late when the light division descended the rough side of the
Aldea Lengua mountain to cross the river, and the night came suddenly
down, with more than common darkness, for a storm, that common
precursor of a battle in the Peninsula, was at hand. Torrents of rain
deepened the ford, the water foamed and dashed with encreasing
violence, the thunder was frequent and deafening, and the lightning
passed in sheets of fire close over the column, or played upon the points
of the bayonets. One flash falling amongst the fifth dragoon guards, near
Santa Marta, killed many men and horses, while hundreds of frightened
animals breaking loose from their piquet ropes, and galloping wildly
about, were supposed to be the enemy’s cavalry charging in the darkness,
and indeed some of their patroles were at hand; but to a military eye
there was nothing more imposing than the close and beautiful order in
which the soldiers of that noble light division, were seen by the fiery
gleams to step from the river to the bank and pursue their march amidst
this astounding turmoil, defying alike the storm and the enemy.
The position now taken by the allies was nearly the same as that
occupied by general Graham a month before, when the forts of
Salamanca were invested. The left wing rested in the low ground on the
Tormes, near Santa Marta, having a cavalry post in front towards
Calvariza de Abaxo. The right wing extended along a range of heights
which ended also in low ground, near the village of Arapiles, and this
line being perpendicular to the course of the Tormes from Huerta to
Salamanca, and parallel to its course from Alba to Huerta, covered
Salamanca. But the enemy extending his left along the edge of the forest,
still menaced the line of communication with Ciudad Rodrigo; See Plan 3.
and in the night advice came that general Chauvel, with near
two thousand of Caffarelli’s horsemen, and twenty guns, had actually
reached Pollos on the 20th, and would join Marmont the 22nd or 23rd.
Hence Wellington, feeling that he must now perforce retreat to Ciudad
Rodrigo, and fearing that the French cavalry thus reinforced would
hamper his movements, determined, unless the enemy attacked him, or
committed some flagrant fault, to retire before Chauvel’s horsemen could
arrive.
At day-break on the 22nd, Marmont who had called the troops at
Babila Fuente over the Tormes, by the ford of Encina, brought Bonet’s
and Maucune’s divisions up from the forest and took possession of the
ridge of Calvariza de Ariba; he also occupied in advance of it a wooded
height on which was an old chapel called Nuestra Señora de la Pena. But
at a little distance from his left, and from the English right, stood a pair
of solitary hills, called the Two Arapiles, about half cannon-shot from
each other; steep and savagely rugged they were, and the possession of
them would have enabled the French general to form his army across
Wellington’s right, and thus bring on a battle with every disadvantage to
the allies, confined, as the latter would have been, between the French
army and the Tormes. These hills were neglected by the English general
until a staff officer, who had observed the enemy’s detachments stealing
towards them, first informed Beresford, and afterwards Wellington of the
fact. The former thought it was of no consequence, but the latter
immediately sent the seventh Caçadores to seize the most distant of the
rocks, and then a combat occurred similar to that which happened
between Cæsar and Afranius at Lerida; for the French seeing the allies’
detachment approaching, broke their own ranks, and running without
order to the encounter gained the first Arapiles and kept it, but were
repulsed in an endeavour to seize the second. This skirmish was followed
by one at Nuestra Señora de la Pena, which was also assailed by a
detachment of the seventh division, and so far successfully, that half that
height was gained; yet the enemy kept the other half, and Victor Alten,
flanking the attack with a squadron of German hussars, lost some men
and was himself wounded by a musket-shot.
The result of the dispute for the Arapiles rendered a retreat difficult to
the allies during day-light; for though the rock gained by the English was
a fortress in the way of the French army, Marmont, by extending his left,
and by gathering a force behind his own Arapiles, could still frame a
dangerous battle and pounce upon the allies during their movement.
Wherefore Wellington immediately extended his right into the low
ground, placing the light companies of the guards in the village of
Arapiles, and the fourth division, with exception of the twenty-seventh
regiment, which remained at the rock, on a gentle ridge behind them.
The fifth and sixth divisions he gathered in one mass upon the internal
slope of the English Arapiles, where from the hollow nature of the
ground they were quite hidden from the enemy; and during these
movements a sharp cannonade was exchanged from the tops of those
frowning hills, on whose crowning rocks the two generals sat like
ravenous vultures watching for their quarry.
Marmont’s project was not yet developed; his troops coming from
Babila Fuente were still in the forest, and some miles off; he had only
two divisions close up, and the occupation of Calvariza Ariba, and
Nuestra Señora de la Pena, was a daring defensive measure to cover the
formation of his army. The occupation of the Arapiles was however a
start forward, for an advantage to be afterwards turned to profit, and
seemed to fix the operations on the left of the Tormes. Wellington,
therefore, brought up the first and the light divisions to confront the
enemy’s troops on the height of Calvariza Ariba; and then calling the
third division and D’Urban’s cavalry over the river, by the fords of Santa
Marta, he posted them in a wood near Aldea Tejada, entirely refused to
the enemy and unseen by him, yet in a situation to secure the main road
to Ciudad Rodrigo. Thus the position of the allies was suddenly reversed;
the left rested on the English Arapiles, the right on Aldea Tejada; that
which was the rear became the front, and the interval between the third
and the fourth division was occupied by Bradford’s Portuguese infantry,
by the Spaniards, and by the British cavalry.
This ground had several breaks and hollows, so that few of these
troops could be viewed by the enemy, and those which were, seemed,
both from their movement and from their position, to be pointing to the
Ciudad Rodrigo road as in retreat. The commissariat and baggage had
also been ordered to the rear, the dust of their march was plainly to be
seen many miles off, and hence there was nothing in the relative position
of the armies, save their proximity, to indicate an approaching battle.
Such a state of affairs could not last long. About twelve o’clock
Marmont, fearing that the important bearing of the French Arapiles on
Wellington’s retreat would induce the latter to drive him thence, hastily
brought up Foy’s and Ferey’s divisions in support, placing, the first, with
some guns, on a wooded height between the Arapiles and Nuestra Señora
de la Pena, the second, and Boyer’s dragoons, behind Foy on the ridge of
Calvariza de Ariba. Nor was this fear ill-founded, for the English
general, thinking that he could not safely retreat in day-light without
possessing both Arapiles, had actually issued orders for the seventh
division to attack the French, but perceiving the approach of more
troops, gave counter-orders lest he should bring on the battle
disadvantageously. He judged it better to wait for new events, being
certain that at night he could make his retreat good, and wishing rather
that Marmont should attack him in his now strong position.
The French troops coming from Babila Fuente had not yet reached the
edge of the forest, when Marmont, seeing that the allies would not
attack, and fearing that they would retreat before his own dispositions
were completed, ordered Thomieres’ division, covered by fifty guns and
supported by the light cavalry, to menace the Ciudad Rodrigo road. He
also hastened the march of his other divisions, designing, when
Wellington should move in opposition to Thomieres, to fall upon him, by
the village of Arapiles, with six divisions of infantry and Boyer’s
dragoons, which last, he now put in march to take fresh ground on the
left of the Arapiles rocks, leaving only one regiment of cavalry, to guard
Foy’s right flank at Calvariza.
In these new circumstances, the positions of the two armies embraced
an oval basin formed by different ranges of hills, that rose like an
amphitheatre of which the Arapiles rocks might be considered the door-
posts. This basin was about a mile broad from north to south, and more
than two miles long from east to west. The northern and western half-
formed the allies’ position, which extended from the English Arapiles on
the left to Aldea Tejada on the right. The eastern heights were held by
the French right, and their left, consisting of Thomieres’ division with
the artillery and light cavalry, was now moving along the southern side
of the basin; but the march was wide and loose, there was a long space
between Thomieres’ and the divisions, which, coming from the edge of
the forest were destined to form the centre, and there was a longer space
between him and the divisions about the Arapiles. Nevertheless, the mass
of artillery placed on his right flank was very imposing, and opened its
fire grandly, taking ground to the left by guns, in succession, as the
infantry moved on; and these last marched eagerly, continually
contracting their distance from the allies, and bringing up their left
shoulders as if to envelope Wellington’s position and embrace it with
fire. At this time also, Bonet’s troops, one regiment of which held the
French Arapiles, carried the village of that name, and although soon
driven from the greatest part of it again, maintained a fierce struggle.
Marmont’s first arrangements had occupied several hours, yet as they
gave no positive indication of his designs, Wellington ceasing to watch
him, had retired from the Arapiles. But at three o’clock, a report reached
him that the French left was in motion and pointing towards the Ciudad
Rodrigo road; then starting up he repaired to the high ground, and
observed their movements for some time, with a stern contentment, for
their left wing was entirely separated from the centre. The fault was
flagrant, and he fixed it with the stroke of a thunderbolt. A few orders
issued from his lips like the incantations of a wizard, and suddenly the
dark mass of troops which covered the English Arapiles, was seemingly
possessed by some mighty spirit, and rushing violently down the interior
slope of the mountain, entered the great basin amidst a storm of bullets
which seemed to shear away the whole surface of the earth over which
the soldiers moved. The fifth division instantly formed on the right of the
fourth, connecting the latter with Bradford’s Portuguese, who hastened
forward at the same time from the right of the army, and the heavy
cavalry galloping up on the right of Bradford, closed this front of battle.
The sixth and seventh divisions flanked on the right by Anson’s light
cavalry, which had now moved from the Arapiles, were ranged at half
cannon-shot in a second line, which was prolonged by the Spaniards in
the direction of the third division; and this last, reinforced by two
squadrons of the fourteenth dragoons, and by D’Urban’s Portuguese
horsemen, formed the extreme right of the army. Behind all, on the
highest ground, the first and light divisions and Pack’s Portuguese were
disposed in heavy masses as a reserve.
When this grand disposition was completed, the third division and its
attendant horsemen, the whole formed in four columns and flanked on
the left by twelve guns, received orders to cross the enemy’s line of
march. The remainder of the first line, including the main body of the
cavalry was directed to advance whenever the attack of the third division
should be developed; and as the fourth division must in this forward
movement necessarily lend its flank to the enemy’s troops stationed on
the French Arapiles, Pack’s brigade was commanded to assail that rock
the moment the left of the British line should pass it. Thus, after long
coiling and winding, the armies came together, and drawing up their
huge trains like angry serpents mingled in deadly strife.

BAT T L E OF S AL AMANCA.

Marmont, from the top of the French Arapiles, saw the country
beneath him suddenly covered with enemies at a moment when he was in
the act of making a complicated evolution, and when, by the rash
advance of his left, his troops were separated into three parts, each at too
great a distance to assist the other, and those nearest the enemy neither
strong enough to hold their ground, nor aware of what they had to
encounter. The third division was, however, still hidden from him by the
western heights, and he hoped that the tempest of bullets under which the
British line was moving in the basin beneath, would check it until he
could bring up his reserve divisions, and by the village of Arapiles fall on
what was now the left of the allies’ position. But even this, his only
resource for saving the battle, was weak, for on that point there were still
the first and light divisions and Pack’s brigade, forming a mass of twelve
thousand troops with thirty pieces of artillery; the village itself was well
disputed, and the English Arapiles rock stood out as a strong bastion of
defence. However, the French general, nothing daunted, despatched
officer after officer, some to hasten up the troops from the forest, others
to stop the progress of his left wing, and with a sanguine expectation still
looked for the victory until he saw Pakenham with the third division
shoot like a meteor across Thomieres’ path; then pride and hope alike
died within him, and desperately he was hurrying in person to that fatal
point, when an exploding shell stretched him on the earth with a broken
arm and two deep wounds in his side. Confusion ensued and the troops
distracted by ill-judged orders and counter-orders knew not where to
move, who to fight or who to avoid.
It was about five o’clock when Pakenham fell upon Thomieres, and it
was at the instant when that general, the head of whose column had
gained an open isolated hill at the extremity of the southern range of
heights, expected to see the allies, in full retreat towards the Ciudad
Rodrigo road, closely followed by Marmont from the Arapiles. The
counter-stroke was terrible! Two batteries of artillery placed on the
summit of the western heights suddenly took his troops in flank, and
Pakenham’s massive columns supported by cavalry, were coming on full
in his front, while two-thirds of his own division, lengthened out and
unconnected, were still behind in a wood where they could hear, but
could not see the storm which was now bursting. From the chief to the
lowest soldier all felt that they were lost, and in an instant Pakenham the
most frank and gallant of men commenced the battle.
The British columns formed lines as they marched, and the French
gunners standing up manfully for the honour of their country, sent
showers of grape into the advancing masses, while a crowd of light
troops poured in a fire of musketry, under cover of which the main body
endeavoured to display a front. But bearing onwards through the
skirmishers with the might of a giant, Pakenham broke the half-formed
lines into fragments, and sent the whole in confusion upon the advancing
supports; one only officer, with unyielding spirit, remained by the
artillery; standing alone he fired the last gun at the distance of a few
yards, but whether he lived or there died could not be seen for the smoke.
Some squadrons of light cavalry fell on the right of the third division, but
the fifth regiment repulsed them, and then D’Urban’s Portuguese
horsemen, reinforced by two squadrons of the fourteenth dragoons under
Felton Harvey, gained the enemy’s flank. The Oporto regiment, led by
the English Major Watson, instantly charged the French Appendix I.
infantry, yet vainly, Watson fell deeply wounded and his
men retired.
Pakenham continued his tempestuous course against the remainder of
Thomieres’ troops, which were now arrayed on the wooded heights
behind the first hill, yet imperfectly, and offering two fronts the one
opposed to the third division and its attendant horsemen, the other to the
fifth division, to Bradford’s brigade and the main body of cavalry and
artillery, all of which were now moving in one great line across the
basin. Meanwhile Bonet’s troops having failed at the village of Arapiles
were sharply engaged with the fourth division, Maucune kept his
menacing position behind the French Arapiles, and as Clauzel’s division
had come up from the forest, the connection of the centre and left was in
some measure restored; two divisions were however still in the rear, and
Boyer’s dragoons were in march from Calvariza Ariba. Thomieres had
been killed, and Bonet, who succeeded Marmont, had been disabled,
hence more confusion; but the command of the army devolved on
Clauzel, and he was of a capacity to sustain this terrible crisis.
The fourth and fifth divisions, and Bradford’s brigade, were now hotly
engaged and steadily gaining ground; the heavy cavalry, Anson’s light
dragoons and Bull’s troop of artillery were advancing at a trot on
Pakenham’s left; and on that general’s right D’Urban’s horsemen
overlapped the enemy. Thus in less than half an hour, and before an order
of battle had even been formed by the French, their commander-in-chief
and two other generals had fallen, and the left of their army was turned,
thrown into confusion and enveloped. Clauzel’s division had indeed
joined Thomieres’, and a front had been spread on the southern heights,
but it was loose and unfit to resist; for the troops were, some in double
lines, some in columns, some in squares; a powerful sun shone full in
their eyes, the light soil, stirred up by the trampling of men and horses,
and driven forward by a breeze, which arose in the west at the moment
of attack, came full upon them mingled with smoke in such stifling
clouds, that scarcely able to breathe and quite unable to see, their fire
was given at random.
In this situation, while Pakenham, bearing onward with a conquering
violence, was closing on their flank and the fifth division advancing with
a storm of fire on their front, the interval between the two attacks was
suddenly filled with a whirling cloud of dust, which moving swiftly
forward carried within its womb the trampling sound of a charging
multitude. As it passed the left of the third division Le Marchant’s heavy
horsemen flanked by Anson’s light cavalry, broke forth from it at full
speed, and the next instant twelve hundred French infantry though
formed in several lines were trampled down with a terrible clamour and
disturbance. Bewildered and blinded, they cast away their arms and run
through the openings of the British squadrons stooping and demanding
quarter, while the dragoons, big men and on big horses, rode onwards
smiting with their long glittering swords in uncontroulable power, and
the third division followed at speed, shouting as the French masses fell in
succession before this dreadful charge.
Nor were these valiant swordsmen yet exhausted. Their own general,
Le Marchant, and many officers had fallen, but Cotton and all his staff
was at their head, and with ranks confused, and blended together in one
mass, still galloping forward they sustained from a fresh column an
irregular stream of fire which emptied a hundred saddles; yet with fine
courage, and downright force, the survivors broke through this the third
and strongest body of men that had encountered them, and lord Edward
Somerset, continuing his course at the head of one squadron, with a
happy perseverance captured five guns. The French left was entirely
broken, more than two thousand prisoners were taken, the French light
horsemen abandoned that part of the field, and Thomieres’ division no
longer existed as a military body. Anson’s cavalry which had passed
quite over the hill and had suffered little in the charge, was now joined
by D’Urban’s troopers, and took the place of Le Marchant’s exhausted
men; the heavy German dragoons followed in reserve, and with the third
and fifth divisions and the guns, formed one formidable line, two miles
in advance of where Pakenham had first attacked; and that impetuous
officer with unmitigated strength still pressed forward spreading terror
and disorder on the enemy’s left.
While these signal events, which occupied about forty minutes, were
passing on the allies’ right, a terrible battle raged in the centre. For when
the first shock of the third division had been observed from the Arapiles,
the fourth division, moving in a line with the fifth, had passed the village
of that name under a prodigious cannonade, and vigourously driving
Bonet’s troops backwards, step by step, to the southern and eastern
heights, obliged them to mingle with Clauzel’s and with Thomieres’
broken remains. When the combatants had passed the French Arapiles,
which was about the time of Le Marchant’s charge, Pack’s Portuguese
assailed that rock, and the front of battle was thus completely defined,
because Foy’s division was now exchanging a distant cannonade with the
first and light divisions. However Bonet’s troops, notwithstanding
Marmont’s fall, and the loss of their own general, fought strongly, and
Clauzel made a surprising effort, beyond all men’s expectations, to
restore the battle. Already a great change was visible. Ferey’s division
drawn off from the height of Calvaraza Ariba arrived in the centre
behind Bonet’s men; the light cavalry, Boyer’s dragoons, and two
divisions of infantry, from the forest, were also united there, and on this
mass of fresh men, Clauzel rallied the remnants of his own and
Thomieres’ division. Thus by an able movement, Sarrut’s, Brennier’s,
and Ferey’s unbroken troops, supported by the whole of the cavalry,
were so disposed as to cover the line of retreat to Alba de Tormes, while
Maucune’s division was still in mass behind the French Arapiles, and
Foy’s remained untouched on the right.
But Clauzel, not content with having brought the separated part of his
army together and in a condition to effect a retreat, attempted to stem the
tide of victory in the very fulness of its strength and roughness. His
hopes were founded on a misfortune which had befallen general Pack;
for that officer ascending the French Arapiles in one heavy column, had
driven back the enemy’s skirmishers and was within thirty yards of the
summit, believing himself victorious, when suddenly the French reserves
leaped forward from the rocks upon his front, and upon his left flank.
The hostile masses closed, there was a thick cloud of smoke, a shout, a
stream of fire, and the side of the hill was covered to the very bottom
with the dead the wounded and the flying Portuguese, who were scoffed
at for this failure without any justice; no troops could have withstood that
crash upon such steep ground, and the propriety of attacking the hill at
all seems very questionable. The result went nigh to shake the whole
battle. For the fourth division had just then reached the southern ridge of
the basin, and one of the best regiments in the service was actually on the
summit when twelve hundred fresh adversaries, arrayed on the reverse
slope, charged up hill; and as the British fire was straggling and
ineffectual, because the soldiers were breathless and disordered by the
previous fighting, the French who came up resolutely and without firing
won the crest. They were even pursuing down the other side when two
regiments placed in line below, checked them with a destructive volley.
This vigorous counter-blow took place at the moment when Pack’s
defeat permitted Maucune, who was no longer in pain for the Arapiles
hill, to menace the left flank and rear of the fourth division, but the left
wing of the fortieth regiment immediately wheeled about and with a
rough charge cleared the rear. Maucune would not engage himself more
deeply at that time, but general Ferey’s troops pressed vigorously against
the front of the fourth division, and Brennier did the same by the first
line of the fifth division, Boyer’s dragoons also came on rapidly, and the
allies being outflanked and over-matched lost ground. Fiercely and fast
the French followed and the fight once more raged in the basin below.
General Cole had before this fallen deeply wounded, and Leith had the
same fortune, but Beresford promptly drew Spry’s Portuguese brigade
from the second line of the fifth division and thus flanked the advancing
columns of the enemy; yet he also fell desperately wounded, and Boyer’s
dragoons then came freely into action because Anson’s cavalry had been
checked after Le Marchant’s charge by a heavy fire of artillery.
The crisis of the battle had now arrived and the victory was for the
general who had the strongest reserves in hand. Wellington, who was
seen that day at every point of the field exactly when his presence was
most required, immediately brought up from the second line, the sixth
division, and its charge was rough, strong, and successful. Nevertheless
the struggle was no slight one. The men of general Hulse’s brigade,
which was on the left, went down by hundreds, and the sixty-first and
eleventh regiments won their way desperately and through such a fire, as
British soldiers only, can sustain. Some of Boyer’s dragoons also
breaking in between the fifth and sixth divisions slew many men, and
caused some disorder in the fifty-third; but that brave regiment lost no
ground, nor did Clauzel’s impetuous counter-attack avail at any point,
after the first burst, against the steady courage of the allies. The southern
ridge was regained, the French general Menne was severely, and general
Ferey, mortally wounded, Clauzel himself was hurt, and the reserve of
Boyer’s dragoons coming on at a canter were met and broken by the fire
of Hulse’s noble brigade. Then the changing current of the fight once
more set for the British. The third division continued to outflank the
enemy’s left, Maucune abandoned the French Arapiles, Foy retired from
the ridge of Calvariza, and the allied host righting itself as a gallant ship
after a sudden gust, again bore onwards in blood and gloom, for though
the air, purified by the storm of the night before, was peculiarly clear,
one vast cloud of smoke and dust rolled along the basin, and within it
was the battle with all its sights and sounds of terror.
When the English general had thus restored the fight in the centre, he
directed the commander of the first division to push between Foy and the
rest of the French army, which would have rendered it impossible for the
latter to rally or escape; but this order was not executed, and Foy’s and
Maucune’s divisions were skilfully used by Clauzel to protect the retreat.
The first, posted on undulating ground and flanked by some squadrons of
dragoons, covered the roads to the fords of Huerta and Encina; the
second, reinforced with fifteen guns, was placed on a steep ridge in front
of the forest, covering the road to Alba de Tormes; and behind this ridge,
the rest of the army, then falling back in disorder before the third, fifth,
and sixth divisions, took refuge. Wellington immediately sent the light
division, formed in two lines and flanked by some squadrons of
dragoons, against Foy; and he supported them by the first division in
columns, flanked on the right by two brigades of the fourth division
which he had drawn off from the centre when the sixth division restored
the fight. The seventh division and the Spaniards followed in reserve, the
country was covered with troops, and a new army seemed to have risen
out of the earth.
Foy throwing out a cloud of skirmishers retired slowly by wings,
turning and firing heavily from every rise of ground upon the light
division, which marched steadily forward without returning a shot, save
by its skirmishers; for three miles the march was under this musketry,
which was occasionally thickened by a cannonade, and yet very few men
were lost, because the French aim was baffled, partly by the twilight,
partly by the even order and rapid gliding of the lines. But the French
general Desgraviers was killed, and the flanking brigades from the fourth
division having now penetrated between Maucune and Foy, it seemed
difficult for the latter to extricate his troops from the action; nevertheless
he did it and with great dexterity. For having increased his skirmishers
on the last defensible ridge, along the foot of which run a marshy stream,
he redoubled his fire of musketry, and made a menacing demonstration
with his horsemen just as the darkness fell; the British guns immediately
opened their fire, a squadron of dragoons galloped forwards from the
left, the infantry, crossing the marshy stream, with an impetuous pace
hastened to the summit of the hill, and a rough shock seemed at hand, but
there was no longer an enemy; the main body of the French had gone
into the thick forest on their own left during the firing, and the
skirmishers fled swiftly after, covered by the smoke and by the darkness.
Meanwhile Maucune maintained a noble battle. He was outflanked
and outnumbered, but the safety of the French army depended on his
courage; he knew it, and Pakenham, marking his bold demeanour,
advised Clinton, who was immediately in his front, not to assail him
until the third division should have turned his left. Nevertheless the sixth
division was soon plunged afresh into action under great disadvanatge,
for after being kept by its commander a long time without reason, close
under Maucune’s batteries which ploughed heavily through the ranks, it
was suddenly directed by a staff officer to attack the hill. Assisted by a
brigade of the fourth division, the troops then rushed up, and in the
darkness of the night the fire shewed from afar how the battle went. On
the side of the British a sheet of flame was seen, sometimes advancing
with an even front, sometimes pricking forth in spear heads, now falling
back in waving lines, and anon darting upwards in one vast pyramid, the
apex of which often approached yet never gained the actual summit of
the mountain; but the French musketry, rapid as lightning, sparkled along
the brow of the height with unvarying fulness, and with what destructive
effects the dark gaps and changing shapes of the adverse fire showed too
plainly. Yet when Pakenham had again turned the enemy’s left, and Foy’s
division had glided into the forest, Maucune’s task was completed, the
effulgent crest of the ridge became black and silent, and the whole
French army vanished as it were in the darkness.
Meanwhile Wellington, who was with the leading regiment of the light
division, continued to advance towards the ford of Huerta leaving the
forest to his right, for he thought the Spanish garrison was still in the
castle of Alba de Tormes, and that the enemy must of necessity be found
in a confused mass at the fords. It was for this final stroke that he had so
skilfully strengthened his left wing, nor was he diverted from his aim by
marching through standing corn where no enemy could have preceded
him; nor by Foy’s retreat into the forest, because it pointed towards the
fords of Encina and Gonzalo, which that general might be endeavouring
to gain, and the right wing of the allies would find him there. A squadron
of French dragoons also burst hastily from the forest in front of the
advancing troops, soon after dark, and firing their pistols passed at full
gallop towards the ford of Huerta, thus indicating great confusion in the
defeated army, and confirming the notion that its retreat was in that
direction. Had the castle of Alba been held, the French could not have
carried off a third of their army, nor would they have been in much better
plight if Carlos D’España, who soon discovered his error in withdrawing
the garrison, had informed Wellington of the fact; but he suppressed it
and suffered the colonel who had only obeyed his orders to be censured;
the left wing therefore continued their march to the ford without meeting
any enemy, and, the night being far spent, were there halted; the right
wing, exhausted by long fighting, had ceased to pursue after the action
with Maucune, and thus the French gained Alba unmolested; but the
action did not terminate without two remarkable accidents. While riding
close behind the forty-third regiment, Wellington was struck in the thigh
by a spent musket-ball, which passed through his holster; and the night
picquets had just been set at Huerta, when sir Stapleton Cotton, who had
gone to the ford and returned a different road, was shot through the arm
by a Portuguese sentinel whose challenge he had disregarded. These
were the last events of this famous battle, in which the skill of the
general was worthily seconded by troops whose ardour may be
appreciated by the following anecdotes.
Captain Brotherton of the fourteenth dragoons, fighting on the 18th at
the Guarena, amongst the foremost, as he was always wont to do, had a
sword thrust quite through his side, yet on the 22d he was again on
horseback, and being denied leave to remain in that condition with his
own regiment, secretly joined Pack’s Portuguese in an undress, and was
again hurt in the unfortunate charge at the Arapiles. Such were the
officers. A man of the forty-third, one by no means distinguished above
his comrades, was shot through the middle of the thigh, and lost his
shoes in passing the marshy stream; but refusing to quit the fight, he
limped under fire in rear of his regiment, and with naked feet, and
streaming of blood from his wound, he marched for several miles over a
country covered with sharp stones. Such were the soldiers, and the
devotion of a woman was not wanting to the illustration of this great day.
The wife of colonel Dalbiac, an English lady of a gentle disposition
and possessing a very delicate frame, had braved the dangers, and
endured the privations of two campaigns, with the patient fortitude
which belongs only to her sex; and in this battle, forgetful of every thing
but that strong affection which had so long supported her, she rode deep
amidst the enemy’s fire, trembling yet irresistibly impelled forwards by
feelings more imperious than horror, more piercing than the fear of
death.
 CHAP T E R I V.

During the few hours of darkness, which succeeded the cessation 1812.
of the battle, Clauzel had with a wonderful diligence, passed the July.
Tormes by the narrow bridge of Alba and the fords below it, and at day-
light was in full retreat upon Peneranda, covered by an organized rear-
guard. Wellington also, having brought up the German dragoons and
Anson’s cavalry to the front, crossed the river with his left wing at day-
light, and moving up the stream, came about ten o’clock upon the French
rear which was winding without much order along the Almar, a small
stream at the foot of a height near the village of La Serna. He launched
his cavalry against them, and the French squadrons, flying from Anson’s
troopers towards their own left, abandoned three battalions of infantry,
who in separate columns were making up a hollow slope on their right,
hoping to gain the crest of the heights before the cavalry could fall on.
The two foremost did reach the higher ground and there formed squares,
general Foy being in the one, and general Chemineau in the other; but
the last regiment when half-way up, seeing Bock’s dragoons galloping
hard on, faced about and being still in column commenced a disorderly
fire. The two squares already formed above, also plied their muskets
with far greater effect; and as the Germans, after crossing the Almar
stream, had to pass a turn of narrow road, and then to clear some rough
ground before they could range their squadrons on a charging front, the
troopers dropt fast under the fire. By two’s, by three’s, by ten’s, by
twenties they fell, but the rest keeping together, surmounted the
difficulties of the ground, and hurtling on the column went clean through
it; then the squares above retreated and several hundred prisoners were
made by these able and daring horsemen.
This charge had been successful even to wonder, the joyous victors
standing in the midst of their captives and of thousands of admiring
friends seemed invincible; yet those who witnessed the scene, nay the
actors themselves remained with the conviction of this military truth, that
cavalry are not able to cope with veteran infantry save by surprize. The
hill of La Serna offered a frightful spectacle of the power of the musket,
that queen of weapons, and the track of the Germans was marked by
their huge bodies. A few minutes only had the combat lasted and above a
hundred had fallen; fifty-one were killed outright; and in several places
man and horse had died simultaneously, and so suddenly, that falling
together on their sides they appeared still alive, the horse’s legs stretched
out as in movement, the rider’s feet in the stirrup, his bridle in hand, the
sword raised to strike, and the large hat fastened under the chin, giving to
the grim, but undistorted countenance, a supernatural and terrible
expression.
When the French main body found their rear-guard attacked, they
turned to its succour, but seeing the light division coming up
recommenced the retreat and were followed to Nava de Sotroval. Near
that place Chauvel’s horsemen joined them from the Duero, and covered
the rear with such a resolute countenance that the allied cavalry, reduced
in numbers and fatigued with continual fighting, did not choose to
meddle again. Thus Clauzel carried his army clear off without further
loss, and with such celerity, that his head-quarters were that night at
Flores de Avila forty miles from the field of battle. After remaining a few
hours there he crossed the Zapardiel, and would have halted the 24th, but
the allied cavalry entered Cisla, and the march was then continued to
Arevalo. This was a wonderful retreat, and the line was chosen with
judgment, for Wellington naturally expected the French army would
have made for Tordesillas instead of the Adaja. The pursuit was however
somewhat slack, for on the very night of the action, the British left wing,
being quite fresh, could have ascended the Tormes and reached the
Almar before day-light, or, passing at Huerta, have marched by Ventosa
to Peneranda; but the vigorous following of a beaten enemy was never a
prominent characteristic of Lord Wellington’s campaigns in the
Peninsula.
The 25th the allied army halted on the Zapardiel, and Adaja rivers, to
let the commissariat, which had been sent to the rear the morning of the
battle, come up. Meanwhile the king having quitted Madrid with
fourteen thousand men on the 21st reached the Adaja and pushed his
cavalry towards Fontiveros; he was at Blasco Sancho the 24th, See Plan 3.
within a few hours’ march of Arevalo, and consequently able to
effect a junction with Clauzel, yet he did not hurry his march, for he
knew only of the advance upon Salamanca not of the defeat, and having
sent many messengers to inform Marmont of his approach, concluded
that general would await his arrival. The next day he received letters
from the duke of Ragusa and Clauzel, dated Arevalo, King’s
describing the battle, and telling him that the defeated correspondence, MSS.
army must pass the Duero immediately to save the dépôt of Valladolid,
and to establish new communications with the army of the north. Those
generals promised however to halt behind that river, if possible, until the
king could receive reinforcements from Suchet and Soult.
Joseph by a rapid movement upon Arevalo could still have effected a
junction, but he immediately made a forced march to Espinar, leaving in
Blasco Sancho two officers and twenty-seven troopers, who were
surprised and made prisoners on the evening of the 25th by a corporal’s
patrole; Clauzel at the same time marched upon Valladolid, by Olmedo,
thus abandoning Zamora, Toro, and Tordesillas, with their garrisons, to
the allies. Wellington immediately brought Santo Cildes, who was now
upon the Esla with eight thousand Gallicians, to the right bank of the
Duero, across which river he communicated by Castro Nuño with the left
of the allies which was then upon the Zapardiel.
The 27th the British whose march had become more circumspect from
the vicinity of the king’s army entered Olmedo. At this place, general
Ferrey had died of his wounds, and the Spaniards tearing his body from
the grave were going to mutilate it, when the soldiers of the light division
who had so often fought against this brave man rescued his corpse, re-
made his grave and heaped rocks upon it for more security, though with
little need; for the Spaniards, with whom the sentiment of honor is
always strong when not stifled by the violence of their passions,
applauded the action.
On the 26th Clauzel, finding the pursuit had slackened, sent Colonel
Fabvier to advise the king of it, and then sending his own right wing
across the Duero, by the ford near Boecillo, to cover the evacuation of
Valladolid, marched with the other wing towards the bridge of Tudela; he
remained however still on the left bank, in the hope that Fabvier’s
mission would bring the king back. Joseph who had already passed the
Puerta de Guadarama immediately repassed it without delay and made a
flank movement to Segovia, which he reached the 27th, and pushed his
cavalry to Santa Maria de Nieva. Here he remained until the 31st
expecting Clauzel would join him, for he resolved not to quit his hold of
the passes over the Guadarama, nor to abandon his communication with
Valencia and Andalusia. But Wellington brought Santo Cildes over the
Duero to the Zapardiel, and crossing the Eresma and Ciga rivers himself,
with the first and light divisions and the cavalry, had obliged Clauzel to
retire over the Duero in the night of the 29th; and the next day the French
general whose army was very much discouraged, fearing that Wellington
would gain Aranda and Lerma while the Gallicians seized Dueñas and
Torquemada, retreated in three columns by the valleys of the Arlanza,
the Duero and the Esquiva towards Burgos.
The English general entered Valladolid amidst the rejoicings of the
people and there captured seventeen pieces of artillery, considerable
stores, and eight hundred sick and wounded men; three hundred other
prisoners were taken by the Partida chief Marquinez, and a large French
convoy intended for Andalusia returned to Burgos. While the left wing
of the allies pursued the enemy up the Arlanza, Wellington, marching
with the right wing against the king, reached Cuellar the 1st of August;
on the same day the garrison of Tordesillas surrendered to the Gallicians,
and Joseph having first dismantled the castle of Segovia and raised a
contribution of money and church plate retreated through Wellington’s
the Puerta de Guadarama, leaving a rear-guard of cavalry despatch.
which escaped by the Ildefonso pass on the approach of the allied
horsemen. Thus the army of the centre was irrevocably separated from
the army of Portugal, the operations against the latter were terminated,
and new combinations were made conformable to the altered state of
affairs; but to understand these it is necessary to look at the transactions
in other parts of the Peninsula.
In Estremadura, after Drouet’s retreat to Azagua, Hill See Chap. IV. Book
placed a strong division at Merida ready to cross the XVIII.
Tagus, but no military event occurred until the 24th of July, when general
Lallemand, with three regiments of cavalry pushed back some
Portuguese horsemen from Ribera to Villa Franca. He was attacked in
front by general Long, while general Slade menaced his left, but he
succeeded in repassing the defile of Ribera; Long then turned him by
both flanks, and aided by Lefebre’s horse artillery, drove him with the
loss of fifty men and many horses upon Llera, a distance of twenty miles.
Drouet, desirous to retaliate, immediately executed a flank march
towards Merida, and Hill fearing for his detachments there made a
corresponding movement, whereupon the French general Intercepted
returned to the Serena; but though he received positive correspondence.
orders from Soult to give battle no action followed and the affairs of that
part of the Peninsula remained balanced.
In Andalusia, Ballesteros surprised colonel Beauvais, at August.
Ossuna, took three hundred prisoners and destroyed the French
dépôt there. After this he moved against Malaga, and was opposed by
general Laval in front, while general Villatte, detached from the blockade
of Cadiz, cut off his retreat to San Roque. The road to Murcia was still
open to him, but his rashness, though of less consequence since the battle
of Salamanca, gave Wellington great disquietude, and the more so that
Joseph O’Donel had just sustained a serious defeat near Alicant. This
disaster, which shall be described in a more fitting place, was however in
some measure counterbalanced by the information, that the revived
expedition from Sicily had reached Majorca, where it had been
reinforced by Whittingham’s division, and by the stores and guns sent
from Portugal to Gibraltar. It was known also, that in the northern
provinces Popham’s armament had drawn all Caffarelli’s troops to the
coast, and although the littoral warfare was not followed up the French
were in confusion and the diversion complete.
In Castile the siege of Astorga still lingered, but the division of Santo
Cildes, seven thousand strong, was in communication with Wellington,
Silveira’s militia were on the Duero, Clauzel had retreated to Burgos,
and the king joined by two thousand men from Suchet’s army, could
concentrate twenty thousand to dispute the passes of the Guadarama.
Hence Wellington, having nothing immediate to fear from Soult, nor
from the army of Portugal, nor from the army of the north, nor from
Suchet, menaced as that marshal was by the Sicilian expedition, resolved
to attack the king in preference to following Clauzel. The latter general
could not be pursued without exposing Salamanca and the Gallicians to
Joseph, who was strong in cavalry; but the monarch could be assailed
without risking much in other quarters, seeing that Clauzel could not be
very soon ready to renew the campaign, and it was expected Castaños
would reduce Astorga in a few days which would give eight thousand
additional men to the field army. Moreover a strong British division
could be spared to co-operate with Santo Cildes, Silveira, and the
Partidas, in the watching of the beaten army of Portugal while
Wellington gave the king a blow in the field, or forced him to abandon
Madrid; and it appeared probable that the moral effect of regaining the
capital would excite the Spaniards’ energy every where, and would
prevent Soult from attacking Hill. If he did attack him, the allies by
choosing this line of operations, would be at hand to give succour.
These reasons being weighed, Wellington posted general Clinton at
Cuellar with the sixth division, which he increased to eight thousand men
by the addition of some sickly regiments and by Anson’s cavalry; Santo
Cildes also was put in communication with him, and the Partidas of
Marquinez, Saornil, and El Principe agreed to act with Anson on a
prescribed plan. Thus exclusive of Silveira’s militia, and of the
Gallicians about Astorga, eighteen thousand men were left on the Duero,
and the English general was still able to march against Joseph with
twenty-eight thousand old troops, exclusive of Carlos D’España’s
Spaniards. He had also assurance from lord Castlereagh, that a
considerable sum in hard money, to be followed by other remittances,
had been sent from England, a circumstance of the utmost importance
because grain could be purchased in Spain at one-third the cost of
bringing it up from Portugal.
Meanwhile the king, who had regained Madrid, expecting to hear that
ten thousand of the army of the south were at Toledo, received letters
from Soult positively refusing to send that detachment; and from
Clausel, saying that the army of Portugal was in full retreat to Burgos.
This retreat he regarded as a breach of faith, because King’s
Clausel had promised to hold the line of the Duero if correspondence, MSS.
Wellington marched upon Madrid; but Joseph was unable to appreciate
Wellington’s military combinations; he did not perceive, that, taking
advantage of his central position, the English general, before he marched
against Madrid, had forced Clausel to abandon the Duero to seek some
safe and distant point to re-organize his army. Nor was the king’s
perception of his own situation much clearer. He had the choice of
several lines of operations; that is, he might defend the passes of the
Guadarama while his court and enormous convoys evacuated Madrid
and marched either upon Zaragoza, Valencia or Andalusia; or he might
retire, army and convoy together, in one of those directions.
Rejecting the defence of the passes, lest the allies should then march
by their right to the Tagus, and so intercept his communication with the
south, he resolved to direct his march towards the Morena, and he had
from Segovia sent Soult orders to evacuate Andalusia and meet him on
the frontier of La Mancha; but to avoid the disgrace of flying before a
detachment, he occupied the Escurial mountain, and placed his army
across the roads leading from the passes of the Guadarama to Madrid.
While in this position Wellington’s advanced guard, composed of
D’Urban’s Portuguese a troop of horse artillery and a battalion of
infantry, passed the Guadarama, and the 10th the whole army was over
the mountains. Then the king, retaining only eight thousand men in
position, sent the rest of his troops to protect the march of his court,
which quitted Madrid the same day, with two or three thousand carriages