Scientific American Environmental

Science for a Changing World 2nd

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CHAPTER 5

Guiding Question 5-1

What types of environmental hazards impact the health of people?

Multiple Choice
1. According to the World Health Organization, how many people fall victim to
waterborne diseases each year?
A. 100,000
B. 1,000,000
C. 100,000,000
D. 1,000,000,000
E. none of the above
Answer: D
Section: 5.1
Level: Easy
Bloom’s Level: Remembering

2. Waterborne and _______ diseases are the main infectious disease threats to human
health.
A. airborne
B. chemical hazard
C. vector-borne
D. physical hazard
E. biological hazard
Answer: C
Section: 5.1
Level: Easy
Bloom’s Level: Remembering
3. In a vector-borne disease, the _______ directly causes the disease.
A. vector
B. pathogen
C. human
D. host
E. water
Answer: B
Section: 5.1
Level: Easy
Bloom’s Level: Understanding

4. Which of the below choices is not a vector-pathogen pairing?

A. mosquitoes : Plasmodium that causes malaria
B. field mice : bacterium that causes Lyme disease
C. tick : bacterium that causes Lyme disease
D. mosquitoes : virus that causes dengue fever
E. copepods : Guinea worm larvae
Answer: B
Section: 5.1
Level: Medium
Bloom’s Level: Applying

5. Which human activity has not influenced the prevalence and seriousness of health
hazards?
A. deforestation
B. urbanization
C. dam building
D. habitat fragmentation
E. All of these options have influenced the prevalence and seriousness of human health
hazards.
Answer: E
Section: 5.1
Level: Easy
Bloom’s Level: Understanding

6. Infectious diseases are a type of ______.

A. physical hazard
B. chemical hazard
C. biological hazard
D. human-caused hazard
E. Infectious diseases are not hazardous.
Answer: C
Section: 5.1
Level: Easy
Bloom’s Level: Understanding
Short Answer
7. Why is the health of the natural environment one of the biggest influences on human
health hazards?
ANSWER: The health of the natural environment has a large influence on the severity
and number of human health hazards because we humans have disrupted the Earth’s
ecosystems to better suit our own needs and wants. This causes the ecosystems to be
unbalanced, and as we know from previous chapters, this can cause a lot of problems. In
terms of human health, unbalanced ecosystems can select for the overpopulation of a
particular pathogen or vector. For example, deforestation increases the breeding grounds
for mosquitoes harboring the protozoan that causes malaria or dengue fever virus.
Section: 5.1
Level: Medium
Bloom’s Level: Applying

8. Why is it difficult to map cause-and-effect relationships of human hazards and disease?

ANSWER: It is difficult to assess the direct relationship between a human hazard and
disease because humans are typically not exposed to just one hazard in isolation. Rather,
it is typically a combination of hazards acting together to cause the disease. For example,
the soil runoff of local farms might change the pH of the freshwater reservoir enough that
it then becomes a suitable habitat for a particular water flea that is a vector for a human
pathogen.
Section: 5.1
Level: Hard
Bloom’s Level: Analyzing/Evaluating

9. Why does urbanization sometimes lead to the increased incidence of waterborne

pathogen infections?
ANSWER: Urbanization can lead to the increase in waterborne pathogen infections by
creating suitable habitats for the vectors, or pathogens, to live in. Urbanization means that
more people are living closer together and creating a higher concentration of waste
(which can collect water and become habitats for a multitude of organisms, including
disease-causing pathogens). The increased density of hosts (humans) may also help
spread the disease more efficiently and quickly through the population.
Section: 5.1
Level: Medium/Hard
Bloom’s Level: Applying/Analyzing
Guiding Question 5-2
How do the fields of public health and environmental health help improve the health
of human populations? What environmental factors contribute to the global burden
of disease?

Multiple Choice
10. Public health epidemiologists study the overall health status of ________.
A. a human population
B. a human individual
C. all organisms
D. an ecosystem
E. any organism pathogenic to humans
Answer: A
Section: 5.2
Level: Easy
Bloom’s Level: Remembering

11. What are the variables that a public health epidemiologist has to take into account
when devising a plan to mitigate a health threat?
A. economic
B. environmental
C. cultural
D. only A and B
E. A, B, and C
Answer: E
Section: 5.2
Level: Easy
Bloom’s Level: Understanding

12. What is an example of a cultural variable that may influence the plan of action for a
particular health threat?
A. water cleanliness
B. habitat fragmentation
C. average income of the population affected
D. religious beliefs
E. All of these options are examples of cultural variables.
Answer: D
Section: 5.2
Level: Easy/Medium
Bloom’s Level: Applying

13. True or False: Unfortunately, many environmental hazards are not modifiable.
Answer: False
Section: 5.2
Level: Easy
Bloom’s Level: Understanding
14. Environmental health is a branch of public health that focuses on health hazards in
___________.
A. only natural environments
B. only human-built environments
C. both natural and human-built environments
D. contaminated water, air, and soil
E. drinking water
Answer: C
Section: 5.2
Level: Easy
Bloom’s Level: Understanding

15. Refer to Infographic 5.3. Which disease is completely due to environmental factors?

A. asthma
B. dengue Fever
C. malaria
D. diarrhea
E. intestinal nematode infections
Answer: E
Section: 5.2
Level: Easy
Bloom’s Level: Understanding

Short Answer
16. Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), a sexually transmitted disease, is especially
prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa. Given what you know about the variables affecting
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readily be imagined. In spite of that the directives which we issued never
contained a word to the effect that no prisoners were to be taken in these
partisan fights. On the contrary, all reports showed that the number taken
prisoner was larger by far than the number killed. That it was the
Führer’s view that in their fight against the partisans the troops should in
no way be restricted is authentically proved by the many arguments
which I, as well as the General Staff of the Army, had with the Führer on
this subject.
DR. LATERNSER: What if the commanding generals received
reports about cruelties committed by their own soldiers?
JODL: Then they would be court-martialed. That again is
established in the documents. I remind you of an order, issued by the
Führer, which begins with the sentence, “It has been reported to me that
individual soldiers of the Armed Forces have been dealt with by court
martial because of their behavior when fighting partisans.”
DR. LATERNSER: And that was the only thing the commanding
general could do in a case like that?
JODL: There was no other way open. And even on these orders, he
always acted in accordance with his own legal judgment. Who could stop
him from doing that?
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution have also submitted Affidavit
Number 15, by General Röttiger, Document 5713-PS which is numbered
Exhibit USA-559. In this affidavit General Röttiger states, in the middle
of Page 1:
“Only now, on the strength of documents put before me, do I
realize that in issuing the order to employ the severest
measures to combat partisans, the highest levels might possibly
have had in mind the final aim of using this combating of
partisans by the Army to achieve the relentless extermination
of Jewry and other undesirable elements.”
Did the military leadership at the highest level hold any such point
of view, and was that their final aim?
JODL: No. Of course, one is wise after the event. I too have learned
many things today which I did not know before. However, this
knowledge does not apply at all here, because there were next to no Jews
among the partisans. In the main, these partisans were fanatical Russian
fighters—mostly White Russians—and were as hard as steel. And, to a
question put by my counsel, even the witness Bach-Zelewski had to
admit that there were just about no Jews among these partisans.
As regards the extermination of Slavs, I can only say that the Slavs
who were killed in the partisan fighting amounted to no more than one-
twentieth or one-thirtieth of the numbers which in the normal, large-scale
battles with the Soviet Russian armies the Russians lost in dead or
wounded. As far as figures are concerned, that carries no weight at all.
Therefore that is a completely erroneous view.
DR. LATERNSER: A further Affidavit, Number 16, by the same
General Röttiger, was submitted by the Prosecution under Document
5714-PS, Exhibit Number USA-560. In the last sentence General
Röttiger states the following, and I quote:
“Although generally speaking one knew what the special tasks
of the SD units were, and although this apparently happened
with the knowledge of the highest leaders of the Armed Forces,
we opposed these methods as far as possible since it meant
endangering our own troops.”
In other words, General Röttiger, in his affidavit, maintains that the
special tasks of the SD units were apparently carried out with the
knowledge of the highest military leaders. If that is correct, then, you,
Generaloberst, must have known about the tasks and these questions you
have already...
JODL: Yes, I have already answered. I have never spoken to a
single officer who had knowledge of these matters and told me about
them.
DR. LATERNSER: Also, in the case against the General Staff and
the OKW, the Prosecution have submitted Affidavit 17, Document 3715-
PS, Exhibit Number USA-562. This affidavit comes from SS Leader
Rode. Rode states, at the top of Page 2:
“As proof, one can quote the OKW and OKH order which
stated that all members of partisan groups who had been
captured, such as Jews, agents, and political commissars, were
to be handed over by the troops to the SD for ‘special
treatment’ without delay. Apart from that, this order contained
instructions that in guerrilla fighting no prisoners, apart from
the above-mentioned, were to be taken.”
Generaloberst, was there such an order that in guerrilla fighting no
prisoners were to be taken?
 JODL: Such an order never existed. I have never seen such an order.
It was not contained in the instructions regarding guerrilla fighting.
Apart from that, practically every word in that statement is untrue. There
never was an order from the OKW-OKH—that is, an order which came
from both departments. Jews among the guerrillas. I have already dealt
with that. Agents among the guerrillas. Agents—that is a chapter by
itself. Political commissars. That is quite another point. They were never
handed over to the SD for special treatment—if they were handed over at
all—because the task of the SD was an entirely different one. They may
have been handed over to the Security Police. In other words, every word
is untrue.
DR. LATERNSER: There is an Affidavit Number IS, by the same
SS Leader Rode, which the Prosecution have submitted under Document
3716-PS, Exhibit Number USA-563. Rode states as follows in this
affidavit:
“As far as is known to me, the SD special task groups, attached
to the various army groups, were under the jurisdiction of the
latter in every way—that is to say, tactically, as well as in
every other way. For that reason, the tasks and methods of
these units were fully known to the commanding generals.
They approved of the tasks and methods, since apparently, they
never raised any decisive objections to them.”
Do you know SS Leader Rode?
JODL: No, I do not know him. I do not think it is necessary to say
much about this, because the General of the Police Schellenberg, who
led such a special task group himself, and who really must know, has
stated quite clearly on this witness stand what jurisdiction he was under
and from whom he received his orders.
DR. LATERNSER: That was not the witness Schellenberg; that was
Ohlendorf.
JODL: Ohlendorf? Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Now, I have a few questions about the
Commissar Order. Were you present at the conference when Hitler gave
the Commissar Order orally to the commanding generals?
JODL: As far as I remember, right at the beginning he spoke only to
the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, or the Chief of the General Staff
and a few officers of the OKW, about this Commissar Order. As far as I
recollect he referred to that order of his at a later date when addressing
the commanding generals. I believe that it was during that second
conference that he used the words, “I cannot expect that my generals
understand my orders, but I must demand that they obey them.”
DR. LATERNSER: Do you know any commanding generals who
resisted that order?
JODL: Later on someone told me—I do not know whether it is true
—that Field Marshal Rommel had burned this order. But...
DR. LATERNSER: Does not that recollection of yours refer to the
Commando Order? General Field Marshal Rommel was...
JODL: Oh, yes, that was the Commando Order. You are talking
about the Commissar Order, are you not?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, that is right.
JODL: I remember that there were constant objections from the
High Command of the Army which, unfortunately, had to carry out this
order, and these went on for a long time. Officers of the General Staff
told me confidentially that for the most part it was not being carried out.
I know of one official application made to the Führer to have this order
officially withdrawn. That was done, although I cannot remember when.
DR. LATERNSER: Who made that application?
JODL: The High Command of the Army. Whether it was the Chief
of the General Staff or the Commander-in-Chief, I cannot say.
DR. LATERNSER: When was this application made?
JODL: I believe it was in the spring of 1942.
DR. LATERNSER: The spring of 1942? And to that application...
JODL: I know for certain, the order was withdrawn.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you talk to any commanding general who
approved of that order?
JODL: No. All the officers to whom I spoke considered, first, that
the order should be turned down from the humane point of view and,
secondly, that it was wrong from the practical point of view.
DR. LATERNSER: When Hitler gave his reasons for this order
orally—and you have already told us some of them—he is supposed to
have mentioned additional reasons for making it. I should like you to tell
us what they were so that we may get this matter quite clear.
JODL: He gave a lengthy explanation—as he always did when he
felt it necessary to convince somebody.
DR. LATERNSER: Did he state...
 THE PRESIDENT: Have not these reasons already been given?
DR. LATERNSER: As far as I am informed, Mr. President, they
have not yet all been given.
[Turning to the defendant.] During that conference did Hitler state...
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Haven’t you already given the
reasons which, you say, Hitler gave for this order?
JODL: I have not given some very important reasons, which the
Führer also pointed out. They were...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute.
Dr. Laternser, I have already had to ask you to be more brief on
many occasions in which you have examined witnesses, and really you
have spent over an hour already on this High Command Staff. Every
witness who comes to the box you take a very long time over, and the
Tribunal think that a great deal of their time has been wasted by you.
Now, this witness can give any further reasons, but I do not want any
argument about it. He can give his explanation now.
JODL: I have only to add that the Führer said on that occasion: “If
you do not believe what I am telling you, then read the reports from
Counterintelligence which we have received regarding the behavior of
the Russian commissars in the occupied Baltic states. Then you will get a
picture of what can be expected from these commissars.”
He also stated that.
DR. LATERNSER: I should like to put a question to you about the
report in Document 884-PS, submitted under Exhibit USSR-351.
THE PRESIDENT: Repeat the number please.
DR. LATERNSER: Number 884-PS, it is a document submitted by
the Russian Prosecution on 13 February, and it is on Page 151 of the
second document book for General Jodl. Under Number II of this report,
Page 153, there is the following statement. I quote, “To this, Reichsleiter
Rosenberg in Memorandum 3 suggests...” I do not want to read further.
The next is a suggestion.
I would like to ask you for what reason this Number II was brought
out in this report.
JODL: I can only guess because I did not write it. But I have no
doubt...
THE PRESIDENT: We do not want his guesses, you know. If he
can only guess, then he had better not guess. We want evidence, not
guesses.
 DR. LATERNSER: Yes, I will dispense with this question. I
assumed that the witness would have personal knowledge about that.
Witness, you said yesterday that the Commando Order of 18
October 1942 had been changed—that is, partially revoked by
application of the Commander, West. Who was that Commander, West
who had applied for that change?
JODL: General Field Marshal Von Rundstedt, and he applied to
have the entire order withdrawn.
DR. LATERNSER: You know the order by General Von Reichenau
which the Russian Prosecution submitted on 13 February as Document
USSR-12? It is dated 10 October 1941. Do you know the reasons this
order was issued?
JODL: Yes. Reichenau, at that time, was commanding general of
the 6th Army, and in his army sector was the town of Kiev. This morning
I already started to describe events that took place in Kiev at the end of
September, and that was the reason for this order.
DR. LATERNSER: How did the commanding generals exercise
their jurisdiction—strictly, or not so strictly?
JODL: I know this because Dr. Lehmann...
THE PRESIDENT: That has nothing to do with the charge against
the High Command. There is no charge against the High Command for
having arranged courts martial or administering their courts martial
improperly.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I believe I am of a different
opinion on this point. If the commanding generals heard of any breaches
of discipline or atrocities...
THE PRESIDENT: Do you know of anything in the Indictment, or
anything in the evidence, which charges the High Command, or any
member of the High Command, with improper behavior at a court
martial, or in connection with a court martial?
DR. LATERNSER: No. I merely want to discover the typical
attitude of the High Command.
[Turning to the defendant.] What do you know about the reasons for
the mass deaths which occurred among Russian prisoners of war during
the winter of 1941?
JODL: I am informed on this subject because several adjutants of
the Führer were sent there personally, and they reported to the Führer in
my presence. We were mostly concerned with the mass deaths after the
last great battle for the Vyazma pocket. The reason for the mass deaths
was described by the Führer’s adjutants as follows: The half-famished
encircled Russian armies had put up fanatical resistance during the last 8
or 10 days. They literally lived on the bark of trees and roots because
they had retreated to impenetrable wooded country, and when they fell
into our hands they were in such a condition that they could hardly
move. It was impossible to transport them. The situation as regards
supplies was critical, because the railway system had been destroyed, so
that it was impossible to take them all away. There were no
accommodations nearby. Only immediate careful hospital treatment
could have saved the majority of them. Soon afterwards the rain started,
and then the cold set in, and that is the reason why such a large number
of those prisoners—particularly these prisoners of Vyazma—died.
That is the report of the Führer’s adjutants who had been sent there
to investigate. Similar reports came from the Quartermaster General of
the Army.
DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the shelling of
Leningrad by German artillery? You remember that a witness has been
examined here on that point?
JODL: I was present during two conferences which the Führer
himself had with the German artillery commander who was in charge of
the artillery before Leningrad. He brought along the exact target chart,
and it showed a very carefully worked-out system, according to which
only key plants in Leningrad were marked as necessary targets, so as to
cripple the power of resistance of the fortress. They were mostly
factories which were still producing munitions. The ammunition for this
heavy artillery, only a small portion of which could reach the center of
Leningrad, was so scarce that one had to be extremely economical in its
use. They were mostly captured guns from France, and we only had as
much ammunition as we had captured.
DR. LATERNSER: You know that the witness has asserted that in
his opinion the artillery deliberately destroyed the castles in Leningrad.
You have seen the target chart for this artillery?
JODL: Yes; I myself had the artillery target chart in my brief case
for many weeks. Only the armament industry was marked on it. It would
have been insane to shoot at anything else. Of course, every artilleryman
knows that through dispersion the shots can fall elsewhere.
DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the order from Hitler
and the OKH to destroy dwellings and fireplaces during the retreat in the
winter of 1941? What was the reason for that order?
JODL: The reasons are that...
DR. LATERNSER: I refer to the Order USSR-130. Unfortunately, I
have not been able to ascertain on what day the Prosecution presented
this order. I shall ascertain it later and have the Tribunal informed.
JODL: During that frightful winter battle, with a temperature of 48
degrees of frost, the commanders at the front reported to the Führer in his
headquarters that this battle was exclusively a battle for warm shelter.
Those who did not have some sort of heating arrangement—that is to
say, a village with serviceable stoves—could not hold out and would not
be able to fight the following day. One could say it was really a fight for
stoves. And when, because of this, we were forced to retreat, the Führer
then ordered that those fireplaces must be destroyed—not only the
houses but also the fireplaces were to be blown up—because in such a
critical situation that alone would prevent the Russians from pursuing.
Since, in accordance with the Hague Regulations for Land Warfare,
every type of destruction is permissible which is absolutely necessary
from the military point of view, I believe that for this type of winter
warfare—and it happened only during the winter—that order can be
justified.
DR. LATERNSER: What do you know about the case of Katyn?
JODL: Regarding the finding of these mass graves, I received the
first report through my propaganda department, which was informed
through its propaganda company attached to the army group. I heard that
the Reich Police Criminal Department had been given the task of
investigating the whole affair, and I then sent an officer from my
propaganda department to the exhumation to check the findings of the
foreign experts. I received a report which, in general, tallies with the
report which is contained in the White Book issued, I think, by the
Foreign Office. I have never heard anyone raise any doubts as to the
facts as they were presented.
DR. LATERNSER: You have also seen the film which the Russian
Prosecution have shown in this courtroom, and which showed atrocities
committed in the Yugoslav theater of war. Can you explain any of the
pictures which you perhaps still recollect?
JODL: I believe that every picture shown in this courtroom is, and
was, perfectly truthful as a picture. These were captured photographs.
But it has never been said what the photographs represented. It was not
clear from the film whether the dog that was mauling a human being was
not photographed in an army dog training center.
THE PRESIDENT: That is mere argument.
DR. LATERNSER: I was about to stop him.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: I was thinking of certain photographs which
you might be able to clarify with a statement as: “I remember one
photograph of a police dog jumping at a human being or a dummy.” Can
you say...
THE PRESIDENT: You asked him about these photographs, and he
says that they were all true—in his opinion—true pictures; and he didn’t
take them. He doesn’t know anything about them, and anything that he
can say upon them appears to us to be argument.
DR. LATERNSER: I will withdraw that question.
Generaloberst, was Louvain captured in the manner as testified by
the witness Van der Essen? The witness Van der Essen said that Louvain
was taken without fighting.
JODL: I have ascertained that the Armed Forces communiqué of, I
think, 18 May contains the sentence, “Louvain taken after heavy
fighting.” But I do not believe...
THE PRESIDENT: What was the place that you are asking about?
DR. LATERNSER: I asked the witness in what way Louvain was
captured: whether it was only evacuated by the enemy, and then
occupied, or whether the town had to be fought for. The witness has
stated that there was no fighting for Louvain, and that therefore it was a
particularly despicable act.
THE PRESIDENT: How did it affect the General Staff?
DR. LATERNSER: Well, in that case, Mr. President, I do not know
who should be blamed for this event. I cannot see any connection with
any one of the defendants; and if nobody can be blamed for it, we must
strike out the whole event.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it one of the events which is charged in the
Indictment?
DR. LATERNSER: No, the Indictment does not refer to it.
THE PRESIDENT: And the evidence, did the evidence deal with it?
DR. LATERNSER: There is no reference to it in the Indictment; but
in the evidence, a witness was produced who stated that the University of
Louvain was willfully destroyed by the German artillery although there
was no reason to fire on the town.
THE PRESIDENT: I didn’t catch the place—but go on.
JODL: I know that the Armed Forces communiqué of 18 May 1940
contained the sentence, “Louvain captured after heavy fighting.” Even
though the German Armed Forces communiqué was silent on some
things, it certainly never stated deliberate untruths. I can say that because
I edited it.
DR. LATERNSER: You already spoke yesterday about the case of
Oradour. I merely wanted to ask you what Field Marshal Von Rundstedt
did about this event when it was reported to him.
JODL: Many weeks afterwards I learned that an investigation had
been started by Field Marshal Von Rundstedt, and that there was
correspondence about the case of Oradour between Field Marshal Keitel,
the Armistice Commission, and Field Marshal Von Rundstedt.
DR. LATERNSER: Did the Commander, West begin court-martial
proceedings?
JODL: He must have done so, because I read a statement of an SS
court in connection with this event.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the outcome of those proceedings?
JODL: I cannot say.
DR. LATERNSER: Then I come to the last points. How many
conferences were there before the Ardennes Offensive in December
1944?
JODL: There were four conferences about the Ardennes Offensive.
DR. LATERNSER: Did you attend all of them?
JODL: I took part in all of them.
DR. LATERNSER: Was there ever any request for an order, or was
an order ever issued at one of these conferences to shoot prisoners during
this offensive?
JODL: No. And I can also add that not once during any one of those
conferences was a single word mentioned which did not deal with purely
operational considerations. There was no talk at all about the conduct of
the troops.
DR. LATERNSER: Generaloberst, would you have known if such
an order had been issued by—let us assume—Field Marshal Von
Rundstedt?
 JODL: There can be no question of such an order. It never could
have been issued through the military channels. It could have been issued
only through the Police—that is to say, Himmler or the SS.
PR. LATERNSER: But then it would not have been binding on the
units of the Armed Forces—that is, of the Army?
JODL: It is quite out of the question that any commanding general
of the Army would even have accepted such an order; and I know of no
order of the Führer which was directed against ordinary prisoners in this
way.
DR. LATERNSER: I merely put that question because the witness
Van der Essen also stated in this courtroom that, judging by the way the
prisoners were treated, he had to draw the conclusion that it was the
result of an order from a higher level. That is why I asked that question.
Do you know the case—the Commando case?
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you had put your last question. You
said that was your last question.
DR. LATERNSER: The last questions. Mr. President, I shall be
through in about 5 minutes. I ask you to take into consideration the fact
that Generaloberst Jodl is a member of the indicted group, and that he is
the officer who is best informed, and that an hour and a half for such an
examination is not an excessive amount of time.
[Turning to the defendant.] Do you know the Commando case in
which the son of the British Field Marshal Alexander was a participant?
JODL: Yes, I know the case.
DR. LATERNSER: Please tell us about it.
JODL: I heard about this affair through a report—I cannot quite
remember whom it came from. I discussed it with Field Marshal Keitel,
and I expressed the view that it was not necessary to take court
proceedings against a lieutenant just because he was wearing a German
cap during an action of this kind. Court proceedings were in progress
against him, and Field Marshal Keitel gave the order that these
proceedings be discontinued.
DR. LATERNSER: And the proceedings were discontinued?
JODL: Yes, they were.
DR. LATERNSER: Well now, regarding the extent of the group,
two more questions: What was the jurisdiction of the Deputy Chief of the
Armed Forces Operations Staff?
 JODL: The Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff—I
would say—directed, in practice, the general staff work of my entire
staff, from which, of course, I was separated to a certain extent because I
was in the so-called Security Circle Number 1, and my staff was in
Security Circle Number 2—that is to say, outside; and the whole of this
general staff work within the inner staff was directed by him, and if
necessary, he acted, of course, as my deputy.
DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution have stated that the Deputy
Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff was responsible for strategic
planning. Is that correct?
JODL: No. I was primarily responsible.
DR. LATERNSER: Is the significance of the position of this Deputy
Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff equal to the significance of
the other positions which are comprised in the indicted group?
JODL: No, it is far below that. He did not have the position of a
commanding general of an army, nor the position of a General Staff
chief.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much; I have no further
questions.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other defendant’s counsel want to ask

any questions.
DR. STAHMER: Were you present, Generaloberst, when toward the
end of March 1944 Himmler reported to Hitler, during the situation
conference, that about 80 Royal Air Force officers had escaped from the
camp, Stalag III, at Sagan?
JODL: At the moment when Himmler reported this fact, I was not
in the big hall of the Berghof. I was in the next room telephoning.
Hearing a very loud discussion, I went over to the curtain to hear what
was going on. I heard that they were talking about the escape of the
English airmen from the Sagan Camp.
DR. STAHMER: Was Reich Marshal Göring present at this
situation conference?
JODL: The Reich Marshal was not present at this situation
conference. I am absolutely certain about that.
 DR. STAHMER: In later talks with the Reich Marshal, did you find
out what he thought of the shooting of some of the escaped officers?
JODL: From talks with the Chief of the General Staff of the
Luftwaffe, I learned that the Reich Marshal was indignant at this
shooting, and I knew that particularly in situations such as these the
former officer in him who did not approve of such incredible acts came
to the surface. One must give him his due. There were repeated
arguments over this between him and the Führer, which I witnessed
personally.
DR. STAHMER: I have no more questions.
HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for SA): With the permission of
the Court, I will ask the witness a few questions.
Witness, you were Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and
the units at your disposal were known to you. The Prosecution assert that
you expected to find in the SA a fighting unit in the first days of
aggressive war on the basis of the so-called Commando unit
(Kommandotruppe). Now I should like to ask you if the term Commando
unit is known to you in connection with the use of the SA by the
Wehrmacht.
JODL: No, that is not known to me. I heard the word Commando
unit for the first time in connection with the undertakings of the English
Ranger battalions. We never used this term.
HERR BÖHM: There can be no question then that the SA was used
as a Commando unit behind the regular troops in the entry into Austria
or in the occupation of the Sudetenland?
JODL: I know of no case where formations of the SA co-operated
in the occupation of another country—with the exception of the Henlein
Free Corps; but that, however, consisted primarily of Sudeten-German
refugees. In the Henlein Free Corps there were, I believe, a few SA
leaders who had formerly been officers.
HERR BÖHM: Was the Feldherrnhalle Regiment used as an SA
unit or as a Wehrmacht regiment in the war?
JODL: The Feldherrnhalle Regiment was definitely a Wehrmacht
regiment. I should like to say that it embodied the traditions of the SA,
and it was recruited primarily from the SA, but it had nothing whatever
to do with the Supreme SA Command. It was a Wehrmacht regiment in
every sense of the word.
 HERR BÖHM: Do you know anything about the fact that in 25
group schools, and in 3 Reich leader schools of the SA, 22,000 to 25,000
leaders and assistant leaders were trained annually for the front, and that
these 22,000 to 25,000 leaders and assistant leaders were used as such in
the Wehrmacht?
JODL: I know nothing about this, and I consider it impossible that
the Wehrmacht had its leaders and assistant leaders trained by anyone
else than by its own personnel.
HERR BÖHM: Would not the position be that all the SA members
were drafted into the Wehrmacht as ordinary soldiers, and had to rise
from the ranks in the same way as any Wehrmacht soldier?
JODL: The SA were drafted into the Wehrmacht the same as any
other German. I know of many cases where high SA leaders started their
service in the Wehrmacht in the very lowest positions as soldiers or as
noncommissioned officers.
HERR BÖHM: Then, the Prosecution also assert that after 1934 the
SA trained not only 22,000 to 25,000 leaders and assistant leaders, but
that 25,000 officers, commissioned and noncommissioned, were trained
by the SA for the Wehrmacht. Do you know anything about this?
JODL: What I said before about assistant leaders is true to an even
much greater extent among the officers. The officers were trained only in
the military schools of the Army and nowhere else.
HERR BÖHM: The Prosecution assert further—and I ask whether
you know anything about this—that in the course of extending the war
effort, 86 percent of the professional leadership corps were made
available.
JODL: I cannot give a binding answer to that. I do not know about
that.
HERR BÖHM: And the Prosecution assert further that the SA sent
70 percent of its millions of members straight to the Wehrmacht. It may
be that 70 percent of the SA members did their military service. I want to
ask you whether these 70 percent were taken straight from the SA or
whether they were called up in the ordinary groups which applied to the
able-bodied male population?
JODL: No importance whatsoever was attached to the SA when
men were drafted into the Army. The SA man was drafted like any other
German who was called up for military service. Whether or not a man
had been in the SA previously, did not matter in the slightest.
 HERR BÖHM: Did the Wehrmacht ever take SA signal units
(Stürme), engineer units, or cavalry units, or medical units, and use them
in action inside or outside a division of the Wehrmacht?
JODL: I personally knew of no case where any SA unit appeared in
action outside Germany during the war.
HERR BÖHM: Did the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff
have a liaison man with the SA?
JODL: No. From time to time an officer came to me from the
Supreme SA Command, and he generally inquired as to the fate and
well-being of the Feldherrnhalle Regiment, which had come primarily
from the SA, or was composed mainly of members of the SA, and later,
about a Panzer formation which also continued the tradition of the
Feldherrnhalle of the SA.
HERR BÖHM: The Prosecution have submitted a newspaper which
shows that on the occasion of the mustering of SA members, Field
Marshal Brauchitsch was present. They want to show from this the close
connection between the training of the SA and the Wehrmacht. Can you
explain this photograph?
JODL: I believe it can be explained by the fact that Field Marshal
Von Brauchitsch accompanied the Chief of Staff Lutze once when the
latter inspected an ordinary SA unit, and he was accompanied by Field
Marshal Von Brauchitsch because, as I have already said, after the Röhm
Putsch we no longer had any cause for conflict with the SA. At the
outbreak of war the SA placed all their equipment, including all tent
squares, at the disposal of the Wehrmacht. I remember very clearly.
HERR BÖHM: Could this visit of Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch,
when he inspected the SA members, be part of the official activity of the
Field Marshal?
JODL: No, in my opinion that was an act of courtesy.
HERR BÖHM: From the point of view of conspiracy with which
the SA is charged here, do you know that it was said to have always been
the task of the SA, especially in the years 1933 to 1939, to prepare
Germany, and especially the youth, for a difficult war of conquest by
instilling, increasing, and maintaining a warlike spirit in Germany,
especially among the youth? Do you know anything in this connection
from personal observations?
JODL: I do not know anything about that. That the SA, as a branch
of the Party, also endeavored to foster the patriotic spirit within its ranks,
to carry on physical training, is a matter of course. As to preparing for
wars of aggression, no one ever did that.
HERR BÖHM: But that was asserted here in regard to the SA. You
are of the opinion that it is not true?
JODL: I have no reason to think that it is true.
HERR BÖHM: I have no more questions.
DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop):
Generaloberst, the 26th of August 1939 was fixed as X-Day for the
attack on Poland. Is it true that on 25 August the order to attack was
withdrawn upon the urgent request of Ribbentrop because, according to
the communication which reached the Foreign Office, Great Britain had
ratified the Treaty of Alliance concluded with Poland on 6 April 1939,
and Ribbentrop told the Führer that the advance of German troops would
therefore mean war with Great Britain?
JODL: I cannot answer the whole of your question, but I do know
something about it. When, on the 25th, to our great surprise we received
the order, “The attack fixed for the 26th will not take place,” I
telephoned to the then Major Schmundt—Field Marshal Keitel was not
there—and asked him what was the matter. He told me that shortly
before the Reich Foreign Minister had reported to the Führer that Britain
had concluded a pact—a mutual assistance pact—with Poland, and for
that reason he could expect British intervention in the war with Poland.
For this reason the Führer had withdrawn the order for attack. That is
what I learned at that time.
DR. HORN: In the spring of 1941, after the Simovic Putsch, the
Führer held a conference with the Commanders-in-Chief of the branches
of the Wehrmacht and the Defendant Von Ribbentrop was called in to
this conference later. Is it true that at this conference Von Ribbentrop
represented the point of view that before military action was taken, an
attempt should be made to settle the differences with Yugoslavia by
diplomatic means? How did Hitler react to this suggestion?
JODL: I recall this incident especially well because about 1 hour
before I had said the same thing to the Führer, that we should clear up
the situation with an ultimatum. An hour later, without knowing about
this, the Reich Foreign Minister made the same remark, and he fared
considerably worse than I did. The Führer said:
 “Is that how you size up the situation? The Yugoslavs would
swear black is white. Of course, they say they have no warlike
intentions, and when we march into Greece they will stab us in
the back.”
I recall that statement very exactly.
DR. HORN: Generaloberst, is it true that the Foreign Office from
the very outbreak of the Russian war was completely eliminated from
Eastern questions, that Ribbentrop complained personally and through
his liaison man, Ambassador Ritter, and that he had no success with his
suggestions to the Führer?
JODL: I know that Ambassador Ritter, who came to see me very
often, repeatedly complained in private talks about having such a large
part of its field of activity taken away from the Foreign Office, and I
must assume that that was not only the opinion of Ambassador Ritter but
also the opinion of the whole Foreign Office as well as of the Foreign
Minister.
DR. HORN: In your testimony you have already mentioned the fact
that the Wehrmacht was against Hitler’s intention to renounce the
Geneva Convention. Do you know that Ribbentrop also energetically
opposed Hitler’s intention, and that after the objections of the
Wehrmacht had been rejected at the beginning, Ribbentrop then
succeeded in inducing Hitler to give up his intention?
JODL: Put that way, I cannot confirm it fully. One thing I know for
certain: the Foreign Office informed me in writing of its unfavorable
attitude toward this suggestion or idea of the Führer. For me that was
conclusive proof that the Reich Foreign Minister held this point of view.
I recorded this unfavorable attitude of the Foreign Office—together with
the unfavorable attitude of the Army, Navy, and Luftwaffe—in a short
memorandum, and submitted it to the Führer. To what extent the Reich
Foreign Minister personally remonstrated with the Führer about the
matter, I cannot say with certainty.
DR. HORN: Is it true that Von Ribbentrop spoke against the
chaining of English prisoners of war as reprisal for the chaining of
German prisoners of war, and in agreement with the OKW induced
Hitler to discontinue this measure?
JODL: That is true. The Reich Foreign Minister, the Foreign Office,
repeatedly remonstrated with the Führer to withdraw the order
concerning the chaining of Canadian prisoners, and it must be assumed
that these many objections, which were also supported by the OKW,
finally succeeded in having the order withdrawn.
HERR BÖHM: In the Tuesday afternoon session you discussed the
question of terror-fliers. In this connection you stated that by making
inquiries and observations you wanted to prevent the ‘cause’ for the
decision regarding the intended treatment of this question. The
Prosecution submitted two documents on this question. One was the
record of an alleged talk between Ribbentrop, Göring, and Himmler at
Klessheim, the other an opinion by Ambassador Ritter, who has already
been mentioned. I would like to hear from you as to whether you know
anything about Ribbentrop’s attitude toward the handling of the question
of terror-fliers, especially whether Ribbentrop advocated that this
question be dealt with according to the Geneva Convention, and whether
he thought that it was possible to deviate from this Convention only if
decisive military necessities demanded it, and even in that case only by
expressly indicating beforehand to the protective powers that it intended
to depart from the Geneva Convention?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, can’t you put that question more
shortly; what does he know about it?
DR. HORN: Is it true, Generaloberst, with regard to the question of
terror-fliers, that Von Ribbentrop, in the same way as the Wehrmacht,
was against departing from the Geneva Convention, and he put this view
to Hitler?
JODL: To this I can say—again from talks with Ambassador Ritter
—that I knew that the Reich Foreign Minister advocated official
procedure, that is, official notice that we could no longer consider certain
acts of terror as belonging to regular warfare. That was the original point
of view of the Foreign Office. To this I said at the time that the Führer
would probably not be interested as I had concluded from his oral
instructions. As it turned out, the suggestion, such as the Reich Foreign
Minister intended to make, was never put forward, or at least I never saw
it.
DR. HORN: Do you know anything of a peace feeler by English
officers on behalf of General Alexander, backed up by the English
Government, in 1943?
JODL: I know very well that at that time, in Athens, an Englishman
—I believe it was an English captain—established contact with us. This
captain said that he came from English headquarters in the southeastern
area. I was present when the Reich Foreign Minister reported to the
Führer about this matter, and I know he suggested that this contact be
tried to see what results it might bring. That was done; the Führer agreed;
but I heard nothing more about the matter, and apparently nothing came
of it.
DR. HORN: Do you know anything about any further peace
attempts of Ribbentrop, especially after the Polish campaign, after
Dunkirk and 1943?
JODL: I only knew of the attempts and intentions after the Western
campaign. At that time the Führer spoke quite openly and frankly with
everyone. I myself, as well as the Reich Foreign Minister, heard the
Führer agree that peace would be concluded with England at any time
only if part of our former colonies were given back to us.
DR. HORN: Is it true that the Defendant Von Ribbentrop suggested
to Hitler that Hungarian Jews, insofar as they wished to do so, be
permitted to emigrate?
JODL: I recall that too. Shortly after the occupation of Hungary by
our troops, at about the beginning of May 1944, there was a conference
at the Berghof, at which a decision was to be reached. The Führer wanted
to hear our views as to whether the Hungarian Army should be dissolved,
or whether it should be left as it was. At the end of this discussion, which
was of a purely military nature, the Reich Foreign Minister said to the
Führer, “Can we not send all the Hungarian Jews by ship to some neutral
country?” The Führer answered, “That is easier said than done. Do you
think that is possible? No one would take them. Besides, it is technically
impossible.” That is my recollection of this talk.
DR. HORN: You spoke yesterday of the expulsion of the Danish
Jews, and you said that this expulsion took place on Himmler’s orders.
An affidavit by a Colonel Mildner has been submitted to me, in which it
is asserted that this expulsion took place on the orders of the Reich
Foreign Minister. Is that statement true?
JODL: Before this Himmler-Führer conference, which caused me to
send my teletype message to the Wehrmacht Commander in Denmark, I
never heard a word about the Jews being deported from Denmark, and I
never heard that the Foreign Office had any part in it.
DR. HORN: Did you ever get to know anything about the basic
attitude of the Defendant Von Ribbentrop toward the Jewish question?
JODL: Apart from this suggestion about the Hungarian Jews, I do
not recall any talk by the Reich Foreign Minister, at which I was present,
in which there was any mention of Jews.
 DR. HORN: Thank you. I have no further questions.
DR. KRAUS: Did I understand you correctly, Generaloberst, when
you testified yesterday that in 1935 it was decided to set up 36 divisions?
JODL: That is true, yes.
DR. KRAUS: I am interested to know how many divisions were
ready by 1 April 1938? I am interested in this key date because on that
day the financial aid of the Reichsbank stopped. Can you tell me how
many divisions were ready on 1 April 1938?
JODL: At that time there were about 27 or 28 divisions actually
ready—that is, as regards personnel and materiel.
DR. KRAUS: Can you tell me, Generaloberst, how they were made
up?
JODL: I cannot say with certainty.
DR. KRAUS: Approximately?
JODL: I do know that only one Panzer division was ready at that
time, one cavalry division, one mountain division, and the rest were
probably infantry divisions. The other Panzer divisions were not yet
equipped, and they existed only as skeleton formations.
DR. KRAUS: I would like to know to what extent this armament
was increased between that date and the outbreak of the war on 1
September 1939—that is, increased from 27 divisions?
JODL: From the autumn of 1938 on, the picture became much more
favorable because the preparations in the armament industry were now
producing results, and plenty of equipment was being delivered for the
divisions; also, because from this time on, the trained age groups were
beginning to come in. Therefore, in the late autumn of 1938, we were in
a position to set up approximately 55 divisions—including reserve
divisions—even though some of them may have been only poorly
equipped. In 1939—as I said before, according to my recollection—there
were between 73 and 75 divisions.
DR. KRAUS: Therefore, the number of divisions set up after March
or April of 1938, after President Schacht left the Reichsbank, increased
by 200 percent in 15 or 16 months, whereas it took more than 3 years to
set up 27 divisions?
JODL: That is true, except that these 55 divisions, or rather these
75, were still very short of equipment in the same way as the small
number in the spring of 1938, or in April 1938, which I mentioned. But
the fact that from that time on armament went much faster was due—as I
have said—to the very nature of things.
DR. KRAUS: Thank you, I have no further questions.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, you testified yesterday that the
Intelligence Service during Kaltenbrunner’s time was better organized
than before. Please tell me, what position did Kaltenbrunner hold during
your time in the OKW?
JODL: I met Kaltenbrunner when...
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. Dr. Kauffmann, you have asked
a general question. We have had all of Kaltenbrunner’s positions given to
us more than once. What is it you want to know?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, Kaltenbrunner only testified
quite generally to the fact that his intelligence service was connected
with the military Intelligence Service. This witness can tell us what this
connection of the military Intelligence Service with the other intelligence
service amounted to, especially as regards its scope and its influence on
policy as a whole.
THE PRESIDENT: I didn’t understand you to ask him anything
about the Intelligence Service. You asked him a quite general question
about what relations he had had with the OKW during the time that the
defendant was connected with the OKW, in perfectly general terms. It
might have involved an answer which would take about an hour.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I restate the question which apparently
did not come through properly?
Witness, you testified yesterday that in Kaltenbrunner’s time the
whole Intelligence Service was better organized than before that time—
that is, under Canaris. Now, I ask you what position did Kaltenbrunner
have within the Intelligence Service?
JODL: Kaltenbrunner...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the particular question that you want to
ask? The Tribunal do not think that you ought to ask general questions of
this nature. If you have got anything particular that you want to know
about, you can ask it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: What did Kaltenbrunner do during the
situation discussions which took place daily?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, it is scarcely possible to
imagine any more general question than that with reference to
Kaltenbrunner: What was his activity over a number of years?
 DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I said, during the situation
report, that is, the daily military conferences—how did Kaltenbrunner
conduct himself? What did he do? What did he say? Did he report? What
did his reports consist of? That, in my opinion, is a concrete question.
THE PRESIDENT: What time are you asking about?
DR. KAUFFMANN: I am asking about the time after his
appointment as Chief of the Reich Security Main Office, the time from
1943 on. That is the only time which is in question.
THE PRESIDENT: You can ask him with reference to particular
conferences, certainly. Why not ask him with reference to particular
conferences, if you know any?
DR. KAUFFMANN: That was my intention.
Witness, do you understand what the question is? Will you please
tell me?
JODL: As far as I recall, until the spring of 1945 when the
headquarters were finally moved to the Reich Chancellery in Berlin,
Kaltenbrunner did not take part in any situation discussions. I cannot
recall ever seeing him at a discussion in the Führer’s headquarters.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Excuse me, do you mean 1944 or 1945?
JODL: 1945. From the spring of 1945—that is, from the end of
January, I frequently met Kaltenbrunner in the Reich Chancellery. Before
that time he came to the Führer’s headquarters, from time to time, and
talked to me there—especially about taking over the Canaris Intelligence
Service—but he was not present at the situation conferences of the
Führer.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Did he submit written military situation
reports?
JODL: Before he took over the Intelligence Service from Canaris—
he took it over on 1 May 1944—before he took over the Intelligence
Service, he sent me from time to time very good reports from the
southeastern area, and these reports first called my attention to his
experience in the Intelligence Service. He then took over the Intelligence
Service, and although I was against it at first, after I had expressed my
views to him I even supported him, for I had the impression that the man
knew his business. After that, of course, I constantly received reports
from Kaltenbrunner as I previously had received them from Canaris. Not
only did I receive the daily reports from agents, but from time to time he
sent what I should call a political survey on the basis of the individual
agent’s reports. These comprehensive situation reports about the political
situation everywhere abroad attracted my special attention because they
summed up our whole military situation with a frankness, soberness, and
seriousness which had not been at all noticeable in Canaris’ reports.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Witness, you also testified yesterday that after
the daily military situation conference was ended, Hitler gathered around
him his trusted confidants and his political men. I ask you now: Was
Kaltenbrunner in this circle of confidants?
JODL: I never heard of Kaltenbrunner being in this private circle of
the Führer, and I never saw him there. What I saw was a purely official
attitude.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you, I have no more questions.
FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for
Defendant Dönitz): Generaloberst, Grossadmiral Dönitz is accused of
calling on the Navy to continue to fight in the spring of 1945. Did you
yourself, as a responsible military adviser, advise the Führer at that time
to capitulate?
JODL: I did not advise him to capitulate at that time. That was
completely out of the question. No soldier would have done that. It
would have been of no use.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Not even after the failure
of the Ardennes Offensive in February 1945?
JODL: Not even after the failure of the Ardennes Offensive. The
Führer realized the situation, as a whole, as well as we did, and probably
much sooner than we did. Therefore, we did not need to say anything to
him in this connection.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What were the reasons
for not doing this?
JODL: In the winter of 1944 there were many reasons for not doing
this, apart from the fact that the question of capitulation or discontinuing
resistance concerns only the Supreme Commander. The reasons against it
were, primarily, that we had no doubt there could be only unconditional
surrender, for the other countries left us in no doubt on that score; and
even if we had had any doubt as to what faced us, it was completely
removed by the fact that we captured the English “Eclipse”—the
gentlemen of the British Delegation will know what that is. It was exact
instructions about what the occupying power was to do in Germany after
the capitulation. Now, unconditional surrender meant that the troops
would cease to fight where they stood on all the fronts, and be captured
by the enemy facing them. The same thing would happen as happened in
the winter of 1941 at Vyazma. Millions of prisoners would suddenly
have to camp in the middle of winter in the open. Death would have
taken an enormous toll.
Above all, the men still on the Eastern Front, who numbered about
3½ million, would have fallen into the hands of the enemy in the East. It
was our endeavor to save as many people as possible by sending them
into the western area. That could only be done by drawing the two fronts
closer together. Those were the purely military opinions which we held
in the last stages of the war. I believe that in years to come there will be
more to say about this than I can say or wish to say today.
DR. NELTE: Generaloberst, how long have you known Field
Marshal Keitel?
JODL: I believe I met him in 1932 when he was chief of the
organizational department of the Army.
DR. NELTE: And from that time, except for the time you were in
Vienna, you always worked with him?
JODL: There was a time when Field Marshal Keitel was not in the
War Ministry but in the field. I believe that was in 1934-35. I then lost
sight of him. Otherwise I was with him all the time.
DR. NELTE: Was your work with him only official, or did you have
personal relations with him?
JODL: In the course of the years, as a result of all we went through
together, these relations became very personal.
DR. NELTE: The Prosecution have characterized Field Marshal
Keitel as one of the most powerful officers of the Wehrmacht. They
charge him with using this position to influence Hitler. Other circles
represented here called Keitel, weak, and accused him of not being able
to achieve his purpose in his position.
I do not want to ask any questions which have previously been
asked and answered; but there are questions which have been previously
answered in various ways—as you have heard—and only a person like
you can answer them, a person who worked with the Field Marshal for
more than a decade. Therefore, please tell me briefly—making your
sentences short—what the official relations were between Keitel and
Hitler.
 JODL: The official relations between the Führer and Field Marshal
Keitel were exactly the same as between the Führer and me, but on a
somewhat different level. They were purely official, especially in the
beginning. They were interspersed, just as in the case of all other higher
officers, by constant clashes between a revolutionary and a Prussian
officer bound by tradition.
DR. NELTE: Then, these clashes, the result of differing opinions,
were a daily occurrence?
JODL: They were a daily occurrence and in effect led to extremely
unpleasant scenes, such scenes as made one ashamed, as a senior officer,
to have to listen to such things in the presence of young adjutants. The
entry in my diary proves that on 19 April 1940, for instance, Field
Marshal Keitel threw his portfolio on the table and left the room. That is
a fact.
DR. NELTE: May I ask what the reason was?
THE PRESIDENT: No, Dr. Nelte. If you want him to confirm the
evidence which the Defendant Keitel has given, why don’t you ask him
whether he confirms it?
DR. NELTE: These are questions, Mr. President, which I have not
submitted to Field Marshal Keitel. My line of questioning became
necessary because between the questioning of the defendant...
THE PRESIDENT: The question you put to him was: What were
his relations with the Führer? You could not have put it any wider than
that, and you certainly covered that with the Defendant Keitel.
DR. NELTE: I discussed it with Keitel.
THE PRESIDENT: You have put the question to Keitel, and Keitel
answered it at great length.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, after Keitel was questioned, a witness
appeared here who would discredit the statement of Field Marshal
Keitel, if what he says is true. Therefore, in order to clarify, I must...
THE PRESIDENT: That is the very reason why I asked you
whether you wanted this witness to confirm what the Defendant Keitel
said, and—if you did—why you didn’t ask him whether he did confirm
the evidence of Keitel.
DR. NELTE: Generaloberst, you have heard that we can simplify
the question on this matter. I submit to you that which the witness
Gisevius said here, in this room, about Field Marshal Keitel. It was, for
the main part, in contradiction to what Field Marshal Keitel, and the
other witnesses questioned about Keitel, had said. I point out that
Gisevius did not speak from his own knowledge, but that he was given
information from the OKW. If you want to consider that, please answer
the question now: According to your knowledge of these things, is it true
what Field Marshal Keitel said under oath—and which was confirmed by
others, with the exception of Gisevius—or is it true what Gisevius said?
JODL: Only that is true which Field Marshal Keitel said. I
experienced it on thousands of days. What the witness Gisevius said in
this connection are general figures of speech. Apart from Hitler, there
was no powerful man; there was and could be no influential man next to
him.
DR. NELTE: The witness Gisevius mentioned an example to prove
that Keitel prevented certain reports from being presented to Hitler.
Since you had a part in this document, I should like to have this one
document presented to you, and ask you to comment on it. It is
Document 790-PS. This document is not an actual set of minutes, but a
note for the files, as you see. It is about the White Book which was
prepared on the alleged Belgian and Dutch violations of neutrality. And
in this connection, the witness Gisevius said:
“I believe that I should cite two more examples which I
consider especially significant. First of all, every means was
tried to incite Keitel to warn Hitler before the invasion of
Belgium and Holland, and to tell him—that is, Hitler—that the
information which had been submitted by Keitel regarding the
alleged violation of neutrality by the Dutch and Belgians was
wrong. Counterintelligence”—that is Canaris—“was to
produce these reports which would incriminate the Dutch and
Belgians. Admiral Canaris, at that time, refused to sign these
reports.... He told Keitel repeatedly that these reports, which
were supposedly produced by the OKW, were wrong.
“That is one instance when Keitel did not transmit to Hitler
that which he should have.”
Generaloberst, I ask you to confirm, after you have looked over this
document, that these notes show that Field Marshal Keitel and you were
expected to cover false reports, and that on the basis of the Canaris report
—contained in Part A—the OKW refused to cover this White Book. Is
that true?
[There was no response.]
 THE PRESIDENT: Well, if you understand the question, will you
answer it?
JODL: I understand the question, and I should like to establish the
facts here briefly, and tell how it really was as far as I can without being
choked with disgust.
I was present when Canaris came to the Reich Chancellery with this
report to Field Marshal Keitel, and submitted to him the draft of the
White Book of the Foreign Office. Field Marshal Keitel then looked
through this book and listened carefully to the essential remarks which
Canaris made, at the wish of the Foreign Office, to the effect that the
intelligence needed perhaps some improvement, that he was to confirm
that military action against Holland and Belgium was absolutely
necessary, and that, as it says here, a final really flagrant violation of
neutrality was still lacking. Before Canaris had said another word, Field
Marshal Keitel threw the book on the table, and said, “I will not stand for
that. How could I assume responsibility for a political decision? In this
White Book are, word for word, the reports which you yourself—Canaris
—gave me.”
Whereupon Canaris said, “I am of exactly the same opinion. In my
opinion, it is completely superfluous to have this document signed by the
Wehrmacht, and the reports which we have here, as a whole, are quite
sufficient to substantiate the breaches of neutrality which have taken
place in Holland and in Belgium.” And he advised Field Marshal Keitel
against signing it.
That is what took place. The Field Marshal took the book with him,
and I do not know what happened after that. But one thing is certain, that
the imaginary reports of this Herr Gisevius turn everything upside down.
All these reports about the violations of neutrality came from these
people who now assert that we had signed them falsely. This is one of
the most despicable incidents of world history.
DR. NELTE: Generaloberst, Admiral Canaris played a part in this
case. Gisevius said, “It was not possible for Admiral Canaris to submit
an urgent report to Hitler on his own initiative.” He asserts that Canaris
gave reports to Field Marshal Keitel who did not submit them. I ask you,
is that true?
JODL: Of course, I did not follow up every document that came to
Field Marshal Keitel; but Field Marshal Keitel submitted everything
which was considered necessary for the Führer to know about. I have
already said that if Canaris had not been satisfied in this connection, he
could have gone to the Führer directly. He had only to go into the next
office and inform the Führer’s chief adjutant, or he had only to tell me.
THE PRESIDENT: If you don’t know, why don’t you say so? If you
don’t know whether he gave it to the Führer or not, say so.
DR. NELTE: I only asked whether the testimony is true, that
Admiral Canaris could not go to Hitler. I wanted you to answer that
question.
JODL: In fact, he went to the Führer dozens of times.
DR. NELTE: If he wanted it, he had access at any time?
JODL: Absolutely, at any time.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, will you tell me what page in the
shorthand notes this evidence is of Gisevius?
DR. NELTE: The evidence about Keitel is in the transcript of the
session of 26 April 1946 (Volume XII, Pages 265 to 271).
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. NELTE: I now want to show you two affidavits which you
signed together with Field Marshal Keitel, which have also been
submitted to the Tribunal. These are the Affidavit Number Keitel-9, High
Command of the Wehrmacht and General Staff, and the Affidavit
Number Keitel-13, Development of the Conditions in France, 1940 to
1945, and the military competencies.
You remember that you signed these affidavits?
JODL: I did so, yes.
DR. NELTE: And if you are sure of that, do you remember the
contents?
JODL: Yes.
DR. NELTE: You confirm the accuracy of your affidavit?
JODL: I confirm this statement.
DR. NELTE: I will not read these affidavits or parts of them. On the
subject of rearmament—that is, regarding General Thomas, who was
also given here as a source of information—I should like to ask you a
few questions.
You know that the Prosecution submitted a voluminous book here,
Document 2353-PS, which is a description of the rearmament, written by
General Thomas. As General Thomas was also given by the witness
Gisevius here as a source of information, I must question you about
Thomas. In his affidavit, which is attached to Document 2353-PS, he
said that on 1 February 1943 he was released from the OKW. Do you
know whether that is true or not?
JODL: As far as I can recall, he was assigned to the group of
officers for special employment by the High Command of the
Wehrmacht. He was therefore at the disposal of Field Marshal Keitel.
DR. NELTE: Did he not have a special assignment when he was
made available for special employment?
JODL: He took over several assignments after that, I believe.
DR. NELTE: I only wanted to ascertain that also after 1 February
1943, General Thomas was still given assignments by the OKW,
especially that of writing this book which has been submitted here, is
that true?
JODL: That is true, that he was engaged in writing what might be
called the “History of Rearmament.”
DR. NELTE: What was his relation to Field Marshal Keitel?
JODL: I know of that from the time when the two men worked
together—that was only before the war and at the very beginning of the
war, and the relations were good.
DR. NELTE: Do you know the reports of General Thomas
concerning rearmament?
JODL: I have no exact recollection of any reports about our own
rearmament. I can only recall reports about the war potential of our
enemies. I remember those.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, are you going to be much longer,
because it is 10 minutes past 5, and if you are not going to conclude
tonight we had better adjourn.
DR. NELTE: I will need a quarter of an hour yet.
THE PRESIDENT: Then we will adjourn at this time.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 6 June 1946 at 1000 hours.]
 ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHTH DAY
Thursday, 6 June 1946

Morning Session
[The Defendant Jodl resumed the stand.]
DR. NELTE: General, yesterday in answer to my last question
about General Thomas you said that he regularly made reports on the
war potential of enemy powers to you and Field Marshal Keitel. Were
these important reports always submitted to Hitler?
JODL: These reports, with detailed graphic descriptions, sketches,
and drawings, were regularly submitted to the Führer and often
occasioned violent disputes, because the Führer considered this
representation of the enemy potential as greatly exaggerated.
DR. NELTE: Did you and Field Marshal Keitel hold the point of
view that the representations of General Thomas were well-founded?
JODL: Field Marshal Keitel and I were both of the opinion that,
after a very careful study of enemy achievements in armament
production, these statements of Thomas were doubtless on the whole
completely accurate.
DR. NELTE: You heard the witness Gisevius say that Thomas was
supposed to have been an opponent of Hitler’s war leadership. In the
course of years and in the reports made, did you ever realize this fact?
JODL: I did not observe this. The only thing that I observed was
that he objected to this exaggerated optimism in which the Führer
habitually indulged, and that perhaps in his basic attitude he was of a
pessimistic rather than an optimistic nature.
DR. NELTE: Was General Thomas dismissed from his position as
head of the Economic Armament Office of the OKW through Keitel’s
efforts?
JODL: No, at the time he retired from active service General
Thomas was under Minister Speer, but Minister Speer no longer cared to
work with him and requested the Führer that he be dismissed from the
armament office which Minister Speer had taken over. And that was
done by the Field Marshal on the order of the Führer.
DR. NELTE: I can therefore establish...